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THE THEAETETUS OF PLATO

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THE THEAETETUS

OF

PLATO

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES

BY

LEWIS CAMPBELL, M.A., LL.D.

PROFESSOR OF GREEK
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS

SECOND EDITION

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TO

EDMUND LAW LUSHINGTON,

EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW,

THIS EDITION OF PLATO'S THEAETETUS

IS ONCE MORE GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED.

L. C.

January, 1883.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

Since the first edition of this work was published in 1861, there have been several important additions to Platonic literature in England. Mr. Grote's book on Plato and the other companions of Socrates appeared in 1865; Professor Jowett's translation, with the analyses and introductions, in 1871 (the second edition in 1875). These great and monumental works had been preceded by the less important effort of Dr. Whewell, who, in 1861, attempted, not without success, to popularize the dialogues in part, and to assert their educational value. Of critical editions, Riddell's Apology, with the valuable Digest of Idioms, was published in 1867 (after the author's death), Dr. Thompson's Phædrus in 1868, his Gorgias in 1871, and the edition of the Sophistes and Politicus, which forms the continuation of this Theætetus, came out in 1867. An edition of the Parmenides, by Professor Maguire, published at Dublin in 1882, is remarkable for clearness of arrangement, and also for a point of view which I venture to think more idealistic than Plato's.
own. Mr. F. A. Paley published a translation of the Theaetetus, with some notes, in 1875. The recent edition of this dialogue by Professor Kennedy of Cambridge is also accompanied with a translation.

Mr. Grote's intensely real conception of Hellenic, and especially of Athenian life, his personal interest in the Sophists and in Socrates, have enabled him to throw a powerful cross-light on Plato, bringing out some features which would otherwise have remained in shadow. His intellectual sympathy with Protagoras in particular gives great piquancy to his analysis of the Theaetetus. But his steadfast utilitarian point of view has made it hard for him to do real justice to Plato's meaning here. No part of Mr. Grote's singular exposition is more paradoxical, or has called forth more criticism, than his account of this dialogue. Mr. Cope's just and clear rejoinder may be alluded to in passing; and an article in the Edinburgh Review for October, 1865, which contains a powerful refutation of Mr. Grote's 'theory of Knowledge,' is the more noteworthy, as it is known to have been written by his friend and fellow-disciple Mr. John Stuart Mill, who, although not a Platonist in philosophy, was a warm admirer of Plato. An excerpt from the Quarterly Review for January, 1866, on the same subject, is reprinted, with Mr. Murray's permission, as an Appendix to the present volume.
Several interesting papers on Plato have appeared in the Journal of Philology, of which those by Mr. Henry Jackson, ‘On Plato’s later theory of Ideas,’ are the most recent and in some ways the most important.

It is needless to refer at length to the many works on Plato which have appeared in other countries since 1861. Of books dealing generally in a critical spirit with the whole body of the dialogues, that of Schaarschmidt (1866), of which more will be said presently, is probably the most remarkable. The voluminous work of Peipers (1874) deals so far principally with the Theætetus. His exposition is learned and thoughtful, but is only occasionally referred to in this volume. On the other hand, I have made constant use, in revising my notes, of three important helps to the study of the Theætetus which have appeared in recent years:—the critical and exegetical commentaries of Hermann Schmidt (1877), the revision of Stallbaum’s edition (in the case of the Theætetus amounting to a new edition) by Wohlrab (1869), and the critical edition of Martinus Schanz (1880), who has in many ways done good service to the text of Plato.

It has been no small satisfaction to me to find that many of the views advanced in my former edition have been since endorsed by writers of so
much authority. To H. Schmidt, especially, my acknowledgments are due for the close attention which he has given to my observations, and for the subtlety and acuteness which he has often expended in examining them.

A full *apparatus criticus* has never formed part of the plan of this edition. But in the year 1856, being still at Oxford, and having undertaken to edit the Theaetetus, I collated the dialogue in the Bodleian MS. with the Zurich edition of 1839, and with Gaisford’s collation in his *Lectiones Platonicæ* (1820). Bekker in his *Commentaria Critica* (1823) had written with reference to this work of the Oxford Professor of Greek:—‘Cogat agmen, quem solum non ipse exploravi, (81) codex Clarkianus. Eius enim causa Oxonium profectus cum Thomæ Gaisfordi lectiones Platonicas prelo paratas invenisset, nolui actu agere, totumque viri diligentissimi libellum in mea commentaria ita recepi, ut quæ ad sententiam, ad syntaxin, ad flexionem quoquo modo pertinentem, transcriberem omnia, quæ orthographica essent, ea fere specimenis loco semel atque iterum posita deinde omitterem.’ Bekker’s confidence in Gaisford’s accuracy was sufficiently well-grounded, but finality in dealing with MSS. is not soon reached, and I was able in several places to correct or supplement Gaisford’s report. To place on record every ν ἐφελκυστικών, every accent
or breathing supplied by a later hand, was no part of my intention, nor has it yet been done. Any one who turns from the Theaetetus in the MS. to the Sophist, Politicus, or Parmenides, which have been much less read, and are therefore more nearly as the scribe left them, will see at once how many accents in particular must have been added by later hands.

I left Oxford in 1858, and was therefore unable, at the time of bringing out my edition in 1861, personally to verify my notes. I might else have avoided one somewhat serious error, viz. that of printing \( \varepsilon \pi \varepsilon \tau \omicron \omicron \lambda \nu \) instead of \( \varepsilon \pi \iota \tau \omicron \omicron \lambda \nu \), as the Bodleian reading in 153 B. How easily such an error might arise under the circumstances may be illustrated by a simple instance. Dindorf's critical note on OEd. Tyr. 11, at least in the editions of 1861 and 1868, is as follows:—"\( \sigma \tau \epsilon \rho \xi \alpha \nu \tau \varepsilon \varsigma \) pro \( \sigma \tau \xi \alpha \nu \tau \varepsilon \varsigma \) a m. rec." This is the reverse of the fact, and M. Schanz may perhaps conjecture that Dübner, who collated for Dindorf, 'merely inspected' the Medicean MS. But it must be evident to a candid mind,—to borrow for a moment the language of constructive criticism,—that Dübner wrote \( \sigma \tau \epsilon \rho \xi \alpha \nu \tau \varepsilon \varsigma \) pr.: \( \sigma \tau \xi \alpha \nu \tau \varepsilon \varsigma \) a m. rec., and that Dindorf misread Dübner's note.

Schanz collated the MS. in 1870, and having tested his work on this dialogue I can bear witness to its great accuracy. He tells us that he went on
the principle of registering everything, however slight. Yet even a Schanz is compelled to place limits to minutiæ. Not only are there still many changes of accent unregistered, not only is the resolution of α, ς, etc., by correctors unobserved in places where it affects the reading, but the distinction between early and late corrections (b and recens b) is by no means completely noted. Also, if Schanz were supposed to have transcribed everything however slight, it might be inferred that the MS. was not punctuated. Now the Bodleian MS. as it stands has three distinct sorts of punctuation:—1. the double colon, by which in this, as in other MSS. of Plato, the speeches of the different interlocutors are kept apart. These divisions are right in some places where the earlier editors went wrong. 2. The colon, often marking even insignificant pauses. This, as well as the mark of a new speaker, has been generally inserted by the first hand. 3. The comma, frequently added by an early diorthotes so as to indicate a slight break in the sentence. This sometimes amounts to an interpretation. The same hand has often added a comma beneath the double colon, thus; where the preceding sentence is interrogative. These three marks—in different degrees certainly, and none of them in a significant degree, but still appreciably,—form part of the traditional deposit which the MS. contains. None of them, least of all the first,
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should be ignored by those who undertake to register every difference however apparently unimportant.

Having perused the MS. side by side with Schanz’s edition, I may be permitted to register a few points (certainly of the very slightest moment) where his observation seems to have been at fault.

N.B.—The references are to Schanz’s edition of the Theaetetus, published at Leipzig in 1880.

Schanz, page 1, line 5. ποστ μήν; Here as below p. 2, l. 9, b has added τ for τερψίων, which was however unnecessary, as the double colon (:) marks the new persons—hence τ is not continued.

2. 9. ‘καλ. ἐπεν Τερψιον τριβίτυν b.’ This is not true in the sense that B had omitted to distinguish the persons with the colon (:) ; τ is added, as before, ἐκ περισσείας.

2. 15. ἑπηρόροδόμην BT, corr. bt. ὀστέ BT (so also in 15, l. 22 μήτε).

3. 6. τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν σε, καὶ περὶ ἐκείνου ἄν ἱρώτων interp. B vel b.

4. 11. εἴδοκιμων Tb. (rec.): εἴδοκίμων B.

10. 35. ‘ἄροκοις BT, sed κ ex emend. B.’ The correction is by a recent hand. The note should run therefore ‘ἄροκοι b rec. T: ἄροτοις B et apogr. V.’

12. 22. Post γεγονοῦσ commate distinxit b vetus.

12. 26. Post ἐπαργεῖς distinguuit B.

13. 29. ἀφαίρωμαι bt : ἀφαίρωμα BT.

16. 23. ‘ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ revera B.’ This is so, but ἐπιστολῶ b should be added.

17. 8. τὸν κολοφώνα ἀναγκάζω προσβηβάζω τὴν χρυσήν σειράν ὡς sic distinxit b.
19. 7. Ἐγώγε is written in space of fewer letters by first hand. The former word was oxytone: ὑ. Ἐγώ?

20. 9. 'θαύμαντος BT, sed ν in ras. B.' Imo ν erasit b.

22. 1. δόντεν οὖν (in the note) is an obvious misprint.

23. 16. ἥπερ (accent uncertain) B: ἥπερ b.

24. 15. Post ὄναρ distinguat B.

27. 4. 'τε add. T. om. B.' It should be observed that ἐμὲ is at the end of a line (ἐμὲ | τινος).

27. 16, 17, 16. 'οὖν' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον om. BD, add. bd. 17. ἀποδεκτέον T: ἀπολεκτέον B. This is not quite accurate. The note should run οὐ | ταύτωι λεκτέον B: Litteras ταυτοι erasit, ταυτώι λικτεων, οὐν' ἄλλου λέγον in margine sinistra suppletiv, τοσά ἀνο in rasura scripsit, λ in δ mutavit, b. (The vox nihil apolekteon was never written.)

28. 14. τίσον B: the corrector erased the stroke which made the τ, changed ο to σ and ν to γ.

29. 9. 'λέγομεν' recens 'b.'

31. 1. 'πίθανολογία TV et ut videtur B: πίθανολογίας ex emend. B.'

πίθανολογίας is the reading of B p. m. only, as in numberless other places, σ has been corrected by a recent hand to στ.

31. 9. 'ἡ ἐπερον T' et recens 'b.'

32. 29. ὅφη (sic) (not ὅφη) b.

35. 24. οἶων τε 'in marg.' recens 'b.'

36. 26. παρ' ἀν etiam b.

37. 22. ἄλλα ἤ (not άλλα ἤ) B.

38. 19. 'ἐδοξήθησαν B, corr.' recens 'b.'

39. 1. αὐ τοῦτων τῶν (sic) B pr.

39. 16. τῶν σκίρρων (?) B.

40. 3. The confusion in B is increased by το having no accent:—ὑπήρειον.

43. 7. ταυτὰ B.

43. 13. ἤ b.

44. 20. 'ἡ* B.'—Fuit ἤι.

45. 15. ἤ B pr. (?).

46. 5. ἤ τι τῶι B pr.

46. 18. δικαὶ τά B pr.
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47. 27. μυρία BT: μόρια b.
48. 23. τ’ αὖ B: τ’ αὖ b.
49. 15. ‘ἐπιδέξια B.’ The accent is not by the first hand.
50. 15. καὶ σοφαὶ B (Schanz has here corrected his own error).

51. 34–52. I. B omits the division of the persons after πάνω γε, and the second μὴ γάρ.
52. 27. B has αἵρετα.
53. 16. I read ἀκυροστέρα in B.
54. 9. ‘ἡ* B.’ Fuit ἦ.
55. 4. Post ἐπερβάλλει commate distinxtit b.
55. 18. αὐτοῖς B: αὐτοῖς b.
55. 24. ὅπερ τι ἄρων B: ὅπερμαιδρῶν vetus b.
57. 15. ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ὦν statim post δοκεῖ sine puncto infert et Theodoro tribuit B.

59. 7. αὐτόi B:—the breathing is by a second hand.
59. 16. ‘ταῦτα ut videtur in margine voluit b’—recentior.
61. 33. ὅ· τι B (sic).
61. 34. ‘ὁργάνῳ B, sed ν postea additum.’ B wrote ὁργᾶνων, and the τ has since been changed to ν—probably not by the first hand.

62. 34. ‘ἄμφορεως T, apogr. V et ut videtur B.’ The last statement is erroneous. What may have looked like a sigma over the line is a mark of reference to the marginal note φωνής καὶ χρόνων, which has a corresponding mark.

63. 4. τὸ, τέ (sic) b.
64. 3. ἡ ψυχή (recens b) is not a v. r., but an interlinear gloss.

64. 10. Here is a similar error, τοῦτων ἰδιονύστι (not ἰδι) is an interlinear gloss.
64. 24. ‘οὐδέ B’ (cum rasura supra v), ‘εὶ in marg.’ (recens) ‘b.’

64. 29, 30. The Bodleian while reading ὁ or ὦν, also loses the distinction of persons, appearing to drop a speech of Theodorus, thus:—ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον φαίνεται ἦ ὦν: ταῦτα ἐκείνῳ τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς. There is this mark of uncertainty : in the margin.
65. 1. ὅ (ἡ in rasura) B.
66. 11. δεηγοῦν (not δεηγοῦν) B.
69. 18. (Here in Schanz’s text the second Σω. should be deleted and Κάλλιστα, τὸ δέ, κ.τ.λ. should be continued. There has been an oversight in proof-correcting). ‘ἦροι . . . μέτοι θεσσετο, κάλλιστα Σωκρατῖ τιμῆθη Hirzel.’ B reads as Schanz intends to do, only with a superfluous colon (:) after ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν. But the lower dot is probably by a second hand.
71. 6. ἀναγκάζοντο . . . δοξάζει primus Theæteto tribuit Heindorf.’ Here B is not clear about the persons, placing the colon (:) after both λέγεις and δοξάζει. But the Cesena MS. divides with Heindorf.
71. 23. ἦν reversa B: ἦν vetus b, sed ἦ iterum in marg. b.
72. 4. νῶι B with : in marg.
73. 10. αἰσθανόμενοι sine accentu B.
73. 21. Dele ‘αὐτοῖ B.’
73. 24. ὅ B. Fuit ὅ:.
74. 11. In the marginal reading of b, which is prefaced with ἐν ἀλλοϊς οὖσι, τοῦτον is read for τοῦτο.
75. 15. τὸ sine accentu B.
75. 21. αὐτοῖ sine spiritu B.
76. 4. B probably wrote επειδὴ τοῦτο ἐπησθησο. The corrector has erased all but the last five letters, and clumsily corrected to ἐπησθησο.
76. 26. διαβαθμοῦσιν b (not B). The β and ν are written over erasures of ν and μ, and the α is cramped into the space of ε.
77. 8. ἄν τοι B pr.
78. 5. αὐτόν B (? or b ?).
80. 19. ‘φορῶν’ recens ‘b,’
81. 24. ἄλλω (not ἄλλω) b.
85. 11. B began to write a colon (:) after ἀπεροῦμεν, then added γέπω instead, without the colon (:) and without accentuating μὲν of ἀπεροῦμεν.
85. 12. ‘ἀπαγορεύσεις B, sed η ex emend.’ Fuit ei.
85. 28. αὕτη : τῶν (not αὕτη τῶν) B.
86. 14. δικαστήρια sine accentu B pr.
87. 11. αυτῶν sine spiritu B.
88. 31. 'ἐνεργεῖστα τε B.' Sed alterum e correctum ex a.
92. 9. b (marg.) would add ξής (sic) after μέρη. What Schanz reads ἐστὶν is the mark of reference ‌/, corresponding to the mark over μέρη ‌/: in the text.
93. 6. αὐτῇ B.
93. 9. The ἀ of ἀγωνιστού seems to have been blotted off by the first hand.
99. 7. There is no division of the persons, and the accents in B are even fewer than is noticed by Schanz. ἔσκοπομένων εἰ γε ὡς τι νῦν ὡς ἄφερῶν B pr.
99. 23. ἕ B : ἕ b.

More really important than Schanz's re-collation of the Bodleian is the work which he has done at Venice. By singling out the Venetian MS. App. 4, 1, (T), as the archetype of all MSS. of the lesser dialogues not copied from the Bodleian, he has greatly simplified the task of settling the text of this part of Plato. And his use of Ven. II (Schanz's D) as a witness to the earlier reading, where the Bodleian has been made illegible by correction or otherwise, is also very judicious.

While consulting Schanz throughout, however, I have by no means always followed him. He has introduced into the text, without marking them, several conjectural readings, which appear to me unnecessary. And he has adopted some rules of orthography, which, even if proved correct, would hardly be convenient in a work like the present.
Dr. W. H. Thompson, the Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, is so high an authority on the interpretation of Plato, that an opinion which he has kindly communicated to me must not be neglected, although his expression of it came too late to be inserted in the proper place. In the difficult passage 153 C: Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τὸν κολοσθᾶνα, κ.τ.λ., he agrees with the late Mr. James Riddell and myself in taking τὸν κολοσθᾶνα as an 'accusative of the effect:'—(he would print καὶ—ἐπὶ τῶν τὸν κολοσθᾶνα—ἀναγκαίως προσβιβάζων):—but he prefers to understand ἀναγκαίως προσβιβάζων, sc. σε, ‘I get or force you to admit.’ He observes that προσβιβάζειν in the sense of πείθειν is not unfrequent, and that the accumulation of ἀναγκαίως προσβιβάζων, when either seems sufficient, is characteristic of Plato. Dr. Thompson concur in rejecting the old interpretation, which made τὸν κολοσθᾶνα accusative in regimen, and προσβιβάζων = ἐπιτιθεῖσ. 

I have also to acknowledge the kindness of Professor Jebb, of the University of Glasgow, in calling my attention to the oration of Lysias pro Mantitheo (xvi. §§ 13–17),—referred to also by Grote,—as an illustration of the keen interest which the Athenians of all classes felt in the battle of Corinth (B.C. 394), in which Dexilaus fell and Theaetetus probably received his wounds. The inscription on the monument of Dexilaus, by naming the archonship of Eubulides, leaves no doubt as to
the year in which he died; although we may never know in what way he and his four comrades were distinguished from the rest of the Athenian six hundred.

Mr. F. A. Paley, in a note on 202 A, says that ἀνεγό is ‘necessarily emphatic, being in the nominative.’ This is hard to understand. Why may not the construction be the same as in Rep. 5. 472 D: ὃς καὶ δύνατον γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἀναφορα?—Mr. Paley adopts the readings of 204 C, 209 C, suggested by me in 1861.

Lastly, I may be allowed to make here a correction in the text of the Sophist, which had not occurred to me at the time of publishing my edition of that dialogue. In Soph. 226 C, the word διακρίνειν has rightly been condemned as introducing the general notion inopportune, and where a specific term is obviously required. Read διεινειν, ‘to thresh out corn,’ and compare Hesiod, Op. et D. 595, 6,

δημοτὶ δ᾽ ἐποτρύνειν Δημήτερος ἱερὸν ἀκτὴν
dινέμειν.

This emendation, although conjectural, has had the rare felicity of being adopted by Professor Jowett.

St. ANDREWS, January, 1883.
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Although the three chief lines of thought in Plato, whether to be described as practical, speculative, mystical, or as ethical, theoretical, erotic\(^1\), are rarely quite separate, and are blended in different proportions, yet the distinction between them affords a convenient enough ground for a rough classification of his dialogues. Even the simplest, which are also presumably the earliest, of Plato's writings, such as the Laches, Charmides, and Lysis, may, without violence, be thus distinguished.

In trying to ascertain the point of view from which a particular dialogue was composed, we should therefore study it, in the first instance, less in relation to those of the same period but different subject matter, than to those before and after it which dwell upon a cognate theme:—(just as a student of Shakespeare may learn more in comparing Mids. N. Dream with the Tempest than with Romeo and Juliet, or Romeo and Juliet with Ant. and Cleo. than with Rich. II).

Now as the Gorgias is a clear sample of the ethical and the Symposium of the mystical aspect of Plato's thought, so in the Theætetus the purely scientific tendency is in the ascendent.

Socrates' confession of ignorance was felt by Plato to imply a certain ideal of knowledge. His eager persistent search for an irrefragable definition of each term of human interest, implied that this ideal was not merely transcendent, but must be applicable to the world and to human life. His acceptance of knowledge as the sole test of authority pointed the same way. And his resolution of blameworthy

\(^1\) More generally one might speak of the good, the true, the beautiful, or of conduct, knowledge, and aesthetic enthusiasm. But the words used in the text are more directly descriptive of Plato.
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conduct into intellectual error added a religious sanction to the pursuit of Truth.

In the simpler dialogues Plato is contented with representing Socrates as engaged in his life-work of detecting contradiction in others, and so bringing into strong relief at once their ignorance and his own,—pointing only from afar off to the conception of a Science which shall be an infallible guide. The questions, Can Virtue be taught? Are the Virtues many or one? are dimly felt to run up into the higher question, Is Virtue one with Knowledge? Once in the Charmides, where Temperance has been defined as Self-Knowledge, some difficulties concerning Knowledge itself are started by the way, as whether there can be a Knowledge of Knowledge—must not this be a Knowledge of ignorance as well?—and so on. But the problem is merely incidental and the treatment of it paradoxical and verbal. Plato knew, however, that underneath these inquiries, and behind the contrast between the Socratic and Sophistic methods, there lay deeper problems, which Socrates had not distinctly formulated, and still less fully discussed: viz. What is teaching? What is the nature of Knowledge? What is the standard of Truth? What is meant by the distinction of One and Many? In approaching the concentrated investigation of these higher problems, Plato is not content with idealizing Socrates, but enters anew into relations with the older philosophies which had possibly impressed his youth and certainly went far to constitute the intellectual atmosphere in which he lived.

In dwelling afresh upon the work of Socrates he (in common probably with Euclides) saw in it a striving towards certain general forms, which, in their perfect abstraction, could only be thought of as eternal. To Plato that was a vision which enlightened all his subsequent thoughts: but on any theory except that which denies all growth and change in him, it must be acknowledged that there was progress also in his conception of the Ideas. How far he was ever satisfied with the half-mythological presentation of them which appears in the Cratylus, Meno, and Phædo, may be left for those to determine who seem to know him better than he knew himself. However this may have been, we need not wonder, if, in passages avowedly mythical, like those in the Phædrus,
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Timæus, and Politicus, such crude unscientific notions tend to reappear.

But the new vision of Truth, however inspiring, was sometimes felt to 'raise more questions than it solved.' And it was in consequence of these questionings that Plato was led to reconsider his own and his master's relation to Hellenic thought. In order to interpret Socrates and to advance beyond the position gained by him, it was necessary to draw back in order to spring forwards, reculer pour mieux sauter, and to examine into the first principles not only of the inquiries of Socrates, but of all inquiry. In undertaking this new 'Kritik of Pure Reason,' Plato did not desert the Socratic spirit. He only carried into a region which Socrates had declined to enter, the same process of self-examination and of unwearyed converse with others which Socrates practised and enjoined. In destroying dogmatism Socrates had seemed to get rid of metaphysics; but he had only made more fruitful the metaphysics of the future. In exposing the conceit without the reality of Knowledge he had only provoked the question, 'What, then, is the reality?' In controverting particular fallacies, he had set one at least of his disciples thinking, 'What then is the πρῶτον ψεύδος—the main source of error?'

While passing his hand, so to speak, over the tangle which he had to solve, Plato found two main threads, which were often twisted into one:—the tendency to postulate in all inquiry either the non-existence or the absoluteness of difference,—the identity of opposites, or the incommunicability of attributes: either to say, Black is white, or That which is white can have no tinge of yellow.

In this more condensed treatment of first principles, Plato still retains much of the spirit as well as the form of dramatic dialogue. In the Theaetetus, indeed, they are retained to the full. Only the conversation is now not merely between Socrates and his respondent for the hour, but also between Plato and other philosophers old and new. They are brought upon the stage and made to explain themselves. They are confronted with each other. They are treated with the utmost urbanity, and with a searching criticism, ironical and unsparing, until they are compelled, as it were, to give in their contributions to the sum of Truth. Philosophic
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Dialogue thus becomes the vehicle of a sort of historic fiction, containing, with the criticism of the present, at once a reproduction and an interpretation of the past. This 'History of Philosophy' is, however, penetrated with original thought, and each actual phase is represented as typical of a universal tendency and necessary moment in the realization of true ideas.

The dialogues in which Plato adopts this comprehensive standpoint are thought by some to indicate a later phase of Greek speculation generally, which is supposed to have passed out of a rhetorical into a more logical mode. But Plato's conception of what is opposed to philosophy may naturally have moved together with the aspect of philosophy which was uppermost in his own mind. And until it can be shown by some independent proof that the Euthydemus is later than the Phaedrus ¹, it is best to steer clear of such assumptions. It is antecedently by no means improbable that the Phaedrus and the Parmenides represent, not different periods, but different moods. The less known cannot throw light on the more known: and Plato's thoughts are better known to us than the particular incidents of Athenian life which gave occasion to them.

The Euthydemus and Parmenides may be regarded as, in different ways, preparatory to the dialectical effort which is commenced in the Theaetetus, and continued in the Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus.

The Euthydemus is a broad caricature of reigning logical fallacies.

The Parmenides is a serious statement of the difficulties which beset Idealism, whether (1) in the post-Socratic, or (2) in the Eleatic form. At the same time it contains the most uncompromising assertion of Idealism.

This is not the place for a full exposition of the Parmenides, which Professor Jowett's Introduction has rendered superfluous. But it may not be amiss to point out the significance of the dramatic situation in that dialogue.

Socrates is there represented as in early youth anticipating the theory of ἀνθρώπων, which has since been generally associated

¹ From the allusion to Isocrates in the Phaedrus L. Spengel infers a very early date. But this presumption is balanced by other considerations.
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with the name of Plato, and would be naturally attributed to him by the reader of the Cratylus, or the Phædo, or of the fifth and tenth books of the Republic.

By means of this theory the young Socrates successfully refutes the thesis of Zeno, which that philosopher blushingly acknowledges to have been a polemical effort of his own early youth. But the aged Parmenides subjects Socrates in turn to criticism, and the wonderful boy, whose speculative impulse is praised by the old philosopher as Divine, answers each objection with a new hypothesis, which always corresponds to some actual form of idealism. He fails, however, to establish any of them: whereupon Parmenides puts him through an exercise not unknown to Zeno, in which, by the application of ordinary logic to his own transcendental theory of the One Being, he develops a series of antinomies, which Socrates is compelled at once to admit, and to declare impossible.

Is it reading too much between the lines to understand Plato here to mean: (1) that the current mode of applying the principle of contradiction, however much it might rest on the authority of Zeno, was, as he says in the Sophist (259 D), unworthy of any one who is come to man's estate; (2) that although the Platonic theory based on the practice of Socrates gave promise of a mighty grasp on truth, yet, as hitherto held and stated, it was still immature; and (3) that, in order to complete and strengthen it, it was necessary to go back once more to the great fountain of speculative thought, and appeal from the disciple to the master, from the method of Zeno to the spirit of Parmenides, who must be approached in the truth-seeking temper of Socrates?

In the Theaetetus, Socrates declines to examine Parmenides. That task is reserved for the Neo-Elatic friend who appears with Theodorus and Theaetetus on the following day. The present dialogue is chiefly occupied with the consideration of what may be loosely spoken of as Heraclitean doctrines, but which, as Plato says, are really 'older than Homer.' In developing these doctrines Socrates makes use of more than one saying which is still to be found amongst the fragments of Heraclitus.

It is remarkable that Plato nowhere speaks of Heraclitus
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with unqualified respect, although much in his own teaching was consciously or unconsciously a repetition or expansion of truths stated or anticipated by that great mind. If we may trust Aristotle, Plato had first known Heracliteanism in the exaggerated form in which it was taught by Cratylus, and certainly he has more to tell us of the followers, whether in Ephesus or Athens, than of their master.

Yet it is not fanciful to say that in idealizing Socrates, and connecting the remembrance of him with the great thoughts of the first philosophic age, he saw in the Elenchus an illustration in the sphere of mind, on the one hand of actual mutability and fluctuation, and on the other of an absolute standard,—in so far justifying both Heraclitus and Parmenides. Socrates can make any opinions move; no position remains fixed when he comes near. But he cannot and will not argue unless allowed to assume the reality of knowledge.

In the foregoing general exposition it has been assumed that the main body of the Platonic writings, and the dialectical dialogues in particular, are from the hand of the master.

The position so held is intermediate between that of Mr. Grote, who maintains the Alexandrian tradition in its integrity and defends even the Axiochos and the Epistles, and that of Schaarschmidt, who acknowledges only nine dialogues. The work of Schaarschmidt appeared in 1866, when my edition of the Sophistes and Politicus was in the press. He had previously given some indication of his views in the pages of Rheinische Museum and elsewhere. He, and Socher before him, have succeeded in showing the remarkable disparity which exists between the purely dialectical dialogues and those which these writers leave unquestioned—a disparity both in the mode of handling and in the substance of the thought. The difference is not here denied,

1 The following statement of Platonic doctrine, by one of the most zealous of modern Platonists, contains the sum and substance of Heraclitus' teaching: 'Ohne Stillstand in fortwährenden Kriege wie in Schachspiele Alles in geregelte Weise seine Plätze Wechselt, so dass das Lebende zum Tode, das Tote zum Leben dens wird und nichts verliere, indem nichts sich gleich bleibt. In diesen ewigen Processe des Werdens ist das einzig Constante das Gesetz.' Teichmüller, Die Platonische Frage, p. 54. Only, in the inchoate thought of Heraclitus, the Law is not distinguishable from the Process.

2 Schaarschmidt carries his scepticism much further than Ast or Socher did.
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but, as in the edition of the Sophist, etc. (1867) and in Professor Jowett’s introductions (1st ed. 1871), the dialogues in question are assigned to a different period of Plato’s literary activity, in which, as Professor Jowett observes, the style begins to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element has become subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the development of abstract thought great advances have been made on the Protagoras and the Phaedrus, and even on the Republic. But there is a corresponding diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the persons, a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompleteness in the general design.... ‘The play of humour and the charm of poetry have departed never to return.’

Schaarschmidt’s three great tests, viz. literary excellence, the presence of a moral purpose, and quotation by Aristotle, are more plausible than some which previous critics have applied. And in his application of his method there is much acute criticism, although a suspicion now and then arises that insufficient grounds are being eeked out by vigorous writing.

But (1) (to take first the external test) the argument from silence is especially fallacious in the criticism of ancient writings, and the question of Aristotle’s testimony to Platonic dialogues is complicated with doubts as to the genuineness of the Aristotelian treatises.

(2) For masterly skill in composition, is there any comparison, for example, between the Symposium or Republic and the Timaeus or the Laws? Is there not also in both of these last named ‘a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompleteness in the general design?’ The cumbrousness and prolixity, which are so evident in the Laws, are accounted for on the ground that Plato is reported to have left his last work in an unfinished state. Without cavilling about the possible origin of the story, may it not be observed, in the spirit of Goethe’s pregnant saying, ‘It is a sketch which never could have been finished?’ On the other hand, if the subject is taken into account, the literary skill shown in the Parmenides is very great.

1 Introd. to Philebus, sub init. and the eleventh of the Metaphysics
2 Introd. to the Statesman. are rejected by Schaarschmidt.
3 The third book of the Rhetoric
4 Conversations with Eckermann.
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(3) That Plato at the meridian of his powers wrote with the consciousness of a great practical aim, may be at once conceded. But is it inconceivable that a time may have arrived when experience had shown him the distance of the goal, and, without relinquishing the end, he may have applied himself for a while to the speculative treatment of intermediate problems? There are not wanting traces, even in the Republic, of a belief that if ‘Geist’ was ever to be the ruling power, a severer training than Glaucon could bear must be prepared for the Kings of the future. And if the legend embodied in the Epistles is not absolutely baseless, we are led by it to conceive of a time when Plato’s hopes for the Hellenic world had been rudely checked,—when he was ‘weary of the hateful confusion’ 1 of Greek politics. And what is more natural than that, at such a time, he should reconsider his whole position; and that even in bitterness and isolation, still remembering his practical aim, he should bethink him of a δεύτερος πλούς, a second best polity, which mankind might possibly receive to their advantage, though they rejected the highest and best?

For the writer of the Politicus at least, although estranged from his contemporaries, is fully bent on bettering the world through a science of Politics. And the lines sketched out by him are precisely those which Plato in his old age, with renewed calmness and mellowness of insight, carried out at length in his last great writing—the Laws 2.

Protagoras. The most brilliant representative of ‘ordinary thinking,’ or rather of popular philosophizing, in the age of Socrates was Protagoras, whose assertion of relativity was the counterpart of Gorgias’ denial of the absolute. As, in the dialogue which bears his name, he powerfully defends Hellenic education and morality against the criticism of Socrates, so here his doctrine 3 is made to serve as the type of all doctrines of sensationalism and subjective relativity.

In the absence of external evidence it is difficult to determine (1) how much of what is here assigned to Protagoras is really

1 Μημοσημεῖον... πλάσμα καὶ αὐτοχθόνοι. Ep. 7. 350 D.
2 For a more detailed attempt to support these views see the edition of the Sophistes and Politicus already referred to. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1867.)
3 On the real value of Protagoras’ saying ἄρχον μεταφορὰν see Appendix B: also Jowett’s Introduction, 2nd edition, iv. 256–9.
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his, or again (2) whether those unnamed philosophers who are called his 'disciples' were really so or not.

(1) In three places at least we may point with some confidence to traces of the real Protagoras:—(a) in the interpretation of his saying ἄνθρωπος μέτρον, ὃς οὐκ ἐμὸν φαίνεται τοιαύτα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐμὸι, οὐν δὲ σοι, τοιαύτα δὲ αὐτὸ σοι, which recurs almost verbatim in the Cratylus, and which Plato would hardly have repeated so nearly in the same language if he were not quoting:—(b) in the defence of Protagoras (167, 8), where he contends that the bettering of mankind is possible without assuming an absolute standard of knowledge and truth;—the agreement even of the language here with the representation in the Protagoras is an 'undesigned coincidence,' which may fairly strengthen our belief in the fidelity of both:— and (c) in the confession of 'agnosticism' which is introduced casually at 162 D. So much being clear, it is natural to infer that some other points, such as the illustration of 'the wind blowing hot and cold,' may be Protagoras' own. But here it becomes impossible to speak with any approach to certainty. Of one thing, however, we may be quite certain, viz. that what Protagoras is said to have 'told as a secret,' was not to be found in his writings. When he is represented as saying that Being is an unscientific term, and should be replaced by Becoming, that is only a dialectical inference from his words1. He had asserted the Reality of Appearance, but would have been surprised to find his assertion construed into the denial of Reality.

(2) That some actual persons are alluded to as the 'disciples of Protagoras,' and that they held a sensationalist theory, is rendered probable by the further reference, which can only be construed as a sober statement of fact, to those who maintain a modified Protagoreanism. But it would be rash to assume that the μάθησις Προταγόρειον held the doctrine which Plato assigns to them with anything like the clearness and consistency with which it is developed by him. It is far more probable that from scattered and inarticulate hints he has evolved the subtly woven theory which he criticises. This probability is greatly enhanced by the passage of the Sophist (246 A B) in which the contest between idealism

1 Kennedy's Themistocles, p. 231.
and materialism is described. 'The idealist in defending his serene invisible height, breaks down the earthworks of his opponents bit by bit, until what they maintain for true reality (ἀλήθεια) is shown by his destructive arguments as a moving process of becoming, and not as being.' This is really the manoeuvre, only veiled with irony, which Plato here employs against the disciples of Protagoras. In attributing to them the refinement of acknowledging unseen processes, he 'takes them for better men than they are,' and assumes that they would make a similar admission to that which is wrung from them in Soph. 247 ¹. Those whose case is hopeless (the αὐτόχθονες) are left out in the cold as ἀμνηστ. Plato says, in short, to the sensationalist, 'You are a kind of idealist, if you only knew it. Let me take you with me as far as you can go: and then (like the dog in Jules Verne's Voyage to the Moon) you shall be left hanging between Earth and Heaven.'

Aristippus. In favour of supposing that Aristippus was at least included amongst the men thus designated may be urged (1) the general resemblance of the doctrine of sense to later statements of Cyrenaic theory;—it is not necessary, as Peipers imagines, that the men alluded to by Plato were so thoroughgoing as he represents them to be:—(2) the person of Theodorus, who is connected both with Protagoras and Cyrene (not that he is himself inclined to hedonism). But this point, like many others in the historical environment of the Thestetus, must be left uncertain.

Aristippus is mentioned by name only once in Plato. In the Phaedo it is emphatically remarked that he and Cleombrotus were not present at the death of Socrates. If we connect this with the strong language in which the position that pleasure is the chief good (which Aristippus held), is met in the Republic (6. 509 B: Οὐ γάρ δὴ των σὺ γε ἡδονὴ αὐτὸ λέγει. Εἰσφῆμει, ἕν δ' ἐγώ), it is natural to infer that he was regarded by Plato with little sympathy, and that he was probably one of those who left Socrates too early, and gave themselves the credit of their discoveries ². The tone of Xenophon's representation conveys a similar impression. Attend-

¹ J. S. Mill may in like manner be said to have made admissions against which his father and Bentham (the true γαμηνίς) would have protested.
² To say (with Schleiermacher) that Aristides in Thuc. 150 E is a sort of paronomasia for Aristippus may seem an extravagant suspicion, and yet it is difficult to banish it altogether.
ing, like Socrates, to the theory of human life, of knowledge and of the chief good, he seems to have been enabled, by the impulse of Socratic inquiry, to give a philosophical form to the popular doctrine, to which his easy temper and indolent life inclined him, that the Good is nothing else but pleasure. With this he consistently enough combined the sceptical assertion, The impression of the moment is the only Knowledge. He probably supported both these principles with certain physical and logical theories: adding that nothing was by nature just, but by custom and usage, and that the same word used by different men represents a different idea.

Whether his doctrine had fully developed itself into the distinct form which is given in the Theætetus to the hypothesis, Sense is Knowledge, it is impossible to say. That he is pointedly alluded to amongst the ‘disciples of Protagoras,’ if not as their chief, there seems little doubt, from what is recorded of his opinions. A comparison of the following extracts tends to establish this: although it must be remembered that the discussion of these questions by Plato and Aristotle may be supposed in some degree to modify the statements of later writers:

Diog. L. 2. 86: Δόν πάθη ψυχή−


Plat. Theat. 152 D: Ἐκ δὲ δὴ

See also Phileb. 42 E: Μὴ κινομένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφ’ ἐκάτερα •

Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 7. 191: Φασὶν οὖν οἱ Κυριναῖοι κρι−

Plat. Theat. 152 C: Αἰσθήσις

. . . ἢν τὸ κείμενον ἐκεῖνον τὸν λόγον, εὐδοκή−

. . . οὐκ ὅτι τὸ τῦτον ποιῶν. 153 D: Ὡδὴ
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καὶ γλυκοζύμη, δυσκόλως λέγει ἀναφερομένους καὶ ἀναφερόμενους· ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐμπνευσμένον τῶν πάθων λευκῶν ἐστιν καὶ γλυκό ἐστιν, αὐτὸς οὗτος τὰ ἀποφαίνεσθαι.

192: Καθὰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοτεινὸς καὶ ἱεροκλιτικὸς ὑπὸ πάθων καίμεται, ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ὀμφαλόμυρων ἀρεσκάται, ὁ δὲ ἀπορρέει τῶν ὀμφαλῶν ἵνα ὑπὸ δύναμιν καίμεται, ὃ δὲ μεμφρόη διαφέρει ὡς τὰς Θῆβας, καὶ διανύσῃ ἐνακάλυπτε τὸν ἢλιον, ἐπὶ πάθων δὲ τοῦτός τὸ μὲν ὅτι πάσχοντος, οἷς ἀχαιομαίνεται καὶ ἀρέσκαται, ὡς τὸ γὰρ ἀχαίαν ἔστι τὸ καὶ ἀρεσκάτης, ὃς ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐνακάλυπται, ὡς καὶ οἷς ἐνακάλυπταῖτο ἐστιν πλοῦτος τῶν ἀκραίων παθῶν μηδὲν λαμβάνειν. 195: Ἐπεὶ οἶδα κατὰ κριτήριον φασὶν εἶναι καὶ θαύμα ἁθρόσων, ἀκόμης δὲ καὶ ἀκόμης τόσον κράματα. 196: Λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ τι καὶ γλυκὸ καλοῦσιν καὶ μηδὲν πάντες, καὶ οἷς τι λευκὸν καὶ γλυκὸ ὃκ αἰσχοῦσιν ἐκακοστὸ γὰρ τοῦ ἑαυτὸν πάθος αναπλημμένα.

Diog. L. 2, 87: Ἀλλὰ μὲν οὐδὲ κατὰ μνήμην τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ προορίζουσαν ἐνδοὺς φασὶν ἀπεξελέγομαι, διερευνητικὸν ἐπιστήμων, οἷον ἡ ποιήμα μέρος τῆς ἐκτελοῦσθαι, τὰ τέλη τοῖς κράματα. 196: Πῶς ἐκακοστὸ γὰρ τοῦ ἑαυτὸν πάθος αναπλημμένα.

senses is ascribed to Democritus. Some of the expressions and illustrations, as well as the argument itself in different aspects, are thus proved to have had a wider currency. (2) In the early part of the Theaetetus, motion is said to be good, and rest evil. In the Cyrenaic theory, and in the Philebus, three states are spoken of, smooth motion, which is pleasure, rough motion, which is pain, and the absence of both, which is a state of indifference, 'like the sea in a calm.'

But while these considerations should be allowed their full weight, it must be remembered that Aristippus and those who thought with him did resolve knowledge into shifting impressions of a changing world. And here the parallel of the Philebus affords a strong confirmation of the hypothesis we are considering. Nothing was more natural than that the boy Theaetetus should attribute certainty to momentary impressions, and that the boy Philebus should petulantly assert that pleasure is the only good. Each in doing so presents a different aspect of a necessary phase of mind. But when they both (or rather Socrates for them) attempt to strengthen their theory by a peculiar doctrine of motion, which, however popular, must have had limits to its reception, it becomes highly probable that the two speakers drew some of their inspiration from a third, who is found to have upheld both pleasure and sensation, and to have supported them with this same doctrine of motion.

There remains therefore some ground for the hypothesis that, in the earlier part of this dialogue, Plato has these Pseudo-Socratics in his eye, together possibly with others. Whether Aristippus was really, or only by implication, a 'disciple of Protagoras,' and whether or not he consciously based his doctrine on the Heraclitean theory of the Universe, are questions which it is wisest to leave undecided.

It is more distinctly obvious that throughout the dialogue Megarians Plato is holding close converse with his friends of Megara. The elenchos of Socrates is whetted for the occasion by contact with Megarian logic. Both in the attack upon Protagoras and in his defence, weapons are plied which bear the distinct brand of that neighbouring workshop, and it is often hard to say whether Plato is laughing most at the doctrine refuted or at the method of the refutation. For reasons which will appear presently it suited his purpose to make the 'negative arm' preponderate in this dialogue. And the Megarian dialectic was adapted to this aim.
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It may be noticed generally, that there is a peculiarity in Plato's manner of alluding to the thinkers of his own time. He speaks not of definite schools, but of 'a certain theory,' or of 'certain men.' We do not read of the friends of Antisthenes, or the disciples of Aristippus, or of Euclides and his band (ὁ Ἀμφί Ἐπελείδης), but 'I have met many such men,' 'there are numbers who keep saying this,' or more familiarly, 'there are certain refined persons, to whom we must show courtesy.' Allowance must no doubt be made for the natural reticence of Plato, and for the irony of the philosopher, who 'knows nothing of his neighbour.' But it is also reasonable to infer that the schools which claimed affinity with Socrates were only in process of formation, and that their boundaries were not yet well defined. It is from later writers, and not from Plato, that we learn which of the other philosophers then living exercised an influence that could survive their age.

Euclides.

Euclides of Megara, Plato's contemporary and fellow-disciple, seems in his method to have combined the negative dialectic of the Eleatics with the cross-questioning and with the ethical definitions of Socrates. The dialogue, written and spoken, seems to have assumed with him something of a controversial form. His ἐπίσκεψις must have been more earnest and philosophical than the vulgar ἐπίσκεψις so often ridiculed by Plato; but it was subject to the same defects, though in a less degree. We are told further, that he used to attack the conclusion and not the premises of an opponent.—One other fragment of his logic remains. He is said to have objected to definition by comparison, because if things are unlike, they should not be compared; and if like, it is better to deal with the thing itself than its resemblances.

The centre of his positive teaching was the Good, which he said was one, called by many names, as Wisdom, God, Intelligence; and to what was opposed to this he denied existence. Here also the teaching of Socrates is engrafted on that of Parmenides and Zeno. The One Being, which is above growth and decay, is to be sought for, not in the universe, but in wisdom, the mind, and virtue. The non-existent is that which is opposite to, or other than the Good.

His theory of knowledge was probably less absolute than that of Parmenides, denying reality to the impressions of sense, but relying upon a sort of dialectic and upon certain ideas or forms, amongst which some diversity was allowed, so far at least as they entered into human language.

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It is not easy to determine to what extent the teaching of Euclides contained the germs of the sophisms of Eubulides, or of the paradoxes of Diodorus and Stilpo. If it had such a tendency, he must have approached Antisthenes more nearly than would otherwise appear. It seems not unreasonable, however, to suppose that Eubulides may have introduced a new element into the Megarian school. At all events he gave a new and not altogether wholesome impulse to its paradoxical side.

The following are the chief points in which the Theaetetus affords indications of its connection with the school of Megara.

(1) Its controversial tone.

Socrates more than once expresses the consciousness of such a tendency. We start indeed with the virtuous determination to conduct the argument, not as professors of word-fencing, but as lovers of knowledge, and yet presently we find ourselves in danger of being on a par with 'those skilful men.' Protagoras is imagined as reiterating this reproach, and confirming it by the reflection, which is dwelt upon also in the Phædo, that controversy leads to the hatred of inquiry. We are moreover oppressed throughout the discussion with the fear of an imaginary adversary, skilled at the same sophistical weapons. And on reflecting, at each stage of the argument, what it is that has ruled throughout, and that remains triumphant, we are compelled to answer 'a negative dialectic.' The first impression of the youth, the maxims of the old philosophers, even our second thoughts and the strained effort of the imagination to substantiate them, are raised, only to be parted from the sphere of knowledge by this sharp weapon; which in another aspect is the liberating though still dividing instrument of the man-widwife Socrates. In this sense the Theaetetus may fairly be regarded as an 'eristic' or Megarian dialogue; since, although it is no mere sophistical sham-fight, it is characterized by the predominance of that dialectical exercise which consists in refuting theories. This is noticed by Plato himself in the passages just referred to, and is implied in the image of μακερώς.

And the form of refutation used corresponds to that 'reductio ad absurdum' which is described as characteristic of Euclides. In each case the proof is not impugned, but the thing proved is laid hold of and annihilated. Man is not the measure, for, if so, then why not every other creature endowed with sense? Motion cannot be the sole principle, for, if so, language would be impossible. Protagoras is made to object to this mode of treatment. Socrates imagines him as challenging them to disprove his premiss, and complaining that they use only negative proof.

1 Theaet. 164 D.

2 200 A–C.
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(2) Besides this correspondence of method, there are also some coincidences of idea.

(3) The turning-point of the whole dialogue, the fulcrum, by means of which the mind is finally lifted out of the region of sense, is the mention of the good, or expedient, which Theaetetus had at first unwarily included amongst the things which are not, but become. The knowledge of what is good cannot be resolved into sensation, nor into those motions on which the doctrine of sense was founded, because it regards the future.

This thought arises simultaneously with the eloquent digression, in which a just and holy life accompanied with wisdom (μετὰ φρονήματος) is set forth as the way from Earth to Heaven. And the form in which this idea of good occurs, is not transcendent, as in the Republic, nor, as in the Philebus, arrived at by a process of reasoning upon the combination of finite and infinite in the world. It is more simple and Socratic than in either of these. And while it is conceived of as one, Socrates is not afraid of varying the name (ἀγαθόν, καλόν, ἀφέλιμον, δίκαιον, σωσίαν, φρόνησις).

(3) In its general aspect the Theaetetus affords only a partial escape from the relative world of sense and opinion towards absolute being, terminating with the conception of λόγος as definition by the distinctive difference. Where it may be noticed, by the way, that the stress laid upon the perception of individual peculiarities (πρῶτον δέ συμμόρφος αὐτῷ τῶν ἄλλων συμμορφῶν... διαφοράς τι μνημείον... κατάθηκα) is parallel to the saying of Euclides, that comparison does not convey knowledge.

This intermediate character of the Theaetetus is indicated by Plato’s own remark, that we are wavering between two factions, not siding wholly with either. Such a position is still in harmony with the philosophy of Euclides, who made some attempt to hold unity and diversity in solution together, and who rested ultimately on some form of reasoning (λόγος). It may be added, that the two conceptions with which the dialogue closes, of the separation of a whole into its elementary parts, and of the power of distinguishing the thing in question from all others, belong to the tendency combated in the Sophist, but more or less embodied in the Theaetetus, to acquiesce in difference, falling short of the highest unity.

(3) In one or two points we are reminded of the later Megarian subtleties, and are led to suspect that they may have had their counterpart in the school of Euclides.

The humorous account of the man, from whom there is no escape, who shuts your eye, and asks if you see his cloak with it, may be

1 509: ὁδὲ ὅσια ὅτι οὖν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἔτι ἱνάκειν τῆς ὁσίας πρεσβείας καὶ δυνάμει ἑπερχόμενος.
2 165 B.
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compared with the ἐγκεκαλυμμένος of Eubulides. And when we are asked whether any one ever said to himself τὸ ἐτερὸν ἐτερὸν εἶναι, we may find a later parallel in the paradox of Stilpo, ἐτερὸν ἐτερὸν μὴ κατηγορεῖσθαι. Such casual hints confirm the suspicion that the tendency already existed at Megara, though in a milder form than afterwards, ‘to part everything from everything,’ τὸ διαλέιν ἐκαλον ἀπὸ πάντων (Soph. 259 E). A more pleasing instance of the same analytical bias appears in the three φάσματα or axioms of the mind, by which it suffers itself to be bound; or in the repeated difficulty, ‘Ἀρ’ ὅν τέ τὸν εἰδότα μὴ εἰδεῖν, which in fact underlies many of the later paradoxes.

There is often no more satisfactory account to be given of variations and inconsistencies in Plato, than that in different dialogues he is consciously approaching and examining different contemporary theories, adopting their tone, putting on their dress, as it were proving their armour, not without a latent confidence in the unaided strength of Mind.

This philosophical side of the dramatic genius of Plato is as real as and more important than the poetical. The dialogue is not only a convenient artistic form for bringing out the different aspects of a question; Plato is himself continually holding converse with some one: and dramatic propriety is preserved not only in minute points, but in the tone pervading a whole dialogue. Those in which an Eleatic stranger is the chief spokesman may still be Plato’s, although they seem pervaded by a pedantic consciousness of method not found in others; a similar remark applies to the Parmenides: and even amongst those in which Socrates holds the first place a marked difference is perceptible; which may be accounted for by saying, (1) that Socrates is not Socrates, but Plato becoming all things to all philosophies: (2) that Socrates is not altogether Plato, but a part-representation, part-creation of Plato’s, which he contemplates and converses with, and even criticises: (3) that Socrates himself has different faces, reflected partially in his different followers, the most characteristic of which, the negative ‘elenchus,’ was reflected in Euclides of Megara.

Recent critics, both in England and Germany, have denied all connection between the part played by Euclides in the Preface and the Megarian element of the dialogue which is generally admitted. And yet the significance of such indications in other dialogues can hardly be questioned.

1 190 A.
2 155 A.
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The prominence of Simmias and other Pythagorizing Socrates in the Phædo affords an obvious parallel. And supposing that the Preface were merely equivalent to a dedication, even a dedication often implies the acknowledgment of special affinities. That one motive is to awaken interest in the person of Theætetus is perfectly true; but this could have been done equally by other means, for Theætetus had many friends in Athens. In representing this dialogue as having been preserved and read at Megara by the head of the Megarian school, Plato makes a departure from his usual practice analogous to the more striking innovation of making a friend from Elea the chief speaker in the dialogues which follow.

Plato’s criticism of Protagoras, both here and in the Protagoras, is friendly and respectful,—rather indicating certain necessary stages in the pursuit of truth, than destroying fatal error. But for other professed thinkers he has less tolerance. And if it were possible to ascertain who those were with whom he found it impossible to argue,—who were beyond the pale of dialectic, in short,—the fact would be of no less interest than the evidence of his close intercourse with the school of Megara.

(1) Of the enthusiasts of Ephesus, who profess to be deeply read in the wisdom of Heraclitus, it is unnecessary to say more than is contained in the description of Theodorus, whose exact soul is naturally vexed by their inconsecutiveateness. ‘They support their master’s theory of a flux, only by the absence of fixity in their own thoughts. They are fond of explaining “ignotum per ignotius;” each follows his own inward light, regardless of the rest, and every one of them despises his fellow.’ This picture, the oriental features of which are noticeable, may be illustrated from the Cratylus,—which is partly written in imitation of the same school,—where Socrates professes himself puzzled to determine what is intended by their symbol, Fire. By one it is interpreted to mean the Sun, by another the principle of Heat, by another Mind.

(2) The Cynics are probably the ὄψιμαθεῖς of Soph. 251, 1

\[1\] Crat. 43.
who are admitted to discussion ex gratia for form's sake, who deny predication, and 'will not have it that a man is to be called good. Man, they insist, is man, and good is good.' And it has been usual to identify these persons with the men from whom Socrates has heard 'in a dream' that prime elements cannot be defined. But the latter doctrine is surely very different from such crude nominalism, and belongs to some one who believed too much rather than too little in the 'formal cause,' since he asserts that the essence which corresponds to definition is a definite ratio between units which are undefinable. The opinion quoted, if properly examined, is not a denial of predication, but rather the denial that anything can be predicated of the prime elements, ἐξ ὅν ἴμεῖς τῆς συγκείμενα καὶ τἀλλα, which is by no means the same thing, and merely amounts to saying that matter is formless, or that substance in the abstract is without attributes.

The conjecture which identifies notions so different would hardly have been entertained but for some misunderstanding of a passage of Aristotle, Metaph. 2. 3. 1043 b, where 'the Antisthenians and such rude persons' are mentioned in connection with a theory of essence as a complex (συλλαβή) of elements (ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων). Aristotle says that his own view, in which ὀφεὶα is the concrete, of which matter and form are the component elements, may be thought to give a certain colour to the error of those coarse thinkers who denied the possibility of definition. But ὀφεὶα (the object of definition) is really neither matter nor form, although these elements in their separate abstractedness are indefinable.

Aristotle in writing thus may have had this part of the Theaetetus in his mind. But the allusion to the Cynics is a mere excrescence on his argument, and, if closely examined, is seen to have but a remote bearing on the distinction of στοιχεῖα and συλλαβή. A suggestion put forth by the present editor in 1861 is more defensible, viz. that Socrates here as in other places, where he 'speaks from hearsay' (Phaed. 62, Phil. 20), is quoting some Pythagorean. The whole tenor of the passage, and the illustrations from number, measure, and music in the pages which follow, are in favour of this. He and Theaetetus, however, have not heard from

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1 201, 2.

d 2
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the same source, and the man who, using the term ἐπιστήμη, said that what was definable was knowable, but that the undefinable was also unknowable, must have been a Socratic philosopher, and probably (as Schleiermacher also thought) was a Megarian.

Another thesis of Antisthenes, the denial of contradiction, μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, has a certain bearing on several parts of the Theaetetus, and in particular on the question, 'Is false opinion possible?' But a fallacy which entered so deeply into all the controversies of the time, and which Socrates acknowledges to have had a disturbing influence on his own (i.e. on Plato's) mind, is not to be exclusively attributed to men of whom Plato speaks as he does of the ὑμαθεῖς in the Sophist. It is safer and more profitable to pass by Antisthenes and his master Gorgias, and to refer the fallacy at once to its origin in the Eleatic logic. The same may be said of the 'eristic' difficulty which occurs both here and in the Meno, 'How will you inquire about that which you do not know?'

If the deniers of predication, who are introduced under protest, in Soph. 251, are the followers of Antisthenes, it is beforehand highly improbable that the same persons had been spoken of under another aspect in Soph. 246. And if it is true that the Cynics preferred logical and ethical discussion to physical inquiries, their nominalism can hardly be made to represent downright materialism. Thus, on two independent grounds, it is unlikely that the ἀντίκρισις of the Sophist, and the σκληροὶ καὶ ἀντιτυποὶ ἀνθρώπων of Theaet. 155 E, who are, to say the least, closely related to each other, have any connection with Antisthenes.

More features of the personal character of Antisthenes are preserved than of Euclides and Aristippus, but fewer of his philosophy. From the way in which the grave Xenophon treats him, and from the calm epithets of Aristotle, he seems to have been the butt of the Socratic school, a sort of mixture of Ajax and Thersites. He regarded Socrates with a rude half-appreciating fondness, which was reciprocated with good-humoured pleasantry. But he boasted, justly enough, of a certain strength of character, which was in fact the piece of Socrates that was continued in him. He is praised for his pure and nervous Attic style, of which we have a specimen,
possibly genuine, in a rhetorical contest between Ajax and Ulysses. His genius, however, seems to have been opposed to abstract speculation. Hence he followed rather the form than the spirit of the Socratic teaching, both on human life and on the significance of terms. His views on the latter subject were probably influenced also by his previous intercourse with Gorgias.

There are, as might have been expected, several points of outward coincidence between his teaching and that of Euclides on the ethical side. They agree that virtue is one, that wisdom (φρόνησις) is the chief good, and so on.

But the dialectic of Antisthenes seems to have been at once more rhetorical and more sceptical: approaching much more nearly to the later Megarian paradoxes, with which it finally coalesced in the teaching of the Stoics. He has been called a materialist, and no doubt the term applies to him so far as he denied ideas, but his scepticism had nothing to do with physical inquiries, which he abjured. It was a part-practical, part-logical nominalism. 'I see a horse, equine properties I cannot see.'—'There is only one term applicable to one thing'. Hence controversy is impossible, and every assertion equally true. Definition is only a complex term, and accordingly no single thing can be defined, except in the imperfect way of comparison. You cannot say what a thing is, except by naming it, but only what it is like. Connected in some way with this theory was the saying, in which he agrees with Prodicus, that the first principle of education is the study of names. He was thus related to Aristippus in philosophy much as Gorgias had been to Protagoras: denying the absolute, while the other asserted the relative,—or rather contending that nothing existed absolutely but facts and individual things.

The one great philosophy of which Plato takes no account is Atomism. Democritus, though a contemporary of Socrates,
and Protagoras, is nowhere named by him, although he is continually quoted by Aristotle, who speaks of him as 'comprising in his definitions the material only.' The question is at least worth raising, whether the believers in gross matter, whose views Plato felt to be so alien to his own, were followers of Democritus and Leucippus in whole or in part. If the passage of the Theaetetus only were in question, the 'uninitiated' might be supposed to be mere ordinary thinkers, the unregenerate mass of mankind. But the men in the Sophist are clearly philosophers who are ready to maintain their principles against the world, although the description may be generalized from more than one school.

The supposition that the Atomists are referred to in these passages has been rejected on the ground that according to Ar. Met. 1. 4, in upholding their 'Void,' they asserted the existence of 'Not-Being;' and not-being is of course bodiless and unseen.

The collection of the very numerous allusions to Democritus in Aristotle would be a valuable contribution to the History of the earlier Greek Philosophy. They would be found to present the student with this difficulty, that while occasionally, as in the passage above quoted, the Atomistic doctrine is spoken of as a kind of purely speculative dualism, it is much more frequently referred to in terms which indicate a distinctly physical theory. It is happily unnecessary to argue here at length a point which has been clearly established by Dr. Zeller in his History of Greek Philosophy (2nd edition), that the chief characteristic of the Atomistic philosophy from the first was the firm grasp with which it held the ideas (which to most contemporary schools were so unreal) of space, extension, solidity, and weight.

It is not hard to believe that the abstract foundation of mechanical science should thus have been laid in an age when geometry was rapidly growing to maturity: the real difficulty for us is to conceive in what manner a mechanical theory was united with, if not occasioned by, the dialectical recoil from the Eleatic Undivided Whole. Yet in the earlier stages even of modern science such a confusion of physic and metaphysic was not impossible. The 'Plenum' of Descartes has probably not been without its influence on the Interpretation of Nature.
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The Absolute Being of the Eleatics, although the object of Pure Mind and identical with it, was not yet free from the associations of extension. ‘Being is full of being; it is continuous, for being touches being.’ Against this aspect of their doctrine the polemic of the Atomists was directed, when they asserted the existence of the non-existent. It was the non-existent, as the space in which the existent moves: and their Existence, while uncreated and unchangeable, was also that which has extension, solidity, and weight. Parmenides and Democritus both sought for something absolute behind phenomena: the Eleatic found it in the Unity of Being: the Atomist resolved this into Space and body. The relations between these made it possible to conceive of motion and of primordial differences of bulk and form.—The weight of atoms of equal bulk was supposed uniform.—All else was relative and subjective (νόμος): depending on the impression produced on us by the Atoms in various combinations.

How far is this view of their theory consistent with the conjecture that some friends of Democritus may be alluded to in the passages of the Theaetetus and Sophist already mentioned?

(1) It does not seem impossible that Plato should accuse such persons of denying the existence of anything ‘bodiless’ or ‘unseen.’ For the ‘bodiless existence’ which they are represented as denying is the ‘inmaterial essence’ of the εἴδων φῶς; and the ‘unseen process,’ which they will not believe in, is the movement of the Heraclitean fire which annihilates all that is stable or tangible. Both these are very different from the ‘void space’ of the Atomist, which is only asserted as the necessary condition of matter and motion. And (except polemically) he would rather say that ἀδιάμον and κενόν together constitute the reality of sensible existence, than that Being exists and Not-being also exists. Aristotle speaks of the Atomistic principle as τὸ ὑποκείμενον σῶμα. And this, to use Plato’s language, is at least κατὰ φῶς ὀρατόν (Tim. 30 B).

(2) A presumption in favour of such an allusion is afforded by the manner in which the sense of touch and of resistance is dwelt upon. It is true that the atoms could not literally
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be either seen or handled: but they had all the mechanical properties of things visible and tangible, and Plato was at least as likely as Aristotle to represent them as the objects of sense. See Ar. de Sensu, 4: Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλεῖς τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀποτάστατον τι ποιοῦσι πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀπὸ τοιοῦτο.

The sense of touch or resistance (which the Ancients hardly distinguished) is naturally referred to those ‘primary’ qualities of body which the Atomists upheld. Now these are dwelt upon in the two passages in question more than in the whole discussion of the doctrine of sense in the Theætetus, and in language which is much more suggestive of something hard. Note especially the words, Theæt. 155 E: Ἄριστος τῶν χερῶν λαβέσθαι. Soph. 246: Εἰς γὰρ ἔλκοντα, ταῖς χερόν ἀνεγείρας πέτρας καὶ δρῆς περιλαμβάνετες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων διασχίζονται τοὺς εἶναι μόνον δι' ἐμφάνει καὶ ἑπαφήν τινα. 247: Πότερον ὅρατόν καὶ ἀπτόν τι αὐτῶν; Ἡμ.: Πᾶν δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν ταῖς χεραὶ συμπέσεις εἶσιν.

(3) It may be observed further that in the Sophist the men are driven into a corner by being pressed to define (a) whether the Soul is material, which they are not afraid to admit, and (b) whether justice and wisdom are so. Might not this mode of attack be suggested to a Socratic philosopher by the apparent contradiction between the moral sayings of Democritus and his material system?

The materialists are then imagined as retiring upon a more abstract conception of Being:—‘Everything in which there is either an active or a passive power;’—i.e. they are supposed to rise from the idea of matter to that of force. The tendency thus recognized surely indicates a different materialism from that of Antisthenes, and the close sequence of the reasoning by which it is developed is not unworthy of the tenacity and penetration which seem to be justly ascribed to Democritus. See Ar. de An. 1. 2: Δημόκριτος περὶ αὐτῶν τοῦτον γλαύκωτρος εἴρηκεν:—an expression which anticipates Bacon’s praise of him.

(4) It may be urged against the above conjecture (a) that, although Democritus might fairly (from Plato’s standpoint) be called ἄμοιος, as the spirit of his inquiry was alien to
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rhetoric and poetry, and ἀμάτωρ, for he is known to have written against the Protagorean maxim, yet the imputation of coarseness which Plato's picture conveys could not attach to him.—This objection may be partly met, however, by supposing his theory to have degenerated in the hands of his followers.—(b) That the elenchus of the εἰδὼν φύσις is described as levelled at the ἀλήθεια of these materialists, who would thus seem to be identified with the disciples of Protagoras in the Theaetetus. To which it may be replied, that the account in the Sophist appears to be generalized from more schools than one, not all of whom would deserve the title of 'sprung from the ground' (σαρκωτό καὶ αὐτόχθονες). This last therefore alone strictly answers to the title 'hard and repellent' in the Theaetetus. The difficulty must, however, be acknowledged, and it remains, whatever hypothesis with regard to the allusion is adopted. ¹

If these passages really contain any allusion even to degenerate followers of Democritus (who might be related to him as the Ephesian enthusiasts to Heraclitus), the fact is interesting as confirming the anticipation that no Greek thought of any permanent value failed to obtain some recognition from Plato, though it might be recognized only to be rejected. We are also reminded of Aristotle's saying, that Plato's dialectical bias unfitted him for physical studies; and of Lord Bacon's, that Time brings down the lighter goods of antiquity but drowns what is of solid worth, which may be thought no unfitting comment from the physical point of view.

(5) Democritus would also rank with those who argued from dreams and madness that nothing which appears is real (οὔδεν ὑπὸ φανερά εἶναι) ².

Plato's relation to other Greek thinkers, although of great importance, especially in connection with the dialectical dia-

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¹ Another ἀλήθεια is spoken of in the Cratylus, which may perhaps be that of Antisthenes, but the reference there is evidently to a logical and not a physical theory.
² It is possible that the διασερεῖν of the Philebus, 44, 46, who are said to be very clever in physical science, and have an account to give of pleasure while they deny its reality, may also have been in some way related to the Atomistic school. Compare, for instance, the fragment Πολύιαν ἰδάναι διάσελτον τὰ θανάτου, κ.τ.λ. and the minute way in which the causes of sensation are analyzed by Democritus while its reality is denied: also the words τὰ συγκεκριμένα βία διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν, Phil. 46 ad fin.
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Logues, ought not to be conceived of in a narrow or literal way. Contemporary theories must not be suffered to crowd in upon him, so as to cramp the freedom and originality of his thoughts, of which they are not the substance but the occasion. It may be impossible always to trace the threads which he has taken up and woven into the fabric of his philosophy, but this defect in our knowledge need seldom leave us in doubt of his meaning. He views existing opinions in different lights and in different combinations as he moves amongst them, just as natural objects group themselves differently according to the point at which we stand. The materialist and sensationalist, who in the Theaetetus are ironically contrasted, in the Sophist appear to be combined as the enemies of ideas, differing only in the degree of their unregenerate hardness. In the Cratylus, again, Heraclitus and Protagoras are opposed.

Plato had certain men in his eye, but what interested him far more were the different aspects of philosophy. And these could not be limited to this or that individual, or extended so as to embrace his inconsistencies. A great name in the past might be wholly identified with one of the great streams of thought; but from the speculative height whence Plato surveyed the present, rival doctrines might at one time be generalized in a single view, and at another time by a change of position might be seen as wholly distinct.

The general significance of the Theaetetus has been fully treated by Professor Jowett in his Introduction. In what follows I propose to touch separately on the following points: (1) Philosophy and Education, (2) The Doctrine of Sense, (3) Plato’s appeal to Experience, (4) the Ideas as Categories, (5) Connection of Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, (6) Plato’s psychology, (7) The digression or episode in pp. 172–7, (8) The date assigned by Plato to the reading of the dialogue at the house of Euclides.

The discussion of these topics will give an opportunity of illustrating the Theaetetus from other dialogues besides those already quoted.
1. Philosophy in Plato is inseparable from the higher education, i.e. from the evolution of true thought by the action of mind on mind. This general notion is expressed under various imagery, in each case symbolizing the development of an inherent power. (a) ἀνάμνησις (Meno, Phædo, Phædrus). The soul is led by questions, or by the sense of imperfection, or by the vision of beauty, or by intercourse with a sympathetic mind, to the reminiscence of ideas or of an ideal, perceived by her in her prenatal state. (b) τόκος ἐν καλῷ (Symp.). The soul of man when he approaches maturity aspires to break the limits of the individual being. This is a kind of puberty or potential pregnancy of the soul, which, through contact with what is beautiful either in persons, actions, or thoughts, attains to the object of her longing, the birth of lasting truth. (c) κάθαρσις, λόγος (Phædo, Republic). The soul is bound by the force of desire in a prison of sense, until philosophy or dialectic gradually breaks her bonds, and purifies her from the earthly elements amidst which she has been compelled to live, and also lifts the eye of the soul from looking downwards on dark shadows to contemplate the ideas, as they are illumined by the good. Then thought attains its highest energy, the light within is married to its kindred light, and Reason and Truth are born. (d) Harmonic motion (Timæus). The soul is plunged in a turbid stream of growth and decay, and the circle of the Diverse in her is wheeling all ways, until she is steadied by the perception of number in the movements of the planets as organs of Time, and this perception gives predominance to the motion of the Same in her.

The humorous image of μανετική, 'the art of delivering,' which is peculiar to the Theætetus, brings several of these different figures into a single form. It combines more completely than any of them the positive and negative aspect of the elenchus, the stimulating and the benumbing effect of Socrates. These no longer appear separately, as in the Charmides and Meno, but exist together in harmonious unity. The Charmides ends with the contradiction that temperance or modesty is inconceivable, and yet Charmides, the modest youth, is ready to commit violence upon Socrates, that he may gain modesty from him.
(a) Theaetetus, like the slave in the Meno, is led by questions to express what is not merely his own private thought, but, as appears from the history of Philosophy, a necessary step in the progress from unconsciousness to the possession of truth. As each hypothesis is evolved and put away, he is prepared and induced to rise naturally to the stage next following. And as he becomes more aware of the difficulty of the subject, he is more eager to proceed with the inquiry.

Socrates, who has the discernment of spirits which the Pheærus requires in the educator, perceives in Theaetetus the true philosophic nature. Although 'there is no reason to doubt that Theaetetus was a real person,' yet we may suppose that, like Socrates, he is more or less idealized. The qualities which are postulated in the sixth book of the Republic as necessary for the pupils of philosophy are one and all expressly attributed to him. And when he acknowledges the unity of the mind as the organ for perceiving general truths, Socrates—although the features of the youth are far from regular—declares him to be beautiful as well as good. On the other hand, the figure of Socrates himself, as the man-midwife, combines with the familiar characteristics of the real man much that is Platonic and ideal. Whilst he holds in reserve the sharp dividing instrument of the Elenchus, which separates between the mind and her offspring and discerns the false birth from the true, he also presides, as the Spirit of Dialectic, over the mental intercourse which alone can satisfy the legitimate longings of the soul.

(b) The condition which Socrates by his art perceives in Theaetetus, is that on which Diotima expatiates in the Symposium:—καίναι γάρ, ἐφη, ὡς Σωκράτης, πάντες ἔθνοι... καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἡλικίᾳ γένοιται, τίκτειν ἐπιχείρει ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις. The signs of this travail (which Socrates alternately aggravates and allays) are the discontented consciousness of ignorance and the irrepressible desire of knowing the Truth. In Theaetetus it already takes the highest form, not love or ambition, but a passion for ideas, and Socrates, with a skill which is comparable to that of Diotima, sets before him successive courses of wisdom, which excite or slake his

1 Jowett’s Plato, iv. 226.
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'fancies,' but do not appease them. The humour of this conception is kept up to the end. ¹

(c) At the same time Socrates is liberating Theaetetus from the prison of sense and clearing his vision that he may look steadily at the Ideas.

At first he is only permitted to distinguish each individual sensation from every other, though binding them together in bundles for the convenience of naming them. Presently, perception and memory are shown to be separable from sensation; but they are still occasioned by it. The bonds are further loosened by the observation that in judging what is expedient for the future, the present impression of sense is worthless in comparison with reflection: but still the future is relative to the present and the past, and the test of past wisdom is the impression of the moment when it arrives.—Theaetetus now seizes the great truth that the mind does perceive some things (unity, number, sameness, difference, etc.), without the instrumentality of the senses; but still it perceives them as attributes of the object of sense. Further inquiry is made into this process of thought. The mind can think truly and also falsely. What difference is implied in this? An attempt is made to conceive of it by reasoning from an abstract alternative,—(knowledge or ignorance, being or not-being), but we are compelled to fall back upon the conception of a process between sensation and the recollection of former sensations, or between different abstractions of the world of sense laid up in the memory. Lastly, there is allowed to float before the mind the thought of an abstract whole; first as consisting of the combination of indefinite elements, then as an indivisible elementary unit arising out of them. But if the combination is known, the elements must also be known. And even the power of analysis is an inadequate test of Knowledge. Nor is the desired criterion fully attained, even when the complete whole

¹ In the notes on p. 143 a doubt has been raised concerning the description of the appearance of Socrates, which adds piquancy to the humorous image of his 'art,'—viz. whether τὸ ἐξω τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν means 'prominence of the eyes,' or 'width between the eyes.' It is true that in Xen. Equ. 1, ἐξιθλόφθαλμος is opposed to κοινὸςθαλμός. But in Ar. H. A. 1. 8. 5 the words ἐντὸς and ἐκτὸς seem to refer more naturally to the position of the eyes in the face. And the new meaning suggested is rather more in accordance with the allusions in Aristophanes and in Plato's Symposium.
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which is the object of thought, has been distinguished, by its characteristic difference, from every other.

Socrates (in the language of Rep. B. 7) has gone down into the cave, and is leading Theàtétus upwards, step by step, till towards the end he gives him just a far-off glimpse of the summit to be attained hereafter,—μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἐν τῷ γεγονός εἴδος, ἰδέαν μὲν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχου. But he is not himself groping his way. Each footstep is firmly planted, as by one who has tried every inch of the path and knows the country well. In other words, Plato is no longer satisfied with anticipations of truth, but is striving to bridge the chasm between ideas and facts, between crude experience and complete theory. But of this more presently. Here only remains to say (d) that in this upward progress that which most steadies the thought of Theàtétus, who is a trained geometer, is the perception of number and an adumbration of the idea of good.

2. Much of what is rejected in the Theàtétus as a theory of Knowledge reappears in the Timæus as a ‘probable’ account of the physiology of sense. The same interflow of active and passive motions, especially in vision, of which the same phenomena are mentioned, the carrying about of qualities from place to place, and several points even of minute terminology, are repeated there. This helps to show that the theory here developed as that of the disciples of Protagoras who rest their doctrine on Heraclitean principles, is not a mere occasional Essay written for the special purpose of this dialogue, but a serious piece of work having a real place in the history of thought.

There is one point of this doctrine as stated in the Theàtétus, on which some obscurity still rests, viz. the distinction between quicker and slower motions in 156 C D. The text is not quite free from uncertainty, although the reading of Cornarius is probably a consequence and not merely a cause of confused interpretation. The Scholiast not unnaturally understood the slower motions to be the sensations of touch and taste as distinguished from those of sight and hearing. Sight might naturally be supposed to have more of fire, and touch more of the nature of earth. But this distinction has no relevancy to what precedes, and is nowhere applied in
what follows. And in the MS. text the words φέρεται γάρ... πέρανεν appear to refer, not to all the motions, but to the swifter only. Now in the example of wine being distasteful to the sick palate (159 D), the term φέρεται, which is here introduced in formulating the theory, is deliberately applied. So that if the MSS. are right, the sensation of taste is not one of the slower motions. And the same illustration makes it manifest that in any case the subject and object, πάσχον and ποιοῦν, on the one hand, and on the other hand the sensation and quality together, are opposed, if not as slow and swift, yet certainly as producer and produced (γεννῶντα καὶ γεννώμενα). And the word πλησιάζει, which belongs to the slower elements, is applied not to the tongue, but to the eye.

Recent editors are agreed (even Dr. Kennedy yielding a Elimination of doubtful assent) in adopting another interpretation, according to which the slower elements are the ποιεῖν and πάσχειν, the quicker elements being the qualities and sensations. Professor Kennedy's doubt is thus expressed: 'I am unable to discern the use of discriminating between agent-patient and their products as to slowness and swiftness.' This remark hits the point of the obscurity, and ought to be met. The answer turns upon the motive which Socrates here attributes to the Protagoreans, viz. to develop a sensational doctrine that shall not too obviously violate common experience. With this motive, for example, they are supposed to invent the term ἀδροσμα, and to speak of each kind of concrete objects as an aggregate of motions.' Thus, to speak with Aristotle for the sake of clearness, they get rid of the categories of quantity and quality. But there is another category, not less surely given in experience, which they find it still more difficult to dispose of, the category of substance. There is an ineradicable prejudice in favour of thinking that I am more lasting than my impressions, the chameleon than his colours, the moon than her phases, etc. Thus, when sensations and attributes have been shown to be ever so momentary, the doubt lingers, whether there is not still something permanent, viz. the subject and object in which these severally inhere (in the language of Scoto-German Metaphysics, the Ego and the External World). To which doubt the theorists reply by saying, 'Oh, substance is only a slower motion.' It would
have been clearer certainly to have introduced the distinction between ἀληθεία and φόρος, and to have said expressly that substance is altered, while sensation and quality are in locomotion. But this distinction is wanted afterwards for a serious use, and would have taken from the humour of the present passage, where the Protagorean is represented as simply bent on reducing all as far as possible to motion as such. Where he is obliged to admit a difference, it suits his purpose to call it a difference of degree. For it is not his cue in any case to recognize differences of kind. But the implied admission is turned against him by the Elenchus in the passage referred to (181 D).

Mr. J. S. Mill's 'Permanent Possibilities' may be cited as a metaphysical expedient having a similar motive.

3. Plato is well aware that philosophy, to be fruitful, must begin and end with experience. This is the note, which chiefly distinguishes his method, not only from the dogmatic anticipations of the fifth century, but still more from the comparatively barren idealism of his Megarian friends. The whole spirit of Socrates, with his common instances and his resolute preference for human questions, in spite of his love of paradox, pointed in this direction. And the reader of the Platonic dialogues is often surprised, when he seems to have been carried into a region of mere abstractions, to be suddenly met by an argument drawn directly from the facts of ordinary life. The truth is that Plato is perpetually striving to reconcile thought with reality both in the individual and in the world. And although in spite of all his efforts his thought remains abstract still, and never entirely penetrates the subtlety of Nature, he continually acknowledges in practice that while all things are to be tested by logic, the conclusions of logic must be tested again by fact. 'That sensations differ is a matter of fact' (154 A), 'the illusions of dreams and madness are facts of experience' (157 E), 'Protagoras must be wiser than others, else he would have no fees' (161 D), 'the world is full of examples of the truth that knowledge is power' (170 A, B), 'any one must acknowledge this' (171 D), 'States make laws with a view to future expediency' (177 E), 'Protagoras himself knows better than his pupil the effect which will be produced
by a particular speech’ (178 E). All these are direct appeals to experience. And therefore the student need not be surprised when, after the subtle inconclusive argument about false opinion, the claims of true opinion are cut short with the example of the law-courts (201 A), or the question whether the knowledge of the simple or the compound comes first is settled by the experience of Theaetetus in learning to read (206 A). A similar collocation of fact and logic occurs in Soph. 264 A, where, after it has been proved with incredible difficulty by a long chain of metaphysical proof that communion is possible between not-being and some kinds of being, the further question, whether not-being in the shape of falsehood enters into speech, is decided in a moment by the mere repetition of the statement ‘Theaetetus is flying.’ So in the Republic, when the definition of justice has been reached, it is tested by vulgar instances,—rà φροντικά αὑτῶν προσφέροντες (4. 442 E).

It is said in the Parmenides, and the thought recurs in the Sophist and Politicus, that the mature mind despises no phenomenon in which there are the traces of a law. In the Philebus the dialectician is said to carry subdivision as far as there are forms to guide him. In the Phaedrus—where Plato’s transcendentalism is most apparent—individual experience is not forgotten: Δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συμέναι κατ’ εἶδος λεγόμεναν, ἐκ πολλῶν ἑνώ αἰσθήσεων εἶσ ἐν λογισμῷ συναιρομένοιν—δεῖ δὴ ταῦτα ἱκανῶς νοῆσαι, μετὰ ταῦτα θεώμενον αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ὑπάκουα οὖν καὶ πραττόμενα, δεξιῶς τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν (271 E). Indeed the Phaedrus sounds every note in Plato’s compass. And his struggle to reach the individual while holding fast the universal is nowhere more evident than in the passage just quoted. The same purpose is evinced in the remark at the end of the Theaetetus: ‘Ἀλλὰ σὺ πρῶτον γε, σὺμα, Θεάτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἄν ἡ σιμότης αὐτῆς τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτή-των ἄν ἐγὼ ἐώρακα διάφορον τι μημεῖον παρ’ ἐμοὶ ἐννημοσυνεῖκα καταβήσεται, καὶ τάλλα ὀφθαλμὸς ἐξ ὧν εἶ σὺ, κ.τ.λ.

4. In accordance with this clinging to experience, Plato’s ideal theory, so far as it is allowed to appear in the Theaetetus, deals not with hypostatized entities, but rather with necessary forms of thought, which are as inseparable from percept-
tion as from reasoning. In the digression indeed, which, however luminous, has still something of a mythical tone, the philosopher is described in language which recalls the Republic, as contemplating everything as a whole and as taking men up out of the sphere of personal questions into the higher region, where justice and injustice, kingship as kingship, human nature as human nature, are discussed apart from particulars. But in the dialectical argument, the relative aspect which has been suggested by Protagoras is nowhere lost sight of. The mind perceives by herself the being of objects, their identity, difference, likeness and unlikeness, also unity and number concerning them. She also reaches after the good and beautiful, reviewing and comparing her perceptions with this aim. Knowledge is not to be sought for in particular impressions, but in generalizations drawn from them. The numbers eleven and twelve are forms upon the waxen block, i.e. they are remembered, or rather abstracted from perceptions of sense. In the aviary there fly innumerable birds, some gathered in groups (κατά εἰδη), some flying everywhere about (i.e. modes of thought universally applicable). Whether the whole is separable from the parts or not (χωριστών or ἀχωριστών) it bears some relation to them, and for the present we are disposed to think that the parts must be included in perfect knowledge.

This manner of conceiving knowledge and being is not a mere concession to Protagoras or Heraclitus, nor is it only due to the intentionally subjective aspect of the whole dialogue. It rather marks Plato’s advance to a more definite conception of his own meaning.

He is not now engaged, as in the Republic, with sketching a vague outline of philosophic method, but has entered upon the ‘longer way’ of dialectical inquiry, in which the highest generalizations, when he really grapples with them, are found to be conceivable, if at all, only in relation to an actual world to which they give light and order, and where affirmation and negation, to have any meaning, must have reference to one another, and to the content as well as to the form of propositions.¹

¹ The obvious fact, that ὀνήμα in the Theaetetus is equivalent to Daseyn rather than to Wesen has not been sufficiently observed by those who question the genuineness of the Sophist because there Being = the sum of positive realities.
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5. This aspect of the Theaetetus is closely connected with the Sophistes and Politicus which follow it. In the Sophistes the criticism of sense and motion is followed up with a no less thorough criticism of the Immutable Being, and the question 'How is falsehood possible?' is answered through an examination of the idea of falsehood and of negation. In the Politicus an attempt is made to sketch an ideal outline of the application of Science to human societies, and of the false or imperfect forms of society, from which the immediate guidance of Science is withdrawn. These dialogues were to have led up to the Philosopher, in which, probably apart from controversy, Plato's ideal of Theory and Practice would have been bodied forth.

It does not appear that at the time of writing the Theaetetus Plato had distinctly planned the other three. The terms in which Socrates declines to examine Parmenides might certainly lead the reader to expect a separate treatment of the Eleatic principle. And the conversation ends with an appointment to meet at the same palaestra on the following day. But the Preface only contemplates Socrates, Theaetetus, and Theodorus as the interlocutors. These alone are mentioned by Euclides as having taken part. Still less is there any hint of another than Socrates having taken the lead. And although the opening of the Sophist links on that dialogue to the conversation of the previous day, yet there is no direct reference to the unfinished talk about Parmenides, nor is the figure of μαντής in any way kept up, while the concrete form in which the question is bluntly put by Socrates, 'What are the Sophist, Statesman, Philosopher?' is strikingly different from the 'What is Knowledge?' of the previous day. Had Plato written the Theaetetus and Sophist continuously, it is hardly to be supposed that he would not have woven them together with more art.

There are other grounds for believing that the Sophistes and Politicus were written somewhat later than the Theaetetus. In my edition of those two dialogues (Oxford, 1867) I have proved by 'quantitative criticism' that in point of diction, as well as in other important respects, they are intermediate between the Republic and the Laws, while the Theaetetus stands between the Phaedrus and Republic. And in a more
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general way Professor Jowett, whose judgment on such a question is of the highest value, remarks emphatically on the difference of style which separates the Philebus, Sophist, Politicus, Laws, and in some degree the Timæus, from the earlier dialogues. (See his Introduction to the Sophist, sub init.) Pure Elaticism has no doubt a great effect in drying up the springs of imaginative expression. The second part of the Parmenides, and the passage in the Theætetus about the whole and its parts, may be contrasted in this way with other portions of the same dialogues. But this remark does not dispose of the criticisms here referred to, which relate to the whole tenour of the dialogues now in question, nor does it account for the change of manner both in Theætetus and Socrates.

These and other reasons have led some to doubt the genuineness of the Sophistes and Politicus. I have attempted to meet such doubts by showing, as above stated, that in the same degree in which these writings diverge from the Gorgias or Republic, they approximate to the Laws. The discussion may now be summed up in the words of the English translator of Plato: 'There would have been little disposition to doubt the genuineness of the Sophist and Politicus, if they had been compared with the Laws rather than with the Republic, and the Laws had been received, as they ought to be, on the authority of Aristotle, as an undoubted work of Plato.' Schaarsschmidt, the latest enemy of the two dialogues, is as inconsistent in accepting the Laws, as he is consistent (however paradoxical) in rejecting the Philebus.

But to return. However different from the Theætetus in style and external treatment, the Sophist and Statesman are connected with it in subject, and also in their point of view.

The theory of Knowledge, which at the end of the Theætetus remains indeterminate, is completed by the discussion of first principles in the Sophist. And although the subject of the Statesman is not the nature, but the

1 An important contribution to the more exact definition both of the place of the dialectical dialogues and of the growth of Plato's central doctrine has been made quite recently by Mr. H. Jackson, in his elaborate papers on the Philebus and the Parmenides in the Journal of Philology, Nos. 21 and 22: 'Plato's later Theory of Ideas.'
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application of Knowledge, yet there is a distinct advance in the conception of Knowledge or Science, on which the discussion is based.

The relation of Knowledge to Experience, and the nature of the ideas as categories (supr. 4, 5), have come out in the Theaetetus. But the chief conceptions of Knowledge there put forth are those (a) of rising from particulars to universals and so contemplating each thing as a whole, (b) of analyzing a whole into its parts, and (c) of being able to describe an object by its difference.

In the Sophist it is shown that to generalize, distinguish, and analyze is not enough. Ideas must not be seen only in their separate abstraction, but also in their combinations and correlations. And in the course of the Politicus it appears further that Knowledge, in order to be fruitful, must take a grasp of the actual world, where the ideas are not found in elementary simplicity, but are transferred into the long and difficult syllables of action. Logical analysis must follow the lines of nature. Dichotomy must not be forced where it is inapplicable. And rash generalization (misplaced συναγωγή) is to be equally avoided. Every nature is to be separately interrogated, until each has yielded all that its peculiar experience enables it to contribute to the sum of wisdom. It is not enough to define an art by some distinguishing mark. To know its boundaries aright, we must also know the kindred arts from which it is distinguished. There are categories not only of things in general, but of social facts: seven departments, for example, of human industry. Plato nowhere shows a deeper conviction of the extent and comprehensiveness of Science.

6. Another growth which may be traced in these three psycho-dialogues, and also in the Philebus and Timeæus, is the increasing clearness and minuteness of Plato’s psychology. Such hints towards a study of the phenomena of mind as occur in the Phædo, Meno, Gorgias, Republic, or even in the Phædrus, are comparatively vague. In the Theaetetus Plato is for the first time continuously employed in the close analysis of mental operations. The nearest parallel in the Republic is the description, in Book 7, of the effect of number
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in awakening reason by giving distinctness to contradictory perceptions. But in the Theaetetus we have a whole series of similar observations:—the connection of αἰσθησις and φαντασία in the case of the wind (p. 152), the analysis of vision (153 E foll.), the logical postulates, which we are asked to contemplate steadily as ‘facts of consciousness’ (155), the further analysis of vision (156, 7), the account given of illusory perceptions (158, 159), the case of letters and sounds seen and heard but not understood (163), the relation of μνήμη to αἰσθησις (ibid.), the illustration of degrees of perception (165), the distinction between the organ and the percipient mind (184), the whole attempt to give a subjective account of false opinion (187–200), and, in particular, the description of thought as self-dialogue (189, 190), the image of the waxen-block, accounting for confusions of sense and memory (191 foll.), that of the aviary, for confusions of pure thought, (198 foll.), the three definitions of λόγος (206 foll.);—all these are instances of the working of a new spirit, which is not found in equal strength in the Republic or Phædrus.

Now to the same reflective tendency may be referred several passages of the Sophist and Philebus, and the effect of it may be traced also in the Politicus and Timæus. The following points may be especially noted:—the acknowledgment obtained from the idealists that Knowledge is a process (Soph. 248), the description of the process of dialectic (254), the meaning of denial (ἀπόφασις) (257), the distinction of λόγος, διάνοια, φαντασία, αἰσθησις (263, 4):—the origin of γραμματική (Phil. 8), the description of ηδονή, δόξα, μνήμη, ἀνάμνησις, φαντασία (37–39):—the passage about μετρητική (Polit. 285), the reason for the argument from example (277):—the account of sensation, and the distinction of νοῦς from δόξα ἀληθῆς in the Timæus.

The question raised towards the end of the Theaetetus, whether knowledge is not of simple parts as well as of the complex whole, corresponds to various ἀπορίαι in the Parmenides, and also to the place in the Sophist (245) where it is shown that Becoming as well as Being partakes of completeness and unity. A cognate point is also touched upon, viz. whether the εἶθη are χωριστὰ or ἀχωριστα. The theory that the Element (or simple idea) is unknowable, forms
the opposite extreme to the 'Protagorean' assertion that single impressions only are known. The truth is indicated that an apprehension of unity and universality is present even in the simplest distinct perception. The passage which prepares the way for this conclusion may be compared with the similar 'prosæutik' in Rep. 4. 436.

7. The Episode or Digression, 172–177.
Throughout the earlier part of the dialogue Plato's moral enthusiasm has been held under a severe restraint. It here bursts forth in a passage of still chastened and subdued eloquence. Socrates is represented as having hitherto found it difficult to be quite serious, while delivering the boyish mind of Theaetetus of its first crude notions, and refuting with indirect arguments, which he himself occasionally suspects of sophistry, a popular philosophy which dressed up men's ordinary thoughts with subtle notions borrowed from past thinkers. He has accordingly been using various arts to draw the grave Theodorus into the discussion. In this he at last succeeds. But even so, his attempt at seriousness at first breaks down. He is still haunted by the humour of the previous argument, and Theodorus rebukes him for 'running Protagoras too hard.' On this Socrates lays hold of the admission, implied in Protagoras' teaching, that there is a difference, if not between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, yet between better and worse conditions of individuals and communities. On this he is about to base the argument that since legislation aims at bettering the condition of states, it is proved true or false, right or wrong, as it succeeds or fails. But at this point he seems to catch the tone of his respondent, and indulges the inclination of Theodorus by interposing a pause in the game of question and answer. In the presence of the deeper subject which now awaits discussion he suspends the argument for a while, and allows his eye to range over the whole position,—reconnoitring as it were before engaging at close quarters,—contrasting the life of the philosopher with that of the lawyer and the man of the world. After this (177 D) he resumes the argument at the point where it was broken off, and, still in conversation with Theodorus, disposes finally of Protagoras and the Heracliteans. And in all that follows, although
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Socrates does not relinquish his playfulness, a deeper note is clearly perceptible. The productive power of Knowledge, the universal striving toward the good, the independence of mind in perceiving the true relations of things, the difficulty about false opinion, and other weighty topics, are handled with essential gravity and sobriety.

Thus the poetical and dialectical aspects are fused together more completely than in the Phædrus. And the correspondence is unmistakable between the contrasted lives on the one hand and the contrasted theories on the other:—as the philosopher is to the lawyer, so is the ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ to the φαντασία τοῦ αληθηνοῦ. But Peipers (Untersuchungen, i. pp. 472 ff.) is too matter-of-fact, when he treats the digression as an integral part of the discussion, and as directly suggested by the mention of δίκαια καὶ καλά.

Teichmüller, on the other hand, would treat such semi-mythical passages in Plato as wholly secondary and subordinate to the dialectical, concessions to popular sentiment, or to ‘the child in us.’ I cannot think that Plato would endorse this view of the imaginative portions of his own writings. They express a different but not a lower aspect of the truth; and at least equally vindicate his claim to have surveyed ‘all time and all existence.’ ‘Reason touched with emotion’ need not have less hold of reality than reason pure and simple. And abstract thought without such aid is not merely less effectual (διάνοια γὰρ αὐτῆς οἶδεν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐνεκά του καὶ πρακτικῆ), but is also less complete.

The digression approaches very closely in style and substance to many passages in the Republic, as will appear in the notes. But it contains no allusion to the philosopher’s relation to an ideal state, whether (as in the Gorgias) because Plato had not yet enounced his conception of the philosopher-king, or because he had withdrawn again into isolation,—or more probably because of the difference of the subject. The philosopher here is not merely useless to his city, but looks down upon it as from a distant height. He knows nothing of his neighbour, but is engaged in contemplating human nature in general. The conception is more ironical than in the Sophist (in this approaching the Republic), and less embittered than in the Politicus; although the con-
TEMPT WITH WHICH THE LEGAL SPIRIT IS DESCRIBED IS SUFFICIENTLY BITING.

8. The solemnity of this passage, and the shadow which it casts over the remainder of the dialogue, is in keeping with the time when the whole conversation is imagined to have taken place. Socrates, as he tells Theodorus casually at the end, is going presently to answer the indictment of Meletus; —to show, therefore, in his own person what a poor figure the philosopher makes in a law-court. This life-and-death occasion, however (ἀλλ’ η ἐπὶ τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ), sits very lightly on him, and he is as ready as at any moment of his life to engage in philosophical discussion. Not only so, but his inexhaustible humour, if less irrepressibly exuberant than in his intercourse with Phædrus by the Ilissus, is no less ready to spring forth in the presence of a youth who is gifted with the philosophic nature. Yet there is an undercurrent of more than usual earnestness, which takes advantage from the grave presence of Theodorus, but is profoundly in keeping with the actual crisis.

Another shadow mingles with that cast by the death of Socrates, and helps to give a further personal interest to the discourse. For the reader is to imagine that at the moment when this record of his brilliant promise is being read at Megara, Theætetus himself, who has been wounded in battle at Corinth, has just been carried back to Athens, that he may die at home. The memory of one thus distinguished in action as well as in thought is intended to consecrate the whole dialogue.

The date of the battle mentioned in the Preface can only be fixed within certain limits. The suggestion of E. Munk (whose arrangement of the dialogues in the order of the lifetime of Socrates of course gives a late place to the Theætetus) that the occasion meant was in the year 369, when the allied forces under Chabrias disputed the Isthmus with Epaminondas, is sufficiently disposed of by the remark¹ that Terpsion cannot be supposed to have waited thirty years before ful-

¹ Wohlrab, 1869.
filling his intention of asking to see the writing of Euclides. So late a date also, as Professor Jowett observes, 'a little impairs the beauty of Socrates' remark, "that he would be a great man if he lived." These are strong reasons for preferring the battle of b.c. 394, which seems to have stirred the hearts of the Athenians in a peculiar way, as the first great national effort after the restoration of the democracy. In that year Theætetus would be at most twenty-one. And this date does not seem impossible, for the praise of his conduct in the fight would be all the louder if he then saw service for the first time. The supposition which alone remains, that of an uncertain date between b.c. 390 and 387 (the limits of the Corinthian war), has the doubtful advantage of giving time for the distinctions mentioned by later writers as attaching to Theætetus,—at all events for the discovery of the five regular solids, which he might have hit upon even sooner than this (μαθητὸς γὰρ κἂν παῖς γένους ἅν ²).

9. In any case, therefore, the Preface cannot have been written earlier than b.c. 394, when Plato was about thirty-five, and in all probability was written much later, for in fiction (unlike politics) the mention of an event is none the worse for being 'ancient history.' But even so much cannot be decisively maintained respecting the dialogue as a whole,—for the preface, and the concluding words, and other passages, may possibly have been written long after the main portion had been composed. Internal evidence, however, as has been already indicated, would seem to assign to the Theætetus a place, though earlier than the Sophist, yet not much, if at all, earlier than the Republic.

Teichmüller has recently, with great confidence, set up a new criterion, by which he thinks to separate once for all between the earlier and later writings of Plato. This is afforded by the simple statement of Euclides, that in finishing his transcript of the conversation he has omitted the interlocutory words. By which Teichmüller understands Plato

1 The beautiful monument to the young knight Dexitius in the Ceramicus at Athens (ἀνθίδιον ἐν Κορίνθω, τῶν πέντε λείπον) is commonly attributed to this year.
2 Ar. Eth. N. 1.
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to signify that the admixture of narrative in the Parmenides, Symposium, and Republic had been a mistake, and that this method should be abandoned by him henceforth. Our critic also assumes that Plato kept this resolution, and that consequently no narrated dialogue is later than the Theaetetus, and no dialogue in which the several persons are directly introduced is to be considered as earlier. The form of the Euthydemus, Protagoras, and Phaedo, where a narrated dialogue is enclosed in a dramatic setting, is regarded as intermediate, and these dialogues are therefore assumed to come shortly before the Theaetetus.

That the words of Euclides are not without significance may at once be admitted. The Theaetetus is the only dialogue which is supposed to have been written down 1. This takes from the improbability of so close and subtle an argument being repeated from memory. And the omission of 'said I' and 'said he' certainly adds to the continuity of the effect, without destroying the illusion that we have the authority of Socrates for the minute accuracy of the report. It may further be conceded that of the dialogues which are similarly dramatic in form, several of the most important are on other grounds probably the last of all,—the Sophist, Politics, Philebus, Timaeus, Laws. But, not for the present to state objections to an hypothesis which makes the Gorgias a later dialogue than the Republic,—not only is the Phaedrus thus placed inordinately late, but the Laches, Io, Euthyphro, Crito, Meno, and Cratylus must either be rejected, or assumed to belong to the later half of Plato's career. A theory which undertakes so much is somewhat heavily weighted, and this one happens to be not very securely based. For the Preface shows, not that the Theaetetus is like some dialogues in its dramatic form, but that (in having a formal introduction) it is unlike all. And the inference to be drawn from this is rather that Plato was willing to vary his style in such external respects, than that he now adopted a hitherto unthought of plan to be henceforward uniformly followed by him. Indeed, if he had laid so much stress upon this point as Teichmüller supposes, there was nothing

1 Jowett’s Plato, iv. 225.
to prevent him from revising the whole series of his writings in the same sense.

10. In the Theætetus, the various notes of the most undoubted of Plato's writings are present in felicitous harmony. While rivalling the Symposium in perfection of form, and containing touches of humour and of enthusiastic insight which recall the Phædrus, it is, of all the dialectical dialogues, the most exact in philosophical expression. And in the subdued eloquence of moral earnestness it is comparable only to the Phædo, Gorgias, and Republic.

To return once more to the vexed question of its position in the series. The Symposium cannot have been written before the division of Arcadia in b.c. 384. But in the Symposium, Plato has not yet broken with the poets (p. 209), and the Republic is therefore later than the Symposium. Now it has been seen that the indications of style in the Theætetus bring it very near indeed to the Republic, while it has close relations with dialogues which are later still. The combined maturity and freshness, complexity, subtlety, and lightness of the Theætetus are consistent with the result thus indicated, that when he wrote it Plato 'had on his back' years (at least) forty-eight. He has himself indicated (at 180 E) the point of view from which the dialogue was composed. The battle of the philosophies was not yet over. Socrates had set up a standard of knowledge, which, supported by his dialectic as preserved at Megara, was sufficient to overthrow the popular doctrine of mere relativity, and to cast a shadow of 'philosophic doubt' over the scepticism of the day. But the ground gained hitherto had been mainly in the region of negative proof. In order to win an entrance for Science upon the 'terra firma' of positive reality, it was still necessary to criticise afresh the first principles of dialectic itself, and to come to a final reckoning with Parmenides.

What came of this final reckoning need not be considered here. But it may be observed that the difficulties raised in the Theætetus, no less than those in the Parmenides, tend to show the inadequacy of merely formal reasoning, and to prepare the way for a provisional solution, in which an indeterminate element, whether to be known as \( \delta \alpha \rho \epsilon \rho \omicron \nu \), \( \alpha \nu \epsilon \pi \rho \omicron \nu \),
πολλά, or ἀνεφρος δύνα, is to be admitted into the region of speculative truth;—in which the composite nature of οὐσία is also to be admitted, and the correlation of or communion of different categories postulated.¹ In working out this problem, 'new weapons' have to be introduced into the Platonic armoury, while some of those here exhibited are retained in use.

¹ See H. Jackson, On Plato's later Theory of Ideas, Journal of Philology, Nos. 21 and 22. This discussion throws additional light on Theet. 201, 2.
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The dialogue has been written down by Euclides and is produced by him on the occasion of Theætetus' expected death. The persons are, Socrates, Theodorus of Cyrène, and the boy Theætetus.

Time, just before the trial of Socrates.

Theodorus introduces Theætetus to Socrates as a youth who has all the essential qualities of the philosophic nature. Socrates acknowledges the authority on such a point of Theodorus as an accomplished teacher. He begins to question Theætetus. ‘You go to Theodorus for wisdom, i.e. Knowledge. But what is Knowledge?’ ‘Geometry, arithmetic, astronomy; shoemaking and other handicrafts.’ ‘That is an enumeration of Knowledges, not a definition of Knowledge.’ ‘I see, you want a general expression, such as I and young Socrates here lately invented for irrational quantities.’ ‘Excellent, only try.’ ‘I want to do so all the while, but cannot.’ ‘Then come to me, who am the man-midwife of young minds.’

Socrates proceeds to expound the nature of his art in such a way as effectually to encourage Theætetus, whom he once more exhorts to try his best. The youth now answers,

1. Knowledge is Sensation.

This (1) is shown to be the same with the dictum of Protagoras, ‘Man the Measure,’ i.e. Things are to each man as they appear to him:—which again is proved to rest (2) on the mysterious doctrine of Heraclitus and other great men that All is Motion and that things are not but become.

(3) Sensible perception is then explained as the momentary outcome of the meeting of action and passive motions. Sensation is an instantaneous process; all attributes are absolutely relative.
(4) Sensation and quality are twin vibrations, perpetually shifting from place to place, whilst agent and patient (object and subject) change their attributes indeed, but are comparatively (though never entirely) stationary. They are slow motions, whereas the others are swift.

(5) What are known as the illusions of dreams and madness and the disordered taste of the sick palate are accounted for by this hypothesis. The unpleasantness of wine is as real to Socrates ill, as its pleasantness is to Socrates when well.

(6) Thus the doctrines of Heraclitus and Protagoras unite to substantiate the answer of Thesetetus, of which they are the objective and subjective counterparts.

I. (a) 1. But the theory, if consistent, is somewhat strange.

Does it not make all percipients equally wise, and make discussion purposeless? Protagoras is no wiser than an ape: Thesetetus is as wise as any god.

(2) This is perhaps a superficial objection. Let us examine the statement ‘Knowledge is Sensation.’

Then to see without understanding is to know; to remember without seeing is not to know.

Further, one may know and not know the same thing, know it near but not far off, know it faintly and strongly, dimly and vividly, and the like.

(3) To this Protagoras would reply by depreciating mere verbal quibbles, and boldly accepting the facts, that memory is indistinct, that each man differs infinitely from himself, and may at the same moment both know and not know the same thing.

In supporting his thesis, he would maintain that men’s perceptions differ not as true and false, since all alike are real; but as better and worse. And the wise man is he who can change them from worse to better, whether in men or vegetables, in individuals or states.

I. (6) Theodorus being now the respondent, Protagoras’ own maxim is examined, as explained by himself:—What seems to each man is real to him to whom it seems.

Does it not seem to each man that other men are wiser than he?

If all think always truly, some think falsely.

Theodorus has trouble in maintaining his opinions. Are they false to his opponents, but true to him?

Most men dissent from the opinion of Protagoras. But his opinion justifies them in their dissent. Is the one ‘measure’
h�e to be preferred to the many? Or does not the one confirm the many, by asserting that they are right in thinking him wrong?

I. (γ) Protagoras is not in life, and would not be convinced if he were. But his followers will hardly maintain that all men are equally wise in knowing what is wholesome for the individual or expedient for the state. So much indeed has been already hinted in Socrates’ defence of Protagoras (I. (a) 3).

(At this point the argument is interrupted with an eloquent digression, in which the life of the philosopher, who has leisure for many arguments, which he can drop and take up again at will, is contrasted with the life of the politician).

—Well, the state makes laws with a view to expediency, of which experience is the only test. And the same is true of every judgment which regards the future. Protagoras professed himself a better judge than his disciple could be of the persuasiveness of a rhetorical speech. So far, then, the doctrine of absolute subjectivity is disproved.

I. (δ) But what of the immediate perceptions of warmth, white, and sweetness? Are they always true for the percipient at the moment? Even this cannot be maintained by those (I. (3)), who base the doctrine of Sensation upon the doctrine of Motion.

All motion is either change of place (φορά) or change of nature (αλλαγής). And if motion is absolute, all things are always moved in both these ways. Therefore the perception and the quality which fit between subject and object, as before described, must also change their nature in the instant of sensation, so that they cannot be so much as named. Each thing no sooner is, but it is not; it is no more thus than not thus; or rather it is anyhow and nohow.

In the course of this argument Theodorus has expressed his abhorrence of the Heracliteans of Ephesus, whose doctrine is as unstable as the Universe in their conception of it. Theaetetus now asks that the opposite doctrine,—that of Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus, may be discussed.

II. Socrates avoids this task for the present, but takes Theaetetus again in hand and resumes the previous question about the nature of Perception. The sensible qualities of objects are perceived not with but through the organs of sense. And there are some attributes which the mind herself perceives without a separate organ,—number, difference, sameness, being. The mind’s own judgment of these things is called Opinion.
CONSPECUS.

Now Opinion is either true or false, and Knowledge is True Opinion.

But how is false opinion possible? We have already felt this difficulty within the sphere of sense. It now returns upon us in a more abstract form.

Three answers are proposed, and each is followed into various ramifications. False opinion is (1) to think without Knowledge, or (2) to think what is not, or (3) to mistake one thing for another. For thought is the mind's dialogue, and opinion is a silent proposition.

But each of these answers leads to insuperable difficulties, and, finding ourselves in a strait, we are driven to seek aid from the imagination. (a) Shall we say that the mind takes impressions like a waxy block, and that mistake occurs in the process of identifying new impressions with the old, i.e. at the meeting-point of sensation and memory?

This image does not extend to mistakes in abstract reasoning. (b) Then shall we compare the mind to an aviary containing birds, some of which are gregarious, some grouped in families, some solitary and ranging over all? We have caught them all, and have them all within the mind, but as they fly about we may get the wrong bird by the wing, and so may take a rock-pigeon for a turtle-dove, and this is false opinion. Even here the image comes short of the reality. For so far as we take hold of the wild pigeon we have it actually in hand as known, and cannot err about it.

However, leaving this subsidiary question unsolved, we find a short cut to answering the main question, whether True Opinion is or is not Knowledge. The judges in a law-court have often been brought by rhetoric to form a true opinion of matters of fact, which no arguments can demonstrate. They have True Opinion but not Knowledge, which in such cases cannot exist without ocular demonstration.

III. Wherein then does Knowledge differ from True Opinion? If we can find this, perhaps we shall at last find the definition of Knowledge.

(a) Knowledge is True Opinion with an account of the object. That of which no account can be given is unknowable.

(b) The prime elements are unknowable, while their complex or combination is known. The element can only be named. The
nature of language implies that an account comprises more elements
than one.

Here are two statements, which may be considered together.

True Opinion with an account or reason is a plausible definition
of Knowledge. But how can the complex be known if the element
is unknown? In learning to read, we learned the letters first,
then syllables. In learning music, we first learn the notes.

Yet, on the other hand, the syllable may be regarded as an in-
dependent unity springing from this combination of the letters.
And this leads up to the general question of the relation of parts
to a whole. Is the whole identical with all the parts, or separable
from them? Is ‘All’ in the singular identical with ‘All’ in the
plural? So far from simple unity being unknowable, we find that
the object of Knowledge is always one and indissoluble.

But, to return to the former of our two statements, If Knowledge
is true Opinion with an account, what is meant by the latter term?
Three answers are again proposed:—

1. Statement in words. But this is universally attainable.

2. Enumeration of parts or elements. (Definition by analysis.)
But I may enumerate the parts, having only true opinion of them
and not Knowledge.

3. Definition by the characteristic difference.

But here again the question rises, Does such definition rest on
Knowledge or on True Opinion? And if the former, then we have
once more to ask ourselves, What is Knowledge?

The art of Socrates condemns all the answers hitherto given.
But Theaetetus, who has been delivered of more than he knew was
in him, will be more fruitfully inventive, or at least more intellec-
tually modest, in the time to come.
ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.

ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ,
ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

ἈΡΤΙ, ὃ Τερψίων, ἦ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ;
ΤΕΡ. 'Ἐπιεικὸς πάλαι. καὶ σὲ γε ἐξήτουν κατ' ἀγοράν καὶ θεαίμαζον, ὅτι οὐκ οἷος τ' ἦ εὐρέων.
ΕΥ. Οὐ γὰρ ἦ κατὰ πόλιν.
ΤΕΡ. Ποῦ μὲν;
ΕΥ. Εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων Θεαίτης ἐνέτυχον ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἀθήνας.

3. ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ] Euclides and Terpsion appear also in the Phædo as the Megar-rians who were present at the death of Socrates, p. 59 C: Καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων. Compare with the preservation of this dialogue by Euclides, and the introduction of Theodorus of Cyrene, the preservation of the Pythagorean dialogue by Phædo, and the introduction in it of Simmias and Cebes (Φιλολόγων ὁμογενῶν). See also Tim. 27 A.

5. For the ellipse (of ἔνεις or some such word) cp. the omission of ὲ with ἕως, infr. 143 E. This idiom suits the conversational style.


7. καὶ θεαίμαζον] It is perhaps intimated that Euclides, like his master Socrates, was to be found daily in the marketplace.

9. 'Where, then?' μὲν expresses surprise.

11. ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου] For the expression compare Charm. 153 Α: Ἐκ Πολιδαίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου. For the probable date of this battle see Introduction.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΤΕΡ. Ζώντι ἡ τετελευτηκότι;

ΕΥ. Ζώντι καὶ μάλα μόλις ἱαλεπῶς μὲν γὰρ ἐχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτὸν αἱρεὶ τὸ γεγονός νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι.

5 ΤΕΡ. Μῶν ἡ δυσεντερία;

ΕΥ. Ναί.

ΤΕΡ. Οἶον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι.

ΕΥ. Καλὸν τε καὶ ἁγαθὸν, ὁ Τερψίων, ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ νῦν ἥκοντον τινων μάλα ἐγκομιαζοῦντων αὐτὸν περὶ τὴν μάχην.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδὲν γ' ἀτοπον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτον ἢν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ αὐτοῦ καὶ Μεγαροὶ κατέλευνεν;

ΕΥ. Ἡπείγετο οἰκαδε· ἐπεὶ ἔγωγ' ἐδεόμην καὶ συνεβούλευον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἤδελε. καὶ δήτα προπέμψας

1. Ζώντι ἡ τετελευτηκότι] Terpsion's fears are excited by the word φερομένω.
2. Ζώντι καὶ μάλα μόλις] ‘Indeed, only just alive.’
3. μὴν [‘However.’
4. αὐτόν] ‘Affects him.’ Compare Soph. Ant. 606 : τῶν οὖν αὐτοῦ πολὺ παντογίρως. ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι completes the sense of γεγονός: i.e. τὸ πάθημα τὸ ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι γεγονός: but the expression is less formal.
7. Οἶον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι] ‘What a noble life is then in peril!’ The worth of Theaetetus is acknowledged by his Megarian friends, and is further confirmed (though confirmation was needless, ll. 11, 12) by the praise of him which Euclides has just heard (καὶ νῦν, l. 9).
9. ἥκον] The imperfects here and below, ll. 14, 15, refer to the time spent by Euclides in company with Theaetetus and those who carried him.
11. θαυμαστότερον] Sc. ἡ δή.
The conversational ellipse, continuing the idiom from οὖν γ' ἀτοπου, avoids the awkwardness of repeating ἢν. (θαυμαστότερον ἡ Schol., Thom. Mag.)
14. ἐπεί... ἐδεόμην] Wohlraub compares infr. 150 A B, 158 A, 167 A, etc. ἐπεί... γε in such places marks the necessity of the foregoing explanation. It was not for want of friendly insistence that Theaetetus did not stay, but because he longed to be at home.
15. δήτα implies that there is something important to be said. ‘And, I may tell you.’
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

π. 142. αὐτοῦ, ἀποιῶν πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ἐθαύμασα Σω-
κράτους, ὡς μαντικός ἄλλα τε δὴ εἶπε καὶ περὶ τοῦ-
του. δοκεῖ γάρ μου ὁ λόγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν
αὐτῷ μερικῷς ὡς, καὶ συγγενόμενος τοις καὶ δια-
λεξθεῖσι πάνιν ἀγαθὴν καὶ ὕπατο τῆς φύσιν. καὶ μοί
ἔλθοντι Ἀθήνας τοὺς τε λόγους ὧς διελέξθη αὐτῷ
δηγήσατο, καὶ μάλα αξίως ἄκοψ, εἰπὲ τε ὅτι πᾶσα
ἀνάγκη εἰς τοῦτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι, εἰπὲ εἰς
ἡλικίαν ἔλθων.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ ἄληθῆ γε, ὡς ἐσκευή, εἶπεν. ἀραρ τίνες ἦσαν
οἱ λόγοι; ἔχους ἂν δηγήσασθαι;

ΕΥ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐκοιν ὅτι γε ἀπὸ στό-

p. 143. ματος’ ἀλλ’ ἐγραφάμην μὲν τὸν’ εὔθεις ὑκαὶ ἐλθὼν

1. ἀποιῶν πάλιν] 'As I re-

turned.'

ἀνεμνήσθην] Sc. ὁ εἶπε Σ.

περὶ τοῦτον. The sentence is

modified by the introduction of

the verb ἐθαύμασα. 'I recalled

the words of Socrates about

him, and marvelled at the pro-

phetic insight, which, like many

sayings of Socrates, they show-

ed.'

3. δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι] δοκεῖ gives

a slight uncertainty to the ex-

pression. It here qualifies ra-

ther the mark of time ὁ λόγον πρὸ

τοῦ θανάτου than the infinitive

ἐντυχεῖν. So below, 144 C, δο-

κομεῖ belongs more in sense to

ἀλειφάμενον than to ἰόνι. 'I

think it was a little while be-

fore his death that he met with

him.'

8. εἰπὲ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθων] 'If he

lived long enough.' These words also, as inter-

preted by the event, have a

prophetic sound.

εἰς ἡλικίαν] Sc. τοῦ ἐλλόγιμος

γενέσθαι.
(1871) proposed ἐγραφαὶ μὲν. But both the middle voice and the particle are idiomatic and expressive. And although μὲν at first opposes the written notes to an extempore repetition, it is quite Greek, though not quite logical, to utilize it for the minor opposition (with ἵνα τε) of the fair copy to the notes or rough draft.

1. ὑπομνήματα] ‘Notes.’ See Phaedr. 275 A, where letters are called ὑπομνήματα φάρμακον: ib. 276 D.

3. δὲ μὴ ἐμμυρήματος] ὅτι μὴ ἐμμυρήματος. μὴ gives indecisiveness to δὲ.

6. Ἀλκηθεὶς ἡκουσα] The clauses are parallel and not consequent; hence the σαφεῖσθαι. Heindorf’s conjecture, adopted by Schanz, ἀλλ’ ἡδὲ ἡκουσα σου καὶ πρότερον, although most ingenious, is less idiomatic than the MS. text.

καὶ μέντοι, κ. τ. λ.] μέντοι opposes Terpseus’s present confession to his question in 142 D, which implied ignorance of the story. ‘And, now I think: of it, I have always wanted to ask you to show it me, but have let opportunities slip till now.’ That which is really most emphatic is expressed by the participle. It has been objected to this rendering, (a) that δείρο is not used as an adverb of time except with μήκος or ἄρτι, (b) that διατίρπησων, meaning ‘to delay,’ could not have been used here without an adverb of place. But, (a) such transference of adverbs from place to time is not unusual, and it occurs in the case of δείρο in Plat. Tim. 21 D: ἢν ἐδέ η δῆς ἐπιραφεῖ μὲν, διὰ δὲ χρόνον καὶ ἐμβολὴν τῶν ἐγγεγραμμένων οὐ διάπρεπε δείρο ὁ λόγος. In the present passage, the deviation from common use is softened by the neighbourhood of ἄρτι. Comp. Ἐσχ. Eum. 596: Καὶ δείρο γ’ ἄρτι τὴν τίχυν ὀν μέμφομαι. Such a refinement upon a common phrase is in the manner of Plato. And (b) διατίρπησων is elsewhere used absolutely, with a touch of blame in it, as meaning not simply ‘to delay,’ but ‘to waste time.’ See Rep. 5. 472 B: Λέγω, καὶ μὴ διατίρπησι θυσίας 42, 43, 47: also Aristoph. Eq. 515: Φθορί γάρ ἄνθρωποι ὄν ἀναθεῖ ταῦτα πεπάνθετε διατίρπησων, where it occurs together with a participle, as here.

8. πάντως ἐγὼς . . . δείμαι] ‘Besides, as I have walked in from the country, I should in
They enter the house, and Euclid produces the roll, which his servant reads to them.

any case be glad of a rest.'
This asyndeton is frequent, πάνωσε having the force of a particle. Infr. 162 Δ: Πάνωσε καὶ οὖν ὃι μᾶλ' ἐμμελοῦσαν ἐνέπαλαν ὑπακοῦν. Polit. 268 E: Πάνωσε οὐ πολλὰ ἐκφέρεται πάνωσε ἕτη.
1. 'Ερυνών ] 'Ερυνῶν was a spot on the Cephisus, close to Eleusis, where it was fabled that Plato had descended with Proserpine. Paus. 1. 92. There were other places of the name.
2. ὅ ποιος | Euclid's servant. 7. οὐκ ἔμοι Σωκράτης ἴσον ἔμελον κ.τ.λ. ] These words are parallel to οὖσαι τών λόγων, depending on ἴσον ἔργασις. Compare Arol. 19 ο: Ταύτα... ἀφαύτη... Σωκράτη... τερματίζοναν.
8. τῇ τε γεωμετρίᾳ Θεοδώρῳ] Theodorus the mathematician of Cyrene, with whom, according to a doubtful tradition, Plato once studied. He is a geometer, and stands thus on the threshold of philosophy; and he is of Cyrene, the city of Aristippus, with whom he may be also connected as being one of the friends of Protagoras. See infr. 164 E: Όι εὐπροσομοὶ σὺς Πρωταγόρας κατ᾽ ἐλεύθερον... έις Θεοδώρου εἰς θοῖς.
10. οὐκ οὖν εἰς τῇ γραφή, κ.τ.λ.] Imitated by Cicero, de Amic. c. i: 'Quasi enim ipso inter loquentes, ne inquam et inquit sapientia interponendum.' Teichmüller finds in these words the transition from the earlier to the later manner of Plato. But this seems to prove too much. See Introduction.
11. "αἱ μεταξὺ... διηγήσεις] 'The bits of narration interrupting the dialogue.'
πελώναι τε] πελώναι depends immediately on διηγήσεις, and ὅτε λέγει is epexegetic. Editors have preferred αὐτοῦ, placing the comma at διηγήσεις, which makes the syntax more regular, though with an awkward inversion. The MSS. often err in reading αὐτοῦ for αὐτοῦ, but it is safer to follow them where there is no manifest error.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ἢ ἂν περὶ τοῦ ἀποκριμωμένου, ὅτι π. 143. Συνέβη ἢ ὁ Ὀἰχ ὁμολογεῖ, τούτων ἐνεκα ὡς αὐτὸν αὐ-

τοὺς διαλεγόμενον ἔγραψα, ἐξέλον τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου, ὁ Ἑυκλείδη.

ΕΥ. 'Αλλά, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε.

ΣΩ. Εἶ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκηδόμην, δ

ἀνθρώπων,


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In this Preface we have been introduced to Theaetetus as a man already distinguished among his fellow-citizens. In what follows we are to see the promise of his youth. We are told of Theaetetus by late writers (besides the fact that he heard Socrates and followed Plato) that he taught mathematics at Heraclea, and that he was the author of the first treatise on the five regular solids. The interval which this seems to require between the trial of Socrates and the death of Theaetetus (to which it is difficult not to suppose an allusion here) increases the uncertainty of the date. But see Introduction.

6. Εἰ μὲν . . .] 'If my heart were in Cyrene.' There is an imperfect sequence of clauses, arising out of the interposition of the clause ήττον γὰρ . . . ἐπεξεκισε. The last words form a transition to the main thought, to which the speaker gradually returns. The opening is characteristic of Socrates. He begins by putting an analogous case, in which the person addressed is interested.

7. τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν . . . ἀνθρώπων]
ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μὴ, οὖ Σώκρατες, ἐμοὶ τε εἰσεῖν καὶ ἐὰς τεύχειν τοῖς καὶ ἧμιν τοῖς νέους ἐπιμέλειαι ποιοῦμεν; τὸν δέ—ηττον γὰρ ἐκείνους ἡ τούσδε φιλόδοκο, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμώ εἰδέναι τίνες ἢμῖν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενεικεῖσι ταύτα δὴ αὐτοῖς τε σκοπόν καθ’ ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔροτὸ ὦς ἂν ὅρῳ τοὺς νέους ἐθέλουσα ξυγγίγνεσθαι. σοὶ δὴ ὦν ἐλέγομαι πλησιάζωσα, καὶ δικαίως αὕτως γὰρ τὰ τέ άλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ἐνεκα. εἰ δὲ οὖν τινὶ ἐνέτυχες ἄξιος λόγοι, ἥδεος ἂν πυθόμην.

1. ἢ τίνα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν
'Or other liberal pursuit.' Comp. Tim. 88 C: 'μισθία καὶ πάσα φιλοσοφία προχώρομεν.' This word, like ἐπιτηδεία, ἐπιστήμην and others, is used by Plato sometimes in the more general and familiar, and sometimes in a more restricted and technical sense.

2. νῦν δὲ, κ. τ. λ.] It makes little difference whether νῦν δὲ is joined immediately with ταύτα δη., κ.τ.λ., or with a suppressed apodosis of which these words are a resumption. In the latter case we should omit the break with Wohlrab, Schanz and H. Schmidt.

3. τίνες ἢμῖν τῶν νέων] ἢμῖν (sc. τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις) is not emphatic. The emphasis is anticipated in τοίοῦτο.

4. τίνες ἢμῖν τῶν νέων... (8.) 1. ἢμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν] Comp. Thuc. 1. 6: 'Ο μεταβιβάσα τούτων τῶν εἴδους ἡμῶν.


11. εἰπῶν refers to λόγον inl. 9.


PLATONOS

soi akousai paion a'xiou, oifer umin ton politon mei

rakiai entetochkika. kai ei mev hyn kalos, efoboumen

an sfodra lenein, mvs kai to dào w ev entidumia authou

eivai' nyn de, kai mou a'xhoun, ouk esti kalos,

proseiskei de soi th ton te simotita kai to ezw ton

ommaton ypston de h so taiv elxei. adedos dh lgein.

ev gar ido oti doi polytoe enetugou, kai paion

palloi peplepsiaka, oudeina pòs hstoumen outh

thetaumastos ev pevukota. to gar evima dh onta, os

efobalumon. An imitation of

this passage occurs in the Sym-

posium attributed to Xenophon,

c. 5.

'to ezw ton ommaton' (1) 'In

having prominent eyes.' So

this point in the description of

Socrates has been commonly

understood. But may it not

rather mean (2) 'in the width

between the eyes,'—a confor-

mation sometimes accompany-

ing a powerful brain? This suits

with the tofobalw parabolow

of Aristophanes quoted by Plato

in Symp. 221 B (cp. Phaed. 86

D). As efw with the article takes

the place of an adjective, so it

is used here, like a neuter ad-

jective, for the abstract notion

of 'outwardness.' Cp. to sfodra,

Symp. 210 B, Phil. 45 C.

9. to gar evimaih osta .. ynymoiou

The anacolouth adds

to the expression of surprise.

Cp. Frolag. 317 A: To ouv

anodidramoua dh doxasai anpo-

dranai, allla katafani einai, polle

moria kai tou enkaihmatoi. Farm.

128 B: To ouv .. outhos istor-

ron lgein osate mveden ton authon

eirpeinai dokein scheidon to le-

gonasa taiva, uper hmais toue

allou fainetai umin to eirman

edosiai.

os allw xalipou] The simple
and obvious meaning of these words, 'as it is hard for another to be,' i.e., 'in a degree hardly to be equalled,' has been questioned by critics because it was thought that χαλεπὸν could not be applied to qualities that are not acquired. But the word is not tied down to this preciseness of meaning. It has passed out of it even in Homer. Cp. Od. 11.150: Χαλεπὸν δὲ τάδε ζωῆσιν ὀράσθεν (which may be similarly explained as = χαλεπὸν ἄστι τοις ζωοῖς τάδε ὀράσθαι).

So elsewhere in Plato χαλεπὸς occurs where human agency is not in question to signify 'next to impossible.' See Rep. 6.502 C: Χαλεπὰ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἄδυναν γε—viz., that philosophers should be kings, a consummation requiring, as a precedent condition, the combination of qualities which is indicated here. What Plato would think of this grammatical refinement may be inferred from his caricature of it in the Protagoras, 344 E: Σὺ δὲ φύσ, δὴ Πίττακε, χαλεπὸν ἀσθάλον ξημερεῖ τὸ δὲ . . . ἀδύνατον.

3. γενέσθαι (τουτώτῳ τώ), 'I should not have thought there could have been an instance of this combination, nor do I find it usual.'


ἀλλ' οἳ τε, κ. τ. λ.] The thought is exactly paralleled in the Republic, where the same combination of qualifications is described as essential to the philosophic nature, and its rarity is dwelt upon in similar words. Rep. 6.503 C: Ἐθυμαθεῖς καὶ μημονεῖς καὶ ἄγχοι καὶ ὁμοίως οἷος ὅτι οὐκ ἔδειξαν ἀμα πάντα ὑματικῆς καὶ νεκροτεκνίκης τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τός δικαίως, οἵοι κοιμώμε κατ' ἴσηι καὶ βεβαιωτός τούτων ἐδέξαται ἵνα, ἀλλ' οἳ τοιούτοι ὑπ' ὁμοίως τῆς ἀφθονίας ἔρχονται, καὶ τὸ βίβαζον ἀπ' ἀυτῶν ἐξαίχθησαι. Ἰλεόθυ, ἐφι, λέγεις. Οὐχιγόραν τὸ βίβαζον αὐτοὐτα ἴθει καὶ οὐκ ἐφυητάζει, οὐ τις μάλλον ἄς πιστοῖς χρήσατο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς ψάθους δυσκύλητα δοκεῖ, πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὐτοὺς ποιεῖ τάς τε δυσκύλητας ἐγείρει καὶ δυναμίζει, καὶ ὑπόρου τε καὶ χάριμον ἐμπλήσσεται, ὅταν τε δὲ τοιούτου πεποιηθέντων; So the difficulty of combining bravery with gentleness is dwelt upon, ib. 375, 6. See also Polit. 309, 310, Legg. 6.773. The essentials of the philosophic nature enumerated in the 6th Book of the Republic are, love of truth, quickness in learning, good memory, liberality, justice and gentleness, temperance, courage. Thesetetes is the embodiment of this nature.


5. πρὸς τὰς ὀργάς ὀξύρροποι] 'Impetuous.' 'Quick in temper as in mind.'
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

tes φέρονται οὔσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοία, καὶ μαντεῖοι. B κότεροι ἡ ἀνδρεύσεις φύονται, αἱ τε αἱ ἐμβρυθεστεροὶ νοθροὶ ποὺς ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες. οὐ δέ οὖτω λείως τε καὶ ἀπαίστως καὶ 5 ἀνυπόμωτο εἴρθεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις μετὰ πολλῆς προάστωσι, εἰδον εἰαίων ῥεῖμα ἄψοφηθε ρέοντος, ώστε θαυμάσασα τὸ τηλικοῦτον οὖτα οὖτω ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Εὕθς ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἐστὶ τῶν πολι-

10 τῶν;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημονεύον δὲ οὐ.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶνδε τῶν προσώπων ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ. c ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐξό δρόμῳ ἠλείφουσα ἑταῖροι τῇ τινίς

2. φύονται] Rep. 6. 503 C: Οὐκ ἔδιδον... ψέσθαι. 'Have more the nature of madmen than of courageous men.'


5. ἀναιτίας] 'Successfully'—'Making rapid progress.'


9. καὶ αἰτίας for further information.

11. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημο-

νεύον δὲ οὐ] Théodoros takes the interest of a teacher in the youth himself, Socrates, or of a fellow-citizen in his father.

12. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐστι... ἀλλὰ σκό-

πε! This double ἀλλὰ is frequent in Plato. Comp. also Soph. Phil. 520: 'Ἀλλ' αἰσχρὰ μὲν τοῦ γὰρ ἐνδείκτερον | ἦν ψέον μετά τοῦ καίρου ποινήν.| ἀλλ' εἶδοκε, πλέωμεν. The second ἀλλὰ puts definitely forward the proposition for which the first ἀλλὰ has cleared the way.

13. ἐν τῷ ἐξό δρόμῳ] The scene then is a gymnasium, perhaps the Lyceum. Compare Euthyrh. 2 A: Σὺ τὰς ἐν λυκείῳ καταλήψιοι διαιρέσει ἐνδεικτέᾳ νῦν διαφέροις ἐς τὴν τοῦ βασιλείου στοάν; taken in connection with infr. 210 D: ἐν τῷ τοῦ βασιλείου στοάς. Théodorus had seen the young men in the portico as he entered. The word δρόμος seems to have been applied to several parts of the gymnasium. Euthy. 273 A: ἐν τῷ καταστήματι δρόμῳ. (See the whole passage.) Aristias ap. Polluc. 9. 43: 'Ἡν μοι παλαιότερα καὶ δρόμοις ξυστάς πέπλασα. Archaeologists are not agreed as to the exact part of the palestra which is here indicated. ἑταῖροι τῇ τινίς] One of these,
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 144. οίτου αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, νῦν δὲ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλεξία-
μενοι δεύορ ιέναι. ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ γεννάσκεις αὐτοῖς.

Σ. Γεγυνώσκω: ὁ τοῦ Σωκράτους Ἐφυρονίου ἔστι,
καὶ πάνω γε, ὁ φίλε, ἀνδρός ὁν καὶ σὺ τούτου δει-
γει, καὶ ἀλλα εὐδοκίμου καὶ μέντοι καὶ ὑπόθων μάλα 5
πολλὴν κατέλεπτε. τὸ δ’ ὅνομα οὐκ ὁθὰ τοῦ μερακίου.

D. ΘΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὁ Σῶκρατες, τὸ γε ὅνομα τῆς
μέντοι ὑπόθων δοκοῦσι μοι ἐπιτροποὶ τινες διεφθαρκέ-
ναι: ἀλλ’ ὅμοιον καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ρημάτων ἔλευθε-
ρώτητα θαμαστός, ὁ Σῶκρατες.

Σ. Γενικῶν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. καὶ μοι κέλευε
αὐτὸν ἐνθὰ παρακαλίζεσθαι.

ΘΕΟ. Ἑσται τάντα. Θεαίτητε, δεύορ παρὰ Σω-
κράτη.

Σ. Πάνω μὲν ὅν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ὃν κάγῳ ἐμαυτὸν 15
ἀνασκέψομαι, ποῖόν τι ἢ ὁ πρόσωπον. φησὶ γὰρ ἐκ
Ε. Θεόδωρος ἔχειν με σοὶ ὁμοίον. ἀπὸν ἐν ἡν ἡ ἐχότων
ἐκατέρου λυράν ἐβη αὐτάς ἠμώσθαι ὁμοίον, πότερον
scious of, ὅταν κρίνεις μέλλης ψυχήν

Νέος Σωκράτης, is named in this
dialogue, and is an interlocutor
in the Politics. The others
remain mute. Such ἕως πρό-
σωπα occur in many dialogues;
e.g. Lysias, Charmantides, etc.,
in the Republic. Observe the
idiomatic use of δοκέω here and
infr. D. Cpr. supr. 142 C.

4. καὶ τάνῳ] καὶ is intensive,
5. καὶ μέντοι] 'And surely,
now I think of it.' This is a
reason why the youth should
have been better known. The
construction returns to the
indicative.

Ε: Καὶ μὴν ποὺ καὶ τόσε δεῖ

the gymn-

13. Θεαίτητοι] The abrupt
vocative, without ὃ, is the
address of the master to the
pupil.

15. ἐκαί] καὶ is to be taken
closely with ὅ and the verb.
Cf. Soph. Antig. 280: Πάνω,
πρὶν ὁρίζῃ κάμε μεστώσας λέγω
(where join πρὶν καὶ μεστώσας).
19. εἰ μουσικὸς δὲν λέγει] The
'As he is a cultivated man, we must respect his judgment of our mental endowments.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐπεσκεφτάμεθ' ἄν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὐφόρτης ἐπειθόμεθ' ἄν, ἄμουσον δὲ, ἡπιστοῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθή.

5 ΣΩ. Νῦν δὲ γ' ὄμαι, εἰ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν προσώπων ὁμοιότητος, σκέπτεον εἰ γραφικὸς ὁν λέγει π. 145. ἦ ὦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν γογγαφικὸς Θεόδωρος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔχ, ὅσον γ' ἐμε εἴδεναι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικὸς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως δὴ πού, ὃ Σάκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικὸς τε καὶ μονοτόκος καὶ ὄσα παιδείας ἔχεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἁρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σώματός τι ὁμοίους φησίν εἶναι ἑπαινῶν την ἡ ψέγων, οὐ πάνυ αὐτῷ ἀξιον τῶν νοῶν προσέχειι.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ἰσως οὖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', εἰ ποτέρου την ψυχὴν ἑπαινοὶ πρὸς ὑπ'...

man then is not the measure of the likeness of musical sounds! Yet afterwards Theaetetus is wholly unconscious of contradicting thus his first admission.

1. Ἐπεσκεφτάμεθ' ἄν] Cp. esp. Crit. 47 B: Γυμναζόμενον ἀνήρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παρόν ἀν-

10. ὅχ, ὅσον γ' ἐμε εἴδεναι] The Cesena MS., with a few others, has γ' ἐμε, but the greatest number (including the Boll.) read γι με. ἐμε seems more pointed, 'not that I know

of,' but με is possibly right.

11. Ἄρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικὸς;] 'Nor a geometrician, neither, eh?' There is an archness in the question, which affects to make doubtful what is matter of notoriety.

13. Ἡ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς] 'I wonder if he is also an astrono-

20. εἰ ποτέρου] 'The mind of one of us two.' The indefinite πότερος occurs several times in Plato. Cp. Soph. 252 Α.: 'Εστι πότερον αὐτών, ὀδιάς μη προσκοινοῦνον; Though not common in other writers, it is precisely analogous to the
Therefore, Thesletus, you must be cate-
chized by me; for he has praised you to me
very highly.

You learn
from Theod-
dorus sever-
things.

9. Ἐδ ἄν ἔχω] 'That is
good!'—'I am glad to hear it.' Or rather, perhaps, more
hypothetically, 'It is well, if it is so.' For (1) cp. Menex.
249 Ε: Χάριν ἔχω τῷ εὐνοῦ. Σ. Ἐδ ἄν ἔχω. ἄλλα ὅπως μοι μὴ
cατερίζει. And for (2) Polit. 277 Α: Καθὼς θέλεις ἄν
ὁμιν ἔχων. Σ. Καλῶς ἄν, δὲ Σ., ἦμιν ἔχωι. δὲι δὲ μὴ σοί μόνον ταῦτα,
avl alla kaimo—έφυσκεν.
11. μὴ ἀναδίω τὰ ὁμολογήματα] 'Do not shrink from what you
have agreed to.' Cp. Hom. Π. 13. 225: Οὗτος τε ἰδον Ἐλκών
ἄνδυται πολίμως κακοῦ. Euthyd. 302 Ε: Οὐκ ἣττῳ γὰρ μοι ἀνά
dωσε.
ΟΣ. Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἀρμονίας καὶ λογισμούς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμούμαι γε δή.

5 ΟΣ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὡς παί, παρά γε τούτον καὶ παρ’ ἄλλων, οὐς ἂν οἰμαί τι τούτων ἔπαινεν. ἀλλ’ ὁμοι, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχον περὶ αὐτὰ μετρώσω, μικρὸν δὲ τι ἀπορῶ, δ’ μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τῶνδε σκέπτεσθον. καὶ μοι λέγει· ἄρ’ οὖ τὸ μαθήματος ἔστι τὸ σοφότερον γίγνε·

10 σοι δὲ μαθήματα τίς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὕ; Η ΟΣ. Σοφία δὲ γ’ οἰμαί σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοὶ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

15 ΟΣ. Τότε δὲ μῶν διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίουν; Η ΟΣ. Ἡ σοφία. ἦ οὖχ ἀπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοὶ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΟΣ. Ταῦτα ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

14 ΟΣ. Τούτ’ αὐτὸ τοῖνυν ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπορῶ καὶ οὔ δῦ-

2. τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν] ‘A-

3. οὗτος γε δή] ‘I cer-

4. Προθυμούμαι] ‘I cer-

5. ταῦτα γε τοῦτον] γε (the

6. ἀλλ’ ὁμοι, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα . . .

7. For the ironical μικρὸν

8. ἀπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ

9. For the indefinite plural

10. ἀπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ

11. For the version of Ficinus, 

THEAETHTOS.

145. ναμαι λαβέων ἑκανός παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, Ἐπιστήμη ὅ τι ποτε
tυγχάνει ὃν. ἄρ' ὅων δὴ ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτῷ; τί
φατε; τίς ἂν ἡμῶν πρώτος ἐπιοι; ὁ δὲ ἄμαρτὼν,
καὶ ὁ ἂν ἂλτ ἄμαρτάνῃ, καθεδέται, ὡσπερ φανείν
ὁ παῖς ὁ σφαιρικότερος, ὁνος. ὅς δ' ἂν περιγένηται
ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιστάξει ὁ τι ἂν
βούλησαι ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Τὸ σχισάτε; οὐ τί ποιοῦ οὐ
Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογιῶν ἀγροικίζομαι, προθυ-
μοίμενος ἡμᾶς ποιήσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλοις τε
καὶ προσηγγόροις ἄλληλοις γίγνεσθαι;

b ΘΕΟ. Ἡκιστα μὲν, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν
ἐίη ἄγροικον, ἄλλα τῶν μειρακίων τι κέλευς σοι ἀπο-
κρίνεσθαι, ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀξίως τῆς τοιαύτης δια-
λέκτου, καὶ οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ διεξοθεῖσθαι ἦλικίκαν ἔχω. τοῦτο

1. λαβέων ἑκανός] 'To grasp adequately.' 'To get a clear
conception of.'
2. λαβέων ἑκανός παρ' ἐμαυτῷ] Phil. 50 D: Λαβᾶστα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφείναθα, κ.τ.λ.
3. ὁ δὲ .. ἄμαρτάνῃ] 'But he who makes a blunder, or who-
ever is in error from time to time.'
4. καθεδέται .. ὅνος] Schol. Τῶν οὖν παιδίων ταῦτα τοῖς μὲν
μικρῶται βασιλείς εἰκόνοι, καὶ δὲ τι ἂν προπετάτων τοις ἄλλοις ὑπῆ-
κοινοι, τοῖς δὲ ἢπειρωμένοις ὅνοις.
7. Σιριδε] So the Bodleian MS. Others (including Ceb.)
have ύπας by a common error. The first person is obviously
more in keeping with the urb-

10. προσηγγόροι] The active
and passive meanings are com-
bined. 'Mutually conversable.'
8. Republic 8. 546 α: Πᾶνα
προσήγορα καὶ ἓντα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναι. There is possibly an
allusion to the mathematical
meaning here: 'to make you
friends, and bring you into
relations with one another.'
9. Republic 7. 534 D: Ἀλόγου
ὅτοις ὥσπερ γραμμάς, and the
phrases Σύμφωνα καὶ συνάγομαι,—
Ὁμοία καὶ συνάγομαι, in later Py-
thagorean writings.

11. μὲν is omitted in T.
12. τῶν μειρακίων τι] Steph.
conj. τωά, which is also found
as a correction in one MS., but
cp. Euthyd. 277 D: Ἄνδρας τι
τετύμησαν τὸ μειράκιον, βουλήμενοι
ἀνασύναται αὐτῷ.
13. διαλέκτου] 'Conversation,'
with something of the more
technical meaning of 'abstract
discussion.' Republic 5.
14. A: Ἕριδας, ὁ δὲ διαλέκτος,
πρὸς ἄλληλους χρόμενοι.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

dε πρέπει τε ἄν τοῦτο καὶ πολὺ πλεῖον ἐπίδοσιν ἐστὶν τῷ Ἰωάννῃ ἐστὶν ἐπίδοσιν εἶχεν. ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ἤρξασθα, μὴ ἀφίσσο τοῦ Θεατήτου, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα. Ἔναί. Ἀκούσεις; δή, ὁ Θεατήτης, ὁ λέγει Θεόδωρος, ᾧ ἄντιστάσει, ὡς ἠγίω ὁμοιοί, οὕτω καὶ ἡθολογήσει, οὕτως καὶ θέμισ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄνδρι σοφῶς ἐπιτάττοντι νεώτερον ἀπεδείχθη. ἀλλ' εἴπο τι καὶ γενναῖος εἰπέ· τί σοι δο-κεί εἶναι ἐπιστήμην;

ΤΕΛ. Ἀλλα ἐρὶ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ πρός ἰκεῖτε, τάντας γάρ, ἢν τι καὶ ἀμάρτω, ἐπανωρ-θώσετε.

ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἢν πέρ γε διόν τε ὅμοιον.

ΤΕΛ. Δοκεῖ τοινυν μοι καὶ ἄπαρα Θεωδώρου άν τις μάλιστα ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἄν τιν δή ὑπῆρξε, καὶ αὕτη σκυτοτομική τε καὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συμμετρικῶν τέχνης, πάσης τε καὶ ἔκαστης τούτων, οὐκ ἀλλ' ἤτις τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Γενναῖος γε καὶ φιλοδόρος, ὁ φίλα, ἐν αἰτη-θείς πολλὰ δίδωσι καὶ ποικίλα ἄντι ἀπλοῦ.

2. ἐπίδοσις ἔχει] Rep. 7. 536
D : Διαλόγων γάρ οὐ ποιησθεν, ὡς γνωρίσκως τι τάλα δυνατό μακ-βάνεις, ἀλλ' ἤτοι τῇ τριχαίμ, νῦν δὲ πάντες οί μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πάνω.

3. μὴ ἀφίσσο τοῦ Θεατήτου, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα] Cr. Lach. 184 C : Ἕρη δ' ὅπερ σοι οὐξ ἀρχής ἔλεγον, καὶ τακράτης τόδε μὴ ἀφίσσο, ἀλλ' ἀπειθήσας συμβουλεύεις. Rep. 5. 449 C.

5-7. ἀπιστώς, 'to disobey,' ἀπιστέον, 'to be disobedient.'

5. οὕτω δίκαιος . . . νεώτερον ἀπει-θείς] Instead of making ἀπιστῶν depend on δίκαιον, a new clause is introduced expressing the particular point in this disobedience which make it unlawful. The like change occurs often in Plato, and is part of the fulness of his style. See above. 144 B: ὃς δ' θαυμάσαι, κ.τ.λ., and note.

10. πάντως γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] Thea- tetus is not yet alive to the difficulty of the subject. He is sure that Theodorus and Socrates have entire command of it.

14-17. ἐπιστήμων . . . ἐπιστήμη] Theaetetus does not distinguish between sciences and science. Grammatically, the variation is caused by the introduction of the singular ἐπιστήμη.

18. Γενναῖος γε] Referring to
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣ.

146. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τούτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. "Ἰσως μὲν οὐδέν ὁ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω,

ὁταν λέγης σκατικήν, μὴ τί ἄλλο φράζεις ἡ ἐπιστή-

μην ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδεν.

ΣΩ. Τί δ’, ὅταν τεκτοικήν; μὴ τί ἄλλο ἡ ἐπι-

στήμην τῆς τῶν ἑυλίνων σκευῶν ἐργασίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲ τούτο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ ἐκατέρα ἐπιστήμην,

τούτο ὀρίζεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅσι.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ’ ἐπερωτηθέν, ὁ Θεατής, οὐ τούτο ἦν,

εἰ καὶ γεναιδος above, and to

Theodorus’s praise, supr. 144 D.

19. σοκιλλα] Either ‘a rich

variety of things,’ or ‘many

complex notions for one simple

one.’ The analysis of terms

which follows points rather to

the latter meaning; but the

former is more natural, and is

supported by comparing Phile-

bus 12 C (at the opening of

the dialogue): Τὴν δὲ ἕδοσθι οὐδα

ὡς ἐτὶ ποικλὸν . . . ἐστι γὰρ

ἀκόντων μὲν οὕτως ὅπλας ἐν τι, μορ-

φᾶς δὲ δησον πανταῖς εἰλήφη καὶ

των τρόπων ἀνομίας ἀδόλημον.

The two objections (πολλά, ποι-

κίλα) are discussed in the

reverse order. See below: Τίνων

. . . ὑπόσιαι, Πρῶτον γε ποι . . . Ἑπιτά

γε ποι, κ.τ.λ.

1. Πῶς τί] What (τί), and


Soph. 261 Ε; Πῶς τί τοῦτ

εἴτες; ὅπερ φήβην, κ.τ.λ. Some

editors interpunctuate in all

such cases (πῶς; τί, κ.τ.λ.). But

the Greek idiom often combines

two interrogations in a single

clause.

2. Ἰσως μὲν οὐδέν] Sc. λέγω,

‘perhaps I am talking non-

sense.’

3. σκατικήν] This is said to

have differed from σκατοτομη

(above); and the change of

word is an instance of Plato’s

love of variety (ep. supr. C:

ἀπιστέω . . . ἀπιστεύω). Perhaps

the one was a generic, the other

a specific term. At least they

do not exclude each other in

Plato. See Rep. 2. 374 B:

’Ἡ αὐν σκατικῆς διε μᾶλλον κήθε-

σαι ἢ πολεμικῆν; ὘δημών, ἧλι

δρα τῶν σκατοτόμων, κ.τ.λ. Ib.

10. 601 C: Πούσαι δε γε σκα-

τοτόμοις καὶ χαλκεῖς; . . . οὐδ’ ὃ

πούσας δε τε χαλκεῖς καὶ δ σκα-

τεύοις;

3. ὅταν . . . φράζεις] ‘You express

by the term “shoemaking.”’

12. ὅταν . . . ἐρωτηθέν] ‘But

what I went on to ask you.’ Cp.

supr. p. 16. l. 3, μὴ ἀφίσσο, κ.τ.λ.

τὸ δὲ γε ἐρωτηθέν is a MS. con-

jecture (‘τὸ δὲ γε, τ ms. τὸ δὲ γε

ἐρωτηθέν, Ven. suppl. 7.’ Schanz).
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὑπόσα τιμές. οὐ γὰρ ἄρθρη- p. 1
σαί αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἡρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ γνώναι ἐπιστή-
μην αὐτὸ ὁ τι ποτ' ἐστίν. ἡ οὔθεν λέγω;

ΘΕΑ. Πάνιν μὲν οὖν ὀρθός.

5 Σ. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἰ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων p. 1
τι καὶ προχείρων ἔρωτο, οἷον περὶ πηλοῦ, δὲ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα αὐτῷ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν χυτρεῶν
καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν ἱπποπλαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν πλυν-
θοργῶν, οὐκ ἂν γέλοιον εἴμεν;

ΘΕΑ. Ἰσος.

10 Σ. Πρῶτον μὲν γε ποι οἰόμενοι συνέναι ἐκ τῆς
ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τῶν ἑρωτώντα, ὅταν εἴπομεν

1. τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὑπό-
σα τιμές] The first answer of
Meno to the question, 'What is
virtue?' is exactly analogous to
this of Theaetetus about know-
ledge. Instead of attempting
to generalize, he enumerates
the several kinds of virtue.
Men. 71 E: Ἀνδρὸς ἄρετήν . . .
και ἄρετήν . . . παιδὸς ἄρετή, κ.τ.λ. Socrates replies (Men.
72 A): Πολλά γε τινὶ εὐπορίας
σαί κεχρήσθαν, δὲ Μῖνω, εἰ μὲν
ζητῶν ἄρετήν σαίς τι ἀλήτρει
ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κειμένων, κ.τ.λ.
The whole passage should be
compared with this. See also
Lach. 191, 192, where Socrates
finds a similar difficulty in lead-
ing the respondent to the con-
ception of a general notion,—
and Soph. 240, where Theate-
etus is again entrapped into a
similar mistake in defining the
word εἰδέλον.

2. ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ] Rep. 472
C: Καὶ τις ἡμᾶς—εἰ ἀποκρι-μεθαβούν
οὐδὲ ἐστίν.

5. εἰ τις ἡμᾶς—εἰ ἀποκρινα-
μεθα] For the double εἰ comp.
πηλός, εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέτες εἴτε ἄλλων ἐν ὀντινωνοῦν δημιουργῶν. ἦ οἶεί τές τι συνήσι τινος ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἴδε τι ἐστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ’ ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνόψεσιν ὃ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ.

ΣΩ. Σκυτικὴν ἄρα οὐ συνύψεις ὡς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἄγονή, οὐδὲ τινα ἄλλην τέχνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ ἑωτιν οὖτος.

ΣΩ. Γελοία ἄρα ἡ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθείτι ἐπιστήμην τί ἐστιν, ὅταν ἀποκρύφη τέχνης τινος ὄνομα. τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἀποκρύφηται, οὐ τοῦτ’ ἐρωτηθείσι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ Εὐκερ.

ΣΩ. Ἡ ἐπειτα γέ ποι ή ἄγον φαιλόω καὶ βραχεῖως ἀποκρινάσθαι περιέχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδόν. οἰον καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτηθείς φαιλόν ποι καὶ ἀπλοῦν

1. εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέτες] It is in Plato’s manner to surprise us with a fresh example at each step of the argument, instead of dwelling upon one already adduced. Rep. 3. 333 B: ὁ ἀπόκρισις τοῦ ἐρωτηθείτι, οὔτω καθ’ ἕκτ’ ἐπιστήμην τί ἐστιν, ὅταν ἀποκρύφη τέχνης τινος ὄνομα. τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἀποκρύφηται, οὐ τοῦτ’ ἐρωτηθείσι.

2. οἶεί τές τις τές is made oxymoric here because of τι following. oĩol is parenthetical, and therefore does not affect the position of the enclitics. For the sense cp. Men. 80 D: Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητέσει, ὁ Ἀραχνατε, τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ οἴει οὐκ ὁ παράπαν ὅ τι ἐστιν.

12. ὅταν ὁ, ὄνομα] 'When he gives as an answer the name of a particular art.' The accusative is cognate.

15. Ἡ ἐπειτα γέ ποι] This ought strictly to refer to the illustration; to which the sentence presently returns. But Socrates had reverted to the main subject in the preceding instances.


17. ἐν τῇ τῶν πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει] For the form of reference with ἐν cp. Thucyd. 1, 9: Ἐν τοῦ σκῆπτρου τῇ παράδοσει, Phileb. 33 B: Ἐν τῇ παραδοσεί τῶν βιων. The frequency of this idiom perhaps assists the genitive.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

εἰπεῖν ὅτι γῆ ὑγρῷ φυσικῶς πηλός ἀν εἶ, τὸ δ’ π. 14 ὅτου ἐὰν χαίρειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐραίον, ὥς Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνεται: ἀτὰρ κυνεύεις ἐρωτᾶν ὅλον καὶ αὐτῶς ἡμῖν ἕναγχος εἰσῆλθο διαλεγομένον, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σῷ ὑμών κύρω τούτῳ Σώκρατε. 

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποιόν δή, ὦ Θεάιτη; 

πηλῶν, which is descriptive rather than objective. 'In the question of the clay.'

1. πηλός ἀν εἶ[.] Either, (1) 'earth, if tempered with moisture, will be (ἀν εἶ) mud,' or (2), 'moistened earth would seem to be (ἀν εἶ) the definition of mud.'

2. ὅτου is masculine (supr. A B), although τῶν above (p. 19, l. 13) was neuter.

3. νῦν γε οὕτω] 'Now as you put it.' So far Theaetetus has appeared wholly unfamiliar with the conception of a universal notion. But Socrates' illustration reminds him of the comprehensive simplicity of geometrical expressions. And thus he finds a clue in what he knows to the new labyrinth of inquiry into which Socrates invites him. Mathematical ideas, being the first pure abstractions obtained by the mind, are peculiarly fitted to guide it to the contemplation of abstractions generally. So at least thought Plato: Rep. 7. 522–531. On the minuteness of such illustrations see Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. (1840) p. 197: 'A number of Plato's dialogues are intended merely to produce the consciousness of a general notion, which we possess without the trouble of acquiring it. Hence his dis-
cursiveness has often the effect of tediousness to us.'

In reading what follows, it must be borne in mind that, by the ancients, arithmetic was studied through geometry. If a number was regarded as simple, it was a line. If as composite, it was a rectangular figure, whether plane or solid. To multiply was to construct a rectangle, to divide was to find one of its sides. Traces of this usage still remain in terms like square, cube, common measure, but the method itself is obsolete. Hence it requires an effort to conceive of the square root, not as that which multiplied into itself produces a given number, but as the side of a square, which either is the number, or is equal to the rectangle which is the number. The use of the Arabic notation and of algebra has greatly assisted in expressing and conceiving the properties of numbers without reference to form.

6. Σώκρατει] Young Socrates becomes the respondent in the Politicus. To introduce him here by name is quite in the manner of Plato. Naber's proposal to cancel this word, and Μεγαρός supra. 142 B, is surely erroneous. To do so would be to blur the outlines which Plato has made distinct.
1. Περὶ δυνάμεων τι ἡμῖν θεόδωρος δεδέχη τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντάποδος ἀποφαίνων ὅτι μὴ κείνην ξύμμετρον τῇ ποδαίᾳ, καὶ οὕτω

But it is not clear that in Plato’s time this point of terminology was fixed. And on comparing 148A it would rather seem that δύναμις is here an abbreviation for ἡ δύναμις γραμμή εὐθεία, i.e. to speak arithmetically, not (1) the ‘power’ but (2) the ‘root,’ and the same term is presently limited by Theaetetus and young Socrates to irrational roots. Cf. Eucl. B. 7. Def.: ἐκ δύο δυναμῶν πρῶτη, δεύτερα, etc. ἀποτιμὸν πρῶτη, δεύτερα, etc. This explanation suits the context best. But the question is not one of much consequence. For just as the sides of the squares which are equal to 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17 are δυναμεῖς σύμμετροι, the squares themselves may be described as ἡμῖν ἀσύμμετροι τῇ ποδαίᾳ, i.e. having irrational sides.

2. Η. Schmidt, who is followed in this by Schanz, has deleted the comma which was placed after πεντάποδος in previous editions.

3. τῇ ποδαίᾳ] Sc. (1) δυναμεῖς, or (2) εὐθεία:—the unit of measurement for integer quantities. The meaning is that the line \( = \sqrt{1} \) or \( \sqrt{r} \) is incommensurable with the line \( = \sqrt{3} \).

H. Schmidt takes τῇ ποδαίᾳ (δυναμεῖς) for an instrumental dative, ‘commensurable by the “unit.”’ This is less natural than ‘commensurable with unity,’ and particularly awkward if δύναμις is the square. For how can a square be the measure of a line? If the words τῇ ποδαίᾳ were cancelled as a gloss, they...
κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην προαιρούμενον μέχρι τῆς ἐπτακαί- p. 14'
θεκάσοδος· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ ποσὸ ἐνέσχετο. ἦμων οὖν εἰσ-
ήλθε τι τοιούτων, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειροῦ τὸ πλῆθος αἱ δυνά-
μεις ἐφαίνοτο, πειραθήναι ξυλλάβειν εἰς ἐν, ὅτι
5 πᾶσας ταύτας προσαγορεύσαμεν τὰς δυνάμεις.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ εὔρετε τι τοιοῦτον;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκοῦμεν. σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ.
ΣΩ. Λέγε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διειλαθομεν. τὸν
10 μὲν δυνάμενον ἵσον ἱσάκις γίγνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ

could be more easily spared
than many phrases which have
ever been excised by recent editors.

The square root of 2 was
also incommensurable with the
unit-line. But this had been
already proved in the familiar
theorem about the side and the
diameter of a square, and was
therefore passed over as already
known.

The sides of the square could
easily be found through the
familiar relation between the
hypotenuse and the other sides
of a right-angled triangle.
Thus, the diameter of 1 = √2.
The hypotenuse of √2 and
√1 = √3. And so on.

the construction is κατὰ σύνος,
as if it were εὑρέσθη, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.
'To generalize and find an
expression whereby we should
embrace them all.' Cp. Soph.
Philot. 341: Τοιγαρούν τὸ σων
φράσον ἀδικεὶ πάλιν μαί πράγμα, ὅτι
ὁ ἐνώμπισεν. Charm. 166 B: 'Επ'
αὐτῷ ἰέει ἐρευνών, ἀναδιάφῃν πα-
σῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ὡς σωφροσύνη.

9. Τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα] For
this collective use of ἀριθμὸς
cp. Phaed. 104 A: Ἡ γραμματίκα καὶ
πειμπάται καὶ ὁ ἡμείς τὰ ἄριθμα
ἐπιστάμεθα. Soph. 238 A: 'Ἀριθμῶν
βῆ τὸν ἑμώνα.

10. δυνάμενον] Used here in
its ordinary sense, without any
reference to δυνάμενον above.

Insensitive γίγνεσθαι] I.e. to
be made as a square number,
which, as Euclid says, is a ἱσάκις
ίσος, ἡ ὁ ὅπω διὸν ἵσον ἀριθμὸν
περιεχόμενον. 'To arise by the
multiplication of equal
numbers.' Such technical abbre-
viations hardly admit of strict
grammatical analysis. But this
formula may be accounted for
by the apposition of parts to the
whole. Cp. infr. 148 A:
'Ἀδύνατον ὅτι ἱσάκις γίγνεσθαι,
κ.τ.λ. 193 C: Ἀδυνάτου εἰς ἀριστερά,
and note.
THEAITHTOS.

Π. 147. τὸ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνον τε καὶ ἱσόπλευρον προσέπομεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν τοῖνυν μεταξὺ τούτου, ὃν καὶ τὰ τρία καὶ τὰ πέντε καὶ τὰ ὅσο ἀδύνατος ὅσος ἱσόκλισις γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ πλείων ἑλαττονάκις ἢ ἑλάττων πλεονάκις γίγνεται, μεῖζον δὲ καὶ ἑλάττων ἁέρ πλευρὰ αὐτῶν περιλαμβάνει, τὸ προμήκης αὐτὸ σχῆματε ἀπεικάσαντες προμήχη ἁρμθὸν ἔκαλεσαμεν.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡςει μὲν γραμμαῖοι τὸν ἱσόπλευρον καὶ ἐπίπεδον ἁρμθῶν ἑτερογενεῖς, μήκος ὁρισάμεθα, ὡς τὸν ἑτερομήχη, δυνάμεις, ὡς μῆκει μὲν οὐ

1. τετράγωνον τε καὶ ἱσόπλευρον]
The expression is amplified and varied for the sake of non-mathematical readers.

9-13. προμήχη... ἑτερομήχη]
These terms were distinguished by the later Pythagoreans. Nicomachus says that ἑτερομήχης ἁρμθῶν has one factor greater than the other by 1, προμήχης by more than 1.

12. τετράγωνοι;] 'Form as their squares.' This use of τετράγωνοι is enough to show that geometrical terminology was not yet fixed. See the notes on δυνάμεις... προμήχη... ἑτερομήχη.

ὡς μῆκει μὲν οὐ δύναμται εἰκονίζειν, τοῖς δ' ἑπίπεδοις δ' ἱσόκλισις;] Translate either, (1) 'not commensurable with the former in linear measurement, but in the superficial content of their squares,' or (2) 'not commensurable with them in linear measurement, while they are mutually commensurable in the surfaces of which they are severally roots.' I.e. the lines which are (or stand for) the irrational roots are not commensurable with the integral roots or with unity (Ῥ ροδίαχος), but their squares, being integers, have a common measure.

They are commensurable not in themselves, but in their squares, that is, they are potentially commensurable (δύναμις μὲν οὐ δύναμις). For the construction of δύναμις comp. δυνάμεις αὐτά in the Def. of Euclid quoted above; also, Eucl. 10. 22: 'Ἡ δύναμις αὐτά. It remains doubtful whether the one set of roots (δυνάμεις) or both are the nominative to δύναμαι, and consequently, whether τῶν ἑπίπεδων refers (1) only to oblong number, or (2) to both oblong and square number. The former alternative may be adopted as the simpler; although the latter would be the more accurate expression. Instead of enumerating all the
irrational roots, which seemed infinite, they conceived the idea of finding an expression which should embrace them all. They first went for assistance from arithmetic to the less abstract forms of geometry (Ar. Met. 1. 2: Αλ γαρ ἐξ ἀλλότρων ἀκρι- 
βίωτοι τῶν ἑκ προσβάτοις λεγο-
μένων, οὐκ ἁρμηνευτικὴ γεωμετρίας).
Here they at once found a 
generalization. All numbers
which can be produced by equal
integers they called square num-
bers. The rest, formed of un-
equal factors, they called ob-
long. The roots of the former
can be measured by unity, the
roots of the latter cannot, though
the numbers themselves can.
Hence a general distinction,
and a simple nomenclature.
The roots of square numbers
they called μήκη, i.e. μέκε σύμ-
μετροί, commensurable in whole
numbers, the roots of oblong
numbers, δυσάμεις, i.e. δυσάμει
μόνον συμμετροί. And similarly,
in regard to solid quantity,
i.e. the cube roots of numbers.

In other words, $\sqrt{16} = 4$ or $16 = \boxed{4}$;

and $4 = \boxed{\text{the line forming one of its sides.}}$

On the other hand

$\sqrt{12} = 3.464$ or $12 = \boxed{\frac{6}{2}}$ and $2 = \boxed{3.464}$;

and $3.464 = \boxed{\text{not commensurable with the side of the former square, although the squares are commensurable. The boys ended with the term with which they started; and yet they had gained much: they saw now as one, what they had seen as many; as a whole, what they had seen as infinite; and this by limiting the application of the term and distinguishing the thing from that with which they had confused it. In like manner an advance is made towards a true conception of knowledge, when we have distinguished it from sense and from true opinion, although we fail to define it as it is in itself.}}$

4. οὐκ ἱμάχος τοῖς ψευδομαρτυρίοις ἔστωσαί 'Will not be found guilty of perjury.' Cp. supr. 145 C, οὐδεὶς ἐπισκέψῃ, and note. The article refers to what has been already mentioned. The feminine form ψευδομαρτυρίων is used in Legg. 11. 937 B.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 148. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὴν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὦ γε ἐρωτῆς περὶ ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ ἂν δυναμηθην ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως· καὶ τοῦ σὺ γε μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτον τι ζητεῖν ὡστε πάλιν αὐτὰ φαίνεται ψευδῆς ὁ Θεόδωρος.

c ΣΩ. Τί δαί; ἕι σε πρὸς δρόμον ἐπαινῶν μηδεὶς οὐτοὶ δρομικὸ ἐφή τῶν νέων ἑντευχηκέναι, ἔτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμᾶζοντος καὶ ταξιστοῦ ἡπτήθης, ἥττον τι ἂν οἰεὶ ἀληθῆ τὸν ἐπαίνεστα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἐγώγε. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἡσπερ νῦν ὑπὶ ἔγω ἑλεγον, ὁμορόν τι οἰεὶ εἰναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν πάντη ἄκρων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ τῶν Δί' ἐγώγε καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκρότατων.

ΣΩ. Θάρρηι τοῖνυν περὶ σαντῷ καὶ τι οἰον Θεόδωρον λέγειν, προθμυθήσθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν τε ἄλλων περὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί ποτε τυχαίως ὄν.

3. καί τε καί Τ.
7. διαθέων] Running a course. Comp. Prot. 335 E: Νῦν δ' εὕτε ὅσπερ ἂν εἰ δειοὶ μοι Κρίσιες τῇ ἱμαρίᾳ δρόμῳ ἀκμαίοις ἐπεσάβα, ὅ ταῦτα δολιχόδρομων τοί ἡ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διαθέων τε καὶ ἐπεσάβα.
9. ἄληθῇ is cognate or adverbial accusative, as in Menex. 242 D: "Ὅτε οὐκ ἄληθῇ ἀμφισβητοῖν.
12. τῶν πάντη ἄκρων] The Bodl. MS. has ἀπειθῶν, with an accent over the a, and a dot over each of the letters ς, ι. β. ἄκρων is required by the words which follow. Cp. Lach. 192 C: Τῶν πάντων καλῶν προγμάτων ἤγει σύ ἄνθρωποι εἰμι; Εἴ μὴν οὖν ἵστη ὅτι τῶν καλλίστων. The mistake perhaps originated in not perceiving that ἄκρων is masculine. 'Knowledge is no trifling matter to find out, but it belongs to men every way complete;' i.e. not, like the runner, accomplished in one thing only.
14. καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκρότατων] 'Most certainly, to men complete in the highest degree.' The superlative of ἄκρος, συμμέτωσις is a kind of double superlative. Cp. Legg. 10. 906 B: Τῶν παντάπασιν ἄκροτατων διατησοῦν.
17. προθμυθήσθην] Supr. 145 D.
18. ἐπιστήμης is governed partly by περί, but chiefly by λόγον.

But he fears that the question about knowledge is not so easy.

Socrates still urges him.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

26

ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμίας μεν ἔνεκεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φα- p. 141 νέται.

ΣΩ. Ἡθι δὴ καλὸς γὰρ ἁρτὶ ὑφηγήσω τειρὸ μυμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρατιν, ὡσπερ 5 ταύτας πολλὰς οὕτως εἰνε ἔδει περίελαβες, οὕτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰνε λάγος προσεπεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλα ἐδ ἴαθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σοῦ ἀποφερομένας ἑρωτήσεις. ἂλλὰ γὰρ οὕτι αὐτὸς ὁυ- 10 ναιμαι πεῦσαι ἐμαυτῶν ὡς ἰκανῶς τι λέγω, οὐτ' ἄλλου ἀκούσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύει· οὐ μὲν δὴ αὐ οὖδ᾽ ἀπαλλαγήν τοῦ μέλειν.

ΣΩ. Ὄδινες γὰρ, ὦ φίλε Θεάτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὸς ἄλλ᾽ ἐγκύμων εἶναι.


2. καλὸς γὰρ ἁρτὶ ὑφηγήσω Comp. Gorg. 455 D: Αὐτός γὰρ καλὸς ὑφηγήσω. ὑφηγίσαθαι is sometimes 'to set a pattern,' as in writing or drawing. Rep. 3. 403 E, Legg. 10. 890 C.

3. ἐν εἰδί περίελαβες . . . ἐν λά- γῳ προσεπεῖν] The processes of generalizing and of defining or naming, although more clearly distinguished here than supr. 147 D (συλλαβάζειν εἰν εἰν . . . ἀυτος προσοφοιɣότομον), are still considered as different aspects of the same thing.

4. ἀκούων . . . ἐρωτήσεις] Thus it is indicated that, although this is the first meeting between Theaetetus and Socrates, the curiosity of the youth had been previously awakened. Those whom Socrates had puzzled, had puzzled their com-panion in turn. See Apol. 23 C, Symp. 215 D.

5. The reading is doubtful. μέλειν has on the whole the best authority; but the reading of the Scholiast, εὐφέβεοι, which is found on the margin of several MSS., supposing it to have been originally a gloss, agrees better with μᾶλλον. There is an idea of uneasiness in μέλειν which suits well with the context. And although οὖν ἀπαλαγήν τοῦ μᾶλλον (ὁκ. ἵππως τι λέγων) is sufficiently Greek, yet 'to get rid of a care' is a simpler notion than 'to get rid of an incipient act.' For μέλεια used personally compl. Aesch. Ag. 370: ἔσοι βροτῶν ἐξώνεσθαι μέλειν. Soph.Electr. 342: Κίνου λαθέσθαι τῆς δὲ τικοτούσης μέλειν (where it may be impersonal, as perhaps here). Eur. H. F. 772: Ὑποὶ θεοῦ τῶν ὁδίκων μέλεος.

148. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἐίδα, ὥς Σώκρατες ὁ μέντοι πέπουθα λέω.

149. ΣΩ. Εἴτε, ὁ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὡς ἔγω εἰμι υἷος μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσύρας, Φαίνομαι γάρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁγίων τὸ ἔμφασιν, ἀκήκοας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡθῇ τούτῳ γε ἂκουσα.

ΣΩ. Ἠρα καὶ, ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτήν τέχνην, ἀκήκοας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ εἶ ἵσθι ὅτι μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπης ἵνα πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους λέγῃ τὰ γὰρ, ὅ ἐταξεῖ, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην, οἱ δὲ, ὅτε ὦκείδοτες, τούτῳ μὲν οὖν λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀποτύπτατος εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν; ἦ καὶ τούτῳ ἀκήκοας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιων οὖν σοι τὸ αἰτίον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἀπαν ὡς ἔχει, καὶ ῥέων μαθήσει ὁ βούλωμαι. οἶσθα γὰρ ποι ὡς οἰδεμά αὐτῶν ἐτι αὐτὴ κυσκομένη τε καὶ τίκ- 30

4. μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλο- 

5. ἁσύρας] Truly noble and valiant,’ or ‘commanding,’ or ‘of no common or feeble mould.’

γενναίας] ‘Of the right sort.’


13. ἀποτύπτατος, κ.λ.λ.] ‘That I am the strangest of mortals, and bring men to their wit’s end.’ ἀποτύπτατος is the very word to express Socrates’ idea of himself,—αὐτῶν τε καὶ τοὺς λύ- 

15. γονοῦ. Symp. 215 Α: Οἱ γὰρ τι βραβοῦ τὴν σημ ἀποτύπτατος ἦν ὑποτήτοι εὑρέθησαν καὶ ἐφεξῆς καταριμήσας, ἀποτύπτατος εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπορεῖν] Comp. Men. 79, 80: Ἡκονομοῖο μὲν ἔγωγε καὶ πρὶν συγγενῆσας σοι ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν Ἀλο ἦ αὐτὸς τέ ἀπορείς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκεῖ ἀπορεῖν. . . καὶ δοκεῖ μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καί ἐκπείρας, ἀποτύπτατος εἶναι τὸ τε ἐν τοῖς καὶ τῆς τι πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ βαλα- 

30. Consider the midwives; they have once had children, but

The whole passage is at least as much in favour of the MS. reading ἀποτύπτατος, as of Stallbaum’s conjecture, ἀπορέας, which was suggested by the former part of it. Men thought Socrates a strange being, because he made them discontented with themselves.
πλατωνος

tousta allaas maieutesai, alli ai hde adynatoi tik- p. 149.
tevn.

θεαι. Paniu mnen oin.

σω. Aitian de ge toutou fasin einai tin "arpe-
5 mnu, oti allochos odsa tin locheian eilhxe. stefrfsas
mnen oin ara ouk edoake maieutesai, oti h androptieta
phiisi asbevestera h labeiin tekhn tin wv an h apieros-
tais de di hekian atokes prosetaaxes, timosa tin
aithin omiotheta.

10 θεαι. Eikos.

σω. Oukoiyn kai tode eikos te kai anagkaion, tais
kousas kai mhe ginwoskevai malloos upo tov mouin
h tov allon;

θεαι. Pani ge.

σω. Kai mhn kai didousai ge ai maiai farmakia
kai epadosai doventaie geirein te tais adinias kai
malthakoterass, an boyloutai, poein, kai tiktein te o
de tas dystokousas, kai ev neon ev dixe amblis-
skein, ambliskousin;

4. Atrian] An adjective
agreeing as predicate with
"Artemis. 'Artemis is said to be
responsible for this.' Cp. infr.
150 E: Tis mnu mouiaios o teos
kai egw oimios.
5. Allohos] Used etymologi-
cally, as if from a priv., and
lechos o logicos.
6. Ara] According to this
tale. Cp. fosin supra.

η androptieta phiisi, k.t.l.] 'It
is not in human nature to be
come skilful where it is not
experienced.' This point is
dropped in the comparison:
unless Plato means to hint that
the art of Socrates was super-
human.
8. Atrous] Bodl. p.m. aistros.
The correction is by a recent
hand.

15. farmakia] The Diminutive
is noticeable. 'Gentle reme-
dies.'

17. tiktein te dei] Sc. poein.
Cp. Symp. 206 D: Skubropow te
(sc. ygenetai) kai lupousenu sv-
speryatai, k.t.l.
18. nevo de] Sc. tis brefor, said
here of the embryo, 'At an
early stage,' i.e. before abor-
tion is dangerous. Cp. Hipp.
de Morb. Mul. § 3, 97: 'Hη
149. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡστὶ ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Ἄρι οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἴσθησαι, ὅτι καὶ προμνῆστραί εἰσι δεινῶταται, ὅσ πάσοσοφοι οὖσαι περὶ τοῦ γνώσεων ποιῶν χρῆ ποιῶν ἀνδρὶ συνῳσκεῖν ὡς ἀριστοσ παιδας τίκτεων;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ τούτῳ οἴδα.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα οὖν ἔτι τούτῳ μεῖζον φρονοῦσιν ἡ ἐπὶ τῇ ὁμφαλητούμεα. ἐννοεῖ γάρ τής αὐτῆς ἡ ἄλλης οὔτε τέχνης εἰναι θεραπεῖαι τε καὶ ξυγκομῆδην τῶν ἐκ γῆς καρπῶν καὶ ἂδ γεγυμόσκειν εἰς ποιῶν γῆν ποιῶν ἑπτάντει εἰς καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέων;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς.
ΣΩ. Εἰς γυναῖκα δὲ, ὁ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οὖν τοῦ τοιοῦτου, ἄλλην δὲ ξυγκομῆδης;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν εἰκὸς γε.
150. ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἄδικον τε καὶ ἄτεχνον ξυγναγηγὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς, ἢ δὴ προκαγωγεία ὠνομα, φεύγοναι καὶ τὴν προμηθητικὴν ἀτε σεμναὶ οὖσαι αἱ μαίαι, φοβοῦμενα μὴ εἰς ἐκεῖνη τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐμπέσωσιν. ἔπει ταῖς γε ὅντως μαίαις ἵνα μόναι ποι προσῆκει καὶ προμηθήσασθαι ἀρθῶς.
ΘΕΑΙ. Φαινεται.

μηναῖον φθίρρι τὸ παιδών, where the same thing is spoken of.
(This explanation is adopted by Scharschmidt, 1874, and by H. Schmidt, 1877.) For the ellipse, which is a little difficult, cp. infr. p. 161 Α, τὸ γε σῶν, sc. κύμα. óντως is lost sight of as the sentence proceeds. The subject of ἀμβλιακουσων (used causatively) is still al μαίαι.

4. ποιῶν χρῆ] 'What woman should be married to what man, to produce the noblest of spring.'
13. Εἰς γυναῖκα simply repeats the construction of εἰς ποιῶν γῆν. In such cases the construction is often elliptical, as here.
16. ἅδικον τε καὶ ἄτεχνον] 'Unlawful and skill-less.' contrary to morality and nature. Socrates, according to his wont, assumes that vice is simply ignorance, so that 'vicious' and 'unscientific' are convertible terms.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Το μὲν τοῖς τῶν μαίων τοσοῦτον, Ἐλαττών p. 15: δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. οὐ γὰρ πρόσεπτο γυναιξὶν ἐνίοτε μὲν εἰδωλα τίκτεω, ἐστὶ δὲ ὧν ἄλλῳ, τούτῳ δὲ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι διαγνώσαι. εἰ γὰρ προσῆην, μεγίστον τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἑργον ᾧν ἂν ταῖς μαίαις τὸ κρῖνει τὸ ἄλλης τε καὶ μῆ. ἡ οὖκ οἶει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγογε.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ γ' ἐμῇ τήρη τῆς μαίευσεως τὰ μὲν

1. Παλτέον δὲ] There is a slight irregularity in the antithesis, occasioned by the stress on τοσοῦτον. The balance of clauses is, however, completed with τῇ δὲ γ' ἐμῇ, k.t.l.

2. τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος] It is doubted whether δράμα here and infr. 169 B, Rep. 5. 451 C, is literal—"function" or figurative—"rôle." In either case the unusual word ("performance" for "work") has here a humorously imposing effect.

8. Τῇ δὲ γ' ἐμῇ τήρη τῆς μαίευσεως] For the well-known metaphor, which is nowhere else so completely elaborated, compare Symp. p. 206, sqq. (where Diotima proceeds to explain the mystical expression τόκος ἐν καλῷ) κουσοὶ γὰρ, ἔφη, δὲ Σάκρατες, πάντες ἄφινες καὶ κατὰ τὸ σώμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ἐπιθύμων ἐν τινὶ ἠλείρα γένεσθαι, τίγετος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις. τίγετος δὲ ἐν μὲν αἰσχρῷ οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ. διοίκει δὲ τοῦτο δῖον τὸ πράγμα καὶ τοῦτο ἐν δητηρίῳ ὡς ἀφανίατον ἄστιν, ἡ κύπεσις καὶ ἡ γένεσις...

... οὖν δὲ τῷ κυώντως τε καὶ συμπαρασύων πολλή ἡ πτοιήσεις γέγονεν περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλης ἐνδοίναπλοικτοῦντων ἔχοντα. Ἰβ. 209: τοῖς οὖσιν ὧν τις ὡς νέους ἑγκυμών ἡ τῷ ψυχῆς θεῖος ἐν, κ.τ.λ. to the end of the speech. Repub. 6.

490 Β: Οὐκ ἀρκέωνος οἷδ᾽ ἐστολήγος τοῦ ἐρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ δὲ ἑστὶν ἑκάστος τῆς φύσεως δύνασθαι ψυχής ἐφέπετεθαι τοῦ τοιοῦτοι προσέχει δὲ συγγενείς φιλευτάσις καὶ μεγίστη τῷ ἄνω ἄνω, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀληθείαν, γεννήσας τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἐφή καὶ τρίφοτο καὶ οὕτως λόγου νοῦν, πρὶν δὲ σα. So far of the relation of the mind to knowledge. For the relation of the teacher and the taught see Phaedr. 276 E, 278 Α: Πολλ' οὖν, καλλίως σπουδήν περί αὐτῆς γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τήρησιν χρώμεσθαι, λαβόντων ψυχῆς προσήκουσαι, φυτεύων τε καὶ στείρη μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους, οὐποτέ τέ τις φυτεύοντας βοηθεῖν λειτούργει, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀσκοῦσιν ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα... δεῖν δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις αὐτοῦ λύγισθαι οἷον νικεῖ γεγονείς εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν ἐναυτῷ, ἢ ἐμφάνει εὖθυτα εἰπειν, εἰ ποτὲ ἡν ποτὲ τούτω έγονε τε καὶ ἀδελφοί ἄρα ἐν ἄλλωσιν ἄλλως ψυχής κατ' αὐτῶς ἐνέφυσασιν. For the theory of teaching and learning thus illustrated see Rep. 7. 518 Β: Δεῖ δὴ, εἰπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόδοτα νομίσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εἰ ταύτ' ἀληθῆ, τὴν παιδείαν, οὐχ οἶνος τινὲς ἐπαγγελλοῖς μενοῖς βασιν εἶναι, τοιαύτην καὶ ἐναυτοῦ, βασιν δὲ τού οὖκ ἐνέφυσεν εῖ συν ψυχῆς ἐπιστήμης σφείς ἐπηθέναι οἷον τούπλοις ἐφεδρικῶς ἀνὴν ἐπιθυμεῖ, κ.τ.λ.—where it occurs
under a different metaphor, that of the cave.

It is always difficult to separate the Platonic from the real Socrates. In the present passage they are indissolubly blended. That men thought Socrates the strangest being, and that he brought them to their wit's end, is matter of fact. The quaint humour, perhaps even the name 'Son of a Midwife,' is Socrates' own. But it is impossible to determine how far the theory based upon his practice, that to teach is not to put something into the mind but to evolve something out of it, or to turn the mind from darkness to light, was consciously held by Socrates himself, and how far it is Plato's theory of the method Socrates pursued. It receives its full development in the seventh book of the Republic, but is not there, as here, combined with the Socratic confession of ignorance.

3. μέγαστον δὲ τοῦτ’ ἐν] 'But as its greatest triumph my art comprises this.' δὲ answers to μὲν above, the former δὲ being parenthetical. μέγαστον recalls μέγαστον καὶ κάλλιστον supra.

5. δυνατόν] Sc. τὸν ἐκοινώσα αὐτήν.

εἴδωλον] Comp. Symp. 212 A., Rep. 7. 520 C. (From whence Bacon probably took his Idola.) Soph. 240 A, 264 B, 266 C.

6. ἀποτείκτη] 'Is delivered of.' ἀπο- denotes completion or result, as in ἀποσωμάτω, ἀποτελεῖσθαι.

7. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε] 'For I have the same previous condition which the midwives have, in being barren of wisdom.' ἐπεὶ implies 'This is our highest function, for like the midwives I cannot pretend to what is higher still, viz. original production.'

12. ὁ θεὸς] Who presides over my art as Artemis does over that of the midwives. ὁ θεὸς must not be identified with τὸ δαιμόνιον, though they are probably connected (see below,
eimì δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τις σοφός, οὐδὲ τί μοι p. 15
έστιν εὐήμη τοιοῦτο γεγονός, τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἔκ-
γονον; οὐ δὲ ἐμοὶ ξυγγυγοῦμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαί-
νονται ἐνοί μὲν καὶ πάνω ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προϊό-
5 στὶς τῆς ξυνοποιίασ, οὔσπερ ἄν ὁ θεὸς παρείκη, θαυ-
μαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδίδωτε, ὥσα αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
δοκοῦσι: καὶ τούτῳ ἔναργει ὅτι παρ᾽ ἐμοὶ οὖδὲν πά-
ποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ παρ᾽ αὐτῶν πολλαὶ καὶ
καλὰ εὑρύτες τε καὶ κατέχοντες. τῆς μὲντοι μανείας

and cp. Apol. 40 B: τοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ
σημείον), but belongs rather to the
belief expressed in Apol. 21,
23, where Socrates speaks of his
cross-questioning as a Divine
service, because occasioned by
the oracle at Delphi; and Phaed.
85 B: 'Εγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτός ἔγορα
ὅμορφοι εἶναι τῶν κόσμων καὶ
λέγει τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, i.e. sacred
to Apollo the god of the true
μονοκλή (ib. 61 A: οὐκ ἐπι-
σοφοφίας οὔσης μεγάτας μονοκλής):
but here, as in one or two places
of the Apology, the feeling is
generalized. The impression
remains, however, that Apollo's
part herein corresponds to that
of his sister Artemis.

1. τι] This is preferred as
the Bodleian reading. τι, the
reading of T, etc., may possibly
be right. C. F. Herm.
compares Phaedr. 228 B: Εἶ μὴ
πάντα τι ἡ μακρᾶς.
οὐδὲ τί μοι] 'Nor have I
had such a prize of my inven-
tion born to me, the offspring
of my own mind.' Perhaps
there is a slight play upon the
word εὐήμη. Compare Soph.
Ed. Tyr. 1107: Εἴη ὁ Βασίλειος
θεὸς εὑρήμα δέξαν' ἐκ τοῦ:[Νυμφᾶν
'Ελκυσάδαν, αἰς πλείστα συμπαίξεις;
but the primary meaning is

'inventory.' Cp. Phaedr. 278 A:
γλcharted γεγονός...γραμματείς εἰς, and εὑρύτες below.

2. ἐστιν...γεγονός] This differs
from γεγονόν as ἔχων with aor. or
perf. partic. differs from the
perf. act. This punctuation is
upheld by Burger, De Theat.
47, who, however, suggests that
γεγονός may be interpolated.
Most editors place the comma
after τοιοῦτο. Cp. Lach. 186 E:
ὤτε γὰρ ἕρετης ὤτε μαθητὴς οὐ-
δείς...γεγονός. The dior-
thotes of the Bodl. MS. has
placed a comma after γεγονός,
as in the text.

6. ἐπιδίδωσι] Sc. φαίνονται.

7. καὶ τούτῳ ἔναργει δέι] 'And
that manifestly.' τοῦτο, sc. το-
ιοῦσιν: viz. ἐπιδίδωσιν.

ἐναργεῖ δέι] A strengthened
form of δῆλον δέι. 'As clear as
day.' Plato frequently thus
extends an idiom. C. F. Her-
mann, Wohlrab, and Schanz
agree in deleting the comma
after ἐναργεῖ. It must be ad-
mitted, however, that καὶ τοῦτο
is more usual than καὶ τοῦτο
in such a connexion. The Bodl.
MS. favours the punctuation
of the earlier editors.

9. εὑρύτες τε καὶ κατέχοντες]

'Holding as their own dis-
coveries.' Schanz reads καὶ τεκόντες, which is found in some inferior MS. authorities, and may possibly be right, but may also be due to corruption, through the accidental omission of καὶ, or to MS. conjecture. The ν.τ. καὶ τεκόντες rather points to this; and κατέχοντες gives a perfectly good sense, expressing the satisfaction a man feels in the secure possession of that which he owes to the exercise of his own powers. Those who left Socrates too early had no such security. Wohlrab quotes Symp. 175 D: άνδρα γὰρ ὅτι εὐρές αὐτό καὶ ἔχεις. 3. ἓ ἀστό ἦν] 'They left me, whether it was that they despaired me, or were themselves won over by some one else.' The needless emphasis has given rise to suspicion. Heindorf read ἓ ἀστό ἦ (of their own accord, or through the influence of others'), for which there is slight MS. authority. Schanz proposes ἓ αὐτό, where αὐτό is still more superfluous than the minute antithesis. If ἓ αὐτό ἦ is read, the clause may be either joined to καταφρονη-

santes or (with L. Dissen quoted by Wohlrab) to ἀνδρα. The latter is more probable.

παιδίσκους] 'Attracted,' 'captivated,' cp. Thucyd. 6. 54.
4. τὰ... λοιπὰ] 'What more they had in them.' Cp. infr. 210 B.
5. ἐξήμβλασαν] Cp. Aristoph. Nub. 137: Προπτέροι εξήμβλασε εἴρησθαι (where, however, the verb is used causatively as above 149 D, ἀμβλασκόμενοι).

διὰ ποιητὰν ξυνοιλίαν] Symp. 206 C: Τίκτευν δὲ ἐν μὲν αὐτῷ τὸν συλλογικόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ. Cp. infr. 151 A B. The image of μαιευτική is merged in that of ποιητική. The word ξυνοιλία expresses more than one kind of intercourse.

9. 'Ἀριστείδης ὁ Δυσιμάχου] We read of the introduction of this youth to Socrates in the Laches, 179 A: Ἀριστείδης ἔστιν ἡ δυσιμάχους. Ἡμῖν ἐστω τινίς ὁμοίως ὁδῶν, ὅπερ μὲν τούτῳ... ἐμὸς δὲ αὐτῷ ἐδε' παπάφθων δέ καί οἶτος ὄνομα τιμεῖ τοῦ ματρὸς, Ἀριστείδης γὰρ αὐτῶν καλῶς. Lysimachus and Melesias are consulting Nicias and Laches, in the presence of Socrates, about their sons, Aristides and Thucydides.
1. δαυμαστὰ δρόμαντες] 'Showing extraordinary solicitude.' 'Going on their knees to me.' Cp. Apol. 35 A: 'Εώρακα τιμα... δαυμασία ἐργαζόμενος, καὶ δεινὸν τι οὐρανόν πιέζοντο εἰ ἀποδιδούνται.

2. τὸ... δαυμανὸν] Here, as always, not commanding, but forbidding; and, as generally, neutral and impersonal. This is not the place to discuss the subject. It suits well with the intensely self-reflective nature of Socrates (lost sometimes for whole days in thought) that he should pause suddenly on the eve of doing something, without being able (at the time) to explain to himself and others the motives of reason or feeling which checked his impulse.

3. οὖτοι] This is the reading of T and most MSS. The Bodleian has αὐτὸς, which is certainly admissible, and is perhaps also preferable as the more difficult reading. 'In some cases I am permitted to do so, and the men themselves improve.' But οὖτοι is on the whole more probable.

7. ἡ ἐκείναι] I has ἡ κείναι. Schanz reads ἡ κείναι.

9. πως] Qualifying μὴ δὲξομαι. 'Whom, somehow, I perceive not to be,' etc.

13. ἐξεδωκα] For the word cp. Soph. 242 D: ἄνινθε έτερος έιπών (τὰ δοτα), ἀνρωτι καὶ ξηρον έθρυμων καὶ ψυχρόν, συνοικίζει τι αὐτά καὶ ἄδειασι. For the thing cp. Lach. 200 D: Καλέων τις Νικόρατον τοίχων ἀνιστροφή, εἰ γάρ οὖτοι ἄλλα γὰρ ἀλλοι μοι ἐκάστοτε συνιστούσι. For the ironical hyperbole in θεσπεσία cp. Euthyd. 289 E: Καὶ γὰρ μοι οἱ τε ἀνδρες αὐτοῖς ὁ λόγου ποιεῖν, ὅταν συγγείμασιν αὐτοῖς, ξυράσοντος, καὶ Κλεόπνη, δοκοῦντο εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ τέχνη αὐτῶν θεσπεσία τις καὶ ὑψήλα.
151. ἕνεκα τοῦδε ἐμήκυνα, ὕποπτευόν σε, ὦστερ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀει, ὦδίνει τί κνουντα εὐδον. προσφέρου ὦν πρός με ὅσ πρὸς μαίας υἱόν καὶ αὐτοῦ μανετκόν, καὶ ᾧ ἀν ἔρωτο, προβιμοῦ ὄπος οἶος τ' εἰ, οὐτως ἀποκρίνασθαι. καὶ εάν ἄρα σκοπούμενος τί ὄν ἄν λέγησι, ἡγήσωμαι εἰδολον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἰτα ὑπεξαιρόμαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω, μή ἀγρίανε ὦστερ αἱ προφτοτοκι περὶ τὰ παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἦδη, ὃ ἑυμάσσει, πρὸς με οὕτω διεσέξουσι, ὅστε ἀτεχνος δὰκνευ ἔτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπειδὲν τινα λήρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι, καὶ οὐκ ὀδύται ἐνοικό τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδὲς ὁ θεός δύναντος ἀνθρώποις, οὐδὲ ἐγὼ δυναύτω τουκτοῦν οὐδεν δρόω, ἀλλά μοι γιευός τε ἐγυγχορήσας καὶ ἀληθές ἀφαιρήσας οὐδαμῶς θέμας. Πάλιν δὴ οὐν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς Θεαίητη, ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, πειρώ λέγεων, ὃς ὅ ῥοῦ όιος τ' εἰ, μηδέστοι ἐπίτης. εἀν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλη καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, οἶος τ' ἐστε.

Θεαι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὡς Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὕτω παρακλησεινενον αἰσχρόν μὴ οὔ παυτὶ πρόφορ προβήμεισθαί ὃ τί τις ἔχει λέγειν. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστάτης-μενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὃς γε μνινα φαινεται, οὐκ ἀλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἰσθήσης.

2. προσφέρου] Charm. 165 B: Σὺ μὲν ὁς φάσκεστοι ἐμοῦ εἰδέναι περὶ ὧν ἄρωτον προσφέρει πρὸς μέ μεὴς οἶος τ' εἰ, μηδέστοι ἐπίτης. εἀν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλη καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, οἶος τ' ἐστε.

10. τις λήρον] Some 'barren stuff.'
11. οὔς θεός] Plutarch in quoting this passage reads οὔς θεόν με. ΙΙ. οὔνες θεός] And therefore not the presiding genius of my Art.
15. τοῦτο ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἰσθήσης] The MSS. have ἀποβάλλω, Bekk. corr. See below, ἀφαιρέωμαι, where T and B pr. have ἀφαιρέωμαι.
Σ. Εδ' γε καὶ γενναῖος, ὃ παῖ· χρῆ γὰρ ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος p. 15 ἀποφανῶμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοινὴ σκεφτόμεθα, γόνιμον ἡ ἀνεμαίοι παγκεῖ ὁν. αἰσθητική, φήμη, ἐπιστήμη ἦν.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

Σ. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὗ φαίλοι εἰρη-


dered in English or any modern language, in which the notion of the five senses has become fixed. 'Sense-perception' is too definite for it here. See below, 156 B: Αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοῦτο ἅμικρα ἐξουσίαν δομᾶτα, ὑδάτεις καὶ ἀκολούθουσα καὶ ὑφήσεως καὶ καῦσεως καὶ ἐχθρίας γαίᾳ καὶ λίποι καὶ ἔπιπτον καὶ φῶςι καὶ φόβοι, κ. τ. λ. Perhaps 'to see and feel is to know,' is the nearest equivalent to what Theaetetus means. But 'feeling' has ethical associations which must be excluded here. The German word 'Sinn' presents a nearer parallel.

Before reflection begins, our individual impressions are those of which we are most conscious and most certain. And subjective certainty is the primitive meaning of to ἐπιστήμη. Hence aisthēsis seems at first sight identical with ἐπιστήμη. Cr. Phæd. 83 C: "Ὅτε γυμνὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγέλλεται ἄμα το ἐκείνη ἡ λυπηθής σφόδρα ἐτὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγείσθαι, περὶ δὲ ἀν αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτόν πάσχει, τοῦτο ἐναργεῖσθαι τοῖς καὶ ἀληθεύσεσθαι, οἷς ὄντως ἄν. Aristotle, Metaph. 3. 1009 b: Ἡ ἐπεὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἄλλα ἐνοίκ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐκστρων, ..., ὅσοι δὲ διὰ τὰ ὑπολογίανν πρὸς ἑνὸν μὲν τὴν αἰσθήσιν, ταύτῃ δὲ ἐνοίκ ἄλλοτε, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν εἰς ἀνάγκης ἐνοίκ ἐναι φαινόμενα. The saying of Theaetet-
3. ἂνθρωπον] Not 'Man,' i.e. collective human nature; nor yet exactly 'Each man.' As we have seen, p. 147, Theseutus is little conscious of the universal. Hence ἂνθρωπος signifies to him not humanity, nor yet the individual, as opposed to it, but this or that man, 'any man you choose.' And whether or not it was so intended by Protagoras, it would certainly appear to have been so understood by his 'disciples,' to whom Socrates presently refers.

7. ὅσο ὅια μὲν, κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Cratyl. 385 E, 386 A: 'Ὅτερον Προταγόρας ἠλεγε, λέγων πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι ἂνθρωπον, ὥσ ὥρα ὅια μὲν ἐν ἑαυτῷ φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἑστὶν ἑαυτῷ, ὅσο δ' ἐν σοί, τοιαῦτα δ' ἀδ' σοί. This repetition of the same language affords a presumption that the explanation, as well as the original saying, is Protagoras' own.


16. ἕφ' ἑαυτῷ] 'ἑαυτῷ Vindob. suppl. 7. ἑαυτῷ B T.' Schanz. The accusative may be defend ed from Thucyd. 1.141: 'Ὅταν . . . τὸ ἔφ' ἑαυτόν ἕκαστος σφητέων. 4. 28: Ὑπὶ σφῆς εἶναι. The prep. is used in a slightly pregnant sense, = ἐπιστοτεῖν, 'As far as to itself, and no further.' Cf. infr. 160 A: οὐδ' . . . ἐκεῖνο . . . ἑαυτῷ τοιουτοῦ γενήσεται. (Perhaps the accus. is also partly due to the idea of motion in πνεύμα.) ἔφ' ἑαυτῷ is sup-
ported by H. Schmidt. For ἄρ' ἐστιν, which is preferred by
Wohlrab, Schanz and others, cp. Tim. 51 B: 'Ἀρ' ἐστι τέ πορ
ἀνόητον ἄρ' ἐστιν. For the use
of the reflexive pronoun cp.
Rep. 4. 419 A: Καὶ οὐδὲν δὲ έπα
του. This notion is carried
further by Locke, Hum. Un-
derst. 2. 8. § 21: 'The same
water may produce the sensa-
tion of cold in one hand
and heat in the other.'

7. Τὸ δὲ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνε-
σθαι ἐστιν. 'When you say
"appear," it is that he has a
sensation.' The example is kept
in view throughout. There is
MS. authority for αἰσθάνεται.
(Cp. inf. 164 B: τὸ δὲ γε ὅπο
ὅπο ἄνισθαι ἐστιν, εἰσερ καὶ
τὸ ὅπο ἐνισταῖ.) But the
change of subject makes αἰσθά-
νεται preferable. Cp. inf. 186
D: Τὸ οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδεις
ἀνόμα π. τ. λ.; Αἰσθάνεται ἡμις.
Crat. 430 C: Τὸ γὰρ γεγονός
γεγονόθα αὐτοῖς. And the re-
petition of the terminus is a
more probable form of corrup-
tion than the recurrence of σθ
in the same word. φαίνεσθαι ap-
ppears as a correction for φαι-
νεται in some MSS.

9. Φαντασία δὲ] I. e. 'In
regard to heat and cold and
the like your theory and that
of Protagoras agree.' Φαντασία
occurs here simply as the noun
φαίνεσθαι, = 'appearing,' rather
than 'appearance,' and must be
kept clear from the notion of
faculty, and the associations
due to Aristotle, (see de An.
3. 3, where he defines it, κι-
νησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς καρ
ἐνέργειας γεγονοτε.) Appearance
(or relative being) becomes a
middle term between sensation
and being, so that all is merged
in sensation. Thus, while the
answer of Theaetetus is shown
to coincide with the saying of
Protagoras, the reader is gently
led to acquiesce for the mo-
moment in their common point
of view.

In τιθεμένοι] Cp. infr. 204
D: Ἐν γε τοῖς δει γίνη ἀριθμοῦ
ἐστι. These are instances of
Plato's tentative method.

10. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται] (1) Sc.
αιτία, which however is purposely
omitted; viz. τὰ θερμά, κ. τ. λ.
ΘΕΛΙΤΗΣ.

σ. ἄνθρωπος ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ ἔστι καὶ ἄνευδες, ὡς ἐπιστήμην οὖσα.

ΘΕΛΙ. Φαίνεσθαι.

σ. Ἀρ' ὅσι πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσοφος τις ἦν ὁ 5 Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἦμων μὲν ἦν ἔστερον τῷ πολλῷ συρφητὲ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐλέγεν;

Or, (2) while τὰ θερμαὶ, κ. τ. λ. are subj. of καὶ συφθέει, ota may be cogn. acc. 'For they would seem to be to each according to his sensation.' As we dwell upon the above example in support of the identification of appearance and sense, ὅτι τὰ μὲν μικρῶτα ψυχρῶτα τὰ δὲ μέγα οὖσα, (where, however, ἐστὶ was carefully excluded,) we are led insensibly to substitute 'relative being' for 'appearing,' by a play of words, which may be preserved in English, 'What appears to me, is to me.' And from relative being (ἐπιστήμην εἰσι) we argue at once to 'being' (ἐπιστήμην ἀρα τοῦ ὄντος). For a similar recapitulation, in which the argument is really carried a step further (with γὰρ), cp. τρίτον τοῦτο κατὰ τὰ πρώτα φαίνεται ψυχρῶς ἐν ἴσον οὖσα δόξα.

For γάρ, introducing as a reason what is properly an inference, cp. also Gorg. 454 D.

2. Ἀνθρώπος ἀρα] 'Sensation then is of Being, and is infallible, in accordance with your theory.' Certainty is here implicitly assumed as the mark of ἐπιστήμη. The genuineness of the last words has been needlessly questioned by Wolff and others. They are required in order to bring 'the wheel full circle' and to complete the identification of Protagoras' theory with that of Theaetetus. Compare with ὅτι ἐπιστήμην οὖσα, infr. 160 C: Κατὰ τῶν Πρωταγόραν.

5. Ἀρ' ὅσι, κ. τ. λ.] If sensation is of Being, then Being is not Being but Change. ἀρα in such questions (cp. infr. 200 C) is more emphatic than ἄρα. Here it expresses delighted surprise. 'In the name of all that is charming, was Protagoras even wiser than we knew?' For the Graces in this connexion cp. Prot. 320 C: Πολλά ταῦτα μοι... χαριστηρον εἰσὶν μὲν ἃμεν ἴσον λέγειν.

'What? says Socrates, did Protagoras then teach an obscure exoteric doctrine to the multitude, and tell the truth in esoteric confidence to his disciples? Did he teach the one to believe in ὄντα, the others in nothing but γεγομένα;?' Prof. Kennedy.

7. τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ] He told the real truth, not in his book which is so entitled ('ἀλήθεια'), but privately to his disciples. Cp. Crat. 413 A: Ἑγώ δὲ, ὡς ἔρμαγες, ὅτε λατρεύει ἄν περὶ αὐτῶν, τούτα μὲν πάντα διαπεποίησαμεν ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ. (Socrates has just given a derivation of the word δικαστήριον,
which he thus ironically attributes to the disciples of Heraclitus as an esoteric doctrine.) By a similar irony, he says here that the ‘friends of Protagoras’ have learnt their doctrine from their master ‘in a mystery.’ Clearly then the doctrine which Socrates proceeds to develop was not to be found in the written teaching of Protagoras, but in the interpretations of his reputed followers. The question, how far the Cyrenaics are indicated by the phrase, ‘disciples of Protagoras,’ has been discussed in the introduction.

τὴν ἄλλην] There is a slight allusion here to the work of Protagoras of this name, which is more distinctly referred to afterwards.

2. καὶ μᾶλ’ οὐ φαύλον λόγον] ‘I will tell you, and it is indeed a high argument.’ He had spoken of a λόγος οὐ φαύλος above (151 E). Cp. infra. 179 D.

3. οὕτ’ ἀν τι προσείτους] (1) ‘Nor can you call anything rightly by any name.’ Or (2) with H. Schmidt, making οὕτ’ οὐδέν the object and τι predicative, ‘Nor can you rightly call it anything or any kind of thing.’ But this is less probable, and is certainly not required by what follows.—Whoever the contemporaries were to whom Plato refers as the disciples of Protagoras, he aims beyond them at the whole relative side of Greek thought, of which Heraclitus was the most prominent exponent.

8. καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλλην] These words are introduced in order to include Empedocles, whose elements, however, were not subject to growth and decay, and who was probably not independent of an Eleatic influence. His Muse is called in the Sophist (242 E) μαλακωτήρα (in contradistinction to the συντονότερον μοῖχον of Heraclitus), because his two principles of friendship and strife do not possess the world together, but alternately.

11. ἐξωφρέσθων] MS. authority preponderates (numerically) in favour of ἐξωφρέσθων, which Stailbaun and Wohlrab have
vanily attempted to defend. Even if it were clear that Empedocles was set over against Protagoras and Heraclitus, or that these (coupled with τὰ καὶ) only counted for one, the use of the dual here would still be unnatural. Stobæus, who quotes this passage, has ξυμ-φερίσθω, which is possibly right. In the Bodleian MS. there is an erasure to the right of the omicron, which seems originally to have been ο. An accent on the penultimate has also been erased. Thus ξυμφερίσθω (or συμφερίσθω) is supported by the Bodleian first hand, besides three other MSS. 'Be it assumed (since we cannot ask them) that the philosophers of all ages speak with one voice concerning this.' For the imperative, denoting a provisional assumption, cp. infr. 187 B: Καὶ μοι τὸ τοῦτο ἀποκειμένον. 197 E: Πεποίησον: Soph. 248 A: Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτοις τοῦτο ἡμῖν μενέτω ξυμφερίσθων. Rep. 6. 485 A: Τοῦτο, . . . ξυμφερίσθων. Rep. 2. 672 E: Διασπερᾶσθαι. Possibly the word ξυμφερίσθων retains here something of its literal meaning, 'are gathered together,' 'move all one way.' Thuc. 7. 36. The boldness of the language, especially the word στρατωτέων, is in favour of this.

3. 'Ἐπίχαρμος' Epicharmus, ed. Krüsemann, fr. 95: Ξυμφερίσθη, καὶ διεκρίθη, καὶ ἀπέχθεν ὕπεν ἦδε πάλιν γὰς μὲν εἰς γὰς, πνεύμα δ' ὧν, Ιβ. fr. 90: Φύσις ἀνθρώπων ἀληθεύςεις τῶν ποιημάτων. The passage quoted by Diog. Laert. 3. 10 (who says that Plato borrowed from Epicharmus), though interesting, if authentic, is too long for quotation here, except the line ἐν μεταλλαγή δὲ πάντες ἐτί πάντα τῶν χρώμων. (Cp. Mullach, Fragment. Phil. Gr. Epicharm. vv. 177-194.) Epicharmus (circ. 490 B.C.) is called a Pythagorean. One or two of his γράμματα remind us of Heraclitus, although, as only fragments from his Comedies are preserved, we cannot tell in any case how far the notions expressed are his own.

τραγῳδίας δὲ, 'Ομηρός Where the form is in question, ἐνθα are distinguished from τραγῳδία: as in Rep. 3. 394 C. Where this is not the case, they are combined as tragedy, this being another name for στιχοῦμα μυθικό: e.g. Rep. 10. 605 C: Ἀκροφωμενον 'Ομήρου ἦ άλλον τοις τῶν τραγῳδιστῶν.

4. 'ἐνθ' ἐντον] The best MSS. read "Ομήρος ἐντος. A few add γάρ, as in a similar passage, 175 D (ἀκριμόν τε κ.π.λ.) γάρ is added in one MS. (Ven. ξ.) ἐνθ' ἐντον is Heindorf's very probable emendation. The MS. reading is to be defended, if at all, by supposing a 'return to the indicative.'

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

πάντα εἰρηκεν ἐκγωνα ῥῆς τε καὶ κυνῆςως. ἢ οὐ π. 152.
δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρὸς γε τοσοῦτον στρατό- p. 15;
5 πεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν Ὀμηρον δύναιτο ἀμφισβήσασις
μὴ καταγελάστοις γενέσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ τρόποι, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ, ὁ Θεαῖης. ἑπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ λόγῳ

6. μὴ... γενέσθαι] A few MSS. have μὴ ὁ. But the omission of οὐ may be defended by the remoteness of the supposition.
Cp. Sophist 241 E: Τούτων γὰρ μήτε ἀληθείστων μήτε ἀμφισβητών σχόλια ποτέ τις οἷδ᾽ τε ἐστιν...
6. μὴ καταγελάστοις εἶναι: Soph. O. T. 76, 77. μὴ belongs to the adj. 'Who could prove other than ridiculous?' Compare with the whole passage Cratyl. 401 E, 402 A, where, after proposing first 'ἐστία (fire)' and then ὀσία (displacement), as derivations for ὀσία, Socrates says: 'Ὁ ἡμαῖς ἐνσωμάτωσεν τὸ σωμάτως σοφίας. ἔρρ. Ποίον ἤδη τούτο; Σω. Γελοῖον μὲν πάντως εἰπέναι, οἷόν μεῖν τιμᾶ τινὰ παράνομα ἔχειν. ἔρρ. Τίνα ταύτην; Σω. Τὸν Ἱδαλίτου μοι δοκεῖ καθαρῶς παλαί�示ο σοφοὶ λέγοντα, ἀνεχόμεν τὰ ἐπὶ Κρόνον καὶ Ρέσα, καὶ Ὀμηρος ἠλευν. ἔρρ. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; Σω. Λέγει τοῦ Ἱδαλίτου ὃτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδέν μένει, καὶ ποταμὸν ῥήμα ἀπεικαζόν χάρη τὸν λέγει ὡς διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἄν ἐμβαίνεις, κ. τ. λ. Two Orphic lines are then quoted besides this of Homer and Hesiod: 'Ὡς τρόπος τρόπος καλλίροος ἤρξ᾽ γάμοιο, ὡς βασιλέα
7. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε, κ. τ. λ.] The clause δι᾽... ἡσυχία ἐνcluded is added in explanation of τῷ λόγῳ σημεία.
8. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε, κ. τ. λ. 'The theory is confirmed by the following indications of the fact that,' etc. H. Schmidt quotes Menex. 237 E: Μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον τοῦτο τῷ λόγῳ, δι᾽...
ΤΕΛΕΙΤΗΣ.

p. 153. σημεία ἰκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἱστοχία: τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν τε καὶ τῶρ, ὁ δὲ καὶ τάλλα γενεὰ καὶ ἐπιτροπεῖε, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως· τούτῳ δὲ κίνησις, ἢ ὅπῃ αὐτὰ γενέσθαι εἰς πυρὸς;  

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνταί μὴν οὖν.  

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε τῶν ζώων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται.  

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ’ οὖ;  

Thuc. 1. 2: Καὶ παράδειγμα τὸθε τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἐστί, διὰ τίς μετακινεῖται τὰ ἀλλα μὴ ὁμοίως αὐξηθήσονται· ἐκ γὰρ, κ. τ. λ.  

1. δοκοῦν] The expression has been thought harsh [δοκοῦν] Schanz; and Badham proposes to read ὀδοῦν. But cp. supra. 152 D: "Αδὴ φαινεῖ εἶναι. Infr. 153 E: Καὶ δὴ ἐκαστον εἶναι φαινει χρώμα; also 176 C: Δευτεροτύπες τε δοκοῦσιν. 'Being, so esteemed.' 'What passes for Being.'  

3. δὴ καὶ τάλλα γενεὰ] 'Which our theory assumes to produce all other things.' The symbol of fire as the primal element is elsewhere associated with the theory of a flux. See Cratyl. 401 (quoted above), lib. 413 B (speaking of the Heracliteans): 'Ο μὲν γὰρ τις φησὶ τούτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἢλεον τούτον γὰρ μόνον διαθότα καὶ κάνοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ δύνα. ἐπειδὰν οὖν τοῖς λέγων αὐτῷ ὅμοιον ὡς καλὰ τε ἀκροκός καταγέλαι μοῦ ὡσδος ἀκούσας καὶ ἐρωτημένη, εἰ ἐκεῖνον δίκαιον ὅλην εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἦλαι δή, λαμπροῦστον οὖν ἐμφας ἐν τοῖς ἄνθρωποις λέγει, αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησὶ· τούτῳ δὲ οὐ μᾶθαι ἐστὶν εἰδέναι, ὁ δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησίν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἐνω. ὁ δὲ τούτων μὲν πάσων καταγελάων φθαρεῖ· ἐναί δὲ τὸ δίκασαν ὁ λήγει 'Ανακτήθησαι, νοῦν εἶναι τοῦτο, κ. τ. λ. Thus the mythology of the doctrine was rationalized by its adherents. In this dialogue every feature of it is presented, from the most sensuous symbolism (ἕλιος, χρυσὴ στεφά) to the most abstract principle (τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἴτω, 156), and its most remote application. See also the famous saying of Heraclitus (fr. Burywater): 'Κάσμον τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπόκοκαν, οὗτοι θεῶν τούτων ἀνθρώπων ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἐστων ἦν τε αὐτί καὶ ἠται πῦρ ἀδίκου ἀπόκοκος ἀπόκοκος μέτρα καὶ συνομομένου μέτρα. But the symbol fire was by no means confined to Heraclitus (cp. the Atomists, Pythagoreans, etc.).  

5. τούτῳ δὲ κίνησις] This is added parenthetically with reference to τρίψεως. Τούτῳ δὲ κίνησις has been adopted by editors on the authority of the Bodleian MS. But τούτῳ is also the reading of the Boll MS. The marginal note δυσκόλεις is due to the corrector (b) who changed τούτῳ into τούτω, instead of restoring κίνησις.
ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ τῶν σομάτων ἔξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας δύσλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεων ἐπὶ πολὺ σώζεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δ’ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις—οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήματος μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεως διότι καὶ κατά τις μαθήματα καὶ σώζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ’ ἡσυχίας,

3. ἐπὶ πολὺ [‘To a great extent;’ or ‘for a long time.’
The MSS. vary between ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ (T etc.), and ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (B etc.), from which ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ has been conjectured. But ὡς in T was at first omitted, and ἐπὶ πολὺ gives a better sense. Cp. Thuc. 8. 1: ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν ἠπιστώς. Crat. 415 A: Τοῦ ἄνευ ἐπὶ πολύ.

5. Ἡ δ’ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις [ζεῦς] ἐξει in Plato, like φαντασία, is less technical than in Aristotle. It is simply the noun of ἔξεις, whether transitive or not. The body is said ἔξεις ποσς, the mind is said ἔξεις τὰ μαθήματα; hence ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔξεις, ‘the condition of the body;’ but ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξεις, ‘the having in the mind.’ Cp. Rep. 9. 591 B: Ἡ ψυχὴ τιμωτάτη ἔξω λαμβάνει σωφροσύνην τῇ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃν ... στεμένη. Ar. Met. 4. 1022. 6: ἔξω δὲ λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ὧν ἐνεργεῖα τῆς τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου .. ἀλλὰ δὲ τρόπον διάθεσις, κ.τ.λ.

For a similar transition from one sense of a word to another cp. 158 E: Τὰ δ’ ἰδέα δοκοῦντα τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ.

‘But with regard to the having the mind, is it not through learning and practice, which are motions, that it gains what it learns, and is preserved, and becomes better?’ The sentence proceeds as if ψυχή were the subject, at all events of the latter part. Cp. Rep. 7. 552 B: Ἡ δ’ ἄγε, ἢ δ’ ἐγὼ, λύσει τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν δεισμῶν, κ.τ.λ.

6. κινήσεων δότων] Cp. Prot. 329 D: ‘Ὅτι ἑνὸς δότος οὐκ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετή. δότων is neuter; ‘things which are of the nature of motion,’ like τοῦτο ἐκ κινήσεως above. Others suppose δότων to be the masculine form used for the feminine according to a well-known tendency of Attic Greek. But in this case it would be better to read κινησός δότων with Buttman and Schanz.

7. σώζεισαι] (1) ‘Retains’ (middle), or, better, (2) ‘is preserved’ (passive). ἔξω, as above interpreted, the preceding ἐξαίρεσις τε .. καί, and ἐπιλαμβάνεται in the corresponding clause, may be urged in favour of the former: for which cp. 163 D: Ἔτσι ξυπατεῖ μνήμην τούτων καὶ σωζόμενον. Rep. 455 B: Μηδ’ ἃ ἐμαθεί σώζω. But when σωζόμενον is rendered as passive, there is a more natural progress in the thought, ‘gets knowledge, is preserved, improves,’ while ἐπιλαμβάνεται may be as justly opposed to improvement as to retention. And we avoid the difficulty of supposing that the word is used differently here, and a few lines
above and below: cp. Symp. 208 A: Μελητῇ...σωσέ τὴν ἐπιστήμην. See the whole passage. In the indeterminate state of grammar, may there not be a real, though not unconscious, ambiguity? H. Schmidt thinks that σωστα may be taken reflexively throughout sections B to D, ‘Es lässt sich in allen drei stetter medial fassen, in der ersten und dritter als “servat se” und in der zweiten als “servat sibi.”’ This comes practically to the same thing as (1).

4. τὸ μὲν ἄρα ‘The one, then, namely, motion, is good.’

There seems no reason to suspect a gloss. There would be a want of Plato’s usual explicitness without κίνησις; and the variety of genders presents no difficulty. Cp. Rep. 433 D: ἕνωμιλλον ἄρα—ἡ—δύναμις; inf. 156 B: Τὸ δὲ αἰτήθηκε.

7. Ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔγεγο...οὕτι (1) ‘Must I go on to mention still weather and calms, and the like, showing how quietness in every case corrupts and destroys, whilst its opposite preserves: and for my crowning instance, pressing it into the service, shall I insist upon it that by his golden chain Homer means the sun?’ For προσβιβάζων, ‘making it yield to my theory,’ cp. Phaedr. 229 E: Αἰς εἶ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβάζῃ κατὰ τὸ εἰλὸς ἑκατόν.—If one is to force each of them (the mythes) to harmonize with probability,’ Cratyl. 427 C: καὶ τῶλα σῶσε ψαίνει προσβιβάζων—ὁ νομοθέτης, ‘forcing the sound of words to square with the sense.’ Mythology, poetry, nature, body, mind, the elements, had already been ‘pressed into the service.’ But this final instance requires still greater force. Thus Plato glances, as he does elsewhere, at the absurd allegorical interpretations of Homer which were current (amongst Heralclitans and others) in his day. The position of the accusative ἐνθείη χρυσὴν σειρὰν is possibly due to the attraction of the active προσβιβάζων, and to the previous accusative, τὸν κολοφόνα, which is in apposition to the sentence (Riddell, Digest of Idioms, §§ 11, 13). For the transitive clause with ἀναγκάζω cp. Symp. 202 A: Μὴ τοίνυν ἀναγκάζῃ, ὥς μὴ καλῶν ἐστιν, αἰτήθηκεν εἰναι. Parm. 133 C: ‘Ὁ ἀγωνιστὰ ἀναγκάζων αὕτα εἰναι. Or (2) ‘And finally, shall I clinch the proof (or shall I compel assent) by bringing on my crowning argument (and showing) that by his golden chain Homer means
καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἴσως σήμους καὶ π. 15: ἀπολλύεσθαι, ὅτι δ' ἐτερα σώζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων τῶν κολοφώνων ἴσως προσβιβάζον τὴν χρυσῆν σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἴλιον "Ομήρος λέγει, καὶ δηλοῖ 5 ὅτι ἔως μὲν ἄν ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κυνομένη καὶ ὁ ἴλιος, ὅσον ὁ ἴλιος ἄν, εὔφροσὺν οὖν τῷ ἔν. Φρ. 29: ἴλιος οὐχ ἐπιστηθεὶς μήτω, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔρωτες μὲν Δίου πάχος ἐξετάθησαν. See also Enr. Orest. 982–4. "As fire was the symbol of motion, so the sun was the still more concrete symbol of fire. See Rep. 6. 508, where the sun is allowed to be paramount in the region of sense; being essential to vision and to life. For the way in which the authority of Homer and the poets is used, ironically by Plato, but seriously by those whom he imitates, cp. Cratyl. 391, where an argument is based upon the line ἐν Σάλβων καλπάξως θεοὶ, ἀνθρώπους δὲ Σκύμαρδον, and infr. 194 E: "Ὅταν τοῖνος λαβὼν τὸ τι κατὰ ὑπ' ὅ ἐκέρατο ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιήσεις." 5. ἡ περιφορὰ ἡ κυνομένη καὶ ὁ ἴλιος] The motion of the whole universe, and the perpetual interchange of the different elements, was symbolized in the Heraclitean theory by the revolution of the sun, who not only rose and descended, traversing the sky, but was also quenched and rekindled daily. Νέος εὖ ἐμέρα (fr. 32). Lasselle compares Ar. Meteor. 1. 9: Ὁ μὲν δὲν ὃς κυνοῦσα καὶ κυρὰ καὶ πράσιν τῶν ἄρχων ὁ κόσμος ἑτέριν ἐν ὁ φανερῶς ἡ τοῦ ἴλιου φορὰ διακρίνεται καὶ συνεργίον τῷ γένεσθαι πληθυσσὸν ἡ παράτροπον, αὕτη τῇ γενέσθαι καὶ τῇ φορᾷς ἔστι... Ἐστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἐκ σῶρως ἀναθημα-
THEAIHTHOS.

P. 153. πάντα ἐστι καὶ σώκεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις:
ei ἄ δὲ σταῖθ᾽ ὄροι ὡσπερ δεθὲν, πάντα χρήσται ἂν δια-
φθαρέται καὶ γένωται ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἁνοὶ κατὸ πάντα;
ΘΕΛ. ἈΛΛ ἐμοίγε νοκέ, σῶ Σῶκратες, ταῦτα
δηλοῦν, ἀπερ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὡσῶλαβε τοιῶν, ὥ ἁριστε, οὐτωşi. κατά τά

...οις, ἀπιςί. ἢ δ᾽ εἴροι εἰς ὠδιαρ,
νέφος... Ρέστει δὲ κύκλος οὗτος μυμούμενος τοῦ τοῦ ἦλιον κύκλων,
ἀμα γὰρ ἐκεῖνος εἰς τὰ πλαῖσια μετα-
βάλλει, καὶ οὕτων ἄνω καὶ κάτω. Δέι
δὲ νομίσαι τούτων ὡσπερ ποταμῶν
ρύματα κύκλῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, κοινῶν
ἀροὺς καὶ ἑδοτο. ... Ὄτε εἰπέρ
μαύστοτο τοῦ ἡλεών οἱ πρότερον,
τὰς ἀν τούτων τοῖς ποταμῶν λέγειν
τῶν κύκλων ρύματα περὶ τὴν γῆν.
Cp. infir 181 D Τὶς δὲ περιφοράν,
and note: Phil. 28 E.

2. εὶ δὲ σταῖθ᾽ Cp. Phaedr. 245
C (where the point of view is
nearer to Plato's own): Τὸ ἀκις-
νητον ἀδησάτον, τὸ δ᾽ ἄλλο κινοῦν καὶ
ἐπ᾽ ἄλλον κατοίκουμεν, παύλαν ἔχον
κινήσεις, παύναν ἔχον ζωῆς...
οὕτω δὲ κινήσεως μὲν ἁρχῇ τὸ ἀτό-
κινον. τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐτ ἀπο-
λυσθαι ὅστε γίγνεσθαι δυνάμις,
ἡ πάσα το οίνουν πάσα το γένος
συσβασοῦσα στήρικα καὶ μάτητε
ἀδύνα ἐκεῖν ὀδοὺς κινηθέντα γενόσθαι.
In the text all is made to de-
pend on change; in the above
passage all change depends on
that which is self-moving; but
in both, motion is essential to
being. Cp. also Legg. 10.895
Α.: Εἰ σταῖθ᾽ ποι τὰ πάντα ὡς
γενόμενα, καθέστει οἱ πλεύστεις τῶν
τουτῶν τομήσας λέγεις, τὸ δ᾽ ἀρι
ἐν αὐτοῖς ἁριστε προτέρη κινήσου
γενέσθαι τῶν οἰκημένων; Αρ. Ἐτ.
1.994 Λ: Τὸν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ὡς τοῦ
ἄρους κυκλῆρας, δοτόν δ᾽ ὡς τοῦ
ἡλίου, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ὡς τοῦ νείκους,
καὶ τούτων μιᾶν εἶναι πέρα. Ιβ. 11.

6–10. Simpl. in Aristot. Cat.
p. 1056. Bas. (quoted by Las-
salle): Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐπετριωτὰ ἐπίνων ἐπιλεῖπει, αἰτιοῦ ἀν πάντα ἰδαι-
σθέντα διό καὶ μέρετρα 'Ομήρ-
νὸς ἡμέλεθε περὶ τούτων καὶ ἔριος
καὶ συνεκτάνα αἰτιοῦ μέρετρα 'Ομή-
ρο, σύγχρονος κόσμου δοκεύς αὐτὸν
ἐξοθείκειο. Περὶ τοὺς ἄνω κάτω τοὺς
ἄνθρωπος ἔριος κατά τὸν ἠμέλον
107: 'Έριος ἀν το θεών ἐκ τῇ
ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο 'Ημέλεθε
τὴν τῶν ὑπονόμων κατ᾽ ἔριο
συνεκτάνα αἰτιοῦ μέρετρα 'Ομή-
ρο, σύγχρονος κόσμου δοκεύς αὐτὸν
ἐξοθείκειο. In the words ἄνω
κάτω there is perhaps an allu-
sion to Heraclitus' ἔνθα ἄνω κάτω
muia. See also Phaedo 72 C.

Some of the latest guesses
at truth have sometimes had a
real or fanciful resemblance to
the earlier ones. See Comte in
Miss Martineau's abridgment,
vol. 1. p. 429: 'Amidst the con-
fusion and obscurity which exist
on this subject, I think we may
conclude that no organism, even
the simplest, could live in a
state of complete immobility.
The double movement of the
earth, and especially its rota-
tion, may probably be as ne-
necessary to the development of
life as to the periodical dis-
tribution of heat and light.'

6. Ὡσῶλαβε ἧμερον ἢ ἐναι ὅσιον τῆς
knowledge, i.e. of sensible
perception? This is now
evolved, a fresh appeal to ex-
perience being made at every
3. The theory is now applied. (1) Colour is not something without nor in the eye, it arises between, when the eye encounters a particular motion. Hence it is different to man and other animals, to different men, and

σματα προτον, δι δη καλεσ χρωμα λευκον, μη ηναι π. 152 αυτο ετερον τι έξω των σων σματων μη δι εν τωι σματοι, μηδε τω αυτω χωραν αποταξις. ηδη γαρ ην ει η τε *ον που εν ταξι και μενοι και ουκ αν εν 5 γενέσει γίνοντο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πῦς;
Σ. Ἐσσώμεθα τῷ ἀρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτό καθ' αὐτό ἐν οἷς τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῶν οὕτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκόν καὶ όσιόν ἄλλο χρώμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν σματῶν πρὸς την προσήκοουσαν φοράν βαφείται γεγενημένον, καὶ δ' ἐκατόν εἶναι φαμεν χρωμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον έσται, π. 154 ἀλλα μεταξὺ τι ἐκατότρ ἵδιον γεγονός· ἢ σὺ δισεχρι-

step. Each sensation is the result of a double movement from within and from without. Hence all sensations are, (1) relative to the individual (ἐκατότρ ἵδιογεγονός); (2) relative to each other. (1) is proved chiefly of the sensations of colour, warmth, etc.: (2) of the perceptions of size and number.

κατὰ τὰ δυτικα] 'In the sphere of vision.'

2. έτερον τι] ‘A separate thing.'

3. χωραν] Cp. infr. 156 C.

10. πρὸς τὴν προσήκοουσαν φο-

 rivals] The theory does not consider the origin of this motion. The instinctive belief in the reality of external things is already weakened.


12. οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον] 'Neither that which strikes, nor that which is struck,' i.e. Neither the motion from within nor that which meets it from without. Here, as elsewhere, 'sight' is conceived of as an act, and not as a passive impression. And τὸ προσβαλλόμενον is the object, τούτο, ψ προσβάλλει τὰ δυτικα. This is a curious use of the passive voice. But the comparison of other passages, esp. Tim. 45 C: ὁπερ ἐν αὐτρείδη τὸ πρόσωπον έπειθεν πρὸς δ τῶν . έξου έκυπτεν, excludes the possibility of doubt, although the expression so understood is inconsistent with the theory of active and passive elements, which is afterwards introduced (infr. 156 A).
σανο ἄν ὡς ὁν ποι φαίνεται ἐκαστον χρώμα, τοιούτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὄροιν ἐκω.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μά Δ' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀλλο ἀνθρώπῳ ἃρ' ὀμοιον καὶ σοι φαίνεται οὕτων; ἔχεις τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, ἡ πολὺ μᾶλλον, 5 ὅτι οὐδέ σοι αὐτῷ ταύτῳ διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὀμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τούτῳ μᾶλλῳ μοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἑκεῖνο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν εἰ μὲν δ' παραμετρούμεθα ἢ ὅ ἐφα-
πτόμεθα, μέγα ἡ λευκόν ἡ θερμὸν ἡν, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἁλλὸ προσπεσθοῦ ἄλλῳ ἄν εἰνεγόνε, αὐτῷ γε μὴδὲν μεταβάλλων. εἰ δὲ αὐτὸ παραμετρούμενον ἡ ἐφαπτό-
μενον ἐκαστον ἡν τούτων, οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸ προσελ-
θόντος ἢ τι παθόντος αὐτῷ μηδὲν παθὸν ἄλλῳ ἄν ἐγένετο. ἔπει νῦν γε, ὦ φίλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα 15

9. δ' παραμετρούμεθα] Cornarius, followed by most editors, reads δ', taking παραμετρούμεθα actively. Although (as H. Schmidt remarks) in the example given infr. 155 B the case is altered by the supposition that Theaetetus has grown, I still adhere to the MS. text and interpret (with Jowett) 'that with which we compare ourselves in size.' The instance most in point is that adduced in the Phaedo, 102 B, where Simmias is shorter than Socrates, but taller than Phaedo. There is in any case some confusion between relativity and subjectivity. This is partially evaded by making self the subject of comparison, but would be increased if τὸ παραμετρούμενον meant 'that which perceives size,' as it must if δ' is read. None of the examples given are such as to suggest the notion that bigness is in the eye.

We are introduced to a new class of objects, and make a transition in the argument at the same time. All that I can see, hear, feel, etc., is seen, heard, felt, etc. by me alone, and arises solely in relation to me. Again, I view the size of other bodies in relation to my own, or I compare different quantities. I cannot think of any magnitude or number as great or small, except in relation to some other magnitude or number.

12. τὸ παραμετροῦμεν ἢ ἐφα-
πτόμενον] I. o. 'I, the subject in the one case of self-measurement, in the other of sensation.' Cp. 182 A, τὸ . . . πάσχειν. Ar. Eth. N. 10. 4. § 5: Διὰ τὴν δὲ (τὴν αἰσθήσεως) λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν ἢ ἐν ὧδ' ἐστι μηδὲν διαφέρεται.
eúcherōs pws ánagkaζómeθa lègeν, ós fai̇n an Prow- p. 15. tαγόρας tε kai' paȯs o' tα aυtα ἐκείνων eπιχειρο̇ν lègeν.

THEAI. Pòs δή kai' poía lègeis;

5 ΣΩ. Σμικρόν λαβεί παράδειγμα, kai' πάντα εἴσεi à o
boúloμαι. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που εἴς, ἀν μὲν τέτταρας
aυtόις προσενέγκης, πλείον φαμέν εἶναι tῶν τεττάρων
kai' ἡμιολίους, ἕαν δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττως kai' ἡμισεις-
kai' οὐθεί ἀνέκτων ἄλλως lègeν. ἡ συ' ἀνέζει; 10

THEAI. Οὐκ ἐγώγει.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἀν σε Προταγόρας ἔρτης ἡ τις
ἀλλος, Ἡ Θεαίτης, ἔσθ' ὅπως τι μείζον ἡ πλείον
γίνεται ἄλλως ἡ αὔξησθεν; τι ἀποκρινεῖ;

THEAI. 'Εαν μὲν, ὁ Σάκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν
15 μόν ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὃτι οὐκ ἔστιν' εάν δὲ πρὸς τὴν
προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία ἐπιτυχεῖ, ὃτι ἔστιν.
ΣΩ. Ἐδ' γε νὲ τὴν Ἡραν, ὁ φίλε, καὶ θείως. ἀτάρ,
ὡς Εὖκας, εὰν ἀποκρίνῃ ὃτι ἔστιν, Εὐριπίδειοι τι ξύμ-
βησται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται,
20 ἡ δὲ φημὶ οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.

1. eúcherōs pws anagkaζomēθa 'We allow ourselves to be drawn into using strange and ridiculous expressions.' Protagoras would not find fault with us for calling the six dice more than the four, but for using the verb εἶναι to express the relation.

6. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που εἴς The difficulty has been stated with regard to size, it is now illustrated with regard to number.

14. τὸ δοκοῦν Cp. p. 157 C: 
Dokeiντα σοι.

16. φυλάττων Not exactly 'avoiding' (φυλαξάμεθα), but 'being careful:' keeping watch on one point only. Cp. Gorg. 461 D: 'Εαν μοι ἐν μόνων φυλά-
tης. Τι τούτο λέγεις; Τὴν μακρο-
λογίαν... ἤν καθόρξη: infr. p. 180 A: Ἐδ' πᾶν φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βίβαιον ἑαυτὸν ἔλευσιν. Also infr. 169 C: πᾶν τίρει τὸ τοπόθητε, μή, 
k.τ.λ.

17. Ἐδ' γε... καὶ θείως Theaetetus' answer showed great dialectical aptitude. He perceives the contradiction, and yet will not answer para tō dokou̇n aútp̣. Cp. Rep. 1.346 A: καὶ, ἕ μακαρε, 
μὴ para δῶσαι ἀποκρινόμεν, ἵνα τι 
kai' περαινομεν.

19. ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα] 'Our
ΤΕΛΙΤΗΣ Ὑλη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν τι ἐκάμοι καὶ σοφοῦ ἔγω τε καὶ σοῦ ἢμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητάκοτες, ἢδη ἄν τὸ λουθὸν ἐκ πεισμοφαινὴς ἀλλήλου ἀποσπειρώμενοι, ἐξενεκθέντες σοφιστικὸς εἰς μαχήν τοιαίνη, ἀλλὰ τοὺς 5 λόγους τοὺς λόγους ἐκρούομεν· νῦν δὲ ἄτι ἰδίωται πρῶτον βουλήσομεθα, θεᾶσασθαί αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά, τί ποτὲ ἐστὶν ὁ διανοούμεθα, πότερον ἦμών ἀλλήλοις πλημφοῦν ἡ οὐδ' ὀπωσδοῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε τοὔτ' ἂν βουλομένων. 10

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε. ὅτε δ' οὖν τοις ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἦμέρα, ὑπὸ πάνω πολλὴν σχολὴν ἀγοντες, πάλιν ἐπανε-σκεφτόμεθα, οὔ δυσκολαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὃντι ἦμῶς διχαινοῦσθαι. 15

7. αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ] 'Compared with one another.' The reading of the old edd., αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά, might be defended, but αὐτὰ is the Bodleian reading.


12. ὑπὸ πάνω πολλὴν σχολὴν ἀγοντες] Plato does not forget, either here or infra. 172 E, that Socrates has been summoned to appear before the King Archon.

13. οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες] 'With no feeling of impatience.' Cp. Men. 75 C D: Εἰ μὲν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἰπὲ καὶ ἐμποτικὸν ἐπέ-μενεν, εἶναι τι ἐν αὐτῷ, ὅτι ἐμοὶ...
One voice says, Nothing can become more or fewer, greater or less, while it is equal to itself. 

Another: —That to which nothing is added, and from which nothing is taken, remains equal to itself.

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άυτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, ᾧν ποτ’ ἐστὶν ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα ἡμῶν; ὃν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, ὃς ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μείζον μηδὲ ἔλαπτον γενέσθαι μήτε ὄγκος μήτε ἄρθρῳ, ἦδον ἕιν αὐτὸ 5 ἑαυτῷ. οὐχ οὖσος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δέ γε, ὃ μῆτε προστίθειντο μήτε ἀφαιρεῖν, τούτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαι ποτε μήτε ἐκλείπειν, ἢδε δὲ ἢσον εἰναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, ὃ μή πρῶτον ἦν, ἢ

μήν ἐξηταί: εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁρᾶξ ἤλεγ, ὡς ἐρωταὶ λαγὸν καὶ ἄλσον; εἰ δὲ διέσκευε τῆς καὶ σὺ νυν φόδοι δυνεῖς βουλουμένοι ἄλλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον πως καὶ διαλεκτικότερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

1. φάσματα[ These mental phenomena (that have started into prominence). The ἀπόφασισ just stated have made us aware of certain 'facts of consciousness' or postulates of our own minds. These are here called φάσματα, but presently, when they have been expressed and assented to, ἀναλογίματα. Cp. Polit. 268 E: Τοῖς χείρες τῆς Ἀτρέως τοῖς καὶ θεῶν ἐκθέσεως ἱκράντων ἰδρας φάσμα. Μενο 85 C: Ὀποτε διὰ πρὶν ἀνασυνάρτησαι αὐτὸ, ἀναφέρεσθαι οὐκ ἔχεις αὐτόν, ν.τ.λ. For the thought cp. infr. 203 A: Βασικοίσθεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλογίζεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς. Πρωτ. 331 C: Οἶδας γὰρ δοκεῖ μόνο τοίς βουλίσκο τούτο καὶ εἰ τοῖς δοκεῖς ἐλέγχεσθαι ἄλλο ἐμί τε καὶ σι.]

2. ἢν πρῶτον . . . φήσομεν] 'The first of which, as we look steadily at it, we shall thus put into words.'

8. ἀφαιρεῖτο[ Sc. ἄρ’ αὐτῷ, Or, possibly, the pronoun is here the subject: 'And it suffers no diminution.' Cp. infr. B: ἀφαιρεῖτον.

II. δὲ μὴ πρῶτον ἦν] This may be construed in two ways. (1) 'What existed not before, but (exists) afterwards, this cannot be, without production and a process of becoming.' (2) 'What was not before, neither can that be afterwards, without production,' etc.

The latter is the more subtle interpretation, but is probably right. Schol.: 'Ὁ ἠπόκολος τὰ ἄλλα παρέλεκτων λέγει. 'Prorusque its Latine dixeris quod non prius erat at postea id esse.' Heindorf.—'Nay but, if it was not before, it cannot be afterwards.' Cp. Soph. 265 B: Ἦσας ἐν οἷα γίγνεται τοῖς μη πρῶτον οὕσιν υἱότερον γίγνεσθαι. The position of ἄλλα in the MSS., however (ὑστέρων ἄλλα libri omnes, W.), throws some doubt upon the reading, and ἀρα may be suggested. ὑστέρον ἄρα τούτο εἴη, ν.τ.λ., 'that, as our postulate runs, this cannot afterwards be with-
out becoming and having become.' For the addition of γενόσθαι cp. infr. C.

H. Schmidt observes that the contradiction is not between the assumptions themselves, but between the assumption and the fact. But μάχεται αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς can only mean 'fight amongst themselves,' and if the logic of such a half-humorous passage is to be pressed, No. 3 may be supposed to say 'Socrates is what he was not; he must have changed.' 'No,' says No. 2, 'he cannot have changed, for nothing has been taken from him, therefore he is not diminished.' No. 1 then comes to the aid of No. 2.

6. τῇδε [Of the height you see me.'

7. ἐν ἓναντι] 'In the space of a year.' 'Within a year.' This very natural expression has somehow given offence, and Madvig conj. παθότα ἐν ἓναντι, an emendation which appears to have been anticipated by the copyist of Par. 1814.

9. μηδεν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος] 'My size having been stripped of nothing,' i.e. 'Without anything being taken from my height.' Badham conjectures μηδεν ἐμοῦ τοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος. But this is unnecessary.

II. ἰνεν γὰρ τοῦ γένεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον] This axiom is supplementary to the three former. In the first, the aorist was used (γενόσθαι), the present in the second (αἰξίσθαμαι, φθινώ). Both (γενόσθαι καὶ γέγενεσθαι) are accordingly combined in the third, by means of which the two former are applied. It is now shown that the aorist implies the present. To us such refinements are difficult, because needless. The subtlety is carried still further in the Parmenides, until it is reduced to the formula, 'That which is, is.' Parm. 156 C: 'Εστός τε πρῶτον ὑπέρων καὶ κατὰ πρῶτον καὶ κατὰ μέγαταν ὑπέρων ἔσται, ἀνεν μὲν τοῖς μεταβάλλειν αὐχ ὁδὲς τε ἐσται ταῦτα πάσχειν... ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν μεταβάλλει ἀνεν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν.
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Now short-
ese, without
becoming so.

Thestetus
is full of
wonder and
bewilder-
ment at
this con-
tradiction:
—a sign of his
philosophic
nature.

ἀδύνατον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλύσ τοῦ ὅγκου οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐνεηχάραν ἔλαττον. καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις
οὐτώς ἔχει, εἴπερ καὶ ταὐτά παραδεξόμεθα. ἴπτει γάρ ποι, ὃ Θεαίτητε: δοκεῖς γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἀπειροῦ
τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι.

ΤΘΕΙΑ. Καὶ νὴ τοὺς θεούς γε, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὑπερ-
φυός ὡς θαυμάζω τι ποι' ἐστι ταὐτά, καὶ ἐνιοτε ὡς
ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδιών.

ΣΩ. Θεόδωρος γάρ, ὃ φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς ὃ
tοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεως σου. μάλα γάρ φιλοσόφου
toū τοῦ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γάρ ἄλλη ἀρχή

3. καὶ, which implies a subtle connexion between ὅπου and
ἄλλα μυρῖα, can only be expressed
in English by the emphasis
on 'these.' Cp. Soph. ÐEd. Col.
276: ἦσαν μὲ κανόνα, ἤδη
σώζετε.

†παραδεξόμεθα] Sc. παρὰ τοῦ
Πρωγόρου. 'If we are to take
this at his hands;' i.e. not
only accept, but adopt this as
our own difficulty. Cp. infr.
161 B, Charm. 162 E: Εἴ οὖν
ἐμπόρευς τούς' εἶναι σωφροσύνη
ὅπερ οὔτε λέγει, καὶ παραδέχει
τοὺς λόγους, ἐγών πολὺ ἂν ἤθεν
μετὰ σοῦ σκοποίησα... ἄλλα πάνω
ἐμπόρευο, ἤφη, καὶ παραδέχεσαι.
But it must be admitted that
εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἴπτει ὃ παραδεξόμεθα
would give a plainer sense.

*ἐποιέα γάρ ποι] 'I assume this
(ὅτι), for I suppose I take you
with me.' Cp. Euthyphr, 12 C:
'Εκεί γάρ ποι ἑώς γε: Ἐθν. πά-
νυ γε. The MSS. have εἰπεί, but
there can be little doubt of the
truth of Heindorf's emenda-
tion. The six dice are more
when compared with four. They
were fewer when compared with
twelve. They cannot be more
without having become more,
and they cannot have become
more without increase. Pro-
tagoras would say: It is true
the same thing cannot be more
without addition, but the dice
in the two cases are not the
same thing, for they are in a
different relation.—The distinc-
tion between relative and abso-
lute quantity is so familiar to
us, that this is apt to appear a
mere verbal quibble. But the
solution of such difficulties was
one of the steps by which the
Greeks arrived at that distinc-
tion.

9. οὐ κακῶς τοπάζεω] 'Theo-
dorus is evidently right in his
surmise about you. For this
Wonder is a true symptom of
the philosophic nature.'

11. οὗ γὰρ ἄλλη ἄρχη φιλοσό-
2: ἤδη, τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ θεοφάνες
καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤθεν ἀρχη
gος φιλοσοφεῖν, κ. τ. λ.

Aristotle also observes that
if wonder is the beginning,
cessation of wonder is the end
of philosophy;—so reconciling
Plato's saying with that of
Democritus, who made ἀδιάν- 

\[ \text{θαμμαία his aim. See K. F. Herm.} \]

\[ \text{Gesch. d. Plat. Phil. p. 153.} \]

1. τὴν Ἐρέμου Θεώματος ἤκουον] \[ Hes. Theog. 265 : Θεώμας δ’ Ὠκεανοῖς βαδυρέματα πυγάμα | ἡγάγει "Ηλέκτρον" ἢ δ’ ἀκείνων τίκεν Ἐρέμον σφυρ. v. 780. \]

2. τοῦτον μανθάνεις ἢδε] ‘Do you begin to perceive what is the reason of this, according to the theory we attribute to Protagoras?’

Aristotle, Met. io. 1063 A, points out that the Protagorean doctrine rests very much on the relativeness of quantity: Φαι- 

\[ \text{νοντα ὑπὸ ἡκούσα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀνεπάθεις ταῖς καταργείσις τῷ τὸ ποιόν ὑπελεξίθαι μὴ μένεις ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων διὰ τὸ καὶ εἰσὶν τετρά-} \]

\[ \text{πνημα τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡς εἰσίν. ἢ δ’ ἄποιεῖσα κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς φύσεως, τὸ δὲ ποιόν τῆς ἀριστωτοῦ.} \]

6. Χάρις, κ. τ. λ.] ‘Shall I then earn your gratitude, if in regard to a man, or rather men, of high renown, I help to elicit the truth of their meaning from its hidingplace in their minds?’

\[ \text{μᾶλλον δὲ ἄνθρωπον | Viz. Hera-} \]

\[ \text{clitus, Homer, and the others mentioned above, 152 E.} \]

7. ἄνθρωπον... αὐτῶν] The two genitives are not precisely in the same construction: ἄνθρωπον is governed by διανοιασ, αὐτῶν by ἐξ ἐν τῷ ἐν ἐν. The pronoun αὐτῶν, however, is frequently used to recall a noun, which, for the sake of emphasis, has been placed in the forepart of the sentence, e.g. Rep. 5. 477 D: Ἐπιστήμην ποίησαν δυναμὶ τῶν φήμων εἰς αὐ- 

\[ \text{τῆς, κ. τ. λ. Cp. Shak. Winter’s} \]

\[ \text{Tale, 5. 1 : ‘Whom | Though} \]

\[ \text{bearing misery, I desire my} \]

\[ \text{life | Once more to look on him.’} \]

\[ \text{ἀποκεκρυμμένην is to be taken} \]

\[ \text{closely with ἐν ἐν.} \]

\[ \text{as the order shows. Cp. Phed. 89 A :} \]

\[ \text{πεθεκυμήτως αἰκαλαία-} \]

\[ \text{τοί.} \]

12. ἄρπι τοῦ χρόνον λαβήσθαι] What may be ‘grasped thus.

The extreme materialists are here discarded; in the Sophist they are made better for the
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δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι π. 155. ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ὁ Σώκρατες, σκληρούς γε λέγεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους.

5 ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ γὰρ, ὁ παῖ, μᾶλ' ἐκ ἄμουσι. ἀλλοι δὲ

argument's sake, that we may be able to discourse with them. The description there is very similar. Soph. 246 AB: Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐς οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀόρατον πάντα ἔκλονες, ταῖς χεραῖν ἀντικύροις πέτραι καὶ δρῦς περιμένετε. Τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἡρωικὴ ἡγεμονία πάντων διαχειρίζονται τούτῳ εἶναι μόνον δ' παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐσπαθὴν τιμα, ταύτων σώμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὑπαύτων, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἰ τις φοίει μὴ σώμα ἔχων εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθλοῦσιν ἂλο ἀκοῦσιν. 247 C: τοιῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἐν ἐπαινεσχεθεῖν οἱ γας αὐτῶν σπαρτοί τε καὶ αὐτόχθωνες, ἀλλὰ διατείνωσιν ἂν πάνταν δὲ μὴ δυνασίαν ταῖς χεραῖς ἐξαιρεῖσθαι εἰναι, ὡς ἄρα τούτῳ οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστὶν.

πράξεις] E. g. δικαιὰ καὶ δίκους πράξεις. Soph. 247 C AB.

1. γενεσίας [E. g. αἰσθήσεις, εἰ- ναις, ἓδωτη.

Sensationalism is here treated as already a kind of idealism, whereas in the corresponding passage of the Sophist, p. 246, the doctrine of an unseen γένεσις is regarded as an inference which the idealist by his dialectic compels the reluctant materialist to accept. See Introduction.

3. σκληροῦς . . . καὶ ἀντιτύπους] 'Hard and repellent,' i.e. stubborn and impenetrable. Cr. Soph. 246 B: Ἡ δεωνίας ἐκθέσεις ἀνδρός ἂν γαρ καὶ ἐγὼ τούτων συρκούσι προστύχον. For the verbal climax cp. Tim. 62 BC: 

Σκληρών δὲ, ἄθεους δὲ ἢ ἡμῶν ἢ σάρξ ἐπίκειται . . . τὸ δὲ ἐκ τριπλῶν ἐν βάσεως . . . ἀντιποικίας εἶδος.

There is perhaps a humorous intention in the application of these material attributes to the men in question, similar to the play of words by which the Heracliteans are called βίωτοι, infr. 181 A.

5. ἀλλοι δὲ πολύ κομψότερον] In comparison with these advocates of gross bodily 'matter,' Protagoras is almost an idealist. His disciples believe not indeed in a world of ὑπερ' ἑκάσιν, but in a hidden process underlying appearances. Cr. Rep. 5. 477 C: δυνάμεις γὰρ ἐκὼ ὀβεταὶ τωλὶ χρῶν ὡς ὄβετε σχῆμα, κ. τ. λ.

ἀλλοι δὲ] Vide. the μαθητὴς Πρωταγόρου, to whom he communicated his doctrine ἐσπαρ- 

rittō, 152 C. Schleiermacher (who is followed by Schanz) conjectured ἦλλ' ὀδὴ: but the men would then be apt to be confused with the ἄδρες ἀνθρωπός above. The 'disciples of Prota-

goras' are evidently contemporaries of Plato. Aristippus is probably included. (Κομψός καὶ συρφήτης are opposed, Hippia-

ς Maj. 288 D: ὃν κομψός ἂλλα συρφήτης.) The word κομψός is used similarly of certain name- 

less (Pythagorean?) philosophers in Polit. 284 E, 285 A: Πολλοὶ τῶν κομψῶν λέγουσιν δὲ ἂρα μετρητικὴ πεῖ σφετέροι τὰ γεγόρομεν. Cr. Phil. 53 C: κομψὸς γὰρ δὴ τινες (Megarians!) αὐ
p. 156. τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσα μεν ὑπὲρ ἤμων οἷς δὲ χάριν ἔχειν.

3. ἢν] 'Really,'—according to the well-known idiom, which becomes more frequent in Aristotle. What a thing proves to be when an inquiry is finished, that it was before the inquiry began. It is a transference of the reality of history to a general statement. H. Schmidt's argument for taking ἤν literally, 'In the beginning all was motion,' is not convincing.—The doctrine asserted above is now more minutely developed.

οἶνος ὡσον] Sc. ἢν.

8. συνεκτυποῦσα] 'Tumbling forth to light at the same moment.' Compare the lively expression in Rep. 4, 432 D, when justice is discovered: πιάδα, ὅ μακρας, φανερα πρὸ τὸ δοκεῖν ἤμων ἐξ ἐφης κυλοῦσθαι. For the insertion of καὶ γενομένη cp. Soph. Ant. 537: Καὶ γενομένη καὶ φέρω τοῖς ἑαυτίοις. Aesch. Prom. 331: Πάνω τοιαύτα καὶ τε- τολμηκός ἐμοί. The present tense denotes a process that is always in transition.

Far more refined are those whose mysteries we now reveal. Their first principle, upon which the whole depends, is that All is motion. Motion is active and passive, and each kind is infinite. These meet and produce innumerable twinbirths:
παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ἀνομασμέναι: τὸ δ' αὖ αἰσθητῶν p. 156
gένος τούτων ἐκάστας ὑμίγκον, ὄφεισι μὲν χρώματα
παντοδαπαῖς παντοδαπά, ἀκόαὶ δὲ ὀσαυτῶς φωναί, ο
καὶ ταῖς ἀλλαῖς αἰσθήσεις τὰ ἀλλα αἰσθητὰ ἔγγεν
5 γνώμενα. Τί δὴ οὖν ἡμῖν βούλεται οὕτως ὁ μύθος,
ὁ Θεατής, πρὸς τὰ πρότερα; ἂρα ἐννοεῖς;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅυ πάννυ, Ὡ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλ' ἄφεις εάν τοὺς ἀποτελεσθῆ. βούλεται
gὰρ δὴ λέγειν ὅσ ταῦτα πάντα μέν, ὡστερ λέγομεν,
κινεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτῆς ἐν τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν.
ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιά-
ζοντα τὴν κίνησιν ἵππει καὶ οὕτω δὴ γεννᾷ, τὰ δὲ

(quoted by H. Schmidt): 'uni-
cuique ex jam dictis clare cons-
citate credo, affectus tot vari-
tiones oriri, ut nullo numero
definiri queant... plerique
animi fluctuationes omnina non
habent.'

2. The Bodleian, with most
other MSS., has ἐκάστης.

242 C: Μίθῳ του ἐκαύτος φαίνε-
tαι μετακακήθαι πανιν ὡς οὕτω
ἡμῖν, κ. τ. λ. For the spirit with
which all this is done compare
Rep. 8. 545 D E: Φύσει αὐτάς
τραγοκός, ὡς πρὸς πάνδρος ἡμᾶς
παράλογα καὶ ἐρεχθούσας, δὲ δὴ
στουδή λγουσα, ἄψηλογον-
μένας λέγειν;

6. πρὸς τὰ πρότερα] 'In rela-
tion to what came before,' viz.
from 153 D, ὑγνώλατε—το 155
C, παραδεξιόμεθα.

8. 'Ἀλλ' ἄφεις εάν]' Well, look
attentively; perhaps we shall
be able to finish it.' Cp. infr.
192 E: 'Ἰδί δή, εάν τι μάλλον
νῦν ἐπιστῇ. εάν = 'in the hope
that.'

9. ταῦτα] ποιοῦσα, πάσχοντα,
αισθητα, αἰσθήσεις.

πάντα... κινάται] Cp. Locke:
'The next thing to be con-
sidered is, how bodies produce
ideas in us, and that is mani-
festly by impulse, the only way
which we can conceive bodies
operate in.'

11. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ] 'The
slower have their motion in
one spot, and in relation to
what is in contact with them,
and are thus the producing
elements; but those which are
[thus] produced are swifter;
for they are carried about, and
their motion is from place to
place.'

For ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ cp. infr. 181
CD: 'Ὅταν μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ.
12. τὰ δ' γεγονόμενα τοὺτω δὴ]
Schol.: ἔπει τὸ δὴ ὑποστικτὼν.
This only means that οὗτω δὴ
is to be taken with the pre-
ceding words. The phrase has
been felt to be somewhat harsh;
and perhaps the second οὗτος
may have crept in from the
preceding clause. The (prob-
ably conjectural) interpolation
of Cornarius after οὗτω δὴ
[βραδυτερά ἐστων] δουν δὲ αὖ
p. 156. γεννόμενα ἔτι δὴ θάττω ἑστι' φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν
φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν. ἐπειδὰν ὅσον ὤμα
καὶ ἄλλο τὶ τῶν τούτων ξυμμέτρων πλησίαιον γεν-


toχύ, πρὸς τὰ πόρρωθεν τὴν κίνη-
σιν ἱσχει καὶ ὄντος γεννοῦ, τὰ δὲ
γεννόμενα ὄντω ὃδε] is quite un-
necessary, and confuses the real
sense. It was occasioned by
the condensation of the lan-
guage and the inversion or
′chiasm′ in what follows, which,
to correspond exactly, should
have been τὰ δ᾽ αὐτὰ φέρεται καὶ
gεννᾶται. The slower mo-
tions are the ποιόντα καὶ πά-
σχοντα, which, when in con-
tact, produce (without changing
place) the αἰσθήτα and αἰσθήσεις
(i.e. qualities and sensations),
which are the ′quicker mo-
tions,′ and pass to and fro be-
tween the ποιόντα καὶ πάσχον.
Cp. inf. p. 159 C D: Ἐγέν-
νος γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν πρωσμολογη-
μένων τὸ τοῦ ποιόντα καὶ τὸ πάσχον
γλυκύτητα τε καὶ αἰσθήσεις, ὅμι
φερόμενα ἀμφότεροι. Qualities
and sensations are in locomo-
tion, because existing merely
in the act of flowing from sub-
ject to object, and from object
to subject, perhaps also because
they are realized now here, now
there. Cp. 153 D E. When it is
said that they are the swifter
motions, the theory is vaguely
connected with Heraclitean
doctrine. Sensations and qua-
lities are drops in the ever-
flowing river of succession.
The man or the tree is like the
dull weed that clogs it,
itself to be carried down in
time. Subject and object are
more of the nature of Earth,
sensation and quality are sparks
of the everliving Fire. That
the ποιόντα καὶ πάσχον are both

gεννᾶτα appears from 159
C D: Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ . . . τὸ τοῦ
ποιόντα καὶ τὸ πάσχον, quoted
above.

Sensational idealism is ham-
pered by the necessity of dis-
olving ′substance′ (whether
matter or mind) into a series
of transient processes, without
too violently contradicting ex-
perience. An instance of this
logical necessity has appeared
since the above note was
written, in Mr. J. S. Mill′s ′Per-
manent possibilities′ (Mill on
Hamilton, ch. XI.), a device
which unintentionally throws a
vivid light on Plato′s meaning
here. Perception and attribute
are conceived as momentary;
things and persons are imagined
as a gradual growth and decay.
By ′slow′ and ′swift′ are really
meant ′lasting′ and ′mo-
mentary.′ The distinction of kinds
of motion (ἀλλοίωσις, φορίς) is
purposely slurred over here,
that it may come in as a fresh
point at a later stage of the dis-
cussion, 181 C. Cp. 157 B.
See also Kant, Krit. d. r. Vern.
B, 230.

76 D: Ἐστὶ γὰρ χρῶ ται ἀπορροφὴ
σχήματος ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰ-
σθήτα. This definition is said to
be ′κατὰ Γοργίαν,′ In Tim. 67 C
Plato calls colour φλάγα ἃν
σωμάτων ἐκίστων ἀπορρέουσαν,
ὄψει ξυμμέτρως μάρια ἔχονσιν πρὸς
αισθήσεων. Cp. ib. 45, 6. Plato′s
account of sensation in the
Timæus coincides in many
points with this part of the
Theaetetus, showing that, al-
νήση την λευκότητα τε καὶ αἰσθησιν αυτὴ ἢμμυφυτον, p. 156
ἀ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐγένετο ἐκατέρων ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο
ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων τῆς μὲν ὄψεως
πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ
εἰς συναπτικότων τῷ χρῶμα, ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα
ὄψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὀρᾶ δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο
οὐ τι ὄψιν ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ὀρᾶν, τὸ δὲ ἐγγενεύσαν
τῷ χρῶμα λευκότητος περιπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο ὡς
λευκότης αὖ ἀλλὰ λευκῶν, εἴτε ξύλου εἴτε λίθος εἴτε

though rejected as a theory of knowledge, the hypothesis
is retained as a 'probable' doctrine of sense. See also
Phil. 34.

3. τότε δὴ, κ.λ. 'Then it is
that while these are issuing in
the midst, sight from the eyes,
whiteness from that which helps
to create the colour, the eye is
filled with seeing, and sees now,
and becomes not sight indeed,
but seeing eye, and that which
helps to give the colour birth
is covered with whiteness, and
it too becomes not whiteness
but white, whether stick or
stone, or whatever it is that
happens to have been coloured
with this hue.'

μεταξύ φερομένων. It is
doubtful whether this means
'whilst they are moving,' or 'as
they are moving in the midst.'
The former is idiomatic Greek,
but the latter seems preferable
if we turn to 154 A: Μεταξὺ
tι ἐκάστη ἰδίων γεγονός, and infr.
182 Α: Φίλοσοφῳ ἐκατον τοιῶν
dιὰ αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιητῶν
tι καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος. And
the idiomatic use of μεταξύ be-
longs rather to cases in which
one action supervenes upon
another, than where both are
simultaneous, as here.

9. εἴτε ὄργον, κ.λ. The
MS. reading is ὄργον ἡ χρώμα.
Heind. who receives ὄργον .
χρώμα from Cornarius, adds,
'ne ipso quidem χρωμα opus fui-
rit, h. l.' But ὄργον has scarcely
more authority than χρώμα. One
MS. (Par. H,) has σῶμα on the
margin, but ὄργον . . σῶμα,
though it has thus some slight
authority, is not satisfactory.
The real text is perhaps re-
stored by dropping χρώμα, and
reading ὄργον as in the text
(ὁργόν Par. F,) 'White, whether
stick or stone, or whatsoever
happens to be coloured
with that colour.' The repetition
of similar consonants is a fre-
cent form of corruption; cp.
esp. 158 C; ἄρι φρῆ, κ.λ.;
where three MSS. (Bodl. Vat.
Ven. P,) read ἄρι χρῶν χρῆ,
κ.λ. (Χρόνου, χρόνου, χρόνου,
χρόνου, occurring within the
next few lines.) Also, 149
C, ἄριστοοι for ἄτοκοι Bodl. pr.
Vat. pr. Ven. Π. with ἄριστο-
νατος a few lines above.

Another way is opened by
the ingenious conjecture of
Schanz, who reads ὄργον . .
σχῆμα. Cp. esp. Men. 75 B;
"Εστι γὰρ δὴ ἡμίν τοῦτο σχῆμα, ἢ
μόνον τῶν ὅσων τυγχάνει χρόματι ἄλοιπον. But the language is clearer and simpler without introducing the notion of 'form.' For ἐφετέρων ἐτέρων cp. infr. ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ λίθων καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἐδώς τε καὶ ἑδώς. Hipp. Maj. 292 D: Καὶ λίθω καὶ ἀειλο καὶ ἀνθρώπω καὶ θεῷ, κ.τ.λ. The sentence is turned like Phædr. 237 A: ἐτέρω δι᾽ ὅδε ἐδώς λεγεία, ἐτέρω δι᾽ ὅδε μονακές τὸ λέγεται ταύτην ἐξετά την ἐπωνυμίαν. Rep. 10. 612 A: ἐτέρω πολυειδὴς ἐτέρω μοναείδης ἐτέρω ὑπὸ ὑπὲρ καὶ ὑπό. The aorists, while marking the momentariness of each act of sense, give picturiness to the expression, referring, as in the Homeric similes, to an imaginary case. 4. τόιν τοῦτον Supr. 152 D. 6. ἐτέρω καὶ τῷ ποιοῦν] A further effort is here made to melt away the 'category of substance' into thin air. The 'permanent possibility' (which is only relatively permanent) is incognizable in itself. 'For it is impossible to have a firm notion (they say) even of the active and passive elements as existing separately in any single case.' ἀντῶν, εἰς τῶν κινουμένων, 'To distinguish in them the active or passive element as existing,' ἀντῶν refers, as H. Schmidt points out, to σκαληρῶν καὶ βερμῶν καὶ πάσης, κ.τ.λ., i.e. sense-phenomena generally. It depends rather on τῷ ποιοῦν καὶ τῷ πάσχον than on ἐνος. Cp. Arist. Met. 5. 20: ἔστωσεν ἀνείον λέγεται πλῆρες τῷ ἀνείον ἐν ῥήν ἐνος. For ἀντῶν Carusius suggested αὐτῷ. If a change were necessary, αὐτῷ would seem more probable. τῶν ἐν ἐνος, 'of things taken singly,' might then be compared with τῶν ἐν ἑκάστον, Phil. 16 D. (Wohlrab joins ἐν ἐνος αὐτῶν, 'in the case of any one of them.') For ἐν ἐνος cp. infr. 186 A, ἐν πόσῳν. 7. νοητα...παγερα] Rep. 5. 479 C: Καὶ γὰρ τῷ παγερῃ ἐπιμομοφερεῖσθαι, καὶ οὖν ἐνοικοῦσκε ὑπὸ τὴν μὴ εἰσάγειν αὐτῶν δυνατῶν παγερεύειν νοητα, οὗτος ἐμφορέται ὑπὸ οὐδέτερον. The word is used by Aristotle. 11. πάσχον ἀνεφανη] E.g. The same eye, when seen, is active, when seeing, passive.
Neither seeing eye nor coloured object can be thought of as existing independently of this mutual process. We must not speak of anything as existing, but only as becoming this or that, arising, passing, or changing. This applies not only to single things, but to those

\[ \text{όρχησ έλέγομεν, οὖδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ κἂν αὐτό, ἀλλὰ p. 15; τι} \]

\[ \text{μώ} \]

\[ \text{τὸ δ' εἰ} \]

\[ \text{πολλά καὶ ἄρτι ἤναγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνη-} \]

\[ \text{θείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. τὸ δ' οὐ} \]

\[ \text{5 δὲ, ὡς τὸν σοφὸν λόγον, αὐτὲ τῇ ἐν-γχαρέων αὐτὲ} \]

\[ \text{τοὺ ἐμοῖ υἱεν τὸδ' ὡς ἔκεινο ὡς ἄλλο ὡδὲν} \]

\[ \text{ἄν όμοι: ὃ τί ἀν ἴσθη, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι} \]

\[ \text{γεγονόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἄλλοι-} \]

\[ \text{ούμενα: ὡς εὰν τί τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὑέλεγκτος} \]

\[ \text{ιο τοῦτο ποιῶν. δὲ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὐτω λέγει καὶ} \]

\[ \text{περὶ πολλῶν ἁθροισθέντων, ὃ δὲ ἁθροίσματι ἄνθρω-} \]

\[ \text{πῶν τε τίθεναι καὶ λίθων καὶ ἐκαστὸν ἵππων τε καὶ} \]

\[ \text{τίδος. Ταῦτα δὴ, ὃ Θεάτητε, ἥ' ἱδει δοκεῖ σοι} \]

\[ \text{εἶναι, καὶ γεύομαι ἐν αὐτῶν ὡς ἀρεσκόντων;} \]

3. ὡς δὲ ἢμεῖς] 'Though, as I need not observe.' The irony of this appears very clearly, if we compare 197 A: Εἴ μὲντοι ἴν ἀντιλογικά, κ.τ.λ.

4. τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ] Sc. ποιῶν. Or rather τὸ is an accusative in opposition to the active of ἐγχαρέων, κ.τ.λ.

5. ὡς τοῦ] The genitive is a point of transition to ἵμων.

7. φίλαγγεσθα...] 'To use the expression.' ('Man muss Ausdrücke wie γεγονόμενα ff. brauchen.' H. Schmidt.)


11. ὃ δὲ ἁθροίσματι...τίθενται] Sc. δύνα. The subject of τί-θενται is indefinite. From our Protagorean point of view, that which answers to a common name, or which counts for one, is not ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, nor ἐν παρά τὰ πολλά, but an arbitrary or conventional aggregate of phenomena. Cp. Parm. 165 A., where the word δύνα answers to ἁθροίσμα here, but implies something even more vague and formless. The same terminology recurs infr. 182 A, οὐ μανθάνεις ἁθροίσμαν λεγόμενον, where it denotes genus as opposed to species. A doubt may be raised whether the wholes here intended are general (a class = an aggregate of individuals) or particular (a thing or person = an aggregate of attributes). The former is preferable. Cp. however Tim. 56 C: ἑπεξεργασθέντων δὲ πολλῶν τοὺς δύκους αὐτῶν ὀρατάς (of the invisible particles of bodies).

12. καὶ ἐκαστὸν [ὡς τέ καὶ}
ΤΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 63

p. 157. ΘΕΑΙ. Ούκ οίδα ἔγογε, ὁ Σῶκρατες· καὶ γὰρ
οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοήσαι, πάτερα δοκοῦντά
σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἦ ἔμοι ἀποτελεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μημονεύεις, ὁ φίλε, ὡς ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ'
οίδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἔμοι, ἀλλ' 5
εἰμὶ αὐτῶν ἄγονος, οὐ δὲ μανεύμαι καὶ τοῦτον ἐνεκα
ἐπάθω τε καὶ παρατίθημι ἐκάστων τὸν σοφὸν ἀπο-
 νοεύσασθαι, ἐως ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σοῦ δόγμα ἐννεαγάγω,
exaekténtos δὲ, τὸν ἴδιον σκέψομαι εἰτ' ἀνεμαίων εἰτε
γνώσμον ἀναφανήσαται. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν καὶ καρτέρων 10
εἰ καὶ ἀνδρέως ἀποκρίνων ἄν φαίνησαι σοι περὶ ὠν
ἀν ἐρωτῶ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρώτα δὴ.

ΣΩ. Λέγε τούτων πάλιν, εἰ σοι ἄρεσκε τὸ μή τι
ἐναι ἄλλα γίνεσθαι οἷον ἁγάθων καὶ καλῶν καὶ πάντα 15
ἄρτι διῆμεν.


7. παρατίθημι] Supr. 149 C: Δίδονται γε αἱ μαῖαι φορμαία καὶ ἐπίδευμα. See the description of the education of a Greek youth in the Protagoras, 325 E: Παρατίθεσιν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῶν βαθμῶν ἀναγεφυγόμενων παιδῶν ἁγάθων ποιήσατα. The genitive is perhaps partitive with παρα-
tίθημι, but more probably governed by ἀναφανήσαται.

10. καὶ καρτέρων] ‘And with perseverance.’ Boldness was all he required at first; 148 C, δέορε: 151 D, εἶν . . . ἀνδρ., i. e. σοι ἄρεσκει] ‘Whether you are pleased with the idea that nothing is, but is ever becoming, good and noble, as well as what we have just enumerated.’

15. ἁγάθων καὶ καλῶν] As in 156 Βαῦνθως is made to include desire, fear, etc., so, by the subtle introduction of these words, the doctrine is pushed to its farthest limits, and thus its chief fallacy is hinted at—that of arguing from sense to higher things. So afterwards Protagoras is made to assume that the doctrine applies to states as well as individuals.

ἁγάθων καὶ καλῶν are brought in as it were accidentally, merely as a fresh example, like κοροπλαθῶν supr. 147 B. But this, to the Platonic reader, was already a tacit ‘reductio ad absurdum,’ and for all readers

bundles of things, which men call sorts or natures.

The master is invited to acknowledge the theory so far developed. Socrates disclaims having any share in it, except that he has helped to bring it to the birth. The Good and Noble must be thought of with other things, as not existing, but arising continually.
it prepares the way for the pivot-argument from the δέα τού ἀφελίμου in what follows, 177 ff. H. Schmidt, however, approves of Heindorf’s proposal to cancel these significant words.

2. θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν. The order is φαίνεται θαυμασίως ὡς ἔχειν. θαυμασίως ὡς is stronger than θαυμασίως, and is formed by attraction of the antecedent from θαυμάσιως ἔστω ὡς.

4. Μὴ τοίνυν] The doctrine is now so far developed that we have only to notice an objection, and it will be complete. As false opinion is our stumbling-block afterwards, so now false impressions have to be accounted for. The solution is a simple one, and confirms our theory—they are not false to him who is the subject of them. The position, Sense is knowledge, was at first made equivalent to the reality of the object of sense (p. 152). But are dreams real? Are the illusions of madness true? Is that really bitter which tastes so to the diseased palate?—If truth is wholly relative, if nothing is but what becomes, this must be so.


6. δόσα...τέ ἄλλο] The double cognate accusative is also noticeable. ‘The cases in which it is said—to have any other illusory impression.’

10. πολλού δὲ] This phrase has become equivalent to an adverb. Hence it is unnecessary to adopt δὲν from Heindorf’s conjecture.

11. ἄλλα πὰν τοῖνυν τοῖς οὖσιν ὡς φαίνεται εἶναι] E. g. Democritus (who is believed to have written against Protagoras) said of all sensations except hardness and weight: Σμηνέων δ’ ὡς οὐκ ἔφεσιν, τῷ μὴ τοῖνυν πάση φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἔργοις, ἄλλ’ ὡς ἦμιν γλυκὰ, τοῦτο
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 158. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθεύτατα λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὴ ὦν, ὡς παῖ, λειπεται λόγος τῷ τὴν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιστήμην τυθεμένον καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἕκαστο ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ φαίνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ εἰπεῖν ὦτι ὦν ἔχω τι λέγω, διότι μου ὃν δὴ ἐπετελήσας εἰπότοι μαίνεσθαι ἢ ὢσοι μαίνομεν ἢ ὥσοι ὅνειροττοτενοὺς ὃν ἑπενδὴ δοξάζωσιν, ὅταν ὃι μὲν τοιούτων ὀφείλεται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πτερόι τε, καὶ ὡς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ διανοοῦν ὄνωται.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ τὸ σώματος ἅμισυβήτημα ἐννοεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν, μάλιστα ὑπὶ τοῦ ὑπ’ ἀπαρ χεῖρὰ περὶ τοῦ ποιῆσαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιῶν;

ΣΩ. Ὁ πολλάκις σε ὀμαίναι ἁγικοῦμεν ἐρωτώντων ἐστὶ τὸ τις ἔχει τεκμήριον ἀποδείκτοις, εἰ τις ἐρωτεύεται νῦν ὑπὸ διὰ τὸ παράνομο, πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ πάντα ἀ διανοοῦμαμεν ὅνειροττοτεμεν, ἡ εὐρηγόρομεν τε καὶ c ὑπαρ ἀλλήλων διαλεγόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὴν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀπορών γε ὦτῃ χρή 20

ἄλλοις πικρῶν καὶ ἐπίροις ὄντων καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπέρ, τοῖς δὲ στρεφοντος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὁμοιῶν.

6. νῦν δὴ [Supr. 151 D. 9. οι μὲν . . αὐτῶν] Ι.ε. the

προτετεί] Sc. οὗτοι εἰναι. ὁρατὰ τέτειν 

Cp. supr. 149 D: τίσκετε τῇ δὲ, and note.

15. Ὁ πολλάκις] 5 is not exactly governed by ἀκροβατῶν ἐρωτώντων, but is cognate accusative in apposition with the whole sentence which follows. 'What question do you allude to? This. I dare say you have often heard it asked, etc.' Riddell's Digest, § 15, b. Cp. 165 D: 'A ἑλληθῶν ἄνευ πελταστικὸς ἀνηρ μισοθίσας ἐν λόγοις ἐρώμενος, κ.τ.λ. Rep. 4. 443 B: τὰ ἐνώτιμα, ὃ ἐρωμεν ὑποτεύθυνε, κ.τ.λ.

Arist. Met. 3. 6. 1011 A: Τὰ δὲ τούτα ἀπορώμενα ἡμῶν ἐστὶν τῷ ἀπορείν τότερον καθεύδομεν νῦν ἡ ἐγρηγοροῦμεν. Πν. 7. 5.

20. ἀπορῶν γε ὦτῃ χρή ἐπιδαίξαι] Descartes de la Méthode, p. 164 (Cousin): 'Et que les meilleurs esprits y étudient tant qu’il leur plaît, je ne crois pas qu’ils puissent donner aucune raison, qui soit suffisante pour ôter cette doute, s’ils ne présumposent l’existence de Dieu.' Descartes, however, would not say.

There is a doubt which is often raised about them: e.g. when it is asked, Can we prove that we are not dreaming now?
Dreams have as much reality to the dreaming mind, as daylight impressions have to

όμοιος ἐφ᾽ ἐκάτερος διάσχισθαι. Attention was of course early attracted by the phenomena of dreams. See esp. II. 22. 199: 'ὅς δ᾽ ἐν ἐνεέρω ὁ δυστατα φεύγοντα διόκειν.

B has ὅτε χρόνον χρή, whence Schanz formerly conjectured ὅτε χρόμενον χρή, and now reads ὅτε χρών. But T gives χρή, and χρόνον occurs a few lines below. ἄπορος] Sc. τὸ ἀμφισβητημα γίγνεται, ὅφε, κ.τ.λ., explains the point of the difficulty.

1. πάντα γὰρ ἄσπερ ἀντίστροφα τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ] 'For everything corresponds in each exactly, as if one series was the counterpart of the other.'

2. ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ] This is the reading of the best MSS., though ὑπνῶν is supported by the greater number. If the latter reading were adopted, ἐν τῷ must be changed to ἐν τῷ.

4. καὶ ὅταν δῆ 'And when in a dream we do seem to be relating dreams,—it is strange, the resemblance of this state to that.' ἄνειρα... διηγίσθαι] Either (1) 'to tell dreams,' or (2) 'to give utterance to thoughts which are only dreams.' Cp. supra. πάντα δ ἰδιαούσιμα ἄνειρῶτ-

τομεν. ἄνειρα in (2) is a sort of cognate accusative, or rather, is in apposition to the suppressor of διηγίσθαι. ἄνω is adverbial to δοκῶν. (Meno 85 C: ἄσπερ δὲ ἄρω ἀνακειόμεθα αἱ δύσει αὐτῶν'. But the former explanation (1) is simpler and is really free from objection. ὅταν δῆ has a different force in (1) and (2). Either, (1) 'When it comes to this,' marking a climax, or, (2) 'When in fact,' marking the correspondence to the previous clause. The second interpretation (2), although in some ways plausible, seems to require Hirschig's emendation διαλέγονται διηγίσθαι. τοι-

των refers to the waking, ἀκέλοιος to the sleeping state, like ἐνδέκτη and ἐκεῖ of the visible and invisible world. There is a slight break in the sentence before ἄρων, κ.τ.λ. Heindorf's conjecture ἄρα (for ἄνειρα), approved by Cobet, and adopted by Schanz, ('and when in dreams we do seem to be relating something'), is rather flat, but is more plausible if we adopt Hirschig's emendation:

'when we seem to have a conversation in our dream.'
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

158. ὥστε ἰσον μὲν χρόνον τάδε φαμέν ὡντα εἶναι, ἵσον δὲ ἐκείνα, καὶ ὁμοίος ἐφ' ἐκατέρω διάσχυσιμοθειά.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὕκοιν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου, ὥστι οὐκ ἰσος ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; πλῆθει χρόνου καὶ ὁλεγότητι τὸ ἀληθὲς ὀρισθήσεται ;

Ε. ΘΕΑΙ. Γελώνων μὲν ἄν εἰπ οἶναχῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφές ἐνδείξασθαι, ὁποῖα τοῦτον τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μοι δοκῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἐμοὶ τοιῶν ἄκουσε οἷα περὶ αὐτῶν ἄν λέγοιειν οἷ τὰ αἰ ὄσκοντα ὃς ὁμοίους τῷ δοκοῦντι ἐτίῳ ἀληθῆ, λέγουσι δὲ, ὅσον ἐγὼ ὀμαίς, οὕτως ἐρωτώντες, ὁ Ὁσαῖς ἄλλοι, ὃς ἐτέρωσε οἷ χρονίν ξεῖς τῷ ἐτέρῳ ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβουμεν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐαυτῶν εἶναι ὃ ἔρωτόμευ, τῇ δὲ ἐτέρῳ, ἀλλὰ ὅλως ἐτέρων.

7. πλῆθει χρόνου καὶ ἀληθείᾳ] The supporters of the same doctrine as quoted by Aristotle extended this argument to meet that from general consent. Met. 3. 5. 1000 B: Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀλθῆς ὃς πλῆθει κρίνεισθαι ἀνίσταται προσήκου ἐνδείξεως.

10. τὶ ἄλλο . . σαφές] 'Any other certain test.'

14. ὁμοίους] 'Who determine.' Perhaps there is a touch of irony in the application of this word to the Protagoreans.

17. μὴ ὑπολάβουμεν τῇ μὲν τοιῶν] These words expand παντάπασι, and are required in order to place Theaetetus at the right point of view.

Megarian subtlety is here ironically brought to the help of Protagoras, by the introduction of a fallacy in the Euthydemus vein. The language of logic is applied to the sensible world: the language of ideas to things which admit of degrees. And the idea dwelt upon throughout is that of difference. The language is humoured accordingly.

Socrates ill can hardly be said to be ὁλως ἐτέρωn, wholly different, from Socrates well, but they differ when taken each as a whole, ὁλως τοῦτο ὁλως ἀληθή (159 B). Cp. Democritus ap. Ar. de Gen. et Cor. 1. 2: Καὶ ὁλως ἐτέρων φαίνεται ὁνος μετακινηθείσος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γραμμάτων καὶ κωμικα γίγνεται γραμμάτων.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον τοίνυν ταύτων τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυνάμει ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὑπόθεσιν, ὅταν ἡ κομιδὴ ἐτέρων. 

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον ὁμολογεῖν;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοίγε δοκεῖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τι ξυμβαίνει ὁμοίως τῷ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἰτε ἐκατοφῶτε ἢ ἄλλω, ὁμοιόμενον μὲν ταύτων φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοιόμενον δὲ ἐτέρων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ᾧς πολλὰ μὲν εἰ ὑπάντησαν καὶ ἀπειρα, ὡστετος δὲ γε ἐν τῇ πά-σχοντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμετρυόμενον

15 καὶ ἄλλῳ οὖ ταύτῃ ἄλλα ἐτέρα γεννήσει;

1. τοίνυν] 'Then,' i.e. taking the question as you put it in their behalf. The particle is added with reference to the words καὶ μή, κ.τ.λ., above.
2. οὖν] Hirschg and Schanz read ἐν from Badham's conjecture. But the subject of ἔχειν is easily supplied from the preceding sentence, leaving ὑπάντησαν to be the object.
6. Εἰ δρῶ] 'What is the same is like, therefore what is like is the same.' This is one of many examples of the imperfect state of logic, which puts Socrates' respondent at his mercy. He does not always escape unchecked, however, see Prot. 350 C: Ἐγὼ γε ἐρωτηθήσαν ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐστι οἱ ἄνδρεις ὁμαλοκρατεῖτε, ἀνόμοιον δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄνδρεις, οὐκ ἠρωτήθητε; εἰ γὰρ μὲ τότε ἤρω, εἰποῦν δὲ ὅτι οἱ πάντες. And Socrates is not now speaking in his own name.

8. ἀνομοιόμενον] ἀνομοιότης is used several times by Plato, but is not found in other writers. It seems to be a coinage of some philosopher. See esp. Rep. 8. 547 A.

' The combination of one element with this and another with that, and again with another different from all.' Compare with what follows, Ar. Met. 5. 2. 1026 B: Εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ τῶν σοφίστων λόγοι περὶ τὸ συμβαθάκο αὐτῷ εἰπέν, μᾶλις πάντως πάντως ἐτέρων καὶ ταύτων μουσικός Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος, κ.τ.λ.

15. γεννήσει] The future is used because συμμετρυόμενος = ἄλλο συμμετρεῖσθαι.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 69

p. 159. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλλ’ ἤδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σω-
κράτη αὐτὸ ἄσθενοντα: πότερον ὁμοίων τούτ’ ἐκεῖνο ἤ
ἀνόμοιον φήσομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αρα τὸν ἄσθενοντα Σωκράτη, ὅλων τοῦτο
λέγεις ἀλη ἐκεῖνος, τὸ ὑγιαίνοντι Σωκράτει;

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες: αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ἀνόμοιον δὴ που.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐτέρου ἄρα οὖτος ὀσπερ ἀνόμοιον;

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ανάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἀ νῦν διήλ-
θομεν, ὡσαντως φήσεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡγαγέ.

ΣΩ. Ἐκαστον δὴ τῶν περικότων τι ποιεῖν, ἀλλο 15
τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτη, ὡς ἐτέρω μοι
χρήστει, ὅταν δὲ ἄσθενοιφτα, ὡς ἐτέρω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ’ οὐ μὲλλει;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐτέρα δὴ ἐφ’ ἐκατέρω γεννήσομεν ἐγώ
τε ἐ ω πάσχοι καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιεῖν;

2. λέγομεν δὴ] Phed. 100
C: Καὶ πάντα δὴ οὖν λέγω.
Σωκράς is in an imperfect con-
struction, governed partly by
λέγομεν, partly by φήσομεν. The
object here is to impress us
with the assumption of the ab-
soluteness of difference.

φήσεις] I. e. Having laid down
these premises. We now ven-
ture to apply our theory uni-
versally: not as supr. 153 D:
Kατὰ τὰ δόματα πρῶτον.

12. καθεύδοντα] Par. F. marg.
add. καὶ ἐγγυροῦσα. Bodl.
καθεύδοτα. Is it possible that
καθεύδοντα δὴ ἐγγυροῦσα may
be the true reading? But cp.
supr. 149 E: Εις γυναῖκα δὲ, and
see Riddell’s Digest, § 232.
—‘Platoni satis visum est re
quaedam significasse.’ Wohl-
rab.

13. ἔσκαστοις φήσεις] Sc. ἀνό-
μοιον καὶ ἐτέρων εἶναι τοῦ ἐγγυρο-
τος, κ.τ.λ.

15. το ποιεῖν] ‘To act upon
something;’ to be agents. So
to ποιεῖν ἐμὲ, below. Soph.
247 D: ἔτει εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἐτέρων
ὁμών.

19. ἐφ’ ἐκατέρω] In either
case. Cp. Parm. 130 Α: Δι-
γυροῦσα δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους . . ἐφ’
ἐκαστον ἀξιοθαλμό τὸν τε Παρμε-
δεν καὶ τὸν Ζήσανα.
Accordingly, wine both seems and really is pleasant to me when well.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ὑπάρξει τοῦ προώρωμα ὑγιαίνων τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τό πάσχον γλυκίττητα τε καὶ ἀίθη-ν σιν, ἀμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὕτω αἰσθανομένη τῇ γλόσσᾳ ἀπείρασατο, ἡ δὲ γλυκίττης πρὸς τοῦ ὑώνου περὶ αὐτῶν φερομένη γλυκίν τῷ ὑώνῳ τῇ ὑγιαίνοντι γλώσσῃ ἐποίησε καὶ ἔδωκε καὶ φαίνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν ὦν τὰ πρώτα ἡμῖν οὕτωσι ἀμφότερα ὑγιαίνοντες.

10 ΣΩ. Ὑπάρξει τοῦ ἀσθενοῦτα—ἀλλα τὸ πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτῶν ἐλάβες; ἀνομοίω γὰρ δὴ προσήλθεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

15 ΣΩ. Ἑτέρα δὴ ἂν ἐγεννησάτην ὁ τοιοῦτος Σω-κράτης καὶ ἡ ὑώνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τῇ γλώσσᾳ αἴσθησιν πικρότητας, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ὑώνου γεγομένης καὶ φερομένης πικρότητας, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὑπὸ πικρότητας ἀλλὰ πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ ὑπὸ αἴσθησιν ἀλλὰ αἰσθανομένον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομβῆδη μὲν οὖν.

9. ἀπειράσατο] ‘The sensation, arising on the side of the subject, renders the tongue perceipient.’
14. ἀσθενοῦντα] The former construction is resumed from ὅταν... λάθη, supr. C.
18. ἐγεννησάτην] The use of the third pers. helps to support the notion of ‘Socrates being a different man.’ Observe, too, the accuracy with which not the wine, but the drinking of the wine, is spoken of as the ‘active motion.’ The dual is expressive. ‘They produce when paired.’

For this whole example cf. Symp. 186 B, where the same thing is briefly stated by Eryximachus: Τὸ γὰρ ὑγιὲς τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὸ ουσίων ὑγιαίνοντας ἀμφάλλον τε καὶ ἀνδριαῖον ἄστη, τὸ δὲ ἀνδριαῖον ὑγιαίνον τε καὶ ἀνδριαῖον ἀπογονοῦσα ἀλλὰ ὑγιεῖ, ἀλλὰ δὲ ὑγιεῖν ἐρωτεύεται.
ΣΩ. Σ. Ούκοιν ἐγό τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι οὖτως αἰσθανόμενον· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἰσθήσεις,
καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλοις τοιαύτης ποιεῖ τον αἰσθανόμενον· οὔτε ἕκειν τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μήτοτον ἄλλος συνελθὼν ταύτων γενήσαν τοιούτου γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλος γενήσαν ἄλλοις γενήσεται.
ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εστι ταύτα.
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἐγὼ γε ἐμαυτῷ τοιούτος, ἐκεῖνὸς τε ἐαυτῷ τοιούτου γενήσεται.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ ὦν.
ΣΩ. 'Ανάγκη δὲ γε ἐμὲ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενον γίγνομαι· αἰσθανόμενον γὰρ, μηδὲν δὲ αἰσθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνός τε τοιαύτης γίγνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνος τε τοιαύτης γίγνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνος τε τοιαύτης γίγνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνος τε τοιαύτης γίγνεσθαι.

I. οὐδὲν ἄλλο γε γενήσομαι οὖτως αἰσθανόμενον] 'There is nothing else from which I can receive the same sensation.' That ἄλλο is the object of αἰσθανόμενον is evident from what follows. For the accusative see 185 A: 'Α δὲ ἐπέκοιτο διότι μὲν αἰσθάνει, αἰσθάνοτα εἶναι δὲ ἄλλως ταύτη αἰσθάνεια, and elsewhere. There is a stress on οὖτως. For γενήσομαι, αἰσθανόμενον see a few lines below, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενον γίγνομαι. The words γίγνεσθαι, αἰσθανόμενον, have become in a manner technical; cp. infra. 182. γενήσομαι αἰσθανόμενος answers to ἐγενήσατο, αἰσθανόμενον above. The point insisted on is not the identity of the subject while in the same combination, but the difference which arises with every new combination. For ἄλλοι τοιαύτης (the Bodleian reading) cp. supra. οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίζων. 'For a different object implies a different sensation, and makes him who perceives it a different man.' i.e. I and my sensation become different with every change in the object of sense.

The intention of these words is to mark the incommunicable individuality of every act of sense: i.e. not wine or bitterness, but the peculiar bitterness of a particular wine to a particular palate at a particular moment. (This view of the passage is disputed by H. Schmidt, but accepted by Wohlrab and Prof. Jowett.)

4. τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμή] 'Which (in this case) affects me.' It is unnecessary to supply αἰσθανόμενον. Supra. 159 C. As the sensation changes with the object, so the quality changes with the subject.


γνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὸς ἦ πικρὸν ἦ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνεται. 

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Σ. Οὐκόκου ὅτε δHELL ΤΟ ἐμὲ πουόν ἐμοὶ ἐστὶ καὶ 

15 οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτῷ, ἄλλου δὲ οὐ; 

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; 

Σ. Ἀληθῆς ἀρα ἐμοὶ ἡ ἐμὴ αἰσθησίς. τῆς γὰρ 

2. ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι] Ἐντόσα ἡ γεγονόμενα. Schanz, 

from Frei’s conjecture, unnecessarily repeats γενέσθαι. The 

eclipse is easily supplied. The doctrine at first rejected the 

verb ‘to be’ (157 B). Now, 

grown bolder, it professes in 

difference as to the language 

employed, seeing that the fact 

has been made so clear, and 

the consideration of the most 

formidable objection has ended 

in triumph.

14. ὅτε δὲ] ‘Since it is so.’

Cp. supr. 154 E, Symp. 206 

A: ὅτε δὴ τοῦτον ὃ ἐστιν οὖν. 

17. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς ὁρῶσαν ἀεὶ 

ἐστὶ (1) ‘Since it is inseparable 

from my being at the particular 

time.’ Cp. supr. B: ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν ὁσίαν συνδεῖ μὲν, 

συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδεὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

‘Denn sie ist immer ein Stück
The newly-coined word helps to celebrate the establishment of the theory.

Cp. infr. 208 E: Αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων γνώσις ἐστι, οὐ πρότερον ἦν δοξασθῆ.

13. Πρωταγόρας τῶν σοφότατων
Prot. 309 D: Σοφότατος μὲν αὖν δήμον τῶν γε νῦν, εἰ σοι δοκεῖ σοφότατος ἐστιν Πρωταγόρας.

Perhaps Plato is ironically preparing the way for what follows, p. 161 D, 162 C.

15. ἀισθήσεως ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι
The proposition which Theaetetus ventured 'out of his own consciousness' now appears as the resultant of pre-existent tendencies of thought. The doctrine 'Sense is knowledge' is the meeting-point of the two theories 'Man is the measure,' and 'All is motion.' The several topics are recapitulated in the reverse order.

So Ar. Eth. N. 1, 3, 8: Περὶ μὲν ἄκριτου καὶ πῶς ἀποδεικτὸν καὶ τί προτειδέμεθα.  

γίγνεσθαι here nearly = συμβαίνειν.  
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Τούτο μὲν δὴ, ὡς έσκε, μόλις ποτὲ ἐγενήσατο... p. 160. μὲν, ὃ τε ἤδη ποτὲ καὶ τυχάνει ἦν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκον τα ἀμφιδρόμα αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιβρέκτειν τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπουμένου μὴ λάθη τίμις οὐκ αὗτον ὄν τροφῆς τὸ γιγνόμενον, άλλα ἀνεκμαίο τε p. 161.

1. Τούτο μὲν δὴ... ἐγενήσατο] Our theory is now complete. (1) First the hypothesis was ventured, Sensation is knowledge. (2) This was at once identified with the axiom of Protagoras, 'The man the measure of what is:' and their common meaning was brought home to us by the analysis of a familiar example. (3) The mystery was revealed which lay beneath this saying, but had been reserved for certain 'disciples of Protagoras,' the Heraclitean theory of the universe that 'All is motion;' in which all philosophers save Xerxes concur: which is witnessed to by poetry; and confirmed by the observation of nature. (4) This theory of being was then applied to the phenomena of sense; by which means the contradictions of common language were removed; and (5) in meeting the formidable objection drawn from what are commonly called false impressions, the doctrine was still further developed, and shown to be universally applicable.

At each step it has grown in distinctness, and boldness, and apparent certainty. At first only warmth, colour, and the like were spoken of; gradually our eyes were opened to the relativeness of size and number. By and by it was assumed that the term αἴσθησις includes pleasure, pain, hope, fear, etc. Then we are quietly asked to concede that things good and beautiful have only a relative existence. And, being now fairly at the mercy of the argument, we cannot resist the admission that the illusions of dreams and madness are as real as our waking and sane impressions. They are real to us at the time when we experience them; which is all the reality any thing is permitted to claim.

3. τα ἀμφιδρόμα αὐτοῦ] Accusative in apposition to the action of περιβρέκτειν, κ.τ.λ., like τὸν κολοφώνα, supr. 153 C. 'And now to celebrate its birth in due form, we must really in our argument "run round about" with it, and consider, etc.'

Schol.: Ἦμαρα πέμπτη τοῖς βρέφεσιν ἐκ γενέσεως οὐκ ἀληθίνα παρ' ὅσον ἐν τούτῃ καθαίρουσι τὰς χειράς αἱ συνεφαγμέναι τῆς μαμμιότες, καὶ τὸ βρέφος περὶ τὴν ἑστίαν φέροντα τρέχοντα κύκλῳ, καὶ τοῦνα τίθενται τούτῳ, διότι τε πέμπουσι τῷ παιδίῳ, ὡς ἐπὶ πλείστον πολύνος καὶ σημεῖα, οἱ τὰ φύλα καὶ οἰκτίοι καὶ ἀκλός οἱ προσοψίοι.

ἐν κύκλῳ περιβρέκτειν] 'All round;' i.e. leaving out no point of view.

4. τῷ λόγῳ] 'In our argument.'

5. τὸ γιγνόμενον] 'That which is now born to us.' In this and in some other cases where the reading has been ques-
καὶ πεέδος. ἦ σὺ οἱ αἱ πάντως δεῖν τὸ γε σὺν τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι; ἦ καὶ ἁνεξεί ἐλεγχόμενον ὅρων, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλαπάνεις, εάν τις σοῦ ὠς πρωτοτόκων αὐτὸ ὑφαίρῃ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνέξεται, ὁ Σάκρατε, Θεάιτης, οὐδαμῶς ἡ γὰρ δύσκολος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἰπέ, ἦ αὖ ὅπε όὐτός ἔχει;

ΣΩ. Φιλολόγοις γ' ἐν ἄτεχνος καὶ χρηστός, ὁ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι μὲ οἱ λόγων των εἴναι θύλακον καὶ ῥηθὼς ἐξελόντα ἔσχεν ὡς οὐκ αὖ ἔχεις οὐτὸ ταῦτα; τὸ τό μὲ γεγονόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἐξέρχεται παρ' ἐμοῦ ἀλλ' ἀεì παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοί προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδέν ἐπισταμαί πλέον πλήν βραχεός, οὔτων λόγων παρ' ἐτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ὀποδέξασθαι μετρίως, καὶ νῦν τούτῳ παρὰ τούθε πειρά- 15 σομαι, οὐ τι αὐτὸς εἰπέν.

mented, the present or imperfect tense really gives additional vividness.

3. τις σοῦ] The Bodl. first hand gave τις τοιοῦτοι[. Although these words are added to the second clause, they belong in sense rather to the first, i.e. χαλαπάνεις ὡς πρωτοτόκων. Cp. supr. 151 C.

5. οὐδαμῶς δύσκολος] 144 B; Μετὰ πολλὰ πράσινοι. 155 A; Οὐ δυσκολάνοιτες, κ.ε.λ. 6. αὖ[ 'You have proved that it is so.—Is this position now to be reversed?'


'You are truly a patient inquirer and an ingenuous person, Theodorus, if you take me for a sack full of different theories; and expect me without any difficulty to pull out the refutation of what has been now stated. But you do not perceive what is really taking place all the while (τῷ γεγονόμενῳ).


13. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκέσκ] 'But I have no advantage in wisdom beyond this simple skill, to receive a theory from some wise person, and accept it on fair conditions.' Cp. Rep. 7. 531 E.

15. μετρίως] 'In a spirit of
THEO. Σὺ κάλλιον, ὡς Σώκρατες, λέγεις· καὶ ποίει p. 161.
οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οἴσθη οὖν, ὡς Θεόδωρε, ὃ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἐναίρου
σου Προταγόρου;

5 THEO. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνιν ἣδεος ἔρικην, ὡς τὸ
δοκεῖν ἕκαστο τοῦτο καὶ ἐστιν· τὴν δὲ ἄρχην τοῦ
λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ ἔπες ἄρχομεν τῆς ἀλη-
θείας ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρου ἐστίν ὡς ἡ κυνο-

fairness.' 179 Α.: Μερίκως ἄρα
ήμων πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλον σου εἰρή-
νείται.

παρὰ τούτων From Theaetetus.
Or is Protagoras meant?
3. ὡς Θεόδωρε] Theodorus is
now gradually drawn into the
discussion, but proves a shy
respondent. He shrinks from
being made the instrument of
his friend's defeat (162 A), is
not moved by Socrates' hu-
morous challenge (ib. C), will
not accept the responsibility of
'guarding the orphan' (165
A)—he is a mere geometrician
and unused to dialectic (ibid.),
and only when Socrates de-
clares that with no one else
can he conduct the argument
with becoming gravity (168
D E) is he induced to come
forward and discuss the ques-
tion so far as his own subject
is involved in it, but no further
(169 C). He listens to the
long digression (172—177),
but evinces some impatience
when the discussion is resumed
(177 C), and although at one
point (181 B) he shows un-
expected eagerness, he refuses
to be drawn into further argu-
ment (183 D).

δ ὑπως] A courteous way
of expressing strong dissent.
Prot. 329 B: Ἐπερ ἀλαρ τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ πειθοῦν ἄν, καὶ σοὶ
πειθοῦς ὁ ἥθαμασα σου λέγον-
τοι ... Gorg. 458 E: Ἀκου
δή, ἢ Γοργία, ὃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς
λεγομένοις ἐπὶ σου. No fault is
found with the arguments of
Protagoras, only if we follow
his doctrine to its results, all
creatures that have sense must
be equally infallible. Hence
there can be no teaching and
no discussion.

6. Τὰ ἄλλα ... ἔρικην, ὡς] 'For the most part I am
charmed with his statement of
the theory that, etc.' ὡς, κ.τ.λ.
explains ἔρικην and not the
whole clause.

8. τῆς ἀληθείας] 'Ἀλήθεια
seems to have been the title,
or at least one title, of Prota-
goras' work. It is often co-
verty alluded to in this and
other dialogues. See esp.
supr. 152 C, and cp. Cratyl.
391 C: Εἰ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν
Προταγόρου ἄλοικα ὡς ἀποδίχομαι,
τὰ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀληθείας ῥηθέντα
ἀγαπήσων ὡς τοῦ ἄξιον.

Lach. 196 C: Κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν
οὐκ ἄν πάσα ὡς γροῦρ.
κυνοκόφαλος] Something more
remote even than the Μωσόων ἵσχος, infra. 209 B. As we might say, Why not the lemur or the chimpanzee?

2. πάνω καταφρονητικός] ‘Showing a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him.”

3. ἡρεστώ] This use of the norist indicative with ἔνα, ὅσα, etc., is not infrequent. Euthyd. 304 D: Καί μὴν, ἔφη, ἄξιον γ’ ἦν ἀκόνισα. Τί δέ; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. Ἰνα ἤκουσαν ἀνθρώπων διαλεγομένων, ἵνα νῦν σοφότατοι εἰσιν. Ἀσκ. Prom. 749: Ὄποις πέδως σκύψασα τῶν πάνω πόνων ἀσφαλέσθησα.

5. Βασαράχων has been rejected by several editors as a gloss on γερόνων. It is sufficiently defended by Stallbaum, who quotes Bernhardy, Syntax, p. 193. The introduction of γερόνων alone would be too abrupt, and the reference in infr. 167 B would not be clear.

7. ἱστɛὶ ἔσται, κ.τ.λ.] The future indicative with εἰ is often used in dwelling on a supposition which is unendurable. Cp. Sophocl. Philoct. 108: Εἰ μ’ οὕτως ἐκ τῶν σῶν μ’ αὐξάσθαι βιά;

17. ταῦτα] The old edd. with things? His principle clearly includes all creatures that have sense; and destroys his own pretension to superior wisdom:—
Not to say that it cuts at the root of dialectic and of all discussion.

1. τής μαυσωλείως] Here Naber would again prune the text.

2. οἷς δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα] Locke, Hum. Und. 13. § 88: 'But if it should so happen that two thinking men have different ideas, I do not see how they could argue or discourse with one another.'

3. ἢ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία] Ar. Met. 3. 4. 1006: 'Τό γὰρ μὲν ἐν τι σημαίνειν οἶδαν σημαίνειν ἑστὶν, μὴ σημαίνεσθαι δὲ τῶν ἀναματῶν ἀποφυγεῖ το διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς ἄλλους, κατὰ δὲ τῶν ἀλλιώτων καὶ πρὸς αὐτῶν' οἴδαν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοεῖναν ἐπὶ. Euthyd. 286 C: Τούτῳ γε τών λόγων πολλῶν δὲ καὶ πολλαί τε ἀρχομέναι ἀεὶ διαφημίζει καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμφί πραγμάτων σφοδρὰ ἐξώριστον αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ το παλαιότεροι ἐμοί δὲ δὲ τις βασιλεύοις τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τὸ ἄλλον ἀναπτύσσειν καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῶν. οἴμαι δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ σοῦ κάλλιστα πείσασθαι. ἄλος το ἦ ψυχῶθη λέγεων οὐκ ἔστι; τούτῳ γὰρ δύνασθαι ὁ λόγος. Gorg. 481 C: Εἰ μὴ τι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀπαράτοις πάθοις, τοῖς μὲν ἄλος τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλος τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἄλος τις ἢ μένων ἢ τι ἐπαν-. υκαρχία πάθος καὶ οἱ ἄλος, οὐκ ὃς ἢ ἡ ῥῆβος ἔλεγχεσθαι τῷ ἐτέρῳ το ἀντιπάθημα.

4. ἐπισκοπῶν] 'To contemplate,' or 'consider.' Supr. 155 A, infr. 207 C.

5. μακρὰ μὲν καὶ διαλέγοις] 'Great, say enormous.' μὲν points forwards to the alternative implied in ἀλλὰ μὴ παύουσα, κ.ρ.λ. 'But then perhaps he was in jest.' Others, with Buttman on Men. 82 A, ἐκλεπ μὲν ἔστι, take μὲν to mean, 'I presume.' But in that and similar passages the question is the first of a series, or at least preliminary to something which is to follow. διαλέγει, Schol.: Μεγάλη, ἢ ἐπὶ πολὺ δικοῦσα, αὐτῷ το περιβόητος ... σημεῖα δὲ έστιν δὲ καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸ καὶ τὸ νυκτερικὸ. The meaning, 'loud' (if it really existed, but it is perhaps due to a fanciful derivation from διλόζω), must have been derived from the meaning 'long.' Cp. Μακρὸν δύτεῖν, φωνή οὐρανομήχις. The idea of vast size, or length, may again have arisen from the association of infinity with gloom. If so, the word is possibly related to ἤληγη, ληγη. Compare ῥάζ, ῥάζη πτέρυγα, πτώσις, etc. 'Vast in extent' is the only meaning admissible here and in de Legg. 10. 890 D: οὐ χαλεπά τε ἐστι ζωοκολουθῶν λόγοις οὕτως εἰς πλήθος λειτομέρεια, μήποτε τὸ αὖ κέλευται διωλόγα; This, too, is the meaning in which it is used by Neoplatonist writers. For the climax with καὶ compare 155 Ε: Σεληνοῦσ τε ... καὶ ἀντιστάσειν. 173 Ε: Σεμκρᾶ καὶ οἴδες. Rep. 5. 449 D: Μέγα καὶ έλον.
ΕΘΕΙΤΗΣ.

p. 162. διωλύγιος φιλαρία, εἰ ἄληθῆς ἡ ἄληθεια Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλὰ μὴ παῦξονσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βιβλίου ἐφθέγξατο;

ΘΕΟ. 3 Ω Σύκρατε, φίλος ἀνήρ, ὀσπερ σύ νῦν δὴ ἔστε. οὐκ ἂν ὁὐν δεξαίμην δὲ ἐμοὺ ὁμολογοῦντος ὅλεγχαθαν Πρωταγόραν, οὐδ' αὐτῷ παρὰ δόξαν ἀντιτείων. τὸν οὐν Θεατήτου πάλιν λαβέ· πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μάλι ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαίνετο ὑπακοῦειν.

ΣΩ. 3 Ἀρὰ κἂν εἰς Δακεδάμων ἐλθὼν, ὡς Θεόδωρος,

2. ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βιβλίου]

'If the Truth of Protagoras is sincere, and was not laughing when she uttered this from behind her impenetrable screen of written words.' There is an allusion to the etymology of ἀδύτον.

Cp. the celebrated passage in the Phaedrus, about written teaching, 275 D: Δεδών γὰρ τοῦ, ὁ Φοῖδρος, τοὺς ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ἀλληλοκαίριοι χωρισάτων καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκεῖνα ἐκγονά ἐστιν καὶ νῦν ἧς ἦσαν, κἂν ὁ ἄρητος τι, σημάνοις πᾶν σέγα, κ.λ.λ. For the imagery which is here resumed see above, 152 C: Τοῦτο ἐκινήσει μὲν νῦν ἠμέτρητω τῷ πολλῷ συρματίῳ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τῷ ἐλέγχῳ ἐλέγει. 155 E: Τὸν ἀλήθειον ἀποκε-κραμένην... μὴ τις τῶν ἀμνήστων ἑπακοίη, ἐὰν μὴ οὐκ ἂν τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν... ἀπὸς ὁ μῦθος. At first Protagoras himself spoke in riddles—now his 'Truth' is personified, and speaks obscurely from her hidden shrine. Plato often thus follows up a metaphor. Compare the well-known image of the wave Rep. 4. 441 C: Ταῦτα μὲν μέγιστι διεκ- νέκασαν. 5. 453 D: "Αν τε τις εἰς κολυμβηθήσθων μικρὰν ἑμπέσῃ ἂν τε εἰς μέγιστων πλαγιῶν μέσον, ὅμως

gε νὲ ποιεῖ δὴ ἔττον. 457 B: "Εν δὲ τοις μίμημα διαφημίζειν ὅστε μὴ κατακλυσθήσημαι. 472 A: Τὸ μέγατον τῆς τρίκλεως. 473 C: 'Οσπερ κύμα ἑκείνων κατακλύσεων.


7. πάντως καὶ] See above, 143 A, and note.

8. ἐμμελῶς... ὑπακοῦειν] Cp. Soph. 217 D: Πάντες γὰρ ὑπα- κούονται σοι πρῶτοι. Rep. 5. 474 A: Glaucos says, 'Ἀλλα τοῖς σο σε προδιώκοι, ἀλλα ἄμων ὅσα δύνα- μαι. δύναμι δὲ εἰνοίᾳ τε καὶ τῷ παρακελεύσεως, καὶ ἵνα ἂν ἄλλου τοῦ ἐμμελεστήρων σοι ἑσπερκοῦμην. The notion is not that of a respondent who asents to everything, but of one who apprehends the drift of each question in turn. See 145 D E, 155 D E, 159 B.

9. Ἀρὰ κἂν εἰς Δακεδάμων] It appears from this, and 169 B, that the Lacedaemonians used to compel bystanders to join in their gymnastic exercises. ("Ἐλεκοῦν πρὸ τὸ γυμ- ναῖον... ὅτι δὲ ἄποδονθαι κελεύουσαν.) This is probably
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

πρὸς τὰς παλαιότρες ἴξιοὺς ἄν ἄλλους θεόμενος π. 162.
γυμνοὺς, εἴνοις φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπίδεικνύναι τὸ ἐίδος παρασκύψωμεν;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, ἐπερ μέλλοιέν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι; ὁσπέρ νῦν οἶμαι ὡμᾶς ἐπίσεων ἐμὲ μὲν ἔαν θέασθαι καὶ μὴ ἔλκεν πρὸς τὸ γυμνᾶσιον σκληρὸν ἡδὴ ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεατέρῳ τε καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαλαίειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ οὕτως, οὐ Θεόδωρα, σοὶ φίλον, οὐδὲ ἐμοὶ ἐχθρόν, φασίν οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι. πάλιν δὴ οὗν καὶ εἶ τὸν σοφὸν θεαίτητον ἱείων. Λέγε δὴ, ὡ Θεαίτητος, πρῶτον μὲν ἀ νῦν διήλθομεν, ἄρα οὐ συνθαλλόμενοι εἰ ἐξαιρήθησαν οὕτως ἀναφανήσας μηδὲν χείρων εἰς σοφίαν ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀνθρώπων ἡ καὶ θεῶν; ἡ ἦττον τι οἴει τὸ Πρωταγόρου μέτρον εἰς θεοῦ ἡ εἰς ἀνθρώπους λέγεσθαι;

According to this theory, Themistocles is as wise as any God.

the point of the allusion here. There is no reason to suppose that the human form was less visible in an Athenian than in a Lacedemonian palestra. The law observed in severer times at Athens, which forbade adults to enter a gymnasion where boys were exercising, perhaps throws some light on this Spartan custom. (Æsch. c. Tim. p. 2, § 12.)

2. εἴνοις φαύλους] Socrates courteously implies his own inferiority. H. Schmidt objects that Socrates, although pretending ignorance, professes to have a special gift in dialectic. But the words have the same ironical tone as supr. 154 E, ἢς ἑχοίς, Rep. 2. 368 D, ἢν οὕτως οὗ ὑμεῖς οὐ δεικνύειτε, and are used with reference to the failure of Socrates and Themistocles to come to any conclusion hitherto.

3. παρασκύψωμεν] 'Stripping beside them,' i.e. to compare with them.

7. σκληρόν] 'Stiff,' opposed to ὑγρότερῳ, 'more supple.' Symp. 196 A: ἔγρας τὸ ἐίδος (ὁ ἤρως) οὐ γὰρ άν οἶδε τῇ πάντῃ περιπτώσεσθαι . . . εἰ σκληρόν ἦν.

Cp. Rep. 3. 410 D, where σκληρόν is metaphorically applied to character: Ἀριστοτέλες τε καὶ σκληρότοτος καὶ οὐ μαλακίας τε καὶ ἡμερῶς. See too Hor. Od. 4. 1: 'Desine... flēctere mollibus Jam durum imperis.'

8. προσπαλαίειν] Sc. or, 'Let more supple youth try a fall with you, and do not drag me into the gymnasion.' (Jowett.)

11. σοφός] 'Qui scientiam aedificavit esse ponendo repente sapientem evasit.' Heind.


15. εἰς θεοῦ] Contrast with
p. 162. ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δι’ οὐκ ἔγωγε. καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐρωτᾶς, πάνω θαυμάζω. ἤνικα γὰρ δείχες οὖν τρόπον λέγοις ἐν τῷ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνω μοι εἰς ἐφαινέτω λέγεσθαι νῦν δὲ τοῦνοντι τάχα μεταπέττωκεν.

ΣΩ. Νέος γὰρ εἶ, ὥ φίλε παι. τῆς οὖν δημηγορίας ὁξείως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθεις. πρὸς γὰρ ταύτα ἐρεῖς Προταγόρας ἦ τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, ᾧ γενναίοι παιδεῖς τέ καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε ἐξογκαθεζόμενοι, θεοῦς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἁγοντες, ὦς ἐγώ ἐκ τοῦ τοῦτο ἐξάντλησεν, ὅπερ λέγουσαν οὐκ ἄγονεν.

this Legg. 4. 716 C: 'Ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἦν τῶν χρηστῶν μῖτρων ἑνὶ μίλησα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ποῦ τε ἢς φασιν ἀνθρώπων.—a truth of which Plato here gives out a distant hint.

4. τοῦναντίον] Viz. οὐκ εἶ φαινόμενον λέγεσθαι. This word is not the subject of μεταπέττωκεν, but in apposition with the subject, forming part of the predicate. 'Nunc autem res subito in contrarium vertit. Ut Me- non, 70 C: 'Ἐνθῆδε δὲ τὸ ἐκαθότων περιστρέφετε.' Heind.— Riddell (Dig. of Idioms, § 13) would treat all such examples as accusatives. But with verbs of becoming, etc., the above explanation appears more probable.

τάχα] So the Bodleian MS. with Vat. Ven. Π. Other MSS. have ταχύ.

6. Νέος γὰρ εἶ] Parm. 130 E: Νέος γὰρ εἶ σι, φασίν τὸν Παρμενίδον, ὁ Σάκρατες, καὶ ὁ σαίνου ἀντιλήπταις ἐπισκοπῆς ὡς Εἰ οὐλήπταν.

τῆς δημηγορίας ὁξείως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθεις] 'Your ear is quickly caught, and your mind influenced, by popular arguments.'
λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰσὶν ἡ ὡς p. 162.
οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἔξωρῳ, καὶ ἄ οι πολλοὶ ἀν ἀποδέχοντο ἄκοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὡς δεινὸ εἰ μηδὲν διαίσθε
eis σοφίαν ἐκατοσ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος ὁπο−
5 στο διὰ ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ’ ἡμινοῦν λέγετε,
ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρησθεῖ δὲ εἰ θεόθορος ἡ
Ἀλλος τι τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρόνοις γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος
οὐδ’ ἔνδο μόνων ἀν εἴη. σκοπεῖ τε οὐν σὺ τε καὶ Θεό−

damφι μουσῆς καὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ ὡς τὸ μέσον; Legg. 7. 817 C
(the poets are addressed): Μὴ δὴ δέχετε ἡμῖν . . . ἐπερέψων ἡμῖν
δημογορεῖν . . . πρὸς κρίνει τὰς ἀρ−
χαὶ εἰπα ἡπτὰ καὶ εἰπτήδεια πε−
πούκατε λέγετε εἰς τὸ μέσον εἰς μὴ.
Here λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον is
not equivalent to δημογορεῖν,
but means rather to 'recite in
public.' Cp. ib. 2. 664 C: Ἐς τὸ
μέσον δημογορέον. The passages
already quoted show that ἔγνω
eis τὸ μέσον, meaning 'to ad−
duce in illustration or argu−
ment,' is quite Platonic. See
also Phil. 57 A: ὅδ’ ἐνεκα
ταῦτα προ περνεγκαμέθα εἰς τὸ μέσον.
There is a slight expression of
violence in ὅδ’ . . . ἐγνωτε,
'dragging in the gods,' which
suits the context well.
1. ὡς εἰσὶν ἡ ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν]
Here, as 152 A, Protagoras'
opinion is quoted in his own
words. Diog. Laert. 9: Ὑπὲ
τινὰν οὐκ ἢ ἵνα εἰμίναι, οὐδ’ ὡς εἰσὶν
οἶδ’ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν. πολλὰ γὰρ τὸ
κολλοῦτα εἰμίναι, ἣ τα ἀδιόητης,
καὶ βραχύν ἃν ὁ βίος ἢ τοῦ ἀν−
θρώπου.
2. ἔξωρῳ] Rep. 6.492 E: Τεῖον
μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παρούσαν ἔξωρο−
μεν λόγον.
5. ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην] In
dealing with a metaphysical
theory it is not enough to have
shown its inconsistency with
common sense. It must be met
upon its own ground, and the
truth which it contains, as well
as the sources of falsehood,
clearly distinguished. This, and
not merely, as the Scholiast
says, that he may draw out
Theaetetus further, is Socrates'
motive in relinquishing the
ground he had taken in 151
C. This point of method
has two aspects, the Socra−
tic defiance of opinion and
the Sophistic contempt for ob−
vious facts. Gorg. 472 B:
'Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σου εἰς ὧν οὐκ ἡμολογώ
οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις. Soph.
293 E: Σεμ. φανερός, ὡς θεά−
τητη, εἰ σοφιστήν σὺν ἐφοράς.
Θε. τί δὴ; Σεμ. δέξεις σου μέν
ἡ παντάπασιν οὐκ ἐχεις δοκιμα−
. . . τὸ δ’ εἰ τῶν λόγων ἐφυράτης
σε μόνον.
8. οὐδ’ ἐνὸς μόνον] Schol.: Ἐκ
τῆς τῶν κυβερνῶν συνενθέειας ἐλαβε
τὸ ἀδελφὸν μόνον, ὅταν ἔκει πίει ἐν
τῷ παίζειν ἐν τῷ ἐλάχιστον.
(1) 'Not worth an ace.' Or,
if, as Wytenbach thought, the
phrase originated in the line
of Homer, Il. 8. 234: Νῦν δ’
οὐδ’ ἐνὸς ἀδειοί εἶμιν ἔκτροπος.
(2) 'No better than a single man,'
whereas he is now ἔτέροπον πολ−
λῶν ἀντάξιον. Cr. Polit. 297
E: Τῶν ἔτερον πολλῶν ἀντάξιον
ΘΕΛΗΤΗΣ.

p. 163. δοροσ ει καποτε θυατολογιας το και εικοσι περι
tοιτου λεγομενου λογος.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' ου δικαιον, ο Σωκρατες, ουτε συ
ουτε αν χνης φαιμεν.

Σω. 'Αλλη δη σκοπτεον, ους εοκεν, ος ο τε σος 5
και ο Θεοδοφων λογος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παινυ μεν ουν θλη.

Σω. Τηδε δη σκοπτομεν, ει αρα εστιν επιστημη τε
και αισθησις ταυτων η έτερων εις γαρ τοιτο που
πας ο λογος ημων έτεειν, και τοιτω χαριν τα πολλα 10
και ατοπα ταυτα εκινησαμεν. ου γαρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πανταςασι μεν ουν.

 Β Σω. 'Η ουν ομολογισμεν, α τοι οραν αισθανο-
μεθα η τοι ακομαιν, παντα ταυτα άμα και επιστασθαι;
οιν των βαρβαρων πρων μαθεων την φωνην ποτερων 15
ου φησιμεν ακομαιν, οταν φθεγγονται, η ακοαιν τε
και επιστασθαι η λήγονται; και αυ γγαματα μη
επισταμενοι, βλεποντες εις αυτα ποτερων οιχ οραν, η
επιστασθαι, επειρ ορομεν, δωσχυρυμεθα;

iatro. See above, 143 D; "Δειον γαρ . γεομετριαι ένεκα
and below, 167 C: 'Ο σοφοτην . δειον πολλων χρηματων των
πανδειπων. Bonitz questions such a use of δειον.(αντίδειον),
and would read ουδενος λογου.

1. πιθανολογιας τε και εικοσι] The Bodleian reading in the
ancient hand. (Schanz doubts of this, but the erasure of αι is
quite discernible.) Most MSS. have πιθανολογια. Cp. Ar. Eth.
N. 1. 2: Παραλησων γαρ φαι-
νειται μαθηματικοι τε πιθανολογιων
τεν αποδεικται και βηηκοι οπο-
δειξει αποτεινων.

2. τοιτων] Several MSS. have τοιτων.

5. ο τε σος κα] Theaetetus

has answered for both. See
above, συ τε και Θεώδωρων.

9. η έτερων] ποτερων B.

10. τα πολλα και άτομα] The
novel doctrine of active and
passive motions, the reality of
dreams and phantasies, etc.

11. εκινησαμεν] Rep. 5. 450
Α: 'Οσον λογον πολυ, άνπερ εις
άρχης, κινετε περι της πολιτειας

13. 'Η ουν, κτλ.] The argument
is in brief as follows:
'If sensation is knowledge, we
can know and not know the
same thing; since (1) we have
perfect sensible perception of
things we do not know thoro-
roughly; and (2) we remember
(i.e. know) things which we do
not sensibly perceive.'
ΘΕΑΙ. Αὐτὸς γε, ὥς Σώκρατες, τούτο αὐτῶν, ὅπερ π. 163. ὰρομέν τε καὶ ἄκοινομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φύσομεν: τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρώμα ὄραν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, τῶν δὲ τῆν ὀξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἄκοινεν καὶ ἀμήκτητα ἁμάρτητο ἀπὶ τῆς ἂμα καὶ εἰδέναι. ὃ δέ οὐ τε γραμματιστὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἄρμαινεις διδάσκοντι, οὑτε αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ ὄραν ἢ ἄκοινεν ὑπὲρ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΣΩ. "Αριστά γ', ὥς Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἀξίων σοι πρὸς ταύτα ἀμφιστηρήσαι, ἣν καὶ αὐξάνῃ. ἀλλ' ὀραὶ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο προσιτών, καὶ σκοτεί πῇ αὐτῶ διωσόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Το ποίον δή;

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιόνδε: ἐὰν τις ἔρωτο, ἄρα δυνατόν, ὅταν τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτο ποτε, ἐὰν ἐχόντα μνήμην αὐτοῦ δὲ ἑπεθεί, κ.τ.λ. Socrates might have asked. Does every one who sees the forms of the letters, or who hears the sounds, possess the sciences of them (γραμματική, μουσική, 145 A)'

Could he give an account, e.g. of the ἀξίωσης and βαρύτητας of what he hears? Ср. Реп. 7. 524 C: Μέγα μὴ καὶ δύναι καὶ ἐμαυνήν ἔρα, ἀλλ' οὐ κεκαμημένον ἀλλὰ συγκεκριμένον. Not even the objects of sense are known by sense, but by a higher faculty.

10. τόδε ἄλλο προσιτῶν, κ.τ.λ.] The implied metaphor is probably that of the wave. It is continued below, 172 B: Λόγοι δὲ ἡμᾶς ... εἰ λόγου, μείζον εἷς ἐλάττων, καταλαμβάνει: and is slightly varied, 177 C: Πλείω δὲ ἐπιφώνησα κατακύψει ἡμῶν τῶν εἷς ἀρχής λόγου.

14. ἐὰν ἔχοντα] The Bodl. MS. has ἔπισκοπα, for which error cp. Реп. 7. 532 B. H. Schmidt (as Schanz formerly) defends ἔπισκοπα, in the sense of 'main-
θεαιτήτος. 85
p. 163. τούτου καὶ σωζόμενον, τότε ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅ μέμνηται. μακρολογῶ δὲ, ὡς ἔουκε, βουλόμενος ἔρέσθαι, εἶ μαθῶν τίς τι μεμνημένος μὴ ἄδειν.
θεαί. Καὶ πῶς, ὃ σῶκρατες; τέρας γὰρ ἄν ἐν ἑ; 5 ὅ λέγεις.
σῦ. Μή οὖν ἐγὼ ληπῶ; σκόπει δὲ, ἄρα τὸ ὅραν ὁμικ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὁψίν αἰσθήσεων;
θεαί. ἐγώ γε.
σῦ. Ὀδύκοιν ὃ ῥόδον τί ἐπιστήμων ἕκειν γέγονεν ιο 10 ὅ ἐδέ κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον;
θεαί. Ναί.
ε. σῦ. Τί δὲ; μνῆμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι;
θεαί. Ναί.
σῦ. Πότερον οὖν ὃ τι πιθός;
θεαί. Τιμός δὴ τούτου.
σῦ. Ὀνκοίν ὃν ἐμαθεὶ καὶ ἐν ἑσθετο, τοιουτοῦ τιμοῦ;
θεαί. Τί μήν;
σῦ. ὃ δὴ εἶδε τοίς, μέμνηται ποι ἐνίστε; 15
θεαί. Μέμνηται.
σῦ. Ἡ καὶ μῦσας; ἡ τούτο δράσας ἐπελὰθετο;
θεαί. Ἀλλὰ δεινόν, ὃ σῶκρατες, τούτο γε φάναι.

'taining,' 'keeping up,' i. e. not allowing to fade. But τι ἔχοντα is simpler, and is sufficiently supported by MS. authority.
5. τέρας γὰρ ἄν ἐν ἑ; ὅ λέγεις] 'The supposition is monstrous.'
Parm. 129 B: Εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄραμα τις ἐπίστασθαι ἄνθρωπος γενόμενο δ' τὰ ἄνθρωποι ὄραμα, τέρας ἂν, ὅμως, ἢν. Phed. 101 B: alib. The word τεραστείαν Ar. Nub. 418 (with the verb τεραστύομαι) is connected with this use of τέρας.

13. τί δὲ;] So Bodl. first hand, Vat. Ven. II. It seems more appropriate in serious argument than τί δαί, the common reading.
μέντοι] The particle brings forward something hitherto lost sight of, which may tend to modify the foregoing statement.
We have hitherto dwelt on αἰσθήσεως to the exclusion of μνήμη, etc.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

86

ΣΩ. Δεί γε μέντοι, ει σώσομεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον· p. 164.
ei dē μή, ὀχέτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἕγω, νὴ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύον, οὐ μὴν
ικανὸς γε συννοι· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πῆ.

5 ΣΩ. Τηδὲ· ὃ μὲν ὀρῶν ἑπιστήμων, φαμέν, τούτου
γέγονεν ὅπερ ὀρῶν· ὡς εἰρ καὶ αἰσθησις καὶ ἑπι-
στήμη ταῦτων ὁμολογηται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ γε ὀρῶν καὶ ἑπιστήμων γεγονός οὐ
10 ἔσχα, εάν μύση, μέμηται μέν, οὐχ ὀρᾷ δὲ αὐτὸ.
ἡ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ γε οὐχ ὀρᾷ οὐκ ἑπισταται ἐστιν, εἰπὲ ὁ
καὶ τὸ ὀρᾶ ἑπισταται.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Συμβαίνει ὁρὰ, ὡς τις ἑπιστήμων ἐγένετο, ἐτι
μεμημένον αὐτῶν μὴ ἑπιστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὀρᾷ. ὁ
τέρας ἔφαμεν ἃν εἶναι εἰ γίγνοιτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθείστατα λέγεις.

20 ΣΩ. Τῶν αὐθανάτων δὴ τι συμβαίνειν φαίνεται,
εάν τις ἑπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθησιν ταῦτων φῇ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐαυκεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλο ὁρᾷ ἐκάτερον φατέον.

1. ei σώσομεν] The use of
the optative is questioned, and
σώσομεν has been conjectured.
But see Riddell’s Digest, § 77.
He observes that the time of
the infinitive after δεί (sc. τοῦτο
φάναι) is undefined. A
similarly doubtful optative occurs
in Polit. 268 D: Τοῦτο τοῖνιν ἢ
ἡμῖν ποιητήν, εἰ μὴ μέλλομεν...
kataχείναι τὸν λόγον. For
the sense cp. especially Phædo, 89
B: ‘Ενεπέρ γε ημῖν ο λόγος τελευ-
tήσθη, κ.τ.λ.

3. οὗ μὴν ικανὸς, γε συννοι] ‘But I do not quite com-
prehend why it is so.’

Ven. Π. ὀρῶν, sc. ἐστίν or γέγονεν.
Compare the technical use of
αισθανόμενος, noticed above, 159
D, 160 A. Also 156 D: Ἐγένετο
οὗ τι δής ἀλλ’ ὕβαλμας ὀρῶν. See
also 160 D: Ἐπιστήμων... ἄκηρ
αισθήσεις.

264 A: Φαίνεται δ’ ο λέγομεν.
The text is a page from a Greek work on logic, discussing contradictions and arguments. The text includes references to other texts and authors like Protagoras, Sophists, and Epimenides. It also mentions the distinction between logical and verbal contradictions.

Transcription:

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ΦΕΛΙΣΤΗΣ.

2. πάλιν] μὴ πάλιν Bodl. (μὴ), Vat. Ven. II. The Bodleian margin however says, ἐν ἐνίπο

7. ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου] Viz. the


5. 453 E, 454: 'Ἡ γνώση, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ Παλαιόν, ἡ δύσμος τῆς ἀντι-

8. οὐκ ἔστη τὰ ὁμολογίασεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαλεγόμενον καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἔνθεσις ὀρμη-μένων, εἰπεῖν βούλιοι τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐρέων.


154 D: Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεῖνοι καὶ σοφοὶ, κ.τ.λ., echoed in ἐκείνους τὸις δείνοις ἀνδράσι, below.
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ΘΕΑΙ. Οὗτοι μεν θάνων ὅπως λέγεις. p. 164.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δήλωσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὃ γε δὴ νοῶ, ὡρόμεθα γὰρ δὴ εἰ μαθῶν καὶ μεμημένων τίς τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τῶν ἰδῶν καὶ μύσαντα με-5 μυημένον, ὅρωντα δὲ οὖ, ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδῶτα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἀμα μεμημένων τούτῳ δὲ ἐίναι ἀδύ-νατον. καὶ οὖτω δὴ μύθος ἀπόλετο ὁ Προταγόρης, καὶ ὁ σος ἀμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, ὅτι ταύτων ἐστιν.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὗ τι ἂν, οἷμαι, ὁ φίλε, ἐπερ γε ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ ἑτέρου μύθου ἔξη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἢμινε· νῦν δὲ ὁρφαῖον αὐτὸν ἠμεῖς προπηλακίσθημεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ὁ ἐπίτροπος οὗς Προταγόρας κατέλιπε, βοηθεῖν ἐθέ-15 λουσιν, ὃν Θεόδωρος ἔσ τίδε. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοῦ κινδυ-νεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ' αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν.

ΘΕΟ. Οὗ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου τῶν ἐκεῖνον ἐπίτροπον· ἠμεῖς p. 165.


11. ἐπερ ὁ πατὴρ] See the passage of the Phædrus already quoted, 275 E: Πλημμελοῦσας δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκη λοιδορ-θείς τοῦ πατρὸς ἐοί δεῖται βοηθεῖν, k.t.l. Cp. Soph. 241 D: Μὴ με οἷον πατραλοίποι ἐπολάβης γίγ-νεσθαι τινα. Τι δὴ; Τὸν τοῦ πατρ-ρὸς Παραμείνου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἢμίν ἀμεμνημένον ἤτοι βασανίζειν. It is in another sense that Phædrus in the Symposium (177 D) is πατήρ τοῦ λόγου.

15. κινδυνεύσομεν] Note, 'I will undertake the risk,' but = κινδυ-νεύσω βοηθήσω, 'It seems I shall have to take his part myself.' Cp. Craty. 399 A: Καὶ κινδυ-νεύσω ἐὰν μὴ εὐδοκημάζω, ἡτί ἠμε-ρον σοφωτέρον τοῦ δεόντος γνώ-σθαι. Symp. 174 C: 'Εγὼ μὲν καὶ κινδυνεύσω καὶ εἰγὼ οὐκ ὡς ὦτο λέ-γεις, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὃμηρον φαίνετο δὲ τῷ σοφῷ ἀνήκει ἕναν ἔσορα ἔλεγες.

when he came to Athens. Apol. 20 C : 'Ανδρί, δε τετελέσε χρήματα σοφιστικά πλέον ἢ ἐξίχνιστει οἱ ἄλλοι, Κάλλις τοῦ Ἰπποκόου. Prot. 311 A, 315 D: Xen. Symp. i. 5. It hardly needs to be observed that ἐπίτροπος, like ὅρθρος, is used figuratively, with reference to doctrines.

1. τὰ τῶν ἡθῶν λόγων] 'From the abstractions of dialectic.' We are accustomed to speak of Geometry as a purely abstract science, but see Arist. Met. i. 2: Αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐπιστοὺς ἀκριβοτέρας τῶν ἐκ προσθήκων λογιομέτρων, ὀποῖον ἁρματική γνωμετρία. The expression ἡθῶν λόγων is used differently in Symp. 215 C: 'Φιλοῦς λόγους ἄνω ὀργάζων, but cp. Phaedr. 262 C: 'Νῦν γὰρ ἡθῶν πᾶς λέγομεν ὅπερ ἐξίχνισε Ἰσαὰκ παραδειγματισμῷ. Antisthenes is said to have called the Ideas of Plato ἡθῶν ἐπιστημήν. For λόγοι = διαλεκτικὴ cp. Phaed. 99 E: 'Εδοξε δὲ μοι χρήσις εἰς τῶν λόγων καταφυγεῖν ἐν ἐκείνους σκοπεῖν τὴν ὀλίγειαν. See also Arist. de An. 1. i, where a distinction is drawn between φιλόσοφος, μαθηματικός, and φυσικός.

2. μεντοι [soi] is omitted in Bod. Vat. Ven. π. Although retained in the text by Schanz, it is not necessary to the sense.

If retained, it should be amended, as H. Schmidt observes.

έξομεν Theodorus speaks on behalf of the ἐπίτροπος Προταγόρου.

4. τὴν γ' ἐμὴ] Cp. infr. 168 B: Καὶ ἐμὴ δύναμιν, and, for the 'modest' use of γ', Crat. 44 E, Rep. i. 329 A: Οὐδενέμοισαντα. 5. μὴ προσέχων τῶν ῥήματι τῶν νοῦ, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰδίσμεθα] By freeing ourselves from the habitual oppositions of words, we are sometimes reconciled to what at first appears a pure contradiction. Spinoza (Cog. Met. 1.) shows a still loftier indifference to common language: 'At vero si rem accuratius examinare vellemus, possemus fortasse ostendere Deum non nisi impropie unum et unicum vocari; sed res non est tanti imo nullius momenti iis qui de rebus non vero de nominibus sunt solliciti.' Many of the difficulties in Greek philosophy arose, as Plato himself points out in the Sophist, from the too great stress laid upon logical alternatives; while the complexity and variety of things as they exist was lost sight of. ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰδίσμεθα] According to our common mode of affirming and denying: 'viz. with a view to words.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΟ. Εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, ἀποκρινόμεθα δὲ ὁ π. 165.
νεῶτερος· σφαλείς γὰρ ἦτον ἀσχημονήσει.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα. ἔστι δὲ οἴμαι τούτῳ τι· ἄρα οὖν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι
τούτο ὁ οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν ἀποκρινούμεθα, ὅ Θεαίητε;

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αδύνατον ποι, οἴμαι ἔγογγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ ὁρᾶν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις. τι
γὰρ χρήσει άφύκτορ ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν
φρέατι συνεχόμενος, ὅταν ἔρωτα ἀνέκπληκτος ἀνήρ,
καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τὸν ἔτερον ὀφθαλμόν, εἰ
ὀρᾷ τὸ ἰμάτιον τῷ κατειλημμένῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φήσω, οἴμαι, τούτῳ γε, τῷ μέντοι
ἐπερφ.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁρᾷς τε καὶ ὑμὶν ὁρᾷς ἂμα ταῦτον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω γε πῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσει, τοῦτο οὖτε τάττω ὡς
ἡρῴμην, τὸ ὠπος, ἀλλ' εἰ, ο ἐπίστασαι, τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ

3. Λέγω δή τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτη-
μα] Χρ. Rep. 5. 473 C: Ἐπ' αὐτὸ
δή, ἴν ἐγώ, εἰμι δ' τῷ μεγίστῳ
προσνεκάμον εὐμάτι. Where So-
crates assumes the same 'tragic'
tone as here.

4. ἄρα οὖν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι
. . μὴ εἰδέναι] This (Megarian)
question lies at the root of
most of the ἀπορία which follow.

9. ἀφύκτορ] Euthyd. 276 E: Τοιάτα ἥμει ἐρωτώμεν ἄφυκτα,
ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενον['] Caught
in a pit,’ i.e. unable to stir hand
or foot.

11. καταλαβὼν . . τούτο . . ὀφθαλ-
μῶν . . εἰ ὁρᾷς τὸ ἰμάτιον. The fal-
cy called ἐγκεκαλωμένος (‘ob-
velatus’), which has been called
the invention of Eubulides,
seems to be here anticipated.

17. οὐδὲν . . τούτω, κ.τ.λ.] Τάττω,
sc. ἀποκρινόμεθα. Χρ. Rep. 5. 473
Α.: Ἐξερευνηθαίσας ὡς δυνατά ταῦτα γε-
νόντος δ' οὐ εἰπόταται (sc. ἐξερεύνησα).
For the sense cp. supr. 158 E:
Μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταῖς ἑλώσι,
κ.τ.λ. Χρ. Euthyd. 295 E: Πάντω-
ρον ἐπίστασαι τῷ ἐπίστασαι, ἡ
οὖ; Ἐγώγε, ἐφικ, τῇ γε ψυχῇ.
Ὅτας αὖ, ἐφη, προσκοπίσκεται τοῖς
ἐρωτώμενοις, οὐ γὰρ ἔγογξ ἐρωτώ
ἄλλ', ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπίστασαι τῷ, κ.τ.λ.
For the intentional abruptness
of the expression (‘None of
that! I never asked you for
it’) cp. Phil. 28 E: Οὐδὲν τῶν
ἀπόν. Τοῦτο . . τὸ ὠπός] τοῦτο, al-
though presently explained by
τὸ ὠπός, is in the first instance
pronominal for οὕτω γε πῶς.
7. ὁ θαυμάσιον] Such addresses interposed give a tone of increased earnestness, expressing the interest of Socrates in what he is about to say.
9. ἀξύν...ἀμβλύ] These terms are properly applicable to vision.
10. σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα τὸ αὐτὸ] 'To know the same thing strongly and feebly.' e.g. τὸ ψυχρόν. — 152 B: ἰπποί...ἀ μὲν ἡρέμα, ἀ δὲ σφόδρα; but the reference here is probably to sound, cp. τὸ ἀκούνων below. (H. Schmidt takes τὸ αὐτὸ adverbially, 'stark und leise ebenso.' but cp. infr. 166 B.) Aristotle does not feel the difficulty.
15. Μαθησιαρḥoν ἐν λόγοις] 'A logical mercenary.' μαθησιαρχον is aimed at the Sophist's fee.
13. ἰμβαλὼν] 'Making his assault.'
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ξυνποδιάσθης ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, οὐ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενός τε π. 165. καὶ ξυνδήσας ἦδη ἄν τότε ἐλύτρων χρημάτων ὅσων σοι τε κάκειν ἔδοκε. Τίν οὖν δὴ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, φαίνει ἂν ἵνασ, λάγον ἐπίκουρον τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἑρεῖ; 5 ἀλλο τι πειρομέθεα λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ταύτα τε δὲ πάντα ὅσα ἠμεῖς ἐπαμώνοντες αὐτῷ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσωμος, οὐμαι, χωρισθεῖται, κατα- p. 166. φρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγον, Οὗτος δὴ ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ ῥήτορος, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐροτηθὲν ἐδέισαι, εἰ

quidem satisfact.] In Ven. Π. both α's are written over erasures. πολυάρῃσσος occurs twice in the Odyssey, 6. 280; 19. 404: "Ονομάζετε θείες | παιδί παιδί φίλων πολυάρῃσσος δὲ τοῖς ἐστίν. Protagoras seems to have affected certain rhetorical expressions, and he or some other Sophist perhaps may have used this word. See Phaedr. 267 D: ὑπενθύμισεν, etc. Stallbaum quotes Themist. Orat. 22. 325. 19. ed. Dindorf.: Τὸν πολύσωμον πληθυντὸν τι ἂν ἔδωκαν ὑπερήφανον καὶ ἐρωτήτως ἔστιν. For the sense cp. Euthyd. 272 B: Τῆς σοφίας δὲ ἐγνώκαν ἐπιθυμητός, τής ἐρωτικής. Ibd. 273 E: Ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ταύτην τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐχεῖν, ἠφεὶσθον, ἀνεχθῶς γὰρ ἔγνωσι σφῶ ὡσπερ ἄνευ προσαγωγῆς. Ibd. 296 D: Ἀλλὰ θαυμάσθης, ἂν δὲ ἐγὼ, ὧν πολυτιμῆσε Εὐθύδημο. Ibd. 301 B: "Ἡδὴ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῆς σοφίας ἐπιχείρησεν μεμειχθαί, ἅτε ἐπιθυμῶν αὐτής.

2. χρημάτων . . ἑδάκτης] Protag. 328 B: Καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τού μισθού τουτούτων πε- ποιημα, ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὰς παρ' ἑμῶν μάθης, ἐὰν μὲν Βούλθησαι, ἀπο- δέδοκεν ὁ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἄργονοιν—

ἐὰν δὲ μή, ἑδάκτης εἰς ἴπτον, ὑμόσωμα, ὅσων ἂν ἄρα ἐμὴ εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν.

3. τε] Bodl. ye, which Wohl- rab defends.

7. Ταύτα τε πάντα] From 162 D onwards.

8. ὁμόσωμος . . χωρισθεῖται] 'He will grapple with us.' There is a change of construction similar to that in supr. 149 D: Καὶ τίστεσθαι τὸ δὲ τὰς δυνατοκούσας, καὶ . αἰμβλίσκουσι. Protagoras is first imagined as pushing his adversary 'over a precipice,' by stating the-Eristic objection to his doctrine in an extravagant form, and then as turning from arguments to facts, and showing the bearing of his theory not on truth and falsehood, but on (relative) good and evil.

10. χρηστός] Here almost = εὐχέρης, 'Good easy man!'

ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ, κ.τ.λ.] 'When he had found a child who was terrified by the question,' etc. For the dative cp. Rep. 1. 343 A: δὲ γε αὐτῷ . . . χειρόσκεις.

παιδίον] Cp. infr. 168 D, where the same exaggeration is used.
The use of the article has a humorously pathetic rather than a pompous effect. Cr. Soph. 239 B: Τὸν μὲν τοὺς ἐμὲ γε ἐτι τι τις ἄν λέγω; Plaid. 258 A: Τῶν αὐτῶν. Ib. 20 B: Τὸν ἐμὲ. Ib. 59 B: Τῶν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γαργάλιαν καὶ Φιλισθών.

4. ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς Σάκρατες]
Slovenly Socrates!

7. εὶ δὲ ἄλλῳ| Sc. ἀποκριμέ-
νεν σφαλλεῖν. The former case, εἰ δὲ σφαλλεῖν, was contingent. This is present fact. For the sense cp. Charm. 162 C D.

8. αὐτικα] 'To begin with.'
tινὰ σοι ἑυγχωρησεῖσθαι] I. e. ἐμὲ. 'Do you think a man would admit it?'

μνῆμα] 'That the memory a man has of an impression when it is past, is anything like what he experienced at the time.'

9. τουτοῦτον τι ὀδύσω πάθος] Hume, Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding: 'Everyone will readily allow that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination.'—'We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind.'—'When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed.'

man ignorant, and that every man becomes as many as the changes he undergoes. More seriously, he would challenge us to prove either that each man's sensations are not peculiar to him, or that it does not follow from this, that what appears to each man, is to him.

10 ἀκούονται τούτο δρᾶν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματα μοῦ ἀναπείδεις, ὡς καλῶς ποιῶν. ἐγὼ γὰρ φημὶ μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐχειν ὡς γέγραφα· μετρον γὰρ ἐκαστὸν ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὀντῶν καὶ μὴ· μυρίων μέντοι διαφέρειν ἔτερον ἐτέρον αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα ἐστὶ τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ σοφὸν ἄνδρα τολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἄλλῳ αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ λέγω σοφόν, ὃς ἂν τινα ἡμῶν δ’ φαίνεται καὶ ἐστὶ κακά, μεταβάλλουν ποιήσῃ ἁγαθὰ φαίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι. τὸν δὲ λόγον αὐτὴν τῷ ῥή·

Compare a strange fancy of Comte's, Catéchisme Posit. p. 2: 'For each man differs from himself successively as much as he differs simultaneously from other men.'

1. καὶ τούτους γεγομένους ἀπείρους] 'Which become multiplied to infinity, if only alternation take place.'

2. ἀνομοῖοι γεγομένων, the reading of Bodl. Vat., admits of a possible rendering: 'If only the man become in a different way.' i.e. when he is the subject of a different process. But the reading in the text (that of T and other MSS.) is probably right.

3. ὃ μακάρι] 'By all that is sincere.' Protagoras is supposed here to appeal to Socrates as an ingenuous, single-minded person. In other cases ὃ μακάρι conveys a hint of εὐθυμία ('Bless your simple heart!'), Phaedr. 236 D.

4. γεγομένωρ] 'In a nobler spirit,' viz. than that of mere verbal dispute.

The genitive is not objective but descriptive. Cp. Euthyd. 295 D: Βουλημένος μὲ δηρείσαι τὰ ἄνθρωπα περιστάσαι. 'If we must really be on our guard against being entangled by each other with words.'

8. ἀνομαξω] Suppr. 160 B.

19. τῷ ῥήματι] 'In a verbal
way.

3. φαίνεται... καὶ έστι... έστι καὶ φαίνεται] What is to be taken with λόγον. 

6. κατηγορητέον] See του καίμ

8. μεταβλητέον... έξι] This 'practical' view of education is in close accordance with that which Plato attributes to Protagoras in the dialogue which bears his name. See esp. 328 Α.: Ἀλλὰ κἂν ἐν δύναμις ἔστι τις ὁποῖς διαφέρει ἡμῶν πράξει βάσιμαι εἰς ἀρετὴν, ἀγαπητῶν. He would tell us that he is far from disparaging the wisdom of the wise; but he would define wisdom as the power of bringing men over, not from false ideas to true, but from a...
πλάτωνος

συγγενής εαυτός χρηστή ēποίησε δοξάσαι ēτερα τοι- p. 167.
aῦτα, ἀ δὴ τινὲς τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ
tιμωτέραν ἐξῶν λαμβάνει, σῳφρο-
σών κτωμένη. Gorg. 524 B: "Εχει τὴν ἔξω τὴν αὐτοῦ. And
above, 153 B: 'Ἡ τοῦ σώ-
ματος ἔξω . . . ἢ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξω, we seem to pass from one
meaning to the other within
a few lines, as here. Comp. also
Gorg. 523 C: ψυχαὶ ποιησά
έχουσαν. ēαυτή presents more
difficulty, but it may still be
genuine. The transition is easy
and not unfrequent from the
person thinking to the mind
thinking. Cp. Phaedr. 82,
where the change from the
masculine to the feminine, i.e.
from the persons to the souls,
occurs several times together.
Gorg. 526 B: Τοιοῦτον τινα .
ἐντος δ' ἄλλων. Infr. 173 A: Ἱ
μεροῦς δ' καὶ οὐκ ἐρυθὼ τὸς ψυχῆς.
τήν γὰρ ἀδέσποτα καὶ τὸ κύδων . . . ἢ ἐν
πάσαν δουλεῖα ἀφήγηται . . κυνίσιος . . . ἐν ἄπαντις ἄψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλ-
λοσα, οὐκ οὐ δυνάμενοι, κ.λ.Α. See also, for an instance of a
like change of subject, Rep. 4.
441 B: Μονοτείχεις καὶ γυμναστείχεις
κρατιδ᾽ προστήσατον. That such
a change of subject does occur
here, is evident from the nomi-
native χρηστή. The reflexive
pronoun is also facilitated by
συγγενῆ, being a correlative
word. Cp. Phaedr. 238 C: Ἱ
τῶν ēαυτῆς συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμοῦ.
Compare also for the use of
the reflexive pronoun, where it
cannot be strictly referred to
the subject of the sentence,
Rep. 419 A: Ἐδώ τίς σε φη μὴ
τῶν εὐδαιμονῶν ποιεῖν τούτους
τοὺς ἄρας, καὶ ταῦτα δ' ēαυτοῦ.
Supr. 152 B: Ποτέρον . . . ἕφ' 
ἐαυτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχῆς ἢ οὐ
ψυχῆς φύσομεν.

dοξάζωντας is preferable as
the reading of the best MS,
as the harder reading, and be-
cause the change to δοξάζωντα-
was so easy with the same word
occurring a few lines above.
For the change from the sin-
gular τοῦ to the indefinite
plural cp. Rep. 1. 344 Β: 'Επειδὰν
ὅτι . . . αὐτοῦ . . . δουλοῦνται . .
ἀντί τοῦτον τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὑπο-
μάτων . . . μακάριοι κέκλημαι,
οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ
ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, δοῦν ἂν πύθωνται
αὐτῶν τὴν ἄληθα ἀδικίαν ἢ δικηκότα:
et passim.

'For it is not to be supposed
that anybody ever makes one
who thinks falsely afterwards
think truly. For it is impos-
sible either to think what is not,
or to think anything beyond
the present impression, which
is always real. But, I suppose,
whereas men through having an
inferior mind entertain thoughts
of a kindred nature, a good
mind causes them to have good
thoughts, those, namely, which
men in ignorance call true.'

If any change of reading were
required, the most probable
would be the transposition of
συγγενῆ ēαυτῆς and ēτερα τοιαύτα,
—ποιησάς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζωντας
ἐτερα τοιαύτα χρηστή ēποίησε
δοξάσαι συγγενῆ ēαυτῆς.

1. χρηστή] Sc. ψυχή.

2. φαντάσματα] This word here
contains no association of falsehood, seeing that φαίνεται and εἶναι are identified; but neither does it imply truth.
2. ἀληθήσερα ὑ' οἴκου] I. e. 'all are equally real.'
3. κατὰ δὲ φύτα γεωργοῦσι] The theory is exposed by being gravely carried to the farthest point. Man is reduced to a level not only with brutes but with vegetables. Cp. Ar. Met. 1008 b: Εἰδημεῖν ὑπολειμβάνει ἀλλὰ ὅμοιοι οὐκέτι τε καὶ οὐκ οὕτως, τι ἄν διαφερόντως ἔχει τῶν φυτῶν; This however is only remotely hinted at. At present we are to receive this as an additional proof of Protagoras' boldness. For a more serious use of the analogy between human nature and the vegetable world see Rep. 6. 491 D: Ἐπιγράμματος πέρι ὧν φύσιν πέτρει ἐξωτερικόν ἐν τοῖς ζωάνις, κ. τ. λ. and, for a still closer parallel, Tim. 77 Α: Τῆς γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνης ζωγραφικῆς φύσως φύσιν ἀλλοις ὅμοιοι καὶ αἰσθήσεις κεραυνές, ὡσ' έτερον ζῶον εἶναι, φυτεύεισθαι δὲ δὴ νῦν ἡμεικὴ διάδρομα καὶ φύτα καὶ σπέρματα παθενήσατα ὑπὸ γεωργίας τιθασάν πρῶτο ἦμας ἤσχε πρὶν ὲ ἄλλων τῶν ἰχνών γένη, προσβηθεντα τῶν ἰχνών σώλην. Heiml. quotes Aristot. de Plant. 1. 1, where, after mentioning the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles on the question, 'Do plants feel?' he adds, 'Ὤσαντο καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐπιθυμεῖν μόνον αὐτὰ διὰ τὴν σφοδρὰν τῆς ἀνεκτικῆς ὑπερήφανος ἐνέχων ἐφησθεν, ἐὰν συντάξῃ, ἤσχετα δοτέων αὐτὰ καὶ λυπεῖσθαι αἰσθήσεωι τα σύμφωνα ἔστω. Cp. Esch. Eumen. 911: ΑΘ. στίγμω γάρ, ἀνδρός φαντασμοῖς δίκην, τὸ τῶν δικαιων τότε ἀνέκδηθην γένος.
6. χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγιεῖνας αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἰδίως ὑποτεθήκει 'Impart to them good and healthy sensations and real ones too;' i. e. not only real (which they all are), but also good and healthy. The difference of idiom by which in Greek what is most emphatic is put first, though well known, is often a source of difficulty.
Cp. supr. 150 E: Αὐτοῖς τὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἱδίως ἀληθείας ἐίναι.
Schleiermacher's conjecture, ἀληθείας, has been generally received, but ἁληθείς (in which Wohlrab agrees) is very possibly right. For the difficult position of τε cp. Rep. 4. 465 E: Καὶ γέρα διέχουσα παρὰ τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεως ἐστὶ τε καὶ τελευτάσσοντες ταύτη ἢ ἄλλη μετέχουσιν. Πρ. 5. 472 A: Εἰκότως ἀρα δεικνύου τι καὶ ἐνδοκὴν ὑπάρχον παράδοξον λόγον ταύτη τε καὶ ἐπεικείρεις τοιαύται. The objection drawn from supr. δὲ τιμέω, ... ὑπὸ ἄνθρωπος ἁληθῆ καὶ λοιπῷ is cancelled by the preceding γάρ ὅτα ἄει ἀληθῆ. The state of plants has as much reality as that of the wise man;
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tε καὶ ἀληθείς ἐμποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γε σοφοὺς τε καὶ π. 167.
ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν
πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἔτει οὖά γὰ
ἐκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῆ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι
5 αὑτῇ, ἵνα μὲν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ. ἀλλὰ ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν
ὅπως ἀντὶ ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ
δοκεῖν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς
τοὺς παιδευμένους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν
σοφὸς τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευ
dιεἰσ. καὶ οὕτω σοφότεροι τέ εἰσιν ἔτεροι ἔτερων καὶ
οὐδεὶς ἑυόδη δοξάζει, καὶ σοι, ἕαν τε βουλή ἕαν τε μή,
ἀνεκτέον ὅπως μέτρον σώκτει γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος
οὗτος. ὃ σὺ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητεῖν,
ἀμφισβητεῖ, λόγῳ ἀντίδεξελθόν, εἰ δὲ δὲ ἐρωτήσεων
15 βούλει, δὲ ἐρωτήσεων. οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτῳ φευκτεόν ἀλλὰ
πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέον τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι. ποιεῖ
μέντοι οὕτως· μὴ ἄδικείν εν τῷ ἐρωτάν, καὶ γὰρ
tολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν
ἀλλὰ ἡ ἄδικοντα ἐν λογίας διατελεῖ. ἄδικεῖν δὲ ἐστὶν

and the latter has no advantage
in point of truth.

2. ταῖς πόλεσι.] A further step
is thus made in advance. Having
already (supr. 157 D) in-
cluded the good and noble
amongst the things of which
each man is judge for himself,
it is natural to apply the same
theory to the State, and to law
and justice. It is on this point
that the dialectic of Socrates
afterwards lays hold:—infra.
172 A, 177 C.

3. εἶσι has been needlessly
suspected.

9. ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων]
Prot. 328 B.

12. ἐν τούτῳς] ‘Through the
instances herein adduced.’

14. λόγῳ ἀντίδεξελθόν, κ.τ.λ.]
Protagoras himself is represen-
ted as master of both styles
(Prot. 329 B: ἵκανος μὲν μακρὸς
λόγοις... εἰπεῖν... ἵκανος δὲ καὶ ἐρω-
tῆσθαι ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχύ),
and in the Phædrus Socrates
himself adopts both, of course
to the implied disadvantage
of the rhetorical. See also Gorg.
449 B C, Soph. 217 C: Πᾶ
tερον ἐκοθάνα μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξάναι
... ἢ δὲ ἐρωτήσεων;

ei δὲ δὲ ἐρωτήσεως βούλει.] Sc.
diæxélthión. Protagoras is sup-
posed to add this out of com-
pliance with Socrates’ humour.
mév in the preceding clause really
looks forward to ποίει μέντοι,
k.τ.λ.
Theoaithtos.

p. 167. ἐν τῷ τουώτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρίς μὲν ὃς ἁγάμοις ἄγαμοις δὲ διατρήξεις ποιήται, χωρίς δὲ διάλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ ποίησέ μα τὸ ἔτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν προσδιαλέγεσθαι σπουνδάζῃ τε καὶ ἐπαναρθεὶ τὸν προσδιαλέγομενον, ἐκεῖνα μόνα αὐτῷ ἐνεκείμενον τὰ σφάλματα, ἀ αὐτὸς ὑφ’ ἐαυτοῦ καὶ

p. 168. τὸν προτέρων συνουσιῶν παρεκέκρουστο. ἂν μὲν γὰρ οὕτω ποίησις, ἐαυτὸς αὐτάσχονται οἱ προσδιατρίβοντές σοι τῆς αὐτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας, ἀλλ’ οὐ σὲ, καὶ σὲ μὲν διάζονται καὶ φιλήπτουσιν, αὐτοῦς δὲ μαζικοὶ συνηθιζούσι καὶ φεύγονται ἀφ’ ἐαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ὡς ἄλλως γενόμενοι ἀπαλαγώσοι τῶν οἱ προτέρων ἔστας· ἐὰν δὲ τάναντία τούτων δρᾶς ὁσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, τάναντία ἔμβησεται σοι καὶ τοὺς ἔργοντας ἀντὶ φιλοσοφίας σοφὸν μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀποφαίνεις, ἐπεὶ...

διὰ προσβήσεως γενόντα. ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἔρρεθι, οὔ δυσμενῶς ὀνὸμα μαχητικὸς, ἀλλ’

Theoaithtos.

p. 167. εν τῷ τουώτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρίς μὲν ὃς ἁγαμοις μὲν ὃς ἁγαμοις τὰς διατρήξεις ποιήται, χωρίς δὲ διάλεγομενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ ποίησι τε καὶ σφάλλη καθ’ ὅσον ἂν δυνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διάλεγεσθαι σπουδαζῃ τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῦ τὸν προσδιαλέγομενον, ἐκεῖνα μόνα αὐτῷ ἐνεκινομενο τὰ σφάλματα, ἀ αὐτὸς υφ’ ἐαυτοῦ καὶ

p. 168. τῶν προτέρων συνουσιῶν παρεκέκρουστο. ἂν μὲν γὰρ οὕτω ποιῆσις, ἐαυτοὺς αὐτασχονται οἱ προσδιατρίβοντες σοι τῆς αὐτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας, ἀλλ’ οὐ σὲ, καὶ σὲ μὲν διάζονται καὶ φιλήπτουσιν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μαζικὸς συνηθιζούσι καὶ φεύγονται ἀφ’ ἐαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ὡς ἄλλως γενόμενοι ἀπαλαγώσοι τῶν οἱ προτέρων ἔστας· ἐὰν δὲ τάναντία τούτων δρᾶς ὅσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, τάναντία ἔμβησεται σοι καὶ τοὺς ἔργοντας ἀντὶ φιλοσοφίας σοφὸν μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀποφαίνεις, ἐπεὶ...

διὰ προσβήσεως γενόντα. ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἔρρεθι, οὔ δυσμενῶς ονὸμα μαχητικὸς, ἀλλ’

1. εν τῷ τουώτῳ] Sc. εν τῷ ἔρωτϊ, supr. 'To play false in this particular game.'
2. τὰ σφάλματα] 'Those slips and deviations which are due to himself and to the company he has previously kept.'
3. τὰ σφάλματα] 'Those slips and deviations which are due to himself and to the company he has previously kept.'
4. τὰ σφάλματα] 'Those slips and deviations which are due to himself and to the company he has previously kept.'
5. αὐτὸς ὑπ’ ἐαυτοῦ] 'The language here applies his theory. Supr. 166 B.
6. ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου] 'Viz. τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ἢ ὑπὸ λόγους γεγονέναι. See the remarkable passage in the Phaedo on this subject, 89, 90; where a parallel is drawn between the growth of misanthropy and scepticism.'
7. αὐτὸ ἐλθὼν] 'Viz. supr. 166 C; Γενναυτέρως ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἐλθὼν ἐλέγος.'
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Ηεφ τῇ διανοία συγκαθέσαι ὡς ἄληθῶς σκέψεις τι ποτε π. 168. λέγομεν, κινεῖται τε ἀποφανόμενοι τὰ πάντα τὸ τε δοκοῦν ἐκάστη τοῦτο καὶ ἐκκαὶ ἰδιώτη τε καὶ πόλει. καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψεις εἰτε ταῦτα εἰτε καὶ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἰσθήσεις, ἀλλ' οὕς, ὅσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ συνθείας ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὅνομάτων, ἀδὶ πολλοὶ ὅποι κἀν τύχοσιν ἐλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλους παντοτες παρέχουσι. Ἐνοή, ὁ Θέοδορος, τῷ ἐταῖρῳ σου εἰς βοήθειαν ἀνεπηρήματο καὶ ἐμὺν δύναμιν, συμφαί 10 ἀπὸ συμφράων εἰ δ' αὐτὸς ἐγγ', μεγαλεύσερον ἄν τοῖς αὐτῶ ἐβοήθησέν.

ΘΕΟ. Παίξεις, ὁ Σώκρατες· πάνω γὰρ νεανικῶς τῷ ἄνδρι βεβοήθηκας.

ΣΩ. Εὗ λέγεις, ὁ ἐταῖρε. καὶ μου εἰπέ· ἐνενήσας 15 ποιν λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Προταγόρου καὶ ὅναδίκων τε ἦμιν ὅτι πρὸς παιδίον τοῦ λόγου ποιοῦμεν τῷ τοῦ παιδὸς φίλω ἀγονιζομέθα εἰς τὰ εαυτοῦ, καὶ χαρι-

1. Ἡεφ τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθέσαι] Sc. σεαντός. Cp. infr. 174 A: Λύτην Κυκλαθέσα. 'Meeting us without reserve, in a candid and good-humoured spirit.'

6. ὅποι ἐν τύχοσι εἶλκοντες] Soph. 259 C: ἄλα τε οὗτο βατέρα τότε δ' ἐπί βατέρα τοῦ λόγου ἄλεξε. Phil. 57 D: Τάς δεικνύσεις περὶ λόγων ἀλέξεν. Infr. 195 C, 199 A.

9. ἁνεπηρήματο] 'I have contributed as a beginning.' Notwithstanding Buttman's ingenious defence of this word, Lexil. 1. 103, it is difficult not to incline to the conjecture of Corrius suggested by Schneider, προστιμίσαν μέν. Cp. Legg. 6. 757 B: ἴνα μὲν ἐπαρείπει, πᾶν δ' ὅσον ἐν ἐπαρείπῃ: Soph. Ed. Col. 72: ὡς ἐν προσαρχῶν συμφά, κερ- δάνυ μέγα. See however infr. 171 E: ἐπηρήσαν μὲν βοθοῦντες, — and cp. the use of ἐπάρχεσαν in the Homeric hymn to Apollo, l. 125: οὕτα ἐν Ἄρτης Ἑρακλεός ἀργαστῶ, ἔλατο κινδύνος ἔπεασθαι, καὶ τε ἀμβροσίᾳ ἐπέτετο | ἀθάνατον χίρων ἑπόροσθαι, and the use of ἐπαρείπεσαν in Tim. 141 C.

10. μεγαλεύσερω] A rhetorical word, used probably in ironical imitations of Protagoras's style. See note on πολυάρατον, 165 E. Cp. Xem. Mem. 2. 1. §34: Οὕτω ποὺς διώκεις ἔπεασθα τῆν ὑπ' Ἀρτης Ἑρακλεός παιδεύσας, κατοίκησε μέντοι τὰς γνώμας ἐς μεγαλευσίᾳ ρήμασιν ἢ ἐγὼ πάν. 12. πάνω γὰρ νεανικῶς τῷ ἄν- δρι βεβοήθησε] 'Your defence of our friend has been most vigorous.' For τῷ ἄνδρι cp. supr. 162 A: Φιλος ἄμφη. 17. χαριντισμόν τιμα... λόγαν]
ΤΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 168. ἐντισμὸν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμνύων δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον, σπουδάσαι ἡμᾶς διεκελέυσατο περὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ λόγων;

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνένοησα, ὦ Σωκράτες;
ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ;
ΘΕΟ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Ὅρας οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα πλὴν σοῦ παιδία ἐστίν; εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἀνδρὶ, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ δεῖ νερωτώντας τε καὶ ἀποκριμένους ἀλλήλους σπουδάσαι αὐτοῦ περὶ τῶν λόγων, ἵνα μὴ τοιοῦτο γ᾽ ἔχω i0 εγκαλεῖ, ὡς παίζοντες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθα αὖ τοιοῦτο τῶν λόγων.

ΘΕΟ. Τί δ’; οὐ πολλῶν τοι Θεαίτητος μεγάλους πόγωνας ἐχόντων ἂμεινον ἂν ἐπακολουθήσει εὐγεφροποιήμενον;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τι σοῦ γε, ὦ Θέοδωρε, ἂμεινον. μὴ οὖν οἰοῦ ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἐταιρῷ τετελευτηκότι δεῖν p. 169. παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνειν, σὲ δὲ μηδείν, ἀλλ᾽ νῦ, ὡ ἀρατε, ὄλγον ἐπιτῶς, μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἔως ἂν εἰδωμεν, ἐτε ἄρα σὲ δὲ διαγραμμάτων περὶ μέτρον 20

'Giving a bad name of "quibbling" to our argument and exalting the respect due to his maxim, he bade us be in earnest when we are dealing with his theory.' For τὸ πάντων μέτρον cp. Phil. 20 B: τὸ...εἰ βούλει. The sentence continues as if ἐνένοησα ὦν had preceded. For χειρακαμάτῳ cp. supra. 167 E, and for ἀποσεμνύων 166 C. τοῖς (which Schanz omits with pr. T.) adds a touch of humorous earnestness to the request of Socrates. 7. τὰδε πάντα] Viz. Theseìtus, the younger Socrates, and their companions. Supra. 144 C, 146 B. 11. αὖ τοιοῦτον τῶν λόγων] Cola. p. m. Ἀτοῦ τὸ λόγον. The Bodl. p. m. had αὐτοῦ τῶν τῶν λόγων. Cp. 166 D: Τῶν δὲ λόγων αὐτὸ μὴ τῷ ἐπιμάλι μον διαλεξ. τοῖτον τῶν λόγων, if correct, refers to the fresh arguments which Protagoras had assumed in his defence, and the discussion founded on them. 18. στὶ δὲ μηδεὶς] The pronoun is simply used to strengthen the negative. Cp. Soph. Ὀδ. Τυρ. 1019: Καὶ πῶς ὁ φίλος ἐξ ἰὸν τῷ μηθεί; 20. διαγραμμάτων...ἀντροπομοιο] Note the variety, and cp. supra. 147 A B.
ἐίναι, ἐπεὶ πάντες ὁμός σοὶ ἴκανοι ἔστιν εἰς τὸ p. 169. ἀστρονομικὸν καὶ τάλλα δῶν ὅθεν ἐπὶ πέρα αἰτιῶν ἑχεις διαφέρειν.

ΘΕΟ. Οἱ ράδιοι, ὡς Σάκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενοι 5 μὴ διδόναι λόγου, ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ ἀρτι παρελήφθησα φάσκοντα ἐπὶ ἐπιτρέψεις μιᾷ ἀποδεκατηκαί, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάζω καθάπερ Λακεδαμίμοι; σὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίρρωνα μᾶλλον τείνεις. Λακεδαμίμοι μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ ἐπιτρεπτοῖ ἀποδεκατηκαί κελεύσας, σὺ δὲ κατ' Ἀνταῖον 10 τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δράμα δρᾶν τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνέγερε πρὶν ἀναγκάζησα ἀποδύσας εὐς τοὺς λόγους προσπαθαύσαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀριστά γε, ὡς Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπεικονισάς: ἱσχυρικότερος μὲντοι ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνον. μιρύσιο
15 γὰρ ἔδη μοι Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησεῖς ἑντυγχά-

2. αἰτιῶν ἔχεις] 'You are reputed.' Rep. 4. 435 E: οἱ δὲ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν (τοῦ θεομακείου εἶναι), Gorg. 503 B. Cp. the use of αἰτίων in Rep. 10. 599 E, 4. 435 E.
8. τείνεις] Cp. Phaed. 65 A: 'Εγγὺς τι τείνει τοῦ τεθνάναι. 'You come nearer to the analogy of Sciron.'
9. κατ' Ἀνταῖον] The allusion to the Lacedemonian custom (supr. 162 B) is repeated, but, as usual, with fresh imagery, and additional point. The Lacedemonians tell one to strip or go away. But you, like Sciron, strip all you meet with, and, like Antaeus, force them to wrestle with you. H. Schmidt needlessly suspects κατ' Ἀνταῖον. There is a slight inversion for the sake of emphasis. The natural order would be μᾶλλον τι κατ' Ἀνταῖον.
10. τὸ δράμα δρᾶν] (1) 'To go about your work.' Or (2) 'To perform your part.' Cp. supr. 150 A: "Ελαττῶν δὲ τού ἐμοῦ ἔριμος, and note.
11. πρὶν ἀναγκάζῃς] Schanz, following Heindorf, thinks it necessary to read πρὶν ἐν ὅν might of course easily fall out before ἀναγκάζῃς. But its omission may be defended on the ground that ἐνπεις contains a general statement.
ἀπόδυσας] 'Having stripped him of every pretext.'
13. For νόσον Heindorf aptly compares Phaedr. 228 B: Τῷ νοσοῦτεν περὶ λόγων ἀκοῦν.
14. ἱσχυρικότερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνον] 'But I have more of the athlete in me than they had;' (ἱσχυρικός = 'given to trials of strength.'
15. Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησεῖς] Winkelmann (Fr. Antisthenes) suspects an allusion to Antisthenes here. But the Scholiast
is probably nearer the mark: ΟΙ Ἰερασύμοιοι, Καλλικλῆς, Διονυσίωνας, Ἐδιδούμενοι καὶ τουσών. Cp. Euthyd. 297. 1. καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν| 'Men of valour in the art of controversy.' μᾶλ' εὖ ἔγγεγορφασω] 'Have bruised me well.' 2. οὖσι τοὺς ἐρωτευόμενοι ἐνθέδωκε] Sc. μ. implied in ἐφ' ὑπὲρ. It is left doubtful whether οὖσι is to be joined with δεηθεῖν or ἐνθέδωκεν. 'So strong a passion for this kind of exercise has taken possession of me.' It is not forgotten that Socrates says this at the close of his career. For ἐνθέδωκε cp. Phaed. 89 D: Ἡ τ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν μανθάνωσι νέων ἐνθέδωκεν. 3. δεηθεῖ] For the inversion (=οὖσι δεηθεῖ τις ἐρωτεῦ) cp. Rep. 391 D, 6. 500 A. 4. προσανατριφάζομεν] 'Giving me a grip,' 'trying one fell with me.' 6. ἀλλ' ἄγε] The Bodl. has ἀλλὰ λέγει. See above 162 D: Εἰς τοῦ μίκαν ἄγεσας, and note. ἄγε is more vivid and in better agreement with the image which follows. Hermann's objection is well answered by H. Schmidt. 7. [ἀν] ἄν has weak MS. authority. Cp. supr. B: πρὸς, κ. τ. λ. and note. 9. ἁν προτίθεσαι] Viz. διαγραμμάτων πέρι, supr. A. 11. λάθωμεν] Cp. supr. 164 C: Λαθώμεν ταῖτα...ποιοῦτες. There is exquisite humour in Socrates' warning Theodorus against being sportive in argument. 12. τις] Somebody; i.e. Protagoras. 16. ἀντιλαβώμεθα] 'Let us at-
οὗτος τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ ἰδὼν, ὅρθως ἦ σὺν ὅρθως p. 169.
εὐυχεραιόμεν ἐπιτιμᾶντες τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς αὐτὰρκὴ
ἐκατον ἐς φρονήσει ἐποίει, καὶ ᾗ 
ἑλπίζη ἔννεφ 
Προταγόρας περὶ τε τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χείρων δια-
σφερέτος δυσά, οὐδὲ καὶ ἐναῖ σοφοῖσ. οὐχί;

ΘΕΟ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοῖνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν ὁμόλογην, ἀλλὰ
μὴ ἦμείς βοηθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐνεχορήσαμεν, οὐ
δὲν ἂν πάλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι. νῦν
δὲ τὰχ' ἄν τις ἦμας ἀκύρως τιθεὶ τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ὁμολογίας.
δὸ καλλιόνος ἔχει σαφέστερον περὶ τοῦ
του αὐτοῦ διομολογηταῖς. οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παρ-
αλλάττει ὅτως ἡχον ἡ ἄλλως.

ΘΕΟ. Δέγεις ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοῖνυν δὲ ἄλλως, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου
λόγου ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβουμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν. p. 170.

tack the question from the same point as before.' Cp. Rep. 8. 544
B: Πάλιν... ὡςπερ παλαιοτῆς τῆς
ἀκήνα λαξήν πέρειξ.

3. καὶ ἦμεν ἐνεχορήσαν] The
sentence breaks and reverts to
the direct form. Cp. Rep. 6. 489
D: Οὗ δὲν σὺν φασι, κ.τ.λ. καὶ ἦμεν ἐν
ἐνεχορήσαν ἀληθῆ σε λέγων.

(Other, with Heindorf, 'and
whether Protagoras was right
in admitting.') In conceding
for Protagoras that some men
are wise, we went beyond his
own words. We must try to
prove it out of his own mouth.
He says, What appears to each
man, is to him. Now it cer-
tainly appears to every man
that some are wiser than him-
self, and some less wise; that
some think truly, others falsely.
Therefore, whether Protagoras
be right or wrong, it is the case
that some think truly, and
some falsely.

11. καλλιόνος ἔχει] 'It would
seem the less exceptionable
course.' The rare form of the
adverb in -os avoids the ambi-
guity of καλλιόν ἔχει.

12. διομολογηταῖα implies
greater thoroughness than ἀν-
ὁμολογηταίου, supr. 164 C.

οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει
'It is of no small importance
to the question at issue.' So-
crates appeals again to the
geometrical consciousness of
Theodorus, to whom possibly
παραλλάττει, a half-technical
word, may express more than
the simple διαφέρει.

15. δὲ ἄλλως... ἐκ τοῦ... λόγου]
'Not through any third person,
but from the data supplied by
himself.'
ΤΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ

p. 170.

ΈΩ. Ποῦ;

Σ.Ο. Οὐτωσί. Τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι
φησὶ που ὁ δοκεῖ;

ΈΩ. Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν.

Σ.Ο. Οὐκοῦν, ὃ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου, 5
μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ
φαμέν οὐδένα ὃν τινα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἤγείρεθαί τῶν
ἄλλων σοφότερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλως ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐν γε
τοῖς μέγιστοις κινδύνους, ὅταν ἐν στρατείας ἡ νόσος
ἡ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειλάζωνται, ὅσπερ πρὸς θεοῦς ἔχειν 10
τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἄρχοντας, σωτηρίας σοφῶν προσδο-
κώντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαφέροντας ἡ τῷ εἶδέναι. καὶ
πάντα που μεστὰ τὰ ἄνθρωπον ἤποιτον διδασκάλους
τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῶν τῶν
τε ἔργασιν, οἰκόμενον τοὺς ἢ ἰκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν, 15
ἰκανῶν δὲ ἄρχειν εἶναι. καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀπασὶ τῇ ἄλλο
φήσομεν ἢ αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἤγείρεσι οἰκολαίν
καὶ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν;

ΈΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλῳ.

Σ.Ο. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν 20
ἠγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ἰσχυρὰ δόξαν;

ΈΩ. Τί μὴν;

Σ.Ο. Τί οὖν, ὃ Πρωταγόρα, χρησάμεθα τῷ λόγῳ;

6. καὶ φαμέν is paratactic for λέγοντες.

10. χειλάζωνται] There is a
zeugma only in so far as the verb is used literally with ἐν
βαλάσῃ and figuratively with ἐν στρατείας ἡ νόσος.
Cp. Lach.
194 B: 'Ἀνδραίς φίλους χειλαζό-
μενον ἐν λόγῳ... βοηθήσων.

Rep. 6. 489 C: Τὸ δὲ ἄλφης
πέρικλει, ἐάν τε πλουσίου ἐάν τε
πένης κάρμη, ἀναγκαῖον εἷναι ἐπὶ
ιατρῶν θύρας ἐνα, καὶ πάντα τῶν
ἀρχεσθαι δεόμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄρ-
χειν δυναμίνον. On the omis-
sion of πρὸς with the second
word see Cobet, Var. Lect,
pp. 163 sqq.

23. ὃ Πρωταγόρα] Bodl. Val.
pr. Ven. P. have τὸ Πρωτα-
γόρα. But the Bodleian has ὃ
in the margin by an ancient
hand.
The reading τὸ may have been
suggested by τί δὲ αὐτῷ
Πρωτα-
γόρα infr. E.
πότερον ἄληθή φῶμεν ἂεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δοξάζειν, ἢ π. 170.
ποτὲ μὲν ἄληθή, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδή; ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γάρ
που ἔμβασιν ἂεὶ ἄληθή ἀλλ’ ἀμφότερα αὐτοὺς
doξάζειν. σκότει γάρ, ὃ Θεόδωρο, εἰ εἶχελοι ἂν τις τὸν
5 ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν ἢ σφι αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ὡς οὐδεὶς
ήγειται ἐτερος ἐτερον ἀμαθή τε εἰναὶ καὶ ψευδή
doξάζειν.

ΘΕΩ. Ἀλλ’ ἀπιστον, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰς τούτο γε ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος ἦκει ὃ
tοις χρημάτων μέτρου ἀνθρώπων λέγων.

10
ΘΕΩ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΣΩ. "Ὅταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτὸν πρὸς με ἀπο-
φαίη περὶ τινος δοξάζω, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τούτο κατὰ τὸν
ἐκείνου λόγου ἄληθῆς ἐστο, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις
περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἐστι κριταὶ γενε-
15 σθαί, ἢ ἂεὶ σε κρίνομεν ἄληθῆ δοξάζεις; ἤ μυρίοι
ἐκάστοτε σοι μάχομαι ἀντιδοξάζειτε, ἡγούμενοι
ψευδὴ κρίνει τε καὶ οἰςσαί;

ΘΕΩ. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, μᾶλα μυρίοι ἡ
dήτα, φησίν Ὀμηρος, οἱ γέ μοι τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων
20 πράγματα παρέχουσιν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ οὖν; βοῦλει λέγομεν ὁς σὺ τὸτε σαυτὸ
μὲν ἄληθῆ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῆ;

ΘΕΩ. "Εισεκνέν ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκην εἶναι.

8. εἰς τούτο... ἀνάγκης... ἦκεν] 'Is driven to this.' 'Is re-
duced to a point where this
is inevitable.' Cp. Soph. Οδ. 
Tyr. 687: 'Ὅρας ἔν ἕρεις;
18. Νὴ τὸν Δία... παρέχουσιν
'Yes, truly, Socrates, I have
opponents more than I can tell,
as Homer says, and they give
me worlds of trouble.'
19. φησίν Ὀμηρος] Od.16.121:
Τὸ τὸν διομένης μᾶλα μυρίοι εἴο
ἐνὶ ὄλῳ.

τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα] 'The trouble of the world,' i.e.
troubles, the greatest that can
come from all men. Cp. śesichin.
c. Timarch. 9: Τὸ δὲ τελεστῶν
dησαυτοί πρὸς τὸν κόσμον αὐτῶν τὸν
Πιτακάκου ἐμαστίγους τὰς ἐξ ἀν-
θρώπων πληγᾶς σὺν εἰς χρόνον
δοτῇ, κ.τ.λ. A somewhat similar
use of ἀνθρώπων occurs in Soph.
Phel. 305: Πολλὰ γὰρ τὰς ἐν
tὸ μερίφι γίνου τὰς ἀνθρώπων
χρήσας. 'Respondest vulgare illud
nostrium, alle menschenmög-
lliche.' Heindorf.
ΤΕΛΙΤΗΣ.

p. 170. ΣΩ. Τι δὲ αὐτῷ Προταγόρᾳ; ἄρ' οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μὴ δὲ αὐτὸς ἤτοι μέτρων εἶναι ἄνθρωπον μὴ δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ, ὡσπερ οὖδε οἴνωτα, μηδὲν δὴ εἶναι ταύτην.

p. 171. τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἢν ἑκεῖνος ἐγραψεν; εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ἤτοι, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίησα, οἷοθεὶ ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὀσφρ πλείους ὡς μὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ὡς δοκεῖ, τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ἐστίν.

ΘΕΟ. 'Ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ γε καθ ἑκάστην δόξαν ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. 'Ἐπειτὰ γε τοὺτ' ἔχει κομψύτατον. ἐκεῖνος 10 μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἰνόσως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξάσιτων ὁμιλῶν, ἢ ἑκεῖνον ὑγοῦνται πευδεσθαί, συγχωρεῖ που ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὀμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἄπαντας.

ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

b ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἢν ψευδῆ συγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴν 15 τῶν ἡγομένων αὐτῶν ψευδεσθαί ὀμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι;

ΘΕΟ. 'Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οἱ δὲ γ' ἄλλοι οὖν συγχωροῦσιν ἐαυτοὺς ψευδεσθαί;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. 'Ο δὲ γ' αὐ τῷ ὀμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν εὖ ὡν γέγραφεν.

ΘΕΟ. Φαίνεται.

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1. Τι δὲ αὐτῷ Προταγόρᾳ;] Sc. ἀνάγκη ἔστιν; Or rather, as H. Schmidt points out, a more general notion: 'What follows for Protagoras? Is he not compelled?'

2. μηδὲ .. μηδὲ] 'If Protagoras himself also did not think so, nor yet the majority, as indeed they do not.'

3. συνοίησα] This is present, because it has been asserted just above in ὡσπερ . οἴνωτα.

4. "Επειτὰ . κομψύτατον] Now follows the most exquisite touch of all.' Cf. Rep. 5. 558 A: Τι δὲ; ἢ πράξεις ἐνίοτε τῶν δικαιοθέτων οὐ κομψῆ;…—ἐχει, sc. το πράγμα, 8. ὁ λόγος. μὲν points forward to the antithesis, which is expressed in οἱ δὲ γ' ἄλλοι, κ.τ.λ.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Προταγώρου ἄρξαμε— p. 171. νων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μάλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκείνου ὄμολογήσεται,—ὅταν τῷ τάναντα λέγουσι συγχωρή ἀληθῇ αὐτῶν δοξάσεως, τότε καὶ ὁ Προταγώρας αὐτῶς συν. ὁ 5 χαρήσεται μῆτε κύνα μῆτε τὸν ἑπταχόντα ἀνθρώπουν μέτρου εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἐνὸς οὐ ἄν μὴ μάθη. οὐχ οὖτως;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὔδειν ἂν εἰ ἡ Προταγώρου ἀλήθεια ἀληθῆς, οὐ τε τινὶ ἄλλῳ οὔτ' αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἄγαν, ὁ Ὁσκρατεῖς, τὸν ἑταίρον μοι καταθέομεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τοι, ὁ φίλε, ἀδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν

1. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα) 'So then, the result obtained from them all is this.' Cf. Soph. 245 E: Τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους λέγοντες αὐθεντευσάντοι, ἦν ἐκ πάντων εἰδάμεν ότι τὸ δὲ τοῦ μὴ δεχότας οὐδὲν εὑρήσκομεν εἰπεῖν δὲ τί ποτε ἤτοιν. Αρ. Μετ. 988 a: Τοσοῦτον γ᾽ ἠχομεν ἐξ αὐτῶν, δει, κ.κ.λ. The preposition is probably suggested by ἐξ δὲ immediately preceding. 'On all hands, then, including Protagoras, we find it disputed, or rather on his part it is admitted.' This use of ἐξ has been needlessly disputed by Heindorf and others, and Schanz reads ὑπὸ ἀπάντων. Badham suggests ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ τῶν Προταγώρου. 2. διὰ... συγχωρήσεται] These words are explanatory of ὑπὸ ἐκείνου ὄμολογήσεται, and what follows, from μῆτε onwards, depends immediately on συγχωρήσεται, but really also on all that precedes. The construction of a sentence is frequently thus disturbed by the introduction of an explanatory or appositional clause. Cp. Rep. 7. 529 B: οὐ δύναμαι ἀλλά τι μοίᾳ τι άνω ποιεῖν ψυχήν βλέπειν μάθημα ἡ ἐκείνη, δὲ ἀν περὶ τὸ δὲ τῇ καὶ τὸ ἄρατον, εἰ καὶ τὴν ἀνα κέχρως ἢ κάτω συμμετοχῇς τῶν αἰσθήσεως τῇ ἐπικρή μπαδαίες, οὐσὶ μαθείν ποτὲ φημι αὐτῶν, οὐσὶ άνοι ἀλλὰ κάτω αὐτοῦ βλέπειν τῇ θυμήσει, κἂν ἐξ ὑπότατον ὡς ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν δόλατι μπαδαί. The futures middle are used with passive meaning.

5. μῆτε κύνα] Supr. 154 A. 12. Ἅγαν] 'We are urging my friend too vehemently,' 'running him very hard.' καταθέομεν] Cp. Legg. 7. 806 C: Τί δράσομεν, ὁ Κλείσια; τῶν ξένων ἔσωμεν τὴν Σπάρτην ἡμῖν οὖσα καταθραμμέν; 14. Ἀλλὰ... ἀδηλον] 'But it does not appear that we are outrunning what is right,' i.e. I do not see that we are transgressing any rule of truth or fairness. τὸ ὅρθον means simply
Could he put his head above the ground, no doubt he might convince us of much folly. But we have done our best. No one will deny that one man is wiser, and another less wise, than his neighbour.
ÏΑΤΩΝΟΣ

η ἡμείς ὑπεγράφαμεν βοηθῶντες Πρωταγόρα, οὐς τὰ π. 171. μὲν πολλὰ ἡ δοκεῖ ταύτη καὶ ἔστων ἐκαστὸν, θερμά, ἔτηρα, γλυκέα, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τίποτος τούτου· εἰ δὲ που ἐν τοῖς συγχωρήσεται διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλον, 5 περὶ τὰ ὑγείαν καὶ νοσόδηθη ἔθελημαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πάν γνώσει καὶ παίδιον καὶ θηρίον δὲ ἰκανὸν εἶναι ἰάσθαι αὐτὸ γιγνώσκον ἐναυτὸ τὸ ὑγείων, ἄλλα ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλον διαφέρειν, εἴπερ ποῦ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ π. 172. αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἷα ἂν ἐκαστή πάλις οἰδήεισα θῆται νόμιμα ἐαυτῷ, ταύτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἁλθεῖα ἐκαστή, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφότερον οὕτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως

immediately on φάμερ.—May there also be a slight play upon the word ἰστασθαι? ‘This unstable theory will make a stand hereabouts if anywhere.’ See also Thuc. 6. 34: Προς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ αἱ γνώμαι ἰστανται.

1. η ἡμείς ὑπεγράφαμεν βοηθῶντες Πρωταγόρα] This ‘new wave’ of discussion rises upon the last, 167 B, 168: Κατὰ μὲν σῶματα ἑαυτῶν νόμοι, κατὰ δὲ φυσικά γενορθεῖσαι ταῖς πολεμίας τὰ χρηστά αὐτὸ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. εἰπεὶ οὖν γ’ ἂν ἐκαστή πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκεῖ, ταύτα καὶ εἶναι αὑτῶν οὕτε δὲ αὐτὰ νομίζῃ.

The argument is beginning to relax a little under the influence of the ἄμαθον καὶ καλὸν thrown carelessly in, 157 D.

4. συγχωρήσεται] Sc. δὲ λόγος. Others go back for a subject to οἰδήειν, supr. D. But if the imaginary opponent were wholly indefinite, why should a doubt be expressed whether he would make a reasonable admission?

So in what follows, 172 A, the words εἴπερ ποῦ, εἰκόν τὸν τοιχίσθηε, imply certain preconceptions and tendencies.

6. καὶ θηρίον δὲ] ‘Nay, even every inferior animal.’ Vegetables might have been included. Supr. 167 B C.

10. Οὐκοῦν . . . περὶ πολιτικῶν] The distinction in the case of sensible things between the impressions of sense, and the knowledge of what is good, is evident enough. The analogous distinction in the case of things moral and social is less obvious. See, amongst other passages, Rep. 6. 505 D: Τι δὲ; τόδε οὐ φαινομέν, ὅσ δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ δὲ ἐλπίεται τὰ δοκεύεται κἂν μὴ ἢ ὅμως ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτήσωσι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδέκα ἐτεῖ ἀρετεῖ τὰ δοκεύεται κατάσβαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ δυτὰ ἐξετάσει, τὴν δὲ δέχασθαι ἐνταῦθα ὑπὸ πᾶσα ἀρετήξει;

p. 172. ἢ τῷ συμφέροντα έστερα ἡ μὴ συμφέροντα
tίθεσθαι, ενταῦθ', ἐπερ πον, αὖ ὠμολογησεὶ σύμβουλο
λόν τε συμβουλοῦν διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεος δόξαν ἐπέραν
ἐπέρασ πρὸς ἄλλης, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πάντων τοιμάσει,
β φήσαι, ἡ ἂν ἤθητα πόλις συμφέροντα οὐθέσθαι αὐτῇ, 5
παντὸς μᾶλλον τάτα καὶ συνοίτες. ἀλλ' ἐκεί οὐ
λέγω, εἰ τοῖς δικαίως καὶ ἀδίκοις καὶ ὀσίως καὶ ἀνο-
σίως, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει
αὐτῶν οὐδέν οὐσίαν ἑαυτῶς ἔχων, ἀλλ' τὸ κοιν' δόξαν
τοῦτο γίνεται ἀληθῆς τότε ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὄσον ἂν το
δοκῇ χρόνον. καὶ ὄσοι γε δὴ μὴ παντάπασι τοῖς Πρω-
ταγόροις λόγοι λέγουσιν, ὅπει πώς τὴν σοφίαν ἀγουσι.
Λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὁ Θεόδωρος, ἐκ λόγων, μεῖζον εὖ ἐλάτ-
cτονος, καταλαμβάνει.

8. ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι] He drops the figure, and passes
from what the 'argument' would be apt to say, to what certain
persons, who are presently defined, actually do say. For a
somewhat similar transition from 'arguments' to 'certain
persons' cp. Gorg. 457 C: Ὅμως, ὁ Γοργίας καὶ σε ἐμπειρον
εἶναι πολλών λόγων καὶ καθορα-
κέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοὐδε, ὅτι
αὐτὸς δύναται περὶ ὅν ἐν ἑπι-
χειρίσασθαι διαλέγεσθαι διαφέρέ-
μαι πρὸς ἄλλοσ καὶ μαθώντες
καὶ διδάσκοντες ἑαυτοὺς οὕτω δια-
λύσαν τὰς συνοίτες ..., καὶ ἐναὶ
gε τελευτώσαν (cp. καὶ ὄσον γε
in the present passage), κ.τ.λ.

11. μὴ παντάπασι] 'In part
only.' For the negative form
cp. Soph. 247 B: Τούτῳ οὐκέτι
κατὰ ταύτα ἀποκρίνονται πάν ('here
they make a certain distinc-
tion'). Aristotle (Met. 1008 a)
uses the expression τοῖς τὸν Πρω-
tαγόρον λέγουσι λόγων.

12. ἐπὶ πὼς τὴν σοφίαν ἀγουσι] 'Conduct their philosophic pro-
cedure thus.' 'Proceed some-
what on this wise in their philosophy.' Cp. Men. 30 Ἕ
'Ορᾶς τούτων ὡς ἑπιστήμων λόγων καταγίσει;

ἄδε' refers either to the pre-
ceding sentence, or to the ex-
position which is broken off by
the digression:—certainly not
(with H. Schmidt) to the digres-
sion itself.

The digression which follows
is not merely an ornament. As
in the Sophist the philosopher
and the sophist are the counter-
part of being and not-being re-
spectively, so here the man of
the world and the philosopher
represent the contrast between
the life of sense and the life of
knowledge.

13. μεῖζον εὖ ἐλάττονος] The
question of Justice and In-
justice, etc. is greater than the
question of the relativity of
Sense. The greater question is
not fully resumed in the pre-
This is the attitude of some who have partially relinquished the Protagorean doctrine. They offer us a new and important handle for discussion.

Before entering upon this, however, sent dialogue, but is treated at large in the Gorgias and Republic.

1. Οἰκοῦν σχολὴν ἀγομεν] Compare the opening of the digression in the Phaedrus, 258 E: Σχολὴ μὲν δὴ ἐν τοῖς . . . and Cic. de Amic. 5: 'Et dixit Fannius, otiosi.' We must suppose that the impending trial of Socrates, although not alluded to until the end of the dialogue, is in Plato's mind throughout this passage. Cp. Gorg. 522 B.

2. ἐν δειμώνει] 'In sober truth.' The words add a touch (not here of exostulation but) of solemnity.

4. ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις] 'In scientific pursuits.' Supr. 143 D: Γεωμετρίαι ἡ τίνα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν. Tim. 86 C: Μονοτείχη καὶ πάσης φιλοσοφίας. Socrates takes common ground with Theodorus. Cp. infr. 173 E: Τά τε γαρ ἡπάντητα καὶ τά ἐπίπεδα γεω-

metropoia, ὁμοομοίως τε ὑπὲρ ἀστρο-

nomoúōma. Compare with the whole passage the opening words of the Apology (esp. ὁμολογηθην ἃν ἔγωγε ὦ κατὰ τού-

tos εἶναι ἰσχύος), and the dispute of Socrates with Callicles in the Gorgias.

8. ἐν πίνακι κυλινδούμενον] 'Who have knocked about from their early days.' Compare Aristophanes' περίπτρα δικών (Nub. 447), and Dem. de Cor. 269.

κυλινδούμενον] The word expresses contempt for the 'casual,' 'hand to mouth,' intellectual existence of the lawyer. Cp. Rep. 5. 479 D: Μεταξύ ποι

cυλινδεῖται, Phaedr. 257 A, Polit. 309 A.

10. πρὸς ἔλευθερους] Soph. 253 C (referring to this): 'Η πρὸς ἄδεις ἐλάθημεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἑλε-

θέρων ἔμπυσωτες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κυλινδούμενον ζητούσες τὸν σοφι-

στὴν πρότερον ἀνεπεξεργασία τῶν ἐλευ-

θέρων συμμαχοῦσαν, οἷς ζητήσαν τὸν ἀληθὲς...

κ.τ.λ. 7. 536 D: Οἴκειν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τῶν ἑλευθέρων χρὴ

μακράμαχαν—and the whole image of the cave with its captives and their liberation. See also Aristot. Met. 1. 2: Δῆλον οὖν ὦν ὦν δὴ οὐδεμίαν αὐτὸ βιοῦμεν χρείαν ἐτέραν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀνθρώπως φάμες ἑλευθέρους ὦ αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα καὶ

μὴ ἄλλον ὄν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴ μόνη ἑλευθέρα οὕτος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν.
we pause to reflect upon the happiness and freedom of the philosophic life, which has leisure to take up fresh topics or to lay them down at will. Not so the mind which is exercised in the courts of law. The
The training of a freeman, the other of a slave—

which has been already alluded to. It is rather the strong arm of the law, which the adversary could bring to bear, if the speaker wandered from the indictment. (So also Ast and H. Schmidt.) 'But the other sort are always pressed for time: for the ebbing water hurries on the speaker: and he has no liberty to follow whither fancy leads him, but the adversary is at hand to wield over him the resistless logic of coercion, holding a written outline of the points to which he must confine himself, which forms a running commentary to his oration.'

2. ἡν εἰκός οὐ κρίτεων ὑπογραφὴν retains its verbal force nearly as if it were ὑπογραφαμένα, but is not the antecedent to ἐν. See 11.7 E, note on ἐν.

ἢν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν] 'What they call their affidavits.' The affected unfamiliarity with legal terms is in good keeping. Compare Rep. 3. 400 B: Καὶ, ἐς ἐγώμαι, λαμβάνω καὶ τίν᾽ ἄλλον τροχαίον ἄνώμαζα.

3. πρὸς διεστόρην] Not simply the διαστήθη, but rather δῆμος or νόμος, whom he represents. Compare the passages in the Republic in which Δῆμος is spoken of as the master of the ship (488), as the great Sophist (492), and as a mighty beast (493); and cp. Eu-


4. τῶν δικαίων] So the Bodleian MS. 'Some cause or other.' This reading suits the distant, unfamiliar tone, in which judicial proceedings are here described. The other reading, ἐν χειρὶ τὴν δίκην ἔχοντα (T, etc.), gives a different force to ἐν χειρὶ... ἔχοντα,—not merely 'engaged with' but 'having in his power.'

καὶ οἱ ἀγώνες] 'And the trial is never for an indifferent stake, but always immediately concerns the speaker.' αὐτοῦ is surely masculine, not neuter (as Stallb. and Wohlrab).

Whose mind becomes inevitably dwarfed and crooked and servile.

1. έντωνοι καὶ δριμεῖς γίγνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τῶν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεύσαι καὶ ἔργον χαρίσασθαι, συμμερῷ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὁρθῶς τὰς ψυχὰς. ἦν γὰρ αὐξήν καὶ τὸ εὕθυ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἢ ἐκ νέων δουλεία ἀφέρηται, ἀναγκάζοντα πράττειν σκολιά, μεγάλους καὶ κινδύνους ήτι ἀπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλοντα, οὗς οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοῦς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ πεσόδος τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικῶς τρεπόμενοι πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγκλώνται, ὡς ἤγεοι οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς τὸν ἰδίον τοῖς μετακινών τελευτῶσι, δεινοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς οἴνοι. Καὶ οὕτω μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτοι, ὡς οὕτως τὴν δύναμιν ἡ καμία δὲ ἤναγκασμένων ὑπηρετεῖν διάτε ἐσώ ἐν ἔξω τεραν βλέπῃ, τοιοῦτον πλείον κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον. Τούτω μετοίκον, ᾧ ἐγὼ, τὸ τῆς του ῥήτους φέστεος, εἶ ἐκ παιδὸς εὐθὺς κοπτόμενην περιείσακτο τοὺς τῆς γενέσεως συγγενεῖς ὡστερ μολυβδίδαις, αἱ δὲ εὐδαίμονες τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λιχνεύσαις προσφυγίᾳ γεγονόμεναι, περὶ τὰ κάτω στρέφοντες τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὅλως κ.τ.λ.  

9. πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγκλώνται. 'Are continually thwarted and cramped in their growth.' Rep. 6. 495 D: 'Αγελάλες μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὅπως δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ βασιλείων ῥυπηρῷ τὰ σώματα λελαθήσται οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐξογκελασμένου τε καὶ ἀποτεθρομμένου διὰ τὰς βασιλείας τυχάνουσιν. 10. 611 C: Τεθείμεθα μεῖν διακειμένοι αὐτά, ὡσπερ αἱ τῶν βασιλείων Γαλατακών ὀργίαις αἰκὶ ἀν ἐτί ράθος αὐτῶν ἱδονεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὅπως τοῦ τα τε παλαιά τοῦ σώματος μερί τα μὲν ἐκκελάσθαι, τα δὲ συντετρίβεθαι καὶ πάντας λει- λαθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κυμάτων. Gorg. 535 C-E
Theophrast θεύομεν τούς δε του ἴμετέρου χορού πότερον βούλειν p. 173- 
edelvontes ἡ ἐάσαντες πάλιν ἐκ τῶν λόγων τρεπό-
μεθα, ὡς μὴ καί, δ ἰὼν δι ἐλέγομεν, λαῖν πολύ τῇ
eλευθερίᾳ καί μεταληφθη τῶν λόγων καταχρομέθα;
1 ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμίως, ο Σάκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.
πάνυ γὰρ εἰ τοῦτο ἔρημα, ὅτι οὐχ ἴμεος οἱ ἐν τῷ
cτούμεν χορευόμεν τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται, ἀλλ’ οἱ λόγοι
τοῦ ἴμετρων ὅσπερ οἰκεῖαν, καὶ ἑκατός αὐτῶν περι-
μένει αὐτοτελώθηνα ὡταν ἴμεον δοξῇ, οὕτε γὰρ ἐπι-
10 στὴς οὕτε θειότης, ὅσπερ ποιήται, ἐπειμήκον τε καὶ
ἀρξὼν ἐπιστατεῖ παρ’ ἴμεον.

1. τῶν δὲ τοῦ ἴμετρον χοροῦ Phaedr. 247 A: 'Εν θεύ εἰ ἐν

2. διελθόντες] The expression is a little confused: for the

3. ὅ νῦν δὲ ... μεταληφθη] "Our freedom, which consists,

4. ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμίως, ο Σάκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.

5. ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμίως, ο Σάκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.

6. ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμίως, ο Σάκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.

7. ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμίως, ο Σάκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.

8. τοι ἴμετρον] The article is rather doubtful. If genuine,

9. ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμίως, ο Σάκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.

10. ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμίως, ο Σάκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.
They know nothing of politics or of public life, still less of revells and intrigues for power.

1. ὃς ὡκεῖν The sentence continues as if λέγομεν had been lectēōn.

2. τοὺς φασίδος διατριβοῦσαν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ is emphatic, i. e. ‘who are frivolous in such a pursuit.’ For an account of these gentry see Rep. 6. 489 D-496, where they are called παπαστόροι; ἄσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἰργαίοι εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ ἀποδεδιάχονται, k.τ.λ.

3. Οὖν ὅπως 

4. The irregularity is softened in the present instance by the fact that the earlier part of the sentence forms a sort of collective nominative to προσίσταται. With this list of ‘worldly goods’ compare Rep. 6. 491 C: Πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθά, τὸ ἄλλο καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἱστοὺς σώματος καὶ ἐγγένεια ἐρρομένη ἐν πόλει καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτων οἰκεῖα.

5. ‘Clubs’ or ‘leagues.’ See Rep. 2. 355 D: ἔτυλ γὰρ τὸ λαυδώμειν ξυνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἐταρείας συνάξησι... Thucyd. 8. 54: Καὶ ὁ μὲν Πεισάνδρος τὰς τὲς ξυνωμοσίας, οὗτος ἐπάγχως πρόγεγαν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὀδοὺς ἐπὶ δίκαιος καὶ ἄρχαίς, ἀπόσαι ἐπελθόν, κ.τ.λ.

6. τὸ τί γέγονεν] So the Bodleian and several other MSS., including the first hand of T. But Clement in quoting the passage reads τίς with the majority of manuscripts. This, however, may easily have arisen out of what follows. Stallbaum
PŁATOWOS

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The philosopher’s ignorance of these things and of his neighbour’s pedigree, is not ironical but real. His body is at home in the city, but his mind is

saying, ‘Si quis alius, certe philosophus scit, quid recte, quid secus in republica fiat.’ But if he is ignorant of what is passing, how can he judge of it? See above, νόμων δὲ καὶ ψυχίσματα, κ.τ.λ., and infr. 174 C: Οὐκ εἴδος κακῶν οίδεν οίδεν εἰς τοῦ μὴ μεμλητήκαιναι. And cp. Rep. 6. 496. This reading is consistent with the spirit of paradox which is unmistakably present throughout. No part of the description except the absence of rhetoric would apply to the real Socrates. Even in this dialogue we have seen that he knows some of the antecedents of Theaetetus and is interested in knowing more.

2. οἱ τῆς βαλαττῆς λεγόμενοι χώρας Aristid. Or. 3. Τ. i. p. 30. ed. Dind.: Τὸ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ τούτον καὶ ἐγχειριῶν ἄστεραι ἐν εἴ τις ἐξαιρειμέναι βούλευτον τοῖς χῶραις τῆς βαλαττῆς. (Stallb.)


9. κατὰ Πίνδαρου] The fragment is thus quoted by Clem. Alex. Str. 20. 707: Πέτασα κατά

Πίνδαρον τὰς τε γὰς ἐπίνενδεν οὖν τε ἐπὶ ἄνθρωπόν, καὶ πάσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνῶμεν (v. 1. ἐρευνῶμεν). He seems to have had the poet’s words, as well as this passage, in his mind. Plato therefore seems to have changed κέντρα into the more prosaic φέρεται (πέτασα occurs as a marginal reading), and to have introduced the words καὶ τὰ ἐπίστεια γνωμοτροπία (perhaps also ἀνθρωπομοίωσα), in compliment to Theodorus, adding τὰς διὰ τῶν ἑτῶν ἑκάστου, κ.τ.λ. Plato almost always thus interweaves quotation with his own language, and accommodates the poet’s measures to the rhythm of prose; e.g. Rep. 2. 365 B: Πότερον διέχει τείχος ψυχοῦ ἥ σκολιαν ἀπάται ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ σκοτεινὰ διαβάζει; 1b. 364 D: Τὴν δ’ ἀρχήν ἓρωτα θεόν προπάροιβῃ ἐθνικαὶ καὶ τῶν ὀδον μακράν τε καὶ ἀνάτος. Protag. 340 D: Ὁταν δὲ τις οὕτως εἰς ἄκρον ἤκουσεν, μήδεν δ’ ἤπειτα πέλειον, καλεῦπον περὶ οὐσιῶν, ἐκήρυχ. τὰ τε γὰς] Boll. τὰτ (but with an erasure over τ). Is it possible that Plato wrote τὰς τε, as in the quotation of Clement? This seems probable, when it is considered that τὰ ἐπίστεια, κ.τ.λ. is an afterthought, to which the transition as the words stand in the text is
traversing
the earth
and hea-
ven, com-
passing the
whole of
everything.
He is
laughed at
by ordinary
people, as
Thales was
by the
Thracian
maid-ser-
vant. For
knowing
nothing of

somewhat abrupt; and also that
the term γεωμετροῦσα is more
naturally applicable to the sur-
facing surface than to the lower parts of
the Earth.

2. τῶν δισταυ ἐκάστου ὅλου]
’Ο γὰρ συζυγεύοντος διαλεκτικός, ὁ
de μῆ, σὲ. (Rep. 7. 537 C.)
See the humorous illustration
of this in the Republic, 5. 474
C. ’Οτι διὰ τῶν φῶν κυρίων τι,
δεί φαινότα τούτου, ἐν ἄρθρῳ λεγή-
tαι, αὐτό τὸ μὲν φιλοῦτα ἐκεῖνον, το
δὲ μῆ, ἀλλὰ τῶν στέργοντα, κ.κ.λ.
And ib. 6. 486 A: ’Εκατοντάτων
συμμετοχὰς βυζίη μελλονῆς τοῦ
ὅλου καὶ παντὸς ἐν ἐπιρήσεισθαι
θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρώπου, . . . ἢ οὖν
ὑπάρχησι διαφορὰ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ
θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, ἐπιστῆ
δὲ νόσιος; οἶδα τε οὖσιν μέγα
τι δικαίως ἐντοῖ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅλων;
Ibid. 500 B.

3. διόν] ‘In its universal
aspect.’
’εἰς τῶν ἑγγῶν] ‘Not lowering
herself to contemplate any
of the things surrounding her.’

4. Theodorus does not at
once understand the contrast
between ‘things universal and
things near.’

6. Θράττα τι] ‘Θράτταν a pa-
tria ancillam hanc dicit. ἐμμελὴς
autem h. l. ad leporem et ve-
nustatem in jocando trahendam
docuit Rubenken. ad Longin.
p. 261. Fabellam hinc forte
duxit Laërt. i. 34.’ Heind.

Does not ἐμμελὴς rather refer
to the slave’s neatness in her
own department? Cp. τοῦς καὶ
dεῖξις 175 E. ‘A trim and
dainty Thracian handmaid.’
The opposite is implied in
ἀχρηστότης . . . ἀθλητικός, infr. C.
The same jest occurs in Chaucer,
The Millere’s Tale, 3458–60:
‘He walked in the fields for
to prie
Upon the starres, what ther
should befalle,
Til he was in a marlepit
ynalle.’

10. ταύτιν δὲ ἄριστα σκώμμα] ‘The same piece of raiillery does
not fail to apply,’—‘will serve.’
For the metaphorical use of
ἀρείαν ὑπ’ ἐπι Soph. Ant. 613:
Τὸ τ’ ἔτοιμα καὶ τὸ μελίνα καὶ τὸ
πρὸν ἐπάρροιτο νόμοι ὀδέ.
For the application of the
σκώμμα in the mouth of an
enemy see the speech of Cal-
licles in the Gorgias, 484 sqq.,
which presents many points of
similarity to the present pas-
sage.
Τῇ τοιαύτῃ] Σο. ἄνθρωπῃ.
10. ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον] These words refer only to δημοσία, and recall 172 C.
14. ἐλ φρεάτα] 'Into pitfalls and all manner of perplexity.'
Cp. supr. 165 B: Τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενον. But the words immediately refer to supr. A: Πεσόντα ἐσ φρέαρ.
15. ἡ ἀγχυμοσύνη] 'And the awkwardness of the position is terrible, making him seem no better than a fool.'
17. Ἰδὼν] I. e. he cannot use personality in invective.
21. τύραννος... ἐγκομιαζόμενον] Governed (1) by ἀκούων, implied in ἀκούειν below: or (2) more truly, an accusativus pendant. τε is answered by δέ in γῆς δέ, κ.τ.λ. infr.
22. ἐνά τῶν νομέων] Comp. the Politicus, 266 D, where this is regarded as the most universal conception of the
kingly office; contemplating

romantic as a whole, the philo-

sopher thinks of basilisk only

as a part of it: 'Oti t' touide

meidham taw logon oute symeroteiou

malkon emeltheni h mi, taw te sim-

kratoren oidein htmakr pro taw

meizous, aei de kai autin perainei

taithdston. Soph. 227 A:

Taw logon meidham apogmatikis

h parmakoptiasias oidein xittwn oide

ti malkon tughaine melos, el taw

meikra to de megala dphieli qmias

katafros, tou qmor korphos aneka

noi patwv tughwv to evngeneis

kai to phi evngeneis kataroioi pei-

rowmien tawv pro t sofas i e taw

pasias, kai thesaro tov etwv kata

taw qmorfta oidein yginei qeloi-

ostera, symeroteion de taw dia

strategikis h fheirostatikis qe-

noiata thermiki oidei neomiknes,

all ois taw polw xeuroteso.

The latter passage has also a

slight tinge of the irony of the

text. The figure may have

originated in some saying of


1. 2. § 32: 'Oti symerasten oi

dokoi evna, eis tis qemikous bouw

agwneis nomikos kai taw bouwv elat-

tous te kai cheirous poiais mi hmelno-

logi kados boulwvseis evna. Pl.

§ 37: 'O de Kritias 'Alal tawde

to se apkevthei dekseis, taw sapon-

tewv kai tawv xektonwv kai tawv

xalkwv. ... Nai ma Di', efhi o

Kychlidh, kai tawv voukolwv ne' el

di mi, phlaitou, apo mi kai sun

elaitous taw vou poisfis.


4. nomikwn te kai voukolwv

'Only he thinks that the crea-

ture whom they tend, and out of

whom they squeeze their wealth,

is of a less tractable and more

insidious nature.' There is here

an anticipation of the bitter

satire or actual human nature

which appears in the Politicus.

 agoraqwh de... artholias] 'Rough

and uncivilized from stress of

work.'

6. qemwn evn brres, k.t.l.] And

so cut off from the great world,

over which the philosopher

freely ranges, supr. 173 E.

10. qenai qemwvow] 'And

when they cant of pedigree . . . '
variations of the protasis.

4. οίς πάσιν καὶ προγόνοις]

Compare the comic fragment ascribed to Menander: Men. Fragm. Inc. 4 (Meineke):

'Αραλεὶ μὲ τὸ γείσον μὴ λέγει, εἰ φαλέις ἔρι,
Μήτερ, μήτερ τὸ γείσον αἰὲ ἄν τῇ φωνῇ
'Αγαθὰν ἐπάρχῃ μηδὲν οἷον θρόσων,
Εἰς τὰ καταφαίνουσαν εἰς τὰ μυθήματα,
Καὶ τὰ γείσαν, ἀμβλῳδέας τοὺς πάσιν ὅσα
Οὐδὲ ἀν δὲ ἐχεῖς ἑαυτόν ἀν, οὐδὲ εἴπεις, ὅπρος
Οὐί εἰσιν πάσιν' πῶς γὰρ εἴχεις· ἄν ποτε; κ.τ.λ.

4. οἱς πάσιν καὶ προγόνοις]

This expression recurs frequently in later Greek authors.

6. Βαρδαροὶ τε καὶ Ἐλληνες]

These words belong to all the preceding nouns.

7. οἱς πάσιν καὶ προγόνοις]
The order is εἰς καταφάινειν τίτι καὶ εἰςοι προγόνοις.

8. ἀναφερόμενοι]

Sc. τὸ γέισον, of τὴν εὐγένειαν. The genitives depend upon σμαραγδόλαγας, or rather, more vaguely, upon the sense of the words ἄοφαν αἶτι καταφαίνειν τῆς σμαραγδόλαγας, as δυναμεῖν upon γελεί below, κατα-

9. ἀπὸ τῆς σμαραγδόλαγας]
The genitive is not quite analogous to ἀμφίθεον εἰςαμοσίας, Apol. 41 C, which is rather quantitative:

nor is it exactly equivalent to ἄοφαν ἢ σμαραγδόλαγας (like ἄγαμον...

The whole sense lies somewhere between σμαραγδόλαγας καὶ ἀναφερόμενοι...

The whole sense lies somewhere between σμαραγδόλαγας καὶ ἀναφερόμενοι...

The whole sense lies somewhere between σμαραγδόλαγας καὶ ἀναφερόμενοι...

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The whole sense lies somewhere between σμαραγδόλαγας καὶ ἀναφερόμενοι...
ΤΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 123

p. 175. καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὡς δὲ ὁ ἀμφι-
βρώμων εἰς τὸ ἄνω πεντεκαιεκοστὸς τοιούτος ἤν, οὐα
συνεβαίνειν αὐτῷ τύχη, καὶ ὁ πεντεκαιεκοστὸς ἄπτ' ἀυτοῦ,
γελα συνεβαίνον λογίζεσθαι τε καὶ χαυνοτήτα
ἀνοίγειν ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἄπασι δὴ τούτοις ὁ 5
τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελάται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερ-
ηψάνοις ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἐν ποσῖν ἁγνοῦν τε καὶ
ἐν ἐκάστοις ἄπορον.

ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι τὰ γεγονόμενα λέγεις, ὡς Σώ-
κρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐφ' ὅταν δὲ γέ τις ἄνω, ὡς φίλα, ἐλκυσθῇ ἄνω,
καὶ ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ. Τί ἐγὼ σὲ
ἀδικοὶ ἢ σὲ ἐμέ; εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ
ἀδίκιας, τί τε ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἢ
ἀλλήλων διαφέρετον; ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Ἐλ βασιλεύς εὐδαίμων 15

2. οὐα συνεβαίνειν] The Bodl. reads οὐα συνεβαίνειν αὐτῷ τύχη. Perhaps rightly. The meaning in both cases is the same. 'He was,—what Fortune made him.'

3. ἄπτ' αὐτοῦ] Sc. (1) τοῦ πεν-
τεκαιεκοστοῦ: or (2) τοῦ ἀμφι-
βρώμων. But the latter (2) has less point.

11. Ἐφ' ὅταν δὲ γέ, κ. τ. λ.] Compare Rep. 7. 515 E, 516: Ἐλ δ', ἢ δ' ἐγὼ, ἐγείρεσεν ἐλκε τις αὐτῶν βία διὰ
τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνά-
τους, καὶ μὴ ἀνείπω πρὸς ἐξελκόσεις
πρὸς τὸ τῆς ἠλίου φῶς, ἄρα οὐχὶ
οὐκ ἀδικοσθαι στε ἀν καὶ ἀγανακτειν
ἐλκόμενοι, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς
ἐλθοῦν, αὐγὴς ἢ θερστά τὰ δηματα
μεστὰ ὁμα τοῦ ἃ ποιήθη ἢ ἐν ἑφεσι
τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄληθεών.

των... τις] The indefinities are used with an indirect refer-
ence to τοῦ σμικροῦ ἐκείνου καὶ
δριμον καὶ δυσκαλωθέντων below (D).

12. καὶ...αὐτῷ] 'And he finds
some one willing.' Supr. 154.
E, Rep. 1. 343 A, etc.

15. Ἐλ βασιλεύς εὐδαίμων] See the passage of the Gorgias (471), in which Polus contends that Archelaus is happy.

(Διογ. Ι. mentions a diatribe of Antisthenes, called Ἀρχέλαος, ἢ περὶ βασιλείας, in which Gorgias was assailed.)

Buttmann thus defends εἱ, which a few MSS. omit: 'Quamvis certum exploratum-
que haberent vulgares illi orato-
tes, regem propter diversitias
suas unice beatum putandum
esse, tamen rem ita in enemiiis
tractabant, ut, quasi dubia ea
videri possent, multis eam exem-
plis argumentisque probarent.
Quidni igitur v. e. enemii
alicujus in Creœsum argumenta-
tum his verbis indicari potu-
erit; εἱ Κροίσος εὐδαιμόνιοι.' If εἱ is retained, a certain point
may be given to αὖ (with Cou-
what justice is, from distributive on the theme: 'Is a king happy?' to contemplate the ideas of the royal office and of human happiness. Then that shrewd legal mind is

κεκτημένος τ' αδ' πολύ χρυσόν, βασιλείας πέρι καὶ π. 175 ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαίμονίας καὶ ἀθλήτης ἐπὶ σκέψιν, ποιώ τέ τινες ἐστον καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἀπο-5 φυγεὶν,—περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ὅταν αὖ δὲν λόγον διδόναι τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκείνον τὴν ψυχήν καὶ ὁρμῶν καὶ δικαίων, πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀνώτατον ἀποδίδωσιν. ἰδιγγῶν τε ἀπὸ υψηλοῦ κρεμασθεῖς καὶ βλέπων με-τέωρος ἄνοισθεν ὑπὸ ἄνθειας, ἀδημονών τε καὶ ἀπορών

sin, Wagner, H. Schmidt) by supposing βασιλείαν καὶ κεκτη-μένος to be distinct subjects: 'Is a king, or, again, one possessed of much gold, to be accounted happy?' It may be questioned, however, whether ἡ βασιλεία might not give a better meaning.

In any way of taking the words as they stand, τε seems to impede the sense, and αὖ is superfluous. If Plato is really quoting from a rhetorician, this is possibly not a fatal objection, though the conjectures πῶς πολύ, πάσχοιν, (Heusd. Hirscheg. Badh.) would seem probable. (Schanz reads from Madvig's conj. βασιλείας εὐδαιμων κεκτημένος ταῖς χρυσίοις.) Possibly, however, the words βασιλείας...χρυσίοι are adapted from some poet. (Cp. Theogn.: ἔ-δαιμων εἰσ, καὶ δεῖς φεῖλον ἄθρω-τας, Κύρ,' ἀρτηγή δ' ἄληθες οὐδεμίας ἄραμα.) In which case γὰρ πολύ-χρυσον is perhaps the true reading. For κεκτημένος in such an adaptation, cp. (besides Pro- tag. 340 D quoted above), the quotation of Tyrtaeus in the Laws, 629 A: ὅτε' ἐν μην-σαίμην ὅτι' ἐν λαγῷ ἄνδρῃ τίθει-μην, ὅτι' ἐλπίζωστατος ἄνδρώ-πων εὖ, φησίν, ὅτι' ἐπιλλά
dagathâ κεκτημένος, εἰτῶν σχεδὼν ἄπαντα, κ.τ.λ. (E.g. the lines might run Εἰ βασιλείαν εἰπ, ἵθε-ομι ὅ τ' ἔστω πολύχρυσον.) There is a close parallel between the present passage and 174 B: Τοιγάροι, κ.τ.λ. Cp. τ' ἔγω σ' ἀδικῶ with ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ...ἀναγκασθη λέγευν: ἡ σῦ ἐμὲ with ἐν ταῖς λοιποίαι: εἰ (or ἂ) βασιλεύς ... with το-μαρσάντ τε γὰρ . . .


3. ἀνθρώπων φύσει] Cr. suppl. 174 B: Τῇ τωμαρσά τις φύσει.

8. ἰδιγγῶν τε] 'He gives the philosopher his revenge; (for) dizzied by the strange experience of hanging at such a height and looking downwards from mid-air, and being dismayed and lost, and broken in his utterance, he is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaids, nor by any other of the uneducated, for they do not perceive his plight; but by all whose nurture has been the reverse of servile.'

The sentence probably divides after ἄνθειας, and ἀδημονῶν τε . . . answers to ιδιγγῶν τε. (ἰδιγγῶν τε. γὰρ add. Ven. 2. This is quite unnecessary.)
THEAETHTOS.

P. 175. καὶ βαρβαρίκους, γέλωτα Θράττας μὲν οὐ παρέχει οὖθεν ἄλλῳ ἀπαθείετος οὐδεὶς, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς δ’ ἐναντίοις ἢ ὁς ἀνδραπάδοις τραφέων ἄπασιν. Ὅτοι δὴ ἐκείρου τρόποις, ὁ θεόδωρος, ο μὲν τῶν ὑπὲρ τὸν κληρεῖν τε καὶ σχολὴ τεθραμμένον, ὃν δὴ φιλόσοφον οὐδὲν καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐναι, ὅταν εἰς δυνατὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, ὃν στροματῶδεςμον μὴ ἐπισταμένον συσκευάζεσθαι μηδὲ ὑφον ἱδύναι ηθοπας λόγους οὐδὲ αὐτὰ μὲν τοιαύτα πάντα δυναμένου τοῦ τε καὶ ὄξειος δια-κονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἑπιδεξία

1. βαρβαρίκους Lit. ‘Speaking a strange dialect.’—strange i.e. to the inhabitants of the higher region. Schanz admits into the text Pierson’s conjecture βαρβαρίζων (‘stammering’), founded on a passage in Themistius which seems an echo of this; Themist. 22. 278 b: ὁδοθεῖ γὰρ λεγόμενον εὐθέως καὶ λαμπρομένως καὶ βαρβαρίζομεν. But there is no sufficient reason for rejecting βαρβαρίζων.

6. ὃ ἀνέμειητον] ‘Who may, without our surprise or censure, appear simple and a mere cipher, when some menial service is required of him, if he has no skill, for instance, in tying up bedclothes with the proper knot, nor in flavouring a sauce, or in fawning speech:—the other character is that of the man who is able to do all such service with smartness and dispatch, but has not the skill to throw his cloak over his right shoulder with a gentlemanly grace; no, nor to celebrate aright with the music of discourse, in his turn, that life which is lived in truth by the immortals and by heaven-flavoured men.’ Cobet requires οὐδέν for οὐδεὶς. But the dative, whether masculine or neuter, is analogous to Soph. (Ed. Tyr. 1019): ἔξι οὖν τῷ μηδεί, and agrees better with οὐδέν.


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ἐλευθέρος οὐδὲ γ' ἀρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος ὅρθως π. 176.
ὑμὴν σα θείων τε καὶ ἄνδρων εὐδαιμονίων βίων ἀληθῆ.

ΤΕΟ. Εἰ πάντας, ὡς Σώκρατες, πείθοις ὁ λέγεις
ἀντιπερ ἐμὲ, πλεῖον ἂν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω καὶ
5 ἄνθρωποι εἴη.

ΣΩ. Ἅλλ' οὖν ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὡς
Θεόδωρος ὑπεναντίον γὰρ τι τῷ ἀγάθῳ αἰών ἐν
ἀνάγκη. οὖν ἐν θείως αὐτὰ ἐδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ θυμητὴν
φύσιν καὶ τόυτο τῶν τόπων περιπολεῖ εὖ ἀνάγκης.

said to sing ἐνι δεμέ, and the
antithesis requires the other
rendering. The slave can tuck
in and pack up bedclothes, the
freeman wears his garment with
a grace. Theslaves' contribution
to the banquet is literally ὄψαν
ἦδων, figuratively ὃς λόγων
465 D: Ἱδ' ὡς πορμαὶτ. ἀντι
τρόπον ὄψαις ἐν ψυχῇ ὡς ἐλείν
ἐν σώματι.) The 'freeman's'
part is literally the lyric and
song; in a higher sense, dis-
course of philosophy and
virtue. This is his proper
δρας. Sp. Symp. 177 D, where
the minstrel is dismissed, and
Eryximachus proposes that
they should discourse of the
praises of love: ἄκοι γάρ μοι
χρήση ἐκατὼν ἡμῶν λόγων εἰπέ
ἔπαιν᾽ ἑρωτοῦ ἐπὶ δεξα ὡς ἐν
δύναται καλλιστον. Prot. 347
E. There is a further 'har-
mony' between the discourse
and life of the philosopher;
Lach. 188 D: Καὶ κοιμήθη μοι
δοκεί μουσικὸς ὁ τουιτός εἰναι,
ἀρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡμοσμαινὸν ὑπὸ
λύρας οὐδὲ παιδας ὁργοῦν, ἀλλὰ
τῷ δεῦτε ἡ ἡμοσμαινὸν αὐτὸς αὐ-
τοῦ τῶν βίων ξύμφωνον τοὺς λόγους
πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀνεκοῦσον διαφωτι
ἀλλ' ὅπερ λαμεῖ, οἷοι δὲ οὐδὲ
φρυγιτὶ οὐδὲ λυατεῖ, ἀλλ' ὅπερ
μόν' Ἐλληνεὶς ἐστὶν ἀρμονία.

There is an allusion to the
well-known custom of taking
the lyre in turn. ὃς λόγως
is perhaps rightly supposed by
Rubn. ad Tim. p. 146 to be a
poetical expression, quoted
perhaps from Euripides or
Epicharmus.

2. θείων τε καὶ ἄνδρων εὐδαι-
μονίων βίων ἀληθῆ] There is a
rhythmic cadence in the
words, cp. Phedr. 261 A:
Πάρτε δή, θρήματα γενναία,
καλλισταὶ τε θαύρον πείθατε.
Rep. 617 D: 'Ἀνάγκης θυγατρὸς
κόρης Δαχτύως λόγος, κ. τ. λ.
Symp. 197 E, the end of Aga-
thon's speech. This is not
improved by deleting ἀληθῆ
with Cobet, and so leaving an
iambic ending — — — — — — — — .

7. ὑπεναντίον γὰρ] Compare
the saying of Herschius, Fr. 56:
Παλίντον ἀρμονικόν ὁμοιός ἄκοι
πλύσας καὶ τόξου. The preposi-
tion convenies the idea of 'bear-
ing up against.'

9. τόντω τῶν τόπων] Viz., τῶν
σωματοιδών τε καὶ όρατων τόπων,
Rep. 7. 532 D. The imagery of
place in which Plato's philo-
sophy is enfolded appears most
prominently in the Phaedo, the
Phaedrus, and Rep. 6 and 7.
The notion that evil must
exist in everything but the Divine Nature reappears in a curious mythical form in the Politicus, 270; and is implied Tim. 48 A: 'Εξ ἄναγκης καὶ
νοῦ συντόσσως. 86 B: Τὰ δὲ περί
ψυχήν (sc. νοστὶόμα) διὰ σώματος
ἐξίν, κ.τ.λ. 116. 69 D: Ἐλπισμαρα
σαμοί ν' αὕτη ἀναγκαίως τὸ θεν
τών γένος ἐξέπεσαν. In the
Phaedo evil is almost identified
with the bodily principle. Our ignorance on the subject is,
however, confessed in the Lysis, 220 E, 221: Πάτερεν,
ἐν τῷ ἑγίστρῃ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ἀνάληγα,
αὐτῷ πεπείλην ἐποίησαν αὐτῷ διὰ
ἐλλάσσαι τοῖς τοιούτοις; . . . τῇ γε
σελείρῃ τὸ ἐρέστησα, δὲ τὸ
ἐπεὶ ἐποίησαν τῇ μηδενὶ τοῖς
τοιούτοις; τὰ γὰρ
ὁδεῖν;
2. φυγὴ δὲ ἁμόρισας θεόν]
Phaedr. 252 E, 253: Ἰερονύμοις
de παρ' ἐναυῶν ἀναρίσκεσθαι τὴν τοῦ
σφέτερον θεοῦ φύσιν, ἐπιστρέψαν
diὰ τὸ συντόσσων ἡγακάσθαι πρὸς
tὸν θεόν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαρμόσων
αὐτῷ τῇ μήκῃ, ἀνανύσωσθεν, ἐξ
ἐκείνου λαμβάνασθαι τὰ ἔθι καὶ τὰ
eπιτηδεύματα, καθţ ὡς
ἑναυῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπων μετανεῖς.
Rep. 10. 613 A: ὅτε γὰρ ἄθεν ἦν
αὐτῷ θεόν ποιήσει, δὴ ἂν
προσδεμεθῇαν ἐθῆλη δικαίοι γέγεν,
sαμαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἀρετήν εἰς
ὡς θεοῦ δυνάμεις ἀνθρώπων ἁμόρισας
θεόν. 116. 500 B: ὡς γὰρ
ποιήται, ἀνθρώπων, ἐφολοὶ τῷ γε
ὁ ἄληθες πρὸς τοὺς ὑδαığıν τὴν
διάνοιαν ἔχουσι κατὰ βλέπειν εἰς
ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας καὶ μαχη-
μένους αὐτοὶς φθόνον τε καὶ δυνα-
μενεῖας ἐμπύκλησθαι, ἀλλὰ εἰς
tεταγμένα ἄντα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα
ἀκὲ ἔχουσι ἀρίστας καὶ ὑθεμένοις
οὐ οὐκ ἄκεροττα ῥὸς ἀνθρώπων
ἐποίησας εἰς μακρογενή
cτὸ ἡμῶν, καὶ τὰ ὑδά
αναγκαίαν θεῖον ὑποκοιμήσει ἔτι
ἐλατούσαν.
this: for there must be some evil to resist the good, and this cannot dwell in heaven, but must wander about this lower world. Our wisdom therefore is to escape heavenwards, by becoming

the more dialectical dialogues one side of the contradiction disappears, and it is assumed that philosophy is essential to real virtue. Phaed. 69 A B: 'Ο μακάρε Σωκράτης, μὴ γὰρ οὖν αὐτὴ ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλ- λαγὴ, ἠδοξᾶ· πρὸς ἧδονας καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβους πρὸς φόβους καταλάττεσθαι ... ἀλλ' ἣ ἐκείνο τὸ κόσμον ὅρον, ... φρόνησις, ... καὶ ξυλοπό- δην ἀληθῆς ἀρετὴν ἢ μετὰ φρονή- στειαν, ... χωρίζομεν δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἄλλατομεν ἀντὶ ἄλλων, μὴ συγκεκριμένοι τις ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή, κ.τ.λ. In the Republic it is again acknowledged that it is possible to partake of virtue without philosophy, but in an imperfect way; e.g. in the case of the soul which laments its choice of another life; 10. 619 C: Εἰσα ἐὰν αὐτῶν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ υδραυλικοῦ ἱδρύων, ἐν τεταγμέ- 

4. ἵνα ... δοκῇ εἶναι ... ἀγο- 

ονόις γὰρ ἤτιον ἄδικαι] The whole of this passage is paral-

lel to the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus in the second book of the Republic, and the same thought is differently worked out in the Gorgias.

5. ὁ λέγομενος γραῶν οἶδος] 'This is what men commonly repeat, an old wives' fable, as appears to me.' The meaning of λέγομενος here (not= 'as the saying is') seems determined by λέγομεν following.

9. περὶ τούτον] 'Moreover a man's real ability, or else his nothingness and want of man-

hood, is concerned with this.' περὶ τοῦτο is read in the quo-

tations of Iamblichus and Theodoret. It is approved by Cobet, and has been adopted by Schanz. The genitive is accounted for by the indeter-
minuteness of the point in question. 'On this, one way or other, depends,' etc. ἀνωθεία is suggested by ἄνδρος.

5. ὁρθοτρόπωσις baro vassou] 'Vulgar'—'mechanical,' or 'mean.' The contrast here is not between truth and falsehood, but, as in the Politics, between the actual and the ideal.

6. τὸ οὖν ἀδικοῦσιν, κ. τ. λ.] This very favourite thought is developed in the Gorgias. See esp. 524-7.

7. τὸ μὴ... ἡμῶν εἰναι] 'Not to admit that villany constitutes him a clever man.'

9. οὐ λέον] 'That they are not mere absurdities, cumbering the ground:'—'not solecisms,' as Carlyle might say.


λέον] Charm. 176 A: 'Εγὼ μὲν λέον ἡμίσεως εἰναι καὶ ἀδικοῦσιν λόγω ὑπέκου ἦσαν, Phaed. 72 C: Τελευτώντα πάντα ἐν λέον τῶν ἐνδυμάσιν ἀποδεζέεσκαι καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἄν φαόντοι.

10. οἰον... σωθεσσομένους] 'Such as all must be in the city who are to live securely there.' 'Such as those must be in the state whose lives are not to be forfeit,' i.e. endangered by every accusation (Wohlraub). Cp. Soph. Ant. 189: 'Ἡ ἔστιν ἡ σώζωσιν. 14. διὸ εἰσορθεὶς πάσχοι καὶ ἀδικοῦτες] 'Which men often escape entirely in doing wrong,' 'for we all escape alike.' Heindorf.

This is a man's true 'cleverness' and proof of virtue. And the real penalty of vice is one which cannot be escaped by clever shifts. For to act wrongly is to be removed from the Divine pattern, and to be brought

to bring...
ΘΕΟ. Τίνα δὴ λέγεις;  
ΣΩ. Παραδειγμάτων, ὁ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὠντι ἐστάτων, 
tοῦ μὲν θεοῦ εὐθαμοστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀδέου ἀδια-
τάτου, οὐχ ὀρθῶντες ὅτι οὗτος ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἥλιθοτῆτος 
τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνοντι τῷ μὲν ὁμο-
ομοῦμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιομοῦμενοι. 
οὐ δὴ τίνοις δικήν ἥξωντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ὃ ὁμο-
οῦνται. ἐὰν δὲ ἐπισώμεν ὃτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγωσί 
tῆς δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν 
τῶν κακῶν καθάρος τόπος οὐ δέσεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν 
αὐτοῖς ἀμοιράττει τῆς διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ ἔξωσε, κακοὶ κα-
κοῖς συνώντες, ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὃς δεινοὶ καὶ 
πανοῦργοι ἀνόητον τινῶν ἀκούονται.

2. Παραδειγμάτων] Cr. Rep. 9. 592 B: 'Αλλ', ὃν τ' ἐγὼ, ἐν 
οἴμαι ἓν παραδείγματι ἀνάκειται 
tῷ βουλομένῳ ὅρῳ καὶ ὀρθῶ 
ἐαυτὸν κατοικίζειν.
3. ἀδίκου] 'From which all 
that is Divine has fled.' 
8. τῆς δεινότητος] 'From this 
cleverness which is their boast.' 
10. τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς] Viz. 
πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ αγ-
ρίων ἔρωτας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν 
tῶν ἀνθρώπων, Phed. 81 A.
καθαροῦ Ἡθοδ. 83 D: Ἐκ γὰρ 
tοῦ ἀμοδοχέων τῷ σώματι καὶ τούτου 
αὐτοῖς χαρίεραι ἀναγκάζεται, οὐ 
μόρος καὶ ἄμορφος γίγνεσθαι μέν 
καὶ οὐ μηδέποτε καθαρὸς εἰς Ἁλυ 
ἀμφείσια ἅλλ' ἃτο τοῦ σώματος 
ἀναπλάζεται εὐθανά, ὡστε τὰ 
πάντων πίστες ὡς ἄλλα σόμα καὶ ὡστε 
ἀντικροταί ἐμφάνιζον, καὶ ἐκ τού 
tῶν ἀμοιρῶν ἐπεκτείνεται τῆς τοῦ 
δεινοῦ καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ κοινοῖ 
καινοοῦσα ἡνία.

Ibid. 69 C: Καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, 
κ.τ.λ. καὶ αὕτη ὁ ἱερότονος κα 
θαρμός της ἡ και 
κοίνοις καὶ 
διὰ ταῦτα τέλεσθαι . . . καταστηθήσατε . . . 
πᾶλιν αἰνηθήσατε δη δε ἀμόγος 
καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἁλυ 
ἀμφείσια ἅλλ' ἃτ 
τοῦ σώματο 
ἀναπλά 
ζεται εὐθα 
ἀμφ 

11. κακοὶ κακοῖς συνώντες] κα 
коίς is probably neuter. See H. Schmidt, Exegetischer Com-
mentar, p. 139.
12. καὶ παντάπασιν ὃς δεινοὶ]
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 177. ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ, ὥς Σῶκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ὅδε τοι, ὥς ἑταρὲ, ἐν μέντοι τι αὐτὸς συμβεβῆκεν, ὅτι ἂν ἴδια λόγου δὴ δοῦναι τε καὶ δεξιοθεὶν περὶ ὅν ψέγουσι καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικῶς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεῖναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάνδρως φεύγειν, τὸτε ἀτόπως, ὃ δαιμόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἄρεσκον αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς περὶ ὅν λέγοντες, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκεῖνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται, ὡστε παῖδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποτοµῶνε — εἰ δὲ μή, πλεῖον ἄλλως ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τῷ ἔξ ἀρχῆς λόγῳ. — ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἐμπροσθεν ἱομὲν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὥς Σῶκρατες, οὐκ ἀνθέστερα ἀκοῦειν. μέγα γὰρ τῇ κυριῶτε ὄντι ἑπακολουθεῖν εἰ μέν τοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανιόμεν.

ΣΩ. Ὅσοιον ἐντάπιθα ποὺ ἧμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ὁτὲ καταγράφει καὶ ὁ πρῶτος πρὸς τὸ μέσον.

L. e. the feeling of superiority will only be confirmed in them. The force of ὧς extends to ἀνέφεντα τινῶν.

2. Ὅδε τὸν ὥς ἑτάρῃ ἤμεν πρὶν ἀνίκητο πιστεύω, ἐν αὐτῶν γνωστός ἦν. Ἡ ὀρθογώνια ἑκεῖνα ἐνταξιωτατε ἐπειδή τοῦτο δοκεῖ παῖδων, σταυροῦσαν ἐπὶ τὸ μέβεδον. ἔμεν. Ἡ ὀρθογώνια ἑκεῖνα ἐνταξιωτατε ἐπειδή τοῦτο δοκεῖ παῖδων, σταυροῦσαν ἐπὶ τὸ μέβεδον. ἦμεν παῖδων, σταυροῦσαν ἐπὶ τὸ μέβεδον. ἦμεν παῖδων, σταυροῦσαν ἐπὶ τὸ μέβεδον.

3. Ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκεῖνα πως ἀπομαραίνεται ὧς ἀποτοµῶνε — εἰ δὲ μή, πλεῖον ἄλλως ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τῷ ἔξ ἀρχῆς λόγῳ. — ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἐμπροσθεν ἱομὲν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

4. Ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκεῖνα πως ἀπομαραίνεται. Ὡς ἄμεσα δὴ, ὥς ἑταρὲ, ἐν μέντοι τι αὐτὸς συμβεβῆκεν, ὅτι ἂν ἴδια λόγου δὴ δοῦναι τε καὶ δεξιοθεὶν περὶ ὅν ψέγουσι καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικῶς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεῖναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάνδρως φεύγειν, τὸτε ἀτόπως, ὃ δαιμόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἄρεσκον αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς περὶ ὅν λέγοντες, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκεῖνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται, ὡστε παῖδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποτοµῶνε — εἰ δὲ μή, πλεῖον ἄλλως ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τῷ ἔξ ἀρχῆς λόγῳ. — ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἐμπροσθεν ἱομὲν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ. ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὥς Σῶκρατες, οὐκ ἀνθέστερα ἀκοῦειν. μέγα γὰρ τῇ κυριώτε ὄντι ἑπακολουθεῖν εἰ μέν τοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανιόμεν. ΣΩ. Ὅσοιον ἐντάπιθα ποὺ ἧμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ὁτὲ καταγράφει καὶ ὁ πρῶτος πρὸς τὸ μέσον.
3. In other cases they would insist strongly on the truth of their principle,—with respect to justice in particular they would insist that the enactments of any state are just for her, so long as they remain in force;—but when good is in question—'

4. perì tâ dikaiâ . . . perì tâgathâ] 'In regard to what is just,—concerning what is good.'


6. eōster ãv kêtai] Supr. 172 B: 'Osoos ãv dêkî xhôsos, perì ãv tâgathâ] Rep. 6. 505 D: 'O dê diakî miû ãpasta psîchê kai toûttû enêka pánta prwttai, ãpomantemòmê tên eînai, âpòdôsâ dê, k.t.l. What is good cannot be apparent merely. (Compare the saying of Des Cartes and Spinoza: 'The idea of God implies His existence.') This was not, however, universally admitted. Ar. Eth. N. r. 3. § 3: Tômaûthen dê tîna plînê ënixi kai tâgathâ, k.t.l.

tâgathoû...ôphîma] Rep. 5. 457 B, 458 E: kallôta ëgô toyôû kai légêi kai lêleixêi, òtî tô miû ôphîmaan kállî, tû òtî blâvboud allojûn . . . jámous . . . pou-

'Porro uti bonum et malum non dicitur nisi separate, sic etiam perfectio, nisi quando perfectionem sumimus pro ipsa rei essentia, quo sensu antea diximus, Deum infinitum perfectionem habere, hoc est infinitam essentiam, seu infinitum esse.'
p. 177. ἐστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν κέρται ὁφέλιμα, πλὴν
εἰ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγω τοῦτο δὲ που ἱκὼμι ἂν εἰη
πρὸς θ λέγομεν. οὐχι;
ΘΕΟ. Πάνω γε.
                      e ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα;
                      d ὁ ὄνομαξόμενον θεωρεῖται.
ΘΕΟ. Μὴ γὰρ.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' ὅ ἂν τοῦτο ὄνομα ἂι, τοῦτο δὴ που
στοχάζεται νομοθετουμένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους,
καθ' ὅσον οἶεται τε καὶ δύναται, ὡς ὀφεληματίαν το
ἐαυτή τίθεται. ἢ πρὸς ἀλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθε-
τείται;

p. 178. ΘΕΟ. Οὐδεμιὸς.
ΣΩ. Ἡ ὅντ' καὶ τυγχάνει άei, ἡ πολλά καὶ δια-
μαρτάνει ἐκάστη.

1. πλὴν εἰ τις . λέγομεν] Rep. 7. 333 D: "Εστι δ', ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ,
οὐ περὶ ὅμορμος ἄμφιοβήταςι, ὡς τοσοῦτον πέρι σκέψις ὅσων
ἡμῖν πρόκειται. Τὸ σκοφεὶ to name the leg-
lature may give the name
φέλιμον to what it will. Cp. 
Charm. 163 D.
3. πρὸς d λέγομεν] In respect of 
that which we mean.
5. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα
'Let him not intend the name 
but the thing which is con-
templated under it,' γάρ re-
fers to Theodorus' πάνω γε.
Badham's conjecture, τὸ πράγμα
δ' ὁμορμοεμ θεωρεῖται, has re-
ceived a curious apparent con-
firmation from the variant 
which appears on the margin 
of two MSS. (Ven. II and Ces.), 
ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὄνομαξομεν 
θεωρεῖται. But it may still be 
doubted whether this is not 
a coincidence of conjectures.

For λέγειν in Plato is rather 
'to mean' than 'to say.' For 
the sense cp. Ar. Met. 1. 
1006: Τὸ δ' ἀποροήμενον οὐ 
τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐλεύθε 
ὅτως, οὐ 
καθ' ὅσον οἶεται τε καὶ δύ-
ναται] 'To the extent of her 
opinion and her power.' 1.
She prescribes what she thinks 
beneficial, so far as she is able 
to enforce it. (She may be 
blind to her true interests, or 
a stronger power may prevent 
her from legislating according 
to her own views.) Cp. Rep. 
1. 338 foll.

A state
makes laws
for the be-
enefit of its 
members,
but they 
are not al-
ways benefi-
cial.
πλατωνος

θεο. οἷμα ἔγογε καὶ διαμαρτάνειν.

σω. "ἐτι τοίνυν ἐνθέντε ἄν μᾶλλον πᾶς τις τοις ἁμο-

λογίσεις ταυτά ταυτά, εἰ περὶ παυτὸς τις τοῦ ἐδώνος

ἐρωτήσῃ, ἐν ὧ καὶ τὸ ὀφέλημα τυγχάνει ὃν. ἔστι δὲ

5 του καὶ περὶ τῶν μέλλοντα χρόνων. ὅταν γὰρ νομο-

θετόμεθα, ὃς ἐσομένως ὀφέλημος τοὺς νόμους τιθέ-

μεθα εἰς τὸν ἐπείτα χρόνον. τοῦτο δὲ μέλλων ὀρθῶς

ἀν λέγομεν.

θεο. πάνυ γε...

σω. "θεὶ δὴ, οὖτως ἐρωτᾶμεν Προταγόραν ἢ

ἄλλον τινά τῶν ἐκείνω τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων, Πάντων

μέτρον ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὡς φατε, ὃ Προταγόρα, λευκών,

βαρέως, κούφων, οὐδὲν ὅστοι οὐ τῶν τινών ὀφέ-

λημών. ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, σία

2. ἐνθέντε] 'From the following point of view.'


τοῖνυν ἐλού ἄυτον ὀρθῶς...πάνω

τοῖς περὶ σπάσματος ἢ φυτοῦ. By

analysing the term 'beneficial' into 'future good.' Socrates is able to extend his proof to sensitive things, and thus di-

rectly to refute Protagoras. For not only 'future good,'

but 'future hot,' 'sweet,' 'tune-

ful,' 'persuasive,' is known by the

ἐπιστήμες, and by him alone.

Plato also brings out the signi-

ficant principle that 'prediction

is the test of science.'

ἔστι δὲ] Cp. τὸ ὀφέλημα.

Whatever is expedient is also referrible to future time. As

elsewhere, the connotation of the term is limited by the

example given, so that τὸ ὀφέ-

λημα here really = τὸ ἐν νομοθέ-

τήν ὀφέλημα, 'Expediency

as a principle of legislation.'

Cp. infr. 179 A. And, for the

use of καί, supr. 152 B: ὅπωςν

καὶ φαίνεται οὔτως ἐκατέφερα;

7. τούτο δὲ] Cp. τὸ ἐσόμενον

εἰς τὸν ἐπείτα χρόνον.

μάλλον] The MSS. vary be-

tween μάλλον (Bodl. Vat. Ven.

π.), μᾶλλον μᾶλλον (Coisl.), and

μᾶλλον μᾶλλον (T.pr. cett.). But

μᾶλλον is given by the cor-

rector of Τ.

13. λευκών, βαρεῶς, κούφων, οὐ-

δεν ὅστοι οὐ] Cp. supr. 171 E:

Τά μὲν πολλά ἢ δ Odyssey ταύτῃ καὶ

ἐστιν ἐκατόρθωσι, θερμά, ἠφά, γλυκέω,

πάντα ὅσα τού τῆς τούτου τούτου.

And, for the omission of ἐκατόρθωσι

supr. 159 C, καθείρου, and

note.

14. τὸ κριτήριον] The word

is formed from κρῖσις, on the


Legg. 6. 767 B: δόσο δὴ τῶν

λοιπῶν ἐστο κριτήρια. The pre-

sent is probably one of the

earliest instances of its use.

οῖα πάσχει τοιαύτα σίδημον]
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 135

p. 178. πάσχει τουίτα οίμενος, ἀλήθη τε οἴεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὂντα. οὐχ οὖτος;

ΘΕΟ. Οὖτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, φύσιομὲν, ὡς Πρωταγόρα, ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ὃ ἂν ὅσον οἴηθη ἔσεσθαι, τάντα καὶ γίγνεται ἐκεῖνο τῷ οὐθέντι; οἰον θερμά, ἄρα ὅταν τὸς οἰκήθῃ ἱδιότης αὐτῶν ποιέων λήψεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν βερμότητα, καὶ ἐτέρως, ἰατρὸς δε, ἀντοιχήθη, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν φῶς οὔτε μέλλων ἀποβηγεῖσθαι: ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἄμφοιτο τέρον, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἰατρῷ οὐ θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρέτων γενήσεται, ἓαυτῷ δὲ ἄμφοτερα;

ΘΕΟ. Γελοιοὶ μὲν τί ἂν εἴη.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’, οἴμαι, περὶ οίνου γλυκύτητος καί αὐ-

Sc. οὖ. Or rather the accusatives are cognate. Cp. supr. 152 C: οἶα γὰρ οἰδάνατα, and note.

2. ὀντα[.] There is a slight stress on the present tense in opposition to μελλόνων ἔσεσθαι.

4. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόνων ἔσεσθαι, φύσιομὲν] As here knowledge seems to emerge with the mention of future time, so in the Protagoras, 357, virtue is shown to be knowledge, because it implies the power of comparing the future with the present. (Cp. the line of Homer, Il. 1. 343: οἴδε τι οἴδε νοήσῃ ἀμα πρόσο καὶ ὁπίσω.)

7. οἰον θερμά[.] The word is placed absolutely, or in a loose construction with φῶς οὖτος infr. Heindorf comp. Crat. 393 E: ὃς τὸ βήτα· ὃς ὅτα τοῦ ή καὶ τοῦ τί καὶ τοῦ αἱ προστεθέσεων οὕν οὐδὲν ἐλάπησαν, κ.τ.λ.

ἀρα . . . κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν] ‘Surely we must suppose (must we not?) that the result will be according to the opinion of one of them, or shall we say that it will be in accordance with both?’ It is implied in what follows, which opinion is probably right. For the indefinite ποτέρου see above, 145 B, εἶ ποτέρου, and esp. Lach. 181 D.

αὐτῶ[.] The accusative (not αὐτός) is used because the man is supposed to consider his own case objectively.

12. ἐαυτῷθεἄμφοτερα[.] Viz. καὶ θερμὸς καὶ πυρέτων. The same word is repeated in a different relation. Cp. supr. 147 E, δινόμενον, and note.

Cp. Aristotle, Met. 1. 5. 1010 b: ἦτα δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ὡσπερ καὶ Πλάτων λέγει, οὐ δήσαν ομοίως κυρία ἡ τοῦ ἰατροῦ δόξα καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἄγγειοντος, οὖν περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι ἄγιως ή μὴ μέλλοντος.
στηρότητος μελλοντικοῦ έσεωσθαί ή τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα, p. 178

Τι μήν;

ΣΩ. Οὔδ' ἂν αὖ περὶ ἀναρμόστου τε καὶ εὐαρ-κρίνει ωσμομένου παιδοτρίβης ἀν βελτίων δοξᾶσθε

μονικοῦ, ο καὶ ἐπειτα αὐτῷ τῷ παιδοτρίβῃ δόξη
eυάρμοστον εἶναι.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἑστιάσεσθαι μὴ

μὴ μαγειρικοῦ ὡντος, σκευαζομένης θοίης, ἁκροτέρα ἡ

κράτις τῆς τοῦ ὡφοποιοῦ περὶ τῆς ἑσομένης ὑδωρίης.

περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ὧδε ὡντος ἐκάστῳ ὡδέος ἡ γεγονός

κρίνει πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχόμεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ

μέλλοντος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δόξει καὶ ἑστεθαί πάτερον

αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀριστοὶ κριτῆς, ἢ σὺ, ὁ Προταγόρα, τό

γε περὶ λόγου πιθανον ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσομένῳ εἰς

δικαστήριον βελτίων ἀν προδοξάσσωμεν ἡ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν

ὄστισον;

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα, ὁ Σάκρατε, τούτῳ γε σφόδρα

ὑποσχεῖτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτὸς.

ΣΩ. Νῦ Δία, ὁ μέλε. ἡ οὐδείς γ' ἂν αὐτῷ διε-
dress, nowhere else used by Plato, marks Socrates’ exquisite enjoyment of the humour of the situation.

1. ει *οίη The MSS. have all ει μη, Heindorf corrects this to ει πη, and gives the following note: — Prefecto in futurarum quoque rerum cognitione omnibus precellere se Protagoras profitebatur, aut nemo ipsi magnum doctrinæ mercedem solvisset, si quo modo persuasisset discipulis, etiam de futuris rebus neque vatem neque alium quemquam melius posse judicare, quam ipsum sibi unumquecumque. V. ad Gorg. § 75. 47. Platonis autem sententiam restituimus unius litterulae mutatione. Quippe vulgo scriptum ει μη τως ανω, unde contrarius prorusus et absurdus sensus efficit. Quam scripturam nequis tumdam arbitretur verbo αυτος ad Protagoram tradendo et αυτο πutando in αυτο (sc. τω συνώντε), manifesta h. i. est superiorum verborum ποτέρων αυτος αυτο πρωτος κατες repetitio, neque tum ferri posset hoc αυτο: adeo id maleste redundaret. Idem vitium insedit Phileb. 34 C: ‘Ιαι μη την ψυχὴν ἑδονὴν καθώς σώματος δι’ μάλιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάθοιμεν. Corr. ει πη, et Protag. 331 D: Καὶ γαρ ὅπως ὤμως ὀμνηγήσῃ προσέκουσ. τὸ γαρ λεγεῖ τῷ μέλιτι ἕστιν δ’ μη (l. ἐπη) προσέκουσι καὶ τὸ σκέφτοιτο τὸ μαλακήν.’

This reasoning is in the main correct. But δη, which is the received correction of Phil. l. c., seems more forcible here than πη, which has no particular aptness in this passage. ‘If it had really been his wont to persuade them of that which has been now suggested.’ Cp. 166 C: Ει δη δομάτων γε . . . : alib. The corruption probably originated in the slightly obscure reference of αυτος αυτο, or perhaps simply from the neighbourhood of Νη (written ρη). [Schanz also, it would seem independently, suggests ει δη.]

Schleiermacher solved the difficulty by omitting αυτος (which, as H. Schmidt observes, might be suggested to an emender by ποτέρων αυτος αυτο, supr. 178 E), and referring αυτος to Protagoras. But this destroys the force of καὶ, and the question is not between one oracle and another, but between the opinion of the master and of the common individual. For αυτο referring to an indefinite subject cp. Apol. 39 D: Ου γαρ αυτο αυτη ἢ ἀπαλληλαγη ανετα πανω δυνατη ανετη καλη, ἀλλ` ἐκείνη καὶ καλλιτε ρη καὶ μάντη, μη των ἄλλων καλοιπών, ἀλλ` ἀκαδημο παραπρακτος ἀπως ἐστα ώς βλεπανται. For the change from plural to singular, which has been elsewhere illustrated, cp. esp. Rep. 1. 344 B C.

The μάντη is introduced as being ἐπιστήμην of the future generally, just as the physician is of future health or sickness, the musician of future harmony, etc. τως ἄλλω points distantly at Protagoras himself, and his position as the prophet of the school is hinted at. Cp. supr. 162 A: 'Εκ του ἀδότου την βέβαιον ἐφθανότο.
μάντις οὖτε τις ἄλλος ἄμεινον κρίνειν ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς p. 179. αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ νομοθετίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον
5 περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἄστι, καὶ πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῦν νομοθετοῦ-
μένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὠφέλιμωτά-
του ἀποτελεῖν;

ΘΕΟ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῶν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλον σου
10 εἰρήσεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖν σοφότερον τε ἂ
ἄλλου ἄλλον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιούτων μέτρον εἶναι,
ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μὴ ὁπωσδέον ἀνάγκην
εἶναι μέτρον γίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἂρτι μὲ ἡπάγακα
ἐν δὴ ἑκείνῳ λόγῳ, εἶτ' ἐξουλοῦμη ἐπεὶ μὴ, τοιοῦτον εἶναι.

15 ΘΕΟ. Ἐκείνη μοι δοκεῖ, ὅΣ Σώκρατες, μάλιστα
ἀλλικεῖθαί ο λόγος, ἀλησκόμενοι καὶ ταύτῃ, ἥ τὰς
τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὕται δὲ ἐφάνησαν
τοὺς ἑκείνου λόγους οὐδαμή ἀληθεῖς ἕγομενα.

ΣΩ. Παλλαχῆ, ὁ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλη ἂν τὸ γε 
20 τοιοῦτων ἀλοίπη, μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἶναι.

H. Schmidt remarks that the descriptive imperfects are con-
tinued from ὁπωσδέον supra.

4. al. νομοθετίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλι-
μου] 'Legislation and expedi-
ency' (which is the principle of
legislation).

5. πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογεῖ] An ap-
peal to common sense like
supr. 171 D: ὁμολογεῖν ἂν τοῖτό
γε ὀντικοῦν. Thus we return
to the chief statement, which
has been reinforced with the
additional argument beginning
with Ἐν τοῖν, supr. 178 A.

Arist. Met. 11. 1063 a: Τοι-
τοῦ δ' ἂντος τοιοῦτοι, τοὺς ἐτέρους
μὲν ὑπολεγητοίν μέτρον εἶναι, τοὺς
δ' ἐτέρους οὐχ ὑπολειπεῖν.

12. τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι] Supr.
150 C.

13. ἃς ἂρτι] Supr. 167 D.

15. Ἐκείνη ... ταύτῃ] The
position which Theodorus has
previously accepted is nearer
and more familiar to him than
that to which he points as still
in the hands of Socrates. Hence
the use of the demonstratives.

16. καὶ ταύτῃ] 171 foll.

20. μὴ] Cp. supr. 156 C.

τὸ τοιοῦτον is either (1) the
theory, or (2) (as cognate sub-
ject of ἀλοίπη) the refutation
of the theory.
THEAEITHTOS.

perί δὲ τὸ παρόν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, εξ ὅν οἱ οἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίγνονται, χαλεπώτερον ἔλειν ὡς οὐκ ἄλθείς. ἵσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω. αὐτάς ἀνάλωσι γὰρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, εἰς, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμης τάχα ἄν οὐτα λέγοντες, καὶ Ἑθαίτητος ὡς οὐκ ἄπο σκοποῦ ἐφρήκεν ἀσθήσιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταύτων θέμενος. προσεύθηκεν οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, δ ὡς ὁ ὑπὲρ Πρωταγόρον λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτέων

1. perί δὲ τὸ παρόν, κ.τ.λ.] This was the point reserved above, 178 D E: Περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ὀδοντικῶν, κ.τ.λ. For the change from singular to plural cp. Hēr. 2. 373 E: Πολέμου . . . εξ ὃς.

εξ ὃς] 'The momentary effect produced on each man, from which arise the sensations, and the beliefs which are in accordance with them.' Vid. 156 D E; and note the incipient distinction between αἰσθήσεις and δόξα καὶ . . . δόξαι is added because we are now directly engaged with Protagoras, who said τὸ δοκεῖν ἐκάστῳ εἶναι, or rather with those disciples of his who support his theory on the Heraclitean principle. πάθος in this sense appears to have been a technical term of the Cyrenaic school. Cp. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 191: ἄρως οὖν οἱ Κυρηναῖκοι κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ παθή καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνειν καὶ ἀδιάφευγες τυγχάνειν, κ.τ.λ. But we may observe that Plato here, as elsewhere, distinguishes the physical impression from the sensation itself.

5. δότα] As conjectured τὰ δότα, but see above, 178 B: Ἀληθῆ τε ὡς ἄντι αὐτῷ καὶ δότα.


8. ὡς . . . ἐπέτατε] Supr. 166 C, 168 B. In the previous section Ὀσκρατος was dealing directly with Protagoras. He now goes still more closely to work by grappling with the principle on which the theory of Protagoras is grounded by his disciples, especially by those who are also followers of Heraclitus. We have already answered him (supr. A) in his own person, but we have not quite done with him (infr. 183 B) until the Heraclitean ἠθικος has been finally disposed of.

σκεπτέων . . . διακρόνοντα] Soph. 246 B: Τοιοῦτον οἱ πρὸς αὐτῶν ἄφθασαν ταύτας μὲν εὐλαβεῖς καταλαμβάνειν ἀγαπῶν ἐξ ᾗ ἀφαίτητον ποθὲν ἀμέωνον, κατὰ δὲ ἄτα καὶ ἀσέματα ἐκεῖνοι τήν ἀδηλεύουσαν αἰσθάνετε τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνον εἰσόμενα καὶ τὴν λεγομένῃ ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἀλήθεια κατὰ σχέσεις διαβαίνοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἄντι αὐτῶν μεταβολῆς τῶν προσαγωγοῦντον, ἐν μίας δὲ περὶ ταύτα ἄπλητος ἀμφότεροι μάχη τε, ἰθεαίτης, ἀλλ' ἐννοίατης. This combat is somewhat differently de-
Perhaps this is im-
pregnable, but let us
approach, and try
whether its founda-
tion in the doc-
trine of
motion is
secure.

I. 3. Criti-
cism of the
principle. All is mo-
tion.
Final re-
jection of
the doctrine of
motion as
scribed in the present pas-
sage.

1. τὴν φερομένην . . . οὐδὲν]
taútēn refers to the conclusion in 160 C and the preceding
argument from 156 A on-
wards.

διακρούοντα] (διοίωντα Bodl.)
Schol.: 'Εκ μεταφοράς τῶν δια-
kακωμοίνων τὰ κεράμα, εἴ ἀκέ-
ραία εἰσών, Cp. Philob. 55 C :
Γενναίος δέ, εἴ τῇ σαβρόν ἔχει,
pάντα περικρούομεν. Compare the
English expression, 'As sound
as a bell.'

5. ἐπιδίδοσιν πάμπολον] 'Gains
in importance,' 'is weighted
with increasing energy.'

Byz. ap. Athen. 295. ed.
Sch.: 'Εκκλίσον δὲ καὶ χορη-
γούν, ὥς φησιν ὁ Βυζαντίος Δη-
μήτριος, οὐχ ὅσπερ τῶν
μεσθομένων τού τε χοροῦ,
ἀλλὰ τοὺς καθορμοίνως τοῦ χοροῦ,
καθάπερ τοὺςμα σημαινεί.

It would appear from this
that the Heracliteans of Ephe-
sus upheld a doctrine akin to
that of the Cyrenaics.

tούτου τοῦ λόγου] λόγος
is here almost equivalent to
'school of thought.' Cp. supr.
tοῦ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ, κ.τ.λ.,
infr. τῶν ἁπασκομισμένων λόγων.

8. τῷ τοῖς 'We are the
more bound to consider the
question, and that in the light
of its first principle, even as
they present it to us in the
discussion.' Gorg. 448 E:
'Ὡσπερ σοι τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὑποτεί-
νατο Χαρεφῖν. (καὶ ἕξ ἄρχής is
the Bodleian reading, τέ ἄρχης T.
The words η τοιάδε σκένης . .
μάλλον ἕξ ἄρχης εἶ ἂν occur in
Lach. 189 E.

9. ὃσπερ αὐτὸν ὑποτείνοντι]
Viz. in referring everything
to a first principle, whether
of fire or motion.

I. τῶν 'Heracliteων] Sc.dog-
mátων. peri τοίτων, κ.τ.λ. depends
verbally partly on διαλεχθήματι,
partly on ἔμπειροι, but really
upon the notion 'there is no
discussion possible.' Cp. infr.
180 C: Ὅσπερ γὰ ἔρων. If the
genitives were masculine, and
out of construction, the use
of έμπειροι without an object
would be too abrupt. Com-
pare, however, para mēn τοίτων,
below.
p. 179. ‘Ομρείων, καὶ ἐτι παλαιστέρων, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἐφεσον, ὅσοι προσποιοῦνται ἐμπειρού [εἶναι], οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἶνον τε διαλεξῆται η τοῖς ὑστρόφων. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται, τὸ δὲ

ἀπέπερ στὸ λέγειν 152 C. Cratyl. 439 C: Φαίνονται γὰρ ἔμοιγα καὶ αὐτοὶ οὖν διενορθῶθηναι.
1. ὁμερείων] Cratyl. 152 C.
3. αὐτοῖς μὲν] μὲν points to the opposition which comes out distinctly afterwards (180 C) between the men and their doctrine. There is no conversing with the men; we must examine their doctrine on our own account.
4. [εἶναι] Omitted in most MSS. including B T.
5. τοῖς ὑστρόφων] 'With men in frenzy.'
6. ἄτεχνως γὰρ] 'For, in true accordance with their master's writings, they are ever in motion; but as for dwelling upon an argument or question, and quietly asking and answering in turn, they are absolutely without the power of doing so; or rather they possess in a surpassing degree the most perfect absence of all quietness, even in the minutest respect.'

More literally, (1) 'It is beyond everything, how utterly incapable they are of rest even in the most trifling respect.' Cr. Ar. Eth. N. 4. 1. § 39: ὑπερβολῆς . . . τοῦ μυθεύν ἀν ὑπολόγον. Infr. 192 C.

The doubtful point in this rendering of the last words is πρὸς τὸ μυθῆς σμερῶν = 'in respect of what is less than little.' For πρὸς compare Soph. 248 C: ὅταν τὸ παρῆ η τὸν ὑστρῶν ἡ διὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμκράτην δύνημι. And for μυθὲ σμερῶν cp. Phileb. 60 C: Φράσωσι . . . ἡδονῆς μυθὲ τὸ συμκράτην ἔχουσαν. See also Phaedo, 93 B: οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τὸ συμκράτην . . . ἐπὶ πλέον . . . ἡ ἐπὶ ἐλπᾶν . . . αὐτοῦ τοῦτο εἶναι.

Here it is assumed that by a stretch of hyperbole, made possible by the negative sentence, μυθὲ σμερῶν is substituted for σμερῶν. Cr. ἤγετο . . . ἡ τὸ μυθὲν, supr. There is a similar emphasis, though with less complexity, in Symp. 192 C: Οὐκ ἐθέλομεν, ἀν ὅπος εἶτεν, χαρίζεσθαι ἀλλήλων οὐδὲ σμερῶν χρόνων . . . (where οὐδὲ σμερῶν χρόνων might be rendered 'any time at all'). ὑπερβολῆς is here taken as impersonal, and τὸ, κ.τ.λ. as epekegetic. The use of μῦ (not νῦ) is occasioned by the hypothetical turn = ὁδόν εἰ μυθὲ σμερῶν ἐτῆ. The genitive ἐνωκίας is postponed.

(2) Mr. Riddell, in his Digest of Idioms, § 246, observes that 'to τὸ οὖν οὔ δὲν must be supplied ἐνωκίας;' i.e. he would render 'the utter absence of it is extraordinary, in regard to the entire absence of rest in the men even in the least particular.' But this is surely too harsh.

(3) H. Schmidt (Fleckes. Jahrb. 103. 306) suspects the whole sentence (μᾶλλον . . . . ἐνωκίας) as interpolated.
friends of Heraclitus in Ionia, defend the doctrine of motion with all their might.

But we must take their theory into our own hands to test it. For the men are in a flux, and offer us no hold for argument.

\[\Sigma \Omega. \, \text{Iosos, o Theodore, toous andras makhomenous eorakas, eirneousi de ou synegonos. ou gar sou}\]

The point in \(\text{upereballe}i\) is, not that \(\text{oued oidein}\) is a stronger expression than \(\text{mhe-din}\) (it should be compared with \(\text{hetton . . .} \, \text{h to mhe-din}\)), but (a) the negation is put more strongly by being affirmed; (b) \(\text{upereballei}\) assists the climax, as being a stronger word than any in the former clause; and, (c) if the first rendering is correct, what was at first spoken of only with reference to argument, is now asserted generally (pro to mhe-symkron). 

\[\text{Cp. infr. Mhe `en logo mhe `en tais aitwn psycheis.} \]

\[\text{5. wesper ek farostras, k.t.l.}\]

\[\text{Cp. Protag. 342 D (of the Spartans): Tae mio polla ein tois logous eurhsei aitwn philwv twn fainomenvon, epistta, ouw an tychwv ton lemovmenov, enivale rhima brachvi kai suneprhammenov, wesper deyevs akrpisths.} \]

\[\text{6. anastwntes}] \text{Cp. Soph. Aj. 302: Logoua anistpa.}

\[\text{tou] Sc. tou rhmatistikov.} \]

\[\text{7. ti eirhen] Sc. to rhmati-}

\[\text{skion.}

\[\text{kainos `metoneumenva] `Of words new-fangled ill,' `of terms strangely twisted to an unheard-of sense.' Compare the humorous simile in Protag. 329 A: `Wesper ta xalexia, k.t.l.}

\[\text{10. biebavon . . . stasimov] `Fixed or settled—stationary.' eina] genodai is purposely avoided.

\[\text{12. aitov] Sc. to biebavon.} \]

\[\text{16. ou gar sou etaitoi elan} \]

The dislike of a geometrician to the Heraclitean 'method' is not unnatural. And it is unmistakably evident here
that Plato has used a 'tour de force' in bringing together the Heracliteans and the 'disciples of Protagoras.'

1. τὰ τουαίτα] Sc. εἰρήκεια
    (Heindorf) or, rather, τὰ βιβλία
    ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

4. Πολὺς μαθηταῖς] 'Disciples forsooth!' Rep. i. 330 B: Ποι' ἐπεκτείνεται, ἃ Σέκρατες; alib.

5. αὐτόματοι ἀναφθόνται] 'They spring up unbidden, wherever each happens to have caught the afflatus.'

6. ὅπως ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ ἐνθυσάσας] Contrast with this Hegel, G. d. Ph. ed. 1840, p. 55:
    'It is the very spirit of this whole recital, that the more
developed Philosophy of a later age, is really the product of
the previous labours of the thinking mind: that it is
required and determined by these earlier views, and has
not sprung of itself independently from the ground.' ('Nicht
isolirt für sich aus dem Boden gewachsen ist.') For the ex-
pression αὐτόματοι ἀναφθόνται cp.
    Rep. 7. 520 B: Αὐτόματοι γὰρ ἐμφώνῳ ἀκούσεις τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῃ
    πολιτείᾳ. As in supr. 172 foll.
    we had a description of the
man corresponding to Pro-
tagoras' theory, so here we
have the men of Heraclitus.
The wildness and the enthu-
siasm, at once speculative and
irrational, are Oriental rather
than Greek, and are probably
due rather to the soil than
to the germ. Comparatively
little of this is to be found in
Heraclitus himself, although
for their abrupt quaintness
his sayings might be called
ἱματικὰ αἰνηματικὰ.

8. οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ λάβοις λόγον
    Ar. Met. 3. 4. 1006 a: Γελοίον
to ὅτι καί άλλοι λόγον ὑπὲρ τῶν μορφῶν
    ἔχουσα λόγοι, μὴ ἐχὲν ὁμοιος
    γὰρ φυτόν, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἦ τοιοῦτος
    ἤδε. 10. 1063 a: Μιθέων γὰρ
    τιθέντες ἀναφέροι τὸ διαλέγεσθαι
    καὶ διᾶς λόγον, ὅτε τρέφει
    μὲν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὀκ ἐστι
    λόγος.

9. αὐτοῖς δὲ δὲν παραλαβότας]
    'But we must take the doc-
    trine out of their hands, and
    con it over by ourselves like
    a geometrical theorem.' Theo-
dorus speaks as a mathematic-
cian. The object of παραλα-
βότας is vague; neither λόγον
in the sense just used, nor
ἀφήνες; but τὰ Ἑραλδεῖα ταῦτα,
η τοιοῦτον.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μετράως γε λέγεις. τὸ γε δὴ πρόβλημα p. 181 ἀλλ' τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων μετὰ τούτων εἰκονισμομένων τούς πολλούς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Ὀκεανός τε καὶ Θάνατος ἰσχύμα τοῦ τυχόνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἑστήκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν υπότερων, ἀπὸ σοφιστῶν, ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικτοῦσαν, ἵνα καὶ ὁ σκύτοσώμα αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν μάθωσιν ἀκούοντες καὶ παῦσαντα ἡλικίας οἶόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἔστιν, τὰ δὲ κυνησθοί τῶν ἄνων, μαθώτες δὲ ὅτι πάντα κυνήσται τιμῶσιν αὐτοὺς; ὅλην δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὁ Θεό- δωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αἰ τάνατοι τοῦτοι ἀπεφύγαντο, Ὀλον ἀκινήτων ἑτέλεος, τῷ πάντι ἀνοικίαν εἶναι, καὶ ἀλλὰ ὡσα ἡ Μέλισσοι τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἑαυτοῦμενοι πάσιν τού- τοῖς διαχειρίζονται, ὅσ' ἐν τε πάντα ἔστι καὶ ἑστηκεν

1. τὸ γε δὴ πρόβλημα] 'Well, the theorem, as you call it.' Compare with the repetition of γε the double use of γερ, ἀλλ', κ.τ.λ.

2. παρειλήφαμεν . . ἀποδεικνυόμεν] 'The doctrine comes to us from ancient and from modern sources. The ancients indeed veiled their meaning from the multitude and said, etc.; but the moderns openly declare their meaning.' See H. Schmidt, Krit. Comment., p. 509.

4. ρέμα τυχόνει] Sc. ὄντα, which is purposely (or instinctively) omitted. Ἡμε- νές τε καὶ Θάνατος are in opposition with ἡ γένεσις, and ρέματα is predicate. γε, etc. expresses not what the poets said, but what they meant, depending partly on παρειλή- φαμεν.


10. τιμῶσιν αὐτούς] These words merely satirize the φα- λασφορά of the Sophist. H. Schmidt's remark that the multitude are predisposed to extol a doctrine which reflects the arbitrariness of their life, introduces a subtlety which is not present in the text.

11. Ὀλο[ MSS. Ὀλω. But the words of Simplicius in Aristot. Phys. f. 7. α' are decisive: 'Ἀκινήτων αὐτὸ φημεῖν καὶ μόνον ὥς πάντων ἐξηράμενον.'

12. τετέλεος, τῷ πάντι] So all the MSS. Buttm. conjectured τῷ ἐξηράμενῳ τῷ πάντι. This is gathered from the quotations of Simplicius, and is probably right. Cobet, relying on the same source, changes ὀλον to ὀλων.

14. ἑστηκεν αὐτὸ εν αὐτῷ] 'All Being is One, and stand- eth self-contained, not having any space in which it moves.'
The nearest approach to this latter assertion in the fragments of Parmenides is in the lines—

(78–85 Mullach) ὁδὲ διαφθοραῖς ἐτῶν, ὡς τὰν ἕντων ὕμνον. ὁδὲ τε τί μᾶλλον τὸ κενόν ἐνόμισε, τοῦτον ἐν τούτων τέκτων ἔπλεξε. Ἀλλὰ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δικαστῶν ἕστω, ἀρχηγον, ἀπαύνον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ἀληθῆς τῆς μᾶλ τις ἡ σωφρόνησις, ἡσυχίας, ἔτοις τῶν ἐν τούτῳ τε μένων καὶ ἕντων τε κοίται.

He asserts, however, that being is not without boundaries, else it would be imperfect.

Zeno appears to have said, that being was neither with nor without boundaries. Cf. Arist. de Xenoph. Gorg. et Meliss. c. 3: Ἀδικῶν δὲ ὡς καὶ ἐνα καὶ ἀφαίρεσθαι, οὐκ ἀπειρον, οὔτε πεπερασθεν "Ἀπειρον γὰρ τὸ μή εἶναι τὸ δὲ ἐν οὕτω τὸ τῶν πάλλου τοιούτω ὅμως ὅσθω. 'Εν γὰρ οὐκ ἦκι πρὸς δὲ τί περατεί.

'Dass hier Melissus als Vertreter der Eleatiscben Schule genannt wird, hat seine Grund darin, dass der Beweis... έστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔχου χώραν ἐν ἑκατείας nach der von Heindorf angezogenen Stelle Aristot. Phys. 4. 6, dem Melissus angehört.' H. Schmidt.

The Eleatics did not abstract the idea of Being from that of extension, although its fulness destroyed the idea of space. It was here that the Atomists joined issue with them. To Leucippus and Democritus the relations of body were not symbolical but real. They felt that they must account for motion. Hence their assertion of the existence of empty space, τὸ κενόν, or, in other words, τὸ μή ἐν, in the material sense.

3. ἐν τῷ μέσῳ] Viz. by having partly discarded and partly retained the principle, ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρωπος... τὸν Ἰστόμον λόγον ἑπαναλαμβάνει λεγομεν. 5. διερ χώρασι] For the humour cp. Rep. 5. 474 A: Τῷ ἐντὸς τοιαύτως διώκετο διεκ, διά γραμμής παίζοντες] A game, like our French and English, was called διεκστιενά. 7. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι] 'I think therefore we ought first to examine the one faction, to whom we first addressed ourselves, these wavering movers of unrest,' and if we find any truth in them, we will join our efforts with theirs to pull us to them, endeavouring to shake the others off. But if those who stand for the un-
site faction, who say that the One Being which fills all things doth not move. We find ourselves on the dangerous middle ground between these armies. With which side shall we go? Shall we declare for the inviolable constitution of all things, or for the

broken Whole of Being seem to speak more reasonably, we will desert to these again from the revolutionary violence of the movement party."

1. τοῖς ῥέονται] 'The unstable philosophers.' (The river-gods,' Jowett.) They are humorously identified with their principle. Vide supr. αὐτὸς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγραμματα φέροναι. This way of taking ῥέονται—not as causative—is also confirmed by the parallel passage in the Cystylus, 439 C: ἄλοι τοῖς ῥεσπερ εἰς τινὶ δύσω ἐμπεσοντες κυκώναι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐφελκάμενοι προσεμβάλλουσι. Socrates adopts the jest of Theodorus, supr. 180 B:  οὐδὲν βέβαιον ἐὰν . . . εἰς ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς.


5. ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν παρ' αὐτῶν Bodl. Vat. Ven. II. παρ' αὐτῶν ἀπ' αὐτῶν T cett. Schleierm. corr.: αὐτὸ τῶν Bekk. But for the position of αὐ cp. supr. 161 A, and note). We pass from the image of a game to that of a civil war, in which the Heraclitans are the 'movement,' or revolutionary, party. There is probably a slight play on the word στασιώνι, and certainly also on the phrase τὰ ἀκίνητα κινεῖν. For 'to move what may not be moved' was, as the scholiast indicates, a proverbial way of speaking of sacrilegious actions. See esp. Legg. 8. 842 B: Διὸς ὡς τὸν κύριον νομον οὐκ ἔστω β. μὴ κυνεῖτω γῇς ὁ ρα μηθεῖς . . . νομίζοι τὸ τάκινητα κυνεῖν ἀληθῶς μοίον εἰς. Thuc. 8. 15: τὰ τὰ χειμά τάλαντα . . . κινεῖν. 7. μηθεῖν μέτρων] 'Nothing worthy of our reception.'

12. οὐδὲν μὲν αὖν ἀνεκτῶν] 'Nay, Socrates, we can by no
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣ. 147

p. 181. ΣΩ. Σκέπτεσθαν ἃν εἴη σοῦ γε οὕτω προθυμουμένου.
Δοκεῖ ὁνυ μοι ἀρχῇ εἶναι τής σκέψεως κινήσεως πέρι,
ποίον τί ποτέ ἀρα λέγοντες φασὶ τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι.
βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόῦτο. πότερον ἐν τῷ εἴδος
αὐτῆς λέγονσιν ἣ ἄσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δυό; μὴ μένει
τοι μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκεῖτο, ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σὺ, ἣν
κοινὴ πάσχομεν, ἂν τι καὶ δή. καὶ μοι λέγε. ἀρα
κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς, ὅταν τι χώραν εἰκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ
ἡ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφεται;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐγώγε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν ἐστῶ εἴδος. ὅταν δὲ ἡ
μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γνώσεις ἐδε, ἢ μέλλων ἐκ λευκοῦ ἡ
σκηνὴν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνεται, ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἄλλοις
ἄλλως, ἀρα οὐκ ἢξιον ἐπερον εἴδος φάναι κι
νήσεως;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν. δυὸ δὴ λέγω τούτω εἴθ
κινήσεως, ἄλλοισιν, τῷ δὲ ἀπερίφοράν.

means endure to stop short of thoroughly examining the
meaning of both sets of thinkers. It is therefore, of course, adverbial.
Madvig’s conjecture, ἀνεκτὸν, had occurred to others. But
the humour of the place, where Theodorus, who had been so
backward, is now become so eager and ἀρχαῖος φαλαλόγος in
the hands of Socrates, is more pointedly expressed by ἀνεκτὸν,
the MS. reading.

1. σοῦ γε] I. e. You, that
were so reluctant to enter on
the discussion. Cp. suppl. 169
C: ὃς μέντα περιπλέκω γε ἢν
προφθέσαν ὃς ἐκ σαμαρα-
ῳς ἢ ὁμοίω τοι οὐ.

2. ἀρχῇ] This is the predi-
cate, the subject being con-
tained in what follows. Hence
no article is required.

5. ἢ ἄσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται,
δύο] Parm. 138 B: Κινούμενον
ἀν ἡ κύρος ἀν ἄλλως ἄλλως
ἡ κύρος. No argument
from this about the comparative dates
of the two dialogues. ἄλλοισις
as yet includes αἰσχράσις.

§ 3: Πρὸς οὖς, καὶ πέρα ἢδοριζο-
ται ποιῶν κίνησιν λέγοντα ἡ πά-
σες, οὐ χαλεπῶν ἀπαντήσαι.

6. ἡ κύρος πάσχομεν] Socrates continues the notion
of danger from suppl. A B, and
with his usual irony professes
fear of τῶν τὰ ἄκατα κινεῖσθαι.

11. ὅταν δὲ γὰρ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
Cp. suppl. 156 C D.

18. ἄλλοισιν, τῷ δὲ ἀπερίφο-
ράν] 'Coisl. τῷ μὲν ἄλλοισιν,
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΟ. 'Ορθῶς γε λέγων.

ΣΩ. Τούτῳ τοινυν οὕτω διελόμενοι διαλεγόμεθα ἡδή τοῖς τὰ πάντα πάντα μάνουκοι κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐροτεμένος - πότερον πάν φατέ ἀμφοτέρως κινεῖσθαι, σφήμονον
5 τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον, ὅ το μὲν τι ἀμφοτέρως, τὸ δὲ ἐτέρως;

ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλα μὰ Δι' ἔγραψε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν. οἶμαι δ' ἂν φάναι ἀμφοτέρως.

ΣΩ. Εἴ δέ γε μὴ, δ' ἑταίρε, κινούμενά τε ἀυτόις 10 καὶ ἐστώτα φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μάλλον ὀρθῶς ἔξει εἰπεῖν ὅτι κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἐστήκεν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οἰκοῦν ἐπειδὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐνιώται μηδενὶ, πάντα δὴ πάσαν κίνησιν π. 18
15 ἑκατοντάτα.  ὑν δὲ περιφοράν—quod glossa sema sapiet." Stalib. Cp. Soph. 221 E, alib. It may be asked why circular motion should be chosen to represent φορά. The answer possibly is, that the revolution of the Heavens is conceived of as embracing all other kinds of motion. Cp. supr. ἐστὶ καὶ ἂν ἕνωσε, κινούμενος καὶ τοῦ ἄλλος.

Perhaps also the revolution of the Heavens (or of the Sun) is symbolical of the Heraclitean cycle of elements. (Lassalle.) For περιφορά interchanged with φορά cp. Rep. 7. 528 Δ: Ἕν περιφορά ἡδή ὅτι

στερεόν λαβόντες... ἀστρονομίαν ἔλεγον, φοράν ὅσαν θάνωσε.

It must be admitted that φορά would more exact. But the compound is more rhythmical, and, as περιφερέσθαι does not always mean 'to revolve,' it may be used here for locomotion in general. See Tim. 70 B, Apol. 19 C, Rep. 3. 402 A-C.

2. διαλεγόμεθα ἡδή] Imagining them, for the sake of our argument, to be less impracticable. ὑποτεθέμενοι νομίμωτερον αὐτοῖς ἢ νόμοι ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖται ἢ ἀποκρίνασθαι. (Soph. 246 D.)

5. τὸ μὲν τι... τὸ δὲ] Rep. 4. 436 C.

6. ἐτέρως] 'In one or other of these two ways.' Cp. Soph. 226 Δ: Οὐ τῇ ἐτέρᾳ λήτησθαι.


14. ἐνιώται] Almost all the MSS. have ἐν εἰναί. But the correction of the Boll. MS. to ἐνιώται appears to be in an ancient band.
2. Σκόπητε δ' μοι τόδε αύτῶν. τῆς θερμότητος ἢ λευκότητος ἢ ὑπόφθεις οὖν ωμὸν πῶς ἐλέγομεν ϕάναι αὐτοὺς, ἥρεσιν ἐκαθότων τούτων ἄμα αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιοῦντος τοῦ καὶ πάσχοντος, καὶ τὸ μὲν τό πάσχον *αἰσθανάμενον ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰσθησίνη εἴγνωσθαι,

by the use of ἐπιστήμων just before. In the present place it might recur naturally, as it is in the manner of Plato to recall a train of thought by repeating some remarkable word. (Rep. 488 A: Οἱ ἐπιστήμων. Supr. 180 C: Τὰ τε δὲ τρόπισμα.) To which it may be added, that there is a consciousness of technicality observable in the present passage. (ἵνα οὖν ἡ ποιήσις ἄμα ἀποκαλύπτει τὸ φαίνεται δύσμα, κ.τ.λ.) Apart from these considerations, the rareness of the word, which would be a strong argument in its favour if it had MS. authority, must be allowed to weigh against it as a conjectural reading. And it may also be urged, that the masculine gender of αἰσθησίς would impair the effect of the passage, in which everything seems to be made, as far as possible, neuter and impersonal.

But Heindorf's emendation, αἰσθανάμενον, agrees perfectly with the context and with all that precedes (esp. Supr. 159 E, 160 A), and it is quite possible that αἰσθησίς may have slipped in instead of it by an unconscious logical inversion on the part of the copyist. This conjecture is therefore adopted in the text.

6. τὰ] I.e. when we carry
our analysis beyond the act of sensation to that which underlies it. έν is omitted in one MS., and Schanz reads ἀρα instead.

1. ποιῶν τι MSS. ποιοῖν. But the Boileauian margin has ποιῶν τι, with marg. F. corr. E. ή ποιῶσης] Two difficulties stand in the way of the reception of any new 'term of art,' the strangeness of the word, and the effort required to follow the generalization which it presupposes.

2. ἀλλόκοτον] 'Strange and uncouth.' ἀλλοκοτότερον is a v. r.

3. ἀθρόων λέγουσαν] 'The collective (i.e. general) expression.' This harmonizes with the language adopted above, 157 B: Δει δε καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ὥσ τοῖς ἀθροισματι ἀνθραπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἐκαστὸν ζῷον τε καὶ έλεός.

The conception of quality is of later growth than that of kind or form; since the latter is less abstract, and still retains a tinge of metaphor.

6. εν] καὶ εν Boll. corr.

7. μηδ’ αὐτό το ποιῶν η τάσχων] Supr. 157 A. αὐτό distinguishes the active and passive elements from the crude notion of an object, which is analysed into these.

8. άλλ’ εξ’ ἀμφοτέρων... αἰσθήσεως] 'But out of both as they come together—they become, while producing sensations and sensible things, the one of a certain kind, the other percepient.'

Attribute and perception arise together in the act of sense out of the meeting of agent and patient, neither of which has any independent existence. The text is not grammatical, but neither is it really open to suspicion, and Malvig's conjecture, ἀποστειθέντα, makes nonsense. The construction may be explained by substituting εἰ τοῦ συγγενοῦσας ἀμφότεροι for εἰς ἀμφοτέρων συγγενομένων, —or the sentence from τὰς αἰσθήσεις to the end may be taken as an expansion of γίγνεσθαι το σουαίτα φανῆσαι. Cp. the construction of infr. 194 CD, where, conversely, τὰ ίσωτα should in strict grammar be a genitive governed by τὰ σημεῖα.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 182. ΘΕΟ. Μέμνημαι τῶς δ’ οὖ;  

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν τοὺς ἄλλα χαίρειν ἕσωμεν, ἐνε ἄλλως ἐσὲν ὡτοὺς λέγουσιν. οὐ δ’ ἐνεκα λέγομεν, τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττομεν, ἐφοτώτες. Κινεῖται καὶ ἰῃ φατε, τὰ πάντα; ἦ γὰρ;  

ΘΕΟ. Ναί.  

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφότερα ἃς διειλόμεθα κινήσεις, 

θερόμενα τε καὶ ἀλλονύμενα;  

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δ’ οὖ; εἰ πέρ γε δὴ τελέως κινήσεταί.  

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοῖς ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἡλλοιώτου δὲ τὸ 

μῆ, ἔγομεν ἃν που ἐπεί, οἷα ἀττα ἰῃ τὰ θερόμενα.  

η πῶς λέγομεν;  

ΘΕΟ. Οὐτῶς. 

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὖδε τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν μείν 

τὸ ῥέον, ἄλλα μεταβάλλει, ὡστε καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦτον ἰε 

εἶναι ῥήη, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλην 

χρόαν, ἢν μὴ ἀλφταὐτή μένον· ἀρά ποτε ὁδὸν τὸ 

τὸ προσεπτείν χρώμα, ὡστε καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν;  

. ΘΕΟ. Καὶ τὶς μηχανή, ὁ Σωκράτης; ἦ ἀλλο γε 

τὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων, εἴπερ ἄει λέγοντος ὑπεξέχρηται, ἀτε 

δὴ ῥέον;  

2. εἴτε ἀλλως . . . λέγονταν]  

We need dwell no longer on the 

details of the theory, since 

our business now is with its 

first principle—κίνομαι.  

7. Οὐκοῦν, κ.τ.λ.] Sc. κινεῖται 

τὰ πάντα.  

12. λέγομεν] λέγομεν Τ.  

17. ᾗ μὴ ἀλφ ταὐτή μένον]  

Cp. supr. 154 D: Φυλάττων μὴ 

ἐναπταίτο εἲνα. Infra. 183 A: Ἡν 

δὴ ἔκινη ἡ ἀπόρωσις ὁρθὴ φαν. 

And, for the argument, Cratyl. 

439 D: Ἀρ’ οὖν οὕτω τὰ προσε 

πτεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ ἄει ὑπεξέ 

χρηται, πρὸςοον μὲν ὡς ἐκεῖον ἤ 

ἐπειτα ὡς τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἀνάγκη ἄμα 

ἡμῖν λέγοντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθὺς 

gίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξέχρηται καὶ 

μηκέτι οὕτως ἔχειν;  

τὶ προσεπτείν χρώμα] To give 

the name of any colour (to an 

object)—To use the name of 

any colour so as to apply it 

rightly.  

20. τῶν τοιούτων] Viz. τῶν 

αισθητῶν, i.e. the remark ap 

plies to all sensible attributes 

and not to colour only. For 

the step which, for the sake 

of brevity, Theodorus is here 

allowed to make by himself, 

H. Schmidt well compares 

supr. 158 C E, 189 C, 196 B.
Τι δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐροῦμεν ὅπως ὑποστήσθησην, π. 184. οἷον τῆς τοῦ ὀράν ἥ ἀκούειν; μὲνεν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῇ τῷ ὀράν ἡ ἀκούειν; ΘΕΟ. Οὔκ ουν δὲι γε, εἰπερ πάντα κινεῖται.

5. Οὔτε ἄρα ὀράν προσηρτέων τι μᾶλλον ἡ μὴ ὀράν, οὐδὲ τιν' ἄλλην αἰσθησιν μᾶλλον ἡ μὴ, πάντων γε πάντως κινομένων.

ΘΕΟ. Ὁ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν αἰσθησίς γε ἐπιστήμη, ὥς ἐφαιμέν

10 ἐγὼ τε καὶ Θεαίτητος.

ΘΕΟ. Ἠν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἡ μὴ ἐπιστήμη-μην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτόμενοι δ' τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμην.

ΘΕΟ. Ἑοίκατε.

15 ΣΩ. Καλὸν ἀν ἡμῖν συμβαίνω τό ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμηθείς ἀποδεῖξαι ότι πάντα κινεῖται, ἵνα δὴ ἐκεῖνη ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὀρθῇ φανῇ. τὸ δ', ὥς ἐνεκέν, ἐφάνη, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις,

1. Τι δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως] So far of aisthēsia, now of aisthēsias.
2. μὲνεν] Sc. τῆς ἀισθήσεως.
5. Οὔτε ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.] 'Then we must not at all predicate seeing in preference to not-seeing, nor any other sensation rather than the absence of it, since all things move in every way.' Join οὔτε μᾶλλον.
6. Bekker reads οὔτε...οὔτε, perhaps rightly.
12. Οὔδεν is adverbial. For ἐπιστήμην...ἀπεκρινάμεθα cp. supr. 147 B: 'Ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τίχνης τινὸς ὄνομα. We gave 'sense' as an equivalent for Knowledge. But 'sense' = 'not-sense,' therefore if 'sense' = 'knowledge,' 'sense' = 'not-knowledge.'
15. Καλὸν ἀν ἡμῖν] 'Here is a fine result of having corrected (or completed) our first answer in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest, and so to make it clear that that first answer was right, whereas it would seem to be made clear that if nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right, both "it is so" and "it is not so," or, if you choose, "becomes so," that we may say nothing that would bring them to a stand-still.' For the ayn-denot, and for ἄν ('would seem to') Heind. well compares Rep. 10. 602 Α: Χαριτεύ ἄν ἐπὶ, κ.τ.λ. Badh. conjectures Καλὸν ἄρ' ἡμῖν συμβαίνει.
becomes, equally true, except that both Yes and No are falsified while we are uttering them. A new dialect should be invented to carry out this theory. The only

1. ώστε τ' ἔχειν φάναι] These words are added in explanation of πάσα. While you are naming a quality, it is altered and slips away; and while you are naming a sensation, it has given place to another. While you say the words ‘Sense is knowledge,’ your theory of change compels you to utter in the same breath, Sense is not knowledge. In supporting your answer by the doctrine of motion, you have made this and every other answer alike unstable.

3. ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτόν] ‘That we may not arrest them (τῶν μίσθων) in their flow.’ Cp. supr. 181 D E, 182 A. The humour is lost by reading αὐτόν.

5. ἔλεγεν, ἦς Θεόδωρος] μή is changed to οὐ, because the words are taken out of their hypothetical connection.—Compare the conclusion of the Parmenides.

6, 7. τῇ] The articles, which seem necessary, were added by Schleiermacher. Their absence is defended by Wohlrab, who quotes Soph. 244 A: ὁπότεν ὅν φέλει γεγένητο.

7. οὖδὲ γὰρ] ‘For when we think of “so,” there is no motion in it: nor yet in “not so.”’
ΠΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ

tōn lógon tōtou légonouv, ós nūn ge prōs tīn ayt- p. 183
tōn ἑπόθεσων οὐκ ἔχουσι ῥήματα, εἰ μὴ ἁρα τὸ ὑὸ
ὅπως. μάλιστα δ ὦτως ἀν αὐτοῖς ἀρμόττοι, ἀπειρου
λεγόμενον.

5 ΘΕΟ. Οἰκειωτάτη γοῦν διάλεκτος αὕτη αὐτοῖς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὁ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταρχῇ ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὕτω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ' ἄνδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρων εἶναι, ἂν μὴ φρόνι- μός τις ἐπιστήμην τε αἰσθησιν οὐ συγχωρησόμεθα
10 κατὰ γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κυνείσθαι μέθοδον. εἰ μὴ τί
πῶς ἀλλως Θεαίτης ὄσσε λέγει.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀριστ' εἰρήκας, ὁ Σωκράτης τούτων γὰρ 
περανθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ δεὶ ἀπηλλάγχας σοι ἀποκρινό-
μένον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρω-
15 ταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοή.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ πρίν γ' ἀν, ὁ Θεόδωρε, Σωκράτης τε 
καὶ σὺ τοὺς φάσκοντας αὖ τὸ πᾶν ἔστησαι διέλθῃς, δ' ἀστερ ἂρτι προϋθεσθε.

δυνάμει ἂν καὶ μὴ ἐντελεῖα τὸ
ἀδύμητὸν ἑαυτῷ.

2. τὸ οὖτ' ὡς . . ἐπισιρ ριρίμο-
μενον] With most of the Greek
philosophers the Infinite was
a purely negative idea.

At this point sensation appears
to be annihilated. And
yet if we view the dialogue as
a whole, the impression we re-
ceive from it is rather this:—
Sensations are purely relative
to the individual, and infinitely
diverse: taken alone, therefore,
they cannot be the objects of
knowledge and thought: but
it is not denied that they are
the occasions of thought and
the conditions of knowledge.
(186 D: Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς πάθε-
μασι τοῖς οὐκ ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐν δὲ τῷ
περὶ ἄκεινου συλλογισμῷ.)

3. οὕτως . . . λεγόμενον] Viz.

οὖτ' ὡς.

6. τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταρχῇ] This
τε is answered by ἐπιστήμην
τε . . . καὶ εἰσεχετή.

Aristotle, Met. 3. 4. 1009 a,
expresses the same sense of re-
lief: Καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἀπηλλαγμένον
ἀν εἰμιν τοῦ ἀκραίου καὶ κολλοιν-
τός τι τῇ διανοιῇ ὅρισαι.

10. οὐ μὴ τί πόε] This
τέτει is to follow the argument, but
Socrates has no intention of re-
linquishing Theodorus, now that
he has dragged him in. This
gives occasion for the banter
which follows.

15. σχοή] The optative depends
on συνθήκας. 'As it was agreed
I should, when the discussion
of Protagoras' argument should
be completed.' ·Supr. 169 C.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣ.

p. 183. ΘΕΟ. Νέος ὁν, ὁ Θεαίτης, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀδικεῖν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἂλλα παρασκευάζῃς ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει δώσεις λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάντερ γε βούληται, ἦδιστα μὲν ἡ ἡκουσα περὶ ὧν λέγω. ΘΕΟ. Ἰππέας εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ Σωκράτης εἰς λόγους προκαλούμενος· ἐρώτα ὅπως καὶ ἀκούσεις. ΣΩ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκῶ, ὁ Θεόδωρε, περὶ γε ὧν κεκλείει Θεαίτης, οὗ πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΟ. Τῇ δὴ ὧν οὐ πεῖσέσθαι;

ΣΩ. Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ ἐν ἐστὶν λέγονται τὸ πάν, αἰσχυνόμενοι μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶμεν, ἤτοιν αἰσχύνομαι ἐν ὑπερταῦσθαι. Παρμενίδης δὲ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, αἰδώς τέ μοι εἶναι ἀμα δεινὸς τε. συμπροσέμεξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ 11.

1. τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις] Viz. Socrates, who, in his character of Sciron (supr. 169 A), is not likely to be over-scrupulous.
3. τῶν ἐπιλοίπων] Viz. the discussion of the Eleatic principle according to Socrates' own proposal, supr. 181 A.
7. Ἰππέας εἰς πεδίον] 'You challenge cavalry to an encounter in the open plain.'

Schol.: Ἰππέας προκαλεῖ συμβολής εἰς πεδίον, ἐπὶ τῶν τοὺς ἐν τις βολίνους καὶ εὐπορομενοκατέρχονται αὐτῶν εἰς ἐρήμου προκαλομένων. Πλάτων ἐν Θεαίτης καὶ Μέλισσος Καταγεφυενίων, γράφεται δὲ καὶ Ίππον εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ συμβολής ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς ἄ βολεται τις προκαλούμενος. The latter interpretation is alone suitable here. For the point is, not that Theodorus is provoking defeat, but that Socrates is eager for the fray.

11. Τῇ δὲ ὧν] Either 'in what respect?' or 'for what reason?' The former is preferable. Theodorus is puzzled, as supr. 161 A. 'How do you mean, Socrates, that you will not comply with his request?' Rep. 5. 449 C: Τῇ μαλακῇ, ἐφη, ἤμειν οἷς ἀφίζετε; Σέ, ἂ, δὲ ὅ, ὅ. Ἡ ἡ ἅλος ἐπὶ πάλιν, τῇ μαλακῇ; 'Ἀπορράθηκας, ἰνα πέφικα, ἐφη, . . .

12. ἐστὸς] So Bodl. (though rather doubtfully) with Vat. Ven. Π, and other MSS.
15. τῷ τοῦ Θεαίτης] Π. 3. 172: 'Πᾶς τι μοι ἔστι, ὧδε ἔστι, δεινὸς τε.'
16. έσται ἡμα] This is the reading of the Bodl. MS. and of T. Συμπροσέμεξα γὰρ . . τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνω τὸν πάνω πρεσβύτης] In what connection do these words stand with the Parmenides? Do they imply that Plato had already written it, or that he
Plato such a distinct perception of the difference between the grammatical sense and the real drift of an author. The expression ἐ διανοούμενος ἤρομην occurs in Lach. 190 E.

5. ἄσκεστον... λόγον] ‘Should fail to be considered through the endless intrusion of alien subjects of inquiry.’

6. τῶν ἐπισκοπαζόντων λόγων] We pass from the image of a flood (supr. 177 B) to that of a disorderly crowd of discussions. Compare Philebus, 62 C: Βούλει δήτα, δοκεῖς ἄρπαρός ὑπὸ ὅρην τις ἠδούμενος καὶ βιαζόμενος, ἤτοι άναπταμάς τὰς ὑφὰς ἀφ' πάσας τὰς ἐπιτίμας εἰσέχει καὶ μέγαν τοῖς καθώς τὴν ἐνεστίαν; See also Shakespeare, Lucrece, 1301, 2: ‘Much like a press of people at a door Throng her inventions, which shall go before.’ For the use of the verb see Rep. 6. 500 B: ἔπεισεν κομψὰς... said of the bad philosophers.

εἰ τις... πείσται] ‘If we once let them in,’—‘give them a hearing.’

7. ἄλλως τε καὶ] ‘Especially as.’ For the paraletic structure cp. Aesch. Pers. 689:

“Ἀλλαὶ τοί πάντως χολα κατὰ χθουνός
θεοί | λαβεῖν ἁμών εἰσίν ἦ μεθικεῖα

had conceived it? or do they refer to a fact or to a supposition which was the germ from which that dialogue sprang, or which was used to ornament it, by Plato or by some one else? Or did Plato add the present passage after both dialogues had been written? Some light is thrown upon this question by comparing Soph. 217 C: Οἶον (δι’ ἐρωτήσεως) καὶ Παρμενίδης κραμένη καὶ διεξούστι λόγος παγκάλου παρεγκύμην ἐγὼ νός ὅν, ἐκεῖνον μάλα δὴ τότε ὅτος πρεσβύτου. This passage conveys the impression that the written dialogue is referred to. At all events, the repeated reference helps to mark the Parmenides as belonging to this series of dialogues. (See Introduction.) The same conception of the time at which Parmenides lived, and the same reverence for him, is implied in the words of the Eleatic stranger (his professed disciple), Soph. 237 A: Παρμενίδης δὲ ο μέγας, ὃ παί, πανεῖ ἡμῶν ὅσιν... ἀπεμαρτύρατο... δὲ ἐκάστοτε λόγων.

1. βίβος... γενναίον] ‘A magnificent depth of mind.’ Schol.: Φαίνεται καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης σεμείωσιν τὸν Παρμενίδην.

2. αὕτη τὰ λεγόμενα] It is remarkable to find already in
cause the question about Knowledge to be endlessly deferred.

Transition from Sense to Opinion. We therefore return once more upon our old track, and ask, With what do we see and hear what is white or shrill? Do we see and hear with our

... The reasons given here for avoiding a criticism of Parmenides and the Eleatic doctrine are not such as would prevent its being discussed in another dialogue. It would therefore be a mistake to argue from them against the genuineness of the Sophist. Compare with the expression ὅν τῶν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει αμήχανον. Rep. 5. 450 B: Οὐκ ἔτει δὲν ἰδεῖν λόγους ἐπεξηγήσαι.


ὅν καὶ περὶ ἐπιστήμης] Supr. 149 E. This reference to knowledge prepares us for the 'appeal to experience' in what follows. - A different method is required for the ontological problem. - Thesetetus' first an-

1. ἐν τίς, κ.τ.λ.] The reasons given here for avoiding a criticism of Parmenides and the Eleatic doctrine are not such as would prevent its being discussed in another dialogue. It would therefore be a mistake to argue from them against the genuineness of the Sophist. Compare with the expression ὅν τῶν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει αμήχανον . Rep. 5. 450 B: Οὐκ ἔτει δὲν ἰδεῖν λόγους ἐπεξηγήσαι.

eyes and ears, or through them!

Not with, but through.

We are not each of us a sort of Trojan-horse full of disconnected faculties. There is one presiding nature, in which they all meet. This is with which we see through our eyes.

2. ἐπιλαβίσθα
to check your answer and show where it is erroneous.
Or. Rep. 5. 450 A: ὅμως... εἰργασάμενοι ἐπιλαβόμενοι μου.

9. φιλήν γάρ τοι [Would it not be strange, if in each of us there were perched, as in a sort of Trojan horse, a number of separate perceptions, and these did not all meet in some one nature, the Mind or what you will, with which, through the medium of these, we perceive the various objects of sense?]

10. ὀσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἱπποῖσι The plural is caused by ἤμι. As if each of us were a sort of wooden machine, like the Trojan horse (a sort of Noah's ark, as we might say).—Man cannot be regarded as a bundle of separate faculties having no higher unity: that would be too mechanical a conception of his nature. The term 'organ of sense' perhaps originates with this passage. The difference between ὦ and δι' αὐτῷ direct and indirect instrumentality, is obvious, but difficult to render exactly.

11. ἴδε is used in the concrete vernacular sense; Thuc. 2. 51: Τοιοῦτον ἦν ἐπὶ πᾶν τῆς ἴδεας.

15. Τοιὸδέ τε ἐνεκά 'It is with a view to this that I am so precise with you, namely, to the inquiry whether,' etc. τοιὸδέ (better than του δι') has a double reference to εἰς μαν τινά Ἴδαν... ἱονθήσατι and to ή τοι, κ.τ.λ.

18. πάντα τὰ τούτα must mean 'all attributes,' preparing
184. αὕτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν; ἵσως δὲ βέλτιον σεὶς λέγειν αὕτα ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἡ ἐμὲ ύπερ σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καὶ μοι λέγει· θερμά καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κούφα καὶ γλυκέα δι' ὅν αἰσθάνει, ἄρα οὐ τοῦ σῶματος ἕκαστα τίθης; ἡ ἄλλου τινός;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν, ἃ δ' ἐτέρας.

185. δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δ' ἄλλης ταύτι' αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δ' ἀκοής, δι' ὤσεως, ἣ ἃ δ' ὤσεως, δι' ἀκοής;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω;

ΣΩ. Εἰ τι ἄρα περὶ ἁμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἄν διὰ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ὄργανον, οὐδ' αὐδ' διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου περὶ ἁμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι' ἀν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χρώας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἁμφοτέρων ἡ διανοεῖ, ὅτι ἁμφοτέρῳ ἐστὸν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἑγώγε. 

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν καὶ ότι ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρω μὲν ἐτερον, ἐαυτῷ δὲ ταῖτόν;

and hear through our ears.

But we cannot see and hear through the same organ.

There are somethings which we perceive about the objects of both senses, e.g. that they are both, that

The object of one sense cannot be perceived by another. Therefore if I perceive anything about the objects of two different senses, it cannot be through either of them. This cannot be a perception of either sense which embraces the objects of both.'

12. οὐκ ἄν...αἰσθάνοι' ἀν] 'I wonder if you have this notion,' i.e. 'Surely you have.' Cp. supr. 145 Α.; and for the position of ἡ, Rep. 2. 396 B, ἵππους, κ.τ.λ. . . ἡ μοὴς;

3. πολυπραγμονεῖν] Socrates will not, if he can help it, act beyond his part as questioner and μανητής.

the way for the suprasensual attributes to be adduced below. For τῶν σώματων Rep. 4. 436 Α. In καὶ ξένες...ἀναφέρειν; the question is put more strongly instead of continuing καὶ εἰ δέι ἵνα γε τῶν τοιούτων ἀναφέρειν εἰς μὴ συμματικόν τι. This passage is differently interpreted by H. Schmidt, who takes εἰ τινι, κ.τ.λ. as hypothetical, and supposes the apodosis to be deferred, where Socrates breaks off at ἵσως δέ, κ.τ.λ.
they are different from each other, and each the same with itself. That both are two, and each is one. That they are like or unlike. Through what organ do we perceive these things? If I had asked, through what do we perceive that they are salt, you would have said 'the tongue.' Through what, then, do we perceive being and not-being, sameness and

8. τὸ κοινὸν] 'That which regards them both.' You can refer any particular sensation to its proper organ. Can you do so in the case of these common perceptions?

Cp. Rep. 7. 522 C: ὁ λοιπὸν τὸ κοινὸν, οὐ πάσι προσχρῆται... ἐπιστήμη... τὸ ἐν τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία διαγγελλόμενα.

10. ἀμφιέτερα] So B: ἀμφιέτέρων.

16. τὸ τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦτοις] 'Which is common not only to these sensible objects, but to all things.' H. Schmidt would confine πᾶσι to objects of sense (ἐκ τούτοις ἀκοὴ-τοῖς), referring τοῦτοις to φωνή,

χρία, χωμός only. Although this is more strictly logical, it seems improbable that the notion of ἐπὶ πᾶσι (and of ἐπὶ πάντων, 186 A) should be thus narrowed.

18. ἄνων δὴ ἠρωτώμεν] Viz. as Theatetus understands it, ἀμφιέτερα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταὐτόν τε καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἐτὶ δὲ ἐν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν, referring to what has just preceded.

19. περὶ αὐτῶν] Concerning the objects of sense.
ΤΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 161

π. 185. ὄργανα, δι' ὃν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἑκαστα;

ΤΕΑΙ. Ὁσίων λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιό-
tητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταῦτα τε καὶ τὸ ἑτέρον, δὲ ἔτι δὲ ἐν τε καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν. δὴ λογικῶς δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἄρτι ὅτι τοι ἐρωτάτως καὶ τἀλλα ὅσα τούτως ἐπεταί, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τού σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Ὄστε, ὁ Θεάτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἐστὶν ᾧ ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μᾶ Δία, ὁ Σόκρατες, ἐγώγα σου ἀν ἐκομιμείτων, πλὴν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ' ἐναὶ τοιοῦτον ὑδέον τούτως ὄργανον ὑδόν ὀστήρ ἐκείνος, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ δι' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κονά μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Καλὸς γὰρ εἰ, ὁ Θεάτητε, καὶ οὕχ, ὅστε ἔλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός· ὁ γὰρ καλὸς λέγων καλὸς τε κἀγαθός. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐπουρνάς με μάλα

— 16. Καλὸς γὰρ εἰ] The enthusiasm with which Socrates accepts Theaetetus' acknowledgment of the truth that the mind has its perceptions, independent of sense, belongs to the most interesting aspect of Greek Philosophy. 'Gradually it threw off the garment of sense; it revealed a world of ideas. It is impossible for us to conceive the intensity of these ideas in their first freshness: they were not ideas but gods, penetrating into the soul of the disciple, sinking into the mind of the human race; objects not of speculation only, but of faith and love.' (Jowett.) Compare, as another instance of this religious feeling, Soph. 265 D: Νῦν μὴν βλέπων εἰς σὲ καὶ ὑπολογίζων ἀπέφευγε σε καὶ τὸν θεὸν αὐτόν γίγνεσθαι, τοὺτ' ἐκ τοῦ γενόμενος. Καλὸς γε, ὁ Θεάτητε. καὶ εἰ μὲν γε σὲ ἱγιομεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἑπτά χρόνων ἄλλων ποιοτοῖς ἐνόθη, νῦν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθών ἀναγκαίως ἐπιχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ἑιμορογεῖσθαι ἐπιθετί δὲ σοι κατομαθηθών τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι καὶ ἄνω τῶν παρ' ἑμῶν λόγων αὐτή πρόοιμον ἐφ' ὀπερ νῦν ἔθεσθαί φησι, ἐσάρχων χρό
νος γάρ ἐκ περιττοῦ γίγνοιτ' ἀν.

17. ὁ γὰρ καλὸς λέγων, κ.τ.λ.] Rep. 3. 402 E.
— 18. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ] (1) 'Ad kalói ex precedid, mente repetendum est, que notatus digesnum est elliptis, quum post
συχνοὶ λόγοι ἀπαλλάξας, εἰ φαίνεται σοι τὰ μὲν p. 18
αὐτὴ δὲ αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ
σώματος δυνάμεων. τοῦτο γὰρ ἢν ὃ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι
έδοκεν, ἐξουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δόξαι.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεται γε.
ΣΩ. Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο γὰρ
μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἑγὼ μὲν ὃν αὐτῇ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ᾽ αὐτὴν
ἐπορέγεται.

10 ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τὸ ὁμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, καὶ τὸ ταῦ-
τὸν καὶ ἐτέρον;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Τὶ δὲ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, καὶ ἁγαθὸν καὶ
κακὸν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μᾶλιστα
πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη

hec proâ δὲ τῷ καλῷ non infran-
tur nominativus, verbo ei vel
addito vel subaudiendo, velut
infortur Sympos. 195 C: Νῶς
μὲν οὖν ἐστι πρὸς δὲ τῷ νόμῳ
ἀπαλλάξει... Heind. (2) 'Prater
hoc pulchrum, quod in te lau-
davi.' Stallb.

The latter (2) is right. 'Be-
sides this beauty you have
shown, you have done me a kind-
ness.' Cp. Eurip. Hec. 382:
Καλὸς μὲν εἶπαι, θύγατερ, ἄλλα τῷ
καλῷ λόγῳ πρόσακοι. Thuc. 4.
98. 2. The phrase in Symp.
195 C ought to be similarly
construed.

6. τοῦτο γὰρ μᾶλιστα ἐπὶ πάν-
tων παρέπεται I.e. ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοι-
νῶν ἐστι (supr. 185 C). It will
serve therefore as a sort of
crucial instance.

9. ἐπορέγεται expresses Plato's
notion of the intuitive action
of the mind (νόησις), not as mere
contemplation, but as a passion-
ate outgoing. Rep. 6. 490 A B.
15. εἰ τοὺς μᾶλιστα] In this and
similar phrases the article re-
tains its demonstrative force,
as is evident where the words
are separated; e.g. Euthyd.
303 C: 'Εν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῖς με-
gαλοπρεπέστερον. Soph. OEd.
Col. 742: 'Εν δὲ τῶν μᾶλιστας ἡ ἡγὼ.
16. πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι] 'To consider in relation to each
other;' viz. as opposites.

Thætetus is probably thinking
of the recent argument in
which ἁγαθόν, ἀφιλίμων, μῆλον,
were identified. The 'idea of
good' is still regarded by him
'hypothetically,' and, as it were,
from beneath. But he is no
longer capable of the fallacious
admission into which he fell
unwarily, supr. 157 D. The
"Εχε δή ἄλλο τι τού μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς οἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὀσφαύτως;

Τῇν δὲ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὁ τι ἐστῶν καὶ τῇν ἐναντίότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ καὶ τῇν οὐσίαν ἀδ τῆς ἐναντίοτητος αὐτῇ ἡ ψυχή ἐπανοίγεται καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πειράται ἤμων.

Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Ὄκουν τὰ μὲν εἶναι γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίων, ὡς διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τῆν ψυχὴν τείνει.

Thinking over the past and present with a view to the future.

"Εχε δή] 'Hold there!' Socrates sees his opportunity of furthering the argument by applying the last expression of Theetetus, and therefore bids him pause over it.

Τῇν δὲ γε οὐσίαν] Sc. τοῦ σκληροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ. 'The fact that they exist' (Germ. 'Dasein'). In this and similar passages Plato may be said to be appealing to the consciousness of his reader.
tā de peri tōtōn ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε οὖσίαν καὶ p. 18
ἀφέλειαν μόνης καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων
cαὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται ὅς ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οἶων τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχέων, ψφυγὸν οὐσίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀνυχίσει, ποτὲ τούτου
ἐπιστήμου ἐσται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἐν ἐπι-
στήμῃ, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἑκείνων συλλογισμῷ οὐσίας
γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μὲν, ὥς ὡς, δυνατὸν
ἀναφερθῆναι, ἔκει δὲ ἀδύνατον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

1. ἀναλογίσματα] 'But what
the mind discovers by reflecting
upon these.' The idea of propor-
tion (τὰ ἀνάλογα) does not
seem to enter into the verb
ἀναλογίζειμαι and its derivative
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ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.
fore it fails of truth, and is not knowledge. This lies not in our impressions, but in that which the mind collects from them.

Sensation, therefore, has no share in knowledge. They are wholly distinct.

We have found what knowledge is not. Our aim was to find what
receives impressions from without through certain bodily organs; but knowledge implies the comparison of the impressions received through different organs, and this must be the immediate function of the mind. The whole of this last section should be compared with Rep. 7. 522-6.

5. ἐκείνω τῷ ὅνωματι 'But in that other term, whatever it is, which is applied to the mind when engaged alone with being.'

The form of expression is partly influenced by the words (186 D), τῷ οὖν ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὅνωμα; κ.τ.λ. The distinction between ὅνωμα and ῥῆμα is not observed here.

10. πάντα τά πρόσθεν ἐξηλεύσαι As if in a mathematical demonstration.

13. Δόξας] δόξα follows naturally upon ἀισθήμα. Charm. 158 E, 159 A: Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εἰ τοῖς πάροικοις σωφροσύνης, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς ἀναγίγνομαι. ἀκόντι γάρ που ἐνοοῦσαι αὐτὴν, ἐπεὶ ἔνεικα, ἀισθήμα των παράσκευοι, εἰ ἦτο δόξα ἄν τις σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἶναι τῇ ἀντὶ καὶ ὑποτεῖν τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

As in finding the mathematical δύναμις Theaetetus used a word which had been employed in the previous inquiry, so here. But hitherto δόξα has been bound up with φαντασία and ἀισθήμα, and even where Socrates had preserved the distinction between apprehension and judgment (179 C), this had passed unnoticed.


17. ἀλλ' τί ('something else') is not adverbial here.
THEAITHTOS.

p. 187. ΣΩ. Οὕτω μέντοι χρὴ, ο Θεαίτης, λέγειν προθυμως μᾶλλον ἡ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὄκνεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. εἰ ἐκεῖε γὰρ ὅτι δρόμεν, δύον θάτερα, ἠ εὐρήσαμεν ἐφ᾿ ἐν εὐρήσατε, ἡ ἦττον αἰσχρόμεθα εἰδέναι ὅ μηδαμη ἰσμεν* καὶ τοι οὐκ ἀν εἴη μεμπτὸς μοσθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος. 5 καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τι φής; δυοῖν ὅτιν οἰδένω δόξης, τού μὲν ἄλθηνοι, ψευδοὶ δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου, τὴν ἄλθη δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὁρίζει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡγούμεν τούτῳ γὰρ ἀδικοφείν μοι φαινεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ’ οὖν ἐτ’ ἀξιόν περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν 10 πάλιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐράτει μὲ πῶς νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολλοὶ λάκις, ἀστ’ ἐν ἀπορία πολλῇ πρὸς ἐμαυτόν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχομεν ἐπειδ’ ἐστὶ τοῦτο 15 τὸ πάθος παρ’ ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγυνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν

3. ἐὰν . . . δρόμεν] For the first person cp. infr. 210 B.
10. ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν] 'To take up a thread of the previous argument.'

Though we have dismissed the saying of Protagoras, so far as it is bound up with sense, τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπι, (φωνεῖρα εἰς σύμμεσσα αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, Soph. 264 B), yet the same question returns upon us in regard to opinion considered by itself. This forms a link of connection between the present inquiry and the foregoing. Cp., Cratyl. 429 D:

*Āρ’ ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράσαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀρα τοῦτο σοι δώσαιν ὁ λόγος; συνοι γὰρ ταῖς οἷς λέγουσι, ὁ φίλε Κρατίλε, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλιν.

But, still to return upon a former track, Is false opinion possible?

See also Euthyd. 284 A, 286 C, where ἡ ἀπορία (ὅτι ψειδεῖσθαι, ἀντιλέγειν, οὐκ ἔστιν) is ascribed to the followers of Protagoras amongst others. It has generally, however, been associated with the name of Antiphon.

15. τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ’ ἡμῖν] 'This experience of the human mind.' Cp. suppr. 155 A.

18. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐτ’] Though the past discussion has been 'wiped out,' this still remains 'to trouble the mind’s eye.' Badham would read
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ἐτὶ διστάζουν, πότερον εάσωμεν αὐτὸ ἡ ἐπισκεψόμεθα p. 187. ἄλλου τρόπου ἡ ὁλίγον πρότερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μή, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἰ πέρ γε καὶ ὁπνοῦν φαίνεται δεῖν; ἄρτι γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ 5 Θεόδωρος ἔλεγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις κατεπείγει.

ΣΩ. Ἐρθὼς ὑπέμνησας. Ἰσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ καὶ εἰροῦ πάλιν ὀπτερὸν ἵνα μετελθεῖν. κρείττον γὰρ ποι ἀμικρὸν εἴ ἡ πολὺ μὴ ἰκανός περάναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδὴ φαμὲν ἐκάστοτε εἶναι δόξαν, καὶ τινὰ ἦμών δοξάζειν ψευδή, τὸν δ' αὖ ἀληθῆ, ὡς φύσει οὕτως ἔχοντον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γὰρ δὴ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τόδε γ' ἐσθ' ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ p. 188.

καθ' ἐκαστόν, ἦτοι εἰδέναι ἡ μὴ εἰδέναι; μαθάνειν

δ' ὑπάτω, but the asyndeton is expressive. δ' also has been changed to δ' (Buttmann), but without reason.

2. ἄλλον τρόπου ἡ ὁλίγον πρότερον] i.e. not with reference to sensation and motion (supr. 164, 167, 171, 180), but in a more abstract way. The new 'manner' has something in it of the Eleatic spirit. For the expression compare Soph. 245 E: Τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου λέγοντας αὐθέατοι.

3. ὁποίων] The Bodl. has ὁποίων. But the second γε is awkward, and ὁποίων has good authority in T.

6. κατεπείγει [Supr. 172 D.

8. πάλιν ὀπτερὸν ἵνα μετελθεῖν] We seemed to ourselves to be launching into a wholly new inquiry, but we have fallen into the same track by a different route. Cp. Aristot. Eth. 1. 7. 2: Μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταύτην ἀφίσται. Aesch. Prom. 845: Ταῦτα μετελθών τῶν πάλαι λόγων ἱχνος.

κρείττον . . . περάναι] This is said in order to obviate the discouragement which may be felt at having to return again upon our footsteps. Cp. Soph. 261 A B.

13. ἐξῶν is neuter. For the plural cp. Rep. 2. 375 C: Ταῦτα δὲ ἀδιάφόρου ἐκεῖ.

16. ἦτοι εἰδέναι ἡ μὴ εἰδέναι] Socrates here takes up the thread of reflection introduced above, 165 B: Ἀρ' οὖν τοῦ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰδώτα τι τούτο δ' οὖν μὴ εἰδέναι; It was one weakness of the sensation doctrine that it led to this contradiction. The same opposition considered in the abstract is now used to
prove the impossibility of falsehood in opinion.
The discussion which follows probably bears some relation to the notions of Gorgias, and perhaps of Antisthenes. At all events it would seem to be a fragment of Eleaticism; being exactly analogous to the difficulties raised by Zeno against the possibility of motion. It runs parallel also to the subtleties of the later Megarians.

1. μεταξῆς... λέγω] The construction follows the analogy of χαίρειν ἐός. Cp. Soph. 258 E, where the phrase again occurs in a loose construction.

2. γινόν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν οὗτος] Because we choose to dwell on the absolute alternative, knowledge or ignorance. Cp. supr. 158 E: Μη ὑπολογίσωμεν, κ. τ. λ., where a limited 'Standpoint' is similarly emphasized.

Plato thus hints at the true solution of the difficulty, viz. the conception of a gradual process, which is afterwards presented under the image of the impressions on wax, etc.
The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις which had been developed in the Meno and Phaedo, is perhaps also held in reserve.

5. λείπεται] 'Remains'—when learning and forgetting are left out.

6. ἐς [Since that point is settled.]

7. ὑπό τι οἴδει] For τι thus interposed ep. infr. 192 A.

12. ἀ τὰ ψευδή δοξάζον] The articles refer to supr. 187 E.
την μὴ Ἡωκράτη εἰδότι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν π. 188
ὡς ὁ Ἡωκράτης Ὑθειττός ἢ ὁ Ὑθειττός Ἡωκράτης;

ΤΕΙΑ. Καὶ πῶς ἀν;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ οὗ μὴν, ἃ γέ τις οἶδεν, οւδέκα που ᾧ μὴν
5 οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδ’ αὐ ᾧ μὴ οἶδεν, ἀ οἶδεν.

ΤΕΙΑ. Τέρας γὰρ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἄν τις ἐτί ψευδὴ δοξάσει; ἐκτὸς
γὰρ τούτων οὐνατόν που δοξάζειν, ἐπείπερ πάντ’ ἢ
ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτων οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται
10 δυνάτων ψευδὴ δοξάσαι.

ΤΕΙΑ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὗ ταύτη σκέπτεον ὁ ζητοῦμεν, κατὰ
τὸ εἶδέναι καὶ μὴ εἶδέναι ἰόντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι
καὶ μὴ;

ΤΕΙΑ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Μή ἀπλοῦν ἢ ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ οὖντα περὶ ὅπου
δοξάζου οὐκ ἐσθ’ ὡς οὐ ψευδὴ δοξάζει, κἀν ὅπως ὁ
ἄλλος τὰ τῆς διάνοιας ἐχῇ.

4. Ἀλλ’ οὗ μὴν . . . ἂ οἶδεν
‘But surely when a man
knows anything, he cannot
take for that thing one which
he does not know, nor for what
he does not know can he take
what he knows.’ Cp. infr.
191 A, and note.

5. αὐτὰ] Cp. Phaed. 99 B:
‘Ο δὴ μοι φαίνονται . . . ὡς αἰτίον
αὐτὸ προσαγορείναι : and see
155 E.

6. Τέρας] Supr. 163 D, and note: Τέρας γὰρ ἂν ἐίθ’ ἂ
λέγεις. Phaed. 101 B, alib.

9. ἐν δὲ τούτοις] ‘And
under this alternative, viz. as
developed in the above
instances.

MS., by an obvious error, has
ζητοῦμεν. Cp. Polit. 276 C:
‘Ο λέγομεν, and v. ttr.
13. εἶναι] So the Coelolinian
MS. and the corrector of T.
Most MSS. have εἶδέναι.

16. Μή ἀπλοῦν ἢ] ‘May not
the case possibly be simply
thus?’ μὴ expresses συνείσφος
=‘I should not wonder if.’
Cp. Phaed. 67 B: Μή οὐ βεμπτόν
ἡ. Ibid. 69 A: Μὴ γὰρ οὐχ
αὕτη ἡ ὁρδή ἀλαγή, κ.τ.λ., μὴ
σχε自然界 τις ἡ τουαίτη ἀρετή.
Crit. 48 C: Μὴ . . ταύτα . .
σκέμματα ἢ; and see Ast. Lex.
sub v. For ἀπλοῦν in this
sense cp. supr. 147 C: Ἀπλοῦν
306: Πάντων οὖν ἄπλων ἐστὶ
τούτο ἢ . . ἐχει διαφοράν . . .
Aristot. Eth. N. 5. 9. 9: ‘Ἡ οὐδὲ
tουτο ἀπλοῦν.
p. 188. ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκὸς γ' αὖ, ὁ Σῶκρατες.
ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί ἔρωμεν, ὁ Θεαίτης, εάν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνῃ. Δυνατον δὲ ὥστη ὃ ἕλγεται, καὶ τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὧν δοξάσει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν όντων του εἴτε αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ; Καὶ ἡμεῖς δὴ, ὡς οὐκέτε, πρὸς 5 ἐντὰ ἑσσόμενον ὅταν γε μὴ ἀληθῆ, οὐχὶ οἴμονος.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς ἔρωμεν;
ΣΩ. Οὖτως.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθι ποιοῦ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐστιν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιοῦν;
ΣΩ. Εἰ τις ὁμὸς μὲν τι, ὁμοῖος δὲ οὐδέν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἐν γε τι ὁμοῖος, τῶν όντων τι ὁμοῖος.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγνωσί.
ΣΩ. Ὡν ἐν γε τι ὁμοῖος ὑν τι ὁμοῖος.
ΘΕΑΙ. Φαύνεται.

p. 189. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὤν ἄρα τι ἄκουν ἐν γε τι ἄκουει καὶ ὅν ἄκουει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

3. ὃ ἕλγεται] 'Which is herein asserted,' Buttman and Bekker conjecture λέγεται, which seems probable, but not necessary. Op. Phaed. 77 D: Ἀποδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅτι λέγεται καὶ πῶς, where there is a similar doubt.
11. Εἰ] Interrogative. 'I mean to ask whether (for example) a man who sees something, sees no single thing?'
13. ἐν γε τι ὁμοῖος The converse argument is used Rep. 5. 478 B (where it is asked, 'What is opinion concerned with?') ἡ οὖν τι αὖ δοξάζειν μὲν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδὲν; Ἀδύνατον. Ἀλλὰ ἐν γε τι δοξάζει ο δοξάζειν; Ναὶ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν μὴ δὲ γε οὐχ ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ὁμοίον ἐν προσαγωγόντω. Πάντως γε. This close relation between the ideas of unity and being, derived from Parmenides, appears frequently. See especially Soph. 237 D: Ἀκόνυτον τὸν τι λέγοντα ἐν γε τι λέγειν. The mind cannot recognise Being except where it finds its own impress of Unity.
10. know to be what I know, nor what I know to be what I do not know. And what other case (under the above alternative) is conceivable?
15. 2. The path of knowledge being thus hemmed in, we try the path of being. To think that which is not, is to think falsely. But can I think of what is not, either absolutely or with reference to anything? I cannot see, and yet see nothing.
And that which I see, being one thing, must have existence.
For unity and being are inseparable. The same is true of hearing and touch.
And of thought also.
To think what is not is to think nothing, and to think nothing is not to think.
False opinion, if it exists, must be something different from this.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἀπτόμενος δὴ τοῦ, ἐνὸς γε τοῦ ἀπτεταίρ. p. 181 καὶ ὄντος, ἐπερ ἐνὸς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτο.

ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἐν τι δοξάζει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ ἐν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὄν τι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγνώρισ.

ΣΩ. ὁ ἄρα μὴ ὃν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον, ὡς εἰσκεῖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε τὸ μὴ ὃν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλο τι ἄρ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδή δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλο εἰσκεῖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ *τε γὰρ οὕτως οὔτε ὡς ὁλίγον πρῶτον ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδής ἐστὶ δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ ὄν δὴ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ’ ἄρα ὅτε γιγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγορεύομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

Met. 3. 2. 1004 a: Ἀπόφασιν δὲ καὶ στέρησιν μᾶς ἐστι βεβαία
διὰ τὸ ἀμφιστῶς θεωρήθαι τὸ
ἐν, οὐ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἢ ἡ στέρησις (ἡ
γὰρ ἀπλῶς λέγομεν ὅτι οὐκ ὑπάρχει
eκέιν ἢ τοῖς γένει, κ.τ.λ.)
te seems required (as Van
Heusde observed), but γὰρ is
right. Cp. 190 E: Οὔτε γὰρ
tαύτῃ, κ.τ.λ.

οὔτε ὡς ὁλίγον πρῶτον] Viz.
cατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι,
188 C.
22. Ἀλλ’ ἄρα ἄδε γιγνόμενον]
‘But may it be supposed, then,
that what we express by this
name arises in the following
way?’ ‘In what way?’ ‘That
what we call false opinion is
really a sort of crossing of
opinions.’
3. Can it then be a cross-application or transference of thought? i.e. When I think one existing thing to be another? Theaetetus believes this must be the true falsehood.

Socrates claims credit for moderation in not pressing this contradiction in terms, and passes on.

1. 'Ἀλλοδοξίαν] This seems to have been a prevalent conception. Vid. Arist. Met. 3. 5. 1010 Α: Φασιν δει και των Ὀμηρον ταῦταν έχουσαν φαίνεσθαι την ἀδίκιαν, άιτα ἐπιστή των Ὅκτα, ως ἐξαιτη ὑπό την πληγήτως, κείεσθαι ἀλλοφορονέωσαν, άσε φρονούσας μέν καὶ τούς παραφρονέωσας, άλλως οὖ ταῦτα. He ascribes this application of Homer to Democritus, de An. i. 2. Cr. Herod. i. 85: Ἀλλοδοξίας τοῦ Κροίσου.

φομένοις] In apposition with the preceding verb, introduced by οὖν. This third case is linked on to the second, but is not, as H. Schmidt supposes, a subdivision of it. The three cases are (1) thinking what we do not know, (2) thinking what is not, (3) thinking cross-wise.


17. ἢν μὴ μάτην θαρρήσῃ] Supr. 163 С: ἢν καὶ αξίσαν, He refers to the boldness with which Theaetetus now answers, supr. 187 Β: Οὔτω... χρῆ... λέγειν προθέμεως.
When I take one thing for another, I must have either one or both things in my mind.

Either at once or in turn.

When I take one thing for another, I must have either one or both things in my mind.

Either at once or in turn.

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probably thinking of Odyssey 19. 224: 'Ερέω, ὡς μοι ἰδάνον ἔτυχον. Compare the φάσματα in the beginning of the dialogue. The semblance which the mind presents to me, when it thinks, is simply that of conversing, and of being engaged in question and answer with itself.'

2. ὅταν δε ἀρίστασα ὧν. But when it has come to a determination, whether slowly, or by darting swiftly to its conclusion, and so is now at one and not divided in judgment, we call this its opinion.'

13. παντός μᾶλλον...παντάσαις ὡρ᾽...ἀνάγεται] These adverbs give an almost dramatic vividness to the description of the process of thought. Note especially the liveliness of τα, which some critics have rejected. Cp. Phil. 38 C: Αὐτόνν...ἀνέριστον δὲ...ποτὲ ἀκούστω λεγαί τὴν πέτραν...

The Greek language from Homer downwards was peculiarly apt to suggest such reflections as these, διαλεκτική was its proper development. The following remarks of Col. Mure (Lit. of Greece, 2. 14. § 1) on the self-dialogue of Homer, apply in some degree to all Greek literature: 'Exclusively proper to Homer is his power of dramatizing, not merely action, but thought; not merely the intercourse between man and man, but between man and himself, between his passions and his judgment. The mechanism of which the poet here chiefly avails himself is to exhibit the person under the influence of excited feelings as communing with, or, as Homer defines it, addressing his own mind; discussing the subject of his soliciude under its various aspects as a question at issue between his judgment and himself. The conflicting feelings are thus, as it were, personified; while the current of the language, often the very sound of the words, is question and answer. When it has agreed with itself upon a final answer, we call this its opinion.

Opinion is a silent proposition.
To think this to be that, is to say, 'This is that.'
Now who ever said...
to himself.

Surely fair is foul, 'or 'wrong is right,' or 'odd is even.'

The breast of the man seems to be laid open before us, and in the literal sense of the term, we read his thoughts as they flit through his bosom.'

Note the liveliness with which fresh touches are thrown in. It must be remembered here that sensible perception is excluded from consideration for the present, as well as learning and forgetting. Everything is either known or unknown: present to the mind, or not present.

These words have been unreasonably questioned, on the ground that no limit can be set to the illusions of madness. Not to dwell on the general weakness of such minute philosophy,—the critics forget that

τὸν βοῦν is the ox, thought of as such. Cp. the words ἀμφότερα γε...τῇ ψυχῇ just below. This reference to the extreme case of madness which has been already cited (supr. 157 E) is quite in Plato's manner.

These words are intended to meet the difficulty which may have been felt about the general statement (τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον) ώσ παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἐτέρον ἐτέρων ἔτιν, in supr. B. Several of the MSS., including Bodl. and Coisl., have ἐτέρων δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἐτέρου τὸ ἐτέρων κατὰ ῥῆμα ταῦτα ἐστὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου, where ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει evidently refers to 189 E: ὢτι πᾶρα γα ἐπὶ ἐν μέρει. This cannot be adopted without rejecting περὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου as confusing the sentence. The drift would then be, 'You must not dwell upon the words as regards
things alternately presented to
the mind, seeing that the word
ἐτέρων, as far as the word goes,
is the same as applied to both.'
This would be an imperfect
way of developing the distinc-
tion thrown out above, and un-
like Socrates, who, especially
in this dialogue, always waits
for Theaetetus to follow him.
And it is equally necessary to
‘let the word alone,’ whether
the objects are conceived alter-
nately or both at once. The
words ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει may
therefore confidently be re-
jected as a mistaken gloss.

If the words ἐπειδή... ταῦτών
ἐστι are genuine, περὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου
must either be omitted or trans-
posed. But it is possible that
ἐπειδή, κ.τ.λ., has also crept in
from the margin, and this sus-
picion is so far confirmed by the
fact that the Bodl. p. m. wrote
ἐστιν. We thus revert to the
reading of T and several MSS.
ἀπειδή δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ρῆμα περὶ τοῦ
ἐτέρου. περὶ is often used rather
vaguely, e.g. Rep. 7, 538 E: Καὶ
περὶ δικαλον ἰσοίστως καὶ ἰσαμοῦ.
If δὲ καὶ σοι is retained, καὶ may
be understood with reference
to supr. 189 D, where Socrates
takes credit for not pressing
the words ἀλήθεις φεῦδοι. 'You,
too (as I did in the former
case), must let the word alone
in regard to the Other.'

But this is rather strained.
The version of Ficinus led some
critics to conjecture εἰ καὶ σοι
dοκεῖ. But this, as Buttman
observes, would not harmonize
with Theaetetus' reply. I have
ventured to change δὲ καὶ σοι
to δὲ ἐστιν σοι, an emendation
which has often occurred to
me in reading the passage.'
For the sense cp. Euthyd. 301
Α, where the word ἦς dwelt
upon: Τίνα τρόπον, ἐφ᾽, ἐτέρου
ἐτέρων παραγενομένου τοῦ ἐτέρου
ἐτέρων ἐν εἰ; 'Αρα τούτῳ, ἐφ᾽ον
ἐγὼ, ἀπορεῖς;... ἀλλ᾽ ἔγωγε σοῦ'
ἀν πάθα ὁμοὶ τοῦτο ἀπορήσαι ἄν
οὐ τὸ ἐτέρων ἐτέρων ἐστιν.

12. ἀναγκάζοιτο... δοξάζει]
which I am not thinking.

This transference, therefore, is also inconceivable.

We are in great straits. But we dare not face the consequences of failure until we have turned every stone.

These words are clearly given to Theetetus in the Cesena MS., as well as in Heindorf's edition.

3. ὡστε γὰρ ταύτῃ] 'The truth is, that the existence of false opinion in our minds does not appear on this any more than on the (two) former grounds.' The clauses, though connected outwardly by γὰρ, are rather parallel than consequent, as in 152 C. Cp. also supr. 182 B. In all these places some would change γὰρ to ὥστε.

8. πολλά . . καὶ ἄτομα] E.g. that it is impossible to distinguish the sophist from the true philosopher; and the other difficulties brought out in the Sophist.


12. ἀισχυνοιμη . . λέγω] 'I should feel ashamed on our behalf, if, while we were still in doubt, the strange consequences I refer to were pressed upon us.'

15. *ἀυτοί έκτο τοῦ γελοίου ἐστῶτες] 'When we are ourselves free from the absurdity,' 'exempt from the ridicule.' This point is not attained in the Theetetus; and this whole passage may be regarded as an anticipation of the Sophist.—The MSS. have πάσχοντες αὑτά (οὐ τὸ ἀναγκάζοντα όμολογεῖν τοιοῦτα, Wohlrab). But Ast's correction, αὑτῶς, is extremely probable. Heind. conjectures πάσχοντες αὑτό, αὐτοῖ, κ.τ.λ.
mistake them; e.g. No one ever said to himself, Good is evil. And if only one is present to me, I cannot discourse about them, e.g. if I am thinking only of the good, I cannot say, Good is evil. We are in great straits. For the result at which we seem in danger of arriving is contradictory to most important facts.

We must not appeal to these, however, until we have extricated our minds, if possible, from this metaphysical tangle. For logical and metaphysical difficulties are not to be solved 'ambulando,' but by a higher criticism of the forms of thought which have occasioned them.

In what follows, we are brought gradually back from the simple to the complex, from the more abstract to the more concrete. We are compelled to image to ourselves, what was discarded at a former stage of the inquiry (supr. 188 A), a process between the relativeness of sense and the absoluteness of knowledge, which, like every process, admits of degrees. Thus, it may be said, the idea of Motion returns upon us in a higher form.

The mind is a storehouse of old impressions, in which we are continually looking for the types of new ones. But the old impressions fade and get confused, and we fail to bring them with precision and clearness into contact with the new. Hence we sometimes think falsely.
We said it was impossible that I should think what I do not know to be what I know, also I should be ignorant of what I know.

But perhaps it is possible in a certain way; e.g. Theetetus knows Socrates, and yet may.

2. ἡμια, κ.τ.λ.] Supr. 188 C: ἀλλ' οὐ μή, κ.τ.λ. This passage proves that the phrase nearest to εἰς in all these expressions is the subject, and the more remote phrase, generally preceding it, contains the predicate.

5. τότε ὑπόπτευσα] This surmise was naturally suggested by the impossible case, which had been just stated, of Theetetus being mistaken for Socrates by one who knew neither of them.

6. τοίοιτον εἶναι] Sc. αὐτῷ, τὸ ψευδὴ δεξιάτα. τοίοιτον supplies the antecedent to δ. Others (Stephanus, H. Schmidt) omit the comma after ἐσαμεν, and take τοίοιτον as ἀδύνατον.

13. οὕτω] So as to imply knowledge of what we do not know.

ὅτε· ἵσω] This is the punctuation of the Bodleian MS. καὶ ἵσω, the reading of T and other MSS., is unnecessary. A qualifying clause is sometimes thus introduced before ἀλλά—without any particle of connection with what precedes. Compare Soph. El. 450: ἱμηρα μὲν τὰ', ἀλλ' ὅμως | ἄξιω, δέος αὐτῷ. Οἰδ. Col. 1615: ἵκηρας, μεῖν, οἶδα, παίδες ἀλλ' ἐν γάρ μόνον | θα πάντα λείπ οὐ ταῖ' ἔτος μυκῆμας. Eur. Alc. 353: ὅχραν μὲν, οἶμαι, τέρψων ἀλλ' ὅμως ἄρος | ψυχῆς ἀπαλαίην ἐν. Supr. 171 C: Εἰκὸς γε ἄρα... ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀναγκή, κ.τ.λ. Compare also the frequent asyndeton with πάντως. For ἵσωs... ἵσωs δὲ cp. Apol. 18 A: ἵσωs μὲν γάρ κεῖσιν, ἵσωs δὲ βελτίων δὲ τῆ... 'Perhaps the difficulty will not resist our treatment, or perhaps it will.'

ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟ ΕΧΩΜΕΘΑ, ἐν ὧν ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βασανίζειν. σκόπεις οὖν ἐν τῷ λέγω. ἄρα ἐστὶ μὴ εἰδότα τι πρότερον ὑστερον μαθεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ ἐστὶ μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὖθις ἐτέρον καὶ ἐτέρον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δὲ οὗ;

ΣΩ. Θές δὴ μοι λόγον ἕνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνόν κήρυξον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μεῖον, τῷ δὲ ἐλαττον, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρτέρον κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρον, ὁ καὶ σκληροτέρον, ἐνώς δὲ ὑγροτέρον, ἐστὶ δὲ οἷς μὲ- 10 τρίως ἔχοντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίθημι.

ΣΩ. Δόρου τοιώνν αὐτῷ φομεν ἐναι τῆς τῶν τοῦ risk the chance of failure, for; etc.

3. μαθήων] The tense is noticeable. Whatever difficulty may attend the conception of the process of learning and forgetting (μαθήων, ἐκμαγεῖον), it is certain that things are learnt and forgotten (μαθηύ, ἐκμαγεῖον). In what follows the process itself is imagined rather than analysed.

7. ὦ] Cp. Phileb. 33 D: Θεῖ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν, πα- θητών τὰ μὲν, ἀλλ. The image (which was repeated in later Greek philosophy) is not unlike Locke's illustration of the different kinds of memory. Hum. Und. 2. 10. §§ 4, 5: 'The brain in some retains the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like freestone, and in others little better than sand.' Ib. 29. § 3: 'If the organs or faculties of perception, like wax overhardened with cold, will not receive the impression of the seal from the usual impress wont to imprint it, or like wax of a temper too soft, will not hold it when well imprinted; or else, supposing the wax of a temper fit, but the seal not applied with sufficient force to make a clear impression—in any of these cases the print left by the seal will be obscure.'

8. κήρυξον ἐκμαγέον] Plato's image is not the common one of a waxen tablet, but of a 'block of wax,' such as was used for sealing. The word ἐκμαγέον is used first of the whole mass, afterwards of those parts of it which have received the particular impressions.


13. τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μυτρός] Hes. Theog. 54, Aesch. Prom. 461: Μνήμαν θ' ἀπάστων μοισο-
Μουσών μητρός Μηνησούνης, καὶ ἐς τοῦτο, ὅ τι ἂν ἐν p. 191. 

βουληθῶμεν μην μονεύσαι ὅν ἂν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχουσα αὐτὸ ταῖς ἀσθέσει 
καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποπνοοῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεία 

5 ἐννημανομένους. καὶ ὅ μὲν ἂν ἐκμαγῆ μηνονεύσκ 
tε καὶ ἐπισταθαι, ἐως ἂν ἐνὶ τὸ ἔδωλον αὐτοῦ. ὅταν 
δ' ἐξαλειφθῇ ἢ μὴ ὦν τοὺς γενηται ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπίλε- 

6 ἔστω οὕτως.

6. ῥα ἐξαλειφθῇ] 'Ven. II. 

corr. δ' ἐξάληφθη. Boud. et Vat. ἐξ 

omittunt.' Schanz. The Boul., 

however, has δ' in the margin 

by a later hand. The common 

reading is sufficiently probable: 

the regularity of the sentence 

is broken by the introduction of 

ἐως ἄν, so that instead of δ' ἔδω 

we have ἔστω δ'. Cf. supra. 158 

E: 'Ὄ ἄν... ὅταν, and notes. 

10. τοῖς] Viz. ἂν ἔδω καὶ 

ἀκούσῃ ἢ αὐτός ἐννοήσῃ (supr.) 

Although I know what is 

present to me in sensation, i.e. 

though I may have in me a 

previous impression of the same 

thing, yet I may mistake it, 

i.e. fail to identify it, when 

present, as the original of that 

previous impression.
THEAII. Νῦν δὲ τῶν λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Δεῖ οὖς λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διορισμένων, ὅτι ὁ μέν τις οἶδε σχῶν αὐτοῦ μνημείων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μή, τούτῳ οἴηθηναι ἑτέρον τι ὅν οἶδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἑκεῖνον τύπον, αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ μή νόμενον δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον. καὶ ὁ γε οἶδεν αὐτῷ, οἰηθήναι εἶναι ὁ μή οἶδε μὴ ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα· καὶ ὁ μή οἶδεν, ὁ μή οἶδεν αὐτῷ καὶ ὁ μή οἶδεν, ὁ οἴδεκα καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται γε, ἑτέρον τι ὅν αἰσθάνεται οἰηθήναι ἐναίναι· καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται, ὅν τι μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ τοῦ αἰσθάνεται, ὅν μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ἐν ὅν αἰσθάνεται. καὶ ἕτει γε αὐτῷ οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν ἀισθησίαν, οἰηθήναι αὐτῷ ἑτέρον τι ὅν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὐτῷ καὶ ἑκεῖνον τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν ἀισθησίαν, ἀδύνατον· ἔχεις εἰ ὅν τε· καὶ ὁ οἶδε καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεται ἔχεις

2. ἐξ ἀρχῆς διορισμένων] Laying down the following preliminary aphorisms. These are in fact a restatement of the points already agreed upon. There is a change of subject: δεῖ ὃς ἡμᾶς λέγειν.

6. δὲ γε οἴδεν] Sc. μὴ αἰσθάνομεν. Ἡ. not supposing him to have a sensible perception of either object.

8. καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται γε] Sc. μὴ εἶδος. Ἡ. not supposing him to know it. Both the above cases are distinguished from that in which the predicate is something both known and perceived.

13. καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησίαν] He holds the stamp left by the former sensation in a line with the present sensation, so that the two impressions coincide. Cp. inf. 194 B: ἐκαταμενόν μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος.

This is added so as to bear upon the case below, C.D.: 'ὅταν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, κ.τ.λ.

16. The second δ is justly questioned by Bonitz. ἔχεις τὸ μνημεῖον ὥρθος] Cp. such expressions as ὥρθος δυνατόν, ἐξ ὥρθος δυνατόν. The above statement may be put shortly thus: Mistake is impossible—1. Between things not perceived by sense, when we know both or one or neither of them. 2. Between things not known, when we have a sensible impression of one or both or neither of them. 3. Still more impossible, if that may be, between things, (a) both of which are known, both perceived by sense, and the knowledge of each of which is identified with its proper sensation: (b) One of which we know and also perceive sensi-
without
sensation.
Still less
when two
things are
known and
present to
sense, and
when the
sensation
and the old
impression
coincide: or
when
neither is
present to
the mind
at all.
But when
something,
either
known or
unknown,
is present
to sense,
and the
mind
brings to
meet the

bly, and identify the know-
ledge of it with the sensation:
(c) Both or either of which
we neither know nor perceive
sensibly.

The only cases left, in which
mistake is possible, are (1)
when one thing is known and
another perceived sensibly; or
(2) when two things are known
and also present to sense, but
we fail to connect knowledge
and sensation rightly.

3. καὶ ὅ ὁδὲ ὁδὲ... δή ἄλλων...
In order to exhaust
every conceivable case, the
verse or negative of each of
the foregoing cases, in which
knowledge and sense were com-
bined, must be fully stated.

6. ὑπερβάλλει ἀδύναμι. Ὅσον
Cp.
supr. B: Ἀθωνιστάτον ἐπὶ ἑκείνων
ἑν ὁδὸν τε. The genitive is
governed by ἀδύναμι. 'All these
cases are beyond everything in
regard to the impossibility of
any man's thinking wrongly in
any of them.' Cp. supr. 180 A.

9. ἢ αὖ ὅ ὅ ὅτι ἄλλων... μᾶθω] 'For perhaps if you state
them, I may better perceive
your meaning.' Cp. supr.
156 C: Ἐὰν ὅσον ἄπελεύφθη. The
question here = λέγω.

11-14. Ἐὰν ὅτι... καὶ ἄλ-
λοιανται] Error arises amongst
things already known, when
we mistake for these either (1)
other things already known
and now perceived through
sense, or (2) something now
perceived by sense but not pre-
viously known, or (3) when for
something known and perceived
we mistake something else
which is also perceived and
known. Cp. supr. 191 A: Ἡδίκα,
κ.τ.λ., and note.

15. ἄπελεύφθη] 'I am lost.'
For this use of the aorist of the
immediate past, where a per-
son reflects on his own state,
Όδε δὴ ἀνάπαλιν ἀκούε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεό-
δωρον καὶ ἐν ἑκατόμῳ μεμνημένος οἵος ἐστί, καὶ Θεα-
τητον κατὰ ταυτὰ, ἀλλα τι ἐνιοτεῖ μὲν ὅρῳ αὐτοῦς,
ἐνιοτε δὲ οὐ, καὶ ἀποκρινετὶ ποι ἀυτῶν, τοτὲ δὴ οὐ, καὶ
ἀκούω ἡ τίνα ἀλλην αἰσθησιν αἰσθάνομαι, τοτὲ δ᾽ ἄ
αισθησιν μὲν οὐδεμιᾶν ἐκο περὶ ὦμῶν, μέμνημαι δὲ
ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἤττον καὶ ἐπιστάμαι αὐτὸς ἐν ἑκατότῳ;

κ. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τούτῳ τοῖνυν πρῶτον μαθὲ ὁν βούλομαι δή-
λῶσαι, ὡς ἐστι μὲν ἂ οὐδεὶς μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἐστι δὲ το
αἰσθάνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕλπις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἂ μὴ οὐδεὶς, πολλάκις μὲν ἐστι
μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Ἡδὲ δὴ, ἐὰν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπίστηγ. Σωκράτης

p. 193. ἐπιγιγνώσκει Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεατητον, ὅρᾳ δὲ μηδέ-
τερον, μηδὲ ἀλλην αἰσθησιν αὐτῷ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν·
οὐκ ἃν ποτὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξάσειν ὡς ὁ Θεατητος ἐστὶ
Θεόδωρος. λέγω τι ἡ οὐδέν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, ἀληθῆ γε.

ΣΩ. Τούτῳ μὲν τοῖνυν ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἦν ὁ
ἐλεγκν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον τοῖνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γιγνώσκον 25
ὐμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γιγνώσκον, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μηδέ-
tερον, οὐκ ἃν ποτὲ ἀδ ὧηθεῖν, ἄν οἶδα, εἰναι ἃν μὴ
οἶδα.

cr. Soph. Aj. 693: "Εφερε' ἐστι
περικοροθεὶς δ' ἀνεπτομένας, ἀπο-
λειφθήσας is the opposite of ἐφε-
πεσθαί.
1. ὁδὲ δὴ ἀκούειν Cr. supr.
182 A B.
FEAI. 'Orphos.

ΣΩ. Τρίτον δὲ, μηδέτερον γιγανόσκων μηδὲ αἰσθανόμενον οὐκ ἂν οὐθεὶν, ὥς μη οἴδα, ἔτερον τω ἐστι, ὧν μη οἴδα. καὶ τάλλα τὰ πρότερα πάνθ᾽ ἔξης νόμιζε 5 πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτ' ἕγε ἐπεὶ σοῦ καὶ Θεοδώρου τὰ πυευδῆ δοξάσω, οὕτε γιγανόσκων οὔτε ἀγνοοῦ ἀμφοῦ, οὔτε τὸν μὲν, τὸν δ᾽ οὐ γιγανόσκων. καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταύτα, εἴ ἂρα ἔπει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕπομαι.

10 ΣΩ. Λείποντες τοινυν τὰ πυευδῆ δοξάσαι ἐν τοῖς, ὅταν γιγανόσκων σὲ καὶ Θεοδώρον, καὶ ἔχων ἐν ἐκεῖνος τῷ κηρίῳ ὁσπερ δακτυλίων σφόνιν ἀμφοῦ τὰ σημεῖα, σὰ διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ικανοῦ ὅρου ἀμφοῦ προθυμηθάντω, τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐκατέρων σημεῖον ἀπόδοσι τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὅψει, ἐμ- 15 βιβάζως προσαρμόσατε εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἰχνὸς ἢ νὰ γένεσαν αὐγνωρίσος, ἐν τούτων ἀποτυχών καὶ ὅσπερ οἱ ἐμπαλιν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω τὴν ἐκατέρων ὅψιν πρὸς τὸ ἄλλοτριον σημεῖου, ἢ καὶ οὗται ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὅψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀρι-

13. διὰ μακροῦ, κ.τ.λ.] 'Seeing both of you imperfectly far off, I endeavour to assign the right impression of memory to the right visual impression, and to make the latter stand in its own foot-print, so as to fit, that recognition may take place; and then failing to do so, and bringing the new and old stamps crosswise like men who put their sandals on the wrong feet.'

14. ἐμπαλιν ἐμπαλιν Mcr. προσαρμόσατε] Sc. τὶν ὅψιν. These words and the following (ἴνα γένηται αὐγνωρίσι) suggest an allusion to Aesch. Choeph. 205—211:

17. παραλλάξας] Cp. for the metaphorical use of this word (which here retains something of its literal sense) Tim. 71 E: Ὑδείες γὰρ εἰς ἄρισταν στήσθει μενυζή, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ καθ᾽ ὑπὸν . ποδηθεὶς . . . διὰ νόσον διὰ τίνα ἐνθουσιασμὸν παραλλάξας.

18. ἢ καὶ οὐ] 'Or my mind errs being affected in the same way as the sight is affected in looking at a mirror, when it shifts so that right becomes left.' Vision is conceived of as flowing from the eye to its object. Cp. Tim. 43.

19. δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταφροῦσιν] 'Shifting, right-side to left.' The words have given some trouble. Buttmann conjectured μεταφεροῦσιν, Hein-
ΤΕΛΕΤΗΤΟΣ. 187

π. 193. στερὰ μεταρρέουσης, ταύτων παθῶν διαμάρτω τότε
δὴ συμβαίνει ἡ ἑτεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδὴ δοξάζειν.

ΤΕΛ. Ὅταν γὰρ, ὁ Σάκρατες ἀλμασίως ὁς
λέγεις τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος.

ΣΩ. Ἡ μὴ τοίνυν καὶ ὡς ἀμφότεροις γιγνώσκων τὸ
μὲν πρὸς τῷ γιγνώσκειν αἰσθανόμαι, τὸν δὲ μῆ,
τῇ δὲ γνώσει τοῦ ἔτερου μὴ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν ἔχον,
ὁ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον καὶ μου τότε οὐκ
ἐμάθον.

ΤΕΛ. Οὐ γὰρ οὕν.

ΣΩ. Τούτο μὲν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γιγνώσκων τὸν ἔτερον
καὶ αἰσθανόμενον, καὶ τὴν γνώσιν κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν
αὐτοῦ ἔχον, οὐδὲντε οὕσεται εἰναι αὐτοῦ ἔτερον
των ὧν γιγνώσκει τε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὴν γνώ-

3. ὃς] So Bodl. and other
MSS., but some have ὧς.
340: 'Your description tallies won-
derfully with one's experience
of what Opinion is.' The other
reading (which is possibly
right) requires a comma at
Σάκρατες, 'One's experience of
opinion tallies wonderfully
with your description.' (Ces.
&. Schanz is silent about the
reading of Τ.)
7. τοῦ ἔτερον] Viz. of the
former, which is present to
sense.
8. ὃ καὶ τοῖς πρόσθεν] His-
before γιγνώσκον: but for the
transition from the 1st to the
3rd person when the nomi-
native is indefinite cp. infr.
195 D E: ὀνθηδεῖμεν . . . ὀνθ-
θεῖσιν.
14. ὡς γιγνώσκον] This is the
Bodleian reading, which seems
preferred to ὅν, the reading of T. The reference of ἐκείνου is thus made more distinct.

1. ἦν γὰρ τούτο;] ‘We agreed to this!’

6. ἐγὼ... ἔχειν] ‘Or having some other sensible perception of them, to fail in holding the previous impressions of both, each over against the sensation which belongs to it.’ This reading of Van Heusde is supported by T and other MSS., which read τῷ σημείῳ. The Bodl. has τὸ σημεῖον. Stallb. reads τὸ σημεῖον... ἐκάτερον. Heindorf, τῶν σημείων... ἐκάτερον.

8. ἀλλ’ οἶνον τοξότην φαύλον] I. e. we try, sometimes in vain, to make our memory coincide with present facts. We are beginning to have a livelier conception of the movement of the mind and of the remoteness of sensible things from our notions of them.

12. Καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν] ‘So likewise when,’ etc. In the former case both objects were known, and both present in sensation: in this, while both are known, one only is present to sense.

13. τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀποφύγος αἰσθη- 


15. εἰπήθητο] Sc. αὐτῶν. Most MSS. read μηδὲ ἔγραθε, but the correction of the Bodl. is in the ancient hand.

18. ἐν αὐτοῖς... ἡ δέσα] ‘Here, and here alone, opinion twists...
στρέφεται καὶ ἐλίττεται ἡ δόξα ζευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς
gιγνομένη, καταντικρὸ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὑθὺ τὰ οἰκεία
συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἀληθῆς, εἰς
πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ζευδῆς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὦ Σωκράτε, λέγεται; 5
ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοῖνυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸ
ἐρεῖς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τάληθες δοξᾶζει καλῶν, τὸ δὲ
ζευδόσθαι αἰσχρόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ’ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τάτα τοῖνυν φασίν ἐνθέντει γίγνεσθαι. ὅταν 10
μὲν ὁ κηρός του ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθὺς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ
λείος καὶ μετριός * ὀργασμένος ᾗ, τὰ ῥάντα διὰ τῶν
αισθήσεων, ἐνοχμανόμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη Ὁμήρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ
δ ὁμοιώματα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις καθαρὰ τὰ στημέα 15
ἐγγυγμόμενα καὶ ἱκανός τοῦ βάθως ἑχουσά πολυχρόνια
and twirls about, becoming true and false alternately.' Cp.
the language of Rep. 5. 479 D: "Ὅτι τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νύμμα...
μεταξὺ που κυλινδιέται, κ.τ.λ.
3. ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους] 211
(1) τύπος is here the present im-
pression, which we endeavour
to fit into the mark left by the
former one (ἀποτύπωμα). τύπος
can scarcely be (2) 'the form
of the object.' This would be
inconsistent with the previous
use of the word, 192 A.
6. μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς] Plato
is satirizing the fallacy of sup-
posing that physical illustra-
tions can serve to explain the
operations of the mind.
10. φασίν] This may or
may not imply a reference to
some contemporary doctrine.
It indicates the half mythical
tone which Socrates has as-
sumed. He knows nothing
of himself, but only repeats
what he has heard.
12. ὀργασμένος 'Tempered,'
This word has been restored
from Timæus to Suidas, the
latter of whom quotes this
passage. MSS. ὀργασμένος.
τὰ ῥάντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων...
ἐνοχμανόμενα . . . καθαρὰ τὰ στη-
μέα ἑγγυγμόμενα] The thread
of the sentence is resumed in
295 D: Πᾶν τοιούτων . . . ἔμο-
βαινον . . . γέλως ἄν . . . γέρωντο
τῶν τοιούτων . . . Phaed. 69 B C:
Χωριζόμενα δὲ, κ.τ.λ.
14. κέαρ] The Homeric form
is κgps. But κέαρ, although still
a poetical form, might be felt
to harmonize better with Attic
Greek. See above, 173 Ε,
and note.
16. ἱκανός . . ἑχουσά] 'Being
adequate in respect of their
depth.'
impure, when the impressions are either imperfect or faint, or short-lived, or crowded, or coarse and dim, so that it is difficult for the mind to make each sensation correspond to its proper footprint.

2. τῶν αἰσθήσεων 'Do not fail in identifying the new impressions with the old.' The genitive depends on παραλλάττοναι, like τοὺς σκοτοῦς above.

3. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ δότα... καλεῖται] (1) There is here a similar irregularity to that noticed above. The sentence begins as though it were to be σαφῆ γὰρ... δότα (ἐν τῇ σμείᾳ) ταχὺ εἰρύσκοντων, or something of the kind; but the thought grows as we proceed: and σαφῆ... δότα is left as an accusativus pendens. What follows is to be construed thus: ταχὺ διανύσματος (οἱ τοιοῦτοι ταῦτα) δὲ δότα καλεῖται, ἐκεῖστα ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκμαγεῖα. 'Such persons quickly distribute things (as we term them) each to the place of its own former impress upon the block.'

Or (2) ἐκμαγεῖα may possibly here, as in Legg. 7, 800, 801, mean the mould or form of the seal which gives the impression. Cp. supra, note on ἀντιπνώματα καὶ τόπους, (2). This gives a simpler construction and a good meaning, but ἐκμαγεῖα is used in the other sense infr. E. 'For they quickly assign them (τὰ σμεῖα) as being distinct, and having room enough, each to its proper (sensible) original, or so-called reality.'

5. ὁ δὲ δότα καλεῖται] Supr. 152 D: 'Α δέ φαμεν εἶναι, 153 E. The latter part of the dialogue does not forget the earlier part.

σοφὸς] Supr. 161 D, 167 B.

8. λάτιον... κέαρ] II. 2. 851: Πυλαμίνες λάτιον κῆρ. 16. 554: Πυλαμίνες λάτιον κῆρ. In Homer the epithet 'shaggy' is transferred from στίχους to κῆρ,—but is here understood of a rugged surface that will not take clear impressions. The wisdom of Homer consists in his knowing of the κῆρος, rather than in his praise, which is, of course, mistaken. But Plato is satirizing the allegorical method of interpretation, which may have been often not less absurdly applied.

9. ὁ πάντα σοφὸς σωμάτι] To appreciate the irony here, it is well to compare Soph. 233 D E, where the parallel is drawn between the man who 'creates' everything and the man who knows everything; as well as Rep. 10. 596, sqq.
ΤΗΝΗΤΟΣ.  191

p. 194. καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἢ ὑγρὸν σφόδρα ἢ σκληροῦν, ἢν μὲν ὑγρὸν, εὐμαθεῖς μὲν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γίγνονται, ἢν δὲ σκληροῦν, τάναντια. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιοι καὶ τραχιόν, λιβαδεῖς τι ἢ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμειγνύσις ἐμπλεκον, ἔχοντες, ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα ἰσχυον. ἀσαφῆς δὲ καὶ οί τὰ σκληρὰ βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ἔνει. ἀσαφῆ δὲ

p. 195. καὶ οἱ τὰ ὑγρά: ὑπὸ γάρ τοῦ συγχείοθα ταχὺ γίγνονται ἀμυδρά. εάν δὲ πρὸς πάσι πούτως ἐπὶ ἀλλήλων συμπεπτωκότα ἢ ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας, εάν τοῦ σμικροῦ ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἐτι ἀσαφέστερα ἐκεῖνον. πάντες οὖν οὕτωι γίγνονται οἷοι δοξάζεις ψευδῆ. ὅταν γὰρ τι ἄρωσιν ἢ ἄκολοφον ἢ ἐπινοοῦσι, ἔκαστα ἀπονέειν

3. τάναντια] I. e. δυσμαθεῖς μὲν, μὴμαθεῖς δὲ. Plato is again thinking of the rare combination of brilliancy with solidity, which is present in Theetetus, supra 144 A.

λάσιοι] ‘Shaggy.’ Here, as in the case of δυσμαθεῖς, we experience what is a frequent difficulty in Plato, that of determining the precise ethical meaning with which he adapts an Epic word.

4. λιβαδεῖς τι] ‘Those in whom it is shaggy and rugged, a gritty substance, or one filled with an admixture of earth or dung.’ The correction λιβαδές τε (Ficin. Haed.) avoids the inconsistency of putting as a single case what are spoken of above as two (λάσιοι... ἢ... κοπρῶδες): ‘In whom it is shaggy and rugged and stony, or full of the admixture of earth or dung.’


10. οὗτοι] Cp. supr. 191 D: ‘Τις αὐτοί ἐννοοῦσιν. It may be asked, whether these expressions do not provide for the difficulty that is raised afterwards about 11 and 12? The answer probably is, that the difficulty which is brought into full light afterwards, is here silently anticipated. (Compare the introduction of ἄγαθον and καλὸν in 157 D, and the deliberate slurring over, in 188 C, of the case which is afterwards to be recognized, 191 A. The inconsistency must be admitted, but it is not necessary, with H. Schmidt, to condemn the words.

The case supposed, though not distinctly stated, may be that in which an impression of sense calls up an alien association: i.e. the second of the two cases given above, 194 A.

12. ἢ ἐπινοοῦσι] Cp. supr. 191 D: ‘Τις αὐτοί ἐννοοῦσιν, a fresh image is in-
ταχὺ ἐκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς τέ εἰσι καὶ ἀλ— p. 195. λοτριονομοῦντες παρορῶσι τε καὶ παρακοῦντες καὶ παρανοοῦσι πλεῖστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὖ ὄντοι ἐφευρησμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ὄρθοτατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὦ Σῶκρατες. ΣΩ. Φῶμεν ἁρα ἐν ἡμῖν ἰσχείς δόξας εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθείς δὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς.

ΣΩ. Ἡδὴ οὖν οἱ ὁμοθετα ἰκανῶς ὁμολογήσθαι ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔστοι ἀμφιτέρα τούτω τῷ δόξα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡπερφυὸς μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Δεινὸν τε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὃς ἀληθῶς κυνδυνεύει καὶ ἀνθρὲς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀδολέσχης.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δὲ; πρὸς τί τούτ' ἐπεις;

ΣΩ. Τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ δυσμαθὴν δυσχεράνα καὶ ὅσο

introduced in Plato’s usual manner. The touches of humour have led some critics to suppose that Plato is alluding to contemporary opinions (supr. 191 C, note on l. 8). But may he not be laughing at himself?

The description of the act of recollecting in the Philebus, 34 B, should be compared with the present passage: Ἠκαστὸ ὁμοθέτα πάθη ἡ ψυχή, τοῖς ἄνυμον τὸ σῶμα τούτου ἐστὶ ἐν ἑαυτῇ δὲ τὶ μᾶλλον ἀναλαμβάνει, τότε ἀναμιμήσκεσθαι που λέγομεν. ἡ γὰρ; Πάνω μέν οὖν. Καὶ μή καὶ ὅταν ἀπολύσασα μή τ γείτοις αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἑν ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ἀναλαμβάνει τοῦτο ἀναμιμήσθησαι καὶ μήθη που λέγομεν. The former and simpler process corresponds to the search for the impression upon the wax; the latter to the hunt in the aviary for a missing bird.

15 Ἠκαστα . Ἠκαστοι]; 1) τα δευτεροτα ἐκμαγεῖος, καὶ 2) τα σημεία τοῦ οἴσιν. See above, note on σαφῆ γάρ, p. 1. 194 D, l. 3.

1. λοτριονομοῦντες] ‘Misappropriating,’ i. e. ‘Assigning wrongly.’

3. καλοῦνται αὖ ὄντοι] αὖ reffers to supr. 194 D: Καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ ὄντοι καλοῦνται. ἀμαθεῖς is the opposite of σοφοῖ, the words ἐφευρήσμενοι τε δὲ τῶν ὄντων being inserted by way of explanation.

13. Δεινὸν τε] The old editions had γε. The abruptness of the reading in the text is better than such a meaningless connection. Socrates breaks out, after a pause, with an expression, the relevancy of which does not at once appear.
p. 195. ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. τί γὰρ ἂν τις ἄλλο θεῖο ὄνομα, ὅταν ἂνοι κατὸ τοὺς λόγους ἐλκη τις ὑπὸ νοσθείας οὗ δυνάμενος πεισθήναι, καὶ ἢ δυσπάλλακτος ἢ' ἐκά-
η στον λόγον;

ΤΕΑΙ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ τί δυσχεραίνεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐ δυσχεραίνομαι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεδοικα ὡ τι ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἂν τις ἔρηται με. Ἔσθεὶς ἡ ψευδὴ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐστιν ἔφοβον ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὐτὲ ἐν ταῖς διανοίασι, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῇ συν-
νάψει ἀισθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν; Φήσω δὲ ἐγὼ, οἴμαι, 10 καλλοπὶ ἐμένος ὡς τὶ εὐρηκότων ἦμων καλὸν.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἐμοί γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὧν Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχρῶν εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ ἀποδειγμένον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόνων, φήσει, λέγεις ὅτι αὐτὸν ἀνθρωποῦν ὅπως διανοοῦμεν μόνον, ὅρῳ μὲν ὡ τι, ὑπὸν οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὑπὸ καὶ ὅρῳ μὲν ὡτε ἀπτό-
μεθα, διανοοῦμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἄλλα οὐδὲν αἰσθανό-
μεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ; Ταῦτα, οἴμαι, φήσω λέγειν.

ΤΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἄρθρος γε.

Ε ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, φήσει, τὰ ἐνδέκα, ὧ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἦ σα 
διανοεῖται τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἂ
ποτε ὑπὸ καὶ ὅρῳ δῶδεκα εἶναι, ἂ μόνον αὐτοῖς ἔ
τιν ὅδε, σὺ ἄποκρινοι.

ΤΕΑΙ. ἄλλα ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ὅτι ὅρῳ μὲν ἂν τις ἦ

2. ἦν κατὰ τοὺς λόγους ἔλεγ̄
τις] Compare the still livelier image supr. 191 C: 'Εν ὧ 
ἀνάγκη πάντα μετατρίφωσα λό-
γον Βασιλείου.

14. οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις ὅτι 
αὐ] 'Is it not then part of your 
thesis, he will say, that on 
the other hand ...' If mis-
take arises upon the wrong 
union of sensation and thought, 
thought cannot be mistaken
when unaccompanied by sen-
sation. (Cp. supr. 190 C.) The 
opposition between these two 
cases is expressed by αὐτ. Most 
MSS. have φήσει. But φήσει 
is in Par. 1812.

16. ἦν ὡσ] 'Which again,' 
i.e. as well as the man.

20. *φήσει] Boll. φή 
with Vat. Ven., P., φής [T. Stephanus 
corr.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

έφαπτόμενος οίρθείή τά ἐνδέκα δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μέντοι p. 195.
ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα
dοξάσεις εὔτως.

ΣΩ. Τι οὖν; οἱ τινὰ πῶς ποτὲ αὐτῶν ἐν αὑτῷ
5 πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἐπτὰ καὶ p. 196.
pέντε προθέμεναν σκοπεῖν μηδ' ἄλλο τοιοῦταν, ἀλλ'
αὐτά πέντε καὶ ἑπτά, ἃ φας εἰ ἡμεῖς ἐν τῷ
ἐκμαγείᾳ εἶναι καὶ πιεῦσῃ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι,
tαῦτα αὑτὰ εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων ἦδη πῶς ποτέ ἐσκέψατο
10 λέγων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν πόσα ποτ' ἔστι, καὶ ὁ
μὲν τις εἴπεν οἴηθες ἐνδέκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα,
ἡ πάντες λέγουσι τε καὶ οἴοντα δώδεκα αὑτὰ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ τόν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ
ἐνδέκα· ἐὰν δὲ γε ἐν πλείον ἀριθμῷ τις σκοπήται, ὡς
15 μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἷμαι γάρ σε περὶ παντὸς μᾶλ-
λον ἀριθμὸν λέγειν.

7. αὑτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά] The insertion of the article after
αὑτὰ does not seem necessary, though it may possibly be
right.
ἐκεῖ... ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείᾳ] ‘In that
block of which we spoke.’
μνήμεια] ‘Records.’ At this
stage of psychological inquiry, Memory is made to do the
work of Abstraction.
9. εἰ τις ἀνθρώπων] The ques-
tion is resumed with εἰ, depend-
ing on λέγω, which has broken
the regularity of the sentence.
‘I mean to ask if...’ If the
sentence had proceeded regu-
larly, it would be followed by
σκοποῦμεν... εἰπεῖν. But εἰ
ti, &c., follows λέγω = ἔρωτο.
10. λέγων πρὸς αὐτῶν] Socrates
refers to his own description of
the process of thinking, supr.
189, 190.

14. ἐὰν δὲ γε] Thesetetus is
permitted to enlarge a little
upon the subject of calculation,
with which he is familiar (supr.
145 D). We seek to identify
the sum of 7 and 5, of which
we have thought (ἐνοίκοσμεν) with the corresponding number
in our minds; and by mistake
we identify it with 11 instead of
12.

The statement of this case
shows the inadequacy of the
figure we have adopted. For
where are the 7 and 5 and the
sum of them of which we think?
They are not in sensation:
must they not then be in the
waxed block? The former
difficulty returns—we have
taken one thing which we
know for another thing which
we know.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣ.

p. 196. ΣΩ. Ὄρθως γὰρ οὐκέτα ἐνθαμοῦ ἔτι ἢ μὴ τί *πότε γίγνεται ἄλλα ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγεύᾳ δώδεκα οἰδόθηναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικε γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρῶτους πάλιν ἄνθηκε λόγους; ὁ γὰρ τούτο παθών, ὁ οἶδα, ἢ ἐτερον αὐτὸ οἶδα, ἢ ἐναντίον οἷον ἦν, ἢ ἑφαμεν ἄδυνατον, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ ὁ ἡμακάζωμεν μὴ ἐναι ψευδηθῇ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτά ὁ αὐτὸς ἄναγκαζομεν εἰδῶς μὴ εἰδέναι ἁμα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλληδότατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀλλ' ὅτι οὖν δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν ἃ τὰ ψευδηθῇ δόξαμεν ἢ διανοιαὶ πρὸς αἰσθησις παραλλαγήν. ἢ γὰρ τούτῃ ἢν, οὐκ ἂν ποτέ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς διανοιμαῖσι ἐψευδομέθα. νῦν δὲ ἦτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδῆς δόξα, ἢ τις οἴδει, οἷον τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων ἑνώτερα αἴρει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀπορον αὖρεσιν προτίθης, ὥστε Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερα γε κινδυνεύει τὸ λόγος οὐκ εἰσεν. ὡμοὶ δὲ, πάντα γὰρ τολμήσεως, τι εἰ ἐπικείμενον ἀνακοινώτευσώμεν;

1. *πότε*] MSS. πάντες. Heind. corr. οἴδατέν αὐτῷ, 8c. τῶν σκοπούμεν. 5. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρῶτους] 'The discussion has reverted to its first stage.' Supr. 88 B. Comparing Phil. 43 C, one is tempted to read ἄν ἡμοι.
8. ἡμακάζωμεν ἢ ἡμακάζωμεν] 'It was by this very argument we tried to make the non-existence of false opinion inevitable, because otherwise it would be inevitable that the same person should know and be ignorant at once.' 11. ἀλλα ὅτι οὖν] 'Anything but this.' So Bodl. Most MSS. give ἀλλα τι οὐκ.
18. ἀμφότερα] Viz. τὸ εἶναι ψευδῆς δόξαν and δὲ τοῖς οἷον οἷον τε εἶναι μὴ εἰδέναι. 19. τι ἀνακοινώτευτω] 'How, if we were for once to venture on a shameless course?' The distinction between potential and actual now to be made requires a definition of the act of knowing. The difference meant is analogous to that observed by Aristotle between ἐπιστήμην and θεωρέω; which is his favourite example of the difference between εἶναι and ἔννοια. Op. Eth. N. 1. 8: Ἀπαθής ὁ δ' οὐ μερόν ἐν κτήσει ἢ ἐν χρήσει τὸ ἰματων ὑπολαμβάνειν. The ten-
To meet this difficulty, we venture to say what it is to know, — (a daring step, as we are still to seek for the definition of knowledge.)

THEAI. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἕθελήσαντες εἶπεῖν πούν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι.

THEAI. Καὶ τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον;

ΣΩ. Ἐσκάς οὐκ ἐννοεῖν, ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν ἐς ἄρχης ὁ λόγος ζήτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ὅσ οὐκ εἰδόσι τί ποτ' ἐστὶν.

THEAI. Ἐννοῶ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐσπεῖρ' οὐκ ἀναυδὲς δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαινεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἰνόν ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὁ Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεψα τοῦ μὴ καθαρὸς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκες γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γνωρίσθησαι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐντυλίγεσθαι. διενορθία τῆς ἐπιστήμης εἷλαν ἐντυλίγεσθαι, ὅπερ εἰς τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲ φάσκαντες εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστήμην ἔχαν γεγονόσειν ἐντυλίγεσθαι, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐντυλίζοντας τοῦ λόγου τὸν μὲν δὴ καὶ παντάπασι μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἐντυλίγοντας, οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμην τὸ αὐτόνομον εἶναι, ἀν τὶς μὴ ὁδεῖ μηδαμῶς, ταῦτα εἰςεῖναι ἀμύς γε ποιοῖς· καίτως ὡς ἐντυλίζεται ὁ οὐκ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῷ.

ΣΩ. Ἐσκάς οὐκ ἀναυδέσσας δοκεῖς μὴ εἰδόσι τί ποτ' ἐστὶν;

To meet this difficulty, we venture to say what it is to know, — (a daring step, as we are still to seek for the definition of knowledge.)

THEAI. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἕθελήσαντες εἶπεῖν πούν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι.

THEAI. Καὶ τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον;

ΣΩ. Ἐσκάς οὐκ ἐννοεῖν, ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν ἐς ἄρχης ὁ λόγος ζήτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ὅσ οὐκ εἰδόσι τί ποτ' ἐστὶν.

THEAI. Ἐννοῶ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐσπεῖρ' οὐκ ἀναυδὲς δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαινεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἰνόν ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὁ Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεψα τοῦ μὴ καθαρὸς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκες γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γνωρίσθησαι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐντυλίγεσθαι. διενορθία τῆς ἐπιστήμης εἷλαν ἐντυλίγεσθαι, ὅπερ εἰς τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲ φάσκαντες εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστήμην ἔχαν γεγονόσειν ἐντυλίγεσθαι, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐντυλίζοντας τοῦ λόγου τὸν μὲν δὴ καὶ παντάπασι μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἐντυλίγοντας, οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμην τὸ αὐτόνομον εἶναι, ἀν τὶς μὴ ὁδεῖ μηδαμῶς, ταῦτα εἰςεῖναι ἀμύς γε ποιοῖς· καίτως ὡς ἐντυλίζεται ὁ οὐκ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῷ.


ΤΟΙΟΕΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

7. ἦν ἀντιλογικός] The apodosis (βιαλεγόμεν ἄν ὁς τούτων ἀπεχόμενος) is omitted, and the construction changed, because, from supposing himself ἀντιλογικός, Socrates proceeds to imagine the effect of the presence of such a man upon the discussion.

10. τούτων τ᾽ ἂν ἐσό νομολογοῦσι; Not exactly with Heind., Stallb., 'abstinere nos jubeatur,' but (1) (sub. δύϊ) 'would have dwelt on the necessity of abstaining,' or, possibly, (2) (throwing an emphasis on ἦμαν), 'Would have professed to abstain.' The kind of sophistry intended is illustrated supr.

157 Β.κ. 165-7. τούτων ἀπε-χομενος is not, as some interpreters would have it, 'without definition,' but 'without assuming the reality of knowledge.'
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. 'Ακήκοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσι τὸ ἐπιστάσθαι; π. 197
ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ισως. οὐ μέντοι ἕν γε τῷ παρόντι μνή-
μονεύω.

ΣΩ. 'Επιστήμης ποὺ ἔχει φασὶν αὐτὸ εἰναι.
5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἡμεῖς τοῖνυν σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἰ-
πομεν ἐπιστημὴς κτήσων.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί οὖν δὴ φῆσεις τούτο ἐκείνον διαφέρειν;
ΣΩ. 'Ισως μὲν οὐδέν. ὁ δὲ οὖν δοκεῖ, ἀκούσας
10 συνδοκίμαζε.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εαν πέρ γε οἷος τ’ ὁ.
ΣΩ. Οὐ τοῖνυν μοι ταὐτὸν φαίνεται τῷ κεκτησθαι
tο ἔχειν. οἷον ἐκ ἱμάτιον πριάμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατῆς
ἂν μη ὑφούσθη ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτό, κεκτήσατα
15 δὲ γε φαίμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὄρθως γε.
ΣΩ. 'Οραι δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐι δυνατόν οὕτω κε-
κτησέντι τῇ ἐχεῖν, ἄλλη ὀσπερ εἰ τις ὁριθας ἀγρίας,
περιστερᾶς ἢ τι ἄλλο, ὑπεύοσας οίκοι κατασκευασά-
20 μενες περιστερεώνα τρέφοι. τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἂν πού
τις φαίμεν αὐτὸν αὐτὰς ἢ ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτηται.
ἢ γὰρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

4. 'Επιστήμης... ἔχει] Euthyd.
277 B: τῷ δ’ ἐπιστασθεὶς... ἄλλο
tῇ ἕχειν ἐπιστήμην δὴ ἕστων;
Phed. 76 B.
13. "ἐκ ἱμάτιον"] Stallb. attempts to defend the optative
without εἰ (which has only slight authority), from Rep.
549 A, ἄγριος εἰς, which is not
quite parallel, (and there is
MS. authority for inserting ἅν.)
The comparison of 193 A: Ἐω-
κράτης ἐπιγραφάσας, κ.τ.λ., sug-
gests the conjecture φορέω as an
alternative reading. The Bodl.
has φορῶν as an early correc-
tion.
18. μὴ ἔχειν, ἄλλ’] This oppo-
sition between minute parts of
a sentence is characteristic
199 Α.Β.
20. ὁσπέρ] The apodosis (sc.
οὕτω τὴν ἐπιστήμην κεκτησαί) is
suppressed,—the main thread
being resumed in πᾶλιν δὴ, κ.τ.λ.
οίκοι τρέφοι.
ΤΡΟΠΟΝ δὲ γ' ἄλλον οὐδεμιαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτάς παραγεγονείναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκείῳ περιβάλῳ ὑποχειρίᾳ ἐποίησατο, λαβέων δὲ καὶ σχεῖν, ἐπειδὴ διόκηται, θερευσμένῳ ἢν ἄν ἀεὶ ἐθέλη, καὶ πάλιν ἀφεῖναι· καὶ τούτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν, ὅποσάκις ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρυκόν τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν ὡς οἶδ' ὦ τι πλάσμα, νῦν αὖ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεών τινα παντοδαπῶν ὀρνίθων, τὸς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας οὐσίας χωρίς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πᾶσῶν ὅπῃ ἄν τύχωσι πετομένας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πεποίησθοι δὴ, ἄλλα τι τούτων ἔχετεν;

ΣΩ. Παιδίων μὲν ὄντων, φάναι χρῆ, ἐναὶ τούτῳ 15 τὸ ἀγγείων κενῶν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐπιστήμης νοῆσαι ἢν δ' ἄν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθερέξῃ ἐις

2. δύναμιν μὲν] Heind. well compares infr. 301 B: Πείσα μὲν.
3. λαβέων... ἐθέλη] 'To take and to hold, when he desires to do so, any one of them which he chooses to catch.'
8. κήρυκών τι] 'We sought to establish in the mind a sort of moulding-block of wax.'
11. τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας, κ.τ.λ.] The distinction indicated is probably that between, (1) individuals in the aggregate (πολλὰ ἀθροισθέντα, 157 B); (2) intermediate abstractions, as the virtues, numbers, etc.; (3) the highest abstractions, as Being, Goodness, resemblance, difference, etc. Little is thought, however, of any distinction between memory and abstraction, as appears from the interchange of the terms μνημεῖον and διακόμη in what precedes.
12. κατ' ὀλίγας] E.g. the virtues, arts, etc.
14. ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πᾶσῶν] E.g. τὴν οἰκίαν... τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέστηται, 186 Α. The supremacy of certain universal forms, or categories, is a conception which belongs to the maturity of Plato's thought. (See Introduction.)
15. φάναι χρῆ, εἴπα] Although φάναι χρῆ is parenthetical, the sentence receives an indirect turn from it. νοῆσαι, sc. χρῆ.
16. ἀγγείων] 'Receptacle.'
τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἢ εὑρηκέναι π. 197. τὸ πρᾶγμα ὁ ἢ ἐν αὐτῇ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τούτῳ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡστο.

5 ΣΩ. Τὸ τοῖνοι πάλιν ἢν ἢν βούλειται τῶν ἐπιστημ. — p. 198. μῶν θηρεύει καὶ λαμβάνει ἵσχειν καὶ αἴθις ἀφιέναι, σκότει τὸν δὲ ἄσχειν, εἰτε τῶν αὐτῶν ἢ τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτε ἐκτάστω, εἰτε ἐκεῖνον. μαθήσει δ᾿ ἐνθήνει σαφέστερον τί λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγεις

10 τέχνην;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημῶν ἀρτίον τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντὸς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἑπολαμβάνω.

15 ΣΩ. Ταύτη δὴ, οἷμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτὸς τῆς ὑποχειρίας ταῦ ἐπιστήμης τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἔχει καὶ ἀλλὰ παραδιδοῦν ὁ παραδιδοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάκτες,

20 παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κεκτήσατε ἐν τῷ περιστεραίῳ ἑκείνῳ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῷ δὴ ἐντείθειν ἤδη πρόσοχες τὸν νόμον.

8. ἐνθήνει] The Bodl. MS. has ἐντείδων, which might mean, 'If you will come and look from where I stand.'

15. ὑποχειρίας] 'Under (in the power of) his hand.' (Supra. 197 C.) But not necessarily προχείρως, 'in hand.'

16. ἔχων] The omission of the subject (ὑν, δ’ ἔχων) is supplied in the next clause by the addition of ὁ παραδίδων.
θεαίθτος
p. 198. ἐπίσταται; τάντων γὰρ ἀριθμοῦ εἰσὶν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. 'Η οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμός ἀν ποτὲ τι ἡ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὰ ἡ ἀλλο τὶ τῶν ἔξω ὅσα ἔχει ἄριθμον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε ὅ τι ἄλλο τὶ θέσομεν τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει οὖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. ὁ ἄρα ἐπισταται, σκοπούμενος φαίνεται ὃς οὐκ εἰδος, ὡς ὁμολογήσας ἀπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἰδέναι.

ἀκούεις γὰρ που τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν περιστε- 15

4. ἡ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὰ] This is the reading of the MSS. with the exception of Vat. Δ, which omits αὐτὰ: the reading ἐπὶ τὸς is a conjecture of Cornarius. The common reading is defensible. If αὐτὰ is omitted, the antithesis is imperfect; and if grammatical symmetry were desired, it could be restored by substituting ἀστρῶν αὐτῶν. But there is no real flaw, for τὶ is cognate accusative, and ἀριθμῶν τι = cast up a sum. The second accusative in the plural, of the things which constitute the sum, is therefore perfectly admissible; and it is also pointed, referring to αὐτὰ τὰς καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν in supr. 196. A. 'Might he not cast up a sum, either of abstract numbers in his head, or of things about him that happen to be numerable?'

As in the Parmenides, where unity is provisionally negated, so here, where it has not been fully reached, the objects of Knowledge (or rather Knowledge themselves) appear in loose bundles which fly as we approach them.

9. πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει οὐ] 'What such-and-such a sum amounts to.' (ἀριθμητική here seems to include λογιστική.)

11. The question here is not of error, but of inquiry. The pursuit of knowledge implies ignorance even where the process is correct.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ῥῶν κτήσει τε καὶ θήρα ἐρόμεν, ὅτι διιτῇ ἤν ὣ θήρα, p. 198. ἦ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτήσασθαί ἐνεκα· ἦ δὲ κεκτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερῶν ἄ πάλαι ἐκέκτησθαι. οὔτω δὲ καὶ ὁν πάλαι ἐπιστήμαι ἦσαν αὐτῷ ἄ χαλοντι καὶ ηπιστάτατο αὑτά, πάλιν ἐστὶ καταμανθάνειν ταῦτα ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου καὶ ἱθοῦτα, ἢν ἐκέκτησθαι μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δ' οὐκ ἔλεξε τῇ διανοιᾷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ Αληθῆ.

10 ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὴ ἠρτί ἡρῶτον, ὅπως χρῆ τοῖς ὅνο-και χρώμενοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἄριμήσων ἦ τὸ ἀριθμητικός ἦ τα ἀναγνωσόμενοι ὡς γραμματικός, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μαθημένος παρ' ἑαυτῷ ἄ ἐπιστάτατα;

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ Ἀλλ' ἄτοπον, οὐ Σόκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἡ Ἀλλ' ἄ οὐκ ἐπιστάταται φῶς αὐτῶν ἀναγνώσσωσθαι καὶ ἀριθμήσειν, δεδοκίτοις αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν γράμματα, πάντα δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἐπιστάσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ Ἀλλ' καὶ τοῦτ' ἄλογον.

20 ΣΩ. Βούλειν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων οὔδεν ἢμῖν μέλει, ὅπῃ τὸς χαίρει ἐλκων τὸ ἐπιστάσθαι

1. ἤν The past tense implies 'We have found it to be . . .' Supr. A.

2. πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι] So the MSS. And it is unsafe to change to κεκτῆσαί, as such variations may have depended on some law of euphony. Cp. Sophocl. O. C. 5: Συμφορά μὲν ἐξαυτῶν, τοῦ μικροῦ δ' ἦν, κ.τ.λ.

7. πρόχειρον] As we say, 'at his fingers' ends.'

10. Τοῦτο] Accusative in apposition with the action of the verb, as ταῦτα is very frequently used. 'This was my drift in asking,' etc. Cp. Rep. 2. 377 A.

20. ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.] The question asked above, 198 A, was τὸ . . . θηρείεις, κ.τ.λ., τῶν δίται ὀνομάτων. But the illustration has thrown so clear a light upon the subject that in giving our answer we may dispense with nominal definitions.

21. ὅπῃ τὸς χαίρει ἐλκων] 'Whatever confusion may be willfully made with the verbs to learn and to know,' i.e. in the ἀφυβρισθήσεις above referred to, that a man cannot learn
impossible for him not to know what he knows, i.e. not to possess what he possesses, but yet he may mistake one thing that he knows what he knows nor what he does not know. For the language cp. Soph. 259 C: καίρει τότε μέν ἐπὶ βάτερα τότε δὲ ἐπὶ βάτερα τοις λόγοις ἐκλάον.
4. δοτε ὀδηγεῖτε] ‘So that in no case does it come to pass that a man is ignorant of what he knows, but still he may get hold of a wrong notion in regard to it; for he may not have in hand the knowledge of the particular thing in question, but another instead, when in hunting up some particular knowledge from his stock (τοῦ ὁ κέκτηται) he gets hold of the wrong one by mistake as they flit across him: that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the knowledge of eleven instead of that of twelve,—in other words, the rock-pigeon that was caged within him instead of the dove.’
5. μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν] These words are put emphatically forward in antithesis to μὴ κέκτησαν. When hunting for some particular knowledge amongst what he possesses and knows, he catches one for another as they fly about: e.g. the arithmetician makes a mistake in regard to number when he seeks in the flock of numbers for that which = 7 + 5, and takes hold of 11 instead of 12.

The germ of the present metaphor appears in the Euthydemus, 290 C, 291 B: Θερμείων γὰρ εἰσὶ καὶ οὗτοι (οἱ λογισταὶ) οὐκ ἐπιστημονὴς ἐργαζομαι τούτοις ὁ ἐκθέτεσθαι, δοσπερ, σοιμι, οἱ ὄργυμοι τοῖς ὀργυμοισὶ παραθέσασθαι... ἀλλὰ ἂν παντὸς γελοῖο, ὄσπερ τὰ παιδὰ τοῖς κορόδους διώκοντα, διοῦσα, ἀεὶ δὲ ἐκάστην τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐτίκα λήφθηναι αὐτῷ δὲ ἐκ θερμήνων. Compare also Arist. Met. i. 5. 1009 b: Τὸ γὰρ τὰ πετώμενα διώκειν τὸ ἐργαῖν ἀν ἐκ τῆς ὀλίβην.
7. ἀν’ αὐτοῦ] The difficulty of the sentence lies in these words. They probably refer to ὁ κέκτηται... ὁ ὁδηγεῖτε above. For it is difficult to imagine that ἀν’ αὐτοῦ and περὶ αὐτοῦ above do not refer to the same thing. If this be so, the meaning is, that he makes a mistake concerning some general subject, e.g. concerning number in general, when he takes one particular thing contained in it for another. τοῦτον therefore has a narrower reference, and means, ‘of this particular thing,’ viz. which he is in search of. For a similar use of τοῦτον, without anything to which it immediately refers, cp. supr. 180 A: κάποιον ἔργον λόγον λαβέω, τί εἰρην. Infr. 202 C: Τὸν μὴ δοκοῦντα δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον.
πετομένων ἄνθ᾽ ἐτέρας ἐτέρας ἀμαρτῶν λάβῃ,— ὅτε ἄρα p. 199.
τὰ ἐνδεκα δώδεκα φήσῃ εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἐνδεκα ἐπιστή-
μην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβῶν, τὴν ἐν ἐαυτῷ οἶον
φάτταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς.
5 ἩΕΑΣ. Ἐχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον.
ΣΩ. Ὅταν δὲ γε ἂν ἐπικεφαλή λαβῶν λάβῃ, ἄψευ-
δεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι
ἄληθῆ τε καὶ γενικὴ δόξαν, καὶ ὃν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὁ
ἐνδυσχεραίον, μενεν ἐμποδοῦν γίγνεσθαι; ἦσος οὖν
10 μοι συμφήσεις. Ἡ πώς ποιήσεις;
ἩΕΑΣ. Οὕτως.
ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀ ἐπιστανται μὴ ἐπισταθαὶ
ἀπηλλάγμεθα: ἂ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτήσθαι οὐ-

ἀσεπιστήμους εἰμι περὶ τούτου (ἐς.
οῖ οὖν μὴ δύνηται, κ.τ.λ.). διαπε-
μήνων is genitive absolute, in
partial construction with ἐτέρας.
The words ἄρα... οὕτω have been
questioned by many critics.
Ἀστὴς τῶν ἄρα οὐν is the most
plausible of the conjectural
emendations.
1. ὅτε ἄρα... φήσῃ εἶναι, ...
λαβῶν] We pass from ὅταν to
ὁτε ἄρα, because reference is
now made to the case actually
in question. The participle
λαβῶν is expository to the verb
understood in what precedes.
'He has hold of something
else: that is (in the case above
adduced) taking the knowledge
of eleven for that of twelve.'
As if ἔχειν... οὖν τε ἦν τὸν
ἄν τινα. The change to the
nominative is partly occasioned
by ὅταν λαβη coming in between.
ἄρα = 'as in our illustration.'

For a similar exegesis cp.
Legg. 3. 690 Ε: Ἀγορίστατες
τῶν ἡν καὶ ἐκάστα κλεφτη ὃς
τὸ ἡμεί τοῦ πάντως πολλάκις ἐστι

πλέον ὁπόταν ἢ τὸ μὲν ὅλων λαμ-
βάνον (εἴη μὲν, τὸ ὅποταν μέ-
τρων, τὸ τὸ μέτρων τοῦ ἀμέτρου
πλέον ἠγαθον, ἀμείβον δὲ χει-
ρονος.
6. ἄψευδεῖν] In construction
with φαμεῖν, supr.
12. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν... μέντοι]
'For indeed we have got rid of
the trouble of men not knowing
what they knew... notwithstanding
there is a still worse
danger which now looks in
upon us.'
ἐπισταθαί] So the Bodleian
with all the other MSS. except
pr. Ven. II. This is hardly suf-
cient authority for the change
to ἐπισταθαί. The transition from
singular to plural is not more
remarkable than that from the
3rd person to the 1st in κεκτή-
μεθα, infr. It may be accounted
for by the fact that Socrates is
speaking generally, and no
longer with reference to the
individual case supposed above.
Compare especially Rep. 7.
537 Ε and v. rr.
ΤΟΙΟ ΠΟΙΟΝ;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλαγή ψευδής γε- 5 νήσται ποτέ δόξα.

ΤΕΙΑ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τινὸς ἑξοντα ἐπιστήμην τούτον ἀυτὸ ἄγγειν, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνη ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐαυτῷ ἐπι-

στήμην ἐπειτὰ ἐτέρων αὖ τοῦτο δοξάσει, τὸ δὲ ἐτέρων τοῦ τούτο, πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγεν-

μένης γνῶναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδὲν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ λόγου καλύει οὕδεν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν παραγενομένην γνώναι τι ποιήσαι καὶ τυφλό-

πτητα ἰδεῖν, εἰπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἄγνοησαι ποτὲ τινα 15 ποιήσει.

ΤΕΙΑ. "Ἰσως γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς τὰς ὀρνιθὰς ἐνθεμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἐδεί δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνας τιθέναι ὅμοι συνδιαπεμεμένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύνετα τοτε μὲν ἐπιστήμην 20

2. παραφαινέσθαι] As it were, 'looking in at the window.' The reading παραφαινέσθαι (Ven. x etc.) deserves mention.

5. Εἰ... γενήσεται] ei with the fut. ind., as usual after δι-

νῶν, expresses alarm or indignation, 'to think of such a possibility!'

8. τὸ τινὸς] These words de-

pend immediately on διενόθην, in common with ei ἡ τῶν... δόξα: but πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία also has reference to them.

9. ἀγνωμοσύνη] Used here in its most literal sense, = τῷ μὴ γιγαντίαω, 'from being un-

acquainted.'

12. ἐπιστήμη] Viz. which he possesses, δὲ δὴ ἔχει τι καὶ κίστηται, referring to ἑξοντα.

11. πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία] The clause which follows this is a more particular statement or explanation of that which pre-

cedes. Compare the structure of Rep. 4. 445 B: Τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦτον φίλου φύσεως παραπ-

σιά καὶ διαρθυμομένης βιωτίων ἄρα ἐστι, ἐὰν πίστει τοι. δὲ ἢ ὅτι βουληθῇ ἄλλῳ ἐλην τοῦτο ὁπόθεν κακίας μὲν καὶ ἀδικίας ἀπαλλαγη-

σται, κ.τ.λ., supr. 144 Α.

19. ἀνεπιστημοσύνας] Cp. the Charmides, 166 E, etc.
λαμβάνοντα, τοτέ δ' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι, ὑπὲρ
ψευδὴ μὲν δοξάζεω τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθὴ δὲ τῇ
ἐπιστήμῃ.

Σ. Οὐ γὰρ, ἔργῳ γε, ὁ Θεάτης, μὴ ἐπιανέω σε.
ο ἡμένου ἐπτεῖς, πάλιν ἐπισκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ὡς
λέγεις: ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβὼν ψευδὴ προ-
μένει, φῆμι, δοξάζει. ἡ γὰρ;

Θεαί. Ναι.

Σ. Οὐ δὴ τού καὶ ἀργησαί γε ψευδὴ δοξάζειν.

10 Θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ;

Σ. Ἀλλ' ἀληθὴ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδώς διακείσεται περὶ
δύν ἐφευρεῖ

Θεαί. Τὶ μὴν;

Σ. Ἐπιστήμην ἀρα οἰσεται τεθρευκώς ἔχειν,

15 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην.

Θεαί. Δήλον.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν
πρώτην πάρεσαν ἀπορίαν. ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος
γελάσας φησί. Πότερον, ὁ βέλτιστος, ἄμφοτέρας

20 τις εἰδώς, ἐπιστῆμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ἡ
οἰδεν, ἐτέραν αὐτὴν οὐταί τινα εἰναι ὁν οἰδεν; ἡ
οὖν ἐτέραν αὐτῶν εἰδώς, ἡ μὴ οἰδε, δοξάζει ἐτέραν ὁν
οὐκ οἴδε ήτοι τὴν μὲν εἰδῶς, τὴν δ' οὐ, ἡν οἴδεν, ἡ
μὴ οἴδεν; ἡ μὴ, μὴ οἴδεν, ἡ οἴδεν ἑγεῖται; ἡ πάλιν αὐ

4. Οὗ ῥάθων γε, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates again charmed by the diale-
ctical readiness of Thesetetus, and yet is compelled to refuse
his suggestion. Cp. supr. 184
C, infr. 204 E: Ἀνθρώπος γε,
κ.τ.λ. Phaedo, 62 E: Ἡσθήναι
tε μοι ἐδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβτης πραγ-
ματείας, κ.τ.λ.

17. ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσαν
ἀπορίαν] 'We find ourselves
again confronted with the same
difficulty which encountered us
at first.' Cp. Phil. 13 C: Πά-
λιν εἰς τοῦ αὐτοῦ φερόμεθα λόγοι,
ὁ Πρώταρχ. 18. δ', ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος]
Supr. 165, 195 C, 197 A.

20. ἡ οἴδεν, κ.τ.λ.] Supr. 188
B, 192.

22. αὐτῶν] Most MSS. have
ἀυτήν, from the preceding line.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 207

p. 200. μου ἐρείτε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν ἔστιν ἢ ἐπιστήμη, ὅς ὁ κατηχούμενος ἐν ἑτέροις τοῖς γελοίοις περιστρεφομένοις ἢ κηρύνοις πλάσμασι καθερε-ξας, ἔσεσ περ ἄν κακτήται, ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἔδω μὴ πρε-χείρους ἔχει ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθήσασθε ἵσσεσθε εἰς ταύταν πεπράγετε μυρίκαις οὐθὲν πλέον ουκούντες; Τί πρὸς ταύτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀποκρινο-μεθα; ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλὰ μά Δία, ὦ Σῶκρατε, ἐγὼγε οὐκ ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν. ΣΩΛ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἦμιν, ὦ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπι-πλήρει, καὶ εἰσεῖκενται ὅτι οὐκ ἡρῴως ψευδή δόξαν ἐν προτέραις ἴσον καὶ δύναμιν εἰς ἐπιστήμην, ἐκείνην ἀφείνετε; τὸ δὲ ἱστών ἀδύναμον γνῶναι, πρὶν ἄν τις ἐπιστήμην ἰκανός λάβῃ τί ποτ' ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάρκη, ὦ Σῶκρατε, εἴ ποτ' παράτης ὡς λέγειν οἴσθαι.

ΣΩΛ. Τί οὖν τις ἔρει πάλιν ἐκ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γάρ που ἀπερειμέν γέ πω.

3. γελοίοις περιστρεφομένοις] It would be rash to infer from this ridicule that the image is not Plato's own. Is Socrates never made to accuse himself of absurdity? Rep. 1.354 A: οὗ μέν τοι καλῶς μεταγείνει καὶ ἐμαυτῶν ἀλλ' οὗ διὰ σὲ. Prot. 340 E: ἐμεῖς γελοίοι λατροί. He is here speaking dramatically in the person of the ἐφαστοῦκεν ἄνδρα, who is bent on exposing their weak points. Cp. supra 162 D, 166 A.

5. καὶ οὕτω δῇ, κ.π.λ.] Cp. esp. Charm. 167 foll., and, for the 'ad infinitum' argument, Parm. 132 E foll.

11. ὁ λόγος] Either this particular argument, or rather the discussion generally, in the form of an imaginary disputant. Supra. 195 D.

13. ἐκείνην] ἴσος ἄξωμα is the subject immediately in hand, hence ἴσος stands for ἐπιστήμη as the more remote.

τὸ δὲ] Σκ. ἴσος ἄξωμα τί ποτ' ἔστιν.

15. ἰκανῶς λάβῃ] Supra. 145 E.

19. ποτ' is the reading of Ven.Π., and is probably right. (Cett. πω.) Schanz reads οὐ γε πω ἀπερειμέν. This is partly confirmed by the scribe of the Bodl. MS. having begun to punctuate after ἀπερειμέν, and in then adding γε πω, having forgotten to accentuate the last syllable of ἀπερειμέν.
ordeis] So T pr.Vat.
Cosil. Zitt. The Bodl. has ἀπαγορεύσεις with an erasure.
Schanz reads ἀπαγορεύσες. The usual aorist form is ἀπείρησε.
8. καὶ τὰ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γυγνόμενα πάντα] True opinion guides to right action, but it is a blind guide. See esp. Rep. 6. 506 C: Οὐκ ἔσται πάντα ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ἀλλὰ πάσας αὐτοχραίες, κ.π.λ.
10. 'O τὸν ποταμὸν] 'The man who had to show where the river was fordable is reported (ὑπ’) to have said, Go on, and you will find.' For the expressions αὐτὸ δείξει, τάχ’ ἀν αὐτὸ φήμει cp. Phileb. 20 C: Προειδότες ἐπὶ συμφέρουν δείξεις.
Protag. 324 A: Αὐτὸ σὲ διδάξεις.
Cratyli. 402 C: Τοῦτο γε ἄλλον αὐτὸ λέγει ἐπὶ πρόγνησιν ἄνωμεν ἐπικριματικοῦ ἐστὶ. Hipp. Maj. 288 B: Εἰ δ’ ἐπιστήμης ἐστι σκαταγγέλλοντος, αὐτὸ δείξεις. The Schol. says: δείξεις αὐτὸ, ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ πέραν γνωσμάτων κατακεραυνών, κατακότων γὰρ τιμών εἰς ποταμοῦ πρὸς τὸ διαπέρασαι ἤπειρο τῆς τῶν προσόργουνεν εἰ βἀδος ἔχει τὸ ὑδάρ. ἀν δ’ ἐφ’ αὐτὸ δείξεις. The explanation is probable, though the authority is uncertain.
See above, τιλεω δὲ ἐπιρρήσειν... τὸν ἐξ ἄρεις λόγον...; and cp. Rep. 5. 453 D: 'Εάν τι τις εἰς κολυμβῆθην μωρὰς ἐμπέσῃ ἐὰν τε ἐν τῷ μεγαθὸν πελάγος μέσων, ὅμοιο γε νεὶς οὖν ἤτον.
12. τάχ’ ἀν... ὑπούργοι] Either (1) (Heindorf), 'Perhaps by giving us trouble, it may of itself bring to light that of which we are in search,' or (2) 'Perhaps the very thing we are in search of may come in our way and show itself,' or (3) taking ἐμπόδων γενόμενον with τῶς and αὐτὸ φήμει τὸ ἵππορόν ὡς a new sentence. 'If we proceed with this inquiry, perhaps, through its giving us trouble,—the very object of our search may show itself.' In (3) ἐμπόδων is used with a forcing of the derivation, like πρόσφρης supr., 'amongst
our feet.' Both in (2) and (3) the idiomatic use of dékyniμεν is extended to φαινομ.: eμπιθανον γενόμενον [Coming in our way,' i.e. giving us trouble. Those fording the river were feeling the bottom with their feet. Compare the way in which justice 'turns up' in the Republic, 4. 432 Ω: Πάλαι, ως μακάρε, φαίνεσθαι πρὸ τῶν ἡμῶν καλλιδουμένων. Prof. Jowett translates, 'We may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for.'


4. αὕτα] Sc. τὸ εἰρημένον, i.e. δόξα αληθῆς.


In what follows the Bodleian MS. gives τούτων with Vat. Δ. Ven. Π. This is better than τούτων, which can be defended only by supposing the plaintiff to plead his own cause. Trans. 'Or do you suppose there are such clever teachers in the world, as to be able to convey to others the reality of what happened to men, of whose being robbed or otherwise assaulted the hearers were not eyewitnesses?' Schanz reads, from Naber's conjecture, εἰ μὴ... τούτων...


Failing to conceive of false opinion, we return to examine the theory of Knowledge which identifies it with true opinion. We have not to search far; for in the familiar case of judicial evidence, a true opinion may be
ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πείσαι μέν.

ΣΩ. Το πείσαι δ' οὐχί δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιήσαι;

ΤΕΑΙ. Τι μὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὃταν δικαίως πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ

5 περὶ ὧν ἴδαντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἀλλως δὲ μὴ,

ταῦτα τότε ἐκ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθὴ δόξαν λαβόντες,

ὁμον ἐπιστήμης ἐκριναν, οὐδὰ πεισθέντες, εἰπερ

ἐν ἐδίκασαν;

ΤΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν, ὁ φίλε, εἰ γε ταῦτα ἢν δόξα τε

ἀληθῆς τι καὶ δικαστῆρια τι καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὁρᾶ ποτ' ἂν

formed by the judges without

the possibility of knowledge;

since in questions of fact no-

thing short of personal ob-

servation ensures certainty. The

definition ‘Knowledge is true

opinion,’ is therefore inade-

quate. And the example given

is calculated to suggest the next

definition—διά ἀληθῆς μετὰ

λόγου.

The question returns, Are the

above conceptions and images

Plato’s own, or is he repeating

in them some contemporary

theories? The comparison of

other dialogues and the close

examination of the passage it-

self tend to the conclusion that

although they may have been

suggested to him from without,

they may be fairly regarded as

his own creation. See especially

the passage in Phil. 44 C foll.,
in which, after certain men

have been brought forward as

‘soothsayers’ or ‘allies,’ there

follows the analysis of the plea-

sure derived from Comedy,

which is one of the most origi-

nal and ‘modern’ passages in

Plato. The image of the ‘im-

pressions’ on the wax has not

only been revived in specula-

tion, but perpetuated in com-

mon language. And that of

the aviary has probably been

less fortunate only from its

greater boldness and subtlety.

1. πείσαι μὲν]. The implied

antithesis is διάδοξα δ’ ὡς.

Cp.

Rep. 5. 475 E: Οὐδαμῶς, εἰσπον,

ἀλλ’ ἄμοινες μὲν φιλοσόφοι. Τοῦτ’

δ’ ἀληθῆς, ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸς λέγεις;

Soph. 240 B: Οὐδαμῶς ἀληθι-

νών γε, ἀλλ’ ἐνωκός μὲν.

11. τι καὶ δικαστῆρια] Several

MSS. read δικαστηρίων. These

words were rejected by the

older critics, except Buttmann,

who conjectured καὶ δικαστηρίᾳ,

very aptly for the sense, if the

word can be made to signify

‘worthy of a good judge.’ See

the words εἰπέρ εἰ ἔδικασαν . . .

ὁρᾶ ποτ’ ἀν δικαστῆς ἀκρος ἐδώ-

ζεις. It is in Plato’s manner

thus ostensibly to restrict him-

self to the case in point. Cp.

152 C: Ἐν τ’ θερμίας καὶ πάσι τοῖς

τοιούτοις. 204 D: Ἐν γε τοῖς

ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἔστιν.

Possibly (1) καὶ δικαστοῦ ἄφια

may be the true reading. Cp.
The text seems to be a page from a book discussing a philosophical or literary topic, with references to ancient sources and commentary. The page contains a page number, a title, and a series of paragraphs with block quotes, likely from a text discussing philosophical or literary ideas. The text is written in Greek and contains a mix of modern English and Greek commentary. The page appears to be discussing philosophical concepts, possibly related to memory and knowledge, with references to ancient authors like Philebus and Socrates. The text includes corrections and notes, indicating an academic or critical commentary. The page also contains a footnote, which suggests that the writer is referring to a source or another work for further information.

The text seems to be from a work that deals with the nature of knowledge and memory, possibly a critical analysis of ancient texts. The page includes a reference to a scientific calculator, which could imply an attempt to apply modern scientific methods to understanding ancient texts. The text also mentions a scientific calculator, which could be a reference to a modern tool used in the study of ancient texts.

The text is written in a scholarly style, with a focus on critical analysis and discussion of philosophical concepts. The page contains a mix of modern and ancient language, indicating a careful examination of ancient texts and their implications for modern understanding.

The text is a mix of Greek and English, with a focus on the analysis of ancient texts and their relevance to modern understanding. The page contains a footnote that references a specific text, indicating a scholarly approach to understanding ancient sources. The page also includes a reference to a scientific calculator, which could imply an attempt to apply modern scientific methods to understanding ancient texts.
όκουσας ἐπελελύσμην, γι' π' ἐνοῦ, ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀληθὴ δύσαν ἐπιστήμην ἑκατέρα, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης. καὶ ὅν μὲν μὴ ἔστι λόγος, οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἑκατέρα, οὔτως καὶ ὁμομάχως, ἄ δ' ἔχει,
σ ἐπιστήμης.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καλὸς λέγεις. τὰ δὲ ἐν ἐπιστήμη ταῦτα καὶ μὴ τῇ διήμερ, λέγει, εἰ ἅρα κατὰ ταῦτα σὺ τ' ἐν τῷ κάγῳ ἀκμάζωμαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἉΛΛ' οὐκ ὁδὰ εἰ ἐξευρήσω λέγοντος μένι τάν τέτοιον, ὅσ' ἔγχω, ἀκολούθησαιμί.

ΣΩ. Ἀκον δή ἄναρ ἄντι ὁνεῖρατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὐ

once heard expressed in a way which until this moment I had forgotten.'

1. τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δύσαν] Cp. Meno, 97 E, 98: Καὶ γὰρ αἰ δύσαν αἰ ἀληθείς, διὸν μὲν χρόνον παραμένως, καὶ τὸ χρόνον παραμένως, καὶ πᾶντα τά ἄριστα ἐργάζονται. πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἔθελον παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπτεύοντας ἐκ τῆς συχνὸς τοῦ αὐθών, δοκεῖν νῦν πολλοῦ δίδαι εἰσόν, ἦν ἡ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸς δήση αἰτίας λογισμῷ... ἐνεπείδαν δὲ δε-θοῦν, πρότερον μὲν ἐπιστήμην γί-γνοντα ἤπειρα μῶντος καὶ διά τιτά ἔν τι μέτωπον ἐπιστήμην ὑπο-θεὶ δύσαν ἑκατέρα, καὶ διαφέρεις δεμόφιον ἐπιστήμην ὑποθές δύσαν. See the whole passage. Also Polit. 309 C: Τών... δῶσαι ἡλιθή δύσαν μετὰ βεβαιότατο. Symp. 202 A: Ἡ οὐκ ἔσχοσαι ὅτι ἔστι τι μεταξύ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας; τί τοῦτο; τὸ ὁρᾶ δοξάζεις καὶ ἀνεί τῶν ἀνεί λόγων δούναι οἷον οἶος, ἐφ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔπιστασθαι ἔστων ἄλογον χάρ πράγμα πῶς ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ; οὔτε ἀμαθία τῷ χάρ τοῦ ὅτες τυχάνον πῶς ἐν εἰς ἀμαθία; οὗτ' ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ; ἄστι δὲ δὴ που τοιοῦτον ἄ ὁρᾶ δύσα, μεταξύ φρο- νήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας. Rep. 6. 506 C: Οὐκ ἔσχοσαι τὰς ἅμα ἐπιστή- μες δοξάσας, ὅσ' ἔσχατα αἰσχρά; ὅσι δὲ βλέπεσαι τυφλαὶ; ἡ δοκούσα σοι τι τυφλῶν διαφέρον ὡσ' ὁρᾶς πορευόμενοι οἱ ἄνει τῶν ἀληθείς τι δοξάζοντες;

4. οὔτως καὶ ὁμομάχως] I. e. using this strange term ἐπιστήμη. Infr. τὰ δὲ ἐν ἐπιστήμη ταῦτα. (For the participle cp. Gorg. 493 B: ὁ ἄειδές δὲ λέγον, Sophocl. Phil. 64.) ἐπιστήμης, like αἰσθητὴς and ποιήτης, supra, 160 D, 182 A, is a novel word, and is formed on the analogy of αἰσθητός.

6. Ἡ... λέγεις] 'Truly, that is fortunate.' 'A timely recollection, indeed!' Gorg. 447 C.

7. εἰ ἄρα] 'That I may know whether.' Cp. supr. 192 C: Ἐν ἀρα... μάθω. εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα σὺ τ' αἰγῶ ἀκρολάμεν] Had they both heard from the same source? Or is Plato here, as in the beginning of the dialogue, weaving together two distinct theories? If infr. 206 C is to be construed strictly, the latter is true. (See Introduction.)

11. ἄναρ] Cp. Phileb. 20 B: Λόγων ποτὲ των πάλαι ἀκούσας
p. 201. ἢδοκουν ἀκούειν τινὸν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἰονπερὲι ἐπεισχεῖα, ἐξ ὅν ἡμεῖς τε συγκεῖεμεθα καὶ τάλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχου, αὐτῷ γὰρ καθ' αὐτῷ ἐκαστὸν ἀνομίας μοῦν εὖ, προσεπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατον

ἀναρ...νῦν ἐνοῦ... Φανδ. 61 D: Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰπὼν ἢ αἰνεὶ... λέγω. It suits Plato's humour to speak in this distant fashion of a school towards which he felt an 'imperfect sympathy.' What Socrates has heard carelessly, as well as that which Thesetetus once heard but had forgotten, is compared to a dream.

1. ἢδοκουν ἀκούειν] 'I heard in my dream.'
2. τὰ πρῶτα οἰονπερὲι στοιχεῖα] 'The first rudiments, so to speak, of things.' In what follows it is vain to distinguish between different senses of στοιχεῖον. The word is here regarded by Plato as a generic term, of which the denotation of the letters of the alphabet is only the most familiar use. 'Everyone will acknowledge that musical notes are also στοιχεῖα' (206 B). In fact the unit of apprehension in every subject is the στοιχεῖον of that particular subject-matter. The word συλλογὴ is similarly generalized, so that in passing from language to other things there is no change in the meaning of the word. Op. infr. 202 E: Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖα τε καὶ συλλογῆς, ἢ οἷς ἄλλοι οὖσοι εἰς τὸν ἑαυτὸν τὸν εἰσίν τις λέγομεν.

For such figurative generalization, which is different from poetic metaphor, cp. esp. Legg. 7. 823 B: ἡ θεορεῖ γὰρ πάσην τι πράγμα ἐστι, κ.τ.λ. See some valuable remarks of Prof. Jebb's on the use of metaphor in Findar, Journal of Hellenic Studies, 3. 1. 167.

3. αὐτὸ γὰρ... εἰπ] 'For that each element in its proper self-existence can only be named.' Op. especially Soph, 251 B: Χαίροντιν οὐκ ἑστεῖς ἄγαθον λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἄλλα τὸ μὲν ἄγαθον ἄγαθον, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον.

4. προσεπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν] 'But it is impossible to go on to predicate anything of it (the element), either affirmatively or negatively. For in so doing there is added the idea of existence or non-existence; but nothing must be added, seeing that you can only speak of the element by itself.'

5. ὅπε γὰρ] Σε. εἰν ἄλλο τι προσέκαν τις.

6. οὐδὲ τούτο] This has given needless trouble. Heindorf thought the article was required as with the other words, and inserted it. Buttmann objected to τούτο being so far separated from ἑαυτοῦ, and ingen-
tauta mén gar peritréxonta pási prosoférèsebhai, p.2 étera óntha ékeínon ois proostíthetai, déin de, éiper ἢν δυνατον αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἴχεν οἰκεῖον αὑτοῦ λόγου, ἀνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὅτι τῶν πρῶτων ῥηθήναι λόγος· ὅ γὰρ εἶναι δὲ αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἡ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον· ὀνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχεν· τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἡ ἐν συγκειμένα, ὅσπερ αὐτά πεπλεκτα, ὡστὶ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλεκέντα λόγον γεγονέναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκῆν εἶναι λόγον ὀὐσίαν. ὡστὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν στοιχεία ἄλογα καὶ

7. ἡδή] I.e. 'when we come to them.'

9. ὀνοματῶν γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου ὀὕσιαν] Cp. Sophist, 262 D: where it is described more accurately as συμπλέκτης τὰ ρήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασι. See the whole passage.

A passage of Aristot. Metaph. 7. 3. 1043 b, is closely parallel to this. He has just shown that sensible reality (ἀισθητὴ ὀὐσία) consists of matter or potentiality (γῆ, δύναμις), and form or actuality, (μορφή, ἐνεργεία): ὧστε ἡ ἀπορία ἤν ὁ 'Ἀνεικασθενές καὶ οὐσίας ἀπαθεῖνοι ἵπποιν, ἔχει τῶν καρπῶν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστιν ὀμνησθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὄρον λόγον ὡς κακερὸν). ἄλλα ποιεῖν μὲν ἔστι εὐδείχθαι καὶ διδάσκει, ὦστε ἄργον τί μὲν ἐστι, οὐ, ὅτι δ' ὁνομα κατίτερον. ὄτσ᾽ ὀὕσια ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἐνδείχθαι εἶναι ὄροι καὶ λόγον, οἷον τῆς αἰσθητῆς, έν τη αἰσθητή έν τη νοητῆ γί' ἦ' ἐν τ' αὐτῇ πρώτων, οὐκ ἔστιν, εἰπερ τι κατὰ τοὺς σημαίνειν ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀριστικός, καὶ δεὶ τῷ μὲν ὦστε ὑπάρχει εἰσι, τὸ δὲ ἄρτε μορφήι (See Introduction.)

Locke's 'simple ideas' are not very different from the meaning of στοιχείαν here.
p. 202. άγνωστα είναι, αίσθητα δέ· τάς δέ συλλαβάς γνωστάς τέ καὶ ῥήτας καὶ ἄληθεὶς δοξής δοξαστάς. οταν, μὲν οὖν ἀνεύ λόγου τήν ἄληθή δοξάν τωσ τοις λάβῃ, ο ἄληθεύειν μὲν αὐτόγ τήν ψυχήν περὶ αὐτό, γιγνώσκειν δ' οὖν τόν γάρ μή δυνάμενον δούναι τέ καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνέπιστήμων εἶναι περὶ τούτων προσαλβόντα δε λόγον δυνατόν τε ταύτα πάντα γεγονόναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἐχειν. Οὕτως εὖ τὸ ἐννύων ἢ ἄλλος ἀκήκοας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτῃ, δοξάν ἄληθε μετά λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καμιόδη μὲν οὖν.

ν. ΣΩ. Ἀρ', ὁ Θεαίτητον, νῦν οὖτω τήδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ

1. τάς... συλλαβάς] This word, like στοιχεία supr., is of course to be taken in the figurative sense, for the 'combinations of simple objects or ideas.'

2. καὶ ῥήτας] There is possibly an allusion, as in λόγον supr., to the mathematical use of the word. Cp. Rep. 8. 546 C: Πάντα προστήρα καὶ ῥήτα πρὸς ἀλληλα ἀνέφηται. Πλ. 7. 534 D: Ἀλλόγους διότερ γραμμ. But the immediate reference is to ῥήσεις λόγος, 'Capable of expression.'

4. ἀληθεύειν... εἰς αὐτό] 'Is exercised truly with regard to it.'


7. δοξάτων... ταύτα πάντα] Sc. ἀληθεύειν καὶ γιγνώσκειν καὶ δοξάτων τέ καὶ δεξασθάν τῶν λόγων. On this kind of pronominal expression see Riddell's Digest, § 55 and §§ 17 foll.

Contrast with this Arist. Phys. Ausec. 1. 1 (who points out that the elements, or simple ideas, are known not by sensation, but by analysis; and that definition distinguishes, while the name signifies an undivided whole):

"Εστι δ' ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφὴ τὰ συγκεκριμένα μᾶλλον' ὑπὲρ τοῦτον γίνεται γράμμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί, διαφορά ταύτα... Τὸ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, γνωριμίαν, τὸ δὲ καθόλου, δὴν τί ἔστι. Πολλά γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου. Πέποιθε δὲ ταύτῳ τούτῳ πρὸς τούτῳ τιμα καὶ τὰ δύο ματαία τῶν λόγων. Ὅλον γὰρ τί καὶ ἀδιαρίστως σημαίνει, ὡσ κέκλασων δὲ ἀρμόδως αὐτοῦ διαφέρει εἰς τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ."

11. Ἀρέσκει... σε] Supr. 172 D.

14. νῦν οὖτω] I.e. 'in a casual conversation.' Supr. 142 Е.
εἰλήφαμεν δ' πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ζητοῦντες π. 20: πρὶν εὑρεῖν κατεγείρασαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὅ Σῶκρατες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰκός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὖτως ἔχειν· τίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐτί ἐπιστήμητε ἢς χαρᾶς τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ ὅρθης δόξης; ἐν μέντοι τί μὲ τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιὸν δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα· ὡς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἀγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος γνωστών.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκεῦν ὅρθως;

ΣΩ. Ἡστέον δὴ· ὡσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα, ὡς χρώμενος ἐπε πάντα ταῦτα.

15 ταύτα.

1. καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν] 'Many a philosopher.' καὶ πολλοὶ, like καὶ μῦδα, is an intensive form. Rep. 8. 562 C.

5. αὐτὸ τοῦτο] 'The definition itself.' whatever may be said of the theory that has been stated as a ground for it. Heindorf's conjecture, εἰκός γ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, would give a different turn to the sense. 'It is natural to suppose that we have said well.'

9. λέγεσθαι κομψότατα] 'To be the cream of the whole theory.'

10. τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος] The 'complex mode' is a natural class or genus, which these philosophers suppose themselves to have discovered.

13. Ἡστέον] Symp. 217 C.

14. τὰ παραδείγματα] Cp. Polit. 277 E, 278 D, where the same example, that of letters, is introduced to illustrate the nature of Example: ὁμοίως τῶν στοιχείων ἑκατὸν ἐν ταῖς βραχυτίταις καὶ μάσται τῶν συλλαβῶν ἰκανώς διαισθάνονται . . . μετατίθειμα δ' εἰς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων μακρὰς καὶ μή βαδίσας συλλαβῶν ταῦτα ταύτα πάλιν ἀγνωστικῇ.

H. Schmidt observes that παραδείγματα here are rather archetypes (Vorbilder) than examples (Beispiele). And it is true that the argument from letters is not so much an illustration as the very foundation of the theory.

eiπε] Sc. the person from whom Socrates and Theaetetus are supposed to have heard
ΤΟΙΔΙΤΗΣ.

Σ. Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖα τε καὶ συλλαβᾶς. ἢ οἷοι ἄλλοις ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπέει τὸν εὐπόντα ἂ λέγομεν;

ΤΟΙΔΙΤΗΣ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' εἰς ταῦτα.

Σ. Βασανίζομεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνωντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρὸ τῶν ἀρ' αἱ μὲν συλλαβᾶι λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα;

ΤΟΙΔΙΤΗΣ. "Ισώσ.

Σ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔμοι φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἰ τις ἔρωτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν οὕτως, ὡς Θεαίτης, λέγε τι ἄστι σῶ, τι ἀποκρυφεί;

ΤΟΙΔΙΤΗΣ. "Οτι σίμα καὶ ὡ.

Σ. Οὐκόν τούτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς;

ΤΟΙΔΙΤΗΣ. "Εγώγε.

Σ. "Ιδι δὴ, οὕτως εἴπη καὶ τὸν τοῦ σίμα λόγον.

ΤΟΙΔΙΤΗΣ. Καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεία;

Σ. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ, ὡς Σωκρατεῖς, τὸ τε σίμα τῶν ἀφόνων ἐστὶ, νόφος τις μόνον, ὧν συμπτούσης τῆς γλώττ.

the theory ‘in a dream.’ Cp. supr. 201 C: Εἰπόντως τοις ἄκοντας, Ιππ. 206 E.
6. Βασανίζομεν δὴ αὐτὰ] 'Let us take and examine them, or rather let us put the question to ourselves.' The image of hostages, whom we may treat as we please, is kept up.
7. μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς] This is done more fully by and by, 206 A; cp. supr. 155 A.
8. οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως] For εἰπέ omitted cp. supr. 169 D.
9. λόγος is predicative. 'You have this for an account.'
10. Καὶ πῶς . . . στοιχεία] ‘How is one to spell each single letter?’
11. τὸ τε σίμα . . . τοῦ δ' αὖ βητῃ] For τε followed by δ' cp. Rep. 3. 394 C.
12. Theaetetus extemporizes the theory of phonetics, which is given more fully in Phil. 18 B foll. Sigma is a semivowel.
13. οὖν συμπτούσης τῆς γλώττ.] This mode of definition reminds us of the Anti-sthenean saying quoted by Aristotle—ποὺς μὲν τι ἐστιν ἐνδεχεται καὶ διδασκαλικα, κ.τ.λ.; and also of Euclid's objection to definition by comparison.
της τοῦ δ’ αὖ βῆτα οὖρε φωνῇ οὖτε ψόφος, οὔδέ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων. ὅστε πάνυ εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἁλόγα, ὅν γε τὰ ἐναργέστατα αὐτὰ τὰ ἐπτὰ φωνῆς μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδ’ ὄντωνυ.

5 ΣΩ. Τούτο μὲν ἄρα, ὁ ἑταῖρε, καταφθάκάμεν περὶ ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φανόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; τὸ μὴ γνωστῷ εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον, ὁ ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβὴν, ἃρ’ ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκὸς γε.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ ἀμφότερα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλεῖον ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινα ἱδέαν γεγονότιν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ἀπαντά ἐμοίγε δοκοῦμεν.

ΣΩ. Ὑπὸ δὴ ἐπὶ δυνών, σύγμα καὶ ὃ. ἀμφότερά ἐστιν ἡ πρῶτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἐμοῦ όνοματος. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑγινώσκοντος αὐτῆς τὰ ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ σύγμα καὶ τὸ ὃ ἄρα γιγνώσκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ἐκάτερον ἃρ’ ἅγνοει, καὶ ὀυδέτερον εἰδῆ ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει;

3. ἐναργέστατα] Bodl. ἐναργε- στατα, sed ex em., the second e being in rasura.
9. ἀποδεδείγμεθα] Heindorf conjectured ἀποδεδείγμεθα, for which MS. authority (Coisl. et Ëar. E. ex corr.) has since been found; and it has been received by Bekker. But Stallbaum rightly defends ἀποδεδείγμεθα in the sense we have declared our opinion in which meaning the pf. pass. is used by Xenophon and Lysias. Cp. supr. 180 D: Ἀποδείκνυ-
5. μένων, 195 D: Τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδείγ-
μένον. Cp. however infr. 205 C: Ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέ-
γοντι. But this refers to a part of the theory which has been accepted in the words τοῦτο μὲν . . . καταφθάκαμεν.

7. 3. 1043 b: Οὕ τοι ἀνατα δὴ ἔπεισθον ἢ συλλαβή ἐκ τῶν στοι-
χείων ὄντα καὶ συνθέτωσι.

The word συλλαβή is used probably not without the consciousness of its etymology.
p. 203. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλα δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλὰ μέντοι εἰ γε ἀνάγκη ἐκάτερον γυνώσκειν, εἶπεν ἀμφότερά τις γυνώσκειν, προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντι ποτὲ γυνώσκεσθαι συνλαβῆν, καὶ οὕτωσ ἦμιν ὁ καλὸς λόγος εἰ ἀποδεδρακὸς οἰχήσεται.

Ε. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἐξαίφνης.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ καλὸς αὐτὸν φθιλάττομεν. χρῆν γὰρ ἑσος τὴν συνλαβῆν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐκεῖνον ἐν τι γεγονός εἶδος, ἴδεν μιαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἰο ἔχον, ἐπερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν καὶ τάχα γ’ ἐν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἦ ἐκείνως ἔχοι.

ΣΩ. Σκεπτόμεν, καὶ οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνάνδρος μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

p. 204. ΣΩ. Ἐξῆτο ὅδ’ τις νῦν φαμέν, μία ἴδεα εἰς ἐκά-

5. ο καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὸς οἰχήσεται] The image is that of the disappearance of a favourite slave (Prot. sub init.). Compare with the humorous pathos with which this is spoken Phaed. 89 B: ὁμερόν, ἔφη, καίῳ τάς ἐμᾶς καὶ σο ταύτας, εἶποτ ημῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ ὑπομεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιῶσασθαι, καὶ ἔγωγ ἃν, εἰ σο εἶναι καὶ μὲ διαφύγοι αὐτὸς, ἔφερκαν αὐτοὺς ταύσαμεν ὥσπερ Ἀργείου, μὴ πρό-

15. μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνόν λόγον] In these words, as in the figure of the dream, and in κομψῶσα

17. Ἐξῆτο ὅδ’ τις νῦν φαμέν, μία ἴδεα] There is no occasion to suspect the reading, or to

10. ἴδεα, ἴδεα] ἴδεα is here rather more concrete, ἴδεα more abstract; but ἴδεα is used for ἴδεα a few lines below. Generally, ἴδεα is more logical, implying distinction; ἴδεα more metaphysical, imply-

ing unity. (See Appendix D.)

Or is it something by itself resulting from them!

In that case it cannot

Let the case be then as we have now put it, that the syll-

able or complex (whether of letters or of anything else in

the world) is a simple form
στῶν τῶν συναρμοττῶν στοιχείων γιγνομένη ἡ συλλαβή, ὁμοίως ἐν τε γράμμαι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις ἀπασιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεὶ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δὴ;

ΣΩ. "Ὅτι οὐ ἄν ἦ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι. ἦ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονός ἐν τῇ ἑδος ἐτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν;" ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώγη.

10 ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον τότερον ταυτῶν καλεῖς ἡ ἐτερον ἐκάτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. "Ἐχο μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις προθύμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύων λέγω ὅτι ἐτερον.

ΣΩ. Ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὁ Θεαίτης, ὀρθή· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δὲι δὲ γε δὴ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διαφεροῖ ἄν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος;

arising out of each combination of harmonious elements.' The words 'Εχιτῶ δὴ ὡς take up the thread of τάχις ἀν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἡ ἐκίνως ἔχοι. In the conjectural reading the words ἔχιτω ... μᾶν ἱδιάν would of course refer to ἱδιάν μᾶν αὐτῷ ἑαυτῷ ἔχοι. Schanz reads ἤστω. But the anacolouthon is not more harsh than in supr. 173 D: Ἐπονείας δὲ ἐταὐχεῖν ὡς ἀρχή, κ.τ.λ. Soph. 218 E: Τὶ δήτα προτασαμεθ' ἐν εὑροστοι, ... ἕως ἀποκλειείς; Δρομ. 21 C: Διαλεγάμενος αὐτῷ, ... ἔδεξ μοι. See Riddell's Digest, §§ 270, 271.

For μία ἱδία = ἑδος ἱδίαν μᾶν ἔχον cp. Euthyphr. § 3 D: ἐπονείας ὁ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν; ἐπονείας ὁ πάντα τὰ τε ἀνάστα ἀνάστα ἐσται καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια. Infr. 205 C: Μία τε ἱδία ... συλλαβή ὡς ἐπι. 18. Δὲι δὲ γε δὴ] Sc. καὶ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὅρθην ἐκεῖνην.

19. τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός ... τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν] Cr. Ar. Met. 4. 26. 1024 a: "Ὑποτ γὰρ καὶ ὅσια ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀρέσμοι πᾶν μὲν λέγεται, ὅλος δὲ ἄριστος καὶ ἀρεῖον ὑποτ οὐ λέγεται, ἀν μὴ μεταφάρ. πάντα δὲ λέγεται, ἐφ' ὅις τὸ πᾶν ὡς ἐφ' ἐν, ἐπὶ τούτου πᾶσα ἀπὸ δημοκρασίας πάσα ὄστος ἄριστος, πᾶσα αὐτῇ αἱ μοιάς.
THEAI. 

Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐσθ' ὁ τι διαφέρει; ὦν ἐπειδῶν λέγομεν ἐν, δύο, τρία, τέταρτα, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ ἐὰν διέ θρία ἡ τρίς δύο ἡ τέταρτα τε καὶ δύο ἡ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἡ ἑτέρων λέγομεν;

THEAI. Ταῦταν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ’ ἄλλο τι ἡ ἕξ; 

THEAI. Οὐδὲν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ’ ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ εἰρήκαμεν;

5. ἡ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν] The words ἡ πάντε καὶ ἕν, which were introduced by Cornarius, are anticipated in the simple enumeration ἐν, δύο, etc. They do not occur in the Bodleian or any other MS.

10. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ’ ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ εἰρήκαμεν;] So far the MSS. give a meaning perfectly clear and natural. The words which follow are not so clear. The only way in which it seems possible to construe them as they stand in the MSS., viz. πάντα τὰ ἕξ εἰρήκαμεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες, is by laying an unnatural stress on ἐν in οὐδὲν. 'Again, while we speak of all (in the plural), is there no one thing of which we speak?' This is brought out more distinctly by C. F. Hermann's conjecture, οὐκ ἐν. In my former edition I proposed to substitute πᾶν for πάν. But πᾶν is probably to be retained. Cp. Symp. 183 D: ἔκ δὲ ταῦτα τις αὐ θλέψας ἤγιον ἐν πᾶν, κ.τ.λ. Phil. 14 D: Πολλὰν εἶναι πᾶν. And I now think the most probable solution is to suppose πᾶν to have dropped out from its similarity to πάν. H. Schmidt justly observes that this line of conjecture is more logical than that followed by Heindorf and others, who substitute the awkward expression πὰν τὰ ἕξ for πάντα τὰ ἕξ in the previous line. 'Do we not repeat something when we say τὰ πάντα' is not a satisfactory sense. The present passage is one in which a reader of Plato will expect extreme clearness and minuteness of logical sequence. And to put πᾶν τὰ ἕξ in the beginning of the argument would be to assume bluntly that which it is intended to prove, viz. that an aggregate may be regarded as one thing. With this object it is necessary to reason from the plural to the singular, and to do so gradually. The above argument might lead to the substitution of τὰ πᾶν for τὰ πάντα (a suggestion adopted by Schanz, and in part by Wohlrab, who reads τὰ πᾶν αὐτὰ). 

But can we go so far as to distinguish All, in the singular, from All, in the plural! It is evident that 'all of six' is the same as 'all six.'
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναϊ.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δε, *πὰν οὐδὲν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἡ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἔξε;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα ἄρα ἐν γε τοῖς ὁσα ἔστι ἄριθμοι ἐστὶν, τὸ τε πάν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἀπαντά;
ΘΕΑΙ. Φαύνεια.

ΣΩ. Ὡδὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγομεν. ὁ τοῦ πλέθρου ἄριθμος καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταῦτα ἡ γὰρ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναϊ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὡσαύτως.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναϊ.

six" (in the plural). Again, in speaking of all, in the singular, is there nothing which we express? 'There must be.' 'And is not this six?' 'Yes.' But there is needless obscurity in the logical inversion by which, after reasoning from the number, we should then reason to it. The required sequence is restored by reading as in the text. The passage may then be rendered, 'Have we not, then, in each expression, spoken of all the six?' 'Yes.' 'But again, while speaking of them all, is there no one thing all of which we express?' 'There must be.' 'And is that anything but the six?' 'Nothing.' This gives much greater force to the inference here and in E. Compare with the resumption of the previous admission in τὰ πάντα λέγοντες, Soph. 238 E: Οὐκοῦν τὸ γε ἐκεῖ προσάπτειν τειρόμενος ἐναντία τοῖς πρόθεν ἔλεγον; Φαύνει. Τί δὲ; τοῦτο προσάπτων σοὶ ἄριθμον ἐνι διελεγόμεν; After ἀνάγκη, we must understand πὰν τι λέγειν. Compare Symp. 192 E: Οὐδ' ἄν ἐσ' ἔξωρμηθεν... ἄλλο ὀνείρευτον (sc. πάσας τις), κ.τ.λ. alib. The reasoning of Parm. 144 C may be advantageously compared. See also Aristot. Poct. 1451 a. And for the abrupt form of the question with οὔδ' cp. Gorg. 474 D: Τί δὲ τάδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα... εἰς οὐδ' ἀποβλέπον καλεῖσ ἐκάστοτε καλά;

7. Ταῦτα... προσαγορεύομεν] 'We give the names πὰν and πᾶνα to the same thing.'

10. λέγομεν] Several MSS. have λέγομεν. If λέγομεν is right, it refers, not to the present sentence, but to the argument which it introduces about the relation of parts to a whole.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 223

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τουαίτα ὁμοίως; ὁ γὰρ ἀρμῆσον πᾶς τὸ ὅν πᾶν ἔκαστον αὐτῶν ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. 'Ο δὲ ἔκαστον ἀρμῆσον μᾶν ἀλλο τῇ μέρῃ τῇ ἔστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ουδέν.

ΣΩ. 'Οσα ἀρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἰὰν εἴη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φανεται.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὁμολογεῖ ταῖς, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἀρμῆσον τὸ πᾶν ἔσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ὅλον ἀρ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἰὰν εἴη, τὰ πάντα ἐν μέρῃ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Μέρος δ' ἔστιν ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὡς ἐστὶν ἵ τοῦ ὅλου;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ ποιντὸς γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀνδρικοὶ γε, ὃ Θεαίτητε, μάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἄτούχαν ἄπτῃ, αὐτῷ τοῦτο πᾶν ἔστιν;

2. ὁ γὰρ ἀρμῆσον Ι. τ. ε. ὁ ἀρμῆσον πᾶς ἔκαστον ἐστὶν τὸ ὅν πᾶν ἔκαστον. 'The number of each taken altogether is each real thing taken altogether,' or 'each taken altogether so far as it exists.' Stallbaum's conjecture, ἔκαστον, would be more convenient, but we cannot venture to say that ἔκαστον is wrong, τὸ δὲ ἔκαστον ἔκαστον, δ ἔστιν. Cp. Rep. 6. 490 B; Αὐτῷ δὲ ἔστιν ἔκαστον τῆς φύσεως. It must be admitted, however, that the text becomes more uncertain in the last few pages of the dialogue.

5. ὁ δὲ ἔκαστον ἀρμῆσον] The word ἀρμῆσον implies plurality. Hence ἔκαστον, unless it is corrupt. We are now reasoning from singular to plural, as before from plural to singular.

10. ὁμολογεῖται] ὁμολόγηται, the reading of T, is of nearly equal authority.


19. Ἀνδρικὸς μάχει] Viz. for the thesis he has chivalrously taken up, 204 B: Παρακαμπθέων λέγω ὅτι ἐτέρον.

20. αὐτῷ τοῦτο πᾶν ἔστιν] Is this very thing all, just as above, ἔστιν ὡς ἐστὶν. πᾶς, being predicate, does not need the article.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὁλον δὲ οὐ ταύτων τούτῳ ἐσται, οὐ ἂν μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ; οὐ δὲ ἂν ἀποστατῇ, οὐτε ὅλον οὐτε πᾶν, ἀμα γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι οὐ ἂν μέρη ὑ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω γε.

10 ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, ἐπερ ἡ συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐστῖν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ ὡς μέρη ἔχειν ἐκατέρτης τὰ στοιχεία, ἡ ταύτων οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ἐν ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅντως.

2. Ὁλον] To be taken predicatively, like πᾶν immediately above.
3. οὐτε ὅλον οὐτε πᾶν] Sc. ἔσται γενόμενον. 'Will have become at once not-whole and not-all.'
4. ἀμα γενόμενον, κτ.λ.] 'Being changed in the same instant from forms which are identical to other forms which are likewise identical.

ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ] Viz. ὅλον = οὐ δὲ μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ = πᾶς.

τὸ αὐτὸ] Viz. οὐχ ὅλον = οὐ πᾶς.

'Both equally lose their entirety of nature.' (Jowett.)
7. ἐλέγομεν] The argument is resumed from 204 A: 'Ὅτι οὐ δὲ ἡ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι.

10. Πάλιν δὴ... ἀνάγκη] 'Then I may repeat, what I was trying to suggest a little while ago, that if the syllable is distinct from the letters, they are not its parts; else, if they are, it must be indistinguishable from them, and no more knowable than they are.' In fact it was shown that the knowledge of the letters was a condition of syllables being known.

Supr. 203 D, 204 A: Ἑρωνικοῦς τὰ στοιχεῖα ἄπανα ἀνάγκη τῇ μελλόντῃ ποτῇ γνώσεσθαι συλλαβήν... οὐκοῦν μήρη αὐτής οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.

12. ἡ ταύτων οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι] For the turn of the sentence compare Rep. 6.490 A: Ἔνιοί δ' αὐτῷ, εἰ νῦ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἤν ἔστωσεν αὐτῶν πάντως καὶ πάσην ἐδει ἡ ἀλήθεια διότι μηδὲν μετέχειν φιλοσοφίας ἀλήθειας. Ιβ. 503 A: Ἐλέγομεν δ', εἰ μηκότατες, δεῖν... τὸ δόμα τοῦτο μή' ἐν πόσοις μή' ἐν φόβοις... φαίνεσθαι ἐνεώθερυ τῇ τῶν ἀδυνατηστῶν ὁποκριτῶν. Ιβ. 7.525 B: Διὰ τὸ τῆς οὗσας ἀπτεῖν ἐνακάθωτοι τῇ μηδέποτε λογιστικῷ γενόμενος.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἵνα μὴ γενηται, ἔτερον αὐτῶν αὑτὴν ἐθέμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Τί δε; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συνλαβῆσι μέρη ἐστιν, ἔχεις ἄλλα ἀττα εἰπεῖν, ἃ μέρη μὲν ἔστι συλλαβής, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεία γ' ἐκείνης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕδαμος. εἰ γάρ, ὁ Σάκρατες, μόρια ταῖς συγχωροῖς, γελοῖον πον τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ' ἄλλα ἴναι.

ΣΩ. Παντάπασι δή, ὁ Θεαίτης, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μιὰ τις ἱδέα ἀμέριστος συνλαβῆ ἀν εἰη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ Ἐοκεν.

ΣΩ. Μέμηνσαι οὖν, ὁ φίλε, ὅτι ὅλον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εἰ δέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρῶτων οὐκ εἶναι λόγος, ἐξ ὅπως τὰ ἄλλα σύγκειται, διὸ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐκατον εἴη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχοι προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο, ὥσ' ἔτερα καὶ ἄλλοτρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὕτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἀγνωστόν αὐτὸ ποιοῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμηνσαι.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἡ αὕτη ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονοεἴδες τι καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ ἔλγει; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὖχ ὀρθὸ ἄλλην.


21. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τις] 'And is not this same thing (viz. that it is uncompounded) the cause of its having a simple form without parts?' The same cause makes it to be unknowable and without parts. Therefore if the 'syllable' or complex is without parts, it must be unknowable. Bonitz objects to the logic of this and reads τῇ for τοῦ. This is tautological, and Bonitz' reasoning is rightly rejected by H. Schmidt. See below, E. For illogical conversion in Plato cp. supr. 152 B C, 159 A.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς ταῦτὸν ἐμπέπτοκεν ἡ συνάδεσθη ἔδος ἐκεῖνο, εἶπεν μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Παρατάσσω μεν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συνάδεσθη ἐστὶν καὶ ὅλον τι, μέρη δ' αὐτὴς ταῦτα, ὁμοίους αἱ τε συν-

λαβαί γνωστάς καὶ ῥητάς καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπεὶ περὶ τὰ

πάντα μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταὐτὸν ἐφαίνη.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μᾶλα.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ γε ἐν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὁμοίως μὲν συν-

λαβῇ, ὁσαίτωσ τε στοιχεῖον ἄλογον τε καὶ ἄγνωστον ἡ γὰρ αὐτῇ αἰτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαύτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλας ἐπεῖν.

15 ΣΩ. Τούτῳ μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχόμεθα, ὅσι ἂν λέγη 

συνάδεσθη μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ῥητὸν, στοιχεῖον δὲ τού-

ναντίον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ γὰρ, εἶπεν τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' αὖ; τούναντίον λέγοντος ἄρ' οὖ μᾶλ-

20 λον ἂν ἀποδέξασθαι ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς σύνωσθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ 

τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιόν;

ΣΩ. Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνον διετέλεσας ἡ τὰ 

στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ δῆμη διαγιγνώσκειν πειρόμενος καὶ


ἐκεῖνο] 'Sc. τῷ τῶν πρῶτων εἶθε,' Heindorf. Rather ἐκα-

στὸ τῶν πρῶτων. Cp. peri αὐτοῦ, supr. C.

15. μὴ ἀποδέχόμεθα, ὅσι ἂν λέγη] For this common use of ὅσι ἂν without antecedent cp. esp. Soph. Ant. 35: 'Αλλ' ἵνα του-

τῶν ταῦτα δρᾶ, φῶς προκείμενα δη-

μάλιστα ἐν πόλει.


23. 'Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο] 'That in learning you continued doing nothing else but endeavou ring to distinguish, etc.' Cp. Men.

80 A: 'Ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἀντίστε 

ἀναφέρει.
The tendency of the present passage is to rise from the conception of elementary objects of sense (simple ideas of sensation) to that of abstract ideas (universals, predicables), as the true elements of knowledge.

Cp. Ar. Met. 1 a, 995 b: Πότερον αὐτάρχα οἶκοι καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ γένη ἐστίν ἔστω καὶ ἔστω διαφέρουσα ἐνυπάρχοντα ἐκαστον.

This may be illustrated from the frequent use by Plato of the example of letters, elementary sounds, etc., to represent the ideas and the mode of becoming acquainted with them.

The following passage,—Rep. 3. 402,—is an instance of this:—

"Ωπερ ὅρα . . . γραμμάτων πέρι τότε ἐκεῖσ' εἶχομεν, ὅτε τὰ στοι-

χεία μὴ λαυθάνου ἡμῖν ἐλέγα ὡντα ἐν ἁπασιν οἷς ἐστὶν περιφερέμενα, καὶ οὔτ' ἐν συμφρον οὔτ' ἐν μεγαλῷ ἠττιμᾶζομεν αὐτά, ὡς οὐ δει αἰσθανεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ προϊόντων μεθέναι διαγεγράφοιται, ὡς οὐ πρότερον ἐσόμεθι γραμματικῷ πρὸς οὔτως ἔχωμεν. Ἀλλ' οὔτως καὶ εἰκό-

ναι γραμματίκως, εἰ πάντως ἐν ἀδιαίρετω τῷ μεταφέρειται, καὶ τῷ λύκωσε ἐν κατάστρεποι ἐμφαίνομεν, οὐ πρότερον γνωσθέντα, πρὸς ἀν αὐτὰ γραφεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀπάντη τῇ αὐτῇ τέχνῃ τῇ καὶ μελέτῃς; παντάπλησι μὲν αὐτῷ. Ἀρ' οὖν, ὁ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως οὐδὲ μοι τις πρότερον ἐσομάς, οὔτε αὐτοῖς, οὔτε ὑπὲρ φομέν ἡμῖν παντινέρων εἶναι τοῖς φύλασν, πρὸς ἀν τῷ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ εἶναι καὶ ἄν

δρεῖας καὶ ἔλευθερίατος καὶ μεγα-

λοπρεπεῖας καὶ διὰ τοῦτον ἀδελφά

καὶ τὸ τοῦτον αὐτὸς παντεῖα περιφερέμες γραφώμεθαι, καὶ εἴστα ἐν οἷς ἐνεπτυχανωθεῖ οὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν συμφρων οὕτως ἐν μεγαλῷ ἠττιμᾶζομεν,
This need not, however, affect the truth of our third answer.

Alle τῆς αὐτῆς αἰώματα τήχης εἶ-

At the same time it is hinted that the sensible elements, so far as each of them can be regarded as one individual thing, are also objects of Knowledge.

Cp. Ar. Met. 1a, 994 b: "Ετσι τὸ ἐπιστασθαί ἀναιροῦσαν οἱ οὖσις

To resume the argument from 201. Theophrasus has heard it said that true opinion with a reason was knowledge: and that nothing which had not a reason could be known. This reminds Socrates of a theory which said that of the elements (or alphabet) of things no account could be given—they could only be named. But of their combinations an account could be given, and these could be known. Knowledge according to this consists in being able to give an account of anything. This, however, may be true, and yet the theory on which we have based it may be unsound. Testing this by the example of letters, we find that of the syllable σω an account can be given (it can be analysed), but not of its constituents σ and ω. But is the syllable known, the letter unknown? If so, in what way are we to conceive of the syllable? As all the letters? How then can I know them all, and yet none singly? Or is it a simple unity formed out of them? It cannot then be related to them as a whole to its parts,—unless we can establish a distinction between whole and all. But all (singular) cannot be distinguished from all (plural); and this, containing all the parts, can scarcely be distinguished from the whole. Hence whole and all are indistinguishable. Therefore either the syllable has parts, and, consisting of things unknown, must be itself unknown; or, not having parts, it is uncompounded, and therefore itself, according to the theory, unknown. But our own memory ought to teach us that we first learnt to know the letters, and then the syllables and combinations of them.

Though the theory is rejected, we gain through criticising it the notion of a complex whole.

2. καὶ ἄλλα φανεῖν ἀποδεί-

The train of thought here broken off is resumed in the Sophist, where the ἄρωμα ἄληθεια are treated as elements, and combinations of them are shown to be possible; also in the admission of ὀνήματα. Cp. Phileb.

4. δὲ τι δῆ... γραμμάτων] There is here a beginning of the formal or pedantic rhythm which is more common in the Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus. Indeed the manner of Socrates in this part of the Theaetetus bears a close resemblance to that of the Eleatic Stranger.
ΤΗΛΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 206. μετὰ δόξης ἀληθῶς λόγου προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεστήμην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρῆ ὅραν.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, τι ποτε βουλεταί τὸν λόγου ἡμῖν σημαινέω; τριῶν γὰρ ἐν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνον δὴ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐν τῷ τὴν αὐτῷ διάνοιαν ἐμφάνῃ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὠνομάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάστορρον ἡ ὑδάρ τὴν δόξαν ἐκπυμομένον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥήμα. Ἡ οὖ τοῖο δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιούτον λόγος εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εμοιγε. τὸν γούν αὐτὸ δρώντα λέγειν φαμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ γε πᾶσι ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θάττων ἡ σχολαίστερον, τὸ ἐνδείκασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἐκάστου 15 αὐτῷ, ὅ μὴ ἔνεος ἡ κοσμὸς ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς καὶ οὕτως ὅσοι εἰ τι ὀρθῶν δοξάζουσιν, πάντες αὐτῷ μετὰ λόγου φαινοῦνται ἔχοντες καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἐτὶ ὀρθὴ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοινύν ῥαδίως καταγιγνώσκομεν τὸ μη-

4. τι ποτε βουλεταί] The subject is either ταῦτα λέγων (cp. infr. B): Τῶν ἁπαθημένων ἐπιστήμην δὲ νῦν ἀπεστάφη), σε ὅ λόγος, μεσ. τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθῶς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεστήμην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

τῶν λόγων . . σημαινέων] Id. qu. τῶν λόγων εἰπών σημαινέων. 'What are we to understand by the term λόγος? 3 Three meanings are put forward as possible: (1) Expression in words. (2) Analysis. (3) Definition.


10. ἐκπυμομένον] 'Imaging.' Cp. the saying of Democritus, λόγος ἔργον ἑκατομέμεν.

For τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥήμα Cpr. Tim. 75 E: Τὸ δὲ λόγων νῦν ἐξα μέον καὶ ὑποτεύχη φρονήσει κάθεσθαι καὶ ἀρατόν πᾶσιν ἡμῖν ὀνομάσθαι. Soph. 263 E.


21. καταγιγνώσκομεν] 'Accuse in our minds.'

τὸ μηδὲν] 'Nothing at all,'
δὲν εἴρηκεν τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὁ νῦν p. 201 σκοποῦμεν. ἦσος γὰρ ὁ λέγων οὐ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τι ἕκαστον δυνατόν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρυσιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρωμένῳ.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅιον τὶ λέγεις, ὃ Σόκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὅιον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἀμάξης λέγει τὸ ἔκαστον δὲ τε δούραθ' ἀμάξης. ἂ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἴμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σὺ ἂν ἀγαπῶμεν ἂν ἐρωτηθήνετε ὁ τὶ ἔστιν ἀμάξα, εἰ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν τροχοῖ, ἄξων, ἑπετερία, ἄντυγες, ζυγόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὅ ἐν γε ἰσως οἴοις ἂν ἤμαι, ὅσπερ ἂν τὸ σὸν ὀνόμα ἐρωτηθέντα καὶ ἀποκρυμμένον κατὰ συλλαβήν, γελοίους εἶναι, ὅρθως μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ λέγοντας ἂ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς εἶναι καὶ ἔχει τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικός τὸν τοῦ Θεατήτου ὀνόματος λόγον. τὸ δ' οὖν εἶναι ἐπιστήμων

i. e. ‘utter nonsense.’ Cp. supr. 180 A: Ἦττην... ἃ το μηδεῖν. Tim. 77 B: φ'... τούτην το μηδεῖν. This is better than to take the article with the infinitive, because the sense passes on more smoothly from καταγκνώσκομεν, than if this word were used quite absolutely.

Otherwise expressed, μη... καταγνώσκομεν το... ἀποφηνάμενον, ὠς το μηδείν εἴρηκεν.

3. τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα, κ.τ.λ.] This is suggested (μανθικεία) by the preceding argument (206 A B).


Cp. Arist. Met. 2. 3 998 b: Ὅτερος δ' ἐστιν ὅ διὰ τῶν γένων ὀραμάς καὶ ὁ λέγων ἵν' ὡς ἰστιν ἐνπαρχότας.

10. ἑπετερία] The MSS. have ἑπετερία, or ἑπετερία.

12. 'ὁ δ' ἰσως οἴους ἂν ήμαι] ὁ δ', sc. ὁ λέγων, supr. The apodosis is deferred, as is often the case when an illustration has been introduced with ὅσπερ. It is resumed with οὖν τοῖς.

Cp. Rep. 3. 402 A: 'ὅσπερ ἄρα... γραμμάτων πέρι... ἂρ' οὖν, δ' λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὖν οὐδὲ μονοκολι, κ.τ.λ.

14. γελοίους εἶναι (sc. οἰομένου) belongs equally to the protasis and to the suppressed apodosis.

Cp., for a similar interweaving of the illustration with the case illustrated, supr. 147 A C.

17. τὸ δ' οὖν εἶναι 'Whereas, he would say, it is impossible.' Cp. 157 B: τὸ δ' οὖ δὲι, and note.
ΩΛΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

p. 207. ουδέν λέγειν, πρὶν ἄν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἐκαστὸν περαινή τοις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ποι ἔρρηθη.

ΘΕAI. Ἐρρήθη γὰρ.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω τοῖς καὶ περὶ ἀμάξης ἦμας μὲν ὅροις βὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἐκατον ἐκεῖνον δυνάμενον διελθεὶν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν, προσλαβόντα τὸν οὐσίαν τῶν, λόγον τε προσελθοῦσα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δόξῃ καὶ ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικῶν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμων περὶ ἀμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περάνναυστα. 10

ΘΕAI. Οὐκοῦν εἴ δοκεῖς σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Εἰ σοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδείχει τὴν διὰ στοιχείων διέξοδον περὶ ἐκαστὸν λόγον ἔναι, τῇ δὲ κατὰ συναφείς ἡ καὶ κατὰ μείζον ἔτε ἀλογίαν, τούτῳ δὲ μοι λέγε, ἵνα αὐτὸ ἐπισκοπῶμεν.

ΘΕAI. Ἀλλὰ πάνω ἀποδείχομαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἠγουμένος ἐπιστήμων ἐναὶ ὑποτικῶν ὑπονοοῦν ὑπονοοῦν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ ὅτε μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ ἐναί, τὸτε δὲ ἔτερον, ἥ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἔτερον, τοτε δὲ ἔτερον δοξάζῃ; 20

ΘΕAI. Μά Δὲ οὐκ ἐγώγες.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα ἀμφιμορεῖ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει κατ' ἀρχὰς σαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρόντας αὐτὰ;

ΘΕAI. Ἀρα λέγεις τῆς αὐτῆς συναφείς τοτὲ μὲν 25

2. ἐν τοῖς πρώτησι 206 Α.: 18. τὸ αὐτὸ ὅτε μὲν ἦν ἐγ. thinking τ to be the first letter both of τ η and θ. For the construction cp. Phaed. 59 Α., supr. 192 D.
11. ἐν] Sc. αἰνοῦ, from αἰνοῦ" ἐν, supr. Α.
12. εἰ] sc. εἰ is interrogative, depending on τούτο μοι λέγει.
15. αὐτῷ] 'Your answer.'
17. ἔτερον, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Soph. supr. 228 Α.
18. τὸ αὐτὸ ὅτε μὲν ἦν ἐγ. thinking τ to be the first letter both of τ η and θ. For the construction cp. Phaed. 59 Α., supr. 192 D.
19. τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν] E. g. thinking the first letter of θ at one time θ at another τ.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

έτερον, τοτέ δὲ ἐτερον ἡγούμενως γράμμα, καὶ τὸ π. 20
αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην
τιθέντας συλλαβήν;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα λέγω.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Μᾶ Δί οὖ τοῖνυν ἀμνημονῶ, οὐδὲ γέ πω
ἡγοῦμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὅταν εἰς τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ Θεαίτητον
γράφων τις βῆτα καὶ εἰ οὐσία τε δεῖ γράφειν καὶ
γράψῃ, καὶ αὐτὸ Θεόδωρον ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦτα καὶ π. 20
εἰ οὐσία τε δεῖ γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, ἀρ ἐπίστασθαι
φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν πρώτην τῶν ύμετέρων οὐνομάτων
συλλαβήν;

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' ἄρτι ὁμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὕτως
ἔχοντα μὴν εἰδέναι.

15 ΣΩ. Καλώς οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δεύτεραν συλλα-
βήν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως ἔχειν τὸν αὐτόν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν γε.

ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν τάτε τὴν διὰ στοιχείων διέξοδον
ἔχων γράφεις Θεαίτητον μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, οὗτοι ἔχοις
γράφῃ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δήλου δή.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐτε ἀνεπιστήμων ὄν, ὀρθὰ δὲ δοξά-
ζων, ὡς φαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

7. ἐν...καρφ] Sc. κατ' ἄρχας
τῆς τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσεως.
17. οὐδέν γε] Sc. καλείν,
'Certainly not.' γε assents to
the meaning of the question.
Cp. Phil. 38 A: οὐδέν γε, ἄλλης
ἀπερ ἑκούσιον λέγω.
18. 'Αρ' οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] 'Soc. Then
in writing out correctly the
word Theætæus, he will do so
not only with right opinion,
but with command of the enu-
meration of elements; will he
not? Th. Clearly he will.
Soc. And that while still without
knowledge, though with right
opinion. Is not that what we
say? Th. Yes. Soc. And yet
with definition added to right
opinion. For he wrote with
command of the way through
the elements; and this we ad-
mitted to be knowledge.'
THEAIHTOS

p. 208. ΣΩ. Λόγου γε ἐχὼν μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης. τὴν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἐχὼν ἐγραφεῖν, ἢ δὴ λόγου ὁμολογήσαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀλυσ.

ΣΩ. "Εστίν ἀρα, ὃ ἐταύρη, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, 5 ἢν οὕτω δεὶ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. "Ομοφθέν, ὡς ἐνεκεν, ἐπιστήμησαμεν οἰνθεύτεσ 

ἐξειν τῶν ἀληθεσιαν ἐπιστήμης λόγου. ἢ μήπο 

καθηγορίωμεν; ἠμον γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο τις αὐτὸν ὀριεύται, 10 

οἷς τὸ λοιπὸν εἰδος τῶν τριῶν, ὡν ἐν γε τι ἐφαμε 

λόγον θήσεται τῷ ἐπιστήμην ὀρίζομεν δόξαν εἶναι 

ὄρθὴν μετὰ λόγου.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ορθὸς ὑπὲρμασας" ἐτὶ γὰρ ἐν λοιπόν. τὸ 

μὲν γὰρ ἕν διανοίας ἐν φοινῆ ὀσπερ εἰδολολικον, τὸ δὲ 15 

ἀρτι λεγέθην διὰ στοιχείου ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ὀλον" τὸ δὲ διὰ 

τριτον τί λέγεις;

ΣΩ. "Οπερ ἄν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπιστευν, τὸ ἐχειν τις 

μεῖν οἰς εἰπείν ὃ τῶν ἀπάντων διαφέρει τῷ ἐρωτηθέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οἷον τίνα τίνος ἐχεις μοι λόγου εἰπείν;

Δ ΣΩ. Οἷον, εἰ βούλει, ἡλίου πέρι ἴκανον οἴματι σοι


ἡμῶν ἐκφράστηκαν ὅσον θαρείδος ἀπαντάν, πάντα 

ἀπὸ πάλιν ὀσπερ ὑπὸ ἄρνο 

εἰν. 278 E: Ἰδα ὅπερ ἀντί ὁνέ 

πατος ἢμων γίγνεται. Lys. 218 C. 

The expression is proverbial, and there is no distinct refer 

tence to the 'dream of Socrates. supr. 201 D.

9. ἐπιστήμης λόγου] λόγος is 

used here in a double sense. 

(1) 'Definition of Knowledge.' 

Cpr. 148 D: 'Εν οὐλόγῳ προσανατικόν. 

(2) That 'account' of a thing 

which (with right opinion) 

constituates Knowledge. The play 

of words may be preserved:

"when we thought we had 

found the most indubitable 

'account' concerning Know 

ledge."

10. τε [Viz. the nameless 

author of our theory. 

18. ὕπερ ἄν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπιστευν] 

The two former were inferences 

from different meanings of ἑ 

γεων;—'to express' and 'to enu 

merate.' See 206 D: Τὸν γο 

ὐδρο ὑπὸ ὁποτά ἐργα 

φαμεν.

20. ἴκανον ἀποδέχασθαι] 'Suffi 

cient to obtain your assent.' 

ἀποδέχασθαι is an epeegegetic 

infinite.
εἶναι ἀποδεξασθαί, διὶ τῷ λαμπρότατον ἔστι τῶν κατὰ p. 208
tῶν οὐρανῶν ὁντῶν περὶ γῆν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως μὲν οὖν.

Σ_OM. Λαβὲ δὴ τοῦ χάριν ἑιρήταί. ἔστι δὲ ὅπερ ἀρτι
5 ἑλέγομεν, ὡς ἁρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἐκάστων ἄν λαμβάνης
ἡ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὡς φασὶ τινες, λήψεις
ἐκόμος δ᾽ ἀν κοινοῦ τινὸς ἑφαστη, ἐκεῖνων πέρι σοι ἐσται
ὁ λόγος ὃν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ἦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μανθάνω καὶ μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν λόγον ἐ
10 τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν.

Σ_OM. Ὅσο δ᾽ ἂν μετ᾽ ὁρθῆς δόξης περὶ ὑπονοοῦν τῶν
15 ὑπότων τῆν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ αὐτοῦ,
ἐπιστήμων γεγονός ἐσται οὗ πρότερον ἦν δοξα-
στής.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμὲν γε μὴν οὕτως.

Σ_OM. Νῦν δέ, ἡ Θεαιτήτε, παντάπασιν ἔγογξεν
ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὡσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ
λεγομένου, ἐννήμα τινὲς σμικρὰν ἐνεῖος δὲ ἀφεστήκη
πόροροθεν, ἐφαίνετο τί μοι λέγοσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τούτο;

Σ_OM. Φράσω, ἐὰν οὖς τε γένωσαι. ὁρθήν ἔγογξεν p. 209
ἐχὼν δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, ἐὰν μὲν προσλάβω τῶν

4. λαβ[η] I.e. ὅθεν. 'Let me explain to you.'
6. ὡς φασὶ τινες] The tenses are certainly Socratic, and
probably the Megarians are meant. (See Introduction.)
12. αὐτοῦ.] This punctuation appears preferable when it is
observed that there has been a
tendency in the last few pages to accumulate genitives.
tην διαφοραν αὑτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων, 'Its
distinction from other things.'
13. δοξασθής.] Cp. 160 D: 'Επιστήμων ἂν ἐγν, ὡσπερ
άλοσθαίν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Λόγος δε γε ἦν ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφοράτης ἐμνεία.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡς τοις.

ΣΩ. 'Ἡνίκ' οὖν ἔδοξαξόν μόνον, ἄλλο τι ὁ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἦπτόμην τῇ διαφορᾷ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔσκεν.

ΣΩ. Τῶν κοινῶν τι ἀρα διενούμην, ὃν οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ἡ τις ἄλλος ἔχει.

B ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Δίος· πῶς ποτὲ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὲ μᾶλλον ἔδοξαξόν ἡ ἄλλον ὀντινοῦν; θές γάρ με 15 διανοούμενον ὡς ἐκείνου ὑπὸς Θεαῖττος, ὅσ ἂν ἐκ τῶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐκχιαρὰς καὶ ὕφεσιμος καὶ στομά καὶ ὧστ' ἐν ἐκατότων τῶν μελῶν. αὐτὴ ὑπὰ ἡ διάνοια ἐκθ' ὁ τι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαῖττην ἡ Ἐσώδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἢ τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν τῶν ἔχοντων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τι γάρ;

1. δὴ] According to the hypothesis.

4. ἦν] 'Is,' according to the hypothesis.

τῆς σῆς διαφοράτης] 'Of your differentia.' Plato affects this abstract termination. Cp. esp. δικαιία, Prot. 331 B, Gorg. 508 A.

7. ὁ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τοῖς ἄλλων αἰτίαις] It occurs to Socrates while speaking that the 'Difference' of one person from another is not one but many. Hence the inexact correlation.

12. ἢ τις ἄλλων ἔχει] The verb (ἔχει) is attracted by τις ἄλλος. The phrase Μυσῶν ἔχοντων is strengthened by the insertion of the article. The earlier editors (under protest from Buttmann) read τὰ λεгоμέναν. There is no reason for this. Cp. supra 173 D: οἰ τῆς θαλάττης λεγομένου χεῖν. Arist. Eth. N. 8. 3: Δεῖ γὰρ τοὺς λεγομένους άλας συναναλάτσα. In the examples quoted by the Scholiast the proverb is used to express contempt. Here it rather conveys the notion of indifference.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. 'ΑΛΛ' έαν δή μη μόνον τὸν ἔχοντα ρίνα καὶ π. 20ι ὄφθαλμον διανοηθεῖ, ἄλλα καὶ τὸν σμόν τε καὶ ἔξ-ς-ς ὄφθαλμον, μὴ τι σὲ αὐ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἡ ἐμαυτὸν ἡ ὁδὸν ταὐτότητον;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. 'ΑΛΛ' οὐ πρότερον γε, οἷμαι, Θεαιττοῦς ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σμότης αὐτή τῶν ἄλλων σμοτήτων ὃν ἐγὼ εὕροκα διάφορον τὰ μνημεῖον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνοημαμένη καταθήκαται,—καὶ τὰλλα σύνως ἐξ ὃν εἰ σὺ,—[ἢ] ἐμέ, καὶ ἐαν αὐριον ἀπανθόςω, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὅρθα δοξάζειν περὶ σοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἀρα καὶ ἡ ὄρθη δοξα δ' ἐν εἰς ἐκάστου πέρι.

2. τὸν σμόν τε καὶ ἐξόφθαλ-

μον· Supr. 143 E. In Xen. 
Cyp. 1. 9 ἐξόφθαλμος is opposed to κολλόφθαλμο. But in Ar. 
Η. Α. 1. 8, § 5 the words ἐκτὸς 
and ἐκτὸς seem rather to refer 
to the position of the eyes.
8. μνημείον... ἐνοημαμένη] 
Cp. 191 D, 192 A, 194 C, 196 
Δ. The theory which has been 
rejected is still permitted and 
intended by Plato to leave an 
impression on the mind.
10. εἰ σὺ,—[ἢ] ἐμέ, καὶ 
Bodl. 
εἰ σὺ ἐμέ καὶ: Ven. Ξ. et pr. Π. 
καὶ: Ces. εἰση ἐμέ καὶ: 
Ven. Ξ. γρ. οἶση ἐμέ: cett. 
εἰση ἐμέ καὶ. The reading is 
uncertain. That adopted in 
the text is the most plausible 
which can be said to rest on 
MS. authority. ἢ refers back 
to αὐτὴ ἡ σμότης, passing over 
tὰλλα σύνως ἐξ ὃν εἰ σὺ, which 
is added διὰ μίνου and answers 
to ἐξόφθαλμον in the previous 
sentence.

Heindorf's conjecture, ἢ, re-
ferring to μνημεῖον, is unsatis-
factory, because it is rather the 
object of sense, which, by fitting 
the μνημεῖον, would be said to 
remind. Hence ἢ ἐμέ καὶ (ad-
opted by Wagner) would seem 
a fair emendation. But a still 
simpler line of conjecture is to 
suppose, as in my former edition 
(1861), ἐμέ καὶ in the Bodleian 
reading to have been trans-
posed from καὶ ἐμέ. This gives 
the same meaning (the sentence 
as usual passing out of the rel-
ative construction), and ac-
counts naturally for the corrup-
tion. If this emendation is 
right, the sentence must be 
supposed to revert by a con-
versational licence to the indi-
cative mood. Cp. suppl. 149 D: 
Ποιῶ καὶ... ἀρβλικακουσιν, and 
ote. Schleiermacher's conjecture, ἢ ἐμέ, κ.τ.λ., leaves the 
subject of ἀναμνήσεων doubtful. 
That of the Zurich editors, εἰς 
σὺ ἐμέ, καὶ εἰς ἐμέ, introduces an 
abrupt and awkward inversion.
ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ οὖν προσλαβέων λόγον τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τί ἂν ἔτι εἴη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ἡ διαφέρει τι τῶν ἄλλων, πάνυ γελοῖα γίγνεται ἡ ἐπίταξις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὑπόρθην δόξαν ἔχομεν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων δια-

φέρει, τούτων προσλαβέων κελεύει ἡμᾶς ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὕτως ἡ μὲν σκυτάλης ἡ ἐ ὑπέρον ἡ ὅσον δὴ λέγεται περιτροπὴ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν ὑπὲρ ἂν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ δὲ παρακληθείς ἀνθικ ολοῖ δικαιότερον τὸ γάρ, ἃ ἐχομεν, τά τι προς-

λαβεῖν κελεύειν Ἰνα μάθημεν ἃ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γε-

ναιεῖ ἐφοτε ἐσκοτομέμφον.

ΘΕΑΙ. ***††ει γε ὅτι τι νῦν δὴ ὅσ ἔρων ἐπὶ θου;

And the use of ὑσα in this sense is questionable.

9. ὑπέρον . . . περιτροπὴ ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ αὐτὰ παρατεταλέαν πολλάκις καὶ μὴν ἀναύστων, ἡ ὑπὸ τῶν ταυτῶν τὶ πραττόντων. μεῖνηται δὲ αὐτὴς Φιλίμων ἐν Ἰησοῦ καὶ ἑποίθαθα Πλάτων. (Schol.)

10. αὐτὸ τὸ λέγον Ἰ. ἐπὶ ν. ἐπὶ τ. Cpr. Pheodo, 72 B, Legg, 3. 668 Δ: λέγοντες ἐργεῖν ὅτι θείος πρὸς χρονόν τε καὶ ἐρ-

γορὸν ἐστιν καίστοτε τὰ λεγόμενα τίμαι καὶ καλά κατὰ πόλεμ.

12. πάνω γενναίος ... ἐσκοτω-


14. ***††ει γε ὅτι SotheBod-

leian MS. (but with no accents by the first hand.) Ven. T. has ἐπὶ εἰς, with the rest, except Vat. Δ, which has εἰ δὲ. The Bod-

leian continues without punctuation from ἐσκοτωμένων, and accents as above. But the ac-

cents appear to have been added by a later hand. Is it possible

some words may have slipped out! such as τὶ νῦν δὴ; ἔ γε δὴ τί —'Well, what then?' If, as I

presume, your question just now' (supr. D) 'prepared the

way for some announcement.'

The reading of Vat. Δ (εἰ δὲ δὴ . . . τί, κ.τ.λ.) admits of being

rendered, however: 'Well, but if,—what were you just now saying, when you asked the

question?' Most of the editors give Ἠσο. The ques-

tion referred to is τὰ οὖν προ-

λαβεῖν . . . τὶ ἄν ἐφ. ἔπη; This

is a little difficult; and Badham, reading EI δὲ, most ingeniously

conjectures τὶ νῦν δὴ ὡς ἐτερον

ὑπέρον, i.e. 'what was the sup-

pressed alternative implied by

your use of μέν?' But ὑποτεθε-

σθαι elsewhere refers to a dis-

tinctly expressed postulate or

condition (Rep. 1. 346 B), and

if it could be used of something

merely implied, the imperfect

tense would be, required in

such a reference. πυθερβαι and
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩ. Ει τὸ λόγον, ὃ παῖ, προσλαβεῖν γνῶναι κελευεῖ, ἃλλα μὴ δοξάσας τὴν διαφορότητα, ἤδε χρηματίζει ἣν εἰς τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου. τὸ γὰρ γνώναι ἐπιστήμην ποι λαβέω ἐστίν. ἦ γάρ;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθεῖς, ὃς ἔουκε, τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἀποκρινέται ὃτι δόξα ὅρθη μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγον γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτο ἂν εἰς κατ' ἐκείνου.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕν παλικαν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ παυτάπασι γε εὑρισκεῖν, ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φανερόν ὅρθην εἰναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἰτε διαφορότητος εἰτε ὄροιν. οὔτε ἄρα αἰσθητικῶς, ἢ Θεαττὴς, οὔτε δόξα ἀληθινής οὔτε μετ' ἀληθεοῦν 15 δόξης λόγον προσγεγράμμενον ἐπιστήμην ἃν εἶν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔουκεν.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲν ἔτι κυνικῶν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὃ φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἡ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δῖ ἐγώγε πλείω ἢ ὅσα εἶχον 20 ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σὲ ἐφηκά.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἡ μανετυκῆς ἡμῶν τέχνη ἀνεμαία ψηφι ἑγενήσαθι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τρο-φῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

*φίλοισθος are nearly synonymous in Plato. Theaetetus very properly recalls Socrates from his unawed discursiveness. Mr. Paley reads ἐν δή, τί νῦν δή, κ.τ.λ. 2. ἥδε χρημίζει 

*δόξαν are nearly synonymous in Plato. Theaetetus very properly recalls Socrates from his unawed discursiveness. Mr. Paley reads ἐν δή, τί νῦν δή, κ.τ.λ. 2. ἥδε χρημίζει ἢν εἰς τοῦ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν.

7. ἀποκρινόμενοι πολλά ὧν λόγος.

12. φαίνει] ἐκείνον καὶ. The absurdity is in fact the same as in Theaetetus' first attempt, supr. 147 B.

17. For the 1st pers. plural cp. supr. 154 D. It may be called the good physician's figure, —σχῆμα ηρμοκορναίων.

19. Καὶ νει μὰ Δῖ ἐγώγε πλείω]
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰν τοῦν άλλων μετὰ ταύτα ἐγκύμων ἐπι-κειμένης γέγνεσθαι, ὁ Θεαίτητος,—ἐὰν τε γίγνη, βελτιώ-νου ἐσεὶ πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἔξετασιν, εάν τε κενὸς ἦν, ἢττον ἐσεὶ βαρὸς τοῖς συνούσι καὶ ἤμερότερος, σωφρόνως ὡκ ὦ ὁ ἑδαν ἔσεθαι ἢ μὴ οἰσθα. τοσοῦτον 5 γὰρ μόνον ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδὲ τι οἶδα ὃν ὦν ἂλλοι, ὡσοὶ μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἀν-δρες εἰσὶ τε καὶ γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ μακενιάν ταύτην ἐγώ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχιστον, ἡ μὲν τῶν δ' ὑπακόην, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίου καὶ ὡσοὶ κα-λοὶ. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, ἦν μὲ γέγραπται· ἐωθὲν δὲ, ὁ Θεόδωρος, δεύρο πάλιν ἀπαντώμεν.

καὶ πλέον, 'even more:'—καὶ μὰ δι' ἐγὼ ἐστὶν interposed.

1. Ἐὰν... ἐὰν τε... ἐὰν τε] For this hypothesis within hypothesis cp. supra 147 A, and note. ἐὰν τε... ἐὰν τε are correlatives.

Then, Thetetetus, should you go about hereafter to conceive afresh,—whether you do conceive, your state will be the more promising for what you have now gone through, or whether you remain barren, you will be gentler and less offensive to those about you, for you will be too modest to think that you know what you do not know.'

9. ἐκ θεοῦ] θεοὶ is here generalised. Cp. supra. 149 B, 150 C.


11. τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν] Indicements for impiety were laid before the ἄρχων βασιλέως, who was the representative of the ancient kings in their capacity of High-Priest, as the Rex Sacrificulus was at Rome. (Smith’s Dict. of Ant.) It is at this point that the Euthyphro is supposed to open.

13. ἐωθὲν δὲ, κ.τ.λ.] These words may have originally belonged to the dialogue without implying the promise of a continuation. Cp. Lach. sub fin.
APPENDIX A.

Heraclitus and Parmenides.

As after-ages saw amongst Plato's contemporaries distinctions which were only partially developed in his time, so in a less degree, and with the difference which his genius implies, Plato viewed the past through a generalization and an antithesis. Heraclitus and Empedocles, and from another point of view Protagoras, were the representatives of one tendency, Parmenides and his followers, of the contrary one. The opposition between them is that between rest and motion, unity and diversity, absolute and relative, universal and particular, finite and infinite, positive and negative, between knowledge and opinion, ideas or conceptions and impressions.

In endeavouring to conceive what Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Protagoras really were, it is necessary to divest our minds of this contrasted form under which we are led to think of them in reading Plato.

It would only be an approximation towards a true estimate to say that Parmenides represents the idea of unity, being, or rest; Heraclitus that of dualism, of a process, or motion, and Pythagoras that of harmony and order, or definite proportions, as intermediate between the other two.

Philosophy was yet too near its origin for its streams to have diverged very far. As we come nearer to those early thinkers, we find that they had more in common than we supposed. They have a common mythological element, the atmosphere in which their thoughts move, and which they strive to pierce, although it veils their meaning partly from themselves; inhaled by some in the Greek and Sicilian valleys, by some, perhaps in earlier purity, on the Eastern plains, but in all finding its highest sensuous embodiment in the Sun or Fire. The notion of Διὸς is common to Heraclitus and Parmenides, the οὐκ άπτένη of the one is paralleled by the ἀνάρχον of the other.
The endeavour to pierce this veil of language is accompanied in all of them by a melancholy scepticism and contempt for the common opinions of men. The words of Plato in the Phædo, οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκράτος δὲ τα ἐν σκότῳ, might have been applied by any of the earlier philosophers to the condition of men, who believe the testimony of their senses before that of reason, and cling to their own narrow thoughts instead of being conformed to the law of Nature or Being.

With this scepticism is combined in all of them what may be termed an ideal Pantheism: the speculative and religious intellect filling the void of observation with the intensity of its own early thought. All that is particular owes its being to Wrong, in the universal alone is harmony and righteousness and peace. The world of opinion is a world of 'nought and night'; the fullness of being is absolute, and commensurate with thought. The nature of things, says Philolaus, belongs to divine, and not to human knowledge.

Such being the ground colours more or less discernible throughout the philosophy of the sixth century B.C., what were the distinguishing features by which they were relieved? It is now proposed to consider this in the case of Heraclitus and (more briefly) of Parmenides; and it may be remarked in passing, that, historically speaking, it does not seem very probable that either of these philosophers pursued his reflections with direct reference to the other. The idea of the History of Philosophy is a little apt to intercept our view of the History itself. As a Platonist sees in the Ionian and Eleatic two opposite poles, so the Hegelian is tempted to trace the progress of thought from Parmenides to Heraclitus, while a Kantian may view the Eleatic transcendentalism as the higher. Such thoughts may supply a valuable theory, but they are not strictly historical. Parmenides and Heraclitus were nearly contemporary, Heraclitus being the earlier of the two: they lived far apart, and were subject to different influences.

Heraclitus. I. Heraclitus of Ephesus was an Eastern Greek, and it is not merely fanciful to find an analogy between his thoughts and the more dreamy speculations of the remoter East. But they have a greater interest for the student of philosophy, not only as having contributed primarily to the speculative impulse of the Greek mind, but as permanently valuable in themselves, and anticipating some of the most fruitful of modern ideas. Bacon drew

2 Τὸ γὰρ εἶλαν κατὰ νύμμα, Parmen.
from them some of his happiest expressions; and Hegel professed to have embodied in his own Logic every principle which they contained. ‘The voice of the Sibyl,’ says Heraclitus, ‘although its notes be harsh and rude, yet penetrates to a thousand years.’ This pregnant saying may be well applied to the obscure utterances of Heraclitus himself. Half understood even by his own followers, imperfectly appreciated by Plato and Aristotle, he exercised a wide-spread influence, second only to that of Parmenides in its intensity. Caught up afresh by the Stoics and Neo-platonists, and by the Fathers of the Christian Church, and read by them in the light of deeper wants, his words received a new interest from their sublime spirit of awe and sadness. And thus many of them have been preserved to us; and reveal in dim and broken outline the proportions of a most noble and far-seeing intellect.

It is the common fate of great thinkers in an early time, that for the most part only the negative side of their teaching ‘lives after them.’ One reason is, that it is the most distinct and intelligible to themselves and their contemporaries. Deep intuitions, but unsubstantial, though clothed in palpable imagery; anticipations, vague and unsupported by proof, of the human mind, dreaming on thoughts to come, partly become engulfed by time, partly remain dead and fruitless and unknown, until their meaning is revealed by the development of cognate thoughts in distant ages, and a later sympathy detects what is hidden there in germ. So the doctrine of Heraclitus, which undoubtedly contained an element of order and unity, if not of rest, and had been as ideal as any, was degraded to be the support of the doctrine of sense, although it again enters to restore the balance of philosophy when in danger of being bound fast in the Elatic One.

Heraclitus himself had followed in the wake of previous thinkers. As the emigrant Xenophanes had ‘looked up to the vault of heaven and said that the One was God,’ so Thales had looked forth on the expanse of the Ægean and said that Water was the All, with a vague sense that Nature must be simple and all-pervading. The tendency of his successors had been towards the idea of an homogeneous Infinite. Heraclitus rose to the conception of Nature as a universal ever-acting Law.

He felt deeply the falseness and contradictoriness of sensation and opinion, not because he contrasted their objects with that of knowledge, but because he felt that these are presented as being

\footnote{Thus the dialectic of Plat. Rep. 6 is a sort of ἀδιασταλομέσα μέε. See also the Sophist and Parmenides.}
something in themselves,—‘not fluctuating but fixed,’—and not as moments in the Universal Process. This is itself unseen, but is symbolised in several ways. ‘The Order that embraces all things is an everliving Fire, Eternal, Uncreated, kindling itself by measures and extinguishing itself by measures;’ i.e. The Idea of the universe implies at once absolute activity and perfect law. This Idea is also represented as ‘the invisible harmony’ which is ‘better than the visible,’ as the ‘Thought which guides all through all,’ as the ‘Universal Word’ or ‘Reason,’ as the ‘One Wisdom,’ as ‘Time,’ as ‘Righteousness,’ as ‘Fate,’ as the ‘Name of Zeus.’

This Eternal process, which is at the same time a law or harmony, is inseparable in the mind of Heraclitus from the notion of dualism. The process is from This to That and back again, the harmony is between opposites, which do not cease to be opposites, although the one passes into the other. This was not lost upon Plato. ‘The universe is ever drawn asunder and together at once, says the muse of firmer tone, viz. the Ionian: Plat. Soph. 242. It is implied in the blunt words, ‘War is the Father of all things:’ and in a saying of more doubtful meaning, Πολίτωνος ἀρμονίας κόσμου, δεμοτήρ λύπης καὶ τάσσων. Different interpretations of this have been suggested. Perhaps it might be paraphrased, ‘As the arrow leaves the string, the hands are pulling opposite ways to each other, and to the different parts of the bow (cp. Plato, Rep. 4. 439), and the sweet note of the lyre is due to a similar tension and retention; the secret of the Universe is the same.’ Thus Homer is blamed for praying that strife may be no more, since without strife there can be no harmony. ‘The Deity is Day and Night in one, winter and summer, war and peace, fulness and hunger.’ Each thing is ever producing or passing into its opposite—evil into good, and good into evil: light into darkness and darkness into light. This Eternal process is the world: ‘All coming out of one, and one arising out of all.’ Its nature is to reveal itself in contradictions: Συνάψειος οὐλα καὶ οὐχι οὐλα, κ.τ.λ. ‘En το σοφων μονων λέγεται οὐκ εθήλει καὶ εθήλει, Ζητων εθηλομα τ.τ. ‘

But it is more particularly described as the way upwards and downwards, which is the same. In everything there is contrariety, and the action of the all-embracing, all-dividing fire. But there is a more general contrariety between the fire itself and its grosser forms, i.e. between the absolute process itself and

1 Fr. 66 (Bywater).
2 Hor. Epist. 1. 12. 19: ‘Quid velit et possit rerum concordia dissona.’
3 Fr. 59.
4 Fr. 65.
the elements which are at once the subjects and the products of its Law. Fire is becoming all things, and all things are becoming fire;—the things are typified as air and water and earth. Here it is more difficult to separate the symbol from the thought. There is an effort made to give greater outward reality to the process, and the language becomes more sensuous accordingly. The way upwards is the way from earth through water and air to fire, the way downwards is from fire through air and water to earth. Both processes are ever moving on together; and each element has its own harmony or law. There is then not only contrariety and harmony in the world, but also a lower and a higher. This is more simply expressed by the distinction between the moist and dry exhalations; e.g. the clouds and the sun: the one dark, the other light; the one tending downwards, the other upwards. These are, as it were, the body and soul of the world. The death of either is the other's life. The Universal Process is perpetually circling between them. At this point we return to the world of sensible things. They exist only by perpetual strife, life and death work together in them; their birth is a death, their death or absorption into the higher region is the true life; the only harmony amongst them is due to war. But is there war in heaven? Is there no escape from this region of conflicting elements? Is the fire itself, the origin and goal of the struggle of existence, torn asunder by a similar struggle? We may possibly imagine the primordial activity and its law (πῦρ, μέτρα) as two coexistent and opposite principles, the balance of which is order (κόσμος); but it is probably nearer the truth to say, that the fire is inseparable from the world, and therefore from the conflict of things: as these in their war are ever coming into existence and absorbed again, so the fire is ever parted asunder so as to become all things, and at the same time united out of them 1, quenched into the lower forms and kindled into itself again. But then this process is all-embracing; not isolated like the war of particular things: and for each thing to rise from earth to fire, that is, from particular existence to the Universal Process, is to attain to peace. This seems to be implied in the notice of Diog. L. (9. 8): Ὑμν δὲ ἐναντίων τὸ μὲν εἰς γίνεσιν ὅγον καλέσαντι πόλεμον καὶ ἐρυθήν, τὸ δ' ἐτοὶ τὴν ἑπίφρωσιν ὁμολογίαν καὶ εἰρήνην. On the other hand, that which is wearied with the 'Eternal process moving on,' is carried downwards by a weak desire of rest and of particular being; and to this is

1 Διαφερόμενον ἐπὶ συμφέρειν. ἐποίησαν ἠδὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν,—κάρατος ἀνά-

2 Οὕτω ταῦτα ὡς ζεύγος ὑμέίνα—κακοῦ.
attributed the origin of the individual soul. (See Lassalle, Her.
vol. i. pp. 123 sqq.)

What is the bearing of this theory on the mind, on human
knowledge, and on human life?

1. The universal law or process may be conceived of as a con-
tinued act or utterance of mind (γράμμα ἐκθαμβῶσαν πάντα, ὁ ἐ
σοφὸς, θεῖας λόγους). This, though more or less personified (as Ζισ, 
Δίκης, Θεός), is nowhere distinctly personal. The act or utterance
itself is the soul of the World, not exactly "immanent," but ever
moving throughout all, passing into everything and returning into
itself again. Yet while thus pervading all things, it essentially
holds the upper ethereal region, and embraces all, being opposed to
the things beneath it as universal to particular.

2. Knowledge therefore is the acquaintance and union with this
universal and pervading mind or law. That human mind is the
best, which most partakes of it; that which lives in its own world
of particular impressions and notions, is "nearer earth and less in
light." This idea finds a symbolical and also an abstract expres-
sion. "A dry soul is the wisest and best, flashing through the body
as lightning through a cloud" (cp. ἔγρα ἀναστυμιαίσιν). "The soul
that is moist (e.g. with wine) "embodies" itself like a gathering
cloud" (cp. ἔγρα ἀναστυμιαίσιν). "The Law of things is a law of
universal Reason, but most men live as if they had a wisdom of
their own." "To live in the light of the universal Order is to
be awake, to turn aside into our own microcosm is to go to sleep."
"Most men even when they hear are as though they heard not,
their speech bewrays that though present they are absent mentally."
It is an obscure question, and one which Heraclitus probably did
not distinctly ask himself, by what path, according to this theory,
the mind passes from sense to knowledge, from the darkness of
the particular into the light of the universal. The answer would
probably be little more than that the eye of the soul is opened.
As the faculty of sight is quenched in sleep, so the mind is quenched
while it is concerned only with the things surrounding it. But if
a man is awake, the fire within him finds its kindred fire, and
flashes through the clouds of the sensible world. Thus living in the
universal order he becomes a partaker of the mind which follows
all through all. Sensation is not annihilated, but is absorbed into
the grander movement of the mind, and becomes the transparent
medium of true vision. (See the expression κατὰ φῶς ἔταιν, 
where the transition from sensible to mental perception is not
marked.) While the mind is thus acquainted with the universal
law, it must also follow the swiftness of the universal motion (Plat. Cratyl. 412 : Διά τοῦ λόγου ἑνα παντὸς), distinguishing all things into their true elements (διαίρεων ἐκαστῶν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φύσεως διας ἔχει), perceiving their transformations, comprehending their unseen harmony (πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρυπτός καὶ καταλίφθην). Heraclitus could not be unconscious that this was an ideal state for man, who 'lights a taper for himself in the night,' and 'is but an ape to compare with God.' The subtlety of Nature far exceeds the subtlety of man's intellect, and her energy far exceeds his power to grapple with it. Hence as in the Heaven of Heraclitus there is no rest, so in his philosophy there is occasionally a despairing tone. This, however, never occurs in speaking of the Eternal process, but only of its comprehension by man.

3. For in comparison with the grandeur of the Universal Law, human life becomes a very little thing, if it be not more fitly called a death. Indeed, as in all things else, so in man, life and death are ever working together. His body is ever absorbed into his soul, his soul is ever dying into his body; his birth into the world is the entombment of a higher life, the death of what is earthly in him is the awakening of the God. As the Reason is but a small part in any man, so the good amongst men are few, and misunderstood (for dogs also bark at him they know not). Even the philosopher is like the gold-digger, who toils much and finds little, and often his truest wisdom is to know himself, and to feel the nothingness of his individual Being in the presence of the Universal Order. Yet public law is to be zealously maintained, as more general than the private will, the excesses of which are to be quenched as a dangerous fire.

Such is the bare outline of a thought the grandeur of which was far beyond the comprehension of that time. The Λόγος or Law of Heraclitus was not exactly a law of progress, for his elements are ever circling in one round, yet it is as near an approach to that Idea as is to be found in Ancient Philosophy. A still nearer approach is made to the conception of the infinity and simplicity of Nature. And while we feel that the metaphysical systems of Plato and Aristotle owe much of their strength and reality and perfection to the One Being of Parmenides, and in part also to the Pythagoreans, in whose philosophy finite and infinite were already combined, it is im-

1 Fr. 2.  
2 Fr. 26.  
4 "Τὸ ἐν χρήσει νῦν μᾶλλον ἡ πορεία, Fr. 103."
possible not to recognise in Plato a nearer kindred to Heraclitus than to any other of his predecessors. The union of Imagination and Reason, the plasticity of mind, the tendency at once to soar and to roam, may be mentioned as some of the points of communion between them. Many scattered thoughts, as well as the spirit pervading whole passages, might be quoted in confirmation of this. It is not surprising therefore if Plato grasped the thought of Heraclitus more firmly than the dark philosopher's own followers had done.

The fate of Heraclitus' teaching at Ephesus reminds us of his own picture of the soul that is too weak to follow the Universal motion, and falls away from it to take an individual shape. The very multiplicity of his symbolism seems to have contributed to this result; each disciple interpreting the whole theory by the figure which was most intelligible to himself: one fastening on the Fire, another on the Sun, another on the dry exhalation, another on the more abstract Righteousness, or the ruling Mind, while some appear to have seized upon his habit of teaching by strange outward signs, if there be any truth in what Aristotle gravely asserts, that Cratylius at length

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1 The two passages in which this appreciation appears most distinctly are, Sophist. 243: Διαφέρομεν γάρ (συ. τοῦ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς) ὑποκύπτεται, φασὶν αἰ τῆς συστοιχίας τῶν Μονών (with which contrast Sympos. 187, where the saying is explained away), and Cratyl. 413: ὁ ἄρχων ἀρχιτέκτων τοῦ πῶς εἶναι νομίσματος τούτον τι εἶναι, ὅποιον ἕλεγον ἄλλο ἢ χαριστία, διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναι τι δεῖχεν, δι' αὐτὸ πάντα τὰ γεγονόμενα γέγοναν, εἴπερ δὲ τῆς πάντως καὶ λογικότερον εἴπερ δὲ συνάνθρωπον καὶ δεικνύοντα οἷον τῆς, ἄλλος δὲ τούτους λέγει, τι εἴπερ αὐτὸς μεθέλησεν, καὶ τάχθησαν διὸ ἔστωσεν τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἕτει δὲ, ως ὁδηγόν μεταφορὰς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα δηούν. 

2 This may be illustrated by the continuation of the passage of the Cratylus just quoted. Μέχρι μὲν αὐτὸ κατανύση ὧν ἔπειτα ἔλεγομεν, παρά συνέχειά τοῦτο εἶναι τοῦ δίκαιου. ἔγνω δὲ, ὅταν οἰκονομείται, ἄτι λαμβάνομεν ἃν περί αὐτοῦ τῶν μὴ πάντα διαπλασαμένα ἐν ἀπορίας, ὃν τοὺς εἶπε τοῦ δίκαιου καὶ τοῦ άνδρος—δι’ ὧν ἐγέρσεται, τούτ’ ἐστὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦκαὶ ἣδε καλλίν.
only moved his finger. These divided members of Heraclitus continued after him a partial and spasmodic life, and the system ended consistently in a kind of war.

Until the end of last century the fragments of the early Greek philosophers were only accessible to the few scholars whose reading extended over a large field. These of Heraclitus were first collected by Schleiermacher in 1807. But the discovery of the Philosophumena in 1851 gave materials not previously accessible. For Hippolytus, or whoever wrote that treatise, sought to discredit Noetus by identifying his teaching with that of the old Ephesian, and to this pious wish we are indebted for several fresh quotations from the Ἱερά Φύσις. The sentences containing these additional fragments were carefully re-edited in 1854 by Jacob Bernays, by whom the study of Heraclitus has been otherwise greatly advanced (Heraclitea, 1848, etc.). More recently, in 1869, there appeared from the same acute and learned pen Die Heraclitischen Briefe, ein Beitrag zur philosophischen und religionsgeschichtlichen Literatur, a memorable essay towards determining the complex question, 'What kind of evidence can be obtained from spurious writings?' In this work, and also in his Heraclitea, Prof. Bernays has pointed out many echoes of Heraclitus in subsequent literature.

Mr. Bywater has conceived the design of presenting in one view the substance and the shadow of Heraclitus, of letting us hear the 'voice of the Sibyl' and its reverberations; not by weaving the scattered fragments into a complete whole with the help of unlimited conjecture, as was done by Lassalle (more theologian than scholar) in 1858, and more recently by Schuster in a laborious effort of 'constructive criticism' (Teubner, 1873), but by displaying the relevant facts, including the citation of authorities, with as much exactness and with as little admixture of conjecture as possible.

The citations throw considerable light both on the interpretation of Heraclitus and on the history of his influence. An obscure phrase often becomes clearer when we see how it was quoted (see esp. Fr. 60); and even the names of the authors are instructive. We are reminded by them how a secondary phase of Heraclitus' doctrine came to be woven into the philosophy of Plato; how

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1 Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae. Recensuit L. Bywater, Coll. Rex. Soc. Oxon. 1877. Some of the remarks which follow here were printed in an article for the 'Academy' of that year.
the dark speaker was compelled by Aristotle to render up his logical account, as Locke and Leibnitz are by our Hegelians at the present day; how the Stoics gave him fresh currency, having been attracted to him both by the austerity of his spirit, and by the kindred nature of his symbolism (νῦν, ἐκπρώσασθε); lastly, how the Fathers of the Church employed him as they did other heathen writers, now wresting him to their side for the condemnation of Pagan superstition, now seeking to overthrow an adversary by comparing him with the infidel philosopher.

The reproach of obscurity was more deserved by Heraclitus than that of melancholy, which became proverbial perhaps in consequence of his association with Stoicism, although it is true that the philosophy of change, which saw ‘man kindled and extinguished like a spark in the night’ (Fr. 77), was in close accord with the sadness which had characterised much of the earlier Ionian reflection (Minnermus, Fr. 2; Hdt. 7. 46). But it may be questioned if he were more obscure than other prophets of the mind, who in the sixth century B.C., perhaps unconsciously moved by some Oriental influence, strove to catch the universe in aphorisms. And if his Ἐρρέωσ were now extant, abrupt and disjointed as it would probably still appear (not, as Bacon thought, outweighing Plato), it might be more intelligible to us than it was either to Aristotle or to the Stoics.

The ‘transcendent Pantheism,’ whether of Heraclitus or Parmenides, is an open secret to the student of Descartes and Spinoza. The Hegelian, for whom the true individual is the true universal, and all thought proceeds by collision of opposites, can understand his master’s saying that he had taken up the philosophy of Heraclitus into his own. And some of our modern φυσικόνομοι might be surprised to find, in what they supposed to be a fistful of air, the expression of principles which they have verified, such as the permanence of the sum of energy, the interchangeableness of energy and heat, the reciprocal transmutation of elementary forces, the transience of phenomena, the permanence of law, the relativity of perception to the organs of sense (Fr. 37), and might acknowledge that ‘Anticipatio Nature’ was less a term of opprobrium than they had imagined. But the wonder would be all on their side, for Heraclitus would have wondered at nothing so much as if these things had turned out otherwise.

The scholar might find germs of Platonic thought and expression (Fr. 115, 114; cp. Rep. 2. 376, 7. 540); the general critic, unconscious
coincidences with remote literatures, like that between Fr. 69, 'Time is a child at chess,' and the well-known lines of Omar Khayyám. The agnostic and the mystical theologian might both find meaning in the deep saying, 'God at once reveals and hides himself,' while the religious reformer would rejoice to see that Greek no less than Hebrew prophets felt the abomination and absurdity of sacrifice. 'They think to purge their sins by polluting themselves with blood' (Fr. 130). So rich in germinal expression was this prophetic soul, who, in clinging to a seeming paradox, was really presaging thoughts of many generations.

The character of Heraclitus came nearer than that of Socrates to Plato's description of the great mind born in a little State and despising her birthplace, but soaring aloft to survey things in Heaven and Earth. The pride shown in his contempt for Pythagoras and Xenophanes, and his grudging praise of Bias, may help to account for the conceit which Plato noted in his followers: but there is a Socratic loftiness in the tone in which he speaks of death (as an emanation, Fr. 37, a sloughing-off of the body, Fr. 85), and in his outburst on behalf of Hermædorus we see a trace of underlying kindliness and of the passion for justice which is the best note of the philosophic spirit. We gather from Fr. 73 that he was more austere in his habits than Xenophanes.

II. The sublime thought of the Eternal movement of an infinite law was not, however, destined to be the final conception of the Greek mind. While life and death and the succession of phenomena were thus idealized on the Eastern shores of the Ægean, a different, though parallel impulse was preparing elsewhere, it is said at Elea in Magna Græcia: an impulse equally if not more sublime, yet by itself no less incapable of giving rise to such a philosophy as Plato's. Xenophanes had already said—

'There is one God above all in heaven or earth, not like to mortals either in form or mind.' 'He is all sight, all thought, all hearing.' 'He ever abides immoveable in one stay: nor does it become him to waver to and fro.'

Inspired with this thought Parmenides rose at once into an ideal world of mind and being, not seeking there an explanation of the sensible universe, nor endeavouring to grasp its law, or idealize its continual process, but dwelling solely on the all-sufficient object of Absolute and Perfect Being. From
the world in which his thought reposed, growth and decay were exiled far, into a region which Pure Being did not enter, a world of nothingness, which yet seemed to satisfy the minds of ordinary men, who trusted in the blindness of opinion and sense, and lived amongst contradictions. For in this lower world of opinion, opposite principles ever strove, light and darkness, heat and cold. But Pure Being is one, a rounded whole, perfect and full, identical with the Absolute Mind. The only symbol of Parmenides is the Perfect Sphere.

The main effort of Plato’s dialectic, as is well known, is to bring these opposite poles of thought, the Eleatic and Ionian, into organic and well-balanced harmony. In its most abstract conception it is the problem of the one and the many (τὸν λόγον ἑγόμεν πάθος παρ’ ἡμῶν), or of motion and rest. In this effort he was assisted by the Pythagoreans, who had already found a sort of middle term in Number.

The doctrine of Parmenides does not enter directly into the Theaetetus, from which the discussion of it is expressly excluded: but his influence is notwithstanding present in the Megarian method, which was in part derived from Zeno (see Introduction), in whose hands the One had acquired a negative power, and was used rather to distinguish than to comprehend, so becoming rather the form than the sole object of thought. This Eleatic influence appears chiefly (1) in the relentless way in which sensation and motion are reduced to nothingness, and because they have no unity are shown to present no object to the mind: (2) in the crowning point of the dialogue, where it is admitted that there are universal perceptions of pure mind, and that Being is the principal of these: (3) in the paradox about false opinion, which is similar to that of Zeno about motion,—not ‘it is impossible for a thing to be in two places at once,’ but ‘it is impossible to know and not to know at the same time,’—and is solved in the same way by reverting to the conception of degrees: (4) in the form of argument with which this paradox is enforced, ὁ ἐν γίνεται ὁ ὁρᾶν ἔν τι ὁρᾶν ὃν ὁ ὁρᾶτ; (5) in the question about the whole and its parts, pp. 203, 204.
APPENDIX B.

"Ανθρωπος μέτρον.

Protagoras, who gives to the inquiry in the Theaetetus its subjective turn, and some part of its dramatic interest, had died at the age of seventy, some ten or twelve years before the trial of Socrates, which is the supposed date of the conversation. The real share borne by him (or by his Shade) in the dialogue is less than appears at first sight. It is to his ‘disciples’ that the doctrine of sense based on that of motion is attributed, and though he is made to bear the brunt of the attack, because the guardians whom he has left will not defend his ‘orphan’ theory, yet when challenged to meet him upon his own ground, Socrates falls back upon the saying quoted at first, ‘Man is the measure of all things,’ and the explanation of it, ‘Things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you.’ The same words occur also in the Cratylus. This, then, is nearly all that we can with any certainty point to in this dialogue as Protagorean, except the name of his treatise ‘Αλήθεια, the sceptical fragment about the existence of the gods, and perhaps one or two rhetorical words, such as μεγάλεωντेς, πολυράπον. For it is evident that the doctrine of motion and becoming, which he is said to have entrusted to his disciples ‘in a mystery’ (cp. Cratyl. 413), cannot have been extant in his writings. It is therefore surprising to find Sextus Empiricus representing the tenets of Protagoras in language closely resembling that used in the Theaetetus. The wonder is abated, however, if we reflect that there was really a very close affinity between Protagoras and the Cyrenaics, and that of this affinity Plato is in this dialogue the interpreter. Aristotle follows Plato in identifying the theories of Protagoras and Heraclitus. And there are thus three sources, independent of Protagoras, from which the account of Sextus may have been derived: the Cyrenaics, the Theaetetus, and Aristotle. The similarity of the language in which different sensationalist theories are described in later times may possibly indicate
the influence of this very dialogue in fixing the terminology of that aspect of thought.

It is therefore the more interesting to examine the one saying of Protagoras which is here preserved: Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄκροπον ἐστιν, τῶν μὲν δὲν ὅτι ἀπί, τῶν δὲ μὴ δέντων ὅτι σῶσ ἔστιν. Might not this seem at first sight to imply something less than the absolute relativeness of knowledge? Might it not even be interpreted to mean, 'quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus'? In answer to this it may be remarked, first, that Protagoras appears so far at least to have interpreted his own saying, 'ὅτι οὐ μὴν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοῖσιν μὲν ἐστὶν ἐμοί, τοῖσι δὲ σοι, τοῖσι δὲ αὕτη σοι.' But it may be added, secondly, that the distinction between the race and the individual, between the general term 'man,' and the singular term 'this man,' was probably not distinctly present to his mind. When we reflect on the absence of any abiding consciousness of the universal and of the distinction between abstract and concrete, exhibited, for instance, in the first answer of Theaetetus, or in the attempt of Meno to define virtue, it becomes evident that the term man, thus barely used by a popular teacher, would naturally call up the idea, not of human nature or of the human mind, nor of the race collectively, but of 'a man,' 'this or that man,' an individual, 'you or me,' not, however, conceived of as an individual, nor consciously distinguished from any abstract or generic notion of man, but simply present to the imagination.

Protagoras saw that men were weary of systems which had no reference to human life, and seemed to make knowledge unattainable. He saw persons teaching astronomy and the nature of Being to those who wanted to learn how to become able and successful citizens. Like other popular teachers, he had a keener eye for the immediate wants of those who came to him than for abstract truth. The theory of Parmenides, which had its warm advocates at Athens, was one purely objective; although beginning and ending in the mind, it was wholly independent of any human standard: the highest aim for man was to rise by pure thought into the world of being.

Protagoras felt, like Socrates, that the truth which man requires is relative to man, but, unlike Socrates, he made this the end and not the starting-point of his inquiry, and instead of searching by reflection for that one truth by which man ought to live, he

1 Cp. τοὺς ἄθροισιν, Thuc. 1. 140, which does not correspond to the modern generic use of the word.
APPENDIX C.

was contented with inferring that truth was variable, according to the common notion, 'many men, many minds.'

As embodied in the Theaetetus, the above doctrine receives some fresh characteristics, first, as being made the type of a contemporary theory, and being interwoven with that of Heraclitus; secondly, as holding one side of an antithesis, which gives a sharpness and precision to the term ἀθέτωρας, as equivalent to ἦλκτος ἤμας, which it probably had not when first used; and, thirdly, by being pushed to its minutest results, according to the Megarian method,—not only 'man' but 'each man,' not only so, but 'every creature,' and even the same person at different times.

APPENDIX C.

Protagoras and Mr. Grote.

I. Knowledge is relative in two senses, not wholly unconnected with each other, which in ancient philosophy were not yet clearly distinguished. There is the relation of subject to object, and the relation of the universal to the particular. For the sake of clearness, these different aspects of the relativity of knowledge may be treated separately, although the study of either involves the consideration of both.

(1) Knowledge is relative to the mind. But here also there is a distinction which must not be overlooked. For there is a general and a particular subjectivity. (a) There can be no knowledge apart from the mind which knows. An object of knowledge without a subject is inconceivable. Or rather, knowledge cannot be conceived except as the joint working of the mind and of that which is external to the mind. All knowledge is necessarily in this sense subjective. But this condition in no way limits or impairs the certainty or perfection of knowledge. Relativity of this sort is not inconsistent with the existence of Absolute Truth. (b) It is otherwise with the peculiar subjective conditions of individual minds. These modify and render defective the knowledge of particular men, 'who see and know but in part, and have different prospects of the same thing according

1 From an article in the Quarterly Review for January, 1856.
to their different positions to it. Yet even this partial knowledge, in so far as it is knowledge, has an objective and universal reality.

Now, although it is mere nonsense to talk of eliminating the subjective element, if by object-without-subject is meant knowledge minus mind, there is no such absurdity in supposing that knowledge, while remaining under the conditions of mind, may become perfect through being purified from the effect of bias. Nor is it chimerical to hope that to this ideal an indefinite approximation may be made in the growth of science, in which every forward step is the relinquishment of that which some have thought, for that which all who understand the proofs must think. This process is, in effect, the enlightenment or enfranchisement of individual minds. The aim of every scientific inquirer is to come forth from the den and stand under the open heaven; to correct the inequality of the mirror of a particular mind by a method valid for all minds; to shake off the idols of the tribe and theatre, and become the denizen and pupil of the universe, and no longer of a country or of a sect only. Such are the images, borrowed from the old philosophy, in which Bacon described the progress of knowledge. Those who believe in the reality of inductive science will hardly maintain that they are illusory. And they point to an idea of knowledge as something wholly different from individual opinion; as containing what, in contradistinction to the particular subjective, may be called the subjective-universal.

Closely parallel to this, if account be taken of the intellectual circumstances of the time, was the idea of knowledge which Plato derived from Socrates. He looked for a definition that should hold universally, an irrefrangible hypothesis, an opinion which could not be shaken by examination. In other words, he sought for that which is true, not for the individual thinker only, but for all who think. He everywhere acknowledges, however, or rather insists, that general truths cannot be attained or imparted except through the awakening of individual minds. There is no vision until the eye is turned in the direction of the light. It is only the coarse Thrasymachus who imagines that he can take and thrust his notions bodily down his hearer’s throat. And Socrates, in attempting to answer him, is unable to say anything but what he individually thinks. The Socratic dialogue represents the meeting-point of a particular conscious-

1 Locke’s Conduct of the Understanding, § 3.
ness with universal reason, and the process which results is an approximation on the part of two individuals to a universal truth. In none of the dialogues in which Socrates is the chief speaker is there any element of authority; but they are equally removed from sanctioning an arbitrary or capricious 'private judgment.' No testimony is admitted but that of the respondent's own mind; no persuasion or enforcement, except that of argument, is applied. The single duty recognised is that of obeying reason. But there is no dispensation from this duty. Except in passages which are clearly playful or ironical, mere verbal juggling and all opinionativeness are earnestly deprecated, and the speakers simply endeavour, by means of dialectic, to obtain and exhibit Truth. 'We must use our own faculties, such as they are, and say what we really think.' 'We must follow, at all risks, whithersoever reason guides.' 'No logical puzzles can frighten us from pursuing the path of knowledge.' 'We have to consider, not who said this, but whether that which is now said be true.' 'It is my way, Crito, to yield to no influence of those surrounding me, but to the reason, which, when I think, seems to me the best.' This is the reply of Socrates, when urged to escape from prison: and so in the same prison he advised his friends. 'Care not for Socrates, but care much rather for the truth.' This position was contrasted by Plato with that of Protagoras, who asserted the subjectivity of all knowledge without distinguishing the universal from the particular subject. His formula was rude, but intelligible: 'Man is the measure; that is to say, things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you.' This Plato understood as the denial of that belief in a common measure or universal truth which was implied in the work of Socrates, and he joined issue with Protagoras accordingly. Mr. Grote has given fresh life and interest to this ancient controversy by taking the part of Protagoras against Plato. Himself holding that while the subjective feeling of belief is universal, the object or matter of belief varies in each particular case, and apparently thinking that this radical imperfection is incurable; not distinguishing, as it would seem, between the propositions, 'My belief is my belief,' and 'My belief depends wholly upon my individual peculiarities'—or, at least, not recognising the difference between belief

1 Theat. 171 D.  
2 Rep. 3. 394 D.  
3 Theat. 197 A; Men. 81 E.  
4 Charm. 162.  
5 Crito, 46.  
6 Phaed. 91 C; cf. Soph. 246 D.
grounded on sufficient and insufficient reasons—he can imagine no alternative between a blind dogmatism and the entire relativity of truth. Either one individual opinion is the infallible standard by which all other opinions are to be judged, or else every opinion is alike valid, not indeed for those who question that opinion, but for the person holding it. But is not a third case possible? That which is different need not be wholly different; and may there not be in all human experience, however diverse, a common element? If belief is universal, so also is the process of reasoning. May not the exercise of this on the facts of experience bring men gradually to the acknowledgment of universal truths—not such as have been laid down by dogmatists, but such as are found, at least approximately, after long inquiry, when out of many ingenious hypotheses some have been verified beyond the possibility of doubt? It is not necessary that these should be dogmatically taught. Indeed, they cannot be imparted thoroughly unless the learner is led to repeat the process of invention. His curiosity must be aroused and satisfied, his reason must be awakened to perceive and solve the difficulties surrounding each hypothesis. Otherwise, he may believe, but cannot know.

Mr. Grote accuses Plato of first misrepresenting Protagoras and afterwards following him, and of misrepresenting him in two ways: in identifying his doctrine with another and a different doctrine, that knowledge is sensible perception, and in having suppressed the characteristic addition 'to me,' 'to you,' as if Protagoras had said that relative truth was absolutely true.

The weight of the former charge depends on the intention of Plato in blending the two theories, and on the exact signification of the term which we translate Sensation or Perception. Now it should be observed that the word Εσθήσει is expressly said to include, according to the theory, the feelings of pleasure, pain, desire, and fear, and apparently also the distinction between good and evil. The common characteristic of these impressions and of knowledge, according to this theory, is that of constituting the experience of an individual at a particular moment (τὸ παρὰν ἐχίστηρ πᾶδες). Such present impressions are regarded as more certain than the fainter repetition of the same in memory; and the active operation of the mind, in reviewing and reasoning over her impressions, is supposed to be

1 See Theet. 158 E.
2 Ibid. 153 B.
3 Ibid. 157 E.
4 Theet. 166 A, compare Hume.
left out of view. Protagoras might possibly have exclaimed at this, and said that the individual was the measure to himself in thought as well as in sensation. But he seems to have drawn his examples from the facts of sense; and Plato's object is to show that while the impressions of sense and feeling have in themselves only a momentary value, it is not so with the reasonings of the mind by which these are compared and generalised, and which are often justified not at the moment, but long afterwards in the actual experience of those who did not share them at the time.

This brings us to the other accusation, that Plato has suppressed the words ('to me,' 'to you,' ) which mark the essential relativity of Protagoras' 'Measure.' He has certainly not forgotten them, for he has been at some pains to illustrate this very point, where it is shown how the theory justifies the illusions of a sick palate; and, again, where it is observed that the opinion of the true prophet proves not less true for those who did not believe him. If Plato is unfair to Protagoras, it is in making an addition, which may or may not have been consciously implied in the formula, 'Each man is the measure of what is true to him.' To this Plato adds in effect, 'and there is no other standard of true being.' But this negative aspect of the doctrine necessarily becomes explicit, when the statement is viewed as having a controversial import. The assertion 'Man is the measure' is unmeaning, unless this measure is brought into competition with some other, such as the Eleatic Being. Now, if the formula is thus interpreted, there are two less exact modes of expressing the same thing. Either 'nothing is true' (i.e. absolutely), or

1 The difference between ancient and modern philosophical language is repeatedly exemplified in this discussion; what Mr. Grote calls 'compared facts of sense,' e.g. weighing, measuring, etc. (ii. 364), Plato would probably have treated as the conclusions of the mind on reviewing her passive impressions.

2 Theset. 152 B: Επακολούθησαντεν εναλφεω, κ.τ.λ.

3 They are true to the sick man during his sickness. Mr. Grote says (ii. 353), 'Socrates imputes it as a contradiction to Protagoras—'Your doctrine is pronounced to be false by many persons; but you admit that the belief of all persons is true; therefore your doctrine is false.' Here also Plato omits the qualification annexed by Protagoras to his general principle—Every man's belief is true—that is, true to him. That a belief should be true to one man, and false to another, is not only no contradiction to the formula of Protagoras, but is the very state of things which his formula contemplates. Plato is more wide awake than Mr. Grote imagines. He points out that Protagoras did not hold the principle of relativity to be only relatively true; otherwise he must have admitted that all the world, who differed from him, were not to themselves measures of truth, and that he himself in their judgment, that is in relation to them, was not a measure, so that his principle was not applicable to them.
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'everything is alike true' (i.e. relatively). Either 'there is no absolute,' or 'the relative is the only absolute.' Both forms of expression are found in the Theaetetus. But it is not fair to infer from this that Plato has argued 'a dictum secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter.' The same cavil would apply at least with equal force to the language of Protagoras himself, who called his treatise Ἀλήθεια, real (not phenomenal) truth.

'There can be no discussion without reference to a common ideal standard.' 'There can be no discussion without reference to individual belief.' Mr. Grote's whole argument proceeds on the implied assumption that these two propositions are irreconcilable. Hence he charges Plato with inconsistency in at one time appealing to an imaginary expert or wise man (the βασιλεὺς τεχνῶν of the Politicus), the personified ideal of knowledge, and at other times repudiating all authority except that of the consciousness of the respondent in the dialogue, and thus upholding what Mr. Grote characteristically styles the 'autonomy' of the individual reason. But the whole spirit of Plato's dialectic lies in bringing together the individual and the universal consciousness, and if cross-questioned on the point he would probably have said, as he has said of the kindred antithesis of the one and many, that this union is essentially inherent in the nature of thought, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἑδυνατών τι καὶ ἀγώνως πάθως. Those beliefs, however, which are more particularly the respondent's own, which he derives from natural idiosyncrasy or from previous intercourse, are invariably shaken and removed by Socrates, and much also of what is evoked during the conversation by his suggestive art, is in turn criticised and cut away. That which is allowed to remain as the result of the discussion (though still open to further examination) is certainly the present belief of the respondent; but is different in kind from the belief with which he entered on the argument. He began with loose impressions gathered from hearsay or from his own half-reasoning; he ends with a conviction which has been evolved by an active exercise of the reason, in which reference has been made at every step to an ideal standard of knowledge. This result is not adequately described by saying that the beliefs and convictions of one person are modified by another. Plato appeals at once to the requirements of the argument, and to the consciousness of the individual reasoner, and, whether his position is tenable

1 Theaet. 152, 166, 167; cp. 179 B. The former expression, 'Nothing is true,' is however more frequently assigned to Gorgias.

2 Phil. 15 D.
or not, he cannot be accused in this of alternating between opposite points of view. If the two appeals are mutually destructive, he makes them, not alternately, but together. The horns of Mr. Grote’s dilemma pass harmlessly on either side of Plato. Even one who professed to have found absolute truth, might hold that this could only be communicated by awakening gradually the individual mind. But Plato in most of his dialogues professes to be still seeking for the truth in whose reality he believes, and invites others to help him in the search. He views universal truth as neither hopelessly lost, nor actually found, but in continual process of discovery. He certainly does hold inquiry to be a real endeavour, and not a mere mental exercise, and believes (in spite of difficulties which he keenly appreciates) that the distinction between truth and error has a value that is independent of human opinions. And it is here that he parts company with his English critic. Mr. Grote urges, in language nearly similar to that with which Socrates in the Theætæus affects to defend Protagoras: ‘To say that a man is wise, is to say that he is wise in some one’s estimation, your own, or that of some one else.’ This is undeniable: but then every such estimate must be either true or false, nearer to or farther from a perfect estimate. Of this difference, indeed, no man is an infallible judge, though one man can judge more correctly than another, as experience proves. God, not man, is the measure, as Plato himself has said. But it is not less clear on this account that the degree of approximation is something real, and that he who judges more correctly of this is in reality the better judge. Mr. Grote admits that, in his own opinion, in matters involving future contingency most men judge badly: only a few persons, possessed of sufficient skill and knowledge, judge well. He believes the distinction to be real and important, and allows that most other persons believe the same. He adds, ‘In acting on this distinction, I follow out my belief, and so do they. This is a general fact, respecting the conditions which determine individual belief. Like all other causes of belief, it

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1 Phæd. 75 E: *O καλῶν μαθητῶν, οἱ δὲ καταστήσω ἀναλαμβάνον ἄν εὖ.*
2 Theæt. 166, 167.
4 Legg. 4. 716 C.
5 This language, like that in the defence of Protagoras (Theæt. 167), seems to be adopted (unconsciously) to avoid the words true and false. But it is at least as arbitrary to withhold the terms true and false from judgments, as to apply them to pleasures, which Plato has been censured for doing in the Philebus. See also vol. ii. p. 351, where the question of degrees of mental force is substituted for the question of truth or reality.
operates relatively to the individual mind.’ (Vol. ii. p. 355.) This is indisputable: but those who believe the distinction to be real and important, believe in a measure of truth, which they do not suppose to alter with the variations of belief. They believe the distinction to be important for others as well as for themselves. ‘When a man speaks of truth, he means what he himself (along with others, or singly, as the case may be) believes to be truth:’ he does not mean only what is true to him. Once more, Mr. Grote says, ‘You pronounce an opponent to be in error: but if you cannot support your opinion by evidence on authority which satisfies his senses or his reason, he remains unconvinced. Your individual opinion stands good to you, his opinion stands good to him. You think that he ought to believe as you do, and in certain cases you feel that he will be brought to that result by future experience; which of course must be relative to him and his appreciative powers. He entertains the like conviction in regard to you.’ (Vol. ii. p. 515.) This is freely admitted—and amounts to this, that each (either truly or falsely) believes his own opinion to be true. When Mr. Grote says he thinks the doctrine of Protagoras respecting pleasure ‘nearer to the truth’ than that of Gorgias, and that of the Republic ‘utterly at variance with the truth,’ does he mean nearer to and at variance with what is true to him? No man ever held fast an opinion merely as his opinion, but as the truth. And this implies reference to a standard which is independent of individual judgments. But to confound mere individual belief with belief grounded on evidence, or rather not to admit the difference between them, would take us back to Pyrrho and the ancient sceptics. Nor is there any modern theory of knowledge, whether that of Locke or Kant or any other, on which such a doctrine, which is really the denial of knowledge, is tenable. The same misunderstanding may be made apparent by analysing a favourite expression of Mr. Grote’s, viz. ‘individual reason.’ Granted that nothing is true for me but what I in my own person believe—that it is impossible, even were it desirable, to force conviction—that when I yield to an authority, I exercise my private judgment in pronouncing the authority sufficient,—still the question may be asked, wherein differs the assent of the individual reason from impressions of sense or creations of fancy? And it would be difficult to find any distinguishing note, except the consciousness that the object of assent cannot be otherwise, and claims the belief of all who think. Mr. Grote will say that this con-
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sciousness often proves delusive, and that the case of sensation is exactly parallel. Those whose minds are constituted alike have similar thoughts, as those whose organs are alike have similar perceptions. To this Plato would answer that but for the hope which lay at the root of the endeavour of Socrates, that differing minds may be brought by dialectic nearer to one another, by being brought nearer to unchanging principles of truth, and that the eye of reason may be thus purged to see the light, philosophy would be an idle pursuit, the turning of an oyster-shell or a scytæle, a cycle without the hope of progress, an endless process never moving on, a ‘purpose’ not ‘increasing through the ages,’ but terminating in failure and despair.

How far Plato ever viewed universals as wholly objective is a question which cannot be determined without taking into account the differences of ancient and modern thought. The distinction between the mind and external objects had not yet been clearly made. Both poles (the objective and subjective) were absorbed in the antithesis of Being and Phenomena, which the Eleatics had placed far asunder, leaving their reconciliation as the great problem of the succeeding age. The tendency of the early speculation had been to give to psychological problems what in modern language must be called an objective treatment, in saying which we ought not to forget that we are applying a distinction which was then unknown. Parmenides and Heraclitus were not unconscious of the working of the mind, but their thought did not assume the form of self-reflection. The unity or the energy of scientific intelligence appeared to them as the Permanent Substance or the Law of Change, which constituted the Universe.

1 Vol. ii. p. 361, note.
2 See a curious note in vol. ii. p. 285, where it is said that the controversy between Mr. Mill (who holds the common attribute of many objects to be one) and Mr. Spencer (who says that the same abstract word denotes one attribute in subject A. and another exactly similar in subject B.) illustrates forcibly the extreme nicety of the question between the one and the many, under certain supposable circumstances. Also vol. ii. p. 329.
3 The Enia Rationis exist relatively to Ratio, as the Enia Perceptionis exist relatively to Sense. You do not, by producing the fact of innate mental intuitions, eliminate the intuent mind; which must be done in order to establish a negative to the Protagorean principle.
4 Mr. Grote sometimes speaks of reason in language which appears to us happily inconsistent with his argument in the present discussion. See for instance his touching and impressive words on the death of Socrates (vol. i. p. 302, note). 'He contemplates death with the eye of calm reason; he has not only silenced 'the child within us who fears death,'... estimating all things then as before, with the same tranquil and independent reason.' Was his estimate really true? Or was Socrates really pitiable to those who pitted him?
5 See for instance the verse of Parmenides, τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἠτένι τε καὶ ἐλθεῖν.
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But the theory of Protagoras, and the more potent influence of Socratic inquiry, gave to philosophy what may with equal propriety be called a reflex or subjective turn, and side by side with Existence and Appearance, or Becoming, rose the corresponding difference of Knowledge and Opinion, or Sense. Now Knowledge, according to Socrates, is of Universals, and these Universals Plato identified with Being. He often speaks of general ideas, and especially of the Idea of Good, in language which implies that their reality is independent of particular minds, but yet when Socrates suggests, in answer to Parmenides, that they are of the nature of thought, he gives utterance to a mode of conceiving them which is never entirely absent, but is latent even where not expressed. This frequently appears from phrases dropped by the way, as when the form (έδος) is identified with the definition (λόγος), or when, in the midst of a poetical description of the ideal world, it is said that the human soul must have seen the forms of Truth, because it is necessary that Man should comprehend the meaning of general terms. And in the well-known passage of the Republic, where the highest truth is set over against the highest knowledge, they are both viewed in relation to the mind, which, through intercourse with the Existent, begets Thought and Truth; and the Idea of Good is regarded not only as the transcendent Form of Being (ἐπίκειται τῆς οίκειας) but as the crowning study or act of intelligence. A transition is thus made from what at first appears a fanciful ontology towards a true psychology, which in the Theaetetus, Sophistes, Philebus, and the seventh book of the Republic, is seen to have made considerable progress in the analysis of mind.

(2) The question of Subjectivity has already led us to distinguish between particular and universal, between the modifications of the individual consciousness and true knowledge, in which these differences are lost. And we have seen that this distinction corresponds nearly to that made by Plato between the transitoriness of Phenomena and the permanence of Being, and, still more closely, to his antithesis of Sensation or Opinion and Science. But the knowledge of universal truths would

1 Μή τῶν εἰδών ἱκανῶν σὺ τούτων
νόμον, Parm. 132.
2 Thesm. 148 D.
3 Phaedrus, 249 B.
4 θεωρήσεις νόμων καὶ διάδειαν, Rep. 6. 490 B.
5 Μέγιστον μάθημα, Rep. 6. 505 A;
ἐν τῷ γραμμή τελευταίᾳ, Rep. 7.
517 A.
6 See esp. Theaet. 185, 186, 189 E,
194; Soph. 261-2; Phileb. 33-43;
be of less value, if these were not applicable to particular facts. And hence the inductive, generalising process, is followed by one deductive and specialising. But this is not merely a return to the subjective particular from which the mind set out. For a phenomenon seen in relation to other phenomena by the light of general laws, is different from the same phenomenon, when at first presented to the inexperienced and unreflecting sense. Therefore the particular modification of the individual subject is to be distinguished from the true particular, which has objective as well as subjective reality. Now as Plato, in the infancy of Induction and of Moral Science, had a notion of universal knowledge, which he believed in but could only partially realise, through an imperfect method of hypotheses and exclusions—so in the absence of any adequate means of verification, he saw the necessity of connecting the universal forms of knowledge with particular facts. The powerful impulse which he received from the Eleatic philosophy tended to the sublation of all diversities of existence, as well as thought, into a merely abstract Unity. But on the other hand, the method of Socrates, whose generalisations were sifted through examples, and the genius of Plato himself with his manifold affinities to the world, required the Muse of Philosophy to descend from these heights, even into the den if necessary\textsuperscript{1}, and to hold intercourse again with the objects of sense and with mankind. Plato sometimes speaks, especially in his more imaginative moods, as if he wished to repeat the Eleatic contrast of Being and Phenomena in a new form: as if the real and apparent, the Ideal and the Actual, were separated by an impassable chasm. This way of speaking has become stereotyped in what is called the Platonic theory of ideas, including the doctrine of reminiscence: a theory which, in seeking to account for the knowledge of phenomena, creates new difficulties, which it fails to solve. But in those which Plato probably regarded as his more exact writings, the half-mythical crudities of this hypothesis have disappeared, the necessity as well as the difficulty of reconciling the abstract with the concrete, the Ideal with the Actual, is clearly recognised, and more than one dialogue is chiefly devoted to this task. An approach is made to a new and larger idea of knowledge, not merely as the Universal in which subjective peculiarities are done away, but as the Union of all permanent relations in the contemplation of

\textsuperscript{1} Rep. 7. 519.
the mind. A change of this kind, especially when made gradually by a writer who often ironically half reveals and half conceals his thought, is apt to expose him to the charge of inconsistency. That Plato, in falling into Mr. Grote's hands, has not escaped this fate, is partly due to those who have hitherto represented the philosopher as a mere transcendentalist. But Mr. Grote sometimes speaks as if knowledge could not comprehend the universal with the particular, as if generalisation and specialisation were incompatible. He says (vol. ii. p. 253): 'It is inconsistent in Plato, after affirming that nothing can deserve the name of art except what is general—capable of being rationally anticipated and prescribed beforehand: then to include in art the special treatment required for the multiplicity of particular cases.' He finds fault with the examples drawn from facts of sense to illustrate knowledge in the Theaetetus, and truth and falsehood in the Sophist. See also a passage in the chapter on the Politicus (vol. ii. pp. 471–3), where the relative or specialising aspect of Plato's doctrine is very forcibly characterised. We may notice, as affording a point of transition towards the same mode of thought, a passage of the Philebus, where, besides the abstract knowledge of measures, numbers, and forms, the knowledge also of concrete existence is allowed to be necessary for the perfect life 'if a man is to know the way to his own door.' But it is not fair to accuse Plato of returning to the doctrine which he had rejected that 'sense is knowledge,' because he admits that knowledge is related to particulars, any more than it is fair to speak of the argument of the Theaetetus as the rejection of individual reason (vol. i. p. 295). He has not relinquished his belief in the immutable nature of true knowledge. 'Where there is not absolute permanence there can be no reason' is an emphatic statement of the very dialogue which asserts the relativity of the ideas. Here we repeat that if Plato holds contradictory opinions, he holds them not alternately, but together. While expatiating on the 'plain of truth,' he speaks of general notions as passing from many sensations to a unity comprehended by reasoning. And after describing the happiness of the philoso-

1 See esp. Sophist. 259 C; Polit. 73 A, 285 B.
2 Viz. the facts of a case of assault or robbery. Plato purposely chooses the simplest examples. But when Mr. Grote represents him (vol. ii. p. 352) as saying that to be personally present and look on is 'essential to knowledge or cognition,' there is a qualification suppressed. It should be 'knowledge of a concrete fact.'
3 'Theaetetus is sitting—Theaetetus is flying.'
4 Sophist. 249 C.
5 Phaedrus, 249 B.
pher who knows nothing of his neighbour but studies the universal nature of man, he speaks of the mind as abstracting and generalising from her impressions. The Phædrus, as Mr. Grote has observed, combines the extreme of generality with the extreme of specialty. But the special is supposed to be enlightened by the general, and this position, whether tenable or not, is in no sense a return to the mere subjective relativity of Protagoras. The Parmenides, Theætetus, Sophistes, Politicus, and Philebus, do, however, show a change or growth in Plato's theory of knowledge, which may be briefly stated thus. The difficulty of finding a way down from the Ideas to sensible things is clearly stated in the Parmenides, and again touched slightly in the Philebus, where, however, the Ideas are conceived somewhat differently as unities amidst plurality, and knowledge, as we have already noticed, is made to include particulars. The Theætetus presents a similar class of difficulties from the subjective side, arising from the co-existence, not of Being with phenomena, but of Knowledge with sensation and opinion. It is natural to suppose that Plato was led by these difficulties towards the modified view which he has expressed in the Sophistes and Politicus, where the ideas appear as logical wholes, standing in relation to each other, genera comprising species and species individuals under them; where the distinction of absolute and relative, or, in Greek language, of rest and motion, disappears in the notion of a complexity of fixed relations, and universal and particular meet in an all-embracing harmony or law (μετρόν).

APPENDIX D.

εἴδος, ἑίδα.

§ 1. The words εἴδος and ἑίδα are throughout nearly synonymous in Greek, but there is a tendency observable to a difference in their use, perhaps in some way connected with the difference of gender. εἴδος seems earlier to have shaken itself clear of metaphor, and to have settled into an abstract meaning. Thus in Thucyd, 2. 20

1 Thesl. 175–186.
2 The important word μέτρον, 'participation in the idea,' occurs only in the Parmenides and Sophistes in Plato. See Ast's Lexicon, s.v.
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τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἐνόσιον means simply the nature of the disease, but in 2. 21 τοῦτο ἐν ἑπὶ τῶν τῆς ἴδιαν, ‘was such in its general phenomena.’ ἴδια calls up a picture, while εἶδος simply designates a class or kind of thing. So σῶσα ἴδια...θανάτου, Thuc. 3. 81, is not ‘every kind of death,’ but ‘death in every form.’

§ 2. The word εἶδος occurs frequently in Plato in its ordinary sense. Thus in Theaet. 157 C: “Ἀθροιστῶν τε τιθεταυ καὶ λίθων καὶ καθ ἐσκαρπον ὧδεν τοι καὶ ἐκδος, the word is scarcely more abstract than in Herodotus, 1. 94: τὰ...τῶν παιγμάων ἴδια.

A more philosophical application of the same use occurs 181 D, where we have the δῶ εἰδη κυήσεως.

§ 3. It occurs also in a more abstract sense, which we may possibly be right in attributing to Socrates, as a distinctly logical term. εἶδος then means a class, or species, as that to which particular things are referred, which contains them, and marks them off from others, and which itself answers to their definition. See Theaet. 148 D: Ταύτας πολλὰς ὤφθης ἐν εἶδε περιέλαβες. 205 D: Ἐις ταύτων ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλάβη εἶδος ἐκείνη.

§ 4. It may be doubted whether in Plato the word εἶδος ever loses entirely the association of its earliest meaning (in which he frequently employs it) of outward appearance, form. (See Ast, Lex. sub voc.) But as it approaches to its technical use in his philosophy, it tends to regain metaphorically the association of visible shape, which in a literal sense it has cast off. The metaphor is not perfect, however, until the word has been changed to ἴδια. Or if we choose to put it so, εἶδος expresses the general shape and contour of a thing; ἴδια implies also the colour and the whole appearance. εἶδος is a colourless ἴδια. See Theaet. 203 E: ἔν τι γεγονός εἶδος, ἴδιαν μιᾶν αὐτῷ αὐτῶν ἡχον. And there is a real difference underlying the figurative one. For a comparison of passages tends to prove that εἶδος is applied to the universal forms of existence as they are distinct from one another; ἴδια rather as each of them has a unity in itself. Thus in Theaet. 1. c. we have ἐν τι γεγονός εἶδος, ἴδιαν μιᾶν αὐτῷ αὐτῶν ἡχον, ἐτερων ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων. Again, 204 A: Μία ἴδια εἰς ἐκατον τῶν συναρμοστῶν στοιχείων γνωριμία. Ἡ. Α.: ἔν τι εἶδος ἐτερων τῶν πάντων μερῶν. 205 C: Μία τις ἴδεα ἀμέριστος συλλάβη ἐν ἴδια. 205 D: Καὶ μία ἑτερίν ἴδια. Cp. 184 D: Εἰς μίαν τινα ἴδεα...συνεσχετε.

It should be noticed, that in the above passages the use of both words is in a transition state, assuming rather the form of an adapt-

1 Cp. Rep. 544 C: Ἑν τω ἄλλῳ ἡχοι ἴδεαν πολλάκις, καὶ πρὶς καὶ ἐν ἴδεα

διαφερετί τοις καταλληλον.
APPENDIX E.

The Theaetetus and Aristotle.

One chief source of difficulty in the Theaetetus to the modern reader is the imperfect development which it presents of the conception of the Proposition. In the earlier part, the ever-varying succession of phenomena, bound up with the ever-varying impressions of sense, are only dimly felt to belong to any Subject. Indeed as the argument proceeds, the unity of that which is the subject of different impressions or qualities is expressly denied. At a further stage, where the question arises, How is false opinion possible? there appears indeed a sort of consciousness that all predication implies a subject (188: ὁπεὶ πρὶν τῶν ὅτι ὁπεὶ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀντι, and that to think is to say to oneself, 'This is that'—which first shows itself in the example, 'I think Theaetetus is Socrates,' and is afterwards more distinctly expressed where it is said that

1 συλλογισμός in the Theaet. (186) is nearly equivalent to 'abstraction and generalization.'
thought is the mind’s silent discourse. But that which remains unnoticed is the relation of subject to predicate in any proposition. Thus it is assumed that when one predicate is substituted for another (as when, in the propositions, ‘Yonder man is Socrates,’ or ‘Thersites was handsome,’ the terms ‘Socrates’ and ‘handsome’ have been substituted by mistake for ‘Thesetetus’ and ‘ugly’), this is the same thing as if the terms so confounded were predicated of each other (thus, ‘Thesetetus is Socrates,’ ‘What is ugly is handsome’).

The relation between the terms of a proposition where the subject is something immediately perceived by sense, is brought out afterwards by the image of the waxen block; but the same indistinctness still hangs about abstract propositions. The line is not clearly drawn between saying, ‘the sum of 7 and 5 is 12,’ and saying ‘11 is 12.’

Lastly, when it is asserted that the combination of names in speech corresponds to the combination of elements in the object of knowledge, we are still left in the dark as to the exact relation between words or things which is implied in either combination.

This confusion between subject and predicate is, in other words, to use Aristotelian language, the confusion of matter with form, and of ὁμοιόμετα with ἔνεργεια. The subject is all its predicates ὁμοιόμετα, and that which, together with the new attribute, becomes νόητον. Thus Ἀλλιάς ἀμυων becomes ἀμυωνικός: hence Callias is in one sense the material part.

It may be said, therefore, that in the earlier philosophy, when the matter changes from one form to its opposite, or from a privative to a positive state, it is lost sight of that the form cannot properly be said to change, and that the matter or subject, as such, remains unchanged, while assuming different forms.

1. It is this aspect of the questions raised in the Thesetetus which is taken up by Aristotle, who follows Plato in pointing out that the views of Heraclitus and Protagoras meet in one. Their views are thus identified and criticised at length in two very similar passages of the Metaphysics (3. 1005 b–1012 b, 10. 1061 b–1063 b), in both of which Aristotle is engaged in defending the principle of contradiction.

The theory of Heraclitus is stated in its most abstract and logical form, ‘Everything at once is and is not.’ This is at

1 A close study of this passage (189, 190) will afford convincing proof of the indeterminate state of the science of logic at this time, and the necessity of getting behind Aristotle (if the expression may be permitted) in order to understand Plato.
first put forward with the qualification, 'Some (i.e. Plato?) think that Heraclitus means this:' but afterwards it is made to figure as the Heraclitean theory, 'adopted by many physical philosophers.' The theory of Protagoras is shown to come to the same thing; for if every man's impression is true, then contradictories are true (and not true) together.

Aristotle does not profess to use direct proof in defence of what he assumes to be self-evident and the basis of all reasoning, but he brings forward a number of indirect arguments, which throw considerable light upon the nature of the question. These are intended for such persons as really feel the difficulty: there are others for whom a more summary method is required (οι μὲν γὰρ παθὸς διόκτως, οἱ δὲ βιὰς'). Amongst these arguments there are two which deserve especial notice here, as being of a different kind from any which are to be met with in the dialogue.

(a) 'We will not say that the act of predication must either be or not be something, lest they should accuse us of begging the question; but we will say, that every predicate means something, and that its meaning is one, and not indefinitely various; otherwise language and even thought is destroyed. And to predicate it in this one meaning of a particular subject is either true or false. Hence, "man" and "not man" cannot be truly predicated together of the same subject.'

(b) 'The difference between the same man's impressions at different times regards not the quality, but the subject of it. Sweet and bitter are the same to the sick as to the healthy man: it is the wine that appears to him at one time sweet and at another bitter. The idea of sweet is the same to him in the past, present, and future.'

There are other points in which the discussion is characteristic of Aristotle (as where it is said that the principle of motion rests on a too narrow induction; or that if all creatures having sensation were destroyed, the universe would still exist; or where he points out that the admission of degrees, e.g. 'nearer and farther from the truth,' necessitates a standard of truth to which the approach is made); but the influence of this dialogue and of the discussions (Megarian and Platonic) which preceded and followed it is also very apparent. The following points of coincidence are worth mentioning:—

APPENDIX E.

(1) It is assumed, as part of the theory, that everything is thus and not-thus (οὐσία καὶ οὐχ οὐσία). But this is nearly the last point to which the principle of motion is reduced in the Theaetetus (183 A B). Aristotle proceeds to infer that everything must be infinite; and this in two ways: first, as 'not-this' means 'everything but this,' it follows that everything must be everything else; and, secondly (with Plat. Theaet. loc. cit.), if οὐσία καὶ οὐχ οὐσία is true, then its contradictory (οὐδὲ οὐσία ὁμοι οὐχ οὐσία) must also be true; and this, he adds, must go on to infinity. The theory gives an indefinite, that is, a purely negative account of Being (τὸ μὴ ὂν λέγην).

(2) Further, in reference to Protagoras it is shown that, in making all impressions true, he makes them also false,—his own theory amongst the rest.

(3) The Heraclitean or Protagorean philosopher is seen to avoid tumbling into a ditch. It is evident therefore that he acknowledges the distinction between good and bad. Everything then is not equally indifferent. And if there are impressions to which the theory does not apply, so much has been conceded. Or, 'as Plato puts it,' with regard to the future, the physician is a better judge of what will prove wholesome than a chance person.

(4) Aristotle further points out the absolute relativity of the doctrine. They cannot say, 'What appears, is,' but 'What appears to me, is to me.'

The following scattered touches may be quoted without comment:

'The theory of Protagoras is called ἡ περὶ τὸ φαντάσμα αἴσθησις.'

'My eyes may each receive a different impression from the same thing.'

'The doubt about the criterion of knowledge is like the question whether the waking or the dreaming life is real.'

'Socrates is not a different person for every different attribute.'

'When a pleasant thing appears bitter, this is in consequence of a manifest defect, viz. disease. The one state then (i.e. the healthy one), and not the other, is to be held the measure of things.'

'Language is made impossible.'

'The man thinks thus and not thus: i.e. it is equally true that he is not thinking as that he thinks. He is reduced to the condition of a vegetable.'

(5) Lastly, Aristotle, like Theodorus, remarks upon the difficulty of reasoning with the men, because they will not lay down anything to start with, and allow it to remain firm.

Aristotle's view may be summarily described by saying that he

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1 Καὶ γίγνεται δὴ τὸ Ἄναγκας, 
διότι πάντα χρήματα. Aristotle thinks that if this argument had been put to Heraclitus himself, he would have been compelled to acknowledge its force.
meets the indefiniteness of the physical and sophistic theories by asserting the distinction between form and matter and the eternity of form.

2. But he does not deny that a continual process takes place between them, or that there is a world in which growth and decay, generation and corruption, are ever going on, viz. the world of sensible things, which in Aristotle reasserts its reality, as being inseparable from the natural forms, and perhaps even from the relations expressed in mathematics.

This is not the place for the discussion of Aristotle's theory of becoming. It is enough to notice (1) that he adopts from the early philosophers, whom he classes together as upholding the material cause, on the one hand the dualism, and on the other the indeterminateness of matter (Phys. Ause. r), and points out that therefore it can only be the object of knowledge 'by analogy,' with reference to the form. And (2) his conception of sensation as a realization of mental life is very similar to that expressed in the Theaetetus and Timeus. The ἐπιργεμον ἀισθήτων, which is inseparable from the ἐπιργεμον αἰσθητοῦ, is the meeting point of active and passive elements in motion. (In modern language it is a process between object and subject.) But the φαντασία or mental image, which accompanies sensation but is separable from it in thought, in the Theaetetus is merged in sensation, although the term as here used is simply the noun of φανερόν (φαντασία ἄρα καὶ ἀισθήσεως τεῖτον), but is clearly distinguished from it by Aristotle. The distinction is made the ground of an argument for the possibility of error.¹

3. The same distinction between matter and form is also applied to the solution of the doubt, whether the complex whole is one or many, e.g. whether the syllable is all the letters combined, or something above and beyond them. Aristotle shows that neither

¹ (Met. 1. 101 b: Οὐδὲν ἡ ἀισθήσεως where the φαντασία is false the βίος ἀγαθόν τοῦ ὄντος ἢ τούτων ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, but the φαντασία may be true. De Sens. 3. Op. de ὑποκατάστασιν τῆς ἀισθήσεως.) Again, even An. 2. 3.

The difference between Aristotle and Plato (in this dialogue), on this point of psychology, may be illustrated by the following tabular view:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ascent of the Human Mind</th>
<th>From Knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sense to Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. ἀισθήσεως</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. φαντασία</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. μνήμη</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. ἐμπνεύσεις</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. προέγεργημα</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. ἐπιστήμη</td>
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<td>7. σοφία</td>
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These two are in some cases inseparable. Each of which is accompanied by

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Each of Which is</th>
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<tr>
<td>δίκαιον</td>
<td>φαντασία</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἁλίθης</td>
<td>φαντασία</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the parts nor their arrangement can create the form of the whole: much rather it is this mould which determines the arrangement of the parts. It is prior to them, and is eternal and uncreated. They affect the nature of the compound thing only by being capable of receiving a certain form.

At this point Plato (in the Theaetetus) and Aristotle seem almost to touch one another, except that in Aristotle the conception of the end (τὸ ὁφελεία) is bound up with that of the form.

As the tendency in the Theaetetus is to rise from the ordinary notion of an element to that of elementary Ideas, so Aristotle points out that the universal is in one sense an element: (i.e. logically.) (Met. 4. 1014 b.)

4. Among the germs which the Theaetetus (like most of Plato's dialogues) contains of Aristotelian formule, the most remarkable is the distinction between possessing and having Knowledge, which obviously corresponds to Aristotle's distinction between Knowing and Contemplating (ἐπιστεόω, θεωρεῖω)—his favourite illustration of the difference between possession and use, or between a potential and an actual state. No such general application is made of it by Plato. The notion enters into the Theaetetus only as a last ineffectual attempt to reconcile the existence of Knowledge with the possibility of error, and it is expressed through an imaginary symbol. But the distinction latent in the image—between the potential and the actual—is the same by which Aristotle afterwards solved this and other difficulties, if not finally, yet with admirable completeness.

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APPENDIX F.

Platonic Idioms in the Theaetetus.

Ἀλλ' ὁ πρῶτον γε, οἷον, Θεατῆτος ἢ ἐμοὶ δεσποτήστηται, πρίν δὲ ἡ συμμόρφησις αὐτῆς τῶν ἄλλων συμμορφῶν ἢ ἐγὼ ἑώρακα διάφορον τι μνημεῖον παρ’ ἐμοὶ ἐνεχιμένην καταθήκα, Theaet. 209 C.

The words of Socrates, it is said in the Euthyphro (11 B, 15 B), are like the words of Daedalus; they are endued with motion. This image expresses the most characteristic peculiarity of Plato's style, the source of much both of its beauty and of its difficulty. His thoughts are not fixed and dead, like specimens in a museum
APPENDIX F.

or cabinet, but flying as he pursues them, doubling, hiding, re-
appearing, soaring aloft, and changing colour with every change of
light and aspect.

The reader of the Theaetetus, for example, is disappointed, if he
looks for perfect consistency with the Republic, or if he expects to
find the logical statement of a definite theory. The ground is
shifted several times. One line of inquiry is abandoned, and yet
the argument presently returns from a new starting-point upon the
former track. A position is assumed and then relinquished;—the
figures are erased,—and yet the subsequent discussion is not without
reference to the hypothesis which has been demolished. The doc-
trine of sense, for instance, is wholly negativized, and yet it cannot
be said that we are not intended to gather something from it.

Plato's metaphors are 'living creatures' rather than figures of
speech; he regards them not as airy nothings, but as realities; he
recurs to them with fondness, as Lord Bacon does. But no ex-
pression is ever merely repeated in Plato. If an image is recalled,
it is with some additional or altered feature; if a conception is
resumed, it is not merely copied, but a fresh picture is drawn from
the life. Even in recapitulating, some modification is often made,
or the argument is carried further. Thus the photograph, as it has
been called, of the connection is apt to be blurred, from the thought
moving as we read. Even in the same passage, where an ordinary
writer would be contented with referring to an example or illus-
tration just adduced, Plato surprises the reader with a different one,
which perhaps gives a new direction to the current of thought.
A fair instance of this occurs in Theaet. 169 A, where Theodorus
says: 'It was mere nonsense in me to hope that you would excuse
me and not compel me to strip for the contest, as the Lacedae-
monians do. You are rather to be compared to Sciron: for they
tell one either to strip or go away; but you are rather like Antaeus
in your way of doing business, for you will let no man go till you
have stripped him (like Sciron) and compelled him to wrestle with
you (like Antaeus).'

The argument itself (δ λόγος) is continually personified and is
spoken of under a Protean variety of figures.

It is at one time our servant, who must wait our leisure, or who
runs away from us, or who seems likely to die and vanish away
'like a tale.' More frequently it has power over us, like a General
commanding us, like a sea in which we must swim for our lives,
while it rolls its successsive waves over us, like a wind which car-
rries us we know not whither. Sometimes 'its name is legion,' and
it is multiplied into a swarm or an impetuous throng. Or it takes
a milder form, as the raft, or dolphin, on which we seek to escape
from a sea of doubt, or the wall behind which we screen ourselves
from the driving shower. The Argument talks with us, it goes
through a subject, takes up a position, hides its face from some
threatening objection and passes on. It rebukes us for unfair
treatment of itself, it can be insulted, it stands in need of help,
it has a father, and guardians of its orphanhood.

This movement or plasticity of ideas, which penetrates the whole
of Plato’s writings, is closely connected with their conversational
form, and manifests itself in what may be called his poetical use of
language.

The observation of both these elements of Plato’s style is of im-
portance to the student, because it spares him from the necessity of
resorting to some forced construction, or flying to conjecture, upon
each occasion of grammatical perplexity.

I. Conversationalism. In Plato we often meet with irregularities
of construction, which in an oration or set treatise would be referred
to looseness or inelegance of diction, but which only make the dia-
logue more easy and lively and natural.

a. Changes of construction. The following are a few out of
several instances in the Theætætus:—

(1) 144 A: Τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ διστα..πρὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι..ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν
ἀν φόμην γενότοι σοὶ ὅρᾳ γεγομένου. Theodorus begins by
simply expressing his surprise, but proceeds to dwell upon
his previous anticipations and experience to account for it.

(2) 153 B: Ἡ δ’ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἦν..κατα πολλά μαθηματὰ, κ.τ.λ. Cp.
173 D: Σπονδαί δ’ ἐπαιρεῖν ἐν’ ἄρχει..οὐδ’ δεικνύειν πρᾶττεν
προσίσταται αὐτόν.

The emphasis on the first words causes the sentence to begin
vaguely, and the construction is determined as it proceeds.

(3) 167 B: Ποιήσας ψυχῆς ἦν δεξίοντας συγγεγυ οἰκῆ. Here, unless something is corrupt, a transition is made to the re-
flexive pronoun, as if ψυχῆ were the subject of δεξίοντας: a transition
from the persons who think to the mind which thinks.

(4) 172 B: Οὐκ ἂν τολμήσει φήσαι (ὄ λόγον)...εἰθέλουσι
ἰσχυρίζονται. He passes from what the argument would say,
to what certain persons do say. So elsewhere there is often
a transition from the indefinite singular to the indefinite
plural.

To this may be added the occasionally difficult use of the cases of
nouns: e.g. Theæt. 147 C: Ἑν τῇ τοῦ προτό ὀργήσει, without περὶ:
just as we might say in conversation, 'the mud-question,' for 'the question about the mud.'

β. Resumption. A thought is frequently resumed in the same sentence, for the sake of modifying it, or of particularizing the aspect in which it is considered, or merely for the sake of clearness. The introduction of the pronoun αὐτοῦ, to recall a noun which has been thrown back for the sake of emphasis, is a familiar instance of this.

E.g. 155 D: Ἐάν σοι Ἀνδριώ .. τής διανοίας τήν ἀλήθειαν .. συν-εξερευνήσαμει αὐτόν;

Perhaps the most marked instance of resumption in the Theaetetus occurs 171 B: Ἐνεκὸν δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκείνου ὑμολογήσατε, ὥσπερ τῇ τάξει καὶ λέγων ξυγχωρή ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων διαλέξεων, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸν συγχωρήσαται.

γ. Redundancy. There are other ways in which regularity of construction is sacrificed to fulness of expression.

E.g. 153 C: Ἐὰν οὖν σοι λέγω πρεμίας τε καὶ γαλάζιας καὶ ὅσα τοιούτα, θεὶ αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίας σήμουσι καὶ ἀπηλώσουσι καὶ ἀποπλάνωσι, τὰ δ’ ἔτερα σώζει.

172 D: Τοῖς λόγοις ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται, ὡσπερ ἡμεῖς τοῖς τρίτοις ἢθι λόγοι ἐκ λόγου μεταλλαχθέντες, αὐτῷ κάκευσι, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς ὁ ἐπιλόγων τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέσῃ.

199 B: Μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦτος οὖν τε, ἀλλ’ ἐτέραν ἀντ’ ἐκείνης, ὡσπερ .. ἄνθ’ ἔτερας ἐτέραν ἥμαρτοι λάβῃ, ὅτε ἦρα τὰ ἔνθεκα διάδοχα φόβοι εἶσαι, τὴν τῶν ἐνθέκα ἐπιστήμην αὐτέ τῆς τῶν ὕπερδεκα λαβῶν, τὴν ἐν ἐνεργῷ αἰῶν ὑπάνταν ἀντὶ περιστρέψ.

An occasional consequence of this fulness of expression is the deferred apodosis, which sometimes occurs, especially after ὡσπερ: e.g. Rep. 3. 402 B: ὡσπερ ἢρα .. Ἄρ’ οὖν, ὁ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως, κ.τ.λ. Theest. 207 A: ὡσπερ ἢρα .. οὕτω τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ.

δ. Also connected with the conversational form of Plato’s writings, and the plastic, growing condition of his thoughts, is the imperfect kind of argument which he sometimes employs. It is a saying of Aristotle’s that Dialectic deals tentatively with those subjects on which Philosophy dogmatizes (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειρατικὴ περὶ ἢ φιλοσοφία γνωριμική); and Bacon speaks of a Socratic induction. To this, and to a certain economy used towards the respondent, is to be attributed the frequency of the argument from example (the example often covering more ground than is quite fair), and of the inference, by means of simple conversion, from particular to universal.
The immaturity of the science of logic no doubt renders this mode of reasoning more easy and natural than it could be in a later age, but it is not explained without allowing for the fact that the inquiry is conducted, at least on the part of the respondent, in a tentative and inductive spirit.

An instance occurs in the Theaetetus, 159 A, when it is argued that if what is different is dissimilar, then whatever is dissimilar is wholly different, and what is similar is the same. That Plato was fully aware of the inconclusiveness of the form of argument thus ironically adopted, appears from Protag. 350 C, where Socrates is checked for it by Protagoras, who says, "Εγώνε ἐρωτηθείς ὑπὸ σοῦ, εἰ εἴ άθρότου θαρραλέοι εἶσιν, ὁμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι άθρόιοι, οὐς ἡρωτήθην· εἰ γὰρ με τότε ἦρω, εἶπον δὲ δι καύκουσ.

And sometimes, even where an instance is really meant to cover a large conclusion, its power is ostensibly limited with persuasive modesty: as in Theaet. 152 C: Φαντασία ἀρα καὶ αἰσθήσεις τούτων ἐν τε θερμοίς καὶ πάσι τοῖς τουτούς... Αἰσθήσεις ἀρα τοῦ δετος δὲ εἶ σποτ.

Ib. 204 D: Ταῦτα ζα εἴν γε τοῖς δεσμο ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστι, τό ἐπ ύπο προσαγωγόμεν καὶ ἐπ ἀπαντα.

c. It is difficult to separate between the conversational and the poetical element in Plato. Their combination gives him the power of 'saying anything.' Just as there is a freedom of expression possible in conversation, which we feel to be impossible in writing, or as the poet can express with grace and dignity what by other lips were better left unsaid.

II. This leads us to the Poetical use of language. Plato's words have frequently a different value from any that could be given them by a mere prose writer. The language as well as the thought is instinct with a creative power, which gives it a dramatic vividness and refinement; at times even a dithyrambic cadence, or a lyrical intensity. The poet whom Plato most resembles in this is Sophocles; but his style may be regarded as the mirror of all Greek literature.

a. Poetical use of single words.

(1) Choice of a more sensuous expression (πρὸ ὤμολογον ποιεῖν).
  150 D: Ἐναργεῖς ὦ γιώ διὸν ὑπὲρ ὅτι ('as clear as day').
  155 A: Ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα.
  156 B: Συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γενεικρέσση.
  160 D: Μὴ πταίὲν τῇ διανοίᾳ.
  162 A: Διωλόγος φλυαρία.
  165 B: Σφαλεῖς γὰρ ἦτον ἀσχημονήσει.
169 B: Μαλ’ εὖ δυσκεκόφασιν.
171 D: Ταῦτα ὄν.. ἵστασθαι τὸν λόγον.
172 E: Ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντιδίκος (wielding coercion).
202 A: Ταῦτα.. περιστρέφοντα πάσι προσφέρεσθαι.
To which may be added the ‘hypocoristic’ use of diminutives.
149 C: Φαρμάκα.
195 A: Ἐάν τοῦ σμικρῶν γῇ τὸ ψυχάρισ.
(2) Use of Epic words, the meaning of which is sometimes spiritualized.
149 A: Μαίας γενναίας καὶ βλοσφυρᾶς.
162 E: "Ἄξιος οὖν ἐνδε μόνον.
174 D: Πολύ βδάλλοντα.
189 E: Τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰδαλλεῖται διανοομένη.
194 E: "Ὅταν τοίνυν λασιοῦν τοῦ κέαρ γῇ.
(3) Playing upon a word.
150 C: Εὐρημα. (Cp. Soph. Οἰδ. Τύρ. 1108.)
152 A: Τίν διήθειαν.
181 C: Τοῦτο ἰδίοντα.
194 C: Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ.
208 B: "Ἀληθεύσατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον.
Closely related to this is (4) the etymological use of words: i. e.
when, by dwelling upon its etymology, a word is made to express
something different from, or more than, its ordinary meaning.
149 B: "Ὅτα διοχος οὖσα τήν λοχείαν ἐλήξεν.
152 E: (perhaps) ζυμφερέσθων (let them march one way).
160 E: Τάμαμφειδράμα αὐτόν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κόκλω περιθερκτέων.
193 C: "Ωστρεί οἱ ἐμπαλίν ιπτοδεέμενωι παραλάβας.
198 D: Πρόσχερον 8' οὐκ εἶχε τῇ δικαιί.
(5) Poetical use of particles: e. g. the frequent use of ἀρα, helping
to keep up the idea that Socrates is repeating what he has heard,
the occasionally difficult reference with γάρ (152 C: Οἶα γάρ, and note), the hyperbaton of καί (154 E: Καὶ μὴ ἐπσωγε), and gen-
erally the dramatic liveliness with which successive clauses are con-
trasted, as if each were put into the mouth of a different person.
Speech thus becomes literally a ‘self-dialogue.’ See especially 155
B: "Ὁ μὴ πρότερον ἢν, ἀλλὰ ἄστερον τούτο εἶναι (!): and 190 B: "Ὅτι
παντὸς μᾶλλον.. ὡς παντοῦ μᾶλλον.. ὡς παντάπασαν ἄρα.. ὡς ἀνέγη.. ,
with which the supposed answers of the mind to itself are in-
roduced.
Compare Phil. 38 C: Τί ποτε ἀρα ξετι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθ’ ἐστάσαι φανταζόμενον ἤπο τοιν δεινόρ.
β. The same poetical energy shows itself in the expansion of
some of the ordinary forms of grammar. In this also Plato reflects
the general tendency of the Greek language.

1. Apposition. The use of the apposition of clauses (as a form
of epexegeisis) deserves to be reckoned among the more striking
peculiarities of Plato's style. One example from the Theaetetus will
suffice to indicate what is meant.

175 D: Πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν... διγγαλιὲς σφι ... ὑψηλοὶ κριμασθήσις... ἀδημοσίως τε καὶ απορών καὶ βαρβαρίζων...
γύλωτα... παρέκκλει, κ.τ.λ., where another writer would prob-
ably have inserted ἴφρ. (Cp. Lach. 182 B.)

Sometimes a sentence is thus placed in apposition with a pronoun
such as τὸν (189 E ad fin.) or ὅ (158 B). Compare the use of τὸ
ὅ, e.g. 157 E. A slightly different use is that of the accusative in
apposition to the sentence. Instances of this are 153 C: Ἐσι
τότοις τὸν κολοσσῶν, κ.τ.λ.; 160 E: Τὰ ἀμφιδρόμα αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.
(Many of the examples of resumption and redundancy above referred
to would fall grammatically under this head.)

2. Attraction. E.g. where a main verb was to be expected, we
find a participle. It can be accounted for; but there is reason to
believe that it is partly due to the neighbourhood of another partici-
pile, or of some word that is usually construed with a participle.

173 B: Τοῦτo δὲ τoῦ ᾧμετέρoν χορoῦ πότερoν βονεῖς διελθόντες ἀ,
ἐλάνται πῶς ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τροπῶμεθα; where we should have
expected διελθόμεθα.

150 D: Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαινόμεθα... καὶ πάντα ἀμαθεῖς, πάντας δὲ προοί-
μης τῆς συνωσίας... θαυμαστῶν δὲν εἰπιδιώκετε, ὡς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ
toῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦμεν: where, but for the proximity of ὡς, εἰπιδιώκετε
would probably have been εἰπιδίδομεν. See also
λαβῶν, 199 B, which but for ὥσιν... λάβῃ would be λαβότα.

γ. To the same self-consciousness of language which betrays itself
in the foregoing instances may be attributed the minuteness of an-
thesis, which, though common everywhere in Greek, is strikingly so
in Plato.

150 E: Ἐμου δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἣ αὐτόι ὡς ἄλλων πεσιδεῖτε (ὅ).
197 C: Εἶ δυστικῶν ἀητῶν κεκατημένον μὴ ἔχεις, ἄλλ' ἄσπερ, κ.τ.λ.

δ. This power of refining upon language is turned to account in
adapting the mode of expression to the exigencies of the argument.
E.g. 152 B, where we are gradually led from the example of
the wind, which one man feels cold, and another not, to the
position that sensation is the correlative of reality. See
also 158 E, 159 B, where, as the argument proceeds, (ἔτερον)
τὸ ὅτι θα λέγειτε is substituted for ὅτι θα ἄτερον.
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e. The care which is taken of the rhythm is a further peculiarity of Plato’s style, and may be treated as a poetical element. This is especially noticeable (1) in the manner in which quotations from poetry are shaded off so as to harmonize with the surrounding prose, and (2) in the occasional elaboration of prose writing to something like a metrical cadence.

(1) 173 E. In the quotation from Pindar, φέρεται is probably substituted for πέτεται (see note on the passage), the words τὰ ἐπίσεδα γεωμετροῦσα are inserted, and τῶν ὄστων ἐκάστου ὄλων is added at the close. Thus the poetical language is interwoven with the sentence, so as to embellish it without interrupting its harmony.

194 C. The substitution of the (early) Attic εἰσπ for the Homeric κρίπ is probably due to a similar motive.

(2) Dithyrambic and lyric cadences are more frequent in some other dialogues than in the Theaetetus. See especially Sympos. 196, 197, the close of Agathon’s speech, especially the last few lines, in which the rhetorical antitheses have more the effect of rhythm than of argument: Phædr. 238, 241, alibi; Rep. 8. 546, 7; 10. 617, 18; and several places of the Timæus, e. g. 47 B: ὁ μὲν ὁ μῆλος τειχάδων συμφωνεῖ ἀδιόρμοντος ἐν ἀρχαιοὶ μάτην. With such passages may be compared Theaet. 176 A: Οὔδε γ’ ἀρχαιοὶ λόγοι αἰφνίζοντο ἐρθών ἐφησομεν θεῶν τε καὶ ἄνθρωπων ἐκδικών βίων ἀληθῆ.

The same power shows itself more slightly in an occasional inversion of the order of words for the sake of emphasis.

158 B: Οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν αἰσθανθής εἰσι.

160 D: Κατὰ δὲ Προταγόραν τῶν συνάγων τῶν παῦσων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρων εἰσι.

ξ. A few words may be added in conclusion on the artificial structure of Plato’s dialogues, of which the Theaetetus is acknowledged to be a prominent example.

There is a unity in each of them, approaching to that of a living organism:—the spirit of the whole breathing in every part:—a continuity independent of the links of question and answer, by which it appears to be sustained; which may be viewed apart from the scenery and the changes of persons, and the passages of humour and pleasantry by which it seems to be interrupted.

And while it is comparatively easy to distinguish the principal stages of the argument, yet there is such a dovetailing and interpenetration of the parts, that it is difficult to adopt an exact division without doing violence to the real harmony, or even to mark the exact point of transition from one hypothesis to another.

An instance of this is the way in which the reader is prepared
for the argument from the idea of expediency, which may be said to be anticipated as early as 157 D: ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν. (Compare the anticipation, at the very beginning of the dialogue, 144 E: Ἐπεκεκφάσθη δὲ εἰ μονοκλὲς δὲν λέγει, of the conclusion arrived at 179 B: Σοφότερον τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τῶν μίν τουούτων μέτρων εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.) The difficulty of reconciling the ideas of goodness and wisdom with the doctrine of sense appears more distinctly in the defence of Protagoras, 167 A, and presses for solution as an element of the common opinion of men, 170 A: Καὶ ἐν γε τοῖς μεγάλοις κυδώνοις . . . παρὰ σφίσιν.

These two passages have prepared the way for the statement in 171, 2, of the 'semi-Protagoreanism' of those who will not venture to say that every creature knows what is for its own health, nor that every individual and every state knows equally what is expedient in legislation. When a breach has thus been made in the enemy's lines of defence, a rest is afforded to the reader by the vision of the Divine Life which follows, in which, however, the ideas of wisdom and holiness and righteousness have a direct bearing upon the conclusion towards which we are being carried step by step, and its effect upon the tone of the discussion is apparent in the words 177 D: Πλὴν εἰ ἐς τὸ δυσμα λέγοντα τοῦτο δὲ τοὺς σκέψις ἐν ἑαυτῷ πρὸς δὲ λέγομεν οὐχὶ; κ.τ.λ. At this point the argument from Expediency is fully entered into. But it is difficult to say exactly where it began.

A similar gradation may be observed in the development of the difficulty about false opinion.

Note also the artfulness of the transition from sensation to thought, 184-187, and from 'true opinion' to 'true opinion giving an account of itself,' 201.

And while the earlier part is written with a view to what is in reserve, the previous discussion is not forgotten as the inquiry proceeds. See 194 D: Ἀ δὴ δοτα καλεῖται, compared with 152 D: Ἀ δὴ φασμα εἶναι, οὐκ ὁρθὸς: and 209 C: Μημέρους παρ' ἐμοῖ ἐπιστημηναίας καταθήκης,—an application of the (relinquished) conception of the waxen block.

Plato's philosophy has been compared to a building, of which the Republic is the superstructure, while the other dialogues are the pillars and fretted vaults upon which it rests.

The image fails to give an adequate idea of the perfection of Art,—or rather of Nature conscious of itself,—which gives harmony, but not regularity, a growing, not a fixed, consistency, both to the parts and to the whole.
His writings are the creations of a great master, whose sketches are worked up into the larger monuments of his genius, a cycle surrounding an eternal Epic poem, bound together by the unity not merely of a particular age and country, but of an individual mind.

*Ω θαυμάσιε, ὃ θαυμώνε, ὃ ἔταΐρε, ὃ μέλε.

These and the like phrases are apt to be slurred over in translating or interpreting Plato, from the frequency of their recurrence and the difficulty of appreciating their exact force in each connection. They belong to that conversational sprightliness and play of fancy which it is impossible to bind to any rule.

Here, as elsewhere, Plato carries further an existing tendency of the Greek language. Such addresses as δαυμώνε, δαυμώνῃ, γῆς, in Homer (II. 6. 407, 486, 518, 521; cp. Plat. Rep. 344 D, ἄδαυμώνε Θρασύμαχος) vary in signification according to the mood of the speaker. The same may be said of ὧ δαυμώσε, ὧ μέλε, in Aristophanes.

In Plato the variety of such addresses is much greater, and the variety of their meaning greater still. They can often be more perfectly rendered by a changed expression of the voice or countenance, than by any words. All that can be said of them generally is, that they give an increased intensity to the tone of the conversation at the moment, whether this be grave or humorous, respectful, ironical or familiar.

ἀ δαυμάσε in its simplest use conveys a remonstrance, ‘I wonder at you.’ The most decided instance is in the Phædo, 117 D: ὁ λοι, ὃν, ποιεῖτε, ἁ δαυμάσει. ‘What are you doing! I am amazed at you.’ It may also sometimes convey admiration. But it is frequently used where the subject of wonder or surprise has nothing to do with the person addressed: e.g. Cratyl. 439 C, where it indicates Socrates’ intense interest in the mystery of the Ideas. Compare the use of the form of congratulation ἁ μακάρε (see Aristoph. Nub. 167) to express Socrates’ own delight at some great discovery: e.g. Rep. 432 D, where Justice is discovered; Phæd. 69 A, where Socrates congratulates himself as well as Simmias on the superiority of the philosophic life.—In Theæt. 151 C, ἁ δαυμάσε can hardly be rendered except by a note of admiration. ‘Do you know that many have been ready to bite me!’
Nearly the same is true of Δικαίωσίμες, 180 B, though it here retains a slight tone of remonstrance. ‘Disciples, my good sir!’ ‘Disciples, did you say?’ While in 172 C it wears quite a different expression, conveying Socrates’ genuine admiration for the philosophic life, and is more difficult to render. ‘Ah! my good friend, this is not the first time I have observed how natural it is that a philosopher should make a poor figure at the bar!’

The affectionate confidence and familiarity expressed in Δικαίωσίμες, Δίκαιος, Δίκαιος έταφε, acquire, in Δικαίωσίμες, a degree of humorous or triumphant gaiety. Theaet. 178 E: Νη Δίσι, Δίκαίωσίμες, ‘My dear fellow! I should rather think he did.’

The use of quaint adjurations and addresses in Shakspere affords an interesting illustration of this feature of Plato’s style. For example, when Hamlet says, ‘O good Horatio, I’ll take the ghost’s word for a thousand pound,’ the address is prompted not this time by Horatio’s worth, but by the relief caused to his own mind by the discovery of the king’s guilt.
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