Encyclopædia

of

Religion and Ethics
Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics

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VOLUME V
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<td>Ross (John M. E.), M.A.</td>
<td>Minister of St. Ninian's Presbytery Church, Golders Green, London; author of The Self-Portraiture of Jesus, The Christian Standpoint.</td>
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<td>Royce (Josiah), Ph.D., LL.D.</td>
<td>Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University; Gifford Lecturer at the University of Aberdeen, 1898-1900.</td>
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<td>Salmond (William), D.D.</td>
<td>Professor of Mental and Moral Science in the University of Otago, Dunedin.</td>
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<td>Sayce (Archibald Henry), D.Litt. (Oxon.),</td>
<td>LL.D. (Dublin), D.D. (Edin. and Aber.).</td>
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<td>Scott (John Henry), M.A.</td>
<td>Fellow of Queen's College and Professor of Assyriology in the University of Oxford; President of the Society of Biblical Archeology.</td>
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**CROSS-REFERENCES**

In addition to the cross-references throughout the volume, the following list of minor references may be useful:

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<td>Fellowships</td>
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# Lists of Abbreviations

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## II. Books of the Bible

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**ABBREVIATIONS**

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III. For the Literature

1. The following authors' names, when unaccompanied by the title of a book, stand for the works in the list below.

- Baethgen = Beitrag zur sem. Religiongesch., 1888.
- Baldwin = Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology, tr., 1891-1905.
- Benzerus = Heb. Archäologie, 1894.
- Darenberg-Saglio = Historische Archiv, 1886-90.
- Delaunay = Lehrbuch der Religionsev., 1905.
- Deussen = Die Philosophie der Upanishads, 1899 [Eng. tr., 1906].
- Doughty = Arabia Deserta, 2 vols. 1888.
- Hamburger = Realencyclopadie für Bibel u. Talmud, i. 1870 (1892), ii. 1883, suppl. 1886, 1891 f., 1897.
- Holder = Allgemeine Sprachkunde, 1891 ff.
- Howitt = Native Tribes of S. E. Australia, 1904.
- Jubbawin = Cours de Litt. celtique, i.-xii., 1893 ff.
- Lagrange = Etudes sur les religions sémitiques, 1894.
- Lane = An Arabic-English Dictionary, 1863 ff.
- Lepsius = Denkmäler aus Ägypten u. Äthiopien, 1849-1860.
- Lichtenberger = Encyc. des sciences religieuses, 1876.
- Liddell & Scott = Handbuch der nordsem. Epigraphik, 1898.
- Moir = Sanskrit Texts, 1859-1872.
- Mues-Arnolt = A Concise Dict. of the Assyrian Language, 1894 ff.
- Panly-Wissow = Realencycl. der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, 1893-1895.
- Pfeiffer = Römische Mythologie, 1888.
- Réville = Religion des peuples non-civilisés, 1883.
- Riehm = Handworterbuch d. bibl. Altertums, 1893-1894.
- Robinson = Biblical Researches in Palestine, 1856.
- Roscher = Lex. d. gr. u. röm. Mythologie, 1884.
- Schirer = GJV, 5 vols. 1898-1901 [HJT, 5 vols. 1890 ff.]
- Schwab = Leben nach dem Tode, 1892.
- Siegfried-States = Hb. Worterbuch zum AT, 1893.
- Smend = Lehrbuch der alttest. Religionsev., 1899.
- Smith (G. A.) = Historical Geography of the Holy Land, 1896.
- Smith (W. R.) = Religion of the Semites, 1894.
- Spencer (H.) = Principles of Sociology, 1895-1896.
- Spencer-Gillen = Native Tribes of Central Australia, 1899.
- Spencer-Gillen = Native Tribes of Central Australia, 1904.
- Swete = The OT in Greek, 3 vols. 1893 ff.
- Tylor (E. B.) = Primitive Culture, 1891 [1900].
- Weber = Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud u. verwandten Schriften, 1897.
- Wiedemann = Die Religion der alten Ägypter, 1890 (Eng. tr., revised, Religion of the Anc. Egyptians, 1897).
- Wilkinson = Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians, 3 vols. 1878.
- Zunz = Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden, 1892.

2. Periodicals, Dictionaries, Encyclopedias, and other standard works frequently cited.

- AAG = Archiv für Anthropologie.
- AAOJ = American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal.
- AE = Archiv für Ethnographie.
- AGPh = Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
- AHIR = American Historical Review.
- AHT = Ancient Hebrew Tradition (Hommel).
- AJPh = American Journal of Philosophy.
- AJP = American Journal of Psychology.
- AJRPE = American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education.
- AJSL = American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature.
- AJTh = American Journal of Theology.
- AMG = Annales du Musée Guimet.
- APE = American Palestine Exploration Society.
- APF = Archiv für Papyrusforschung.
- AR = Anthropological Review.
- ARW = Archiv für Religionswissenschaft.
- AS = Acta Sanctorum (Rollandus).

- AEG = Archiv für Ethnographie.
- AASG = Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
- ASoC = L’Année Sociologique.
- AAWT = Archæological Survey of W. India.
- AZ = Allgemeine Zeitung.
- BC = Bulletin de Correspondence hellénique.
- BE = Bureau of Ethnology.
- BG = Bombay Gazetteer.
- BJ = Bellum Judææ (Josephus).
- BL = Bampton Lectures.
- BLE = Bulletin de littérature Ecclésiastique.
- BOR = Bab. and Oriental Record.
- BS = Bibliotheca Sacra.
- BSA = Annual of the British School at Athens.
- BSAI = Bulletin de la Soc. archéologique à Alexandrie.
- BSG = Bulletin de la Soc. des Géographes.
- BTS = Buddhist Text Society.
- BW = Biblical World.
- BZ = Biblische Zeitschrift.
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<td>Church Quarterly Review.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DACL</td>
<td>Dict. d'Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie (Cahrol).</td>
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<tr>
<td>DB</td>
<td>Dict. of the Bible.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Dict. of Christian Antiquities (Smith-Chesterham).</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCB</td>
<td>Dict. of Christian Biography (Smith-Wace).</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCG</td>
<td>Dict. of Christ and the Gospels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Dict. of Islam (Hughes).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNBI</td>
<td>Dict. of National Bibliography.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPHP</td>
<td>Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWAW</td>
<td>Denkschriften der Wiener Akad. der Wissenschaften.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBR</td>
<td>Encyclopedia Biblica.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIB</td>
<td>Encyclopedia Britannica.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERE</td>
<td>The present work.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eexp</td>
<td>Expositor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEP</td>
<td>Expository Times.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIG</td>
<td>Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum (coll. C. Müller, Paris, 1885).</td>
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<tr>
<td>FL</td>
<td>Folklore.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FJL</td>
<td>Folklore Journal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FJR</td>
<td>Folklore Record.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>Gazette Archéologique.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>Golden Bough (Frazer).</td>
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<tr>
<td>GG</td>
<td>Göttinische Gelehrte Anzeigen.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GJ</td>
<td>Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GJH</td>
<td>Grundriss d. Iranischen Philologie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GV</td>
<td>Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GI</td>
<td>Geschichte des Volkes Israel.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HBB</td>
<td>Hastings' Dict. of the Bible.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHES</td>
<td>Histoire des Arts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HGL</td>
<td>Historical Geography of the Holy Land (G. A. Smith).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>History of Israel.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HJ</td>
<td>Hdbb Journal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNP</td>
<td>History of the Jewish People.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>Historia Naturalis (Pliny).</td>
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<tr>
<td>HW</td>
<td>Handwörterbuch.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Indian Antiquary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICO</td>
<td>International Critical Commentary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICR</td>
<td>International Congress of Orientalists.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Indian Census Report (1901).</td>
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<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inscriptiones Graecae (publ. under auspices of Berlin Academy, 1873 ff.).</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGSA</td>
<td>Inscriptiones Graecae Antiquissimae.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGI</td>
<td>Imperial Gazeteer of India (1885); new edition (1906-1909).</td>
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<tr>
<td>IJE</td>
<td>International Journal of Ethics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITL</td>
<td>International Theological Library.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JA</td>
<td>Journal Asiatique.</td>
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<td>JAF</td>
<td>Journal of American Folklore.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAI</td>
<td>Journal of the Anthropological Institute.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JASBS</td>
<td>Journ. of As. Soc. of Bengal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JBL</td>
<td>Journal of Biblical Literature.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JBTC</td>
<td>Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JD</td>
<td>Journal des Débats.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDT</td>
<td>Jahrbucher f. deutsche Theologie.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JE</td>
<td>Jewish Encyclopedia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHIC</td>
<td>Johns Hopkins University Circulars.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHS</td>
<td>Journal of Hellenic Studies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLZ</td>
<td>Junter Literaturzeitung.</td>
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<td>JPH</td>
<td>Journal of Philology.</td>
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<td>JPT</td>
<td>Jahrbucher f. protest. Theologie.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPTS</td>
<td>Journal of the Pali Text Society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JQR</td>
<td>Jewish Quarterly Review.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRAI</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAS</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JASBSO</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay branch.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JASC</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ceylon branch.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JASRK</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Korean branch.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEGS</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTS</td>
<td>Journal of Theological Studies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAT</td>
<td>Die Keilschriften und das AT (Schrader), 1883.</td>
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<tr>
<td>KATZ</td>
<td>Zimmern-Winckler's ed. of the preceding [really a totally distinct work], 1903.</td>
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<tr>
<td>KB or KBH</td>
<td>Keilschriftliche Bibliothek (Schrader), 1889 ff.</td>
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<td>KGS</td>
<td>Keilschriften und die Geschichtsforschung, 1878.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCBI</td>
<td>Literarisches Centralblatt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOP</td>
<td>Literaturblatt für Oriental Philologie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOT</td>
<td>Introduction to Literature of OT (Driver).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>Legend of Perseus (Hartland).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSS</td>
<td>Leipzigser sem. Studien.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mélusine.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAI</td>
<td>Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGH</td>
<td>Monumenta Germaniae Historica (Pertz).</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGJ</td>
<td>Mittheilungen der Gesellschaft für jüdische Volkskunde.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGWJ</td>
<td>Monatsbericht f. Geschichte u. Wissenschaft des Judentums.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas of the Bible (Hamburger).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNDPV</td>
<td>Mitteilungen u. Nachrichten des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR</td>
<td>Methodist Review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFG</td>
<td>Mittheilungen der vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWJ</td>
<td>Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBAC</td>
<td>Nuovo Bollettino di Archeologia Cristiana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>Nineteenth Century.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHWB</td>
<td>Neuenbürgisches Wörterbuch.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NINQ</td>
<td>North Indian Notes and Queries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKZ</td>
<td>Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td>Notes and Queries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>Native Races of the Pacific States (Bancroft).</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTZG</td>
<td>Neutestamentliche Zeitschrift.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLZ</td>
<td>Orientalische Litteraturzeitung.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>Onomastica Sacra.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTJ</td>
<td>Old Testament in the Jewish Church (W. R. Smith).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTP</td>
<td>Oriental Translation Fund Publications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB</td>
<td>Polychrome Bible (English).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBE</td>
<td>Publication of the American Oriental Society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Primitive Culture (Tylor).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEFM</td>
<td>Palestine Exploration Fund Memoirs.</td>
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LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

PEFSt = Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement.
PGL = Patrologia Graeca (Migne).
PB = Preussische Jahrbucher.
PLN = Patrologia Latina (Migne).
PNQ = Punjab Notes and Queries.
PR = Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India (Crooke).
PRE = Prot. Realencylopädie (Herzog-Hauck).
PRR = Presbyterian and Reformed Review.
PRR = Proceedings of the Royal Society.
PRSE = Proceedings of Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
PSBA = Proceedings of the Soc. of Biblical Archaeology.
PTS = Palæ Text Society.
RA = Revue Archéologique.
RAan = Revue d'Anthropologie.
RAS = Royal Asiatic Society.
RAP = Revue d'Asyriologie.
RB = Revue Biblique.
RB EW = Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington).
RC = Revue Critique.
RCd = Revue Celtique.
RCA = Revue Chrétienne.
RDM = Revue des Deux Mondes.
EE = Realencyclopädie.
RE = Revue des Études Grecques.
REG = Revue Égyptologique.
REF = Revue des Études Juives.
REE = Revue d'Ethnographie.
BHL = Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses.
RHL = Revue de l'Histoire des Religions.
LN = Revue Numismatique.
LP = Records of the Past.
RP = Revue Philosophique.
RQ = Römische Quartalschrift.
RS = Revue sémitique d'Épigraphie et d'Hist. ancienne.
RSA = Recueil de la Soc. archéologique.
RSI = Reports of the Smithsonian Institution.
RTAP = Recueil de Travaux relatifs à l'Archéologie et à la Philologie.
RTT = Revue des traditions populaires.
RTTP = Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie.
RTr = Recueil de Travaux.
BWB = Realwörterbuch.
SBAW = Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.

SBE = Sacred Books of the East.
SBO = Sacred Books of the OT (Hebrew).
SDB = Single-vol. Dict. of the Bible (Hastings).
SMA = Sitzungsberichte der Münchener Akademie.
TAPA = Transactions of American Philological Association.
TASJ = Transactions of the Asiatic Soc. of Japan.
TC = Tribes and Castes.
TES = Transactions of Ethnological Society.
TAJL = Theologische Litteraturzeitung.
TAT = Theol. Tijdschrift.
TRHS = Transactions of Royal Historical Society.
TRSE = Transactions of Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
TS = Texts and Studies.
TSBA = Transactions of the Soc. of Biblical Archaeology.
TU = Texte u. Untersuchungen.
WAI = Western Asiatic Inscriptions.
ZA = Zeitschrift für Assyriologie.
ZATW = Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft.
ZCK = Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst.
ZCP = Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie.
ZDA = Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum.
ZDMG = Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.
ZDPV = Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
ZE = Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
ZKF = Zeitschrift für Keilschriftforschung.
ZKG = Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.
ZKT = Zeitschrift für kathol. Theologie.
ZM = Zeitschrift für die Mythologie.
ZNW = Zeitschrift für die neuest. Wissenschaft.
ZPK = Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik.
ZTK = Zeitschrift für Theologie u. Kirche.
ZVK = Zeitschrift für Volkskunde.
ZVWB = Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
ZWT = Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie.

[A small superior number designates the particular edition of the work referred to, as KAT², LOT¹, etc.]
DRAVIDIANS (North India).—1. Meaning of term.—The term 'Dravidian' (Skr. Dravida, the adjectival form of Dravida) seems to have been primarily an equivalent for 'Tamil,' but was extended by Caldwell (Dravidian Grammar, 4 ff.) to denote the family of languages formerly designated Tamulian or Tamilic, practically including all the languages of Southern India—Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Canarese, and Tula—which form a group well defined and closely related to another. Manu (Institutes, x. 43, 44) speaks of the Dravidas as a tribe of Ksatryyas, or warriors, who had become out-castes and, as they are the only southern tribe mentioned in his lists, Caldwell supposed that in ancient times the name was loosely applied to the whole of the South Indian peoples. Whether or not this belief was well founded, his invention of the word 'Dravidian' as a generic term for the South Indian group of languages is convenient, and has been generally accepted. By a natural, if not perfectly justifiable, extension the term, primarily philological, has been widely used in an ethnological sense, and we have become accustomed to speak of the Dravidian peoples when we really mean the races speaking the Dravidian languages. Even in this slightly extended sense the term 'Dravidian' is fairly exact and little open to misunderstanding. Risley, however, in his report on the last Census of India (1890), has used the term in a much wider sense. He includes in it races 'extending from Ceylon to the valley of the Ganges, and pervading the whole of Madras, Hyderabad, the Central Provinces, most of Central India, and Chota Nagpurs'; and he regards this as 'probably the original type of the population of India, now modified to a varying extent by the admixture of Aryan, Scythian, and Mongolid elements.' Nearly all the other existing races of India, except the Indo-Aryans, such as the Rajputs, Jats, and Khatris of the Panjab, are classed by him as Scytho-Dravidians, Aryan-Dravidians, or Mongolo-Dravidians. In other words, every element in the present population which cannot be classed as Aryan, Scythian, or Mongolid, is designated 'Dravidian.' This terminology is, as Risley himself is aware, open to much criticism. Like 'Aryan,' 'Dravidian,' originally a purely philological term, is wanting in precision when used in an ethnological sense. But the name, however unsatisfactory it may be, has now passed into popular use, and the writer of the present article is unable to suggest a better alternative. Here it is taken to denote that form of Animism which constitutes the belief of a body of forest tribes occupying the line of hills which forms the backbone of the Peninsula, extending from the Indian Ocean into the lower course of the Ganges. Analogous forms of belief are found among the agricultural, artisan, and monial population of the great northern Plains, and along the lower slopes of the Himalaya. Beliefs and practices of this type form the basis of popular Hinduism as we now observe it. In fact, no clear line of distinction can be drawn between these forms of Animism and much of what is known as orthodox Hinduism. Both have been in contact for an enormous period of time, and each has reacted on the other. Hinduism admitting many of the Animistic beliefs and rites of the darker races, while these in their turn have largely accepted the outward observances of the Hindu faith, worshipping the Hindu gods, who are often only modifications of their own deities, and adopting the rules of caste and the social restrictions concerning food and personal purity which caste enforces.

2. Primitive Dravidian religion.—An attempt has been made by Caldwell in Southern India to investigate on the basis of philology the primitive Dravidian beliefs. 'They were,' he says (op. cit. 118), 'without hereditary "priests" and "idols," and appear to have had no idea of "heaven" or "hell," of the "soul" or "sin;" but they acknowledged the existence of God, whom they styled Kali, or king—a realistic title little known to orthodox Hindism. They erected to his honour a "temple," which they called Koili, "God's house;" but I cannot find any trace of the "worship" which they offered to him.' In another passage (ib. 550 ff.) he compares the demonology of the Dravidians with the shamanism of High Asia, noting as features of resemblance the absence of a regular priesthood; the acknowledgment of God's existence, combined with neglect of His worship; the non-existence of belief in metempsychosis; the objects of worship being not gods or heroes, but demons, which are supposed to be crnel, revengeful, and capricious, and are worshipped with blood sacrifices and wild dances.
The officiating magician or priest excites himself to frenzy, and then, as if possessed by the demon to which worship is being offered; and whilst in this state he communicates to those who consult him the information he has received. The demonology practised in India by the more primitive Dravidian tribes is not only similar to this, but these tribal demonologies, in their external form and in the manner in which they are performed, resemble the Shamanic worship would apply equally to the Dravidian demonology; and in depicting the ceremonies of the one race, the author has attempted to depict the other also.

It must, however, be remarked that the belief in demoniacal possession, unless Caldwell uses the term in its technical sense, is found among the Northern Dravidians.

3. Shamanism.—Thus, according to Caldwell, the basis of the beliefs of the South Indian Dravidian tribes is shamanism, and many instances of similar customs are quoted among those of the North; e.g. the Kuru or Mu'assas of Chotā Nagpur communicate with the evil spirit which they worship through their priest, the bājji. He assembles the people, music and dancing commence, and an invocation of the spirit is chanted—

"until one or more of the performers manifest possession by rolling of the eyes and involuntary spasmodic action of the limbs. The affection appears contagious, and old women and others who have not been dancing become influenced by it in a moment. This, perhaps, is the most thorough form of demon worship with which we are acquainted, and its votaries to keep up to its own reality each time it was resorted to (Dallston, 223.)"

Similar practices employed for the exorcism of diseases are widely spread among the people of the northern Plains. But even among the tribes which occupy the central region of hills this form of shamanistic orgies seems never to have taken the same hold among the people as has been the case in Southern India, where what is known as Devil Worship may be observed much more frequently than in the north. This has been described among the Shānāras of Tinnevelly by Caldwell (op. cit. 585 f.) and by Burrell ("The Devil Worship of the Tulas," 1894); and in Northern India, at least, shamanism has played a quite unimportant part in the development of the popular beliefs.

4. Animism.—The religion of the Northern Dravidians is mainly a form of Animism, defined by Tylor, who invented the term, as "the belief in Spiritual Beings" (Prim. Cult., 2, 1901, i. 424); or as Jevons (Intro. to Hist. of Rel., 1896, p. 22) defines it: "All the many movements and changes which are observable today taking place in the world of things, were explained by primitive man on the theory that every object which had activity enough to affect him in any way was animated by a life and will like his own."

The term has been used by some authors to cover the various manifestations of what is commonly but cumbersomely styled the "anthropomorphic" tendency of savage thought. (Marrett, Thrsh. of Rel., 1900, p. 6); and the same author (ib. 11) urges that what he calls "Super-naturalism" is "not only logically, but also, in some sense, chronologically prior to Animism." Following the same line of argument, Risley ( Census Report, 1901, i. 202), while accepting the title "Animism" for the vague, amorphous conception which he is discussing, endeavours to ascertain the ideas which underlie it:

"In many of the religious works and seeks by all means to influence and conciliate is the shifting and shadowy company of unknown powers or influences making for evil rather than for good, which resides in the primeval forest, in the crumbling hills, in the rushing river, in the spreading tree, which gives its name to the thing which is denounced to the snake, which generates jungle fever, and walks abroad in the various guises of cholera, smallpox, or murrain. Closer to this he does not seek to define; he knows only that he which he offers him, or whose symbol he daub with vermillion at the appointed season. Some sort of person is behind that is enough for him. Whether it is associated with a spirit or an ancestor, or an ancestor, whether it proceeds from the mysterious thing itself, whether it is one power or several, or is not stop to inquire."

And he goes on to say that—

"the hypothesis that the earliest beginnings of savage religion are to be sought in the worship of the demon to which worship is being offered; and whilst in this state he communicates to those who consult him the information he has received. The demonology practised in India by the more primitive Dravidian tribes is not only similar to this, but these tribal demonologies, in their external form and in the manner in which they are performed, resemble the Shamanic worship of the Tartars. The latter worship Supreme beings who figure in savage mythology almost, and the priest and priestesses of the earlier tribes, in somewhat appropriate attributes. The former become departmental spirits or gods, with shrines and temples of their own and incessant offerings from appeasing votaries. The latter receive sparing and infrequent worship, but are recognized, as oracles, as presiding beings of a higher type than the wishes of mankind, patrons of primitive ethics, makers of things, who have done their work and earned their repose."

From another point of view, dealing with the case of persons gifted with the hereditary powers of healing, Rose (i. 161) shows that—

"As primitive religions have no conception of the distinction between the sacred and the profane, they are supposed to receive their power from their standpoint, that, precisely as physical life is transmitted, so to the soul transmitted to the soul transmitted to another, and with the life transmigrate, as it were, all the attributes and powers of the progenitor. On this theory it is quite easy to explain the trance which is caused by the curing disease or causing evil by means which we may call supernatual."

Animism, as we observe it in Northern India, develops on various lines, according to the diverse objects which are supposed to be occupied and dominated by spirit agency. It will be convenient to begin with the worship of the celestial bodies, though, as a matter of fact, this type of worship is probably later than the cult of tree-spirits or of the village gods. It is in an advanced stage of religious belief, says Robertson Smith (Rel. Sem., 1894, p. 114), that celestial gods predominate.

6. Sun-worship.—Sun-worship prevails widely among the forest tribes of the Central Hills. When they are in trouble, the Khurkārs appeal to the sun; to open space on which he alone serves as an altar. When a sacrifice is needed, the Khinsārs offer a white cock to him, according to the laws of mimetic magic. The Bhūytās and Orions worship him as Bhārām or Dharā Devatā. The Khurkārs reverence him as Bhagāwān, 'the wonderful, the divine one'— a term borrowed from the Hindus; his service is done in an open space, where an ant-hill is used as the altar. The Khurkārs adore him under the name of Bero.

'Every head of a family should during his lifetime make not less than five sacrifices to this deity—the first of cows, the second of a pig, the third of a white goat, the fourth of a ram,
and the fifth of a buffalo. He is then considered sufficiently propitiated for that generation, and regarded as an ungrateful god if he is not thus handsomely to his kin.

Worship of a similar kind is done by the Kols and Orasões (gg.7.) (Dalton, 130, 132, 133, 141, 157, 159, 180, 223). The Davars, a forest tribe in the Thana district on the west coast, worship the Sun at 157). the moon, and the stars, the headman providing rice, meat, water, and other provender for the occasion, and the chief of the tribe making an offering of rice to his god. Among the village populations of the Plains this non-Aryan worship of the Sun has been combined with the Aryan cult of Surya or Sūrāj Narayan.

7. Moon-worship.—Moon-worship, though probably earlier in origin than that of the Sun, is much less important. The Binjūs of Chota Nagpur worship Nind-bonga as the Moon, in conjunction with Sing-bonga, or the Sun. In some other cases the worship of both luminaries is combined, as with the Chandar of the Mundas, known also as Chando Omol or Chanals, who are worshipping two goddesses, the wife of Sing-bonga, the Sun-god, and mother of the stars (Risley, Tribes and Caste, i. 136, ii. 103 f.; Dalton, 186). The most curious form is the Chauk Chandals rite in Bihār. On that day the people fast and perform a Brahman to worship the Moon with an offering of flowers and sweetsmeats. It is believed that, if any one looks upon the Moon that day, calamity will befall him. Should any one be unlucky enough to do this, he will repel the dangerous influences by getting himself abused by other people; abuse, like mock fights, being regarded as a means of protection against demons (Frazer, GB 2 III. 98 f.). He therefore, in order to excite their abuse, flings stones on the roofs of his neighbours' houses (NINQ v. 23 f.).

8. Planet-worship.—The worship of the other planets is of much less importance. Their motions are observed chiefly by astrologers, who calculate the horoscopes of children, and examine the figures with a view to determining whether a marriage will or will not be auspicious. Eclipses are supposed to be the work of spirit agency embodied in the demon Rāhu, who can be scared away by noise, while the suffering Sun or Moon can be restored to vitality by sacrifice and fasting during the period of the eclipse (see OMS 615).

9. The spirits of water.—According to the theory of Animism, the flow of water in river, stream, or well is considered to be due to spirit action, and floods and whirlpools are the work of a malignant spirit. In the Panjāb, when a village is menaced by floods, the headman makes an offering of a coco-nut (which is probably a form of commendation of an original human sacrifice) and a rupee to the flood-demon. He holds the offering in his hand, and stands in the water until the flood rises high enough to wash it away. Then it is believed that the waters will abate. Some offer an animal victim, a buffalo, horse, or ram, which, after being has been drawn from its car as a sign that the offering has been made, is flung into the water (NINQ i. 5). At a whirlpool on the Tapri river the Gonds sacrifice a goat before daring to cross the stream (India Gazet. 1870, p. 35). This propitiation of the water-spirit develops in two directions—first, into the worship of rivers held specially sacred, like the Ganges and Nerbādā, on whose banks, when the summer baths, he enters into communion with the spirit of the stream. As his body is cleansed, so his soul is relieved from pollution. His idea of purification is not spiritual in our sense of the word—that is foreign to primi-

tive habits of thought—but spiritual in the sense of getting rid of evil spirits and their dangerous influence. In the second place, the vague spiritual entity which animates the waters rises into one or other of a host of water-goddesses, like Kājā Khír or Ír Bhadrā, who are worshipped by fishermen and boatmen whose business is on the water. They often make a great show of the worship. Some have underground connexion with a holy river; others are appropriated to the cult of some special god; others are oracular. Hot springs, in particular, indicate the presence of the fire-spirit; of a demon which, if not propitiated, brings disease; of a Rākṣasa or demon slain by a goddess whose blood keeps the water warm (Waddell, Among the Himalayans, 223; BG xiv. 375).

In the same way the fall of rain is due to spirit agency which, if not conciliated, causes drought. The curious nudity rite, by which women endeavour to repel the evil influence by dragging a plough through the soil—a good instance of mimetic magic—is familiar (Crooke, PR i. 60; Frezer, GB y. 189). 10. Wind-spirits.—On the same principle the spirit which causes wind is personified in the Panjāb as Sendā Bir, the whistling god, whose voice announces the approach of the wind. It has now been adopted into Hinduism as an incarnation of Śiva, and is regarded as a malignant deity, causing madness, and burning houses, stealing crops, and otherwise immoral (Rose, i. 139). When a whirlwind comes, the Gūsta women in Mirzapur hold the house thatch, and stick an iron or wooden spoon into it as a charm against the demon; if a man were to touch it, the storm would sweep the roof away (NINQ 183). In the Panjāb, Phūrā, the defied saint who rides on the little whirlwinds which blow in the hot weather, and an appeal to him protects the worshiper from harm (Crooke, PR i. 51).

11. The hail-demon.—Hail also is the work of a spirit, which, under the rules of sympathetic magic, can be scared by cutting the hailstones with a knife; or the business of repelling it is entrusted to a special magician, like the ēdāri of eastern Bengāl, who, when a storm approaches, rushes almost naked from his hut, with a rattan wand in his right hand, invoking Paramēsvara, the Supreme God. He ascends a mound, and, spreading abroad his hands and indicating by a motion of his wand the direction in which he desires the hail to pass away, he recites a series of doggerel incantations (Wise, 369 f.). The Gargapuri of the Central Provinces and the Woli or Cheel of Kumaon exercise similar functions (NINQ iii. 106; Central Provinces Gazetteer, 1870, p. 48).

12. Tree-spirits.—The tree with its waving leaves and branches, apparently dying in the autumn and waking to new life in the spring, providing various medicines and intoxicants, is naturally regarded as inhabited by a spirit. Such spirits, impersonations of the vague terrors of the jungle, the cause of death, accident, and disease to those who intrude within their domains, are generally regarded as malignant. But, when the tribe adopts a settled life, it is provided by the tree-spirit with a home and shelter. Tribes like the Mundās take care to preserve a patch of the primitive jungle in which the spirits disestablished by the woodman's axe may repossess. Here most of the tribal religious worship is practised (see OMS 114). The cult at a later period develops into reverence for one or other of the special varieties of trees, some of which, like those of the fig genus, are regarded as the abode of the collective gods; others are appropriated to the service of individual gods, as the Bel (Egle marmelos) to Siva, or the Tulasī (Ocimum sanctum) to Viṣṇu. Under the shade of the village tree, where the business of the
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community is conducted, are placed the rude stones which collectively embody the Grâma-devâta, or local gods and godlings (see § 27).

These tree-spirits, in their most primitive conception, form a host of beings without special names, and to whom various functions are assigned. But in process of time they tend to become concentrated into one or more distinct personalities, like the Silvanns of the Romans. Such is the case, for instance, with the jangals of Konajhar, who stands at the head of their system, and is regarded with great veneration (Risley, Tribes and Castes, i. 333). We find also, in Bengal, Thânpati, one of the older gods of the Savârás, 'Lord of the sacred groves' (path) (20, ii. 244). In the same category is Sârnâ Bûrhi, the 'old lady of the grove' (satru), who corresponds to Deswalt, the 'lady of the cleared land' of the Mundâs (Bradley-Birt, Chods Nagaore, 20).

In the United Provinces her place is taken by Bansaâî Mâ (Skr. ranaspati, 'ruler of the wood'), who is known by the Musahars, a half-civilized jungle tribe, as Bansâli or Bansâli Gôra.

By her command the trees bear fruit, the bulbs grow in the earth, the bees make honey, the tussur worm fattens on the sâra, the deer, wolves, and jackals (useful as food to man) multiply their kind. She is the goddess of child-birth. To her the childless wife makes prayers for the grant of offspring and to her the midwife in the house of the sorcerer expels devils from the bodies of the possessed. In her name she is called upon to found a temple around the village and a wall, and she does a brick-kiln. Woe to the man who takes a false oath in the name of Bansâli! (Noesdor, Calcutta Res., lxxvi, 204). So strong are the beliefs of the sub-Himalayan Târît.

They fear the demons lurking in the forest trees, especially the weird cotton tree (Bombax kepha-phyllo).

'Only the terrible fire of wood will bring these poor bear- striken creatures to open their doors and remove the heavy barriers from their huts at night; and even in the daytime, amidst the songs of human life, the songs of the birds, and the crooning of cattle, no Tharû, man, woman, or child, will ever venture along the wood without a lead, a branch, or a piece of old rag upon the Bansâli formed at the entrance of the deep woods, to save themselves from the many diseases and accidents the gleeful and malicious spirits of the forests can bring upon and cause them. The Bansâli, or "good spirit" of the woods, is a square space cut in the grove, six feet by six, and covered with pine branches' (Knowles, 214).

Another form of this cult, already alluded to in the case of the Tharûs, is that of attaching rags to trees. Such thus decorated are found to be all over Northern India, and are known as Chithâryâ or Chithâriya Bhavâni, 'Our Lady of Tatters', or in the Panjâb as Lintâr Pir, or the 'Rag Saint' (Crooke, P.R. i. 101). The question of the motive of these rags has been much discussed by Hartland (LP, ii. 175 f.). Discarding the two most obvious explanations—either that they are offerings to the god or presiding spirit, or that they contain the disease of which one desires to be rid, and transfer it to any one who touches or handles them—he regards the rite as another application nature—same reasoning which underlies various ancient sense—chrom-therapeutic and folk-medicine.

In the same line of clothing in a whch a hand may cause me (1901, i. 352), while in contact with a beneficient power for the vague, amorous to me to health, or promote my disease and tenderness with that of my want, even the god, has by its contact, by the wound a peculiar bond with the wart; the

The evidence from Northern India corroborates this explanation, which throws much light on the Animistic practices which are discussed in the present article.

One peculiar custom connected with trees is that of marrying the bride and bridegroom to them—of which numerous examples have been collected in Northern India (Crooke, P.R ii. 116 f.). The object of this custom is obscure. In some cases it may be in order to communicate to the newly-wedded pair the vigorous reproductive power of the tree. In most cases, however, the intention seems to be to transfer to the tree the malignant spirit influence which menaces them, and, in particular, endangers the fertility of the union (Frazer, GB ii. 195 f.).

13. Worship of Mother Earth.— From the worship of the vague spiritual beings with whom the Dravidian peoples the forests amidst which he dwells, and in which he collects the game, roots, and fruits which constitute his only food supply, we pass on to the worship of the Earth-Mother, which marks the adoption of a settled life and his earliest experiments in agriculture. Among many savage races the Earth-deity is spiritualized as female (Tylor, i. 326); and it has been suggested with some degree of probability that the predominance of Mâ continue in the mediTherian-man in the Earth-deity represents a survival from the matriarchate, the prevalence of which has been attested in India by a considerable amount of evidence (J. E. Harrison, Proleg. to Gr. Religion, 1900, p. 291, 499; Risley, Gait, Census Report, i. 448). As in the case of the Greek Thesmophoria, the gist of which was a mimicking of Nature's processes, in a word, the ritual of sympathetic or mimetic magic—the women fasting seated on the ground because the earth was desolate, then rising and reveling to stir the Megara to imitate the impulse of spring—the North Indian cult of Mother Earth is largely in the hands of women. Again, though we find in the Rigveda the personification of Dyans and Prithivé respectively gods of heaven and earth, from whom the other deities and even the whole universe were supposed to spring, this cult is quite different from that of the Earth-Mother as we find it among the Dravidians (Monier-Williams, Brâhmânism and Hinduism, 1891, p. 182; Oppert, 402).

14. Restoration of the fertility of the Earth-Mother.—The theory of the Dravidians of many primitive races, e.g. the Romans (Granger, Worship of Romans, 1895, p. 208), is that the Earth after bearing each successive harvest becomes exhausted, and that if she is to continue to discharge her functions she must be recharged and restored to activity. In one of the dances of the Kol women of Chôta Nagpur, they all kneel and pat the ground with their hands in time to the music, as if exating the earth to be fertile; and this also doubtless is the intention of the Orion dance when the performers all face inward and simultaneously jumping up come down on the ground with a resounding thump that marks the finale of the movement (Dietrich, 498, 626).

The same rite was performed at the worship of Demeter Cidaria in Arcadia, and it is found in many other parts of the world (Frazer, Pausan., 1900, iv. 259). Secondly, among the Gôth (Ntl. Voy. of Bran, ii. (1897) 150), it was believed that the Earth-spirit needed to be periodically refreshed with human blood. This was one of the ideas underlying the custom of the sacrifices among the Kândus (g.v.). Thirdly, the fertility of the soil was supposed to depend upon the periodical marriage of Mother Earth with her male consort. The cult of this divine pair meets us throughout the whole range of Dravidian myth, belief, and ritual. Thus in Bengal we find Bûrhi, Bûrhi.
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15. Marriage of the Earth-goddess.—The rites of symbolic marriage of the Earth-Mother to her partner are performed with a certain amount of trouble; they generally haunt a sacred tree, but in their worship, if a perfect tree be not procurable, a branch of it will answer the purpose (Crooke, 420). In among branch trees and in caves the bridal pair, the pair Dik and Deohārīn, the impersonated protectors of the village site (dik), and they also recognize as crop-guardians the pair Nīngī Bhāgīyā, the phallic tiger, to whom, when the grain is up, the first five handfuls, after being taken home and crushed, are offered; and Hariyārī Mātā, 'the mother of greenery,' to whom a burnt sacrifice is made in the field at sowing and harvest time (Crooke, Tribes and Castes, iii. 435, 447). The Pārvās, a forest tribe in Khāndesh, sacrifice, before harvest, goats and fowls, and make an offering of corn to a pair called Bar Kambā and Rānī Kajhāī, who occupy adjoining sacred trees; the pair are invoked at the marriage rites in a song which describes the wedding of these deities of the forest (BG xii. 97 f.). The divine pair worshipped by the Kharwārs of the United Provinces is Cenānḍā and Chāndā, and apparently moon-deities (the moon having a powerful influence over the fertility of the crops), who correspond to the Munda Desaullī and his wife, Jhīr and Dukī (Russel, Caste and Cunm., ii. 261). Among the Pālāmān (BG xii. 154 f.) the Kharwārs of Pālāmān reverence in the same way a pair known as Darbār and Dākīn, a boar and country spirits being offered to the male, and a sow and spirits to the female; in Mirzapur, their goddess Devī is associated with the cult of the phallic Gānsām (NINQ i. 40). In the United Provinces and Bihār we meet a pair of village sprites, Chandvere and his spouse Chandverī, or Jāk and Jakīn, who are known as the shooting deities, because husband and wife live in separate villages, and, when the crops in one village are more productive than those of another, the people think that the Jāk robs the fields of the barren tract to support his wife. This reminds us of the law of the XII Tables, which 'forbade people to spirit away the crops from a neighbour's field by means of spells and incantations' (Crooke, TC ii. 447; Frazer, Pausanias, v. 57).

In a higher stage of culture among the people of Bengal, Sītālā, a form of the Mother-goddess, who presides over smallpox, has as her husband Ghantaśkarāmba, who is now being adopted into the cult of the goddess Kālī, a pair of these goddesses being offered to a partner (Gait, Bengal Census Report, i. 193). The patron pair in Rājputāna are Ėklinga, whose name betrays his phallic origin, now known as Jāk and Jakīn, who are known as the shooting deities, because husband and wife live in separate villages, and, when the crops in one village are more productive than those of another, the people think that the Jāk robs the fields of the barren tract to support his wife. This reminds us of the law of the XII Tables, which 'forbade people to spirit away the crops from a neighbour's field by means of spells and incantations' (Crooke, TC ii. 447; Frazer, Pausanias, v. 57).

A small trench is then excavated, in which barley is sown; the ground is irrigated and artificial heat supplied. When this is done, the females join hands and dance round it, invoking the blessings of Gaurī on their husbands. The young corn is then taken up, distributed, and presented by the females to the other grains. Then the males eat it in their turbans' (Tod, i. 608). This is one of the Gardens of Adonis so fully illustrated by Frazer (Adonis, Attis, Osiris, 1907, p. 194 f.). In Southern India every villager is associated with the Earth-goddess Bhumi-devī, as her Sūvā (Opper, 356); and in a still later development Sūva is represented in his androgynous form as Ardhanārīsī, with a hermaphroditic body, uniting in himself the principles of male and female generation.

16. Ritual of the worship of Mother Earth. Among the forest tribes of the Central Hills, Mother Earth is supposed to live with the other village gods in a pile of stones collected round the sacred tree of the hamlet. Worship is done through the baīja (q.e.), or aboriginal priest, at the chief agr-
18. The Mother identified with the snake.—In her chthonic aspect the Mother-goddes and her partner are naturally identified with the snake, an animal which lives in holes and moves in the darkness. This was the case at the Greek Theomorphia, where it is intimated that we have seen (§§ 9, 14), grown-up women have private services of their own, which are distinct from the tribal celebrations. Other tribes worship her when they begin to plant their seed, and ploughing, the ploughing-goddess, or gleaming the petals of the mahua (Bassia latifolia). With some tribes the offering consists of molasses, butter, cakes, a fowl, and some spirits. According to the principles of mimetic magic, the god is of the grey-coloured, and the fowl speckled (NYI Q. l. 77).

17. Her benign and malevolent aspect.—In fact, the character of the offering marks the twofold conception of the goddess. In her benign form she is Mother of all things, giver of corn, producer of fertility in man and beast. Accordingly she is presented with offerings of flowers, milk, or the fruits of the earth. In her malevolent and chthonic aspect her malevolent nature is recognized by a tribe which dispose of their dead by inhumation, she is appeased by blood sacrifices of animals, or even, as in the case of the Kandhis, with human victims. Worship of this tribe (Calcutta Rev. v. 51), states that in her malevolent form, as the supreme power,

"when a tribe engages in war with enemies of another race, her awful name is invoked, and vows of sacrifice are recorded in the event of success. Her nature is purely malevolent; but she does not seem to interfere with the independent action of other deities in their respective spheres, and she is nowhere peculiarly present."

On the other hand, in her benign character she represents the Greek Gaia. Upon her depend the fecundity of the soil and the growth of all rural produce; the preservation of the patriarchal houses, the health and contentment of the people, and, in especial manner, the safety of the flocks and their attendants. She is worshipped by human sacrifices. She has no fixed corporeal shape, form, image, symbol, or temple. But she, together with the other superior gods, may temporarily assume any earthly form at pleasure; as, for instance, the tiger as convenient for purposes of wrath."

In her benign form, among the Kharwaras of Mirzapur she is honour: by sprinkling pulse and rice on the ground, with the prayer: 'Mother Earth! Keep us in prosperity, and protect the ploughman and oxen!' (NYI Q. 141); while the orthodox at the time of sowing and harvest, prays: 'I salute the Earth, the realizer of all desires, she who is blessed with all kinds of riches and creatures; she who is contented, faithful, and virtuous, the giver of all that one asks for the realization of desires' (ib. v. 76). In the eastern Punjab she takes the form of Shāh Mātā, 'Mother of fertility,' and she is represented by a plough coultor placed between two round balls of cow-dung, probably with a phallic significance. Over these are laid leaves of holy trees, and the peasant, as he measures the corn on the threshing-floor, prays: 'O Mother Shāh! Give us increase, and make our bankers and rulers contented!' (ib. l. 173). Her epithets in the Kandhi prayer: 'We are not satisfied with our wealth; but what we do possess we owe to you, and for the future we hope for the fulfillment of our desires. We intend to give such a dog as shall such a village, to bring human flesh for you. We trust to attain our desires through this service. Forget not the oblation!' (Macpherson, Memorials, 1802, p. 179).

19. The cult of the Earth-Mother developing into a general Mother-cult.—It seems probable that from this primitive conception of the Earth-Mother as either kindly or malevolent has developed the worship of the Mother-goddesses, which forms such an important element in the beliefs of the people of Northern India. As in the Greek vase she appears rising out of a mound, so Ellamānā’s image is a figure hewn in stone, fashioned so that only the hand is visible, while the body is concealed in the earth; and the same conception appears in Buddhist bas-reliefs, where we find the Earth-goddess, Mahāpatathā or Prithivī, rising out of the ground and supporting the horse of the Master (J. E. Harrison, op. cit. 277 ff.; Oppert, 468; Grünwedel, Buddhist Art in India, 1901, p. 100 f.).

This conception of the Mother-goddess seems to be the most important element in the Dravidian cultus which is identical with the Mother Earth. Like the Earth-Mother, the other Mothers appear in a double manifestation, at once benignant and malevolent. This is shown in the epithets of Devī, who is the most common type of the class—Kanyā, 'the maiden'; Kanyākumāri, 'the youthful virgin'; Sarvamāngalā, 'always auspicious'; Sākambhāri, 'nourisher of herbs'; and, on the other side, Chāna, 'the destructive'; Kāli, 'the black one'; Rānjā, 'the fierce'; Raktadānti, 'bloody-toothed.' It is this contrariety of aspect which renders the cult of the Mother-goddesses so perplexing. In one contrasted and yet identical form they both appear in the eastern Bengal and the Mother is usually worshipped under the form of Siddhāśvarī, 'perfected queen,' or Vṛddhāśvarī, 'old queen'; but when epidemic diseases rage in such a district, an emphatic epithet is Rākhṣyā or Bhadrā Kālī, 'Kālī the protector, the auspicious' (Wise. 135). In this benignent form she is one of the favourite objects of worship in Bihār as Kēsakarnī, 'she who confers pleasure' (Bhāgavata, 15. 49). In the Central Provinces the village-goddess Devī represents the Earth-goddess; she can cause or avert smallpox and cholera, and is inseparable in the body of any one suffering from the former disease; and so much so that those who enter the room where the
patient teas take off their shoes as a mark of respect to her (Russell, i. 79).

20. Varied manifestations of the Mothers.—Hence the manifestations of the Mothers are infinitely varied. Thakurgali, who has a shrine at Anjar in Kachchh, is the 'looking-glass goddess,' before whom the votary worships his own image on a sheet of silvered glass; but, to illustrate the clasmaty of this phenomenon, it is said to have been originally a Chārān woman, who when attacked by robbers committed suicide, and was elevated to the rank of a manifestation of the divinity (BG. v. 212). Another group of six Mothers in Kathiāvār are also said to be the daughters of a Chārān who was dismissed from court as unlucky because he was childless. He practiced superstitions at a shrine of Kali, and his six daughters, who were born in response to a prayer addressed to the goddess, became Mothers (ib. viii. 642 f.). The cult, in fact, is vague in the extreme. The worship of Ekvīrā, the Mother of the Kārī Caves, is mixed up with the original Buddhism, of which this place was a centre, part of the cultus being the circumambulation of a dagoba, or Buddhist relic shrine; and the temple of the Turturāīīa Mother is served by women, who are supposed to be modern representatives of the ancient Symbols (ib. xi. 43; Cunningham, Archæological Reports, xiii. 147). It is in Western India that the Mother-cult most widely prevails. Each Rājput clan in Kathiāvār has a particular Mother, whose sanctuary is dedicated to Maīa with her brides immediately after marriage, and the mint at Navanagar is presided over by the Mother Aśāpātr, 'hope-fuiller'; but poulage goes on under her very eyes.

21. Ritual of Mother-worship.—The worship at the famous shrine of Bohehrāī in Baroda may be taken as an example of the ritual of the Mother-cult, which here is almost purely Animistic. Every morning the head officiant, after ablution, enters the adytum and pours a mixture of milk, curds, clarified butter, sugar, and honey—known collectively as pāchāmātrī, 'the five divine foods'—over the image, and drops water over it through a perforated metal pot, while a Brāhmān chants hymns from the Veda. Coloured powder and flowers are placed upon the image, incense and camphor are burnt, and silver lamps are kept lighted day and night. After the worship, the priest takes his food (ḍhābāghoj) consisting of wheat-flour, sugar, and clarified butter, is offered with a coco-nut (a survival of human sacrifice), and the morning service ends with the ringing of bells, burning of camphor, ringing of bells, and beating of gongs. Another meal of sugar and milk is offered to the goddess about 10 a.m., a little being sprinkled over the image, and the rest consumed by the priests. In the evening a passage of the sacred book telling of the exploits of the Devi is read, the figure is washed and worshipped, and more cooked food is presented (BG vii. 611 f.).

More usually the Devi or Kali receives a blood offering, some of which is sprinkled upon the altar (see DEVĪ FATA).

Of all the orthodox Hindu cults that of Devi is most akin to Animism, and hence many of the forest tribes of the Central Hills accept as representatives of their many village-goddesses, such as Khumātā, primarily an Earth-goddess; the Desāhīī Devi, goddess of the four quarters of the hamlet; and the Chidhēlīiī Devi, who has a shrine at Nārāyana, one of the various local incarnations like the Vindhyābāsī Devi, the goddess of the Vindhyā range (Russell, i. 53). In the Panjab we find unmarried girls receiving special treatment as the image of the goddess, to whom, as to the goddess, offerings are made twice a year. Here also, girls make images of Siva and his spouse Pārvati, Devi in her mountain form, and afterwards throw them into the water. The popular explanation is that this rite commemorates the suicide of a woman married to a boy husband.

But a different explanation has been suggested. The deities Śiva and Pārvati are regarded as the soul and body of one, and their images are placed in branches over a heap of flowers and grass; but some localities leave many people in doubt until we have full details of the rites observed at all the festivals of Devi we cannot hope to discover the ideas underlying these local rites (Ross, i. 76).
that mountains were formed by rival divine or evil powers warring with each other and using the rocks as missiles (VII Q. i. 47). The cult of mountains is an ancient one in Dravidian; bundling sacred hill or hill-top is very doubtful, and at any rate the reverence paid by the Aryans to the mighty Himalayan peaks must have dated from the time when they first came under observation. Many of them became seats of the Hindu gods, and one title of Siva is Girisa, while that of his consort is Pârvati, both meaning 'mountain-dweller.'

In Bengal the Mundas, Santals, Mallis, and others worship a mountain god called Marang Burû or Bar Pahar, 'great mountain,' to whom their tribal priest makes sacrifice of buffaloes and other animals. These sacrifices are made at the chief visible habitation of the deity, a bluff near Lodhia (Gait, i. 191).

In the Hoshangâbâd district of the Central Provinces, Sûryabhan, or 'Sun-rays,' is a common name for isolated, round-peaked hills, on which the Sûn-god is believed to dwell; and on one of the Kûrâgâb hills, Dûngar Deo, 'the mountain-god,' resides on the nearest hill outside the village, where yearly at the Dasahra festival he is worshipped with an offering of five cows, a buffalo, and a ball of vermilion paste. They regard him as their tribal god (Elliott, Settlement Report, 1867, pp. 121, 254).

24. Animal-worship.—The Northern Dravidians share with other primitive races the belief that animal intelligence is identical with that of man; that animals can, as in the folk-tale world, talk and act precisely as men do; that men and animals may for a time resume the forms which had once been theirs, or, for that matter, take any other. Hence shape-shifting, as it has been called, is widely accepted, and it may even take place by means of death and a new birth, the powers and qualities or even the actual form of a deceased ancestor being reproduced in his descendants. Hence various animals are worshipped within the Dravidian area, of which a few instances will be given here to illustrate the local cults as a supplement to the facts collected in art. ANIMALS.

(a) The horse.—Some of the Rajput tribes of Gujrât worship Ghôrâ Deva, 'the horse-god,' in the form of a horse of stone, at their main festivals; and on the sixth day after a birth the Ojah Kumhâr potters of Kacchh form a horse of clay and make the child worship it (Campbell, Notes, 292). One of the chief gods of the Goths is Kundayen, the horse of the god who is worshipped on the outskirts of the village, or at the village gates, during the rainy season. Only men join in the worship, women being excluded. The bûnamak priest besmears the stone with red lead, presents a horse made of pottery, then a heifer, on the head of which he pours spirits and prays: Thou art the guardian of the village; we have come and offered to thee according to our ability. If in anything we have failed to please thee, forgive us. Protect our oxen and cows; keep us in safety; let there be no fear in the jungle. After this the victim is slain and boiled, some of the meat is laid with flour before the horse, and the worshippers eat the remainder of the food. Campbell, Notes, 191 (p. i. iii). The Goths and other Central Indian tribes place earthenware horses on the tombs of ancestors and on the village shrines, which serve as steeds for the sâinted dead and for the local gods.

(b) The tiger.—The tiger is naturally worshipped by the forest tribes. Bîghsvâr, 'the tiger lord,' is a favourite deity along the Vindhyan and Karnâta hills. The Santals and Kisans worship him as Bûmrajâ, 'forest king,' who will not kill man, and believe that he spares them in return for their devotion. Even those who do not actually worship him swear by his name or on his skin, as is the case among the Hos and Jângâs (Dalton, 132, 133, 158, 214). The tribes further west, like the Kûrâgâs, worship Bâgî or Vâgh Deo, and a female form called Vâghâdi. Dharma in this case pretends to know spells by which he can protect himself and his parishioners from the beast (Berar Gazetteer, 191 f.; Elliott, op. cit. 255 f.). The belief in tiger-men, or men who are really metamorphosed tigers, is so common, the man-eater being often a person of evil life changed into that form (Gait, Assam Census, i. 250 f.; Crooke, PB ii. 216 f.).

(c) The cow.—Cow-worship, which appears to arise among pastoral tribes which have attained some degree of culture, is naturally not found highly developed among the Dravidians, and the life of the animal is not protected by the effective tabu enforced by orthodox Hinduism. The Gonds, for instance, kill a cow at the funeral rites and hang the tail of the victim on the grave-stone as a sign that the obsequies have been duly performed; and the Kûrâgâs among the Kûrâgâs Dûngar Deo, 'the mountain-god,' resides on the nearest hill outside the village, where yearly at the Dasahra festival he is worshipped with an offering of five cows, a buffalo, and a ball of vermilion paste. They regard him as their tribal god (Elliott, Settlement Report, 1867, pp. 121, 254).

It is only among the semi-Hinduized forest tribes that the cult of the cow has made much progress. In Nepal, where under the present dynasty the rules of Hinduism are rigidly enforced, it is deemed the highest sacrifice to approach the image of the sacred animal, except in a position of adoration, 'insomuch that a malicious person, wishing to suspend the agricultural operations of his neighbour, would be sure to effect his purpose by placing a stone or wooden figure of a cow in the midst of a field' (Kirkpatrick, 100). Further west the cult of the cow is closely connected with that of Krya, and in Central India we have the curious rite of the silent tendance of cattle, in which the performers, drawn from the highest classes of the community, bathe, anoint themselves, put on garlands of flowers, and walk in procession through the grazing grounds, holding bunches of peacock feathers (NinQ i. 154 f.). Special godlings are also worshipped to secure the safety of cattle. Nagar Deo in Garhwal on the lower Himalaya is supposed to have the cattle in his charge, and he is represented by a tripod fixed on a platform to which the first milk given by the animals is dedicated. In Kumân his place is taken by Chaumû or Baudhûn, who recovers stray beasts, rears calves, and is the protector of the cattle. When the animal is found, he is blessed by the sacrifice of a goat (NinQ i. 56). Among the Kârrâs of the Central Hills, Gaurâyâ or Gaunrayâ, properly a god of boundaries, presides over the herds (Crooke, Tribes and Castes, li. 251).

(d) The dog.—In common with the Kunsch of Khândesh, the Bihils of that district show extreme reverence to the dog and horse; and the dog is respected by all Marâthas, a load of an animal as the companion of their god Blissorâ; and by many Hindus in Western India, who worship the dog of their god Kâli Bhairava (Campbell, Notes, 270). At the shrine of Malhari in Bhavnâr the Vaggâyîyas minutely dress in blue woolen coats, tie belts and skins round their waists, and meet the pilgrims barking and howling like dogs. They endeavour, in fact, to assimilate their appearance to that of the god whom they serve (Robertson Smith, Rel. Semites, 457). Each Vaggâyîya has a bowl into which the pilgrims put food; the Vaggâyîyas lay these down, fight with each other like dogs, and plant their faces in the ground. After a few mouths, as animals do, into the bowls and eat the contents (BG xxii. 212). The cults of Bhairobra or Bhaivara, and of Khândru Rão, Khânfôba, or
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Khąpojī (now promoted to be an incarnation of Siva), which are widely spread in Western India, have dog-worship as their basis. The Bauris of Bengal will on no account touch a dog, and the water of a tank in which a dog has been drowned cannot be used. It is said that this is because the animal had purified it. Under the influence of the Hindus they have now invented a legend that, as they themselves kill cows and other animals, they deem it right to regard as sacred that which is often holy to them as the cow is to Brāhmans; this, as Risley remarks ( Tribes and Castes, i. 79 ff.), being 'a neat reconciliation of the twinges of conscience and cravings of appetite.' But it seems clear that this is an afterthought, and that, the dog being really the sacred animal of the tribe, its 'uncleanliness' resulted from its sanctity, as in the case of the pig among the Semites and other races (Frazer, Pausanias, iv. 127 ff.). In general it may be said that all so-called unclean animals were originally sacred; the reason for not eating them was that they were divine (GB ii. 315).

In India, birds are regarded as sacred by the Northern Dravidians and the sanctity of the others, like the crow, the pigeon, and the waggtail, is suggested by the respect paid to omens taken from them. The skin of a species of Bucerus or hawks is used in an early stage of wealth (dhana-chiryā), is hung up in houses by wizards in the Central Provinces, and the thigh bones are attached to the wrists of children as a charm against evil spirits (Hilop, 6). The peacock seems among the Kandus to impersonate the Earth-Mother, because they placed an effigy of the bird on the top of the merisāh, or human sacrifice-post (Malothy-Leman, Manual of Ganjam, 1882, p. 84).

Fish are regarded in many places as sacred. Some are believed to contain the souls of the dead; all varieties are emblems of fertility, and are therefore used in the marriage rites. At most of the sacred places in Northern India along the sacred rivers, such as Hardwar, Mathurā, and Benares, the fish in that portion of the stream adjoining the bathing places are carefully preserved, and any attempt to catch them is fiercely resented by the Brāhmans. The taboo here enforced is partly due to the sanctity of the holy place which makes things connected with it sacred (Jevons, Intro. 63); they are also popularly regarded as the presences of the surviving character of the stream, and as connected with the dead whose ashes are consigned to its waters. They have now been adopted into the cults of the Hindu gods, and pious people write the name of Rāma on their backs, and of the Mother-cult, at which they enclose in little packets and throw to the fish. Once Sīta, wife of Rāma, was bathing in a Deccan stream, when one of the fish bit her leg. If one be now caught and its palate examined, in it will be found a ball of batter (BG xviii. pt. i. 93). The crocodile is worshipped as an object of terror. In Baroda the crocodile god, Magar Deo, is worshipped once a year to protect men from the attacks of these monsters, and also as a preventative against illness. The deity is represented by a piece of wood in the form of the animal, supported on two posts (Dalal, i. 157).

In India, to regard as sacred a portion paid to some of these animals may rest upon a totemistic basis; but it is difficult to say where, in Northern India, the line can be drawn between animal-worship and totemism. A source of totemism which is in accordance with the current beliefs of the Dravidians is obscure; and totemism, as we find it at present, generally appears as a mode of defining the exogamous groups, many of which trace their descent from some animal, plant, or other thing which the members of the group regard as sacred and will not eat or injure. The totemistic exogamous groups have been discussed by Risley (Tribes and Castes, i., Introd. xiii ff., and Dalton (254). The latter states that among the Oráons 'the family or tribal names are usually those of animals and plants, and that when the name of the animal or fruit of the tree is tabbed to the tribe called after it.' This respect for the totem seems now hardly to exist among the totemistic Dravidian tribes of the Central Provinces, the sacred animals and animals having generally been adopted into the cult of some Hindu deity (Russell, l. 159 f.). The feeling of reverence is still strong in Central India, where the totem tree is never cut or injured; men make obeisance to it, and when they weep their faces when it pass (Luard, i. 198 f.).

26. Local village-godlings.—Writing more particularly of the Semites, Robertson Smith (Rel. Semit. ii. 92) remarks that 'the activity, power, and dominion of the gods were conceived as bounded by certain local limits, and, in the second place, they were conceived as having their residences and homes at certain fixed sanctuaries.' In order of time the worship of the totemistic tribes is probably later than that of the celestial gods, as they can hardly exist under the conditions of a nomadic life, and their worship probably marks the foundation of the cults of the races of these gods, as appears from the character of the priesthood (§ 49), has no connexion with Brāhmanical Hinduism. They vary in name, character, and function, in the country. But all have one distinguishing mark—their influence is confined to a particular area, and it is only when some shrine has, by cures and wonders performed within its precincts, acquired a more than local reputation that it attracts the worship of persons residing beyond its special domain. When this stage is reached, it leads to the establishment of a local cult, which, as it develops and becomes important, is generally annexed by some priest drawn from the orthodox ranks of Brāhmanism, and the local god is gradually promoted to a seat in the regular Hindu pantheon.

27. The village shrine.—The general name for these gods is Čāma- or Čāmān-devatā, 'the godlings of the village,' or in the modern vernacular Gān-devatā or Gān-devī, the last title marking connexion with the Mother-cult. Sometimes, again, they are known as Gān-devatā. The name of the shrine is called Deōhar, 'holly place'—a term which is also applied to the whole body of village gods. In its simplest form the village shrine is a collection of water-worn stones placed under the sacred tree of the village, in the Plains, where all stones are scarce, pieces of old carving from a ruined Buddhist or Hindu religious building are often used for this purpose, and occasionally the desecrated image of the Buddha may be seen doing service as the representative of the village Devi or her consort. Sometimes ancient stone axes, looked on with awe by people who now use none but metal implements, have been found in such places. In the more proper guise a small square building of brick masonry, with a bulbous head and perhaps an iron spike as a finial, serves as a shrine. Its position is marked by a red flag hung from the adjoining sacred oak, which is erected close by to serve as a perch for the deity when he deigns to visit the shrine to receive the offerings and attend to the prayers of his votaries. In the villages occupied by the purer Dravidian tribes, such as the Lower Dravida, the shrine is usually a rude mud hut roofed with bamboo and straw, which is often allowed to fall into disrepair until the godling reminds his votaries of his displeasure by bringing sickness or some other calamity upon them. Inside is a small mud plat-
form, on which a jar of water is usually placed and offerings are made.

No clear distinction is made between the various kinds of spirits which occupy such a shrine. First, there are the purely elementary deities, like the Earth-goddess and the moon-goddess, whose spirits which are regarded as generally benign, like the Satī, the spirit of a woman who died on the pyre of her husband, or those which are actively malignant. Thus on the borders of the hill country where the Aryan invader may introduce what is called a brahmin, a shrine in honour of some defiled Brāhman, where the worshipper makes anlibation of milk or curds, lights a lamp, and offers the fire-service (homa); and in an adjoining Dravidian village a baghūt, a rude shrine or cairn erected on the spot where a man was killed by a tiger, at which a Kol makes an occasional sacrifice (NY&Q ii. 10). In the case of the Pandja, the fusion of cults is equally obvious. Wilson (op. cit. i. 147) describes at Kānq a shrine erected by the Chāmāra, or mendicant Hindu leather-dressers, inside which they light a lamp twice a month, and "when they are in trouble they would come to this shrine and bow down before it, and promise that if their trouble were removed, once a month, they would present some offering, such as bread, or a coconut, or a flag. If the saint fulfilled his part of the bargain, the worshipper followed his latter a month, the vow was regarded as fulfilled. Thus I was told that a small flag waving over the shrine had been presented by a man named Bill, and who had promised to offer a flag on his recovery. Often a shrine may be seen outside the village to the village god, or to the smallest god, or some other deity, where at set times the women make offerings of water or gruel; and a small lamp may be often seen burning on a Thursday evening at the tomb of a Muhammadan saint. These practices are said to be forbidden in the Koran; but the women especially place some faith in them, and a Bāīn is said to have divorced his wife because she persisted in light- ing lamps at a Fakhīr's tomb, in hope of being blessed with a son.

This concrete instance admirably illustrates the beliefs of the low-class Musalman population, who are in the main converts from Dravidian tribes, and whose faith in the tenets of the Prophet is only a thin veneer over their primitive Animistic creed. In the same part of the country we often find the worship of Bhūmiyā, the earth-god, combined with that of one of the great Ma- hammadan saints; and in one village it appeared that the Hindu Jāts distrusted their worship between the saint Shāikh Ahmad Chishti of Ajmer (q.v.), Brāhmanus, and the Pipal, or sacred fig-tree. Once again, in the hill-country where caves are found, they are utilized as local shrines. They are places of mystery, the fitting abode of the gods, and it is believed that they form an entrance to the nether world. Such cave-shrines are numerous in the lower Himalayas, and many of them have been appropriated by the orthodox Hindū gods (NY&Q ii. 147). They are the prototypes of the great cave-temples of the Buddhists and Hindus, like Ajanta or Elephanta (q.v.).

28. General characteristics of the Grāma-devata worship.—It is obviously impossible to attempt any precise definition of vague, amorphous beliefs such as these. The creed of the lower classes of the population is, on the one hand, purely Animistic, a cult of the powers of Nature. On the other hand, it has been added a belief in the necessity of propitiating sundry goblins and evil spirits, many of the latter being the angry ghosts of persons who have perished by a tragic or untimely death. This has, again, absorbed from Hinduism the worship of Brahmanus, and from Mahābāla, the spirit of the spot, or that of the essential god of Islam. Further, we occasionally find more than one element united in a single cult. It is, therefore, unnecessary to attempt to compile a list of these vague-goddings. A few examples may be given to indicate the general character of this form of worship.

29. Worship of Gānāum Deo.—Ganaum Deo is an important god of the Gonds, Kols, and kindred races. An attempt is now being made to give him a place in Hinduism as a form of Kṛṣṇa; but his Dravidian origin is apparent. In Mirzapur he is particularly venerated, and an Aryan priest propitiates him, when the rice is ripening, with the sacrifice of a fowl, goat, or sucking-pig, and an oblination of liquor. He generally resides in a tree, and near his shrine is usually placed a rude stone representing Devī. We have here another instance of the cult of the male and female element performed to stimulate the growth of the crops (Crooke, Tribes and Castes, iii. 312).

But Ganaum was another of the blessings supposed to be a chieftan of the Gonds who was killed by a tiger. His legend tells that after his death he visited his wife, and she conceived by him.

*Descendants of this ghostly essence are, it is said, living to this day at Amuda, in the Central Provinces. He, about the same time, appeared to many of his old friends, and persuaded them that he could save them from the maws of tigers and other calamities, if his worship were duly inaugurated and regularly performed; and it was in the following year that festivals were established in his honour; but he may be worshipped at any time, and his shrines are usually under a tree, and misfortune confidently appeal to him (Dalton, 325).

20. Worship of Bhairon.—Bhairon, another favourite Dravidian god, is often confounded with Bhūmiyā, who is one form of the consort of the Mother-goddess. He has been appropriated into Hinduism as Kāl Bhairava, who is often depicted with eighteen arms, ornamented with a garland of skulls, with ear-rings and armlets formed of skulls, a serpent coiled round his head, in his hands a sword and a bawl of blood. He is thus a fitting partner to the blood-stained Mother, Kālī. But it seems clear that in the primitive conception he is one of the divine pair to whose union the fertility of all people is due. Even in his Hinduized form as Kāl Bhairava he retains the characters of Animism. As worshipped by the Kuni cultivators in the Deccan, he is represented as a man standing; in one hand a trident, in the other a drum shaped like an hour-glass, while he is encircled by a serpent, a mark of his chthonic origin. He appears again in an underworld with oil and vermilion, and he remains kindly so long as he is supplied with offerings of butter. He causes snake-bites, and tells whether an undertaking will do well or will fail. On the chest of the god there are two small holes. The person who wishes to consult the god places a betel-nut in each of the holes, and explains to Bhairav that if it is white and betel-nut fails first, the undertaking will fail; and that if the betel-nut fails first it will mean that the undertaking will fall. He is a god of the earth, according as the event is to be, to let the lucky or the unlucky nut fall first. He tells the god that if he will drop the lucky nut, and if his undertaking prospers, he will give the god a cock or a goat. Twice a year, before they begin to sow and before they begin to reap, the villagers come in procession and worship Bhairav* (BG xvii. p. 289).

Bhairon or Bhūmiyā is also known as Khetprāl, or 'field-guardian.' In the Pandja, when the crop is nearly ripe the BRAHMANUS are consulted to fix an auspicious time for reaping; and, before the work is begun, five or seven loaves of bread, a pitcher of water, and a small quantity of the crop are set aside in the name of Khetprāl (Rose, i. 126). Bhūmiyā, again, at times changes sex, and is identified with the Earth-Mother, and provided with a consort in Chandwând or Kheri, the per- sonification of the village site (NY&Q v. 180). Like his consort, Bhūmiyā has a male and female aspect. He is said to visit with sickness those who show him disrespect, as, for instance, by cleaning their teeth near his shrine.

*These Bhūmiyās, who thus bear the reputation of being revengeful and vicious in temper are respected, and offerings to them are often made; while those who have the character of easy, good-natured fellows are neglected (NY&Q iii. 107).
31. Worship of Hanumān, the monkey-god.—In the same grade is the monkey-god, Hanumān, Hanumān, 'he with the jaws,' also known as Marnti or Mahābīr, 'the great hero,' who has become fully adopted into Hinduism as the helper of the god Rāma in his war against the demon Rāvana, which forms the subject of the epic of the Rāmāyāṇa. He is, however, plainly a survival from the old theriolarity. He is represented by a rude image, combining human and monkey characteristics, an image which was very prominent, and the whole smeared with vermillion. He is an especial favourite with the Marāthas; but most villages in Northern India have a shrine dedicated to Hanumān, and the establishment of his image is one of the first formal acts performed at the settlement of a new hamlet. In every fort, built or re-built by Sivaji, the Marāthā hero, he placed inside the main gate a small shrine with an image of Hanumān (BG x. 335). Even now this god has hardly gained full franchise in the Hindu pantheon, and in the greater shrines he acts as warden (deva-rājā) to the higher gods. He has now become a fighting partner of the Mother-goddess, and he is essentially a Dravidian god, bearing in his representation among the Dravidian Suiris of Mirzapur little of the monkey-character except his long tail; and he is identified with the Vedic Varuṇa, god of the dark wild Bhuīyās of Kounjah (Buchanan, i. 467; Dalton, 147). Some years ago, when an epidemic broke out among the forest Kāthkaris of Nāsik, they believed that it was a judgment upon them because they used to kill and eat the sacred Hannmān monkeys. They fled the country for a time in order to escape his vengeance (BG xvi. 65).

32. Spirit-worship.—Besides local gods of this class, most of whom are associated with the fertility of the land, cattle, and people, the Dravidian is beset by a host of spirits of another kind.

First come the vague terrific forms, the impersonations of awe and terror, spirits of the waste or of the darkness, like the jīvaṃ of Semitic folk-lore—the Rākṣasas, the Bīr or Vīra, the Dāno, the Dāitṛyas. These are now all known by Aryan names, but their representatives were also doubtless found among the Dravidians. Some account of these, and other like vague potentialities, will be found under BENGAL, § 8, DOMS, § 2, and DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Indian).

Secondly, there is the worship of Bhūta or Bhūtās, the restless spirits of those who have perished by an untimely death, or have failed to reach their longed-for rest, because they have not been honoured or obeyed. They are generally malignant, and if not regularly propitiated bring disease or other suffering on those who neglect their service. Such are Rāja Lākhan, worshipped by the Kols with his sister Belā, and Rāja Chandol, the tutelary god of the Korās. Most of these seem to be historical personages. Rāja Lākhan apparently having been a leader of the Hindus against the Muhammadan conquerors. He is still held to be present and receive constant worship (Crooke, PR i. 198 ff.). In some cases this is the Harāni Lālā, the cholera godling, and Haridās Bābā, the patron deity of the Ahirs (p. 47). This process of delination of persons famous or notorious in life, still goes on actively.

33. Boundary-worship.—The local character of the worship of the village-gods is shown by the respect paid to boundaries, and in the cult of the deities presiding over them. The Roman worship of Terminus, with the sanctity attached by the Latins to boundary-stones, is one of the most familiar examples of this class of beliefs (Smith, Dict. Antiq. i. 90 f.). Among the Gonds the village boundary is marked by a stake into which the ancestral ghosts (Sleeman, i. 269 f.). In its most primitive form the cult is found among the Dravidians of the Vindhyā and Kālīrāng ranges, who employ their bājīja priest to perambulate the village annually, and to report the presence of the common liquor, distilled from rice or other grains, in order to prevent the inroad of foreign spirits, who are regarded as necessarily hostile. The boundary, again, is often defined by making a goat walk along the disputed line, and watching it till it gives a shiver, which is regarded as an indication of the wishes of the spirit, whose adjudication is at once accepted (MNQ ii. 282). This boundary-spirit naturally develops into a deity in whose charge the line is placed. Thus, according to Macpherson, the Kandhs recognized Sundī Pamma as the boundary-god; particular points on the boundaries of districts, fixed by ancient usage, and generally upon highways, are his altars, and these demand each an annual victim, who is either an unsuspecting traveller struck down by the priests, or a sacrifice provided by purchase (Memoriai, 90; Calcutta Rev. v. 53). Among other tribes, like the Raṭtiās of Bengal, Goraiyā is regarded as a sort of rural Terminus; the Teli olinen offer a sucking-pig in the rainy season before the image is dried until the following spring, in the presence of the god, the victim after sacrificing being either buried in the ground or given to a Dosādh (p. 47), who seems to act as priest of the more primitive deities, and claims the offerings as his legitimate perquisite (Risley, Tribes and Castes, ii. 309). Another deity of the same type, Sewaōriyā, is the tribal god of the Bhuīyās and Ghāsīyās of the United Provinces, who sacrifice a goat and offer some fluids and a thick cake, the head of the animal and the cake being, the perquisite of the mahto, or headman, who performs the rite (Crooke, Tribes and Castes, ii. 45, 418). Among the Santās his place is occupied by the sima-bonga, the collective boundary-gods, who are propitiated twice a year with sacrifices of fowls offered on the boundary of the village where these deities are supposed to dwell (Risley, Tribes and Castes, ii. 234). Under the title of simantapījā, 'boundary-worship,' this has become part of the Hindu marriage-rites, the youth when he comes to fetch his bride being obliged to free himself from the foreign and hostile spirits which have accompanied him, by a rite of worship performed at the boundary of the village of his bride.

34. Implement-worship.—The worship paid to the implements used by the husbandmen...
tools of the artisan falls into a different class, which has sometimes been included under the head of Fetishism—a term which possesses no scientific value. In various forms it appears among the rural classes of the North West Provinces (L. N. von, 187). The mind of the east of Orissa, on the fourth day of the feast to Durgā, lay their razors, scissors, and mirror before the image of Visvakarma, their patron deity, with offerings of sweets and flowers, the god of artificers (Tribes and Castes, i. 29). The Kaibartā fishermen of Bengal Proper celebrate the feast of Jālpānī in the early spring, on the last day of which they lay their net, smeared with red lead, on the river bank (ib. i. 380). The Khāmār potters arrange their trade implements and specimens of their manufactures on the kiln, ornament them with leaves of the Bel tree (Eugé marmelos), and present oblations; while the Pāi palm-tappers set up their sickles and present offerings of flower and grain (ib. i. 525, ii. 167). Perhaps the most remarkable of these so-called fetishes is the garūrd, or sacred chain of the baigār prophet, which is kept in this highly venerated by the god. With this the baigār lashes himself into a state of ecstatic frenzy, and hysterical girls are thrashed with it to drive the devil out of them. This chain, under the name of Śakātī Pervi, is supposed to be worshiped by the priests of the Gonds, carried in procession, and solemnly deposited in the shrine (Hislop, App. p. 8; Crooke, Tribes and Castes, iii. 411). Among purely agricultural implements, honour is especially paid to the plough, the corn-sieve, basket, and broom used in cleaning and measuring grain, and the rice-pounder, to which a phallic significance naturally attaches (Crooke, Pād. ii. 12).

35. Stone-worship. Stones throughout Northern India are recognized as the abode of spirits and deities. One form of this worship, that of the lingam, or phallus, now appropriated to the cult of Siva, was formerly believed to have been adopted from the Dravidian tribes of the south by the Aryans (Oppert, 372 f.). This view is now generally rejected (Hopkins, Rel. of India, 1896, p. 471). It is said to be alluded to by the writers of the Veda in the śvā-sva, 'tail-gods,' but the cult was not openly acknowledged until the rise of Siva-worship in the Epic period (ib. 150, 462). The growth of this form of worship has been attributed to the Brahmins, and suggests that the lingam is in origin a miniature Buddhist dagoba, or relic-shrine (Hist. of East, and Ind. Architecture, 1889, p. 167). The worship of Siva in this form is now spread throughout India at least as early as the 6th or 7th cent. A. D. (Wilson, Essays, 1862-77, i. 224). Siva, again, is associated with the bull Nandi, and in this form may be compared with the Greek Dionysus in his bull form, as god of fertility, with which his phallic emblem is perhaps associated (J. E. Harrison, Prolegomena, 432 ff.). Oppert (675 f.) asserts that the Dravidians were originally adherents of the Sakī, or Mother-worship, and indicates any evidence to show that these same people worshipped the linga, or the organ of generation; and even at the present day we cannot point out any aboriginal tribe, which has retained intact its national customs, as revering the Phalus. This assertion is probably an over-statement of the facts. As we have seen, most of the Dravidian tribes combine with the worship of the Mother-goddess that of her male consort, and the mimetic celebration of the union of the divine pair suggests erotic rites. Hislop has collected a long Gond epic which tells of the creation and adventures of their hero, Linga. But, as he says, this has obviously been compiled under Hindu influence, and cannot be regarded as embodying the real traditional lore of the Gonds. At the same time, it suggests that lingam-worship was familiar to this tribe, and with them, in the form of the tiger, it was combined with animal-worship in the personification of their deity, Visvakarma (ib. i. 188). With this may be compared the worship by the Sudhas of Bengal of their goddess Khambé-wari, who is represented by a peg (Riley, Tribes and Castes, i. 68).

36. Other stone-worship among the Dravidians. —Stone-worship appears in other forms among the Northern Dravidians. Thus we find the worship of caims. The Bhils of Rājputāna erect on the hill-tops, to the memory of the spirits of deceased relatives, caims of stone, on which they place rude images of the horse, burn small oil lamps, and sometimes hang pieces of cloth. Goats or male buffaloes are offered here, and the pottery horse-figures are made with holes through which the spirits of the dead are supposed to enter, and then travel up to heaven, when the horse is presented to the deity (Bannerman, i. 53). Conical hillocks of stones are often found in the plains of the local gods, and are known as Deorālī, a title also applied to one of the Himalayan peaks (Kirkpatrick, 60). In Mirzapur, in the United Provinces, the hero Vānkalā Bīrī is represented by a form of stone, the Arod, to which every traveller adds one as he passes by. The hero is now on the way to promotion, as the offerings at his shrine are taken by a family of Brahman priests (N. V. Q. i. 40).

Secondly, we find special worship of particular stones. In all the villages of Central India are stones known by the names of Motī Mātā, 'pearl Mother,' or Lālābī Phānlī, 'the red flower Mother,' which are worshipped when cholera appears. The Bhil barāda, or medicine-man, officiates; he cuts off the head of a goat, and offers it with some lemons, copper coins, eggs, flowers, etc., in a piece of a broken earthen pot, while a toy cart, apparently used as a vehicle for the goddess, is placed beside the stones. When the head of the goat has been offered, the barāda takes up the potsherd and places it on his head. A watchman takes a living goat, an attendant carrying a pot full of country spirits, which drops slowly out of a small hole in the bottom of the jar. Behind this the car of the goddess is drawn by a third officiant. The procession is directed towards the famous shrine of Onkārnāth, and suggests that the barāda is a substitute for another goddess, Sātī Mātrā, 'Mother of truth.' Here the jar and carriage are left, and by this means the spirit of cholera is supposed to be enticed away beyond the limits of the town, by the aid of her chariot, and attracted by the goat and spirits presented to her (Luard, i. 78). This primitive method of disease-transference illustrates the Animistic character of the cult. In some cases the stone, which is the home of the deity, is replaced by pillars of wood, blackened by constant offerings of oil and butter. Such are the representatives of Bīrnāth, 'hero lord,' worshipped by the Ahrīv castes as a protector of their cattle. The worship of the Ahrīv is a worship apparently identical with the cultus of the group of deities known as Bangaramā, Bangārā Bīl, or, in her Hinduized form, as Devī, who are worshipped in various parts of India (Hislop, 15 f.; Crooke, Tribes and Castes, i. 63 f.). This pillar-worship takes various forms. Sometimes we find a stone pillar (lātī) appropriated to the hero Bīrnas, who is probably in origin a Dravidian deity, but is usually associated with the hurling hero of the Mahābhārata epics. The Gonds worship him in the form of a shapeless stone covered with vermillion, or of two pieces of wood standing on the ground, like those of Bangaramā. Among the Naikās, one of the Gonds, he is represented by a huge
stone rising out of the ground and covered with
vermilion.

In front of this, Nalkūdā Gosāna trees with Bai Gosāna and Kālāsā in acts of adoration. The order of the religious services seems to be as follows. At 5 p.m., having cooked a little rice, the worshipper bares his head, and all the gods are identi

fied with the Sun; deities of Nature, like Marang Buru, the mountain-god, and Jair or Jhur Erā, goddess of the sacred grove; besides a separate group of family-gods, arranged in two divisions—the family-gods, and the Abgē-bonga, or secret god (Rāle, Tribes and Castes, ii. 282). The other more Hindustani tribes have in the same way developed deities with special functions, like Dīprātī Dēo with his wife Angārnati, the war-gods of the Kharwars of the Kaimūr range, and Zorbā Dēotā, a god of hunting (Nāg, iv. 36, 77).

38. Theogonies.—Some of the North Dravidian tribes have framed elaborate theogonies with legendary accounts of the creation of man and of the dispersal of the tribes. Thus the Mundās tell how the self-existent primeval deities, Otē Bōram and Sing-bēngō, or the Moon-god and his spouse, have given to them the art of love, and placed them in a cave to people the world (Dalton, 185). The Khandi legend of the struggle between Bārāhā Pēnni, the Supreme Being, and his sister, Tari, the Earth-goddess, which ends in the creation of man and all other living things, is more elaborate, and has probably been embellished by the vivid imagina
tion of the natives who supplied Macpherson with his information (Memorials, 84 ff.). The Good legend of the birth and adventures of Linga has already been noticed (§ 35). Among the more advanced and Hindustani tribes, legends of this kind seem to have almost entirely disappeared, overlaid by the traditions connected with the Hindu gods, who have gradually displaced or absorbed the tribal deities.

39. Sacrifice.—The theory underlying the prac
tice of sacrifice is, according to the well-known but not universally accepted theory of Robertson Smith, the desire to attain communion with the god by joining with him in the consumption of the flesh of the victim or the fruits of the earth offered at his shrine. In the modern view of the Dravidians, however, it is purely a business transaction, do ut des, an arrangement that, if the god fulfills the desires of the worshipper, he will receive a sacrifice in return. Totemism (§ 25), has almost completely ceased to influence the popular beliefs, and it is thus impossible to trace the steps by which, if it ever had a general rule among the people, the clan totemism was developed into the methods of sacrifice which are in use at present. Here, too, as is the case with all their beliefs and rites, there is no literary evidence of any kind to assist us. There is, however, some scanty evidence to prove that the modern custom may have a totemistic basis. Thus the Parayali of the Kaimūr range hold the goat in great respect—a feeling which among the Pālōo and Chāndā, the chief of the bird’s clan, is worshiped to avert an epidemic of cholera. The goat is not sacrificed,
but released as a scape-animal (Crooke, *Tribe and Caste*, vi. 180). More significant than this is the rule that after sacrificing the flesh of the animal must be consumed by the worshipper and his clanmen, then and there, in the immediate presence of the deity, following the Vaishnava, the Misrah, Shaivite, or the Earthling traditions of the Dravidians (Jovons, *Introduct. 145 f*). In fact, as was the case in ancient Israel, all slaughter is equivalent to sacrifice (Robertoott Smith, *Rel. Semites*; 241, v. 279) it may be noted, is also the Hindu rule, and many of those who indulge in meat use only that of sacrificed animals, following the rule of Mann (*Institutes*, v. 31) that meat must be eaten only on occasion of sacrifice. The Dravidians are specially careful not to share the sacred meat with strangers, or even with members of their own tribe outside the inner circle of relationship.

40. Methods of sacrifice.—The methods of sacrifice differ among the various tribes. In the more primitive form the ritual is crude: the Gōlās of Bengal turn a pig loose amidst a herd of buffaloes, which are encouraged to gore it to death (Nath, *Travels*, 7). We occasionally find among the northern tribes the habit of tearing the victim in pieces, as in the Gond sacrifice to Ṣāgheēvar, the tiger-god (Dalton, 290). This points to an original habit of eating the flesh of the fallen victim, which survives, in some of the Greek mysteries and the practices of the Bacaeus, and appears among the southern branches of the tribe, where a lamb is torn to pieces by a man with his teeth (Bulletin Madras Museum, ii. 265). At a Devi shrine in Gorakhpur the pigs to be offered are brought to the temple with their hind legs tied; and, the throats of the animals being half cut with a blunt knife, they are allowed to bleed to death before being staked (*X. V* v. 122). The Tiya of Bengal, like many of the other menial castes, when they offer a goat to Kālī at the Divālī, or feast of lights, do not decapitate the victim, but stab it in the throat with a sharp piece of wood (Wise, 395). The ordiary method, however, is by decapitation.

In Northern Bengal the usual shrine of Kālī consists of a heap of earth, generally placed under a tree, with a stake to which the head of the victim is fastened, so that the neck may be stretched out for decapitation (Buchan, ii. 749). The Gorkha custom of sacrificing buffaloes, by one, or at most two, vicomnents of the family eyes, or Newārs, or aborigines of the country, who allow the animal to bleed slowly to death, is very cruel and very disgusting (Oldfield, *Sketches*, ii. 346 ff.). Such was also the custom of the Bāumī of Chotā Nāgpur at the Binda-parab feast. Two male buffaloes were driven into an enclosure, and on a raised stage adjoining and overlooking it the Bāumō and his family priest discharged arrows at the victimes.

41. The times of sacrifice.—No special time is appointed for the Dravidian sacrifices. At the more important festivities of the Mother-goddess the victims are slaughtered throughout the day and night. In some Greek shrines it was the custom to slay the victim at night and consume the flesh before the dawn (Pausanias, ii. xvi. 1. x. xxxvii. 4). This was also the rule among the Arabs (Robertson Smith, *Rel. Semites*; 282). For the Hindu śāspit sacrifice, in which the victim, as the name implies, seems to have been pierced with a spike or lance, the time was fixed after midnight; but some authorities preferred the dawn (Rajendralal Mitra, *Indo-Aryans*, i. 384; Jovons, *Introduct. 146*). This rule still prevails among the Prabhās of Western India, who at marriages sacrifice a goat to the family-goddess. In some families the rite is done at midnight on the day before the marriage. The goat is brought into the room and made to stand before the image. One of the wives of the family eyes, or the eldest forward, washes the victim's feet, sprinkles red powder on its head, and, after waving a lighted lamp round its face, retires. The eldest man in the household, or a banbe, proceeding to the image hall, slays a handful or two of rice in it before the goat, and, taking a sword, stands on one side. While the animal is eating the rice, he cuts off the head with one stroke, holds up the head, lets a few drops of blood trickle over the image of the goddess, and then places the head on a metal plate under the seat of the deity (*BG* xviii. pt. i. 195). At the shrine of Bechārj in Baroda the victims are slain at dead of night, in order not to grieve the feelings of Brahman and others (*ib*. vii. 614).

42. The self-surrender of the victim.—The feeding of the victim before sacrifice is probably a means of propitiating it, and suggesting to it is a willing victim. When the Raṭūlās of Bengal sacrifice an animal to Bar Pahār, the mounain-god, the victim is given rice to chew, and is decked with flowers before being slain (Riseley, *Tribe and Caste*, ii. 293). At the worship of the Mother-goddess, Bechārj, when a buffalo is brought for sacrifice, red powder and flowers are sprinkled over the animal, and it is worshipped. A white cloth is thrown over its head, and a cluster of flowers, removed from the image of the goddess, is hung round its neck. A
lamp filled from one of those burning in the shrine is brought lighted from the inner room and placed on the stone altar in front of the temple. The buffalo is then let loose, and if it goes and smells the deceased is considered to be obsequious to the Devi, and is slain at once, if possible by a single stroke of a sword. A blood-stained flower is presented to the deity, and the bystanders apply some of the blood to their foreheads. The blood is believed to be a preservative of health, and even the Brāhmans preserve cloths dipped in the blood, as charms against disease. If the buffalo refuses to smell the lamp placed on the stone altar, it is taken away, after one of its ears has been cut and a part of the blood offered to the goddess on a flower (DG vii. 614).

A more common method is to test the victim by pouring water on it, which was a custom in Greece (J. E. Harrison, Prolegomena, 625). When the Thags did sacrifice to Devi, their patron goddess, they used to place on a white sheet the consecrated pickaxe and knives used in their murders, with the sacrifice (like the goat), two goats were selected, black and perfect in all their parts. They were bathed and made to face the west; and, if they shook themselves lustily to throw off the moisture from their bodies, they were considered acceptable to Devi. If only one goat was found to be acceptable, if neither did so, it was a sign that Devi had rejected both, and the party ate the rice and drank the spirits. But this was regarded in the light of a simple meal, and the sacrifice was postponed to another occasion. When the sacrificial feast took place, the skins, bones, and offal of the victims were thrown into a pit, and they were regarded as so sacred that none but a Thag was allowed to see them (Thornton, Illustrations of the History and Practice of the Thugs, 1837, p. 63 f.). The rule that the victim must shake its head in token of acceptance is also found in the Panjāb (Rose, i. 118).

43. Variety, sex, and colour of the victim.—The rules as to the variety, sex, and colour of the victims are not very clearly defined. The animals most commonly sacrificed are buffaloes, goats, pigs, and fowls. The Bhils of Khandesh show their complete divorce from Hindooism by sacrificing a bullock to their gods Hātīpāwa and Vāghākān Kunvar, the 'tiger lord,' while their other deities receive a he-goat or 'Gow' as the special fowl (BG xi. 95). The Kanjar gypsies of the United Provinces offer a pig to Nathiyā; a lizard to Māṅk Gurr; a goat to Devī; a pig to Jakhōyat; and a fowl to Mata Crook. Tribes and Castes, ii. 147). The Mundas offer a male buffalo to Desvāll, their village-god, and fowls to his consort, Jāhīr Būrīl (Risley, Tribes and Castes, ii. 103). But this distinction of victims seems to be exceptional.

The colour of the victim offered to the chthonic and malignant powers (like the Greek σφυξίως (J. E. Harrison, Prolegomena, 661)) ought to be black. When the forest tribes of the Kaimārī range offer sacrifice to Chped, a malignant female deity, it should consist of a black she-goat and a black fowl; Banaśi, the forest-goddess, is less actively malignant, and is honoured with a grey or spotted goat (NINQ i. 57). Among the Marāthas, fowls with ruffled feathers are peculiarly acceptable offerings in cases of disease, and if a cock be sacrificed it should be able to crow (BG xi. 34). Following the same laws of symbolic magic, the Kāsias and Khyamias of Bengal offer a white cock to Jōrām, the Sun-god (Dalton, 132, 141).

44. The head of the victim.—The head of the victim is universally regarded as sacrosanct, as was the head (Robertson Smith, Race Semites, i. 379). Among the Dravidian tribes it is sometimes, when severed, laid upon the altar of the deity in whose honour the sacrifice is being made, but more usually it is the portion of the priest (Dalton, 142; Crooke, Tribes and Castes, i. 8). The Biātes of the United Provinces, who pretend to be Brahmo-Hindus, practice the curious rite of sacrificing a pig to the village god, and this being done by a low caste Chāmār ojā, or medicine-man, who cuts off the head, buries it deep in the ground, and appropriates the remainder of the flesh (Crooke, Tribes and Castes, ii. 773; Rose, i. 133). It has now been commenced in paying

45. Commutation of animal sacrifice.—The animal sacrifice is occasionally commuted in deference to the humanitarian ideas of the Vaiṣṇava and Jain sectaries. In one form of the rite, slaughter of the animal is replaced by merely cutting the ear, letting a few drops of blood fall on the ground or upon the altar, and then allowing the animal to escape (Rose, i. 120). The same custom probably in part explains the rite of letting loose a bull (vyūrāsarga), when devotees release an animal in sacred cities like Benares or Gaya, or when a young animal is branded with the trident of Siva, and released in this manner to the gods (see ANCESTOR-WORSHIP, vol. i. p. 452). The more primitive form of the rite was to slay the animal, with the object of providing food for the spirit of the deceased. This rule is still in force among the Thugs, and they kill another calf on the grave, and hang up the tail of the victim on the grave-stone, as evidence that the funeral rites have been duly performed. In default of this, it is supposed that the spirit is unable to rest, and returns to haunt the survivors (IA i. 348 ff.).

46. The scape-animal.—The animal sacrifice, again, is commuted into the scape-animal, with the addition of the belief common among the Dravidians, that it is the ‘vehicle which carries away the collected demons or ills of a whole community’ (Frazer, GB ii. 101). This rite is most commonly performed as a means of removing epidemic disease; e.g., in the United Provinces during an epidemic of cholera, a buffalo bull is marked with vermilion and driven beyond the village boundary, thus taking away the disease with him. When the idea is still further worked out by Brāhmans, it develops by painting the beast all over with lampblack and smearing its forehead with vermilion, to represent the ‘vehicle’ on which Yama rides, or for the chariot of the goddess (BG ii. 147). Thus, as the chariot more effective, the scape-animal is loaded with pieces of iron, as a potent protective against evil spirits (NINQ i. 102, v. 116).

47. Human sacrifice.—Human sacrifice was, as is well known, common among the Dravidians, and the best illustration of it is derived from the Kandh (q.v.) rite of mariaš sacrifice. Probably most of the rites of the same kind performed by the allied tribes were done with the same intention (Crooke, PR ii. 167 ff.). As was the case in Greece, we find survivals which indicate a commemoration of the rite (Lang, Myth, Ritual, and Religion among the Vedics, ii. 116 f.). Thus, at Nāsik in the Deccan, when cholera appears, a woman of the Māṅg, a menial tribe, is solemnly led out of the city as a scape-victim. She remains outside the city limits till the next day, when she lathes and returns. This ceremonial, which resembles that of bringing a victim to a shrine, doubtless implies an earlier rite of human sacrifice (BG xvi. 521). Another rite resembles that of the self-immolating pilgrim, used in former times to fling themselves, in the name of Siva, over the cliff known as Bhairava Jhānp, near the famous shrine of Kedārnāth in the lower Himalaya; this seems to have prevailed farther west in the hills of the Panjāb (Atkinson, ii. 773; Rose, i. 133). It has now been commuted into paying
for the services of a bādi, or rope-dancer, who slides on a rope suspended upon a cable attached to a platform or a cliff, the service of a priest, or a worshipper with a banner, to offer prayers to the deity, is also a common duty. In some Kamaun villages (YINQ i. 55, 74 f., 129, iii. 265). In the form of the Bihunda rite the same custom prevails in the Tamang district of the Hooghly. (Bose, ii. 133.) In many parts of the Eastern Himalayas to the higher altitudes of the Vidy Deo, the tiger-god, a man is covered with a blanket, bows to the image, and walks round it seven times. During this performance the worshippers slap him on the back, and are then expected to eat something. Then they set out to the forest as if pursued by the children, who liling balls of clay at him, and finally bring him back, the rite ending with feasting and drinking (Dalal, i. 156).

48. Periodical sacrifices.—The main tribal sacrifices of the Dravidians are not, as a rule, performed annually, and the victims sometimes vary from year to year. The Mundas sacrifice every second year a sow, every third year a ram, every fourth year a buffalo, to their mountain-god, Marang Buru, and the main object is to induce him to send favourable rain (Dalton, 199). The Tipperas have a legend that their king, Sri Dharma, enjoined that human sacrifices be offered only triennially (ib. 111). This rule of triennial sacrifices is followed by the Kharwaras, Cheros, and Nagbansis, while the Kura offers a sow yearly to the tribal Sat, and a black goat every third year (Bhugol, 53; Bhushan, 152; Dalton, 139, 137, 138). There are other instances of feasts celebrated at intervals of more than a year, such as the Theban Daphnephoria and the Boeotian Daphnées (Frazier, Panamanas, v. 41, G 32 i. 225 f., iii. 228 f.). Those which recur at intervals of eight years seem to be based on an attempt to harmonize lunar and solar time, just as the twelve years' feasts in South India may roughly represent Jupiter's period of revolution round the sun (Angipudi, 204 f.). But it is difficult to suppose that considerations such as these could have influenced people in the state of culture possessed by the Northern Dravidian tribes. It is possible that, in some cases, considerations of economy and the cost of providing the necessary victims may have suggested the rule that the sacrifices should take place at intervals longer than that of a day.

49. The priesthood.—It is said of the Kurkās of the Central Provinces that they have no priest- hood, by class or profession, and their ceremonies are performed by the elders of the family (Central Pr. Gt. 53). But, although many of the North Dravidian tribes the domestic worship, including that of deceased ancestors, is performed by the senior member of the household, or by the house father. But practically all these tribes have reached the stage of possessing priests. The term 'priest,' however, does not usually define with accuracy the functions of this officiant, the duties of medicine-man, sorcerer, exorcist, or witch-finder being generally combined in a single individual or class. Thus, at the Mundā rites in honour of Desauli, the village patron god, the sacrifice and offerings are made by the village priest, if there be one; if not, by any of the men who possesses the necessary legendary lore (Dalton, 196). Among the Malās of Bengal the village headman acts as priest in the worship of Dharmer Gosain (Ridley, Tribes and Castes, ii. 57).

The priest, again, among the Kandas is often identified with the shaman.

The priesthood may be assumed by any one who chooses to assume the functions of this officiant, and is not asceticism being authenticated only by the claimant's remaining for a period varying from to twenty years (ib. 110). In a lugud, dreamy, confused state, the consequence of the absence of his third soul in the divine presence. And the ministry which may be assumed by him has few exceptions, he lies down at pleasure' (Macpherson, 103).

Their jannis, or priests, he goes on to say, are divided into two classes—

one which has given up the world, and devotes itself exclusively to religious offices; and one which may still engage in every occupation excepting war. The former class are disposed to hold that they are entitled to greater deities; but the two classes pass irresistibly into one another, and many of both are seen to perform every ceremonial, with two exceptions, namely, the village sorcerer, sacri- ficer, at which a great and fully instructed priest alone can officiate; and the service of the Vidy Deo, which the priesthood alone can conduct. And this god, it is to be observed, requires that his priest shall serve him only, while all the other deities accept divided service from their ministers' (ib. 104).

The 'great jannis,' or ascetic who has given up the world, can possess no property of any kind, nor money, nor, according to his rules, even look upon a woman; and he must generally appear and act as other men as possible. He must live in a filthy hut, a wonder of abomination. He must not wash but with spittle; nor leave his door, save when sent for; except perhaps, when he wanders to draw liquor from some neglected hamlet, the foot of which he may he bound, if required, lying half drunk. He scarcely ever wears a decent cloth or blanket. He commonly carries in his hand a broken axe or bow, and has an excised, stilted, sleepy look; but his ready wit never fails him in his office. He eats such choice morsels as a piece of the grilled skin and the feet of the sacrificial buffaloes, and the heads of the sacrificed fowls; and, when a door is cut up, he gets for his share perhaps half the skin of the head with an ear on, and some pieces of the heart.

The layman priest, on the other hand, has a wife and family, and may accumulate wealth. He eats apart from other laymen, but may drink with them (ib. 104). These statements must be accepted with some amount of caution as Macpherson, relying on information received from his native subordinates, was inclined to a more elaborate system of beliefs and ritual to the Kandas than the tribe probably ever possessed.

Among the other tribes of the same family this ascetic class of priest does not seem to exist, though, of course, the diviner or witch-finder often adopts the shamanistic tricks which are the common property of his kind. Macpherson also records the singular fact that some Hindus were employed by the Kandas to assist in the service of the minor deities.

This alone would indicate that there has been a great change in their religion; but it is probable that the hindus alluded to are the Daha or sorcerers from the witchcraft superstition has called into existence' (Dalton, 236).

50. Priestly titles.—Along the Kaimūr range and in Chota Nāgpur the tribal priest is known as the bāgi (Macpherson). Among the mon- ized tribes he is known by the titles of pāhan (Skr. pradhāna, 'leader') or pujārī, 'one who does the service of the gods,' both titles being borrowed from the Hindu. But among without a bāgī, and such is the superstition of the people, that they would rather leave a village than live without him. Usually he is a member of one of the non-Aryan tribes, and is generally selected from those who live in the more remote tracts, and who, not being contaminated by Hindu beliefs and culture, are supposed to have the most accurate knowledge of the evil spirits, and the modes of placating and repelling them. In the more civilized villages in Pālamūnī, Forbes found that even Brāhmans and Rājputs were being occasionally appointed to this office—a sign of the progressive process of the village from an essentially Hindu yoke. The bāgī is looked up to with awe by all the residents, is responsible for the appearance of disease in man or beast, and is bound to offer up the sacrifices necessary to repel it.

He is supposed to be better informed about the concerns of the village than any one else, and to be able to point out each man's tenure. Among the jungle tribes he is invariably the arbitrator in all disputes pending to be adjudicated by the claimant's remaining for a period varying from ten to twenty years (ib. 110). In a lugud, dreamy, confused state, the consequence of the absence of his third soul in the divine presence. And the ministry which may be assumed by him has few exceptions, he lies down at pleasure' (Macpherson, 103).

Their jannis, or priests, he goes on to say, are divided into two classes—

one which has given up the world, and devotes itself exclusively to religious offices; and one which may still engage in every occupation excepting war. The former class are disposed to hold that they are entitled to greater deities; but the two classes pass irresistibly into one another, and many of both are seen to perform every ceremonial, with two exceptions, namely, the village sorcerer, sacrifice, at which a great and fully instructed priest alone can officiate; and the service of the Vidy Deo, which the priesthood alone can conduct. And this god, it is to be observed, requires that his priest shall serve him only, while all the other deities accept divided service from their ministers' (ib. 104).
The official among the Goonds bears the same name.

The nuptial, funeral, and similar ceremonies are performed under the head of aged relations. But generally in every village there is a man who is supposed to have the power of charming tigers and tigers' blood and other potions are administered to those suffering from drought, cholera, etc. He is called a Bagis (USSR, 1890, p. 271).

The pahan of the Cheros and Khawarás, and the layá or náyá (apparently a corruption of Skr. nágvá) (leader) of the Kóra, exercise similar functions (Dalton, 120; Risley, Tribes and Castes, i. 609).

53. Appointment of priests.—In Chotá Nagpur, according to Forbes (VINQ iv. 5), the office of priest is hereditary;

but in the event of the becoming necessary to appoint a new

Bagis, a meeting of the entire community is held, and the suc-

cessor is appointed by vote; the individual selected is then

called on to accept the post, and, in the event of his declining,

day is fixed for the ceremony of installation. On the appointed
day the whole village community meets in solemn concourse;

the village headman presides, and the proceedings commence

by his calling upon the candidate to state publicly whether he is

willing to accept the office, and the success of the ceremony

will be entirely dependent on whether he will be found

to perform are explained to him. He is then conducted round

the tuns of the village, the different landmarks of which are

explained to him. The whole party then proceed to the

place of meeting, when the president, taking up the Bagis's

inam or ulus, in which are known the knife and dagger,

solemnly hands them to the new incumbent, and the

following ceremony is repeated:

These ceremonies include the presentation of sacrificial

knives, and are repeated in the formal manner described to each successive Bagis, and

are used solely for the purpose of installing him. In the villages where under hindu

influence these hereditary implements of the Bagis seem to be

frequent, they are used.

In other cases a special ceremony is performed to ascertain the will of the local deity regarding the appointment of his priest. Among the Baiga on the lower slopes of the Himaiyá, as one of the greater hindu festivals, the villagers bathe, and, parading some weeks after, the drinking-cup, the shrine of the

local god, invoke them. ‘He who is chosen is miraculously rap-

ed or inspired by the god, and, taking up the cup, he is able to
discern the future’ (Crooke, i. 252). Although it contained nothing but

t. The Deotá (goddess) may also declare his pleasure in this

matter by imbuing one of his votaries with the power of

thrusting, unharmed or unmarked, an iron rod through some

portion of his flesh. It is the custom in one village to ask the

Deotá from time to time after the death of his priest whether

he wishes a successor appointed. The image is raised upon the

shoulders of the people, and, if the god presses heavily to the

left, the wishes the election postponed; if to the right, he

wishes it to take place without delay’ (PSQ 1.12).

Similar ceremonies are performed by the other Dravidian tribes. Among the Mangils, the pahan is always selected from among the descendants of the earliest settlers in the village, who alone understand how to propitiate the local gods. He is always selected from one family, but the actual pahan is changed at intervals of three to five

years, by the rite of the sacred winnowing-fan—

mystica wunus lacoOi. This is taken from house
to house by the village boys, and the man at whose

house it halts is elected; the same method of selec-
tion prevails among the Orsöns (Risley, Tribes and

Castes, ii. 106 f.; Dalton, 247).

52. Priestly tabus.—Among the Malars the
dándana is appointed by Divine election. After

his call he must spend a certain time in the

wilderness, in intimate communication, as his

flock believes, with the deity, Beo Gosam. From

the time of his appointment he devotes himself to

the priestly profession, and his hair is allowed to grow like

that of a Naziri, because his powers of divina-
tion entirely disappear if he cuts it. The cutting

of the hair of a holy man is, as Frazer shows (GBS

L. 262), dangerous to two reasons; first, there is

the danger of disturbing the spirit of the head,

which may be injured in the process, and may

revenge itself upon the person who molestes him;

secondly, the breaking of the shorn

locks, which may be accidentally injured, and

thus, on the principles of sympathetic magic, may

endanger the original owner, or may be used

by some evil-minded person to work black magic

against him. After admission to full orders the

Malær priest must establish his ability to foretell

events, and

he must prove by the performance of some stupendous work

beyond the strength of one man, that he is supernaturally aided

by the Supreme Being. The priest may be a married man, but

after entering orders he must henceforth have no sexual

relations with or touching any woman except his wife. Having

undergone all the tests, his ordination is formally timed by the

Mangil (headmen) of the village, who ties a red silk thread to

which cowries are attached round his neck, and binds a torban on

his head. He is then allowed to apprise his tribal of the

ceremonial sacrifice of buffaloes celebrated by the Mangil in the month of

January, and must drink some of the blood of the victim

(Dalton, 270).

Another interesting tabu of the Dravidian priests

is that enforced at Žindá Kášin in the Panjab,

where they are required always to sleep on the

ground or on a square bed of grass made on

the ground between four posts. This reminds us of the

Hellori or Seldi, priests of the Pelasgian Zeus

of Dodona, who sleep upon the ground and have

their feet unwashed, and of the Prussian priests

who sleep in tents near the sacred oak (Hom. H.

xiv. 234 f.; Sophocheles, Trach. 1167; Rose, i. 118 f.; M. xx. 36).

53. Renunciation of priests.—The methods of

renouncing the Dravidian priest vary. Usually

he supports himself on the head of the victims

and portions of the other offerings which are his

perquisite. In the case of the Mangils among the

Munda tribes, the religion of rent-free land, and among the other tribes he

receives gifts of grain and other produce at harvest
time, and food at the chief tribal feasts.

54. The sister’s son as priest.—The fact

that inheritance among many of the people in the

North India is traced through the female has been held to

indicate the prevalence of polyandry in ancient
times. ‘It was probably wide-spread amongst many tribes in other parts of India, but the present day retain no tradition of the practice’ (Risley-Gait, Census Report, 1901, i. 448). This is specially shown in the case of those tribes among whom the sister’s son does sacrifice to appease the spirit of the deceased. Thus among the Háts of Bengal a pig is sacrificed on the tenth day after a death to appease the spirit of the departed, the flesh being eaten by the relatives, while the nephew (sister’s son) of the dead man officiates as priest; and the same is the case among the Dom (q.v.), Musahars, Pasis, and Tantis of the same province (Risley, Tribes and Castes, i. 316, ii. 167). Among the Kovás, another of the United Provinces, if the services of a Brahman cannot be secured, the sister’s son of the deceased can officiate; the Bhiyars hold him in great

honour, and make periodic presents to him as the Hindu do to a Brähman; and in the case of the Dom as in Bengal, he is the funeral priest; among the Kols the marriage rites are performed by the same

relative (Crooke, Tribes and Castes, i. 93, ii. 95, 925 f., iii. 309; Dalton, 83). This primitive form of priesthood is almost certainly a survival of the

matriarchate. A record of the struggle between the matriarchate and the patriarchate has been traced in the Brahman legend, which tells how Tari, the

Earth-goddess, contends with her consort, Búpa Pénú. The latter is finally victorious, and as a sign of Tari’s discomfiture imposes, as in

the Semitic story, the cares of childhood upon her sex (Maeshil, 14 ff.).

55. The aboriginal priest adopted into Hinduism.—The process of adoption of these aboriginal priests into Hinduism has been clearly traced in the Central Provinces by Russell (i. 170 f.). Here the

class of village priests consists of doctors and astrologers, the

joshi, joyé, jangam, and his fellows, occupy for the

lower castes the position which Brähmans hold in the

higher strata.

They are the descendants of the more primitive form of

religion—that of the village gods. In many cases their ritual

has probably been derived from a Dravidian source, and they
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themselves may be the prominent descendants of the tribal priests, or witch-finders, for witch-finders are now for the most part employed in the service of the Hindu gods, and this is probably a kind of religious evolution, of a less tribes; and, moreover, different authorities have held that a shrine, which represents a great retrogression from the purer nature gods of the Vedas, have been derived from Davidian sources.

56. The jot tribes.—Further, we find among the Davidian tribes that certain castes, possibly in imitation of the Brahman Levities of Hinduism, have become specialized for religious purposes, and function as priests to the Village Provinces. The Vaishnavas of Manbhum and Western Bengal act as priests of the meaner tribes.

Their offices as priests of the various spiritual powers that haunt the forests, rocks, and fields and bring disease upon man and beast are in great request. A Bhumij or a Knmi who wishes to propitiate these dual-conceived but potent influences will send for a Maulnik to offer the necessary sacrifices in preference to a Lay or priest of his own caste—a fact which speaks strongly for the antiquity of the settlement of the former in the country (Bisley, Tribes and Castes, p. 82).

The biaga (g.v.) caste in the same way provide priests for the Goons; and the Harijanized Provinces, the Paturi branch of the Kajhirs, who perhaps, take their name from the paf, or sacred plateau, which gives a deity to the Kuris, Kurkis, or Munias, act as priests of the whole tribe, and take, like the Harijan of the Vikramshetra, the share and other goods of the dead man, by wearing or using which they are supposed to pass them on to the next world for his comfort. Hence they are held in such contempt that their parishioners will neither eat with them nor drink water from their hands (Crooke, Tribes and Castes, iv. 153 ff.).

57. The merial priesthood in the Plains.—Among the merial tribes and castes of the Plains the Vilag collection is performed by priests drawn from the very lowest ranks, Bhangi, Dosidih, Mal, or barber; while the semi-Hinduized tribes of the Kaimur range generally employ a Chero or Dhuma. Nor are their services confined to members of the tribes which generally employ them. Women even of high caste use their services in worshipping those local gods, whom the innate conservatism of their sex inclines them to propitiate side by side with the higher Hindu divinities. In time of stress, when famine, disease, or other trouble besets the village, all classes of the community employ them to perform the blood sacrifices and diverse ceremonies of propitiation, which they themselves do not understand or are unwilling to perform.

58. Promotion of Davidian gods into Hinduism.—Writing of Greek religion, Campbell (Religion in Gr., Lt., 1888, p. 46) remarks that the reaction of primeval local ceremonies upon the Aryan religious deposit is one of the many causes of the infinite variety in the popular cults of deities reverenced throughout Greece under the same name.

‘People at an early stage of culture,’ he says, ‘are too entirely steeped in the awe and reverence which has descended to them from their forefathers to adopt readily any new type of worship coming from abroad. The initiative fault is active and the features of the new religion, but the inherent force of that religion will always prevail over such subjects, which begin with are but imperfectly understood.’ They remember elsewhere (p. 45), ‘as an undergrowth when the tall trees of the forest were felled.’

The survival of these deities among a race of heathen is the kind of relics that are generally wor- shipped them is further encouraged by the fact that they are to a large extent the impersonations of the awe and mystery of the forest, or the malignant manifestations of the primitive Mother-goddess. A new race occupying an unknown land is naturally inclined to insist on the conciliation of those local powers, which, if neglected, are likely to visit them with their displeasure. The Aryan form of Animism was not in its nature different from that of the Davidians, and hence the accept- ance of the local cults presented no difficulty. The spirit of Hinduism has always been catholic, and it has always been ready to give shelter to foreign beliefs, provided it was permitted to assimilate them in its own fashion.

‘The homely jungle hero,’ says Lyall (Asiaitic Studies, i, 50), ‘comes eventually to get bred in rank among regular divinities, wherever his tribe is promoted into a class of Brahmans are prone to deny the existence of this pro- cess, and to protest that those of the people from which should be understood as only voluntary on their part, and merely superficial; they would be willing to keep their Olympus and classic and even the heads of some of their lowest Brahmans have to, and is not troubled by any such fine scruples, to he illustrate the rude Ogos and Mink (now Aryans of the Jungle) as fast as they come to him for spiritual advice, sets them up with a few decent caste prejudices, and gives to their rough untutored superstitions some Brahmatc shape and vivacity. This is vxevia to the refined Vedantists of the towns, but the same thing goes on everywhere; for a lofty orthodoxy will not attract ignorant outsiders, nor will it keep the mass of a people within a common outline of belief. So the high and mighty deities of Brahmanism would never draw upward the peasant and the woodswinner who were not invited to bring with him his fetich, his local hero or sage, his werewolf and his wicca, all to be dressed up and interpreted into orthodox emanations. In one part of Bengal the Minks (an aboriginal tribe) used to worship the gaw of the earth and the spirits in the mountains, which were turned towards Ixian, they changed their pigs into a saint called Father Adam, and worshiped him as such; when the Hindus got a turn at them the pig became identified as the famous ‘Boar Avatar of Vaisnava, whose name is Varaha.’

This account admirably explains the process by which these local gods are accepted into Hinduism.

A few examples may be given of Davidian gods promoted in this way. The cases of the Bhairon, Ganesh, and Hinnman have been already referred to (§ 29 ff.).

‘A deliberate goddess of the Bhils, who under Hindu guidance was re-named Laksmi, goddess of prosperity, gained the title of Sitala Maa, the smallpox goddess, whom the women of the village-gods are supposed to have worshiped under the name of Macpherson tells how, when the Hindus occupied the Kandh country, they took over the local goddess, Kandhini, and, joining in the aboriginal worship at her shrine, her worship became practically confused with that of Durga, but it is still discharged with regularity and pomp by this joint ministry’ (Calcutta Rev. v. 88).

The adoption of the Hindus of these aboriginal gods is often masked by a sageness, which, if an image was accidentally found, and the agency by which it is said to have been recovered is often that of one of the men of the non-Aryan tribes. This tale is told of the famous image of Jaganath, which is said to have been recovered of the aboriginal tribe of Savaars. Bull (580) describes how a Kand found an image said to resemble that of a cat, which is now recognized as that of Narsinh, the ‘man-lion’ incarnation of Visnu. Often the image or image is said to have been discovered as the result of a dream. One of the most famous liqaga in the Central Provinces was recovered in this way, and the same tale is told of an image of Kryao in western India, of the great ‘tanka’ at Mewar, and quite recently of an image that on the seashore near Bombay (BG v. 81; Tod, i. 242; NINO £. 175). The same inference may perhaps be drawn from the fact that the most valued by modern Hindus are those known as nonpusumh, that is, existing spontaneously and of their own nature pervaded by the essence of nature. They are mere rough stones or rocks supposed to have descended direct from heaven, or to have appeared miraculously on a hill or by the side of all objects of creation, and, when discovered, temples are built over them. The most usual object of this kind of stones are supposed to represent the Ligua of Siva, or the idols are built round them, a Yoni (to represent the female organ) is usually added (Morier-Williams, Brahmanism and Hinduism, 69).

These Davidian local gods seem to have supplied much of the coarser elements of modern Hinduism—the lascivious blood sacrifices of the belief in the occasional immolation of human beings, the use of
spiritsuous liquor in the service of the gods—all of which appear in the Sákta cult, the most degraded form of which was the case in Greece, where 'it must be remembered that the cruder and wilder sacrifices and legends ... were strictly local; that they were attached to these ancient temples, old altars, barbarous zones, or wherever they could be received. In reality, holding the Pausanias found the most ancient relics of Hellenic theology' (Lang, Myth, Ritual, and Religion, i. 282ff.).

Draavidian feasts and festivals.—The Draavidian feasts may be roughly divided into two classes: (1) those celebrated at the chief agricultural seasons—ploughing, sowing, harvesting—the object of which is to promote the fertility of the soil and the growth of the crops; (2) those intended as a means of purgation, the periodical expulsion of the malignant spiritual powers which menace the community. The line, however, between these two classes of festivals cannot be clearly drawn, and the ceremonies of one occasionally merge in those of the other.

When the hot weather has passed, with the first fall of the monsoon and the first important feast-time, the Eroh Sim feast, when he crowns the blessing of the Mother-goddess who presides over the crops, by making a sacrifice of chickens in her sacred grove. This is followed by the Haurar Sim, 'the feast of greenery, the sacrifice made to secure the favour of the gods (Bradley-Birt, Indian Up-land, 278 f.). At the transplanting of the rice the Rain-god is again invoked; and at the critical period when the success of the crop depends upon abundant rain, the Chhat-praor, or 'umbrella feast,' is held. It is a form of rude mimetic magic.

A long thin tree trunk of its branches supports the smallest of umbrellas roughly made of gandy tissue, and together, amidst the excited shouts of the celebrants, they are raised aloft until, standing perpendicularly, the hill trunk is fixed firmly in the ground. As it slowly settles into place, the presence, gathering up handfuls of dust and earth, pelts the umbrella with loud cries and much laughter, dancing round it as white as round a maypole, while the men then sorcerously perform wonder of abstinence and acrobatic skill. Copies drinking of rice beer brings the feast to a close' (ib. 290f.).

Finally, when the rice is in ear and the season of harvest approaches, the Jathonai feast, or offering of first-fruits, is performed. Tiny sheaves of the half-ripe corn are placed in the sacred grove upon the sacrificial stone, and prayers are made to the gods that will permit the crop to be safely reaped and garnered. The sacrifice of a pig, the flesh of which is cooked and eaten in the grove, is an essential part of this feast (ib. 291). The corn, as Frazer suggests, is eaten sacramentally 'as the body of the corn-spirit' (GB² ii. 318 ff.). This round of Santal feasts may be taken as specimens of those performed by the Northern Draavidian tribes, further accounts being reserved for the articles on Mundás, orions, and others.

An example of the second class of festivals— the purgation feasts—is to be found in the Maig-praor or Damalanga of the Mundás. A sacrifice is made to the village-protecting deity, Desan. At this period an evil spirit is supposed to infest the locality; and, to get rid of it, the men, women, and children in procession come through the village, the sticks in their hands as if beating for gane, singing a wild chant and vociferating violently till they feel assured that the bad spirit must have fled; and they make noise enough to frighten a legion' (Dalton, 290 f., 196 f.).

An important part amongst the mental castes of the Plains, among whom, after the Doovali, or feast of lights, the house-mother takes a sieve and a broom, and beats them in every corner of the house. (Cf. Aryan and old Brahmanic ritual.)

These feasts have been exhaustively discussed by Frazer (GB² iii. 39 ff.).

The lights used at the Doovali feast are probably intended as a means of expelling evil spirits. Among the Pávras, an aboriginal tribe of Khánsé, at this feast four or five stones are brought from a neighbouring hill and placed outside the houses, but within the village lands. They are painted red, liquor is sprinkled on the ground and freely drunk, and goats and fowls are sacrificed. Dancing begins at nightfall, and, with the lighted torches, goup branches are thrown to house followed by the villagers. Every housewife comes out with a lighted lamp in her hands, waves it before them, marks their foreheads with the lamp oil, and gives them food. In this way every house in the village is purified (DG xii. 100). Further south it resolves itself into a means of purifying the cattle. After feasting, a figure of Balindra, god of cattle, is made and hung up in the cowshed, with rice and coco-nuts tied round its neck. The cattle are decorated with splashes of colour and garlands. The heaviest bull and the swiftest heifer in the herd are covered with flowers, and driven through the village, followed by a crowd of shouting youths.

60. The Holi.—The most interesting of these Draavidian festivals in North India is that of the Holi, known further south as the Shimga. The chief part of the rite is the burning of the Holi fire, the primitive custom, which is probably due to a sort of sympathetic magic to ensure a due supply of sunshine for the crops (Frazier, GB² iii. 313 ff.). But there are other incidents which suggest that the festival in its present form is complex, and that more than one train of thought has led to its observance. Returning to that primitive tribe, the Pávras of Khánsé, we find that a pit is dug, and a wooden stake thrust into it, and lighted at night. Every one brings a piece of bread, some rice, and a cock, portions of which are thrown into the fire and the rest consumed on the spot. Drinking and dancing go on till dawn (DG xii. 100). In Kurnútan each clan erects a tree covered with rags which are begged by the young men from the people of the tribe. Near the tree a fire is kindled and the tree is burned. While it is being burned there is a contest between the clans, each trying to carry off a sheaf of cloth from the tree of another clan.

When the tree is consumed the people leap over the ashes, believing that in this way they get rid of itch and other diseases. The analogy with the custom of hanging raggs on trees is abundant. In Gwalior, again, two phallic figures are constructed. One, made of wood, is preserved year to year; the other, of bricks, after the fire is lighted is broken to pieces with blows of shoes and cudgels.

The wooden figure is placed beside the wedding couch as a fertility charm (NING iii. 92 f.). A similar rite is the Khatphivuit of Kurnútá, when a fire of dry grass and weeds is burned round a pole. Obscene songs are sung, and the purport of one is that the cattle are now safe from demons (ib. iii. 135). Among the Draavidian Býürs, again, a stake of the sacred cotton tree is driven into the ground, and a time is fixed for the destruction of Old Year. The fire is lit by the village báigá, and the people after parching ears of barley at it eat them. They sprinkle the ashes about, and with them mark their foreheads (Crokke, Tribes and Castes, ii. 12). An important part of this is the leaping over the fire and the driving of the cattle through it, which Frazier (GB² iii. 312) thinks 'may be intended, on the one hand, to secure for mankind a share of the vital energy of the sun, and, on the other hand, to purge them of all evil influences; for to the primitive mind fire is the most powerful of all purificatory agents.' Further than this, we find that, in the
ceremony as performed in the Madura district of the United Provinces, the important portion of the ritual indicates that the representative of the community, should walk through the fire not in a perpendicular way, but in a manner which seems to imply that he was expected actually to lose himself to the flames. A similar rite practised by the king of Tyre seems to represent the consummation of an actual fire sacrifice (Frazier, Adonis, Attis, Osiris, 38; Crooke, Pl ii, 317). The Holi, then, appears to be a combined chief institution aiming to promote fertility and dispel evil influences.

61. The Satnalia.—It will have been noticed that in connexion with festivals of this kind there is a period of licence, which may be compared to that of the Roman Satnalia. The Māthaparab, or spring feast of the Munda, is held in January, when the granaries are full of grain, and the people, to use their own expression, fill of destiny. They have a strong notion that at this period men and women are so overcharged with vicious propensities that it is absolutely necessary for the safety of the person to let off steam by going for a long, full vent to the passions. The festival, therefore, becomes a saturnalia, during which servants forget their duty to their masters, children their reverence for parents, men their respect for women, and women all notions of modesty, delicacy, and gentleness; they become mad diwale (Frazier, 1893).

In the same way the rites of the Holi festival are accompanied by indecency of word and gesture, the singing of ribald songs, and the flinging of filth or coloured water on passers-by. Such orgies are commonly associated with the rites of the spring festival or the purging of the corps (Frazier, GB3, iii. 118 ff., 138). It seems more probable that these acts of indecency are intentional as a piece of sympathetic magic to induce fertility, than, as Crawley (Mystic Rose, 1902, p. 278 ff.) suggests, a means of purification and breaking with the past by a complete inversion of the normal, decent course of ordinary life.

62. Hunting-festivals.—The last group of the Dravidian festivals which can be considered here is that of the general hunt. In Chotā Nagpur the Hos, as well as most of the other non-Aryan tribes of the district, have a great national hunting-festival in May. Immense crowds assemble, beat the forests, and kill enormous quantities of game (Burn, p. 107 ff.); Among the Rājputas this is represented by the annual spring rite of the Akārīna, when the boar, the enemy of the Mother-goddess, Gauri, is slain (Tod, i. 598 ff.). Frazier connects this slaying of the boar with the ancient Indian Hāmarkūr. This general hunting-festival, again, seems to develop into the Munda rite, when all the girls of the village arm themselves, and make a descent upon a neighbouring village, whence they carry off all the live stock, in the shape of fowls, kids, pigs, and lambs, which they can secure, the village thus railed retaliating by a similar raid upon another; and in the Pfins, in Hidār, at the Jīr Sital feast in honour of Sītal, the smallpox goddess, the people in the forenoon cover themselves with mud, which they shower on every one they meet, and in the afternoon go out with clubs and hunt hares, jackals, foxes, and any animal they can find in the village (NINQ, iii. 98; Grierson, Bhār Poushant Life, 401). The import of these rites is obscure. They may be connected with the totemistic slaughter of sympathetic animals, as in the case of Hunting the Wren; or they may be purificatory or catarrhal (FL xi. 230 ff., xxi. 270 ff.).

63. The current religious beliefs of the peasant.—I propose to consider the general views of the so-called Dravida peasant of the United Provinces on the subjects of religion and morality. This question was specially considered at the last Census, and much useful information has been collected.

Beginning with the Pānjiā, Wilson, a careful observer (Sirsā Settlement Rep., 1883, p. 133), holds that the ordinary Hindu peasant of the Pānjiā has practically no system at all. He has a vague idea that there is a future life, in which those who are good in this world will be happy in a heaven, while those who are bad will be sent to a hell; this he considers as a punishment for his various sins against the gods, demons, saints, and goddesses. He is in a hurry to avert temporal evils or to secure the blessings of the spirit world. In order to improve his prospects in the world to come, he has an idea that sin will bring evil upon himself and his fellow in this life as well as after death. His idea is that the good and evil deeds which he reaps in this life will be rewarded in the next. The ordinary European moral distinctions, only they do not take so wide a range. Instead of extending to the whole human race, or to the whole nation or sect, they extend only to his tribe, or village, or family. He thinks it wrong to tell a lie unless perhaps he thinks it a relative of his is involved in it. He thinks it wicked to injure a man unless he has been injured by him, or to cheat another unless he thinks that other would cheat him if he got a chance; or to take a bribe without giving the promised consideration for it. He has a vague idea that it is good for him to meditate on the deity; and, to show that he has not forgotten him, he musts the name of Śaṅkā, or of some other Hindu god, when he rises in the morning, and, if it is piously inclined, at all times also, in season and out of season. Notwithstanding all the numerous saints and deities whom he endeavors to imitate, he has a vague belief that above all there is one Supreme God whom he calls Nārāyana (Nārāyana) or Parasurāma (Parashurama), who knows all things, and by whom all things were made, and who will reward the good and punish the bad both in this life and in the life to come.

Fagan, writing of the neighbouring district of Hissar, remarks (NINQ, ill. 129) that the peasant is in no sense an orthodox Hindu. He feeds and venerates, though he does not respect, the Brahman; and he acknowledges the existence of three great Hindu gods, Śiva, Viṣṇu, and Śaṅkū. Of the more strictly orthodox, but inferior gods, perhaps Sūtra Nārāyana, the Sun-god, is the one most commonly worshipped. His worship consists in bathing at the temple on the morning of the fasts, in burning, in some temples, obesience, and pouring water over the śingam of Śiva. He worships Sūtra Nārāyana on Sundays; and the more pious fast on that day in his honour, eating one meal, and abstaining from the use of salt. But these gods are too great for every-day use. 'He lives, as it were, in an atmosphere charged with the spirits of departed saints, heroes, demons, and others who are in a position to, and as a matter of fact do, exercise a benevolent or malevolent influence in the affairs of mankind, and it is from them that he selects those who are to be the recipients of his every-day devotion. It is as a matter of fact so much the more to his advantage to worship them with fixed ceremonies as he does Śiva or Sūtra Nārāyana; but they are always conscious of almost present to him as the beings who have the most immediate connexion with his own destiny.' In the Dravida Provinces of Hīndustān, the Earth-god, and Śītag, the goddess of smallpox, are most commonly worshipped. Fire he adores by dropping butter into it; he worships the Pīpal, or sacred fig-tree, at dawn, after bathing, by pouring water at its root and making obeisance.

Burn (1783 ff.) corroborates the existence in the United Provinces of belief in a Supreme God, called Bhāgvan, Paramesvāra, Śiva, or Nārāyana.

* * *

A cultivator in Bundelkhand thus described his religion to Lard (i. 64): 'All I know about religion is that every day we call Rāma, by whose grace we live. All my life is taken up with work. I do not do things which would outrage me, associate with the low, or eat forbidden things. This is all my religion.' In other words, religion amounts to observance of the ten commandments.

DRAVIDIANS (South India)—I. Introductory.

The Southern Dravidians, numbering about 57 million of people, occupy the portion of India that is bordered on the north by a line which, south of the Western Ghats, runs along the foothills of the Western Ghats to Kolhapur and Hyderabad, then passes south of Bareilly to the Bay of Bengal on the east. The term ‘Dravidian,’ irrespective of boundary, is generally used in the sense applied to it by Kurnarla Bhattacharya in the 8th cent. (about AD. 725 ([Ioreen, Hist. of India, 1905, p. 70]) to include those southern peoples who then spoke languages he termed ‘Andhravardī,’ or ‘Telugu’ (‘Telugu’ (Telugu) which are now divided, as chief languages, Telugu, Tamil, Kanarese, Malayalam, and Tulu. Many attempts have been made to connect this group with other outside families of India such as the Chadic, the Ateic, and the Australian; but so far as any conclusive evidence is concerned, the attempt is now generally regarded as a failure (Linguistic Survey of India, vol. IV, p. 292). The same conclusion seems to have been arrived at with regard to efforts made to connect the Southern Dravidians with other known races of the world, or even with those of North India. Recent head-measurements in South India have led Thurston (Castes and Tribes of Southern India, vol. I, p. xli) to the conclusion that whatever may have been the influence which has brought about the existing sub-brachycephalic or metacephalic type in the northern areas, this influence has not extended southward into the Tamil and Malayali cians, Dravidian nations have been relatively isolated in their own cultural centers. It follows that there is no reliable evidence whether the Southern Dravidians are autochthones, or whether in some primitive time they reached their present habitats from some outside country. In South India they were preserved, almost down to historic times, from the outside social and ethical influences of Aryan, Scythian, or Mongolian stock which overwhelmed the Aryo-Dravidian races, which spoke some proto- Dravidian language. The barrier of the Vindhyas range of mountains warded off for long the pressure of these other groups of more advanced civilization. The Southern Dravidians have, therefore, preserved their own indigenous language, diversified in course of time into distinct groups of separate languages. In these languages—Telugu, Kanarese, Malayalam, and especially Tamil—a literature was developed in a peculiar classical form, so archaic and different from the spoken language of to-day that the modern educated Southern Indian would now be unable to read or understand this early literature, unless he made it a special study. It enshrines somewhat of the early history of the social organization and religious conceptions of the pre-Aryan period.

To the east and west of the Vindhyas lay the low coastlands, through which, in due course, Aryan and other newcomers penetrated, settled in the richer river-valleys, and thence advanced through the more accessible passes to the central table-land. These incursions were comparatively late in the lifetime of Dravidian peoples. It is not until the 4th cent. B.C. that mention is made in Aryan literature of the Southern Dravidians. The grammarian Panini in the 6th cent. B.C. merely notes the existence of the Andhras, who ruled in the Telugu country in the north-east of Dravidian lands, and who, from the account of Megasthenes, held an extensive sway south of the Maurya empire as early as 300 B.C. Katyayana, the commentator of Panini, in the 4th cent. B.C. also mentions the Telugu-speaking inhabitants of the Dravidian kingdoms, which had their capitals at Madura and Uraliyar (see being Dravidian for ‘village’ or ‘town’). The Edicts of Asoka in the 3rd cent. B.C. show that the south was then a land of which the kingdoms mentioned above, and that of the Cheras on the east. Asoka records in these Edicts that he had conquered the Kalingas as far south as the Kistna River, and killed 100,000 of the inhabitants—which he regarded because in such a country dwell Brahmanas and ascetics, men of different sects (V. A. Smith, Asoka, Oxf. 1901, p. 16). The publication of these Edicts as far south as Mysore ‘presupposes a widely diffused knowledge of the art of writing’ (V. A. Smith, Early Hist. of India), do. 1905, p. 154). Intercommunication had so increased by the time of Mahendravar, a relative of Asoka, that he is said to have instilled Buddhism as far south as Ceylon (see Dravidian Brahmism).

In the history of religious life—so far as it is of permanent interest—the Southern Dravidians, it is almost impossible to discriminate exactly between what was the original concept of the religious conceptions and what was of purely indigenous origin. Buddhism in India loves to work through analogies, and an analogy may be found in the Aryan influence in the south; but so far as it affected the higher classes and their literature.

The aboriginal Dravidian was of short stature, of dark skin, with a short broad nose. The Aryan—at least the early Aryan ethnically influenced by the aboriginal races, of whom the pure Brahman is the best type in India to-day—was of fair complexion and had typical Aryan features. In South India of to-day—between a Brahman of high culture, with fair complexion and narrow nose, on the one hand, and an isolated Dravidian, on the other, there is a vast difference, which can only be reasonably explained on the assumption of racial admixture; and it is no insult to the higher members of the Dravidian community to trace, in their more lowly brethren, the result of crossing with both the dark-skinned and broad-nosed race of short stature (Thurston, op. cit. vol. I. p. liv).

This mixed Dravidian and Aryan can be traced all over the south, more marked as one goes northwards, and in the north it is even more predominant. The same mixture of Aryan and Dravidian can be traced in the literature of the religious life of the people, so far as it is a record of their best thought. There is throughout it an underlying Dravidian substratum, interwoven and covered over with, sometimes almost
concealed by, accretions from Aryan culture. Just as Dravidian languages, from their contact with Aryan languages, were saturated with a new vocabulary and their literature enriched by new modes of expression, so, in a similar manner, Dravidian primitive religious conceptions were refined from dark superstitions and Animism, until they finally reached a living faith in the saving grace of a Supreme Deity. The primitive Dravidian substratum has been described as a form of shamanism (see preceding). This phase of thought and practice existed in India among the wilder tribes and simpler rural folk, who have their own peculiar ecstatic frenzied dances, amid which the votaries, drugged and foaming at the mouth, are held to be in communion with some demon or godess, and to become soothsayers of the deity thirsting for unholy rites and blood sacrifices. Out of some such phase of thought emerges the pre-historic primitive Dravidian religion, known as some form of Saivism, or worship of Siva. The attributes and rites of this deity were gradually brought into conformity, by a process of compromise, with those of some Aryan deity or deities. The conception thus grew of a half-Dravidian-half-Aryan deity—Rudra-Siva, the Destroyer of the Universe—who became the Supreme Deity, Siva, of the great mass of the Dravidian people. The term Siva is even used in the Vedas as "auspicious"—an epithet of the god Rudra. The word Siva is, however, the Dravidian word for 'red,' and the word rudra in the Rig Veda 'often seems to mean red.' Therefore, at a very early period, it seems probable that the conception of the god Rudra had a tinge of Dravidian ideas (Linguistic Survey, iv. p. 279).

This tinge of Dravidian runs through all Dravidian literature of post-Aryan periods in which the religious ideals of the people were expressed, giving it a distinctive and often perplexing individuality of its own. Dravidian influences had, no doubt, a predominating effect alike on the literature, the religious conceptions, and the philosophic modes of reasoning of the Dravidian. Nevertheless, Dravidian genius, roused by contact with an advanced civilization, developed a distinctive individuality not only to stand side by side with the best of the literature of India, but also to take a place in history as a contribution to the records of the efforts and aspirations of mankind towards truth.

Evidence for the influence of early Christian beliefs (see E.B. ii. 548 ff.) on later Dravidian religious conceptions belongs more especially to that branch of Dravidian thought that is called Saivism. This feeling seems to have impressed itself most strongly on European scholars, who may be said, by their intimate acquaintance with Indian languages and literature, to be least estranged with the spirit and thought of India (see Grierson, 'Modern Hinduism,' chap. xiv.); and it has from this angle been taken (e.g., J. A. F.A.S., April 1907; Pope, Intro. to Tiru Vichakam). The theory of this

1 There is no pure Dravidian word for 'faith.' The Skr. word dhati is used (=Tamil pattu) in Tamil literature as early as the 15th cent.

2 Sanskrit forms of Tamil words are used throughout, as belonging more properly. The Tamil method of pronouncing the Skr. sri, 'blissed,' is retained, as it is of common occurrence.

2 Early history of Dravidian religion.—Tradition ascribes the earliest Aryan influences on Dravidian religious literature to the Acharyans, whose writings were usually in Sanskrit, and were translated into the vernaculars for the use of the common people. The Kural, a collection of couplets, in the Venag metre, on ethical subjects, is especially claimed by the Acharyans as their contribution to the earliest efforts to provide the Dravidian cultivators of the soil with moral teachings. This claim seems improbable; the work is more usually ascribed to a weaver named Tiru Valluvar, who lived at St. Thomé, near Madras. It is said to have been accepted by the 3rd Saṅgha, or Tamil Academy, at Madura, through miraculous intervention of the god Siva to establish the revealed character of its stanzas. Divided into three books, on Virtue, Wealth, and Enjoyment, it is still considered by Tamil-speaking people as a masterpiece of literary structure and of profundity of thought, and was praised from many European scholars. It has been ascribed to the 2nd or 3rd cent. (Barnett, Catalogue, p. 111), but its style is simple—far more so than works ascribed to a much later period.

The same famed Tamil Academy is also traditionally held to have been responsible for the gathering together, at the court of the king of Madura, of 800 Jain ascetics, who issued a collection of 400 quatrains (Avvāru) to serve as a Tamil Veda, or Book of Wisdom, for the daily use of the people. These quatrains are said to have been composed 4000 years ago, but, as a matter of fact, date back, at the furthest period to which they can be assigned, to the 2nd or 3rd cent. A.D. In the outpourings of the soul—tossed from birth to rebirth through the evil of deeds—over the weariness of life and the joy of release from ceaseless transmigrations, there is no evidence of any distinctive school of belief, either Jain, Buddhist, or Saiva, and no mention of a deity. One quatrain alone (243) gives a faint clue to the existence of a difference between northern and southern faiths, by stating that 'many of the southern people have entered heaven (svaragam), while many of the northern have lived in vain; the future of every one depends on his own deeds.'

In these early centuries Jainism and Buddhism flourished throughout South India side by side with the rising claims of Saivas. From the farther south to the southern people into one common national faith, founded on the belief in a personal deity able to enter into communion with his votaries. From the beginning of the 1st cent. (A.D. 20) to the beginning of the 3rd (A.D. 218), the Buddhist faith flourished vigorously, especially in the Telugu country. Here, under the rule of the Andhra-Būryas, the famed Buddhist tope at Amaravati, near the Krishna River, was built. This great Buddhist memorial is now in ruins, and the surrounding country desolate; but in the neighbouring hills are cut out rock-hewn caves, once the abodes of ascetic monks, who must have wanderer far and wide, inciting the faith of their founder and beggar alms.

The Jainist negation of the belief in a soul and Buddhist negation as to the existence of a personal Deity were soon both exploded. The two religious philosophies which these doctrines were in the south from the sources of their birth in far-away Kapilavastu, 200 miles north of Benares. The great revolt of the Dravidian races against both Jainism and Buddhism in the 5th and 6th centuries, and continued until the indigenous deity Siva was left supreme. The land of the Dravidians became henceforth the land
of a belief in a First Cause, who by His grace created a cosmos wherein souls might work out the fatality of "karma," or deeds, and so gain release from the bonds of the successive births and re-births, the uncertainties of awards in heavens or hells.

An account of South India, seemingly authentic, at this period is given by Hiuen Tsiang, a Chinese pilgrim, who travelled all over India to trace the footsteps of Buddha and to learn the condition of the Buddhist faith. It is recorded that this visit took place in A.D. 640, in the reign of the Western Chalukyan monarch, Pulikeshin II. (A.D. 608 to 642), who ruled at Vatsyapi, and is said to have conquered the Southern Pallava monarch, Narasimha Varma, who ruled (A.D. 625 to 645) at Kâñchi (Conjeeveram). The Chinese pilgrim describes Kâñchi as a city five miles round, containing many Jains, 10,000 Buddhist monks, and 80 Brahmun temples. At Mâlâkâtya (country south of the Cauvery) he records that the people did not care to date from A.D. 800, or give any occasion for gain. He says that the country possessed many ruins of old monasteries, but that only the walls were preserved. There were many hundred Deva temples, or the temple of Siva. He also describes one Buddhist stûpa, or burial-mound, "in the Chola country, and another in the Dravida or Pandy kingdom, as ascribed to Aśoka" (V. A. Smith, Aśoka, p. 47). From this it is clear that the coming struggle was to be between the advancing power of Saivism as opposed to the Jain belief and the fading influence of Buddhism. There is further external evidence in the great classical Tamil romances—the Maritamkâlatam, and Silappadikârikaram—of the 2nd cent., that at that period Buddhists, Jains, and Saivas lived in harmony, whereas the third great Tamil classic—the Tirukkâtevam of the 10th cent., gives evidence of the hostility of both Jains and Saivas to the Buddhist faith.

3. Sacred hymns of the Saivas.—The revival of the Dravidian worship of Siva led to the collection of all the early Saiva hymns, composed for singing in the temples to Siva during worship, into what is known as the Tiru Murai, or Holy Sayings. The first three books of this collection contain the poems of the most renowned sage and saint of the Tamils, Tiru Jââna Sambandhar, of the middle of the 7th cent. A.D. (V. Venkayya, Tirumâti Antiqûrây, No. 3 (1906)), whose image is still worshipped in Saiva temples of the south. The next three were the poems of Tiru Sâmukâram, or Tiru Sâmukâram; and the succeeding seven—the last—those of Sundarar, of the 8th and 9th centuries. The poems of this collection, or Devâram, are held to be Divine revelation, and are daily recited, in Tamil lands in the Saiva temples, by a special class of priests. To this collection are further added, as the 8th part of the Tiru Murai, the poems of Mânikka Vâchakar, known as the Tiru Vâchakaram, or Holy Sayings, which date from A.D. 700 to 900 (J. Vinson, Sundârânta Dipika, Aug. 1908; V. Venkayya, Tamil Antiqûrây, No. 3, p. vi.). A ninth collection, by nine minor poets, is known as the Tiru Sûrîti, one hymn relating to a temple built by Jayendra Chola I. (A.D. 1012) (LI xxxvi (1907) 258). The 10th is by a mystic, Tiru Mûlâr; and an 11th contains some poems by Nakkirar Devar of the 4th or 6th cent. A.D. The last ten poems of this 11th collection, by Nakkirar; last three form the basis of a legendary History of Saints, which is known as the Periya Purâyanam, composed by Sekkharar, under the patronage of Kulottungas Chola II. (A.D. 1070-1118) (Sundarar Pillai, Milestones, p. 3; see Barnett, Catalogue, for a nine-fold collection of the Tiru Murai),

The collection of early devotional literature, together with the poems of fourteen later Santana teachers, are sometimes called the 'Sacred Sûtras of the Saiva sect.'

The 10th cent. is noted for the sacred Saiva poems of Paññanattu Pillai, while in the 16th or 17th cent., almost the floating legends concerning the many manifestations of the energies of Siva, were collected together as the Thirukolams of Siva, or Tiru Vâlaiyâdi Purâyanam, by Parâjî Joti. The most popular and sweetest singer of Saiva mystic raptures was Tûyâmnâvar, who wrote about A.D. 1650.

This period of revival of the adoration and worship of Siva exhibits, as an outward expression of the inward devotion of the people to their Deity, the bestowal of an almost incalculable amount of labour and skill on the erection in A.D. 985 of the famed temple at Tanjore, the walls of which were covered with inscriptions telling of the great victories of the Chola king, Kâjâ Kâjâ Deva (A.D. 985). In the time of the heretical Cjola king, Parantaka I. (A.D. 907), the temple to Siva at Chidambaram is recorded to have been covered with gold (S.I. Inscriptions, vol. I. p. 112).

The most famous of all these early poets was Tiru Jââna Sambandhar, who is said 'to have looked upon the overthrow of the Jains and Buddhists as the one objective of his life—of every one of his numerous hymns the tenth verse is uniformly devoted to their condemnation' (Sundarar Pillai, Milestones, p. 79).

He is said to have converted the ruling Pandyra monarch at Madura from Jainism back to the ancient faith in Siva, to which the monarch's wife and prime minister had adhered. The Periya Purâyanam records that not only did he convince the king of the truths of Saivism, and defeat all the arguments brought forward in support of Jain doctrines, but that he afterwards took care that 8000 Jains should be massacred—a massacre which is still commemorated at Madura. The second greatest of these early poets was Mânikka Vâchakar, the author of the Tirupp., who in the 9th cent. A.D. is recorded, in the Vâtakarûrûr Purâyanam, to have totally defeated the Buddhists, and to have finally established the Saiva faith in the Chola kingdom. The king of Ceylon is said to have arrived with his surrounding Buddhist missionaries at the court of the Chola monarch, who vowed to exterminate them if Mânikka Vâchakar could establish the truths of the Saiva faith in opposition to the arguments of the Buddhists.

It is strange that at this early period one of the keenest philosophical arguments against the whole underlying basis of Buddhist and idealism was raised by the Tamil sage. The Buddhists, in their arguments before the Chola king, stated the cardinal doctrine of their belief that all 'knowledge appears and in an instant of time disappears; all is ceaseless flux.' The answer of Dravidian India came in the retort of Mânikka Vâchakar, that in all thought, in all perception, there must persist a momentary consciousness, a moment of apprehension, which persisted in itself evidence of reality. The argument was urged by Mânikka Vâchakar, who asked how he could reply to a Buddhist who uttered madness, for,

"before than did the Buddhist utter forth the words and meanings, since than understanding must have passed away, what revelation of truth and virtue can there be?" (Pope, T.V. p. 96).

The Buddhists, after long disputations, had to confess and repudiate the answer.

"Thou sayest that we possess neither God nor salvation. What, then, is your God and your salvation?"

The best non-doctrinal answer to this question is to be found in Pope, T.V. of Mânikka Vâchakar, now available for English readers in the versified tr. by Pope. These 'Holy Sayings' are, in the words of the translator (p. ix, preface):

1. Hereafter cited as T.V.
2. Hereafter cited as S.D.
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*daily recited in all the great Saiva temples of South India, are on every one's lips, and are as dear to the hearts of vast multitudes of excellent people there as the Psalmists of David are to the Jews.*

It is held that in South India the influence of these hymns was such that

> "by the 12th century both Buddhism and Jainism had become inert and dead" (C.S., July 1999; Nallaswami Pillai, Saiva Religion.

In these hymns, or devotional songs of mystical rapture over the works and grace of Siva, and telling of the ecstatic joy of release from the bondage of ignorance and bonds, Pepe saw everywhere the influence of the Bhagavat-Gita, the deity Siva taking the place of Krsna, the heroic deity of the Sanskrit poem (dating in its earliest form from 400 B.C. to A.D. 200).

The doctrine of bhakti, or faith in Siva, finds expression in the Saiva doctrine of the love and devotion of the soul to the belief and hope that Siva will, through his grace, grant knowledge of the soul's true nature, by which revelation of knowledge the soul would obtain release (mukti) from transmigrations. According to the Saiva Agamintta, either the position of the soul with regard to the grace of the Deity is helpless, in the position of a knower towards his mother, or the grace of the Deity seizes it and brings it into salvation—a doctrine known as marjuri-bhakti, or cat-like faith; and this has been described as the lowest (ai bhakti adhamah) form, for the faith to operate its securing salvation, being in the position of a young monkey grasping its mother—a doctrine known as markatavatnula-bhakti, or monkey-like faith, which is commended (S.D., Oct. 1910, Agamic note, P. 12).

Pope held that this doctrine of bhakti, or faith, permeated the whole after-history of Saivism in a form in which

> "the fervent adoring love and worship of Siva is represented as including all religion and transcending every kind of religious observance" (F. T. v. Ixxix).

It was left to Saivakaracharya, towards the end of the 8th or beginning of the 9th cent., to give the death-blow to Buddhism in the south, and to lay the foundations of a more widespread Saivism than its earlier forms. Born a Nambrthri Brhaman, in South India, at Mahabhar, he died at the early age of 52 in the Himalaya mountains, having crowed into a single book the tremendous outpouring of his genius and learning in commentaries on the Upanisads, Brahma-sutras, and Bhagavat-Gita, while a vast number of revivalist short poems, still recited in the south, are ascribed to him.

In these commentaries India saw its culminating point, in philosophic reasoning, in the doctrine he taught of adavitia, or non-duality—the Indian form of monistic idealism. The monistic doctrine of Saivakara, with its underlying principle of the fictitious maya, conjuring up an unreal cosmos of dream life, with an abstract subject of thought as ultimate entity, was too vague and idealistic to form a basis for a religion sufficient to satisfy the demands of the non-Brahmanical Dravidians for realism and personal worship and love for a Deity. Siva, therefore, admitted, as a preliminary to full knowledge of his adavitia doctrines, the worship of various manifestations of Siva, as avatars of the All-God, inculcating a more refined form of the worship, as opposed to the popular worship of the kris tea, or female divinities. He founded throughout India for Saiva monasteries and his immediate disciples established ten orders of Saiva ascetics to carry on the attack against the rival Buddhist monastic orders. The present guru, or spiritual head—thirty-third in succession from Saivakara—of the monastery he founded at Srirangam, in Mysore, is the acknowledged head of all the Tulu-speaking Saivites who adhere to the adavitia doctrine of Saivakara, which is still taught among Saivat Brhmanams in every considerable village in the south.

The spread of the worship of Siva was in the 10th cent. further fostered by the conquests by the Chola Saiva monarch, Rajaraja Deva (A.D. 985), of the ancient Chera and Pandya kingdoms and Ceylon, and finally the whole of south India became a united Chola and Eastern Chalukyan empire by matrimonial alliances between the two kingdoms. In the Decean a great revival of Saivism is recorded to have taken place in the time of Bhijala, a Jain who had usurped the throne of the last of the Chalukyan monarchs, Somesvara IV. An inscription, of about A.D. 1200, gives an account of how the deity Siva was "specially created in order to put an end to the hostile observances of the Jains and Buddhists" (Thurston, op. cit. iv. 239).

There is, further, a tradition that an incarnation of the bull—always associated with Siva as a form of his energy—was sent to earth in order to restore the worship of Siva, and that this incarnation appeared as a Kanarese Brhman, born near Bijjala, or Bijapur (Fleet, IA v. [1876] 230). Basava in due course had the usurping Jain, Bijjala, assassinated, after which Chenna Basava, the nephew of Basava, established the Kanare Saiva religion in his country. The Saivas there are known as Vira Saita, 'champions of Siva,' or Saiva Bhaktas, forming the sect of Lingayats, who wear the Bhagam and worship Ganad, the bull of Siva.

4. Vaisavas or Hindu reformers. The worship of Vignu, as opposed to that of Siva, was taught by Ramannajaharya, a Brhman born in the 12th cent. (Barnett, Bhagavagita, 1905, p. 55, says A.D. 1017), near Madras, became a convert of the Supreme Being, Visnu or Vasmdeva, as Cause and Creator of the world as a real objective existing cosmos, were inculcated, with the belief in soul as different from the Universal Soul. The doctrine taught respecting the Deity is that known as vidistadovidat, or qualified non-duality, in opposition to the earlier adavitia doctrine of Saivakara. The Suprme Deity, according to this doctrine, is both the highest and the material substance out of which it was created. Faith in this Deity became the centre of a revived Bhdgavatism. The persecution of Ramanuja by the Chola monarch, Kuleuttung or Rajendra Chola II. (A.D. 1070 to 1118), led eventually to the spread of these new Bhagavat doctrines all over India. This was not finally accomplished until the 14th cent., when a new southern teacher, Ramananda, brought up at St. Thomé, near Madras, became a convert to Bhdgavatism in a worship of Rama Chandra, an incarnation of Visnu, which he preached as a faith for the mass of the people. The contact of Aryan learning and Dravidian religious feeling thus led to a revival of Hinduism all over India, for from Ramanuja in the 12th century

> *were spiritually descended Ramananda in the 14th, and Viddapati and Chalasaya in the 16th—the three apostles of Vaiyogin in Hindstan, Behar, and Bengal* (Hoernle, Hist. of India, 93).

The chief followers of Ramanuja, known as Sdr Vayogin, are divided into two schools or sects

> —those of the North and those of the South, or Vada galei, and Ten galei. Both schools hold to the Vedas and Vedanta, the Northern school being more orthodox in its attitude to the Aryan revolotions. The Northern school, further, recognizes a male and a female energy in the Deity, and the...
DRAVIDIANS (South India)

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1 strongly insists on the concomitance of the human will for salvation, whereas the Saivite school maintains the irresistible of Divine grace in human salvation' (Kenen, 1).

The two schools are thus—like the Saiva Agamic schools—divided on the subject of cat-like and monkey-like faith. The Southern school, in place of the Vedas, use their own canonical books of scriptures, consisting of 4000 verses of the Tanjil, known as the Nātiyāvā Prabhānām. These verses are ascribed to saints called alvat, held to have been incarnations of the Deity. These alvat are described as 'those drowned in or maddened with God love' (A. Govindachārya, From the Life of the Artārā, Mysore, 1926). The modern Bhāgavata doctrine of faith of the South school of the Sīr Vaiṣṇavas has been raised to sublime heights in the Artha Pañihakas of Pili Lokahārya (A.D. 1213), until this faith

...in its outward progress becomes more and more intense and rapacious. Instead of compelling it becomes inviting, instead of repelling it becomes bewitching. Effort is merged in craving. Self-assumption gives place to self-abandon. The heart has become poured into the intellect, or rather, the intellect has become fused with the heart' (tr. A. Govindachārya, J.R.A.S., July 1919).

The last great Southern apostle of Vaiṣṇavism was Madhavāchārya, born 1321 as a Saiva follower of Saṅkarā, who became a fierce opponent of the Saivas and of the advaita philosophy. He preached, in opposition, pure duality, or danta, holding that the Divine is composed of matter and the soul is different from matter, māyā, which he held to be real and eternal. The Supreme Soul of Being was by him held to be Viṣṇu or Nārāyana, incarnated as Kṛṣṇa, and salvation was held to be gained by bhākati, or love for Vāyu the son of Viṣṇu.

In the South Kanarese country most of the Telugu-speaking Brāhmans are followers of Madhva, and, as might be expected, most of the Dravidian Hindu classes are Saivas. At present a wide-spread revival of interest in Saivism is taking place in South India, which demands the close attention of all those interested in the future religious life of India, which seems destined to be influenced by the principle underlying the formulated doctrines of the Saivas. At a recent Saiva conference, held in 1909, at Trichinopoly, attended by Saivas from most of the Southern districts and even from Ceylon and Jaffna, it is reported that the proceedings were opened by the recitation of some verses of the Devadāsa and Pratāpa, 'which the Saivites like to call their Psalms.' The report further states that 'the Saivas at the close of the proceedings held a consultation on the subject of the different Saiva schools.'

The spirit of the present revival may be seen from the comments made on the report by the learned editor of the S.D. V. Y. Ramagan—first, to the eflfect that there were as many Brāhmans present 'as could possibly be expected in such strictly religious functions'; and, second, that 'the greatest Apostles of God whose teachings constitute the Saivaśārāvatsa Siddhānta were fort the most part Brāhmans, and they throw open the flood-gates of true spiritual life for all children of God.' A further significant fact in connection with this revival of interest in the history of the Saiva religion is the increasing use made by Saiva writers of Scriptural phrases and analogies. A knowledge of the formulated doctrines of the Saiva Siddhānta was an increasing necessity for all those anxious to understand or who are brought into contact with, the religious life of South India, which seems to tend towards a change in the direction of greater tolerance for surrounding religious beliefs, in the direction of purifying Saivism from the degrading elements contained in the grosser forms of Sakti-worship.

5. Formulated doctrines of the Saivas. The scholastic theological doctrines of the Saivas were

in medieval times set forth in metrical stanzas, with necessary commentaries for their proper interpretation, by a series of poet-philosophers held to have been spiritually descended from the first of these poets who received the earliest form in which they exist in South India, as a revelation from the Deity. This first form is known as the Sri Jiv Jñāna Siddhānta, or 'Apostles' Commentary on the Mahābhedā Theology' in South India. It was composed—or arranged—by Mey-kandar Devar, the Divine Seer of the Truth, in about A.D. 1225. Mey-kandar was followed by Mañju Śrī Śaṅkarā, the Sahkhara, who wrote the Saivasamānyā-neri, and whose disciple, the famed Kottavangudi Umāpati Śivāchārya, composed, in or about A.D. 1313, the Śiva-prakāśāna, or 'Light of Siva,' the Tīru Arut Payyānam, or 'Frucht of Divine Grace,' or the Śivākāya Nīvāraṇām. The S.J.B. of Mey-kandar is held to be the most authoritative of all these works, as being a direct revelation from Siva,

'the purpose of pointing out the way to proceed from the knowledge of the body full of sorrow to the knowledge of the soul and hence to the knowledge of the Supreme Spirit' (tr. Nallaiyanni Pillai, Madras, 1909).

It is a free translation into Tamil—in Aśīrīyam metre with a commentary in Venṭha metre—of twelve Sanskrit stanzas said to have formed part of the Saurṇaṇīya, of which Ayogha, or early works in Sanskrit incalculating the mystic worship of Siva and Sakati, there are said to be 28, now gradually coming to light, of which two have been translated. The Tamil stanzas of Mey-kandar are of such extreme terseness of diction and brevity of expression that even the ordinary Fundits are not able to understand them without proper commentaries, and very few Fundits can be found in southern India who are able to expound the text properly even now. Nallaiyanni Pillai, op. cit. p. viii.

Barnett has recently commented (J.R.A.S., July 1910)—and his view has been accepted in Saiva centres in Madras—that the formulated doctrines of the Saivas, as they first appear in the S.J.B., reached the Southern Dravidians from the north. His contention is therefore that the living faith of the majority of living Tamils is almost in every respect, and certainly in all essentials, the same doctrine that was taught in Kashmir about the beginning of the 11th century, by Ashhanka Gupta.

Both of these schools trace their roots to the Śvetācāra Upaniṣad, and points out that

...the elements of the Tanjil Saiva Siddhānta, the Sanskrit Ayogha, and the Saiva theology of Kashmir, are all contained in the Śvetācāra Upaniṣad, which was canonical long before the days of Saṅkarā' (S.D., June 1910).

These ideas of the Upaniṣad were in Kashmir formulated into the Śrīnivāsa and Śrīpratāpa-abhijñā schools, and, according to Barnett, 'meanwhile filtered down through various channels into the lands of the Dravidians, for whose ancient cults it supplied a theological basis.'

Whatever may be the final conclusion on this point, as to whether the formulated doctrines of the Saivas descended from north to south or ascended from south to north—for the Śvetācāra Upaniṣad and the various current schools of Indian philosophy, such as the Sañkhya, Yoga, and Vedānta, were in the 5th cent. equally well known in the south and in the north, and Sanskrit was used for literary purposes in the south as well as in the north—all the technical terms of the system and its essential features are contained in Saiva devotional literature of South India from the 7th and 8th centuries. These technical terms and essential features are—as set forth, towards the end of the 8th or beginning of the 9th cent., in Saṅkarā's Commentary on the Brahma Sūtras (li. 2. 37) —that

1 Hereafter cited as S.J.B. 2 Hereafter cited as S.P.
3 Hereafter cited as T.A.J.P.
4 A full account of the Upaniṣad is given by V. Y. Ramagan in his tr. of Appaya's Commentary on Vedanta Karika (Chidambaram, now being printed in parts).
The worship of the śiva and śiva is explained by intellectual Sāivas to be the worship not of phallic emblems, but of the representatives of the pillar or temple of the Deity, and various other ideas told of in the Brāhmaṇas, such as the pillar of fire in which the energy of Śiva appeared before Brahamā and Viṣṇu, to show his supremacy, so that thenceforth the worship of the Śiva has been inaugurated in the world. The pedestal (śiva) is Mahadevi, and the śiva itself is the visible Mahāvīra (T.P. T.V. 191).

(a) The necessity for creation.—There exists, it is held, an eternal necessity that a cosmos must be created, because souls, which never vary in number and are eternal, require a cosmos wherein to work out the result of karma, or deeds, which is also eternal.

The S.P., therefore, says that 'Creation is an act of grace; in the world alone souls are able to eat their food and to rid themselves of impurity and attain mukti, union with God' (Goodwill, S.D., March 1905, p. 145).

The underlying principle of this doctrine is that deeds, or karma, must be ripened before they can be eaten or consumed; and, as a place for this process of ripening is necessary, a cosmos must of necessity be evolved, and this evolution can take place only through the grace, or love, of Śiva. It is not until deeds of the past births, deeds of the present birth, and deeds of the enlightened done between enlightenment and final release are 'balanced' that final union of the soul with Śiva ensues. The T.A.P. (vi. 1) clearly states that it is not possible for release to take place until 'the unequal good and evil become balanced.' All deeds of man being an evil, and which becomes necessary that Śiva, through his grace, should evolve a Universe, at the end of each eon, for the benefit of the flock of souls who have not attained the balancing of their deeds and release in previous existences of the phenomenal Universe.

At the commencement of each eon 'the unconscious souls shrouded in that primordial darkness are responsible—in some inexplicable fashion—for the old, eternal deeds, the fruit of which must be consumed by each at the time of its maturity' (Tape, Śādānanda, p. 65).

The S.F., which of all the texts gives the clearest exposition of this Dravidian method of dealing with the soul's state of 'original sin,' does so by merely saying that it is the soul's natural state; that there is no assignable cause for it; that, while the Deity is the creator, the soul is the natural state, just as the cost of rust is natural to copper (Hosington, p. 149).

(b) Method and source of creation.—Absolute Intelligence being having been accepted by the Dravidians as the highest philosophical truth that could be extracted from surrounding current Yoga, Sāṅkhya, and Vedānta philosophies, it became necessary to bring this philosophic conception into conformity with the religious wants of the people. The ordinary intelligence of the Dravidian folk—whom it was necessary to enfold in Hinduism—demanded a beneficent Deity, all-powerful and all-gracious, willing and able to save the soul from the haunting terrors of transmigrations in higher and lower forms, the awards of deed, and a real Universe. Realism—the banner of the revolt under which the Dravidian intellect fought against Aryan thought as it came to be conceived and, as a result, the so-called advaita, or non-duality, of the philosophic conception of Śiva had to become graduated down till it became what is virtually a form of dvaita, or non-duality.

The stages of reasoning by which this transition is graduated could hardly ever have appealed to popular imagination, or even to common intelligence. Sāiva philosophy, both to create the cosmological state as unreal, as the human product of universal māyā, and still keen to call its system advaita, or non-dualistic, was still reiterating the essential character of the cosmos and the object of creation.

The formulation of doctrines, as they first appear in the S.J.B., merely give the scholastic explanation of these terms, and teach the means whereby the middle term (in paśu paśu paśu), the 'bond,' or principal, could be annihilated, and so the soul, paśu, free from the fetter, may then unite with its Master, the Lord.

These formulated doctrines, so far as it has been found possible to extract a consistent account from conflicting interpretations, are as follows:

i. ŚIVA, THE EFFICIENCY CAUSE OF CREATION.—A First Cause is postulated from a principle of effect and cause. According to the S.J.B., because the Universe is seen differentiated into forms known as 'he, she, and it,' and undergoes changes of devotion, continuation, and invocation, it requires a First Cause; just as, when one sees a pot, a cause—the potter—is required. This First Cause is not however, reduced to the dualism of Sankara—One only without a Second—where the cosmos is a delusion conjured up as a dream by an unreal mayā. The Śiva system is, nevertheless, held to be necessary. He may be found on strict non-duality. Śiva is, accordingly, the Sole Cause, without any other co-operating deity such as Brahamā or Viṣṇu, the Brahamānic Creator and Preserver, for 'we cannot find out cause for ultimate cause.' See Saiva Femen (modern cætheism). Śiva stands supreme; all the deities of later Brahamanism are merely of the nature of highest souls, dependent on Śiva to carry out his discretion. It is by the source from which the cosmos is energized throughout its course of creation, preservation, and invocation. He is never the object of thought, he remains only pure Subject. He is neither spiritual form, nor he formless (S.P. iv.).

Almost the first—the ever repeated—verse of the Kural declares: 'He has neither like nor dislike (desires nor non-desires). To the question, Has God form or no form, or is He both form and formless? we find the answer, 'He has all the above three and none of these' (S.J.B.). It is also declared that 'He is form and not form, but to those who know Him He has the form of knowledge' (T.A.P. iv. 1). He is also said to be 'uncomprehensible by the grossest, by His minutestions, by His great grace, and in the benefits He confers' (S.P. i. 1). No other spirit nor form, 'being Absolute Being (or sad) or pure Subject, he can never be the object of cognition' (Hosington, S.F. xi). The full definition of Śiva is, then: One, is, 'That which is perceived by the senses is a-sat (foot-Being) or Changeable, or is perceived not so perceived does not exist. God is neither the one nor the other, and hence called Śiva Sat (pure Being) by the wise, chit (pure Intelligence) or Siva, when not perceived by the human mind, and chit (Being) when perceived by divine intelligence' (S.J.B. vi.). He is, as transcendent Being, in inseparable connection with dispersions or higher energies, the atman, satkāta, of being, Intelligence, and Bliss, or Sat, chit, ānanda.

Notwithstanding these fundamental doctrines of the advaita nature of Śiva as Final Cause and Absolute Subject of Thought, he is, in one form or another, represented in the many Śiva temples. It is contended, by the modern Śaiva reformer, who sees that the 'worst feature of modern Hinduism is its idolatry' (Nalhawami, op. cit., Preface), that all these forms in temples are merely symbolic of some idea or thought respecting a Deity who actually remains formless. In popular imagination these transcendent forms are very abode of a deity, to whom food and offerings are presented for material enjoyment. The two idols to which popular Śaivism pays peculiar attention are—

1 Hereafter cited as S.J.B.
duality, had, nevertheless, to frame a theory to explain Effect from Siva, Ultimate Cause. To postulate matter (see Sānkhya) would have at once reduced the system to pure duality, inconsistent with Vedanta. Strangely enough, the Sāṅkhya was postulated merely the existence of an underlying basis of creation, an essence, a form of matter, elemental matter which was called pure (sūkta) matter. This pure or sūktic, or elemental, abstract matter, is held to co-exist with Siva eternally, producing differentiated spheres of action for souls. Pure māyā has, however, no connexion with souls, which are associated with an impure form of elemental matter (akin to the Sāṅkhya prakṛti) known as impure (asuddha) māyā. In this impure māyā inhere the malas, or impurities of souls—those of karma, or deed, and ātman, ignorance, the state or condition of the soul (ātman) (Tattva Kaṭṭālai, p. 14).

Siva, co-existing with pure māyā as an efficient cause of creation, is pure though (chīt), pure bliss (gaṇey), as postulates the Sāṅkhya, as well as having the dispositions or energies of desire (bhāva, action (kriyā), and knowledge (jñāna).

These are the highest of Siva’s energies, his parā sūktic, essentially connected with him, but over which the soul is aloof and alone. From the first two of these parā sūktic, thought and bliss, are successively developed the parā sūktic of desire, action, and wisdom.

All existence, from Absolute Being to earth, is differentiated as possessing essential natures, categories, or properties called tattvas. Of these tattvas there are 36 primary, which produce a cosmos of 60 subordinate tattvas. The 36 primary tattvas contain a pure tattva, which sprang into being by the grace of Siva’s parā sūktic. Of the 5 pure tattvas the 1st is Nādām, the male energy of Deity, developed from pure māyā; the 2nd is Vindu, the female energy of Deity, developed from Nādām; the 3rd, developed from Vindu, is Sādā Siva, or the state of Siva before assuming forms for the enlightenment of souls; the 4th is Īśāvara, developed from Sādā Siva, which is the obscuring element; and the 5th, developed from Īśāvara, is pure knowledge, the pure element which enlightens souls (Hosington, ‘Tattva Kaṭṭālai’, J.A.O.S., 1853). The Sādā Siva tattva is that in which the energy of desire and knowledge are equal, the Īśāvara tattva is that in which action predominates over knowledge, and the pure knowledge tattva is that in which the energy of knowledge predominates over that of action.

It follows from this that Siva may be taken as the efficient cause of creation, the parā sūktic being the instrumental cause, and māyā the material cause.

The process is explained, perhaps more clearly elsewhere, in S.P. (xxii). Here it is stated that the Nādām, or Śiva, or male energy, the first of the Siva tattvas, is developed from kruddhi, or germ, or pure māyā, by the operation of Siva’s parā sūktic, knowledge; and that, by the operation of the parā sūktic of action, Vindu, or separation, or organised material energy, is developed from Nādām; thence Sādā Siva, Īśāvara, and pure knowledge.

These 5 pure tattvas pertain only to the highest order of souls, the Viṣṇuṇa kālāras, who have only the single mala of ātman; for souls associated with the impure form of elemental matter—impure māyā—there is a five-fold investment, or pariśca, kaśchubha, developed, by the grace of Sādā Siva, of 5 impure tattvas: Kālam (time), Niyati (necessity), Kalā (determination), and—developed from Kāla—Vidvāda (limitation), and Rūgam and Jñāna, or touch (desire). In addition to the above five-fold investment, there is developed—by the grace of pure knowledge—first, māya prakṛti, the source of all the subsequent developments: (1) chittam (the will), (2) būddhi (the judgment), (3) ātmarūpam (the individuality or the I-maker), and (4) manas (mind or understanding)—thence—very much with Sāṅkhya—other Indian metaphysics—the 20 primary mental elements, tattvas, or categories, earth, water, fire, and ether; ears, skin, eyes, tongue, nose; tanmātras, or the rudiments, or elements of sound, touch, form, smell; and organs of actions, hands, feet, mouth, excretion, and generation. From these primary tattvas are developed, in the usual manner of Indian philosophy, the subordinate 60 tattvas, or visible physical external organs (Hosington, loc. cit.).

ii. The Soul. The soul is held to be enclosed from eternity in a fine or subtle body, or ātma śārīra. This is an inherent covering which persists with the soul through all its migrations. It passes with the soul to the various heavens or hells, where rewards or penalties for good and evil deeds are experienced, and it also envelops itself in a body or vehicle (ātman—"a word derived from ātman, 'atman,' because it is exceedingly small; and it is so called because, when associated with ignorance or ātman, the sense of the soul is lost in it."

The soul is defined in the S.J.B. (1), as "māyāyā yantra towram anām ātma", or as existing within the body as a māyā-made instrument. All souls are divided into (1) vijñānakalāras, (2) pralayākalāras, and (3) sakalāras. The first, or highest, order of souls—the vijñānakalāras—are freed from māyā and ātman (matter and deeds), and have only one mala, or impurity, of ātman, or nature of the soul. These souls have reached the sphere of the 5 primary tattvas, and the last births and re-births, merely await final union with Siva. The second class of souls—the pralayākalāras—and are under the influence of the three malas of ātman and ātman, which condition them to renewed births and deaths. These souls—sakalāras—which includes all human beings and the ordinary gods or devas, have the three malas of ātman, ātman, and ātman, and are subject to sense perception, having corporeal existences, wherein the ātman has to be balanced. The soul which has corporeal existences is described as proceeding at death from its physical body, or athāta śārīra, to 'undergo its experiences in heaven or hell, and forgetting such experiences as a dreamer forgets his experience when waking,' as a spirit, or ātma śārīra, in the waking state, passes as an atom in Its Śūkṣma śārīra state into a sperm-cell, and is reborn. The ātma śārīra is a third class of the sakalāras, and is the ultimate source of the ātman in the soul, and it persists beyond the other two strata. This ātman is an essentially inherent mala, or delimitation, which darkens the soul’s light or vehicle. Hence its source or cause is the Šūkṣma (S.J.B. ii. 310). This is also said to be a qualified soul of ātman prakṛti, prordial matter, can self-develop the cosmos.
intelligeuce, so that it cannot understand its true nature (S.B. iv.), its oneness with Siva.

The soul or darkness of the soul must receive enlightenment; two-fold deeds must be balanced, and maya sublimated, before the soul gains its final release (mukti, Skr.; matti or vidya. Tamil). This was, by the grace of Siva, sent into sense-perception with a cosmos.

'the maya, "energy" (Skr. maya="conceal"), in them will herself remove this darkness and cause and effect (S.B. c.)

There are ten imperfect forms of emancipation, including that of the gaining of supernatural powers—so commonly professed in India—as the result of acquiring the nature and power of the Divinity. This power over supernatural beings has been described as the teaching of some Saivas who profess that the soul acquires such miraculous powers; that, in fact, the emancipated one is so made a partaker of the Divine nature and attributes that he is able to gain possession of and exercise miraculous powers which are called the "sidddhis." Persons professing to wield such magical powers are not infrequently found in India, and there is in it a generally prevailing mixture of enthusiasm and fraud" (Pope, T.V. p. xiii).

In the recognized form of emancipation, or union with the Deity, an essential feature of the Saiva religion is that there is no annihilation of the soul, but its individuality or egoism is lost—"its karma has been extinguished. Its identity is lost but not itself" (Nallaswami, S.B. p. 69).

The soul has, as the result of release, this conscious immortality in a separate existence; for, although sharing the blessedness and wisdom of the supreme, it is not mingled with His essence" (Pope, T.V. p. ix).

S.F. (lxiii) says that the soul, when freed, 'is closely united with the higher knowledge, the pâramây. by which it is illuminated, and in whom it has a firm footing—and the soul becomes immutably united with Him. The pâramây, therefore, in the grace of Siva and Siva there is neither duality nor non-duality. The union is to be held similar to that seen when the words tail, 'foot,' (soul), and tail, (Siva), are joined; according to the rules of Tamil phonetics, the combined word becomes tail, the foot becoming united into foot; 'so consider the union of soul and Siva' (vil. 77).

Before the soul passes to its eternal rest in Siva, it is a jiva musthâya, 'freed from life,' but living 'in the body still for a little while, but in a restful state, and power, and faculty, with the Infinite Eternal. He has put off his rich garments and adornments, is besmeared with white ashes, and wears the peculiar habiliments of the ascetic. From his head depends the braided lock of the Saiva ascetic; one hand grasps the staff, and the other the mendicant's bowl; he has for ever renounced the world—all the worlds—sava Siva's self—"Pope from Varadaraj Purâna (T.V. p. xili)."

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DREAMS AND SLEEP.

Introductory (A. LANG and A. E. TAYLOR), p. 29.

American.—See DIVINATION (American).


Egyptian (G. FOUCHART), p. 34.

DREAMS AND SLEEP.—I. General.—From the point of view of psycho-physiology, dreaming is only a part of the more general phenomenon of sleep, and cannot be fully treated except in connection with the wider topic. The physiology of sleep and dreams is still very little understood, as

will be seen by comparing the earliest scientific treatment of the subject, that of Aristotle, with the latest hypotheses of modern physiological psychology.

According to Aristotle (de Somno, de Somnis, and de Divinatione per somnam), sleep is a
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periodical phenomenon found in all animals, and in animals only. It is thus an affection of that phase of mental life which is common and peculiar to animals, the faculty of presentation (ρεφανεστία). Its raison d'être is the need for perpetual to the waking state of central condition from the fatigue attendant on long-continued exercise. Since this state of fatigue attacks the whole representative machinery simultaneously, the condition is naturally associated with the state of waking, and must be sought principally, not in any of the special sense-organs, but in the ινέων αἴσθησις, or central seat of presentation, the heart. More precisely the recurrence of sleep is due to changes in the blood consequent on the taking of food. Food, when taken into the blood, evolves heat and evaporation; the evaporation is suddenly cooled on reaching the brain, and a movement of antiperistalsis is set up, in which most of the vaporized matter is expelled again downwards. It is to this that the muscular relaxation and sensory inactivity of sleep are due. Aristotle thus anticipates both the views that the immediate cause of sleep is a central condition of the 'highest centres,' and that the change is due to the temporary presence of toxic substances in the blood. Dreams are affections of the central organ of consciousness (ινέων αἴσθησις), which must therefore be looked upon as disturbances of the actual sensory percepts. In perception the affection is originated by a real physical stimulus; in sleep such actual perceptions occur sporadically, but they are not the main stuff which dreams are made of. The direct cause of the dream is the persistence in the 'common' or central sensorium of faint relics of the motions formerly aroused by actual stimuli. These residual motions are equally present in waking life, but are not accounted for because they are obscured by the more violent motions due to actual present stimulus. In sleep, where actual stimulation is excluded, the more minute affections of the system due to these minimal disturbances become apparent. Hence we are enabled to give a rationalistic explanation of genuine prophetic or 'veridical' dreams, when they are not due, as most of them are, to mere coincidence. Veridical dreams of impending illness, or recovery, or death are 'indications' of the coming event, due to the dreamer's sensibility to minute organic disturbances which are imperceptible to waking life. In other cases a dream may actually be the cause of its own fulfilment, by providing the first suggestion of an action which is afterwards dwelt on and carried out in the waking state. Veridical dreams in this condition of our intimate friends are accounted for on the ground of our special preoccupation with their concerns, which renders the sleeping soul exceptionally sensitive to those minimal disturbances in its surroundings which originate in the friend's organism. It is never permissible to ascribe such dreams to the direct agency of God; if they came from God, they should be specially vouchsafed to the dreamer (which is not the case), and their occurrence should exhibit marks of intelligent design instead of being, as it is, sporadic and casual.

The best modern accounts of the subject as a part of general psychology are perhaps those of Vollmann von Vollmar (especially good on the descriptive side) and Wundt (see Lit. below). The following summary is taken from Wundt.

Physical or nervous and other periodical functions of the organism, must be looked for in the central nervous system. It is probably a condition due to the temporary exhaustion of the available central forces, and has for its purpose the accumulation of fresh 'tensional forces,' which is favoured by muscular inactivity and diminished production of heat. A second condition is the complete or partial abolition of attention. (Animals regularly fall asleep if deprived of their usual sensory stimuli, and so do men of low mental capacity.) It is probable that this nervous or central condition is a specific alternation of condition favourable to sleep, its direct exciting cause being a specific alternation of condition in the central nervous system which is normally accompanied with a diminution of attention and of the effects of narcotic stimulation, and is most likely that narcotics produce their effect by inducing this central change. Hence Parkinzie and others have held that the direct cause of sleep is to be found in the partial use up of the oxygen of the nervous system effected by the accumulation of carbonic acid, the final product of respiration. In what region of the brain the assumed 'sleep-centre' lies is not known. The physiological changes induced are in general the nature of inhibitions, e.g. diminution of the activity of heart and respiratory apparatus, probably due to contraction of the smallest cerebral blood-vessels. This period of suspended activity begins about three-quarters of an hour after its commencement, and to last about half an hour. Then follows a period of lighter slumber of several hours' duration, which forms a preparation for waking. This period of actual sensorial and percepts.

Dreams, as a rule, one of complete, or all but complete, unconsciousness. Dreaming, on this view, is an accompaniment of the gradual transition from sleep to waking. Similarly, Volkmann divides the processes into five stages: (1) drowsiness; (2) falling asleep; (3) complete sleep; (4) lighter sleep, attended by dreams; (5) waking. The dream has two chief characteristics: (a) the memory images of which it is composed are hallucinatory, i.e., they are mistaken for real and present physical things; (b) the process of apprehension is altered, so that the actual percepts which enter into the dream are interpreted in an illusory fashion.

Dream-appearances, which Volkmann classes as hallucinations, are more accurately regarded by Wundt as generally, if not always, based on illusion; i.e., they are misinterpretations of actual minimal sense-impressions, such as those due to slight noises, to the position of the sleeper's limbs, to truffling pains, slight difficulties in breathing, palpitations, and the like. A slight intercostal pain is misinterpreted as a dagger, a movement of the foot for a fall from a tower, the rhythm of our own breathing for the rhythmical motions of flying, etc. The visual dream is less ambiguous about the condition of internal retinal stimulations, which appear to the dreamer as flights of birds, butterflies, fishes, etc. (The present writer does not believe that he ever has dreams of this kind, which Wundt regards as remarkably common.) Dreams of water are explained by Wundt as due to Urindring in the sleeper's body. Hence again the exceptional frequency of dreams of fishes. (The present writer, with general artistry in painting dreams of fishes at all, nor do several persons of whom he has made inquiries.) The common dream in which we hunt for an object that can never be found, or start on a journey and have repeatedly to return for something that has been forgotten, is explained as due to disturbances of the Gesamteffah, the general mass of organic sensations. The successive illusions of the dream can into a continuous story by association with memory-images. Wundt attaches special importance to memories from the immediate past, particularly those connected with deep emotional excitement. The dream of the recently dead by the emotion with which we watched their last moments and attended their
burial. (This explanation is clearly insufficient. We dream regularly of those for whom we have cared the most, though their death may not have been recent, and may have taken place at the other end of the world. Wundt also omits to take account of the connexion between events from our early childhood, even when they are of a trivial kind and not likely ever to have been attended with any special degree of emotional excitement.)

In general this account would seem to lay too much stress on the element of illusion and too little on that of hallucination. It is probably true that actual minimal sensations form points de repere in all our dreams, but there is no reason to confine the element of genuine hallucination to the one function of establishing links of connexion. Nor is association by itself a sufficient principle to explain the way in which the dreamer interprets his minimal percepts. The individual’s habits of diet, no doubt, largely determine the type of his dreams. A man who eats a heavy meal just before going to bed will dream very differently from one whose meals are light and who eats and drinks nothing for several hours before going to sleep. But, in the main, the cue for our interpretation of our dream-sensations is given us by our interest in the dream itself about the things and persons wherein we are interested. Hence dreams often exhibit a more rigidly logical sequence of events than the facts of waking life. Since the ordinary avenues of intercourse with the extra-subjective world are all but cut off in sleep, the dream can follow its course without interruption, whereas in waking life we have constantly to suspend the working-out of a course of thought or action to attend to wholly irrelevant issues. In much the same way we may explain two of the most familiar peculiarities of dreams— their extraordinary vividness, and the curious foreshorting of time which seems to occur in them. The vividness seems to be due to the absence of the mass of complex and uninteresting detail in which the really interesting experiences of waking life are framed. The interesting presentation stands out alone, or almost alone, and thus engrosses the whole available attention of the sleeper; if we see a sunlit meadow, we see also the shadows that sweep across it, but in dreams there is no light without the shadow. So with the apparent shortening of time. The dream is wholly made up of the interesting moments, without the uninteresting detail which would form their setting in real life. We may dream, for instance, of eating dinner, but not dream each bite separately, though we should have to perform each separately in real life. Or we dream of an important interview, without dreaming of all the uninteresting and irrelevant ‘padding’ which would really spin it out. Hence the apparent contraction of events which would really fill hours or days into a dream which occupies a small time.

The question whether sleep is always accompanied by dreams or not is one which there seems no means of answering. The general opinion of psychologists appears to be that the deepest sleep is entirely unconscious, and that all our dreams belong to the phase of gradual return to the waking state. This is not, however, proved by the fact that we seem only to remember dreams which are typically vivid or are in some common experience to wake, like Nebuchadnezzar (Dn 2), with the firm conviction that we have had a striking dream which we are totally unable to recall. In many cases, it often seems that the last dream is suddenly remembered towards the evening. The cognate facts of hypnotism also show the fallacy of arguing that an interval from which we can recall nothing must have been one in which we were aware of nothing. Whether ‘the mind thinks always,’ as Descartes and Leibniz maintain and Locke denies, must, for want of evidence, be left an open question.

One of the most curious features of the dream is the modification of the central personality of the dreamer which not infrequently occurs. We dream that we are committing, with a light heart, misdemeanours or even crimes which would be impossible to us in waking life. Or a man may dream that he is a woman (or vice versa), and the assumed rôle may be kept up throughout the dream with remarkable dramatic verisimilitude. Or one may assume, for the purposes of the dream, the personality of some familiar historical character, such as Mary Stuart or Oliver Cromwell. Or, again, if the present writer can trust his analysis of his own dreams, the sense of individual personality may be temporarily completely submerged; the dreamer may drop out of the list of dramatic personages on which he is accustomed to look for his part in the world of affairs. This change of identity may be so thorough that it may seem to the dreamer that he is actually a person of another sex, or of another age, or of a different race.

2. In Greek literature.—The belief in the Divine and prophetic character of dreams is universal throughout Greek literature. In the classical language the exposition of dreams is regularly subsumed under μνειακα, as one special province of the art of the μνας, or seer. Aeschylus, writing early in the 5th cent., when the rise of ‘Sophistic’ was giving a special impetus to the glorification of a dreamy culture hereafter, may be thinking of a special origin in oneiroscopy among the chief things for which mankind are indebted to Promethus (Prom. Vinct. 485: κώστα μνειακα ες νευμα κα τραπ γενεσθαι, et.). In Homer the sender of dreams is Zeus; it is he, too, in the Odyssey, who of all Achaeans awakens the Acasta to an unlooked-for part in the story of Troy. (For of course Zeus is not named in this passage, but the Acasta’s dream is a general one, which is afterwards distinguished as the part played by Ajax in the second siege of Troy.) In the case of Agamemnon’s false dream, Nestor says: ‘Had any other of the Achaeans told us this dream, we might deem it a false thing and rather turn away therefore; but now he hath seen it in dreams awesomely himself, the greatest (Il. ii. 50–53). As the over-lord, in Homer, is lord by the will of Zeus, he is apparently supposed (without much positiveness) to receive from Zeus counsel in dreams, while other men’s dreams are of no account, unless, indeed, some accepted νευματος, or dealer in dreams, accredits them. The word occurs but once in Homer (Il. i. 63: ‘some soothsayer or interpreter of dreams speaks to me from Zeus’). In parts of Australia the natives believe that a supernatural being, ‘Kutchi of the Dieri, Bunjil of the Wurunjeri, or Daramnlun of the Coast Murring,’ may visit the medicine-man in dream or vision and reveal to him matters of importance (Howitt, Native Tribes of S.E. Aus-
The familiar Orphic doctrines, that the body is the 'grave' of the soul, and that it is only when free from the body that the soul awakes to its true life, led naturally to the view that in sleep the soul converses with eternal influences and communications from Heaven to which it is not accessible by day. This doctrine is specially prominent in Findar and Aeschylos—poets who stood in specially close connexion with Sicily, one of the chief homes of Orphicism.

Thus Findar says in a well-known passage from the Ορθρός (fr. 131, ed. Schröder) that the soul 'slumbers while the body is active; but, when the body slumbers, she shows forth in many a vision the approaching issues of woe and weal' (ἐν τολάοις ἀνθρώπου ἐκδεικνύεται, ἢ ἦμι σε ἐμείς ἀνθρώποι βροτοί). So in the speech of Drotina in Plato's Symposium (which is demonstrably Orphic in its original form) it is held that we require a fiery oracle to consults on to his revenge by threats conveyed perhaps in horrible dreams, and prepares the way for the enterprise by sending the dream. Clytemnestra misinterprets and dignifies her dream. The theory of incubation (i.e. by dreaming on a spot of special and proved prophetic virtue) is, in historical times, peculiarly under the patronage of Asclepius, and his great temple at Epidaurus is the most famous of the sanctuaries at which such dream predictions could be received. It was usual for the god in person to 'appear in a dream' to the patient and dictate the remedy, or even leave it behind him. When we remember that there was a widely circulated popular scientific literature of medical works addressed to the laity and containing directions for diet and exercise, and prescriptions for common disorders, we can readily understand the considerable repute obtained by sanatoria of this kind. Apart from these great sanctuaries, there were also private professional exponents of the science of interpreting dreams (ἄρτοκρατοι), who were regularly at the service of the credulous. Thus Theophrastus (Charact. xvi. 11) notes it as characteristic of the ἄρτοκρατοι, or δεινός, that, 'when he sees a dream, he utters it freely, and the augur, the doctor, or the augur who reads the dream, interpreter,' to ask to what god, male or female, he should offer prayer.' There were also, as with ourselves, handbooks of the science, for private use, to hand. Thus the time, belonging to or about the 2nd cent. A.D., has come down to us. Even apart from the performance of special ritual purifications (ἀνάδοσιςκρήσεις) to avert the fulfilment of evil dreams, it was held an effectual method of banishing them, as of baulking the effect of evil forebodings generally, to come out into the open air and 'tell them to the sky,' as Iphigenia does with her sinister dream in Euripides (Iphig. in Tauris, 2: οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἰδοὺ· ἐπίσωρα ταῖς ἀρχές τῆς ζωῆς). The same remedy could be practised against presages of evil of any kind, as is done, e.g., by the nurse of Medea in the prologue to that play (Eurip. Med. 67 f.: ὡς ἡμάς μὴ ἔπιλεγε ῥήτορες τὸν συναντήτορός μοί ἐπιθύμητον). The complete ritual involved purification of the bedroom and the dreamer with torches and hot water (cf. the barlosque performance in Aristophanes, Peace 1338: ἀλλά μοι ἀντικήνοις λέγειν ὄμηρον· ἐπευγαίρεται παγγαίνων ὄμηρον, θερμοί μεν ὀπίσω, ὣς ἐν διαφόρον ἀντικήνοις περιπατεῖ). The belief in the Divine and prophetic nature of dreams plays an important part in the Orphic religion and its descendant, the Pythagorean philo-

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the actual Socrates but not shared by Plato. Even the account of the dream of the youth may possibly represent an experience among the Pythagoreans of the late 6th cent., to which Plato would not have wholly subscribed. It should be noted that the famous dreams ascribed to Socrates in the Cratylus and the Lachesis are clearly of Orphic-Pythagorean provenance. The vision which warned Socrates that the treacherous left his soul would reach Athens on the morrow is manifestly the 'fetch' of the Lachesis, which is just leaving the island and about to join Apollo of Delos, the great god of Pythagoreanism. The other vision, which had Socrates 'practise music,' clearly comes from the same source, as he obeyed it by composing a pean to the Delian Apollo (Diog. Laert. ii. 42).

From the Academy the doctrine of Pythagoreanism about prophetic dreams would appear to have passed to the Stoics; hence we find Zeno advising his followers to keep their dreams as a test of their advance towards virtue (Plutarch, De Profect. in Virt. 12; von Arnim, Fragmenta Stoicorum, Leipzig, 1903, i. 50; ἡ τελεπαθία τοῦ ἱδρύτου ἱεροῦ τούτου ὄντες πνευμάτων πρὸ κατοικήσεως.)

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3. Savage and modern dreams.—These Greek beliefs or theories, like most of our theories on such matters, are only more articulate statements of the common conceptions of savage peoples. The Narraga think that the human spirit can leave the body in sleep, and communicate with the spirits of others (telepathy) or of the dead (Howitt, 434). The sleep of the body is the holiday of the soul, which, in sleep, as after death, can ascend to the spiritual plane above the sky, and is free from the bonds of time and space.

Among ourselves, people tell us that they have seen their relatives in dreams and have later come to and recognized them in scenes which they had never before visited in the body. In the same way Howitt writes (p. 439):

'An Aboorjwary man told me that his father came to him in a dream, and said that he must look out for himself, else he would be killed. This saved him, because he afterwards came to the place which he had seen in the dream, and turned back to where his friends lived, so that his enemies, who might have been waiting for him, did not catch him' (p. 439). One of the Kurnit tribe, being asked 'whether he really thought that his Yemite (spirit) could go telepathically,' simply answered, 'yes, I sleep, and I get to distant places, I see distant people, I even see and speak with those who are dead.'

The spirit of a man may visit his friends in his dreams, and experiences are common to most races in the lower culture (see E. B. Tylor, Prim. Cult., 1903, vol. i. pp. 397-400). The belief in the interpretation is, of course, reinforced by what Tylor calls 'doubt narratives,' namely those in which the theory of the experience is mutual. A dreams of B, B (awake or asleep) sees A in the circumstances of the dream.

Tylor quotes St. Augustine (De Civ. Dixi, xviii. 19) in a story told to the saint by a friend. This gentleman, before going to sleep, saw a philosopher of his acquaintance, who came to him and expounded certain Platonic passages which he had previously declined to understand. 'I did not do it,' said the philosopher, when questioned, 'but I dreamt it.' In another case a student in Africa was 'coached' in some Latin difficulties by Augustine, who was in Italy. But Augustine did not dream, or did not remember dreaming, anything about the matter (De Curt. pro Mortuus, xii.; Ep. civii.).

There are many modern tales of this 'man and event' experience which may be mentioned which were written out and signed by the dreamer and his mother, who was in the house at the time of the event:

The Rev. Mr. J. fell asleep in his club, in Princes Street, Edinburgh. He dreamed that he was late for dinner, and that he went home to the house of his father, Sir John L., in Aberdeen Place, where his father would not let him open the door with his latch-key, but it was opened by his father. He then ran upstairs, and, looking into his father's bedchamber, saw a man lying, dead, and found the father below game after him. He then awoke, found that he was in his club, and that the hour was ten minutes to midnight. He hurried home, and found the father lying on the floor, in a state of deep sleep, where he had lain without moving for some hours. (The Philosophical Magazine, iv. 50.)

'There have been some authorities who have given us the usual answers for the ascription of dreams,' answered the philosopher of St. Augustine's tale, Mr. R. answered, 'I did not do it, but I dreamt I did.' Sir John L. was dead when the written narrative signed by Mr. R. was communicated to the writer. Other cases, equally well attested (by five witnesses on one occasion, and by the dreamer) might be given, but enough has been said to illustrate this unusual type of experience.

It is clear that primitive thinkers could explain a dream experience only by the belief in an indwelling soul of each man: and, when the dream proved to be 'clairvoyant' (as of a place not previously seen, but later found), or 'mutual,' the theory would be corroborated. Persons with such experiences, however, were inevitably alive at the conception of spirits, both incarnate and discarnate, and manifestly this belief has been one of the most potent influences in the evolution of religion. As Tylor says (op. cit. p. 445), speculation passed 'from the human soul to the disembodied soul really comes into the presence of the sleeper' (or of persons wide-awake) 'toward the later opinion that such aphantasm is produced in the dreamer's mind' (or of a wide-awake observer) 'without the perception of any external objective figure.'

There are, practically, the two hypotheses: those of an 'astral body,' a real space-casting entity (1), and of 'telepathy' (2). But rationalist, if not reasonable, thinkers will dismiss both hypotheses as figments made to account for events which never occurred. These varieties of opinion, however, do not concern us. We merely record that dreams (with other psychological experiences) account for the animist or spiritual element in religion.

A man's dream comes true; he finds that what he saw in a dream was, though the man no normal means of knowing it, true in reality; he therefore infers: 'something within me can go out of me and wander into places where I have never been.' A modern instance, narrated to the writer by the dreamer, may be given:

At a ball in Stirling, some fifteen years ago, several persons were poisoned by eating ill-conditioned oysters, and some died. The husband of the narrator was among the sufferers. On becoming aware of his condition, he wrote and fastened up two letters to two different firms of stockbrokers in Glasgow, which his wife posted. On the night of his funeral she dreamed, and told the dream to a sister-in-law who slept with her, that she went to two different offices in Glasgow, and in each saw an open ledger, and on a page in each her husband's name at the head of a long list of curious names, of which she mentioned a few. They were the denominations of mines in the Transvaal. At the foot of each page figures were written showing the state of the accounts of the miners. In the one the amount was smaller; in the other larger; the amount was something over £2000. The lady had no idea that her husband was speculating till she saw the addresses of his letters to the stockbrokers, and, on seeing these, before his death she wrote to them, asking them to wind up affairs. To abridge the story, the stockbrokers, after examining the accounts, distinctly proved exactly correct.

The interpretation was by a professor of psychology in a Scottish University, who is the speculator that the husband often told his wife all about his dealings in gold mines, but that she had never listened, and the information was still in a dream, which she was convinced was possible to the dreamer.

When a dream discloses future events, it produces a great impression on many minds, and in unscientific ages is explained as Divine revelation. The Homer of the Homeric tradition, that true dreams come through the gate of horn, false dreams through the ivory gate, is based merely on a pun in the Greek. We now account for prophetic dreams in the mass by saying that, out of dreams of mere fortuitous coincidence is applied; while every one knows that, in telling a dream, we almost inevitably give rational shaping to what was not rational, and, generally, decorate the anecdote. The number of dreams about winners of any great horse race is so great that some must
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The dream played an important part in the life and religion of the Babylonians. In the dream the deity was deemed to reveal his will in a special way to the individual, declaring the will of heaven and predicting the future. The bard, or 'seers,' constituted a particular class of priests, and one of the titles of the Sun-god was baru terit, 'the seer of the revealed law.' Prophetic dreams, however, might be sent to the ordinary layman as well as to the professional 'seer,' and there were books for interpreting their meaning. It would seem that answers to prayer could be obtained through sleeping in a temple and invoking Makhir, the goddess (or god) of dreams. At all events, in a penitential psalm (WA.I, iv. 60, 2) we read: 'Revel thyself to me and let me behold a favourable dream.'

Another type was the dream to be useful, which was considered by Babylonians as a gift of the Sun-god, a means of obtaining knowledge of the future. The interpretation of dreams was taught by Babylonian priests and was connected with astral-astrological, mythological, and magical ideas, and was considered to have a religious and educational value.

In the Epic of Gilgamesh dreams play a conspicuous part. In the struggle of the Babylonian hero with Khnhababa three dreams are needed to assure him of success. The loss of his friend Enkidu foretold a vision of fire and lightning, and in the story of the Deluge the impending destruction of mankind was said to have been revealed to Utu-napišti in a dream. The historical inscriptions are equally full of references to dreams. The will of heaven was made known to Gudea of Lagas through a dream, and the army of Assur-bani-pal was encouraged to cross a river by the appearance in a vision of the goddess Istar, who declared: 'I march before Assur-bani-pal the king, who is the creation of my hands.' Assur-bani-pal himself, when overwhelmed with despair at the outbreak of the war with Elam, was similarly reassured with a dream that one night he dreamed that he was in Pisciaulia. The street was covered with blood, and Istar was driven through the past. Looking round, she saw the late Duke of Edinburgh, with whom she was acquainted. He said, 'They are taking the news to Clarence House.' The following day she read in the newspaper the news of the murder of the Duke's father-in-law, Alexander n. of Russia.

This aspect of dreams (if the facts are accepted) may, of course, be viewed from the side of Myers' theory of 'the subliminal self,' as stated in his book, Human Personality (1905). By those who accept, more or less, Myers' hypothesis some dreams are taken to be 'supernormal,' and bear witness to unexplained ranges of human faculty. In other cases they merely show that incidents which have had no trace on the ordinary memory are none the less treasured in the subconscious memory, and may be communicated to the upper consciousness through the mechanism of remembered dreams. If no man dreamed, it is probable that our modern philosophy never would have evolved the conception of spirit; while, if only five per cent of mankind dreamed, it is fairly certain that the other ninety-five per cent would remain an entirely mending.

DREAMS AND SLEEP (Egyptian)

1. Introduction. — Although dreams were not considered of much importance in Egypt as in Chaldea, Phoenicia, or the Hellenic world, the role allocated to them was much larger than is generally thought; they occupied a constant place in Egyptian life. The relative scarcity of information is a result of the nature of the monuments at present published. While the epigraphy of the temples furnishes only a very few official examples of dreams, we find (1) that, in spite of this scarcity, dreams are of constant occurrence in the literary papyri; and (2) that the instances of Egyptian dreams mentioned by late authors are proved by a correct excerpt from an Egyptian origin. These two points give us ground for thinking that the deciphering of the still unpublished papyri and ostraca will yield an unknown wealth of information.

Further, the study of unpublished ex votos stelae ought, to all appearance, to furnish large additional material on cases of miraculous healing obtained by the medium of dreams. If to all this we add the passages in our sources in which dreams are not expressly mentioned, but are implied by the fact that formule are employed similar to those used in cases of dreams related expressly as such, we are forced to the conclusion that the current ideas as to the frequency and importance of dreams in Egypt stand in need of considerable modification.

2. Classification of material. — Dreams in which the gods intervene directly may be divided into three groups: (a) unsolicited dreams in which they appear in order to demand some act of piety towards themselves; (b) dreams in which they give warnings of various kinds spontaneously; and (c) dreams in which they grant their worshipers an answer to a question definitely stated. The cases of unofficial magic forcing dreams into its service form a separate class.

This classification has the advantage of arranging the facts in a fixed number of groups, which bring into greater prominence the essentially Egyptian characteristics, and also help to decide whether a certain number of dreams mentioned in the Greek and Roman inscriptions can be regarded as really Egyptian. This is an important question to settle for the general theory of dreams.

3. Unsolicited dreams. — Of this first class the work entitled De inscriptionibus Thothis IV. is the best specimen contained in our sources. Falling asleep during the chase, at the foot of the statue of the Great Sphinx, the young prince heard the voice of a god. It promised him the throne of Egypt, and required him to repair the god’s temple, which was threatened with ruin. This story leaves no doubt that the accounts of Neotanemus, though handed down to us in Greek form (cf. Le Sens du DREAMS et de la Pleureuse, by J. Fontenoy, and a number of Greek Inscriptions, by J. Loynad, 1838, p. 122), is an adaptation of an Egyptian document. As in the case of Thothis IV., the god (under the form Anhuri) appeared to the king, and commanded him to repair a certain temple. This is a case of certain works at his temple. On waking, the king was greatly perturbed, and gave the necessary orders to have the work completed with all expedition. It is quite certain that this inspired legend sprang from the remains of a stele, like that of the Sphinx of Gizeh, on which the priests had had an account engraved of the marvellous incident that caused the repairing of the temple.

The case reported by Thubrac (de J. et Oeur, 28) of the dream of Ptolemy Soter belongs to the same category. The king dreams of a colossal statue which orders him to take it back to Alexandria, where it was formerly situated. He interprets this dream as a sign of power and freedom. It shows him that the Sphinx of Gizeh, on which the priests had an account engraved of the marvellous incident that caused the repairing of the temple.

The question of the absolute authenticity of these documents cannot be discussed here. It was proved long ago that the majority of the stelae devoted to dreams on which the dreams were made after Divine intervention bear inscriptions of a much later date than is attributed to them (e.g., the Stele of Cheops at Gizeh, the Stele of the ‘Family’ of Bakhtan, etc.; the Stele of the Sphinx, in particular, has been shown by Erman to be a new version of an analogous legend attributing an identical dream to another prince). It still remains to be proved, however, that these ‘forged’ documents are not adaptations of ancient inscriptions or transcriptions on stone of ancient papyri. The only important facts to be kept in view here are: (1) that official dreams admitted as a regular process this method of Divine warnings by dreams; (2) that numerous restorations of temples and cults were really the outcome of dreams actually experienced, as well as the object of divine foresight, as the will of the gods. An examination of the official texts relating to these restorations of monuments is needed, as well as a study of the parallelism of formule, that these cases are much more numerous in Egypt than is usually supposed.

Besides the above, in which the gods may be said to have been working primarily in their own interests, unsolicited dreams were granted also for the benefit of humanity. The revelation by a dream of the hiding-place of some wonderful chapter, or for use in funerary or medical magic, seems to have been the traditional origin of a number of formal or groups of formule inserted later in the great compilations which became the ‘Books of the Dead’ and the first medical papyri. All that the gods of Egypt did in such circumstances was to show the continuity of their legendary role of ‘beneficent masters of this whole earth.’ Their intervention sometimes took an even more direct form, warming the being given by the god to the chosen kings, who were the Divine heirs, or to important personages, princes, or even simple mortals loved by the gods. Sometimes they revealed the action to be taken in the hour of need, and also help to decide whether a certain number of dreams mentioned in the Greek and Roman inscriptions can be regarded as really Egyptian. This is an important question to settle for the general theory of dreams.

The famous Ethiopian Stele ‘of the Dream’ is the typical example of this class. We are told how Tountamon ‘sees in a dream in the night two serpents, one on the left, one on the
right," and how it was explained on his awaking that these two kingdoms were represented on the horizon by the two Egypt (North and South) of which he would soon be master.

In other cases the gods do not scorn to foretell happy events to certain persons in whom or whose descendants they are particularly interested—with a view to the good that will result for the whole of Egypt. The story of Satni, father of the great magician Sesostris, is an example.

"Now Satni went to sleep and dreamed a dream. Some one spoke to him, saying: 'Thy wife hath conceived, and the child she shall bear through thee shall be called Sesostris, and he shall be a denizen of Egypt."

Sometimes, again, a dream directly reveals the wish of a god. Thus the prince of Baktian saw in his sleep a draught of the sacred river, and said to his father, who was a wise man, 'Is this a sign that he had to send back to Thebes the miraculous statue of the god Khonsus, which had formerly exercised a demon from his daughter. Sometimes, also, the Divine spirit warns the king in a dream to avoid certain projects, either immediate or far afield, which would turn out harmful to the kingdom. However adapted they may be in non-Egyptian compositions, the dream of Memnound, the heir apparent, in which his dream-interpretation by Joseph ( Gn 41) are two good examples, the constituent elements of which are similar to those of Egyptian accounts of such Divine warnings.

The Egyptian dream lore has some descent from the stories of a Copto-romance—the fabulous life of Alexander: 'Then Memnound had the following dream, and saw this vision: he saw a lion loaded with chains and cast into a pit. A man spoke to him: 'Memnound, why dost thou not descend with this lion, since it is perverted to thee? Get thee up, and seize him by the neck of his purple.' Memnound's grief at this dream, and his convictions that the lion signified his master, were not mistaken—in the morning a messenger announced the death of Alexander at treacherous hands." It is highly probable that, if the legend is a genuine one, it is a form from the ordinary type of historical dreams attributed to the Pharaohs of national legend.

The same remark applies to the Scripture story of the dream of Pharaoh and the part played by Joseph. In the present state of our knowledge, there is no reason to suppose that this episode belongs to any particular reign in the Egyptian dynasties, nor even that it belongs, for a fact, to some analogous fragment of the national folklore relating to the legend of the Pharaoh of the romantic cycle. But Egyptianity is in a position to state with assurance that none of the elements of the story is a priori in conflict with the Egyptian data relating to dreams. We know from history that the subject itself (the periods of drought and fertility resulting from the annual overflowing of the Nile) was one of the chief interests of the Egyptian monarchy; the famous stela of the island of Denderah (the "Coffin Texts", e.g., in evidence that facts of this kind were of great importance in nonmonarchical religious ceremonies. We have, moreover, both witnesses to the vital importance of this matter—the former by warnings, the latter by acts of piety. The symbolic method of warning, in the form of dreams, and of giving the least hint or least sign, is analogous to that of the serpents in the Egyptian 'Dream Stela.' Finally, the Pharaoh who wishes to interpret the dream, after all the magicians and wise men had been consulted in vain (Gn 41), is likewise in agreement with Egyptian usage: the popular tales relate that, on the failure of the regular interpreters, the king applied at will to private persons noted for their wisdom, as, e.g., in the case of the wise old man consulted by the Pharaoh in the 'Story of Cheops and the Magicians.'

The interpretation of symbolic dreams was the business of special persons—the 'Masters of the Secret Things,' or the 'Scribes of the Double House of Life' (a very poor modern translation; the real meaning of the title is rather 'the Learned Men of the Magic Library'). At no time do these 'official dreamers' seem to have had the prominence that they enjoyed in later civilisations. As regards the romantic codification of the significations, things, and phenomena seen in dreams, it is hardly likely that Egypt did not possess lists of this kind in the temple, as a matter of fact, we do not possess at the present moment a single papyrus of the same kind as the collections of 'omens tablets' of the Chaldean civilization. It is not a question, of course, of the dreamer seeking for a theoretical system or anything approaching the Oneirocritics of Arcemidus or al-Ghazzal, etc., who could expect would be lists of facts and interpretations conceived on the model, e.g., of the horoscopic calendars.

4. Solicited dreams.—Of more frequent occurrence is Divine intervention by means of dreams sought and obtained, either in exceptional circumstances or in regularly arranged form. Good examples of the first class are furnished by the historical cases of kings finding themselves in a difficult situation, and imploing a god to grant them some help on the future in the dreams that they should follow. The classical inscription of Memenptah (Great temple of Karnak) is a good example:

"Then his majesty saw in a dream as if a statue of Ptah were standing before Pharaoh. He was like the height of... He spake to him, 'Take thou (it), while he extended him the sword, and hasten thou the careful heart from thee.' Pharaoh spake to him, 'Lo... '" (Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, Chicago, 1906, p. 54).

This passage throws light upon Herodotus' story (ii. 141) of the dream of Sothos, a priest of Hephastus, during his struggle against Sennacherib:

"...he put to the priests of the god, and informed them of his dream in a prayer, the model of which is given in Maspero, Contes pop. (see Lit.); and the appearance of the god in a dream was not an unexpected phenomenon, but a necessary consequence of the worship.

The rest of the story—the entering of the temple, speaking before the statue, excommunication, and, lastly, the response of the god—are pure Egyptian characteristics, and are in complete agreement with what we learn from this point from the inscriptions and popular tales.

The various sources of information that have come down to us prove that incubation in the temple in order to obtain a remedy or a magical response was a current practice, not only among princes, but also among private individuals. It is wonderful to find, once more, and in this connexion, how accurately informed is the usually believed. Before Egyptianological knowledge had supplied the necessary proof, the accuracy of Diodorus (i. 28) was contested (Wilkinson, Manners and Customs, Lond. 1878, ii. 256):—"...the figure of the god, in the temple of Memphite Sethos, was worshipped in a public fountain, and the priest, who was called the 'dream-maker,' would take water from it and write the words that were to be spoken to him at the following morning, in the ordinary course of his dreams."

The story of Satni tells of Maltiukanibbi going to the temple of Isattussi (Asklepios) in Memphis, praying to the god, then falling asleep in the temple, and receiving from the god in a dream a cure for her sterility: 'When to-morrow morning breaks, go thou to the fountain of Satni, thy husband; there thou shalt find growing a plant of colocasia; pull it up, leave and all, and with it make a potion which thou shalt give to thy husband; then shalt thou sleep with him, and that very night shalt thou conceive.'

This story is not simply a literary fabrication; for we have the famous Memphis Stela of Pasaenepth, of the Augustan period, giving epigraphical evidence of another case of sterility being similarly treated by a remedy revealed in a dream by the same god Isattussi.

By piecing the various texts together, we gradually arrive at a re-construction of the 'processus' of the Egyptian dream by incubation in the temple. The patient entered one of the sanctuaries where the gods were reported to give responses to those who came to sleep within the sacred enclosure.

Our information is finally verified by the texts discovered in the temple of Isattussi in Memphis, and of Thoth in Khnum. All indications of a specifically magic nature lead to the suggestion that the temple of Thoth Teo at Medinet-Habu, near Thebes (see Durham and Mercure [Egypt] and for the celebrated sanctuary of Isis at Philae, cf. a.p. 45. In Philae, we are assured by Petrie that there were special places in the temple of Bastet, in Siut, in the temple of dreams from the goddess Hathor (Itharlo) relating to the locality of turquoises mines (cf. Egypt and Israel, London, 1911,
p. 49, and Personal Religion, do. 1900, pp. 27, 81). But the same author is probably wrong in thinking that this practice represents a borrowing from ancient Semitic religion.

When the night had returned, the worshipper prayed the deity to reveal himself: 'Turn thy face towards me'; and besought him by his well-known virtues: 'Tis thou who dost accomplish miracles and things that are beyond the power of man, who givest children to him that hath none,' or 'Tis thou who hast created magic, and established the heavens and the earth and the lower world; 'tis thou who givest the means of saving all.' The god was adjured to 'hear the prayer' (and this formula is, in the present writer's opinion, decisive proof that the various stelae on which ears [sotni] are found are, after all, the same discussion on that point, votive offerings of the worshippers whose supplications the god had heard [sotoni] in cases of dreams by incubation). After these invocations, the inquirer waited for the god to come and answer him in sleep.

There is one important point still obscure. We do not know whether, as in so many other savage and semi-savage religions, the consent of the dream was solicited by the swallowing of some narcotic or intoxicating substance (see Taylor, J.C.S. London, 1897, p. 128). Locate the stelae in the two frequently quoted conditions—prayer and fasting—the former has been discussed. As regards fasting, it is almost certain, from a number of evidences, that the food was indispensable to the worshipper desiring a dream. It was originally based, as in uncivilized religions, on the idea that a man should give a pseudo-scientific interpretation to the hypnagogic to dreams caused by fasting; therefore it developed into the idea of moving to a more elevated state of existence. The formulas used are, in fact, the same as those used in the other cases (see Petrie, Personal Religion, 'The Ascertics,' p. 70, for the idea of fasting in general in the Egyptians of the later period).

The god next appeared in a dream. The usual formula is: 'The god N [or 'some one,' instead of the Divine name honorai causa] spake to him, saying .... The deity begins, as a rule, by specifying the identity and the name of the person addressing: 'Art thou not such an one, son (or father, or wife, etc.) of so and so?' (cf. Maspero, Contes populaires, Paris, 1905, p. 137, for the dream of Mahbattakhi, and p. 147 for the dream of Sorus, son of Panishi). When this is settled, the god next tells what should be done 'when morning comes,' and he uses no dark or symbolic language; indeed, it is with much explicit detail that he tells, e.g., at what place a sealed stone will be found, or a certain kind of box, containing a certain book, which must be copied and replaced, to be followed by a certain result, etc. The divinatory dream of an oracle of the type for interpretation is thus a case of oniroscopy, not requiring a metaphysical interpretation, but with the direct instructions of the gods in clear terms. It is by these examples also that the sense of the passage of Hermes Trismegistus is established, referring to 'these prophetic statues which foretell the future by dreams and otherwise.'

DREAMS EVOKED BY MAGICIANS.—Besides these official methods of soliciting dreams from the gods, private magic taught means of obtaining dreams without recourse to the lothier temple procedure. The papyri of later centuries have preserved descriptions of material details and barbarous jingles of words that formed the clearest of these methods.

Papyrus 123 in the British Museum, L. 529 ff., says: 'Take a clean linen bag and write upon it the names given below. Fold it up and make it into a lampwick, and set it alight, pouring pure oil over it. The words to be written are: 'Armuth, Luathlanonch, Anrenophrenh, Phtha, Archenthcthcth.' Then without touching the food, light the lamp and repeat seven times the formula given below, then extinguish it and blow all the smoke upon a lamp, giving none to burn, as I adjure thee.' (cf. Budge, Egypt, Magic, London, 1900, p. 216.)

Magic also taught analogous formulas of dreams on unspecified subjects from the gods of dreams. Res, whose figure is carved or engraved on numerous pillows on which Egyptian heads reclined. With these formulas we enter imperceptibly the domain of pure and simple superstition and the current practices of Egyptian society.

The same British Museum papyrus gives, in L. 64 ff., the method of dreaming 'on the left hand' (mummiform) writing on a piece of cloth, with ink made of special ingredients, a formula accompanied by signs; 'This, who givest children to him that hath none, or 'This who has created magic, and established the heavens and the earth and the lower world; 'tis thou who givest the means of saving all.' The god was adjured to 'hear the prayer' (and this formula is, in the present writer's opinion, decisive proof that the various stelae on which ears [sotni] are found are, after all, the same discussion on that point, votive offerings of the worshippers whose supplications the god had heard [sotoni] in cases of dreams by incubation). After these invocations, the inquirer waited for the god to come and answer him in sleep.

It is doubtful whether the more enlightened members of the Egyptian religious sects, whose gods lent themselves so readily to the commands and threats of men. It is universally admitted, on the other hand, that the dead, who always had power to come and give dreams to the living on their own initiative, were capricious, in common with the cumstances, of being called into the service of private magic.

Cases of direct intervention by the dead are not of great frequency in the literature at present known to us. The view of Pierref (Dict. d'arch. égyp., Paris, 1875, s.v. 'Songs'), that the hallowed papyrus of 'The Teaching of Amenemhet' has reference to an appearance of the 18th-lower, who came in a dream to instruct his son, is nothing more than hypothesis. The same is the case with the frequent references to a deceased man (this may have been a waking vision). The most certain cases of dreams adjured by the formulas found by Erman in the Berlin magic papyri are of dreams adjured for driving off the ghosts that torment children in sleep (see art. Contes populaires). The last papyrus of the Louvre, 3292, is, however, of a dead man (this may have been a waking vision). The most certain cases of dreams adjured by the formulas found by Erman in the Berlin magic papyri are of dreams adjured for driving off the ghosts that torment children in sleep (see art. Contes populaires).

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The magicians took full advantage of this readiness of the dead to evoke dreams. They did not employ all ghosts, but only those whose wretched condition and description of their habits, family, cult, or tomb, and who had consequently to beg assistance of the living and to put themselves at their service in order to exist (see DEMONS AND SPIRITS, Art. Egyptian). The most important attachment in necromancy to the spirits of shipwrecked people, suicides, executed criminals, etc. Most of the Egyptian books of magic include private formulas for sending dreams in this way (cf. the Louvre papyrus 3292, the Gnostic papyri of Leyden, and the late incantations in Greek). The dreams thus sent belong to two general categories; (a) dreams which torment and devour by witchcraft; and (b) dreams sent by a man to himself, perhaps with an ardent love, to encourage a loved one's fidelity, or to bring hostility to a rival or make him physically impotent. In all such cases the sending of the dream is usually complicated by a casting of spells through the medium of a figure of the person to whom the dream is sent (see Maspero, Histoire, Paris, 1905, i. 213; and the cases of 'love figures' given by Judge in his Egyptian Magic, p. 94 ff.). The whole combines, later on, with Chaldæan, Jewish, and Greek magic to form the involved processes of tabellae devotionis, where dream, incantation, and necromancy are all combined, the dreams sometimes, however, remaining the chief element (cf., on this difficult question, Maspero, Études de myth. et d'archéol., égyp., Paris, 1903, pp. 297, 311; and the fine studies of Revillout, 'Amatorii,' in Revue Egyptologique, i. (1881) 69 ff.). A papyrus in the British Museum commends the sending of love dreams by the method of tracing words with a nail 'taken from a wrecked ship' and then throwing them into the sea, or by incantation before a lamp filled with oil of a special composition: 'I desire to appear in the dream of the daughter of N. . . .' By gradual stages the magic adds to these spells a dream or magic death in his service spirits of demons or of ill-disposed gods, and we see developing the system of black magic
which lasted throughout the centuries in the Mediterranean world and in China.

This general theory of the dreams sent by magicians fits exactly in the accounts of pseudo-Callisthenes relating to the dreams of Alexander, and modifies the Egyptian nature—mistakenly contested—of the dreams that were sent to Olympia and to Philip. The first dream, sent to the queen, is accompanied by a ceremony of spell-casting with a wax figure and unctions of magic herbs analogous to all the previous accounts included above. The dreams of Anuk to the queen's room is purely Egyptian, and falls in with the theory of Divine conceptions by dreams described at Luxor and by Joüon. Yet Scaliger's idea was confirmed by Masson and Maspero. Finally, the dream in which the hawk is sent from Egypt to announce the birth of Alexander was equally in agreement with the mechanism employed by the magicians of the Nile Valley.

6. General.—It will be observed that in none of the cases mentioned as yet do we see an ordinary living person taking any part at all in a dream (giving a warning, coming from a distance, announcing an approaching death, etc.); there is nothing of the nature of the interview of Patroclus and Achilles (II. xxiii. 65 ff.). And, on the other hand, we have no Egyptian examples of the dreamer going to a distant land in his dream, except on a very few occasions during future events, or, in a word, playing any of the parts that are so frequent in dreams of other religions. Besides the dreams already mentioned, in which the dead appear, the only other apparitions seem to have been those of gods directing or giving general ideas in the clear language of earth, and, sometimes, but more rarely, calling the attention of the sleeper to certain symbolic figures that must be interpreted. We now come to the final question of what theory was probably held in Egypt as to the mechanism of the dream. No formal explanation has ever been given of this in any Egyptian text known to us, and there is little chance that there ever existed an exegetical work analogous to those possessed by the Mediterranean world. The Egyptian dream is not connected rationally either with the mechanism of omens, or with the theory of 'influences,' or with the process of 'intelligents.' It is a tangible reality and is regarded as such, without mysticism and, as a rule, without symbolism. There is not even any allusion, as by Penelope in the Odyssey (xix. 500 ff.), to the possibility of a fallacious dream. On the other hand, the absence of dreams in which the soul goes away or in which living persons appear is significant. It is perhaps true that the absence of the dead, or of other men, must have had dreams of this type, the fact that they omit to mention them in the texts proves that they did not consider them of importance. Now, if we admit, with Taylor (Prim. Cult. i. 121, 440; ii. 49, 75, 416), that these types of dreams are included in the list of the fundamental elements of primitive religious phenomena, it must be concluded that Egypt was already far beyond these concepts, in this connexion, from the ideas as to the rôle and nature of dreams cherished by the majority of contemporary African peoples. In the last place, the theory of the sleeping state, as present writer, after a careful examination of the Egyptian ideas, to be based not upon the separation or the journey of one of the souls of a human being during sleep, but upon the hypersonsiveness of the sleeping man. This fact may be of great interest for the history of comparative religion. There would seem to correspond, in short, to the sleeping state a special sensitiveness enabled an individual to see and hear beings that are always in existence, but cannot be perceived in a waking state because the senses are too gross. This would agree with the belief that on certain occasions or by certain processes man can actually acquire this lucidity, by way of exception, in a waking state (e.g., 'to see invisible spirits' by rubbing the eyes, or 'to read sealed writing' through the matter of the case, etc.). The whole hypothesis agrees, however, with the practice that we have established as fact or suspected as preliminary conditions in Egypt of other magical processes (as intoned form of incantation), fasting, etc. The whole question would thus come under the general theory of the ecstatic process. Far from being, as in other religions, a device for obtaining contact with Egypt was a state of lucid supersensitivity of the various souls contained in the individual. In support of this view, there is a very important phenomenon to be noted, viz. the ecstatic sleep of the sam, so often described or represented in the ritual and in the scenes of the famous ceremony known as the 'Opening of the Mouth of the dead.' It is during this sleep that the sam acquires the power of seeing and hearing the soul of the dead in all the forms which it takes, as the dreamer declares on awaking.


GEORGE FASCART.

DREAMS AND SLEEP (Tentonic).—Dreams played a considerable part in the lives of the Tentons, but their significance was only prophetic. They were thought to foreshadow events in the future of the dreamer or his immediate surroundings, but there is no hint that they played any part in religion. The idea that revelations as to the nature of the gods could be made through the agency of dreams seems to have been foreign to Tentonic conceptions, and the later mystical dreams of the Middle Ages must, therefore, be held to be a Christian growth. In Scandinavia, whence almost all our information for heathen times is obtained, dreams were not only divorced from religious considerations, but were regarded as the work of the wise men, or of magic. The art of interpreting dreams was in no way connected with magical powers, but was usually found in combination with a philosophical attitude towards life, or spirituality in connection with the afterlife. Thus, in the Laxdala Saga, Gudrun appeals to no witch-wife, but to Gest the Wise, a chief universally esteemed for his ripe wisdom, for the interpretation of her dream; and in the Hethmarringla we find King Halfdan the Black consulting his wisest counsellor about his dream. Every one, however, was acquainted with the rudiments of the art of interpretation, and there seems to have been a general consensus of opinion as to the significance of certain phenomena in dreams: thus Gudrun, in the Lay of Atli, says that dreaming of iron portends fire; and Hógni, in the same poem, declares that his wife's dream of a polar bear only foretold a storm from the east. The fact that most of the recorded Scandinavian dreams are of ominous import must be ascribed to the selective process exercised by the authors of the Saga or poem. But it is a fact that dreams were used as a literary device to deepen the atmosphere of doom which surrounds a fated house, was fully appreciated by them. So, before the catastrophic ending of the Atl (Atels) poems, the wives of Hógni and Gunnar in vain strive to stay their husbands by
the recital of their dark dreams; and the unsuspecting Athi wakes Gudrum to tell her the dream which foreshadows his own death at her avenging hands. In many of the Sagas the suspense before the recital of the dream is heightened by the manner in which the glory of the royal line in the dream of a lofty tree, many-branched, spreading all over Norway and beyond it. Saxo Grammaticus, in his Gesta Danorum, tells us of a dream of King Gorm of Denmark which has a similar significance, and one is also recorded from Sweden.

It is worth while to examine a little more closely the various classes of foreboding dreams. The simplest type is merely a dream vision of what is to come; thus a great blaze indicates the burning of a house, and so on. But the dreams most frequently mentioned in the old Scandinavian sources image forth the persons involved under animal form, showing how deeply rooted was the idea of the fylgja, the materialization, as it were, in animal form, of a man's spirit, which attended him through life, and could be seen in dreams, or by him before the death of its owner (see Soul). Thus, in Njáls Saga, a dream of a bear followed by two dogs is at once read as showing the presence, in the neighbourhood, of the warlike spirit of the two companions, Thróndinn and Eglissón, in the Gyllnagö Saga, dreams of two eagles fighting over the possession of a swan: the eagles are the fylgjur of the two rivals for the love of his daughter, whose fylgja is the swan. There is in other cases a remarkable similarity between this dream and that in the Nibelungenlied, where Kriemhild sees two eagles tear her pet falcon to pieces. Charlemagne's dream of the meeting of a bear and a leopard, recorded in the Song of Iceland, evidently belongs to this class. In other dreams, again, it is the guardian spirit, or a deceased member of the family, who appears to the living representative to warn him of danger or death—in two stories the warning conveyed is of a landslide, from which the dreamer is thereby enabled to escape. In later Christian times we find St. Olaf or one of the popular Icelandic bishops fulfilling this warning function. In the old Icelandic tale of Thórsfinn, three female guardian spirits come weeping to Thórsfinn, imploring him to be wary, for that his thrall Gilli seeks to murder him; but the warning is in vain. Similar is the last dream of Glandrian, the hero of Lay of Atholl, in which she sees dead women, clothed in sad-coloured woods, come to call her husband Gunnar to the realms of the dead. It is characteristic of the stern Teutonic conception of the workings of Fate that dreams are only seldom warnings to be profited by; often they are foreshadowings of an inevitable doom. The gods never appear in dreams until faith in their divinity has been extinguished by Christianity. On the other hand, we must note that evil dreams beset the god Balder before his death (Vegavanskyöa, in the Older Edda). Nightmares were not classed as dreams among the Teutonic peoples, but (and indeed frequently are) attributed to the actual presence on the bed of a supernatural being, a mara, alp, or trude, or to the witchcraft of an ill-disposed neighbour.

In Scandinavia, where the interpretation of dreams was a secular art, unconnected with either magic or religion, the introduction of Christianity did not lessen the esteem in which it was held. Thus it is evidently no disgrace to the Icelandic bishop St. Thorkill that he took great pleasure in the recital of dreams. In England, however, the study of dreams is denounced by an early archbishop, together with magical practices, soothsaying, and the like. That it held a lower place in England than in Scandinavia seems also clear from the absence of dreams as a literary device in Old English prose; in German literature the Nibelungenlied affords evidence for the same view on dreaming as prevailed in Scandinavia; but, on the other hand, we find Walthier von der Vogelweide, who, in his courtly, knightly poems, addresses himself to wise women who professed to interpret them. At the present day, however, Germany is full of 'Traumbucher,' giving rules for the interpretation of dreams, and especially as to the methods of detecting, in some detail of a dream, a lucky number in the State lotteries. These books have an immense sale, and it is a significant fact that in some parts of Germany the lottery agents themselves sell 'Traumbucher,' and that in Austria they have been forbidden by law to do so. In Francenia, the interpretation of dreams for lottery purposes is a kind of secret knowledge, very profitable to its possessors.

It is a firm belief in most Teutonic countries that to sleep in a new house, or at least in a new bed, is the best method of securing a dream; it was the method known in the Middle Ages, and was recommended in the heathen times. A curious variant of this practice was adopted by King Halfdan the Black. This Norwegian king slept in a pig-sty in order to cure himself of a dreamless sleep, which was considered a disquieting mental disease. In some parts of Germany it is thought that, if the dreamer refrains from telling a bad dream until after midday, its accomplishment will be prevented. The frequent refusal of persons in the Icelandic Sagas to relate their dreams, or their protests of disbelief in dreams, may possibly be due to a similar idea. Without parallel in Teutonic sources is the death-bringing dream mentioned in the Icelandic Ljósævinga Saga, where the dream had such power that the first person who heard it must die.

Certain nights, whose significance dates from heathen times, are considered the most important for dreams almost all over Teutonic Europe, especially the Twelve Nights (the heathen Yule), and Midsummer Night. Both in Sweden and in Germany it is the custom to lay a bunch of nine or eleven variegated flowers under the pillow on Midsummer Eve, to ensure that the dreams of the night shall come true.

**LITERATURE.**—W. HERZOG, Über die Träume in der altnordischen Sagenquelle, Leipzig, 1896; F. von WISSO, Völkerkunde der Gegenwart, ed. Berlin, 1902; J. Grimm, Deutsche Mythologie, Berlin, 1879-78; D. SCHRADER, Generalatlas der indogermanischen, Germanisierenden und slavischen, Wissenschaft, 1915, xvi. **DREAMS AND SLEEP (Vedic).**—The chief passage in Vedic literature for the explanation of the psychology of dreams in Brhadārataparvasa Upaniṣad, iv. 3. 9-14. Two theories are advanced: (1) in dreams the soul takes its material from the world and constructs for itself by its own light the objects which it sees; (2) in sleep the soul abandons the body and roams where it will, hence the injunction not to awaken suddenly one who is sleeping, for in that case the soul may not find its way back to the body—an evil which is hard to cure. For the later workings over of this passage in the attempt to harmonize these theories, see DUESSEN, Allgem. Gesch. der Philos., 1894 ff., ii. 271-274. For the present purpose the second hypothesis is not important. Its difference from the first theory is ascribed by Duessen to the poetic form in which it is presented. More probably the difference is deeper, and we have in these verses a poetic version of an extremely old belief frequently found, the idea that under a high stage of civilization, the existence of which among
the Vedic peoples must be posited to explain the efforts made, from the Rigveda onwards, to remove the fancied effects of evil dreams.

The Rigveda and in the Atharvaveda speak of an evil dream (dush-
scapna, duhsepyapnya) as a calamity comparable with sin, disease, and witchcraft, or are employed in the ritual for the expiation of it. From the Rigveda may be cited vi. 8-9, 99, 114, 1.
120, ii. 28, 10, v. 82, 4-5, viii. 47, 14-18, x. 36, 4, 37, 4, 127, 1 (the Rātriśukta, or rather its khaṇḍa), and 164. 1. The thirty-third Pārīṣṭhā of the Atharvaveda gives a list of hymns that destroy the effects of evil dreams: Atharv. iv. 17, 5, vi. 45, 1, 46, 1, vii. 100, 1, 108, 2-5, ix. 2, 3-3, x. 3, 6, xvi. 5, 1, and, as far as the abschnitt-matter is concerned, might have included also: vi. 121, 1-7, vii. 83, 4, xvi. 5, 2, 8-9, xix. 56, 1, 57, 1. The last two hymns are employed in this ceremony called svastayāga, performed each morning to secure good fortune for the king (cf. Atharv. Par. xii. 1, 5). 'For the most part these stanzas contain little that is distinctive. Typical is Rigveda x. 37, 4: 'O Sūrya, with that light with which thou dost conquer darkness, with that which is termed the fire of auras, that is, the light of the sun, the source of life and warmth, which, it is said, is possessed by all living creatures, with that drive away from us all weakness, impurity, disease, and evil dreams.'

In the hieratic literature the manipulation of these stanzas in the ritual is also quite commonplace. Thus at Aitareya Aranyāka, iii. 2, 4, 18, one who has had an evil dream is ordered to fast, cook a pot of rice in milk, make oblations of it, each accompanied by a verse of the Rātriśukta, feast the Brahmanas, and cast the leavings of the oblation. Similar directions are given in Śankhāyana Grhyā Sūtra v. 5, 3-13, with the additional requirement that the milk must be from a cow that is not black and that has a calf of the same colour. Furthermore, Rigveda i. 89, 8-9 must also be recited. In Aśvalāyana Grhyā Sūtra iii. 6, 5-6 the oblation is of rice grains, and is made to the sun with Rigv. v. 82, 4-5, viii. 47, 14-18, or ii. 28, 10. With the first of these verses Śāmsāvada i. 141 is identical. Its muttering is prescribed at Gobhila Grhyā Sūtra iii. 3, 32 (cf. Śāmsāvadāna i. 8, 7) in case of bad dreams. Hiranyakṣevi Grhyā Sūtra 1. 17, 4 orders in a similar case a sacrifice of sesam and diya, accompanied by verses, one of which is equivalent to Atharv. vi. 101. Similar is the practice of Mānas Grhyā Sūtra iii. 15. Kātiyāyaṇa Sṛvanto Sūtra xxv. 11, 20 in the same case directs the Brāhmaṇa (of whom the benediction that consecrates him for the performance of a sacrifice) must mutter a verse practically equivalent to Atharv. vii. 100. 1 (cf. also Āpstiṃkarmiya Sṛvanto Sūtra x. 13, 11). The Rigvedākha i. 25, 2, 24, 1, 25, 1, 30, 1, ii. 33, 2, iv. 20. 1 also join the muttering of a number of verses to destroy the consequences of evil dreams. Noteworthy also is the fact that Śankhāyana Grhyā Sūtra i. 7, 2 includes most of the verses from the Rigveda in the list of verses to be recited each morning.

In the Atharvan ritual the ceremonies are more striking; of them Kauṭikās xvi. 9-13 gives a list. Vishnu is a bodhisattva; he is the god who has had a bad dream which has washed his face. When the dream was very bad, he offers with these hymns a cake of mixed grains, or deposits, while reciting the hymns, such a cake in the land of an enemy. On the stroke the Brāhmaṇa sends forth the elements: honey or chews stalks, or wears a single (red) lotus, or drives a chariot harnessed with asses or bears, or, wearing a wreath of red flowers, drives a black cow with a black calf towards the south (cf. Aitareya, ZDMG xliii. 18). Thus the actual discomforts of the requirement (see above) that dreaming of eating shall be followed by an expulsion is doubtful. Caland regards it as an omen of lack of food, on the principle that dreams go by contraries. But dreaming of eating is in itself a good omen (cf. Pischel, Album-Kern, Leyden,1903, p. 115 ff.). Pischel’s explanation, that it is the failure to find

is stated that Indra formerly suffered from such dreams until the Gṛhyākṣevi afforded him relief.

The ceremonies show that their purpose is not to secure immunity from the actual effects of dreams, but to prevent the imagination of the effects of dream. This view is but the logical result of the old notion that in dreams the soul leaves the body and actually undergoes the experiences which the waking mind remembers with the Vedic belief that sin is not only a moral delinquency, but much more, a quasi-physical contamination. Under these circumstances an excursion into dreamland must have appeared to the Vedic mind as fraught with possible dangers. The methods taken to remove them naturally resemble the attempts to remove actual impurities, physical or spiritual—viz. ablutions and the transferring of the burden to another. The latter means, which is symbolized in the Atharvan ritual by the depositing of the cake of the enemy’s land, is expressed in the Rigveda itself, vii. 47, 14-18, by the prayer to Uṣas (Dawn) to transfer the evil dream to Tīrta Aptya, the scape-goat of the gods. For this mythological concept the Atharvaṇe and in particular the Gobhila Brahmana suggests that the last stanza is a human enemy. In some cases apparently the contamination arises from association with spirits of the dead. Thus at Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa xiii. 8, 4, 4, persons returning from a funeral, among other precautions to escape the unclean influences, wipe themselves with an apamārga plant, implored it to drive away, among other evils, bad dreams. The association with the world of Vayna may also be seen in Atharv. vi. 46, xix. 56; and it is most probable that the ‘friend’ of Rigv. ii. 28, 10 (= Mahārājan Śivatiḥ ii. 229, 3) who speaks to one of danger in sleep, and against whom Vayna’s protection is implored, is a departed spirit.

Auspicious dreams naturally appear much less frequently in the ritual. At Chhandogya Upaniṣad v. 2, 8-9 it is stated that if, during the progress of a sacrifice intended to procure the fulfillment of a wish, the sacrificer sees in his dreams a woman, he may infer the success of his sacrifice.

Divination by means of dreams is attested by Śāmsāvadāna iv. 1-4-2-2, where two ceremonies are described that ensure prophetic dreams.

Dreams as omens.—That the interpretation of dreams must have begun to occupy the attention of the Brāhmaṇas at a very early period is implied by the fact that a certain dream character is an omen of an ornament, or the weaving of a garland (for explanation of these omens from the later literature, cf. Pischel, ZDMG xl. 111). The Atharvaṇa Arāṇyaka ii. 4, 2, 16 ff. gives a number of dreams that forebode death; e.g., if a person sees a black man with black teeth and that men kills him, if a bear kills him, if a monkey jumps on him, if he is carried swiftly by the wind, if he swallows gold (symbolic of the wealth and the character of the subject), if he eats honey or chews stalks, or wears a single (red) lotus, or drives a chariot harnessed with asses or bears, or, wearing a wreath of red flowers, drives a black cow with a black calf towards the south (cf. Aitareya, ZDMG xliii. 18). Thus the actual discomforts of the requirement (see above) that dreaming of eating shall be followed by an expulsion is doubtful. Caland regards it as an omen of lack of food, on the principle that dreams go by contraries. But dreaming of eating is in itself a good omen (cf. Pischel, Album-Kern, Leyden,1903, p. 115 ff.). Pischel’s explanation, that it is the failure to find
in the morning the food dreamt of which constitutes the omen, seems forced. The commentator
who wrote that (Atharv. vii. 106) he looks around as if he had eaten food, suggests a
different explanation. His soul has incantiously
eaten food—an act surrounded by superstitious
practices because of the supposed danger of the
enemies (the Parulaka and others) but, the Aborigines
of the tropical type of the Indian face and head;
migrants from lowlands to uplands develop round-
headedness; from the temperate zone to the tropics
man develops frizzly hair, and so on. The most
obvious of these innate adaptations, physically
logically produced, to the environment is pigmentation.

The skin of man is graded in colour from the
Equator to the Pole. The deeper pigmentation of the
tropical skin is a protection against the
actinic rays of the sun; the bluntness of northern
races, like the white colour of Arctic animals,
retains the heat of the body.

If we followed the analogy of the animal, we
should have to take into account the fact that a
mechanical intelligence enables it to obviate certain
disadvantages of its natural covering. The animal
never exposes itself unnecessarily; its work, in
the case of the larger animals, is done at night, not
in the glare of the sun. Automatically it acquires
an artificial covering in the form of shelter. If
man in a natural state followed a similar principle,
he would be at no more disadvantage than is the
animal. A deeper argument applies to the use
mentioned above, namely, sexual decoration.

What these considerations suggest is that man was
not forced by necessity to invent. The reason is
that at once decor and instinct, and the latter
more. The conclusion is that primary use and meaning of
dress is not so much to provide an adaptation to a
climate as to enable man to be superior to weather;
in other words, to enable him to move and be
active in circumstances where animals seek shelter.
The principle is implicit in the frequent proverbial
citation of clothing to a house.

Dress, in fact, as a secondary human character,
must be treated, as regards its origins, in the same
way as human weapons, tools, and machines.
Dress increases the static resisting power of the
surface of the body, just as tools increase the
dynamic capacity of the limbs. It is an extension
and (thereby an intensification) of the passive area
of the person, just as a tool is of the active mechanism
of the arm. It is a second skin, as the other is a
second hand.

Further, if we take an inclusive view of evolution,
accepting no break between the natural and the
artificial, but regarding the latter as a sequence to
the former, we shall be in a position to accept
indications that both stages, and not the former
only, are subject to the same mechanical laws, and show (with the necessary
limitations) similar results. These laws belong
to the interaction of the organism and the
environment, and the results are found in what is called
adaptation, an optimum of equilbrium, a balanced
interaction, between the two. In this connexion
we may take examples from two well-marked
stages in the evolution of our subject, the
one showing a deficiency, the other a sufficiency of
the artificial covering of the body. A good observer
remarks of the Indians of Guiana, not as a result
of habituation, but as a first impression of their
naked form:

'At the Chaco Indians:

'The Indian is perfectly suited to his environment; even his picturesque costume and the ornamental painting with which he adorns his body is in perfect harmony with his surroundings. The colours blend so beautifully that there is no doubt whatever
that the Indian is of the highest type of culture, a very great degree, the idea of
fitness and harmony.'

If we qualify in the last sentence the word 'idea'

J. E. F. Im Thurn, Indians of Guiana, 1853, p. 194.

W. H. Gregory, Evolution People in Northern Land:
The Indians of the Paraguay Chaco, 1911, p. 65.
by the adjective 'automatic,' or 'unconscious,' we shall have a sound explanation of a very remarkable phenomenon. The evolution of man's artificial covering maintains a balance or harmony with the environment, particularly in respect to light, just as was the case with the naked Indian skins, arrived at purely medicinally, but through the unconscious reaction of the retina. Thus, there is a real continuity between the adaptive colour of the chameleon, and similar cases of so-called protective coloration. But it is primarily a mechanical actuating the environment), and the harmony which human dress may show with its surroundings. The selective process has not been conscious, but neither has it been accidental. It is the result of law. Equally unconscious in its first stages was the adaptation of dress to temperature.

This brings us no nearer to the origins of dress, though it clears the ground. Still further to simplify speculation, we may notice some prevalent hypotheses on the subject. Dress being a covering, it assumes, when instituted, all the applicable meanings which the idea of covering involves. But it follows that, as such, or as any, were responsible for its original institution.

There is, first, the hypothesis that clothing originated in the decorative impulse. This has the merit of being a fruitful idea. Though unconscious, it would operate through unconscious intelligence, automatic feeling. Stanley Hall found that of the three functions of clothing whose realization and expression he investigated (protection, ornamentation, and Lotze's self-feeling—the second is only for the most conspicuous in childhood. The child is unconscious of sex, otherwise this statistical result might be brought into line with the sexual ornamentation of animals. And, though it is unsafe to press any analogy between the civilized child and the savage, the savages known to science are, as a rule, very fond of finery, absolutely, and not always in relation to the other sex.

'The natural man,' says Ratzel, 'will undergo any trouble, any discomfort, in order to beauty himself to the best of his power.'

Dandies, in Thurn remarks, are about as frequent in the Indians as in civilized communities. At Fort Moresby, in New Guinea, young men actually practiced and encouraged it, to be smart and fashionable. In these spheres, indeed, it is chiefly the young, if not mere children, who express the impulse to decoration. Of the Dayaks of Borneo a good observer noticed that a 'a love of finery is inherent in the young of both sexes; the elderly are less fond of it and often dress very shabbily, and save up their good besides for their offspring.'

'But it is in accordance with the rule among animals that among primitive peoples the male sex chiefly assumes decoration. Ornaments among the Indians of Guiana are more worn by men than by women. The stock ornamentation is paint; scented oils are used as vehicles.

A man, when he wants to dress well, perhaps entirely coats both his feet up to the ankles with a crust of red; his whole trunk he sometimes stains uniformly with blue-black, more rarely red and white. He paints it with an intricate pattern of lines of either colour; he puts a streak of red along the bridge of his nose; where his eyebrows were till pulled them out he puts two big tassels. But that is not all; he puts a big lump of red paint, and probably he scatters other spots and lines somewhere on his face. Down is often used with red paint.'

But this analogy is not to be pressed, though it is sound as far as it goes. It applies, that is, up to a certain point in social evolution. Beyond that point the balance inclines the other way, and for the last five hundred years of European civilization decorative dress has been confined to women. During a previous period of some centuries—to be regarded as only a very preliminary stage, the only did the curve of luxury in dress reach its highest point, but there were attempts—spasmodic, it is true—to put down any tendency towards such luxury on the part of women, prostitutes being especially proscribed. But in our exceptional—growing, at any rate—considerable group of cases the rights of the husband. Thus we may infer, that in the last stage, woman as a sex has not only gained freedom, and the right to decorate, previously possessed by the courtesan alone, but has also shifted the balance of sex to a more permanent and efficient position. The story of woman's unconscious struggle for a monopoly of beauty in dress thus illustrates an important social movement.

In practical investigation it is difficult, as Ratzel observes, to say 'where clothing ends and ornament begins,' or, on the previous hypothesis, where clothing springs out of ornament. Since either may obviously develop into the other when both are ideas, and as such, or as any, were who are responsible for its original institution.

Cases where one or the other is absolutely unknown might serve, but there are no examples of this. If an instance, moreover, of the presence of clothing in its original form is observed, it would be impossible to argue that clothing cannot be subject to the decorative impulse. In any case, there is the self-feeling, satisfaction, in the impulse to finery is only one phase of it.

The supporters of the ornamentation hypothesis of the origin of dress have an apparently strong argument in favor of the Brazilians and the Central Australians. They recently studied peoples possess no clothing in the ordinary sense of the term. But they wear ornament, and on special occasions a great deal of it. Brazilian men wear a string round the lower abdomen, the women a strip of bark-cloth along the perineum, tied to a similar abdominal thread. This is sometimes varied by a small decorative enlargement. The Central Australian man wears a waist-string, to which is tied a white tassel. Corresponding to the last in the case of the women is a small apron. Leaving the waist-string out of account, we have remaining the question of the orogenus centre. In both the ornamentation hypothesis and the concealment hypothesis this centre is the focus of speculation. If the Australian tassel of the male sex and the leaf-like enlargement of the Brazilian woman's perineal thread are considered superficially, they may appear to be, if not ornaments, at least attractions. But if it be granted, it does not follow that we have here the first application of the idea of dress.

It would be impossible to make out a case to prove that these appurtenances can ever have satisfied the idea of concealment, as on the next hypothesis is assumed. This hypothesis is to the effect, that male jealousy instituted clothing for married women. Ratzel observes that, if clothing was originally instituted for purposes of protection only, the feet and ankles would have been protected first. Clothing, he holds, stands in unsuitable relation to the sexual life; to wear complete clothes is not the man, who has to dash through the forest, but the married woman. The primary function of her dress is to render her unattractive to others, to conceal the body from other men's eyes. In the lower strata of human evolution he considers that dress as a protection from rain and cold is far less common.
DRESS

But, if we may argue from the practice of exist- ing savages, this hypothesis cannot hold even of the origin of female clothing. For we can, in fact, apply it to that of men. It is certainly a vera causa, at a certain stage in barbarism (the stage when wives became property), of the custom of making and selling women, and of confiscating all a maiden's ornaments and finey when she became a wife. But it does not explain the origin of the small apron worn in very early stages, or of the mere thread in the earliest, and we cannot deny these articles a place in the category of dress.

A frequent corollary of this view is that modesty is a result, not a cause, of clothing (so Sergi). But, as Havelock Ellis observes, "many races which go absolutely naked possess a highly developed sense of modesty." Andamanese women are so modest that when they want to undress to bathe or attend to their personal needs, they retire either from sight or put the new over the old, and then sit or lie down. Modesty in its original independence of clothing is, possibly, a primitive hypothesis, but it is still preserved. Physiological modesty takes precedence of anatomical modesty, and the probability of modesty is developed long before the discovery of any other ornaments or garments. The rise of clothing probably had its first psychological basis in the mental reaction of modesty already sufficiently formed of the "natural," bare, person. Modesty, as it were, is a sublimated and idealized sense of the anatomical modesty of women.

This last statement, of course, cannot hold of the ultimate genesis of clothing. But, once instituted, it was sure to coincide with emotions of modesty. Hence, though modesty and dress is a subject of little importance, except in so far as it has involved the creation of false modesty, both individually and socially, and with the advent of the new body-covering, dress, some importance attaches to it. When clothing is once established, the growth of the conception of women as property emphasizes its importance, and increases the anatomical modesty of women. Waltz holds that modesty is the primary origin of clothing, and therefore of modesty. Diderot had this view. Often married women alone are clothed. It is as if before marriage a woman was free and unmastered; after marriage, clothed and a slave. It is as if before marriage a woman was free and unmastered; after marriage, clothed and a slave.

The garment appears—illogically, theoretically—morally and physically, a moral and physical protection against any attack on his [the husband's] person. But the fact of dress serving as concealment involved the possibility of attraction by mystery. Even when other emotions than modesty, emphasized by jealousy, increase, they may work together for sexual attraction.

The social fear of trepassing disgust combined easily and perfectly with the instinctual one, so that there is a double object of concealment and attracting. It is so with the little apron of the young savage. The brightness of the attraction is indeed a logical outcome of the fear of evoking disgust.

Similarly we find in the most primitive clothing a curious inter-mixture of concealment, protection, decoration, and advertising. As has been hinted when an aperturesence has come to be attached to the sexual area, the resulting psychical reactions are significant. In the previous natural stage there is no such addition to the natural stimulus, first by sexual attraction or signification, and later by decoration or veiling. In the mind of the subject also there comes the consciousness of sex, and later the enhancing of self-feeling, which is the case of dress generally, and not merely sexual, is distributed throughout the personality. The subject's material personality is increased by clothing, and his psychi- cal reaction is proportional to this. The result is this rich complex by straining the balance between himself and others, the balance between himself and the women. The balance between them varying according to circumstances. But it is highly improbable that such impulses could have a place, except to the ritual, to the decoration, and of attachment and expres- sions. Their only means of expression would have been ornament.

Finally, there is the protection-hypothesis. Su- dden falls in temperature, rains and winds and burning sunshine, the danger of injuring the feet and the skin of the body generally when in the forest, and the need of body-armour against the attacks of insects and of dangerous animals seem obvious reasons for the invention of dress. But they do not explain the process of invention, which is the main problem. The cloak, the skirt, the apron, cannot have been invented in answer to a need, directly, without any stages. The invention of cloth was first necessary, and this was suggested by some natural covering. The only line of development which seems possible is from protective ligatures. There are numerous facts which only an independent origin in the decorative period, like the necklace. Here and there we find bands of beads round the ankles, knees, wrists, and elbows, the object of which is clearly to protect the skin and muscles from strains. The use of a strained muscle being caused by the ligatures, the suggestion of an artificial grip might naturally follow, and a system of ligatures would be the result.

The Negra wear black rings of cane round the knee—say, to give strength for climbing. The Malaya wear bands and ligatures to protect the muscles and prevent strains, as, for instance, round the wrist and the body. But the idea of an arm-ring is probably in use in striking and wearing of blows, but the idea of a cestus is unlikely to be the primary motive for ligatures. The Chacoes wear anklets of feathers, chiefly to protect their feet against snake-bites.

Wild peoples, in fact, understand quite well the limitations and the capacity of the human organ- in in respect to the encasement. We may credit them with an adequate system of supplying natural deficiencies, and of assisting natural advantages also. For instance, the Malays explain the object of the parasol, as preventing too much sun upon the head.7 The women wear cabunds (cane) or iron wire, representing a weight of many pounds. The women wear heavy bracelets of brass.8 It is possible, also, that in certain cases dress itself might have been developed from the same source. Thus, when we compare the following type of body-dress with the frequent use, in earlier stages, of a plant bough or cane as a girdle, we can imagine the possibility that the invention of the sheet-form of covering might have been delayed by the extension of the bandage-form.

The term of bandol, of the Satarang women, is a series of cane hoops covered with innumerable small brass links. The series encasing the waist fits close. It sometimes extends right up to the head. They are strung on rushes, and fixed to a cane network inside them. Dense coils of thick brass wire are also worn on the legs.

8. Stend-Hagen, Fagan Races of the Malay Peninsula, 1906, i. 195.
But the ligature as a primary stage of sheet-clothing might have developed merely by adding to its breadth. Given a girdle, we might suppose the use of a belt at the knee or the hips, or at the waist. Among the various bands used by the lowest peoples there is a gradation of the kind. The armbands of the Indians of Guiana are broad cotton bands or strings. Yet there is no evidence to show that such devices were used even to the extent of the connexion of the belt to the skirt. The belt, has been the main origin of the skirt-form of dress. A skirt supplying its own belt is generally a late modification.

Examination of the earliest peoples inevitably leads to a rejection of the ligature-hypothesis. Every consideration goes to show that the earliest ligature was not intended to support the muscles. It is inconceivable that the use of strings in the Guiana example can be intended for such a purpose. In the next place, it must be borne in mind that the chief area of the organism with which dress proper is concerned is the central part of the body, the trunk. Now, the great majority of the lowest peoples known wear no clothes. Shelter is used instead. But there is very commonly a waist-string, and it is more used by men than by women. In most cases it is the point of departure for the evolution of dress, and the mechanism of that departure will be presently discussed. But for the origin of body-clothing it is necessary to find the origin of the girdle. The idea of a girdle at the waist is not an appendage, however broadly the skirt or trousers. This is certainly not its object among the earliest peoples, who have nothing to tie up. It might be supposed that the original purpose of the girdle was that of an abdominal belt, useful both as a muscle-ligature and to alleviate the pangs of hunger. But the earliest girdles are merely strings, and string is useless for such purposes. String, moreover, made of grass or vegetable fibre, or animal sinew or human hair, is an earlier invention than the bandage. Its first form was actually natural, the plant bough or stem.

It is significant that this waist-string is chiefly a male appendage, and that it is worn neither tight nor very loose. Both facts are explained by the purpose for which the string is worn. It is neither a bandage nor a suspender, but a continuous pocket. The savage finds it indispensable for carrying articles which he constantly needs, and which otherwise would encumber his hands. Once fitted with a waist-string, the body, as a machine, is enormously improved, being able to carry the tools of his daily operation and those articles ready for use as occasion requires, without hampering the work of that universal lever, the hand.

We can only speculate vaguely as to the series of "accidents" which led to the idea of the waist-string. It was, no doubt, analogous to the series which ended in the invention of artificial hands in the shape of weapons and tools, but it was certainly much later in time. The varied unconsciously ideas of holding, gripping, and encircling, which the muscular experience of the hand impressed on the brain, might have evolved the principle and practice of a hold-all round the trunk, without the occurrence of any fortunate accidents whatever. The natural position of the hands when at rest would be rejected by unconscious reason in favour of a more convenient spot, slightly higher, which would not interfere with the function of the hands. All downwards tapersing of the thigh, moreover, renders it impossible to keep a string in position. In this connexion it is worth noting that knee- and ankle-bands are used as symbols of the ancestor's wish and the styles of culture for the purpose of holding implements.

The waist-string, therefore, being earlier than clothing proper, and being, as we have suggested, the point of departure for the wearing of coverings, we have next to examine the mechanism of the supposed transition. The girdle as a holder being given, it would serve not only as a pocket, but as a suspender for leaves or bunches of grass, if for any reason these were required. The point to be emphasized here is that the process which suspender would suggest the suspension and therefore the regular use of articles for which there had been no original demand. If, for occasional purposes, a decoration or covering was desired, there was the waist-string ready for use. Central as it was, the decoration or covering would fall below it and be thus applied automatically to the perineal region. Similarly, the hair of the head is a natural holder, though much less efficient, and it is used to support leaf-coverings or flower-decorations.

It is unnecessary to enter upon a description of the various zones of the body which require protection, such as the spine at the neck and in the small of the back, against sun and cold, or the mucous membranes of the perineal region, against insects. The use of clothing of certain textures and colours is partly due to the skin being a thermometer, its temperature varying according to the external weather, and being an index of health. The skin also has a temperature of its own adapted to that of the body, and to neutralize those rays of light which are deleterious to the nervous system and destructive to protoplasm, is also out of place here. We may now pass on to consider the development of the evolution of dress has probably followed a thoroughly hygienic course. But no principles of such hygiene, except the very simplest, can have occurred to the primitive minded man. One of the simplest, however, we may admit for tropical races—the use of a protection against insects. The perineal region is most subject to their attacks when man is naked, owing to the sebaceous character of the surface and its relatively higher temperature. These facts, no doubt, more than anything else, are the explanation of primitive habits of depilation. But depilation is not a complete protection. Something positive is required. The use of bunches of grass or leaves is natural and inevitable, as soon as there is something to hold them, namely, the waist-string. A parallel method is the use of a second string depending from the waist-string in front and behind, and passing between the legs. The Brazilian strip of bast used by women, and the red thread which takes its place in the Trumai tribe, though it attracts attention like ornaments instead of clothing or clothing-like, according to the Steinens also satisfied himself, provide a protection against insects, a serious pest in the forests of Brazil. These inter-crural strings protect the mucous membrane, without, however, concealing the parts, as do leaves and grass. In the present connexion their chief interest is the use made of the waist-string. When cloth was invented, the first form of the loin-cloth was an extension of the inter-crural thread. It may be illustrated from the Indians of British Guiana, though it is practically universal, significantly enough, among tropical and sub-tropical peoples.

The Guiana man or woman's raw strip, called lap; it is passed between the legs, and the ends are brought up at back and front and suspended on a rope-like belt. The women wear an apron, called opaje, made from a string round the waist, and passing between the legs. The Veddás of Ceylon,

1 Unter den Naturvölkern Central-Brasilien, Berlin, 1894, p. 146. For an account of the occurrence of the branch, against insects, see Wilken-Plaete, Handbuch für die Vergleidhende Volkenkunde von Nederlandsch-Indië, Leyden, 1893, p. 47 A.

2 Im Thurn, op. cit. 191.

the later form of loin-cloth naturally superseded the earlier. A length of cloth passed round the waist and between the legs, the ends depending, was both more convenient and more comfortable. In the beginning there seems to have been two articles in one, was more easily kept in position. This is the familiar and widely prevalent loin-cloth. Secondly, it supplied a more efficient method of binding the muscles together, and being two articles in one, was more easily kept in position. This is the familiar and widely prevalent loin-cloth. 1 It may be conjectured, the use of a perineal cloth for men and of a mere apron or skirt for women—a distinction of the earliest date and generally maintained. As showing the practice of such confinement, it is enough to point to a common use of the earlier waist-string. The end of the organ is placed under the string, made tight enough to hold it flat against the abdomen.

The development of the apron and skirt is a simple extension (given the suspensory string and the invention of cloth) of the use of leaves hung from the waist. The frequent use of a rear-apron as a bladder-saving sheet is a hint that it is not without influence upon the skirt, which developed independently. A frequent variation is the fringe. A combination of front- and rear-aprons no doubt prolonged this. When the latter was developed, new methods of suspension were adopted, among them being one similar to that of the loin-cloth, the upper edge serving as a bandage. The use of the waist-string by women, for keeping an inter-erual cloth or tampon in place during the periods, may be referred to; but it did not lead to the development of any article of attire. One example of its use, however, is instructive, as showing how a temporary protection may pass into a regular appendage.

Among the majority of the Nyasa tribes a woman during her periods wears a small piece of calico corresponding to a diaper. The same is worn after childbirth. This is the case generally in Nyasaland. But Angoni women 'always wear them.'

The protection-hypothesis of the origin of dress may thus be adopted, if we qualify it by a scheme of development as suggested above. When once clothing the skin leaves a blank, the loin-cloth upon the abdominal region served to focus various psychical reactions. One of the earliest of these was the impulse to emphasize the primary sexual characters. It is an impulse shown among all the higher anthropoid apes in the majority of early stages in the observations at the attainment of puberty, and it is, as a rule, at that period that sexual dress or ornament is assumed. Among civilized peoples, in the Middle Ages and in modern times, the impulse is well marked by various fashions—the phallocrypt and the tail of the savage having their European analogues. A less direct but even more constant instance of the same recognition is the assigning of the skirt to women as the more sedentary, and trowsers to men as the more active sex. The suggestion sometimes met with, that the skirt is an adaptation for sexual protection, need only be mentioned to be dismissed. The Central African pubic tassel and similar appendages will here find significance, but it is improbable that such accouterment was their original purpose. Once instituted for protection, the other ideas followed. Another of these, which at once received an artificial focus, was the emotion of modesty. It has been observed among the higher animals that the female by various postures guards the sexual centres from the undersides to the front of the male. The assumption of a waist-cloth does not actually serve the same purpose, but it constitutes a permanent psychical suggestion of inviolability. Similarly, the use of any appendage or covering involves the possibility of being cut, and by the addition of decoration, or, later, by the suggestion of mystery.

Further than this speciation as to origins need not be carried. The forms and functions of dress, and the customs connected with it, will supply examples of the material as well as of the psychological evolution of the subject.

2. Material and form.—It is proposed to describe the types of human dress and the materials of which it has been composed only so far as it is necessary to illustrate the religious and social significance of dress as an index to psychological evolution.

If dress be taken to include anything worn on the person other than offensive or defensive armor, there is hardly a single known substance, from iron to air, which has not for one reason or another been employed; while for the purposes of decoration or protection against the supernatural, the very utmost use has been made of the natural covering of the organism, in the way of hair, dress, and the like. Skins, skins painted, fur, feather, and fur ornaments and amulets on or in the projecting points of the body, particularly various orifices. In the earlier stages two features are prominent—the savage is apt to regard anything he wears as an ornament, though it may be actually a protection. Also, the less body-covering there is, the greater tendency to painting, scarification, and tatooing. Having, as Gaultier said, 'no clothes to embroider, they embroider themselves.' As examples of the earliest stages the following are typical:

The Niam-Niam negress wears a single leaf only, suspended by a string from the waist. 1 The Indians of Central Brazil wear a string round the lower abdomen. It is worn after puberty, but it conceals nothing, of course. The women wear a little strip of batist passing between the legs; in some tribes the turib, a triangular decorative piece of bark bast, is worn. 2 Except for waist-bands, forehead-bands, necklets, armlets, and a conventional public tassel, shell, or, in the case of the women, a small apron, the Central African native nakes. 3 The waist-string is made of human hair. The public tassal is a fan-shaped structure of fur-slings, about the size of a five shilling piece. Being carried at corsehole by women, it serves as a decoration rather than a covering. The Arunta and Ningitta women wear an apron. In the Western islands of Torres Straits the men are naked; the women wear a tuft of grass or split pandanus leaves; for dancing, a short petticoat of split pandanus leaves is worn in one example. The Samos the only necessary garment was for men and women an apron of leaves.

The New Ireland men 'go absolutely naked'; the women wear aprons of grass, suspended from cinctures made of beads strung on threads or left over. A belt of leaves is also worn by the women. 4 The Australians of the South show an advance on those of the Centre. The Enahlali white woman's gaunia is a waist-string of opossum-sinew, with strands of hair in front. The Central Australian woman has not even a string. The Enahlali man's wayxep is a belt, six inches wide, of sinews and hair, with four tufts. Opossum-skin rugs are worn in winter.

Among the Cureti of the Amazonas, the men wore a girdle of woolen thread, but the women were entirely naked. The neighbouring Guaporé Indians wear a variety of belts being not only naked and the women wearing a short petticoat. 5 In other tribes of the same region both sexes were quite nude. 6

The costume of the only ornamentalization prevalent with the Lower Congo men is principally confined to a grass loin-cloth, and at the same time the two in one case there was a small apron in front and behind, and ear decorations of wood and metal. The Garo petticoat was less than a foot in depth. To allow freedom of movement, it was fastened only at the upper corners. 11 The Wankonda men wear nothing

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1. Ee Wilken-Platen, pp. 38.
2. J. S. Stanwix, J. A. I. XI. (1910) 221.
4. K. von der Steben, 1901.
5. Spencer Gifford, 570, 572.
7. Turner, Smilos, 1884, p. 121.
9. R. Langlois Parker, The Enahlali Tribe, 1905, p. 120.
bark of a ring of grass wire round the abdomen. The women wear a single head-dress, exactly resembling that of the Kadira. The women at Upoio wear no clothes whatever. In the Shortland islands the women are obsequious and submissive in their manners and customs, the more moral and strict they are in the matter of dress. The fact should be noted, in leaving the subject of the scantiest form of dress, as being a regular concomitant of saktobee or  

Variations of the most opposite character in the same stage of culture are a frequent problem. In some cases they may be accounted for by foreign influence. But any accident may institute a fashion. Thus, the Upoio women are entirely nude, but among the Akikuyu the smallest girl wears an apron. In tropical countries the use of leaves as occasional or permanent garments is regular. Several peoples, such as the Egyptians in the Delta, or the Inca, were clothed throughout the practice into an art. Noticeable details are the single-leaf head-dress, and leaves fixed in arm-  

The Samoans wore girdles of ti-leaves (Cordyline terminalis), gathered when turning yellow. Adorned with flowers, their figured marks are a suitable example of the adhesion to island scenery. The Nias-Nam negroes wear a leaf tuck to a girdle. Fijian women are sometimes dressed in a leaf-girdle only. Goor women of New Guinea wear a girdle. The Javanese of Chota Nagpur are famous for their leaf-dresses. When dry and when wet they are changed for fresh leaves.8 The Semang of the Malay Peninsula wear girdles of leaves. On festive occasions, figureets of Lioealal leaf were used to hold flowers on the arms. Flower leaves were fastened in the girdle and the head- 

The Kayans use bark-cloth, which they dye red and yellow.80 The women of the Barai, the Malay Archipelago, and Polynesia, the girdle of bark-cloth is widely diffused. The Sakai hammer the bark of the oak tree (Anlaria sumatrana) and the wild bamboo (Arvorda) so as to expel the sap. It is then washed and dried. The loin-cloth made of this by the Semang is three, folded round the waist, and tucked up the front after passing between the legs. Both this and the women's fringe leaves are worn by the Malayan strong, which here has been introduced.17 The Woowilu Indians make their clothes, the tounce and the sleeping-sheet, from the bark of trees. The women beat this on a smooth log with a mallet shaped like a club and having grooves which give to the bark-cloth the texture and appearance of a mesh. The better sort of garments are made of stout cotton, of many colours and mixed with the down and feathers of birds.18 Wasten women wear bark-cloth fastened above the breasts and falling below the knees. Formerly the Yedua of Ceylon made bark-cloth from the riti (Anlaria sumatrana)  

The 'shirt-tree' of Brazil is a Lycistis. Its glistening bark is easily stripped. From a length of the trunk a cylinder of bark is taken, and beaten soft. Two arm-holes are cut, and it is ready for wear. This bark-cloth is worn for clothes in Western India. The men of the Abara of Assam wear loin-cloths of bark. Bark-cloth was worn by the ancient Hindoos.18  

Various circumstances, which need not be detailed, make certain peoples adopt leather or fur garments. Against cold and rain these are still unsurpassed. The men of the Akamba wore cloaks of ox-hide before the introduction of the European dress. The Malayan women wore leaf-girdles before cotton cloth was introduced.4 The only garment of a Chaco Indian woman is a skin petticoat, but in cold weather a mantle of skins is worn.5 The Ainu use bear-skins for clothing.6 Arctic and sub-Arctic peoples, like the Eskimo, have made fur-dress into a very perfect covering.  

Such ready-made articles of early dress contained both the suggestion and the material of manufactured cloth. The animal, insect, and vegetable worlds were gradually exploited for this purpose. Animals like the sheep and the llama, trees like the palm, have both supported man and inspired his invention. Thus from the Mauritia palm the natives of the Orinoco derived wood for building; from its leaf they have made mats, nets, and hammocks. Its sap supplied a fermented drink.7 Materials which have complex possibilities are more likely to encourage the inventive impulse of man than is sheep's wool, and cotton, ready-made after agriculture and building, to acquire economical importance.8 The hair of domesticated animals superseded skins; cotton and linen superseded leaves, grass-matting, and the rougher vegetable fibres, palm, aloe, hemp, and the like. With the introduction of an artificial dress-material the savage stage of the evolution comes to an end. But for various reasons many barbarian peoples draw at times upon the older natural fabrics. In some cases, like that of the Sakai leaf-girdle,8 it is regularly used in combination with woven material. The earliest stages of the barbarian period are illustrated by the following typical account of home-made fabric, dye, and dress. The dress of the Fulas is universally the cotton cloths made by themselves out of the plants grown in almost every village. It is cared for by an instrument, probably imported, which is very much like a wire brush about 8 inches by 9 inches, and woven on an ingeneous loom. The cotton is dyed blue with indigo, cultivated by the natives, and is marked by a white pattern produced by tying portions of the cloth together before dipping it.  

It is significant that in these stages the form of the material leads to actualization of its possibilities, and this is brought about by a combination of economy, concealment, and decoration. The third type of the perincal garment becomes regular: namely, for men, the loin and inter-crural cloth combined in one length, and for women a cartridge. For example, the ordinary garment of Fula women is a single cloth, either folded round and tucked in under the arms or wound round the waist, leaving the breast exposed.31 This type has been largely used by both sexes. In an extended form it is the sarong of the Malays. The loin-cloth of men is the muroo of the Polynesians. Both garments have the same method of fastening—a double or treble wrapping round the waist. From these folded developed the suspended or belted skirts of women and kilts of men. A combination of this principle with that of the shoulder-wrap leads to the tunic and robes generally. The toga-form of the outer robe is an echo, in this method of wrapping, of the earliest folded garment for the lower body. The loin-  

Dress,
cloth proper of the male sex has an extremely wide prevalence. As an example, the tunic of the Woodoo Indians, or palfoa of the Mosquitos, is a cloth, 24 inches wide, worn by men round the body, and from it is woven a skirt. All the way from the legs from back to front, the end hanging over centrally. It sometimes supersedes the male costume, 

With improvement in cloth and consequent increase in lightness and folding capacity, a modification was made by many peoples, namely, in the omission of the inter-crural method. Extensive use of this difference in appearance except for the greater volume of the newer fashion. The two styles are often confused under the term loin-cloth. The second is the loin of the Malays.

from the loin-cloth proper were developed drawers and trousers, a type of garment not seldom found among women instead of the petticoat. In all these instances they consist of a loincloth and a modifiable artificial skin, the earliest addition to the natural surface, the primitive waist-string, is still visible. As a girdle and belt it supports various forms of underclothing; by altering its width it supplies once more its original purpose as a pocket. Mantles, cloaks, and caps in the barbarian stages are confined to their particular purpose, protection against rain, wind, and sun. In the latest civilizations, the loincloth or kilt becomes regular for outside life, the barbarian cloak is duplicated into the coat and the overcoat; the cap into the hat and the umbrella. Of the tribes of Nyassaland it is reported that 'the amount of clothing worn varies very considerably, from nothing to European garments.' Such a case will serve to combine in one short view some of the contrasts of the various stages and some of the principles of dress.

The young children of the Yao and Agong run naked. Sometimes one has a strip of cloth suspended from the waist-string. A man wears a similar loin-cloth, and a woman an apron, eighteen inches deep. Both are suspended from the waist-string. The more prosperous men wear calico from the waist to the knee, wrapped round the body and held by a belt. Sometimes it is extended to fold across the chest. Women wear a cloth folded across the upper part of the chest. Often men and women have two cloths, one for the waist, the other for the chest. The Agong wear the latter toga-fashion, a fold being carried on the left shoulder. The loincloth is worn in many forms—blue, white, and another colour. European calico is now used; formerly bark-cloth and skins. Men now wear a turban, introduced by Arabs. In the house a woman still wears only a head apron.

In spite of the underlying similarity of principles universally found, dress more than any external feature distinguishes race from race and tribe from tribe. While distinguishing a social unit it emphasizes its internal solidarity. In this latter sphere there is again, room for individual and communal costume. Some types of racial and communal costume may be sketched.

1. Brookes Low, Lc. 36, 37, 38, 40.
7. H. S. Harwood, At the Royal Institution, 1897.
8. Crookes, 125; Mouler-Williams, Brahmanism and Hinduism 1897, p. 395 ff.
10. Crookes, 125.

Crookes refers the writer to the following passages, and corrects Dubois' error (Hindu Manners, p. 730) in stating that the Muslim haters his coat on the right, the Brahman haters his coat on the left. In the eleventh century, 1890, II, 374; “J. F. Watson, Textile Manufactures and Cosmology of India, I (1890) 55.”
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Dress in the classical account of ancient Greek, and Varro of ancient Italian dress. It is significant, sociologically, that the classic type, characterized by the loose tunic and toga, which with some differences was adopted by the great Oriental races, and is adopted both to the Oriental ideal of repose and to the classic ideal of aristocratic contemplation, was discarded, as the Empire developed into the States of Europe, in favour of what the Greeks called barbarian dress, chiefly characterized by tournai—a dress adapted to activity. Trousers, the Sanskrit chalana, had been connected in India, as now in the East Indian Archipelago, with the dress of warriors and chiefs.

The early Hebrews, like the Egyptians, wore the loin-cloth, originally, according to monuments of the latter, of the loincloth form. Drawers developing from this were first used as a priestly garment. Together with all Semitic peoples and the barbarians of Europe, they differed from Greek peoples in this one garment, though becoming assimilated in the course of time. The loincloth was a shirt. Generally it was of the Greek type, and formed indoor dress. Overlapping by means of the girdle, it provided a pocket; it was slit at each side for ease in walking. It had two types, the long coat, corresponding to the ladanov, and the full-dress cloak, the meth, worn by worthy persons and the priests. Both deserted the toga type with increasing alacrity. It was similar, generally, to the Chinese and Muhammadan long coat. The early Christians wore the ordinary dress of the country. They always evinced a strong feeling against luxury, display, and immodesty in dress. They determined not unlike to their revolt against Imperial paganism and its luxury and vice, but to their own class-feeling and class-prejudice, an impulse of the pride in lower class conditions of simplicity and poverty. This impulse is paralleled in modern labour and socialist psychology, where the workman’s garb becomes a fetish of caste.

Early Christian literature contains stories of Christians being tortured for refusing to put on garments indicative of idleness. All colour was avoided in dress, except the ‘natural’ colours of the cloth. Under the Frankish Emperors a prohibition was enacted against the wearing of a combination of coloured garments. Such a garment gradually gave way, and the dress of the country, monotonous and more of the ‘barbarian’ type, even in the South, was still worn by Christian Europeans without any limitations, country and class being now identical. Among details to be noted are the following:

In Germany and Europe generally, till the 16th and 17th centuries, night garments were not worn; every one slept nude. Sixty years ago in England the use of drawers was almost unknown, and was regarded as immodest and unfeminine. The tight-fitting hose were the man’s characteristic garment. The doublet or jacket was replaced among the academic class by the long coat. An extraordinary variety of fashions prevailed from the Middle Ages onwards. Knee-breeches later replaced the long-robe, and the longer jacket the doublet. The peasant’s overcoat or his linseed gown went back to early European times. Finally, the modern trousers superseded the knee-breeches.

The evolution of material includes some abnormities in taste of the inst. Some extreme cases may be selected to illustrate the same. Among the

1 Hughes, DJ, s.v. ‘Dress’; see E. W. Lane, Modern Egyptians, ed. 1856, p. 83.
3 Wilkinson-Flyea, 42.
5 Chisholm, ed. 1875, s.v. ‘Dress.’
6 Acts of Perpetua and Felicitas, 12.
7 See Rawlinson, Art. perspic.; see Cymbarium, vi, 45.
8 W. Rudbeck, Gesch. der öffentlichen Stätte in Deutschland, 1827, pp. 57, 309.

Central Australians, human hair is used for various purposes, especially for the manufacture of girdles. The giving and receiving of it constitute an important right and duty. A married man’s chief supply is obtained from his mother-in-law. The medieval use of the hair-shirt as a mode of penance depended on the preservation of the fabric for the mortification of the flesh. Similar is the use of hempen fabric, sack-cloth, in mourning. In footgear an analogy is seen in the use of dried peas to make walking painful. The famous feather-fabric of the Nahuas nations, who lived in a paradise of gorgeously coloured birds, was made by skilled artists, termed amantecas. This feather-fab, with its brilliantly hued and stimulating patterns was used for mantles and dresses by the nobles and the wealthy, as well as for tapestry and similar drapery. The most skilled nation was the Toltec.

The interweaving of precious metal with dress-fabric is a luxurious custom, often merging in superstition. Thus Hindus and Chinese consider it lucky to wear gold, however minute the quantity, in some form on the person.

Colour in dress involves many problems of aesthetic, psychological, and biological importance. Behind fashion in colour there seems generally to be a principle of unconscious adaptation to environment. In warm regions, originally unconscious, were superimposed upon this. The varied symbolism of colour in dress has a psychological foundation. Towards the tropics the tendency to gaudiness becomes marked; subdued tones are preferred by inhabitants of the temperate zone. Conversely, there is adaptation to racial and individual skin-colour.

The Enahlayi Australians think red to be a ‘devil’s colour’, and thus have an unconscious appreciation of the powerful stimulus of red. Its erotic connexion no doubt explains its frequent use in marriage ceremonies. A natural association of ideas connects white with the purity of virgins and priests. The following are typical cases of doubtful origin:

Eline was a sacred colour among the Mayas; the priests and the sacred books were clothed in blue. At a certain feast, all instruments used in all occupations, and all children, were painted blue. The Yezidis have blue. Their strongest one is ‘May you die in blue garments!’ In the following example a tabo against mixtures may be involved. According to the Aharvades a combination of blue and red is a sign of sacrilege. Blue and red, however, were worn in the Hebrew high priest’s ephod, with the sash employed to separate the sacred from the secular.

The special colours of Hindus and Buddhists in Northern India are red and saffron. The Hindu abominates indigo. The Sikh wears blue or white and abominates saffron. The Sikhs wear indigo, or, if a descendant of the Prophet, green; never red. Tradition and caste, and race-feeling perpetuate such preferences when once established.

Superstitious reasons for wearing a particular colour are probably always secondary, as, for instance, in the following cases from India:

For six days before marrying the Indian Muslim bride wears old tattered yellow clothes, to drive away evil spirits. A wife mourning her husband after a long absence is dressed in yellow. Most Hindus of the West explain the custom of rubbing the body with turmeric in the same way. Among most high-class Hindus the bride’s clothes are golden; and, so is her hair. The Siwaikis wears yellow clothes. The Lamas of Tibet wear yellow, and yellow is the colour of Buddhism priestly dress generally.

A constant tendency may be observed for the colour, as well as for the form, of the dress of the sacred world to be the precise opposite of that of the profane. In later stages, asceticism is also in
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volved, and simplicity of form is combined with absence of colour in the ordinary priestly garb.

The purple of the Greek world, as worn by the great, and particularly by royal persons, is an expression of super-personality, as distinguished from sub-personal or the contradictory. Royalty among most races wears special colours as well as special dress. For example, the Malay rajas have a monopoly of saffron, for the Malay royal colour is yellow. White is regarded as 'more exalted and sacred'; it is used to conciliate spirits. It is believed at the same time that the blood of kings is white.1 As absence of colour, or the 'natural' colour of a fabric, implies negation or contraction of personality, so 'splendor' as in the various shades of crimson used by the ancient world under the one term of 'purple'—implies expansion of personality, and is suitable for festive occasions, both sacred and profane.

The negation of splendour is often expressed by black or dark blue. Superstition, when using these, relies upon their minimum of attraction rather than upon any optical adaptation. According to the Parsis, it is to be assimilated to the evil eye.2 The Gujarát Musalman believes that black or indigo clothes keep spirits away.3 In Roman Catholicism, as elsewhere, blue or violet is a colour symbolic of death. Blue is also connected with the external attributes of the Virgin Mary, possibly as mourning her dead Son. Such facts show a sentimental adaptation to circumstances. Red and yellow, being connected with organic growth, are the colours of well-being, and of the affirmation of energy and expended personality; the blue end of the spectrum represents the negation of these, in proportion to its deterioration in influence of the organic world. Where mythology and popular superstition has coloured theology, adaptations in priestly and other garb may occur: blue may represent the sky; yellow the sun; silver the moon; red the sacrificial blood, and so on. In social life, colour no less than dress or uniform becomes a distinguishing mark, either by accident or by design. The gild, the club, the social state (as in the case of the blue blousc and similar status-garbs), even the seasons of a Church, are represented by colour.

The following adaptations to sacred circumstances have much the same meaning as the injunction to wear 'decent apparel' on solemn occasions among the various tribes affecting the Malay miners in Malaysia is one forbidding the wearing of black coats, except for the payung, engineer-in-chief.4 Local incidents have much to do with the fixing of rules. In the archery it is possible that a sympathetic harmony with the white colour of the sacred metal is alone intended. In the next case, purity alone may be intended. The Druid wore a white robe when cutting the mistletoe. For a similar function the Cambodian priest wears white.5

The following is an excellent example of the principle of adaptation. The state to which the person is to be assimilated, with no doubt, the succeeding state of cessation of the blood-flow, white being used by way of contrast with red.

A ceremonial system, termed bereusong, is followed by some Dayaks in the case of girls at puberty. The girl is washed, and dressed in white. Then she is incarcerated for a year. During this period she eats only white food; the bunch in which she lies is white wood; at the end she is white herself. A feast is given to celebrate her release; at this she sucks the blood of a young man through a hamon.6

Green has been used to represent sympathy with the growth of green things upon the earth, as in many agricultural rites and spring ceremonies. As a contrast there is the Black Demon; this is 'plainly a mythical expression for the bare wintry earth stripped of its mantle of green.7 The use of green is also known to express the non-festal seasons of a religious year. Occasionally green figures as expressive of corruption. The association of green with certain forms of organic decay may have an added implication of modesty, the instinct to protect, though not necessarily to conceal, the sexual centres.

Most natives in India never wear shoes. Even the rich dispense at least with stockings. Leather is avoided on the external attributes of man. The impulse towards physical cleanliness finds particular expression in foot-gear. It is not so obvious in the case of dress covering the passive areas of the body. The religious rule of removing the shoes before entering a sacred place is identical with that observed in social custom, and the original motive is no doubt merely to avoid carrying dirt or dust into the house either of God or of man.

Head-dress and coiffure involve ideas of ornament and distinction in a more marked degree than any other forms of dress. In so far as these illustrate the principles of dress generally, they are here in point. The Kombs wear a head-dress in order to please the tso, the soul which resides in the head.8 The Javanese wear nothing on the head, which is regarded as holy.9 A Zambesi rain-maker never cuts his hair, for fear the familiar spirits may desert him.10 Fashions and superstitions are equally innumerable in the matter of coiffure. No part of the external surface of the body has been more variously manipulated than the hair. The coiffure denotes differences of race, tribe, clan, sex, age, and social status.

Flowers in the hair are worn by Dayak women; the hair is in a knot at the back of the head. Among Dayak men it is a common practice to grow the back hair and to part share the forelock.2 The Kayans of Horneo shave all the scalp except a large tuft of long hair which hangs down the back. How considers this to be a 'last remnant of the Chinse pigtail?3 The latter and the Americas use various of the ceremonial tuft are of the contrary in many tribes. The hair is either fixed by concentration or neglected by central indication. Similar principles have been applied in the varying fashion of wearing the beard.

Where the hair is emphasized as a human, or as a masculine or feminine, character, its aesthetic appeal is parallel to that of dress, which also emphasizes by various harmonies of colour and form the aesthetic value of the body. Particularly in woman long hair is regarded as beautiful, as her glory (cf. 1 Co 11). From savagery up to modern civilization this attribute has been emphasized by addition, made both by decoration and by culture.

False hair is regularly worn by the Veddas, who never brush, or oil, or wash their heads.2 The latter fashion, though nearer to the animal, may

1 Bacta, 51, 18.
2 Bacta, 51, 18.
3 Bacta, 51, 18.
4 Bacta, 51, 18.
5 Bacta, 51, 18.
6 Bacta, 51, 18.
7 Bacta, 51, 18.
8 Bacta, 51, 18.
9 Bacta, 51, 18.
10 Bacta, 51, 18.
11 Bacta, 51, 18.
be an expression of personal pride in the organism, not in society, since there is no puritanical desacralization.

The use of the fillet has two purposes—to confine the hair, and to prevent sweat from reaching the eyes. The protection of the eyes and the spine of the neck from the deleterious rays of the sun has been stressed in very early times. The general tendency is towards ornament in female, protection in male, head-gear.

Korean head-gear is remarkable. The men’s hats are lined with the breast warp with broad, straight, fringes, similar to the Welsh tall. The brims measure two feet across. The hats are as wide as a man’s head, and they are stained black, except in half-mourning, when they are string-colour. The court officials wear hats so fantastic that it is perfectly impossible to describe them. The women wear no head-gear, except for caps in winter. Such hats as the Korean and the modern European tall hat are the expression of ideas of the dignity of the head, just as was the crown.

4. Ornaments and amulets.—Though dress of the simplest description has an ornamental value, there has always been a precise distinction between dress and ornament. There is little possibility of confusion between them, whether the ornament is directly applied to the body or is actually an addition to the dress. We want to denote this rather than the wearer. Ornament is often de rigueur. No Hindu woman ‘would dare to hold up her head unless well provided with eight kinds of ornaments—pellets, necklaces, armlets, diadems, bracelets, anklets, and jangles.’ Lower races are fond of the necklace-method, using shells, seeds, and beads threaded on string. The women of Giana load themselves with seeds and beads in great rosettes. Almost as prevalent is the use of metal cinctures, which subsequently acquire the value of protective ornament or amulets. Originally they seem to have been an extension of the signature-principle.

Amulets are practically innumerable in their variety. They may be worn on the body or on the dress, and are usually abonormal in material. Dress itself may acquire the virtue of an amulet. The Malays write charms on paper or cloth, and wear them next the skin. The Mussulman and Hebrew amulets of sacred texts are familiar examples. The principle employed is that of assimilation of the sacred force by contact. The people of Surinam wear the ‘strong metal,’ iron, on their bodies, to acquire its strength. In armour dress reaches the climax of its protective functions.

5. Dress as currency.—In the absence of coinage, commodities are often exchanged in the form of mutual gifts, especially in the case of transactions which are more or less purely financial. At such stages any article representing work and intrinsic value is a suitable thing to wear or to present or exchange. In savagery, gifts of clothing are less frequent than gifts of food; in barbarism they are more frequent. The Trojans placed a robe on the knees of the goddess to induce her to save their city. In the East Indian Islands clothes are a frequent offering to the spirits. Blankets were a common gift among the N. American Indians. To show appreciation of an actor’s playing, the Japanese used to throw their clothes on the stage. At the end they were purchased by the donors, and the actor took the money. Blankets form the chief property of the Kwakuitl and Haida. They are treated as money, and may be used as a means of payment. The total value of the Nahuas was in the form of clothes and made-up clothes. The pelts involved in the payment of the tribute was one of the main aspects of the Nahua, ‘Rule of Life,’ which gave the people their name. Also a considerable amount of dress was annually exchanged in the Yukon by the people of the Indians of British Columbia, known as the Todtman, is a distri-

6. Dress symbolism.—Dress acquires ideal valuations from its various uses, materials, and associations. All languages are full of metaphors recording such ideas. According to the Sotopathy Brâhmanâ, ‘the priests’ fees consist of one hundred garlands, for that—to wit, the garment—is man’s outward appearance, whence people, who are not good sons, ask, “What can this be?”; for he is perfect in his outward appearance; with outward appearance he thus endows him.” This example well illustrates the idea that dress is both an expression and an extension of personality, in its superficial aspect.

The symbolism of the virgin zone, the girdle, the royal robe and crown, needs no illustration. In rare cases, an article of value used in exchange acquires the virtue of such objects as regalia and the Australian churinga. The cemupum of the North American Indians

1 Sanderson, in J.A.F. xiv. (1894) 304.
2 Dempster, in J. Thurm. 199. 3 Rickat. 507.
4 Ind. xxi. (1886) 6, pp. 2-4.
5 II, 108. VI, 4, p. 802 fi.
6 F. Valentin, Oud en nieuwe Oost-Indië, ed. 1862, ill. 137.
7 J. L. S. Kennedy, in American Naturalist, Philadelphia, xii. (1890) 678.
8 Jameson, in Brit. xix. (1896) 93.
9 Payne, ib. ii. 376. 10 II. ii. 465, 476 f. VOL. V.—4

5 H. Spencer, Principles of Sociology, 1876-96, iii. 357, quoting authorities.
6 II, 108.
8 Spencer, III. 386 ff.
9 Profeblues, 57-70.
II EBF xiv. (1909) 350.
event waves into them. The Iroquois supported the office of head-man-keeper, who was also or less a depositary of the history of the people. Every year the whole collection was exhibited and explained to the whole tribe. 1

The eagle-plumes of American warriors’ head-dress signified by their numbers and particular marks the achievements of the wearer. Similar marks of honour were made on their garments. 2 It is, however, misleading to characterize such phenomena as dress-language. Out of the extensive list of metaphors from dress only one or two types can be included in illustrations. The Acadian proverb saying of 16th cent. knight-hood contained the phrase, ‘Mon harnois me maison.’ 3 Besides implying the homelessness of the knight-errant, this also involves the application of dress and armour as external shelter no less than as bodily covering. The most prevalent metaphor in all languages, that of dress as a covering, often loses its force as a species of covering, and comes to be a synonym for the garment, owing to its constant use. In proverbs, the wisdom of nations and the wit of orators employs the simplest and the most complex ideas of dress.

In Malagasy the Shabihi proverb is used, ‘to cut out the tongue of the body, is the same as to cut off the English counting your chickens before they are hatched.’ 4 A famous Chinese book of moral instruction says: ‘Brothers are like hands and feet; a wife like skin and clothes. When clothes are worn out, we can substitute those that are new;’ 5

The metaphorical wealth of Indian literature is enormous. In the first place, dress is more than covering; it imparts an anthropomorphie value to the object. According to the Vedic texts on ‘Soma,’ the mixture of soma with milk, sour milk, and barley is a ‘garment.’ 6 Water, say the Upanishads, is ‘the dress of breath.’ 7 In the second place, there is no doubt that a good deal of mythological creation is due to metaphor, not as a disease of language, but as a deliberate use of association of ideas for the purpose of artistic and religious invention. Metaphors, like those of dress, serve, first, to personalize an object, and then to humanize it. There need be no confusion between the two uses; they are simply two methods of viewing one thing. Nor need there be any fetishism behind such cases.

On the other hand, the OT and NT use is purely abstract and literary. But there is no ground for supposing that this is a secondary stage, and that such metaphors were originally material identifications. The lowest savages, for instance, use metaphors merely as such. The pastures ‘clothed with locusts’; the heavens ‘clothed with blackness’; aucher ‘clothed with the sunshine’; ‘clothed with cursing,’ ‘with vengeance,’ ‘with drowsiness,’ ‘with strength and honour’; and flowers clothing ‘the grass of the field’—these are examples of biblical metaphor. Dress-metaphors may be morally applied. Clothed ‘with salvation,’ ‘with righteousness,’ or ‘with humility’ 8 is a pure metaphor. In Zorostrian texts it is said that the garments of the soul in the life to come are made from these parts and that person, 9

A beautiful metaphor like this is not degraded if it becomes concrete; it is merely translated into materiality. The great bifurcation of dress is sexual. Besides the personal symbol and metaphor which this involves (as in phrases like ‘petticoat government’ and ‘wearing the trousers’), there may be mentioned an attempt on the part of asceticism to

express the non-sexual idea. The attempt is made both in the idea of a ‘garment’ and of ‘garb.’ The garment selected is the long tunic, which survived here for other reasons, and the colour is white. Thus all indication of primary sexual characters is veiled; the dress not only covers but replaces the body. White is at once pure, but free from ‘mixture,’ as a mixture of all colours, and neutral, between splendour and shame.

It has been suggested 10 that the Egyptian cruz canasta, the symbol of life, is a picture of the kerchief. In the Hervey Islands a frequent name for a god is tatua manawa, ‘loan-belt.’ 11 A similar notion is that of the girdle, symbol of eternity, as the circle is of infinity.

The relation of soul and body is often expressed in terms of dress. The expression may be merely metaphorical; it may also be real. The body is not only a house or a tomb, as in some early Christian literature; more aptly is it an exactly fitting duplicate, covering the soul. Thus, the body, according to Malay psychology, is the sarong of the soul. Conversely, the destines spoke of the soul as a ‘garment.’ 12 In the one case the inner soul is a house, in the other case the body as a ‘garment.’

The metaphor that mortality might be swallowed up of life, 13 at the same time the body terrestrial is a ‘house,’ a ‘tabernacle.’ 14 The Déne Indian when sick regains his soul by the following method. His moccasins are studied with down and hung up. If the down is warm next morning the soul has entered the shoes, and it may be reunited with the body if the patient puts them on. 15 Here the presence of personal warmth, associated with actual wearing, represents the presence of the soul in the dress.

The metaphorical and symbolical applications of the idea of dress thus show an oscillation between very distant extremes, which may be summarized as on the one hand a sheltering house, and on the other hand an almost organic skin.

7. The social psychology of dress.—(1) The dress of magical dances. One of the free play of the social mind on the subject of dress in magical, religious, and moral opinion and ritual may be introduced by some such observation as that early folklorists regards weaving as a ‘religion of the loom.’ In other words, the operation has significance, attains attention, and may inspire wonder. But the ultimate reason is merely that it is outside the normal plane of ordinary human or, more exactly, animal activity. It is not because there is any reference either to dress or to magic.

The invention of fairy tales illustrates, by extravagant emphasis, various ideas connected with dress, but overlaid with that secondary form of magical belief which is merely aesthetic, literary, or generally fanciful. Stories of magical dresses 7 are numerous. The motif illustrates either the connexion of dress with personality or the use of dress as a protection, disguise, or honour. There is, for instance, the shirt of snowy whiteness which turns black when the owner dies. 8 The emphasis on sympathetic connexion is constant. The shirt which never needs mending while the

1 By Sarce (quoted in March, Lc.).

11 H. G. March, in J A I xvi. (1902) 314; Gill, Myths and Songs from the South Pacific, 1906, p. 35.

18 Crawley, The Idea of the Soul, 1910, pp. 125, 216, quoting authorities.

10 Crooke, in F R. x. (1886) 124.

19 M. R. Cox, Cinderella, 1878, posthum.
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wearer remains faithful is a contrast to the shirt of Nesa.

In German folklore a shirt spun and stitched by a maiden who has kept silence for seven years can undo spells and render the spell-proof. 2 St. Theresa was presented by the Virgin with an invisible cope which guarded her from sin. The clothing and garments which make invisible were familiar subjects of mediæval lore.

Malay folklore tells of the cloth, sasmatō kálī, "which which was of one cloth with each person and when that cloth should be finished the world will be no more."

An old Irish man has a robe, the sóthrub, which is miraculously made without letting in pieces; also a waistband of flowered cloth, which is a sky-blue colour in the morning, but as soon as the mid-day sun shines, the colour changes to red. 2

Among the Tonga and in the Society Islands the deceased are buried in the form of clothes. The soul is summoned, and then "the sacred cloth makes the sacred soul" takes place. In the case, for instance, of an empress in ancient times, her soul was to be evoked "with the aid of her sacrificial robe; then this robe must be thrown over the corpse in the same size, and the body must be covered to the sacrificial hall... be covered with a corpse-pall, and finally the robe must be thrown over the body and the soul of a dead man cannot attend the funeral, he is represented by a suit of sacks clothing carried on a tray in the procession."

At a Celtic festival, a woman's and a man's dress represent deceased ancestors. 2 Among the Eskimos the first child born after a death "represents the dead man. Those nameakes eat and drink the provisions and wear the clothes offered to the dead at feasts, on their behalf. At the end the shades are sent back wearing the spiritual essence of the clothes, while the gross substance is kept by the nameakes."

When the office of high priest in Tonga was vacant, the priestly dress was placed on a chosen male and yams were offered to it. It was regarded as an equivalent for the person. 2 If a Zulu lighting-doctor is unable to attend a patient, he sends his "soul" to place in front of the patient's door, as an equivalent for himself. 2

Bathing in clothes is a form of ceremonial purification. 2 The Druids showed the rotation of dress and person. If dress is a part of personality, it follows that it must share in the duties imposed on the natural body. Similarly, if the soul of a dead person is a replica of his ordinary personality in life, the soul after the death of the body is regarded as wearing clothes. This was, for instance, the case with the Egyptian An

The anointing of garments is a practice found in fashion, ritual, and ordinary life (see art. ANOINTING). As a detail of full dress, the wedding garments of the Masai bride are oiled before being put on. The robes of the Hebrew high priest were anointed with oil. When that person was anointed with the anointed oil, the hygienic purpose of oiling the skin is also fulfilled by oiling the garments worn.

In many cases the dress is not merely a repre-

sentative symbol of the person, but a usable substitute for a dress or less sacred and therefore unusable reality. A Masai man swears to the truth of a statement by his sister's garment, a woman by her father's garment. 2 The converse of this idea may be seen when rare and costly robes are made for the person of the monarch. These associations, in connexion with the innate love of finery, are concerned in certain observances during sickness and at death.

In serious illnesses, when the patients are spread round him in order to tempt the absent soul to return, a similar practice is found in northern India. The less bier of the Mourners Todas. 2 

In China "a coat belonging to the sick man, and very recently worn, is suspended on a bamboo." Incantations are performed to induce the errant soul to enter the coat. When the poles turn round in the hands of the holder, the soul has arrived, and is ready to take up its "favourite costume." For the Chinese ceremony of "calling back the dead," the dead man's favourite costume is employed. The idea is to entice the soul into it, for it should be induced to slip into such of its garments as it had been proud to wear during life. The dress is held out by a mourner, crying "He come back!" Then the soul being supposed to have entered, it is placed on the body of the dead man. 2 The Mongols try to persuade the soul of a sick man to return by putting out his best clothes, washed and perfumed. 2 The Maoris enticed the soul of a dead chief by the half of a piece of its old clothes. 2 The Inuit of the "Wash Taps" make horsehair hats, which are commonly made into a coat or caught in the same receptacle. 2

The customary method of dressing the dead in his best clothes may often be based on similar associations (see below).

The principle of impersonation is easily applied to dress. Particular cases are association to totemic or other animals, and may be regarded as a fusion of personalities, or rather the assumption of a secondary personality.

The natives of the Upper Congo between their faces with oil and charcoal in resemblance of a species of monkey; they explain that by so doing they derive "monkey cunning." Bechuana warriors paint their hair of a horrible colour and paint the skin of a frog on their cloaks, that they may be as hard to hold as are their hind legs. 2 The Inuit and the Dead dead must regard themselves as being identical with red-plumaged birds. They decorate themselves with their feathers. 2 All African tribes, says Schweinfurth (but a statement need not be indulged in interpretation), imitate in their attire some animal, especially those for which they have "reverence." In this way it frequently happens that their superstition indirectly influences the habits of their daily life, and that their animal-worship finds expression in their dress. 2 Among the Yavah of Chos, the bridegroom is dressed as a monkey when he goes to the house of the bride. 2

The purposes of impersonation are naturally manifold, and require general illustration. When a sick Eskimo child is made to wear a dog's harness, and is consecrated as a dog to the goddess Sedna, 2 the idea is, no doubt, change of condition as resulting from change of personality. On a similar principle, the Galápagos concluding that a barren tree is a male, turn it into a female by placing a woman's petticoat upon it. 2

Assimilation of dress to person has innumerable gradations, and passing ultimately into identity or duplication. The principle is complicated by the belief that inanimate objects have souls. There is an Irish belief that the clothes of a dead man wear out more quickly than those of a living man. 3

The Hindus hold that the dress and ornaments of the gods and deified mortals do not decay. 2 Garments, like other inanimate articles, have souls, as in Pijan and Tongan belief.

practices of sympathetic magic are abundantly illustrated by dress. A few typical cases may be cited.

Among the Torajas of Celebes, when the men are on campaign, those remaining behind may not put off their garments or head-dress, lest the warrior's armor may fall off. A moment, the presence of liku being frequently applied. A Malay woman explained that her reason for stripping the upper part of her body in front of an enemy was to make the Rice-bucks thinner. During the festival of the Mexican 'Long-haired mother,' the maize-goddess, whose dress is adorned with the head-dress of the I of I, and the long hair of the I, causes the rice to grow in equal profusion. In a Kashmir story, a weaver offers the king some black thread made of the black thread of the man wishing to his death. A rain-maker in Maluing paints his white dress black, with the explanation 'All along the sky. It rains as clouds, black behind, while it goes.' A woman's petticoat also is put on to signify clouds. In ancient India, the Brahman rain-maker went black with paint as a sign of black. He had to touch water thrice a day. Generally it is a rule that to make rain the operator must himself be wet, to make dry weather he must be dry. Who drives fat oxen should himself be fat.

Magical injury is effected upon a person by means of his dress, as having been in contact with or as representing him. The practice of injuring by personality, and, as such, its significance is en-fragments of his clothes or food, and the like, is world-wide. A rejected lover in Burma gets an image of the lady, containing one of his clothes, and his clothes. This is then passed or drowned. A Wotjebulak wizard would roast a man's opium-skin rug under a blazing sun, and then made him kill his horse or die. The women took to secluded in the water, when the skin felt better and recovered. The Tamul wizard prac-
ticed the same trick. He burned a crotchet with a cloth which he had obtained from the seaweed. Prussian folk has it that if you cannot catch a thief you may get hold of his garment, and throw him into his flight. If this is beaten soundly, the thief falls sick. The last case sug-
gests that the dress is regarded as a part of personality, or as an essential part of its activity. The practices illustrated above are perhaps better explained on this principle than on the hypothesis that things once in contact retain a magical continuity.

The converse method of enforced assimilation produces intimacy and identity by means of dress. To obtain a favour or to conciliate feeling, a Zulu gets a dress article or fragment from the person he has in mind, and wears it next his skin.

More numerous are cases of actual transmission of properties by means of dress. A South Slavon-
ian woman who desires a child puts a charme on a fruit tree. Next morning she places it on her own person. According to Swiss folklore, the dress of a dead child will kill any child who wears it. Such examples need not be multiplied, but their interpretation cannot be found merely in the idea of contagion of physical or magical properties. For early thought, it is an obvious inference that a man's nature.

inheres only in all parts of his body, but in his dress. Probably the interpretation of odour has led to this belief, if the breath is the only element in his invisible emanation which permeates a man's clothing and by which he may be traced, also a part of his other self. But inference from odour does not, any more than the idea of contagion, satisfy all the conditions. There is also, already suggested, to be taken into account the general ideas derived from the specific idea of dress. A garment is an expression of personality; and, as such, its significance is en-
forced by its application to other personalities, while this application receives a concrete meaning and the general idea is concretely realized from the mere fact that the object expressive of personality possesses and may reveal the material impress of the person. These ideas enter into many of the superstitions uses of dress. One or two types may be cited:

The Kayans believe that to touch a woman's clothes would entrain them and make them unsuccessful in hunting and war. The Siamese consider it unlucky to pass under women's clothes hung out in clotheslines, as it saps the vitality of the drinking, merely the application of organic activity and strength is intended.

It is doubtful if cases like the following imply as much as they seem to do. The desire to have an article clean and new is irreducible, but upon it may be developed habits and beliefs of a mystical sort. After buying clothes, scrub them carefully in order to rid them of all contagion of the original owners.

The irradiation of ideas of contact has remarkable power and extension by beliefs concerning the dress of members of the sacred world. Such garments are impregnated with the mana of the wearer, as was Elijah's mantle. But, as pointed out before, metaphors of mana are always be explained to reasons. The idea that 'sanctity,' for instance, may inhere in garments as an eluvium or a force is possibly a late explanation, and not the original reason for the practices and beliefs concerned.

The Mikado's clothes, by reason of their 'sanctity,' caused pain and swellings it worn by other persons. Similarly, to avoid injuring others, his using red vessels was destroyed, immediately after use.

The garments of a Maori chief would kill any man who wore them. In other words, the chief's self, inherent in them, had the power of destroying. In Fiji there was a special disease, kasu lama, caused by wearing the clothes of a chief.

The principles of ceremonial purity and deline-
ment have produced some remarkable forms of dress and rules of toilette.

Among the Mekeo of New Guinea, a woman after childbirth makes a dress made of coco-nut fibre when pouring water. The Tisné or Dée girl during her first period wears a skin bonnet with fringes reaching to the breast, because the sight of her is dangerous to society.

(4) Personality and state.—For the psychology of dress a class of facts relating to murderers and menstruous women, and illustrated by the Eskimo theory of the ha has an important significance. It is a frequent rule that persons who have shed blood, or emit blood, shall indicate their state in a peculiar way. Thus, the homicide among the Northern Indians of America and the painted mouth of a chief is probably not protective, but merely an uncon-
scious impulse to adapt the person to the particular state. The idea of protection may be superposed upon this. The Omaha murderer was not allowed to let his robe fly open; it was to pulled close about his body, and kept tied at the neck, even in hot weather. Such cases, if their meaning is pro-
tective, are perhaps as well explained as reactions to a vague and indeterminate impulse to conceal-
ment rather than as direct attempts to evade the ghost of the murderer's victim.

The smearing of the blood-bedder with blood as a means of adaptation to the state of bloodshed is exactly parallel with any investiture with a sacred

1 A. W. Nieuwenhuis, Queer durch Journo, 1904, l. 350.
2 Bastian, Die Völker des östlichen Asien, 1866-71, Ill. 293.
(Batavia, 1893) xvi.
5 Frazer, G. R., pt. ii. p. 121.
7 Niebuhr, Volksglaube und religiöser Brauch der Südti-
aalen, 1890, p. 20.
8 Spengel, Die Indern, Leipzig, 1879, l. 246.
9 H. Spencer, Principles of Sociology, l. 350.
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dress, as a means of adaptation to a sacred state. The frame of the picture.

The Eckkino theory of tabu brings this out. Both personality in general, and particular states of a given personality, form collaterals of the tabu symbol and its expression of the state. The Eckkino hold that a man who has transgressed tabu appears to animals to be of a dark colour or surrounded by a vapour; for example, they believe that the Tabu of the Bushmen becomes attached not only to the soul of the agent, but to the belongings of the agent which he has tabu'd; in fact, of everything with which he may establish contact. If a child is sick, the mother removes a black attachment from its soul, caused perhaps by the child having taken milk from the tabu'd cow. A dead man's clothes may not be worn, for a hunter wearing them would appear foolish and the souls would avoid him.

Behind all this is the instinct against incongruity, mal-adaptation. A hunter must not wear the dress of a dead man or of a mourner; equally a mourner must not wear the dress of a hunter. The passage from one state to the other, or the transgression of tabu, is not the primary notion. The spiritual garb, resulting from a particular state, not originally the result of any transgression; it is an automatic effect of the state, a psychological echo of the adaptation, assimilation, or identification of the individual with his particular condition.

Again, it is believed by the Greenlanders that, if a whale-father wears a dirty dress, or one contaminated by contact with a whale, he will despoil the world of its tabular grounds. In such cases it is probable that there is originally no notion of contamination or contagion at all; there is merely the incongruity between the tabulated and contaminating circumstances of the hunt—the quarry being approached respectfully and regardfully, and the undress slovenliness of dirty clothes or the ill-omened and tactless reference to death contained in any connexion with a dead whale.

The garment of a particular state must be discarded when that state is past. By this means and by bodily 'cleaning' transition to the new state or to the normal is effected.

The Hebr. high priest after offering the sin-offering had to wash himself and put off the garments he had worn. Similar the Greek worshipper after an expiration might not enter a city or his house until he had washed himself and his clothes. Such rules are of world-wide extension. The principle of contamination in its secondary and ordinary meaning cannot cover all the facts. The original meaning of 'mixture,' and conversely the original meaning of 'purity,' as an unmixed state, supply an adequate explanation, in the principle of a person, in action, material adaptation to state. In customs such as the following the original motive is obscure, but the secondary idea of removal of a dangerous effluvium is suggested.

Among the Berbers of South Morocco, persons who have been wrongly accused of a crime sometimes entirely undress themselves in the saifihouse, when going to swear. They believe that, if they do so, the saint will punish the accused; I conclude, observes Westermann, who reports the custom, 'that at the bottom of this belief there is a vague idea that the absence of all clothes will prevent the oath from clinging to themselves.' Secondary also is the principle that sacred appurtenances may only be used once; when emptied of their force, they must be destroyed. Nor can we regard as primary the principle that change or removal of dress is a rite of separation from the previous state. The important thing is not the moment of transition (and there is no evidence that any danger is attached to this), but the state itself. Passage from one state to another is marked frequently by change of apparel, but it is unnecessary to labour the point of transition. It is rather the principle of adaptation to state or circumstance has, as a corollary, the principle of change, which may be more or less emphasized. Thus, the Lapps strip themselves of the garments in which they have killed a bear, just as after any sacred ceremony the participator puts off their ceremonial appurtenances. The particular state is over and done with; therefore its exterior adaptation must likewise be removed. Ideas of removing the sacred and dangerous influence are probably secondary.

These considerations, in connexion with the principle that solemnity in dress must accompany solemnity of circumstance and function, may explain the following:

For the harvest festival the two officiating elders of the Negus wash carefully and put on new clothes. The Greeks put on clean clothes after their initiation; before offering the Shinto priests of Japan put on clean garments. It is a precept of Islam that the clothes and person of a worshipper shall be clean. A Muhammadan would remove any defiled garment before he commences his prayer, or otherwise abstain from praying altogether. In ancient Christian baptism the novice put off their garments, and clothed themselves in new white robes. At the consecration of a Catholic virgin the novice puts off her ordinary clothes, and puts on the habit and the veil; also the ring on the finger—the ceremony being actually a marriage of Christ. The putting away of this skin dress of the novice and the assumption of new clothes were part of the 'ordination' of the ancient Irishman.

Whether the new state is the extraordinary state of sacredness or the ordinary state of common life, adaptation to it equally involves change of assimilative costume, preceded by removal of that previously worn.

In order to assume the crest of the Lulen, the Bear, the Car. Indian took off all his clothes, and spent some days and nights in the wild state. He then joined the Bear dance, in which he was dressed as a bear. During initiation to secret societies in Congo States the candidate is dressed in British Central Africa, boys during initiation wear bark-cloth. At the conclusion new clothes are put on. Entrance to the various 'gates' is marked by a change of garments after initiation put on new calico. When their initiation ceremonies were over, Kadfs boys were chased to the river, where they washed off the white clay with which their bodies had been painted. Everything about them was burned. They were smeared with the ordinary unguent and were given new garments.

Frazer has suggested that the practices of depilation, and painting the body white or red, at puberty, are in view of the belief in re-birth. The Kikuyu, for instance, hold that a boy is born again at circumcision, and he pretends so to be. But this idea is at past foetal.

When her period is over, a woman puts on new clothes. This is the ordinance of the Shiyagat Ld-Shiyagat, of the Mosaic and Hindu law, and of the vast majority of savage and barbarian customary social codes.

Thus, the Kharwar woman after her period bathes and washes her clothes. The Thompson Indian girl has the special dress she wore during a period of conception to puberty in the womb, into society.

At the end of the kiri, the annual trading expedition, which partakes of the nature of a solemn pilgrimage, the Reeta of New Guineas bathes, anoints himself, and puts on a new shi-join-cloth. His wife, who has stayed at home, also bathes and puts on new garments.

A sort of mechanical link between purification by lustration and the assumption of new clothes is made by anointing. After childbirth the Kaffir mother is anointed ceremonially with the ordinary fat and red clay. This is equivalent to the remuneration of defunct apparel.

New clothes express a new state or condition.

2 Creutz, l. c. 120.
3 Faivre, GIP, II, 508.
4 Janin, l. c. 58.
6 Van Gennep, Rites de passage, 55.

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1 Frazer, GIP, II, p. 221.
2 T. C. Hoden, 172.
3 Westermann, MF, II, 352, citing the authorities.
4 Westermann, MF, II, 352, citing the authorities.
5 E. Sell, Path of Islam, 1898, p. 257.
6 Westermann, MF, II, 416.
7 Mige, Enquet. Ethol., 1944-45, xviii, p. 316; also J. de Viroquet, Les cerémonies et des rites morts, 1816, iii, coll. 500 ff., quoted by Van Gennep, I, 413.
8 Gidegon, Bull. des Vues, 250.
10 H. Blansard, in JAII XI (1910) 296, 297.
12 Totemism und Ethnograph., 1910, 220.
13 Crooke, in NINQ, 67.
15 Beilngreen, 1110.
16 Macdonald, 94.
There is an impulse to rhythmical change in human life, coinciding with later ideas of morality. The DRESS, a fashion festival which was to banish all evil, shook their clothes, crying 'Let the evils be gone!' In such cases the idea of newness, owing to the contrast between the old state and the new and to the impulsive belief in change, provides an allurement, tending to dominate over the principle of adaptation to the new state. In other words, the important thing is not the succeeding state but the rudeness of the old.

Thus, the style of new clothes, the look, new clothes and new utensils were provided by each person; the old clothes were thrown away. The Oneu Tenga National festival, which all were clad in new clothes. The Hindus wear new clothes at the festival of the new year, sarasvathisali.

The Chinese ceremony of the festival by the boy on which the clothes for marriage. A suit of white body-clothes of linen is made for both bride and groom. Brand-new they are, and are worn during the marriage-ceremonies, for on this occasion they themselves become brand-new people. The suits are then put away, only to be worn again in the tomb. In Korea, on the 14th day of the first month, any one entering upon 'a critical year of his life' dresses an effigy of straw in his own clothes and casts it away. Fate is believed to look upon the individual in his new clothes as another person.

Here the second principle of disguise intrudes.

The ideas of disguise by change of dress have been developed in many cases.

Thus, in the seventh month of pregnancy, a Cereanese woman is covered by a sheath of seven colours, a new ornament, and a symbol of the new is placed on this. Thus the husband slices in two with a sacrificial weapon, the body runs away. Women, dressed seven times in seven colours; the Bulgarian, to cure scrofula, will creep naked through an arch of boughs, and then hang his clothes on a tree, the faces of other garments. In Uganda a stick is made to jump over a stick, and let his bark-cloth fall off. The principi on the death and runs in the opposite direction.

Often it is enough to follow the principle of the fantastic as a strong contrast to the previous state which has suffered misfortune.

Thus, a sick woman is dressed in a fantastic gash, and her body is painted with streaks of red and white. She then stands in front of her hot blazing a sword. The last detail is a later stratum. The Mosquito Indians believe that the devil (Wadra) tries to seize the corpse. It is hurried to the place where 'have disguised themselves with paint.' A Sibarian shaman will paint his face red when about to accompany a soul to the spirit-land, expressly to disguise himself from devils. The Tongans, when at war, changed their costume before every battle by way of disguising themselves. Similarly, the king of Israel disguised himself at Banoth-Gilead.

Disguise may take the form of impersonation, and the other person as a thing.

The people of Mimahsa delude the evil spirit by placing on the sick man's bed a dummy dressed in his clothes. A Brazanian king will dress himself who dressed exactly like their royal master. 'So that the enemy may not distinguish him from his disguise.'

The protective value of dress is often expressed merely as that of a covering.

Thus, when the angel appeared to Muhammad, he hastened to dress the infant to cover me with cloth. Then God spoke to him: 'O boy, enwapped in thy mantle, arise and warn!' From this point the prophet commenced his composition of the Quran. A Hindu mother positing a haunted place draws her robe over her child. In old Bengal there was a prayer for the protection of children till they were dressed in clothes.

In its sexual and supernatural uses alike the veil protects both the face or head from sight and the eyes from seeing the forbidden or dangerous object. To see and to be seen are often interchangeable, and often combined as media of dangerous influences. In early Arabia hands men veiled their faces to preserve themselves from the evil eye. Here there is no doubt a combination of subjective and objective methods. The veil of women and the consequent modesty concerning the exposure of the face are a remarkable characteristic of Musalmân social life, and illustrate the secondary habits induced by dress. Ceremonies at the birth of a temporary nature is found in the case of both. The mother is in widowhood. The novice during initiation to the Kotikili of the Zaui wears a veil, and is supposed to see nothing. Similar practices attend initiation to many forms of the secret societies. The veil of the bride is more or less universal. A Musâliman woman takes the veil, just as does a nun. Momentary veiling occurs in the presence of death and in approaching a deity. Socrates and Julias Caesar veiling their faces at the moment of death typified the Greek and Italian national custom.

To interpret, as Van Gennep does, these latter cases as rites of passage, with the purpose of separating one's self from the profane world, is fanciful. The habit is more probably a motor reaction to the impulse for concealment before an object of fear. The veil of the bride is a ritual concession to, and a material accentuation of, the sexual character of modesty, rather than a rite of separation from the previous state. To apply the idea of separation from the previous state to the habit of veiling at the moment of death is clearly impossible. In the case of many secret societies we must rather intend merely to accentuate the sense of mystery.

In connexion with marriage there are customs of stripping or forcible removal of dress. In some cases these seem to point to a diminution of personality, in others they are preparatory to the assumption of a new dress, often presented by the bridegroom. Among the Roro tribes of New Guinea a nubile girl is tatted, and wears ornaments every day. After marriage, for a few weeks she decorates herself every afternoon. She may not visit her father's village until after a ceremony in which she is stripped of all her finery. The idea, no doubt, is to affirm her subjection to her father's family.

The exchange of presents of dress, a prevalent custom at marriage, may be extended.

Thus, the Kola of New Guinea hold the bead ceremony when a first-born child is three weeks old. The infant is decked with various finery, and is carried by the mother, also dressed up, to her mother's brother. A broken egg, a pot, a spear, a peticoat, and a firestick. After smoking and tooth-cleaning, the boy receives the child at the ceremony of the child's mother. In each case the ornaments and clothes from the mother and the child. These and the articles carried by the father become the property of the infant and the girl, the grandson and granddaughter on the maternal side. A return present is given.

Costumes which prescribe the wearing of best clothes or of rags illustrate the most important psychological result of the invention of dress. This is a secondary human character, the feeling for dress, and is one aspect (consisting in extension of self-consciousness) of the reaction to extension of personality. It is really distinct from the feeling for ornament and the impulse to protection, but is correlated with the more physical impulse to cleanliness, and the dermal and nervous refinement which dress has introduced into the human organism. Connected with the latter development are various reactions in the spheres of art and etiquette. Stanley Hall finds that 'of the three functions of clothes—protection, ornament, and Lotse's self-feeling—the second is by far the most conspicuous in childhood.' But the sense of personal dignity and physical pride is only latent in childhood. Of the psychical resultants of dress this adult character is the most significant. As Lotse ...
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put it, clothes extend the limits of self and enable the wearer to wear his own self to a greater extent, and the"glory of each garment. A precise analogy is found in the psychology of tools. Add the sexual factor, and add the more presence or possession of the article of clothing gives the wearer the sense of self-respect and personal dignity, of sexual desirability. Thus it is that one cloth is a person to be bribed him; this was so even in Homeric times, for we may recall the threat of Ulysses to strip Thetis.1

Similarly, to foul a person's garments is a secondarily direct insult. When the sense of well-being is thus interfered with, fun is an expression of it and an adaptation to it. Also, on momentous occasions a man of any period will dress very carefully, unconsciously intending to affirm and ennoble his personality, in an expression of it, the misery, the negation of well-being, or humility, a negative form of dress is employed; value, colour, and style are at a minimum. The diminution of the body and the wearer's identity is a reaction on the psychological state of the individual.

On these foundations luxury and superstition have erected a mass of fashions. Two typical cases follow.

Great personages in Siam used to wear clothes of a different color for each day of the week. As an example, white was worn on Monday, red on Tuesday, blue on Wednesday, red on Thursday, black on Friday, violet on Saturday.

The primary meaning of the dress next cited is not taisuanic, but a suggestion of well-being. Its magical content is secondary, and is there elaborated particularly. The Chinese silks 4, the garment for a long life, is a long gown of gauzy silk, blue or red or brown, with a lining of blue or black. It is essentially crossed over all with gold-thread characters, representing the word 'longevity.' It purports in the first place to prolong the life of the wearer, and therefore frequently wears it, especially on festivals occasions, in order to allow the influence of longevity, creative and indestructible, to work their full effect upon his person. On the anniversary of his birth he will scarcely ever neglect doing so, it being generally acknowledged among the Chinese that it is extremely useful and necessary then to absorb a good amount of vital energy, in order to attain health and healthy during the ensuing year. Friends and kinsmen who the house to take part in the festivities will then, as a rule, greatly admire the dress and tender their reverent congratulations to the happy wearer, whose children have been so full, and so blessed by fate as to have bestowed a present of such delicate and precious description. The longevity garment is generally the gift of children who are full enough to wish their parents to live long. There is considerable ceremony about this last gift: the garment should be as fine as possible in one year which has an intervalary month; such a year naturally has significance. In accordance with Chinese ideas about sympathy between ascendants and descendants, the garments also ensure longevity to the wearer's posterity.2

In war the male impulse is to emphasize personality, this is more powerful than the impulse to protection, though the two may be combined.

The Dayaks wore in war-dress a basket-work hat, kalong, and a jacket of skin or quilted cotton. The crown of the helmet is adorned with feathers of palm plumes. The jacket, or war jacket of silk, has the animal face on the wearer's stomach, and its back hanging over his shoulders. It is little defense, though the head is covered with a plate or shield to protect the pit of the stomach.4

The mere fact that in all periods social meetings are for the wearing of best clothes indicates the social significance of dress. Dress loses half its meaning except in relation to society. The principle of extension of personality refers to the individualistic aspect of dress; the principle of adaptation to state is its social side. The vaguely termed 'festival' of lower cultures is expressive of mutual well-wishing and of common well-being.3

At festivities the Aluns dress in their best clothes. The statement applies to all peoples. The individualistic form of the social meeting is amphitropic.

1 J. B. BIBL., I. 40; IT. B. 202.
2 Ph.D. degree, Sorbonne, Paris, 1854, 1. 319.
3 See Grooth, I. 61 ff.
4 Brooke Low, in JAI xxii. (1902) 53.
5 See G. H. IV, 377.

As is the rule with all peoples, the Guiana Indians, "when expecting guests, especially noble guests, they dress up with the finest dress and ornaments, these often, as in this case, consisting only of a narrow head-cloth by way of a necklace, a pair of earrings of white beads by way of ornament."1

A few types of festival dress may be cited from a variety which exceeds all other forms of human inventiveness and expression which display the human physical pride and his tendency to shift its focus to an artificial and variable substitute.

The Manipur festal head-dress is remarkable. A white turban is bound round the head, and the turban in front is wound round a shumalz, a horn-shaped construction of cane bound over with cloth or gold thread, and ending above in a loop and below in three flat loops which are concealed under the turban. The shumalz is over a foot high, and curves slightly backwards; from the loop at the end hangs an embroidered streamer. On each side of the head a plume made of peacock's feathers and the tail feathers of the hornbill are inserted in the turban. . . . The whole structure is bound together by a narrow band of red and white embroidery, wound round and round and tied, under the chin, with ends hanging down nearly to the waist.2

On high days Tangkul men wear a lift, and the lubop head-dress adorned with toe-man feathers and tresses of hair.3 The Wolwana Indians went on festal occasions crowned made of the curly head-feathers of the curassow, and on the arms, feathers of the mauvay, or yellow tail-feathers of the Ostrich monstrum.4 The women wear great masses of beads round the neck, sometimes shaping the whole space from the bosom to the chin. A petticoat of bark-cloth extends below the knees, which is wrapped round the loins, and the end is tucked in over the front. The exposed part is exposed for a deep vermillion, the colour being extracted from the pod of the arumto abubu.5

The Ackawal wear for festivals a dress made of the bright, greenish yellow, young leaves of the Acta palm (Mauritia flexuosa). The Surinamese women of all the tribes ornament their heads and necks with the black and white bands of red maple feathers, a ruff of black curassow and white egret feathers, and a strip of waist-cloth, as a dress for the feast. At the feast of the dead, Quorong men wear a 'glory.' This consists of bands of red maple and red thread, one and a half inches wide, round bound the head. In many parts of the country beads of bamboo with feathers inserted, the structure being eighteen inches in height itself.

The dance is a social language, a motor expression of individuality in society. As a rule, best clothes are worn. Various circumstances often impose different fashions for the dance, and the wearing of the Veddha puts on the hangula, a white cloth tied round the waist. Formerly leaf-girdles were used.6 Probably such costumes are merely for the facilitation of movement. Other care is paid to the dance as such. The female dancing dress of the Pulas is elaborate, made of velvet or ornamented cotton, sometimes decked with bells which sound in time to the music.7

Meetings of divinity in its most typical character are no less marked by fine clothes. The Qur'an says: 'Weary your godly apparel when you repair to my mosque.8 The injunction applies to all religions, and the literal interpreters, by the distinction between well-willing and well-being, and later to the distinction between worshippers and deity) that excess of luxury is forbidden or discouraged. Cleanliness of attire is regularly enjoined, originally, perhaps, for the avoidance of notoriety, material or supernatural, but of mixture of states. Just as all sacrifice should be precious, so should a dress-wearing be well-dressed. The human victim sacrificed by the Pawnees was dressed in the richest raiment.9 The meridhi of the Khonds was dressed in a new garment before the sacrifice, anointed, and adorned with flowers.10

For seapages the case may be different. When the image of the god is clothed it necessarily wears the richest raiment (see below).

The connexion of line dress with well-being, and the estimate of clothes as a necessity of life,12 are combined in the Hebrew belief that

1 In Thurn, in JAI xxii. (1895) 100.
3 C. T. Hodges, 22.
4 A. Wickersham, in JAI xxvii. (1903) 400.
5 ib. 204.
6 Thurn, in JAI xxii. 190.
7 J. C. Hodges, 193.
8 G. P. Scott Elliott, in JAI xxii. 191.
9 J..shuffle, in JAI xxii. 293.
10 C. G. Macpherson, Memoirs of Service in India, 1855, P. 118.
11 See in 37.
Jahweh was the ultimate donor of food and raiment.1 The teaching of Christ against ‘taking thought’ for raiment, illustrated by the natural dress of the lilies of the field,2 was a wise protest against extravagance in the cult of this secondary deity.3 The old raiment was often put on, it appears, for religious purposes. The old man in the desert was clad in a ragged garment.4

Diminution of personality is symbolized by various customs of removing part of the dress. In India a low-caste man passing through a high-caste street must take off his shoes and turban.5 That the reason for such uncovering is not the assumption of an unprotected state, by removing a garment of defence, is shown by such a case as the following. A person who interviewed Montezuma put off his usual costume and appeared in plain coarse dresses and barefooted.6 The modern European fashion of removing the hat is a salutation of respect of a similar order, and not a removal of defence.

A permanent inferiority of person or status is expressed by the variety of dress.7 In Fries the sons even of rich families are dressed like slaves at public feasts, so long as the father lives, as also at his funeral.8 This is apparently the survival of a strict patera potestas, which remains in force till the funeral; until then the son is the father's slave.9 It is a very marked custom of the Shetland Islanders to show deference to the old. ‘They must never come into the presence of aged persons or pass by their dwelling without taking off their hat, and assuming a crouching gait.’10

An artificial assumption of humility may be employed to emphasize the succeeding magnificence, or to deprecate the ill-luck which may follow pride. For some days before marriage the bride and bridegroom among the Musalmans of the N.W. Provinces wear dirty clothes.11 Such practices may succeed in taking the ideas connected with disgrace and protection from the evil eye. Similar, though of more obscure origin, is the custom, found in old English coronation ceremonies, that the king shall appear in poor garments before he is invested with the royal robes. German peasants dress a child in mean clothes to protect it against the evil eye. In Egypt the children who are most beloved are the worst clad. A fine lady may often be seen in a magnificent dress, with a boy or girl, her own child, by her side, with its face smeared with dirt, and wearing clothes which look as if they had not been washed for many years. The custom of taking the ideas connected with disgrace from the evil eye. The method employed is not disgrace, but humiliation, negation of well-being, either deprecatory or to escape notice. This custom is, however, a very common and widespread practice.

Penance and asceticism often coincide in method. Sackcloth is in this connection the analogue of fasting and humiliation. For penance, it even prescribes clothes of cow-hair, with the wearer's own hair in its folds.8 Among the rules of penance in medieval Christendom was the wearing of dirty clothes. An ancient rule for Buddhist monks was that their dress should be made of rags taken from a dust-heap.11 Early Christian ascetics wore dirty clothes and crawled abroad ‘like animals covered only by their matted hair.’12 Hindu ascetics similarly passed the night in clay or mud, mortifications, until British law interposed to prevent the endurance of the nuisance.13

A curious question is raised by certain fashions of cleanliness in connexion with dress. Physical cleanliness is a habit which has undergone evol-

The ancient Huns and Mongols, as well as the modern Kaimukas, are reported to have washed the feet of the priests, thus removing possible contamination of the body itself, no less than of the higher claims of personality.

In the dress of the Togetic priori Neumann, to it is recorded that the “a

The case of the Australian native, who never takes off his girdle of hair, is rather different; the analogy here is the non-removal of such articles as rings. Thus, while her husband is alive, a Hindu woman dares to take off her ear-rings, which are part of the symbols of marriage.2

Ideas of ceremonial cleanliness have probably had an important collateral influence upon the evolution of habits of cleanliness. Some such ideas the avoidance of mixture of condition and environment may have contributed to the development of personal purity, whereas during the early stages of the evolution of dress there seems to be no a priori reason why clothes, as such, should be periodically cleaned. The case of the Sabaeans illustrates the connexion between cleanliness of dress and of person. The candidate for the priestly office is instructed not to dirty himself; and he must change his dress daily.2 Given the existence of a natural impulse to avoid the threatening of the evil eye, the foundation being similar to that of ceremonial purity—an unconscious preference for cleanliness and distinctness in objects, a preference for the thing itself in its essential, specific, and individual, or unmixed, purity of character—asceticism, when, as is often the case, encouraging uncleanness, is a biological perversion and a social danger. Early Christianity was largely tainted with this.10 St. Jerome approves the observance of Paul, that ‘the purity of the body and its garments means the impurity of the soul.’11

The ritual and emotional removal or tearing of dress is apparently attracting attention from all parts of the world. The Hebrew widow repudiating the levirate takes off her sandal and spits on the ground.12 In Van Gennep’s terminology this is a rite of separation from the husband’s family. Among the ancient Arabs, women were often mourning barefoot, their hair in the face and bosom, but also tore all their garments. The messenger who brought bad news tore off his clothes. A mother desiring to bring pressure to bear on her son took off her clothes.13

A man to whom vengeance was forbidden showed his despair and disapproval . . . by raising his garment and covering his head with it, as was done in fulfilling natural necessities.14 Among the Chuvashes, Cheremiss, and Wotyaks, the humble effect of divorce by tearing his wife’s veil.15

Similar customs, especially the rending of the garments to express indignation or repudiation, were prevalent among the Hebrews.16


10. I. P. Dorf, Choctaw, in P.A. 120, 1900.


Columbian, expresses indignation against a wrong by destroying a number of blankets, the native currency. His adversary is expected to destroy an equal number to satisfy honour and heal the quarrel.

The dressing of garments is perhaps a development from the reflex impulse to destruction generated by anger, indignation, or despair. When it becomes symbolic it may take on the character of a rite of separation, the dressing of the garment indicating farewell to the isolated corpse of the person from calamity or injury. In the Hebrew custom the latter seems to be the prevailing meaning of the rite—a meaning which might naturally be superposed upon an original unconscious reaction to emotions of resentment or sorrow. Stripping, as an indignity or penance, is applied to any person. Thus, when his guardian

\[ \text{(5) Dress of the dead.} \]

Like other states, death is marked and solemnized by a change of dress. In modern civilization, the corpse, whether embalmed or not, is either wrapped in strips of linen or cotton cloths, and covered with the gar-ments, if any, most typical of the dead person's official position. In particular cases, customs like that of the Chinese are observed. When this involves the idea that official dress is more than individual personality, a special covering representing specialized social functions, whereas lay garments represent general dress. Among earlier peoples it is the general rule to dress the dead person in his best clothes. Typical cases are the American Indians, Burmans, Tongkingese, Maoris, Greeks, and Chinese. Careful washing and scrutinizing of corpses are no less significant and prevalent parts of the more or less ceremonious investiture of the dead.

Among the Tah and Rwe peoples the dead body is washed, dressed in the richest clothes, and adorned. The Yorubas dress the corpse in the best raiment. The exposed parts of a woman's body are dyed red. The body is wrapped in clothes, but in grass mats. Among the Kols of New Guinea the dead man is washed, oiled, and painted; a new loin-cloth and ornaments are put on him. The Greenlanders undress a man when at the point of death, and put his best clothes upon him. This detail recurs in China. The Hindus wash, shave, and dress the dead body.

According to Homer, the corpse was covered with a soft clotlhe, and the head was swathed. The Greeks dead were shrouded in the handkerchief garments the family could afford; there was an idea of keeping them warm on the passage to the grave, the latter being, as a rule, a person's best favourite clothes. Five suits of garments are mentioned. The modern Greeks dress the dead in best clothes, but these are not used unless by being snipped with scissors or drenched with oil. The grave-clothes of a Chinese are arranged round his dying body, his feet and hands being bandaged and clothed. He rejoice, in his last moments of consciousness, 'that he will be fashionably attired in the regions beyond the grave.' It was the old custom to strip the man of his clothes just before expiring, so as to put the new clothes on, if possible, before death actually occurred. The Chinese ritual of dressing the dead is most elaborate. The curious point is that the corpse is swathed almost as thickly an Egyptian mummy, but in suits of clothes, not bands of cloth. A distinction is made between inner and outer garments, the former being specially prepared for wear in the grave, the latter being, as a rule, a person's best favourite clothes. Five suits of clothes are mentioned, because five is a synonym of ten. Nine and thirteen are usual numbers. Even numbers symbolise the Yin part of heaven and earth, femininity; they are forever avoided; and odd numbers typifying the opposition of the sexes are used. Confucius was buried in eleven suits and one court dress; on his head was a chapeau cap. But, in accordance with the ancient division of the dressing into three stages, the body-clothes, the 'hawb' dressing, and the outer eleven suits comprised the first stage only, and over them were the 'slighter' and the 'fuller' dressing. The clothes are exhibited to the bereaved before each suit is put on. The elaborate rules of the Li-kis about the dressing of the dead are followed. Previously the best or favourite suit is placed on the dying man before being placed on the corpse: the clothes are put on the chief mourner. He is stripped, and stands on a cloth resting on a chair, so as not to contaminate the floor. He wears a large round hat, so as not to pollute heaven. Then each garment is put upon him in its proper order, and afterwards taken off. In the funeral ceremony of a woman, the oldest son, as chief mourner, still has to put the clothes on. The Li-kis explain the custom by stating that the mourner is con testing a medicine before his father drinks it. As the dressing proceeds the mourners wall and 'howl.' Wide drawers, lined, for comfort, with silk, are first put on. Stockings and a jacket follow. An ordinary jacket of linen, cotton, or silk, and trousers of the same material come next. A second jacket or even a third—the more there are the more devotion is expressed—may be added. When the body-clothes have been put on, the cutous suit follows. The blue gown of the middle class is a common type. It overlaps to the right, and is buttoned at the side. Over this is a jacket with short sleeves, extending, that is, only to the finger-tips; it is the kind of jacket used in winter as an overcoat. A common skull-cap or long hair, or horse hair, complete the suit. The costly silk clothes used on festive occasions are preferred by the wealthy, who are wrapped in satin or brocade. An ascetic attire of the paterfamilias, as high priest of the family. These include an outer and inner cloak, neither having a collar, and a three-piece of the inner draped to form the form of a horse-shoe shape. The inner is dark blue; for summer it is worn, white or green. The outer dress is a long shirt worn round the waist. The boots are of silk. The winter suit alone is used for the dead, even in summer. Women wear their best embroidered clothes, such as a long embroidered mandarins' wives, which in the regular bridal costume. It includes a dragon, the sable of green silk, a dragon, a mantle of red silk, a mantilla of black silk, and boots of red silk. The bride's hood, or parasol hat, is a quarter-globe of thin tinfoil, covered with butterflies, leaves and flowers made of gilt, copper, and symbols of felicity, joy, wealth, and longevity. Great care is taken with the coffin.

Such is the the phos, attire of the dead. Women, as a rule, wear the 'longevity garment,' but men prefer the true sacrificial robe, the the phaks. Of these clothes the clothing laid out for old age, at about the age of 50 or 60. They are preferred but cut and sewn for a man, and put on him—there is a person being likely to live long, and part of her capacity to live must surely pass into the clothes, and thus put off for many years the moment when they shall be required for use. If these clothes have ever been lent to a friend, not of one's own clan, they may not be used for their own purpose. Another suit must be prepared. However it may happen, it is a curious fact that the grave-clothes are often cut carelessly, and merely pasted, not sewn. Quite poor people use cheap mats. It is probably Buddhist influence that forbids the use of weather. Nothing may not be cut or sewn for the corpse. This is supposed to injure the body during decomposition.

The Malays shroud the dead body in fine new surroundings, sometimes as many as thirty. The broadcloth of the mummy are a development for a particular purpose. The costumes have been prepared in advance of the life. In ancient Egypt the gods were invited to grant clothing to the dead. The bandaging of the mummy corresponds in its ritualism very far, for example, with the beards that prepare them, the clothing for the corpse. For instance, a sorrowing husband reproaching his wife for having placed the corpse in the mummy, the bandages for thy burial. I have given to be made for thee many clothes. The application of the swasthas 'a divine task.' In funeral rituals there are the characters 'of putting on the white bandages,' 'of putting on the green,' and of the light red and dark red bandages. The most frequently used was a 'measure of the affection of the relatives.'

As a type of simpler customs the following explains itself, and is significant for the whole theory of the subject.

The Samoyeds dress the corpse in the clothes he was wearing at death, and wrap the whole in birch bark or deer skins. Rare cases occur where derogatory garments are applied. The enthusiasm of horror of death and its semblance sufficiently explains the following rule.

Zoroastrian law ordained 'clothing which is useless; this is that in which they should carry a corpse.' In the case of still useful clothing which had been worn, the process of burning was a very thorough and minute process of cleaning was applied. 1

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1 De Groote, L. 508.
2 De Groote, L. 328ff.
3 Ib. 330.
4 Ib. 341.
5 Ib. 67ff.
6 Ib. 50.
7 Ib. 51.
8 Ib. 65ff.
9 Ib. 60.
11 Ib. 64.
12 Ib. 53.
13 Ib. 217.
14 Od. xiv. 293.
15 Flor de L. 106ff.
16 Lucian, de Lectu, 10.
18 Ib. 66.
When preservatives are not applied to the grave-clothes, some peoples periodically renew them. The bodies of the Corpse-lecas were preserved and clothed, new clothes being supplied as required. At stated periods the Maoris open the coffins of their ancestors, removing the rotten funerals and rolling the bones in new ones.

The outer motif is to place changes of raiment in the grave, just as other articles of use are there deposited. In Vedic times, clothing and ornaments were placed with the dead for their use in the next life. The Chinese place clothes and silk in the grave, besides the numerous suits in which the dead is clothed. In China, clothing, according to Pahari texts, was to be put upon the sacred carks of the 'righteous guardian spirit'—both for its use in the other world.

The clothing and weapons deposited in the Kayan grave are of the highest value, no broken or damaged article being deemed worthy of a place. On the other hand, many people regard such articles useless by cutting or breaking them before deposition; and a principle commonly occurs that in this way, the souls of the articles are released (as is the soul from the broken body of the dead man), and are thus able to accompany him to the place of the departed.

There is naturally some doubt as to the condition of the soul in its super-terrestrial home. Thus the soul of the Mexican, at death, entered the new life naked, whereas the soul of the dead folded wore 'a beautiful mantle' when it departs towards the other world in the way of a sacrificial offering. The Chinese place clothes and silk in the grave, besides the numerous suits in which the dead is clothed. In China, clothing, according to Pahari texts, was to be put upon the sacred carks of the 'righteous guardian spirit'—both for its use in the other world.

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As for the meaning behind these customs, there seems to be, as usual, a series of moral strata or psychological layers. Various emotions might be supposed to be in competition as soon as attention was called to their direction from a man just dead. Other things being equal, and before ideas of contagion on the one hand and of a future life on the other had been developed, principles of property and feelings of sorrow would first come into play, together with the principle of dress as an adaptation to state. Thus the Samoyed type may be one of the earliest. The corpse retained the garments he wore at death. He is prepared for the new state by the protective (both of external and of internal direction) covering of bark or similar substance, which takes the place of the coffin.

Sorrow and affection would make the stripping of the corpse an act impossible for relatives. As the various ideas relating to the state of the dead became clearer, regard would be had to the comfort of the dead. No less than the living they must have the two great necessities, food and raiment. Naive examples of the idea are numerously found in the practices of the ancient Christian church, which wrapped the corpse in a rag, for the purpose, expressed, of keeping the dead man dry and warm. Various penetrates have been known to put an umbrella and gloves in the coffin, as a protection against the rainy skies of the other world.

Later still there would supervene the idea, of complex origin, that articles in the house of death must be, like the occupant, broken and soulless. One component of this idea is perhaps as early as any, namely, the realization that articles of value, permanently deposited in a place by no means secure, and practically known to be unused, should be rendered useless, to avoid robbery and the attendant distressing results of exhumation.

The custom of dressing the dead in his richest raiment, and in many states, the problem becomes less simple. First of all, as soon as the social consciousness realizes that death is a social state, and therefore to be solemnized, a change of garb is necessary. What are significantly termed in various languages 'the last offices' express this principle, as well as the feelings of sorrow and affection, and the desire to do honour to the dead, as for the last time. In such conditions it is inevitable that the best of everything should be accorded to him. But another reason is perhaps involved in the complex psychoses, at least in the earlier stages. This is economic. In early culture, clothes are property. Just as a man's property is called in and realized at his death, so a similar process is universal in mankind. There is thus a still a number of society; and the most personal and most distinctive of his property fittingly remains with him—his personal attire. Equally fitting is it that this item should be of the best, as representing him in the last of his social functions. By a pathetic paradox he is arrayed in his best clothes, as if to assert his personality and to express it in its highest terms, for the last time, though actually that personality is no more.

It is not likely that the dressing in fine clothes to tempt the departing or absent soul to return has any reference in this connection. The custom of using many suits of clothes, or of scarfing the corpse, as an absurdity by the Chinese, is one of those problems that elude all rationalism. There is the analogy of the mummy-swathtings, which suggests that the suits may have been intended as protection; there is also an idea of placing on or with the corpse all his available assets. The custom of dressing the dead in their best clothes, as of placing food with them, has been explained by Frazier as originating in the custom of 'feeding the dead', a notion very common in all his available assets. The custom of dressing the dead in their best clothes, as of placing food with them, has been explained by Frazier as originating in the custom of 'feeding the dead', a notion very common in all

1 Payne, ii. 292.
2 Matthews, Thirty Years in Madagascar, 1904, p. 292.
3 A. A. Macnab, Idee Mytholog. 163.
4 De Groote, ii. 392, 209.
5 Schlegel, vol. i, 567 (1881) 353.
6 Prosecutors, in Namb, v. (1880) 165.
7 Payne, ii. 407.
9 J. J. Garstang, Transactions of the Society of Biblical Archaeology, 175, 177.
10 J. R. Frazer, The Sources of the N.B. W. Indies, Sydney, 1892, p. 79 f.
(6) Mourning dress.—The social significance of dress is well brought out in mourning customs, among which the widow’s headdress is the most prominent. The variations are innumerable, but the principles involved are fairly clear. A few types only can be mentioned here.

Among the Maidu, as mourning, the widows’ hair is cut short and, as mourning, the Andamanese smear themselves with clay; ancient and modern Egyptians ‘paint’ their skulls with the ash. Among the Chippewa, it is said that the men wear a black, red, white, and yellow beaded head covering when mourning.

The Widows of Boreno wear the black cloth round the capes they wear; in the Netherlands the knots of his hair, and bits of his tools, as a necklace. She is painted black, and wears a petticoat reaching to the ankles.

Over the upper body she has two netted vests, the outer ornamented with seeds and feathers. A network cap is on her head. This costume is worn for six months, after which she is relieved of her mourning by the roba momento ceremony, and the petticoat is burnt. The widow is also painted black all over. Among the Maidu, the neighboring people of New Guinea, houses of the dead are worn by the mourners. A dead man’s jaw is often worn as a necklace.

The principle of adaptation in colour is well exemplified. The most frequent colours used are black, white, dark blue, and the natural colours of, as a rule, cheap and common fabrics.

The mourning colour in Korea is that of raw hemp or string. For a year the women wear the well-known mourner’s hat, its shape is that of an enormous toupee, and the face is completely covered with a black veil. The Veil of Dayoko of Baro is white, as being the plainest and most unpretending, is worn in mourning and during out-door labour. It is cheap and will wash. Dark blue is the common colour for ordinary wear. A white head-dress is often worn in mourning.

Women wear as mourning a dark blue felt cap, which they wear on the chin, and the mourners blacken their faces, and cover their heads with ragged mantles. The mourning colour of the dead is black, as is the case with the debris when a death occurs. At sunset it is taken off. Roman women put on black after a funeral. Black clothes as mourning are the fashion in ancient Greece and Rome, and Italy, modern Greece, and modern Europe generally. White mourning is recorded for Korea, Tongking, China, Spain, and the Imperial House for women, and in various parts of modern Europe.

In old England, white scarves, bandanas, and gloves were worn at the funerals of infants and the unmarried. At Singapore a white sash is worn, but apart from this there is no mourning costume in Malaysia.

Mourners among the Tahle people wear dark blue clothes, which they assume as soon as the burial is over. Among the Yoruba, the women wear blue or white. Among the Eora of Bophany blue hat is worn, or merely a blue thread is placed round the arm. This fashion is paralleled by the men of the Midland country, who wear a blue band round the sleeve. In parts of Germany blue is worn as mourning by women, and in parts of Egypt the blue dress is worn by women as mourning.

Women and Children, 1878, i. 442.

Boers, in JAS xliii. 143; Herodotus, ii. 85; Wilkinson, Manneurs et Costumes, 1878, ill. 442.

Brooks, in JAS xxii. (1893) 37.


Nannas and Costumes, 1878, ill. 442.

De Grooth, I. 13; J. Dodt, Lebdliche Social Life of the Chinese of

Aragon, Guatemala widows dyed themselves yellow. Women who wore dark blue clothes in mourning for Euphrades. Grey was the mourning colour of the Guambiotels. It is said that the latter custom has originated in the idea that the mourner is more or less polluted for a certain period, and that therefore a dress worn by him then, being a seat of contagion, could not be used afterwards. But such customs originate in unconscious motivation. Of course, concealment may be aimed at, unconsciously. But several considerations place the theory of disguise out of court. Savage philosophies seldom hold on correct explanations; being ex post facto, they are out of touch with origins. But they do refer to present conscious motives, which again may not be the underlying primary reason.

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Fowler notes that the customs of blackening the face and of cutting the hair after a death are observed not only for friends but for slain foes, and suggests that the latter is the explanation of their use as being a mark of sorrow cannot apply. They may therefore, he adds, be explained as intended to disguise the slayer from the angry ghost of the slain.

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with ashes, soot, and the like is found in America, Africa, New Guinea, Samoa, and very generally throughout the world.\(^1\) The precise reason for the choice of this medium is obscure.

When spiritualism has once become a part of society, it lives on its own vogue, confirmed into the complex of current motives without cancelling the deep-seated original motive of the unconscious mind. Mourning dress, for example, may take on the character of spiritual armor, as a defense against the evil spirits who often act as a syndicate of death, removing and devouring the souls of the living. A Chinese found the grave-diggers and coffin-bearers tie their shadows to themselves by tying a cloth round their waists.\(^2\) A Northern Indian murderer wraped himself up tightly. The custom of blackening the face with ashes has perhaps the same meaning. In the primitive camp the most obvious medium for dirtying the person is, not the earth, but the ashes of the camp-fire, which with a little boiling water will stick in coal countries, a dye as well as a defilement.

A paradox similar to one already noted is the result of this adaptation to state; and, sorrow, and with it an equality of derogation, is the different feelings of state. The dead man is dressed in his best, arrayed like a 할로送 in all his glory; for the last time his personality is augmented to superhumanity, while his habits temporarily assimilate themselves to his actual state, socially substitute themselves for him, and practically negate and cancel his living personality and abrogate their social functions.

2. \(\ldots\).—When clothing is firmly established as a permanent social habit, temporary nudity is the most violent negation possible of the clothed state. Ceremonial nudity is a complex problem, but the idea of contrast, of an abnormal as contrasted with a normal state, may go far to explain many of its forms. At ceremonies of emigration the Malay takes off his strange.\(^3\) Such cases are not doubt due to ceremonial in a way; the psychological influence has more effect when the body is stripped of all coverings. But other examples of the practice are more obscure.

\(\ldots\).—In time of drought, Transyliovian girls strip naked when performing the ritual for rain.\(^4\) In India the practice is regular.\(^5\) To make rain, Keboni men go on the roof of a house at night, and strip themselves of all clothes. Obscene language is interchanged.\(^6\) To induce rain to fall, Ha-Thonga women strip themselves naked.\(^7\) Barunga women, to make rain, strip themselves of their clothes, and put on instead leaf-girdles or leaf-petticoats and head-dresses of grass.\(^8\) At a festival of Somnuri, Bengali students danced naked. A Guajarati mother whose child is ill goes to the goddess's temple at night, naked, or with only a girtle of mela (Melia) or amanso (Poligalath) leaves.

The principle in the above seems to be that a violent change in the course of Nature may be assisted by a violent change of habit on the part of those concerned. It is adaptation to the desired contrast by instituting a contrast in the olitians.

The use of obscene language is, like nudity, a break with the habits of normal life. The use of leaf-girdles is probably no survival of a clothing, but merely a method of touching down the

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\(^1\) From Torrelo, *Notes on South American Tribes*, p. 407; *Hum. Croth.,* I, 80, 184, 775, 189, 290, 288, 370, II, 613; II, H. Johnston, *Chambers's Cyclop.* p. 126; *Chambers's Ill.,* 149, 206, 226; *Turner, Samoa*, 396.

\(^2\) *De Groot, I.,* 94, 301.

\(^3\) *J. T. In *Journ. Expid.,* 1900, p. 333 f.

\(^4\) *Old New Zealand*, by a Pakeha Maori, 1854, pp. 104-114.

\(^5\) *Earl's Dacressing of the Four Elements*, p. 107.

\(^6\) J. B. BEEHEU (1831), p. 123.

\(^7\) *Frazier, G. H.'s Ill.,* 74.

\(^8\) *Frazier, G. H.'s Ill.,* 74.

\(^9\) *Van Gennim, 291.*

\(^10\) *G. H.'s Ill.,* 675.


\(^12\) *F. C. Hodgson, 1898, p. 412 f.


\(^14\) *A. B. Ellis, Tahi-speaking Peoples*, 237.

\(^15\) *Skitt, 299.*

\(^16\) *E. Gerard, The Land beyond the Forest, Edin., 1888, II, 40.

\(^17\) *Pouin, 4.*

\(^18\) *Jenny, 210;* Frazier, *G. H.'s Ill.,* 94.

\(^19\) *J. C. Hodgson, 172.*

\(^20\) *H. A. Jumun, in Fita i.* 140.


\(^22\) *Ward, Hindoo*, 1837, I, 72, cf. 130; J. M. Campbell, in *A* xxiv, 265.
DRESS

violation of the extraordinary state. Similarly, the idea of nakedness is often satisfied by the removal of the upper garment only. Ideas of fertility and outpouring as connected with leaves and with the genital organs are probably later.

The whole subject is illustrated by the following: "In Eskimo and Chukchee the garment becomes brief before the fishing season. Every evening he strips himself of all but a garment, a proceeding not otherwise allowed, and bares near the location of the dugout.1 An Eskimo may not even strip and walrus on the same day, unless he strips and bathes the following day.2 In dealing with a ghost who has been worn, he will then wash and bathe the whole body before eating walrus; he may strip himself before eating seal.3"

The principle of assimilation to special circumstances is here conspicuous. Possibly in the New Guinea example the later extension of the principle to assimilation by contact is involved.

Dress, as will be more fully illustrated below, not only essentially a social habit, but one of the most distinctly social habits that have been evolved, the public removal of garments and nudity generally come under the regulation of custom and law. Dress, like other habits, is a second nature, and social inertia may fix it more securely; hence still the legalism as the pronouncement of Zoroastrian law, that it is a sin to walk with only one boot on.4

The sexual instincts of modesty and attraction give life to the idea of dress, and a balance is seldom exactly attained between them and legitimacy. In modern times the missionary movement has practically removed many a wild race by imposing upon them, as the most essential feature of Christendom, the prohibition of clothing and the development of a cold climate among peoples inclined to prudery and ascetic ideals; hence a factitious sentiment of hypocritical decency. In other races, however, nakedness has evolved similar conditions.

In Japan it is a capital offense to strip naked.5 In most European countries 'exposure of the person' is a criminal offense. The Roman Catholic Church taught, and still teaches in convent schools, that it is wrong to expose the body even to one's own eyes.6 'Modern modesty was carried to great lengths, insufficient clothing being forbidden.7 The Roman prescribes that a man shall not uncover himself even to himself, and shall not wash naked—fear of God, and of spirits.8 Job did so, and atoned for it.9 When in Arab antiquity grown-up persons showed themselves naked, it was only under extraordinary circumstances and to attain unusual ends.10 These latter have been illustrated above.

Such excess of the idea of decency renders still more important the peculiar beauty of the superstitious use of nudity and also its sexual appeal. In the sphere of art it may be the case that peoples accustomed to nakedness, like the Greeks, employ it in a regular subject for artistic treatment, but it does not necessarily follow that it is better understood than among peoples not so accustomed. It lacks the force of contrast. Similarly in the sexual sphere, both natural modesty and natural expansion may be enhanced by the artificial limitations of decency. In this respect dress plays an important part in social biology. By way of showing the contrast, the African and the European conditions may be sketched.

Of the Wa-tavela, Johnston remarks: 'Both sexes have little notion or conception of decency, the men especially seeming to be impervious of any impropriety in exposing themselves. What clothing they have is worn either as an adornment or for protection against the heat in night and early morning. Of the Wa-chagas he observes: 'With them indecency does not exist, for they make no effort to be decent, but walk about as Nature made them.' When the child is old enough to look unusually smart, in which cases they throw cloth or skins around their shoulders.11

Among Englishmen, a race very observant of the deccencies of civilization, Herrick is fairly typical. His attitude to sexual display is described by Beale Griffiths:12 'The fascination clothes in the lover's eyes is, no doubt, a complex phenomenon, but in part it rests on the aptitudes of a woman's garments to express vaguely a dynamic symbolism which must always remain indefinite and elusive, and on the character of the spectator who possesses fascination. No one has so accurately described this symbolism as Herrick, often an admiral of fancies in matters of sexual attractiveness. Especially instructive in this respect are his poems, "Delight in Disorder," "Upon Julia's Clothes," and notably "Janet Peacock." "A sweet disorder in the dress," he tells us, "bindles in clothes a wantonness;" clothes are not on the garment itself, but on the character of his movement that he irritates; on the "erring hole," the "winning wave" of the "tempertous petticoat."13 Henn, of course, may have been thought of in the clinic, and its meaning is hardly less explicit in the English and European milieu.

The significance of dress as an expression of the body will be referred to below in the sexual connexion. Meanwhile the general idea thus illustrated may be regarded as the norm in modern civilization. Its opposite or complementary is the increased value given to legitimate nudity. A movement is even proceeding, particularly in Germany, for an extension of this individual privilege into a restricted and occasional social habit—the so-called Nacktheit movement.

Such tendencies coincide with the twofold attitude towards the human organism which dress has emphasized—first, for the body in itself and regard for its artificial extensions, and second, periodic social phenomena accentuate one or the other aspect. The Spartan practice of nudity in athletics was based on a reasoned theory of health from exposure, and of the effect of clothing as a restraint. The Greeks have been said to 'glory in their nudes, and consider clothing fit only for women.2 Temporary nudity, when in obedience to natural impulse, should be regarded not as a perversion, still less as a survival of a primitive state, but as a rhythmic movement. The point is well illustrated by the use of nudity as a love-charm.

9. Dress and social grade.—Dress is the most distinctive expression in a material form of the various grades of social life. The biological period thus becomes a social period of existence, and the individual is merged in a functional section of the community. The assumption of a grade-dress is, whether explicitly or implicitly, ipso facto a social rite—in Van Gennep's term, a rite of aggregation.

(1) Childhood.—The swaddling-clothes of infants have their analogue in the earliest cultures, in the form of the animals mentioned of the pacuico system. In this the reasons of protection and cleanliness are obvious. After infancy the children of primitive peoples are quite naked in the warm climate. In colder climates they are assumed either at puberty or at the age of six or seven. Probably the former date represents an earlier stratum of fashion. Children, whether first clothed at the earlier age or not, assume adult costume at puberty.

In the New Hebrides, girls and boys are naked till five years of age. Among the Veddas dress is assumed at the age of six or seven. Children of well-to-do Hindus are naked till the third year, those of the poor till about six or seven.2 Running about uncovered, say the Zoroastrian texts, is no sin, up to the age of 15; and it is no sin to be without the sacred girdle till that age.3 In cold climates, where the constant purpose of dress is protection, differences of juvenile and adult costume may be reduced. For example, Sambayned children 'are dressed precisely as their parents, sex for sex.'4

There is little to notice in the matter of coiffure in the child-stage. Cases like the following are exceptional:

Young Naga children have the hair shaved. When a girl is of marriageable age, it is allowed to grow long.5

3. Phalavi Texts, 1, in SBE v. 297.
4. B. Ellis, Jr. 22, quoting authorities.
5. Weilhans, Rede, 173, 190.
6. JAF xi. (1890) 9, 11.
(2) Maturity.—Examples of the ritual assumption of the adult garb may be confined to a few types.

In Florida (Melanias) the male 'wrapper' is assumed with some ceremony at the age of six or seven. In Santa Cruz the adult male is crowned. His assumption is celebrated by a feast and pickling. Big boys whose parents are too poor to give them a proper garment have been known to grow up without one. The customs in the New Hebrides is the same, and after assumption the boy begins to be reserved towards his mother and sisters. The New Guinea boy is the first to acquire a skirt, loin-cloth, from his maternal uncle, rurum, to whom in return he offers certain objects of value as a sign of appreciation of his patron. The rurum makes the cloth, and puts it on the boy in the presence of the relatives on both sides of the family, who then eat together. A similar ceremony of investiture at puberty is practised by the Ioro tribes.

The last initiation of a New Hebrides boy is the investing of the belt. This is a broad band of nutangi bark about six inches wide, encircled with the waist twice and confined by a small strip of plaited grass. 'An untied rope' is the general word for the scooped-out sides of the native's belt. The belt is therefore an ornament, corresponding to the toga virilis, but usually not studded (from inability to provide pins for the feast) until a man is twenty or older. The old Japanese made a ceremony for the assumption of the above belt, which was called the 'kabuto' of girls.¹

The Hindu yamagopa is the equivalent in the sacred objects of the toga virilis, but is not, in religion, a 'person,' not as, if it were, individualized, not even named. The thread is of three slender-cotton filaments, which are wound in a bundle, each of these three consisting of three finer filaments. It is consecrated by sprinkling or is sprinkled, before it is put on. The wearer never parts with it. At the Buddhist church, the priest changes his vestments, so the Buddhist alters the position of the thread. When he is married, he is put on under his right shoulder; when he worships ancestors, the position is reversed; when he is a monk, it is worn on the left shoulder.¹ The earliest mention of this sacred cord, gajaparika, of the Brahman, is perhaps in the Upasagopa.² Worn over the left shoulder, it probably symbolizes the passing of the sacred thread which the warrior is engaged. This gajaparika is of one skein when put on the youth; when it is married it must have three, and, hence, it have five skeins. An initiation cord is put on first, then taken off and the real one put in position. Then the father covers his son with the sacred thread, with its head under the head, and whispers the Gayatri prayer. A cord is put on every year at the festival of Kurukshetra, the cord may never be replaced. The Sunyati, having entered the fourth or last stage of the Brahman's life, does not wear the gajaparika.³ Mani says that the first birth of a Hindu is 'from his natural mother, the second happens on the tying of the girdle of Mudgagnip, and the third is the initiation to the performance of a Sartuta sacrifice.'¹ 'Birth' in such contexts as the assumption of the adult state is an almost universal metaphor. In many well-known instances the metaphor itself has been translated into ritual, as being a convenient and impressive mode of affirming the change. But neither the metaphor nor the idea of re-birth is the ultimate reason of initiation ceremonies.

The sacred thread-girdle, the kosa, worn by every member, male and female, of the Zoroastrian faith, after the age of 15, is a symbol of cleanliness, as a girdle is worn by all the Ormand and his fellows. Bread and water were to be refused to all who did not wear it. It must be made not of silk, but of coarse thread of 12 inches in diameter, and it should be sewed 'three times circumcised the waist.' The other garment made of mudgagnip is worn over the sweater, and a muslin shirt, with short sleeves, worn high, not lower than the hips. At its 'opening in front' is a pocket, 'the pocket for good deeds.' When putting it on the faithful looks at the pocket, asking himself whether it is full. Both skirt and girdle are to be kept on during the night, 'for they are more protective to the body, and good for the soul.' To wear the girdle is to wear one's kusa 'with the religion.'¹ The distinctive garb of the Athenian ephesos was the chlamys. It was ceremonially assumed. The Roman boy at sixteen laid aside the bolda and the toga porina and assumed the white toga of mankind, toga pura or ciris. The path in medieval chivalry was made a square at fourteen. At twenty-one the knight hooded followed, and new white robes were ceremonially assumed, with a satin vest and a leather collar, over the suit of mail. All before but not assumed till puberty. At puberty the Chaco girl is decorated, and for the first time wears the flaring skirt of the women.²

There are, of course, exceptions to the rule that the adult garb is a social dress in the true sense.

Thus the Me'ko tribe have no ceremony in connexion with the assumption of the male band or the female petticoat.¹ Elsewhere the rite involves such usual complications as the following. Before a boy is circumcised, the Masai father puts on a special dress, and lives secluded in a special hut. On his return he drinks wine and is called 'father of the house.' The title is associated with a recognized place. The designation of the father points to the fact, expressed by the dress, that fatherhood, as elsewhere, is a special social grade.

In many examples there is a distinctive dress worn during the passage of the initiate and discarded at the end for the adult dress proper.

Thus, during the initiation of a Kamokor youth he was invested with his long-sleeved, white, sleeveless tunic, and finally fell in a broad band against the feet. This dress was made and publicly placed on her head by a paternal aunt, who received at one time present from the young person's father. When three or four years later, the period of sequester ceased, only this same dress (with a centre mark) of the young person, a ceremonial head-dress. Furthermore, the girl's fingers, wrists, and legs at the ankles and immediately below the knees were covered with clay, and their garments and body spots sprinkled with clay as a protection against the malignant influences which she was supposed to possess. The next step in the grade of social puberty is generally equivalent to nubility.

Among the Atti people a girl announces her eligibility for marriage by a procession, the marriage being performed in the act in which the bridegroom is engaged. She is escorted through the streets, under an umbrella. In the betrothal ceremony, the woman made of New Hebrides, a girl betrothed in childhood wears nothing except on great occasions. When growing up she is clothed, but in the house wears only the pendant. In the house the marriage dressing and tattling are a step towards the marriage of a girl.¹ The Naga youth, on the other hand, the cord must be replaced. Only then does he assume the loin-cloth.³ Frequently a special dress or modification of the adult dress marks a distinction between maturity and nubility. Among the Kfora of New Guinea taiting is confined to the women. When a girl is engaged, the region between the naval and the neck, hilosororow, in a belt. Before marriage the Yehapped gado is tatted between the breasts.¹

The passage from childhood to youth, and from youth to nubility, is often marked by a change in the mode of wearing the hair. As an example, among Naga women the coiffure is a mark of status.¹ When dressing him or her in childhood, the hair is shaved, except for the front and a tuft on the crown; at puberty, the hair is allowed to grow, and is worn in chignon or braid form; when married, the head is shaved and hanging down the back; when they become mothers, they wear these plaited hairforms, which is similar to that of the women.

(3) Sexual dress.—The assumption of dress to initiate the social grade of maturity is the assumption of a social sexual differentiation. The most distinctive social division is the permanent division of sex. Up to puberty this is more or less ignored, and the neutral quality of the previous stage is often indicated by the neutral connotation of the term ‘child,’ and by a neutral fashion of child-dress. It is natural that the growth and maturity of the primary sexual characters should give these a prominent place in the principles of the distinguishing garb, and that they should, as it were, mould the dress into adaptive forms. The idea of social sexuality is well brought out in the stories of

¹ Seligmann, 490.
² Hollis, 594.
³ H. B. Mathews, in JAS xxiv, 427.
⁵ C. W. Hobbs, Ethnology of A-Kambo, p. 70.
⁶ A. B. Ellis, Tiki-speaking Peoples, 235.
⁷ Codrington, 241.
⁸ Woodbridge, in JAS vii (1883) 290.}

¹ Seligmann, 73, 76.
children failing to distinguish girls from boys when nude. The adaptation of the distinctive feminine and masculine garments, skirt and trousers, to the activity of the respective sexes has already been referred to. There is a range of a material expression in a social form of the psychical reflexes from personality, and, in this case, sexuality, has here particular prominence. To regard the affirmation, by means of dress, of primary sexual character is to equate it to the sexual characteristic of the other sex by adorning them is a superficial view. Such intention is secondary, though, of course, it has an important social bearing. Goethe's remark is pertinent for the consideration of dress as an affirmation of personality: 'We exclaim, 'What a beautiful little foot!' when we have merely seen a pretty shoe; we admire the lovely waist, when nothing has met our eyes but an elegant girde.'

The primary sexual character of sexual characters may be illustrated by the following:

A type of female beauty in the Middle Ages represents forms clothed in broad flowing skirts, and with the characteristic shape of pregnancy. 'It is the maternal function, ... which marks the whole type.' The type possibly survived in that clenching of the breasts which involved an immense amount of expansion below the waist, and secured such expansion by the use of the corset and similar device. The Elisabethan farthingale was such a garment. This was originally a Spanish invention, as indicated by the name from cordobés, 'provided with a long skirt.' It was used in England throughout the stage. We find the fashion at its most extreme point in the fashionable dress of the Italian upper classes of the eighteenth century, since it has been fun- mortalised by Velasquez. In England, hoops went out during the reign of George II, but were revived, for a time, half a century later. A corset was worn in Victorian crinoline. Such a garment, however, is not exceptional to the view here expressed—it is, in fact, cor- receivably so, if the necessity of emphasizing feminine characters which is characteristic of the class—that this, like most other feminine fashions in dress, was invented by conscious or unconscious effort to effect the culmination of the distinctive feminine garment, the skirt, as a protection and affirmation of the feminine character.

Augmentation of the masculine character is similar. In medieval Europe an exception is found in a tendency to the use of compressing garments. The tightening of the waist girth is a remarkable adaptation, which emphasizes at one and the same time the feminine characters of expansion both of the breasts and of the abdominal and gluteal regions. 'Not only does the corset render the breasts more prominent: it has the further effect of displacing the breathing activity of the lungs, so that the upward direction, the advantage from the point of sexual allurement thus gained being that additional attention is drawn to the bosom from the respiratory movement thus imparted to it.' The development of the corset in modern Europe has been traced from the hands, or fascia, of Greek and Roman women. The tight bodices of the Middle Ages were replaced in the eighteenth century by whalebone stays. The modern corset is a combination of the fascia and the girdle.

In the sphere of masculine dress and the affirmation by its means of sexual characters, it is as well to refer to two medieval modifications:

The long hose which superseded the barbarian tights and preceded the modern trousers emphasized most effectively the male character. There is a special social quality of elasticity and activity of the lower limbs, the organs of locomotion. The fringings, or codices, of the 14th and 15th centuries is an example of a protective article of dress, originally used in war, which became an article of fashionable apparel, often made of silk and adorned with ribbons, even with gold and jewels. Its history supplies a modern repetition of the savage phallic cryp- crypt, and throws light on the evolution of the idea of dress.

With regard to secondary sexual characters, sexual dress, itself an artificial secondary sexual character, carries on various adaptations. 'The man must be strong, vigorous, energetic, hairy, even feathered, the body smooth, rounded, and gentle.' These characters are echoed in the greater relative coarseness and strength of fabric of masculine dress, and the softness and fluidity of the feminine. The sexual character of women is that of greater darkness of women is a secondary ... sexual character; in this connexion a harmony is un-consciously aimed at; the tendency is for men to wear darker, and women lighter dresses. Women tend to 'cultivate pallor of the face, to use powder,' and 'to emphasize the white underlip.' The attraction of sexual disparity, so important in sexual selection, finds its culmination in the matter of clothing, and it has constantly happened that men have even called in the aid of religion to embrace a distinction was worn by men, though not so universal. One of the greatest of sex allurements would be lost and the extreme importance of clothes would disappear at once if the two sexes were uniform. The picture of dress has, however, never come about among any people.'

The assumption of sexual dress at maturity raises the question of the original meaning of special coverings for the primary sexual characters. Their probable origin in an impulse towards protection against the natural environment has been suggested. When dress becomes more than a mere appendage and produces the reaction of an affirmation of personality, its meaning inevitably be- comes richer. The decorative impulse and sexual allurement take place in the complex. But the chief, and the distinctively social factor, is the process of affin- ing the female and the artificial intimation the particular physiological stage which society transforms into a human grade of communal life. This is well illustrated by such facts as the frequent absence of such dress as, for example, until marriage, and, more significantly, until pregnancy or motherhood. In other cases, as in the frequent confinement of sexual covering to the primary region, the principle is still logically followed. Thus, among many negro peoples, as the natives of Lounge, women cover the breasts especially. Naga women cover the breasts only. They say it is absurd to cover those parts of the body with which one has been able to see from their birth, but that it is different with the breasts, which appear later.

The evolution of sexual dress involves some side-issues of thought and custom which are not without significance. The harmony between the ideas of sexual dress and its temporary disguise for natural functions is brought out in many customs and aspects of thought. The following is an instance:

The Mecke tribes of New Guinea have folk-tales of which the motive is that a man surprising a girl without her dress. His petticoat is still the custom for the husband to fasten ceremonially the bride's petticoat, and the ceremonial binding of the virgin zone embodies similar ideas.

Savage folklore is full of stories connected with disparity of sex-dress. Different dress is worn in different peoples leads to comment when coinci- dences occur. The Dinka call the Bongo, Mittoo, and Niam-Niam 'women' because the men wear an apron, while the women wear no clothes whatever, getting, however, daily a supper bough for a girdle. Sexual disparity, natural and artificial, has often led to speculation.

Repudiating the sexual element, Clement of Alexandria argued that, the object of dress being merely to cover the body and protect it from cold, there is no reason why men's dress should differ from women's. The Naga of Manipur say that originally men and women wore identical clothes. The first human beings were seven men and seven women. By way of making a distinction the man made his hair longer or, if he were a woman, grew a beard. After any marriage he used still the custom for the husband to fasten ceremonially the bride's petticoat, and the ceremonial binding of the virgin zone embodies similar ideas.

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Spinning, weaving, dress-making, and connected arts have been the work of women until modern
times. Before the rise of organized industry, every family was self-sufficing in the production of clothes for its members. Washing and repairing of women’s work, daily with cookery. In barbarism, as among the Chaco Indians, all the making of clothes is done by the women. The men’s large and cumbersome blankets each took months to weave.1

In the lowest stages each adult prepared and looked after his or her attire. As soon as manufacture began with bark-cloth, the preparation of the leaf was the business of women, like other sedentary and domestic arts; but, since the style of the dress depended not upon measurement and cut, but upon folds and draping, women were not actually the makers of dress. In the ancient civilizations the slave-system of industry was applied in two directions. Skilled male artists were employed irregularly by the luxurious; while the regular method of domestic manufacture came to include dress-making and tailoring. Among the ancient Greeks and Italians the making of clothes was carried on in the house by the female slaves under the supervision of the lady of the house. This system gradually gave way to one of more modern fashion, though the attire still retained its claims upon domestic art up to modern times.

In modern civilization the broad distinction of sexual dress has reasserted itself in the sphere of occupation. The dress of men is prepared by men, that of women by women. Special knowledge rendered this inevitable, as soon as cut and shape superseded draping in both female and male attire. But, as in other arts, the male sex is the more creative, and the luxurious women of modern society are largely catered for by male dressmakers.

In the majority of modern nations the care and repair of the clothes of the family is part of the domestic work of women. The washing of clothes is usually women’s work. Yet in Abyssinia it is the man who washes the clothes of both sexes, and in this function the women cannot help him.2 In the sphere of industry Chinese men provide another exception.

(4) Wedding garments.—The sexual dress is at marriage intensified by the principle of affirmation, not of sexuality, but of personality. It is an occasion of expansion, of augmentation; as the social expression of the crisis of love (the culmination of human energy and well-being), it is precisely adapted for the free play and work of super-humanity, and are treated as royal persons. A special and distinctive dress for the bride is a widely spread fashion. As a rule, the bride herself is supposed to make the dress. With marriage, housekeeping begins and, as in Norway, Scotland, India, and elsewhere, the bride supplies the household linen, often including the personal linen of the husband. The variety of wedding dress is endless. Frequently each family supplies the other.

In North India the bride’s dress is yellow, or red—colours which ‘repel demons.’ The Majhwar pair wear white, but after the anointing put on coloured clothes.3 English brides wear a white dress. So did Hebrew brides. On many occasions it is directed that a bride must wear ‘Something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue.’ The Hindu bridegroom supplies the cloth for the wedding dress of the bride. The fact is (as below) that there is an old Hijius, not merely a dowry, but an inter change of ornament and clothes being the principal ingredients. When presented, the clothes are put on; this forms a preliminary marriage-ceremony,4 The gorgeous flowered embroidery, which is part of the bride’s dress in their wedding dress.

Magnificence, generally, in the characteristic of wedding garments throughout the world; white is the frequent, and white and red are the most common of women’s wear, especially with cooks. In barbarism, as among the Chaco Indians, all the making of clothes is done by the women. The men’s large and cumbersome blankets each took months to weave.1

The Korean bridegroom elect often betrothed at the age of five, wears a red jacket as a mark of engagement.5 On the day before marriage the Roman bride put on the toga praestans, which was deposited before the Larci, and put on the tunic vesta or regula, ornamented in a universal Latin fashion way. It was fastened with a woolen girdle tied in the knot of Hercules, nodus Herculis.6 In European folklores an analogue is to be found in the true lover’s knot, the idea being a magical and later a symbolical knitting together of the wedded pair. The hair of the bride was arranged in six locks, and was ceremonially parted with the osilartar hasti. She wore a wreath of flowers, gathered by her own hands.7

Some cases of investiture follow.

On the wedding night the bride of the Kolia people is decorated. Coco-nut oil is put on her thighs. She wears a new petticoat. Red lines are painted on her face, and her arms are painted. Her hair is combed and anointed with oil, and in her locks are scarlet Ailidius flowers. The groom wears a head dress of cassowary feathers; his face is painted red and yellow streaks, and his ears are decorated with dried tiges of pips.7 The Hindu marriage is invested with the two additional skeins necessary to make the full complement of the pashyagari, the sister’s robe of the married man. The Japanese bridegroom is dressed in the manner of a chief. The idea is to represent him as of exalted rank.8 The Malay term l. bridegroom rankasah, the ‘one-day king.’9 The dressing up of both bride and groom and all parties present, for the bridal procession of the Minangkabau is, very remarkable.

The bridal veil, originally concealing the face, occurs in China, Korea, Manchuria, Burma, Persia, Russia, Bulgaria, and in various modified forms throughout Europe and the majority of great civilizations, ancient and modern. In ancient Greece the bride wore a long veil and a garland. The Druse bride wears a long red veil, which her husband removes in the bride’s chamber after the Egyptian veil, boorlo, conceals all the face except the eyes, and reaches to the feet. It is of black silk for married and white for unmarried women.2 Various considerations suggest that the veil is in origin rather an affirmation of the face, as a human and particularly a sexual glory, than a concealment, though the emphasizing of maidenly modesty comes in as a secondary and still more prominent factor. The veil is sometimes a symbol of the expression of the head and the hair. These are also augmented by various decorations.

The wedding dress often coincides with, or is equivalent to, the grade-dress of the married. The stola as a woollen alabaster for the distinctive garment of ancient Roman wives.6 It was an ample outer tunic in design, and possibly to be identified with the bridal tunic red. Among the Hereros, after the wedding meal, the bride’s mother puts upon the bride the cap and the dress of married women.10 The ‘big garment,’ ear-rings, and the iron necklace distinguish Masai married women from girls.11

Further social stages are marked by distinctive dress, such as pregancy, motherhood, and, more rarely, fatherhood. As soon as a Wa-tavetia bride becomes pregnant,1 she is dressed with much display of beads, and over her eyes a deep fringe of tiny iron chains is hung, which hides her and also prevents her from seeing clearly. An old woman attends her, to screen her from all excitement and danger until the last moments of its taken place.12 Among Cameroson tribes is found the custom of

1 Grubh, 69.


3 Smith, J. of the S. of S., xi. 125 f.; Smith, DB II. 251; Crooke, j. F. p. 357.

4 See Field, F. L. 1727.

5 Padfield, 116.

6 Smith’s Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant. s. 70, 1890, 839.

7 Matrimonium.

8 See J. of the S. of S., xii. 122.

9 Veth, J. of the S. of S., xii. 689.

10 Smith’s Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant. s. 70.

11 Doolittle, 1. 116; Griffin, 249; Anderson, Manual of the World, 1786, see ii. 141; F. L. 357; Sinclair-D’Alroy, India, 1909, p. 72; Ralston, Songs of the Russian People, 1872, p. 280; Chassande, The Dress, 1925, p. 8; Lass, i. 83; Eng. Ch. 74.

12 Smith’s Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant. s. 70.

13 J. iris, Die Herren, Gütersloh, 1908, p. 106.

14 Hollis, 282.


16 Baudouin, in J. of the S. of S., 1874, xxii. 300.
DRESS

65

Dress of China.—One of the longest and most curious articles in the history of dress is that dealing with the garb of permanent sacred grades, priestly, royal, and the like, and of tempory sacredness, as in the case of worshippers, pilgrims, and victims. Some examples have been incidentally noticed; a brief reference to certain types must suffice here.

In ancient India the ascetic had to wear coarse, worn-out garments, and for this reason was called a dhoti, or tattered garments—the term may include bark- or grass-cloths—and his hair was braided. The Shvetaks wore clothes not old or dirty. He wore a sacred string. He had forlorn garments, shoes, or string which had been worn by others. The student for the doctor's dress wore the skin of an antelope or other animal, for his lower garment a cloth of hemp, or flax, or wool. He wore the girdle of a Brahman, a triple cord of Mulli grass. A Kisthendra wore as his cord a strip of cotton, a cord of hemp. The religious character of this caste-system renders the locality of some of the last grade conventional.

Temporarily, in worship and on pilgrimage, the ordinary member of an organized faith assumes a quasi-sacerdotal character.

For the haji to Mecca the Muslim must wear no other garments than the ihram, consisting of two seamless wrappers, one passed round the loins, the other over the shoulders, the head being uncovered. The ceremony of putting them on at a pilgrim’s ‘station’ is at-ihram, ‘the making unlawful’ (of ordinary garments and behaviour and occupations). The ceremony of taking them off is at-thalid, ‘the making lawful’. The haji shaves his head when the pilgrimage is over. According to some, the ihram is the shroud of the event of the hajj’s death. More likely it is preserved and used as a shroud when he dies. The most important item in the costume of Japanese pilgrims is the ozuma, a jacket which is stamped with the seal of each shrine visited. They may wear three headdresses or the headgear of the cloth might be sewn on. The garment is not always carefully preserved after the return home, and when the owner dies it is said in it for burial.

The dress of worshippers varies between ‘decent apparel’ and garments of assimilation to the god or the victim or the priest. As in the case of lal-worship, the garments were often kept in the shrine, and assumed on entrance. In certain rites both Dionysiac and his worshippers wear skins. The Bacchanals wore the skins of goats. The veil of the worshipper has been referred to. In the earliest Christian period a controversy seems to have taken place with regard to female head-dress during worship. In the modern custom the male head-dress is removed, the female is retained. Academies sometimes preserve the rule of a special vestment for worshippers, whether lay or priestly.

It has been noted that the dress of jogeours, triumvirates, and troubadours was an assimilation to the sacerdotal. From the same medieval period comes the code of ‘singing robes’. The singer’s habit is a garb of dress or of costume.

(7) Priestly and royal robes.—The dress of the sacred world tends to be the reverse of the profane. Apart from the impulse—to be traced in the mentality of medicine-men—to impress one’s personality upon the audience by the fantastic and the grotesque, there is here the expression of the fundamental opposition between natural and supernatural social functions.

The garb of Tai priests and priestesses differs from ordinary dress. Their hair is long and unkempt, while the lay fashion is to wear it short. The laayan, when they do, wears bright clothes; the priest may wear only plain clothes, which is depicted in the monk’s red-yellow with mangrove-tan. Priests and priestesses, when about to communicate with the god, wear a white linen cap. On holy days they wear white cloth, and on certain occasions, not explained, their bodies are painted with white clay. White and black bands are generally worn round the head. The Ewe priests wear white caps. The priestesses wear steel-crowned hats with wide hats. The Priestess wears white ceremonial used in the wear ‘grey clothes’ reaching to the feet, and a kerchief over the breast.

The survival of some antique modes often suffices, through various accidents and modifications, for the priestly garb, other than sacerdotal vestments. Thus, the raiment, a small antique mantle, was a ‘law of Mark’ (sacramentum, ch. vi. 40), and worn in forest countries.

Miss E. S. Hartland, in JAI xi. 60, 1907.

Westermarck, M.I. 335, quoting authorities.

Miss E. Hartland, Mémoires sur l’ancienne chasublie, Paris, 1781, i. 151.


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1 Hotter, Nord-Hinterland von Kamau, Brunswick, 1903, p. 431.


3 Dobola, 10.

4 SBE. ii. (1907) 223.

5 Dobola, 356.

6 Monier-Williams, 396.

7 The use of these terms to have been anticipated at various times by the adoption of green uniforms worn in forest countries.

8 SBE. ii. 451.

9 Woodhouse, in JAI xi. 60, 1907.

10 Westermarck, M.I. 335, quoting authorities.
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worn by the magister of the Fratres Arvales and by camilli generally.

The history of the dress of the Christian priest-
hood is a long one. Here also we find the principle of opposition to the lay-garb.

The democratic and non-professional character of primitive Christianity may be seen in the fact that in A.D. 165 Pope Alexander I ordered Gallus the bishops who wore dress different from that of the laity. They had been monks, and retained the pallium and girdle instead of assuming the tunic and toga of the superior layman. It is curious that the social differentiation of dress to mark differentiation of social function was resisted so long. But in the 6th cent. the civil dress of the clergy automatically became differ-
ent from the dress of the country, since, while the laity departed from the ancient type, the clergy withstood all such evolution. Thus, in the Western Empire the clergy retained the toga and long tunic, while the laity wore the short tunic, though not quite the same as the tunic of the laity.

The characteristic garb of the Christian clergy, both civil and ecclesiastical, was the long tunic. Originally it appears to have been white. Then its evolution divided; the alb derived from it on the one side, the civil tunic in sober colours on the other. For the civil dress the dignified toga was added to constitute full dress; for use in inclement weather the camara or cappa, an overcoat (plisseale) with a cowl, was adopted. The last-named garment similarly divided into the ecclesiastic cope, and the civil over-cloak. The long tunic still survives in three forms—the surplice, the cassock, and the frock coat. Its fashion in the last instance superseded the toga, which again survives in the academic gown.

The evolution of vestments is in harmony with the psychology of dress generally, and in many aspects illustrates it forcibly. With the vestment the priest puts on a 'character' of divinity. By change of vestments he multiplies the Divine force while showing its different aspects. The changing of vestments has a powerful psychical appeal. The vestment symbolizes his mission from the human and the supernatural; it absorbs, as it were, the rays of Deity, and thus at the same time inspires the human wearer. The dress is accordingly regarded not as an expression of the personality of the wearer, but as imposing upon him a super-

personality. This idea is implicit in every form of dress. Dress is a social body-surface, and even in sexual dress, military uniform, professional and official attire, the properties of the state inherent in it is often quite explicit. Further, the dress gives admission to the grade. In particular cases of solemnity a dress serves to fix the person's sacred function. Thus the Australian messenger is sacred by reason of his red cap.

A temporary sacred garment may even be used sacrificially. At the Zulu festival of the new fruits, the king danced in a mantle of grass or other herbs and corn leaves, which was torn up and trodden into the fields. In such cases there is

perhaps a reverse assimilation of virtue from the sacred person.

Royal dress in civilization tends to combine the principles of military dress and the tradition of the long robes of ancient authority. The subject needs a special analysis. The distinctive head-
dress, the crown, probably is an accidental survival of a military headgear. Among the Franks was a mark of royalty. But its significance is in line with the general principle, and it is essentially an affirmation of the dignity of the head, the crown of the human organism. Among the barbarians, social authority tends to adopt a specific garb.

The headmen of the Naga wear a special dress. The priest-

ingen for believing a distinctive role in the Roman land tribes commissioned the man who buried the dead chief to cover the new chief with a red blanket. This he does, at the same time hitting him hard on the head.

Ideas of purity readily attach themselves to priestly and royal garments. In the following cases it seems to be some survival from Zoroas-

trianism. Among the Kafirs of the Hindu Kush, men preparing for the office of headman wear a semi-sacred uniform which may on no account be defiled by coming into contact with dogs. These men, anarata, were nervously afraid of dogs, which had to be fastened with a long chain. The garments was seen to approach. The dressing has to be performed with the greatest care, a place which cannot be defiled with dogs.

Other less prevalent details of royal raiment are such as the girdle and the veil. In ancient Tahiti the king at his investiture was girded with a sacred girdle of red feathers, which was a symbol of the gods. In Africa velling the face is a general custom of royalty. The pall of the Persian monarchs, originally bestowed by the Pope, typifies their sacred function.

There is a tendency for each article of a royal panoply to carry a special symbolism, significant of the kingly duties and powers, just as the articles of the sacerdotal dress express Divine functions and attributes.

(8) The dress of the gods.—Frazer has shown reason for believing that the costume of the Roman god and of the Roman king was the same. Probably the king was dressed in the garments of Jupiter, borrowed from the Capitoline temple. In the earlier theory of society the gods are a special class or grade in the community. Their dress has not infrequently been an important detail in the social imagination, and has even formed a considerable item in the national budget. In so far as they are used for super-human purposes it is evident that they are to be thought of as united with a particular sacred function. Thus the Australian messenger is sacred by reason of his red cap.

1 Chetham, in Smith-Chetham's DCA, s.v. 'Dress.' J. Fraser, 31.

2 J. Fraser, 31.


4 Hawaiian, in J. A. F. xi. 316.


6 Ellis, Polynesian Researches, 1829, ii. 354 n.

7 Frazer, G.P., p. 110.

8 Frazer, Kingd., 1907.

9 Payne, i. 347.

10 Ibid. 346, 310, x. 541.

11 Oldenberg, Rel. des Vols. 104, 3601.

12 G. Maspero, 'Livre de Ceremonies,' 1896, pp. 119, 679, Ball, in Prsba, xiv. (1889) 1531


14 Turner, 209.


16 Pasch, ii. 18, 212.
Before starting work they purified themselves with water and the image of sacred garlands. The druids, at the Druidic altars, wore a mantle and a shirt of white wool. Zeus in an oracle commanded Osiris or to give Osiris his new clothes. The image of Hera at Samos possessed a wardrobe of garments, white, blue, and purple; some were for wear, some for use. The bronze statue of Bacchus in his mount, a goat he was riding on his spatial, was of the Satyrii. We can speak of the Satyrii as a garland of fine lines. The image of Brauronian Athena wore a veil, and the woman, offered by devout women, the same was the case with the image of Ili baph at Agrigum. The magnificent robe, first used as a veil for Athena at Ephesus, became embracing the body, was seen in the image of Athena at the Panatheneum, is famous. The image was the old woman the goddess had beheld when the robe was placed on the body. This was even worn every fourth year by two Archepheides.

The dress of the god not seldom becomes a thing in itself, just as the dress of a priest or a king may itself be his substitute. The Polynesians employed figs in many ritualistic ways. Idols were robed in choice clothes. Every three months they were brought out, exposed to the sun (the term for this being mokes), re-annointed with oil, and returned to their wrappings. The god was supposed to be contained in a bundle of clothes. Matting and sinnet were similarly used. Pano, the Sasanian god of war, was 'nothing more than a piece of old rotten matter about 3 yards long and 4 inches in width.' These were covered with 'curiously netted sinnet,' just as the sbeleš at Delphi. In Mangaia the gods were 'well wrapped in native cloth.' one god was 'made entirely of sinnet.' The Tabitian word for sinnet is na, and the first enemy killed was called nak, because a piece of sinnet was tied to him. 10

The term 'ephol' in the OT apparently bears three meanings. (1) 'A great and chosen dress of priests' cloth.' Not over the 'robe' but the 'ephol,' it was made of gold, threads of blue and scarlet, and fine linen. Its shape and character are doubtful. Held at the shoulders the priest's hands, it was bound around the waist with a 'curious girdle.' (2) The term seems to be used for a garment set apart from the main. (3) There is the ephol which is an image, or its equivalent. Passages like Jg 8:32 make it difficult to interpret as a garment. But, apart from questions of grammar, which in some cases is very obscure, it is possible to regard the ephol as a worshipped garment, the practice being found elsewhere, or as a garment enclosing or covering an image. 12

Various Divine objects, symbols, or emblems may be clothed. In Uganda a jar swathed in blood and decorated so as to look like a man, represented the dead king. 13 The Bhagata make an image of wood and put clothes and ornaments upon it. It is then sacrificed. 14 Such cases involve impersonation. Even an emblem like the Cross, when carried on Good Friday, or sacred contours like the Kalasha and the laydéš, when clothed, decorated, or veiled, acquire a certain personal quality. The line is not always easily drawn between covering and insignia.

In the highest stages of theistic imagination the dress of a god tends to be metaphorical. He is clothed with the blue sky, with clouds, with thunder, with majesty, power, and splendor.

A. The dress of victims. By dressing an inanimate object, an animal, or a plant, a human quality is placed upon it. It becomes a member of society, by which capacity its saving force is enhanced. It does not follow that being so garbed it is a substitute for a previous human sacrifice. Even gifts may be so personalized. The Malay dress and decorative biflodes which are presented as a gift. 15 But the principle is remarkably dominant in the case of sacrifices and effigies. 16

B. There are cases of a reverse impersonation: 17

After killing a domestic animal, a wild boar, and dance round him, saying that they had not slain the bear. 18 When Nütkas had killed a bear, they put a chief's bonnet on its head and offered it food. 19

Ordinary impersonation is more frequent. Russian peasants dress a birch tree in woman's clothes. 20 At the Little Dance of the Dukhobors, a woman dressed a wooden image made roughly from a tree, and decorated it as a bride. 21 The last ahead of corn and similar representations of the corn-spirit are dressed in woman's clothes. The priests of the Yezidis of Persia had a similar rite, and dressed a bunch of maize in women's clothes and offered it as the corn. 22

The image of 'Death' in Transylvania is dressed in 'the holiday attire of a young peasant woman, with a red hood, silver brooches, and a profusion of ribbons at the arms and breast.' 23 The Iroquois sacrificed two women, one to dart him a bull; weapon, feathers, and ribbons. 24 The human scapgoat of Thrangia was dressed in mourning garb. 25 The scapegoat of Massilia was dressed in woman's clothes.

The mock-kings in various lands are dressed in royal acts, actual or sham. 26 The reasons for the various dresses just enumerated are sufficiently clear.

Dress, by personalizing a victim, provides a convenient method of substitution. When the Oracle ordered the sacrifice of a maiden, a goat was dressed as a girl and slain instead. 27 Such cases may be attributed to priestly myths, but the practice was probably actually occurred. It does not follow, however, as has already been urged, that all cases of a humanly clothed animal or vegetable victim represent substitution for an originally human sacrifice.

The principle of assimilation to a particular environment, which is the focus of the ceremony, has striking illustrations.

In a folk-drama of Moravia, Winter is represented by an old man muffled in fur, and wearing a bearskin cap. Girls in green danced round a May-tree. 28 A common practice in European and oriental folklore is dressing an image representing the spirit of vegetation in flowers or leaves. 29 In time of drought the Serbs took a girl to the oak, dressed her head to foot in grass, herbs, and flowers, even her face being hidden behind a veil of living green. Thus disguised she is called the Dodoša, and goes through the village with a troop of girls. 30 A remarkable case is seen in Suban ritual. When a sacrifice was offered to the red planet Mars, as Longleat calls it, the priest wore red, the temple was draped with red, and the victim was a red-haired, red-cheeked man. 31 The girl—victim sacrificed by the Mexicans to the spirit of the rain, was painted red and yellow, and dressed to resemble the plant. Her blood was supposed to recurit the soil, she was termed Xalayuita, 'she who is clothed with the sand.' 32 The similar victim of the Earth—goddess occupied her last days in making clothes of ash leaves. These were to be the right dress of the maize-god. The next victim, a man, wore the female victim's skin, or rather a simulation of it, as a living image was clothed in the skin of the victim. 33 The victim of Tzocalticopa was invested for a year with the dress of the god. Sleeping in the daytime, he went forth at night attired in the god's robes, with a girl as his companion. 34 At the festival of Tocalti, Tzocalticopa's image was dressed in new robes, and all the congregation wore new clothes.

Social control of dress. Dress expresses every social nuance, as well as every social grade. It also expresses family, municipal, provincial, regional, tribal, and national character. At the same time it gives full play to the individual. A complete psychology of the subject would analyze all such cases with reference to the principle of adaptation.

The least reducible of all distinctive costumes are the racial and the sexual. For instance, the

2. Frazer, G.B.H. II. 574.
4. Holst, 574.
6. Ibid., 186.
7. Ibid., 186.
8. Ibid., 186.
9. Ibid., 125.
10. Acosta, Historia de los Indios de la Nueva España, I. 352.
11. Ibid., 353.
13. Ibid., 73 f.
14. Ibid., 73 f.
15. Ibid., 73 f.
16. Ibid., 73 f.
17. Ibid., 73 f.
18. Ibid., 73 f.
19. Ibid., 73 f.
20. Ibid., 73 f.
21. Ibid., 73 f.
22. Ibid., 73 f.
23. Ibid., 73 f.
24. Ibid., 73 f.
25. Ibid., 73 f.
26. Ibid., 73 f.
27. Ibid., 73 f.
28. Ibid., 73 f.
29. Ibid., 73 f.
30. Ibid., 73 f.
31. Ibid., 73 f.
32. Ibid., 73 f.
33. Ibid., 73 f.
34. Ibid., 73 f.
35. Ibid., 73 f.
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Hindu fastens his jacket to the right; the Musal- 
mán to the left. In European dress the male 
style is to fasten buttons on the right, the fem
ele on the left. Where a division is central, the 
former still uses the buttons on the right hand, 
the latter, on the left, the respective garments 
thus folding over in opposite directions. The larger differences are 
no longer needed, and should be repeated.

A remarkable tendency is observable at the 
present day, which is due to increased facilities 
of travel and intercommunication, towards a cosmo-
politan type of dress, European in form.

The sense of solidarity distinguishing social 
individuals is sometimes expressed, as culture 
advances, in laws referring not only to the preser-
servation of social grades as such, but to their economic 
definitions. Various particular reasons which 
make for the adoption of a particular type of dress are 
the immediate inspiration of sumptuary laws in various 
races and nations. The sumptuary law proper is 
often combined with regulations of grade-fashion.

One of the earliest 'laws' of the kind is to be found in the 
laws of the Ancient Romans. The Koreans have strict 'sum-
porty' laws relating to dress. 'The actual design of the dress is the same,
but it is a matter of which it is used and its colour that are affected by it.
The lower and middle classes may wear none but garments of cotton or hemp;
while the nobility of position also have the white also of wearing violet, which is a sign of good birth or official

dom. The wearing of white at the court is usual, and the It was an enormous 
habit of the Austrian law, and two or more coats 
looking to the united. The shaws of these are large, like 
those of the Japanese kimono. The poor wear 
shoots in wet weather—people wear 
wooden clogs in shape like the French sabot.2 'Silk,' accord-
ng to Zoroastrian law, 'is good for the body, and cotton for the 
soul.' The former is derived from a 'noxious creature'; the 
latter acquires form from earth and water, and when personified 
are angels, part of their own sacralness.4 The Qur'an forbids 
men to wear silk or gold. The Prophet forbids, 
also the wearing of long trousers 'from pride.' 
His injunction was, 'Wear white clothes... and bury your dead in white 
clothes.'

The military Doric State passed laws against luxury in 
female dress. TheSolonian legislation apparently followed 
example. The lex Oppia of the Romans forbade, inter alia, the 
wear of women of a dress dyed in more than one colour, 
except at religious ceremonies. The Emperor Tiberius forbids 
the wearing of silk by the male sex. Philip the Fourth enacted 
a law against luxury in dress. The law of the Westminster 
Parliament of 1303 was concerned chiefly with regulating the 
fashion of dress of the social orders. The law passed in 
1463 'the same, as also, c. 5) regulated dress generally, on the lines of 
the Mercantile Theory of Economics, as had been the case, 
though less successfully, in the preceding Dutch and 
/oraly legislative. Luxury in dress (so the theory was applied) merely increased 
the wealth of other countries. A Scottish law of 1621 was the last of 
the kind.

It is natural that social resentment should follow 
breaks of the most characteristic of all social 
conventions. The mere fact of strangeness, when contrasted with the usual, 
is enough. Thus, in children and uncultivated persons, 
'style' may be aroused by the sight of a black skin or an 
oriental dress or the sounds of a strange language.'

In accordance with this essentially social instinct, 
the Latins denounced the wearing of 'strange gar-
ments' as a sin, adding that it 'raises doubts 
 among the multitudes.' The offence was punishable 
with death.

Various ideas of personal dignity are apt to be 
outraged by such breaches. Even in low cultures, 
carelessness in dress reflects upon both subject 
and object. Unless a Masai girl is well dressed accord-
ing to the dress of the chiefs, and who points herself with oil, 
she is not admitted into the 'chiefesses,' but is regarded as outcast.

In view of such social feeling, it is not surprising that

in countries like India there is no liberty of the subject as regards dress. Nor is there actually 
any more liberty in the matter for members of European 
or American societies. Decency, essentially a social instru-
ment, is difficult to contravene any unwritten law of dress is an 
offense against decency—in itself an adaptation to 
environment and state.

II. Invention of sexual dress. — The remarks 
of Franz may introduce this part of the subject, 
which is curiously large: 'The religions or super-
stitious interchanges of dress between men and 
women is an obscure and complex problem, and 
it is unlikely that any single solution would apply 
to all the cases.' He suggests that the custom of 
the bride dressing as a male might be a magical 
mode of ensuring a male heir, and that the wear-
ing by the wife of her husband's garments might 
be a magical mode of transferring her pains to the 
man.2 The latter mode would thus be the converse of 
the former. We may also note the import-
ance assigned to the principle of transference or 
conjunction. Such ideas, if they are true, are 
perhaps secondary, the conscious reactions to an 
unconscious impulsive action, whose motivation 
may be entirely different. The whole subject falls 
simply into two classes, the male and the female, 
as they come. The Zulu 'Black Ox Sacrifices' pro-
duces rain. The officiants, chief men, wear 
the girdles of young girls for the occasion.

To produce a change in nature, it is necessary for 
the chief himself to take on the species of 
human being that one requires, but its 
meaning is adaptation. Its reverse aspect is a 
change of luck by a change of self. The most 
obvious change is change of sex, the sexual demar-
cation being the strongest known to society, divi-

ing it into two halves. The following shows this 
more clearly:

In order to avert disease from their cattle, the Zulus perform 
the undula. This is the custom of allowing the girls to herd 
the oxen for a day. All the young women rise early, dress 
themselves entirely in their brothers' clothes, and, taking 
their brothers' knickers and socks, open the cattle-pen and drive 
the cattle to pasture, returning at sunset. No one of the male 
sex may go near them or speak to them meanwhile.4 Here 
a change of officiants, socially different, produces a change 
of luck and of nature. Similarly, among the old Arabs, a man 
being stung by a scorpion would try the cure of wearing a woman's 
bracelets and ear-rings.3 In Central Australia a man will cure 
his headaches by his heavy bones of his late child, 
and all evil influences may enter into them instead of into the child.3

In the last case the dress itself acts as a warning notice, repre-
sentative of the father's person.

In the following is to be seen the principle of impersonation, 
the reverse method of change of personality, 
combined, double, no doubt, with an impulsive 
sympathetic reaction, equivalent to a desire to share 
the person of another.

In Southern India the wandering Eulkavalavandi 
have this custom—directly the woman feels the breath 
of the dead, she takes off her dress, and clothes herself 
in her husband's, immediately takes on the dress of the dead, and when 
she is alone in a river, she raises him up with a long cloak.4 In Thuringia the man's shirt is 
hung before the window. In South Germany and Hungary 
the father's name is worn by the child, at least in certain 
public places. In Königsberg a mother puts her clothes over the child, to pres-

1 W. Crooke, Things Indian, 103. For the mistake of Dubois (p. 468) see above.
2 'Likri' (tr. J. Legge), in SBE xxvii. 1855, 289.
3 T. S. Sanderson, in JAF 43. 382 f.
4 SBE xxv. 1886. 49.
5 H. Blasch, w. 127; Hughes, DI. 1885, z.e. 'Dress.'
6 Guillot, Quetelet, ch. 13; J. K. Ingram, art. 'Sumptu-
ary Laws,' in ERE.
7 W. Metzmann, ii. 227.
8 SBE xxvii. 327.
9 Holbe, The Masai, 250.
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vent the evil Druid carrying it off, and to dress a child in its tassets. If the child is sick the medicine-man puts a piece of his own auletta garment upon it. In Silesia a sick child is wrapped in its mother's shawl. A Hindu mother, in some parts of Germany it is unlucky to wrap a boy in his mother's dress.

In other cases, secondary ideas are clearly present. In particular, the influence of a person's dress, as part of or impregnated with his personality, is to be seen.

A holiday being a suspension of normal life, it tends to be accompanied by every kind of reversal of the usual order. Commonly all laws and customs are broken. An obvious mode of reversal is the adoption of the garments of the other sex.

In the middle ages, women wore the clothes of men or women. In Carnival festivities men have dressed up as women, and women as men. In the Argive Ypsiades festival men wore women's robes and veils, and women dressed as men. At the Saturnalia, slaves exchanged positions and dress with their masters, and men with women. In Asia, as elsewhere at vintage festivals and the like, men and women exchange the dress of their sex. In the medieval festes of Purim, the Jewish Bucharanese, men dressed as women, and women as men. The result, and in some degree the motive, of such interchange is purely social, expressive of the desire for good-fellowship and union.

Numerous cases fall under the heading of symptomatic assimilation. Magical results may be combined with an instinctive adaptation, or may follow it.

In Korea, soldiers' wives 'are compelled to wear their husbands' green regimental coats over their heads like headscarves. The object is to be sure that the farmers should have their coats in good order, in case of war.' Some women are encouraged to wear green coats, but the custom is still observed. The explanation is obviously post facto. It seems more probable that the fashion came from the Emirates and that the women wore their husbands' or lovers' colours. Every autumn the Nunges of Assam celebrate a festival in honour of all children born during the year. During this, men disguised as women or as members of a neighbouring tribe visit all the mothers and dance in return for presents. In the Harvey Islands a widow wears the dress of her dead husband. A widower may be seen walking about with a dead woman's head, 'Instead of her shoe, a mother will wear on her back a pair of trousers belonging to a little son just laid in his grave.' In Timor, widows and widowers wear a piece of the clothing of the dead in the hair. The custom is very frequent at tugatur ceremonies and at marriage festivities.

The bride's polos, connected with the puberty of her girls, Basuto women 'acted like mad people. They went about performing curious mummeries, wearing men's clothes, and crying out and making so very noisy a sound that they met.' The Basutu boy is termed sipolo at his circumcision. When the women wear the men's garments and wear the men's ornaments, they appear as women and wear the men's ornaments and long garment reaching to the ground, worn by married women. When the woman is healed they don the warrior's costume and are regarded as men. Even when the hair has grown long enough to plait they are styled a-moror, or warlocks. When an Egyptian boy is circumcised, at the age of 5 or 6, he parades the streets, dressed as a girl in female clothes and ornaments borrowed for the occasion. A friend lays in front, and a friend rocks the boy's own writing-table. To assert the evil eye a woman sprinkles salt behind. In the old Greek story the boy Ascon lived in Syros as a girl, dressed as a girl, to avoid being sent against Troy. He bore a maiden name, Isia or Pyrrha.

In such cases we may see, at the initiation to the sexual life and state, an adaptation to it in the form of an assimilation to the other sex.

The principle of symptomatic assimilation is clearly brought out in the following two examples:

At the ceremonial burying of the placenta, Babar women who officially declare that the child is a boy, but women's

same age if a girl. At the festival celebrating a birth, Fijian men paint on the bodies of the infants. If a child is sick the medicine-man puts a piece of his own auletta garment upon it. In Silesia a sick child is wrapped in its mother's shawl. A Hindu mother, in some parts of Germany it is unlucky to wrap a boy in his mother's dress.

In other cases the data are insufficient for an explanation.

Thus, at harvest ceremonies in Bavaria, the officiating reaper is dressed in women's clothes; or, for the office, she is dressed as a man. At the vernal festival of Hercules at Rome men dressed as women. The choir at the Athenian Odeon is always led by two women. Cases occur of change of sex dress by way of disguise; it is more frequent in civilization than in barbarism.

A Bangala man troubled by a bad mongol, evil spirit, left his house secretly. 'He donned a woman's dress and assumed a female voice, and went to the forest, and, in order to deceive the mongol, he failed to cut his hair and in time he returned to his town, but continued to act as a woman.'

The last of these may suggest a process of assimilation of modern cases that suggest that a congenital tendency towards some form of inversion is present in such cases. On the face of them, we have to account for the choice of a sexual change of dress.

A Kolla homicide wears special ornaments and is tattooed. The latter practice is otherwise limited to the female sex. Women's dress may involve the assumption of women's weakness and similar properties.

The king of Burena suggested to the king of Aracae to dress his soldiers as women. They consequently became effeminate and weak.

The Lycians, when in mourning, dressed as women. Pintarch explains this rationally, as a way of showing that mourning is effeminate, that it is womanly and weak to mourn. For women are more prone to mourning than are men, barbarians than Greeks, and inferior persons than superior. If the document is genuine, we may apply to the Lycians the principle adopted in regard to mourning costume generally. The state of mourning is an absolute suspension, and it may come to be regarded as an absolute reversal or inversion of the normal state of life.

Death, the negative of life, has taken place and made a violent break with the tenor of existence; hence such an adaptation as an inversion of sex dress. Occasions might well be conceived when, if change of attire was desired, the only obvious attire presenting itself would be that of the other sex.

One of the most complex cases at first appearance, is that of the adoption of feminine dress by priests, shamans, and medicine-men. Where for various mythological reasons an androgynous deity

1 Pless, l. 123, ii. 49; Gratien in ZE, 1877, p. 78; Pless, i. 62, ii. 217, 222.
2 Dulaure, Divinité, généralités, Paris, 1805, xv, 315; Brand, i. 356, 357; Coste, Antiqu. Erope, ii. 104, 105; Max. de Seligmann, 1877, p. 314.
4 Sanderson in JAF xxiv, 308. Van Gennep, 09.
6 Endemann, in ZE, 1874, p. 37.
8 Lane, i. 64, ii. 270.
9 Apollodoros, Bibliotheca, iii. 13, 8; Ptolemaeus, Nova Historia, 1.
10 Riedel, 355; Williams, Pjäl, 1859, l. 175.
12 Pintarch, Q. Gr. 56, Mul. t. 245, Lib. 15; T. Moore, Marriage Customs, 1874, p. 37.
13 Spix-Martius, Brasil. 1824, ii. 114.
14 A. C. Haddon, Head-Peakers, 1901, p. 139.
15 Fraser, GIB. 1891, p. 29.
16 Lydon, de Nelsiisina, iv. 46 (51); Photius, Bibliotheca, 322a.
18 Sellmann, 130.
19 Pintarch, Coned. ad Apoll. 22; Varèx, Max. xii. §§ 6, 12.
exists, it is natural that the attendant priests should be sympathetically made two-sexed in their garb, and even that the worshippers should invert their dress. Sacrifice was made to the Bearded Venus of Cyprus by men dressed as women, and by women as men. As a rule, however, the deity is an invention intended, unconsciously enough, to harmonize with a traditional habit of priestly life; as a matter of practice, it leads to inversion, and involves a whole genus of phantasies. Some examples may precede analysis:

Chukchi shamans commonly dress as women. The hair of the Dayaks make their living by witchcraft, and are dressed as women. The priestesses, batukta, of the Dayaks dressed as women. Sometimes a Dayak priest marries simultaneously a man and a woman, both the northern Asiatic peoples and the Dayaks it frequently happens that a double inversion takes place, so that of the witchcraft business. A woman is a man and a woman is a man; it is said by the Koryaks that shamans who had changed their sex were very powerful. The Illi-Balkasian Indian regarded such men as had 'changed their sex' as unusual or supernaturally gifted persons. But it is unnecessary to assume that the priestess is intended to acquire special magical powers attributed to women. This idea may survive. Possibly the fantastic nature of the change was more than change, that had had some influence. Patagonian sorcerers, chosen from children afflicted with St. Vitus's Dance, were among the Indians of Louisiana dressed as women. In the Belcher Islands a remarkable change was observed, a goddess often takes places of a man, instead of a woman, to her mouthpiece. In such cases the man, dressed as a woman, was regarded and treated as a woman, and this signifies that this is in connection with the olden social system. Frazer regards this invention by the same spirit as explaining other cases when sex is exchanged in triadic priesthoods of the Dayaks, Bugis, Patagonians, Ainus, and other Indian tribes. It is stated of some North American cases in the last thirty years, that the dress was inspired by a female spirit, and that her 'medicine' was to live as a woman. In Uganda Sukusu goddesses pass through a phase, to which they wear a dress which they happen to wear long hair, and to be headdresses in the masculine style. The legends of Sardanapalus (Assur-Bani-pal) and Heracles, as was the case in every conqueror, was also as a woman, and the story of the sack of Troy where in these a woman was treated as a woman. And it is probable that these goddesses of unconsciousness, priests, who were priest-gods. Dionysus Pseudos is a similar embodiment of the principle.

Emucah in India are sometimes dedicated to the goddess Durga, and wear female clothes as men who believe themselves to be impotent serve this goddess, and dress as women to escape their virility. A festival was given among the Sioux Indians to a man dressed and living as a woman, but not of this class. The dress was inspired by a female spirit, and that the 'medicine' was to live as a woman. In Uganda Sukusu goddesses pass through a phase, to which they were accustomed, and the feast is given to him annually. Among the iron-workers of Manipur, the god Khumlangaha is supposed to appear in a little fellow, a man is sometimes taken possession of by the god. He is then known as man, and women as woman. The dress of the man is changed to that of the woman, the body from below the arms, the white jacket, and a dhoti. A fine muslin veil covers the head. Superior to the man, by reason of her connexion with the god, and therefore if a man is honoured in the same way he assumes the dress of the spirits as an honour. If a man marries a wife, he sleeps on the right of her, whereas the ordinary place of a man is the right, as being the inferior side. It appears that women are more liable to be possessed by the god, and the same may be observed among all the hill tribes of these parts. The oganos, medicine-men, of the Bangals, in certain ceremonies after a death, for the purpose of discovering the Slayer dress up as women. Off-duty of the Arooan there were 'conjurers' who were dressed and lived as women. On the

Congo a priest dressed as a woman and was called Grandmother, or the Nalavansans, who of ancient Germany, had a priest dressed as a woman. Men of the Valishia sect win the favour of Ksya by wearing their hair long and generally assimilating themselves to the men. The practice is even followed by their women. Candidates for the shroi society of Tahiti were invested with the dress of women.

There is no doubt that these phenomena are cases of sexual inversion, congenital or acquired, partial or complete. Any idea of inspiration by female deities or the reverse is quite foreign to the notion of assimilation of priest to goddess, or of marriage of a priest to a god. The significant fact is that throughout history the priesthood has had a tendency towards effemination. The discussion of this belongs elsewhere.

Sexual inversion has especially obtained among the connected races of North Asia and America. It is marked by inversion of dress.

In nearly every part of the country [of America] there seem to have been, since ancient times, men dressing themselves in the clothes and performing the actions of women. Thus the custom for parents who had a girl-like sex to dress and rear him as a girl, teaching him only domestic duties, keeping him at woman's work, and letting him associate only with women and girls. A Chukchi boy at the age of sixteen will often relinquish his sex. He adopts a woman's dress, and lets his hair grow. It frequently happens that in such cases the husband is a woman and the wife a man. These abnormal changes are often brought about by the shamans, who interpret such cases as an injunction of their individual deity. A similar practice is found among the Koryaks.

Among the Zambos there were men dressed as women. So among the Luwara of ancient Germany, a priest sometimes became a woman. When asked the reason, a woman so changed said stalking an ogano was not good, and so they became a man. In Tahiti there were men, called men, who assumed 'the dress, attitude, and manners of women. If the Malagasy, the men called fannina, wore the dress. The women of South-West (German) Africa, and the Diakite-Sarrasac of the French Sudan, dressed in the same way on days of public importance. Langsdorff wrote: 'Boys, in order to be very handsome, are often brought up entirely in the manner of girls, and instructed in the arts women. They pluck out as soon as they begin to appear, and their chins are shaved off; as they do of the women's.'

Dodd has studied the custom of not man, not woman' or turtuk (half man, half woman) was found frequently among the forest inhabitants. These men, and became a girl, which he has since followed. The turtuk-u-muy, man-woman, of the Indians of California and Arizona, are regarded as regular social beings. Dress as women, they performed women's tasks. "When an Indian shows a desire to shirk his manly duties, they make him take his position in a circle of fire; then a bow and a woman-stick are offered to him, and he is solemnly enjoined . . . to choose which he will, and afterward to abide by his choice." Something analogous is recorded of the ancient Scythians and the occurrence of a phallic rooster among the Thuringians. Some of the above cases, difficult to disentangle accurately, are not so much cases of congenital inversion as of general physical weakness. It is a

1. Macrobe, Satyr., lib. 7, 2; Servius in Verg., Aen. ib. 637.
4. J. T. Maspell, in Flora zu Deutsch und Oesterr. l. 259; St. John, Forests of the Pacific, 1830, i. 62.
10. Roscoe, quoted by Frazer, loc. cit.
11. Ibid., p. 431.
12. Ibid., p. 434.
17. Moeder-Willi, "Religious Life and Thought in India, 1886, p. 130.
18. Ellis, Polyg. Res. i. 524.
19. Westermarck, Mf II 450, quoting the authorities.
20. Ibid., p. 451, quoting Davidow.
23. Kesting, Expedition, 1885, i. 227.
24. Lewis, 250, Reising, Beschreibung des Kongo, Gotha, and St. Petersburg, 1796, i. 370.
25. J. A. X. (1900), 1813.
26. Ibid., p. 450, quoting the authorities.
27. Westermarck, Mf II 461, quoting the authorities.
32. S. Powers, 1821.
33. H. Herod, cest. 16.
remarkable aspect of certain types of barbarous society that the weak males are forced into the grade of women, and made to assume female dress and duties. Such a practice may, of course, induce some amount of acquired inversion. Payne has suggested that the survival was due to advancement in civilization, and that later they formed a nucleus for the slave-class.

The occurrence of a masculine temperament in women is not uncommon in early culture. In some tribes of Brazil there were women who dressed and lived as men, hunting and going to war. The same practice is found in Zanzibar and among the Eastern Eskimo. Shilings, who became queen of Congo in 1640, kept 50 or 60 male concubines. She always dressed as a man, and compelled them to take the names and dress of women. Classical antiquity has many similar cases of queens wearing men's armour in war, and of women fighting in the ranks, either temporarily, or permanently, as the Amazons. The last case, as the analogy of the West African cases of women's regiments, may be based on fact.

In civilization the practice of women dressing as men and following masculine vocations is no less frequent than that in barbarism the custom of effemination of men. Women of masculine appearance are a phenomenon to-day, and the balance of sexual reversal has thus changed.

There remain to be considered two classes who form more or less definite social grades, and in some cases are distinguished by dress. These are old men and women. After the menopause, women, as the Zulus say, 'become men,' and the customs of bontwe, or sexual tabu, do not apply to them any longer. Often, instead of the dress of matronage or savage and barbarous women after the menopause dress as men. For instance, in Uripiv (New Hebrides) an old widow of a chief lived independently, and at the dances painted her face like a man and danced with the best of them. Often they engage in war, consult with the old men, as well as having great influence over their own sex.

Various enactments both in semi-civilized custom and in civilized law have been made against inversion of dress. A typical decision is that of the Council of Gangra (A.D. 370): 'If any woman, under pretence of leading an ascetic life, change her apparel, and insist on the accustomed habit of men, let her be anathema.' The point is noticeable that asceticism here, in the absence of a neutral garb, has recourse to the male dress. Such enactments and the modern laws on the subject are based on the Heb. law (Lev. 19:29) and the Christian of I Co 11, but they embody a scientifically sound principle.

12. Exchange of dress.—This custom is frequent between friends, varers, betrothed, and as a marriage rite. It is analogous to an exchange of any objects serving as mutual gifts, and as ultimate origin is to be found in this natural and obvious practice. Originally, therefore, it is outside the sphere of the psychology of dress proper; but it at once assumes various ideas of dress, often in an intensified form.

In Homer's story Glansus and Bloned exchanged armour and became brothers-in-arms. Among the Khasias an exchange of clothes 'gives birth to or is a sign of unity.' In Ambayna and Yatar and other islands, lovers exchange clothes in order, as it is reported, to have the colour of the beloved person with them. In Eastern folklore it is a very frequent theme that bride and bridegroom exchange head-dress. The Ann youth and girl after formal wear each other's clothing. In South Celebes the bridegroom at a certain stage of the ceremonies puts on the garments which the bride has put on. Among the Macaol Jews they lift a custom of the bride wearing a helmet and sword, and the groom a female dress. At a Brahmin marriage in South India the bridegroom is dressed as a boy, and another girl is dressed to represent the bride.

The secondary idea which is prominent in these customs is that of union between men of a neutral assimilation. This is shown by such cases as the following:

In Bursa a family quarrel is terminated by a feast. The father of the injured woman puts on the shoulders of his husband some of his own family's clothes; the husband puts on him a cloth he has brought for the purpose. Among the Masaín murder may be 'arranged' and peace made between the two families by the office of the elders. The family of the murdered man's wife, and the latter (the family of the murderer) takes the garment of one of the dead man's brothers.

A later stage of development is marked by ideas of contagion of ill-will, or of the conditional curse. By way of making a guarantee of peace, Brahmin tribes wore a wreath of green leaves furnished by the bride and groom, and a cord of cloth manufactured in common, and offered both to the gods, with curses on the murderer of the taker of the cord. To establish that contact with a person which serves as a 'conductor' of conditional curses, in the Moorish institution of Etr, it is enough to touch him with the thread. Though the above statement may be a case of indigility by mutilation of garments, but a magical act of invocating liberty. When Hamburger, south of Asia, in south off the half, and half the clothes of David's ambassadors when they sent them back, he wanted a guarantee of friendly relations. His wife, Franzi observed him, and immediately made a vow to provide spells over these personal guarantees while David was on his way.

Similarly, possession or contact ensures sympathy, whether by mere union or by the threat of injury. In the Muncaver islands, "If a stranger enters a house where children are, the father or some member of the household takes the ornament with which the children decorate their hair, and hands it to the stranger, who holds it for a while and then return it. The procedure protects the children from the possibly evil eye of the visitor.

Union in marriage and the like is commonly effected by enveloping the pair in one robe, or by joining their garments together.

In South Celebes the ceremony of radda ampu consists in enveloping them in one sarong, which the priest casts over them like a coat. The Taliabsans and the Ilovas of Madagascar have the same custom. The Dayak Beloam throws one cloth over the pair. Among the Toba-Batak the mother places a garment over the bride. A similar ceremony among the Ndorh of Dorch is explained as a symbol of the marriage 'tie.' In north Nias the pair are enveloped in one garment. Among the South Celebes the bridegroom meets with a girl before puberty covers her and himself with one mantie. The Hindoos bind the new-born in both men and women, and the Brahman knot. It is the same knot as that is used in the sacred thread. The tying is repeated at various points in the ceremonies. The hudi, or apays, or tied ornament, is worn on the forehead. It is a European waist sash, and is of the kind of ornament. The bride and groom both don wedding clothes during the ceremonies. The Bihillas tie the garments of the bride and groom together. Previously to the ceremony of radda ampu the clothes of the Celebes pair are sewn together—the rite of radda-karri, or radda, or paracki.
In connexion with marriage the custom is hardly intended to unite the woman to the man's family and that of her husband's. More probably it merely assimilates the two individuals; while, from the social point of view, it unites their respective sexual grades.

It is remarkable that many ceremonies of initiation, particularly those in which a spiritual fatherhood and sonship is established, are analogous in method to a marriage rite. Thus the guru of the Deccan Mahars, when initiating a child, covers the nude child for some time with one hand.2

Cases where the rite has one side only are natural, but are apt to take on the character of an act of acquisition and possession. In the Sandwich Islands the bridegroom puts a piece of grass over the bride, this constituting marriage.4 In this it is analogous to the Hindus giving cloth.5 In Arabian times to cast a garment over a woman was to claim her. This explains the words of Ruth (Iv 9). In Mal 3:4 'garment' is equivalent to 'wife'.6 A similar idea obtains in other circumstances, the dress having the force of a personal representative. The Southern Masai have a custom that a woman may never again live alone, but must be taken to some man's kraal5 if she throws her dirinya, grass-petticoat, over him.6

LITERATURE.—This is fully given in the footnotes.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

DRINKS, DRINKING.—The sensation of thirst is a physiological correlate of the metabolic function of the water of life. In effect importance drink comes next to air and before food. Thus in social psychology drink has played a more important part than food, especially since the primitive discoverers of fermentation and distillation made alcohol a constituent of drinkables. After being weaned from his mother's milk—a drink which is also a complete food—man finds a 'natural' drink in water. But, as experimentation in food-material proceeded, the sensation of thirst was supplemented by the sense of taste. The resulting complex 'sense of drink' was satisfied by a series of discoveries which gave to drinkables certain properties both of food and of drugs. Before they were corrupted by European spirit, the Eskimo drank chiefly cold water, which they kept in wooden tubs outside their houses.3 But on occasion they boiled the hot blood and melted fat. An observer states of the New Hebrides: '1 cup, like drinks made from the fruits and the sun of trees, acquire an intoxicating quality by fermentation. In most parts of the Old and the New World the produce of cereals and fruits, and the early palaces largely consumed in the manufacture of some species of beer ... the early civilized drank it to excess.8

1. Fermented drinks.—(a) Beer.—It is impossible to trace with precision the order of discovery and invention. Probably one of the earliest steps was the use and storage of fruit juices. The practice of storage would lead to the discovery of fermentation. The use of corn for the preparation of fermented liquor is perhaps almost as early as its use for food. Cereal agriculture itself

1 As Van Geenup holds (p. 246). On the whole subject of exchange of drugs, see similarly Marion, Malaria, 882, 892, 902, pavia; and for marriage, G. A. Wilken, in Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 21 (1915), xxvii. (1910) 38–400 ff.
2 Jb. x. 411. 6 Jb. xiv. 455.
10 Seligmann, 647.
13 Payne, Hist. of the New World called America, Oxford, 1826–9, ii. 563.

The use of malted grain is probably later than the simpler principle of infusion. The term 'beer' is generally applied to the drinkable products of both. In the majority of early beers, such as the Mexican and Peruvian chicha, infusion only is used.

In Eastern Asia an intoxicant made from rice is very general. Orgys gluttons is frequently used for it The manufacture among the Dayaks is as follows:

The rice is boiled, placed in pots with yeast, rasp. This stands for some days exposed to the sun. Then water is added, and the mixture is allowed to ferment for two days. It is then strained through gauze. This drink is the basis of the Dayaks, the tapis of the Malays, the boody of Java. A similar drink is made by the Buginese and Makassar, called brom. These drinks are extremely intoxicating. The rice-beer, zu, of the Naga is said to be soporific rather than intoxicating.2 This is also largely the case with barley-beers in all their varieties. 'The liquor which plays so important a part in the daily life of the Garo is always brewed and never distilled. It may be prepared from rice, millet, maize, or Job's tears: 3 Many aboriginal tribes of India drink rice-beer. The term sankee, or samee, in China includes rice-beer. Sked or sak, the national drink of the Japanese, is made from the best rice-grains by fermentation. It has a slightly acid taste, and is of the colour of pale sherry. Inferior varieties are shiro-zake (white sak), and a muddy sort, niori-zake. There is a sweet variety, called kuro-zake or black sak. 

Beer made from varieties of millet (Andropogon sorgum vulgaris) is the chief African drink. Its use extends from the Kaffirs to the Egyptians. Under the name of pombe it is familiar throughout Central Africa. In Egypt it is the drink of the poor and the peasant. Besides durra-beer, the Nubians and Abyssinians make a sour beer from oats.6

Where barley is the staple grain for beer manufacture, rice is sometimes used to make a coarser variety. Wheat is occasionally used. In Germany it was once largely employed in what was known as Weissbier.

A grain as important regionally as rice and millet for the manufacture of beer is maize (Zea maiz). Occasionally used in the Old World, as in parts of Africa, it is the staple grain for beer in America, its use extending from the Chaco Indians to the Apaches in the North. The latter made much use of it in their ceremonial life. They called it tawin, and flavoured it with various spices.7 The Southern and Central America maize-beer is known as chicha—a name familiar as is pombe in Africa.

The fermented liquor, chicha, is an infusion of cooked maize in water. This is allowed to ferment. Its use was universal throughout ancient times, such as Peru and China.4 With other ingredients was a particularly strong intoxicant, used only at the hunt, for instance. Today the Indians of the Amazon, mix in wild fruits, brew very excellent chichas, flavouring it with the young shoots of a plant which has the effects of an opiate.8

In Mediterranean and north European culture, barley has been the staple of beer. The ancient Egyptians made a beer, zythum, from barley. Discorides mentions gueus, sipois, and shews as being used in the Greek world. The Hebrews seem to have included beer in the term shabbir (IV strong drink). Spanish beer (ceiba or cerveza), Gallic beer (cervoise), and an infant beer were known to the Romans.9 Germany and England have always been famous for their beers, and in modern times their output is the most important. Here there was an old distinction between stie (beer without hops) and beer (the hopped liquor). Climate and water, as in the case of wine, have much to do with the production of varieties. English beer is quite a distinct variety from either the light or the dark beer of the Continent. The Russian area is the home of barley and rye, or of rye alone.

The geographical range of beer, as of rice, maize, and millet, as well as barley and rye-beer,

5 D. de J. xii. 422, 422, Rassell, ii. 367.
6 Rassell, ii. 367.
8 Payne, i. 104.
9 C. G. Markham, in JAI xi. (1910) 109.
10 S. A. Wijfe, art. 'Brewing', in Ehr.

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under the term, is precisely that of the respective cereals, covering the globe, except the Arctic and Antarctic parallels, and a narrow belt where the vine grows. In this belt, wine has always had a precedence over beer and spirits, and it is not a luxury. In northern Europe, beer is more or less a ‘national’ drink, and everywhere it is a companion to fish. It has not the bitter character of ‘wine’ as opposed to wine that it has greater power of refreshment. Improved methods of storage have increased this since the time when beer had to be drunk before it fermented.

(b) Wines.—There is no reason why the term ‘wine’ should not be included to the many varieties of liquor made by savage and semi-civilized races from the sap of trees. The (Continued page 74)

1 Ratzel, iii. 110; Torley-Jacques, in JAI xxxvi. (1900) 42.
3 Wilken-Peys, xii. 81.
5 Jäger, De sakau- en khaoréeische dranken, 1880, pp. 15, 385, 434.
6 Payne, I. 309.
7 Ratzel, ii. 301.
8 J. W. Thurn, 208.
11 Payne, I. 574 f.
12 Ratzel, iii. 420.

Drinks, Drinking

Drinks (or beverages) are a large and varied group of substances. Some are made from plants and others from animals. They include tea, coffee, milk, beer, wine, and spirits. All of these are enjoyed by people around the world, but their popularity varies depending on cultural and regional factors.

1. Tea: Tea is one of the most popular drinks in the world. It is made from the leaves of tea plants and can be enjoyed hot or cold. China and India are the largest producers of tea, but it is also grown in other countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Sri Lanka.
2. Coffee: Coffee is another popular drink that is enjoyed by many people around the world. It is made from the beans of the coffee plant and can be enjoyed hot or cold. Brazil is the largest producer of coffee, but it is also grown in other countries such as Ethiopia, Colombia, and Vietnam.
3. Milk: Milk is a nutritious beverage that is enjoyed by people of all ages. It is made from the milk of cows, goats, sheep, and other animals. Milk is used in many different ways, such as in soups, cereals, and desserts.
4. Beer: Beer is a fermented alcoholic beverage that is made from grains such as barley, wheat, and rye. It is enjoyed by many people around the world and is produced in a variety of styles and flavors.
5. Wine: Wine is a fermented alcoholic beverage that is made from the juice of grapes. It is enjoyed by many people around the world and is produced in a variety of styles and flavors.
6. Spirits: Spirits are alcoholic beverages that are distilled from a variety of plants and grains. They include vodka, gin, tequila, and rum, among others.

These beverages are enjoyed in many different ways and for various reasons, such as for their taste, for their health benefits, or as a way to celebrate special occasions. They are an important part of many cultures and are enjoyed by people around the world.
Portugal and Spain produce a true brandy, known as aguardiente. Brandy proper is chiefly made in France, and there the beverage was introduced to Europe by the Spaniards.

The Mexican cocoa was prepared by mixing the cocoa-seed into a paste with maras. Diluted with hot water, and churned into a thick froth, which was the actual beverage, it was drunk when cold only, except in the time of drinking hot. Vanilla was usually added as a flavouring. Chocolate, as the drink drunk by the ancient Mexicans, was a careful union both to its aroma and to its fatty constituents. It was known to be a nervous stimulant. In modern times the fat is removed by the screw-press; this and the addition of sugar render it more palatable. Benzoni (1619-1669) describes it as a drink more agreeable to pigs than for human consumption, and named it Thoebroma ("food of the gods"). Thoebroma cacao. It contains the same powerful alkaloid as the cola-nut. As a beverage in Western civilisation it is only less important than coffee and tea.

4. Other drinks.—Drinks prepared from roots are not numerous, but of these the most important are the tubers. S. Though referred to; others are the kava of Polynesia, the paievar of Guiana, and the mishka of the Mosquitos. The root of the sweet potato (Batatas edulis) is occasionally used. Paievar and mishka are made from this root, and kava is used threatening, from the Mamitl utilissima, which in another form is the tapiooca of commerce.

With mishka we approach a class of drinks which become more and more generally social both in the East and in the West, and in use. One noteworthy detail reflects the characteristics of communal life, and also illustrates the stage of culture in which the preparation of commodities is ad hoc, and storage and artificial production are at a minimum. This is the fact that the communal drink is prepared only for special feasts, which are, however, frequent, and is all consumed.

The mishka of the Mosquito region includes all kinds of strong drink, but particularly that prepared from cassava, manioc. The famous kases of Polynesia and Melanesia is in many regions becoming obsolete, and is superseded by European drinks. The soma of the ancient Indians, and the identical Aasana of the ancient Persians, are the most ancient examples of the communal drink becoming religious, and being apotheosised. Amyra, the nectar conferring immortality, was produced, along with this beverage, as an offering from the churning of the milky ocean. It was, however, an unguent rather than a drink (see Ambrosia (Hindu)). The Hisoric ambrosia was the food of immortality; the nectar was the drink of the gods. Sapappa and Anacardiates speak of ambrosia as a drink; it is also employed as an unguent like the Velic amanda. Alcan speaks of nectar as a food. Later, it was a synonym for wine; and acquired the special connotation of fragrance. The Hisoric nectar conferred immortality; hence it was forbidden to men. It was described as epiphloge, and, like Greek wine, was mixed with water or pomegranate and egg, and the root of estragon meaning its name is the same as that of ambrosia.

5. Tendencies of evolution.—The evolution of taste is perhaps not altogether a sociological, but partly an ontological, phenomenon. It is a function of the evolution of manufacture. One or two tendencies may be observed. For example, man's drinks tend to the condition of water. Thus, many beverages of primitive peoples are prepared in a thick soup-like form. Chocolate, for example, was drunk very thick. In Tibet and many Mongol districts tea is prepared with butter. Turkish coffee is characterized by the inclusion of grounds. English beer has passed from a unruled to a sparkling clearness. The thick sweet character of pulque resembles the insinuated must of Greco-Roman wine production. The ancient wine of India, in its origin, was not only very thick, almost of the consistency of treacle, and probably for that reason it was generally drunk diluted with water. The sparkling nature of the best wines has during the last century been suggested both in their origin and in water by the method of effervescence. First applied to the wines of Champagne, it was adopted for certain of the Rhine  

1 Payne, i. 360.
2 In Thurn, 268, 269.
3 See H. A. Macodon, in JAI xxiv. 587, 588, etc.
6 Mill, Liddell-Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, 1901, s.v.
7 Cf. Wickham, in JAI xxiv. 207.

Medieval Europe was rich in the lore of making cordials and essences. To the earliest period of the Middle Ages belong the terms aqua viva and elixir vitae. The discovery of alchemy for elixirs of life and youth probably gave some impetus to industrial invention.

Civilized taste has declared against the fermented drinks included in the term "mead," fermented liquors made from honey have been largely used from the earliest barbarism. The Bogos and Abyssinians make a variety of mead. What is commonly styled honey beer is often merely a sweet fermented liquor, but true honey wine is reported for the Hottentots, Feloops, and A-kambu. Certain peoples have made fermented liquors from succulence substances produced from plants.

Such are recorded for ancient Syria, made from wine and palm wine. In Yucatan a fermented liquor was made from honey, fermented from that obtained by boiling the berries of Schinus molle. Honey beer, madaka (Gr. melo), whatever its nature, is recorded for ancient India. It is said to have been superceded by soma.

3. Infusions.—Tea, coffee, and cocoa are stimulants, without the specific effects of alcoholic drinks. Their properties are due respectively to the alkaloids thein, caffeine, and theobromin. The use of these infusions and decoctions has increased enormously in modern times. It is significant that China has been the chief additio, to the use of alcoholic liquor, and that coffee is chiefly grown in Muhammadan countries. Ancient Mexico seems to have had a hard struggle against the national abuse of intoxicants, and its successful crusade was largely due to the presence of cocoa.

The tea-plant (Thea chinensis) is a native of China and Assam. Its cultivation in India and Ceylon is only very recent, but has assumed enormous proportions, chiefly in N.E. India and Assam, and S. China.

Used for centuries in Russia, which derived good tea from China since its connexion with the East, tea is now drunk practically all over the world. Even a people like the savages of the New Hebrides are fond of tea, coffee, and cocoa, provided it be sweetened with sugar. But the Polynesian natives still prefer the milk of the cocoa-nut. The distinction between the uses of cocoa and coffee was at a period when the tea was not yet known. The use of tea among European peoples is relatively recent, while for China it has been traced back to the beginning of the third millennium B.C.

Tradition assigns the discovery of coffee to Abyssinia. It was introduced into Arabia in the 15th cent., and into Turkey in the 16th. In the 17th cent. its use gained a footing in England and France. The coffee of the New World, deriving from one plant sent to Surinam from Amsterdam in 1718, is now the largest production, Brazil supplying the greater part. Arabia, North Africa, and the East Indies are the other great coffee regions. It is grown also in Southern India.

The best Arabian coffee is grown in Yemen. Besides the infusion, there is a drink, which is prepared from the leaves. The green shoots are dried in the sun, and then roasted and powdered. The resultant beverage is the kahwa of Yemen, the fezun dope of Java, and the kahwah of Sumatra. The Arabs are regarded as being superior to that of ordinary coffee in qualities.

The tree from which cocoa and chocolate are made is indigenous to Central and South America. It was cultivated by the Mexicans, and from them the beverage was introduced to Europe by the Spaniards.
vintages. The production of artificial mineral waters, in which many acids of carboxylic acid groups cause sparkling, is characteristic of the last half-century. One result of fermentation is thus obtained, without, in the case of mineral waters, any fermentation at all.

Avidity for milk is towards the reduction of sweetness. Old wines in which no sugar is left have been preferred in recent centuries. Such, however, have a corresponding excess of alcohol. Dryness in modern wines is increasing, by somewhat after-taste. sweater drinks, like mead and malmsey, are typical in barbarism, and in ancient and medieval culture. Malmsey, the French malvoisie, was originally a Greek wine, and carried on the tradition of the Greek red wine. The Greeks themselves corrected sweetness by various methods, among them being the use of salt water. Savagery and barbarism had no lack of experiments in the production of varied flavours, if not of the correctness of sweetness.

The rice-beer of the Nagas is flavoured with Jungle berries, such as Datun, 2 while the neighbouring peasantry dilute theirs with water. 3 The natives of the Moluccas correct the sweetness of their soppa by adding barks of a latter flavour. The addition of certain spices, particularly cloves and nutmegs, is a refreshing character. In old English life spiced were largely used in both ale and beer and drinks were taken 

A similar tendency, found very early in culture, is to be noted in the preference for sour milk.

6. Animal drinks. — Drinks, other than milk and blood, produced from animal substance, are less common, and nor mérely wine or beers, but actual beverages. The credit of the invention and use of the only animal spirit known to the world belongs to the Tatar tribes of Asia. Their koumiss, distilled from the milk of their mares, has been known since Greek times.

Human milk is the natural food of the human infant. Though differing in some important respects, the milk yielded by various animals is a satisfactory food for children, especially in its products, a valuable food for adults. The use of milk-animals was a great step towards civilization.

When Dayaks kill a pig or an ox, which is done to music and singing, they scramble for the blood. Men, women, and children drink of it; they smear themselves all over with it, and behave like wild beasts, carrying their faces in the bleeding carcases. 6 Blood, in fact, is to the savage 'a perfectly natural food'; certainly, perhaps, that milk, which is nothing but blood filtered through a gland. 7

7. Drinking customs and ideas. — The natural care bestowed upon the preparation of drinkable is greatly developed by growing intelligence, and inspired at certain stages of culture by religious emotion.

'The Hindu is very particular as to the water he drinks. It must be ceremonially pure, though not necessarily chemically pure.' It has to be very carefully fetched. If the carrier leaves or comes near an out-caste or anything impure, the water is thrown away, and the vessel broken, or scorched with sand and water. 8 The kings of ancient Persia had their drinking water brought from particular rivers, especially the Zab. 9 Water, in Zoroastrianism, is sacred. It is a 'dress for breath,' physiologically and physically. It is a sin to drink water in the dark, or to pour it away. Water is the 'dark spirit'; for sacrifice it is more valuable than spirituous liquors. 10

A good deal of myth has gathered about the palm-wine tree (Arecos saccharifera) in the East Indies. Many stories are told of how the juice of the nut has brought the dead to life again. 11 The Dayaks of South-East Borneo

figure palm-wine as milk, flowing from the tree as if from a woman. 12 The Nairs hold that a palm-tree planted by a woman yields more sap than one planted by a man. A folk-tale runs that a woman was sent to deliver a message, and not wishing her baby to starve, cut off one of her breasts. Out of this grew the palm-wine tree. 13 In Angkola a woman prayed to be turned into a palm-tree. When she died, the Angunca tree cut itself from her navel, the opium plant from her forehead, the piasang from her feet, and the pocal from her breasts. 14

Besides the stimulating and expansive properties of wine and spirits, the process of fermentation has naturally engaged the popular mind. A good deal of superstition is, no doubt, to be referred to speculation upon the necessities of human life.

Among the Masai, 15 when honey-wine is to be brewed, a man and a woman are selected for the purpose, neither of whom has had sexual intercourse for two days. A tent is set apart for them to live in until the honey-wine is ready for drinking (six days), during which time they may not sleep together. A man is believed to use honey-wine in brewing, it is believed that the wine would be undrinkable, and the bees that made the honey would fly away. 6

The ultimate reason for such a rule is probably merely an unconscious impulse towards concentration of purpose and avoidance of anything that might divert attention. The participation is particularly delicate. From the original impulse would develop ideas about the danger of mixing interests, no less than material; and, later on, ideas of sympathetic influence, among which may perhaps be seen some comparison of sexual function with the process of fermentation.

In old Mexico the men who prepared pulque wist not touch women for twenty days after any impurities or broths, or but actual beverages. The credit of the invention and use of the only animal spirit known to the world belongs to the Tatar tribes of Asia. Their koumiss, distilled from the milk of their mares, has been known since Greek times.

The Mexican example may be seen a possible explanation of the way in which a comparison of the processes of fermentation and of sex was applied. Making of personality has attached to itself various terms and ideas of 'impurity.' Similarly the ingestion of leaven has been regarded as resulting in an impure condition of the material acted upon. Leaven itself is a symbol of corruption. Thus, an impure state in the persons engaged may induce a similar impurity in the object of their labours. Conversely, in other circumstances, it may expedite a desired change, as from barrenness to fertility. A similar objection to mixture may be seen in an Australian custom. If we compare with it the rule of the Timorean priest 16 which forbids him in war-time to drink cold water, and orders him to drink hot water only, so as not to cool the ardour of the warriors, we may see how a rule arising naturally from an aversion to anything exciting or disturbing, when important operations are in progress, may be sophisticated subsequently. The Australian case shows an earlier stratum of psychosis.

The Ekaahlay people believe that, if a medicine-man have many spirits in him, he must not drink hot or heating drinks. These would drive them away. Also, spirits would never enter a person dolted by the white man’s liquor. 8 The Zambi rainmaker, in order to keep his spirits with him, never touches alcohol. 10

When the savage has reached the idea of a spirit informing his own organism, he has usually also reached the idea that heating or spirituous liquor is itself possessed of a spirit. Thus, if he wishes to potentiate the action of a drug spirit, he must, in sober earnest, refrain from mixing it with others.

The caro bestowed on the preparation of liquors 17

1 Hodson, 601. 2 Playfair, 52. 3 Payne, l, 290.
4 Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indie, l, (1888) 44.
6 Krafft, loc. cit.
7 A. C. Hollis, in J.A.S. xvi. 491.
8 Sahagun, Hist. generale (Jourdan-Simon), Paris, 1591, p. 45.
10 H. O. Forbes, in J.A.S. xiii. (1884) 414.
12 Mission catholiques, xvi. (1905) 206.
is also evidenced in the ceremonial hand-selling of the new wine.

Thus, among the Mexicans, the priest of the god Itzitluk, a
holder of children, invested with the god's robes, opened the
new wine annually in the houses of the people, and ceremoniously
tasted it. It is also made by the Nagas in the feast of
Reigniet in January. This is a genus, or occasion of tabu, and
men carry forth the liquid, spouting not a peculiar sound, and during the
manufacture men and women eat separately.

From this 'tasting' develops the sacrifice of the first-fruits of the vine. The Romans sacrificed the first of the new wine to libate it; and this, till this was done, the wine might not be generally drunk.3

The mechanism of drinking as practised by Europeans is more or less identical with that of eating. The liquid does not fall, it is sucked and swallowed, but each gulp is grasped by the tongue and passed down. Thus a man is able to drink while standing on his head.

Many peoples, however, either have not reached this method or have modified it.4

The wild men of Malaysia drink by throwing the water from the hand into the mouth. The Orang Laut do this with un-
expected aim, a display of more than ordinary ability. Sometimes children are expert. A mother gives her infant water by dripping it from her hand. A New Hebrides native throws the
water back, and literally pours the liquid down his throat without gulping. The ordinary drink in Oceania is the juice of the hub-
rua fruit, or of the Trichilia, a tree resembling the hibiscus, and
in the Himalayas the juice of the morinda. At times boiling water is sucked into the mouth. It is unmanfully to touch the shell with the
hand, and therefore their drinks their liquor through a gourd. In the Hindu ritual of meals, food is eaten with the right hand, but water is drunk with the left; the vessel is taken up with the left hand, and the fingers are slightly bent while the drinker places the
vessel on the forehead, and then, allowing the vessel to touch the lips would be indecorous. The Fijians never put a vessel to the lips when
drinking. They regard it also as objectionable for several per-
sons to drink out of the same vessel. A Mardi chief would not touch a calabash with his hands when drinking; he held his hands close to his breast, and another man, a slave, poured the
water into him. It was a grave crime to let any one use a cup
rendered sacred by having touched its lip.5

The average Bengalee stands with one foot on a wooden stool when standing posture.

Three glasses are to be taken before a draught, for the reason that the stomach does not absorb water quickly, and health cannot be impaired by it. Drinking from the mouth of a leather bag was forbidden. 'He who drinks out of a silver cup drinks of bell-fire. The faithful may not drink out of green vessels, large gourds, or vessels covered with pitch, the last being used for
wine. During the fast of Ramadan it is held that even to
swallow saliva between sunrise and sunset is a sin.6

The natural tendency against mixing re-appears in the custom of not eating and drinking at the same time. This is only partly modified by physical need. Certain foods require a liquid vehicle, and certain drinks stimulate digestion.

When eating rice the Malagasy drink water. But otherwise they rarely drink at meals. The Hindus do not drink until the meal is finished. The natives of Borneo usually drink only after eating. They say that by abstaining from taking liquid with their food they prevent indigestion. Among the Halfa tribes of the Central African savannah maize drinks between meals, but this water. The A-kaboyu never drink at meals, but drink at any time when thirsty.7 The Abyssinians drink nothing at meals.8

Eating, especially in the somewhat rapid method used by early peoples, is hardly compatible with conversation; hence many rules against eating and talking at the same time.

Drinking does not then follow meals. When drink in alcoholic, there is still less restraint of the tongue.

In 15th century England 'people did not hold con-

1 Basco, M., San Francisco, 1872, ill. 410.
2 Hudson, 171.
3 Hudson, 171.
4 The 'trapping' method of Odono's three hundred (J6 748) was not 'as a dog lapped,' but consisted merely in using the hand as a cup.
5 Skar-Berend, Egen-River, London, 1880, l. 1107; Somer-

1 In J a x lxxiv, 322; Ratzel, i, 209; Hobley, 81.
4 Dubois-Beuchamp, 182.
5 Ratzel, ill. 252.

1 Beer, in J A x x l, 100.
2 Mann, J A x l, 822.
3 W. S. Russell, A Pre-Historic People, 61.
4 Ratzel, ill. 252.

1 J. Adair, Hist. of the American Indians, London, 1879, p. 280, for similar instances, Frazer, G. I., Ethnology, 1886, p. 543, and of course in many of the tribes of the South Sea Islands. See also Burchard, 1; and J. D. S., The Auspicious and the Abominable, New Zealand, 1899, p. 247.
3 J. Kepel, 262.
5 Indian Museum Notes, Calcutta, 1899, 3, 160.
alcohol on the larvae can hardly apply to the Cholta Nagpur rain. Some explanation more in accordance with the evolution of mind seems to be required.

In the following, ideas of sympathetic adaptation appear:

Here the preliminary ceremonies for making rain among the Arunta no water may be drunk, else the magic would fail;—no one may try to drink for fear of touching the old chief's body by the same road as the massage (beer). When the king of Congo has a milk-drink, he has a cup of wine brought: he that brings it has a bell in his hand, and, as soon as he has delivered the cup to the king, he turns his face away. A man with a bell, or bell in hand, all present fall down with their faces to the ground, and continue so till the king has drunk. The king would die if he were seen in the act of drinking. When Winwood Reade offered the king of Canasa a glass of rum, the monarch hid his face and the glass under the table when the king of Dahoonay drinks in public, a curtain is held up to conceal him. Bowdich describes the scene of Ashanti drinking: music played, and the soldiers, brandishing their swords with the right hand, covered their noses with their left, singing meanwhile the monotone: 'dink, dink' till the drunkind the extremity of the curtain. A man of consequence never drinks before his inferiors. If it is said in Ashanty that an enemy can most easily impose a spell on the faculties of his victim when drinking. A son of the king of Congo was put to death for having accidentally seen his father drink. A Pongo chief never drinks in the presence of others except behind a screen. When the king of Uganda in Central Africa went to the royal dalay to drink milk, the men dispersed and the women covered their heads. No one might see him drink. A wife handed him the milk-bowl, but turned her face away.

The Thompson Indians believe that enemies can injure a man by magic when he drinks. A Warao when drinking holds a cloth before his face. The habit is particularly strong in the presence of a woman. "I had," says Cameron, "to pay a man to hold my hand to drink; I could not make a man let a woman see him drink."1

In these cases the development takes the form of a refusal of ordinary, familiar, customary gratification. From the Steinen found in Central Brazilian tribes a sense of modesty, attended by shyness and blushing, exhibited when alimentary functions were in progress, a sense as keen as that shown by the majority of the human race in the matter of sexual functions.2 In similar rules cited below there may be seen not merely habits of etiquette, but a sense of modesty and a law of decency, involving the fear of exciting disgust. The idea that such practices hinder the entrance of evil influences, or prevent the soul from escaping, is a later sophistication, and cannot explain their origin.

When the Indian of Cape Finlizzy falls ill, he often accuses it to a demon which entered his body when he was drinking at a stream.3 Bulgarians before drinking make the sign of the Cross, to prevent the devil entering his body.4 Devout Russians used to blow on the glass to drive Satan from the liquor.5 With the Greeks, the soul may be longed for to remain, though the mouth is dangerously open, by offering it a share in the beverage. When the hair of the Siamese boy is cut, there is a fear lest the kham, the guardian spirit of his head, may depart. It is enlaced and captured; then coco-nut milk is presented in a cup, and thus by absorbing the drink of the kham he retains the kham itself.

Rules of drinking, more or less impregnated with superstition, occur all over the world.

In Wasi it is a serious offense to use a cheap drinking-cup.6 A Macör who drinks from the cup of a man who wished him ill became bewitched.7 The Niam-Niam, who are said to be 'particular at their meals,' that is, to observe alimentary decency, wipe the rim of a cup before passing it on.8 Great cars was taken by the Fijians that no one should touch the king's cupbearer. They regarded it as an invariable precaution for several persons to drink out of the same vessel, and held that pollution was carried by saliva.9 The civilized man has the same instinct of isolation and of excluding foreign elements from his drinks.

Contact with particular persons is avoided.

According to the rules of Kafir biontir, relatives of a husband will not drink milk at any kral connected with the wife, nor will the wife's relatives at a kral connected with the husband. For some time after marriage the wife will not use milk. The principle is this: two kral, of which one is a kafir ('dulled') if she consumed her own purchase. After a visit to her father, from whom she takes a goat or ox, the kafir is removed, but the animal is slain, and the female 'dull' passes from the milk into the animal. She has 'cleansed her species.'

In the above case we have probably little more than a phase of etiquette. In others there is a distinct fear of contaminating result in various conceptions of the influence of sacramental purity.

In Tonga, inferior persons might not drink in the presence of superiors, and the various 'ranks' could not drink together.10 In India, water cannot be accepted by high-caste from low-caste persons.11 Even Fakaraka will not drink with Kerisla.12 Among the Nias, whence village feuds are frequent, one village may often be found refusing to drink from a running stream which supplies another.13 New Guineas natives refused to drink water offered to them by Europeans.

In cases like the last there is perhaps no definite conception, merely a vague uneasiness about the unfamiliar. A similar sensitiveness occurs in the case of unfamiliar or untested drinks.

When the Eskimo find a new spring, an eugok, or the oldest man present, drinks of it first to rid the water of any forpusanul or malignant quality which might make it ill. Similar ideas are connected with the hospitable practice of 'tasting,' though there is not clear that this is in no sense the reason of the custom.14 At palm-wine drinking the Krunus hosts takes a mouthful, then drinks fast and last drink himself, in order to take off the feish. The same notion may be involved in the ceremonial tasting by an official of the new wine and the new fruits.15 In India, before drinking wine the chief, the priest or 'captain' of the chief tastes the liquor, to show decency that it is not poisonous, yet it is common for natives to drink the water they offer to a stranger, to prove that it is free from poison.16 Among the Zulus it is not etiquette to offer beer to any one without first tasting it.17

Drinking with a woman is avoided by many peoples in various stages of evolution. The Benjamin would not take drink from the hands of a J. G. Senn, in Smithsonian Contributions, Washington, xvl. (1870) 77.

3 E. Young, The Kingdom of the Yellow Robe, Westminster, 1886, p. 64.
4 Ibid., 452.
5 J. E. Pollock, New Zealand, London, 1883, i. 263, 269.
7 Wilkes, ill. 1860, 390.
8 D. Leslie, Among the Zulus and Amontogas, 2nd, Edinburgh, 1876, pp. 173, 196.
9 D'Urville, Voyage pittoresque autour du monde, Paris, 1834-5, ii. 77.
10 W. Martiner, The Tonga Islands, 2, Edinburgh, 1827, ii. 234.
11 Monier-Williams, 453.
12 V. Ball, Jungle Life in India, London, 1880, p. 89.
13 Hope, 7.
16 See below, note 56; J. L. Wilson, 24.
17 D. Macdonald, Africau, London, 1842, i. 261.
18 Von Rosenberg, 470.
19 D. Leslie, 205.
woman on any consideration. 1 An artificial horror is generated in such cases. The Muskhogees hold it equivalent to adultery that a man should take a pitcher of water from the head of a married woman. It was permissible for him to drink if the woman removed the pitcher herself, and retired after setting it on the ground or another line of mouth. For if the Arunta hold that a draught of woman's blood will kill the strongest man.2

Among the Kaffirs and the Bhumos a menstruating woman may not drink milk; if she does, the cows will be injured. She is restricted to beer. 4 At his daughter's first period, however, a man must abstain from the spot an old cow was fed exclusively on, and its milk constitutes her only food. 5 After being delivered, the Greenhod mother gives her a cup of water for her own use; if any one else drinks from this, the rest must be thrown away, 6 Play mentions the belief that, if a menstruating woman touches wine, it turns vinegar. 7 In various parts of Europe it is still believed that if a woman in her courses enters a brewery the beer will turn sour; if she touches wine, vinegar, or milk, it will go bad.

On the face of these customs and ideas there is a regard both for the woman's own safety and for that of others. She is rendered quite helpless by being insulated, and at the same time is removed from danger. 8 It has been further suggested, for the explanation of similar cases, that any taint of sex would remain in the milk of cows, and that the sympathetic link between the milk and the cow may be snapped by any process which converts the milk into another substance, such as cards. Members of the 'sacred house' may themselves distribute without injuring their source. 9 On this principle the Wanyamwesi practice of mixing vaccine or human urine with milk has for its object the safeguarding of the source. 10

The Jalal of Northern Morocco believe that a murderer is permanently unclean. Poison oozes out from underneath his nails; hence anybody with whom he comes in contact in which he washes his hands will fall dangerously ill. 11 Among the Zulus a wounded man may not touch milk till a ceremony has been performed. 12

The sources of contamination dangerous to drinking are not universally the same. There are some variations, as perhaps the law of Muhammad that a vessel from which a dog has drunk is to be washed seven times before it is used by human beings.

A universal source of contamination is death. After a death the Zulus drink no milk for a day; the mourners also. For some time the widows and widowers apparently are permanently forbidden its use. 13 All that has a bit of a carcass may not drink milk until he has been purified. 14 The dead who has touched a corpse has to drink out of a special goatskin. 15 In the same circumstances the Thompson Indian has to spit out the first four mouthfuls whenever he drinks. 16

For the classification of the various magical properties of drinks the Zulu theory is instructive. But neither here nor elsewhere can a line be drawn between inherent and acquired characteristics. The Zulus logically distinguish between two complementary species of magical drinks. These are 'black' and 'white', negative and positive. The former renders, for instance, everything that causes a man to be disliked; the latter gives him 'brightness', and produces liking and admiration in others. The former is emetic in its properties. The ejected matter is placed in the fire; thus the 'badness' is consumed. The white drink, when used, for instance, to command the affections of a girl, or to cause her to bear a grudge against some object that the person referred to has worn next the skin. 17

Drinks of the first class have the properties of liquids when used for washing; those of the second have the properties of medicines, stimuli, or purificatory drinks which share food with food and drugs. A distinction is clearly to be drawn between the latter class and drinks which have been contaminated by alien contact or by drugs.

Just as mythology developed the generic idea of drink into a water of life or of immortality, so it has developed the idea of cleansing into a water of oblivion. The 'Drink of Forgetfulness' is found in Greek, Hindu, Norse, and Arabian mythology.

In Fijian mythology the spirit of the dead man on his way to the other world drinks of a spring. As soon as he takes the water, he ceases weeping, and his friends forget, and weeping, forgetting their sorrows. This savage Water of Lethe is called the Water of Eternal Spring, or 'his three caves of wine, the Anu sati fal; the drinking of this terminates the mourning. The Kairahs effect the same thing to the Hindus by the use of water touched by a Brahman. 8 In South India holy water is drink to terminate mourning. In Roman Catholic ritual a sick man drinks water which the priest has washed his hands. 9 At the end of mourning the Kaffir widow rinses her mouth with fresh milk. 10 Class Indians 'purify' themselves after a funeral by drinking hot water and washing themselves; 9 cleansing thus both the outer and the inner man. In Central Africa the possessing spirit leaves out of a man by drinking an opium solution. The Gogos believe they purify themselves by drinking spirits. 11 Among the Orissa man is re-admitted to the world when he has drunk the blood of a goat to wash away his sin. 12 When the Bilhpur Bedars re-admit an adulteress, they touch her lips with a red-hot twig of Aspideles pinnata, and give her liquor to drink. 13 In Mexico during 'the bad days,' which recur every four years, children are made to drink spirits. 14

In these and similar cases there is a preference for 'strong' water, whether it be hot or spirits, or blood, or containing some added virtue. It is difficult, therefore, always to distinguish 'purgation' from the ingestion of virtue or magic. Most magical drinks certainly have both negative and positive properties. This is the case, whether literally by acquisition or metaphorically by imagination, with water itself.

The Muskhogee custom of Savannah drunk Ganges water only, not from piety, but because of its medicinal properties. The water of which all men else had been washed and which had been 'distribute to the effect-water.' The Kanges drink water to which the priest has washed his feet. 15 In early England a cure for demoniac possession was washing and drinking the same ozen water. 16

From this aspect drinks are suitable for purposes of consecration and institution. Their virtue gives a vigorous set-off in the new state.

In old Scandinavia the new king drank a horn of liquor before taking his seat on the throne. 18 European monarchs after coronation take the Sacrament. So in Catholicism do married couples. Interesting variants are the following. In Asianten times the first food given to the newly-born child was the homoseale juice. Among the Tahi peoples the father gives his son a name by spitting rum from his mouth upon him. Ram is poured from the ground into the new-born's hand.
When a child is received into the Kak-klo of the Zulu, his 'godfather' acts as a sponsor, and takes the vows in place of the child, unless the child himself chooses to do so himself.

As part of his initiation the Southern Masim buy drinks salt water mixed with uripe mango-flake. He bathes in the sea, and then is fed with Beniskoro, the vine. Then he is given some coconu milk. Whatever the meaning of these drinks, they play a considerable part in his initiation. In savage papal corporal communion milk is sometimes drunk in connection with a pretended new birth. Ancient religion had this fiction. After the initiation the new-born (p.m.) the initiate was fed on milk, like a new-born babe.

Ideas of invigoration are one of the most obvious results of toasting the drinks. 'Dutch courage' has been an important factor in history. At a ceremony previous to war the Tshoerese give their headmen palm-wine outside the temple. After drinking the wine they go round seven times around the temple. This custom is possibly a na?ve way of inspiring the leaders of the people. Ancient classical authors give several accounts of races whose practice it was to go into battle drunk. It is extremely probable that the funeral sacrifices of men and animals in many cases involves an intention to vivify the spirits of the deceased with the warm, juicy, heady life of the creature. The slades in Hades renew their life by drinking blood. The offering of a drink is a frequent method of animating a fest, and is as much regarded as an institutional rite. The Tabo negro squenses rum upon his new-made subman, saying it is the best of all.1

In metaphor and mythology drink plays a considerable part than food. From similes like 'as cold water to a thirsty soul' to the metaphorical description of some as 'a God-intoxicated man,' all the psychical reactions of drinks are expressed in language.

In religion the story of wine constitutes a distinctly ideal element, and it is here that the function of drink receives not only a sort of apotheosis, but perhaps a sound physiological explanation. The Vedas state that the gods were originally mortal; immortality was acquired by, among other methods, the drinking of soma. Similarly the Homeric gods attained immortality by drinking nectar and eating ambrosia. In the mythology of ancient Babylonia, Hasidus brought into the ark a supply both of beer and of wine. According to the Mexicans, the first human beings were created by the gods fed on pulque. The sociological significance of orgiasticism has not yet been studied.

Wine or spirituous liquor inspires mysterious fear. The alchemical mental state which it produces suggests the idea that there is something supernatural in it, that it contains a spirit, or is perhaps itself a spirit. The Japanese, intoxicated by this spirit, arrack, says he is possessed of the spirit, in the Animistic sense, of the liquor. Thus the juice of the grape is the blood of the vine, its soul or life. The drinking of wine in the rites of a vine-god like Dionysus is not an act ofrevoly, it is a solemn sacrament.

Some typical cases of the religious and social uses of strong drink remain to be mentioned. No attempt is made to define stages of evolution. The earliest Brahmans used spirituous liquors in acts of worship. Arrack was offered to the gods. The Sautrmanasi and Vajapeya rites were typical for the drinking of wine, and the earliest evidence in civilization is the soma of the soma. The Vedas prohibited the worshipper from drinking the ceremonial liquor for a sensuous purpose. The Saktas to-day have actually the same principle, and purify the liquors before worship. The followers of Zarathushtra have clung to the old way more consistently than the Hindus. Liquor-drinking forms part of almost all Parsi ceremonies to-day. Liquor is specially consecrated on New Year's Day.

The Eucharist in its early form has the mark of a periodic wine-drinking, breaking up the 'fast' of work-a-day life. It is necessary for organizers like St. Patrick to prohibit excess, which shows that wine was freely taken. The wine represented the blood of Christ and conferred immortality. In the course of history the use of wine has been lent to the ideas of the Church, and in Churches which allow all worshippers to partake of the chalice the wine is not drunk but tasted. The Hebrew Cup of Blessing is an analogue of the wine of the Christ's Supper.1 Of course Christians made a free communal use of the sacred drink; it was given to the dead; vials of it were placed in the grave, with cups inscribed with toasts, such as 'Drink and long life!'

For very special offerings to a god the Bhils make kowari, 'virgin liquor.' The distillers in this case must bathe and wear newly washed clothes before commencing operations.

For special effects, and as an inspiration, a priest may become intoxicated. On certain days the high priest of the Zopatos is obliged to be drunk. On one of these he cohabited with a Virgin of the Sun.

Gods reflected in an intensified form the ideals and habits of their worshippers. If a god is housed, clothed, and fed, he is also supplied with drinks.

A different problem is presented by various customs of eating the dead. Their discussion belongs elsewhere; but they show variation even in the case of drinking.

The Cucumae of the Amazon ground the bones of their dead to powder and drank this in their beer. They said 'it was better to be inside a friend than to be swallowed up by the cold earth.' The Xinamas mingled the ashes of the dead with their drink.11 Here there can be no survival of cannibalism. The Angoni make the ashes of the dead into a broth. This must be lapped up with the hand, and not drunk in the ordinary way.12 The native practice, generally confined to the women, of drinking some of the fluids drawn from the decaying body of a dead relative is a commonplace of Australian anthropology.

As a preliminary to the problem may be mentioned the frequent occurrence of morbid perversions of appetite in cases of strong emotion. Such perversion is applied to a psychosis of affection or respect, the Australian and similar practices are more easy to understand.

The Irish wake is a familiar example of the practice of drinking to celebrate the death. In West Africa the men drink heavily during the fast which follows a death, and the mourners are generally intoxicated.10 The same custom is found in the Yorubas.10 But it is chiefly after the funeral that drinking is the rule of the feast.

At funerals among the Wouwla Indians there is much drinking of wishish. A long line of cotton is stretched, like a telegraph wire, from the house of the dead, where the drinking place is set, to the burial-ground where the body has been deposed. I have seen the white thread following the course of the river for many miles, crossing and re-crossing the stream several times.11 As soon as a Hangala man dies, the family gets in large supplies of sugar-cane wine. Drinking and drinking are carried on for three or four days and nights, until the wine is finished.12 The Guiana Indians drink and dance at the funeral feast.

Among the Tshiyal of the Zambesi the native beer, pombe, plays a considerable part in post-mortem ceremonies. The瞳tz of Bones, a large quantity is prepared. Holes are bored above the grave and pombe is poured in. In one hole, in front of the house where the grave is, the mourners wash their hands with pombe. As the procession retires, a widow of the deceased (she is called mission to-day, that is, after the spirit), her head covered with calico, constantly calls out for pombe, which she drinks beneath the

J. M. Campbell, in JA xvi. 510. 3 Co 110.
covering. At the house of the head widow a large hole is dug and the liquor is poured in. Every one falls down and drinks it without help of spoon or vessel. A feast follows, consisting of porridge and meat.1

Various considerations, some of which are supplied by the individual accounts, suggest that drinking at funerals and their anniversaries is motivated by a double impulse, or rather by two complementary impulses, namely, the desire to stifle sorrow, and the desire to lift the dead man thereunto in the good things of the world to which they still belong, though absent in the body. These two expressions of feeling, coupled with the 'sympathy' shown by the community, render funeral drinking a typical case of social instinct. Secondary ideas necessarily supervene.

The universal employment of a drink of fellowship to initiate and also to terminate a social process is found in the case ofpuberal ceremonies, though rarely. The reason is that, in this case, the process does not include a pair of persons. In the case of marriage and covenants this essential condition is satisfied. Here it may be said that the reciprocal process in the former class is between the son and the members of the social state to which he is admitted. And in many analogous cases this is recognized, though the mind in its universalmore slow to recognize than to concretize an abstract idea as that of community. But in these stages the other member of the couple may be found in the 'godfather' or sponsor, on the one hand, and individual members of the other, either of the same or of the other sex, the latter being the indirect object of the initiation. Thus among many early peoples the boys after initiation drink with the girls. Similar ceremonies are performed in connexion with the willow water. Pick up the kambu youth makes honey-beer, and gives it to the elder who looked after him during the ceremonies.2 At the end of the ntonjane, the Kaffir ceremony performed to celebrate a girl's arrival at puberty, the girl's nearest female relative drinks milk, and then hands the bowl to the girl to drink.3 From such practices there may easily develop ideas of taboo, which is to be ended by drinking or other rite of passage. Thus, in Central Australia the man whose blood has been taken to supply another with health or strength is taboo to him until he releases him from the 'ban of silence' by giving him his mouth.4

Marriage is universally the occasion of a social feast, and the rite in which the bridal pair drink together is one of the most prevalent methods of tying the knot. There is thus both individual and social drinking at weddings. Sometimes the latter is not shared by the marrying parties; sometimes the individual drinking rite is extended to relatives; and sometimes it is carried out by them as sponsors for the bride and bridegroom. Naturally there is considerable variation in the ritual of the act of union.

At Tiperah weddings the bride receives a glass of liquor from her mother; she takes this to the bridegroom, sits on his knee, and, after drinking some of the liquor, gives the rest to him.5 Among the Kalbi, milk from the bridegroom's cows is presented to the bride. Her drinking of this milk renders the marriage complete, and the tie indissoluble. The guests exclaim, "She drinks the milk! She has drunk the milk!" Among the Nubi Kifanah of Thana, liquor is given to the pair when the marriage ceremony is complete.6 In the Kyaungba, the rite of the Kyaungba bride bar the entrance to the village against the bridegroom with a bamboo. Across this he has to drink with them a 'loving' cup, and every one lies down and drinks it without help of spoon or vessel. A feast follows, consisting of porridge and meat.7

In the Mozambique, Japan, Bengal, Indian, and European cases of marriage, the bride and groom are given a man's cup containing its milk. The man drinks, and the woman after him.8 Among the Larks, a cup of beer is given to each of the two parties; they mix the beverage, then drink it. This completes the marriage.9 In the Moluccas, Japan, Bengal, Indian, and European cases of marriage, the bride and groom are given the cup to drink from, Kaffe to drink.10 In the Christian countries the marriage ceremony is separated from the wedding ceremonial proper, but is carried out indirectly when the pair receive together the wine of the Communion, which is to be partaken of immediately after the marriage itself. Among the Gody, the respective fathers of the bridal pair drink together.11

Drinking together at marriage is a rite which applies to two parties the principles of social drinking. Sharing in an act is a sort of reciprocity, and together with interchange of gifts constitutes the universal and fundamental principle of society. The more abstract ideas of similarity, union, and identity follow, and the simple ritual of sharing has a corresponding development. From the beginning there are also involved in the process, but unconsciously, the psychological feelings of refreshment, and in particular to the effects of alcohol, which increase both self-feeling and altruism. Pure altruism is the primary motive of many a custom which involves a simple sharing of drink. Here is the virtue of the man who gives a cup of cold water to a little one (Mt 10:42). The natives of India have the custom of erecting sheds for the giving of water to passers-by. After initiation the boy has reciprocal motives, such as a general desire to conciliate or a wish to avoid the injury of a curse or an evil eye, come to obscure the primary. In the procession preceding the circumcisions in Egypt, the boy is a servant carrying a skin of water and brass cups. Now and then he fills a cup and offers it to a passer-by. Another servant carries a tray with materials for coffee. It is his business, when they pass a well-dressed person, to fill and present him with a cup; the person gives him something, perhaps a half-piastre. The analogy of other Egyptian customs suggests here the avoidance of the evil eye.

Even towards slain animals and the human objects of social resentment pure altruism is shown. Indians of the Orinoco, after killing an animal, pour into its mouth some liquor, in order that the soul of the dead beast may inform its fellows of the welcome it has met with, and that they, too, cheered by the prospect of the same kind reception, may come with alacrity to be killed.12 One may take leave to assign a worthier motive as the origin of this custom. Similarly, though primitive peoples share their drink with the dead, some have learnt to explain the custom of placing such things in the grave as a method of inducing the dead to be quiet, and not to come and pester the living for anything they want.

The co-operating totems of Australia are perhaps the earliest instance known of the principle of co-operative drinking.13

2. Hakluyt, 16.
6. Lichtenstein, i. 262.
7. BGS xiii. 120.
operative industry elevated into a system. Among the totems of the Central Australians is a water-totem. A member of this may drink water when and where he pleases, but it is not necessary for him to receive it, or the permission to take it, from an individual who belongs not to that totem, but to a moiety of the tribe of which the water-man is not a member. The principle, according to Spencer-Gillon, is that of mutual obligation between complementary food-totems, regulating the supply of food and drink. 1

But the principle of reciprocal service is at the root of all social phenomena. Some of its forms are curious; others seem totally unlike the original type. Secondary ideas, once more, are responsible for these fluctuations. An African wife drank the medicine intended for her husband, in the belief that he would be cured. 2 A similar notion is seen in the belief that what a man drinks may affect the child whose birth is expected. A further development is reached in such customs as that of the Kwakiiitl Indian, who, after biting a piece of flesh from the arm of a foe, drinks hot water in order to inflame the wound. 3 At this stage of sophistication there is often a choice of absolutes. The Indians of the Andes are supposed always for his own digestion rather than for the increase of suffering on the part of his foe.

Another case of the intrusion of a secondary idea is found in the Australian custom of drinking human blood before starting on a 'a nullinga' (avenging expedition).

' Every man of the party drinks some blood, and also has some spurted over his body, so as to make him what is called soliduma, that is, lithe and active. The older men indicate from whom the blood is to be drawn; and the men so selected must not decline, though the amount drawn from a single individual is often very great; indeed, we have known of a case in which from a young and strong man until he dropped from sheer exhaustion.' 4

The beginning of a venture or expedition is universally celebrated by drinking, on the principle of invigoration, as in the old English 'stirrup-cup.' But in the Australian example a further notion has come in. On such an occasion a man joined who had some connexion with the tribe to be visited, he was forced to drink blood with the party, and, 'having partaken of it, would be bound not to aid his friends by giving them warning of their danger.' 5

The Indians of the Cordilleras drink of the water of a river, and pray the god to let them pass over. So did the old Peruvians. 6 Digan's army at the banks of the Ubulinganto strewed charcoal on the water, to prevent all other people being to deprive some evil power possessed by the river. 7 More probably the aim is to adapt one's self to the object by contact, to produce fellow-feeling and sympathy by communion.

Ideas of this kind are similar to those concerned in marriage ceremonies of drinking, but involving from the outset, or at least producing, ipso facto, the secondary ideas of mutual responsibility by means of inoculation, or ingestion of another's substance, or a conditional curse, have built up what may be described as the legal forms of social drinking. The drinking of human blood, or of wine produced from such blood, has been a form of covenant among various ancient and medieval peoples, as well as among certain savages. 8 He who has drunk a clansman's blood is no longer a stranger but a brother, and included in the mystic circle of those who have a share in the life-blood that is common to all the clan.' 9

Robertson Smith's induction is actually a tertiary stage of thought on the subject, but present and powerful in the social consciousness of Arabs and other peoples. Among other details in point is the fact that blood-drinking is often produced by drinking any substance other than blood. See BROTHERHOOD (artificial).

The ordeal, often termed 'drinking the oath,' is a legal application of a ceremonial drink. To extract the truth from a man, the Negro dips a boleona in rum. This rum is then offered to the man, and, if he lies, makes his belly swell. A man claiming a right to the use of a person drinks the water in which he has washed the corpse. In legal actions between the chief, the offender drink is drunk at an oath and celerel. It is a poisonous emetic. 10 A Masai accused of a crime drinks blood, and repeats these words: 'If I have done this deed, may God kill me.' 11

Hospitality, a virtue of universal occurrence, is often complicated by superstitious accretions due to fear of the stranger within the gates. As soon as the stranger enters the houses of a Jivaro or Canelo Indian, each of the women offers him a calabash of chicha. A guest is welcomed by the Herero with a cup of milk. These are simple acts of fellow-feeling. It is characteristic of the true drinking Arab races that the custom attains complexity. Among the nomadic Arabs of Morocco, 'as soon as a stranger appears in the vicinity, some water, or, if he be a person of distinction, some milk is presented to him. Should he refuse to partake of it, he is not allowed to go freely about, but has to stay in the village for sake. On asking him what he meant by this custom, I was told that it was a precaution against the stranger; should he be local or otherwise a disbeliever, his drink would cause his knees to swell so that he could not escape. In other words, he has a conditional curse.' 12

Zaid-al-Khali refused to slay a chief who had surreptitiously drunk from his father's milk-bowl. 13

Health-drinking, the propinioit of the Latins, has some variants in the drinking as a test of friendship, the sharing of a drink; the person doing honour drinks first, and hands the cup (in Greek life this became the property of the person honoured) to the other. Another is drinking with a sign, such as a mark or a sentiment of goodwill towards the person honored. The projection outwards of the drinker's will is typified in many languages, as in most of the customs, by emphasizing the fact that he drinks first. Among the Ba-Yaka and Ba-Humua, the host drinks first, and the guest after him. 4 At Abyssinian meal-drinking the host drinks first, by way of showing that the liquor is not poisoned. He notifies a servant which guests need their cups replenished. On receiving the drink, the guest rises and bows. 5 Among the Kabris, it is not etiquette to give beer to a guest in the act of tasting it. This, according to the account given, is intended to safeguard the guest against poison. 6

Terms like 'pledge' connote the idea of guaranteeing goodwill. The poison-test is obviously not the origin of the custom of the host or pledge drinking first. When that custom took on secondary ideas, one of these would be the affirmation that what the host offers is his own, and that it is of his best.

In barbarism the drinking-bose so called is often the form of political discussion. The chief of the A-kikuyu gives his people the news at beer-drinkings, to which he invites them. 7

With agricultural drinking-feasts we return to man's immediate relations to intoxicating or refreshing drink. Drinking partly takes con- nexion with the ceremonial eating of the new crops.

Lithuanian peasants observe a festival called Saboria, 'the mixing or throwing together,' when the sowing of the new corn has taken place. The Ceremonies celebrate the baking of the first bread from the new corn by a ceremonial mixing of beer. 'The whole ceremony looks almost like a caricature of the Eucharist.' All the drinking of the rich and the peasants of South India drink a liquor of milk, honey, and sugar. 8

1 A. F. Ellis, Todi-speaking Peoples, 107 L
3 Spencor-Gillon, in J.A.I.S. (1890) 9, Raitol, 440.
4 Westernarch, M.I. 590.
5 W. R. Smith, Hist. and Pol. of South India, 1896, p. 1431.
6 Tordis-Joyce, in J/Admin, xxi, 2, 237.
7 Raitol, II, 228, 329.
8 D. Leslie, 366.
9 Loutit, 83.
In such rites there is the social consecration, implicit or explicit, of wine itself and its sources. It is perhaps merely an abnormality that fasting among many peoples does not exclude drinking water. In other cases it is notably the case in West Africa. Spirits are largely drunk during the fast after a death, and mourners are generally intoxicated. During the fast-days of the yam harvest the people drink hard, and the king and chief distribute broadly the run. For various obscure reasons, great personages of the sacred world are often restricted to pure water. The Druids were restrained from a prescribed quantity of wine per diem. Plutarch says they never drank it at all, because it is the blood of beings who fought against the gods. The chief of the Kurems of Burma 'attains his position not by hereditary right, but on account of his habit of abstaining from rice and meat. The mother, too, of a candidate for priestly rank must have cherished these things... so long as she was with child. During that time she might not... drink water from a common well.' The Bodia, or Bodii, the point of the Greco people of West Africa, may not drink water on the highway. Here there is clearly a reference to 'priety.' 

As the Egyptians, and many others, would interdict stimulating drinks, as it interdicts all tendency to expansion. 'Water was the principle and most sacred of the primitive monks; and the founder of the Benedictines regrets the daily portion of half a pint of wine, which had been extorted from him by his monks of the age. All drinking water is sacred.

Many peoples low in the scale of culture emphasize by law the natural aversion of childhood, not to speak of womanhood, to intoxicants. The A-kikuyu, for instance, allow no one to drink beer until he has reached the status of 'elder.' The Chaco Indians forbid women and children, even youths, the use of intoxicants.

DRUIDS.—The elaborate system of theology and philosophy ascribed to the Druids by the older school of writers, and the esoteric doctrines supposed to have been handed down from pagan times in the bardic schools of Wales, have no foundation in fact, though they still have a hold upon the popular fancy, which loves to think of the Druids as a mysterious Celtic priesthood, guardians of pure doctrines—the relics of a primitive revelation. Much of this is due to the classical writers themselves, who have strung notions about the Druids, a strictly scholarly examination of the evidence proves that there was little that was mysterious or esoteric about them; nor, though we may regret the puerility of the evidence, is it likely that, had it been fuller, it would have given any support to those unscientific opinions. Our knowledge of the history of the Druids rests mainly upon what Caesar, in a passage of some length (de Bell. Gall. vi. 13 f.), and Pliny and other writers in shorter notices, have handed down, and upon occasional references in the Irish texts. The monumental and epigraphic evidence is practically nil, although Dom Martin (Rel. des Gaulois, Paris, 1727) and others insisted that the figures on various bas-reliefs in Gaul were Druids enshrined in ritual.

1. Origin of the Druids.—Opinion is still divided regarding the origin of the Druids, whether they arose in Gaul or in Britain, and whether they formed a pre-Celtic or simply a Celtic priesthood. Nothing was known definitely by the classical observers. While Pliny (HN xxx. 1) seems to think that Druidism passed from Gaul to Britain, Caesar (B. G. iii. 18) says: 'The system is thought to have been devised in Britain and brought thence into Gaul; and at the present time they who desire to know it more accurately generally go thither for the purpose of studying it. But what is especially the case is, that it is relating what was a current opinion rather than an actual fact, since he says 'is thought' (exstituitur). This opinion has been based on the fact that the Druids were held to be purer in Britain than in Gaul, where, in the south at least, it had perhaps come in contact with other influences, e.g. Greek philosophy, through the colonies in Marseille. Taking Caesar's words as a statement of fact, D'Arlbois de la Buneac (Les Druides, Paris, 1906, p. 23 f.) and others (Desjardins, Hist. de la Gaule rom., Paris, 1876-85, ii. 518; Deloche, RDM xxxiv. 448) hold that Druidism originated in Britain. The former maintains that the Druids were the priests of the Goëides, who, when conquered by the Celts from Gaul, in turn imposed their priesthood upon their conquerors. The Druidic system then passed over into Gaul about 200 B.C., when the Celts were equally triumphant. All this is based upon no other evidence than Caesar's statement.

Valerius (Les Celtes, Paris, 1879, p. 138) further derives British Druidism from the Phoenicians, for reasons which are at once primitive and equally fantastic is its derivation from Buddhist sources (Wise, Hist. of Paganism in Caledonia, London, 1884).

A growing school of writers has on various grounds adopted the theory that Druidism was pre-Celtic in origin, and imposed itself upon the Celtic conquerors in Gaul and Britain. The Druids are not found in the Danube region, in Cisalpine Gaul, or in Transalpine Gaul outside the region occupied by the 'Celts,' i.e. the short, brachycephalic race of the anthropologists (Holmes, Caesar's Conquest of Gaul, London, 1899, p. 15). But the references to the Druids are so casual, especially as no classical writer professed to write a complete account of this priesthood, that this negative evidence cannot be taken as conclusive. Moreover, it cuts both ways, since there is no reference to Druids in Aquitania—a pre-Celtic region (Desjardins, ii. 519). On the other hand, the earliest reference to the Druids in two Greek writers c. 200 B.C. cited by Diogenes Laertius (v. 1), seems to allude to their presence in Gaul, while Celtic priests, though not formally called Druids, were known in Cisalpine Gaul (Livy, xxv. 3). Professor Ihld's postulates Druidism as 'the common religion of the aboriginal inhabitants from the Rhenish to the Rhittarian,' from whom the incoming Celts adopted it (Celt. Brit. ii, London, 1884, p. 72); and in this he is followed by Gomme, who finds many of the Druidic beliefs and practices—the redemption of one life by another, magical spells, shape-shifting, the customs of the Druids in settling property succession, boundaries, and controversies, and in adjudging crimes—opposed to Aryan sentiment (Ethnology in Folk-Lore, London, 1899, p. 22; Village Community, London, 1890, p. 104). This begs the whole question of what was Aryan and what was non-Aryan; and, indeed, there is every reason to believe that Aryan sentiment was not dominant, if not non-existent, in such matters as that of the pre-Aryan folk. Nor is it easy to understand why the Aryan Celts were conquered by the Druidic priesthood, if their 'sentiment' was so antagonistic to the heathenism of the Druids. On the other hand, the arguments used by Reichen (ECCD xiii. 189, 'L'Art plastique en Gaule et le druidisme') in support of the pre-Celtic origin of the Druids suggest a higher religious outlook on the part of the pre-Celtic peoples. The Celts, he says, had no images, and this argues that images were forbidden, and only a powerful
priesthood could have forbidden them. But the pre-Celtic peoples in Gaul had equally no images, while, on the other hand, they had vast megalithic structures. Therefore, again, only a powerful priest can have foreseen the fate of their metempsychosis and foreseen the people to erect the other. The same priesthood, the Druids, continued to exercise that power over the Celts which they had exercised over the aboriginal race. The Celts now adored the religion en bloc; but, when the Celts appear in history, Druidism is in its decline, the military caste rebelling against the foreign priesthood and taking its place. In answer to these arguments it may be pointed out that the Celts do not appear to have had a religious prejudice against images (see CELTS, § XIV); again, the adoption of the aboriginal religion en bloc would be credible only if the Celts had no religion and no priests of their own, while it leaves unexplained the fact that they did not adopt the custom of erecting megalithic structures; finally, the opposition of the military caste to the Druids is no argument for the foreign origin of the latter, since such an opposition has been found wherever these two castes, existing side by side, have each desired supremacy.

2. The ‘gutuatri.’—Besides the Druids, the Celts had other priests, each attached to certain cults like the Roman Flamen. D’Arbois (p. 2 ff.) argues that the gutuatri were the only native Celtic priesthood, and that, when the Druids, whose functions were more general, were adopted by the Celts, the gutuatri assumed a lower place. It is much more likely that they were a special branch of the Druidic priesthood, attached to the cult of some particular god. Anusonius calls Phoebus Belenus gutuatri. D’Arbois refers to the Latin equivalent of gutuatores, while he was of a Druidic stock like another servant of Belenus mentioned elsewhere (Prof. v. 7, xi. 24); and this suggests a connexion between the two. Livy distinguishes the sacerdotes from the antistites of the temple of the Boii (xvii. 24), and this may refer to Druids and gutuatri. Classical evidence tends to show that the Druids were a great inclusive priesthood, with priestly, prophetic, magical, medical, legal, and poetical functions. Most of these functions are ascribed to the Druids by Caesar. Elsewhere we hear of different classes—Druids (philosophers and theologians), prophets, and bardic priests. (Sic. v. 30; Strabo, iv. 4 [p. 197]; Ann. Marc. xv. 9). Strabo gives in Greek form the native name of the diviners as ádrēs, which was probably in Celtic adrēs (Irish ádr). The Druids’ duties in all these classes are performed by themselves, who sing the deeds of renowned warriors; but since adrēs means both ‘prophet’ and ‘poet,’ the diviners may not have been quite distinct from the bards. The connexion between Druids and bards is still clear. No oracle was complete without a philosopher or Druid, according to Diodorus and Strabo, yet both speak of the sacrificial functions of the diviners; while, though the Druids were of a higher intellectual and moral grade and studied moral philosophy as well as Nature (Timagenes), according to the same writer and Strabo, the diviners also studied Nature. Angury was a specialty of the diviners, yet the Druids also made use of this art (Cic. de Div. iv. 41, 90; Tac. Hist. iv. 54), while Pline refers to ‘Druids and this race of prophets and physicians’ (aurum medicuscurum, xxx. 2). Thus the diviners sometimes acted as a kind of sacrist. The Druids’ duties were taken from the sacrifices performed by Druids, while standing in relation to the bards, whom we may regard as another Druidic class. In Ireland we trace the efforts of these priests to detach the Druids who appear in the texts mainly as magicians, though their former priestly functions can here and there be traced. There were the fid (from eulo, ‘I see’ (Stokes, Urkelt. Sprachschatz, Göt- tingen, 1894, p. 277)), learned poets who occupied a higher rank than the third class, the bards. The fid were also diviners and prophets, while some part of the third class, the bards, were also diviners and prophets in Ireland. Hence the two classes stood in close relation, like the Druid and the fid. At the same time, the position of the Druids as a priestly class, the fid remained as the learned class. D’Arbois (p. 108) assumes that there had been a rivalry between the two classes, and that the fid, making common cause with the Christian missionaries, gained their support. But this is unlikely. The fid, less markedly associated with pagan priestly functions, were less obnoxious, and may willingly have renounced purely pagan practices. At an earlier time they may have been known as fithi (=vates), or prophets—a name applied later to the OT prophets and sages (Windisch, Tafeln bei Ciceros, Leipzig, 1865, Introd. p. xiv); but, as they now applied themselves mainly to poetic science, they apparently reducing the bards to a lower position, the name fid designated them more aptly.

The connexion of the fid with the Druids is further witnessed by the fact that the former had an Ard-fid, or chief-poet, and that, when the office was vacant, election was made to it, and rival candidates strove for it (Stokes, Trip. Life, London, 1857, i. 52, ii. 402; Windisch and Stokes, Ir. Texte, Leipzig, 1880 ff. i. 573; ‘Colloquy of the Two Sages,’ Book of Leinster, 187). This resembles what Caesar tells of election to the office of chief Druid (vi. 19), while there was probably a chief-Druid, the filid, as the Druids were elected as judges, as did also the Druids, while both had a long novitiate to serve, lasting over several years, before they were admitted to either class. The gutuatri are known mainly from inscriptions, but Hirlimus (de Bell. Gall. viii. 38) speaks of one put to death by Caesar. An inscription at Mâcon speaks of a gutuatri Martis, i.e. of some Celtic god identified with Mars (Rev. Bryg., 1896, p. 239); two gutuatri of the god Annius occurs in inscriptions from Autun, and another in one from Puy-en-Valay (see Holder, Altelt. Sprachschatz, Leipzig, 1891 ff., I. 340). The antistites tempeli mentioned by Livy, xvi. 24, as found among the Boii, may have been gutuatri, like Anusonius’ antistites. Gutuatri may mean ‘the speakers,’ i.e. they who invoked the gods (D’Arbois, p. 24), or it is derived from the Latin gutuare, to utter, followed by Holder, i. 3406; for another explanation, see Leoh, FCD xxviii. 120), the Gaulish gutuare being Latinized as gutuateru.

3. The Druids a native Celtic priesthood. — There is, therefore, little ground for the theory that the Druids were a creation of, and imported by, the Celts or adopted by the Celtic conquerors. With it is connected the theory that the Druids had a definite theological system and worshipped only a few gods, while they merely gave their sanction to the Celtic cults of many gods or of various natural objects—wells, trees, etc. (Bertrand, Rel. des Gauls., Paris, 1857, pp. 192 ff., 268 ff.; Holmes, op. cit. p. 17). All this is purely hypothetical, and we conclude that the Druids were a native priesthood common to both branches of the Celtic people, and that they had grown up side by side with the growth of the native religion. On the other hand, it is far from certain that many of the pre-Celtic cults were adopted by the Celts, because the Druids were not adored in a section of Gaul, where they felt the influence of Greek civilization, and employed Greek characters in writing (Cesare, vi. 14), some of these cults and
practices may have been abandoned, and the Druids may have become more definitely a learned class. But as a class the Druids were not a philosophic priesthood, possessed of secret knowledge, while the people were given over to superstition and irrational belief. Some of the beliefs of Celtic religion and much of its magic may have been official, in the sense that any one could perform them, just as a Christian may pray without the intervention of a priest. It is probable that the Druids themselves probably practised those cults and used that magic, and doubtless the people themselves knew that greater success was likely to be obtained if a Druid was called in to help on these unoffical occasions. The Druids never lost the magical character which is found in all primitive priesthoods. Hence it is a mistake to regard 'Druidism' as an entity outside of Celtic religion in general, and, on the whole, opposed to it. The Celtic religion, in effect, was Druidism.

The native Celtic name for Druid was probably druids, gen. druidar. In Irish it is drui, druí, or drid (cf. Gaelic draidh, 'sorcerer'). The etymology is obscure. Pliny, connecting it with the Celtic oak-cult, derived it from Gr. ἄρτος, 'oak,' an homonymous derivation (Farrar, Thesaurus, 1884, s.v.) analyzes 'Druid' into drau-vids, regarding the first part as 'oak,' the second as 'divine,' as an intensive, or connecting root with vid, 'to see or know.' The resulting meaning would be 'greatly or highly knowing,' a meaning consonant with the primitive character of the priest everywhere as one who knows more than his fellows (see also Osthoft, Etruskund, Pareng., 1882, p. 196). Diod. Sic. (VIII. 56) and Plut. (De Iside et Osiride, 18), the earliest known writers in the Latin language, use the word, 'to cry aloud,' ofjoma, 'to look,' although the etymology of the latter Gr. word is still uncertain (cf. Boeckh, Dict. Mythol., de la langue greque, Heidelberg, 1870, p. 151). For ogham inscriptions in which the name Druid occurs, see Holder, s.v. 'Druids,' 1. 1350.

4. Were the Druids a philosophic priesthood?

The earliest reference to the Druids by name is found in a passage of Diodorus Siculus (I. 1), who, when referring to the philosophic character of the barbaric priesthoods, cites Sotion and pseudo-Aristotle (c. 2nd cent. B.C.) as saying, 'There are among the Celte and Galate those who are called Druids and Semothoeci.' Cesar, Strabo, Diodorus Siculus, Timagenes, Lucan, Pomponius Mela, and many other later writers speak of the philosophic science of the Druids, their schools of learning, and their political power; but, on the other hand, most of these writers refer to the cruel human sacrifices of the Druids, Mela characterizing these as savagery (iii. 18), while Sestion also describes the 'great power' of the Druids, who were not necessary to immortality. Since Pliny does not regard them as philosophers, but his description of the mistletoe rite suggests their priestly functions, though here and in other passages he associates these with magico-magical rites (II. xxiv. 83, xxiv. 12, xxx. 1). The difference in these opinions shows that a closer practical acquaintance with the Druids revealed their true nature to the Roman Government, which found them more cruel and licentious and superstitious than philosophic. For these reasons, and on account of their hostility to Rome, the latter broke their power systematically (see below, § 12). Thus, it is unlikely that the Druids were reduced to a kind of medicine-men to gain a livelihood (D’Arbois, 77). Pliny’s phrase, Druidas . . . et hoc genus eutum medicorumque, appears to refer rather to their position before the Roman influence and to the fact that they may have been different. Among them—some priests, some diviners, and some practising a primitive medical science. Pliny’s acquaintance with the Druids seems to have been superficial, but he was the first writer to give a correct account of the primitive magical practices belonged to them from the first, and were not the result of Roman suppression. On the other hand, it is probable that the Druids were not the original founders of the whole Celtic area. But the opinion that they were the slyy philosophs seems to have been repeated by a series of writers, without any inquiry whether there was any real ground in fact for their opinion.

The facts upon which what may be called ‘the Druidic legend,’ as it appealed to the classical world, was based were superstition and irrational belief, unlike the Greek and Roman priests (e.g. they taught the doctrine of immortality), they were highly organized, they were skilled magicians, and their knowledge was supposed to be conveyed to the gods (e.g. the language of the gods; Diod. Sic. v. xxxi. 4). On the other hand, we must beware of exaggerating the descriptions, themselves probably exaggerated, in classical writers. Cesar (vi. 14) and Mela (iii. 19) say, ‘They profess to know the motions of the heavens and the stars’—a knowledge which need not imply more than the primitive astronomy of barbaric races everywhere. Thus Cesar’s Druid, Divitiacens (de Boc. i. 41. 90), though professing a knowledge of Nature, used it to divine the future. Strabo (iv. iv. 4 [p. 197]) and Mela (iii. 19) tell of their knowledge of the ‘magnitude and form of the earth and the world,’ of their knowledge of the future, and of their influence over an eternal matter, and in the alternate triumphs of two elements, fire and water. This need have been no more than a series of cosmicomy myths, the crude beliefs of a speculational primitive race.

Similarly, the Druids’ doctrine of metempsychon had certainly no ethical bearing, and, from what may be gathered of it from Irish texts, did not differ from similar beliefs found, e.g., among American Indians and Negroes. The theory of the Druids, if it existed, was elusive: no classical writer ever discovered it fully; it exerted no influence upon classical thought. For the reason the theory of a connexion between Druidism and the Pythagorean system must be rejected, though again we must not overlook the fact that Greek philosophic teachings may have penetrated to some of the Druids, or the Massilian colonies. Probably the origin of this fancied connexion is to be found in the fact that the Druids taught a future existence in the body, and that they had myths, such as are found in the Irish texts (see CELTS, § XVI.), regarding transmigration. It was at once assumed that there must be a link between these Celtic beliefs and the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychon. There are, however, very real differences. The Druidic doctrine of immortality was not necessary to immortality in the sense held by Plato, for, though Pliny does not regard them as philosophers, his description of the mistletoe rite suggests their priestly functions. Pliny’s acquaintance with the Druids seems to have been superficial, but his description of the mistletoe rite suggests their priestly functions, though here and in other passages he associates these with magico-magical rites (II. xxiv. 83, xxiv. 12, xxx. 1). This difference in these opinions shows that a closer practical acquaintance with the Druids revealed their true nature to the Roman Government, which found them more cruel and licentious and superstitious than philosophic. For these reasons, and on account of their hostility to Rome, the latter broke their power systematically (see below, § 12). Thus, it is unlikely that the Druids were reduced to a kind of medicine-men to gain a livelihood (D’Arbois, 77). Pliny’s phrase, Druidas . . . et hoc genus eutum medicorumque, appears to refer rather to their position before the Roman influence and to the fact that they may have been different. Among them—some priests, some diviners, and some practising a primitive medical science. Pliny’s acquaintance with the Druids seems to have been superficial, but he was the first writer to give a correct account of the primitive magical practices belonged to them from the first, and were not the result of Roman suppression. On the other hand, it is probable that the Druids were not the original founders of the whole Celtic area. But the opinion that they were the slyy philosophs seems to have been repeated by a series of
connected with their practice of divination and magic, their human sacrifices, and their belief in the power of ritual.

5. The Druids as teachers. — To the Druids, says Caesar, a great number of the young men flocked for the sake of instruction; but the next paragraph (14) suggests that it was the privilege of exemption from military service and from tributes that encouraged them to go to them of their own accord for instruction, or to be sent to them by parents and relatives. Whatever the reason, the fact that the Druids were teachers cannot be doubted; but, since their course of instruction lasted 20 years, some of their pupils were probably under training for the priestly life rather than for general instruction. The Irish texts show that the insular Druids were also teachers, imparting 'the science of Druidism (druidlech) to as many as 100 pupils at one time, while they also taught the daughters of kings, as well as the fabulous heroes of the past like Cuchulain (Jos. Antiq. 1, 10, 3; Trip. Life, 99). Caesar writes that the subjects of knowledge were the doctrine of immortality, 'many things regarding the stars and their motions, the extent of the universe and the earth, the nature of things, and the manner of the immortal gods (vi. 14); and verses, never committed to writing, were also learned. Strabo (loc. cit.) also speaks of their teachings in 'moral science.' The teaching of immortality had a practical end, for it was intended to rouse men to valour and make them fearless of death. Their scientific teaching was probably connected with magic and divination, and doubtless included many cosmic myths and speculations; their theology was no doubt mythological — stories about the gods such as are found in the Irish texts; their moral teaching was such as is found in most barbaric communities. An example of it is handed down by Diogenes Laertius (proem. 5): 'The Druids philosophize sententiously and obscurely — to worship the gods, to do no evil, to exercise courage.' Ritual formulæ, incantations, and runes would also be imparted. These last may be the verses to which Caesar refers, but they probably also included many myths in poetic form. They were taught orally, in order to keep them from the common people (a curious reason, as the common people could not read), and in order to exercise the memory. The oral transmission of the Vedas is a parallel with this. Writing, however, was known, and the Greek chronographers mention having used this method to a wide region. Perhaps there was also a native script, and the ogham system may have been known in Gaul as well as in Ireland, if we may judge by the existence of the god called Ogmos (see CELTS, § V.). The Irish Druids appear to have had written books, to judge from an incident in the life of St. Patrick (Trip. Life, 284). Beyond what Caesar says of the verses kept secret from the common people and consisting of incantations and myths, there is no evidence that the Druids taught some lofty esoteric knowledge, some noble philosophy, or some monotheistic or pantheistic doctrine. The secret formulæ were kept secret save to the initiated, lest they should lose their magical power by becoming too common, as in the parallel cases of savage and barbaric mysteries elsewhere.

6. Religious functions of the Druids. — The Druids 'take part', says Caesar, 'in most public and private sacrifices, and expound the principles of religion' (Caisar, vi. 13). Their priestly power being so great, the Druids would let no important event pass without their sanction. All details of ritual—the chanting of runes, the formulæ of prayers, and the offering of sacrifices—were in their hands; in a word, they were mediators between the gods and men. Every known form of divination was observed by them, and before all matters of importance their help in scanning the future was sought (Caisar, vi. 16). As to sacrifices, none was complete 'without the intervention of a Druid' (Diod. Sic. v. xxxi. 4; cf. Caisar, vi. 16). This was probably also the case in Ireland, though little is said of sacrifices in the Irish texts; we are, however, to infer from the sacrificial rites described by the authors of the sacrifices at Tara (D'Arbois, Cours de litt. Celt., Paris, 1885, i. 155) and at the Beltane festival (Cormac, Gloss., ed. Stokes, in Three Irish Glossaries, London, 1862, n. v.) that the cruel sacrifices of the Druids horrified the Romans, and this largely discounts the statements about their philosophic doctrines. An instance of their power is seen in the fact that those who refused to obey their decrees were interdicted from all sacrifices—a severe punishment in the case of so religious a people as the Gauls (Caisar, vi. 13 and 16). The Druids played an important part in the native baptismal rites, which were named Plynings (see BRITAIN [Ethnic], § 7), and also in all funeral ceremonies. At burial, runes were chanted, and sacrifices were offered by the Druid, who also arranged all the rites and pronounced a discourse over the dead. The Druids also arranged the various magical formulae, incantations, and prayers. Besides this, they who knew the language of the gods (Diod. Sic. v. xxxi. 4) probably claimed to be incarnations of these gods, in this way escaping the punishment of those earlier priests-kings upon whom the order of the universe depended. With the differentiation of king and priest some of the Druids may have been invested with such divinity, although in Ireland it was still apparently attributed to kings (see CELTS, § VIII.); but this may not have deterred the Druids from claiming similar powers. Such divine pretensions would accord with the claim of the Druids to have created heaven, earth, sea, and sun (Antiqua Laws of Ireland, Dublin, 1865–1901, i. 221), while it would also explain the superiority of their rank over that of kings as alleged by Dio Chrysostom and discovered in Irish instances (see § 9).

7. Medical and magical practices. — Pliny's words, Druidus et hoc genus satis medicorvum, may suggest that the Druids practised the healing art, or that a special class attached to them did so. It is hardly applicable to a wide region. Perhaps there was also a native script, and the ogham system may have been known in Gaul as well as in Ireland, if we may judge by the existence of the god called Ogmos (see CELTS, § V.). The Druids appear to have had written books, to judge from an incident in the life of St. Patrick (Trip. Life, 284). Beyond what Caesar says of the verses kept secret from the common people and consisting of incantations and myths, there is no evidence that the Druids taught some lofty esoteric knowledge, some noble philosophy, or some monotheistic or pantheistic doctrine. The secret formulæ were kept secret save to the initiated, lest they should lose their magical power by becoming too common, as in the parallel cases of savage and barbaric mysteries elsewhere.

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magicians, and their practices included shape-shifting and invisibility, control of the elements and the weather, the producing of fertility, the use of all kinds of spells, and the causing of sleep, illness, and death (Convicitlanitis & see Cicero, § XV.). Though it is possible that the Druids of Gaul may have been more advanced than those of the islands, it is most unlikely that they did not also possess magicians, and it is more than likely that it is this side of their functions to which Suetonius refers when he speaks of the ‘savage’ nature of the Druidic religion; or Pliny, when he calls the Druidi magi (viii. ii. 11) or gens estum nociconstique (xxx. 1), or Posidonius, when he says (in Diod. Sic. v. xxxi. 5) that ‘they tamed the people as wild beasts are tamed’. How far is this from the attributing of a lofty philosophy to the Druids? Moreover, the wide-spread use of human sacrifices among the Druids of Gaul makes it extremely probable a priori that they were also wielders of magic, while, as we have seen, they certainly did ‘dis. des gesta’.

8. Druidic organization.—The enormous power wielded by the Druids both in religion and in politics, as well as the privileges which they claimed, makes it evident that they were a more organized body than the Romans imagined; and this conclusion receives support from the fact that they had fixed annual meetings in Gaul (see below, § 9), and that, as Caesar (vi. 13), there was one chief-Druid wielding authority over all the others. On the death of the chief-Druid, he who had pre-eminent dignity among the others succeeded to the office; but, if there were several of equal rank, the selection was made by vote, while sometimes they even contended in arms for the presidency. Though there were Druidic families, the priesthood was not necessarily hereditary, since, as has been seen, entrance to it was permitted after a long novitiate. There is no direct evidence that the insular Druids were similarly organized; but, in spite of the denials of some recent writers, the fact that there were chief-Druids in Ireland is seen from the texts, and such a chief-Druid, primus nautas, summoned the others together when necessary, e.g. against St. Patrick (Trip. Life, ii. 325).

A passage of Timagenes, cited by Ammianus Marcellinus (xv. ix. 8), and connecting the Druidic organization with the authority of Pythagoras, speaks of one of the Druids as sodalicis adstridis consortis. This points to them as a religious corporation (sodalicium), and perhaps as dwelling in convocilic communities, which is to be taken in that sense, which is not certain. Caesar says that the other hand, who gives the fullest account of them, says nothing of communities of Druids, and the passage of Timagenes may simply be an exaggeration due to the fact that they had some kind of organization or that there were Druidic families, and to a supposed following of the Pythagorean associations by them. The theory has, however, been revived by H. Reber (Z. f. deut. Kultur, vii. 332), who maintains that the Druids lived in communities like the Tibetan or Christian monks, devoted to abstruse studies, and that the Irish monastic system was simply a Christian transformation of this Druidic community life. The Irish have more support to this view; on the contrary, there are numerous references to the wife and children of the Druid; nor is it likely that the Druids, in all cases hostile to the Christians, would have married into Christian monks. The Irish monastic system was formed on Continental models, and owed nothing to paganism, etc.

9. Political and judicial functions of the Druids.—The political power of the Druids would certainly be augmented by their position as teachers; and, though in individual cases it may have owed much to a commanding personality, the evidence leaves little doubt that it was exercised officially. Rulers and chiefs were apparently elected by their choice, and Caesar (vii. 35) speaks of the magistrate whom they chose as ‘the chief of his nation’, which office, he says, had been elected by the priests ‘according to the custom of the State’. It was evidently a customary power which was thus exercised. In Ireland the Druids also interposed in the choice of a king. They sang verses over a sleeping man who had been fed with the flesh of a white bull slain perhaps as a sacrifice; the runes being ‘to render his witness truthful’. The man then dreamt of the person who was to be king, and saw where he was and what he was doing at the time. When the man awoke, the subject of his vision was elected king (Windisch, Il. Tezze, i. 215). Perhaps the Druids hypnotized the man and suggested to him the person whom they desired to be elected. We have no evidence as to the method of election in Gaul. Dio Chrysostom (Orat. xlix.) says of the Druids that kings were their ministers and servants of their thought, and could do nothing apart from them; and, although his witness is late and may be exaggerated, it receives corroboration from the Irish texts, in which the king is always accompanied by his chief Druid, and the two are by no means considered as equal. Moreover, a singular passage in the Tain Bo Cálainge (Windisch’s ed. p. 672 f.) shows King Concho bar giving no response to the blinder of important tidings until the Druid Cuchulain had spoken to him. ‘For such was the rule in Ulster. The men of Ulster must not speak before the king, and the king must not speak before his Druids’ (Antient Laws of Ireland, i. 22). The political power of the Druids, though great, is closely paralleled by that of other priesthoods, and may have served to keep in check the position of the warrior class. They frequently intervened in combats, and by their exhortations made peace (Diod. Sic. v. 31. 6), even when two armies were about to join battle. This probably refers to inter-tribal warfare. As to their judicial functions, Caesar (vii. 13): ‘They are held in great honour, for they decide generally regarding all disputes, public and private; and, if any crime has been perpetrated, or a murder committed, or if there be a dispute about property or about a boundary, they decide it. If any one, whether a public or private case, be submitted to their decrees, they interdict him from the sacrifices.’ Such interdicted persons were regarded as criminals, and all shunned contact with them; in effect they were tabu. Caesar also adds that they met in the voting place, and were a pure spot in the territory of the Carnutes, the central district of all Gaul, and thither came all who had disputes and submitted to their judgments. Caesar may be referring to a bygone past rather than to existing practice, since he himself mentions disputes not settled by Druids, while nothing is said regarding any obligation to refer to Druidic judicature. That judicature was, however, founded, and its judgments were upheld on magico-religious grounds. It is possible that the immolation of criminals taken in theft and other crimes was a punishment ordered by the Druids (Caesar, vi. 18), who no doubt had no support to this view; on the contrary, there are numerous references to the wife and children of the Druid; nor is it likely that the Druids, in all cases hostile to the Christians, would have married into Christian monks. The Irish monastic system was formed on Continental models, and owed nothing to paganism, etc.
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Stress is sometimes laid upon the supposed lack of judicial functions and of organization among the Irish Druids, but it has been difficult to account for this discrepancy. More vital still is the assertion that the Irish Druids were only magicians and philosophers. If a sacred fire at a Druid festival was said to indicate certain verdicts, the characters on the wooden spindles were called fadid or fadill and were considered to be the “pythones” or his Druidism came to Gaul from Britain, the Druids were able to assume judicial functions there. D’Arbois (p. 103) thinks, however, that the exercise of such functions by early Christian clergy in Ireland may be traced to the fact that the pagan priests had a judicial position, and, if the fadid were a Druidic class, they would then be carried on the Druids.

The early Irish and Gaulish Druids.—The often-quoted differences between the Druids of Gaul and those of Ireland are perhaps more apparent than real. We know the certain facts about the Druids; the latter, only from Christian observers, or from documents which have passed through Christian hands; and it is probable that Christian influences may have endeavour to reduce the Druids to the lowest post of mere priests.

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religious functions among the Celts must be set against his
eccentricity. Though the Druids may have been an organization of
priests, and, though there were no "Druides" in Britain beyond the
Roman pale, and in Ireland, entirely to the introduction of Christian-
ity and the opposition of the Christian priesthood. Rome did not attack
the Druids on religious grounds, strictly speaking, but (c) on political
grounds, because the Druids had such power in politics and in the adminis-
tration of justice, and opposed the majesty of Rome; (b) on
grounds of humanism, because the Druids offered human sacrifices;
and, finally, (d) because of the magical superstitions. But this oppor-
tunity implied little more at first than the application of existing
laws against these things. Augustus prohibited Roman citizens from
taking part in the religion of the Druidarum (Suet. Claud. 29); and Pliny
(xxx. 1) asserts that Tiberius interdicted 'the Druids and that race of
prophets and doctors,' though it is probable that this was no more than putting into
force what laws were already in force. After this it meant a suppression of the Druids as such, it
entirely failed of its object; for they were still active in the reign of Claudius, who completely
abolished the cruel religion of the Druids ('Druid-
arium religionem apud Gallos dirae immortalitatis, et
tantum civibus sub Augusto interdictam, peninus
abolevit,' Suet. Claud. 25). Here it is doubtful whether more than an abolition of human sacrifices and
magical practices was intended, for Claudius,
but to death a Roman citizen of Gaul for appearing in
court with a Druidic amulet, the so-called ser-
pent's egg (Pliny, xxix. 3), and Aurelius Victor
says that Claudius merely abolished the 'notorious
superstitions' of the Druids (de Caesar. 4). The
Druids were still in existence at a later time, the
native religion still went on, and Mela (iii. 18)
expressly says that human sacrifice was commuted
to a little harmless blood-letting. The actual
disappearance of the Druids was undoubtedly due
to less to such laws than to the Romanizing of Gaulish
religion begun under Augustus, and to the institu-
tion of the Pagani, at whose sacrifice the Druids
were replaced. Whether the Druids were still allowed to assemble
yearly at the consecrated place in the territory of
the Carnutes (Cass. vi. 13) is doubtful, but they
would certainly not be allowed to act as judges;
and the assembly of the Druids at the Buttington
towns of the three Gauls at Lugdunum (Lyons)
round the altar of Augustus, with its obviously
religious character, was probably intended to take
the place of that assembly. 'A flames of the
province was elected by the deputies, and there
were flamen for each town. If the Druids wished
to be recognized as priests, they would have to
become priests of the new Gallo-Roman religion.

Their position as teachers and secretaries attacked by
the establishment of schools, as at Autun, where
sons of noble Gauls are found receiving instruction
as early as A.D. 21 (Tac. Ann. iii. 43). Thus,
by almost ignoring of the Druids, and as well as by
the direct attack upon certain of their functions, the
Roman power gradually took away from them their
occupation as native priests. D'Arois (p. 73),
however, makes no reference to such a flight, and
refers merely to the resumption by the Druids of
their rites and teaching in forest glades where they
dwell, not where they hid themselves, after Caesar's
war, and he makes no reference to what took place
after the laws against the Druids. Mela (i. 19), though writing in Claudius' reign,
does not appear to refer to secret teaching as a
result of the laws, but, other amplifying Caesar's
words or citing Posidonius, says that the Druids
were taught the son of noble families during a period of
twenty years secretly in caverns or forest depths.
He has obviously confused the twenty years' novitate of some who intended to become Druids
with the teachers given to others. The secret forest recusary were simply the consecrated groves
where Druidic rites were carried on. There the
Druids may have continued to teach, but probably
the sons of noble families took advantage of the
Roman schools. This teaching would be permitted by
Rome, so long as the Druids did not interfere
in politics or practise human sacrifices. Moreover,
Mela does not appear to hint that the commutation
of human sacrifice by human sacrifice was
for the part of the still permissible Druidic religion.
Those who practised the forbidden rites would certainly
be liable to punishment, but probably the bulk of
the Druids succumbed to the new order of things.

But Druids were not exterminated, and perhaps
took a prominent part in the revolt against Rome,
while some prophesied a world dominion for
the Celts at the time of the burning of the Capitol
at Rome in A.D. 70 (Tac. Hist. iv. 54). The mistletoe
and herb rites of the Druids described by Pliny
may have still existed in his day; but he may be
referring, like Lucan, to a former state of things.
After this date the Druids seem gradually to have
disappeared in Gaul and S. Britain, and were
remembered only as philosophers. But even in
the 4th cent., as the verses of Ausonius show
(Prof. v. 12, xi. 17), men counted it an honour to
have a Druid for an ancestor.

In independent Britain, Druidism remained as it
had been (cf. Pliny, xxx. 1), and after the evacu-
ation of Britain by the Romans the Druids seem
have reappeared south of the Roman wall.
Nennius (Hist. Brit. 40) describes how Vortigern,
after being excommunicated for incest, called
together his 'wise men' (magni, tr. 'Druids' in
the Irish Nennius), who advised him to offer a human
sacrifice at the building of a fortress. But neither
in Christian nor in pagan Britain could the Druids
withstand the growing powers of the Christian
clergy. The lives of Celtic saints show how the
Druidic magic arts were equalled and surpassed by
the miracles of the saints, and how they were
evitably overcome, as is vividly seen in the
encounters of Columba with the Druids in the
north of Scotland, described by Adamnan.
Similarly in Ireland, Christianity also destroyed the
Druids; and the Lives of St. Patrick, who com-
bated the 'hard-hearted Druids' (Winne-les, Fr.
Texte, i. 23), and other Lives of saints, are full of
the magical claims and wondrous deeds by which
the heathen priests were discomfited. The victory
of Christianity over the Druids was, in popular belief,
accomplished by a more powerful magic; but, at
the same time, though the Druids passed away,
many of their beliefs remained among the people
as superstitions to which, perhaps, they attached
great importance as to Christianity (cf. Reeves' ed. of
Adanaan, Vita S. Columbae, Dublin, 1857;
D. J. O'Sullivan, Three Irish Lives, 1876; Stokes,
Irish-Celtic Saints, Dublin, 1857; D. J. O'Sullivan,
Antient Lives of Ireland, i. 15).

LITERATURE—The older writers, J. Toland, Hist. of the
B. Davy, Myth. and Rites of the British Druids, London,
1799; G. Higgins, Hist. des Gauls, and Druids, London, 1819, must be
used with caution. More useful are D'Arois de Caballaville,
Histoire de l'Art Athl.tique, Paris, 1886; F. M. Skelton, The
Monument, Rom. Gesch., Leipzig, 1859, iii. 237, v. 94 f.; A.
DRUMS AND CYMBALS

The drum is a musical instrument of the percussive class, consisting of a hollow cylindrical or hemispherical frame of wood or horn, with a "head" or tightly stretched membrane at one or both ends, by the striking of which and the resonance of the cavity the sound is produced. This definition literally includes two objects, the head and the drum. The term "head" has two meanings: either the convex, or the concave, side of the membrane. The actual genus of the membrane-drum cannot be traced, though some speculations have been made on the suggestive analogy of various temporary drums and drum-substitutes. Clearly, like two components, it has been independently invented by a fair proportion of the races of mankind.

Methods directly or indirectly suggestive of drumming are either obvious or recondite to civilized experience. The Veddas have no musical instruments of any kind. In their dances they mark the rhythm by beating with the hands, their chests, flanks, or bellies. The Andamanese women beat the drum with their hands by slapping the hollow between the thighs, or pressing it on the head with the palm of the right hand, which is held at the wrist by the left. This method is common in many civilisations, and the women invariably form the orchestra. This method is analogous to the drum method of the bellicose cat; the same drum made of the belly of a deerskin, or the head of a calf, used by the Veddas in India, and a hymn in the Atharvaveda celebrates its praises. The earliest record of the use of the drum is in ancient music. In the structural variations presented by the instrument, there are types clearly marked.

Among historical peoples the drum is of very great antiquity. Its invention belongs to their history: its forms are the membrane-drum, the tambourine, and the kettle-drum. We shall only know it in the Vedic India, and a hymn in the Atharvaveda celebrates its praises. The earliest record of the use of the drum is in ancient music. In the structural variations presented by the instrument, there are types clearly marked. These are: (1) the incision-drum, a hollow cylinder, varying in length from a few inches to twelve or more feet, and in diameter proportionally. Made from a bamboo, internally or hollowed out, the ends are closed by the nodes or by the trunk section. A narrow longitudinal slit, of varying length, but generally nearly as long as the cavity, is made on one side of the drum. Its width in the larger instruments is about three inches. The tapering of the lips is important, for the drumstick is applied to them, and the tones vary according to the thickness of the substance struck. This drum may be placed either in a vertical or in a horizontal position. The best results are produced from the latter. (2) The stamping-drum is a long hollow cylinder, ending in one end, and having a cavity at the other, its diameter is greater than its length; the "head" of the closed end is either natural, as the node of a bamboo, or artificial, as a "membrane" of skin. This instrument sometimes has a handle, by which the closed end is struck on the hard ground. (3) The single-headed membrane-drum is a wooden cylinder, whose length is not much more than its diameter. The tightly stretched membrane of hide is beaten with the fingers, the hand, or a stick. The stick, usually knobbed, sometimes of a hammer-shape, becomes a heavy-headed club for the larger drums. The other end of the drum is closed. (4) The double-headed membrane-drum is the single-headed with the closed end removed and converted into a "head." This drum is placed in a horizontal position and both heads are used.

The fricton-drum is (3) or (4) with a thong or cord stretched across the diameter of the hide (one head in the case of the double-headed drum), or along its radius, being fixed in the centre. A

1 Murray, OED, s.v., "Drum.
3 E. B. MacRae, in JAL xii. (1887) 317.
5 W. W. Grubb, in JAL xxvii. (1904) 317.
7 G. Prutt, Dict. of the Sanskrit Language, 1878, s.v., "Tata.
8 W. Ellis, Polyn. Researches, 1829, i. 178, 194.

The Buchanan, who are the finest leather-makers in Northern Africa, use it for making the "head" of the memora. An ox-hide is held and tightly stretched by several men. This is beaten with sticks. The process is a musical one, in skin-preparation, here employed to produce ceremontal music. In old days the Chippewas made their war-drum by stretching sticks in the ground, and binding them in place by means of strong hoops. Covering a pot or clay cylinder with a head of skin is a common method of making both permanent and temporary drums. The latter was supported against the drummer's body and played with both hands. Such an instrument is represented in a relief of Ashurbanipal (685-629 B.C.), in which women and children are playing their hands.

Certain peoples representing the lowest stages of culture known have failed to invent the drum, but in savagery generally, in all the stages of barbarism, in all civilisations like that of the Veddas, its use corresponds with its importance as the chief, and sometimes the only, instrument of music. The structural variations presented by the instrument are endless, but the types are clearly marked. These are: (1) the incision-drum, a hollow cylinder, varying in length from a few inches to twelve or more feet, and in diameter proportionally. Made from a bamboo, internally or hollowed out, the ends are closed by the nodes or by the trunk section. A narrow longitudinal slit, of varying length, but generally nearly as long as the cavity, is made on one side of the drum. Its width in the larger instruments is about three inches. The tapering of the lips is important, for the drumstick is applied to them, and the tones vary according to the thickness of the substance struck. This drum may be placed either in a vertical or in a horizontal position. The best results are produced from the latter. (2) The stamping-drum is a long hollow cylinder, ending in one end, and having a cavity at the other, its diameter is greater than its length; the "head" of the closed end is either natural, as the node of a bamboo, or artificial, as a "membrane" of skin. This instrument sometimes has a handle, by which the closed end is struck on the hard ground. (3) The single-headed membrane-drum is a wooden cylinder, whose length is not much more than its diameter. The tightly stretched membrane of hide is beaten with the fingers, the hand, or a stick. The stick, usually knobbed, sometimes of a hammer-shape, becomes a heavy-headed club for the larger drums. The other end of the drum is closed. (4) The double-headed membrane-drum is the single-headed with the closed end removed and converted into a "head." This drum is placed in a horizontal position and both heads are used.

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W. W. Gill, Myths and Songs from the South Pacific, 1876, p. 223.
SIE viii. (1885) 90.

See Green, "Greenland," 1850, i. 162: T. C. Hodson, The Nunsh of Nunivak, 1851, p. 56: A. Simpson, in JAL xii. (1885) 34; Rutledge, p. 825.
DRUMS AND Cymbals

The Buganda drum was made from a section of tree-trunk, conical in form; the base of the cone alone was open. This was headed with a cowry shell, and this was the orifice for the slit. Some were ten inches high, others five feet, and four in greatest diameter. Some were beautifully decorated with carvings and heads. Except in the case of the very large drums, they were hung on posts, so as to get the full benefit of the sound. The skins were kept soft by being dyed with a mixture of goats' milk and water.

The essential character of the snare-drum and friction-drum is the presence of a string or thong of leather across the membrane or drum-head. A simple form is from British Guiana. A fine double drum, with a skin drum and a snare in the centre, passes across the membrane. Before it is drawn tight, an exceedingly slender splinter of wood is secured in the slip-knot, so as to rest on the membrane at right angles to the line of the thread. The head of the drum being unaltered, the instrument gives two different sounds. The friction-head produces, by the vibration of the splinter against the skin, a metallic sound. In another form the string extends along a radius only of the membrane. Such drums, besides producing different tones from the two heads, can be muffled by placing a wood beneath the string.

Small hand-drums are commonly used by various peoples.

The old English tabor is a type of these. The kettle-drum is not frequent. In the East the gong is preferred.

The Grock and Roman drum (tymbavos, symphuum) comprised two varieties of the tambourine type. The one was the flat tambourine; the circumference was hung with bells. The other resembled the lapp form, the under side being closed by a convex hemispherical bottom. This variety was also played with the hand like a tambourine.

The Heb. top (Gr. tymbavos, EY 'tabret,' 'timbrel') was another tambourine, probably without bells or rattles. The same Heb. word represents both the English, and probably there was only one form.

The tambourine, 'which was once among the chief instruments of the Lapland wizards, is now a great curiosity.' Two types were in use. One was a wooden hoop strengthened with two cross-pieces and covered on one side with reindeer-skin; the other was an oval box with a convex under side, lined out of a tree-trunk, and with a reindeer-skin head. In some there was a slit serving as a handle. Each tambourine had an 'indicator' (orpsi) consisting of a large iron ring, on which smaller rings were linked, for measuring the vibration by means of points to the symbols on the membrane. The hammer was made of reindeer-horn. The Lopars treated their tambourines with great respect, and kept them, with the indicator and hammer, wrapped up in fir. No woman dared to touch them.


1 In Thurn, 598.


Cook, Vagabond, 1870, p. 140; W. Ellis, i. 130, 145.


7 For various African drums, see Hobley, Ethnology of A.
pean, and the *nyengi*, a smaller kind resembling in shape two small cups of brass. The European type is derived from the Greco-Roman. These were a quarter or half-circles of metal with a handle. An older form is possibly indicated by the 'bronze vessels' used in the ceremonial dismissal of family *maasis* by the Roman *paterfamilias.* The Roman cymbals, however, without handles or provided with a knob or ring or metal handle; others had a hole for the insertion of a cord. The unfanged, early Semitic type was also known. The Khusians use cymbals in combination with drums. The Chinese drums have two disks, but only one pair of cymbals. The Abyssinians have tambourines, cymbals, and various drums. In modern European orchestras they hold a not unimportant place.

Only in the case of one people, the Hebrews, have cymbals attained independent importance. They were employed in dances and singing with the *zophah*, but in the Temple were used alone. The cymbals of the Hebrews (םֶשֶלֶפֶת, *sellephet*, ֶדֶלֶפֶת, *delphet*) were used in the temple-worship to mark time for chants. They were hanging cymbals, held one in each hand, and clashed together. *Sellephet* is used only in 2 S G 6 and Ps 159. In the latter passage the epithets 'bold' and 'high-sounding' are applied. It has only been proposed, therefore, that the sellephet were the conical flanged cymbals, as used by the Assyrians, giving a muffled sound, to be distinguished from *delphet*, cannot refer to cymbals. According to the Mishnah and Josephus, one pair only was used in the Temple. It is not likely that *sellephet* and *delphet* are ever confused, though the terms *sellephet* and *delphet* is possible. In the case of the Temple cymbals one disk was fixed, and was beaten by the other like a clapper. In later Mishnai the cymbal worn is in the singular number. The cymbalists were Levites. In the Second Temple a special order of Levites had charge of the cymbals, which are stated to have been of great antiquity. Their sound is described as high, loud, and far-carrying. It has been suggested that the 'tinkling cymbal' of *St. Paul's simile implies the metallic spheres worn on bracelets and by courtesans on their belts. This again implies better the epithet than the cymbal.

The use of the drum as an instrument of society, and probably the art itself of drum-playing, have their highest development in Africa. The only national instrument that can employ the drum of the African is the pipes of the Scot. But the skill with the drum is more widely diffused among the Africans. Uganda in the old days supplies a typical example of a drum-conducted community.

The twenty drums of the Baganda were the royal family, or, *gaga*, ninety-three in number. Fifty-one of these were small. They were guarded by a chief, *kakala*, and his assistant *kakala* (who, in one case, was a month's revenue each year in the royal court for beating the drums. A priest was put in charge of the drums. The number of totem-clans had each special drums; the leading members determined the expense. Every chief, besides his drum of office, had his private drum. This was beaten at times to summon his permanent holding of office. Each clan had a special rhythm which was recognized.

Drum-playing calls for considerable executive skill, particularly on account of the rebound of the membrane. It is in the utilization of this rebound that the essence of the drummer's art consists. Even with the heaviest drums no great force is required. The weight of the blow varies as the thickness of the membrane. In the case of large incision-drums, where the body serves as a membrane, the drum head is tapped, and very resonant notes are produced by the use of a light stick. Various forms of drum-stick have been mentioned incidentally.

The Baganda drummer used two short but heavy sticks, club-shaped. The vibration from the large drums was so great that a man who did not understand how to beat them might have his shoulders dislocated by the rebound of the leather when struck. Music could be got from these drums, so much so that any one a man could vocally sound and not some other instrument, was being played. In the New Hebrides big wooden flutes are used for beating the largest incision-drums, the drumming is supplied by small horizontal incident-drums. These are beaten in 'brisk syncopated time, to the loud booms of the bigger drums.'

For the psychological study of music by which the social and religious importance of the artistry of sound is dissipated to be excluded. In drums and cymbals supplies unique data, and the drum-music of such races as the Central African, the American Indian, and his congener the Northern Asian (the Melanesians are, artistically, in a lower class) forms one of the most indispensable documents.

The fact is that the music of the drum is more closely connected with the foundations of aurally generated emotion than that of any other instrument. It is complete enough in itself to cover the whole range of human feeling, which is not the case with its subordinate, the cymbals, while it is near enough to the origins of musical inspiration to appeal most strongly to the primitive side of man's nature. The investigator will need a long experience and adaptation to the atmosphere in which the vibrations of drum and tambourine produce their effect, and that it is only as an exploring did, the orchestral drum-music of negroes to 'the raging of the elements let loose,' is no longer an explanation of primitive music. To put it briefly—the emotional appeal of music is to a very large extent muscular. Rhythm is practically a neuro-muscular quality, and it is the fundamental form of musical sound. Most of our emotions tend to movement. Harmonious rhythm in movement and action is the soul of society, as it is the soul of the dance.

In all primitive music, rhythm is strongly developed. The pulsations of the drum and the sharp crash of the rattles are thrown against each other and against the voice, so that it would seem that the pleasure derived by the performers lay not so much in the tonality of the song as in the measured sounds arranged in contrasting rhythm, and which by their clash start the nerves and spur the body to action, for the voice which alone carries the tone is often subordinated and treated as an additional instrument. Helmholtz observed: 'All melodies are rhythms. Graceful rapidity, grave procession, quiet advance, wild leaping, all these different melodies, called songs, are produced by variations of tones. And, as music expresses these melodies, it gives an expression also to these mental conditions. It is true that we cannot say whether of the body and the voice, or of the thinking and feel -ing generates itself.'

To increase muscular power the strongest stimulus is muscular movement; to produce emotional intoxication the combination of muscular movement that is rhythmic with rhythmic sound or motor translation into music is the most efficient. One great sphere of drum-music has been the social emotions. Not only military, religious, and sexual excitement, but every possible form of social organization has been fostered and developed by its influence. It is a significant coincidence that the boom of the modern cannon and the boom of a primitive drum mean war. In contrast to this large, impressive sound, which is so essentially organic in its nature and its production, may be placed the exclusively religious use of cymbals by the Hebrews, and the prominence of cymbal-music in the perverted sexismman.
of the cult of Attis. These two last cases are isolated phenomena. The music of the drum is more completely human.

The universal presence of the drum is made powerful by the very limitations of the instrument. The player is practically confined to rhythm, and the influential manipulation of this depends on his personality. He is one with his drum. It is this personal element that adds human meaning and will into sound that explains the so-called 'drum-language.'

Further, the player's muscular skill and muscular life are at their highest efficiency; he is for his hearers an instrument, a leader, and a prophet, the individual representative of the social body in movement and in emotion. It is on this principle that the drum in so many races gives the summons for all social functions. The blow of the drumstick translates itself not merely into sound but into spiritual reverberation, an impulsive stroke upon the social consciousness.

The meaning of drum-sounds is thus of a universal, undifferentiated character. They appeal primarily to the muscular sense, and secondarily to all that is built up on that foundation. An instance of the simplest possible application may be found in dances, where others dance or less elaborate:

Explanatory the route to spiritual-land is the soul of a dead chief, the Chippewas punctuate his words with sharp drum-taps, and so do the Jivaros. In this way drums are being played at an assembly, they are made to express and convey to the bystanders a variety of meanings. In one measure they abuse the name of another company, designating them as fools and cowards; then the rhythm changes, and the gallant deeds of their own company are extolled. All this, and much more, is conveyed by the beating of drums, and the native ear and mind, trained to detect and interpret each beat, is never at fault. The language of the drum is as well understood as that which they use in their daily life. Each chief has his own call or sound signified by a particular beat of his drum.4

Klark declares that 'the sound of the tambourine, the convulsive anthem of the shaman, his fierce screams, his wild stare in the dim light, all strike terror into the hearts of savages, and powerfully affect their nerves.' The character of this tambourine-music has been thus described: After some preliminary sounds such as that of a falcon or a sea-mew, which concentrate attention, the tambourine begins to make a slight rolling noise, like the buzzing of mosquitoes; the shaman has begun his music. At first it is tender, soft, vague, then nervous and irregular like the noise of an approaching storm; it becomes louder and more decided. Now and then it is broken by wild cries; ravens creak, geese laugh, sea-mews wail, and eagles scream. The music becomes leader, the strokes on the tambourine become coarser and more vigorous; the drum is raised high, and small tambors sound ceaselessly. It is a deluge of sound capable of driving away the wits of the audience. Suddenly everything stops; one or two powerful blows on the tambourine, and then it falls on the shaman's lap.5

To peoples like the Central Africans, the drum, apart from its directly emotional use in social gatherings, as an instrument of social initiation, plays the part of the church-bell, the clock, the town-crier, and the daily newspaper, besides being used for musical exercise and the exhortation of the sick.

In Africa (Lake Nyasa) the drum is used at dances, at feasts religious and secular, at wakes, by doctors at the sick-bed, by burying the dead, and in various ceremonies over the country.6 Among the Woodua Indians the drum is played when drink is given to either the guests at misti-drinking.7 Of the Baganda drums, Rowe writes: 'There was indeed perhaps to a multitude of men, quite apart from music; it was the instrument with which touched both joy and sorrow; it was used to let people know of the happy event of the birth of children, and it announced the meaning for the dead. It gave the alarm for war, and, the relation of the returning warriors who had conquered in war. It had its place in the most solemn and the most joyous ceremonies.' The royal drums were beaten to announce the coronation of a king, and his entry into a new house, and also at the new moon. Drums are carried on journeys and beseech the wanderers to encourage the walkers. A young man would beat the drum with his hands and sing meanwhile. 'The people when carrying loads, or when on a march, loved to be accompanied by the drum, and, if they had no drum, they sang songs, and set the time for marching by the drumbeat.'

Its co-operative and socializing importance is here well suggested. Its use as a muscular is that of a postal, telegraphic, and telephonic service.

The carrying power of these fine instruments renders communication very rapid. The big drum of the Anyanja can be heard at a distance of six miles.8 The Chippewa drum, which is not two feet high, can be heard at a distance of ten miles. As the drum-telephone is used to-day in Central Africa, it depends on an elaborated code which to one reared in the atmosphere is perhaps more dependent on social understanding and mutual recognition of 'tone-variations' than on a colourless translation of sounds into letters. At any rate, throughout a Central African tribe, the drum is a daily means by which the drum two or more villages exchange their news. Travellers, even Europeans, have obtained food and lodgings by its means.

The notes were anything but an easy matter to those natives in the speedily way it does? The drum-message system is found in New Guinea, and among the Jivaros of South America, the old Mexicans, and some Indians of the North-West. It is particularly developed in Oceania, the countries north-west and north-east of New Guinea, especially New Pomerania. Signalling by means of the incision-drum, but without any highly developed code, was used in Borneo, Java, the Philippines, New Zealand, the New Hebrides, Fiji, and the Harvy Islands.9

Throughout Melanesia, drums are part of a rich man's establishment. A chief will top them; these drums are fashioned into a grinding face. When the drum is an image of a venerated ancestor, the tape are made on the stomach. In Melanesia, ancestor-worship is linked to the civil and military authority of these instruments, half-drum and halfing. It is natural also for rulers and important persons to collect them as many sources of music as possible, though they may leave the more recent applications of supernatural power to the shamans. In the Upper Nile region the 'sacred' official drums hang in front of the chief's house, or under the sacred tree of the village. They are regarded with awe.10 The regalia of a chief are, as it were, his skeleton. These drums are also to be identified with the mysterious power of his office. In other cases, the drum may be regarded as the mouthpiece of a god or spirit, as containing the voice of the earth, or the god or the dead. The voice of the lower cultures, derives impressiveness not from stillness or humbleness, but from loudness and resonant power.

Some miscellaneous examples are appended of 1 J. Roscoe, 2 F. Hooper. 5, 57, 59.

1. The general use of cymbals in the worship of Dionysus and in the Eleusinian Mysteries belongs rather to the category of the impressiveness of noise, as such.

2. Dennemeyer, 54.

3. Ttav-singing Peoples, 326 f.


5. A. Frobenius, in the Slavnei Shornik, quoted by Mikhailovskii, 91.


7. H. A. Wickham, in J.AI xxiv. 394.

8. Frobenius, 84.


10. Ratzel, ii. 37, II. 22; Frobenius, 89-93.


12. Ratzel, 111. 89.
the beliefs and ritual connected with the sacredness of drums.

A third feature of Malay States includes the court and official drums, which are sacred. The royal drums of Jelub are said to be "holy", the skins of cows, and are ritually charged with a chord of twelve different sounds; the royal trumpet and the royal gong also emit the chord of twelve notes. The Sultan of Minangkabau possesses a drum of which he is the gager, and the royal gong. These drums are regarded as having come into existence when the Almighty cut them off from the skins of a royal bullock, which, according to the belief of the Malays, can only be cut with a knife. Any person who even 'brushed past them' would be forbidden to play drum to the royal music. In the Saters the drum is regarded as a holy object, and the "State drum", and powerful jemwul dwell in the other royal drums. Each drum in the palace of an Abyssinian king is a sacred object which is surrounded with a covering of sacred cloths. This drum had a protecting spirit, that, namely, of the slave who was sacrificed on it when it was made. It is beaten only at religious ceremonies.

Thus, the Polygenian god, was more or less represented by his sacred drum. These drums were often surrounded by carved housings; and possibly the evolution here is from drum to idol. While the drum retained its membrane, a connexion would be traced between its sound and the voice of the god. When the royal special drum, knute, of the Baganda received a new skin, the blood of the cow whose skin was used was run into the drum. Also a man was beheaded and his blood was run into it. The idea was that, when the drum was beaten, the life of the man added fresh life and vigour to the drum. When any drum was fitted with a new skin, the ox killed for the purpose also supplied the blood for pouring into the drum. Before a new skin was fitted the fetish was regarded as a necessity and the ceremony was regarded as the act of reinvigorating the palms of the African type. It was not every man who knew how to make a drum-fetish. A characteristic drum-fetish was that of the god of the drum. It was composed of portions of every kind of animal and bird husked; all kinds of metal were used making charges for hunting; miniature weapons, and pieces of cord used in making traps. This fetish was fixed upright in the drum.

In Abyssinian, and in the modern Salvation Army, has the drum found a place. Drums do not appear to have been used by the Hebrews in temple-worship. The usual drum, top, of the tambourine, is often present on their pulpits, and among the women, and to accompany religious music of a joyous and popular character.11 But in the great Oriental religions, particularly in Hindustan and Buddhism, the drum has an important place in the temple-worship; nor is it unknown in the worship of Islam. In lower cults the drum serves as a church-bell, an organ, and a direct vehicle of supernatural power.

The Baganda temple-drums were next in importance after the royal drums, and possessed all its particular rhythm and particular fetish. They were once the sound of the drum ganged on the new moon, warning the people of the monthly rest from work.2 In New Guinea the head-hunters also beat with their drums the ghosts of men slain in battle; in New Britain, to stop earthquakes.3 Demons are expelled by the South African drummers.4 In the Mozambique the drum is employed for the purpose of appeasing the gods causing difficult child-birth.5 In Central Africa demons are driven away with the drum from the sick,6 and by the drums, sceptres and drums are driven away to the music of drums.7 Greek historians record the 'disinfecting' of the sanctuary by Turkish shamans by means of the drum;8 and the use of it to drown the cries of children to Hobson.9 The Abu, or shaman, of the Haidaus undertakes to drive the evil spirits, if the shaman possesses the drum to cause spirits both to appear and to disappear.10

There is always something very human about the use of drum-music, even when applied to spiritualities. An Eskimo knows that drums are beaten softly when the traders' goods are brought in; loudly when the guns are brought, so that the shades of animals present may not be alarmed.11 For induction of spirits, the principle may be that of a summons of the fiends.

An old Motu-mota man observed to Chalmers: 'No drums are beaten uselessly; there are no dances that are merely useless.' The young men, for instance, are supposed to be kept out of the drum and dance that there may be a large harvest.12 The Papuan remark is as universal. Tahiti priests work themselves into an inspired state by dancing and beating their sacred drums. Each god has a special hymn accompanied by a special beat of the drum. On the ancient Israel the dance was preserved to the music of harps, psalteries, and cymbals.13 Among the Chaco Indians the drum is used in the drum dance and called drums,' from the fact that during this period the village drums are beaten incessantly day and night by relays of men.14 Among the Port Moresby natives (New Guinea) the boys at initiation have only one serious duty, which is for each to make his drum. They are taken, and live in the forest until the drums are completed; this may be a week or a month. Several boys go together. A straight branch is selected and cut to the requisite size; this is next screwed with shells till the orthodox shape is arrived at; finally, the cavity is carefully and laboriously burnt out. During the whole period they observe minute rules: if they were seen by a woman the drum would have to be destroyed, otherwise it would be certain to split, and would sound like an old woman's bundle.15 If they cut fish the skin of the drum will burst; red bananas cause a dull tone. They may not touch fresh water, but only that from the red banana, or cocoa-nut talk. Should they touch water inadvertently before the drum is hollowed out, they break it, crying: 'I have mistaken water, my forehead is wet, and I can never hollow out my drum.' The sorcerers instruct them that water extinguishes the 'fire' of the music; a fish

2 J. Roscoe, 293, 294.
3 Haddon, Head-hunters, 1903, p. 308; van der Roest, in Tijd. voor Ind. Talii., Lande., en Volkenkunde, xl. (1868) 327.
4 J. Macdonald, Religion and Myth, 1893, p. 100.
5 Riedel, De stakf a krooksga rosen iaceben Seches and Pupus, Haghe, 1845, pp. 305, 449, 172.
6 J. Macdonald, in J. A. S. xlii. 111.
9 FUG (ed. C. Muller) iv. 227.
10 Pint de Superstitions, 18.
13 M. Dobrzhinets, Answer of the Abyssines, Eng. 1852, ii. 262.
14 J. George, Les Nations nomades et mandarins, et St Peterborough, 1777, p. 172.
18 A. E. Ellis, Talii-speaking Peoples, 190.
19 I. D. Sc, 267.
20 Gruh, 178.
DRUNKENNESS

been tears the tympanum; and the sight of a woman destroys the tone.'

The basket-drum of some American tribes recalls not only primitive substituents for the drum, but certain features of agricultural rituals.

In their sacred rites the Navahos use an inverted basket in lieu of the drum. It is generally made of birch, with a piece of wood or bone fixed to each end of the rim. When inverted the basket is nearly hemispherical. During ceremonies it is beaten with the sacred drum-stick. This is made according to elaborate rules from the leaves of Yucca bacatta. The Navahos say, 'We turn the basket,' when they refer to the commencement of the song; 'We turn up the basket,' when a song is finished. As it is not connected with the incantation, to drive out the evil influence which the sacred songs have collected and imprisoned under the basket. It is no sacrifice to serve food in this sacred drum. To do so is common enough, but without ceremonial meaning. In Greco-Roman cults, such as the mysteries of Attis, eating sacred food from the sacred drum and cymbal was probably a reversion to primitive times, when platter, drum, basket, and winnowing-fan were interchangeable.

The use of the tambourine by the shamans of Northern Europe and Asia is remarkable. This instrument, and its shamanistic manipulation are found in the tribes already encountered by the world in northern parallels, through Asiatic Russia, Greenland, Northern America, and Lapland, and among the Amerindiens, Mongols, Tatars, and others. The structure of this hand-drum has already been described. Those used by the Tatars and Mongols have pictorial designs on the drum-head. The designs are supposed to produce or modify the sounds, and each, being thus a sort of word or sentence accompanied by pure sound, has its particular influence on the spirits who are invoked by the music.4 The Lapp shaman's drum has small brass rings fastened loosely on the head. These rings, or drums, or designs inscribed when the head is beaten with the hammer; and, according to their movements in relation to the magic signs of sun, moon, and planets, the shaman predicts the future. The origin of this method, which, it is to be noted, is always secondary to the musical or 'suggestive' use of the instrument, may be from the following practice: the Yakut shaman places a ring or coin on the palm of the inquirer's hand, moving it about in various directions, and then foretells the future. The Votyak tuna noved beans on a table for the same purpose.5

It is suggestive of hypnotism rather than of musical science that the drum is turned up while the hand is on it in front of the fire. A drumstick or the hand is used in playing. The tambourine plays the main part in the kamlante, the invocation of spirits and subsequent prophesying. The Chukohi shaman in his kamlante taps the tambourine with a piece of thin whalebone. The kam uses the tambourine in various ways, and produces the most varied sounds. The spectators recognize the various rhythms, such as the tramping of horses' foot, during which the kam is supposed to be riding with his guards. As he taps, he collects spirits in the tambourine. Sometimes during the course of the dance, the kam becomes so heavy that the kam bows under the weight.6

LITERATURE.—This is fully given in the footnotes.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

DRUNKENNESS.6—1. Definition.—Drunkenness has never been satisfactorily defined in a

legal or ethicial sense. In any attempt to define it legally, difficulties at once present themselves, and the judge has to reach his conclusions from the evidence. Drunkenness might in general, if not in scientific, terms be defined as that condition of mind and body produced by a sufficient quantity of alcohol (varying according to the susceptibility of the individual) to bring about distinct changes in the intellect, the emotions, the will (volition), the motor mechanism, and the functions of the cerebrum, or small brain, indispensable to the accentuation of any movement. On the various stages and symptoms of intoxication, and forms of alcoholism, see art. ALCOHOL. (vol. i. p. 300.) The definition of 'habitual drunkard' first appeared in the Habitual Drunkards Act of 1878. It runs as follows:

'a person who, not being amenable to any jurisdiction in lunacy, is, notwithstanding, by reason of habitual intemperate drinking of intoxicating liquors, at times dangerous to himself or herself, or to others, or is incapable of managing himself or herself, and his or her affairs.'7

2. Racial degeneration: heredity.—Of great moment as individual and family wreackage wrought by drunkenness is in a large measure the injury done to the offspring. About this degeneracy, until quite recently, there has never existed a doubt. The all but universal testimony of competent observers and of the medical profession all over the world, based upon extensive inquiries, and an impartial exposition of the opinions of the profession on the question remain to this hour unshaken. And it may be said at once that these impressions as to bodily, nervous, and mental degeneration are not to be lightly set aside by any conclusion or opinion based upon the very restricted investigation by one or two authorities, however eminent. In 1910 the Galton Eugenics Laboratory issued two papers by Professor Karl Pearson on the influence of parental alcoholism on the physical health and mentality of the offspring. These papers were supposed to set forth lax and subjective views on the subject of temperament—views which, if capable of proof and acceptance, would indisputably have given a decided set-back to the believed and accepted doctrines of clinicians, and of scientific men and of social reformers in every land, as to the undoubted racial degeneration of the alcoholic individual and his or her offspring. If the first dictum of these observers, to the effect that on the whole in regard to degeneration the balance turns as often in favour of the alcoholic as against the non-alcoholic, could be upheld, the outlook for the nation could not be otherwise than ominous. These opinions, apart from their calamitous effect on the race, shocked orthodox believers in the classical view of the hereditary hold, and Sir Victor Horsley and others entered the lists in its support. If Professor Pearson and his collaborators could have established their proposition to anything like the extent to which their opponents have established theirs, it would have to be seriously entertained, no matter what might be the consequences to society and the race. But they have not done so, and it is not much to the point for them to impugn the investigations of their opponents on the ground that no trouble was taken to ascertain whether the alcoholism or the parentage came first. Indeed, the same charge of laxity of methods of investigation must be brought against Professor Pearson's inquiry. For the 'Preliminary Study of Extreme Alcohollism in Adults' is based on reports made in connection with a very restricted investigation. In any study, whether aiming for or against, some fixed and definite standards are needed by which all cases can be tested. Such would have averted the confusion, the intoxicants used by different races, etc., will be found in the art. Drunks, DRINKING. Cf. also the art. ALCOHOL.
fleeting meanings attached to the terms 'drinking' and 'sober' applied to masses of the population. Many excessive drinkers are never 'drunk,' and many have a reputation for sobriety who consume in one debach as much as the man called a 'drunkard.' An apparent injury to themselves and others. Hence the need for rigid definitions and limitations applied to investigations which, to be of value, would require to be of a comprehensive character, and extended over a series of years. The effect of the 'Study' however, is to demonstrate the close connexion between alcoholism and mental defectiveness, but the question is left unsolved whether this large proportion of mental and physical defects which is much greater than is found in the general population, is attributable to alcohol, or to the pre-existing mental defect.

In the second paper, the theory of the first—that there is no close relation between mental defect in the children and alcoholism in the parents—has been abandoned, and a close relationship is admitted, while segregation is called for on the grounds of hereditary character. Nothing is specific, it will be observed, is said with reference to the undoubted physical stigmata of such degenerates.

Professor Pearson contends that mental defect is antecedent to alcoholism. But what, it may be asked, antecedes the mental defect? Unless this can be answered satisfactorily, one must come full circle to the original standpoint, and be confronted by the old problem. The Pearsonites have abandoned the position that 'the balance turns as often in favour of the alcoholic as of the non-alcoholic parentage,' and practically admit that alcoholism and mental defect are associated; but whether the one precedes the other, and which precedes the other, they do not know. As far as the controversy has gone, there can be no doubt that the authorities who believe that alcoholism, not gross alcoholism—about that there do not exist—but that fairly general kind of free indulgence which takes place daily, with frequent 'week-end' bouts, does lead to the physical and mental impairment of the offspring, are in the right, and can produce unquestioned evidence in support of their view. Than this no controversy of greater moment in regard to alcoholism has been started. To make the impression more hurriedly, irrefutably, and value, a statistical and clinical research into the comparative physique and capacity of the descendants of alcoholic and non-alcoholic parents respectively in several carefully chosen districts would be required, and it is not too much to anticipate what the conclusion would be. It would finally determine whether there is any marked correlation between parental alcoholism and inferiority of offspring manifesting itself not only in childhood but in adolescence; and it would dissipate views calculated to do infinite harm to the race and to the commonwealth.

The degeneracy of alcoholic offspring is attested by such authorities as Magnan, Morel, Lancereaux, Crichton-Browne, Logrand du Saulle, John Macpherson, etc., and it comes about in many ways. The male parent who is a 'soaker'—we need not consider the physical state of the progenitor suffering from the effects of an occasional bout at the time of conception—undoubtedly begets a weak offspring, made sure if his habits worry and impair his physical constitution. The female offspring is more likely to be the subject of hereditary alcoholism, and when the mother is the offender the males perpetuate the parental failing (herédité croisée). It is thought, and there are strong grounds for the presumption, that the female progenitor is the surer and more general transmitter of the hereditary alcoholism of the offspring, and that only occasionally beget defective males. The alcoholic defect either vanishes in insanity, imbecility, and nervous diseases. The proportion of the alcoholic mother, in handing on to her offspring a constitution not only physically, at least, but intellectually not to be gainsaid. This view accords with common sense, even if exact statistical records are wanting, for not only is her condition at conception of moment, but so also is the fact that during utero-gestation and lactation the blood is charged with the toxic agent, specially so during pregnancy. The heredity may be 'immediate' from one or both parents, or 'mediate' from grandparents, the 'immediates' having been free from the taint. And the heredity may be homogeneous or heterogeneous— in one group inebriety begets neurotic children; in the other the inebriety of members of a family springs from neurotic parentage, which may not, and in some cases, even does not, owe its existence to alcoholic excess.

Four of the foremost advocates of the non-transmission of personally acquired characters are Galton, Weikert, Pearson, and Dr. A. Reid—recognized authorities on the principles and laws of heredity. In their view environmental influences play a secondary part; heredity is everything. One may ask the question in this connexion, Are the bad mental effects of vicious habits and alcoholic excess passed on to descendants, thus setting up racial degeneration? Dr. Ford Robertson, following Darwin, Maunsley, and Hartwig, traverses Dr. A. Reid's proposition that 'inborn characters are known to be transmissible from parent to offspring,' and postulates for himself the remarkable doctrine and dogma that 'offspring, as far as can at present be determined, inherit no character whatever from their parents. . . . The distinction between inborn and acquired characters has really no justification in modern scientific fact... . Although there is no inheritance of parental characters, there is of environmental influences, to which all that is of any importance in human ontogenetic evolution (i.e. the development of the individual) is directly due. There is here evidence of acute dialectic diversity: both. . . .

3. Statistics.—The following statistics, which have a profound significance, are submitted in order to give some idea of (1) the annual mortality, sickness, and unemployment consequent upon excessive indulgence; and (2) the prevalence and cost of pauperism, panem lunacy, criminality, and delinquency due to the same cause.

(a) Mortality.—It was calculated twenty years ago (Dr. Norman Kerr) that 40,000 persons die annually in the United Kingdom from drunkenness and habitual drunkenness; and Dr. Wakley, Editor of the Lancet and Coroner for Middlesex, not only confirmed this estimate, but put it higher. Of 1,500 inquests he attributed 900 at least to hard drinking, and he believed that from 10,000 to 15,000 persons died annually in the Metropolis from drink, upon whom no inquest was held. For the United Kingdom, from this calculated the total to be 50,000. Deaths from suicide, drowning, and exposure totalled 7,372 in one year in Great Britain and Ireland, and of these one may safely reckon 1,500 as due to inebriety. The total, therefore, is 51,572, or 15 per cent. Of deaths from accidents and negligence (13,386), 15 per cent may be attributed to the same cause.

Infant mortality.—For the declining birth-rate in this and other lands, to which of late attention is constantly drawn, many causes are assigned, but
in the present connexion we are concerned only with the great wastage occurring in the deserted birth-rate arising from the excess of maternal deaths, especially mothers, parental neglect arising from over-indulgence and improper feeding, no cognizance being here taken of premature births attributable to the drinking habits. The circumstances arising from thereon. In regard to the suckling of infants, the milk of the alcoholic mother is both deficient in quantity and inferior in quality, in spite of the popular belief to the contrary in favour of stout and wines; and, further, there is defective ovulation and sterility.

Comparative mortality for various trades and occupations, including the Licensed Trade itself:—

According to Dr. Newsom, if the comparative mortality figure for all men equals 1000, an equal number of gardeners would yield only 568 deaths, teachers 571, grocers 664, doctors 937 (midway), while at the other end of the scale are brewers 1407, innkeepers and men-servants 1655, and file-makers 1862. Comparing employees in inns, etc., with all other occupied males, it is found that, out of a given number in each group, 8 times as many from suicide, 1 ½ times as many from nervous diseases, 1 ½ times as many from suicide, and 23 times as many from consumption. Regarding the liability of drunkards to public injuries, Prof. Jemmott (Evidences of the 4th Report of the Royal Commission) says:—

'Alcoholism is, in fact, the most powerful factor in the propagation of tuberculosis,' and Dr. R. W. Philip (Edinburgh) agrees:—'The most vigorous man who becomes alcoholic is without resistance before it.'

Actuarial calculations made with great care and exactitude by insurance offices are significant. The best offices insist the premium as much as 50 per cent. and a few absolutely decline proposals of persons in the drink trade. And, as regards abstainers and non-abstainers, the chances of life are no less than 2 to 1 in favour of the former. The ratio is much the same in regard to sickness, recovery being speedier among the former. The moral clearly is that he who desires to live long, wisely, and well should either be a total abstainer or exceedingly temperate. For many persons total abstinence is a necessity of their being. If they are not to make early shipwreck of their lives.

(b) Crimes and petty offences.—In the United Kingdom there were 630,340 apprehensions in the year 1881. In the total, while present to many individuals as is often concluded, the same individual figuring more than once in returns. A total of 318,000 persons who have been in the hands of the police for homicide, assaults, petty thefts, prostitution, drunkenness, disorderly conduct, etc., would be nearer the mark. The total admits of a further reduction to 273,000 as the number in which alcohol plays a chief part; but, as many persons commit petty offences without being officially listed, it would be safe to put the number requiring attention, although not receiving the attention of the police at 80,000—in all 358,000, or 1 to 128 of the population. In Scotland it is reckoned that there are 4700 recidivists, both of the criminal and of the petty offender classes, waging (especially the former) an aggressive war against society, of whom 2500 are feeble-minded, delinquent, parasitical, petty offenders, and 1200 are drunkards, the latter being perhaps somewhat similar to that estimated by Mr. C. S. Loch, C.B., for England.

The sex-ratio of these parasitic offenders is interesting. If we take the lives figured by the convictions and imprisonments, and the drink figures, we have the following ratios:—

Thus from 11 to 20 convictions, males are to females 100:70; 21 to 50 convictions, 100:90; 51 to 100 convictions, 100:180; 101 and upwards, 100:240.

In Scotland, 2500 have been convicted and sent to prison 20 times, and 1330 more than 50 times. Referring to the 1833 report of the Police Commissioner in London, it makes the following of convictions and imprisonments as to the mental irresponsibility of such cases:

'It is only the shortness of human life which limits the number of convictions. Chronic offenders arising from drunkenness are suffering from a nervous closely allied to its symptomatology and heredity which is to the other nervous and to insanity' (see Summary), and 'a defective heredity which (1) induces the subject to crave for a particular mental state—not for alcohol, but for the state which alcohol most certainly produces, who presents the subject with a constitution which is particularly susceptible to the influence of such poisons as alcohol, and (2) which in many cases causes the mental unisonness of independence, of that which tends to the vegetative deterioration of the self and of life.'

(c) Cost of prisons.—In the year 1909 the cost of prisons was:—

In England, £720,340; Scotland, £85,790; Ireland, £211,660—a total of £1,083,470; cost, £7,380,000. It is safe to assume that, but for alcohol, not one-third of the whole cost, or £210,000, would be required for this purpose. The daily prison population amounts to 26,000, of whom 17,000 are interned for crimes and offences directly connected with casual and habitual drunkenness.

(d) Pauperism.—The number of paupers in England, Scotland, and Ireland, and the cost to the country locally and imperially, may be roughly expressed as:—

paupers, 1,083,470; cost, £7,380,000. It is no exaggeration to say that 50 per cent. of pauperism (cost) may be ascribed to drunkenness and habitual drunkenness—in other words, 541,700 paupers and dependents are maintained at a cost of £3,065,000. It is well known that the cost of these paupers in England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, numbering 62,400 picked men (England and Wales 46,000, Scotland 5670, Ireland 10,740), falls little short of £6,000,000 per annum. Of this enormous sum, drunkenness and allied offences and crimes connected directly with drunkenness, may be credited at least with one-third, £2,000,000, most from local taxation and imperial subventions. But this is not all. From the Civil Service Estimates (Class iii., 'Law and Justice,' pp. 229-333), consideration must be given to another set of heavy imperial charges under this head, amounting in all to £1,800,000 for County Courts, Supreme Court of Judicature, Reformatory and Industrial Schools, Criminal Asylums, etc. If to this enormous imperial total under the head of 'Law and Justice' be added the burdens falling upon local authorities under the same head, the total losses due to drunkenness, which drunkenness and allied offences may be debited with 33 per cent, or £560,000,000.

(e) Police.—Maintenance of the police force in England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, numbering 62,400 picked men (England and Wales 46,000, Scotland 5670, Ireland 10,740), falls little short of £6,000,000 per annum. Assuming that alcohol directly and indirectly is responsible for 20 per cent. of the insane, it follows that £1,200,000 per annum from rates and Government grants are required to meet the burden of providing for a daily population of 34,000 lunatics.

(f) Excise and Customs Revenue for one year.—

On the other side of the ledger must be placed the revenue raised by the duties on spirits, beer, wines, brandy, rum, etc., which may be put down at £35,000,000. When over against this revenue is put the cost of drunkenness (see Summary) in consequence of intemperance, the benefit of the enormous revenue sinks into insignificance. £170,000,000 is spent annually on drunkenness. If these two statistics submitted it is hardly possible to contemplate a graver ethical problem than this one of drunkenness, affecting as it does so prejudicially the individual, the family, the community, and the commonwealth.
SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING STATISTICS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Cost and Loss</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Anomalies Mortality</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Sickness and Unemployment</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Law and Justice</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
<td>$8,000,000</td>
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<td>4. Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Pauperism</td>
<td>$41,700</td>
<td>$27,300,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Pauper Lunatics</td>
<td>$29,000</td>
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<td>7. Prisons</td>
<td>$17,000</td>
<td>$620,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Cost of collecting Excise and Customs Duties</td>
<td>$2,130,800</td>
<td>$227,200,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4. Responsibility in drunkenness: anomalies of the Civil and Criminal Law.—There would be no responsibility if intoxication following one bouts were recognized as temporary insanity, or, after many bouts, with resultant organ disease of the brain, nervous system, and the bodily viscera (liver, lungs, kidneys, etc.), as something more than temporary insanity. The civil law is inclined to throw its shield over the drunkard; the criminal law, while not recognizing drunkenness as an aggravation, does not consider it an excuse, in spite of the fact that the sale of drink is unfettered; it will step in to save the drunkard only when given the opportunity, in our criminal law, to save him (until quite recently) only to punish him with the view of reforming him and deterring others—the latter a vain delusion, as people do not drink to commit crimes. Crime is an accident of the intoxicated state. A crime of violence is not in the drunkard's thoughts at the start, and, after intoxication has gone, and intoxication is established, the idea of deterrence for him is as absurd as the notion that he had any notion of his conduct. In 1848 the Bench of Judges laid down the law for England in regard to all forms of insanity, to the effect that to establish a defence it must be proved that, at the time of committing the act, the accused was labouring under such a defect of reason of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of his act, or, in other words, as not to know that he was doing wrong. Accepting in relation to responsibility the test thus laid down, it must be apparent to the most ordinary observer that the intoxicated authors of crime (especially homicide, serious assaults, cruelty to children, etc.), and therefore of 80 per cent. of all serious crimes, and to a very large extent of those due to drink are excluded in this connexion: implying violence and recklessness, would not be held responsible, and would either be dealt with as persons insane at the time of committal, or in the public interest would be detained in prison for long periods because of the drunkenness which led to the injury. In either case society would be protected against such potentially dangerous elements detected in it's midst, and justice would be fully satisfied. But what of the drunkards in pose? Do they take warning from those in esse? Not at all. Later, in 1856, Justice Day said: 'Whatever the cause of the unconsciousness, a person not knowing the nature and quality of his act is irresponsible for it.' The existing law recognizes that, if the drunkenness has not been voluntarily induced, responsibility has not been incurred. But who is to decide when the unconsciousness was voluntary? A ruling which has been viewed with much satisfaction was that given by Lord Low at Glasgow in 1891. He expressed his willingness to give the advantage of the benefit of the doubt, but he was not prepared to invoke malice and deliberation, but that he committed the crime while maddened by strong drink. While that was sufficient to take the case out of the category of murder, there was no question of culpable homicide. There have been several recent rulings of quite another kind in the United Kingdom: and the 'wilful' nature of the crime, as well as the 'voluntary' induced state of mind, has been much dwelt upon. The United States legal view is well put by an eminent New York jurist, Clark Bell, when he states that 'the better rule of law undoubtedly now is that if the person at the time of the commission of the act was unconscious and incapable of reflective action, he could not be convicted. There must be motive and intention.'

Before leaving the 'wilful' nature of the crime and the 'voluntary' induced state of mind, I think it may with reason be asked, Do such cases admit of other interpretations? Might it not be argued, both on its own merits and in the light of more enlightened judicial rulings, (1) whether a man drunk can legally do a wilful act; (2) whether at any stage of a habitual or periodic drunkard's bout the drinking was 'voluntary,' for that would imply the certainty of the absence of latent or patent physical and mental degeneration; and (3) whether, admitting, as in the case of the occasional drunkard, that the imbibing of a moderate quantity was 'voluntary,' the moment inhibition is sufficiently impaired—sooner or later in others, but by reason of the exhaustion of the drunkenness and a period of paralytic intoxication of the higher nerve centres by the toxic agents—further drinking, leading up to the paroxysmal and frenzied states revealed ad nauseam in the criminal law of the United States states, that the 'wilful' crime would have been committed. But, in these cases seem where a plea of 'insane at the time' would be a good and valid one, or the resultant crime would be reduced from murder of the first degree.

The anomalies which emerge when the civil and criminal laws are examined in regard to drunkenness are remarkable. As the capacity to perform intelligently an important act is liable to be seriously impaired, the imbibing of a sufficient quantity of alcohol is liable to vitiate civil acts. Witnesses in civil as well as in criminal trials, when visibly under the influence of drink, have been asked by judges to stand down; or, if they are permitted to give evidence, it is properly discounted. In Scotland an intoxicated prisoner's declaration is considered invalid. In England, the Lord Chancellor acting in Lunacy may, if an inquiry in lunacy has established that any one has been unable to manage his affairs through confirmed intoxication, take the person and property into his custody. Wills are voidable if made when the testator is drunk, whether the testator was or was not, with the property of the intestate, and by reason thereof, intoxicated. Property sold or disposed of under such conditions may be followed by restitution when sobriety is attained. Contracts are now also voidable when the law discovers that the drunkenness was contrived at by the other party for purposes of fraud. They become valid if ratified when sober. Intoxication implies incapacity to consent, and a contract involves the mutual agreement of two minds, so that, if one party has no mind to agree, he cannot make a valid contract. It is not a question of two sober persons differing in bargaining astuteness. This will always be; but it is different when one of the two is drunk. In the United States it is held that, if the bargaining is fair and free from fraud and not over-reaching, it will stand, even although one of the parties was intoxicated. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in a Canadian case, held that the present law of drunkenness rendered habitual drunkenness a sufficient ground for setting aside paternal rights. In British law it has been ruled that, if either party to a marriage contract is under the influence of drink, the marriage is voidable. Intoxication is held to vitiate the use of drink as not to understand the nature and consequences of the act, proof of which would render the act invalid. It is presumed in such a case that there was no intent to marry. To note, all intent and purposes, the civil law shields the drunkard from the consequences of civil acts, testamentary
dispositions, and contracts made in a state of intoxication—thus practically admitting the condition as one of non compos mentis for the time being.

§ 5. Legislation affecting drunkenness.—(1) Great Britain.—In Great Britain, the Legislature, stimulated by Reports of Royal and Departmental Commissions on Licensing, Poor Law, the Feeble-minded, and Habitual Offenders and Inebriates, has in recent years done a good deal with the object of removing temptation in congested slum areas. For the casual drunkard, the laws provide slight penal treatment involving a few days in prison or a small fine, for the payment of which time may be allowed by the Stipendiary, Justice, or Magistrate before imprisonment takes effect; or the offender may be liberated after imprisonment by part payment of the fine equivalent to the time still to be served in prison, the partial fine being provided by friends or by his own labour. For the reformation and protection of habitual drunkards, many of whom are feeble-minded, mentally unstable, and degenerate, the published many such in ten thousands is, in the vast majority of cases, applied to them, and only in a very few cases after conviction are the habituals sent to Certified or State Reformatories. The latter, maintained solely by the State, receive the worst offenders and those not amenable for refractory or intractable, cases; the former, with its semi-penal atmosphere, the quieter and more hopeful cases, who for misconduct and insubordination may be transferred to the latter. The inmates, on cause shown, may be transferred from one to the other by order of the Secretary of State. The State Reformatories are supported by Government grants, the certified by local rates and Treasury subventions; besides the income from the management of the institution, neither has been the success anticipated, or anything like it, owing to the working of the Acts. Stipendiaries and Magistrates have taken little advantage of the Act of 1898 as to Certified Reformatories, and, when they have taken advantage of it, they have hitherto selected wholly unpromising material in many cases. As regards cases suitable for the State Reformatories, Sheriffs and County Court Judges have not availed themselves of the power conferred upon them. There is also a reluctance, on rating grounds, on the part of local authorities, singly or in combination, to provide Reformatories to meet the increasing requirements of the State, which is the principal institution receiving pauper inebriates. Although there is, on the whole, fairly good legislation in the States in the interests of inebriates who are either well or comfortably off in the matter of resources, there is, as in Great Britain, practically no provision made for the impecunious, except for those falling into the hands of the police, and for them the provision is miserably inadequate. (2) British Colonies.—(a) Canada.—Nearly all the Provincial Legislatures have enacted effective measures for habitual inebriety. Ontario in 1873 passed an Act to set up a Home for voluntary and involuntary inmates—the term of stay not to exceed 12 months. A petition is presented to the Judge of the District Court by friends or relatives, or the patient himself; the Judge may grant the petition or send the patient to the Home for trial. Canada can pronounce interdict, and can appoint a Retreat either voluntarily or by order of the Committee of the Habitual Drunkard. In 1867, King's County, N. Y., established a Home. Entrance was voluntary or by order of the Trustees of the Home, who were about to send the criminal to the County jail and select fit subjects. Further, on the report of a Commission of Inquiry to the effect that any person was a habitual drunkard, and incapable of managing his or her affairs, a Petition was then to send the person to the Home. The Home received 12 per cent of licence monies. In 1892 a Home for alcoholics and drug females was set up in Manhattan Island. The inmates of either half were admitted voluntarily or under compulsion. When compulsion was resorted to, two medical certificates were necessary and the order of a Judge, who could call for affidavits or take proof. In 1897, the Washington Home, Chicago, was erected. This Home received, till expiry of original sentence, any person convicted of drunkenness or any misdemeanour occasioned thereby. In the same year the Pennsylvania Sanatorium was opened. In 1898, the Select Committee of the Habitual Drunkard, the institution could receive him on presentation, by his guardian or friend, of the certificates of two doctors attested by a judicial officer. In Connecticut, the Committee of Probation and Reform in 1874, on a majority of the Select men of the town, could order an inquiry as to the allegation of habitual drunkenness arising from drink or drugs. This is the first reference to the need for investigating judicially the pernicious drug habit—unfortunately a growing one in every civilized country. If habitual drunkenness was proved, the patient was conveyed to an inebriate asylum for a period of ten years. The dionysomania was thus viewed in a worse light than the other. Superior courts had the right to interfere and discharge at any time. In New Jersey the application of a 'voluntary' requires to be attested by one Justice, or the applicant may present himself at the Home, and fill up a form, which is as binding as when attested by a Justice. A person drunk when received may, on becoming sober, sign a valid and binding application. The Massachusetts Home has accommodation for 200 patients. If one is unable to pay for maintenance, the Municipality may be called upon for the costs. The New York Home is the principal institution receiving pauper inebriates. 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a curator to manage the drunkard's affairs, and control his person as in interdiction for insanity. A family council is called by the Judge to investigate the truth of allegations, and a petition is served on the alleged 'habitual,' who may be required to enter on a system of abstinence and regain civil rights. Willful and knowing sale of drink to the interdicted is finable and punishable. The curator, sometimes termed the guardian, may place his charge out of the house, and may remove him at any time. The Quebec Province law of interdiction closely resembles what obtained in Scotland 100 years ago, but fell into desuetude, although there are competent authorities who say it could, without statutory enactment, be revived again. In Manitoba the petition is presented by a public officer. There is much to be said for the creation of such an official, as relatives are often placed in an inviolable position, and will not move. Relatives and neighbours are summoned and put on oath. The interdicted may be confined in any place where the Judge may think proper, and be visited or examined by the County Sheriff. While interdiction lasts, baggage, sales, and contracts made are null and void. The interdicted may be discharged and re-vested after proof of 12 months' abstinence.

(c) New Zealand.—Admission is either voluntary or involuntary. Residence is in a ward or division of a house, or on the farm, quite apart from the insane. Great difficulties, as might be looked for, have been experienced in complying with this part of statutory requirement, and special accommodation has long been considered urgent.

6. Prophylaxis and therapeutics.—One of the few hopeful features of the drink problem is the gradual diminution in the use of alcohol in society and in the treatment of disease in hospitals and in private practice, until now it is at the vanishing point as a drug, stimulant, or tissue-builder. In 1892 the principal London Hospitals from 1872 to 1902, although the daily resident population has varied immensely, the overall consumption of alcohol has fallen 32 per cent. No less striking and satisfactory are the figures for the Wandsworth Union, in which the number of inmates, inclusive of the sick, has increased 283 per cent, while the spirit bill has fallen from £571 to £2, 7s. Equally interesting are the figures for the Hospitals of the Metropolitan Asylum Board for 1894 to 1905. The total under treatment for 'fevers' rose from 19,900 to 27,807, while the consumption of alcohol, including stimulants, fell 53 per cent, from £1388 to £515. The same tale could be told of every hospital in the land; and it is especially significant, since the full is the only recorded instance in the medical literature of a prophy-
atic research. In surgical wards of hospitals and in maternity wards, patients operated upon rarely get alcohol, except for 'shock' and severe hemorrhage, especially post-partum (Dr. W. L. Reid, Glasgow), and in these directions alcohol is being superseded by other and better substitutes.

During a drinking bout numerous untoward or fatal accidents often occur. Sensibility and co-ordination of stomach, which is perhaps the least to be feared, as the poison may be rejected, retention of urine, suffocation resulting from the position of the body (head rests on the clinched hands, the child, if convulsed, may suffocate). Shearing death takes place from deep toxic narcosis, exposure, drowning, or bodily injuries. Apoplexy is frequently mistaken for drunken comas, the person with the apoplectic seizure, it may be, smelling of alcohol.

In regard to treatment, something requires to be said of what one might term orthodox medical treatment, and of the many puffed 'secret cures,' freely advertised, regardless of expense, of which only the rich can avail themselves. Before admittance into any of the Homes in which the 'secret' cure is practised, a bargain is struck, and a big sum of money is paid down. Benevolence or philanthropy does not enter into the nature of the remedy, so far as the vendor is concerned, is kept 'secret.' But there is no secret about it, as nearly all such remedies have been analyzed by competent chemists, and their contents are known. As a rule, the composition of the best of them in no way differs from the composition of these prescribed by physicians who act for the good of their patients, and charge the interest on the profits from the sale of the remedies.


LITERATURE.
DUALISM

DUALISM (Introductory)


J. F. SUTHERLAND.

DRUSES.—See Sects. (Christian).

DRYADS.—See Hamadryads.

DUALISM.—The term 'dualism' appears for the first time in Thomas Hyde's Hist. religionis veterum Persorurn (e.g. cap. 9, p. 164), published in 1700, and is there applied to a system of thought novel phileo in which the Evil Being is co-ordinate and co-eternal with the primal Good. The word was employed in the same sense by Bayle (cf. art., Zoroastre, in his Dict., ed. Paris, 1820) and Leibniz (in his Thetis; cf. Erdmann's ed., Berlin, 1874, p. 5475). It was then transferred from the sphere of ethics and religion to that of metaphysics by Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Wolff applies the term 'dualists' to those who regard body and soul as mutually independent substances, and contrasts such thinkers with the monists, who would derive the totality of the real either from matter alone or from spirit alone. The Wolffian usage of the term is now by far the most generally received, although it is sometimes found the word applied to certain theories in ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion.

In its application to the relation between soul and body, spirit and nature, the term 'dualism' recalls a problem which goes back to a very early period, and which has received various solutions in the evolution of human thought. Among the ancient Greeks the tendency was to bring the physical and the psychical into very close relations with each other. Thus their philosophy begins with a naive monism—hylozoism; and, in particular, their artistic achievement reveals a marvelous harmony of the spiritual and the sensuous. But dualistic tendencies likewise began to manifest themselves at an early stage, as, e.g., in the teaching of the Orpicles and Pythagoreans regarding the constitution of soul and body, a doctrine which implies that the soul is independent of the body. In philosophy, however, it was Anaxagoras (q.v.) who first explicitly disengaged spirit or mind (νοῦς) from matter, setting the former, as the simple, the pure, the unmixed, in opposition to the latter; and we may, therefore, speak of Anaxagoras as the first philosophical dualist. But the dualistic mode of thought finds its most magnificent expression in the development of scholastic philosophy of the world of ideas from the manifold of sense. Aristotle, on the other hand, inclines rather towards monism, as appears from his definition of the soul as the entelechy of the body. But his conception of the spirit (νοῡς) as something added to the process of Nature from without, and separable from the body, bears an unmistakably dualistic character.¹ It is certainly true that in the later period of the ancient world the Stoics advocated a monistic hypothesis, by regarding body (νηστοικος και δαικος) into close connexion with each other, and affirming the material nature of all reality; but when, in the further evolution of ancient social life, the old ideals began to lose their fervour, and the dark age returned and more engaged the minds of men, and when, above all, dire moral perplexities began to be felt, matter gradually came to be regarded as something obstructive and evil—something from which the individual must try his best to deliver himself. Thus arose the ascetic ideal of life, and, in hand with it, a rigid dualism. Accordingly we find that the last great system of ancient thought, that of Plotinus, was also a paragone of sensual matter, while the intel- ligible world and the world of sense are set in rigorous opposition to each other. See, further, the 'Greek' section of this article.

Christianity, in its essential principles, has no affinity with a dualism of this kind. Looking upon all that exists as the handiwork of God, it cannot regard matter as something unworthy. Its firm contention is that the source of evil lies, not in matter, but in voluntary action, in the apostasy of spiritual beings from God. Another element which militates against the dualistic tendency is the fact that in Christianity the body ranks as an essential constituent of human nature, as is shown, in particular, by the doctrine of a bodily resurrection. Notwithstanding these facts, however, Greek and Oriental dualists forced their way into the early Church on a wide scale, as appears from the prevalence of asceticism (see ASCETICISM [Christian]), gained a vast influence over the Christain mind. As we might expect, its grasp was still further strengthened by the Platonicism which prevailed in the first half of the medieval period. On the other hand, the ascendency of the Aristotelian philosophy in the culminating stages of medieval thought as the highest expression of a rigid use of science, rather favourable to monism, since it did not permit of any hard and fast antagonism between body and soul. But the Aristotelian view at length underwent a certain modification, in so far as the champions of medieval Aristotelianism, Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, held that the vegetative and animal faculties of the soul, which Aristotle himself assigned wholly to the body, are conditioned by the body only in their temporal functions, and therefore also share in the immortality of the spirit. This view was officially recognized as the doctrine of the

¹ Psychologia Rationalis, Frankfurt, 1722, § 39: 'Dualistae sunt, qui et substantiarum materialium et immaterialium existentiam admissi.'

² Cf. e.g. Aristotle, Metaph. i. 6 (Bekker, p. 998, 14): φύσις τε και ψυχή ου προέρχεται από του ἄλλου κοινως και καθορισμως; τυχεριτας, vi. 8 (505, 24): δε αριθμοι συνεπηρεται από του καθορισμος σωματος και ψυχης (που εστι εν των ψυχων και ουκ εστι εν τω σωματω); τον ημων ανθρωπον αριθμον παντοτε μεταξυ τον ψυχης και ως δυο ειδη του ου και σωματος ειδην ειδην, και ουκ ειδην ειδην; de Anima, 1. 2 (400a, 13): 'Αναγεννηθαις τουτοι μοιχος λογος φησι τε και ψυχης, χρηματος δε και μιας φυσεως; τον ανθρωπον αριθμον μεταξυ των ειδων και ειδην ειδην, και ουκ ειδην ειδην.'

³ De Anima, 1. 6 (415b, 4): και τον ανθρωπον την ψυχην εις ου και σωματος ουκ εις ου και ως δυο ειδην, και των εναν των ειδων ειδην, και των ειδων ειδην.'

⁴ De Anima, 1. 6 (415b, 5): 'Εν τω γαρ ανθρωπω δια των ειδων ειδην ειδην ειδην και ουκ ειδην σωματικον και ψυχην δια των ειδων ειδην περιποιημαι.
Catholic Church by the Council of Vienne (A.D. 1311).

Modern philosophy, as inaugurated by Descartes (q.v.), opened with an unqualified dualism. The conceptions of matter and mind were now for the first time distinctly and clearly distinguishable from each other. Descartes' definition of body and soul respectively as *substantia extensa* and *substantia cogitans* obviously made it impossible to bring the two under a single concept, since the latter substance was held to be absolutely indivisible, while the spatially extended substance is capable of infinite division. Body and soul have thus no internal principle of unity, but are simply joined together by the will of God. A distinction so absolute could not, of course, remain permanently unchanged, but it sufficed at least to put an end to the hitherto prevailing confusion between the physical and the psychological interpretation of phenomena, and made it henceforth necessary to explain Nature by Nature, and the psychical by the psychical. The natural sciences, in particular, had suffered serious detriment from the theory of a sustained physical principle of all natural processes—more especially the formation, growth, and nutriment of organic bodies—as immediately due to the workings of the soul; for, of course, the practice of tracing natural phenomena to psychical causes stood in the way of all advance in exact science, and it was the dualism of Descartes, with its precise delineation of concepts, that first brought such advance within the range of possibility.

This dualism maintained its ground as the dominant hypothesis of the period of Illumination, and Wolff himself claimed unequivocally to be a dualist. But his notion of the antithesis between mind and matter abandoned an endeavour to bridge the gulf in some way, and to find some explanation of the connexion that actually obtains. Descartes himself manifests this striving in his doctrine that the physical and the psychical have their point of contact in the pineal gland; and further instances are found in occasionalism, with its belief that material and spiritual processes are maintained in mutual harmony by Divine agency, in the system of Spinoza, who regarded the two great divisions of phenomena as the attributes of a single substance; and in Leibnitz's doctrine of monads, which derives all reality from spirit, and explains the forms of the universe in the names of souls.

A defection from the prevailing belief in dualism, however, ensued only with the break-up of the Illumination and the emergence of new currents of thought. Various factors combined to make a stand against it. First of all, the movement towards an artistic interpretation of life and a more natural conception of reality—so found alike in the Neurorimatism represented by Goethe and in romanticism—intensified the need of an inherent connexion between Nature and spirit, the sensuous and the non-sensuous. Then came the speculative philosophy of Germany, with its interpretation of all reality and all spiritual life. But the most potent factor of all was modern science, which demonstrated in countless ways the dependence of psychical life upon the body and bodily conditions, alike in the experience of the individual and throughout the entire range of organic being. This forms the starting-point of the theory which with special emphasis now claims the name of monism, and rejects everything in the nature of a self-sustained psychical life. Nevertheless, as has been well said by so eminent a contemporary thinker as Wundt, this monism is in essence simply a return to the hylozoism of the Ionian philosophers; and it is certainly open to doubt whether the question is quite as simple as monists make out, and whether the entire intellectual movement of the eighteenth century was simply a problem, been barren of all result, as monists must perfide maintain. This point will be further dealt with, however, in the article MONISM; and it need only be said meanwhile that it is one thing to think of the world as consisting of absolutely diverse provinces, and quite another to regard human experience as embracing different starting-points and different movements, which can be brought into closer relations only by degrees and in virtue of progressive intellectual effort. It is impossible that dualism should constitute the final phase of human thought; but, in view of such consummation, it has an important function to perform, viz. to put obstacles in the way of a premature synthesis, and to insist upon a full recognition of the antitheses actually present in human experience. Dualism, in virtue of its precise definition of concepts, is least liable to that confusion into which monism so easily lapses; and, to realize the value of such a rôle, we need but recall the aphorism of Bacon: 'veritas potius emergit ex orroribus quam ex confusionibus.'


R. Eucken.

**DUALISM (American).—**The view which has obtained in several quarters, that an ethical dualism exists in the teaching of the early missionaries to the Indian tribes, is a wholly mistaken one. No ethical contrast existed in the native mind between those deities who assisted man and those who were actively hostile to him; and it has been made abundantly clear that such dualistic ideas as have been found connected with other religious conceptions of American Indian peoples owe their origin to contact with the whites. The view that dualism did exist arose from the misconceptions of early missionaries, assisted in many instances by the mistranslation of native words.

'The idea that the Creeks know anything of a devil is an invention of the missionaries' (Gatschet, op. cit., 1890, p. 215). "The Indians believe neither in a hell nor a devil" (Matthews, op. cit., 1890, p. 199).

In some cases the same word which the missionaries have employed to translate 'devil' they have been compelled to use to render 'spirit.' The early missionaries regarded the gods of the Indians as devils, and taught their converts to look upon them as such, but in some cases the natives disagreed with their teachers, attempting to explain to them that their deities were the bringers of all good things, and by no means evil. This, of course, implied not that their gods were 'good' in the ethical sense, that they loved righteousness and hated iniquity, but that they conferred on man the merely natural blessings necessary for a savage existence. Winslow, in his *Good News from New England* (1622), says that the Indians worship a good power called Kiehtan, and another 'who, as faileth as wee can conceive, is the Devil,' named Holhamoek, or in Hohlamoqui. The force of those names is merely the word 'great' in the Algonquin language, and is probably an abbreviation of *Kultanontew*, the 'Great Milton'—a vague term mentioned by Williams and other early writers, and in all probability manufactured by them (see Duponceau, *Languages de l'Amérique du Nord*). On the other hand, the god whom Winslow likens to the power of evil was, in fact, a deity whose special function was the cure of diseases;
he was also a protector in dreams, and is explained by Jarvis as "the Oke, or tutelary deity, which each Indian worshipped."

In the religious conceptions of some tribes the same god is both 'good' and 'evil,' in the sense that the moral judgments of ordinary mankind would have it. Thus Ak-Kanet, worshipped by the Uspe of Brazil, is the name for the supernatural in general, from which all things come, good and evil. In the unison of conceptions, 'good' and 'evil' are supreme deities, the father of all things. The Jesuit missionaries rarely distinguish between good and evil deities, when speaking of the religions of the northern tribes; and the Moravian Brethren, writing of the Algonquins and Iroquois, state that 'the idea of a devil, a prince of darkness, they first received in later times through the Europeans.'

...In the way the Uspey of the Peruvians and the Mictla of the Nahua were not embodied in the evil principle, but simply gods of the dead, corresponding to the classical Pluto. The Jesuit missionaries rarely distinguish between good and evil deities, when speaking of the religions of the northern tribes; and the Moravian Brethren, writing of the Algonquins and Iroquois, state that 'the idea of a devil, a prince of darkness, they first received in later times through the Europeans.'

'...have never been able to discover from the Dakota themselves, says G. H. Pond, a missionary to them for eighteen years, 'the least degree of evidence that they divide the good and evil in such a manner as to persuade themselves as well as others that they are to be visited with punishment or the dire effects of natural calamities by those persons who represent them as doing so as to incommodiously, and because it is so natural to subscribe to a long-established popular opinion' (Ep. Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes, p. 643).

Myths have arisen in several Indian mythologies since the tribes in whose religions they occur have come into contact with Europeans. In these myths the concepts of good and evil, as known to civilized nations, are introduced; and several myths that have been altered to bring the older conceptions into line with the newly-introduced ideas of dualism. The comparatively late introduction of such views finds remarkable confirmation in the myths of the Kiche (Quiche) of Guatemala, which are recorded in the Popol Vuh, a compilation of native myths made by a Christianized Kiche scribe of the 17th century. Dimly conscious, perhaps, that his version of these myths was coloured by the opinions of a lately-adopted concept of Christianity, he says of the Lords of Xibalba, the rulers of the Kiche Hades: 'In the old times they did not have much power. They were but annoyance and opposers of men, and, in truth, they were not called gods. Speakings of the Mayas, Cogolludo says: 'The devil is called by them Xibalba, the derivation of which name is from a root meaning 'to fear'; it relates to the fear inseparable from the idea of death, and has no connexion in any way with the idea of evil in abstract. The gods of the American Indians, like those of other savages, are too anthropomorphic in their nature, too entirely savage themselves, to partake of higher ethical qualities. Personal spite or tribal feuds may render some more imitable than others, but always purely from self-interest, and not through a love of evil for evil's sake. Some, again, fail to pass from similar motives, and not from any purely ethical sense of virtue.

...In the case of the Irish Celts is characterized by the love of the Kish or, in the sense of the old Irish law, the love of the kin or clan, and not by the love of a goddess of a popular sense. The gods of the Kish were largely from similar motives, and not from any purely ethical sense of virtue.'


LEWIS SPRINGER.

DUALISM (Celtic).—Little or nothing is known to us of the religion of the ancient Celts as an ethical religion. The reference to it in classical writers, the evidence of inscriptions, the Welsh and Irish texts, and the witness of folk-survivals reveal it almost wholly as a Nature-religion. To some extent the dualism which is more or less present in all Nature-religions characterized Celtic mythology, but how far it was also an ethical dualism is a matter of controversy. The myth of the Greek gods, who were largely engaged in agriculture, there was a cult of divinities and spirits of growth and fertility whose power and influence might be aided by magic or prayer. Opposed to growth and fertility were alike disease, and death, the evidence of which was seen in pestilence, in bad seasons, and in the desolation of winter. As growth and fertility were the work of beneficent deities, so these evils were probably regarded as brought about by personal agencies of a supernatural and evil character. The drama of Nature showed that the sun was sometimes vanquished by cloud and storm, though it soon renewed its vigour; that summer with all its exuberant life died at the coming of winter, but that it returned again full of vitality; that vegetation perished, but that it received annually the ample plenteude. But what was true of Nature was true also, in mythology, of the personal and supernatural forces behind it. Beneficent and evil powers were in conflict. Year by year the struggle went on, year by year the gods of growth and fertility renewed their assaults, while the gods of evil and immortality. But the struggle, nevertheless, went on year by year. The gods might perish, but only for a time. They were immortal; they only seemed to be wounded and to die.

Such a dualistic mythology seems to be represented by the euhemerized account of the battles between the Boronians and the Thutha Dé Danann in the Irish texts. Whatever the Boronians were in origin, whether the gods of aboriginal tribes in Ireland, or of a group of Celtic tribes at war with another group, it is evident that they had come to be regarded as evil and malicious, and could thus be equated with the baneful personages already known to Celtic mythology as hostile to the gods of growth and fertility. It is evident that the Irish Celts possessed a somewhat elaborate mythological rendering of the dualism of Nature, and this seems to survive in the account of the battle or battles of the Magtured. But, after the Christianizing of Ireland, the old gods had gradually come to be regarded as kings and warriors, and this euhemerizing process was completed by the annalists. Hence in the account of the battles, while it is evident that in some aspects the hostile forces are more than human, the gods are described as kings and great warriors or as craftmen. The Boronians appear as the baneful race, more or less demons, inhabiting Ireland before the arrival of the Thutha Dé Danann. But we also hear of the Firbolgs and other peoples, who are clearly the aboriginal races of Ireland, and whose gods the Boronians are sometimes said to be. The Boronians are certainly the gods of the Irish Celts or of some large group of them.

...Early Irish literature knew only one battle of Magtured, in which the Firbolgs and other peoples, who are clearly the aboriginal races of Ireland, and whose gods the Boronians are sometimes said to be. The Boronians are certainly the gods of the Irish Celts or of some large group of them...

...In the later accounts the battle is dupliicated, and the first sight takes place at Magtured in Mayo, and the second at Magtured in Sligo, two hundred years after the first. In the latter the leader of the Thutha Dé Danann, Nuada, loses his hand, and this remains a point on the grandew of the character of the god. Nuada, and given to Bro, the son of a Boronian by a woman of the Thutha Dé Danann. There is the usual inconsistency of myth here and elsewhere in these notices. The Thutha Dé Danann have just landed in Ireland, but already some of them have united with the Boronians in marriage. This is not the euhemerizing chronicle, but it clearly points to the fact that the Boronians and Thutha Dé Danann were super-
Ireland, and, though in conflict, yet, like conflicting barbarous tribes, occasionally uniting in marriage. The second battle took place on May Eve, which is the beginning of the Celtic summer (see Festivals [Celtic]). Meanwhile the Tuatha Dé Danann had been forced to pay tribute to the Fomorians and to yield up the corn harvest, to avoid their having being conquered. This shows that the ceremonials probably mis- take the end of winter for the beginning of summer, the only a gambarled form. Myths must have told of the temporary defeat and subjection of the benevolent Nature-gods, followed by their liberation after a victory. Following the annalistic account, we find that the exorcising dumbness was in the hour at which the灵感 was satirized by a poet, and 'ought but decay was on him from that moment.' Meanwhile Nuadu had recovered his hand, and Bres, the king of the Fomorians, went to collect an army from his father, who sent him to Balor and to Ineduc. These assembled their forces and pre- pared to attack the Tuatha Dé Danann. In the course of the battle which followed, Indec wounded Ogma (probably a culture-god) and Balor (a personification of the evil eye) slew Nuadu, but himself received a mortal wound from Lug (perhaps a sun-god). This put an end to the band; the Fomorians were routed, and fled to their own part of the country.

Another inconsistency in the annalistic account is that, while the summer is fought on Sambain, one would naturally expect, as powers of light would be represented the vanquished not on a winter but on a summer festival. Perhaps the old myths told of the defeat and subjection of the gods on Sambain, and the victory over the viziers of light on Beltane.

It is clear that the Fomorians, in their opposition to the Tuatha Dé Danann, and from the sinister character assigned to them in folk-tradition, had come to be regarded in mythology as identical with those beings who, to the Celts of Ireland, represented the powers which were unknown to man and foreign to his gods. Blight, disease, fog, winter, the raging sea, and all influences of evil are personified in the Fomorians. Before them men trembled, yet they were not wholly cast down, for they knew that the bright and terrestrial gods, who give light and cause growth, were on their side and fought against their enemies.

A similar enunciated version of old dualistic myths, though presented in a more romantic form, is perhaps to be found in the Welsh story of Lludd and Llewydd.

Lludd is an old divinity (perhaps the equivalent of the Irish Nuadu) who, in this story, figures as a king of Britain. His country is subjected to three plagues: that of the race of the Corannians, who bear every weapon wherever they are spoken, that of a shriek heard all over the island on May Eve, which sears every one, and leaves animals, trees, earth, and water barren; and that of the mysterious disappearance of a year's supply of food. From these three plagues Llewydd by his advice relieves Lludd of them, which he did by causing them to come into the night of things, in which he must bruise in water. Then, having called together his people and the Corannians, he is to throw the water over them. It will poison them; the Corannians are to no have the night of his own race in the country. The second plague is caused by the attack made on the dragon of Llewydd by a dragon with a dragon's head and a dragon's tail, who instructed Lludd how to capture both. This is done, and Lludd burns them in a kiln at Dinas Emrys in Snowdon. The third plague is caused by a mighty magician who, while every one is lulled to sleep by his magic, carries off the store of provisions. Lludd must, therefore, watch, and, whenever he feels a desire to sleep, must plunge into a cistern of cold water. Following this advice, he captures and overpowers the magician, who becomes his vaesar (Loth, Middle Ages, Paris, 1889, L. 773). The Corannians are described as the Priads as a hostile race of invaders, and, contrary to this story, they are said not to have left the island (Lott, II, 256, 274). But the method of getting rid of them is not always the same, for it is possible to the incident of the dragons and the magician, shows that we are not dealing with actual tribes. As Rhygy has shown, they may be a race of dwarfs, their same prob- ably being derived from the early Welsh folk-belief in a kind of mischievous fairies (Celtic Heathendom, London, 1900, p. 601; cit. the Breton dwarf fairies, the Cerr and Corriag). The question arises whether there is not here something alluding to the stories of the battle of Tuatha Dé Danann.

In all three incidents we have a whole realm suffering from possession by the Fomorians, two, fertility, and they are destroyed, the women lose their hope of offspring, animals and vegetation are blighted, and food is stolen away. The dragon plagues of the Welsh Tuirseach, the lion, and the magicians of the Cefn Blwydd give place to each other in the sea, and is called 'the opposition of the tide of Rhy.' The

For the account of the battles, see Harl. MS 6280, text and translation, London, 1899, p. 399. Cf. D'Arbois de Jubainville, Celtic de litt. Celt., vol. II, (Paris, 1854) pp. 181; and for the probable original character of the Fomorians, see art. Cerns in vol. III. of
The activity of hostile powers of blight was naturally greater in winter, and this appears to be referred to both in tales in Irish texts which are the débris of old myths, and in popular traditional beliefs. The stories of a number of different demons, regarded as peculiarly active and malevolent at Samhain (the beginning of winter). 'Malignant bird-flocks' issue from the hell-gate of Ireland every Samhain-eve, to blight the crops and to kill animals. 'They are the souls of all kinds of beings regarded as particularly active and malevolent at Samhain, (the beginning of winter).'

DUALISM (Egyptian).—I. General.—Egyptian religion exhibits, fossilized in the different stratiﬁcations of its various religious periods, the whole series of dualistic notions that we ﬁnd to-day in all the other religions. Thus, in a good many of the chapters of the different 'Books of the Dead,' we ﬁnd traces of a pre-historic period when dualism, in the humblest sense of the term, may be seen in process of formation, and in a form analogous in many respects to what exists at present among numerous black tribes of the African continent. Every good or bad incident experienced or observed by the individual is the work of 'spirits,' visible or invisible (see DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Egy.]); every occurrence of which man feels the consequences is the action of these spirits or counters. In this Egyptian realm of primitive faith, in every other part of creation, no single spirit is speciﬁcally good or bad (generally speaking, it is the one who, being more or less pessimistic in side, is the case with the majority of savage notions); all spirits are irritable, and hungry, and simply try to gratify their instincts, which are the same as those of all other beings of the visible world. But the personal experiences gathered from generations of Egyptians, and collected by sorcerer-priests, led to the notion that these spirits were under the command of stronger spirits, or gods, who were good or bad, and that these masters are good; they are simply the controllers of beings whose attacks are feared by man.

Yet business is to try to steal from the most powerful spirits the knowledge of the means employed by them, to seize their arms, and, above all, to dispossess themselves as these very spirits themselves. Men, therefore, always pretend to be such and such spirits, in order to have more power; but such substitution does not involve any conclusion as to a permanent character of good-will or even of protection so far as the spirit is concerned in whose name they act or claim to act. Fugitive traits of dualism appear. Alliance or identiﬁcation with the most powerful spirits necessitates an attempt at classiﬁcation and the attributing to a certain number of them of the permanent characteristics of beings useful, or even to a certain extent favorable, to man. They are the so-called 'grand and good' spirits, and their alliance is formed between certain spirits and certain men, with a tendency to mutual obligations, based on experimental utility. At the same time, the classiﬁcation of 'spirits' (ancient and bad forces controlled by them) ceases to be an individual appreciation. The knowledge acquired, by traditional teaching, of the means (formule, talismans, mimetic disguises, etc.) of working upon these spirits brings into existence, for the advantage of the initiated, a list of the powers that are generally hostile or sympathetic. The use of this seems to have been reserved at ﬁrst to a social class or tribal group.

In certain chapters of the Book of the Dead, which are evidently of less remote composition, we see the properly so-called dualistic notion of a permanent conﬂict between the different kinds of important spirits very nearly taking deﬁnite separate shape, with an idea of an earthly opposition (giving, of course, the word 'earth,' or 'universe,' the very narrow sense of that patch of ground inhabited by the group in question); and, in opposition to such powers, as such a necessary part of all Nature-religions, did exist. How far that ever became a more ethical dualism is quite unknown.

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more general rule still, their character of good or bad arose from what they had accomplished by their energy (killing, slaying, devouring, tearing, etc.) in the world of gods or gods, not by their free choice, but by the fact that they were slaves, or forcibly detained spirits, in the service of such and such a master. This is the condition of most of our demons. It is a fact of their like in historic times, as may be gathered from the Thelian descriptions (paintings or writings) of the Other-world; and likewise of nearly all the genii and demons of animal aspect.

Poor as a dualistic classification is based on such processes, it is said to be as yet strange to us, nevertheless, once this point is reached, the system already contains the fundamental element—the antagonism of the forces upon which the world's progress depends. Though it seems at first a difficult thing to admit, still it may be affirmed that the mastery of the idea of a moral dualism is much more difficult to attain from this point than was the original comprehension of the idea of the antagonism of purely material order and disorder.

2. Conditions peculiar to Egypt.—A system of cosmogonic dualism like the above, generally achieved through the creation of myths, has been formulated in Egypt and in its ancient religions. But it has stopped, as a rule, among savage peoples, at the limits of ascertained knowledge, and has usually tended to end in pessimistic inaction. The future is a thing as uncertain as the present in development lies in the idea of the possible, then necessary, co-operation of man—and that without assuming any idea of a moral element; it is the much simpler case of the conviction that man can and must be the master of the sun and other beings to maintain order in the material world, and even, in a more humble way, that he can render material aid to the useful beings in their struggle against their enemies. This idea, though instinctive, cannot be crystallized without important preliminary indications supplied by Nature. These enable even elementary religions to abstract from the tumult and chaos of the innumerable phenomena of Nature a relatively clear vision of the great struggles of the elements, climatic and geographical. In this respect Egypt has been truly a privileged country (see § 5, and Calendar [Egyptian]).

In our present turn to investigate the separate elements that united to form a dualistic system in Egypt, we find (leaving out of account the innumerable secondary formations) three dualisms: (1) the Nile and its valley as opposed to the desert; (2) the supposed strife of the stars in the vault of heaven or in the invisible sky of the 'lover world'; and (3) the struggle between the sun and the powers of darkness, taking the place of the struggle of the stars. The whole becomes gradually more closely bound together.

It is difficult to decide whether the first group is the most ancient. A negative evidence seems to follow from the positive fact that the antagonism of the desert and the verdant soil of the valley is not mentioned in the ritual texts, legends, or iconography down to a very late date. Even the assimilation, affirmed throughout Egyptology, of Osiris with the valley, and of his enemy Set with the lonely destructive desert, is found, on thorough examination, to be an assertion of very late date, due to the veneration of Imhotep; and Plutarch is still the best authority to refer to in this matter.

Whatever its actual date, this 'naturalistic' division of dualism never came into the complete body of doctrine except in the form of a complementary explanation. A goody proportion of the pre-historic texts preserved in the Pyramid versions is, on the other hand, devoted to the motions and destinies of the sun. Its influence and the direct influence upon the rest of the world can be clearly deduced from an examination of Egyptian beliefs. The positions of the planets and constellations, the sudden appearance of such bodies as meteors, shooting stars, and comets, are regarded as manifestations of opposing shocks, of struggles to maintain or destroy the order of the universe. It is worth observing that, at this stage of development, the sun has very little importance in itself; its beneficent influence is hardly mentioned in the oldest beliefs, and there is, of course, no question of the sun's antagonism. This aspect can be explained, partly at least, by the small importance, in a country like Egypt, of the gradual disappearance of the heating force, or of the period in a year when it is of most use; it is, in fact, the same which is the case of any kind of beneficent activity. The Egyptian had not yet connected its visible course with the succession of the various seasons of the year—these were the work of the stars, of Sothis, the Great Bear, etc. The moon seems early to have attained a more definite character; its name of Ahi ('the Combatant') is a relic of a time when this planet held an important place in the Egyptian's studies.

On a close examination of the dualistic organization based upon the orbits and influences of the heavenly bodies, two periods can be distinguished in these times at once so remote and yet so far in advance of the starting-point. In one of these periods, the stars seem to produce a kind of group of demons and spirits who control a certain part of the celestial world—a region, a constellation, etc. (see Demons [Egypt].) And the nature of the operation is one of preventing the evil planets, constantly guarding them from the various monsters lying in wait throughout the whole firmament. (About a fifth of the Pyramid texts relate to this subject.) Groups of secondary spirits or genii, with no individual personality, are ranged around the combatants in each encounter, or are localized in a certain spot (bands of jackal spirits, monkey spirits, etc.); others, such as the humunum, form a bodyguard for the sun; and their importance decreases proportionately as the sun assumes a personality and importance for itself. These spirits gradually become groups of angels with no definite function, and in the end are practically confounded with the rays, or vital forces, of the sun.

In the second period, the antagonism of the world becomes accentuated, and the sun's beneficial protective role is defined over against a certain number of stars. These play a more active part, while the spirits of the regions fall into the background. These stars are early defined and regarded as digital, or diagnostic, signs of the day, of the dwellings of groups of spirits. They are described in the texts as accompanying the sun, preparing the way for it, defending it, battling unceasingly. Several deities of the Nile Valley, who were not stellar deities originally, show a tendency to become confused with these gods of the sky, and take a position on board the sun's barque. They all employ their time guiding the barque, reciting incantations, and pointing out dangers. The paintings of the Thelian period, though of very much later date, contain an exact picture of that period, and on the whole agree with essentials of the Pyramid texts. A steady succession of dangers (in which the pikes, harpoons, arrows, and lances of the gods play as important a part as the magic formulæ) is painfully surmounted by virtue of uniting efforts. The sun is guided, protected, and sustained, but never directed; it is not a chief; it simply submits passively to attacks and defenses. The cosmogonic order and well-being always win the day, but never decisively. For, although the sunny pole, and the forces getting into better order, so also is that of the bad gods. The conception is not yet formed that the kiospus is the personal work of the sun, but the fundamental idea is already there—that the kiosps...
DUALISM (Egyptian)

(ma'ait) depends upon the maintenance of the sun's action. On the other hand, Apophi, the single giant adversary of the sun, to begin with, gathers round him his helpers all the isolated spirits who had been wandering on their own account in the primitive struggle. These were the serpent gods of every kind, the boa (e.g., Book of the Dead, ch. 49) or serpent nafs, and all those serpents so vividly portrayed in the group of curious texts of the Pyramid of Unas against serpents; also a whole section of the crocodile gods of the marshes of the sky; and, finally, the earliest adversaries of the gods, the devils, and the sun in the heavens. The sun in the heavenly deserts, the cow, the giant tortoise, the fantastic monsters of the Theban frescoes, the gazelles with serpents' heads, etc. Thus narrowed down into a duel between light and darkness, the struggle between good and evil is imagined and described as taking place during the hours of the night, when the sun was invisible to the eyes of the Egyptians. The lower world is peopled with the god's 'friends' and 'enemies,' under the form of thousands of spirits helping or attacking the groups of gods who protect the sun in its course. The upper and lower heavens are thus peopled, like the earth, by representatives of the primitive dualism.

The evolution of this originally stellar dualism ends, after several thousands of years, in solar dualism. The sun Ra gradually ceases to be a protected god, and becomes a protector. The concept of the sun's isolation on the mountain of the hymns of the Theban period, when describing Ra (the classic sun) or Aten (the sun of Amarna religion), gives a good idea of the conception of the sun god. The fresco of Siptah and the paintings of Seti I. in the royal hypogyes of Thebes, show very well, though with too much mysticism at times, the very strenuous struggle which the sun carries on against the devils of his work; and in the world of darkness, where the 'enemies of Ra' are undergoing all sorts of punishments, the notion already appears that 'hostile' is the chief role of the sun against material light and order, but also in the struggle with everything that is in any way whatever a consequence or necessary complement of this light and order. This step, which was of the highest importance for the broadening of the nature of dualism, was due to the combination of solar dualism with the idea that the demigod Ra, the work of the after creation, through the descendants placed by the sun on this earth. If the Egyptian Ra, Lord of Order, was developed by means similar to those producing the earthly role of the Chaldean Shamash, and if the disturbers of the Egyptian ahotep are the same essentially as those of the Delta of the Emphates, this new and final element would appear to be peculiar to the Nile Valley. It rests upon the fundamental legend of Osiris, son of Ra, a god with human shape, and the distasteful hatred of his inheritors. The process of organization and civilization. Osiris, continued in Horus, left the carrying on of his task to the Divine continuations placed upon the throne of Horus—the Pharaohs, sons of the sun. See EGYPTIAN RELIGION.

The necessity of a counterpart gives rise to the romance of his struggle against Set. The slaying of Osiris, his resurrection, and his departure to the Other-world at one and the same time, shows that the sun once journeys into the lower world, and also make it possible to continue the rôle and reign of Osiris beyond the terrestrial life. At the same time, the legend of Horus succeeding his father Osiris on this earth, after avenging him, shows that the work once begun does not come to an end. In short, the fact that Set is not destroyed, but only conquered, is the solution of what is perhaps the most difficult and noblest problem in the struggle between good and evil in the world. A dualism which is confined to the origin of the world, with a struggle completed at the world's inception, cannot explain the persistence of evil. This becomes clear only when we admit that the struggle goes on indefinitely; and the conception of the battle of Osiris's successors against Set and his followers fits in with the parallel continuity of the ancient solar struggle in the celestial regions.

This parallelism gradually leads to a fusion of the characters of Osiris and Ra, which, we might almost say, was fated from the beginning. Osiris becomes one of the aspects of the struggling sun, and Ra, a means of apparently dying and returning to life. The world was, therefore, the chief role of the sun in the struggle between the forces of good and evil; and his work on the earth gets confused with the creative function of the sun. On the side of the evil forces there is even greater confusion between Set and Apophi, chief of the powers of darkness. Ra-Osiris, chief of all good forces, becomes more and more clearly opposed, as the centuries pass, to Set-Typhon-Apophi, chief of evil. The picture is completed in the last period by the assimilation of Osiris to the beneficent Nile and of Set to the hostile desert.

4. Final aspect of Egyptian dualism.—From this stage it is a comparatively easy step to the relative realization of a dualism with moral elements. The king of Egypt, grandson of Osiris and successor of Horus, in whom there lives, in virtue of his coronation, a portion of the soul of Ra, is strictly required to continue everything his ancestors have done on the earth and are still doing in the sky. The enemies of Ra and Osiris are his enemies, and, inversely, the enemies of the king are the enemies of Ra and Osiris. The gods and the people are a struggle against material light and order, but also in the combat with everything that is in any way whatever a consequence or necessary complement of this light and order. This step, which was of the highest importance for the broadening of the nature of dualism, was due to the combination of solar dualism with the idea that the demigod Ra, the work of the after creation, through the descendants placed by the sun on this earth. If the Egyptian Ra, Lord of Order, was developed by means similar to those producing the earthly role of the Chaldean Shamash, and if the disturbers of the Egyptian ahotep are the same essentially as those of the Delta of the Emphates, this new and final element would appear to be peculiar to the Nile Valley. It rests upon the fundamental legend of Osiris, son of Ra, a god with human shape, and the distasteful hatred of his inheritors. The process of organization and civilization. Osiris, continued in Horus, left the carrying on of his task to the Divine continuations placed upon the throne of Horus—the Pharaohs, sons of the sun. See EGYPTIAN RELIGION.
DUALISM (Greek).—1. The pre-Socratic pluralists. The view of the universe taken by the pre-Socratic philosophers was that the universe was materialistically monistic. This applies to the Ionian hylozoists (Milesian and Epicurean alike)—to Heraclitus as much as to Thales, Anaximander, and the others; for, though Heraclitus laid stress upon the ever-present "fire," since the explanatory term logos was to him merely an aspect of fire, it was only one side of the primary stuff or material out of which the world was formed. It applies also, although Parmenides and his followers emphasized Unity and denied Change, making the one Being and the other Non-being, the teaching is still materialistic and monistic (for the unity of Parmenides is 'corporal'), but the monism rests on the intellectual apprehension of Unity, not on the manipulation of a primary substance. It is the result of the philosophical intellect exercised on the world of our experience, as distinguished both from the scientific intellect and from the poetic imagination, as well as from mere sense-perception. In 'the Many' the intellect perceives only an illusory and a path that none can walk in, 'One'; 'the One' alone is true, and it alone exists. Dualism emerges first with the early pluralists—Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus; and it indicates the nature of the problem which was now being reached, and that the conception was clearly growing of the distinction between man as a thinking subject and the world as the object of thought. It has, therefore, both a cosmological and a psychological significance.

(1) Empedocles.—The first great principle on which Empedocles based his philosophy was that bodies in the universe, and the universe itself, consist of the four elements (he called them 'roots of things')—fire, air, water, earth; and that these are held together or kept in separation, as the case may be, by the two contrary forces Love and Hate. Regarded as a completed Sphinx, this world is conceived as broken up by degrees, through the interference of Hate or Discord, till the moment comes when Discord is supreme and chaos reigns, out of which order is again produced by the gradual influence and alternate dominance of Love, to be again succeeded by the disintegrating agency of Strife; and this alternate process goes on time without end. Here explicit expression is given to the dualistic conception of the world as composed of elements, these need to be moved; but they have no power of movement in themselves; consequently, they must be moved from without—that is, Love and Hate are needed as moveant forces. See, further, art. EMPEDOCLES.

(2) Anaxagoras.—The reputation of Anaxagoras in the history of philosophy rests mainly on two things: (1) his physical doctrine of homoeotemia; and (2) his explanation of the seemingly spiritualistic position that ὁ πάντων, or intellect, is the interpreting factor in the universe. In place of four elements, out of which everything was formed, as Empedocles had taught, Anaxagoras posits an infinite number of primitive substances, each and every one of homogeneous particles, 'which neither come into being nor perish, but persist eternally.' These Aristotelian designates ὁμοετής; whence the substantive and adjective of the same, one of the objects (of each) to designate existence by ὁμοετής and the doctrine thereof as set forth by Anaxagoras. Each homeoeometry is unique and unlike every other; yet each in its own way can exist in accord with the moveant force mixed with each. Consequently, if everything that is is mixed with everything (ὡς ἐν ὡς), a body is what it is simply because of the elements that are predominant in its structure.

George Foucart.
But the world is not explained by these conceptions alone. We require also to take account of our or intelligence. At the beginning, Anaxagoras says, "all things were together; then came mind and all things were formed in its order.

Dualism is an attempt to understand the universe as a whole and to differentiate the individual - a presentation of a teleological view of the world that anticipated Plato and Aristotle. It is the first clear statement in Greek thought that there is a plan and purpose in existence, that Nature has a meaning and is interpretable, and that physics is subordinate to metaphysics.

How far Anaxagoras himself realized the true import of his own doctrine is not known. On the one hand, he was aware of the opposition that the doctrine presents to the monotheistic idea of a God who is the cause of all things. On the other hand, he was aware of the opposition that the doctrine presents to the dualism of the Pythagoreans. The Pythagorean doctrine of the soul as the seat of knowledge and the body as the seat of sensuous perception was in opposition to the dualism of the Parmenideans. The Parmenideans regarded the soul as the seat of knowledge and the body as the seat of sensuous perception.

Duality is further apparent in Anaxagoras's doctrine of sense-perception. Accepting the principle that "that which is recognized by the senses is not recognized by the intellect," he proceeds to explain perception by the dual principle that "that which is recognized by the intellect is not recognized by the senses." He argues that the world is not divisible into parts, but is continuous and indivisible.

In early Greek thought, the Pythagoreans were the first to consider the universe in terms of its two fundamental principles, the one corresponding to the soul and the other to the body. The Pythagorean doctrine of the soul as the seat of knowledge and the body as the seat of sensuous perception was in opposition to the dualism of the Parmenideans.

It is the doctrine that the soul is the seat of knowledge and the body is the seat of sensuous perception. The soul is the seat of knowledge because it is the seat of the intellect, which is the seat of knowledge. The body is the seat of sensuous perception because it is the seat of the senses, which are the organs of perception.

This view of the body as essentially 'vile,' and a hindrance, not a help, to the soul, had great influence in Greek philosophy. It was later accepted by Plato, and it was the basis of the teaching of the mystical Greek Schools of later times—especially the neo-Platonists. See, further, art. PYTHAGOREANS.

3. Plato.—The dualism of Plato centres in his Theory of Ideas, but assumes various aspects according to the context or the point of view from which it is regarded. Besides its distinctly epistemological significance, it has a well-marked psychological bearing, depending on Plato's sharp-cut distinction between the soul and the body, and his doctrine of the soul as pre-existent as well as immortal, and the body as mortal.

Many of Plato's sayings show a dualistic tendency, and his opinion is that the final return to its original home through re-incarnations or metempsychoses. It has also a cosmological reference, both in connexion with the creation of the world, where Plato distinguishes between the soul as well as design or purpose, and in connexion with the creation of the Soul of the World and the creation of Man, whose composite nature presents a great difficulty.

(1) If, as Aristotle tells us, and as may very well be seen from a perusal of the Platonic Dialogues themselves, the three great influences that told on Plato in the formation of his philosophy were the Heraclitean doctrine of nothingness, the Parmenidean doctrine of the indistinguishability of the non-existent and the existent, and the Socratic unyielding demand for definitions and clear concepts pursued on a dialectic method that almost inevitably gave permanence to the concepts attained, the Platonic ideology naturally takes the following shape:

There are two worlds—the world of sense and the world of intelligence. The first is the sphere of change, of the fleeting and the fallacious; the second is the sphere of the permanent and the true. It is to the second of these worlds that Ideas belong; and they are not mere subjective representations, but transcendental self-subsistent entities, immutable and eternal—real independent of the existences, concrete, absolute, timeless and spaceless, and so unnominal. Being the universal, they are not derived from experience, but are presupposed as the conditions, and the ground and limit of being, but show and appearance—objects of 'opinion,' but not of 'Knowledge.' Yet sense is, and the Ideas must have a relation to it. What is the relation? Speaking generally, the answer is that Ideas are the causes of what really sense-objects possess; or, in other words, sense-objects 'participate' in Ideas. This is Plato's famous doctrine of 'participation' (phaino, or of phaino), which is intended to express the 'essence' of Ideas—known also as 'communion' (anamorphosis) and 'presence' (resomorphosis).

If, further, it is asked how sense-objects participate in the self-existent and eternal Ideas, the answer is given in the Philebus, that 'the One' is manifested in 'the Many' in a graded system of knowledge. This does not explain the fact of participation, but it throws light upon the mode. More suggestive still is the figure of 'the Line,' as representative of the cognitive process, in the sixth book of the Republic. Knowledge proper is thus shown to be absolutely distinct from opinion, which is the highest that sense in any of its forms can achieve. The Ideas of the Good is all-pervasive; while transcendent, it also immaterial; although itself above intellect and above sense, it is the cause of both (like the sun in the heavens) and permeates both. But here this should not be shown.

(2) The Platonic dualism is further seen when we raise the question with regard to Ideas, How do we come to know them? The answer to this is given in the Phaidon and the Phaedrus, and, again, in the Meno, viz., we ascribe them to a previous state of existence, the mind viewed the eternal Ideas; and, after its descent to earth and its union with the body, it is able to revive them in part. Only thus, it appeared to Plato, could we explain the facts that truth is attainable by
man at all, that learning is possible, and that virtue can be taught. There is metempsychosis (so, too, Pythagoras had said); and the explanation of knowledge is here. But our birth into this world, the union of the soul with the body, is a descent, and the full ascent is made only when the union is dissolved. Although the body is not regarded by Plato, except in the Timaeus, as essentially vile (in, to Plato, was simply a disease, arising in the souls from madness), yet it is the prison-house of the soul—a clog and hindrance to its complete development and highest perfection. It is mortal and, therefore, a restraint to the immortal, obstructing its clear vision and retarding its perfect acquisition of virtue. On the side of intellectual knowledge, it drags down the soul to the fleeting and transitory, for the body operates through the senses, and these deal with the fleeting and the changeable only. On the side of ethical achievement, it is apt to lower morality and to replace virtue by pleasure, and so to render the perception of ethical ideas faint.

There is truth in the conception of the body as lower than the soul but it is certainly not the whole truth. There is another side to it, namely, that which Browning has so finely expressed in Rabbi Ben Ezra, where it is maintained that:

"...about things
Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more, now, than flesh helps soul!"

Nor does the doctrine of metempsychosis meet the real difficulty. It does not explain how the mind that has had pre-natal sight of the eternal Ideas should come to be joined to a body at all—how the clear vision of the pre-existent state should come to be lost. As to how the soul of man came to fall from its pristine condition, Plato simply says, metempsychosis. But it at once becomes apparent that this view is incapable of keeping up with the gods in the pursuit of reality, 'and through some ill-hap sink beneath the double load of forgetfulness and vice, and their wings fall from them, and they drop to the ground' (see the Myth of the Charioter in the Phaedrus). But what rational necessity there is in this, making a fundamental difference among pre-existent souls, is not obvious. Once metempsychosis gets a start, then the fact of a partially impure life here may explain the necessity of a return, for purposes of purification and of spiritual progress, to earthly life; but how metempsychosis should be the basis of this, or, in other words, how the state of matters necessitating metempsychosis originates, is not shown. Yet this should be shown, if Plato's theory is to be rational throughout.

(3) Into the details of the Platonic cosmology as elaborated in the Timaeus, it is impossible here to enter. The problem is—Given the Platonic Forms or Ideas as eternal immutable existences, and given also the eternal existence of Matter (matter orderless, chaotic, ruled by necessity), how were the order and the beauty of the former to be imparted to the latter? The answer is that the Divine Reason, the Demiurge or Creator, produced the marvellous effect that we know as the world by working upon matter according to an eternal archetype or pattern existing in the Divine mind. According to this intelligible archetype the visible universe as it now exists, and it is the Universe itself, simply to the goodness of the Creator. The result is that the Universe is an animated rational existence, a God; having a Body (σώμα), a Soul (ψυχή), and Mind (νοῦς). Yet, this Universe is not perfect. This arose from the fact that the Demiurge, in working upon matter, met with the pre-conusical and extra-conusical resistance of Necessity (Ἀνέγγειλα). Necessity (πρέπει αὐτῷ) how could it be vanquished? Not, according to Plato, by coercion, but by persuasion. In so far, then, as the Creator could gain Necessity by persuasion, to that extent could he freely execute his design on matter; but, at the point where Necessity resisted and refused to be persuaded, the Demiurge was powerless; hence the imperfection of the cosmos. This is all right, but what is needed is the acknowledgment of a radical dualism in Plato's thinking.

Similarly, the dualistic conception comes out in Plato's account of the soul. The mortal part of him is the workmanship of 'the gods,' but the rational and immortal part is supplied by the Demiurge himself. This division of functions was necessary because nothing mortal could be created by the Demiurge, and, had man been wholly his creation, it might have been possible to cast the blame of man's sin and folly upon the Creator. As formed by the gods, man is a miniature of the cosmos—a microcosmos; but, as his constructors had only mortal elements to work with, their handiwork had flaws and imperfections in it peculiar to the situation. It was theirs simply to create the god-like and the two mortal souls: the spirited and the appetitive (τὰ ψυχικά καὶ τὰ εὐθυμιακά), and to effect the junction of these with the immortal soul, or ψυχή. As the mortal and immortal souls were antagonistic to each other, the best way to do this was to place them in such positions within the body (the skull, the breast, the belly) that the action of each upon the others should be as conducive as possible to god. This is pictorially attractive, but it does not remove the difficulty. The curious relation of the Demiurge to matter and to man, as represented in the Timaeus, is practically an acknowledgment of inability to solve the riddle of the two souls.

4. Aristotle.—The greatest critic of the Platonic Theory of Ideas in ancient times was Aristotle. His criticisms are many and various, but they all centre in the objection that the two worlds—the world of sense and the world of intellect—are left by Plato apart, and that no real explanation is given of change in the world of phenomena. Either the Ideas are an unnecessary duplicate of the facts of experience, or they are useless, inoperative. Nevertheless, Aristotle had been the pupil of Plato, and the doctrine of Ideas left its permanent mark upon him. Hence, a metaphysical dualism which, in other words, how the state of matters necessitating metempsychosis originates, is not shown. Yet this should be shown, if Plato's theory is to be rational throughout.

This dualism assumes various aspects as the different parts of Aristotle's two systems are passed in review. It is specially prominent in his Psychology, in that part of it which deals with the metaphysics of the soul (for psychology was by no means all empirical to Aristotle), and in his Theory of Virtue, or the theory of treatment of the relation of God to the Universe.

(1) The psychological dualism appears in the very definition that Aristotle gives of the soul itself, and in the distinction that he makes between soul and body. Soul he defines as 'the first entelechy [the earlier or implicit realization] of a natural body possessing life potentially': ἀριστερὰ τοῦ φύσεως πνεύματος φυσικὸς δύναμις [τὸ ἑρμηνευτικόν (de An. 412b. 27)]. The body he here regards as matter, to which soul stands in the relation of
form: as Spenser puts it (Hymn in Honour of Beauty, line 132),

‘For of the soul the body form doth take,
Form: as the body form, and doth the body make.’

‘Life is the power of the body to nourish itself, to grow of itself, and to decay of itself; so that, if for matter ‘form’ and ‘form’ we substitute ‘potenti
ty’ and ‘power’, and if we substitute the first state of actuality from the second, as we dis

This clearly distinguishes Aristotle’s view from Plato’s. Plato opposed soul to body, regarding
the latter as the prison-house of the former, and allowed only that the body could be trained
in gymnastic and music to obey the soul. To Aristotle, on the other hand, the body is the
natural instrument of the soul, and so is pre
dominantly the more necessary to form the
concrete particular which we know as the in
dividual human being. Yet, Aristotle adds:

‘It is, however, perfectly conceivable that there may be some particular soul which belongs to
the body, and this because they are not, the expression or realization of any partic
ular body. And, indeed, it is further matter of doubt whether being is the exact re
solution of the body may not on the other hand stand to it in the same separable rela
tion as a sailor to his boat!’

Dualism comes out sharply when Aristotle
reaches the handling of the highest function of
the soul, viz. intellect or nous, where he discrim
inates between the active and the passive nous, and
between nous prinopos and the other psychic
functions. His scheme of functions, beginning
with the lowest, is: nutritive or vegetative soul
(ro droskopos); sentient soul (ro dphptrikos), includ
ing the conative soul (ro dphmikos), which he sometimes
makes a separate function; and intellectual or
noetic soul (noos ro noetikos), divided, as above,
into passive noos (noos dphptrikos) and active noos
(noos noetikos). Each higher function presupposes
the lower, though the lower does not presuppose
dependent on the body.

Thus, the sentient soul presupposes the
vegetative soul, and both sentient and vegeta
tive souls are presupposed by the noetic soul; but
the vegetative soul, or more strictly, the sentient
soul, and not the sentient presupposes the noetic.
It is characteristic of noos that it is eternal and
immortal—at any rate, this applies to the active
or poietic noos; it is introduced into the individual
human being ab extra, and the difficulty is to find
what connexion it has, on the one hand, with the
passive noos and with the other functions of the
soul generally, and, on the other hand, with the
body. As has been said above, it is distinctive of
Aristotle that he recognizes the intimate and indis
soluble relation of soul to body, and the necessity
of taking account of the physiological as well as of
the psychical aspect of mental facts and processes.

His great objection to dualism is, that the transmig
ration of souls was that it assumes that any body is suitable to any soul, whereas the
human body is specially fitted for the soul. To
maintain for soul in form, and deny the body in
saying that the carpenter’s art ‘clothes itself in flues;
the truth being that, just as art makes use of its
appropriate instruments, so the soul must make use
of its body’ (De An. 410b6, 25). But,
when he comes to treat of the active soul,’ it
is a different kind of soul’ (noos) from the others, and ‘it alone admits
of separation, as the eternal from the perishable’
(kadpentr to dhlion to phlogeo).

Still further, the dualism of form and matter
enters into Aristotle’s theory of sense-perception.
(2) The theoretical aspect of the concept of the
dualism has been brought out in the art. DESIRE
(Greek), and need only be referred to here.
On the one side is God, who is the prime unmoved
movent, to which the universe evermore looks desiderating;
and on the other side is the world, though dependent on the Deity and derived from
Him, is, nevertheless, regarded as not created at
one particular time but as eternally existent.
This might be interpreted as simply Aristotle’s way of indicating his belief in impersonal reason
as permeating the universe, and yet he at times
has glimpses of a personal God, apart from the
world and ruling it, as a general does his army.

We must consider also, he says, in which of two ways the nature of the universe contains the good or the highest
being, whether as something separate and apart from
the parts. Probably in both ways, as an army does. For
the good is found both in the order and in the leader, and more in the
latter; for he does not depend on the order, but it depends
on him’ (Met. xii. 10. 1075b, 16).

Moreover, Galen in himself conceived by Aris
totle as Thought, and God’s Thought is defined as
‘the thinking upon thought’ (aiv ton tov noetikou
nous) (Met. xii. 9. 1074a, 30). Personality
is involved in this.

5. In later Greek systems.—Besides the dualisms
that have been now considered, it is to be observed
that there is frequently a dualistic note in Greek
monism, which need not, however, be more than
adverted to here. This applies particularly to the
post-Aristotelian schools. For example,
Stoics found a difficulty in adjusting their doctrine of
the primitive material substance ‘fire’ to the require
ments of man’s rationality; and, in especial, the
neo-Platonists disclosed a distinct dualism in their
system of the Absolute when they came to evolve
their famous Triad of Absolute Unity, Absolute
Intelligence, and Absolute Soul, and therefrom
matter and all that is finite (see the neo-Platonic
section in art. DESIRE [Greek]). The problem of
how to derive Matter from Mind on a mystical
basis is a difficulty that is inherent in every doctrine
of Emanation and seems to be insurmountable.

SUMMARY.—We have now described the leading types of dualism in Greek phil
osophy. The term ‘dual
ism’ is one, but it has diverse signification.
(1) It has a cosmological application, as is seen in the
vocative use of the term by Aristotle in the meaning
of separation as that of the noos in Aristotle.
(3) It has (a) a metaphysical application, as expressive
of the doctrine which maintains that there is a dis
parity between Mind and Matter and the impos
sibility of reducing the one to the other, and
designates the opposite of monism; and (b) an
epistemological application, as in Plato’s grand
attempt to explain the possibility of knowledge in
his Theory of Ideas and in Aristotle’s doctrine of
Form and Matter. (4) There is an application of
the term that is ethical and religious, which has
reference to the dualism between the human
body and the soul, and to the view that the body is a clog
or hindrance to the development of the soul and
may be the seat of sin and degradation.

Lastly, there is a theological application, when
when as by Plato in the Phaedo, this is in
volved as the product of opposing principles—God
and necessity—and an explanation is offered of the
seeming defects in creation which shall minimize
the difficulty of a purely teleological rendering of
the universe. These various meanings, though not mutually exclusive, are distinct, and they should be kept distinct, if the positions of the Greek thinkers are to be understood.

Lewis Carroll—Practically all the books and stories of Lewis Carroll are set in a world dominated by dualistic concepts.

The Wittenberg churchyard—The churchyard of Wittenberg is a significant location in the history of Western thought.

The Battle of Parnassus—The Battle of Parnassus is a famous literary event.

The dualistic universe—The dualistic universe is a central concept in various philosophical and religious traditions.

DUALISM (Iranian)—A tendency towards dualistic conceptions, or, perhaps we may say, towards bilateral symmetry, seems to be an essential characteristic of the Iranian mind. This is to be seen in the constantly recurring distinction of the 'two worlds,' the world of Spirit and the world of Matter—a common concept in the Gathas (e.g. Veda xxix. 5); or, again, in the two lives, the present and the future (cf. Uvēsīya...ahūya, st. lvii. 22; ubōyā ahvīvy, st. xli. 2). This symmetrical dualism, or 'polarity,' as S. Leing would probably style it, finds quaint expression in a curious diagram, attributed to the celebrated minister of Yazdagird I., Atrapat, preserved in the Dinkort (iv. 137, ed. Peshotan, Bombay, 1883), which is represented thus:

![Dualism Diagram]

It will be seen that this curious table divides the whole notion of being into two correlative worlds of Spirit and Matter, with terms relatively corresponding to one another on opposite sides of the central notion itself. But the religious dualism which is ordinarily considered to be the chief characteristic of the Zoroastrian religion. Yet there is no point in connexion with that faith which has given rise to so much controversy among both native and Western scholars. The modern Parsis stoutly deny that their faith is, or ever was, dualistic; and a similar view is held by more than one distinguished European authority.

E. W. West attempted to defend Mazdaism from the accusation of dualism, 'made in good faith by Muhammadan writers, and echoed more insistently by Christians,' though he blames the Parsis that they for themselves for having admitted it, at least during the Middle Ages (see 'Pahlavi Texts,' p. i. in SBE, vol. v. p. lviii f., also pt. ii. lb. vol. xviii. p. xiv). Quite recently J. H. Moulton, in a lecture on Mazdaism, asserted that 'there was never anything that could be called dualism. There were two powers, it was true. We were told that in the beginning one of them chose good and the other chose evil. They began a long, continuous struggle, which was to go on to the end of time, but the end was to be the final destruction of the power of good and the final destruction of the power of evil. That was not dualism. If it was, Christanity could not be reconciled with it.'

It appears to the present writer that the whole question is one of terms. It cannot, of course, be denied that the Supreme God of the Avesta is Ahura Mazda, conceived as essentially good, and the author and creator of all that is good, who is also repeatedly spoken of as Spenta Mainyu (the Holy Spirit), and that in opposition to him is Ahrā Mainyu (the Destroying Spirit). These two opposing principles are, of course, the Ormazd and Abrāfin, respectively of later Persian literature. As is well known, the whole religious system of Mazdaism may be said to consist in the perennial warfare between these two powers. Certainly the mere fact of the antagonism between a good and an evil spirit and their respective followers would not of itself constitute a real dualism in the Avesta, any more than in the Christian, system. But the real point of the matter is that, according to the Avesta system, (1) there exists a Being, evil by his own nature and the author of evil, who does not owe his origin to the creator of good, but who exists independently of him; and (2) this Being is an actual creator, who calls into being creatures and those of the Good Spirit and contrary to his will.

Here is seen the fundamental difference between the Avesta and the Christian (or Muhammadan) theology. In the latter the evil spirit, so far from having an evil independent of God, who is actually His creature, though fallen and rebellious, and certainly is never conceived as creating any beings whatsoever. The distinction seems to be decisive. So far is the idea of the creative power of the evil spirit carried in the Avesta, that not only is Ahrā Mainyu represented as creator of a vast host of demons (daeva), but even this physical world and its inhabitants are divided into creatures of the good and the evil spirits respectively—to the latter being attributed cold, sickness, and even noxious animals, such as wolves, poisonous snakes, etc. The very beginning of the Vendidad is an enumeration of the various plagues created by Ahrā Mainyu in opposition to the various lands and countries created by Ahura Mazda, a special verb (fra-kerb, translated by Darmesteter as 'counter-create') being employed in opposition to the verb ag, attributed to the good spirit. This conception of a double creation was continued, and even enhanced, during the post-Avestan, or Patriotic period, as it has been termed. Even among the heavenly bodies the elements are considered as creatures of the evil spirit and opponents of the constellations and the stars created by the good spirit. Similarly in some of the Pahlavi treatises, the pole is divided; the lists are given of the animals, arranged in two hostile armies, among those of the good creation being the falcon, magpie, crow, kite, mountain-ox and goat, wild ass, dog, fox, etc., whilst the serpent, locust, wolf, and intestinal worms are of the evil creation. There can, we think, be no doubt that all through the Zoroastrian system, from the Avesta down to the Pahlavi theologians, the evil spirit is considered as one with the Creator, and for a reason, even apart from the question of his origin, the system may justly be termed dualistic. It is quite true that, according to the general teaching, Ahrā Mainyu and his hosts are to be entirely and utterly destroyed at the last day, but it can scarcely be denied that, at least in the original system, his origin is quite distinct from that of Ahura Mazda, and that the two-spirits are co-existent, from eternity. We have here a Zoroastrianism limited and modified by dualism, as well as a dualism modified by an ultimate monothelism. These theories may seem to us inconsistent. No doubt the origin of evil lies here in the struggle between the principal divinities, which all religions have had to face, and the form given to this solution character-
izes the divergences which distinguish them from one another. Mazdeism of every age has sought this solution in the doctrine of two independent hostile and diametrically opposite principles—the principle or spirit of Good, and the principle or spirit of Evil. The consistency which we require in such a solution did not fail to present itself to the Iranian mind, and from early times we find that theories were devised as a means of escaping from the difficulties of this dualism. These may be grouped generally under two hypotheses: (1) that the two spirits have sprung from a single, indifferent, pre-existing source; (2) that the Evil Spirit proceeds from the Good Spirit, by generation or creation. The former is the doctrine of the Zervanists, the latter that of the Gayomartians. The Zervanists, according to the descriptions preserved by the Armenian historians, went back to a primal being, Zervan Akarana, lit. ‘Universal Time,’ sometimes apparently identified with Destiny; and this prordial being was supposed to have generated both Ormazd and Ahriman. Zervan, however, seems to be thought in the mind of the produced by an evil spirit, the ‘evils’ or the ‘lilith.’ The Good Spirit. This is practically the solution of the modern Parsees, who make a sharp distinction between Ahura Mazda and Spenta Mainyu. They point out that, especially in the Gathas, Ahura Mazda is constantly opposed, not to Ahura Maalez, but to Spenta Mainyu. Ahura Mazda, the ‘blessed and primary spiritual and sole creator. He is, however, possessed of two ‘faculties’—Spenta Mainyu, or the faculty whose function is beneficent, and Ahura Mazda, whose function is destructive. One cannot not on the first a single monotheistic suggest in unambiguously suggested by the Hindu doctrine of the functions of Vigna and Siva in the Hindu triad. A quite recent Parsee theologian has advanced a new theory, holding that Spenta Mazda and Ahura Mazda denote the good and evil spirits respectively of man, and not of the Divinity (Rastamji Edulji, Zarathushtra and Zarathushtrianism in the Avesta, Leipzig, 1906, pp. 140–159); but we are not aware that this is anything more than a peculiar view of the author. It is an approximation to the Christian doctrine of the origin of evil in the free will of the creature.

LITERATURE.—E. W. West: ‘Pahlavi Texts,’ pars i. ii. in S.B.R.P., vol. iv. ii. (Oxford, 1880); C. de Harlez and J. Piq, Pahlav. Lex., Paris, 1891, Introd., par. lxxviii–lxxviii; A. V. Williams Jackson, ‘Die iran. Religion, or the Avesta’ (I. ii. 1890) 483–487 (Dualism is a characteristic trait of Zarootser’s faith, and in its widest sense—whatever its ultimate source—was undoubtedly the product of his own genius. This dualism is monothetic and optimistic, in that it postulates the final triumph of Ormazd and the destruction of all evil); L. C. Casartelli, Ph. D. of the Magada- yanist Rel. under the Sassanids, Eng. tr., Bombay, 1889, pp. 50–54; ‘The Zarathushtraic Theology of the Present Day,’ in Babylonia and Oriental Record, vol. v. (1900) 222–229; embodying a ‘nineteenth century reconstituted’ by a modern Parsee theologian; and all the writers on the Avesta and Zarathushtrianism. Cf. Literature at end of art. AYTRA.

L. C. CASARTELLI.

DUALISM (Jewish).—Traces of a belief in two conflicting supernatural beings striving for the mastery are nowhere found in the pre-exilic writings of the OT. In the oldest religious belief of the Israelites, Jahweh’s jurisdiction extended over all nature, and Jahweh meant not war with any neighbouring god or demon. There was no evil spiritual being endeavoring to subvert His moral government. While dualism ascribes evil to a divinity, the ancient OT did not find any difficulty in making it emanate from Jahweh Himself (cf. Am 39). No doubt the Israelite was subject to the same psychological laws which raise a horror of the dark and of uninterrupted and desolate places, and horror with malicious hurtful beings than are recorded in the OT; but his mythology was of his own creation and associated with his surroundings. Observing a multiplicity of wild life on the edge of the desert, such as monstrous serpents, jerboa, and wild goats, his imagination searched them with intelligence, and assigned them a habitation in the interior of the desert. There arose the ists, the ‘satan’, the ‘lilith.’ It is doubtful, however, how far he considered them as ‘sublime.‘ They were physically injurious to man when he entered their domain, but did not come into his religious and cosmic views. The monotheism of the OT writers kept the popular beliefs in demonology or belief in demons in the background. The solitary mention of Azazel (q.v.), to whom a goat was sent out on the Day of Atonement, is too obscure to justify any conclusions as to the origin of that rite or the person of Atonement. In Lv 16 the act is viewed as symbolic of a transference of the nation’s sins to another land. The nature and habitation of Azazel are left undefined, as if unknown or of no consequence. Nor is the OT an independent Divinity. The root signifies ‘to oppose’ (by standing in the way), not necessarily in a bad cause. In Nu 22:27, 28 the angel of Jahweh was a satan to Balaam. A personal satan occurs first in passages of the later stages of the Old Testament. Satan is a person, not a eter)

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Already in Tobit (3)—an early pre-Maccabean romance—an evil spirit, no longer, according to Hebrew, from Jehovah, but of foreign origin, slew seven innocent men. Asmodaeus was banished by migration into the wilderness of Egypt, but survived in Jewish tradition as king of the devils. Yet, as against the power of evil spirits (Ber. 51), has been conjectured to be the Smeros of the Avesta, who contends with the Devas night and day (Yasna lix. 10-23; cf. Trea. Avest. Eschat. ii. 10; Tübingen, 1808, p. 339). But it is not he who causes the cock to herald the approaching light, but 'Blessed art Thou, O Lord our God, King of the Universe, who hast given to the cock intelligence to distinguish between day and night' (Daily Morn. Pr.).

The contest in favour of monotheism was carried on by the Rabbis in their combats with Magianism, Gnosticism, and the Minim who believed in two powers, a duality in the Godhead (Friedländer, Die relig. Bewegungen, Berlin, 1905, pp. 193-234; Bergmann, Jud. Apologetik, Berlin, 1908). The Minsha enacts that God should be blessed for evil no less than for good (Ber. ix. 5). A reader in the synagogue should be silenced if he says, 'Thy name be remembered concerning good, or 'We praise Thee, We praise Thee' (ib. v. 3). 'Whosever of angels or spirits, if another object is rooted out of the world' (Suk. 45b). In the Passover service the redemption from Egypt and the slaying of the first-born are emphatically stated as accomplished by God in person: 'I am the Lord thy God, and I am not a scribe, and I am not a messenger."

The strong assertions of the Divine unity and the all-importance of legalism left no room in the Halakhia for Satanology. Hence the Mishna is free from it. Where Satan does occur in the Haggada of the Talmud and Midrash, the description is coarse, puerile, and inconsistent. At one time he is a fallen angel, at another an evil spirit, from heaven, 'he caught hold of Michael's wing,' but the Holy One, blessed be He, rescued Michael (Yalk. Shim. 68; see Kohn, Angelologie, 1886, p. 63). Then he is the 'Great Prince in Heaven' (Pirke d. R. Eliezer, 13); he is also Michael being seeing, he is called, 'the poison of God,' because of his identity with the angel of death. The Qabbala and the mediaval Mystics restored Satan to his ancient greatness and dignity. The pious and puerile, still said by some Jewish communities on the Day of Atonement, reads like a chapter from the Avesta.

If the person of Satan is undefined in Jewish theology, the existence of the yēser ha-rā (in Dabb. bithra, 166, identical with Satan and the angel of death) is a Jewish dogma. This theologomenon is based on the yēser of Gn 3:19, rendered in the AV 'imagination,' and connoting that faculty of the soul which is the cause of rebellion against God. The yēser became very early hypothesized in Jewish theology (cf. the antithesis in yāser  yēser yēser), 'Woe to me because of my tempter' (Jer. 6:28). He is the 'strange god' of Ps 81:1, dwelling in man (Shabb. 105a). As the source of sin, he was already known to Sranach as erēna (211'), ḫī?ytna (37'), rā陌生人 (156), and others in the Apocrypha, where human dichotomy is asserted, such as Wis 10:1, an approach was made towards metaphysical dualism; yet the spirit of legalism checked its further development. Where, as the very virtues of the wicked ( 1 eunomies) are vices in the eyes of the righteous (Yeb. 103a), a Jew can keep the Law and be sinless. 'Blessed are Israelites. When they are occupied with the study of the Law and the performance of good works, the yēser is delivered into their hands, and not they into the hands of the yēser' (Abod. zara, 5b; Kid. 30a; cf. Sir 21:1). He is not a human faculty and therefore not ante-natal, but an adjunct

1 The substitution of 'all' for 'evil' is for the sake of euphony (Ber. 116), probably also from an aversion to terminate anything with a word of evil omen.

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at birth (Senk. 916). He is situated at the left,1 the other dem ez machin, the yerer (ob, being at the right (T. an d. 11u). According to Ber. 61d, he resembles a fly,2 and is placed between the valves of the heart. He was Divinely created for a benevolent purpose. Unless he existed, 1 man would build a house, or man or woman children, or there was no life of the earth (Gen. R. 80). At the end of the world the God will slay him in the presence of the righteous and wicked (Suk. 525).

DUELLING. — I. Under civilization. — Although early Schoolmen declared that the judicial duel was Divinely instituted when David fought Goliath (1 S. 17), the point never ceased to trouble the early Christian Church. Their investigation of the sanctity of the highest antiquity, the origins of the duel elude definite ascertainment as completely as do the various ordeals among the oldest peoples, of both East and West. Found in various forums, from Japan to Ireland, and from the Mediterraneoan to the northern latitudes, it was yet no universal practice, but mainly European 'where the hazel grew', and its traces are scattered. The solemnities preceding the single combat of the Celts and Romans (U. iii. 38 ff.) are marked indications of ancient custom and ceremonial in Homerian times. Historie Greek examples fall, but the usage existed among the ancient Umbrians and among the Slavs (Nicolaus Damascenus (Didot, Frag. Hist. Graecorum, iii. 457); Kelly, Hist. of Russia, London, 1878, pp. 33, 53; Lea, Superstition and Force, Philadelphia, 1892, pp. 108, 110). While the legends of the Greek, battle of the Horatii and Curiatii (Livy, iv. xxiv. f.) may point to an archaic practice among the Romans, the system of trial by battle has neither any tradition in the fragments of early Roman law nor any countenance from the jurists or the code. Roman civilization knew the duel as a Barbarian institution. Scipio Africanus (206 B.C.) met it in Spain (Livy, xxvii. xxi.); it flourished among the Celtic and Germanic tribes (Velleius Paterculus, ii. 117 f.; Paulus, Germ. 16); and a particular tradition, unusually circumstantial, associates it with the Burgundians, and ascribes its revival to King Gundobald (A.D. 501) as an anticy to forewarn the efforts induced by Christian compurgation (Leges Burgundionum, ut. xiv.). Wide diversity of application and form existed; but, with the overthrow of the Empire, the duel as part of the Barbarian code became a sort of common law in Europe, fostered by the martial traditions which were developing into feudalism and were to culminate in chivalry.

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Before the close of the 12th cent. the jurisdiction of the duel was considerably restricted in England by Glanvil's 'great assise,' a sort of magnified jury. The tendency expanded; gradually the duel was superseded in civil causes except land-rights; burghal charters from Henry I. to Henry III. gave numerous exemptions; and by the time of Edward I. the practice was largely confined to trials on the writ of right to land and to 'appeals' for manslaughter and serious crime. Although trial by jury grew fast, the duel was long to remain. The importance of land litigations explains the origin of the professional 'pugil,' or champion, kept sometimes at a regular retaining fee by a religious house. 'From the quilk conneutude,' said Sir John Skene (Exposition of Difficult Words, 1597, s.e. 'Campion'), 'omnis the common saying.

'Do thou rich, do thou strong, Chels thor a champion strong.'

In criminal cases a kindred but more corrupt product was the 'approver,' an informer, frequently infamous, who in making his charge underwent the risk of a challenge to battle. The loser in appeals of battle, being convicted of perjury by the fact of defeat, was hanged; and there is extant a contemporary picture of an approver who thus came to the bad end he had earned (Maitland, Select Pleas of Crown, Selden Soc., London, 1888).

From the 9th cent. the Church was continuously decrying the duel, and duelling simultaneously giving it countenance. The latter process took many forms, one being the acquisition of jurisdiction by ecclesiastical dignitaries over trials by combat. Perquisites of court deduced even clerical minds from the trials. Sometimes a demur of the law courts fought duels in person, and it was as hard to stop the practice as to keep churchmen from bearing arms in war. A Glasgow pontiffal in 1180 includes the liturgy of annual fasts for bearing the shield and baton for a duel, and some saints were esteemed especially efficacious to be invoked for success in such combats. In the First Crusade,

1 Hence his name in the Zohar, וְיָדָו, 'the other side,' 'sinister.'

2 Like Ahbram in the Avesta.
Peter the Hermit himself bore a challenge for a duel of ten, six, or three crusaders against an equal number of Saracens (Taraneti, cap. 81). As usual, practice beclothe precept, and anathema was assailed as a equivalent on the duel in the 15th cent. (Olivier de La Marche, in Traité du duel judiciaire, ed. Prost, Paris, 1872, p. 44) declares that ecclesiastics, like other people, were bound to fight if it involved a point of the faith. The sanctions of the duel occasioned much deep discussion. Nicolas de Lyra wrote a treatise on the ancient precedent of David and Goliath; Cain and Abel admittedly furnished a less satisfactory example.

Until the end of the 13th cent. the duel was a duel of law, but in the 14th it blossomed anew as a duel of chivalry, once more emphasizing its aristocratic and military impulses. The duel, rapidly decaying in other matters, became the fashion for appeals of treason, and this newer chivalric duel took on fresh splendor, especially in the courts of England and France. An important ordinance of England and France in 1396 was a characteristic code, containing regulations most of which passed into general use in chivalric courts. Notable editions of such duel codes were those compiled in the beginning of England under Richard II, and the reproduction of it in the Order of Combats preserved by the Constable of Scotland from a MS belonging to James I. The formalities were evidently known to Chancer, who reproduced them in the Knight's Tale.

There had arisen in that new epoch the private duel, as distinguished from the duel under form of law or chivalry. The Fair in 1306 was a curious institution, fostering the code, and its reproduction of the duels that the Constable of Scotland from a MS belonging to James I. The formalities were evidently known to Chancer, who reproduced them in the Knight's Tale.

Mere tilting matches, different as they were in principle from duels, are easily confused with them, especially when they were 'jousts of war,' in which the combat was a symbolism of the chivalric ideals. Some of these are historic, such as the 'Combat des Trente' in 1351 between thirty Bretons and thirty Englishmen. It is the subject of a French chanson de geste, and its interest is the greater from its having supplied a model for the clan duel (in 1366) of thirty Highlanders of Clan Chattan against thirty of Clan Kay. Not a few fruitless challenges of 100 knights against 100 are extant, and there were many actual duels of numbers, such as of 13 Frenchmen against 13 Italians, and 7 Frenchmen against 7 English. The duel, strictly construed as a combat of two, adjudged by and fought before a court, invariably noble and largely royal, had long a distinctive chivalry for trials of cause in cases of treason, where legal proofs were inadequate. It suited the times. Fourteenth century England devised a Court of Chivalry in which the historical importance of the duel culminated in the wager of war between the Dukes of Hereford and Norfolk in 1308. This duel was stopped at the onset by Richard II, who arbitrarily and illegally exiled both combatants. Hereford returned from his exile next year to depose Richard and take the throne as Henry IV, and it was he who at his coronation jocously assured his champion that he would himself see to the defence of his right to the crown. The 'champion of England' was one of the institutional inventions of English chivalry in the 14th century.

Meanwhile, alongside of chivalry the old duel of law was extensively practised. The Law in the 13th and 14th cent. had no shudder for its brutality, and Bracton could calmly record (de Legibus Anglie, ed. 1640, fol. 145) that the loss of a front tooth maimed a man and gave him an excuse for dueling, and that death bore much to its victory. Pitiful records in the 15th cent. show this, gruesome enough, to have been literal fact, for graces attendant on chivalry encountering before kings were absent when humble combatants in inferior courts maned each other with latan or 'hiscorne,' and tore each other with their teeth. One does not marvel that Pope Nicholas, in 867, had denied the Divine institution of the duel, but one does marvel that nearly seven centuries afterwards, John Major's protest, that 'God did not settle questions in that had well authority on the duel in the 15th cent. (Olivier de La Marche, in Traité du duel judiciaire, ed. Prost, Paris, 1872, p. 44) declares that ecclesiastics, like other people, were bound to fight if it involved a point of the faith. The sanctions of the duel occasioned much deep discussion. Nicolas de Lyra wrote a treatise on the ancient precedent of David and Goliath; Cain and Abel admittedly furnished a less satisfactory example.

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Mere tilting matches, different as they were in principle from duels, are easily confused with them, especially when they were 'jousts of war,' in which the combat was a symbolism of the chivalric ideals. Some of these are historic, such as the 'Combat des Trente' in 1351 between thirty Bretons and thirty Englishmen. It is the subject of a French chanson de geste, and its interest is the greater from its having supplied a model for the clan duel (in 1366) of thirty Highlanders of Clan Chattan against thirty of Clan Kay. Not a few fruitless challenges of 100 knights against 100 are extant, and there were many actual duels of numbers, such as of 13 Frenchmen against 13 Italians, and 7 Frenchmen against 7 English. The duel, strictly construed as a combat of two, adjudged by and fought before a court, invariably noble and largely royal, had long a distinctive chivalry for trials of cause in cases of treason, where legal proofs were inadequate. It suited the times. Fourteenth century England devised a Court of Chivalry in which the historical importance of the duel culminated in the wager of war between the Dukes of Hereford and Norfolk in 1308. This duel was stopped at the onset by Richard II, who arbitrarily and illegally exiled both combatants. Hereford returned from his exile next year to depose Richard and take the throne as Henry IV, and it was he who at his coronation jocously assured his champion that he would himself see to the defence of his right to the crown. The 'champion of England' was one of the institutional inventions of English chivalry in the 14th century.

Meanwhile, alongside of chivalry the old duel of law was extensively practised. The Law in the 13th and 14th cent. had no shudder for its brutality, and Bracton could calmly record (de Legibus Anglie, ed. 1640, fol. 145) that the loss of a front tooth maimed a man and gave him an excuse for dueling, and that death bore much to its victory. Pitiful records in the 15th cent. show this, gruesome enough, to have been literal fact, for graces attendant on chivalry encountering before kings were absent when humble combatants in inferior courts maned each other with latan or 'hiscorne,' and tore each other with their teeth. One does not marvel that Pope Nicholas, in 867, had denied the Divine institution of the duel, but one does marvel that nearly seven centuries afterwards, John Major's protest, that 'God did not settle questions in that had well authority on the
is a determinant of public life. Among German students it has sunk to a rather savage athletic sport. Elsewhere generally a court duel has run, another running, a course parallel to that of private wars—possibly prophetic of that of national wars. Its endurance is determined, not by enactment of law, but by the thought and purpose of the courts, which is bound up with the ideas of private revenge and family blood-feud, not with the conceptions of a State with justice as its primary function. It is instructive, therefore, to compare briefly the law in Britain and in England. In each country certain courses of conduct are called duelling. In Great Britain the duel has in general, since King James's edict, and more particularly during the last century and a half, been treated with far greater severity than was shown to it elsewhere. In this country practically alone is it now the law that to kill in duel is murder, involving the capital penalty. In almost all the rest of Europe this stringency holds only when traditional rules have been in force, for instance, contrasted with the slight repression made in France. Bentham (Works, London, 1843, i. 579, 543), soberly balancing the merits and demerits of penal policies in general and "honorary" satisfaction in special, points out the partiality, uncertainty, and inconvenience of the duel considered as a punishment, although he thought it might be proper to be indulgent to it if the alternative was revenge by poison or the sword. Duels, he pointed out, were less common in Italy than in France and England, but poisoning and assassinations were much commoner. Like the historian Robertson, Bentham as a moralist thought that duelling tended to preserve "politeness and peace," and seems to have had little foresight of its swift decline. In recent times, the conditions, e.g. in France, often appeared to ensure immunity from injury but not from ridicule. The facts seem to justify the inference that for once British laws have had only—by repression of the duel and by adequate civil repression for injured honour—too much leniency to make that at all unnecessary. Frapper for sur la bourse, c'est frapper juste is the dictum of a modern "docteur dueliste" (Croshhob, op. cit. infra, 339). In Britain the spirit of trial by jury has proved a better guardian even of honour than the sword. Perhaps it is not among the things they manage better in Germany and France than we men continue, in however restricted a degree, to condenunce the duel, which ranks among the least barbaric inheritance among the institutions of the European. Probably Bentham himself did not sufficiently reflect that what had so long been abandoned by France, was, if anything, more actively and irritatingly mode of justice, where substantial interests were concerned, stood thereby already grotesquely out of court for the finer task, in modern civilization, of healing the sores of honour.

Significant among recent tendencies, illustrating some of the foregoing views, have appeared in Germany, the centre of modern militarism, especially since 1897, when Bismarck by a Cabinet Order declared his wish that duels among officers should be more effectively prevented by resulting private quarrels to Councils of Honour with appeal to Courts of Honour, commanding officers, and the Kaiser himself. These Councils of Honour for a regiment consist of all the officers, which the Courts of Honour comprise all the officers. This order by its terms did not prohibit duelling, but it enlarged the province of Courts of Honour. Reconciliation by intervention of such Councils and Courts, however, was, and still is, done, permissible only in cases of the honour of the class to which the officer belongs or by good causes. At first hailed as an abolition of the duel, the order was soon found to warrant any action, and in 1897, and since, have pointed out that the Kaiser never departed from the renunciation of the duel, which in affairs of honour; they bluntly stated that the so-called Council of duel of 1897, found a way in which the order would entirely depend for its efficiency on the spirit of the offencive, and that it was powerless to anticipate the crystallization of so deep-rooted a practice as a duel in one stroke. Yet the order was recognized as a very considerable attempt at restriction in the army. It was subsequently made applicable also to naval officers.

The critical forecast was justified by events. Scandals continued to arise, and duels over duel again in very serious and fatal consequences. In 1901 sharp controversy sprang from the discovery that, in violation of an imperial order, candidates for choice as officers in the reserve had been subjected to questions regarding their opinions on duelling, and had suffered prejudice for adherence to the practice. The Minister of War declared in the Reichstag that, while duels were justifiable for such cases as charges of cowardice, insult by violence, or impugnation upon an officer's moral integrity or family honour, everything was done to prevent the duelling of the able. These measures, but did not satisfy those of officers who protested that every officer punished for taking part in a duel should be dismissed from the army. Afterwards, in the same year, a manifesto was infallibly signed demanding the prohibition of all duels and the institution of Courts of Honour in their stead. It was expressly urged that this was the only practical method of curbing duelling and that prevention was to afford more effective legal protection against attacks on the person of individuals. Direct legislative action does not seem to have followed, but the agitation has served a useful purpose in elevating public opinion in Europe.


GEORGE NELSON.
When a girl is found to be pregnant and the man whom she accuses denies his share in her guilt, each of the pair is given a knife, the one first wounding the other is dismissed, and the other is allowed to participate in duels (a privilege normally reserved for the male sex), their opponents may be compelled to have some handicap, as when, in old Bohemian law, they were obliged to stand in a pit divided in the ground. Elsewhere, however, as among the Slavs and Bohemians, the services of a champion were expressly forbidden, on the ground that a man really innocent might be killed.

The cycle of development of the duel would seem to be somewhat as follows: in its ultimate form it is simply a fight, more or less serious, between two men concerning some real or fancied injury. From this point of view it is precisely like any modern fight between two men for the settlement of some difficulty between them, or even for mere revenge. But at an early time the duel became the battle of champions fought for the welfare of society, with various restrictions; e.g. formal witnesses (the later "sacred sides") may be required to see fair play, or certain cases alone may be settled by a duel. Such duel as a test of honour is often referred to by the authorities before a duel may be fought. There is also doubtless present, even in the most primitive form of duel—or more fight—the conviction, on the part of at least one of the combatants, that he has been wronged, and he feels that the victory will decide which of the two has been right. Though the methods employed are far different, the underlying principle is the same as in the most highly polished modern controversy of any sort whatever. From this feeling that "truth is mighty, and will prevail," comes the conception that the duel has a religious sanction, that Divine powers aid the party in the right, and that it is, indeed, an ordeal, in the technical sense of the term. On the other hand, the increasing scope of law imposes ever narrowing bounds upon the duel, and, as other modes of redress are evolved, the duel becomes more and more needless, especially as it is felt that it involves a useless waste of valuable lives, besides interfering with the majesty of the law. Thus the duel finally degenerates into an act of murder, and can be treated as a crime, even a challenge, except in time of war, being punished with death among the Aztecs. Yet the duel dies hard, for there lingers a persistent belief among many of fine fibre that there are wrongs for which no court of law can give redress, and it must be confessed that pecuniary damages or even imprisonment of an opponent is thin salve for wounded honour. Church and State have alike condemned the duel, and justly; yet perhaps the duellist's side of the argument should not, in fairness, be utterly ignored.

The peculiar nature of the duel from the point of view of early jurisprudence is well illustrated by its relation to the blood-feud (q.v.), to which a man killing another in a duel is rarely liable, this being probable due to the fact that both parties were held to be fighting in self-defence, while in the case of murder there was a recognized form of procedure, there would be no room for blood-feud.

The extreme degeneration of the duel is almost ludicrously illustrated by the "nith-songs" of the Greenslanders. *When a Greenslander considers himself injured in any way by another person, he composes him a satirical song, which he repeats with the help of his friends. If this challenges the offending one to a duel of song, one asks another the two disputants sing at each other their wisdom, wit, and satire, supported by their partisans, until at last one is his wife's duel, when the audience, who are also the jury, make known their decision. The matter is now settled for good, and the contestants must be friends again and not reflect the matter, which was in disgrace to the three books of American Indians, ii. 17 (Volt. 50, New York, 1883)."

Lastly, it may be noted that any attempt to trace the duel from a single people is as useless as it had its origin in the fighting spirit of the human race, and that spirit is as universal as mankind.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

DUNKARDS.—See Sects (Christian).

DUNS SCOTUS.—See Scholasticism.

DURGA.—Durga is one of the commonest names of Siva's spouse. Other names are Devi, Uma, Gauri, Pârvati, Chandî, Chânamûdu, Kâli, Kapâlîni, Bhûvâni, Vijâyâ, etc. (For a very full list, see Dowson, Classical Dict. of Hindu Mythol., London, 1905, &c., Devi). The name Durga originally designated the force, the protection, or the strength, and, therefore, natural that she should present various different aspects.

The worship of such goddesses as ultimately were consolidated in, and made up, the great godhead, the great soul of the universe, have become more popular about the end of the Vedic period, for some of their worship now redrewn, especially in the latest works belonging to it. Ambika is called Kâlida's sister in the Vâjasaneyi Sandhitih, but in Vâtburja daggikâ, x. 15, she has already become known as a dual by themselves, as in later times. In the same work, x. 1 (p. 738 of the Bibl. Indica ed., Calcutta, 1866-70), we find an invocation of Durga devi, who is there styled Kalirohanî, daughter of the Sun or Fire; and in x. 1, 7, among verses addressed to Agni, we meet with two other names of Durga (as in the Vedic period), viz Kâtyâyanî (the text has the masculine form, Kâtyâyan) and Kadçûkumâri. Uma, daughter of Himavat, is mentioned in the Kena Upanisad, III., 28, as a heavenly woman conversant with Brahman, on which account the commentator regards her as a personification of Brahmasvâdyâ; but in Tâtr. Ar. x. 15 (according to the Brāhma text) Kâlida is invoked as Umâpâti, husband of Uma. Kâli and Kârtlî, two names of Durga, occur in the Mâyûkâ Upanisad, i. 2, 4, among the names of the seven tongues of Agni. Finally, it may be mentioned that, in Weber's opinion, there is some connection between Durga and Sarasvati, since the epigraph Varadî, Mahâdevî, and Sândhyâsvara, given to Sarasvati in Tâtr. Ar. xi. 28, resemble, at a later period, exclusively to the consort of Câf (cf. Muir, Orig. Skr. Texts, 1858-75, v. 4251).

From the testimonies adduced, it seems certain that about the end of the Vedic period several goddesses had come to be acknowledged who then or later were promoted to the rank of wives of Hûdra-Siva; and of these it is more or less probable, be connected with mountains and with the element of fire. They have all been blended in the one consort of Siva, whose character obviously betrays the diversity of her origin. In her terrible aspect she seems to represent fire as the devouring and, at the same time, expiating element; and in her more benign character we seem to catch sight of a goddess of the mountains. But there were probably other goddesses or female demons, belonging to different parts of India and worshipped by different classes of people, who in the course of time were combined into one great goddess, the spouse of Siva. This coalescence of various elements in the one great goddess does not seem ever to have been complete, since a kind of consciousness of their disparity appears to have lingered in the mind of her worshippers. In the Nârâyana Purâna (a later text) the Devimâhâyâs (assigned by Pargiter to the 6th or perhaps 5th cent. A.D.). In the story of her victory over Sumbha and Nisumbha, related below, Chandâla (here identified with Chandmûdu) as well as Kâli is said to be an emanation from Durga; through them, and not in her own person, Durga is worshipped (from Kumârâ, Cape Comorin, the southernmost point of India, is supposed to have got its name, which we find already in the Periplo Maria Erythraei (Kumârâ, cap. 65).
DURGA

person, she performed those deeds for which she is hereon eulogized.

This syncretistic process, begun in the Vedic period, is all but complete in the Epics, which, however, do not contain explicit accounts of Durga’s deeds. The divinity of Siva is acknowledged, and the ideas concerning her were very much the same as, though less extravagant than, in later times. What they were will best be seen from a hymn of Arjuna to his charioteer, vi, 52, which is here transcribed (tr. Muir, iv, 429):

1. Reversion to thee, Siddhasena [general of the Siddhas; the noble, the dweller on Mandana, Kumârâ, Kâpî, Kâpîlâ, Kaurâ, the recessive, reverence to thee, Mahakâli; reverence to thee, Chandika; reverence to thee, Ò Târîk (delivered), O Varasvanî (beautiful coloured), O fortunate Kâtikâyani, O Kârâ, O Vijaya (victory), who beholds a peacock’s tail for thy banner, adorned with various jewels, armed with many spears, wielding sword and shield, younger sister of the chief of cowherds [Krâsa], eldest born in the family of the cowherd Nanda, delighting always in Mahesâ’s blood, Kauâkiri, wearing yellow garments, loud-laughing, wolf-mouthed; reverence to thee, thou delighter in Satîle, O Umba, Śundarâ, the dweller on Vindhyâ, she whose chief was black one (or Umbî), O destroyer of Kachchhâ. Reversion to thee, O Himâyâ, Virgâ, Dhimûnâ [gold-eyes; distressed, dark-eyed], O Vedaprâtì [tradition of the Veda] most pure, devout, Jâta-varana [female Agni], who dwells continuously near to Jânu, mystical-precious, and sages of the sphereless, thou art

2. The science of Brahman [or of the Veda], the great sleep of embodied beings, O Indra, O creator, O dweller in wildnesses. Thou art called Sêvâ, Sêvâdha, Kalâ, Kûhlâ [minute divisions of time], Sarasvâtî, Sêvî, mother of the Vedas, and the Vedanta [the end of the Vedas, the search], great goddevi, art praised with a pure heart. By thy favour let me be born in battle. In thy victory let me obtain fame, fear, and difficulties, and in the preservation of thy devout servants, and, in Pâtha, thou constantly abidest, and conquerest the Dakshas in battle. Thou art the maternal daughter of Bhairava, Mahakântha [destroyer], Mahishâ, Śyâ, Hirî, the luminous, Sêvî, the mother, Tuseî [constant-shoe], Kûhâ [perhaps, the low], Sêvâ, Kûhlâ [right], increscence of the sun and moon, the power of the powerful in battle, (all this) art seen by the Nîdhas and Câdnapa [to be]. The letter C of the word Chândikâ [mother] in the second syllable of her epithet is another hymn addressed by Udrishtarî to Durga, very similar to the preceding. Among other things, she is said to have ‘her perpetual abode on the Vindhya mountains, and to delight in spirituous liquor, flesh, and sacrificial victims.’ In the sequel, Muir quotes a remarkable line from the Harivamâs (v. 274), according to which Durga was worshipped by the savage tribal races, Barbâras, and Poulindas.

We now proceed to relate the chief mythological data and the deeds of Durga which are found in Sanskrit literature. Usually she is stated to be the daughter of Himayat (Umâ) Himayavati already in churning the ocean. The latter, according to Râmâyâna, i. xix. 14, the daughter of Meru, and, according to the Purânas,2 the mental daughter of the Manes. According to Râmâyâna, i. xixv. 15, Umâ was the younger sister of Gaṅgâ, and called thyroid of a human [or a cow] three sexes, (where she is called Aparâj, she was the eldest daughter of Himayat, and had two sisters, Ekaparnâ and Ekapâlî, wives of Jâta-vrata and Asita Deva respectively. Sometimes, however, Durga is addressed as sister of Vîsû3 and of Indra,4 whence she is said to be called Kauâkiri. Her epithet Vairôchana, in Tattî, Ar. x. 1. 7, seems to make her a daughter of the Sun or perhaps of Fire, while the epithet, t. Gauâ, one of the three with one of the seven Rishis. Some of these statements were perhaps prompted by a desire on the part of the worshippers of Siva to provide his supreme and pristine abode in the world of gods with a consort of more equal rank than belonged to a daughter of the Himâyâla. Such a tendency almost certainly gave rise to the Pañcarâma story that Siva’s wife originally was Satî, daughter of King Dakshâ, the creator, and that in her wrath she abandoned her bodily existence through yagna, when Daksha slighted her husband by not

1. The form in the original is śiddhasenâ, not śiddhasenâ; “godliness;” the interjection is given by Muir following Nâlakânyô. The name might be explained as ‘wife of Śiddhasena;’ Śiddhasena, however, is a name of Kumâra, not Siva.
2. Kumara-stûyas, i. 18, 19.
3. Harivamâs, i. 1028.
4. Jb. and 2360.

inviting him to his sacrifice. For this accident is not yet alluded to in the earliest account of Daksha’s sacrifice in Mahâbhârata, xii. 284, where Siva’s wife is called Devi and Umâ.

The story of Umâ’s marriage with Siva forms the subject of Kathârâma, a Kusuma-samhâra.2 The gods, defeated by the Asura Târaka, consulted Brahmâ; he predicted that Siva’s son by Umâ, who was not yet betrothed to him, would vanquish their enemy. In order to cause Siva, who was practically an ascetic, to come down to the Himalaya, to fall in love with Umâ, Indra dispatched Manmatha, the god of love, to the spot, where just then the beautiful daughter of the Himâyâla, Siva’s host, was offering flowers to the divine ascetic. Manmatha drew his bow at him, and detached his mind from contemplation. Siva waxed wroth, and reduced the god of love to ashes; but afterwards he was moved by Umâ’s constancy as she submitted to the severest austerities in order to win him, and wooed her. The product of their love was Kumâra, who on his birthday killed the Asura. It may be added that the Purânas tell another tale about this story; when she engaged in austerities, her mother dissuaded her from this course, saying, ‘ô ma, ‘ô no.’

Another son of Durga is Gañeśa, the god with the elephant head. His miraculous birth has been related in art. BRÂHMANISM.4

The most famous deeds of Durga are her victories over various Asuras; they form the subject of the Devâmâyâna, an epic poem of the Mâharâja Parâma, which has become the text-book of her worshippers. In this work Durga is said to have been formed, under the name Chandikâ, by the combined energies of the gods, who put forth in their natural shape, and then the gods of the gods, and had set himself up as the Índra of the heavenly dominions. The goddess did battle with the host of Asuras, and killed them wholesale. Then ensued a single combat between Chandikâ and Mahâsûra, who assumed many forms, especially his buffalo shape, from which he derived his name. At last Chandikâ stood on the demon, and cut off his head; but out of the trunk grew the Asura in his natural shape, and then he was killed by the goddess. It is in this act of dealing the last blow to the Asura who comes out of the beheaded buffaloi that Durga is usually represented in Indian art, not only in drawings, pictures and sculptures, but also in poetry; for the great poet Bâna, who lived in the 7th cent. A.D., describes this scene in nearly every verse of his Chandâsakako, a hymn to that goddess (ed. Durgâ-prakâsa and Parasrî, Bombay, 1889; a new ed. and tr. forthcoming by G. Payn Quackenbos, in the Columbia University Indo-Iranian Series).

Besides the killing of Mahâsûra, the Devâmâyâna celebrates the victory of Chandikâ over the Asuras Sumbha and Niśumbha. These two demons had routed the gods, and had usurped the government of the three worlds. The gods implored the aid of Parâma, who came to him in the water of the Gâṅgâ; from her body issued another goddess who is called Ambikâ or Chandikî. Now, it happened that Chandâ and Mûnda, two servants of Sumbha and Niśumbha, had seen this goddess, and had been struck by her beauty; therefore, advised Sumbha to take her as his wife, who

1. Vîṣṇu Purâṇa, tr. Wilson, i. 117, 127, i. 11; cf. Kumârâ-stûyas, i. 21.
2. The same story is also told in the Sîva Purâṇa and the Sîva-râhsya of the Skanda Purâṇa. For references, see ZDMG xxvii. (1875), 284.
3. See Kârâkottâ, ii. 907.
4. It may also be added here that Gañeśa is first mentioned in Tattî, Ar. x. 1899, where a manuscript is referred to him under the name Dantî. Cf. also GANAPATI.
upon which the latter sent a messenger to invite her to marry him. She consented, on condition that he should vanquish her. Thereupon Sumbha sent Dhūmrālochana with a host of Asuras to seize her; but she destroyed them all. Then Chanda sent his daughter, who was another arm of Raktabija. When Ambikā saw them, she waxed exceedingly wroth, so that from her forehead issued a terrible goddess Kālī, of emancipated body, clad in a tiger’s skin, with a garland of skulls hanging from her neck, and with a long beehive lolling from her wide mouth. After a frightful battle, she killed both Chanda and Mundha, from whom she received the name Čhāṃma.5 Now Sumbha himself, at the request of the Asuras, went to meet Ambikā, on whose side fought the energies of all gods, which had taken bodily form. Among the Asuras was Raktabhadra; when a drop of his blood fell on the ground, it was at once changed into an Asura of his form. Thus innumerable Asuras soon came into existence, and increased the army of the enemies of the gods. Chandikā then ordered Čhāṃma to drink up the blood of Beh, and fell upon her; and at last killed the exhausted and bloodless Asura. Now Niṣumbha attacked the goddess, while her lion caused great havoc in the army of the demons. The latter, however, bravely met Niṣumbha, but at last was slain. Niṣumbha also was killed by Chandikā.

There is yet another form of Durgā as Yoganidrā or Niḍrā Kālārūpini, which connects her worship with that of Vijñā-Kṣaṇa, and is apparently intended to bring it under the protection and patronage of Viṣṇu.2 In the Harivaṁśa, 2590 ff., it is related by Valākampāyana that, with the view of defending the designs of Kānsa in regard to the destruction of Deva’s offspring, Viṣṇu descended into Pāṭala, where he sought the aid of Niḍrā Kālārūpini (Sleep in the form of Time). And promised her in return that through his favour she should be a goddess adored in all the world. He directed her on this occasion to assume the shape of Čhāṃma on the same night on which he was to be born as the eighth child of Deva; when he would be carried to Yālodha, and she to Devaki. He told her that she should be taken by the foot, and cast upon a rock, but would then obtain an eternal place in the sky, becoming assimilated to himself in glory; would be installed by Indra among the gods, received by him as his sister under the name of Kaśikā, and would obtain from him (Indra) a perpetual abode on the Vindhyā mountains where, thinking upon him (Viṣṇu), she would kill the two demons, Sumbha and Niṣumbha, and would be worshipped with animals worshiped.3

The same story is told in several Purāṇas, e.g. in the Vijaya Purāṇa, v. 1 (tr. Wilson, iv. 260 ff.).

In another myth the goddess is made to share the glory of Viṣṇu.4 When this god, at the end of the nine years during which the sleep of the contemplation on the universal ocean, the two demons, Madhu and Kaṭaḥba, approached him, with the intention of killing Brahmā, who stood on the lotus that grew out of the navel of Viṣṇu; but the latter cut them asunder with his discus. The part played by Yoganidrā in this transaction was this: that she left Viṣṇu’s eyes on being invoked by Brahmā; thus the god was awakened, and could slay the demons. In the hymn quoted above from the Mahābhārata she is styled ‘destroyer of Kaṭaḥba,’ which seems to attribute the victory entirely to her.

From the quotations given above, it is evident that in the period of the Epics, probably towards the end, the worship of Durgā was already firmly established; and that it was further developed in the time of the Hariśvaṁsa and the Purāṇas. But it is in another branch of later Sanskrit literature, that Durgā worship is at its height. The Tantra, says Wilson,

"always assume the form of a dialogue between Śiva and his bride, in one of her many forms, but mostly as Umā and Parāvati, in which the goddess questions the god as to the mode of performing various ceremonies, and the prayers and incantations to be used in them.

They furnish the rites and formulae in a new form of worship, which has largely superseded the older one based on the Veda.

There was yet another custom at work to give the worship of Durgā a new form. In its present form the theory of sakti. Sakti is the energy of a god, especially of Viṣṇu and Śiva; i.e., it is personified as his female partner, and is identified with the prakṛti of Śākti philosophy, whereby a mystical and speculative foundation is given to the sakti-theory, which is already taught in several Purāṇas. By far the most popular sakti is that of Śiva as Parvati, Bhūvālī, or Durgā; and the majority of the Śaktas, followers of these doctrines, worship this goddess.

We have seen above that already, in the Mahābhārata, Durgā is said to delight in spiritual music and singing. It has always been characteristic of the worship of Durgā.

1 In Bengal, says Colebrooke, 1 and the contiguous provinces, thousands of kids and buffalo calves are sacrificed before the idol, at every celebrated temple; and eminent persons make a similar destruction of animals at their private chapels. The sect which has adopted this system is prevalent in Bengal, and in many other provinces of India. 2 But the practice is not approved by other sects of Hindus.

Even human sacrifices were offered to the godess in some places. Bāṇa (7th cent.), in a lengthy description of a temple of Chandikā, 2 alludes to human sacrifices; Bhāvabhūti (8th cent.) introduces, in the 5th act of his play, Mālātikā and Maṅdhāti, a temple of Śākumā and her votaries, who try to sacrifice a human victim; in the Samārāchāra Kāli, by Haribhadra (9th cent.), a temple of Chandikā and the goddess of a human sacrifice by Sabaras are described (p. 435 ff., Bibl. Ind. ed.); in the Kalī Kārūṇā, ‘minute directions are given for the offering of a human victim to Kāi, whom it is said his blood satisfies for a thousand years.

Finally, mention must be made of the most degraded worship of Durgā and other saktīs by the Vānis, or ‘left hand’ worshippers; in it debauchery and gross immorality are admitted, so that the worship is perverted into a most scandalous orgy.

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated in the article.

HERMANN JACOB.

DUTY.—If taken in a wide sense, the notion of duty is essentially implied in every system of morality and every ethical theory. For all morality and all ethics is, in the final analysis, the recognition of the inclinations of the individual and some objective and authoritative standard to which these inclinations must be subordinated; and it is just this objective control that is emphasized in the notion of duty. Duty comes to us with a claim; it is a thing laid upon us to do whether we like it or not. But, although the element of objective authority is necessarily implied in every moral standard, the notion of duty is far less prominent and exclusive in some systems of morality than in others; and, of course, is also far less distinctly abstracted and analyzed, and occupies a far less fundamental place, in some types of ethical theory than in others.

1 In Greek ethics, for instance, the moral life is, for the most part, presented as a good to be realized or a type of virtue or excellence to be attained. More good or true happiness, the health of the soul, is shown to lie in the life of virtue, the performance of the work or function which his own nature and the part he has to play in the general life of the community mark out for him. To see

1 Miscellaneous Essays, 1873, i. 191, n. 1.
2 A full description of the festival of Durgā as celebrated in Bengal is given by Pratapchandra Chakravorti, Durgā Puja, 1871.
3 Kautilya, ed. Petersen5, Bombay Sanskrit Series, 1869, p. 201 ff.
4 Wilson, Select Works, ii. 98.
5 lb. 254.
DUTY

in this life of virtue his real happiness or good is man's true wisdom, whereas the scepticism which sees in it only a burden and a restraint imposed for the advantage of others is short-sighted folly. The restraints of the virtuous life are only the restraints which prevent a man from being any more himself and would live a truly human life among his fellows. So long as this mode of presenting the moral life prevailed, the element of duty was completely left out, and was subordinated to, the horizons of good or achievement. A man must be courageous, temperate, and just, because in no other way can he achieve his good or true happiness.

It was only when, in Stoicism, this good was conceived to be determined by, and to be realized in obeying, a cosmical law of universal reason that the notion of duty emerged into a new distinctness and prominence. Not that the Stoics could not, or did not, use the same general formulae as the other schools had done. The change, apart from details, is rather one in the whole philosophical atmosphere. The same formulae might be used, but they were used in a new sense. Everything was now coloured by the pantheistic necessity of the Stoic system. The life which it beheld the good or wise man to lead was one determined for him by the laws of the world, which prescribes to man his place in the system of things and the duties pertaining to that place. It was for man to recognize the place and duties assigned to him, and thus consciously to live in accordance with nature, or the immanent reason of the universe. Hence the notion of duty entered into the Stoic system in a double sense, expressed by the two terms καθοδος καὶ καθοδομία. The former term was applied to right action, simple fitting or prescribed by nature, the latter to the same actions when consciously done for this reason by the good or wise man; hence only an action which deserved the latter epithet was completely good or virtuous.

2. Thus it was when morality came to be regarded mainly in the light of conformity to a law that the notion of duty became prominent. The Stoic law of nature, however, was also a law of reason, which the same reason in man enabled him to recognize. And this conception of the law of nature, as the law which reason affirms, continued even after the law of nature had come to be, in many cases, identified with the shape of the jus gentium, or equity of Roman jurisprudence. Now, Christianity, like Stoicism, represented morality in the light of obedience to a law, but the Christian law was the revealed commandments of God—not a law which man's reason had to discover, but one which was given to man by Divine revelation, and had simply to be obeyed. Hence the strictly authoritative aspect of duty stands out much more prominently in Christian than in Stoic morality. Of course, it did not follow that, because the Moral Law was thus authoritative, it was in any sense arbitrary; this mistake is often made of later religions. The natural assumption was that, being God's law, it could not but be a wise and good law. But the law was to be obeyed by man because it was laid upon him by God, not because man himself saw his good or true happiness to consist in obedience to such a law. Man's eternal welfare—his entrance into the Kingdom of God, as the primitive Christians would have said—was bound up with his obedience to God's law, but so bound by God's own ordinance, not by any sort of connexion which man's own reason discovered to him.

Now, this kind of separation between duty and good, this reference of the connexion between them to a hidden Divine source, remains characteristic of the Christian morality and ethics throughout, whereas it was quite absent from Stoicism. This would be master of himself and would live a truly human life among his fellows. So long as this mode of presenting the moral life prevailed, the element of duty was completely left out, and was subordinated to, the horizons of good or achievement. A man must be courageous, temperate, and just, because in no other way can he achieve his good or true happiness. In this sense, then, the performance of duty remains, on the Christian view, always a matter of obedience rather than of insight; the good of obedience is not our concern. On the other hand, as regards the actual contents of the law which is to be obeyed and the mere rightness of obeying it, the tendency of the more philosophical expositions of Christian ethics has usually been to assert that man's own reason or conscience not merely assents to, but itself also affirms, the fundamental precepts of revealed morality. That is to say, God has not only revealed the Moral Law by express communication, but has also implanted it in man's conscience, or made him capable of discovering it by the due use of his natural reason. Revelation only reinforces or amplifies the dictates of conscience or the natural law. Thus, on this view, therefore, the main object of duty is by no means a matter of merely external command; it is no less a matter of internal perception and recognition.

We see the rules of duty to be in themselves right, or such as we ought to obey (Intuitionism) without needing to know wherein the good of obedience consists; conscience has an intrinsic authority which makes itself immediately felt. The coarser expositions of Christian ethics, on the other hand, have tended to present the rules of duty, even when it was acknowledged that they may be known by the light of nature, as depending for their authority on rewards and punishments (e.g. Paley). The same tendency in secular ethics leads to the representation of morality as good policy, and seeks to back up the claims of duty by an appeal to the enlightened self-interest, or at best, to the finer sensibilities, of the individual. The prevalence of this type of ethics in the 18th cent. partly accounts, by way of reaction, for the severity of the classical exposition of the conception of duty which we owe to Kant.

2. Kant—In distinction, with which Kant's exposition opens, between action done from duty and action done from inclination is one which, no doubt, lends itself to such caricatures as that drawn in Schiller's well-known lines, but it was really necessary for Kant's purpose. This was—to make absolutely clear the objectivity of duty. What is right is right whether we like it or not, and, were it not that the right thus stands out as something objective and authoritative over against our private inclinations, the notion of duty would have no meaning. Morality does not begin to exist until this contrast is felt and takes effect. As Kant puts it, 'Interpretation is a game unless it is done from duty, i.e. in the consciousness of its rightness. Paradoxical as this proposition has often been found—for good actions surely are often done without any thought of duty—it is, from the point of view of Kant's system, a truism. An action that expresses nothing but the present inclination of the agent tells us nothing about his character. What he does from inclination to-day, he may likewise from inclination refuse to do to-morrow. The commands of duty do not wait upon

1 Ro, &c. Butler, *Analogy,* p. 114. The conception of a law written in the heart and conscience is very similar to that of St. Paul (Ro 8:21), who may owe it indirectly to the diffused influence of Stoical ideas.
our inclinations, or strike a bargain with us; the imperative of duty, in Kant's terminology, is a Categorical Imperative.

Some other features of Kant's ethical doctrine which are closely connected with his analysis of the notion of duty may be noted. (1) He regards the Categorical Imperative as a formal, universal, and a priori proposition, to be disinterestedly obeyed as a moral law, and as such to be a law which prescribes the spirit in which actions are to be done rather than the objects at which they are to be aimed at. (2) He lays great stress upon what he calls the 'autonomy of the will,' i.e. the necessity that we should be able to see in the command of morality, not a foreign compulsion upon us, but the expression of our own highest spiritual nature which is our true freedom. (3) He regards the conception of the Moral Law as the first and fundamental conception of ethical theory, and that of the good as subsequent to and dependent upon it; in fact, the good is for him, one might say, a religions rather than a strictly ethical conception. From all this it is evident that Kant was not far wrong in supposing himself entitled to look upon his ethical theory as a philosophical version of the Christian morality. (4) He lays great stress upon the 'self,' i.e. the necessity that we should be able to see in the command of morality, not a foreign compulsion upon us, but the expression of our own highest spiritual nature which is our true freedom. (5) He lays great stress upon the 'self,' i.e. the necessity that we should be able to see in the command of morality, not a foreign compulsion upon us, but the expression of our own highest spiritual nature which is our true freedom.
would even have regarded remorse for such a shrinking as fantastic and overstressed.

6. When the various duties are regarded in an objective way, it is natural to seek for some kind of classification of them in order to make a system of duties. But, unless we are quite sure what we are about in using it, it may easily involve in somewhat gross confusion and error. Both terms used in the division are treacherous. The term 'self-regarding duties' is apt to be taken in the sense of duties to oneself, and this was, in fact, one of the heads under which duties were ranged in the threefold scheme favoured by the older moralists, viz. duties to oneself, to one's neighbours, and to God. But it is evident that, in any sense in which we can owe it to ourselves to perform some of our duties, we owe it to ourselves to perform them all; while, in the more literal sense, in which a debt or obligation is owed from A to B, it is presumption on our part to suppose that he can properly be said to owe any one of our duties to ourselves. The term 'social duties,' again, is apt to suggest that there are other duties which are non-socially alone the conduct and we may even be led to infer, with J. S. Mill, that 'the only part of the conduct of any one for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others, while in the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.' (Liberty, People's ed. 1865, p. 65.) But such a view is really contrary to the actual tenor of our moral judgments, which condemn, and assert a right to correct social harm which is much more than 'contiguity' or 'constructive.' And, finally, any supposed right to an absolute independence, however limited, on the part of the individual is contradicted by the very meaning of a right, which, of course, implies social recognition and respect for the claims of others, which are due to misunderstandings to which the division into self-regarding and other-regarding duties is exposed, it does point to a palpable enough distinction between the objects or spheres of the respective duties. We can practise the duty of temperance by ourselves; the duty of truth-speaking can be practised only in relation to others. This distinction—between what we might call immanent and transient duties—in clearly valid enough; but it is not a distinction in the source or basis of the obligation. The performance of both duties alike is owed (metaphorically) to ourselves and (literally) to the moral community of which we are members. The duties which are practised in relation to others may be subdivided into those which are of a more general kind, such as veracity or promise-keeping or honesty, and those which depend upon some more specific relationship or institution, such as parental or filial duty, which depends on relationship within the family. (The distinction between duties of strict or perfect, and duties of imperfect, obligation can hardly be regarded as a distinction of principle, except in so far as it is identified with the distinction of legal obligation and moral duty.)

7. When they are thus classified from the objective point of view, we can hardly deny the possibility of a real conflict between duties. The individual, of course, can do only one thing at a time, and, in face of warring claims, has for his one duty to make the best he can of the situation before him. What this best will be must clearly depend on the particular nature of the situation in question, and it is difficult to think of any satisfactory scheme of division. Perhaps the most common and obvious division is that between self-regarding and social duties. But, unless we are very sure what we are about in using it, it may easily involve us in somewhat gross confusion and error. Both terms used in the division are treacherous. The term 'self-regarding duties' is apt to be taken in the sense of duties to oneself, and this was, in fact, one of the heads under which duties were ranged in the threefold scheme favoured by the older moralists, viz. duties to oneself, to one's neighbours, and to God. But it is evident that, in any sense in which we can owe it to ourselves to perform some of our duties, we owe it to ourselves to perform them all; while, in the more literal sense, in which a debt or obligation is owed from A to B, it is presumption on our part to suppose that he can properly be said to owe any one of our duties to ourselves. The term 'social duties,' again, is apt to suggest that there are other duties which are non-socially alone the conduct and we may even be led to infer, with J. S. Mill, that 'the only part of the conduct of any one for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others, while in the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.' (Liberty, People's ed. 1865, p. 65.) But such a view is really contrary to the actual tenor of our moral judgments, which condemn, and assert a right to correct social harm which is much more than 'contiguity' or 'constructive.' And, finally, any supposed right to an absolute independence, however limited, on the part of the individual is contradicted by the very meaning of a right, which, of course, implies social recognition and respect for the claims of others, which are due to misunderstandings to which the division into self-regarding and other-regarding duties is exposed, it does point to a palpable enough distinction between the objects or spheres of the respective duties. We can practise the duty of temperance by ourselves; the duty of truth-speaking can be practised only in relation to others. This distinction—between what we might call immanent and transient duties—in clearly valid enough; but it is not a distinction in the source or basis of the obligation. The performance of both duties alike is owed (metaphorically) to ourselves and (literally) to the moral community of which we are members. The duties which are practised in relation to others may be subdivided into those which are of a more general kind, such as veracity or promise-keeping or honesty, and those which depend upon some more specific relationship or institution, such as parental or filial duty, which depends on relationship within the family. (The distinction between duties of strict or perfect, and duties of imperfect, obligation can hardly be regarded as a distinction of principle, except in so far as it is identified with the distinction of legal obligation and moral duty.)

Henry Barkei.

Dwarfs and Pygmies.—These terms are nowadays interchangeable in the dictionary of ethnology, and are indifferently applied to those undersized races which exist, or have existed, in various parts of the world. In addition to tribes or nations of dwarfs, there are also small-statured individuals, occurring sporadically among the taller races, who may fairly be styled dwarfs. Their low stature is often attributable, however, to morbid physical conditions in the individual, and not in the case of healthy persons, as an inheritance from a line of ancestors of dwarfish type. The present inquiry is limited to those who are inadulterate dwarfs by race.

In the Tontenian languages, the word 'dwarf' can be traced back for at least twelve centuries, appearing under such forms as O.N. dyrgr, Anglosax. deovor, O.H.G. dewer, Germ. Zwerg. It occurs also in Gaelic as drochd and trosh, but these are probably borrowed from Tontojo sources. The other Osicic synonyms, e.g. O.Ir. leacs, have quite a different etymology, as also have the Cymric terms, e.g. Welsh pygor. The word 'pygmy' is recognized at much earlier dates, being derived from Gr. pygmē, a measure of length from the elbow to the knuckle or fist (pygmē) =11 inches. Similar in connotation is the Gr. prwor, proros, represented by O.Ir. prōr, O.H.G. prūo, 'shrunken,' and also by the Teutonic words for 'finger'; and a like idea may be present in Lat. pupillus (cf. O.Ir. pūl, 'a little,' puppy) and in Gr. puaps (cf. O.Ir. pūs, 'a cub'). The Balto-Slavic group, represented by Russ. kariu, Lith. króliu, is doubtless borrowed from O.H.G. karaus, 'a dwarf,' and also by the German word for 'crossbread,' Schradler, Streller, der niedriger. Altertumskunde, Brunsbü, 1803, pp. 100-100. The fact that the term 'pygmy' was originally held to denote a people of the preposterously small stature of 133 inches renders that term not so acceptable as 'dwarf' in any serious discussion.

The present art, deals with the subject mainly from the anthropological angle; fuller treatises on dwarfs in folklore will be found in the 'Tontenio' and 'Slavic' sections of art. DEMONOS AND DURATS, and in the art. FAIRY.
DWARFS AND PYGMIES

It is to be noted, however, that 'pygmy' has now lost its first meaning, and merely denotes the mere diminution in stature of the ordinary races of man. Windle, who has made a careful study of the facts relating to these people, allows a somewhat high level as the upward limit, laying down the definition that 'any race in which the average stature does not exceed 4 feet 9 inches may fairly be described as pygmy' (Introduct. to Tyson's Pygmies, reprint of 1894, London). This is the height of the West African Obongob of the Gafo, described by P. du Chaillu, and quite recently by Prount (D'Anthropologie, 1910, pp. 435-504), who places the average stature of the men at 4 ft. 8 in. (1.43 m.), and of the women at 4 ft. 6 in. (1.37 m.). This indicates a much taller race than the Akkas encountered by Sir H. M. Stanley, who estimated their adult height at from 3 ft. to 4 ft. 6 in. (In Darker Africa, London, 1899, ii. 92). A. B. Lloyd (In Dwarf Land, London, 1899, pp. 310, 225) gives a similar report of those whom he met. Even lower is the stature of a race, presumably Eskimo, inhabiting the north-western shores of Hudson's Bay in the 17th century, for Captain Pery records (1670) that he found there a native race of people in that region in which the longest corpse did not exceed 4 feet.1 Windle (op. cit. p. xxxiii) cites the case of a Bushman woman, the mother of several children, who was measured 3 ft. 8 in., while another woman of her race measured 3 ft. 3 inches.

The distribution of dwarf races seems to have been at one time world-wide; but at the present day they are found chiefly in the equatorial regions of Africa and Malaysia. Classic writers, such as Pliny, Pomponius Mela, Aristotle, Ctesias, Herodotus, and Homer, make several references to African pygmies, and they also figure prominently in the records of Ancient Egypt. The most important of the tombs at Assuan explored by E. A. W. Budge is that of a provincial governor, Her-Kehef, who lived in the reign of Pepi, in the VIth dynasty (c. 3500 B.C.), and who was sent on an expedition to the Sudan to bring back a dwarf for the king. Brugsch (Hymenemath, Leipzig, 1891, p. 141) cites an inscription at Karnak, belonging to the Ptolemaic epoch,—the three centuries before Christ,—which states that 'the dwarfs of the southern countries came to him [the reigning Ptolemy], bringing their tributes to his treasury.' Ed. Naville, in his account of the festival-hall of Osorkon II. in the great temple of Denderah, in his journal (London, 1862, p. 305), refers to a picture which seems to show that racial dwarfs were specially selected as the vergers of the temple. A very interesting and suggestive comparison between the pygmies of the classic writers and existing dwarf races has been made by Paul Monceaux in his treatise on 'La Légende des pygmées et les nains de l'Afrique équatoriale' (Revue Historique, xlvii. [1891] i-64), the inference drawn being that the pygmies of the Greek and Roman writers, sculptors, and painters are memories of actual dwarfs seen by their forefathers in Africa and India. He further points to the resemblance between the modern Akkas of Africa and the dwarfs portrayed at Pompée, Rhodos, and Cyprus, and to the 'Patakas' placed as figure-heads on Phoenician ships. The supposition that the Jews as well as the Egyptians were acquainted with material dwarfs is strongly supported by the term Gammadim which occurs in Ezk 27:1. In the Vulgate this term is rendered by Pygmies, in

1 Leblanc (Histoire des savantes anciennes, 120th ed., Paris, 1774, i. 130) speaks of a girl, captured on the Lannudor coast in 1717, declared that in her country there were entire tribes of men three feet high, the slaves of those of taller stature. On American Indians of low stature (100-160 cm.), see Siriricka, in Bull, 20 PE, i. 50; and on popular tallacises concerning Indian pygmies, Holmes, 8th ed., 282.

Aquila by 

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under 3 ft. in height, dark-skinned, pot-bellied, and powerfully built, with large arms and legs—this last statement being scarcely consistent with dwarfish stature. They were expert trackers, very nimble and deft. It is stated that two of them once still exist on the banks of a certain river to the south-west.

The existence of a pygmy race in New Guinea has been known for a considerable time. The Indians interviewed by a British expedition sent out by the late Mr. Joseph Balfour, and they have been seen by d'Albertis, Lawes, Cayley Webster, and other travellers. But much interest was aroused in the summer of 1910 by the information sent home by a British expedition with regard to a tribe of dwarfs whom they found inhabiting the Charles Lewis Mountains in New Guinea, at an elevation of about 2000 feet above sea-level. Four of the men were temporarily captured by Captain Rawling's party, and on being measured they proved to be respectively 4 ft. 6 in., 4 ft. 4 in., 4 ft. 3 in., and 4 ft. 2 in. in height. They were naked, except for a grass helmet, a bag, and a heavy, roped, round the waist. They were described as good-looking and well-proportioned, and of a lighter complexion than the natives of the lowlands. The general average stature of these Tapiro pygmies is 4 ft. 8 in., while that of their lowland neighbours is 5 ft. 1 in.

In several other parts of Eastern Asia there are, or have been, dwarf races. In ancient Chinese records there is mention of black or brown dwarfs in the provinces of Shantung, Kiang-nan, and Kansu. A hundred years ago, in the same region, there were, no doubt, several thousand such people, but now they are practically extinct. In the south of India, the pygmies were still to be seen, and their existence is referred to in the Mahabharata. The pygmies of Central India, as given by Coeneus, 11 (in Flotius, Itin. xix. 1720), are of doubtful reality, and probably of Indian origin, resembling the same language as the other Indians. They are very diminutive, the tallest of the whole tribe being the major. Their bodies are only one and a half feet long. They have large ears, and their hair grows very long down to their knees, and even longer. They have the largest body to stature that was ever seen, and when they were grown sufficiently long and copious, they never wear clothing, but, instead, they cut off their head or hair-braids for belts and girdles, which, in front, are their trousers down to their very feet. When their hair has thus thickly enveloped their whole body, they bind it round them with a sash, and so make it serve for a garment. Their privies are thick, and so large that they depend even on their ankles. They are, moreover, unshaven, and so indifferent as to ill-favoured. They are eminently just, and have the same laws as the Indians. They hunt hares and foxes, not with dogs, but with racoons and kites and crows and vultures' (Sir John McBride, Ancient India as Described by Kautilya the Kautilya, Calcutta, 1853, p. 114). In this Negrito phenomenon (in Strabo, p. 711, and Pliney, H. N. vii. 2) adds that they also had some connection with the Pygmies, to whom is ascribed the account in H. N. viii. ii. 5, of Pygmies by whom the races with whom the ancient races, mentioned in H. N. viii. ii. 5, were so-called. These accounts have been carefully analysed by Lassen (Jot. Alterthumskunde, ii, Ludovic, 1872, p. 230), who states that the conclusion that these 'pygmies' represent the Kiprata, a race of dwarfs as compared with the Aryan Indians, long-haired (though beardless), flat-nosed (though light in colour), brave and warlike, and expanded to the constant example of the mythical bird Garuda. Moreover, in Sanskrit literature, their national race, is one of the terms for 'dwarf'.—L. H. Grätzel.

The accounts from America are not so definite as from India or Africa, but dwarf types are reported from Argentina, Peru, the Amazon basin, and Central America. In North America, the Arapaho Indians of Oklahoma and of Wyoming have many traditions of a fierce race of dwarfs with white skin and clever and formidable fathers. They are described as a little

1 For these various American Indian traditions, see accounts by S. Colt, in the Century, Jan. 1903, and by A. L. Kroeber, and S. C. Simms, in Publications 85 and 85 of the Field Columbian Museum, Chicago, 1902.
not now be employed to express a protest against a theory that healthy living dwarf races have originated in the degenerated forms of races of normal size. The very adjective 'normal' would be ruled out of court in this connexion. On the other hand, Kollmann's conclusion, that the pygmy races represent the primitive 'normal' stock of mankind, is an idea that should be carefully considered.

It is, of course, too soon for such ideas to have obtained complete recognition, especially among those whose mental bias is innately conservative. In the present number (April 1911) of Petermann's Mitteilungen, R. Andree refers to certain expressions of dissent aroused by Schmidt's new work, Die Stellung der Pygmaenvolker in der Entwicklungsgesch. des Menschen (Stuttgart, 1910), which follows the lines laid down by Kollmann. Among the opponents of the new ideas, Schwabe, Keith, and Czecanowski are specially named by Andree. The leading arguments in Schmidt's book are thus referred to by a reviewer in the Times, Literary Supplement, 16th June 1910:

'Dr. Schmidt's long and careful study of the physique, the language, and the culture of the dwarf races of mankind... is certainly one of the most important of anthropological investigations that have appeared in recent years. Its conclusions are more revolutionary than those of Schlagintweit... it is a new light... Dr. Schmidt's minute investigation of all the pygmy races known when his book was being written, has led him to some extraordinary views.' The view maintained by the well-known anatomist of Bacl, J. Kollmann, who holds the pygmies to be the oldest known race of mankind on the earth—"the child-race of mankind. The child-race, not a half-bestial race. The distinction is shown very clearly when one regards a race as a whole... They are entirely different from the Pygmies... They are not only men, but undeveloped men; Their mind is a human, a thinking mind; they possess human feeling and a distinct racial will. Morally, although, like children, they are prey to many fleeting impulses and wanting in perseverance, they stand upon the road that leads to self-development; they have a religion which stands in close relation to their ethics. They are anything but vicious or malignant. Their intellectual attainments are very low, but they are capable of responding to demands made upon them, and the mental powers they have evolved are adequate for their way of life... In physical indications, there are, of course, many marks of a non-human ancestry, but the upright or projecting forehead and the frequently large and expressive eyes mark a distinction which cannot be overlooked... Spiritually, the pygmies "stand in no way nearer to the beast than any other race of man..." they "do not give as the smallest encouragement to the supposition that in and by them a bridge can be drawn across a gulf between the human and the beast soul..." We may close by expressing our hearty concurrence with Dr. Schmidt in one sentence at least: not only is his work original, but it is methodically and logically carried through from beginning to end. His investigation of the pygmy races is, at the present moment, one of the most important, if not the most weighty and most urgent, of the tasks of ethnological and anthropological science.'

The conclusion arrived at by Kollmann, Schmidt, and the Andrees has been steadily gaining ground during recent years. It is interesting to note, although the circumstances will have no value in the domain of science, that the same belief was held by the early Scandinavians, who asserted that the dwarves were created before men. The late Charles Godfrey Leland, by an intuitive process, had arrived at the same conclusion. 'I believe mankind was originally a dwarf,' he observed many years ago, in a letter to the present writer. But the assertions of tradition, and the intuition of a man of genius, are negligible quantities in scientific controversy.

The opposite contention is that the taller races represent the degenerate forms of races of normal stature. This view finds little support in the statements made by E. Torday in his book, L'Homme des Pygmées (1895). Torday and his party visited a village of pygmies near the confluence of the rivers of the Bu-Shongos. These pygmies, instead of leading the wandering, forest life of their ancestors, are settled agriculturalists, and have been so for the last two or three generations. They have even been found to be extremely fond of the effects of alcohol, and the alteration in environment and habits is that the sedentary pygmies are considerably taller than their kindred who still lead the nomadic life of the forest. There has been suggested that their superior stature, and their increasing aversion to agriculture, are both due to a possible admixture of blood in a previous generation, and that the settled pygmies are not typical pygmies. This must be so, for the theory of a dwarf race must be strictly ascertained before any satisfactory deduction can be made. There is one conclusion, however, that seems inevitable: if these pygmies are of pure, undiluted stock, and have grown in stature by abandoning the forest, then the converse would hold, and the tall Bu Shongo among whom they live would, if driven into the forest by a stronger race, begin to approximate in stature and physique to the forest pygmies, should they be forced to live their life for a similar period of time. The question of environment cannot be overlooked, but it may be doubted whether its potency is so great as to produce such results.

One or two other facts connected with the Bu Shongo and the nomadic pygmies of their region must be noticed here. Each Bu Shongo kinglet has a group of pygmies under his suzerainty, who supply him with game in exchange for food. But, although the Bu Shongo utilize the pygmies in this way, they regard them as beings of a different nature from themselves. They are held in awe as 'half-giants'—spirits born from trees. This attitude is by no means confined to the Bu Shongo; there is a wide-spread dread of the pygmies among other African tribes. When a piggie arrow is found in a banchan of growing bananas, no man, even the owner, would be bold enough to take away either the arrow or the bananas.

These facts lead naturally to the subject of the reverence paid to dwarves in many lands. In passing, it may be observed that this reverence tends to support the idea that mankind generally regarded the dwarf races as in some sense beings of a special order, the gulf between the race of man and the Kimos of Madagascar, a race of long-armed dwarves. They are known also as Vazimbas, and under this name E. B. Tylor refers to them (Prim. Cult., 1891, ii. 114 f.) in the following connexion: 'In Madagascar the worship of the gods is remarkably associated with the Vazimbas, the aborigines of the island, who are said to have been able to get up and down in the interior, and whose peculiar graves testify to their former occupancy of other districts. These graves, small in size and distinguished by a cairn and an upright stone slab or altar, are places in which the Vazimbas regard with equal fear and veneration... To take a stone or pluck a twig from one of these graves, to stumble against one in the dark, would be resented by the angry Vazimbas inflicting disease, or coming in the night to carry off the offender to the region of ghosts.'

In Southern India a similar attitude is observed towards the dwarfish Kurumals of the Nilgiri hills. Popular tradition asserts that the megalithic cromlechs of the district were reared by the ancestors of the Kurumals. 'Though they are regarded with fear and hatred as sorcerers by the agricultural Madigas of the table-land, one of them must, 1

1A similar belief existed among the pagan Llhuamans regarding the kusukus (Llih. kusuku, 'dwarf, elf'), concerning whom Lasiusius (de Dios Samagurum, Basel, 1616, p. 51 [new ed. Mannhardt, Biebrau, 1830]; cf. also Schmidt, Peterman-Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Bonn, 1896, p. 82) writes: 'Sunt lumres quos Resi Vose (= Kusuku, goblinia) appellant: barbarioci, altitudines unae puante existen in regione tam vile, quod non ad imminente his pape... qui luere deus sinu muse... cum suis animis:... hic vir obiens obiit apotomatus, quod nisi fac, ea sunt vinae, quares quisque sosr tonitas, idque deus... (quoted by Schrader, loc.). For further allusions to Balto-Hispanic beliefs on dwarves, reference may be made to Haeusser, Wissenschaff des d. d. Kabbala, ii. 330, although the work must be used with extreme caution.—L. H. Gray.']

DWARFS AND PYGMIES 125
however, at sowing-time be called to guide the first plough for two or three years, and go through a mystic pantomime of prostrating themselves on the earth newly ploughed, which is certainly fall. When the plough is at rest, the Kurumba must pass the night by the dolmen alone." (Windle, p. xxvi).

However, the dolmen is considered as a kind of Levite estate, possessed of a peculiar supernatural power. Possibly the idea of employing dwarfs as temple-keepers in ancient Egypt may be due to a similar belief. In view of the association between dwarfs and supernatural structures in Southern India, it is of interest to record Captain Meadows Taylor's statement (Cairns, etc., in the Deekhan, Dublin, 1865, p. 1) that the chronicles of the Deccan

"were copied in many little, in the Casarlian language, Mores, Moor's, and these Morers were believed to have been a dwarf race of great strength, who inhabited the country in very remote ages.

A very full account of the Kurumbas, with copious references, will be found in Gustav Oppert's Original Inhabitants of India, Madras, 1883, ch. xii.

Mention has already been made of the resemblance, pointed out by Paul Monecaux, between the modern Akkas and the dwarfs portrayed at Pompeii, Rhodes, and Cyprus, as well as the

Patakas of the Phoenicians.

"A certain race of evil dwarfs," he further says (loc. cit.), "are strongly associated with the Phoenicians. The 'dwarfs of Egypt' or of Phoenicia, the huge head, the thick hanging lips, the enormous eyes, the excessively long arms, the excessively short legs, twisted and bowed.

No one will quarrel with any of this; but the significance of the comparison lies in the indication that the dwarf gods of Egypt and Phoenicia had their origin in a veneration paid to living dwarfs of a similar nature to that accorded in Madagascar and Southern India.

The question of dwarf races is manifestly more circumscribed in Europe than it is in countries where there are living specimens to be studied. Observations made in these countries are, as well as many references in tradition, but the field of conjecture is confessedly wide. Many observers of the African pygmy races have been reminded of European traditions which seem to point to a similar race in Europe.

"Other dwarf races of humanity belonging to the white or the Mongoloid species may have inhabited Northern Europe in ancient times, or it is at least universally supposed that the type of Pygmy Negro, which survives to-day in the recesses of Inner Africa, may have overflowed Europe in remote times. If it is true, then the conclusion is irresistible, that it gave rise to most of the myths and beliefs connected with geniuses, kobolds, and faeries.

The noted ancestor of the little dwarfs in the present day is related, over and over again, of the giant atelier, who lives in the recesses, under the earth, and is a benefactor. Their remarkable power of becoming invisible by admiring the roofs in heritage and behind rocks, their probable habits, in sterile or mountainous districts, of living in the old houses of the dead and caverns, their mischievousness and their prankish good-nature, all seem to suggest that it was some race like this which inspired most of the stories of Tento and Cott regarding a dwarfish people of superb supernatural attributes." (Sir H. Johnston, in Pall Mall Mag., Feb. 1905, p. 170).

Of the dwarf skeletons found in Europe, scientific accounts are furnished in the works of Kollmann and Schmidt, already cited. Special mention may also be made of an article on 'Trouisther Pyg-"mien in Schlesien,' by G. Thilenius, which appeared in the Brunswick journal Globes in 1892 (ib. lxxxvi. no. 74).

A recent addition to the list of European dwarf skeletons is that of a young woman, 4 ft. 6 in. in height, which was found in Scotland in 1707, at the bottom of a pit in the Roman fort at Newstead, Roxburghshire. The skeleton is thus referred to be the most ancient excavation of the fort during the period 1905-1910.

"The most curious of all these human relics was the nearly complete skeleton of a dwarf, found in one of the pits. Professor Peryy estimates the age at from twenty to twenty-three years, and yet the height cannot have exceeded four feet six inches. Though the creature must have been a dwarf, the bones show no signs of rickets or other bone disease, being well formed, but the dwarfism points to a remarkable degree. How it came to lie in the pit beneath the bones of nine horses is a problem of which no solution can be hoped for." (A Roman Frontier Fort and its People, Glasgow, 1911, p. 111).


The Tapiro pygmy living in the Amazon forest is described by Mr. Rawling in The Geographical Journal, xxxvii. 3 (London, Sept. 1911), 343-347. An account of pygmy remains found in a cave in Southern India is contributed by Mr. D. B. J. Rawling to the Saturday Review, London, Sept. 30 and Oct. 21, 1911.

DAVID MACRITCHIE.

DWARAKA (Skr. Dwārakā, Dwārakā, the city of many gates)._The famous city and place of pilgrimage associated with the life of Krishna, situated in lat. 22° 14′ 20′′ N., long. 87° 21′ E., in the native State of Okhānmandar in the peninsula of Kathiawār in Western India. It is the form of the legend, Krishna is said to have been assisted by the hosts of Rāja Jarāsandha, whom he repulsed seventeen times. Jarāsandha, finding it vain to continue the struggle alone, called in the aid of Jarā Kālayavana, who with his horse from the far west bore down upon the doomed city of Mathurā (q.v.); and it was at the moment of time transferred the whole of his faithful people. The first intimation that reached them of their changed abode was the sound of the sacred cow and the clanging of the cows' bells, which awoke the next morning. The legend probably represents some attack by forces from the west on the people of the Jamnā valley, and their retreat before their enemies southwards in the direction of the sea. Krishna, it is said, reigned in splendour in his new city, and there, by his wife, Jāmbavati, daughter of the king of the bears, he had a son named Samba. The latter, by an inexcusable prank, insulted the Pā, or ascetics, who cursed him and his family. To remove the curse they went on a pilgrimage to Somnāth (q.v.), and there Krishna was accidentally slain by the arrow of a Bhul hunter. Hearing of his death, the great Milk maidens, the companions of his ruler, buried themselves at a place called the Gopī Talāv, or "milkmaids' tank." Their ashes, it is believed, turned into the white clay still found at the place, which is called Cappikand, or the ritual well. The clay is used and needed by members of the Vaiṣṇava sect to make their forehead marks. J. Kennedy (J.R.A.S., October 1907, p. 951 ff.) distinguishes the most ancient Krishna of Dwārakā from the Mathurā deity.

Two places are specially venerated in connexion with the life of Krishna—the first, Māl Dwārakā, the 'original Dwārakā,' a little mound on the sea-shore between the mouths of the rivers Somat and...
EARTH, EARTH-GODS.

Man's ideas concerning the earth may be divided into three classes—cosmological, mythical, and religious. In some cases these mingle strangely, and, while man thinks of the earth as a created or artificially formed thing, he also regards it as more or less alive. The mythology entertained by various peoples was a mytho-scientific deduction from man's observation of what he saw around him. In no case had he any conception of the extent of the earth. To him it was merely the district in which he lived. He saw the sea, and believed that it encircled the earth like a vast river. Earth was usually thought of as a flat disk or oblong box floating on the ocean, while the heavens were regarded as a kind of dome, stretching above the earth and resting upon it or upon the waters, or propped up by poles or pillars. Such beliefs are found among lower races—Australians, Eskimo, the wild tribes of the Malay Peninsula, the Ewe of W. Africa, and others. In some cases the surface of the earth covers an 2.

1. Origin of the earth. Man's speculations did not limit themselves to the form of the earth; he bustled himself also with the problem of its origin, and the various solutions of that problem are found with wonderful similarity amongst widely separated peoples. In some cases direct creation by a divinity seems to be asserted. Thus in the sacred myths of the Quiches, preserved in the Popol Vuh, it is said that in the beginning there existed divine beings called 'they that give life.' They spoke the word 'earth,' and earth came into existence. An old hymn of the Dinka of the Upper Nile tells how, 'at the beginning,' Tengdet (on whom see ERE [v. 767]), a god dwelling in heaven, made all things. Similarly a native hymn from the Leeuward Islands tells of Telvi who 'slept in the void. No earth, no sky, no con. He became the universe.' So, too, a hymn of the Zulus describes Awenawul at the Creation, forming everything by thinking 'outside in space.'

But, generally speaking, where the making of the earth by a god is referred to, it is rather the framing of existing matter than creation that is meant. Thus some Australian tribes speak of the framing of the earth by a god, cutting it with his knife in many places, and thus forming creeks, rivers, valleys, and hills. As man himself shaped

2. Lejun, Religions der Steinzeit, 1909.
things out of clay or wood, so he imagined the Creator to have acted, and hence the native word for 'Creator' often means 'cutter-out,' 'moulder,' 'builder,' or 'forger.' In a whole series of myths from different parts of the world, but very common among American Indian tribes, the earth is formed out of a little mud or clay fished up out of the waters by a Divine being, often in animal form. This mud or clay is formed or grows into the earth. Of this myth the Vols and American Indians are probably the best instances. In most cases children of the gods are waters which have overwhelmed a previously existing world, and sometimes it is the earth itself which is fished up or rises out of the deep. This is found in an Atlantean myth in which the raven flies down to the sea and bids earth rise out of the waters. In a Polynesian myth the gods and god-goddess of the ocean, the brine dropping from which coagulated and formed an island. In another series of myths the earth is formed out of part of the body of a gigantic being, who is sometimes hostile to the gods and is slain by them, as in the Babylonian Tiamat, out of whose body, cut in two, Marduk made heaven and (apparently) earth.

Cf. the account preserved by Bezaeus of the gigantic woman Ommagotia of the Isani, who is cut in two, making heaven and earth of the other; and the Scandinavian myth of the giant Ymir, from whose flesh Odin, Vili, and Ve made the earth and the sky, and to whom the gods offered sacrifice in the gigantic first man. Purana, and out of him made earth or sky, men, moon, etc.

3. Heaven and Earth as a Divine pair.—The expanse of heaven and the broad earth were early regarded as personal beings, and also as husband and wife, in which such loving things as spring, being thought of as female. Their union was the source of all things in Nature, and, when the gods of departments of Nature were evolved, these were regarded as their children. Generally also they had mythological histories of their own. In most cosmogonies Earth is the fruitful mother impersonated by Heaven, though in some cases the Sun or the 'Great Spirit' is her husband, and they are universal pair. Mythology also solved the problem of their separation by saying that it had been formidable, and (in many instances) brought about by their children.

Many of Earth and Heaven as a Divine pair are found among African tribes, and, as among the Tofard, they are represented by the male and female Organs of generation, the symbolical poles of heaven and of earth. These myths are found among the African Indians, although with them the earth is sometimes taken as the male and the heavens as the female. In one myth the hero god Matato causes the removal of Heaven from Earth by magic. Similar ideas are widespread among the Polynesians, and in the Maori myth of Rangi and Papa it is their children, especially the father of forest-trees, who cause their separation. In other islands, gods, a sea-serpent, puma, or the first human beings, bring this about. Occasionally the

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1 See Brinton, Relig. of Primitive Peoples, N.Y., 1897, p. 125.
2 de Chardon, Une Légende cosmogonique, Havre, 1884.
5 Brinton, Myths of the New World, Philadelphia, 1890, p. 229.
6 Révill, Rel. des peuples non civilisés, Paris, 1883, li. 46; for other versions in which an island is fished up, see Grey, Polynesian Myth., ed. London, 1899, p. 291; Taylor, To Ika a Maui, London, 1885, p. 1157.
9 Réville, x. 90; cf. the remarks of Bouasse, Hautproblemes der Mythologie, page 849, of the Bantu, L. 380.
11 Zurger, 1881, p. 25; Cushing, 79; Gregg, Commerce of the Sea, L. 387.

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4. Earthquakes.—The movements of the animal who supports or exists within the earth are supposed to cause earthquakes (cf. Animals, § 10). Where a god or giant is the supporter, they are similarly produced, or a god or giant within the earth or an earthquake deity causes them. In other cases the dead are supposed to cause them, e.g. by shaking the palm on which the earth rests, or by struggling to reach the earth's surface. According to the chirags, the earth was created by shaking the earth. In the naive belief of the Caribs, an earthquake was held to be Mother Earth dancing and signifying to her children that they also should dance. 

5. Disturbing the Earth.—The idea that it is dangerous to disturb the Earth or to intrude into its domain, and that, when this is done, Earth must be appeased by sacrifices, is seen in the common custom of foundation sacrifice (see FOUNDATION), in which a human or animal victim is placed below the foundation when the earth is dug out. Frequently this is done to provide a spirit-guardian for the building; but there is no doubt that the propitiatory aspect came first. The analogous custom of sacrificing to rivers when crossing them makes this certain (cf. also art. BRIDGE), and reference may be made to the Japanese ji-ki-an-ari, or 'earth-calming-festival,' for 'propitiating the site of a new building.' Similarly the sacrificial ritual before ploughing, though it has the intention of assisting fertility, doubtless was connected with this idea, and expresses itself in such rites as that of the Chaus, in which ploughing is begun secretly, and is then carefully atoned for with sacrificial and lustral rites, after which it may be proceeded with. The thought is expressed in Sophocles' Antigone (339 f.): 'Earth ... men wears away.' In India, ploughing does not take place on certain days when Mother Earth is asleep. We find the same idea in Celtic myths of lakes which burst forth when a grave was dug, and in India, Earth is worshipped.
before a well is dug. Propitiatory sacrifices were frequently offered before gathering various plants.

6. Earth as Divinity.—Earth is generally known as 'Mother Earth,' depicted by the Aztecs as a many-breasted woman, like the Ephesian Artemis, who is the origin of Earth. Her most notable aspect is the broad-breasted 'Gaia', and the Zuul of Earth with her 'four-fold womb.' In primitive agricultural communities Mother Earth was propitiated with sacrifices, or worshipped with orgiastic rites, and such is still the case among many tribes of W. Africa she is the object of an extensive cult.

Among the aborigines of India, Mother Earth is worshipped mainly in conjunction with agricultural seasons, and as the image representing her was slain at a great festival and hidden in pieces, and portions of the flesh were buried or placed on the field. Among the Tutsis, Nerbunus (or Terra Mater) was specially worshipped by certain tribes in spring, her wagoon being drawn about the land by cows, and attended by her priest, probably in order to make the land fertile. Other goddesses worshipped elsewhere—Fria, Tamfana, and Nehalemnia—were probably in origin Earth-goddesses, while the giants Jordh, mother of Thor, is simply the Earth. Freyr, in some aspects a god of fruitfulness, had also a procession in spring, attended by his priestess, regarded as his wife. After this procession a fruitful year was looked for. Freyr was the son of Njôrdh, perhaps a male double of Njôrdh. Both Njôrdh and Freyr may be regarded as later male forms of an earlier Earth-goddess.

Traces of the cult of an Earth-mother among the Eskimos are very general, as an Earth-goddess, as the consort of the Celtic Disposer, Stamma, Divona, Domnu, Berecynthia, and others; while the Matres with their symbols—fruit, flowers, and a child—are the female extensions of the primitive Earth-mother. But, in accordance with a tendency for gods to take the place of goddesses which is not confined to Celtic religion, certain gods, primarily Earth-gods—those equated with Disposer, and Dagda in Ireland—are prominent. They are also under-earth gods. The older goddess now generally appears as the consort of one of these.

The Veil of earth-mother Prthivi was probably worshipped along with Dyans, and their epithets show their greatness and productivity, as well as their moral and spiritual character. But she is occasionally also associated with some other Earth-goddess. Bhûni, the soil, has a place in village cults, and to this divinity—now male, now female—cakes, sweetsmeats, and fruits are offered.

In Babylon, En-lil was god of the earth, but it is probable that an Earth-goddess had been first worshipped. Such a goddess may be seen in his consort Nin-lil, or in Damkina, 'lady of the earth,' consort of Ea. Probably the great mother-goddesses of the Semitic area—Ashart (q.v.) in Canaan, Atargatis (q.v.) in Syria, Ishtar (q.v.) in Babylonia, etc.—had been Earth-goddesses. They are connected with fertility, maternity, and the giving of children (hence she is regarded as a mother who has given birth and holding a child), and are called 'mother of men.'

Ishtar, at whose descent to Hades fertility ceases, in part symbolizes the death of earth in winter. But, since Earth and under-earth are closely connected, all the cults of Hades, may also have been an Earth-goddess, one name of Hades being 'Enlil.' The earth is also the object of an old Semitic belief, and thither he returned. Ishtar, mother of men, and Attika, receiver of men, are thus different aspects of one being. Earth is also called Ekhtyara, 'house of fertility,' in popular view the gods had sprung from the Earth, and Ishtar is also the mother of the Earth-gods.

The cult of Earth was primitive in Greece. Ge or Gaia was the Mother who sent up fruits. She had local cults and temples, and the fruits of the earth, as well as animal and perhaps human victims, were offered to Ge or Caprotrophor, the title Caprotrophor, applied to an otherwise unnamed goddess, is connected with 'Caprotrophi,' and recalls the belief that children or the first men come from the earth. Other goddesses were derived from or associated with the old Earth-goddess—Aprhodite, Semele, Artemis, Pandora, Aglauros, etc.—and in some instances an epithet of Ge (Caprotrophor, Theor) was separated from her, and became a new goddess. Demeter, 'Earth-mother' (Dana), or 'Grainmother' (Ibi, 'barley'), is certainly also a form of the Earth-goddess, but now rather of the cultivated earth. She is specifically a corn-goddess, but also, and more generally, a Goddess who 'sends us gifts' (Arpoitrophor), while her functions concern vegetation and the fruits of the earth as well as flocks and herds. She is also equated with Rhea-Cybele, herself a primitive Earth-mother.

The ritual of the Theaeuropäische points to Demeter, with Kore, as Earth-goddess. Live pigs, along with dough images of serpents and of the diana, were thrown into underground sanctuaries, and the rites was intended to promote the growth of fruits and of human offspring. The flesh of the pigs was afterwards mixed with the seed-corn, to promote an abundant harvest. All these offerings symbolized fertility, and the throwing of those into underground places resembles the custom of burying offerings to the Earth-goddess.

Kore has also characteristics of an Earth-goddess, and was once probably one with Demeter. She, too, is capacité, and in the representations of her return from Hades, the return of an
the awakening of the Earth in Spring, evoked by ritual actions, e.g. striking the earth with hammers, may be seen.1 While Demeter is said to have visited the fields with death and anger at Phito's rape of Kore, an older myth may have explained this as the result of her own disappearance, as in the case of Ishtar. The Phigaleian myth of her retirement to the house of Poseidon's violence, and the consequent death of vegetation, points also in this direction.2

The great goddess of the old Cretan religion was probably an Earth-mother, the prototype of the Greek Gaia.4 She moulds men and their coffins with the Cretan Rhea and the Phrygian Cybele, and who is primarily the fruitful earth, mother of gods and men. The Great Mother is often identified with Demeter and Gaia.

Among the Romans the primitive Earth-spirit, who was personified as Terra Mater, or Tellus, may also be seen behind each female divinities as Ops, Ceres (the equivalent of Demeter), Bona Dea, and Dea Dia. At the Forficatio, pregnant cows were sacrificed to Tellus, the unborn calves being torn from them and burnt, while the ashes were used at the Parilia along with the blood of the calf. This rite, which the Vestals were concerned, is clearly of ancient date and intended to assist Earth's fertility, or 'to procure the fertility of the corn now growing in the womb of Mother Earth.' Tellus was also invoked with Ceres at the Semestrum to protect the seed, and offerings of cakes and a pregnant sow were made.5 Tellus was associated with the underworld and the manes, as Demeter was with the dead, and she was invoked in the marriage ritual.6 Earth was thus to the early Romans, as to the Greeks, the giver of fruits, as well as of children, while to her, as to a kind mother, men returned at death (see the grave-inscriptions). The cult of Tellus and other divinities connected with the Earth was carried far and wide by the Romans, who assimilated them to local earth-divinities of other lands.

The ancient Mexicans knew Earth as 'Mother of all,' and invoked her at oath-taking, eating some earth sacramentally. Centeotl, goddess of the maize, must be regarded as an Earth-goddess. She was called 'our reverse mother,' and was sometimes represented as a frog, the symbol of the moist earth, with many mouths and breasts. She was also the bringer of children, and was represented bearing a child. Her festivals fell in the autumn and spring, and the old and the older woman representing her was slain.7 In Peru, where, as in Mexico, myth told how the first men came out of the earth, Pachamama, Mother Earth, was worshipped, e.g. at harvest, when corn and chicha was also carried on in grottos and caves, and oracles were sought there.

Sacrifices to earth-deities are laid on the ground, buried, or thrown into a hole.8 Human victims were often slain in agricultural ritual; the earth or seed was watered with their blood, or their flesh was buried, to promote fertility, whether the victim was a prophylactic offering or, as Fraser9 maintains, a physiologically representative of the deity of vegetation. Examples from N. America, Mexico, Africa, Indo-China, and India are cited by him;10 and he is also of opinion that the myth of Osiris' numbers scattered by Egypt may possibly be based on theirs,11 as suggested by the scattering of the ashes of red-haired victims over the fields.12

7. Earth and the Mother.—The belief in the earth as the mother of men may be seen in the myth which told how the first men came out of the earth, of which there are many N. and S. American, Zela, Eskimo, aboriginal and Peruvian instances.13 Greece also had myths of earth-born tribes (abro'dynores), as well as of Erichnionus, the son of Earth. In other myths, men emerge from stones, trees, plants, etc., or, again, the creator god comes out of earth or clay. These are divergent forms of the same myth.

The belief is further seen in the idea that children buried in the Earth may be re-born,8 and a connexion between the two ideas is found in the custom of barren women resorting to the place whence men may be re-born. Hence, as an expression of the belief in the restlessness of the shade whose body is left unburied may be connected with the idea that burial in the womb of Earth is necessary to re-birth. Hence also it is often sufficient to throw a little earth on the corpse to ensure rest to the spirit. Men were often buried in the position in which the child rests in the womb; or, again, the dying were laid on the earth, or a little earth was placed over them to facilitate the passage of the soul to its true home. Analogous is the custom of laying the newly-born child on the ground—probably as a consecration to Mother Earth, or to obtain her protection and strength.9

All these beliefs and customs, and the myth of Heaven and Earth as a Divine pair, are the result of the analogy which man saw between the processes of conception and birth, and those of the earth brings forth. Hence in many languages the words for begetting, sowing, and ploughing, for semen and the seed sown in the earth, for woman or the female organ of generation and the field or ploughshare, and for the mother of men, for earth, are the same, or are used metaphorically one for the other (abro, apero, Heb. zeva', Bab. zērē, etc.).10 Hence Earth was regarded as fertilized by Heaven, or by the rain (cf. the Egyptian formula 6, 'Rain,' addressed to Heaven and earth, 'Be fruitful' to Earth); hence, too, the myth of Earth sown with stones which spring up as men, or of plants growing from human semen spilt on the ground. Earth, as a fruitful mother impersonated as a female, was easily regarded as mother of men and κοιμητήρεια. For this reason the process or symbols of begetting are believed to react magically on Earth's productive powers, and conversely the rites for Earth's fruitfulness on that of man. The

1 See Harrison, ProL to the Study of Greek Rel., Cambridge, 1909, p. 2701; *Hellenic Joum.,* 1904, p. 1061.
2 Paus. viii. 327; see below. § 8.  
3 Ovid, Fast. iv. 631, 728.  
5 Compare with Paus. iv. 27.  
6 Tonten, Les Cultes païens dans l'empire romain, Paris, 1886, I. 333.  
7 Müller, 431; Réville, *Rel. of Mex. and Peru,* London, 1884, pp. 72, 95.  
8 Müller, 310, 309; Réville, 107.  
9 Besides the examples referred to, see also Ling Roth, Nat. of Sarawak, London, 1886, I, 100; de Souza, 521; Lang, Myth, Hist., Gen., vol. ii. 211: Tyler, ii. 723 (Germany, Gipses).  
10 *GBH* ii. 245.
rites of the 'Appropoaiia helped the fruitfulness of Earth and made the end of droughts were flung into the earth. Symbolic sexual acts, as well as sexual union, often performed on the fields, are held to assist fertility, and the myth of the union of Iasion and Demeter on a threepointed field probably arises out of such ritual acts. The marriage of Heaven and Earth is sometimes celebrated ritually, as in the Leti Islands, where the sun is supposed to come down and fertilize Earth at the rainy season, this being made the occasion of a festival in which the sexes unite. Women, because of the analogy of their fruitfulness with that of Earth, or because they first practised agriculture, have usually a prominent place in agricultural ritual. And, again, because of Earth's influence on human productiveness, or because children were supposed to come from earth, Earth is sometimes invoked in marriage rites.

8. Earth and under-Earth. Earth as the tomb of all became the abode of the dead; and hence many Earth-divinities are associated with the latter, since there is little difference between Earth and under-Earth, though growing out of it springing from below the surface. Traces of this are found in Celtic religion; and in Greece, Gaia was associated with festivals of the dead, and was also called Yg xep—s-an epithet also shared by Demeter, whose cult at Phlegraæa pres ages her connexion was the underworld; while the dead were called Astrapos. More obvious still is the connexion of Kore with Pluto, lord of Hades and giver of all blessings which come from the earth, just as Trophonios, an under-world deity, was the 'nourishing god. Most Greek Earth-divinities have this twofold character. The Roman Tellus was also associated with the moist world. Allatu, the Rahu, lady of Hades, may have been an Earth-goddess (§ 6), and, contrariwise, Ishtar may have been a goddess of the under world. Her images have been found in Phoenician graves; and Aphrodite, her counterpart in Greece, was occasionally associated with the under world. The death of Earth in winter would also help to suggest a connexion of the Earth-goddess with the region of the dead. Mythology, however, tended to separate Earth from under-Earth, and the death of vegetation was explained by saying that the Earth-goddess was detained in the under world by its ruler—Ishtar or Allatu, Kore and Pluto.

The connexion is further seen in the similar methods of evoking the return of the Earth-goddess in spring and the spirit of the dead, by striking the ground or striking the earth.

Literature.—This is indicated in the article.

EARTHQUAKES.—See PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS.

EASTER ISLAND. I. Name, geography, and ethnology. Easter Island is the most easterly inhabited island of the Polynesian group, situated in the Pacific Ocean about 1000 miles south-east of Pitcairn Island, and forming an irregular triangle with an area of about 34 sq. miles. Its name is derived from the current belief that it was discovered by theesseract on Easter Day (6th April), 1722. The natives call it 'Te Pito to Henua,' or 'the navel and uternas,' from a seeming resemblance of the volcanoes Rana, Roraks, to the navel (plow) and Kao to the uternas (navel). In 1770 the Spaniards named the island San Carlos, and throughout southern Polynesia it is known as Rapa Nui, though this name dates back only to the seventeenth decade of the nineteenth century. It has also been called Easterland and Wada. Many explorers have visited the island, but none stayed long enough to make a thorough investigation, previous to the expedition of the United States Steamship Mohican, which remained there from 31st March to 31st Dec. 1886. The natives of Easter Island are of comparatively small stature, the largest skeleton measured on the Mohican expedition being somewhat less than six feet in length. They are usually darker, shorter, and fairer than the men. The children have somewhat the complexion of Europeans, but grow darker with age from constant exposure to sun and trade-winds, although the covered portions of the body retain their light colour. The coarse black hair is straight, or wavy, but never kinky, the nose straight, eyes dark-brown with thin dark brows and lashes, cheek-bones prominent, lips thin, and beard scanty. The general facial appearance corresponds (making due allowance for sculptural exaggerations) with the physiognomy of the statues. The breasts of the women are round, rather large, well-shaped, and ample, and their breasts and nipples but large areolas, though neither so great nor so dark as in many other Polynesian islands. In the oldest adult males the pilage on the body is often very thin.

2. Tattooing, which was introduced by immigrants from the Marquesas Islands some two centuries ago, is not practised at the present time, but the older natives are thus decorated, chiefly on the face, neck, waist, and legs, although no special design is adhered to, and its object is solely ornamental. The women are more elaborately and extensively tinted than the men. The bodies were also painted in certain times, whilst the clothing consisted of scant garments, chiefly of tapa or cloth, over the shoulders and about the loins. Feather hats were worn on various occasions, but without apparent religious significance, except possibly in cases of marriage-feasts, and when the chiefs used them as insignia of office.

3. The early population of Easter Island is unknown, but it is practically certain that it was never very great. It is known, however, that their numbers have suffered serious depletion in consequence of the brutal deportation of the islanders by Poru in 1805. In 1868 there were 900, but 900 were removed to Tahiti in 1873, and three years later 360 more emigrated to the Archipelago. At the time of the Mohican's visit in 1886 the natives still on the island numbered 155.

4. The general ethical status of the Rapa Nui, at least in modern times, is relatively high. The women are modest and of a higher moral standard than almost any of the other Polynesians. In disposition the natives are cheerful, contented, and hospitable. Intoxicating drinks, even kava, are wholly unknown. Thieving was common, but was not regarded as immoral. The thief was under the protection of a special divinity, and was believed to be detected only when the theft did not meet with the deity's approval. A system of retaliation existed, by which the person wronged might regain the property plundered, the thief being no wise forfeiting social respect or position. A darker side of their ethics, however, is presented by the cruelty which was meted out to those acquired foes after the conclusion of their wars. Pre-nuptial unchastity was common, and after marrying the husband was at liberty to lend or sell his wife to another for as long a time as he should receive her back without detriment to the self-respect of any concerned. Adultery, on the other hand, was punished with death. Divorce depended on the will of the married pair. Suicide was extremely common, infanticide rare, and
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aberty rites were unknown. The aged found little respect or consideration. Despite Christian influence the object of cemeteries was very rare; but the ancient dances are still retained. These are essentially pantomimic, and in them the arms are employed more than the legs. A small dance, known as the 'hula hula', which is prominent features of the posturing. There are also huta-huta dances of an erotic type, but the sexes seldom dance together. The huta-huta seems to have been danced chiefly at the annual election of a military chief, the celebration in honour of it lasting a month.

5. Amusements to-day, except as a marriage-rite, are very rare; but the ancient dances are still retained. These are essentially pantomimic, and in them the arms are employed more than the legs. A small dance, known as the 'hula hula', which is prominent features of the posturing. There are also huta-huta dances of an erotic type, but the sexes seldom dance together. The huta-huta seems to have been danced chiefly at the annual election of a military chief, the celebration in honour of it lasting a month.

6. In ancient times the government of Easter Island was an arbitrary monarchy. The supreme authority, which was quasi-priestly, was vested in a king, and was hereditary in his family. He ruled over the entire island, which was divided into districts, each named and presided over by a chief. There was no special code of laws, custom defining the rights and duties of natives. For the most part, the ruler was entirely independent of any other, and in the continual conflicts which took place the king and his family were held sacred and were not troubled by either victory or defeat. Since the kidnapping of the prince of Matavea and the murder of his family, the last of a long line of kings, by the Peruvians in 1865, and their subsequent death in slavery, there has been no acknowledged authority among the Rapa Nuis.

7. In war the only weapons known to the natives were obsidian-pointed spears, short clubs, and stones, all of which were used with great skill. Shields were unknown, and there was no class of trained warriors.

8. The ancient islanders buried their dead lying at full length, usually with the head towards the sea. The bodies were wrapped in dried grass bound together by a sedge mat; but later tapo, or native cloth, was used instead of the mat. There seems to have been no special place of burial, although the platforms and the caves were favourite depositories for the dead. The bodies are now frequently exposed to animals and the elements, and are later thrust into their final places of interment without ceremony. The skulls of chiefs seem to have been marked with special clan-tokens, and numbers of such crania have been found.

9. Cannibalism was practised until a recent date, and an old legend states that children were sometimes devoured by their parents to satisfy the craving for human flesh. There is no evidence, however, that cannibalism was a regular ceremony.

10. The general style of architecture seems to have been of two kinds. The more permanent form was that of the rectangular house built of bark or reeds and supported by posts set in the interstices of the stone foundation. These structures were from 10 ft. to 15 ft. in length and 6 ft. to 8 ft. in width. They had a thatched gable roof and nearly straight sides, one of which, contained the door. In constructing the stone part of such a house, a convenient hill or rock was generally taken for the back wall. From this were laid side walls varying in thickness from 3 ft. to 7 ft., the shape being determined in great measure by the topographical conditions, and no definite plan was adopted. The front wall was constructed in the same way as the side, with the exception of the door, which was frequently set back from the posts. Over which was laid a slab of stone, the entrance averaging a height of 20 inches and a width of 19 inches. In some houses two doors are found. The material used was basaltic rock. The average proportions of these dwellings are as follows: height from floor to ceiling, 4 ft. 6 in.; thickness of walls, 4 ft. 10 in.; wall height, 12 ft. 9 in. respectively. The ceiling was made of slabs reaching from wall to wall. This was topped by a mound of earth, which was covered with sod, making the hut effectively rainproof. In a few instances there are dwellings, top openings, and more rooms opening from the main one. A small place was hollowed out of the wall of every dwelling to hold the household gods and any valuables which the inhabitants might value. This quasi-closet is remarkable in that it is frequently roofed by a true arch of lava with a keystone. Near Anahoïrangaro Point there is a round tower 12 ft. in diameter and 20 ft. in height, supposed to have been used as a look-out to observe the movements of turtles. Another such tower, whose shaft measures 244 ft., may be seen near Ahuakapu. It stands in the centre of a narrow platform 67 ft. long.

In Easter Island, as elsewhere in the Polynesian Islands, an important form of architecture was the construction of long, narrow platforms which corresponded to the houses of the natives. They are usually near the beach on high ground, and are built with parallel walls of squared stones laid together, but uncemented. Inside these walls, at irregular intervals, were built small tombs. Between these tombs and those containing walls, were thrown small stones until the horizontal plane of the platform was completed. Into this rubble were set the rectangular stones upon which the images stand. Finally, wings were built sloping from the horizontal plane to the ground. There are 113 platforms in all on Easter Island, each with a name. The largest, Tongariki, is 160 ft. long, 9 ft. wide, and 8 ft. high, excluding the wings, but with these it measures 540 ft., and the platforms vary in character and condition from this to mere shapeless masses of stone. Tongariki was adorned with fifteen statues, all but one of which have fallen face downward on the inshore side and are mostly broken. Another platform, named Vinapu, has six wings. Behind this is a round area 225 ft. in diameter. There is evidence to suggest that this was the ancient place of assembly for feasts and native ceremonies, and other platforms show similar spaces, the platform of Anaoraka having behind it a large triangle paved with cobblestones. Altars, which are said to have been erected for sacrifice, are found in the rear of some of the platforms. They are built of a single shaft, generally of vesicular lava, or sometimes of the material from which the images and crowns were made, and vary in height from 5 ft. to 10 ft., squared from 3½ ft. to 4 ft. on each face. They stand in the centre of a smoothly-paved terrace, and the sides and plinth are covered with figures sculptured in low relief, which, unfortunately, are too worn to be determined. There are traces of fire on the top of these stones, but no charred human bones have been found, so that the idea that they were used for human sacrifice may be discarded, especially as they are unlikely to have been used in the other Polynesian islands for this purpose.

11. The art seems to have been of a crude and simple type. Slabs painted white, red, and black have been discovered. Some of the figures upon them resemble birds, while others are remarkable reproductions of European ships. Sculptured rocks, some of which seem to be prior to all remains except a ruined village west of the town, have also been found. These are covered with fishes, turtles, and a bird-like figure which probably represents Moke Meke. On the wooden clubs and wide-bladed paddles designs of heads
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may be plainly seen. Carved necklaces, which were never worn by the dancers, also exist.

All the stone for the monuments of Easter Island was quarried either in the southern part of the crater of Rano Raraku or else on the western slope of the mountain. The workshops of the image-builders were situated in both of these places. The workman first chose an appropriate rock, then made a rough drawing of his subject in a recumbent position, and finally carved and completed the figures with a keen eye for cutting away loose from the rock. This was done last of all, and with caution, to avoid breakage. There are about 285 statues in, or very near, the crater of Rano Raraku, in various stages of preservation. Their weight varies from ten to forty tons. An unfinished image, the largest on the island, measures 70 ft. in length and 14 ft. across the body. The head itself is 28 ft. long. The faces of these images, which alone are finished with any degree of care, have receding foreheads, high cheek-bones, straight noses, firm lips, long orthognathous chins, and ears of an exaggerated oval shape, possibly representing the very common elongation of the lobes by means of pendants. The backs of the heads are square, on account of the way in which the statues were freed from the living rock. Little care, if any, was given to finishing the body, which in no cases seems to have been cut from the living rock. In three or four instances female statues occur. In feature the images correspond closely with the household gods already mentioned, except that the latter are made of wood, with eyes of bone and obsidian; and, unlike the images, they have the body entirely finished. They range from 2 ft. to 8 ft. in length, and are more modern than the stone household gods. The usual view is that they were images of noted persons; but from the analogy of Polynesian religion in general they seem originally to have been closely connected with the cult of deceased chiefs, or, in other words, were the outgrowth of ancestor-worship.

12. The language of Te Pito te Henua is unmistakably Polynesian, being most closely akin to the Maori of New Zealand, and this is the only island of the group which has an alphabet. There are four main tablets in the possession of the natives, each of which is believed to contain a different tradition. The characters on them are pictorial symbols, and were incised with obsidian points in straight lines on a sunken channel. Some of these tablets seem to have been made of driftwood, very possibly parts of a canoe. They vary in size from 65 in. by 4 in. to 5 ft. by 7 inches. The art of reading them was hereditary in the families of the kings and chiefs, although in isolated cases a priest or teacher might decipher them. Ure Vaeko, an old inhabitant of Easter Island, related the traditions contained in the tablets, and his version was afterwards corroborated by another man, Kaitae by name, who claimed to be directly descended from the last king, Manara. At least approximate translations of these are given by Thompson and Geisler (op. cit. infra).

13. The early religion of Rapa Nui was distinctly Polynesian in type. The chief god was Meke Meke, who was the creator of all, and who is represented either as a godling (or ongono, or in the paintings, as a bird-like figure. In his honour a feast was held annually in July, at Orongo, when eggs of sea-birds were brought from the rocky islets of Motu Kau Kau and Motu Nui, a few hundred yards from Rapa Nui itself; he who first brought an egg unbroken having certain rights to food and other privileges, as being especially honoured of Meke Meke. This god is evidently the Polynesian Tangaloa, the sky-god, who is represented in many Polynesian cosmogonic myths as a bird, originally imprisoned in a gigantic egg (see Cosmogony [Polynesian]). There were numerous less important gods and goddesses, to whose conjugal union was ascribed the origin of all existing things, as told by one of the tablets. Unfortunately the account is too brief for any re-creation of the mythology, although it is mentioned in the inane "book of Akai, who called his wife Hepeue produced abidancy." It is known, however, that there was a god of fish named Mea Ika. There was also a god of birds called Era Nuku, whose wife was Manana, and who had the shape of a fish. Another bird-god was Mea Mon, while the bonito fish had a distinct deity, Mea Kahi. The god of theft has already been mentioned. Legend traces the coming of the Rapa Nui, under their king Hotu-Matua, in two proce from the west, and likewise tells of a conflict between the Vinapu and Tongoiki clans which resulted in the destruction of platforms and the over-throw of statues. The most famous god was the large stone called "dead," while those yet standing are "alive," and are believed to have slain their prostrate foes. This tradition may well represent an actual inter-necine war, which would not be unprecedented in Easter Island. It also explains the deification of the twin-gods, called the "dead," while those yet standing are "alive." Either tradition, however, is extremely doubtful, especially as the platforms where they are placed are favourite places of burial. It is more probable that the statues and, at least to some extent, the household gods, through whom communication was held with the spirits, represent the ancestor-cult of the early Rapa Nui, and that they thus find their analogue in the Melanesian images erected as memorials of tindales, although having in themselves no mana, or supernatural power (cf. Codrington, The Melanesians, Oxford, 1891, pp. 173-174). The statues are still objects of veneration to the natives of Easter Island, and are even being acquired by possession in the same way as the early tablets were protected by tabu (called rahi in this island), which is indicated in Rapa Nui by a white stone set on three common stones. The household gods seem to have received some sort of homage at the principal feasts, especially at the time of the ripening of the fruits, the fishing season, and the gathering of eggs. Temples were unknown, and worship was performed in the open air. The problem of altars has already been discussed.

Fetishism was also part of the religious belief of the island. The tinoike, or fetish-board, was a whalebone paddle, 30 in. long by 14 in. wide, which was waved to the accompaniment of incantations to injure an enemy, while the rapet, or potato-fetish, a double-bladed paddle some 2 ft. long, was employed in similar fashion to protect the potato crops against drought or insects. Still more interesting are the atua mangerio, or fetish stones, small pebbles, either rough or fashioned, which were buried beneath the houses to ensure good fortune. In early times the Easter Islanders had many superstitions, and had recourse to prayers, charms, incantations, and amulets to ward off evil and to bring good luck. They believed in a future life, to which, after death, the soul departed, there to be rewarded or punished as it deserved. For this
has long ago extended greatly towards the North and includes the Russians, she continues none the less to give herself the title of 'Eastern,' and thus to recall, on the one hand, the former eminence of the Orthodox Church of the East, and to bind her- 
self, on the other hand, to the ancient Church of which she claims to be the canonical and genuine heir.

Besides the Christians of those ancient lands in which the Orthodox Church prematurely extended her bounds, she has numbers now about a hundred million believers, to the Russian amongst them. The Russians. She consists of fourteen self- 
governing Churches, that is, Churches completely independent and autocephalous in regard to in- 
ternal administration. These are as follows:

1. The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.
2. The Patriarchate of Alexandria.
3. The Patriarchate of Antioch.
4. The Patriarchate of Jerusalem.
5. The Archipelagoate of Cyprus.
6. The Church of the Bulgarians.
7. The Church of Greece.
8. The Metropolises of Cario and Cyprus.
9. The Church of Rome.
10. The Church of Servia.
11. The Archipelagoate of Montenegro.
12. The Metropolitans of Herzzstadt.
13. The Metropolises of Bukovina and Dalmatia.
14. The Holy See of Jerusalem, which is attached for spiritual matters to the Patriarchate of Jerusalem.

All these Churches, though separate and inde- 
pendent, yet constitute one body, inasmuch as they possess (1) the same faith, (2) the same principles 
of government, and (3) the same bases of worship.

The common Faith. — The common Faith of the Orthodox Churches is drawn from the two 

sources of revelation, according as the infallible Church has understood and interpreted them through her hierarchy, either assembled in Synods, or by themselves teaching each the same doctrine.
The fountains and the rule of dogmatic instruction are the doctrinal decisions of the Ecumenical 
 Councils, or those of local Synods confirmed by an Ecumenical Council. As secondary sources,
Expositions of the Faith are used, such as have been ecclesiastically accepted, inasmuch as they agree with ecclesiastical doctrine. Such are the so-called Symbolical Books of the Eastern Church, 
 especially the Orthodox Confession of Moglas and that of Dositheus. The chief points of Orthodox 
dogma are as follows: — Man, having transgressed the commandment of God, fell from his original righteousness, and, by the sin of Adam, 
lost the true knowledge of God, on the other hand, 
leaning generally towards evil. But the Son of God, having become incarnate, and having been sacrificed on Golgotha, reconciles sinful mankind with God, and establishes His Church for the contin- 
ual supply of the benefits of the Cross. Thus the Church is the storehouse of truth and of sanctifying 
grace; through her the believer is taught the genuine contents of the Faith, and by means of her seven Sacraments (Baptism, Anointing, the Eucharist, Repentance, Ordination, Marriage, Ex- 
traordinary) he is both justified and edified, through faith working by love, in the work of sanctification and in advancement towards all that is good. The Saints are honored as models of 
faith and virtue (by feasts, pictures, and relics), and their intercession with God is requested (cf. the Symbolical Books of the Eastern Church; the published by Kimmel in two vols., Jenae, 1843). The reader may further consult the numerous 
Orthodox Catechisms, of which the principal is that of the Russian Plate; and the dogmatical 
works of the Russian Antonie, of Sylvestre, and in Greek those of Rossi's System of 
Diagnostics of the Orthodox Eastern Catholic Church 
(1 vol., Athens, 1903), and Androuoto's Symbolica

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EASTERN CHURCH. — The Church which 
believes herself to be the canonical heir of the ancient Church remaining in the Faith, 
and Orders of the first ages of Christianity, is called 'Orthodox' or 'Eastern.' Both these names 
distinguish her from, and contrast her with, her sister, 
the Western Church, which has excommunicated 
her, as well as from all the Protestant communities 
which have seceded from the latter. The name 'Orthodox Church,' on the one hand, expresses 

the idea that she is the Church of Christ which 
maintains the correct belief; the appellation 'Eastern Church,' on the other hand, in connection 
with the division of the ancient Roman Empire, 
points primarily to the Eastern half in contrast with 
the Western Church, which is the centre of the 
Church of Rome. Yet, inasmuch as the Western 
Church, under the Pope, by introducing innovati- 
sions regarding the foundations of government 
and regarding faith, at length separated herself from 
the Orthodox Church, the term 'Eastern' acquired a moral significance, pointing to the 
Church as the possessor and champion of the ancient traditional faith, in contrast with 
the degraded and Apostate Church. Thus also, though she

1 Besides this general article, there are separate articles under the titles Greek Church and Russian Church, to which this article is intended to be an introduction.
from an Orthodox Point of View (Athens, 1901), and Dogmatic of the Orthodox Eastern Church (Athens, 1907).

2. Church government. The second claim binding the autocephalous Churches into one whole is the common principles of government. These principles are supported by the holy Canons, by the Fathers, and by the administrative laws of the Eastern Churches, referred to in the Church and completed in the Canons. Among these canonical collections, entitled Nomocanon, the most important is the Code given to Photins, which was sanctioned in 920 by a great Council in Constantinople, and proclaimed as having authority over all the Eastern Church, constituting the fundamental collection of her laws. Modern collections are, on the one hand, the so-called Buddha of the Intelligent Ship of the one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of the Orthodox, published first at Leipzig in 1800; and, on the other hand, the Constitution of the Divine and Holy Canons, published by Kall and Pofi at Atos (Athens, 1897) (Greeck).

According to the principles of Orthodox government, the head of the Church is Jesus Christ; but believers are distinguished into clergy, consisting of three grades (archpriests, priests, and deacons), and laymen, consisting of the faithful. A single organism resting upon the monastic arrangements of Basil the Great, reduced to order by means of legal commands of ecclesiastical and political legislation.

The monks (whose first and second orders wear cassocks) are spiritually subject to their local bishop, excepting the monks of the stauropegia and of the Imperial monasteries. The monasteries are distinguished, according to their regimen, into cenobitic and idiorhythmic.

The centre of each Church is the bishop, but the basis of administration of the autocephalous Churches is the Synodical system, all questions of ecclesiastical administration and discipline being solved in regular or periodically convoked Synods. Not only spiritual questions affecting ecclesiastical life and hierarchical organization are regulated by Church law, but partly also many relations of social life, which are bound up closely with that of the Church, such as questions of marriage, divorce, etc. In spite of all the differences which, owing to their relations towards the civil government, are seldom very distinct in the organisation of the Church, the common spirit of administration appears everywhere. Many Canon Law regions, like the Church of the Orient in the best of them being Ecclesiastical Law, composed by Milasch at Zara in 1902, of which a second edition has appeared.

3. Worship. The third mark of the unity of the Orthodox Churches is the common basis of worship. No one liturgical language holds the place in the Orthodox Church that Latin does amongst the Roman Catholics; every race performs its service in its own tongue. The Table of Feasts of the Orthodox Church rests on the Julian Calendar, which has thus an ecclesiastical significance; hence a reform of it, bound up as it is with ecclesiastical life among the Orthodox, cannot be separate from the secular.

The churches are nearly all built on the same plan; the holy place is separated from the rest of the temple by the shrine for pictures.

The Church is distinguished as 'great,' because they relate to the Lord Jesus or to the Mother of God, or as Saints' days; but the central one is the Paschal feast (Easter). Easter, Christ-

mas, the Assumption of the Virgin, and the anniversaries of the death of the Holy Apostles are preceded by fasts of many days; other fast-days being also Wednesdays and Fridays. The 1st of September, the 29th of August, and the Eve of the Epiphany.

The stronghold and centre of the whole worship is the Liturgy, of which two types are used—that of Basil the Great and that of Chrysostom, which is usual throughout the year. The Liturgy of the Pre-sanctified, called, after the nomenclature of Gregory, the Dialogos, is reified only in Lent. Preaching of the Divine word, for the explanation and imparting of Christian truth, which was anciently an inseparable part of public worship, has now disappeared, and only in Russia does it show some signs of life. Common to all the Churches are certain books for the offices of the Feasts and the Sacraments. (1) Τιμίατο. The Typikon is a book which fixes the canonical psalms and hymns to be used, as well as the mode of conducting the services, for the Sundays and for the other days of the year, as well as for the different festivals. (2) Παναγιεύσιον. The Euchologion contains the order of prayers for the seven Sacraments, and other prayers for different occasions. (3) Προσκύνησιον. The Horologion contains the seven kinds of prayer, the daily prayer, that is, the first, the third, the sixth, the ninth, Vespers, Midnight, and Dawn. (4) Τριωδίον. The Triodion contains the hymns to be sung during the whole of the forty days which precede Easter. (5) Πραγματολογίον. The Pentecostarion contains the hymns to be sung from Easter to Whitunday. (6) Πασχαλικια. The Paraklesies contains the hymns of John of Damascus and others, which are sung from Whitunday onwards. (7) Μεμεριακα. The Menacae contains hymns for all the Saints' days and festivals of the year which are not contained in the Triodion and the Pentecostarion. (8) The Psalter, the Gospel, and the 'Apostle.' The music is vocal and idiorhythmic, and is pleasing when it is well performed. Instrumental music and graven images are forbidden (cf., for the Table of Feasts, the Calendar of Nilles, and for the music the Literature of Krumlacher, in Byzantinische Litteratur, Munich, 1897, p. 599 ff.).

4. Character of the Orthodox Church.—The essential features of the Orthodox Church are two: (a) theoretical, that she preserves and keeps unchangeable doctrine handed down by her (Traditionalism); and (b) practical, that she avoids excess or bias in external ceremonies (Ritualism). The first which, in a word, are the invariable, the unchangeable base and the marvellous beginning of Christianity, because this, according to the Orthodox, is not something empty and invisible, but a revelation having a firm and definite content in regard to faith and the bases of worship and administration; and the Orthodox Church, tolerating no innovation, claims to preserve and exhibit as much as possible the supernatural essence of Christianity. From her point of view, the Western Church came in a rush of development with ancient tradition, and Protestantism is a subversion of traditional foundations, whereas she herself claims to teach essentially what was taught by the Church of the first ages. Certainly, that keeping of the traditional Faith does not prevent the theological development and the many-sided investigation of Divine truth. And if, from the 8th cent. onwards, treatises about Christian truth are the least, it does not follow that the East has been at fault, not, at least, that the East has been at fault, not, at least, that the East should be blamed for not being the inexhaustible source of rich theological research, but to external causes, to well-known political circumstances.

All who visit the Churches of the East are
forcefully struck by the attention to external forms. Whereas the main aspect of the Western Church is that of an administrative institution, having a well-formalized system of obedience to the authority of the priests and bishops, whilst Protestant Christianity is principally a matter of teaching and preaching, the Orthodox Church, having on the one hand a loose administrative system, and on the other hand a lifeless preaching, appears unable to hold a society for worship. Thus dogma is put aside or hidden in the external forms of adoration; the whole religious being of the Orthodox appears generally in reverence and submission to her numerous rites. But surely religious ceremonies are the necessary expression of the internal spirit; and is it not reasonable that the Orthodox Church, having been distinguished of old by her rich religious life, should afterwards lapse? It forms a prevalent explanation of censurial canibalism in the employment of a man-god.

The sacrificial form of canibalism obviously springs from the idea that a victim offered to a supernatural being partakes in his sanctity, and from the wish of the worshipper to transfer to himself something of its benign virtue.18

Censurial canibalism has been a regular institution among the peoples of Central America, in parts of Peru, in Nigeria and various tracts of Equatorial Africa, and in certain islands of Polygon and Moluccas.19

The most remarkable development was in Mexico. At every sacrifice the victim bore the name and filled the rôle of the god. Acosta observes: "More they did sacrifice him, they gave him the name of the idol to whom he should be sacrificed, and armed him with the same ornaments like their idol, saying that he did represent them.20"

The annual representative of Tezcatilpoecs, after a year's luxurious living, was sacrificed at the grand festival. His heart was offered to the sun. His legs and arms were served up at the tables of the lords. The 'blessed food' was chopped up small.21 At the feast of Xipe, prisoners of war were eaten. They were termed tootototli, 22 dicing in honour of Totec.23 A thigh was sent to the king's table. The dish was called tecatlautli. The giver of each feast did not eat of his own captive, but of those of others.24

In Cholula a slave of fine physique was sacrificed as the representative of the sun, and eaten.25 The Mayas ate the flesh of human victims sacrificed to the gods, as 'a holy thing.'26 In Carancue, a province of Peru, it was the custom to eat the flesh of persons sacrificed to the gods.27 In Nigeria, human victims offered to gods are eaten by both priests and people; the flesh is distributed throughout the country.28 Traces of the rite are found in Vedie India.29

Where the god is a deity of the corn, he may be eaten in his anthropomorphic substance or in the form of grain or bread. The Mexican theophagy of Huitzilopochtli is an important example of the rite, though the cult is apparently composite.

A colossal statue of the god Huitzilopochtli 'dough was broken up and distributed among the worshippers. The ceremony was described as killing the god, his body might be eaten,' and was termed teopemal, 'god is eaten.' Women were not allowed to partake. The dough was made of all kinds of seeds and the blood of children. The exhibitd in the temple, the image was 'slain' by the priest, who pierced it with a dart. The heart was eaten by the priests, the rest of the 'flesh' was broken up small and all males received a portion. Smaller images of dough were eaten at other festivals. Reasons assigned were to procure good health, and, in the case of warriors, to increase their strength.30

Analogous cases of the offering of images of divine beings made of bread are adduced by Frazer.31 Holy wafers are often in the form of wafers on which the divine image is stamped in relief. This method may clearly arise without reference to the principal of substitution to be seen in the case of the Christian Eucharist, where it is unnecessary to assume that the stamped wafer is a substitute for an actual lamb.

In so far as the fruits of the earth are conceived as the embodiments of divine beings, the sacramental eating of the new fruits is a form of the rite of eating the god.32 In some cases this solemn act of assimilation is preceded by a purgation, both physical and moral. The intention in the former aspect is to prevent the sacred food from being polluted by contact with common food in the stomach of the eater. For the same reason Catholics partake of the Eucharist not only as the lawful to partake of it after a meal. Lent was originally regarded as the fast preparatory to the Easter communion. Communion, often associated with fasting, was also prescribed before communion.33 A transition from sacrament to sacrifice in this connexion has been suggested.

2 Sahagun, 584 f.; Bancroft, ii. 809.
3 Bancroft, ii. 897.
4 Jb. ii. 629; for other examples, see Sahagun, 75, 116, 125, 158, 164, 188.
5 J. R. King, Hist. Researches on Conquest of Peru, Mexico, etc., London, 1822, p. 79.
8 Bancroft, ii. 297 ff., 440, quoting Torquemada.
9 Sahagun, 707. See also and Bancroft.
10 Castro, Histoire de Mexico (Eng. tr., London, 1807), i. 511; Sahagun, 38, 74, 156 f.; Bancroft, ii. 316; Br. de Bourbourg, iii. 658.
11 Jb. ii. 654.
12 See examples in G. II, 8, 235-35.
13 Jb. ii. 835 f.
14 C. of Council of Trent, ii. 4; Jerome, in Joan, 18, xiv, 15, quoted by Westermarch, ii. 25.
of a god; but a portion of them is presented as a thank-offering to the gods by those who believe in and produced the sacrifice. Sometimes the first-fruits are presented to the king, probably in his character of a god. Till the first-fruits have been offered to the god, the people are not at liberty to eat of the new crop."

In Wermland (Sweden), the peasants eat loaves made from the grain of the first harvest. The loaf is in the shape of a girl, and represents, according to Frazer, "the corn-spirit conceived as a maiden."

Similarly in France, at La Palisse, a man of dough is broken in pieces and eaten, at the end of harvest. The Lithuanian festival of sacriphoria included the eating of loaves ceremonially made from all kinds of seeds. One little loaf was given to each member of the household.

In Ebro, at the end of rice-harvest, each clan has a special meal to which each member contributes some of the new rice. It is termed "eating the soul of the rice." Similar rites are observed in Celebes, among the Hindus, Burghers, and Chinese, in the United States, among the Chews of China.

In Scotland, grain from the Old Wife, the last sheaf cut at harvest, is given to the horses, in order to secure a good harvest next year.

The worshiping of the Ainus of Japan paid to the bear "appears to be paid only to the dead animal." Though, whether alive or dead, it is described as "kamun—a term similar to the sopi of the Masai, the nambo of the Cherokees of the North Americans, and the manos of the Melanesians—it is slain whenever possible; its flesh is a staple food, and its skin furnishes clothing. But at the annual bear-festival a bear was 'worshipped' and then ceremonially slain. Its blood was drunk by the male members of the family. The liver was eaten raw by women and children as well as by men. The brain was eaten with salt. The heart also was eaten. The rest of the flesh was kept for a day, and then divided among all who had been present at the feast."

Similarly the Gilyaks of Siberia pay a certain measure of "worship" to a bear, prior to its sacrifice.

After being shot to death with arrows, it is prepared for food. The flesh is roasted and eaten in special vessels of wood finely carved. They drink out the flesh raw or cooked, as the case may be. Aine do. The brain and entrails are eaten last; and the skull is placed on a tree near the house. Then the people sing, and dance, and dance, and dance, and dance in round measure.

A more detailed account supplies a valuable type of such theophagous ceremonies:

"The breth obtained by killing the meat had already been partaken of. The wood-bellows, platters, and spoons out of which the Gilyak's eat the broth and flesh of the bears on these occasions are always made specially for the purpose at the festival, and only then; they are elaborately ornamented with carved figures of bears and other devices that refer to the animal or the festival, and the people have a strong superstitious scruple against partaking with them. While the festival lasts, no salt may be used in cooking the bear's flesh, or indeed any other food; and no flesh of any kind may be roasted, for the bear would bear the hissing and sputtering of the roasting flesh, and would be very angry. After the bones had been picked clean they were put back in the kettle in which the flesh was boiled. And when the bear meal was over, the old man took his stand at the door of the house with a branch of fir in his hand, with which, as the people passed out, he gave them a blow. If any one had eaten of the bear's flesh or fat, perhaps as a punishment for their treatment of the worshipful animal."

In ancient Greece the worship of Dionysus seems to have included theophagy: Bulls, calves, goats, and fawns were torn to pieces and devoured by the worshippers. They believed, Frazer infers, "that they were killing the god, eating his flesh, and drinking his blood."

At the Athenian Dionysia the flesh of the slain ox was eaten by the participants in the ceremony. "The oxen slain at Great Baseum in Guinea annually to secure a good harvest are eaten by the chiefs."

Similarly, at a spring festival in China, the flesh of the sacrificed bull is eaten by the mandarins. It is possible that at the Thesmophoria, Athenian priestesses ate the flesh of sacrificed swine as a communion of the body of the god. Near Grenoble the harvest supper is made from the flesh of a goat killed ceremonially. Similarly, in the case of a slain ox near Dijon, the ancient Egyptians partook of the flesh of a pig sacrificed to Osiris. Instead of the pig, poor persons offered a cake of dough.

The Kalmucks consecrate a ram as the "ram of heaven" or the "ram of the spirit." The animal is tended carefully and never slain, when it is old, and the owner bequests him of consecrating a death and Corn, and the sacred meat is eaten but the flesh eaten. The Toda, by whom the buffalo is to a certain degree held sacred, is treated 'with a degree of adoration,' never eats its flesh, and except at a sacred meal celebrates once a year. A calf is killed in a secret place of the jungle, and its flesh roasted on a sacred fire. Women are not allowed to be present.

Frazer distinguishes two types of sacrifice: "sacramental killing" of the "animal god"—the Ainn and the Egyptian types. In the former the animal is one which is habitually killed, and the special sacrifice is a "special annual atonection" for the individual "god" of the species 'deity' being 'slain with extraordinary marks of respect and devotion."

The Toda ceremony is an example of the Egyptian type. The prohibition against the use of salt or leaven, or other modifying constituents, is noteworthy in the case of the ceremonial consumption of 'strong,' or 'sacred,' foods. The bread of the Passover and the Catholic host are unleavened. Sacred foods generally may not be mixed, and the prohibition of salt and leaven is no doubt a result of the same principle. 'Strong' foods, again, are as a rule forbidden to women, various reasons being assigned. Male selfishness, ideas of male superiority, connected with the custom of women wearing in public, are sufficient reasons for the prohibition, taken together with woman's natural aversion to such foods, and, in particular, to strong drink. In the 6th cent. the Council of Averroes forbade women to receive the Eucharist with the naked hands. Here a complication is introduced by the then prevailing notion of the natural impurity of woman.

As sacred bread is to the flesh of the god, so is sacred wine to his blood. As the 'worshipper' in the hunting stage of social evolution acquired strength and 'inspiration' by drinking the fresh blood of slain game, in the agricultural stage the process is repeated by drinking wine.
BATING the is and the quite relatives.'

In ancient Brahmanical Zoroastrianism the soma or haoma was in communion with deity. In the former case, as in the case of the Greek Dionysians, the wine itself had come to be anthropomorphized into a god.

But, as a general rule that the totem may not be slain or ill-treated in any way. But there are a few exceptions. The Narriyeri of South Australia were in the habit of killing and eating their totemic animals.2 Moreover, man being the lord of creation, his flesh is regarded as correspondingly 'strong,' and hence more nutritious and strengthening than any other. The Euahlayi Australians hold that what strengthens them more than anything, both physically and mentally, is the flesh of men.3

1. The sacrificial meal.

2. The ceremonial eating.

3. The ‘mythic meal’ of the Australian Intichisma.

4. The totemic animal or plant is not regarded exactly as a closed system, so that the man can kill his totem animal, and thus to enable him to perform the ceremonies for the multiplication of the breed. But these Australian sacraments, so called, are not only in the magical stage, but, to all appearance, devoid of any sentiment of loyalty to the totem or of any powers that he could show by mechanical and business-like aspect of magic rather than its emotional aspect.

There is no evidence of any rite of sacramental communion with the totem by eating its flesh, in cases where the totem may be regarded as a divinity.

1. The divine qualities of a man-god are supposed to be assimilated by the person who eats his flesh or drinks his blood. It was the idea of the early Christians concerning the Lord’s Supper. In the holy food they symbolized a real bestowal of heavenly gifts, a bodily self-communication of Christ, a miraculously imparting of divine life. The partaking of the consecrated elements had no special relation to the forgiveness of sins; but it strengthened faith and knowledge, and, especially, it was considered an oath of eternal life, because the body of Christ was eternal. The holy food was described as the ‘medicines of immortality.’

2. But, even in the early stages of human thought, the distinction between substance and accident is clearly held. The soul of man is nourished (hence the strength and life of his body) by the soul of the food.2 The accidents on both sides are either ignored or explained away. As materialism and spiritualism or animism become separated, the necessity is felt of bridging the gulfs between substance and accidents; hence theories of transubstantiation. Along other lines of symbolism and commemoration. The rite is symbolic of spiritual assimilation; or it is done in memory of a divine being.

In spite of meagre data, not likely to be augmented, the rite appears a logical corollary of several series of ideas. It is a case of convergence; the patent results of the assimilation of food are the basis of the homology. The animism and vitalism so deeply ingrained in religious thought and emotion seem to have a permanent warrant in the facts of nutrition. It is quite natural that the primitive mind should attach magical and animistic ideas to food, as such, and, in particular to flesh. Raw flesh is ‘living flesh,’ warm blood is instinct with life and soul. From the point of view of the magical assimilation of properties, human flesh and blood are the most valuable nutriment possible. But, in spite of occasional lapses into cannibalism, man has generally shown an instinctive repulsion to the habit or the perversion. And, if there is some mystery about flesh and blood generally, there is still more about the flesh and blood of men. Popular expression such as ‘I could eat you’ show that a normal tendency of this kind may exist.

Besides the fascination derived from mystery and even from repulsion, there is no doubt that human flesh of any other species, especially, is regarded as correspondingly 'strong,' and hence more nutritious and strengthening than any other. The Euahlayi Australians hold that what strengthens them more than anything, both physically and mentally, is the flesh of men.

1. It is easy to understand why a savage should desire to partake of the flesh of an animal or man whom he regards as divine. By eating the body of the god he shares in the god's attributes and powers. And when the god is a corn god, such as is indicated in the cases of the Nuer and the Arab, the flesh becomes the blood of the god. And, when the flesh and blood of the god is taken and eaten by man, he is correspondingly ‘strengthened’ or ‘made strong’ by eating of the god's flesh and blood. This ‘eating the flesh of the corn god’ is an act fraught with supernatural probability. Probably all such acts are a form of orgiasticism. So much is suggested by the psychology of cannibalism dictated by revenge, or even by love. Popular expression such as ‘I could eat you’ show that a normal tendency of this kind may exist.

It has been suggested that the killing of divine men and animals may itself be due expressly to a desire for assimilating, by eating, the divine properties. In order to assimilate these properties the surest method is that of physiological absorption, and slaughter is a necessary preliminary.4 On this view certain difficulties, such as that noted by Cicero, are apparently lessened.

1. It is not the spirit of the corn and vine, as such, but the life-giving virtue of bread and wine that is the essence of the sacrament.

Among early agricultural peoples, strong meat, such as flesh, is eaten but rarely. Often it is eaten only, as the drinking of wine is done in the same way. Similarly, the ancient Hindus allowed pregnant women the use of beef by way of strengthening the child.5 But not all theology is of the flesh of

2. K. R. Parker.
3. GB II. 360 C: Cod. de Nat. Dier. II. 10 (41).
5. Crawley, 223.
animals or men. It was in the case of bread and wine that Cicero noted a difficulty.

While, therefore, by stretching the idea of godhead to include victims to the god, many animal and human sacrifices may be regarded as phallic rites, in which there may be a belief that 'god is eaten,' it requires an effort of imagination to hold such belief in the case of eating bread. But a comparison of the facts, both of spirit-belief and of the psychology of eating, shows that the custom is a development rather of the latter of the former set of ideas and practices. All the instances of eating, but few of them, are found in theophagy. For instance, as Westermarck shows, it includes the conception of the conditional curse. A significant case is the ordeal of the Eucharist, in which the swearer, after communicating in the body of Christ, prayed that in case of perjury the bread might choke and slay him. By the nature of the case, on the other hand, there must be either substitution, transubstantiation, symbolism, or analogy, in order to identify the food with the god. In the greater number of instances it would seem that this identification is rather with the divinity of the god than with the god himself.

The two most important instances, the Christian Eucharist and the Mexican theophagy, are in strong contrast. The latter is evidently a development from human sacrifice to ceremonial cannibalism, unless it was that a habit of cannibalism developed along with a habit of god-eating, which can hardly be regarded as a 'survival' of cannibalism. Much less can the Eucharist be so regarded, in spite of such analogies as may be hinted at in West Asian religions. On the face of it, and in view of parallel sacraments with bread and wine, it began in the form of analogy. The words, 'This is my body,' 'This is my blood,' are no survival of earlier and cruder rubries, but an imaginative direction to identify the sources of physical with those of spiritual nutriment.

**Literature.**—In addition to the authorities cited in the footnotes, see the late G. Reauch, art. 'Sacrifice,' in *Enc.*; F. LIEBRECHT, Zur Volkskunde, Heilbronn, 1878, pp. 426-433.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

**3. EBIONISM.**—I. **Nature and Origin.** EBIONISM, taken generally, is the name given to certain tendencies of thought, which crystallized into sects, within Judeo-Christian circles, in the early centuries of Christianity. The sects could have been called Jewish, if Jewish sects, set apart from Judaism it is impossible to understand them. When we remember that Judaism was a national religion, holding within itself a special revelation and a Law enshrined in the sacred treasure of its past; when, further, we recall with what tenacity Judaism clung to its Law, and what sacrifices it had made to preserve its historic identity and nationality—it will be understood what a ferment the new ideas of Christianity set up, and what a reaction of strenuous opposition they were calculated to raise. Ebionism, looked at historically, takes its place as one of the resultants of the future antagonism of Judaism to the simplicity and universality of the religion of Jesus Christ. The Ebionites had moved out of strict Judaism, but they had not moved into the Catholic faith. In a sense they were Jewish Christians; but their Christianity was nominal, and held by such a feeble thread that the slightest tension might snap it. So nominal was their hold of Christianity in its essence that the tendency of Ebionism was anti-Christian. In the years that followed, it became more and more heretical, until by the 6th cent. it had become practically extinct.

I. **Name and general interest of the sect.**—As 1877, an endearment to combine what was characteristic in Judaism with a faith in Jesus as the Messiah, the Son of God shall see, the name 'Ebionism' was given to more than one tendency of thought within Judeo-Christian circles. Some Ebionites were hardly distinguishable from the first Jewish Christians, from men and women, who endeavoured to combine the faith of Christ with the obligations of the Law and their national hopes. Others became strenuously antagonistic to the Catholic faith, and while retaining the name 'Christian,' became really hostile to the spirit of Christ. Finally, there were others who held a faith of a mixed or syncretistic character. While they accepted Christ, they accepted Him only as a revived Moses; and they combined in their creed elements of a heterogeneous character, in which Essenism and Gnosticism are plainly recognizable. But, amid all the elements which we describe as Ebionitic, and notwithstanding the heterogeneous teachings which gather round the name, there were two points common to all Ebionites. The first had regard to the Law, the second to Christ. Ebionism was at one in rejecting the Law and in deprecating Christ. The first point of agreement betrays the Judaism in which they had been reared; the second explains how they drifted outside the current of the Catholic faith and went on a journey of their own.

Why the name 'Ebionites' was given to those Judeo-Christian sects is not very clear. The tendency of the Church Fathers was to trace back each such sect as the Ebionites to a personal founder. Tertullian (de Præser. Hær.) in the 3rd cent. appears to have been the first to give currency to this view, which was held also by Epiphanius (Hær. xxx. 1. 17), who, without much critical judgment, regards Simon (called Hilarus or annimoque mendicus) as the author of the heresy. This explanation, which is without foundation, has been abandoned in modern times, though Hilgenfeld advocated it (Ketzergesch., 429 ff.). There can be little doubt that the name is derived from the Heb. פֶּרֶשׁ, 'poor.' But, while this is clear, it is not equally clear on what ground the Ebionites were so designated. The name gave scope for 'Patristic scorn,' and its bearers were denounced for poverty of intellect, poverty of faith, or poverty of Christology (Origen, c. Celsum, ii. 1; cf. de Princip. iv. 22, and in Matt. i. xxvi, rev. in Ebionit. ed. & trans. v. 8). Though the designation gave a convenient handle for Patristic sarcasms, it is improbable that its origin was so subtle. It is much more likely that it was originally a nickname of the Jews who dared to attach themselves to the religion of Jesus Christ, and who actually were among the poorer classes. The epithet, given originally in contempt, came to be used by Jewish Christians themselves, and gloried in, as describing sufficiently a characteristic of their order. By and by it lost its original significance, as names do; and in course of time it came to describe the sections of Jewish Christians who either failed to advance in faith or receded into mere or less of antagonism to it.

2. **Origin of sect.**—When we endeavour to account historically for the pseudo-Jewish Christians known as Ebionites, we are brought face to face with well-known facts in the minutiae and history of Judaism. Judaism, with its inheritance from the past, and its altogether unique appreciation of the Mosaic Law, was essentially a national religion. It must become the faith of the Jew, and should grow a Catholic faith, but in itself the religion of the Jews was intensely particularistic and national. From the records of the NT we see how there arose a form of faith, known as Jewish Christianity. In substance this was an endeavour to combine what was characteristic in Judaism with a faith in Jesus as the Messiah, the Son of God...
God, and the Saviour of the world. To begin with,
this Jewish Christianity must have held, as one of its
presuppositions, that the observance of the
Mosaic Law was necessary to Christianity (cf.
Harnack, Hist. of Dogma, Eng. tr., I. 298); and,
so far as it was associated with Jewish
Epiphanius Christianity, this remnant held
one of its characteristics, though, as we shall see,
some Jewish Christians were much more tolerant
than others. How, then, did this Jewish
Christianity become associated with the history of
the Church? If we read aright the history of the Apostolic
age, we see in it the gradual process whereby
Christianity freed itself from the swaddling bands of
Judaism—a process which was not achieved
without struggle. To the first leaders of the
Jerusalem Church the truth was not always clear
that the Christian religion was independent of
Mosaicism. The first concession wrung from Jewish
Christians was that, while the Law was binding on
themselves as Jews born, it was not essential for
Gentile Christianity to observe its enactments.
That concession was the emancipating act of the
Jerusalem conference, and it was due in large
measure to Jewish Christianity having gained of St. Paul's
influence. While the work and the teaching of the latter were
intelligible to the spiritually-minded men at the
head of the Jerusalem Church, and, however
resolutely the teaching of the Church was
by means followed that they were intelligible or
acceptable to the mass of the Jews who had become
converts to the Messiahship of Jesus. This is clear
from the hostility which dogged St. Paul's
footsteps from city to city; and it becomes clearer in
after-history, when that hostility developed into
Ebionism, which is simply the residuum of the
struggles and heart-burnings of the age when the
religion of Jesus Christ shook off the trammels of
Judaism.

At this point we are able to estimate the
influence of the national upheaval which ended in
the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. It was an age of
passion, perplexity, and agitation; an age when
extreme men clamoured for extreme views; an age
which naturally gave birth to sectarianism. After
the fall of Jerusalem, the Christian Church was
re-constituted at Pella; but it was a changed
Church. The Jewish element in it had ceased to
be predominant. The passing away of the Temple,
the rude triumph of the Gentile, and the cruel
bands that had been laid on the sacred memorials of
the race had been cut off to cause a reaction which
Mosaic ritual staggered. Further, at Pella the
Church was recruited from the Essenes, and an
Essene element began to penetrate it. By and by
the Church came back to Jerusalem; and then
it came a final crash. Under Hadrian the Jews
rebelled; Bar Cohiba led a forlorn hope (A.D. 132);
the Jews were expelled from Jerusalem; sacrifices
were prohibited; Elia Capitolina was founded (A.D. 138);
and in place of the old Judaism, which
in turn had yielded to Judeo-Christianity, there
was a Church presided over by a Gentile bishop—
a Church in which Jews and Gentiles had become
one, Jew and gentile, who still clung to their national forms, and tried
to combine them with a belief in the Messiahship of Jesus, were driven into heresy. When the
Church had grown, which was a long
process, the tendency of those who retain that belief to
be heretical. The Church having outgrown
Jewish Christianity, Judeo-Christianities tended to
return to Judaism. The time came when Judaism
simply metamorphosed in the guise of Christianity.
Orthodoxy, when left behind by the culture of
the age, and deserted by public opinion, becomes
heresy' (Hipp.; see Hagenbach, Hist. of Doctrines,
I. 63).

II. FORMS OF EBIONISM.—When we begin to
inquire narrowly into the divisions of the sect, we
encounter considerable difficulties. Those arise
from the fact that the Fathers on whom we rely
for our information are not agreed as to who were
or were not Ebionites, and as to what precisely
constituted the Ebionite 'faith.' And at one period the nicknames 'Ebionites' and
'Nazarenes' were given indiscriminately to Judeo-
Christians. When the names lost their original
significance, and when Jewish Christianity in the
Apostolic age was compared with the Catholic faith
in the 2nd century, some Jewish Christians, for
the sake of searching out the differences, made
it easy to say what or where were the heretics
to whom the designation 'Ebionites' had come to be
applied. Moreover, when it is remembered that
these authors were in the habit of dividing
Christianity apart as Syria and Rome, and that writers had few
facilities for exact verification, it can be understood
that divergences in description were liable to creep
in. At the same time that, as a whole, the testimony is singularly consistent.

We may begin with a passage from Justin Martyr in the
middle of the 2nd cent., who, in his Dialogue with Trypho, tells
us that in his day there were two distinct classes of Jewish
Christians. The one he calls 'true' and the other
'false.' The former was associated with believing Gentiles, and did not insist on the observance of the
Law. The latter was not in fellowship with Gentile Christians until they had complied with
the requirements of the Mosaic Law (Dial. ¢. Tryph. ch. xvi.). Thus, we find that the Ebionites and the
Nazarenes were different words for the same
thing, and that both were simply Jewish Christians who,
like all other Judaeo-Christians, had a tendency
to live in the Jewish Dispensation; and who
in following this tendency the second class
fall out of the Catholic movement, and became heretical. Probably Justin
had in view the developed tendency of the second class when, in ch. xvii., of the Dialogue, he refers to some of the Jewish
race who 'acknowledge that Jesus is Christ, while holding
Him to be man of no mean.' Subsequent writers describe these Jewish Christians as 'Ebionites' and
as 'Syncretists;' and that tolerant section the name 'Nazarenes.' The distinction was clear in the 4th cent. to Epiphanius (Harr. xxix.), and to
Jerome. The latter found the Nazarenes dwelling in Persia
beyond Jordan, and classed them with the Ebionites, although
they held to the Virgin Birth and the Divine Kingship of
Jesus (3 Tim. 3. 1). We are on the eve of the
Christian East.

It is remarkable that in the writers who follow Justin, towards the
end of the 2nd cent. and the first half of the 3rd—the
Theban, Hippolytus, and Tertullian—there is only one section of Ebionite
known, viz. those who deny the Divinity of our Lord.
Irenaeus, in the end of the 2nd cent., is the first to use the name
Ebionites (Eus. x, 2, ii. 7, iii. xvi, i, xiv. xxili. 4, v.
1. 4). He is closely followed by Hippolytus (Hist. vii. 84; cf.
Perr. de Frater. ch. 96), while Origen (Advers. c. p. 22). in the 3rd cent., has several references to the Ebionites. In one he
says: 'Those Jews who have received Jesus Nazarenes
by the name of Ebionites' (c. Celts. ii. 1). In another he
makes reference to the Ebionites as 'deriving their name from
the poverty of their position in the Dispensation.
In other
instances, he writes of the twofold sect of Ebionites at Jericho (Kairos), who were acknowledged with the
truth by the name of Ebionites and who were
of the religion of a virgin, or deny this, and maintain that He was
be

(continued)
Jewish Christianity became highly syncretistic, as well as heretical. We may group the characteristics of all the Ebionites under the following divisions: 'Jewish Ebionites,' 'Pharisaic Ebionites,' and 'Gnostic Ebionites.' The relations between the different parts may be illustrated in a table, such as the following:

| A. Gentiles | (a) Non-Christian = Heathencism. |
| B. Jews | (i) Non-heretical = Judeo-Christianity |
| (ii) Heretical |
| (a) Those who accepted supernatural birth of Jesus, with undeveloped Christology. |
| (b) Those who accepted Messianship of Jesus, denied Virgin Birth, and hated St. Paul. |
| (c) Those who became gnosticated. |

1. Nazarenes.—The authorities for our knowledge of the Nazarenes are mainly Epiphanius (Her. xxix.) and Jerome (De Vir. Illus., § 3, and various passages in his commentaries). Epiphanius includes the Nazarenes in his list of heretics, but his account is confused; and in regard to their Christology in particular he confesses that he does not know much (Her. xxix. 7). He is aware, however, that the Nazarenes were executed by the Jews, and that they used the Gospel of Matthew exclusively. Jerome made use of a work by Josephus (ib. 9). According to Epiphanius and Jerome, these Nazarenes were to be found in the 4th cent. mainly about Pella beyond Jordan. Jerome had unusual facilities for knowing a great deal, and when we piece together the various passages in which we have any account of them (cf. Schliemann, Clement, p. 445 f.), we learn that they entertained the following beliefs: They accepted the Divinity of Christ, holding that He was born of the Virgin Mary. They admitted the Apostleship of St. Paul (cf. Jerome, in Is. iii. ix. 1, ‘qui novissimus Apostolorum omnium fuit’). Although they wished to retain Jews themselves and to retain the obligation of the Mosaic Law, they did not desire to bind these obligations on Gentile Christians, nor did they refuse to have fellowship with them. They mourned over the unbelief of the Jewish nation, and eagerly looked for the time when the Jews who loved them not should believe in Christ. It is difficult to describe their Christology, except that, as compared with the Catholic doctrine of Christ, it was primitive and undeveloped, and they held to the supernatural birth of Christ. They described Him as ‘the first-born of the Holy Spirit.’ The Holy Spirit was the παρθήνων των από τούτων of the apostle Epaphras (Col. ii. 9). They believed in the Divine Son, a ‘fons sanctitatis’ (Hipp., B. p. 319 e); Ritschl, indeed, holds that the author was a Nazarene (op. cit. p. 175). Anyhow, they held that, while their view of Christ had risen far above Judaism, and had not degenerated into Pharisaic Ebionism, it had not developed into the Catholic doctrine. It was an arrested belief. It may be added that there is a strong probability that the work called The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, written not long after the fall of Jerusalem, and while the memory of that event was fresh, belongs to the circle of the Nazarenes. This is the view of Ritschl (Entsteh. d. altchrist. Kirche, p. 172) and of Lightfoot (Gal. iii. 319 e); Ritschl indeed, holds that the author was a Nazarene (op. cit. p. 175).

2. Pharisaic (non-Gnostic) Ebionism.—(1) Our authorities for this form of Ebionism are chiefly the apologists Ritschl, Deissmann, and Lightfoot. Ritschl, indeed, holds that the author was a Nazarene (op. cit. p. 175). Hippolytus (Her. vii. 22, x. 19); Epaphras (Her. xxxvii.); Eusebius (HE ii. 37); Tertullian (de Præser., xvii.); and Theodoret (Her. Fab. ii. 2). Our first authority is Ireneeus, accord-
bitter hostility to the Jews (Harr. xxi. 15, 25). We have seen that these Ebionite Ebionites used a Gospel of Matthew, and Ephraim gave us an interesting glimpse of the Baptist narrative in the recension of the Gospel used by them. The most striking point is the account of the voices heard from heaven at the baptism of Jesus: "Thus art thou my beloved Son, the Beloved in whom I am well pleased;" again: "I have this day begotten thee" (Harr. xxx. 20). Thus the Ebionite Baptist narrative, as given in the Ebionite recension of Matthew's Gospel, was clearly meant to show that the day of the Christ-birth dated only from the baptism, which Jesus received, the dignity of Messiahship (cf. Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. ch. xlv.).

(3) Certainly the most characteristic feature of Ebionitic Ebionism was its Christology. The life of the Jesus whom it recognized as the Christ fell into two distinct and clearly defined parts. At the point of cleavage stood the baptism. Up to the moment of His baptism Jesus was a man, on the level of common humanity, and inheriting the tendency of human nature to sin. His sonship up to the point of His baptism was purely ethical, and along the line of that ethical sonship it was possible, so the Ebionites said, for any man to be a Christ. Jesus was pre-eminent, in that first part of His life, for before He was, like other men, justified through the Law, but so pre-eminent was He in justice, prudence, and wisdom that He became worthy to be the Messiah, and at His baptism that seal of worthiness was placed on Him. It was His baptism, then, that made Him worthy to be the Messiah, and then only did He Himself become conscious that He was the Messiah; for, at that moment when the voice from heaven said, "This day have I begotten thee," there descended on Jesus, and entered into Him, a new power, viz. the Christ. This power was not God, and could not be God, for God was infinitely supreme and could not stoop to union with a man. Ebionism at this point was in accord with their Jewish rigidities, which it conceived to be the master-thought of Judaism. What then was this power? It was not God, but, though created, it had 'a proper pre-existing hypostasis.' This power was the Christ, who entered into union with Jesus, not to redeem the world, but to be the prophet of a new order, and to make known the Father. Then only, after the Christ had united with, and entered into the man Jesus, was He able to perform the miracles, and to work miracles. It ought, therefore, to be kept clear, in connexion with Pharisaic Ebionism, that the office of the Christ, so united with Jesus, was not re-demptionistic. The quaternity of the Christ quaternity, who was no mere impersonal power, with the man Jesus was not an indissoluble union, for the Christ before the death of Jesus departed from Him. Only at the resurrection again, the Ebionites have re-assembled and returned to "His own Pleroma" (Tren. iii. xi. 1; and cf. Lightfoot, Colossians, p. 261). It is clear that Gnosticism had already begun its work in connexion with the doctrine of the Christ. If, according to Gnostic speculation, matter was essentially evil, it was impossible that a spiritual Being, such a God, could come into union with it; and this led Ebionism naturally and appropriately for a time to become a Christology of Ebionism.

Gnosticism among the Ebionites. This form of Ebionism may be described (as by Harnack) as syncretistic Jewish Christianity. It is differentiated from Pharisaic Ebionism by the fact that it has incorporated in it elements which were not indigenous to Jewish soil. But the problem is not altogether simple—to trace, either as to their origin or as to their character, the speculative elements which are found in this type of Ebionism. The chief feature of these Gnostic Ebionites is Epiphanius (Harr. xix., xxx.).

Characteristics of their teaching are found also in Hippolytus (Harr. ix. 8-12, Clark's tr.), Origen (Euseb. HE vi. 38), and the pseudo-Clementines.

(1) We may best approach Gnostic Ebionism through the teaching of Cerinthus, to whom reference has already been made. The Ebionites had a Jew, 'disciplined in the teaching of the Egyptians' (Hipp. Harr. vii. 21, x. 17), and the sphere of his activity was in proselytising Asia (Harr. i. xxvii.; Epiph. ii. xxvii. 1). From this time a little after his death, the Ebionites appear already seen of his teaching, it is clear that it was Ebionitic. He held the obligation of the Law; he repudiated the teaching of St. Paul; he rejected the pre-existence of Jesus Christ; and he taught the millennial reign of the Messiah in Jerusalem.

The one point in which his teaching departed from typical Pharisaic Ebionism was in regard to his doctrine of creation. Cerinthus taught that "the world was not made by the primary God, but by a certain power far separate... from that Principality who is supreme over the universe, and ignorant of him who is above all" (Tren. i. xlvii). According to Cerinthus, an immense gulph yawned between God and this world. He bridged it by the conception of a power, inferior to God and ignorant of Him, the world-maker or demiurge (cf. Lightfoot, Col. p. 107; Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. ch. xlv.). The affinity of this conception of a demiurge with Gnostic speculations on the evil inherent in the physical world is apparent. In Cerinthus we have the first hint of what was to become the theology of Gnostic speculation linked with Judaeo-Christianity. He sets forth a teaching which was certainly heterodox, if not Gnostic or Pharisaic Ebionism; but on that teaching he has grafted a speculation which is certainly not Jewish. When the tendency thus shown in Cerinthus—the tendency, that is, to a treatment of Jewish Christianity in terms connected with Jewish Christianity—was further developed, we have Gnostic Ebionism.

(2) The character of Gnostic Ebionism may be ascertained from Epiphanius, though his account is somewhat confused. We learn, however, that these Ebionites agreed with those of the Pharisaic type in holding the validity of the Law, especially of circumcision, made null by the preaching of St. Paul, and in denying the Virgin Birth of Jesus Christ (Epiph. Harr. ii. 2, 4, 16). Their Christology was not uniform, and is somewhat indefinite. Some of them affirmed that Adam and Christ were one. Others regarded Christ as a spiritual Being, created before all things, and higher than the angels. This spiritual Being descended in Adam, was made visible in the patriarchs, and at last, clothed with the body of Jesus, rose again, and ascended back to heaven (Harr. xxx. 3, 16). We learn, further, that they spoke of Christ as 'the successor of Moses'—the only proper name of the Christ (i.e., Jesus), who was 'the Prophet of Truth.' Jesus himself was a mere man, who, because of super-excellent virtue, desired to be described as Son of God (Harr. xxx. 16; cf. Ritschl, "Christian History," ch. 12; Bockmuehl, "The Gospel of Dogma," i. 300). Christianity, therefore, with these Ebionites was simply true Mosaic, and Christ was the successor of the prophet of Sinai. The only part of the OT which they accepted was the Pentateuch, and even it only in part. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of their treatment of the OT was their rejection of the whole sacrificial system. In their recension of Matthew's Gospel (which Gospel alone they accepted) they added, as one of the objects of His coming, the abrogation of the sacrificial system (Harr. xxx. 16: ἕως ὡς καταλύει τὰς θυσίας, καὶ ἐν μία παρειχότα τὸν θρόνον, οὔ παρειχότα ἐν θαβάν ἢ ἑφιαλτικά). Further, they were vegetarians and ascetics. They abstained from flesh or wine, taking as their pattern St. Peter, whose food, they said, was bread and olives (Harr. xxx. 15; cf. Clem. Homilies, iii. 6). They also followed St. Peter in abstaining from marriage (Harr. xxx. 15, 21). The Lord's Supper they partook of with bread and water (ib. 16). Their asceticism on the point of marriage was originally strict, but it had been modified so much in course of time that they would not consider marriage highly (ib. 2; cf. Clem. Hom. iii. 68).
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If, then, we take the picture of these Ebionites, as given us by Epiphanius, we note at once that they have departed from the Pharisaic type in their religious line of direction. Their Christianity, while fundamentally alike, is mixed with elements of Gnostic speculation; (b) their asceticism is rigid, except on the point of marriage; (c) for the protection of animal sacrificial systems, the annals of Pharisaism contain neither precedent nor preparation.

(3) How, then, are we to account for these divergences from Pharisaic Ebionism? The problem is indicated by a solution seems to us to be involved. There can be little doubt that the influences incorporated in the form of Ebionism we are considering come through Esseniism. In this article it is not necessary to enter into a detailed description of the characteristics, origin, or history of the Essenes (see art. ESSENI), nor need we concern ourselves with the perplexing questions arising round this sect, so well described as 'the great enigma of Hebrew history' (Lightfoot, Colossians, p. 82). It will be sufficient to point out a few of the characteristics of the Essenes, as these are indicated by our primary authorities (mainly Philo, Qumran, and the pseudo-Clementine, Ephesi, in viii. 2-13, Ant. xviii. i. 5; and Flinn, JN v. 17). These characteristics may be given in the words of Josephus, which are followed closely by Hippolytus (Phil. v. 22):

‘These Essenes reject pleasures as an evil, but esteem continence and the conquest over our passions to be virtue. They never bestow goats or oxen on the poor children while they are pliable and fit for learning’ (JN vi. v. 2). ‘These persons are despisers of riches. . . . There is, as it were, one paltry book for all the family. For in their eyes, toward God, it is very extraordinary; for before sun-rising they spent a great part of the night in prayer, and put up certain prayers, which they have received from their forefathers, as if they made a supplication for their rising’ (§ 5). After describing their daily bath in cold water, and their measured eating and drinking, Josephus says: ‘They dispense their anger after a just manner, and restrain their passion’ (§ 6). ‘They inquire after such roots and medicinal stones as may cure their dissenterings’ (§ 6). He further says that novices are tried for three years. ‘If the (novice) appear to be worthy, they then admit him into their society. And before he is allowed to touch their common food, he is obliged to take tremendous oaths . . . that he will neither conceal anything from those of his own sect, nor discover any of their doctrines to others, nor take any one out of him so as to do him the hazard of his life . . . and will equally preserve the books belonging to their sect, and the names of the angels’ (§ 7). ‘What they most of all honour, after God Himself, is the name of their legislator (Moses), whom if any blaspheme he is punished capitally’ (§ 8). ‘They are similar to any other of the Jews in resting from their labours on the seventh day’ (§ 9). ‘Their life is stricter than that of their countrymen; they have no passion, and their superfluous life they dispense among the misery of their mind’ (§ 10). Their doctrine of anthropology, according to Josephus, is, ‘that bodies are corruptible, and that the soul which they name of it is not perishable, but that the soul is immortal, and continue for ever’ (§ 11). Josephus, further, tells us that there is another order of Essenes who agree with the rest as to their way of living, and customs, and laws, but differ from them in the point of marriage’ (§ 13). In another passage he makes this remark: ‘The doctrine of the Essenes is this, that all things are best ascribed to God. They teach the immortality of souls, and esteem that the rewards of righteousness are to be earnestly striven for, and when they send what they have dedicated to God into the temple, they do not offer sacrifices, because they have more pure instations of their own’ (Ant. xviii. i. 5).

Much of what Josephus records is confirmed by Philo, and may be quoted from Flinn: ‘There flock to them from afar many who, wearied of battling with the rough sea of life, drift into their system’ (JN v. 17). We are able, without further detail, to understand the leading characteristics of the Essenic Ebionism. It is a rigid asceticism, more especially in regard to food and marriage. They cultivated medicinal and medicinal stones. They preserved their books with absolute secrecy. Their devotion to Mosaicism was fervent. They practised a rudimentary sun-worship. They rejected animal sacrifices. They believed in the immortality of the soul only. On one side, they were true to their Jewish faith, for, in their regard for Moses and the Law and the Sabbath, they were simply ‘Pharisaic in a super-lative degree’ (Hipp. ii. 210). On the other side, in the secrecy of their monastic life, in their scorn of marriage, in their inquiet sun-worship, in their magical arts, in their rejection of all animal sacrificial systems, and in the doctrine of immortality they show remarkable and emphatic divergences from the Pharisaic type of Judaism, and such an influence from extraneous tendencies of thought, that Esseniism may properly be called the Gnostic Judaism; and which has difficulty in believing that it could be wholly a growth from Jewish soil (as Frankel), although it may be that it was the carrying out of the idea of a universal Jewish priesthood (as Ritschl). It is not material for us to inquire here as to the sources of these foreign customs and tendencies of thought—whether from Pythagorean sources (as Zeller), or from Parsi influences (as Lightfoot), or from both (as Schürer). One point, however, must be kept in view: that the Essenes, in their withdrawal from worldly pursuits, and in their doctrine of the immortality of the soul, show the influence of the Gnostic speculative inculcation—this again is an idea which reached a full development in Gnosticism.

We may conclude, then, that Gnostic Ebionism, in the form which we have described as an Ebionism, has assimilated elements from Esseniism. Its asceticism in meat and drink, its persistent rejection of sacrifice, and its speculative elements have come through Esseniism. In the matter of marriage the Ebionites of Flinn go back to Pharisaism, or to that milder party of Esseniism to which Josephus refers. If it be asked when the combination could have taken place, the answer is clear. Before the fall of Jerusalem a filtering down of Christian thought must have taken place. After the fall of Jerusalem the Essenes disappear as a separate party, and it is reasonable to believe that many of them attached themselves to the Judeo-Christian Church at Pella, observing, as they must have done, the fulfilment before their eyes of prophecies uttered by Christ in regard to the doom of Jerusalem (cf. Ritschl, op. cit. p. 223). When they took this step, it would be hard to imagine that they left their Esseniism behind them; and it would be incredible that an order and a system of thought so definite and so masterful as Esseniism should have been without influence in the development of Jewish Christianity.

(4) The form of Ebionism which we have described may be illustrated further from the Book of Ezechias and the pseudo-Clementine literature. In the one we see not merely the essential features of Essene Ebionism, but the indications of an effort to propagate the system westward; in the other we see Essene Ebionism assuming a literary dress. In regard to both, while we have the features of Essene or Gnostic Ebionism, as we have already described them, we seem to be standing at an advanced stage of Essene Ebionism that we may call the Essene Ebionism presented to us by Epiphanius. It will not be necessary here to go into the Gnostic Ebionism as it is thought in the book of Ezechias and in the pseudo-Clementines, with their differences and agreements with the other, and with Essene Ebionism as a whole. See, further, art. ELEKSAITEN.
The chief authority for our knowledge of the book of Ebionites is Hippolytus (\textit{Harr.} ix. 8-15, x. 23), whose account is in the main confirmed by Epiphanius (\textit{Harr.}, xiv. 3, xvi. 3, 6, xxii. 2, 3, 33, 39, 41, and \textit{Origen}, \textit{Cum. Inv.}, II. 13). Hippolytus, coming into personal contact with Ebionites, met them point by point in argument, and felt himself to be dealing with a living issue. He tells us that in the time of Callistus (that is, about the year 222) there came to Rome from Syria a man called Matthias, a cunning and full of schism (\textit{Harr.} ix. 8), who brought with him a book, \textit{Ebionites}, the contents of which had been the subject of direct revelation by an angel. Alcibiades asserted that the angel was 'Son of God, and with the angel went a female called Holy Spirit.' He also declares that he had been preaching unto a new remnant of Isma, in the third year of Trajan's reign (\textit{ib.} a. n. 100). Hippolytus characterizes this as the 'operation of the Holy Spirit' and the invention of the spirit infatuated with pride. The book, according to Hippolytus, insisted on circumcision and the Law. Its doctrine of Christ was partly Judaic and partly Gnostic. It taught that Christ was born as other men, 'but that both previously and that frequently again He had been born and would be born' (\textit{ib.} ix. 8). 'Christ' would appear and exist, undergoing alternations of birth, and have His soul transferred from body to body.' Hippolytus further tells us that the Ebionites 'devote themselves to the tenets of mathematicians, and astrologers, and magicians, as if they were true' (\textit{ib.} ix. 9). The chief point in the system of \textit{Ebionites} was its doctrine of the forgiveness of sins. Hippolytus gives us a clear account of His teaching on that point. The book taught forgiveness of sins on renewed baptism 'in the name of the Great and Most High God, and in [the] name of His Son, the Mighty King,' purging the person of all sin of their own accord, to himself those seven witnesses that have been described in this book—the heaven, and the water, and the holy spirits, and the angels, and the remembrance of the earth' (\textit{ib.} x. 1). Such a renewed baptism, along with the magical incantations of \textit{Elkesaites}, is scarcely necessary for sins only, such as drunkenness, sorcery, the infidelity of friends, or for accidents, such as a dog-bite. The book, finally, enjoining that its mysteries should be kept secret: 'Do not publish the same, nor publish them to the heathen, nor to the Greeks, nor to the Jews, nor to any other nation.'

From the account of the \textit{Ebionites} thus given by Hippolytus—an account confirmed by \textit{Epiphanius} and \textit{Origen}—it is clear that there were the strongest affinities between their tenets and those of \textit{Ebionites} and \textit{Elkesaites} as \textit{Christian}. It is quite possible that the Ebionites were a step in the development of Essene Ebionism (cf. \textit{Ritschl, op. cit. p. 222}). The Christology, which is the surest test of a sect, is in most respects alike. In both, Adam and Christ are identified, and there is the same belief in successive incarnations. The \textit{Ebionites} also agreed with the \textit{Essene Ebionites} in holding the obligation of the Law, in rejection of circumcision (with a consequent free handling of the \textit{OT}), in the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins, and in the beliefs of the \textit{Ebionites} is the doctrine of forgiveness through renewed baptisms and magical invocations. Undoubtedly, there is present here a heathen influence, foreign to Jewish soil. \textit{Ulhorn} has correctly described it as 'a strong heathen naturalistic element' (art. \textit{Ebionites}, in \textit{PRKE}). Probably this doctrine of forgiveness through renewed baptism was meant to take the place of the \textit{OT} sacrifices (cf. \textit{Clem. Recov.} I. 96). On the whole, then, we may conclude that the differences between the \textit{Essene Ebionites} and the \textit{Ebionites} were small, practically only the point of the addition of the new doctrine of forgiveness.

The roots of \textit{Ebionites} go back to that period after the fall of Jerusalem which, according to \textit{Hegesippus}, was the birthday of sectarianism (\textit{Eus. HE} ii. 32). In \textit{Ebionites}, \textit{Essene Ebionism} in the beginning of the 3rd century, and under strong heathen influences, took a step in a direction away both from Judaism and from Catholic Christianity, the impelling influence probably being the book of \textit{Ebionites}. It tended to the distortion of the \textit{Christian} world by the fiction of a new revelation in the pseudo-Clementine literature, as we shall see, \textit{Essene Ebionism} developed in other directions, equally removed from Judaism, but less out of touch with the spirit of Catholic Christianity.

The pseudo-Clementine literature consists of three works—one containing twenty \textit{Hermes} another generally known as the \textit{Recognitions}, and preserved in a translation by \textit{Rufinus}; and, thirdly, an \textit{Epitome} of the \textit{Hermes}—a work of little significance, and of great importance, goes under the name of the well-known \textit{Clement} of Rome. The problems connected with this literature are varied and intricate, while the uncertainties associated with it are among the most S. C. H. R. B. of modern scholarship. Indeed, the only statements which may be made with certainty are that the literature is not from the hand of Clement of Rome, and that it is the literature of a Gnostic Ebionite. It may, further, be said that the \textit{Ebionism} is not so stringent as in Elkesaism, and that much greater stress is laid on Christian elements. The pseudo-Clementine \textit{Literature} cannot be ignored by any historian of the early \textit{Christian} Church, though we may rightly refuse to agree with the extravagant claims of \textit{Baur}, and may doubt if it gives such 'brilliant disclosures' (\textit{Hilgenfeld}) as some critics imagine.

The problems connected with the pseudo-Clementine \textit{Literature} may be briefly stated, though a discussion of them cannot find a place here. There is, for one, the problem as to whether the pseudo-Clementine \textit{Literature} or the book of \textit{Ebionites} is the earliest in time. The conclusion accepted generally (though not by \textit{Baur} and \textit{Ritseh}) is that \textit{Ritseh} is the earlier, and \textit{Ebionites} is the later, to the priority of \textit{Ritseh} there is frequently a strong argument, and interlace the latter problem is becomes at once clear when it is seen how the straightforward \textit{Baur}, \textit{Schlizzmann}, \textit{Uhlhorn} (at first), and \textit{Lichfield} give the priority to the \textit{Hermes}; \textit{Ritseh}, \textit{Lehier}, \textit{Hilgenfeld}, and \textit{Salmon}, to the \textit{Recognitions}. If the \textit{Recognitions} is first in point of time, its date may be as early as a. n. 149; if second in point of time, in point of date may be taken as the middle of the 3rd century. On the whole the position may be assumed here that the literature, at least in the present form, belongs to the earlier part of the 3rd century. The trend of opinion is in favour of the view that both the \textit{Hom.} and the \textit{Recov.} are based on a common source, and that the \textit{Epitome} is a further development of the \textit{Hermes}. There is a further problem as to the time of the writer or writers. It is conceded that the \textit{literature} is coloured throughout by \textit{Ebionism}, but it is not clear if it was meant simply as an \textit{Ebionite} propaganda. On this point the various views are as far as the \textit{Christian} world is concerned, to comment on. But the whole, and the \textit{pseudo-Clementine} literature is not the same as the \textit{Christian} world of \textit{Christian} literature. The authors of the pseudo-Clementine \textit{Literature} are not the \textit{Christian} world of \textit{Christian} literature, for the 

When we consider the teaching of the pseudo-Clementine, apart from questions of origin and apart from the literary form in which the teaching is dressed ('\textit{Tendenzroman}'), we cannot fail to observe the \textit{Ebionite} in which the \textit{Literature} is steeped. Certainty its parts are not equally \textit{Ebionite}, for it is plain that in the \textit{Ritseh} alone the \textit{Ebionite} influence is much less marked than in the \textit{Hom.} The writer of the \textit{Recognitions} is, on the one hand, much less \textit{Judaic}, as in its practical ignorance of circumcision; and, on the other, much nearer the Catholic standpoint, as in his rejection of the anti-

animal sacrifices. But, as a whole, the literature presents us with the features already familiar to us in \textit{Christian} \textit{Esoterism}. For instance, with the book of \textit{Ebionites}, the pseudo-Clementines hold substantially the same \textit{Christian} theology. They view the \textit{Christian} law and custom in the same \textit{Christian} standpoint as the rejection of animal sacrifices, in their refusal to accept St. Paul's teaching, in their encouragement of marriage, and in their condemnation and secrecy enjoined on their adherents, they attach themselves to the same \textit{Christian} standpoint. It is a type of thought which is characteristic of the \textit{Esoters} and of \textit{Essene Ebionism} generally.
In the Christology of the pseudo-Clementines, the most striking feature is the doctrine of the True Prophet. If the aim of life is to obtain the highest good, knowledge is essential. God has, indeed, come to man him- self at the beginning, but he has intervened. The True Prophet, therefore, be- comes necessary. He has come again and again. He has come in the seven pillars of the world—Adam, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Moses. Verse 15 states that: Moses, Adam are incarnations of the True Prophet (Hom. ii. 6, iii. 11, 20, 49; Recog. i. 16, 40, 41; cf. Recog. i. 49, "a man over men, who is Christ Jesus"). The Son's humanity and Ebionism there led equally to salvation, for, 'there being one teaching by both, God accepts him who has believed either of these' (Hom. viii. 6). According to the point of Christ's Deity, the pseudo-Clementines consistently hold that: 'Our Lord and Lord neither asserted that there were gods except the Creator of all, nor did He proclaim Himself to be God, but He with reason pronounced blessed him who called Him the Son of that God who has arranged the universe' (Hom. xvi. 15).

Reference has already been made in this article to the brilliant discourses' which Baru and the Tübingen school have found in the pseudo-Clementine literature. With Baru holds a pre-eminent place. The theory of the development of Catholicity, so earnestly advocated by Baru and so candidly abandoned by Ritschl, gives a central place to this literature. Baru's theory was that the early Church was profoundly Ebion- istic; that Christianity and Ebionism there was a very close identity; and 'Jewish Christianity in general was a kind of Ebionism.' (Kirchenrecht. i. 132 [Eng. tr.]). Baru postu- lated a conflict in the early Church between Ebionism, i.e. Jewish Christianity, and Paulinism. Catholicity at the close of the 2nd cent. was intelligible only as the result of a conflict between two opposing forces—Ebionism on the one hand, and Paulinism on the other; and through this conflict the par- ticularism of Judaism (the aristocratical claims of Jewish particularism) (op. cit., p. 113) developed into the universalism of Christian Church. If the conflict was not discernible in the pseudo-Clementines, and in the controversy between Simon Peter and Simon Magnus. The one was a representative of Jewish Ebionism (Ebionism); the other was the repre- sentative of Paulinism (i.e. Gentile Christianity). Simon Magnus was something more than a pseudonym of Paul (op. cit. p. 36). Simon Magnus was nothing but a caricature of the Apostle Paul. Such was Baru's theory, which is needless to criticize. The main thing is to say that such a theory destroys the historical personality of Simon Magnus, who became a representative of pseudo-Clementine; the historical embodiment of all heresy. It is not denied here that this litera- ture, as a whole, rejects St. Paul, and one passage in the Homilies (xvi. 10) has an unmistakable reference to the Apostle of the Gentiles. Nothing else could have been expected from the Ebionites in which the pseudo-Clementines are sounded. Further, it is absolutely clear that Ebionism was something more than Jewish Christianity, and the Ebionites, instead of being co-extensive with Jewish Christianity, were confined to a small area, and had little influence west of Syria.

III. CONCLUSION.—Our inquiry is almost over. The Ebionites as a sect continued into the 5th cent., and is generally disappeared (Theodore, Hebr. 225, Fab. ii. 11). Nothing else could have been looked for. They had taken a false direction, which led them more and more away from the channel in which the Church's life flowed full and free. Catholicism now availed them nothing. They moved further and further away until all progress was barred against them. While the Church's life and doctrine developed into Catholicity, strong and accustomed, the Ebionites, through a long process, were regenerating it; and until its elements were absorbed either in bitter Judaism or in transcendent heathenism. Catholic Christianity gained nothing from Ebionism, un- less in that rugged way which heresy often has of causing the Church to make sure of its ground and to mature its Christology.

LITERATURE.—The ancient authorities are referred to in the course of the article. In modern literature the following are more important in a study of Ebionites: Gieseler, 'Über die Nazarier und Ebioniten' in Stülrwold-Täubers Arch., ii. 2 (1819); Bauer, de Ebionitarum Graecarum (1853), also Kirchengesch. (1853, Eng. tr. 1875), and Vorles., über die ehrubl. Doxogogenesch. (1860—63); Schillings, Die Clementinen und der Hexateuch (1854); Schrader, Die Schriften und dem Ebionites, 1844); Schwegler, Das nach- apok. Zeitwort (1848); Hugenfeld, Das Clement, Reccogniz. and Honenatus (1848); Gieseler, die Ebionitens (1849); Uhlhorn, Die Clementinen and die Reccogniz. (1854); Ritschel, Die Entstehung der altkathol. Kirchengesch., 1866; Recog. of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ in Eng. tr. (1870); Hagenbach, Dogmengesch. (1886—90); Lightfoot, Cogniz. (1881); Lichthei, Apol. and Post-Apol. Times (Eng. tr. 1886); Schleierm., GZ f. (1886-90); Zahn, Gesch. des NT (1892); Harnack, Doxogogenesch. (1892, Eng. tr. 1894—9); Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine (1896); Kahlen, The Ancient Catholic Church (1892), text. in PRK ("Ebionitien,' 'Ebene- ren,' 'Clementinen'), DCR (1877—80); DOU (1900); also Church State. This would lead to quite an inadequate conception of the subject, for, though Economics includes the management of State resources in such directions as taxation, and is intimately con- nected with State regulation of industrial and commercial activities by factory legislation, tariff policies, land laws, and the like, it considers also the ways in which individuals, groups, and organizations within the State co-ordinate with one another for the purpose of increasing means and administering their resources. As the resources of the community are managed far more by the spontaneous activities of individuals and groups than by the direct intervention of Govern- ments, Economics is concerned chiefly with the former. It inquires how man obtains the goods which satisfy his wants, explains the causes upon which the material well-being of mankind depends, and treats of all activities by which goods are produced, exchanged, and distributed among the individuals and classes of which society is composed. Economics has been described as the science of wealth, but this like most brief definitions, is apt to mislead; and indeed, economists themselves have sometimes carelessly written as if mankind existed for the purpose of increasing the quantity of material wealth. This over-emphasis on one phase of the study was responsible for its being dubbed by Carlyle 'the dismal science,' and for the view still sometimes expressed by the economist, of all men, should most clearly understand that wealth is subservient to a further purpose, and is not in itself the final goal of man's activity. Thus, while in one aspect it is true to

ECLIPSE. See PRODIGIES AND PORTENTS.

ECONOMICS.—1. Connotation of the term.—Economics originally meant the administration of household resources, being the English form of household (cf. La, the book of the Politics, thus defines as household management, including the treatment of slaves. The word 'economy' is, however, now used in a much wider sense, and is applied to the management of all kinds of resources and possessions—the utilization of material goods, of time, of thought, or of labour, in such a manner as to avoid waste. It is not confined to a special de-
say that Economics is the science of wealth, in another, and more important, aspect it is a part of the study of man. Without the economic affording a beneficence of every importance and an increase of the wealth of the citizens was considered a matter for State regulation as a means to the replenishment of the public exchequer and the provision of the sinews of war. Gradually, however, the promoting of the material welfare of the people began to be considered less from the point of view of personal gain and the increase of the finance, a great impetus being given to this movement by the French Physiocrats in the latter half of the 18th cent., who insisted that the network of traditions and the accumulation of the people defeated its own end, and that it was not the business of the statesman to make laws for the increase of wealth, but to discover the laws of Nature which themselves operate for the highest welfare of the people, and to guard these laws from violation and encroachment. Hence to Quesnay (*Droit naturel*, in E. Daire, *Physiocrates*, Paris, 1746) and his followers, Economics became the study of how natural laws worked in an orderly sequence for the establishment of the greatest well-being of the people; and the chief object of the science was the understanding of the conditions imposed by Nature upon human action in the promoting of material welfare. Under this mode of thought, freedom of industry and trade became the dominant doctrine as against the detailed regulation of every branch of economic activity by the State; and in its most extreme form it led to the maxim of *laissez-faire* (q.e.).

The influence of these Physiocratic preconceptions upon Adam Smith was very considerable, for although it is a great exaggeration to say that he was completely under the dominance of the French speculations, he also formulated much of his teaching in terms of the 'system of natural liberty,' and urged that if Nature were only left alone to care for itself much more would be effected than did the method of governmental interference. However defective this view may subsequently have proved (cf. COMPETITION), the immediate result was that Economics became a study of the processes of production, distribution, and exchange of wealth as accomplished by the spontaneous co-operation of men rather than by the action of Governments. Indeed, the revolt from State restraints tended perhaps away from the opposite extreme of non-interference in matters of industry and commerce, save for the provision of the necessary revenue to the public exchequer and the prevention of invasion of the State; and Economics became a social science, and, despite important changes during the last century, it is still more concerned with social than with political or private activities. This by no means implies that economic writings had less effect upon politics; they had more. Pitt, Huskisson, Peel, and Cobden took Adam Smith as their authority in the abolition of restrictions on foreign commerce, on domestic trade, and in the freedom of combination. Ricardo exercised a profound influence upon banking legislation and the abolition of the corn laws; Malthus upon the reform of the poor laws. Nevertheless, in the early stages of the development of Economics as a social science there was a certain narrowness that arose partly from the simplified presuppositions of his consumption, a necessary basis of his activities; but it is only in so far as it becomes subservient to man's interests that it is of importance in economic study.

2. The social and political aspects.—The change of standpoint which accounts for the preference for the broader term 'Economics' is due to the increasing emphasis upon social rather than upon political questions. At first, economic literature was dominantly political, its aim being the attainment of a sound system of public finance, and even the increase of the wealth of the citizens was considered a matter for State regulation as a means to the replenishment of the public exchequer and the provision of the sinews of war. Gradually, however, the promoting of the material welfare of the people began to be considered less from the point of view of personal gain and the increase of the finance, a great impetus being given to this movement by the French Physiocrats in the latter half of the 18th cent., who insisted that the network of traditions and the accumulation of the people defeated its own end, and that it was not the business of the statesman to make laws for the increase of wealth, but to discover the laws of Nature which themselves operate for the highest welfare of the people, and to guard these laws from violation and encroachment. Hence to Quesnay (*Droit naturel*, in E. Daire, *Physiocrates*, Paris, 1746) and his followers, Economics became the study of how natural laws worked in an orderly sequence for the establishment of the greatest well-being of the people; and the chief object of the science was the understanding of the conditions imposed by Nature upon human action in the promoting of material welfare. Under this mode of thought, freedom of industry and trade became the dominant doctrine as against the detailed regulation of every branch of economic activity by the State; and in its most extreme form it led to the maxim of *laissez-faire* (q.e.).

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3. Relation of Economics to Ethics.—As a social science, Economics is concerned with the intricate and complex actions and motives of man, and therefore it is closely related to Ethics. It is true that it is no part of the function of a positive science to pronounce ethical judgments, but even the positive science cannot neglect the fact that moral considerations often affect man's conduct in business life, thus creating a purely ethical consideration. These judgments, however, must be made in the light of the economics of the age; for the economist is more likely to judge the morality of certain acts than the statistician who will simply record them. Economics, too, has come to be traditionally regarded as concerned with the increase of riches, and there was some warrant for the complaints of Carlyle and Ruskin that, while abundant attention was devoted to the production of wealth, too little thought was given to its distribution in such ways as to improve the condition of the poorer classes. Today there is a perceptible shifting of emphasis from the acquisition of wealth to the distribution of wealth, from production to distribution; and the most recent text-books treat the subject-matter throughout with more reference to the material and moral welfare of humanity. Though his primary business is the scientific study and interpretation of facts, the economist never loses sight of this practical aim of affording guidance for social life and reform.
even a prevalent idea that the two were in conflict, and that an elastic conscience was an economic virtue. Clearly, however, such a sharp division cannot be maintained. It cannot be maintained because all economists are subject to the same continuous ethical influence, whether they are capitalist combinations and trusts adopt immoral practices, or whether the adoption of a protective policy leads to corruption. Still less can the question be put whether there is more equality in the distribution of wealth to the highest welfare, even though it should involve a slight check to wealth production.

The nature of ethical and economic considerations need not lead the economist into the deeper controversies that lie entirely beyond the scope of his science. For his practical purposes the precise meaning of 'the good' is less important than the fact that amoralists of different schools there is a general consensus of opinion regarding the desirability of such and such a change in social life. A problem relating to monetary media or banking practice may present little or no ethical aspect, but labour problems which are claiming an increasing share of public attention cannot be regarded as adequately treated without an analysis of the relevant factors, and those who speak with authority in the name of Economics now fully recognize the necessity for this wider outlook.

Whether, indeed, ethical and economic considerations may come into conflict in particular cases is doubtful. Honesty is not necessarily the best policy for a particular individual from the standpoint of the acquisition of wealth; illustrations to this contrary are too numerous to admit of doubt. But for society as a whole, honesty is an economic as well as a moral virtue. No doubt, too, a community may sometimes gain immediately in material wealth by actions that the moralist would condemn, and it is surely true that an act which marks a moral gain to society may result in immediate material loss. But in the long run it is doubtful whether the conflict can subsist; and, as a rule, if not universally, that which is from the standpoint of society economically injurious is likely to be ethically wrong, while that which is ethically good is likely to be economically advantageous. This consideration suggests that it is quite as important for the moralist to give due weight to the moral forces as it is for the economist to recognize the ethical aspects of social phenomena, that is to say, suffering from greater neglect than the latter.

4. Economic method. — Disputes regarding method at one time threatened to divide economists into different schools, but they have now almost ceased. There is no peculiarly economic method of study, and, though the relative importance of analysis and the search for facts varies with the problem under discussion, each is as ineffective alone as is a single blade of a pair of scissors. The controversies about the inductive and deductive, historical and analytical, concrete and abstract methods have yielded place to a general agreement that every method is correct in proportion to its fruitfulness in solving the particular problem, and that in most cases a combination of methods proves most valuable. Thus, while generalization from historical or statistical data is predominantly employed in most of the problems of production, deduction is relatively more important in dealing with the complexities of distribution or such related matters as the incidence of taxation, with the plurality of causes and intermixture of effects baffle purely inductive treatment. There was unquestionably a tendency among the economists of the first half of the 19th cent. to employ the abstract method too exclusively, and to apply the resulting generalizations too hastily, and the protests of the historical school, combined with the advance of statistical science, have tended to the full appreciation of inductive and comparative tests. Much progress has still to be made in such quantitative analysis before a thorough estimate can be made of the relative strength of various economic forces, but the economists are frequently handicapped on this side by the inadequacy of existing statistical data. Nevertheless, there has been a marked advance in this direction, which might well be illustrated by a comparison of the English Poor Law, 1834, proceeding almost exclusively on a priori methods of reasoning, with the Report of the Royal Commission on the same subject in 1909, in which quantitative analysis plays a much larger part. The same feature is evident in comparing the Free Trade controversy of to-day with that of Cobden's time.

In other directions economic method has been influenced by psychological analysis. Jevons in England, Walras in Switzerland, and Menger in Austria simultaneously worked out a theory of value from the side of demand, on the basis of the psychology of buying and selling factors, and to the older theory that started from the side of cost of production. It supplied the fundamental principles of a theory of consumption. Hitherto the economist has generally been compelled to establish his own psychological principles, since they were not sufficiently prepared for his use by the psychologist; but it seems probable that the future development of Experimental Psychology will have an important bearing upon deductive Economics.

Even more fruitful has been the application of biological conceptions to social and economic life, though their uncritical use has sometimes been mischievous by pushing analogies so far that they become untrue. Formerly economists had attempted to explain man's actions by the categories of Physics, and society was treated as if it were a machine. The interactions of men's wills and motives in economic life were explained in terms of stress and strain, attraction and repulsion. The principle of the composition of forces was thought by J. S. Mill (Autobiography, London, 1873, p. 159 f.) to afford a key to economic method by adding 'the separate effect of one force to the separate effect of the other. But, while this method is frequently useful as a simplification, it generally makes the invalid assumption that economic problems are concerned with external forces operating upon objects which themselves remain unchanged. This was felt to be much too external a conception for a social science. Thus, the effects of an increase of wages in a trade might be studied on the mechanical method by showing how relative wages and profits act as forces attracting or driving away labour and capital; but this would not yield a complete analysis, because the increased wage would tend to affect the efficiency of the worker and possibly of the business organization, so that there is an obvious analogy to functional adaptation in Biology. The step from physical to biological analogies has thus marked a great advance, emphasizing the mutual dependence of the welfare of the whole and the parts, of differentiation and integration, and humanizing economic study. But it has also led to much inaccurate thought, the difference between biological and economic phenomena having frequently been ignored, and the discovery of analogies. The 'struggle for existence' in economic life has been treated in a narrowly individualistic way, and the 'survival of the fittest' has been said to necessitate unex-
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stricted competition, while it was forgotten that morally inferior men sometimes display greater ability in manipulating that which is derived from the environment, and that many competitors are favoured, while others are irrationally handicapped, before they enter upon the economic struggle. These kinds of biological causes, however, are confined to the minor writers, and intelligently construed biological methods have contributed greatly to economic advance, for the two sciences have a subject-matter which is similar. One of the great secrets of modern science, and weaving them into a connected scientific whole, that the Wealth of Nations (1776) marks as a great departure in Economics as the system of Copernicus was in the study of the universe, and the chief feature of modern industry was lacking, for industrial capital played no large part in production. Public finance and the nature of money certainly occupied the attention of writers of antiquity; but, apart from an occasional anticipation of modern theories, there is little in Greek and Roman literature that has any direct significance for modern economic life. The industrial conditions were not such as to direct attention to the problems which present themselves most acutely at the present day. In medieval times the slave was disappearing before the free labourer, but industry was still on a petty scale. When wages were low, capital was cheap. Economic speculation was intermingled with theological and moral questions—the determination of a just price, usury doctrines, and luxury exemptions. Furthermore that field is of itself little more than a casuistical system of rules for business conduct. After the Reformation, the introduction of printing, the discovery of trade routes to the East, and the influx of precious metals from the New World, there were hundreds of books and pamphlets on economic subjects before the middle of the 18th cent., usually relating to particular controversies connected with monetary matters and foreign trade. As local industrial regulation gave place to national, the Mercantile Theory (cf. Commerce) became dominant, with its demand for freedom of exportation and its doctrine of the balance of trade. There was a great advance in the analysis of problems of production and exchange, but the separation of a wage-earning class and the rise of capital were only beginning to turn attention to problems of both phenomena and foreign trade. It was when the old industrial order was thus passing away and capitalism was in its infancy that Adam Smith's Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, achieved such success. The name of it is polemenal, being aimed against the imnumerable rules and regulations for the conduct of trade which had lost any justification they may formerly have had in the conditions of the time. The Physiocratic writers in France had already laid stress upon the natural law of freedom before the publication of the Wealth of Nations, but it has now been made clear, by the publication of the notes of his lectures taken by a student, that Adam Smith was teaching very similar ideas in the University of Glasgow as early as 1768 (Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms, delivered in the University of Glasgow, reported by a Student in 1763, and edited by Edwin Cannan, Oxford, 1896). Despite an occasional confusion of economic laws with ethical precepts, which arose from the preconceptions regarding the natural, his exposition of the subject was so forcible and so opportune that it profoundly affected legislation. But the Wealth of Nations also contained a scientific treatment of society on value and profit of wealth, and here the French economists had anticipated him and exercised a strong influence upon him. Target, in his Réflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses (1770; Eng. tr. edited by W. J. Ashley, New York, 1888), gave a
theory of wages, profits, interest, and rent which was largely coloured by the Physiocratic doctrine that agriculture alone yielded a net product over the expenses of production, while manufacture merely changed the shape of materials already productive, which was involved in the process with the useful materials consumed by the artisans during the period of labour; and commerce merely changed the place of materials without increasing the wealth of the society. The theory of distribution received fuller development at the hands of Adam Smith, and, though he did not accept the view that agriculture alone was productive, but extended the conception to manufacture, he established the economic theory that:

* "In agriculture nature labours along with man; and, though his labours do no more than his nature does, yet, if man has any skill or enterprise, he can increase both the quantity and quality of his productions." 

The assumption and the conclusion to be that land yields a surplus in the shape of rent in addition to wages and profits; yet this fact is not due to the greater bounty of Nature in work on the soil than in other industrial pursuits, but rather to the calculations and variations of that bounty. Now, when natural forces have been exploited on a large scale for manufacturing and mercantile purposes, it is futile to ask whether Nature contributes more to production on the land than to other forms of production. The main doctrines of Smith regarding the distribution of wealth did not differ essentially from those of Turgot, though he departed further from the Physiocratic theory and gave more emphasis to the industrial, as distinguished from the agricultural, system. Francis Hutcheson, Hume, Steuart, and other English writers had also made important contributions to the economic theory before 1776, but, as Marshall (Principles of Economics, London, 1907, 1. 575) says, "Adam Smith's name was so vast and resound that all that was best in all his contemporaries, French and English; and, though he undeniably borrowed much from others, yet, the more one compares him with those who went before and those who came after him, the finer does his genius appear, the broader his knowledge, the more well-balanced his judgment. Wherever he differs from his predecessors, he is more nearly right than they; while there is scarcely an economic truth now known of which he did not get some glimpse. And, since he was the first to write a treatise on wealth in all its chief social aspects, it was to him that Hegel, Digges, and others, have returned to be regarded as the founder of modern economics." His highest claim to have made an epoch in thought, according to the same writer, was to have made the first step in a careful and scientific inquiry into the manner in which value measures human motive—a theory which gave a common centre and unity to the science.

The Industrial Revolution, which was only beginning in Adam Smith's time, soon proceeded apace, for Watt discovered the steam-engine in the same year that the Wealth of Nations was published. New problems arose as the factory system superseded the domestic system of production in England, especially far in advance of any other nation, the discussion of them took place chiefly in that country. In the hands of Ricardo and Malthus, therefore, the development and extension of Adam Smith's principles had the directly practical aim of contributing towards the solution of the special problems of the early years of the 19th cent., and this work they did very effectively. Freedom of trade was now more firmly established as a principle, and the conditions of distribution became more acute with the growth of the business unit and the increased number of wage-earners, so that the relation of wages to profit was a subject of intense discussion. The condition of the poor and the influence of the poor-laws were in the contributions of Malthus; the effects of the restrictions upon importation of corn led to an elucidation of the theory and nature of rent; while the financial difficulties of the period of the French war and the suspension of specie payment by the Bank of England caused a development in monetary theory. The Malthusian theory seemed to warrant the view that the poor condition of the labouring classes was due to the fact that when wages rose above the level of subsistence there was a tendency for population to increase and force them down again, and this view in one way by his theory of rent, which showed the tendency to diminishing returns from increased applications of labour to land, and also that the surplus produce above the margin of cultivation went to the owners of the soil. By a careless expression to the effect that wages could not rise above the level of necessities he also provided the basis for the Socialist doctrine which represented the margin of cultivation as the margin of necessary wages, generalized it to the whole of industrial life, and held that capitalists and landowners swept off all surplus produce.

7. Recent development—Recent economic doctrine has been mainly an amplification and modification of that which flourished in England under Ricardo, Malthus, Macaulay, and Mill. But, since the middle of the 19th cent., other countries have been overtaking England in industrial development, and have been contributing ideas to the development of economic thought. Prior to that time France and England were almost the only countries which had contributed anything of importance, but during the last half-century American, German, Austrian, and other writers have applied themselves to the science with such skill and success that they have added it much of its former insecurity and added to its outlook. The increased concentration of capital and the immense growth of commerce, following upon improvements in railways and steamships, have brought about larger conditions, so that problems of transport, international trade, monopoly, and speculation have assumed a larger place in economic treatises. The doctrine of non-interference has been more generally accepted, and the latest phase of this movement of thought, which promises to be the most important for some time to come, is the application of the doctrine of competition to the solution of social and economic problems, and has been the object of the theory of the distribution of wealth and the realization of the tendency of wealth to bequeath to the science.

The subject of distribution of wealth is claiming fuller investigation, and the desire for raising the economic condition of the less fortunate members of the community is tending to overshadow all minor controversies. The economists of the first half of the 19th cent. treated distribution from the standpoint rather of abstract classes like capitalists and labourers than of individuals, and did admirable work in explaining the nature and variations of each category of income—rent, profits, and wages. But to-day the emphasis of popular discussion is upon the great inequalities of income which arise largely from inequalities of inherited property and inequalities of opportunity, and economic inquiry has tended to follow the same direction. Consequently, greater stress has been laid upon the fact that the increase of aggregate wealth is not necessarily accompanied by increased material well-being; and, through the work of Jeunon and the Austrian school, the theory of value has been re-stated from the side of consumption and utility in order to show that the conclusions from the theory of value can fall into the common error of earlier authorities of confounding the two conceptions. It is now of fundamental importance, not only in general
economic theory but also in its application to the principles of taxation and socialistic proposals, to reconcile people in the fact that the relative urgency of wants depends largely upon the extent to which they have already been satisfied, so that it cannot be a matter of indifference in what form he gets his share of a particular quantity of material goods accrues to the rich or to the poor. No doubt recent economists in elaborating this profoundly significant principle have sometimes attempted to give it an air of precision which it cannot sustain, and such calculations of pleasure or utility are apt to raise the suspicions of the philosopher. But, while it is impossible to give absolute proof that a particular poor man suffers more from the loss of a shilling than does a particular rich man, and it may even be quite untrue in special cases, yet in dealing with large numbers any scruple regarding the matter vanishes, for no one would find much comfort in the fact that the income of material wealth was the same whether a million sterling went to the working-classes or to the payers of super-tax. The earlier economists, perfectly fair in interpreting the doctrine of the 'wages-fund,' partly from lack of an adequate theory of demand and consumption, usually thought that if a policy increased or diminished what is now called the 'national dividend,'—the quantity of goods produced in a year,—it was ipso facto good or bad, economical or wasteful. But the principle that the utility of a good depends upon the quantity possessed makes it clear that even a policy which injures the national dividend may yet promote material welfare if it modifies the distribution of wealth to the advantage of the latter. Hence among economists, as well as by socialists, a more even distribution of wealth is considered to be desirable, and modern controversy turns rather upon the advisability of particular methods of achieving it, and upon the magnitude of their effects on productive efficiency and the like, than upon the desirability of the end. This conception of utility or psychic significance has affected not only the standpoint from which the distribution of wealth is regarded, but also many of the results of the principles of material wealth. The fuller recognition of the distinction between material wealth and material welfare has made it necessary to take account of the disability involved in their effects on productive efficiency and the like, than upon the desirability of the end.

8. Problems of Economics.—A summary of all the various subjects that are treated in a textbook on Economics would yield but a dry table of contents. What is here proposed is rather to explain, without unnecessary technicalities, the essential features of the science at its present stage of development, dealing first with the more general principles upon which the subject depends, and secondly with their application to particular policies for the furtherance of material welfare through the action of the State. (a) The primary requisites of material welfare are labour and natural agents; without the cooperation of these no production of any kind is possible. In a secondary place come capital and organization—meaning by 'secondary' not that they are less important in the process of production as now carried on, but that production of some sort is possible without them and they become important at a later stage of industrial development. Labour cannot create material things; but, by operating upon the materials which Nature gives, changing their form, place, or qualities, it adapts them to man's needs. In Nature there is remarkably little suitable for human provision until it
has thus been re-made according to man's own plan. In the last part of the 18th century this adaptation, which is called the production process, had to be performed almost wholly by man's muscular force aided by that of domesticated animals. There were tools, but, the motive-power being muscular, their range of operation was definitely limited by the physical and nervous energy of man. In a very few directions, which now seem by comparison almost negligible, the earlier period had attempted to progress beyond the merely muscular, as in utilizing the wind for ocean traffic and for small mills; but since the advent of the age of inventions we have looked more to the intelligence of man curbing and directing the forces of Nature in such forms as steam and electricity to perform most of the heavier work.

This perfecting of the agencies of production, which is still proceeding rapidly, removes the former limit of physical endurance, and the only bounds to the increase of material power are the far-distant one when all natural forces shall have been economically explored, and the improbable one that man's inventive capacity will come to a halt. This rapid adaptation of the world to man's requirements, by which natural forces are made to work for us, should, if rightly directed, result in a much higher and indeed in a community not only more, but higher, than that of which the future of the aggregate output of goods; these are only instruments that may contribute much or little to welfare and to the raising of the standard of living according to the manner in which they are divided and utilized, and to the number of people embraced in the community. As man's wants are never fully satisfied, or likely to be, the first principle of production is that a people should strive to obtain the goods it requires with the minimum expenditure of effort. This is sometimes questioned by those who are painfully conscious of the fact that people are often to be found who have no work to do, and projects for 'making work' are sometimes advocated. Yet there can be no such thing as a general scarcity of work until mankind is supplied with everything it desires. Defective organization of industry shows itself in maladjustments of the labour force between different trades; in the inability to predict with certainty the future supply of raw produce or food, and the changes and fluctuations in prices; in the spasms and reactions of credit, as well as in the temporary displacements that accompany all progress and change. Such causes as these tend to unemployment, but the most lack of work to be done, and it is wasteful to spend more effort upon making any class of goods than is absolutely necessary.

The effectiveness of labour in production is greatly increased by the advance of science, which teaches men how to make the most of the natural environment by applications of chemical and physical discoveries, and by the general rising of the level of skill and intelligence. It is also increased by the fact that the stock of appliances for production is growing faster than the population, so that every generation bequeaths to its successor much larger quantity of the products of past effort, in the shape of machinery and other forms of capital, than it received from the preceding generation. And the effectiveness of labour depends, too, upon the conditions under which it operates. Thus the separation of employment and division of labour, allowing each to perform the work for which he is most suited by nature or training; through the combination of labour, which can perform what would be quite impossible to any single individual; through the localization of industries in the places best suited to the purpose; the 18th century, and the 20th century, man can weave more cloth in a day than ever before; while the second can produce more better boots than the first, the productivity of their labour will be increased when they specialize their work and exchange their products. Similarly, if, for climatic or other reasons, one district can produce cotton goods more easily than another, while the second can produce coal or granite more easily than the first, it is economical that the districts should specialize their production and exchange their products. Indeed, even if a man possessed such excellent abilities that he could do a dozen things better than most other people, he would still be most beneficial to production that he should devote himself to the occupation in which his superiority was most marked, for it is not economical for a successful lawyer to do his own typewriting, even though, with practice, he might be able to do it expertly.

These commonplace ideas are seldom directly denied, but it is often forgotten that they are not changed by political boundary lines and lines of latitude, and that the advantages of territorial division of labour are not essentially different in comparing two nations from what they are in comparing two towns or counties. If, by hindrances to exchange, a community is prevented from producing the goods in which it has little or no superiority, it must make fewer of the goods in which its relative superiority is great; and such hindrances, by impeding the territorial division of labour, lower the productivity of industry. No doubt there are some incidental disadvantages in all forms of localization of industry, as there certainly are when one labour becomes so specialized that it cannot readily be readjusted to the amount of it in different lines of production as the demand changes; but on the whole the productivity of industry increases when the localization of industry is unimpeded, for much the same reasons as when each man is performing the work for which he has the highest aptitude.

It follows from this conception of localization that the effectiveness of labour depends upon the condition of the land or other natural agents with which it operates. Different areas are very unequally fitted for assisting labour, because of their variations of fertility, climate, geological formation, or geographical position; and, though some of these conditions are sometimes affected by man's action through the incorporation of capital with the soil, others admit of no great modification. In any case, the labour required for producing a given quantity of goods in a favourable locality is less than in an unfavourable one, so that labour is more productive when applied under the former circumstances than under the latter. This gives rise to variations of rent, for those who control the superior sources will naturally reap higher gains than those who control the inferior. Besides variations in natural endowments affecting the productivity of labour applied to land, it is also affected by the response that land makes to intensive cultivation, so that there was at one time a fear that the number of people would increase to such a point that the supply of food and other products of the land would not keep pace with the growth of population. In other words, the effectiveness of labour depends upon the amount of land available, for after a certain point, as the number of people increases, less land can be cultivated, so that the return per man is lower and lower return of produce to the successive increments of labour, unless changes have meantime occurred in the arts of agriculture. If it were not so, there would be no limit to the intensity of the cultivation that could be profitably carried on. The earlier economists may have given too
little weight to the possible improvements in agricultural methods, facilities of transport from abroad, and the like; but it remains true that, if population increases rapidly, the deficiency in these things, as well as in other products of nature, will result in high prices and scarcity, and whatever is not included in the production of a good we possess, the lower is the significance to us of any further addition to the stock of it, until, when superfluity is reached, no satisfaction is dependent upon any one item of the good, and therefore its cost falls to the value of the air. There can be no value in the absence of utility, and the value of any good depends upon the marginal utility—that is, upon the utility of the final increment of the commodity which we are just induced to purchase. Cf. art. CONSUMPTION.

Thus, the nearer the quantity of the commodity approaches to the amount required for complete satisfaction of the wants dependent upon it, the higher will be the marginal utility and the lower the value of any single increment of it. Hence it may be briefly stated that, other things being equal, the demand price of a commodity decreases with every increase of satisfaction, and vice versa.

If the money price of a commodity increases, it is because the price of the commodity price has increased, and because the rate of money interest is high. If the demand price of a commodity increases, it is because the rate of money interest is low, and because the demand for the commodity has increased. If the supply of a commodity increases, it is because the rate of money interest is low, and because the demand for the commodity has decreased. If the demand price of a commodity decreases, it is because the rate of money interest is high, and because the demand for the commodity has decreased. If the demand price of a commodity decreases, it is because the rate of money interest is low, and because the demand for the commodity has increased.

(c) The problem of the distribution of income in the form of wages, rent, interest, and profits is an illustration of the principles of value. The relative incomes of different people depend upon the value of the produce of their labour and the value of the use of their property, so that a full explanation of the fact of widespread differences of income would involve a statement of all the reasons why some one owns more property than others, why some laborer produces a higher return than others, and why different forms of exertion, from unskilled labour to the organization of a huge industry, are so variously valued. This can only be here illustrated in the same way that a price is determined in a market. In the first case the price is determined by the value of the need for the good, in the second case by the value of the use of the property.
paid not for any work that they personally perform, but for the service of factors of production which they own. The magnitude of incomes from the possession of such property depends upon the amount and the efficiency of the property possessed, and these again depend upon individual providence, judicious choice of investment, and the amount of remuneration, as well as upon the magnitude of the individual's earnings, which largely determine the possibility of saving. Within any one class of property incomes there are very wide differences, no more than another of equal size, because of its superior situation, natural endowments, and the improvements made upon it by expenditure of capital and labour in the past; one use of capital yields a higher income than another because the different uses to which capital is put vary in their productiveness, in their security, and in their marketability; and people are willing to accept a lower return on an investment which has a high security and is easily marketed. Similarly, the wages of labour depend upon the value which the public attaches to the goods or services produced by it, and the consequent demand for workers ready to perform the tasks. In each trade the wages will be fixed by the value of the product of the marginal worker—the worker, that is, whose presence will make the greatest possible difference to the employer. If the number of labourers increases while other things remain the same, the remuneration of each will be lowered, because the value of the marginal product will fall as more of it is placed upon the market, unless the industry happens to be one in which the addition of workers makes production so much more efficient that the increased output per head is more than sufficient to counterbalance the fall in the price of each unit of produce. In this way it emerges that the importance of an occupation to society is no test of the wages that will be paid in it, any more than the relative value of corn, air, and diamonds is explained by their importance to human well-being. Precisely as goods rise in value if there are few in the market when many are wanted, so the value of a particular kind of labour rises when there are few labourers in comparison with the demand for their work. Hence the reason why wages in one trade are higher than in another depends upon the number of people and the demand for the work of each. As wages are equal and all trades equally desirable, there could be no such differences of wages. But not only do occupations vary in the advantages, other than money wages, which they afford; the workers are also differentiated into classes who can rarely do each other's work, and the main reasons for the relative over-supply of labour in some occupations as compared with others are therefore to be sought in the circumstances that render labour immobile, and that prevent workers from entering the more highly paid trades. For some temporary reason, such as a change in the nature of demand, too many people may have become specialized to a particular trade and too few to another, but the error cannot be quickly rectified, because of the time required to train new workers. In the course of time it may be expected that the higher wages will attract to the one occupation, and the lower wages will repel workers from the other; but in the meantime the maladjustment of the labour force between the trades will cause a corresponding variation in the value of wages.

Of more permanent and serious import is the fact that the choice of a trade is not free. The people become distributed between different occupations in a rather arbitrary manner, and it would promote welfare if more people followed some, and fewer other occupations than at present. Since many employments call for lengthy and expensive training, the children of parents who are both willing and able to undertake this preliminary expenditure for their children, whether the supply of labour of that kind will be great or small. The chief reason why the kinds of work that any one person can perform are at present paid for on a very low or miserable scale is that there is a very large number of parents who either have not the power or have not the will to bear the expenses required for higher industries. Customs of various kinds also limit the freedom of choice in some cases, and this is particularly important in fixing women's wages, for women are by custom excluded from many employments, and so relatively overcrowd others. The difficulty of gauging in advance the comparative advantages of employments when conditions are rapidly changing, the differences of physique and mental strength, also give rise to differences of wages from trade to trade, where the last-mentioned factor also causes variations of earnings within the same trade.

Besides competition of workers and the relative supply of them in different trades, there is still another factor tending to fix the limits of wages, viz. the principle of substitution. Men compete with one another in persons, with machines in production, and with capital and other combinations. It is the employer's function and interest to keep down the expenses of production by choosing those factors and groupings which are most economical. Thus land, labour, and capital are all needed in farming, and no one of them can be wholly substituted for the others; but they can be substituted for one another at their margins. The farmer may conceivably give up a man area with more labour but less machinery or manure, with less labour and more machinery or manure; or he may produce the same crop from a smaller area of land at still further increasing the labour and machinery. Land, labour, and capital are here being balanced against one another as factors of production, and, if the price of one rises considerably, the others may be chosen to take its place in some measure. So it is in every industry. Each factor and sub-factor, however necessary to production, may find a substitute at the margin in some other factor or sub-factor; and in this fact for their cost there is found a ready explanation of the short-sighted and misleading saying that 'most men earn just about what they are worth,' that being calculated as their economic factor-worth. The wages in a trade tend to equal the marginal worth of the labour in that trade, and that marginal worth is fixed both by the number of workers in the occupation relatively to the demand for their produce and by the competition of other factors capable of performing similar work. Unfortunately, however, the saying just quoted is often used to support the very different idea that a man's income measures his personal efficiency. That is by no means justified by economic analysis. Through the method of substitution the portion of the aggregate produce of the community which goes to remunerate any particular agent or factor of production tends to be adjusted to the efficiency of that factor in supplying the wants of mankind, so that distribution depends upon factor-worth. But, besides labour and organizing ability, capital and land are factors of production; and, though these earn in proportion to their contribution to the wealth of the community, they cannot be said to acquire incomes; their owners receive the reward whether personally efficient or the reverse. Moreover, the theory of distribution takes the wants of mankind as they are, not as they ought to be; so that, if the popular demand
requires successive editions of a sensational novel, while a book embodying the profound researches of the scholar will not sell, the author of the former being more efficient in supplying the wants of mankind, and accordingly obtains a greater share of income. In a deeper sense, no doubt, a man may be so very efficient that the people are unable to appreciate his wares; but that is only to illustrate that intellectual men do not, as such, constitute a claim upon the national dividend under existing conditions.

8. State action for the promotion of material welfare.—After this survey of the general principles, it remains to exemplify their application to particular proposals for State action in furtherance of material welfare. This section cannot pretend to systematic completeness, and selection can only be made of two samples from the multiplicity of projects and activities. The subjects chosen as sufficiently representative and widely debated are the raising of the economic condition of the worst-paid and the suppressing of exploitation for the protection of home industries.

(a) The problem of very low earnings.—The subject of low earnings connects itself with the general principles of wages already enunciated. The tendency of a great deal of wage control, in fact, is to pay to workers their marginal worth in the particular trade. Clearly they cannot permanently get more than this, because, if the marginal worth of a class of men were 20s. a week while the wages were 21s., it would be to the advantage of an employer to dismiss men up to the point at which the gain resulting from a further dismissal would be equalled by the loss. On the other hand, competition for labour among employers should normally prevent wages from falling below the marginal worth of the labour.

Hence, when a large class of work-people is found to obtain very low earnings, two questions arise to the mind of the economist: Are the low wages to be accounted for by the low marginal worth in that occupation, or are they due to special circumstances which prevent properly in the trade in question? more briefly, Are the workers not obtaining as much as their marginal worth? In some cases both questions may admit of an affirmative answer. Thus, in the case of sweated home-work among women, the supply of labour relatively to the demand for it is very high, so that its marginal worth is low. Much of the work is of a kind that can be performed by machinery in factories, and the cost of production in the factory fixes a limit to the wages that can be paid in the home. Many of the articles may be made by the consumers themselves, and, if their price rises, this method of production will be stimulated. There is thus an excessive supply and a limited demand, and these facts alone warrant the conclusion that the marginal worth of the labour must be low. But in the same time there are also reasons for believing that the wages, in some cases at least, fall below the marginal worth, because the bargaining power of the home-workers is very weak; they know little of one another, and cannot take collective action in resisting a fall of wages. So far the conditions of a true market are absent, and in practice different piece-rates are sometimes paid for precisely the same work by different employers. It is in the fact that the institution of minimum wages by law for such industries may be expected to have a good effect; for, if the home-workers were already in all cases retaining their marginal worth, any raising of the wages of one class above those of them, unless, indeed, their worth immediately rose in proportion to their higher wages. But in the case of unskilled men there is little reason to believe that the payment of wages below their marginal worth is very common or important. The main cause of this is that the marginal worth is low on account of the magnitude of the supply of such labour relatively to the demand for it. The idea that the prescription of a minimum wage by law will in such circumstances suffice to eliminate the evil cannot be sustained, for it is impossible to force employers to give more for labour than it is worth, and a man is not worth more simply because the Government declares that he must not be employed for less than a given sum. The result of a minimum wage in these circumstances must be to throw a large number of men out of work altogether. Conceivably this may be desirable as an incident in a larger scheme of reform where the gain is more than sufficient to counterbalance this loss, but the legislative prescription of a minimum wage alone is no remedy. Far more hope lies in an attempt to make the wages of the worth more truly reflect the value of the members of the overcrowded class to a higher level of efficiency, or by checking the degradation of members of the higher grades. The economic reason for the deplorable state of things is that there is a market for them, and the best course to pursue is to rectify this, for economic forces will then work with us in raising the wages of the poorer classes. This means that some of the sources of the over-supply of such labour must be stopped up, and in particular that at the adolescent age boys must be trained to fill some positive function in industrial life, instead of being allowed to drift into any uneducative job that offers good wages at the moment but leads to nothing in the future.

A serious objection is frequently raised to this course by the skilled workman, who asserts that the drafting of boys from unskilled and casual to skilled and regular trades can do no real good, because the skilled trades are already over-stocked; and a number of anti-social policies by Trade Unions and others have been dictated by this view. It arises largely from the practice of thinking about values and wages only in terms of money; as soon as one goes behind the money expressions, it is seen to be fallacious. The bootmaker's objection to the training of more boys for his trade, instead of allowing them to drift into casual and unskilled labour, is that the want he exists to satisfy will be more fully met while the man is making it, and the labourer will be more fully met, so that society gives him less of general commodities for a week's work than before. The objection would be partially valid if all the boys were diverted into this one skilled trade, though it might still be said that, when a set of men who would otherwise be doing little work, or casual work of very low worth, are making boots that are much needed instead, society as a whole will be enriched by the change, despite the fact that the price of boots and the wages of boot operatives would fall. But it is not proposed to draft all the boys into any single skilled industry; they would be distributed over industries of all kinds, so that all wants would be somewhat less painfully met in due proportion. Then, despite the fact that boots are rather less urgently required than before when the supply increases, the bootmaker will not suffer because the supply of this latter is in exchange for boots. The only qualification to this is that by withdrawing labour to a large extent from casual occupations the price of such unskilled labour would rise, and, unless it increased in efficiency fully to correspond, or unless there was no progress and invention in the work performed by the unskilled, their produce would rise in price.
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greater command of general commodities for each
unit of their labour. But in any case the economist
will be able to make real
wages more equal as between skilled and unskilled
trades by raising the earnings of the latter, and
welfare is thereby promoted. The function of
State action in this matter is, therefore, to carry
its educational policy further into the more ade-
quately training of youths, the suppression and
regulation of undesirable forms of boy labour, and
the more thorough direction of the labour force into
its proper industries by the diffusion of information regarding occupations and the like.
In such ways it can raise the marginal worth of
the workers in unskilled trades, by reducing the
supply and by raising the efficiency, so that eco-
nomic forces themselves will then raise the wages.
The State may also bring pressure to bear upon
employers in order to regulate work as far as
possible, instead of offering it in a casual fashion,
and this will likewise tend to diminish the supply,
as will people see that the chances of picking up a
living by odd jobs are reduced, and they will have
a stronger inducement to prepare themselves and
their children for regular work. The suspicion
means that the State can employ for improving the
position of the poorest classes are those which
directly or indirectly increase the efficiency of
the workers, and distribute them more evenly among
different trades in comparison with the demand,
so that their marginal worth is at least sufficiently
high to give them command over the necessary
for decent living.

(b) Free trade and Protection.—The object of
foreign trade is to render it possible for the people
of a country to obtain goods more easily than they
could otherwise do. That exchange is a gain to
both parties, and that it realizes the economies of
division of labour and localization of industries,
is always admitted in regard to domestic trade;
consequently no one questions the advantages of a
policy of free exchange within the limits of a
single country. The doctrine of freedom in inter-
national trade rests upon the same elementary
facts. If each nation devotes its resources to those
forms of production for which it has a relative
superiority, and exchanges such goods for those
which it cannot produce with equal facility, the
income of its people will be higher than if they
were compelled to produce for themselves all the
goods normally within their jurisdiction. The idea
that one country gains at the expense of another
is absurd, and a country that will not buy cannot
sell. Hence impediments to trade diminish the
productivity of labour and capital within the pro-
tected area by nullifying the advantages of terri-
torial division of labour. There is a prima facie
presumption that it pays Britain better to produce
the goods she is producing and exporting rather
than to divert some of her productive forces from
these to making the goods she is now importing.
The burden of proof, therefore, lies upon the
protectionists to demonstrate the falsity of this simple
general principle, or its inapplicability to some
particular circumstances. Broadly, protectionist
arguments may be divided into two classes: those
which urge that impediments to trade will increase
the wealth, employment, or productivity of the
country imposing them; and those which appeal
to wider considerations such as national defence
or imperial sentiment.
The oldest and the crudest of the arguments
arose on the ground that foreign trade benefits
a nation only when the value of the exports exceeds
that of the imports, because it is then supposed
that the difference must come in gold and so enrich
the country. The refutation of the argument is
manifold. The excess of imports or of exports is
usually fairly explicable without the passing of
gold, by taking account of such items as shipping
services and insurance: it makes real
wages more equal as between skilled and unskilled
trades by raising the earnings of the latter, and
welfare is thereby promoted. The function of
State action in this matter is, therefore, to carry
its educational policy further into the more ade-
quately training of youths, the suppression and
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The argument upon which the greatest stress is
generally placed is the benefit of protection to the
working classes by increasing the quantity of
employment of wages. For this various reasons
are assigned. The first consists in resisting
the specific instances in which a trade could be made
employ more people if the competing foreign
goods were excluded. But the free trader has
never denied this. It is upon the second point,
particular industry may be contracted by allowing
imports to compete with it, and charges the
protectionist with the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi.
The position of the free trader is that those in-
dustries that would gain by a tariff would do so at
the expense of a greater aggregate loss to other
trades by diverting productive forces from more to
less remunerative channels. In political campaigns,
however, this argument for protection is one of the
most effective. It appeals to the economic truth
that it is to my interest that the goods I make
should be scarcer while everything else is plentiful,
and if a tariff will bring about that state of things
I shall gain. But, as soon as the promise of making
goods scarce by a tariff ceases to be confined to a
particular trade and is generalized to all trades, it
becomes flagrantly absurd.
Another form of the same method of argument
is to point to the effects of a tariff in leading to the
investment of capital—sometimes foreign capital
—in the protected industry. Even granting that
these effects would always likely to become like
a tariff, it does not follow that protection has
attracted more capital to the industries of the
country as a whole. On the contrary, it causes a
diversion of capital to an equal or greater extent
from other trades which are directly and indirectly injured.

A different kind of argument in support of the protectionist view is that workmen in particular may be benefited by such a tariff as would exclude manufactured goods while permitting importation of commodities which the protectionist regards as raw materials. The argument is that the existence of a tariff prevents further development of industry and its protectionist believes that the resulting protection is more important in the former than in the latter. Quite apart from the difficulty of distinguishing raw materials from manufactures in a state of industry, protection and free trade becomes the raw material of another, the argument appears to rest on a confusion of thought. More labour has, of course, gone to the production of a ton of steel than to the production of a ton of coal; but, then, nobody exchanges a ton of the one for a ton of the other. The question is whether labour has played a greater part in producing £100 worth of steel than in producing £100 worth of coal, and, in point of fact a higher proportion of the value of coal goes to remunerate labour than in the case of steel. The comparison of values alone is relevant here; and, value for value, it is not the case that manufactured goods embody more labour than raw materials.

The most recent plea under this head is that protection might steady employment by lessening the fluctuations of industry. Statistical comparison of the employment situation is too difficult to make at present, and, even if it were not so, it would fail to be convincing, because at most the fiscal policy can be but one among many factors influencing the intensity or recurrence of depressions of trade. The protectionist, however, asserts that the ‘dumping’ of surplus goods by foreign countries into a free trade country at very low prices is a cause of instability. Cf. art. Competition. That the dumping of goods by foreign trusts and cartels has been greatly exaggerated, but they do occur, and on the one side is the gain to the industries that use the cheap imports, which are almost always half-finished goods, while on the other side is the injury to the industries with which the dumped goods compete. The free trader tends to emphasize the former, the protectionist the latter, but the net gain or loss to the importing country depends on the circumstances of the particular time at which the dumping takes place. It is possible that on the whole the loss may predominate, inasmuch as dumping is intermittent; if in a country A, the tariff which is to be imposed in country B is greater. But the burden lies upon the protectionist to show that a tariff would cure the evil by preventing any unsteadiness of employment that it may occasion, and he is apt rather to take this for granted than to prove it. It is quite untrue to say that a free trade country alone is subject to dumping, for similar complaints have been frequently made in protected areas. Moreover, if the price of the goods in a protected country is higher by about the amount of the tariff than in a free trade country, there is no more inducement to dump into the latter than into the former. Indeed, if a country A habitually sends goods of a certain class to B, a free trade country, and to C, a country with a ten per cent tariff, and A now finds itself with a temporary surplus to get rid of without lowering prices at home, dumping will be slightly easier into C than into B, because in C the tax per ton falls as the price falls, and so stimulates sales the more. Further, low protection of about ten per cent, which is all that the Tariff Reform Commission has recommended, would not check dumping, because, on the authority of that unofficial Commission itself, the dumping prices are already dropped by a much larger percentage. Very high protection that stopped imports of that class altogether would, of course, prevent dumping; but, so far from securing stability of employment, it would increase instability by allowing new fluctuations which free trade prevents. It is a steady influence that, when the price of iron in a free trade country falls, importation is checked, and when the price rises more is sent. If this influence is not a permanent one, and the industry dependent upon iron will be subject to greater disorganization and fluctuation of employment, so that a tariff sufficiently high to prevent dumping would create much worse economic instability, one would isolate apart from the other injuries of high protection.

The wages argument, especially in the United States, takes the form of ascribing high wages to the tariff, and appeals for the exclusion or taxation of the products of low-waged European labour. That some fallacy is here involved is suggested by the facts that the countries with low wages are among those which adopt protection, and indeed sometimes urge the necessity for tariff aid against their highly paid competitors, and that no country in the world has ever differentiated in its tariff by favouring imports from countries where wages are high as against those from countries where wages are low. The argument does not take into account the difference between money wages and real wages, and generally in a protected country the cost of living is relatively high. Also, low wages do not mean low cost of production. High wages are found, the output per worker is at least as high in proportion. The true economic relation has thus been inverted. High real wages are due to the higher productivity of labour, and that in turn depends chiefly on the superior natural resources of a country, the efficiency of its workers, and its business organization. It also depends upon foreign trade to the extent that productivity is increased by the competition of foreign goods. When high wages are found, the output per worker is at least as high as the former. In fine, wages are dependent on the effectiveness of labour; and, since the artificial inducement of industries in which labour is not sufficiently effective to render them profitable without a tariff results in lowering the general effectiveness of the labour force of the country, the average level of real wages will be thereby reduced.

It is occasionally proposed that a nation should adopt free trade only towards the countries granting to it the same privilege. In so far as this arises from the belief that trade must be free on both sides if it is to benefit both, it is fallacious; but, in so far as it is based on the view that a tariff may be used for purposes of bargaining, and thus may lesser or remove foreign restrictions, it was admitted by Adam Smith as a possible exception to the general free trade doctrine. It involves immediate loss in the hope of future compensation through freer trade. Its validity depends on the probability of success, as it can be justified only when it removes the hindrances to trade; and in estimating this probability the nature and conditions of the export and import trade of the particular country must be considered. Experience has generally shown that retaliation creates animosities which lead to still higher protection, so that a balance of injury commonly results to the country using the weapon as well as to those retaliated upon. It may be worth noting that, even though much wealth of the nation is diminished by protection, this loss may be offset by political considerations, increased national security, or the like. Such considerations were at one time used in support of the laws and Navigation Acts in the United States, and the particular ease can be treated only on its own merits. On general grounds it may be said, however, that, while a loss to the aggregate wealth does not alone suffice to condemn a policy,
wealth is now a very important factor in national security.


The subject of logical method the best work is J. N. Keynes, The Science of Political, London, 1893.


The subjects of Free Trade and Protection are treated in most of the foregoing works; the following are especially valuable: C. H. Bastable, Theory of International Trade, 2, London, 1890; F. W. Taussig, Tariff History of the United States, New York, 1896;—Buxton, Principles of National Trade, London, 1904.

P. Poverty in its economic aspects, the Reports of the English Poor Law Commission, 1900, with their voluminous appendices, are the amplest source of information. The special points which are dealt with in this article are treated more fully in: W. H. Beveridge, Unemployment, London, 1890; R. D. Foulis, Distribution of Wealth, New York, 1890; R. R. Seligman, Principles of Economics, New York, 1902;—W. H. Beveridge, Women’s Work and Wages (in Birmingham), London, 1905; and the Report on Home Work (no. 24, 1865), Issued by a Committee of the House of Commons, London.

It is impossible to indicate here the vast literature on other phases of political economy, such as Public Finance, Monetary Problems, Trusts, Socialism, Trade Unions, Industrial History, etc. A good bibliography, entitled What to Read on Social and Economic Subjects, is compiled by the Fabian Society and published by King, London, 1910, may be recommended for those desiring guidance on particular topics. The two best Cyclopedias are: R. H. I. Palgrave’s Dict. of Political, 3 vols., London, 1894-99, Appendix i; and Conrad’s Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, 9th ed., 1896.


STANLEY H. TURNER.

ECSTASY. 1. Definition and forms.—"Ecstasy" (κατάβασις) may be defined as an abnormal state of consciousness, in which the reaction of the mind to external stimuli is either inhibited or altered in character. It is much more restricted, as used in mystic theology, it is almost equivalent to 'trance.' During ecstasy the visionary is impersonal, loses interest in sensual enjoyment, and even feels no pain. In the wider sense, all self-induced excitement may be called a kind of ecstasy.

Among human beings in every stage of culture there is a natural tendency to seek some means of exalting the consciousness above the ordinary level of daily experience. The satisfaction which is sought from this heightening of the consciousness may be either a sensual, or of a intellectual, or of an aesthetic kind. It is generally, but not always, associated with religion, since the experience is most easily explained by supposing that the soul has been brought into communication with higher powers. The means used to induce this mental rapture are very various, and have all been discovered empirically. The "kuren-drinking" of the Japanese, the inhalation of tobacco-smoke by the North American Indians, the use of hashish (Indian hemp) by some two hundred millions of Asians and Africans, and the use or abuse of alcohol— the favourite medium of intoxication among the white races—and of opium by the Chinese, are all expedients for artificially altering the state of consciousness in such a way as to produce pleasurable sensations; and most of these are used to induce quasi-religious ecstasy.

Very different methods of liberating the mind from the trammels of ordinary sensation are protracted fasts, flagellation, orgiastic dancing, self-sacrifice, or jumping, and self-punishment by the mechanical application of worsted thongs. 'Oun' by the Buddhists, 'Hasan Husain' by Muhammadan Shi'ites, and the Paternoster or Ave Maria by Roman Catholics, or by gazing steadily at some bright object (see Crystal-gazing), or at some part of one's own body (the tip of the nose, by some Indian contemplatives; the navel, by the monks of Mount Athos). It is difficult to describe the generic type of ecstasy, especially in what may be called its lower forms, since its manifestations are determined partly by the nature of the means employed and partly by the mental state and character of the experimenter. The phenomena of drunkenness differ from those of opium intoxication; the dancing dervish works himself into a different state from the bowing dervish; the dreams of the Persian mystic, inspired partly by wine and strongly tinged with sensuality, are very unlike the raptures and torments of the Roman Catholic eustasia; and these again differ widely from the vision of the all-embracing and all-transcending union which gave to the neo-Platonic philosopher the assurance that his quest of the Absolute had not been in vain. The yoga in ecstasy feels the blissful void of Nirvāna; the ecstatic ascetic experiences the indescribable mysteries of the higher spiritualities; heaven and hell opened to his view; the Roman Catholic fanatic sees heretics torn with hot pincers; the Platonist sees the forms of earthly beauty transfigured through their eternal and more lovely archetypes. In every case the dominant interest and aspirations of the inner life are heightened and intensified, and in every case the enhanced force of auto-suggestion seems to project itself outside the personality, and to acquire the mysterious strength and authority of an inspiration from without.

2. History.—The historical manifestations of ecstasy fill so large a place in the records of religious experience that only a few typical examples can be given. The ancient Greeks were no strangers to what Plato calls "euphoria"; but orgiastic religion was scarcely indigenous in Hellas, and was especially associated in the minds of the Greeks with the barbarous land of Thrace. The Bacchos of Euripides is a magnificent study of the sinster aspect of ecstaticism. Under the Roman Empire, Oriental cults of an ecstatic type were widely diffused; but by this time the population of the European provinces was largely of Asiatic or African origin. Descriptions of
religious frenzy are to be found in Lucretius, Catullus (the *Attis*), and Apuleius. The mystery-cults of the Empire were designed to induce both higher and lower forms of ecstatic feeling. Meanwhile and in the fourth century, the use of psychedelic drugs, which are the conclusion and achievement of the dialectical process and the ultimate goal of the mystical state is encouraged by the later Platonism. Ecstasy was for Plotinus the culminating point of religious experience, whereby the union with God and full knowledge of Divine truth, which are the conclusion and achievement of the dialectical process and the ultimate goal of the mystical state, is realized also in direct, though ineffable, experience. Plotinus enjoyed this supreme initiation four times during the period when Porphyry was with him; Porphyry himself only once, he tells us, when he was in his 68th year. It was a vision of the Absolute, 'the One,' which, being above even intuitive thought, can only be apprehended passively by a sort of Divine illusion into the expectant soul. It is not properly a vision, for the seer no longer distinguishes himself from that which he beholds, and it is impossible to speak of them as two, for the spirit, during the ecstasy, has been completely one with the One. This 'flight of the alone to the Alone' is a rare and transient privilege, even for the greatest sages, and Plotinus himself only say that he has all his desire, and that he would not exchange his bliss for all the heavens of (Evan. vi. 7. 34. vi. 9 passim). From neo-Platonism this philosophic rapture passed into Christianity, though we seldom again find it in such a pure and elevated form. We trace the succession of metaphysical mystics from pseudo-Dionysius to Eriugena, Eckhart, Boehme, and Swedenborg. Some modern poets have described an experience similar to that of Plotinus. Wordsworth, for instance, speaks of being led on 'Until the breath of this corporeal frame / And even the motion of our human blood / Almost suspended, are laid asleep / In body, and become a living soul; / While with an eye made quick by the power / Of harmony, and the deep power of Joy, / We see into the life of things' (Lines composed above Tintern Abbey).

Tennyson records:

'A kind of waking trance I have frequently had, quite up from boyhood, when I have been all alone. This has generally come upon me three repeating my own name two or three times, and quite self, till I come at once, as it were, out of trance; intensity of the consciousness of individuality, the individuality itself, the sense of being awake and alive and in a state of intense consciousness, and not a confused state, but the clearest of the clearest, the surest of the surest, the least of the least, utterly beyond human words. Death was an almost laughable impossibility, the loss of personality (if so it were) seeming no extinction, no tranced condition' (H. Tennyson, Tennyson : A Memoir, 1897, i. 230).

This experience is utilized by the poet in his *Ancient Sage.* In his case, though not in Wordsworth's, acknowledged methods of self-hypnotism are recorded as inducing the trance. Boehme, too, prepared for his visions by gazing intently at some bright object. The mystics of the cloister and cell are often described as leading us to the contemplative journey, an experience hardly to be looked for in this life, it came to be regarded, by the directors of the monasteries and abbeys, by those persons as accorded by God as an encouragement to beginners. Aspirants after holiness are bidden not to be disgusted by the cessation of such favours, since this was the normal course of education in the inward life. It should be added that the best directors deprecate any great importance being attached to ecstasy as a sign of progress in holiness, and discontinue recourse to mechanical methods of inducing it.

There are two periods in the history of Christianity in which the mystical experience was not only possible but usual. The first was in the 14th and 17th centuries. In both cases the great ecstasies came soon after a great spiritual and intellectual awakening—In the earlier period the culmination of the Christian theology and the revival of mental activity which accompanied it, and in the later the Renaissance and the Reformation. Unless at exceptional epochs like these, ecstasy seems to be more common in the lower levels of culture. We find it at present very common in Russia; while in Western Europe and America it appears from time to time as a phenomenon of 'revivals,' which spread chiefly among the semi-illiterate peasantry. Individual ecstasies are often men and women of high cultivation, though with unusual and partly abnormal psychical endowments. But, as a social phenomenon, ecstasy is a much more common and endemic among normal people, chiefly belonging to the lower classes. The study of psychical epidemics is still in its infancy, and is a subject of great interest and importance. From this point of view, the individual is only an element in the general psychical storms, which sweep over whole populations. Ecstasy is communicated by direct contagion, just as panic invades whole crowds. Ecstatic manifestations are the waves of religious excitement which produced the Crusades, in which millions of ignorant folk met with their death; the outbreaks of the dancing mania ('St. Vitus' Dance), which in Central Europe followed the devastating pestilence called the Black Death; the tarantula epidemics in Italy in the 14th and 15th centuries, which were attributed to the bite of a spider, but were certainly due to psychical contagion; the 'convulsionists' in France at the beginning of the 18th century; the 'Jumpers' among the English Methodists; and the trances which were not uncommon during the recent Welsh revival.

In extreme cases, ecstasy produces complete insensibility. 'Schwester Katrei,' who is spoken of as a pupil of Eckhart, is said to have been carried out for burial when in a cataleptic trance. Anæsthesia of the skin is very common during the ecstatic feelings nothing when pins are driven into his flesh. A poor girl in Germany persuaded her friends to crucify her, and expressed only pleasure when the nails were driven through her hands and feet. Here there was no loss of consciousness, the ecstatic feeling nothing when pins are driven into his flesh. A poor girl in Germany persuaded her friends to crucify her, and expressed only pleasure when the nails were driven through her hands and feet. Here there was no loss of consciousness. There is only extreme spiritual exaltation, inhibiting the sensation of pain. It is almost certain that many of the martyrs endured their terrible tortures with but little suffering; and even so a criminal as the assassin of William the Silent bore his cruelties with the same unnatural fortitude. In the account of the martyrdom of St. Perpetua and St. Felicity, the three hours as if dead'; and of one of the 'Friends of God,' Ellina von Crevelsheim, we read that, after remaining dumb for seven years, absorbed in the thought of the Divine love, she fell into an ecstasy which lasted five days, during which she had a revelation of 'pure truth,' and was exalted to an immediate experience of the Absolute. She 'saw
the interior of the Father's heart,' was 'bound with chains of love, enveloped in light, and filled with peace and joy' (Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 441).

Although there is a natural tendency to ascribe the phenomena of self-induced trances to the diabolical influence, the experts in this strange science were constrained to admit the frequency of 'diabolical counterfeits,' and to caution the aspirant against the wiles of our ghostly enemy. It was observed that unusually the result of too impatient craving for supernatural favours, though it might assail even the trustiest saint, especially after too rigorous self-discipline. It was also a matter of common observation that self-induced trances were frequently followed by intense mental depression, and by that sense of abandonment by God which was called 'the dark night of the soul.' These reactions were, indeed, expected by all mystics, and were explained as the last death-pangs of the lower nature, before the final illumination. They were frequently merely the result of nervous exhaustion, but, if induced by the wrong impulse, ecstasy being (from the psychological point of view) an extreme variety of mono-idealism.

In conclusion, we must ask a question which to the religious mind is of the greatest importance. What is the value of ecstasy as a revelation of objective truth? Has it any of the transcendental value which has so long been claimed for it? To ask if the subject is believing in truth, the notion that the emptiness of the trance is a sign that the subject is in contact with absolute truth may probably be dismissed as an error, though it has the sanction of many great mystics. The doctrine implied may be stated in the words of Aquinas:

'... the higher our mind is raised to the contemplation of spiritual things, the more it is abstracted from sensible things. But the mind, when it conceives spiritual reality, is in a consequence, raised above the things of the lower nature. Therefore the mind that sees the Divine substance must be wholly divorced from the bodily senses, either by death or by some rapture' (Summa contra Gentiles, III. 47).

The argument is that, since we can see only what we are, we cannot apprehend the Absolute without first being divested of all that belongs to particular individual existence. We must sink into the abyss of nothingness in order to behold the eternal. The fallacy of the conception is apparent.

The warning of Plotinus, 'to seek to rise above intelligence is to fall outside it,' is very pertinent here. And, secondly, the apparent externality of the rapture, which in the above account of their supposed high antiquity of the Edda songs, but this being considered somewhat farnforth, modern scholars have proposed other explanations. Konrad Gislasen tried to show that the name is a development of the word with _Oddi_, the old seat of learning in Iceland, and the place where Snorri himself was educated. Both these explanations are, indeed, exposed to philological objections, but the former is the better and more natural. Originally Edda was only the title of the didactic work of Snorri, in one of the chief manuscripts of which we read: 'This book is called Edda; it was composed by Snorri, and no one has approached the art of it.' (Cod. Upsaliensis). This manuscript was discovered by the famous bishop of Skálholt, Brynjolf Sveinsson (+1675), who was also the possessor of the chief manuscript of the Eddie poems. The discovery of these manuscripts led to the theory, based upon the intimate relation of their contents, that the two books were closely connected, and the manuscript of poems was also called 'Edda,' without any sufficient reason. The manuscripts came to be spoken of as the 'Elder' and the 'Younger' Edda, the former of those appellations being given to the manuscript containing the ancient poems; this manuscript was also called _Sturlsundi Edda_, as the songs were erroneously supposed to have been collected by the famous priest Snæmund fróði (+1133). This last name has come into general use, but in our own times the poems are mostly called 'the Eddie poems;' and, as these are the chief source of Snorri's work, the appellation is not altogether incorrect.

2. The Edda of Snorri Sturluson.—This work was composed for the famous historian and chieftain Snorri Sturluson (1178-1241), one of the most cultured and highly gifted men of his time. Besides his chief historical work, _Heimskringla_, he left another, the _Edda_, a manual for young beginners in the art of poetry. It is a compendium of the poetry of all the old TENtOIC peoples there had been developed a special poetic language, consist-
ing of simple or composite words, which either had a particular significance, or had been longed to the spoken language (cf. in A.S. such words as bæggyn, ‘a minuscule prince,’ hrin-
gedlæfna, ‘a ship,’ etc.). In Norway and Ice-
länd, and, in particular, in Iceland, especially in the matter of the intricacies of the metrical art, attained its highest development, and was elaborated systematically at an early period. The composite appellations called kenningar, a certain amount of knowledge was indispensable; we also meet with certain cases indicating that the younger scalds learned from their older colleagues the mysteries of their art. Snorri himself, in a poem, felt carried on to write the manual of the art of poetry, his Edda. That work consists of three parts.¹ The middle part is called Skaldskopnarm (‘the Language of Poetry’), and gives general rules for poetic denominations of living things, the old Norse names of dead things, composite denominations of Odin and poetry, gods and goddesses; and the appellations of heaven, earth, sea, sun, wind, fire, winter, summer, man, god, battle, weapons, ships, God (at the Chris-
tians), kings. Then follows a list of the simple and composite names in a similar order, all ac-
companied by scaldic verses, serving as examples. Lastly, there is an appendix (efhjelm-
nyms from everyday language). Two manuscripts add some lists of names (in verse), but they are interpolations and did not originally belong to Snorrí's work. The author sometimes inserts longer stories to explain the origin of some of these names; but, as already mentioned, the old myths were the basis of the whole, and so Snorri found it convenient to write as an introduction to the work a complete survey of the old mythology, based on the best sources—the ancient poems relating to the gods (the 'Eddic poems'), and various living traditions. In those times this was a bold thing to do, but he succeeded in giving such a view of the whole substructure of the work could hardly have been done better, considering the circumstances. He proceeds systematically, beginning with the cosmogony, and its accessories; then follows a description of the oldest times of the gods, the golden age, and the Ash of Yggdrasí (the world-tree). This is followed by an account of the gods and goddesses, their place of abode, Valhall, and everything connected with it; he then relates more fully two myths of Thor's exploits, and proceeds with the story of the deaths of Balder, the imprisonment of Loki, the wonderful things foreboding the approach of Ragnarök; and, finally, he gives a wonderful description of that last fight of the gods, the final battle at Útgarð, Ódin at the head of the Aesir, and their victory. All these things are presented in a dialogue be-
tween a Swedish king, Gylfí, and the trinity of Ódin. The name Gylfasteining (the Delusion of Gylfí) alludes to this, as Gylfí does not know with whom he is speaking.

Snorri's sources were principally the three im-
portant Eddic poems, Völuspá, Vafþrúðnismál, and Gímanaþmol, and a few of the other poems; he chiefly used the Völuspá, from which he probably got the idea of the arrangement of the whole. He

¹The form varies in the chief MSS—Codex Regius 2927, 4 in the collections in the Royal Library, Copenhagen; Codex Arnamagnæus 242, ed. in. the University Library, Copenhagen; and Codex Upsaliensis, Beinardì in. 11, in the University Library, Upsa.—and partly in some other MSS.

often quotes verses from these poems, but not so frequently as in the older works. He does not frequent the myths critically, sometimes in a somewhat arbitrary fashion, and he has not escaped the influ-
ence of Christian ideas, especially at the beginning. His greatest faults are the punishments, which in the Völuspá come before Ragnarök, are placed by him after that event—a total misconception. Another source was the oral tradition, so strong and vigorous in Iceland. The style is magnificent, everywhere, and has many stern, earnest and solemn, and playful and jocose, always full of life. The author reveals himself as the great master of Icelandic prose.

Among the first and the second part—as an introduction to the latter—there is a very interesting chapter on the origin of the 'drink of the poets,' and how Ódin became the owner of it. Thus Ódin, alone of all gods and men, was the owner and giver of the poetical faculty, and he was said to give 'the drink of the poets' to his favourites.

The third chief part of the Edda is Snorri's own poem, the Háfnings, consisting of 102 verses in praise of Hákon the Old, king of Norway (†1263), and Earl Skúli. The peculiarity of this poem is that it is written in various kinds of metre, arranged systematically; Snorri has, how-
ever, missed the older and the younger kinds of Icelandic metrics; he begins with the 'most per-
fest' kind of metre (drottkevær háttur), which in reality is the youngest, and places at the end the oldest kinds of metre, those used in the Eddie poems, and some other metres closely related to them. Of course, Snorri everywhere uses the scaldic phraseology. The reason why he placed his own poem before others is simply that he desired to show how his theories looked when carried out in practice. The poem exhibits the technical finish of Snorri, and his complete mastery of the language and the difficult metres.

This poem gives us a hint regarding the time of the composition of the work, but only a terminus ad quem. It cannot have been composed earlier than the winter of 1222-23, and certainly not very much later. Snorri had lived between 1218 and 1220 at the courts of the princes he praised. The poem is a thanksgiving for the honours bestowed on him. It is most probable that the two earlier parts of the work were written, partly at least, before 1215, but the whole poem may have been written in the years 1217-21.

The Edda of Snorri is one of the principal works of Icelandic literature, admirable both in form and in contents, and quite unique in the latter regard. Of course, it does not give us a perfectly accurate picture of the old heathendom which had then been practically extinct for 200 years; but, on the other hand, it is certain that it always must remain one of our principal sources of information regarding that faith, as the old traditions were preserved in Iceland with a singular tenacity and faithfulness, owing to the remoteness of that country and its very limited intercourse with the outside world.

In one MS (A.M. 242) there are added four gram-
matical treatises, of which the second is found also in the Upsala MS, and the third also in two frag-
ments. Their contents are linguistic, rhetorical, and didactic, but they have nothing to do with Snorri or his Edda. The first of these treatises is on the phonetical system of the Icelandic language in the 12th cent., and is of extreme value. The third treatise is written by Snorri's nephew, Ólafur Jónsson.

LITERATURE.—Q. EDITIONS: The great Arnamagnæan ed., 12 vols., Copenhagen 1847-67, with the Codex Arnamagnæus 242, ed. in. the University Library, Copenhagen; and Codex Upsaliensis, Beinardì in. 11, in the University Library, Upsa.—and partly in some other MSS.
The Eddic poems (the 'Elder Edda', 'Sunnunnad Edda').—These famous poems are for the most part found in a single MS, 2963, 4°, in the Old Royal Collection in the Royal Library in Copenhagen (Codex Regius). The MS consists of 45 leaves, but a whole sheet (8 leaves) is wanting, thereby causing a deplorable lacuna. The MS dates from about 1270, and it was discovered shortly before the middle of the 17th century. It is a very fine one; a phototype edition, with the text printed on opposite pages, was published by L. Wimmer and F. Jónsson in 1891. The first known owner of the MS, Bishop Brynjólf Sveinsson, presented it to the Danish National Library. We know only six leaves of another MS, A. M. 748, 4° (Univ. Libr. Copenhagen), containing some of the same poems as Codex Regius, with one addition, but partly defective.

The contents of Cod. Regius may be divided into two groups: (1) mythical and (2) heroic poems, arranged in a certain, but imperfect, chronological order, which could more easily be applied to the last group of the legendary poems, as the persons described there are all genealogically connected. In the mythical group this was generally impossible, except in one case. Here the interest of the poems centres in the feeling of the man and the gods. One heroic poem, the Volundarkviða, has been incorrectly inserted in this group. In each group there may be observed a tendency to subdivisions, beginning with certain important poems of a more general character. The collector has in many places, especially in the last group of poems, given explanatory and connecting prose pieces. The MS is a copy, not the original collection, which must have been compiled in the end of the 12th century. The MS A. M. 748 is another copy of the original collection, with some additions. A third collection (or copy) was in the possession of Snorri Sturluson.

The Mythical poems (the 'Edda'), a grand poem, is a world-drama having for its subject the mythical life of gods and men from the beginning of the world to Ragnarök; the death of Balder is the central event. The dominating thought of the author is that all evil deeds breed fighting and death. The poem is written throughout in a tone of stern morality. It was composed about the middle of the 10th century. The next in order is the Húsavatn ("The Song of the High One"), a collection of several fragments of poems, all of a more or less ethical and moral character. The first poem is the principal one; in it Odin gives counsels to the human race, as to what is best for man, and how to behave in the different conditions of life, ending with pointing out that after death a good name is the best. Another poem contains the magical songs of Odin; and a third has counsels to a young man, of a similar character to the first. Then follow some poems, which are pre-eminent Odin says: Vafþrúðnismál ("Lay of Vafthrudnir"), describing a trial of wits between Odin and a giant; the giant is defeated, and loses his life; in Grímnmál ("Lay of Grimnir"), Odin reveals his terrible character to a blind and hard-hearted mortal king, his son, Sigmund; in Grímnismál ("Lay of Grímnir"), Thor quarrels with the disguised Odin, whom he does not know—a struggle between wisdom and mere strength, where wisdom prevails. Thor is the mythical hero of Jómsvötn ("Song of Thrym"), which tells of how he lost his hammer and recovered it.

The beautiful poem Skírnismál ("Song of Skirnir") describes Frey's vehement love for the giant maiden Gerðr; while there are the Lótrisaður ("Wedding of Loki"; cf. Völuspá) a story of the world-duel between Thor and a dwarf. The beautiful poem Skírnismál ("Song of Skirnir") describes Frey's vehement love for the giant maiden Gerðr; while there are the Lótrisaður ("Wedding of Loki"; cf. Völuspá) a story of the world-duel between Thor and a dwarf.

To these lays of the gods there are generally added some poems found in other MSS: Hymndóttir ("Song of a daughter") (from the Flesy Codex), relating how Freyr procures information from a plangent regarding the family of her favourite, Odin. Here is found inserted a fragment of a mythical Völuspa in skamna ("The Short Völuspa"). Vígaþula ("Song of Vígur") (found in the 2nd half of the 13th century) is an incantation; the source of the different social orders of men, and the supposed development of social life. The poem, which ends by mentioning kingship, was possibly composed to honour of Harold Fairhair. Grípr ("Magical Song of Grípr") and Völundamál ("Song of Völundur"), the two together and translated as "The Song of Svipdag" (probably a mythical person), who gets good advice from his dead mother Gríl, and then starts on a dangerous journey in pursuit of his ladylove Menglöd.

To the second group of Eddic poems, the heroic lays, belongs first of all the important poem, mentioned above, Völundarkviða ("Lay of Wayland"), describing the smith Vélund, his imprisonment by king Njó and his revenge on the king and his family. Then there follows a group of Holmgjóður ("Helgi Lays"), two poems about Helgi Hundingsbann, who is contrasted in a philosophically—more or less—dialectical poem, the Volsungær ("Lay of Regin"), fragments of two poems—the first great deed of Sigurd; Fáfnismál ("Lay of Fafnir"), on the slaying of the serpent Fafnir; Sigurdr finished, a second poem, beginning with the meeting with the Valkyrie Sigrdrifa, and the good counsels which she gives him. Here comes the lacuna mentioned above; there must at least be two long poems wanting (cf. the Volsungs saga).

The text begins again with a poem relating the murder of Sigurd; he had been married to Gúðrún, daughter of king Gjúki, and had been brought (by magical means) to forget the Valkyrie Sigrdrifa (Brynhild), a sister of Atli Buðsótt (Attila), who had been treacherously married to Gunnar Gjúkason. In a following poem the characters of these two ladies, the principal female actors of the story, are contrasted, and what is best for man, and how to behave in the different conditions of life, ending with pointing out that after death a good name is the best.
she gives a survey of her tragic story. The next two parallel poems, Attakksa and Atlaamda ("Songs of Atli"), the latter called (the Greenlandic, because composed in the Icelandic colony in Greenland), describe, each in a slightly different way from the other, the relations between Atli and Guðrún and her brothers; both are killed at Atli's command, and Guðrún in revenge causes his death. Now, one would think the tragedy would be at an end, but the last act remains. Guðrún conspires to have the three sons of Sölvi, Haraldr, and Ólaf drowned, and begets a son on them. Thus, in her marriage to King Jörmunrekkr, who has accused her of infidelity, and at his command she is to be put to death by horses; she is revenged by her brothers, who also are killed. Such are the contents of the two last poems in Cod. Reg., Guðrúnarkviða ("The Urgings of Guðrún") and Hamblandi ("Lay of Hamblóir"). Grettis Saga ("Song of the Grétta") must also be reckoned with the heroic lays; it is found in a MS of Snorri's Edda, and treats of the giant maidens grinding gold, peace, and, at last, death to Froði, king of the giants.

The legends of the heroic poems were originally, for the most part, German importations into Scandinavia, where they have been transformed and imbued with the expression, spirit, and combinations with each other without regard to original times or places. They are of primary importance for German and Teutonic legendary history. The persons are idealized; they are typical heroes and heroines, a quintessence of the people of the Viking age. Some of the minor characters are, however, drawn from common life. The descriptions of persons and events are exceedingly clear and racy and spiritually, and the language is correspondingly so. The sentences are short and pithy, everything superficial is banished; still, the poems differ in this, that some are more wordy than others; difference in age may be inferred from this.

The age of the poems is on the whole, the period from A.D. 900 to 1050. This may now be regarded as beyond all doubt. But within the limits of this period there may be discerned older and younger groups of poems, when we consider the more or less elaborate descriptions, stories, the persons mentioned, etc. Thus Þrymskviða, Völundarkviða, and Hrynhúsi are among the oldest; Sigurðarkviða, Snorra-Edda, and Hrafnagampr are among the youngest. Only a few are very young, from the 12th cent. (Grípspsá, Vólsunga in skamna), and belong to a late Renaissance of Iceland poetry.

The home of the poems has been the subject of much dispute. Some maintain that they are all Icelandic, others think they are all Norwegian, or composed in the Norwegian colonies in the British Islands. One poem can definitely be proved to be Greenlandic (Atlaamda). The truth is that everything of value for deciding the question of the home of the poems points decidedly to Norway; Norwegian life, Norwegian culture, and Norwegian nature. The poems must, therefore, be Norwegian for the most part. We have no certain way of deciding what is Norwegian and what possibly may be Icelandic. It is not right to consider poems as entirely Norwegian if they have a few backward signs pointing to a Norwegian origin; all these poems are on the same level; there is, on the whole, the same way of considering life, and the same disposition, and might they are all of the same school in spite of their different age.

The metres of the poems are chiefly the three oldest: fornmyting, verses of four syllables, in the epic poems; maldaháttr, strophes of six verses of different length, in the moral and didactic poems; málalóttur, verses of five syllables, in epic poems. One poem, Tryggvason (dated 1132), is a work which may probably belong to the same stock as these. All the poems are strophical, each strophe as a rule consisting of eight verses—six in jofnattyttur; when strophes of more or less than eight verses are found, this is probably due to corruptions of the text. The tradition was unique only for perhaps more than 200 years, and, of course, as might be expected, rather bad. Strophes or verses are often lacking, or words are so corrupted that it is very difficult to make, and bear the names of, them critically, metrically, or linguistically. Some verses are in the tradition given in duplicate form, and the collectors have written down both without choosing between them.

The poems are of all anonymous, probably because the authors considered themselves only as narrators of known subjects. It may, however, be considered as certain that they gave the poems certain individual colours, and moulded the characters with their psychological peculiarities. How far they invented new persons or events has not been decided conclusively. On the other hand, it is certain that they were very independent in their combinations of the old legends.

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EDOMITES.—I. Introductory.—"Edom" is the name of a people frequently mentioned in the OT, and generally located to the south of the Dead Sea. They are regarded as a brother of Israel, and are related to Israel in all its historical, geographical, and national development. In the popular stories in Gn 25, 27, 32 ff., which represent Esau—i.e. Edom—as the elder twin-brother of Jacob, who is otherwise known as "Israel," apart from the direct genealogical relationship, it is evident that the culture and religion, there is good reason to believe that the Edomites and allied peoples of the area lying outside Israelite territory, and especially in N.W. Arabia, played a somewhat prominent part in the development of Israelite religion and history. The name has often been emphasized since the earlier observations of Well- hausen, Kuenen, Stade, and Robertson Smith; and in recent years has come more to the front in Biblical research. In discussions of the origin of
the Israelite Yahweh, the tribes of Israel, the rise of the kingdom of Judah, the locale of the patriarchal stories, the extension of the term 'Egypt' (Heb. Masrayim, Assyr. Muzri) outside the limits of Egypt—in these and other questions the Edomite area, its population and history, and its relations with Israel invariably enter into the field of inquiry; and it is therefore necessary to premise that a treatment of the religion of the Edomites underlines the particular problems of the OT which cannot be discussed in these pages.

The Edomites are otherwise known as 'Eesan,' or 'sons of Eesan,' after their reputed 'father'; and as 'sons of Selh,' after the district of Mt. Seir. Their land may be described as the district between the Dead Sea and the Gulf of A'kabah, bounded by Moab, Judah, S. Palestine, the Sinaitic peninsula, N. Arabia, and the Syrian desert; the more precise boundaries varied from time to time according to the larger political circumstances affecting the surrounding States or confederations. Thus, for purely geographical reasons, it was entirely exposed to the political, social, and religious movements in Western Asia; and its virtual independence cannot be understood apart from the history and thought of the old Oriental world. An important fact is the very close relationship which, as the Horiite and the Edomite, the Edomites held to the Sinai movement, which felt to subsist between the Edomites and their neighbours; Edom, Midian, and Iehmael are intimately connected, and names of Edomite origin or affinity can even be traced in the Israelite tribes of Judah, Dan, and Benjamin. It has long been recognized that the tribe of Judah as constituted in 1 Ch 2 and 4 was 'half Arab,' and of its two main divisions Edomites (Canaanite), the former is explicitly connected with the Edomite Kenaz (Gn 36:1, Jg 12:1, 1 Ch 4:1), while Edomite or 'Horite' elements are somewhat stronger in the latter (see Meyer and Luther, Die Israeliten u. ihre Nachbarstaaten, Halle, 1866, p. 400). The whole body of evidence, when carefully studied, is such as to suggest that a closely inter-related group (which may be called Horiite, Seirite, or Edomite-Ishmaelite) extended westwards into S. Palestine, and that some portion separated and was ultimately incorporated in Judah, thus becoming truly Israelite (see ib. p. 446). This relationship, to which the genealogies testify, is to be supplemented by the Aramean and Edomite extension, which is of special importance in the OT, the full significance of which can as yet be only imperfectly understood.

2. The gods.—Although there is little direct evidence for Edomite culture and religion, there is much that is indirectly valuable, and, even though it is often a somewhat hypothetical character, it cannot properly be ignored.

(a) Edom itself may be the name of a deity. This is suggested partly by the name of the Gittlet Obed-Edom in the OT (2 S 6:19, 1 Ch 15:24, 2 Ch 29:22, etc.), who becomes prominent as a Levitical singer and doorkeeper. The interpretation 'servant of [the god] Edom' is not to be rejected, although it is open to dispute whether the deity in question is necessarily identical with the familiar Edom. Further, Egyptian evidence for a place-name Shemesh-Edom in the Lebanon district (time of Thothmes III. and Amen-hotep II.) seems to equate Edom with the sun-god; and the deity appears in an obscure Egyptian passage, together with names of the gods of Khemmis and Liting (W. M. Müller, Asien u. Europa nach alt-ägypt. Denkmälern, Leipzig, 1893, p. 315 f.). This would suggest a deity of the Hadad-type, fairly well distributed, who became the god of a group of people, and who is represented by himself by his temple at the border between Edom and Moab ('Ain Qudra). The name is found in Phoenician and the Sabata inscriptions (cf. perhaps also Liddell, Ephemeris f. sens. Epigraphica, Giessen, 1904, l. 411).

(b) Edom.—This obscure name, perhaps found in an old Arabian inscription (Hommel, Südarab. Christenthum, Munich, 1893, p. 301 f.), has been plausibly connected with that of the goddess 'A-sit, represented on Egyptian monuments as a wild, warlike rider of the desert (Müller, 340). The Biblical story of Edom, the wild hunter, is commonly associated with the Phoenician myth of Usos and his brother Samiramur or Tyepedros ('high heavens') the god of the elusive and civilized brother and the hunter Usos naturally recalls the account of the twin-brothers Jacob and Esau, and the various points of resemblance between the late euhemeristic Greek record and the older, simpler, and more primitive story in Gen. are sufficiently close to suggest some common Canaanite cycle of tradition. In its present form, the story of Esau and Jacob clearly shows the influence of other elements, and Goldmann has drawn attention to features in Esau which are suggestive of some satyr-like figure (ZATW, 1900, p. 22, n. 3); a considerable modification of the original tradition must in any case be recognized. There is other evidence for some survival of the Canaanite myth in the Cainite genealogy (see J. Skinner, Gen., 1910, p. 123 f.); and consequently, both here and again in the stories which the Edomites are supposed to have told, the forms and elements are the outcome of a very intricate development. Hence, although the above evidence may be used to prove that primarily Esau was not a distinctly Edomite figure, it is clear that the Biblical story in its present form belongs to a time when Esau stood for some section (at least) of Edom, and that this fact alone explains its preservation elsewhere in the Bible.
circumcision. It is true that, according to Jos. (Ant. xiii. 1), the Edomites were circumcised by John Hyrcanus, but this usage may have been introduced then for the first time (see Jer 34:5, cf. Ezek 44:3, and the circumcision of Ismael in Gen 17:12). It is more likely, therefore, that, as Smith suggests (EB II. 688), a Jewish rite of circumcision shortly after birth was substituted for the rite in use among the kindred peoples, namely, circumcision shortly after the first storm, the latter alone being recognised as real circumcision by the Jews.

On a priori grounds it is reasonable to assume that Edomite religion was not isolated from that of the surrounding peoples. The traces of Egypto-Semitic cult found by Petrie in the south of the Sinaitic peninsula date before the age of the Israelite monarchy, but point to the antiquity of definite religious ideas in the desert region outside Palestine. It is interesting to notice that about the 6th century B.C., in an Aramaic inscription from Yemena, Ismaelite, Gen 25:2, named with Dedan, is 21:26; Jer 25:26, contact with Egypt is shown by the name Pet-Qairis, the father of a priest who ministers at the temple of M-b-r-k, a form of a more prominent deity), Shingalwa (Wm, perhaps a form of Astarte), and Ashira ( apparently the well-known Ashira, Ashirat). But the inscription also shows influences of the Hurrian cult of the gods of Bab.-Assyrian influence. Moreover, Edomite contact with Arabia, the presence of a Minean colony in N. Arabia at el-Ola, and the fact that the name Keren (Gen 57, son of Enoch, and corresponding to Cain) is that of an old S. Arabian deity afford a ground for further speculation. Although there is no trace in Edom of the deity Sin, the name is familiar both in ancient Arabia and in the Edomite area (the wilderness of Sin, Mt. Sinai). So also there is no trace of the cult of Ishyur-Ashtar; but the male 'Athyar or 'Aytar is found in Arabia, and is joined with Chemosh in Moab; and Aitar-Saum ( 'Ishar of the heavens') was venerated by the Edomites. The corresponding form 'lord of the heavens,' found in Palestine and later among the Nabataeans, and with an equivalent in ancient Arabia, may also have been familiar in Edom, though perhaps under one of the more definite names (e.g. Hadad, Kaus) already noticed. Finally, some indirect evidence is afforded by the points of contact between Israelite and old Arabian religion, a noteworthy example of which is the Minean throned upon high places, and which is the parent form of the Levitical altar, and by which the Levitical tradition and personal names agree in manifesting a peculiar relationship with S. Palestine, Edom, and that area which is connected more closely with the Edomites generally than with Israel.

4. Edom and Israel.—Suggestive hints for the older religion of the Edomite area may be gleaned from the Nabataean inscriptions found at Petra, which obviously were not entirely novel growths (see, further, NABATAEANS; on the later evidence for Iumein cultus at Ader, see Binning, ZAT, 1906, 220). But more direct hints for the Levitical relationships, see B. A. Cook, Critical Notes on OT History, 1907, p. 84 ff.
persistence of religious observance that some of them may have gone back to Israelite times (cf. Nm. 20:21; Job 19:21). They had not always belonged to Israel; it had been taken by Caleb (Jos 15:13), who, though subsequently reckoned to Judah-Israel, was originally a Kenizite (cf. Gn. 14:13). Thus, Edomites were more or less Edomites, Palestine-Meyer very 'Edomitic' and 'Palestinian,' and Jahweh any Edomite tradition (Die Israeliten, p. 322 ff.), and both Isaac and Ishmael are more naturally located outside Israel and Judah, in the ordinary sense of the terms. Hence, while elements of myth and legend of wide distribution appear in Genesis in a localized form, attached to definite figures and places, it is very noteworthy that much of the material is S. Palestinian. As Meyer and Luther have emphasized, the true popular Israelite tradition is scanty, whereas many traditions of Edomites, and that sort of material, have only happily arisen there (pp. 227, 239, 279, 305, 478); to call them Judaean is too restrictive (pp. 386, 443); the interests are those of the Seirite and Edomite connection (as illustrated by the genealogies) rather than of the Israelites.1

This tendency to discover in the OT data which primarily were 'Edomite' rather than Israelite involves the recognition that their presence is not fortuitous; they have stamped themselves upon Biblical (i.e. Israelite) tradition as surely as certain 'Edomite' groups became—as is seen in 1 Ch 2 and 4—Israelite. The process may be illustrated by the case of 'the line of Abraham's point of the aboriginal patriarchs and the beginning of civilization. This is evidently a piece of distinctively Canaite (i.e. Kenite) lore, and the natural inference is that it was brought into the common stock of Israelite tradition by the Kenites when they entered Judah; so, A. R. Gordon (Early Trad. of Genesis, Edinburgh, 1907, pp. 74 f., 165, 188), who ascribes to them also the account of the origin of the world (Gn 25 f). These fragments testify to some larger and more organic body of tradition, which, in its present modified form, has points of contact with old Canaanite or Phoenician culture-ideals (see Skinner, Gen. p. 123 f.; and, above all, of scholarship, Adam's grandson Ênôsh (man (Gn 4 f.)), its view of Jahwism ran upon lines quite different from the prevailing Biblical view. But, as comparative research has shown, divers peoples or tribes have their own beliefs of origins, and consequently the Kenite lore not only illustrates material brought into the Israelite stock from a S. Palestinian ('Edomite') area, but also shows, by its very presence, that through certain vicissitudes the Kenites were able to impress their tradition upon the literature.2

Edom and the desert peoples enjoy a reputation for wisdom (Ob 4, Jer 49, Bar 25), and the superlative wisdom of Solomon is emphasized by placing him above certain sages whose names have Edomite connexions (1 K 4:29—Ethan the Ezrahite, Heman, Mahol). The names recur in 1 Ch 25 as sons of Zerah (an Edomite clan affiliated to Judah (Meyer, 350)); and thus, quite apart from the question of value, the claim of a Judaean relationship is unmis- taken. See, for example, 2 S., 304 f., 200:17 E., 115 b, 158 f.; cf. also H. Gressmann, RzAW, 1919, pp. 15, 26, 29. N. Schmidt (Hz. 1905, p. 329) does not hesitate to regard Adam's line of descent as an Edomitic division, having his shrines on Mosera and Hor,' the traditional scenes of his death. The lack of written records connected with the Kenites. With the trading of mankind to Adam, 'man,' compare the suggestion that the name Edom is a dialectical form of adam (Söderberg, Ezib 11 ff.).

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Edomites takeable. This, however, is not more striking than the presence of other 'Edomitic' Judaeans in 1 Ch 2 and 4. Thus, 'the Edomites' in 20:3, 31, are not always too doubtful for the conjecture that these chapters contain specimens of Edomite wisdom. On the other hand, the background of the grand book of Job lies outside the limits of Edom. In fact, possibly in the Edomite area,1 and there is no a priori reason why the thought of the book should be regarded as exclusively Israelite. Further, Israelite tradition itself explicitly ascribes to the Midianite Jethro the inauguration of the priestly system (Ex 3 1, 2), and the father-in-law of Moses subsequently appears in Israel (Jg 114, cf. 41). The Levites also have connexions with S. Palestine, and it is noteworthy that such names as Obed-edom, Korah, Ethan, Heman, etc., link the temple of Jerusalem, its officers and its singers, with features which take us away from Judah and Israel.

5. Edom and Jahweh.—That Judah and Edom were very closely connected at certain periods is clear from the history of Palestine. In later times the Idumeans bear such names as Jacob (the rival of their ancestor), Phinehas, Simon, and Saul—names familiar to the outside world, and, on the other hand, the repeated occurrence of names in Kaush and Kos from the 5th cent. onwards points to tradition more distinctly Edomite; and it is noteworthy that the distribution of Edom would favour local and minor cults, the names of the kings include such more prominent and widely distributed deities as Hadad (trice), Kaush (twice), and Baal (once, in בָּנָם, son of the Mouse). It is a striking fact that, although the Edomites, like the other peoples, had their gods, they are placed by Israel apart from other heathen neighbours. The third generation after inter-marriage had full Israelite privileges, whereas Ammon and Moab were banned for ever (Dt 23 7); these two lands are regarded as stumbling-blocks, but there is no warning against Edomite idolatry except in relatively late passages. Nor is allusion made to any Edomite national deity corresponding to Milcom, Chemosh, and Jahweh, in Ammon, Moab, and Israel. Although the gods Hadad, Baal, and possibly Kaush were or had been known in Israel, Jahweh could be worshipped by the Edomite Doeg (1 S 217), and was, no doubt, known in Edom, as He also was— to judge from personal names—in N. Syria. Indeed, according to tradition recorded from the time of Adam, it was the god of the Kenites;2 and, since Gn 4 f. refers to His immemorial worship, it would seem that their clan claimed to possess the cult from the earliest times. But the evidence does not confine Jahweh to the Kenites. His rise is connected with Sinai, Mt. Paran, Seir, Teman, and probably Kadesh (Dt 533, Jg 58, Hab 3); and the persistence of this belief is shown partly by the tradition that Elijah was impelled to visit Horeb, the mount of God, in search of the true Jahweh (1 K 1966), and partly by the lateness of the reference in Habakkuk. It is clear that the Edomite area was, in some very special sense, regarded as the home of Jahweh. In addition to this, with the Kenites are associated the Rechabites (1 Ch 25; Calebite in 4 f (reading 'Rechab' for 'Rechah,' with LXX), and these certainly held that desert conditions were proper to the religion of Jahweh. Their uncompromising zeal, as suggested in the account of Jehu's revolt (2 K 1054), illustrates a reforming spirit, which finds a parallel when the Levites take their stand on Gibeon and put away the sword (Ex 32). Thus, with S. Palestine are connected, directly or indirectly, traditions of the Edomites. The name is named with Edom in La 4; and, for Eliphas of Teman, cf. the form 'Adom' in Gn 303.

1 Tiele, Stowe, Budge, Guthrie, Moore, H. P. Smith, and others; see Paton, D. W., Aug. 1906, p. 116 ff.

2
EDUCATION (Introductory)

Introductory (J. ADAMS), p. 165.
Babylonian.—See CHILDREN (Bab.-Assyrt.).
Bulgarian.—See CHILDREN (Bulgarian).
Egyptian.—See CHILDREN (Egyptian).
Greek (W. MURBISON), p. 183.

EDUCATION (Introductory).—1. The meaning attached to the word 'Education' varies greatly. According to some writers it includes all the forces that influence the development of new generations. According to others it is limited to something so narrow as to be equivalent to nothing more than teaching. The widest meaning is well expressed in the words of John Stuart Mill, who tells us that education 

includes whatever we do for ourselves, and whatever is done for us by others for the express purpose of bringing us nearer to the perfection of our nature; to its largest acceptance it comprehends every indirect effect produced by knowledge, and on the human faculties, by things of which the direct purposes are different; by laws, by forms of government, by the industrial arts, by modes of social life; or, even by physical facts not dependent on human will; by climate, soil, and local position (Rectorial Address, St. Andrews, 1867).

He himself seems to feel that this is rather too wide a view to be of practical application, so he restricts it in the same address to

the culture which each generation purposely gives to those who are to be its successors, in order to qualify them for at least the fullest possible use, for raising, the level of the improvement which has been attained.

In both definitions it will be observed that the idea of Purpose is involved in the process of education; a love for which may have been 'a liberal education,' but the epigram 'the key to the very omission of this idea of purpose, which is always felt to be essential in education.


de S. A. Cook, Rel. of Ave. Pal., p. 88 ff.

Hindu (W. CROOKE), p. 190.
Japanese.—See EDUCATION (Buddhist).
Jewish (M. JOSEPHI), p. 194.
Persian (L. H. GRAY), p. 207.
Roman (J. WIGHT DUFF), p. 208.

If we examine a large number of the definitions supplied by eminent writers, we shall find that there is one term present in almost all of them. This term is 'Development.' The word itself is seldom absent, and the idea implied by it is always present. Thus Pestalozzi states his views in the familiar plant metaphor:

'Sound Education stands before we symbolised by a tree planted near fertilizing water. A little seed, which contains the design of the tree, its form and proportion, is placed in the soil. See how it germinates and expands into trunk, branches, leaves, flowers, and fruit! The whole tree is an uninterrupted chain of organic parts of the plant whose root, trunk, branches, leaves, flowers, and fruit are the respective stages of the developing tree. Man is similar to the tree. In the newborn child are hidden those faculties which are to unfold during life' (see Address on Birthday, 1816).

Froebel as a loyal disciple naturally follows:

'So the man must be viewed not as already become perfect, not as fixed and ineradicable, but as constant yet always progressively developing,... always advancing from one stage of development to another' (Menschenzweckung, Vienna, 1858, § 16).

Besides the ideas of development and deliberate purpose, there are always present in some form or other two additional ideas, those of System and of Knowledge or Culture. In a certain sense a child is educated by the process of living, even when there is no purpose of educating him, and no system in the process; but, in so far as Education

1 On some of the questions involved, the writer may be permitted to refer to the Articles 'Genesis,' 'Palestine,' and the Introduction to 1 Esdras, in R. H. Charles' edition of the Apocrypha (1912).
is treated as an art or as a science, it must be carried on with the deliberate purpose of modifying development by means of knowledge systematically impinged.

Of the four ideas that we have found to be essential to the connotation of the term 'Education,' that of Development applies to the pupil, and development, if not in the form of a plan, is the law which the educator must follow. Both of the other three are more or less under the control of the educator.

The idea of Development involves the correlative ideas of succession and the existence of an inherent law that is brought to light in the development of the organism. The idea of life, literally or figuratively, is always implied when we speak of an organism. This, indeed, would compel us to hunt for the meaning of this mysterious thing called Life, but we must here assume a knowledge of the general meaning of the vital principle. Whatever it is, it pervades the whole of the structure in which it is found. Of it we may be said, as it is said of the soul, 'it is all in the whole, and all in every part.' This distinction, indeed, is of great value in marking off an organism from much that is not an organism at all. As we discriminate between an organism and a machine, so we must discriminate between development and growth. Growth may take two forms—accretion and multiplication—but neither increases in kind or number of parts. Each of itself implies development. Increase in complexity of structure must be added to adaptation to function, before we have genuine development. Development, then, is a process of differentiation correlated with adaptation to function.

This brings us to the third essential element in the connotation of the term 'Development.' It always implies self-determination on the part of the developing organism. This, indeed, is implied in the idea of an organism. It begins, flourishes, and decays, all according to laws that are inherent in its own nature. The laws of its development are indeed part of itself. Its life is simply the exemplification of these laws. The question may be asked, in fact, which is the butterfly; is it the egg, the larva, the chrysalis, or the image? The answer clearly is that it is all of these. 'The idea of the butterfly is incomplete unless it includes all the stages through which the creature passes in the process of its development. We cannot define a developing being unless we take into account what it has been and what it is becoming to be.' The one who plants the seed both is and is not a tadpole. The acorn, the seedling, the sapling, and the full-grown tree are all essential to the true idea of the full-grown oak. The oak is implicit in the acorn; the acorn is explicit in the oak. The acorn realizes itself only by becoming an oak.

2. Theories and problems of education.—The true fundamental aim of every individual is self-realization in the widest and truest sense of the term; but here at the very threshold a serious difficulty arises. The mere phrase 'self-realization' suggests an abstraction of the first importance in Education. True self-development is self-development from within in accordance with the laws of our nature,—is there room in the process for an educator? Does it not seem almost self-evident that an educator, so far from aiding in true development, must of necessity hinder it by imposing on the developing self an influence other than that of the developing ego? This difficulty is one of the popular saying that all true education is self-education. But even Jacobot, an ingenious French teacher who, in his writings, took great pains to depreciate the work of teachers, does not go to the root of the matter. It is a strange demonstration of the uselessness of teachers that results in perhaps the most absurd of all methodologies, as Jacobot's system turns out to be. The sole difficulty is Jacobot's scheme, but is evaded by the inept plan of overt inaction. Why write a volume on Education, as Rousseau does, to prove that the teacher figures as a practically negligible element? The radical notion of selves is to be what it is in Pestalozzi, and still more clearly in Froebel. The cause of this recognition of the difficulty and the attempt to meet it is to be found in the fact that these writers seized their theory of education upon more or less clearly conceived Idealistic principles.

It is true that Rousseau usually gets the credit of being the philosopher who won Pestalozzi for Education. But Pestalozzi lived a long life, and the force that impelled him to Education was not the only one that modified his thought. Kant was just finishing his University studies when Pestalozzi was born, and by the time the educator had found his vocation, and was actually engaged in it, the Kantian thought was beginning to make itself felt. The germs of Idealism were in the air: Pestalozzi could not hope to escape the infection. The plant metaphor, which has since been so overworked, appears to have had considerable influence in modifying his principles; but the metaphor was, after all, only a concrete statement of the Idealist position.

As Kant was followed by Hegel, so Pestalozzi was followed by Froebel, and in both cases an advance in Idealism has been made. For our present purpose, principles, not persons, interest us. We are not specially concerned with either the Pestalozzian or the Froebelian development. The important thing is that the development of the whole school has given a clear demonstration of the educational effect of the theory of self-realization.

There exists at this moment a large and important school of educationalists who ground their opinions on a more or less intelligent interpretation of the life and works of Pestalozzi and Froebel. They have outlived the philosophical difficulties that troubled their later master. They have a system, which expresses what has proved to be valuable, and they are inclined to rest content without going into uncomfortable details. It was otherwise with Froebel. He felt keenly the initial difficulty of his system, and throughout the whole of his Education of the Child he struggled to bring his success to justify the educator in interfering in the work of education at all. The ordinary Kindergartners dabble in the mechanism of Idealism without in the least understanding the nature and necessity of the primary assumption that gives it life and meaning. Naturally, as soon as they set themselves to think at all, they come to a deadlock. The child is like a plant, it can grow and develop; it is growing, but only in a determinate way. True education, therefore, must aim at permitting and encouraging the child to develop in the greatest possible freedom. Froebel sees this very clearly:

'Therefore Education, Instruction, and teaching should in the first characteristic necessarily be passive, watchfully and protectively following, not dictatorial, nor visibly interfering.' Further, in the following section we are told: 'The still young being, even though as yet unconsiously, like a product of nature, precisely and surely will that which is best for himself, and, moreover, in a form which is quite suitable to him, and which he feels within himself the disposition, power, and means to represent' (op. cit. § 74).

If, then, the child thus makes for what is for his good as certainly as he would do so for the flower, it is obvious that the occupation of the teacher is in a parlous state. Why employ a man to make a child do what the child cannot help doing? The usual reply is botanical. A given seed can pro-
duc things but a particular plant, and yet there may be work for a gardener. The very elaborate scheme of gifts and occupations that characterizes the Kindergarten system shows that Froebel regarded the passive, as well as the active principle, and, by his own admission, desirable. We are therefore entitled to a better argument than a mere analogy. The problem is how to find a place for a teacher between the developing nature, with a determination towards good, and a world that is by hypothesis good, as much as all has proceeded from God, and is limited by God alone.

Froebel's answer is above Botany. The educator, he tells us, is himself a part of the world in question: he has, therefore, a place. That this place is consistent with the rest of the theory is manifest, because the teacher who is found imposing laws and restrictions on the child himself is strictly and inevitably subjected to a perpetually governing law; to an unavoidable perpetual necessity; thus all arbitrariness is banished. The educator must at every moment act under two different influences, which yet lead him to the same line of conduct. He must guide and be guided. His consistency as governed and governor is guaranteed by the continual reference of himself and his pupil to that inevitable third. The teacher, while seeking to enable the pupil to attain to self-realization, must seek at the same time to realize himself. Only by rightly guiding the pupil can the master himself be right. If the boy's nature and the master's are each developing freely, then their actions must of necessity fit into each other, and produce a harmony which is the inevitable and invariable third, in other words, the inherent rationality of the universe.

In Education, as in some other directions, the Idealist position has been accepted timidly and incompletely. Instead of boldly accepting the whole of the doctrine thus enunciated in the Education of Man, later Froebelians have selected for special emphasis the principle, 'Find what Nature intends for the children, and follow that.' 'A passivity, a following,' has become their watchword; and so true are they, in theory at least, to this view-point that it is hardly to be wondered at that a sort of general paralysis is the result. So passive must the Froebelians become, if they are to follow that theory, that they must cease to have any influence over their pupils at all.

When we consider the bewildering paraphernalia of gifts and occupations in the Kindergarten, we are inclined to think that the Froebelians have hardly done justice to their principle of non-interference. The justification usually offered is that the various exercises have been discovered by experiment to be exactly the sort of thing that Nature demands, and that the teacher in applying his methods is, after all, only 'passive, following.'

It would be unfair to the system, and not to our present purpose, to argue from the fact that anything more unnatural than many of the practical applications of the principle, it would be impossible to find. The principle can hardly be held responsible for the rigid, and, therefore, irrational application made by unsympathetic teachers. Yet it is the responsibility of the pedagogue to maintain that a benevolent superintendence is too modest a name for the complicated system the Froebelians have now elaborated. The value of the Kindergarten is at issue, the question is—Can the 'passive, following' theory be made to be consistent with the system as now developed?

By observation it is found that children are fond of making things, of expressing thus their own ideas, of 'making the inner outer.' When the educator gives them the opportunity of exercising this power or gift, he feels that he is 'passive, following.' He is but the jackal that provides the meat. The eating is the part of the child. If the teacher is content with this function, nothing more need be said about Education as a mystery. Given a child and certain materials, it is found that a certain result is produced. This may be interesting as a fact in Natural History; it cannot be held to explain anything. The educator does not educate; the child is his own educator.

There is obviously a sense in which it is true that all education is self-education. No man can learn for another; no man can be moral for another. *-Jacobot's definition of teaching, 'causing another to learn,' has been discarded. Can the definition of Education, 'causing another to develop himself according to the laws of his own nature,' be defended? By the conditions of the case, the subject must develop somehow: the only point left for consideration, therefore, is, Can we modify this development so as to produce the best result possible for the case? This involves two distinct problems: First, we have to discover what the highest form of development possible in the given case really is. Secondly, we have to discover some means of attaining this form.

The first problem, as it is stated above, is insoluble. No doubt, were all the conditions of the case known, the highest form of development possible for the given subject would be at once evident. But such knowledge is absolutely beyond our finite minds. Viewed *sub specie aternae, the problem ceases to be a problem, and becomes a mere statement of fact. Unfortunately, this point of view is not attainable.

The case is not yet altogether hopeless. The second problem, which seems to depend upon the first for its very conditions, may itself supply the solution of the first. In working out its own development, the ego may indicate its own ideal, indeed must indicate that ideal. The important question that now arises is, Does it indicate that ideal soon enough for the educator to profit by the indication? Even if this question be satisfactorily answered, there remains the final problem, Can an external mind have any share in determining the development of a self-determining organism? To face the question fairly, we must give up all metaphors, however convenient. Above all, we must give up that wearisome acorn with its resulting tree. It has to be admitted that the tree is implicit in the acorn, and that a little discussion would set us in furthering the development of the oak; but a child is not an acorn; a man is not a tree. We may endow an acorn with life—organic life; we may, if we will, endow it with a sort of generalized consciousness; but in the case of the child there is something quite new, and much higher than the highest we can possibly attribute to the tree. The oak is, no doubt, as absolutely self-determined as an acorn. It is not consciously self-determined. The developing human being is not only self-determined, he is self-conscious.

How does this new element affect the case? Can external influences modify self-development characterized by self-consciousness in the same way as they modify self-development not so characterized? Manifestly they can, in a negative sense at least. The environment, conscious or unconscious, can and does interfere with the full and free process of self-realization. A force that can hinder may reasonably be assumed to be able to help, if only in a negative way. By means of withholding its aggressions one may be said to produce a positive effect; nature is clearly dependent on nurture. It must not be forgotten
that in the process of development there are two forces—an outer and an inner—the nature of the developing ego, and the nurture supplied; and any influence must differ according as it is allied to the one or to the other nurture.

We have the antagonism between two forces—the self-developing ego on the one hand, and the environment against which it strives on the other. It is in this dualism that the ego realizes itself, so far as it rises above the antagonism, and attains an ever higher and higher unity. If the educator is to exercise any influence at all, he must throw his force either with the ego or with the environment.

The natural thing is to throw in his influence with the struggling ego; but what is the result? Suppose that by his help a higher unity is obtained: how does the self-realizing ego fare? The unity thus attained may be real for the educator: it is empty for the struggling ego. This mistake in moral training is exactly parallel with the popular blunder in intellectual education. The blunder in question is the supplying of cut and dry definitions and rules, which certainly introduce order among the confused mass of presented ideas, but an order that is meaningless. The child, for example, is struggling for the understanding of the concept "Abstract Noun." There is a manifold of presented ideas. The teacher may give his child and dry definition which produces an appearance of order. This definition, which imposes a mechanical unity on the hitherto rebellious manifold, may be perfectly accurate, and may represent a real unity to the teacher. To the child it is a hindrance. No general principle can be of use to a child till he has worked for it, that is, till he has made it his own by rising above the antagonism of the particular facts he combines.

To seek to aid the ego, then, by directly helping it, is to weaken it. Even if we understand the idea the ego seeks to attain, we cannot directly aid it in its efforts, for in so doing we reduce the development below the level of conscious self-realization.

The place of the educator is, therefore, limited to the environment. He is but one element of the manifold against which the ego reacts. We must influence the ego by means of its limitations. If we can so modify the environment that the ego must react upon it in a determinate way, we seem to be able to influence the ego directly, and to restrict its power of self-development. Yet the very freedom which certain persons consider the limits of the laws according to which the organism develops itself. If the developing organism responded capriciously to given forces, it could not be said to be self-determined. A perfectly unlimited self exists to be a self at all, and loses all meaning.

If, then, the child answers the educator's stimulus exactly as the educator expects, it is because the nature of the child demands that reaction and no other shall follow this stimulus. It may be here objected that, if this be so, making is really possible. The child is clay in the hands of the potter. All the educator has to do is to discover the laws according to which the child develops, and apply this knowledge. To this a cheerful assent may be given. So far as the educator knows the laws according to which a child develops, so far is the child clay in his hands, to make of him what he will. Nor does this admission in the least endanger the independence of the child as a self-determining organism. The educator can make of the child whatever he pleases, so long as he abides by the laws of the child's development. The very freedom that marks the self-development of the child is the necessity which impels him to act as the educator leads him to act. The child realizes himself fully and freely in the environment that has been modified by the educator. No less freely and fully does the educator realize himself in the environment which he has modified.

Viewed from too close a standpoint, there seems here to be a distinct contradiction. How can a child be at the same time self-determined and determined? But we must remember that the contradiction disappears, and the two forces—the child ego and the educator ego—are seen to form parts of a wider organism in which each finds its only possible freedom in attaining a harmony with its surroundings—in acting thus and thus and not otherwise. If this be so, it may be asked, Why do educators as a matter of fact so often fail to obtain that determining power over their pupils? It is generally admitted that within certain narrow limits the educator does mould the character of the pupil as a potter does the clay; and, when the matter is looked into with any degree of care, we find that the powers are found to be limited by the bounds of the educator's knowledge of the laws according to which the pupil's ego is self-determined.

The objection of the loss of freedom of the child, whose nature is guided by the skilful teacher, may be met by the correlative objection of the loss of freedom on the part of the teacher. If the child must react in a fixed way to certain stimuli, he seems to lose his freedom; but what of the freedom of the educator? In order to modify in a given direction the development of a given organism, the educator must modify his own energies in a definite direction—must, in short, to some extent give up the freedom of his own development. There is here no fatalism. Educator and educated develop alike according to the laws of their being. The fact that a complete knowledge of the nature of the educated would enable the educator to modify the development in no way interferes with the free self-development of the educated. Such complete knowledge is admittedly unattainable. But, supposing it to be attained by the educator, he would by that very knowledge have ceased to be an educator. He would have risen to a point of view from which he could look with full comprehension upon both parties in the work of education. He would see that matter and pupil in their action and reaction upon each other are gradually working out their differences, and are attaining ever higher and higher levels at which certain processes of which certain persons consider the limits of the laws according to which the organism develops itself appear. What causes it to appear that the ego of the educator is dominating the ego of the educated is that the former always works from a slightly higher level. He cannot, indeed, rise to such a height as to be able to envisage at one sweep all the antagonisms and reconciliations that make up the entire sphere of education, but he is always working from a level high enough to resolve the immediate antagonism that makes up the now of education at any given moment.

Underlying all this is the great assumption of Idealism which we must be content to receive and to acknowledge as an assumption. We cannot transcend thought; we cannot prove the organic unity of the universe; but, if the universe be not a natural organism, if there be no reason underlying the manifold of experience, then philosophy has no meaning for us. If all the same, it must be admitted that these wide generalities, while showing that explanation is possible, that a system of education is within the grasp of complete knowledge, give little help in discovering the laws of the child's development. Within this rounded whole that makes up the Idealist's universe, we must begin our work somewhere. We must have a system that fits into the
limited area within which we live. Our practical method does not require to supply a complete explanation of its principles. The essential thing is that it shall not contradict any of the findings of the past, but, as it stands, it may be employed as an instrument for teaching.

To come down from the clouds—let us see how the thing works out. Given a newly-born child, how can the educator bring his influence to bear upon it? The faculty psychologist is at a loss. We must not talk of exercising the faculty of discrimination by changes of light and temperature. This exercise demands, he tells us, a rudimentary form of memory and judgment. And thus the building up of the ego proceeds. The whole process may be summed up in the one word 'training.' In modern educational works this word has acquired a sort of sacred meaningfulness. Few words labour under such a weight of assumptions. Naturally it is marked by a great deal of vagueness; but, as often as it occurs, it appears to connote a process that is peculiarly philosophical yet practical. Despite its ordinary vagueness it is not left without a fairly well-defined philosophical meaning. R. H. Quick, for example, would divide all educators into the three great classes: Realists, Humanists, and Trainers; and the school of educators who follow say that they differ according to whether they carry on the 'training.' If we have regard to the results of the process of education, this classification obviously implies a cross-division; for each of the schools claims to train its pupils, though they differ regarding the means to be used to accomplish the training. Without pressing the distinction too closely, it may be said that teaching lays stress on the knowledge to be conveyed, training rather on the process of conveying it, and particularly on the effect of this process upon the mind of the pupil.

Sometimes, indeed, a lower view of training is held. It is regarded as more or less physical. In his Introduction to the Pedagogy of Herbart (London, 1895), p. ix, we find Ufer saying:

"Animals cannot in any true sense be educated: they can only be trained. Education is an influence upon man. When a person is spoken of as well-educated, we do not think of bodily qualities. The educating influence has reference to the soul and concerns itself with the body only so far as the care of the latter is immediately serviceable to the former."

The very existence of the training school of educators is that this comparatively low view of training is not universal. Pedagogical education is not clearly an element of truth in it. At college there are trainers for the river, and tutors for the schools. As usual, whatever difficulty there is arises from a metaphor. The process represented by the word is carried over from the body to the mind. Fortunately there is more than the usual attenuated connexion between the two terms of the metaphor.

In the last resort physical training consists in teaching an animal to perform certain acts easily by making it do them frequently. Here it is the first step that costs. After the act has been performed once, there is little difficulty in having it repeated and concerned itself with the body only so far as the care of the latter is immediately serviceable to the former."

"The soul has no capacity or faculty whatever, either to receive or to produce anything" (Lehrbuch zur Psychologie, Leipzig, 1834, § 132). This startling statement does not block the way of the educator so completely as at first sight appears: for what Herbart takes from the soul he gives to the ideas; and whatever may be the metaphysical and psychological rights of the matter, the educational process does not suffer. It is sometimes objected to Herbart that his educational theories cannot be deduced from
his psychology; but as a matter of fact his educational theories were elaborated before his psychological studies, and there can be little doubt that the needs of education had a great deal to do with the peculiar form his psychology took. Carried out in its logical issue, the Herbartian system of education implies the possibility of man-making not only on the intellectual but also on the moral side. As Locke demolished the theory of innate ideas, so Herbart demolished the theory of innate faculties. His educational system may not unfairly be said to be a process by which faculties can be supplied. His evolution of the will from the conflict of ideas really amounts to the creation of the will by circumstances if no educator deliberately interferes, or by the educator if there be one who cares to modify the interaction of the conflicting ideas. If, as Herbart maintains, Action generates the will out of desire, there is evidently room in education for a more effective application of the maieutic art than even Socrates ever imagined.

The applications of the Herbartian metaphysic and psychology are untenable, but the educational applications are in themselves very useful, and are really not involved in the condemnation that their supposed foundation deserves. Herbart distinguishes between the rule and the instruction, the distinction depending upon the nature of the connexions involved in the subjects taught. Those subjects which touch human life at the greatest number of points form the best kind of Gesinnungsstoff, as he names the material for educative instruction. In estimating the value of the Herbartian system, the mistake is commonly made of attaching too much importance to the pupil's intellectual qualities sometimes even to the exclusion of the moral, though, as a matter of fact, the moral side bulked very largely in Herbart's mind. No doubt Herbart does attach very great importance to Knowledge as an educational organon, but no competent critic can read his educational work without at once seeing the moral implications of the system. The whole value of instruction, indeed, from Herbart's point of view, consists in its moral bearings. So far does he go in this direction that he has given rise to a great deal of indignation by his well-known saying, 'The stupid man cannot be virtuous.' A view which he qualified by adding, 'It must be clear that he did not mean the word stummpfigzig to be understood as referring to capacity, but rather to the use made of capacity, though it has to be admitted that the word implies something he could not have chosen to convey this meaning. He is continually emphasizing the need of supplying the mind with healthy ideas in order that a full life may be possible. We are too apt to set up a purely negative ideal of virtue. Our favourite moral axioms consist of prohibitions. Herbart is more inclined to demand positive goodness. His advice is not so much 'Avoid evil' as 'Do good.' The dull unstoried man cannot be virtuous because he has not made the most of himself. He is not what he might have been. Ignorant nulla cupido, quotes Herbart, and the remark applies to good as well as to evil. All temptation in the last resort comes from within. We have here the psychological explanation of the saying, 'To the pure all things are pure.' The 'circle of thought,' by which Herbart means the organized content of the mind, determines the character of a man. If all Herbartianism could be gathered up into one sentence, that sentence would be: 'The will has its root in the circle of thought.'

The argument the great need of the Science of Education is a synthesis of the Herbartian and Froebelian systems, and signs are not lacking that such a synthesis is well within sight. Each supplies the defects of the other, each corrects the other's errors.

3. History of education. - From a certain point of view the history of education is the history of the development of civilization. All moral and intellectual progress results from educational processes that need not, however, be conscious processes. At the earliest stages of civilization, Education is inseparable from ordinary acts of intercourse. The child is educated by the mere process of living. He learns by the reactions on his environment, and particularly by imitation, both in its positive and in its negative form. It is true that parents and other adults do at this stage give a certain amount of instruction to the growing child; but all this instruction is given with an immediate and definite aim, and has no intentional relation to the development of the character of the child. True education begins when the community attains to a sort of collective self-consciousness, and, as it were, turns itself back upon itself and takes itself into its hand, with the deliberate intention of guiding development. The mere existence of schools is no proof that there is any attempt at education. These may exist only as a means of imparting a certain dexterity that will increase the value of the individual to the community, or to some section of the community.

Since religion was the first of the social forces that led to a special organization, it is very natural that it should be the first to see the need of education. To secure the proper observance of religious rites, it was essential that there should be a body of skilled priests, and this body could be maintained only by a system of carefully selecting and training young men to take the place of those who succumbed to age or disease. Experience would show that the earlier the training began, the more effective it proved, so what began as a professional college gradually developed a sort of preparatory department. Two influences would at once begin to act in such a way as to keep the school and the college distinct. First, the priests would come to regard the school as an excellent means of sifting out all the characters that gave promise of proving good subjects for the religious life. It was obviously desirable, therefore, to mark off the school from the college by means of certain rites that came to be essential to the priestly whole makes it part of the community. In the second place, it would soon be found that pupils who had gone through the school had benefited by the training, even though they had not been deemed worthy to enter the college. A desire would accordingly arise among the more ambitious parents that their children should share in the advantages of the school, even though there was no desire that they should take up the religious life. This tendency would be strongest where the Church was most powerful, and where the lay nobility was weakest. The connexion between the Church and Education is maintained throughout the ages, though the nature and the connexion varies according to the spiritual state of the Church. When the Church was pre-eminently a political organization, the schools became little better than technical colleges, preparatory to the clerical profession. When the Church reached a high spiritual level, the schools gave their attention to human beings in general, and became places to fashion the raw material of humanity into its noblest forms, literally officine hominum.

Of the history of Education among the primitive races we know very little with certainty. The only point that is quite clear is that Education took a form in each case determined by the prevailing ideals of the race. Caste in India,
Tradition and Ancestor-Worship in China, Dualism in Persia, Practical Common Sense in Egypt, all leave their mark on the kind of education adopted, and the lines along which it was developed. The Theocracy among the Jews, with its consequent emphasis on the individual, resulted in a wide-spread popular education, which was fundamentally moral and religious, but did not neglect the purely literary side. From the Old Testament to the Catechism, most among the Hebrews as a nation a knowledge of reading and writing was wide-spread, and in this respect they stand out in a most favourable light compared with their contemporaries. See Education (Jewish).

With the Greek States, we enter upon a new phase of the history of Education. Not only do we have written records of the actual state of education at the time, but we have more or less detailed discussions of the theory of education and of educational ideals. Among the Greeks generally, the individual was entirely subordinated to the State, the man was lost in the citizen. The subjects taught were classed under the two heads, Moralia and Naturalis, of which the first included literary and physical training. For it must be remembered that Music among the Greeks included not only what we understand by that term, but also that which we call the aesthetic. The study of Music involved a knowledge of reading and writing and the literary arts generally, though, of course, these arts were cultivated in very different degrees in the different Greek States. Among the Athenians, for example, Gymnastics meant mainly the training necessary for war, and Music was limited to the attainments that gave a charm to the orgies they loved. The Spartans had higher ideals; but even among them the training which was to give skill and endurance in warfare. The literary training was confined to the three R’s, and some warlike Music. It is difficult to say under which head the peculiar educational subject of Lycyus is to be placed. Probably this form of training in dexterity and cunning is most fitly classed as Gymnastic. The training of citizens fell naturally into four periods: childhood at the mother’s knee up to 7 years of age; boyhood up to 18, during which period the boys were at public training schools, but each had to have some grown man as his special friend and trainer; youth up to 30, during which time the young men were trained in the practice of war; marriage at which time they were either made soldiers or were married. It is to the credit of the Spartans that female education was fairly well organized in their State. Among the Athenians, the literary side received more attention, though Gymnastic retained its prominence, the recognized physical exercises being now grouped together in the pantothem: running, leaping, quoit-throwing, wrestling, and boxing. The wider life of Athens, and the influence of the foreign element there, favoured the development of individualism. In his great educational work, The Republic, Plato sets himself to combat this individualism, and constructs a system in which the best elements of the actual Spartan and Athenian education are worked up into a system in which the individual is again overshadowed by the State. The Sophists, who against whom Socrates was never tired of girding, were teachers rather than educators. They professed to communicate a certain amount of valuable knowledge rather than to form character. See Education (Greek).

The Tu-PROFESSORS were the most famous in Rome, which owed most of its culture to Greece. Among the Roman teachers were some notable men who deserve to rank as genuine educators. Chief of these is Quintilian, who, though his book professes to limit itself to the training of an orator, gives us a treatise on Education which Professor Larrieu is inclined to regard as the best ever written. The Public Schools of Rome were secular and political, rather than religious; but with the introduction of Christianity a new system of education was established by the Church which was, perhaps, the main object of which was to enable converts to understand the new religion, and, if occasion favoured, to promulgate it. Hence arose the Old Testament, and, side by side, and by, the establishment of permanent places of worship led to the appearance of Monastery and Cathedal Schools, which were able to carry on the work of education after the fall of the Roman Empire. In the time of Charlemagne we find the value of Education recognized in the existence of a famous institution known as the Palace School. This was an itinerant institution which accompanied the Comtis in its wanderings, for the purpose of providing a suitable education for the sons of the nobility. Though probably not founded by him, it certainly attained its fame mainly through the intelligent patronage of Charlemagne. This is also the time of the famous Capitation of 787, probably drawn up by Alcin, then Master of the Palace School. This is a sort of general order sent to all the abbots of the monasteries, and involved a knowledge of reading and writing, and his instructions regarding it. It has been described by Mullinger as ‘perhaps the most important document of the Middle Ages,’ and by Amsper as ‘the charter of modern thought.’

The subjects taught in the medieval schools formed the seven liberal arts. They were divided into two groups, named respectively the Trivium and the Quadrivium. The ‘trivial’ arts were Grammar, Rhetoric, and Arithmetic, and the ‘quadrivium’ Geometry, Arithmetic, Astronomy, and Music. These seven arts were held to include all that was worth knowing in the mediæval world. The first reference to the seven liberal arts, as matter of study or discipline, has been traced to Varro, but the credit of dividing them into the two groups is claimed for each of two writers—Augustine, and a certain Carthaginian named Martinius Capella. The truth probably is that Augustine made the distinction, while Capella, by his more picturesque style, called attention to and perpetuated it.

Universities, what they were or were not founded; they really founded themselves; they grew out of the nature of things. The tendency of learned men to gather together for mutual help led to a process of segregation in suitable districts. No doubt in many cases favourable centres were found at certain schools connected with Cathedrals or Abbeys. In most cases the Cathedral School proved more attractive to learned men in search of intellectual freedom than did the Abbey School. A University was originally known as a studium publicum vel generale, but this phrase does not occur frequently till about the end of the 12th century. The first reference to a school in which the students from one district or one country, hence the charter of a University had to come from one who had an authority recognized in different kingdoms. The only two such authorities in Europe are the Pope and the Emperor. To these, therefore, it became customary to apply for a charter to establish a new University, though some of the oldest and most famous Universities never had any charter, but claimed and exercised the privilege of granting to their graduates the jus ubique docendi.

172 EDUCATION (Introductory)
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did not, as a matter of fact, at first confine themselves to language, but rather treated language as a means of expressing human aspirations. Painting, Music, Sculpture, Literature, and all that had a direct bearing on human life and action formed the matrix with which the Humanists dealt. It is only when the Humanistic view is carried to excess that it leads to the pedantry associated with the mere language drill condemned by Carlyle under the name of gerund-grinding.

(1) Among the most distinguished Humanistic educators was Vittorino da Feltre (1378-1446), a schoolmaster at Mantua, who exercised a very considerable influence on education in Italy. John Sturm (1507-1589) was the master for many years of a famous grammar school at Strasbourg, where he elaborated a procrustean system of instruction, in which the amount of work for each year was absolutely regulated, so that to exceed the amount prescribed was to be severely punished; in fact, to fall short of it. By his pedantry Sturm did a great deal to obscure the real merits of Humanism. The English Humanist, Roger Ascham (1515-1569) and Thomas Nashe (1567-1601), who wrote a better form of Humanism, and it has been remarked that it would have greatly benefited the education of Europe if the example of Mulcaster had been followed instead of that of Sturm. When

the Jesuits saw the political importance of education, and deliberately set themselves to become the teachers of the governing classes of Europe, they founded most of the higher faculties in addition to the Arts faculty, which in those early times corresponded really to a preparatory course for one of the three higher—

The

Parallel with the education of the Monastery, the School, and the University, was that of the Castle, where, instead of the seven 'liberal' arts, were taught the seven 'fine' arts—Horsemanship, Riding, Shooting, Hunting, Swimming, Boxing, Chess-playing, and Verse-making. The contrast between the free and the liberal arts emphasizes the weakness of the Trivium and the Quadrivium— their unwholesome aloofness from the affairs of everyday life. The medieaval scholars, as scholars, held themselves jealously apart from the common things of life; they lived in a world of their own, in a world of abstractions. When we consider that for nearly five centuries the finest intellects of Europe were applied to the discussion of the question of the relation of the general to the particular, we can understand the peculiar intellectual atmosphere which pervaded the world of thought. On the educational side the Renaissance manifested itself in a revolt against this arid scholasticism. The charge of bookishness is sometimes made against the Renaissance education, and it must be confessst that in some of its developments it afterwards yielded to the tendency towards abstraction which is inherent in most forms of teaching. But on its first appearance the Renaissance education valued books mainly for their contents and their general style. It was a later generation that fell into the slough of 'scholarship' and grammatical pedantry.

By the time of the Renaissance the writers and thinkers on educational questions had developed their subject so much that different schools of thought have to be recognized among them. A triple classification is frequently made, the divisions being into Humanists, Realists, and Naturalists. The distinction is based largely upon the nature of the material upon which the mind is exercised as a means of training. The Humanists are those who prefer language and other specially human functions on which to nurture their pupils. They did not, as a matter of fact, at first confine themselves to language, but rather treated language as a means of expressing human aspirations. Painting, Music, Sculpture, Literature, and all that had a direct bearing on human life and action formed the matrix with which the Humanists dealt. It is only when the Humanistic view is carried to excess that it leads to the pedantry associated with the mere language drill condemned by Carlyle under the name of gerund-grinding.

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modifying public opinion on Education than any other publication of the Victorian period.

(3) The Naturalists lay less stress on the more subjects to be taught, and more upon the training supplied by nature itself, so much so that, or the other subject as to bring the pupil into direct contact with life at the proper points, and thus enable him to work out his own education. Instruction is not so much a matter of sticking to the natural approach, as the name itself. The Naturalist, like Locke, feels that the only thing, nor even the most essential thing. The first Naturalist may be said to be Rabelais (1483–1553), who, as soon as he had escaped from his monastic existence, set himself in his own time and moments to the study of the possibilities of education in producing the kind of man that the world requires. His attitude is largely destructive, though in his Éducation (a well-endowed and well-trained youth used as a contrast to Gargantua) we find the ideal at which we ought to aim; and in certain passages we get fairly clear hints towards the method of attaining that ideal. The second Naturalist is More, perhaps less methodically, who in the learned leisure of an easy life set himself to develop his theories of what education should be. Locke (1632–1704), on the other hand, went out of his way to publish a somewhat unmethodical and easy-going essence under the title of Essay on Education. In this we have the fruits of the observation of the medical man, the private tutor, and the philosopher. What the book lacks in system is more than made up for by its practical common sense and by its suggestiveness. J. J. Rousseau (1712–1778), in his pedagogical story of Émile, presents probably the most influential work on Education that has been written in modern times. He believes that man is good and has been corrupted by civilization. The cry of the book is therefore to ‘back to Nature.’ The educator must learn to lose time wisely, and to keep himself in the background, letting the educand develop in his own way. All initiative is to come from the pupil. Fichte (1762–1814), so far as he can be classified at all, must be ranked with the Naturalists. His claim to special notice is his famous Rede on die deutsche Nation, in which he deliberately set forth the claims of education as a regenerator of nations.

Goethe (1749–1832) treated of Education as he treated of almost everything else. His contributions in this section of the educational province in Wilhelm Meister. This marks him out as Naturalistic. It was formerly customary for every German professor of Philosophy to deliver a course on Education, so much so that the best known German writers on Philosophy have written something on the subject, Kant among others. At the present moment there is a prolific literature on educational subjects. While each country contributes to the general problem, each has acquired a specific character by emphasizing some aspect. Thus in the United States, Child Study and the relation of education to social life have received the highest attention, and education has done exceptionally good work in tracing out the relations of temperament to education. In France, too, the educational applications of ‘Suggestion’ are best developed. Germany is specially strong in dealing with the psychological bases of education, but has also given a great deal of attention to the methodological aspect, particularly in connexion with the relation between the Froebelian and the Herbartian Systems. In Great Britain there is less interest in the philosophical bases, and the subject is usually treated in a more or less empirical way.

Literature.—G. Stanley Hall and John M. Mansfield, Educational psychology and description of the Psychology of Education (Boston, 1890); W. S. Monroe, Bibliography of Education (New York, 1897). There are naturally a strong American reference to Thorndike’s Studies of Lectures on the History of Education (New York, 1901) is useful. In National Education (London, 1901), Laurie Magnus gives a very useful Bibliographical Note. There is an extensive work on the contents of the various Educational Libraries, such as the Board of Education Library at the Whitehall Office (1826–1876), the College of Physicians, Guild Library. There are some more or less commercial publications, such as the Schüler durch die pädiatrische Literatur (Vienna, 1879), that are of much general utility. Of Educational Encyclopedias the following are the most important: Kiddle and Scripture’s Encyclopedia of Education (New York, 1874); Schnechel, Cyclopaedia of Education (London, 1892); F. Buisson, Dictionnaire de pédagogie (Paris, 1898). Wilhelm, in his Handbuch der Pädagogik (Langenmuller, 1902), this great work in seven large volumes is excellent. For a more popular work on the whole history of Education, see the Educational History (Paris, 1894). The most comprehensive History of Education is the Geschichte der Pädagogik of K. v. Rümpler (Gütersloh, 1896), and the Geschichte der Bildung und Kultur of K. Schmid (Königstein, 1876). Of a more popular character is the Histoire de la pédagogie of Gabriel Coypuy (Paris, 1885). Both Rümpler and Coypuy appear in English translations. Friedrich Paulsen’s Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts (Leipzig, 1839) is now a standard work. The Herbartian controversy is admirably treated by H. Hayford in his The Critics of Herbartianism (Lon- don, 1879). The chief writers on the Herbartian side are: P. W. Dörpfeld, Denken und Gedächtnis (Gütersloh, 1901); T. Zeller, Grundzüge zur Lehre von der erworbenen Unterricht (Leipzig, 1884); K. H. Leopold, Outlines of the Educational History of England (London, 1896). The ‘critics’ of Herbartianism are represented by H. W. Wilamowitz, Die Schule der ersten Schuljahr (Vienna, 1880); E. S. Sallwärth, Gesinnung und Bildung (Langenmuller, 1897); O. Hubatka, Geschichte der Schulpflege in den letzten Jahrhunderten (Berlin, 1899); Angust Vogel, Herbart oder Pataloczky (Hannover, 1898); P. Natkar, Herbart und Pataloczky, und die daraus resultirenden Lehren (Stuttgart, 1899). A good general book is P. Monroes Text-book in the History of Education (London, 1863). The best work on the education of the French writers is L. L. B. Schem, Éducation des néologismes (Paris, 1888). Among the French writers who have most affected the Science of Education, without directly writing upon it, are: Alphonse Fontame, Temporale et caractère (Paris, 1893); Fr. Paulian, L’Activité mentale (Paris, 1896), and Les Caractères (Paris, 1902); G. Tarde, Les Lois de l’imitation (Paris, 1896). In which there is a large and rapidly increasing literature on the subject. Herbert Spencer’s Education (1861); A. P. Leach’s English Schools at the Reformation (London, 1890); W. T. Harris’s Psychology Foundations of Education (New York, 1908); S. S. Laurie’s Institutes of Education (Edin., 1909), and M. C. Ware’s Manual of the Testing (London, 1905), are probably the works that have produced most effect on educational opinion. Educational theory, as any becoming consensus of opinion, are in such works as P. E. Henderson’s Text-book in the Principles of Education (1910), and P. E. Henderson’s Principles of Education (1911). The Great Educator Series (Heinemann) and the International Education Series (Appleton) contain some excellent contributions. J. Adams.

EDUCATION (American).—1. Primitive teachers.—As elsewhere throughout the world, the teachers of children among the American Indians include the father, who early instructs his sons in the arts and activities which more especially concern the male half of the tribe; and the mother, who in like manner teaches her daughter the domestic activities and industrial arts belonging to women. The grandfather and the grandmother are also teachers, particularly of the mythic lore, tribal legends, wealth of story and proverb; and often certain other aged men and women devote themselves more or less completely to giving such instruction, so that they are practically professional teachers, such as we have to-day. The medicine-man, or shaman, appears likewise as teacher, often in connexion with secret societies, for admission into which children are prepared at an early age. The Indian tribes in which the members of society who live in savage and barbarous peoples refrain from killing
prisoners only to enslave or to debanch them. Even as
The great Ethiopian conqueror bid spare
so many an uncivilized tribe spared the teacher
visited the ground (Milton, Sonnet viii.),
Went to the ground (Milton, Sonnet viii.).
their wild turleneance of strife. Woman's rôle
as the mother and disseminator of many forms of
primitive culture, from ceramic art to the
mysteries of religion, caused her, even in very
remote ages of human history, to be thus spared;
somehow more than when she was the apostle of the
darker side of knowledge, she was feared rather
than loved for her skill and cunning. J. W.
Fewkes tells us that, when, in 1700, the Indians of the
Pueblo of Oraibi, in New Mexico, took and
destroyed the Pueblo of Awatobi (both settlements of the
Tussyan people), the conquerors 'spared all
the women who had song-prayers and were willing
to teach them.' Among those saved was the
Ma-zrau-moof-sei, or chief of the Ma-zrau society, who
declared her readiness to 'initiate the women of
Walpi in the rites of the Ma-zran'; and it was in
this way that the observance of the ceremonial
knowledge of how to do Ma-zran came to us. We learn
further that 'some of the other Awatobi women
knew how to bring rain, and such of them as were
willing to teach their songs were spared and went
forth to valley villages.' The learning of men, too,
made them more exposed to tribal wars than
women, not always so conspicuously as was the case with
women. At the same conquest of Awatobi,
the Oraibi chief saved a man who knew how to cause the peach
to grow, and that is why Oraibi has such an abundance of
peaches now. The Mi-got-i-tu-vi chief saved a prisoner who
knew how to make the sweet so-ri-se (small-eared corn) grow,
and this is why it is more abundant here than elsewhere.2
Captive women who married their captors have often
been not merely teachers of individuals, but of families, clans, and even tribes. They have in
not a few cases influenced the social customs and
the religion of the peoples among whom their new
lot was cast.
(b) The pedlar.—The pedlar, who survives now
only in the more backward of our modern civiliza-
tions or on the fringes of the more advanced cultures of
to-day, still retains traces of his former import-
ance as an educator. He has often been quite as
noted for his dissemination of intellectual wares as
for the distribution of creature comforts or other
material things. As O. T. Mason well says,
'Itinerant peddlers and tramps have marched about the
world and spread truth and knowledge; they have
embraced and wrecked. These have transported things and ideas and words.
They have set up a kind of internationalism from place to
place.'
These itinerant primitive 'tradesmen' are to be found among the American aborigines, where they
served as dispensers of knowledge, distributors of
tales and legends—in fact, as teachers of a great
variety of human lore.
(c) The stranger and the foreigner.—Among
primitive peoples the stranger is often welcome,
not because he brings with him good luck, fine
time and weather, and the like, although such things also
cause him to be happily greeted, but because he is
a bringer of news. This characteristic is noted
also among civilized races, particularly where they
inhabit regions more or less cut off from the cul-
ture-centres of the world. Here the stranger really
takes rank as an educator, being an important
source of information and the direction of knowledge of all
sorts. Westermarck says: "Do not the ancestors
in the remote forests of Northern Finland was con-
stantly welcomed with the phrase, 'What news?'"3
It is by no means true, as is often believed, that
all or many uncivilized peoples are utterly
averted to receiving knowledge from outside their
own tribal bounds, and look with disfavour on any
practical recruiting of their own intellectual re-
sources from foreigners or strangers within their
gates. In fact, probability, however; races, like
individuals, have differed widely in their sense of
receptivity, and in their attitude towards the
exotic in all fields of human activity—mental,
and social, and religious. What is true to-day of
 civilized races in this respect is true of the
uncivilized peoples now existing, and we are
justified in believing the same of their ancestors
of the earliest human times. Heterophilia and
heterophobism have been characteristic of the
races of man's progress, from prehistoric 'savage' to
the culture of the twentieth century. Nor has the
most progressive of modern nations exceeded some
primitive peoples in eagerness to receive and absorb
the new, the strange, and the foreign. Indeed,
the same people, race, or even tribe may contain
within itself these two diverse types, the neophobes
and the neophiles—those who hate and those who
love the new.
—Some Indian tribes, like the Kutenai, e.g., have
few, if any, secret societies and kindred social
institutions; but with many other aboriginal peoples of America these abound, and children
are carefully prepared for membership in them. These
societies are of various sorts—social, political, re-
ligious, and are in many of the tribal ceremonies and
dramatic performances of the Indians, children
have their regular roles, for which they receive
development at the hands of their elders. As in some
other parts of the globe, the advent of manhood
and womanhood (see art. puberty) is prepared for
by much instruction of the young in special ways,
among various American Indian peoples. Mar-
rage, likewise, among many tribes has certain edu-
cational pre-requisites. Among the Apache, one
of the principal tribes of the Siouan stock, Miss
Fletcher informs us (27 RBEW [1911], p. 330):
"In olden times no girl was considered marriagable until she
knew how to dress skins, fashion and sew garments, embroider,
and cook. Nor was a young man a desirable husband until he
had proved his skill as a hunter and shown himself alert and
courageous."
3. Educational processes, institutions, etc.—
The scope and general character of education among the American aborigines are thus described
by Mason (Indian, Amer. Ind. i, [1907] 414):
"The aborigines of North America had their own systems of
education, through which they were instructed in their
coming labours and obligations, embracing not only the whole
round of economic pursuits—hunting, fishing, handicraft, agri-
culture, and household work—but speech, fine art, customs,
economic, social obligations, and tribal laws. By unconscious
absorption and by constant instruction the boy and girl became
the accomplished man and woman. Modes of praise or blame,
the stimulus of flattery or disapprobation, wrought constantly
upon the child, male or female, who was the charge, not of
the parents and grandparents, but, in one or the whole tribe.
Loedek (Mission of United Brethren, Lond. 1794, p. 129) says
the Iroquois are particularly attentive to the future of the
young people for the future government of the state, and
for this purpose admits, that generally the choice of the
principal chief, to the council and council-fist following it.
The Eskimo were most careful in teaching their girls and
boys, setting them to work in all the staple industries,
hunting, showing them how to solve them, and asking boys how
they would meet a given emergency. Everywhere there was the

1 Amor, Anthrop. v. (1893) 306.
2 Ib.
3 Mt. 1:56.
EDUCATION (American)

closest association, for education, of parents with children, who learned the names and uses of things in nature. At a tender age they played at serious business, girls in needlework, and boys in hunting, fishing, and gathering. Children were furnished with appropriate toys; they became little basket makers, were taught to make tools, and to understand the use of many common things, the rocks, the range of instruction being limited only by their capacity. Their efforts were praised, and their success was rewarded, but they were also disciplined, and this discipline was administered freely. In Florida, knowledge was deemed to be of little use to the ignorant, but the religious ceremonies of primitive peoples often contain sections that are directly pedagogical. Such, e.g., are the 'parables' of the Pawnee Indians, concerning which Miss Fletcher, who has penetrated some of the innermost secrets of the American aborigines, says (Indian Story and Song, p. 30):

'...Through an elaborate ritual and religious ceremony of the Pawnee tribe are little parables, in which some natural scene or occurrence serves as a teaching to guide man in his daily life. The words of the song are purposely few, so as to guard the full meaning from those not initiated in the ceremony, but the priest to hold the interpretation as a part of his sacred treasure...'

They are sufficient, however, to attract the attention of the thoughtful; and such a one who desired to know the teaching of the sacred song could first perform certain initiatory rites, and then learn the meaning of the words by the priest, which is 'a prayer for children, in order that the tribe may prosper and be strong, and also that the tribe may live, enjoy plenty, and be happy and at peace.' A Pawnee ceremony celebrated in the spring when the birds are mating, or in the summer when the birds are nesting and caring for their young, or in the fall when the birds are flying, but not in the winter when all things are quiescent' (A. C. Fletcher, in J. R. R. B. J., vol. 2, pp. 29, 30, f.), there are a number of these "parables.'

In these 'parables,' or brief-versed songs, as interpreted by the Kainuk, the genius of the Pawnee Indians, as we may term the high-minded and thoroughly human 'priest' of this tribe, who revealed to Miss Fletcher the true religion of his people, his fathers, we get a glimpse into the mind of the aboriginal American in one of its most instructive moments.

Among the Pawnee (as recorded by G. A. Dorsey, Pawnee Mythology) are: making fun of poor children by rich ones, making fun of or maltreating animals, betraying friendship, meddling with ceremonial objects, quarrelling with children (especially among brothers), wandering away from home, too great pride, needless sacrifices to the gods, false reports of buffalo in sight, etc. Things approved and recommended are: respect for poor boys on the part of rich girls, belief in success through continued effort, hope of greatness and power being attained, obedience to and reverence for the gods, taking care of one's clothing, attention to things while travelling, friendship among young men, high aims in life, marriage of the maiden of one's choice, kindness to birds, listening courteously to everything but not believing all one hears, recognition of the fact of being such a great man, and that a prophet is without honour in his own country.

It was upon such devices rather than upon formal punishment (see Other Punishments) that the American aborigines relied for the ethical results of manhood and womanhood.

LITERATURE.—Besides the material on the American Indian found in the usual works of missionary and ethnological writers, considerable material is to be found in various books on American literature, and in the numerous ethnological publications of the Field Museum of...
Chicago, the University of Pennsylvania, Harvard University, the University of California, etc., the following may be cited:


To the two or three centuries of the Maccabees of India preserved, Fa-Hian, was absent from home in the early part of the 5th cent. for a period of fifteen years, visiting the sacred sites of Buddhism. He remained in two or three monasteries in Patialajura (Patna) and Tampalik (Tamluk), and spent two years also in Ceylon. In all these places he occupied himself in study, and secured copies of Sanskrit and other sacred texts. Many of the monasteries were large, containing 600 or 700 monks; and he describes how students resorted to these centres of piety and learning in search of truth. In Northern India, by which is meant the and adjacent districts, Fa-Hian found that all the instruction was oral, and the rules of the various Buddhist schools were transmitted only by word of mouth. Further to the east, however, the monasteries reserved written copies of the Vinaya, the Sutras of the schools, and also the Abhidharma. The utmost freedom appears to have been permitted to him in every place, every facility being afforded for study and the copying of the manuscripts. Some of the Buddhist books he is said to have himself translated into Chinese after his return to China. There is also in his narrative a single passing reference to Lollard or Nalanda, the site near Gaya of the Buddhist monastery of Ceylon. The later years was so widely renowned. In Fa-Hian's time the place had apparently not yet attained the greatness or importance which subsequently belonged to it. He refers to it as a village and yajlena east of Rājagriha, and the birth-place of Sāriputra, where also he died and was buried; but he makes no mention of the presence of monks or a monastery.

About two centuries after Fa-Hian a second and more famous Buddhist monk from China, Huien Tsang, visited India, and during a period of sixteen years (c. A.D. 629-645) travelled widely in Central Asia and the northern parts of India, returning home, at the close of his wanderings, by land across the continent without seeing the monasteries of Ceylon or the south, of which he gives a merely hearsay account. During the interval of two centuries there had been frequent intercourse and exchange of visits between India and China, but no record of the experiences of the travellers appears to have perished.

The most striking feature of Indian religious life, as Huien Tsang found it, was the revival of Brahmanism, and the growth and extension of the

**Record of Buddhist Kingdoms**, ch. xxviii. Real identifies Nāla or Nālo near Shanghai as the site where Sāriputra was born (see Buddhist Records of the Western World, i. p. 118, ii. 177).
Mahāyāna school of Buddhism accompanied with a decline in numbers and influence of the Hinayāna monasteries of both sects, however, existed, some with as many as a thousand resident monks, engaged in the study of the law and the discussion of questions of religion and philosophy. For example, at the Golden Hill (Hiranyavārāva), a city on the Ganges, there were ten saṅghārāma, with about 4000 priests, belonging for the most part to the Sāmanīyas sect. Nevertheless, there were also, at Patalalaya, also, there were about ten monasteries with 1000 monks; and similarly in many towns of which he makes mention. Hiuen Tsang further records, as Fa-Hian had done, the continual movement of students from all parts of India to these centres of learning and interest.

The most important and flourishing school of Buddhist learning, however, was at Nalanda, identified by Cunningham with the modern village of Barāgōn near Gaya, about nine miles from Rājgir. Here there existed an ancient saṅghārāma, or monastery, built in memory of the Buddha, which had made the place his capital in a former life. It contained an imposing assembly hall and temple, and was maintained out of the royal revenues, in which were several thousands of monks, of great distinction and fame, belonging to the eighteen principal Hinayāna sects. In the evening and after the morning meal, they were wont to listen to the study of the sacred books and the discussion of religious questions. Learned men from different cities resorted in large numbers to the schools of Nalanda for study and the resolution of their doubts and questionings. And the name itself was held in honour far and wide.

It is a proof of the intensive character of this love of learning, as well as of the power and influence of Buddhism, that Hiuen Tsang reports the existence of a great monastery only about twenty miles west of Nalanda, with a thousand priests studying the Mahāyāna, the resort of scholars and learned men from distant countries.

In Central Asia also, Buddhism was possessed of a wide-spread influence. The devotion to learning and to the copying and study of the sacred books seems to have maintained itself for a considerable period. In his recent travels in the districts bordering upon China on the west, M. Aurel Stein found that the name and memory of the Chinese monk were still known and revered as of a scholar of repute.

In the latter part of the 7th cent. a testimony to the extension of Buddhist learning to Malaysia is given by a third Chinese traveller and monk, I-Tsing, who spent more than six years in Srināgoa, or Sumatra, engaged in the study of the law and the collection and translation of manuscripts, Sanskrit and Pāli. I-Tsing made his way to Sumatra and India by sea, sailing from a southern Chinese port in or about the year A.D. 671. His absence from home extended over a quarter of a century, during which time he is said to have travelled in more than thirty different countries, and to have brought or sent home to China four hundred Buddhist texts, of which after his return he himself, with the help of native Indian scholars who accompanied him to China, published translations of more than two hundred. I-Tsing greatly assisted in the manner of life in the monasteries and the discipline of the discussion of the theological and philosophical questions of the time. With the gradual decay and disappearance of Buddhism from India, its influence on literary culture and the thought and life of the people also so soon disappeared. However, and in some centres, at least, it is probable that there were maintained to the end the tradition and practice of learning, and the devotion to study, which made the monasteries influential in forming different schools than either of his predecessors. His narrative conveys the sense of a great activity of discussion and thought, and a wide-spread interest in knowledge, both religious and secular.

Within the boundaries of India itself the travels of I-Tsing were not so extensive as those of either Fa-Hian or Hiuen Tsang. He spent, however, ten years at the university of Nalanda, which he describes as possessed of considerable wealth, and in the composition of commentaries received by the several hundred villages—an endowment for which the monasteries were indebted to the generosity of the rulers of many generations. The monastic regulations at Nalanda were more strict than in other monasteries that I-Tsing visited, and the time and habits of the monks were all subject to rule. The hours of worship and work were determined by an early bird. Within the monastery itself there were more than 3000 resident priests, and the building contained eight halls and three hundred apartments. Besides the ordinary religious services of the monastery, the time of the monks was occupied in reading and study, and in the composition of commentaries and expositions and commentaries on the sacred texts.

The course of instruction for boys began at the age of ten with the study of grammar, to which they were devoted for three years. This was followed by the reading of commentaries and works of a more advanced character on grammatical science, logic, and philosophy, which were all committed to memory. Thus far the course of study was alike for priests and laymen; and no one could claim to be well educated who had not made progress to at least this extent. The priests further studied works on the Vinaya, with the Sūtras and Sūtras. More than once I-Tsing compared the stages or attainments of the student with the several degrees of the Confucian scholar, and enforced the duty of unremitting study by the example of Confucius himself. The treaties of the Abhidharma were also made subjects of study; and public discussions were held, at which heretical opinions were considered and refuted.

It is evident that I-Tsing was imbued with a great respect for the learning, ability, and devotion of his teachers. Of one to whom he was indebted in his early years he writes that he was equally learned in both Confucianism and Buddhism, and was well versed in astronomy, geography, mathematics, and other sciences; and it is the mark of the greatest pains in giving instruction, whether his pupil were a child or a full-grown and capable man. A second teacher was never wearied of teaching from morning to night. The personal attention and counsel which I-Tsing himself received from these and other men elicited his warmest gratitude.

With the cessation of intercourse between India and China, or in the absence at least of written records of such intercourse, direct evidence of the prosecution of Buddhist learning and of the study of the sacred books in the monasteries and at the courts of Northern India ceases. It is, however, to believe, however, that the monasteries in any sense ceased to be centres of education and discipline, where facilities were to be found for literary study, and where the dharma and holy books were kept in the library. The theological and philosophical questions of the time. With the gradual decay and disappearance of Buddhism from India, its influence on literary culture and the thought and life of the people also so soon disappeared. However, and in some centres, at least, it is probable that there were maintained to the end the tradition and practice of learning, and the devotion to study, which made the monasteries influential in forming

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1 Ancient Geography, 1870, p. 458; see IG1, s. n., 'Barāgōn.'
the character and giving direction to the thought of successive generations of students. It is true that lists of Buddhist teachers which are recorded many of the names cannot be identified, and the date or even the existence of the writers is problematical; but the lists are nevertheless proof of the respect in which learning was held, and of the prevalence of a manner of life which gave opportunity for the cultivation of knowledge and rewarded its possessors.

There is sufficient evidence also that in Ceylon and Burma, no less than in India and China, and probably in other Buddhist countries, the literary tradition was well maintained. In Ceylon, in particular, the life and labours of Buddhaghosa (5th cent.) would have been impossible except on the basis of a well-established and long-continued practice and tradition of learning, which held literary pursuits in esteem, tested literary worth, and gathered together and carefully preserved the materials for literary study. How far during these early centuries of intense and fruitful monastic life the education and culture of the monasteries influenced the common people, it is impossible to determine. Perhaps not to any very great extent. The usage of later times, however, would indicate that, in some Buddhist countries at least, education was not confined to those whose lives were spent, or intended to be spent, in the comparative seclusion and leisure of the monasteries; that these last were in a real sense schools of general learning; and that in some instances, and possibly universally, where Buddhist control was sufficiently strong to enforce the rule, the entire population received a measure of education at the hands of the monks, always been a custom or custom to pass a certain length of time within the walls of a monastery, and to submit to the discipline of a training in the elementary principles of knowledge. That the consequences of Buddhist zeal for knowledge, freedom of thought, and speculation were very great and beneficial, it is impossible to doubt. Alone of the great religions of the East, Buddhism stood for liberty of individual thought and action. To a high appreciation of knowledge for its own sake and to principles of generous tolerance the Buddhist faith owed in large part the influential position which it held so long among the nations of the East, and the attraction which it has never ceased to exercise, that is, to attract to the monasteries by the love and respect entertained for the teaching of the Buddha. The propagation of the principles of the Buddhism scriptures. The ordinary schools come under Government control, and receive a grant-in aid. In the latest year for which statistics are available, about 30,000 children were thus trained. In the present system of education, the subjects of instruction are necessarily those of the Government Code; but in addition a catechism of Buddhist doctrine is taught, and the life-history of Gautama Buddha himself is studied. In the monasteries the education is, as a rule, entirely religious, but includes a knowledge of the sacred languages, Pali and Sanskrit, and also classical Sinhalese (Elu); in some instances astrology is included in the curriculum, and the elements of a science of medicine. Attendance at the Sunday schools is entirely voluntary; and, in addition to Buddhist doctrine, ethical teaching of a more general character is given. Apart from Government aid the Buddhist schools are supported by the gifts and liberality of the Buddhists themselves. The Government of Ceylon has recently adopted a system of compulsory elementary education, but as yet (1911) it has hardly had time to become completely effective. Probably it is correct to state that about 60 per cent. of the children of school-going age are in actual attendance at school.

1 Grateful acknowledgment is here made of information and help received from many correspondents in the different lands where Buddhaghosa and other great authors and teachers which are recorded many of the names cannot be identified, and the date or even the existence of the writers is problematical; but the lists are nevertheless proof of the respect in which learning was held, and of the prevalence of a manner of life which gave opportunity for the cultivation of knowledge and rewarded its possessors. There is sufficient evidence also that in Ceylon and Burma, no less than in India and China, and probably in other Buddhist countries, the literary tradition was well maintained. In Ceylon, in particular, the life and labours of Buddhaghosa (5th cent.) would have been impossible except on the basis of a well-established and long-continued practice and tradition of learning, which held literary pursuits in esteem, tested literary worth, and gathered together and carefully preserved the materials for literary study. How far during these early centuries of intense and fruitful monastic life the education and culture of the monasteries influenced the common people, it is impossible to determine. Perhaps not to any very great extent. The usage of later times, however, would indicate that, in some Buddhist countries at least, education was not confined to those whose lives were spent, or intended to be spent, in the comparative seclusion and leisure of the monasteries; that these last were in a real sense schools of general learning; and that in some instances, and possibly universally, where Buddhist control was sufficiently strong to enforce the rule, the entire population received a measure of education at the hands of the monks, always been a custom or custom to pass a certain length of time within the walls of a monastery, and to submit to the discipline of a training in the elementary principles of knowledge. That the consequences of Buddhist zeal for knowledge, freedom of thought, and speculation were very great and beneficial, it is impossible to doubt. Alone of the great religions of the East, Buddhism stood for liberty of individual thought and action. To a high appreciation of knowledge for its own sake and to principles of generous tolerance the Buddhist faith owed in large part the influential position which it held so long among the nations of the East, and the attraction which it has never ceased to exercise, that is, to attract to the monasteries by the love and respect entertained for the teaching of the Buddha. The propagation of the principles of the Buddhism scriptures. The ordinary schools come under Government control, and receive a grant-in-aid. In the latest year for which statistics are available, about 30,000 children were thus trained. In the present system of education, the subjects of instruction are necessarily those of the Government Code; but in addition a catechism of Buddhist doctrine is taught, and the life-history of Gautama Buddha himself is studied. In the monasteries the education is, as a rule, entirely religious, but includes a knowledge of the sacred languages, Pali and Sanskrit, and also classical Sinhalese (Elu); in some instances astrology is included in the curriculum, and the elements of a science of medicine. Attendance at the Sunday schools is entirely voluntary; and, in addition to Buddhist doctrine, ethical teaching of a more general character is given. Apart from Government aid the Buddhist schools are supported by the gifts and liberality of the Buddhists themselves. The Government of Ceylon has recently adopted a system of compulsory elementary education, but as yet (1911) it has hardly had time to become completely effective. Probably it is correct to state that about 60 per cent. of the children of school-going age are in actual attendance at school.
EDUCATION (Buddhist)

has proved less difficult in general to carry out the
order in the country districts than in the
towns; and greater progress in this direction has
been made in the Southern Province than in the
Northern. The system tends, and will increasingly
tend, to eliminate private schools, whether
belonging to the Buddhist or to any other com-
munity.

The general estimate of the moral influence of
the education given does not seem to be high,
even when office is taken of the present
deficiency is ascribed to the character of the teachers
employed, in many of whom a lack of moral fibre
and strength communicates itself with injurious
effect to their scholars. With the monastic schools
under present circumstances it would be impossible
to interfere; but elsewhere it would seem that it
ought not to be difficult to apply a remedy. The
pride and power of Buddhism have been in her
ethical system. And a practical failure in this
direction would be a confession of failure in the
whole.

The education of the girls, as in Eastern coun-
tries generally, is a far less important matter, as compared
with that of the boys. In the monasteries, of
course, only boys and young men are received and
taught. To the other schools and to the Sunday
schools both boys and girls are admitted, but the
latter are often on a different level from any monks
in the monasteries, but with the exception of a recent establishment near the centre
of the island, in which an education and training
is given to Burmese girls, parallel and
served as a school for girls, at an early age,
and remained

180 EDUCATION

years resident in the monastries. If
it was intended that he should return to the life of
a layman, he left school at the age of twelve or
early, having, in addition to religious instruction,
been taught reading and writing and the elemen-
tary rules of arithmetic. The boys who were
designed for a monastic life remained permanently in
the monastery, and received further instruc-
tion in the Vinaya and Abhidharma, and later
also in the Suttas. In the ordinary curriculum the
religious teaching was confined to the life and
sayings of Gautama and the stories of his previous
castings (Cetas, 'Jataka'); the points it was com-
mitted to memory, and also a few simple prayers
and hymns of praise in Pali.

The establishment of Government and mission
schools has had the effect of widening the boys
to a great extent from the monastries
schools, and has received their entire education
in other institutions, it is generally true that
through life their knowledge of, and attachment
to, Burmese rule and doctrine are of a much less
marked character than is the case with most of their fellow-countrymen. In some instances also
the kyauk serves the purpose of a preparatory
discipline, and after three or four years at the
monastery the boys are sent to receive their
education at a school under Government or mission
control. It is still true, however, that the great
majority of the people owe their training and
knowledge to the monasteries. The last Census
Report states that the percentage of the whole male
population of the country is literate, and this
result must be ascribed almost entirely to the mon-
astic teaching. Within recent years attempts
have been made from without to raise the standard
of the monastic schools, and those that have been
will be of great benefit to Government in
spection and accept the Government conditions
and code have been placed on the list for a grant-
in-aid. These overtures, however, have been re-
ceived with a measure of reluctance and suspicion;
and no great progress has been made. As in
Ceylon, and under the influence of similar motives,
government, has been given to the Church; it was
founded on native initiative, where instruction in
Buddhist doctrine and practice takes the place of
the Christian teaching in the schools established
by missionary agencies.

That the greatest influence upon the Burmese nation
of the monastic instruction in the past has been
beneficial there can be little doubt. The results
of the system were twofold. Although the
training was very elementary, and, as regards the lay
portion of the population, ceased at an early age,
it nevertheless imparted a character and tone of
literacy, and placed the whole people on a higher
level of interest and knowledge. No Burman need
be, or as a rule is, so illiterate, as he was
able to read and write. And thereby, both by the
mental discipline and by the stimulus to symp-
athy and thought, his outlook was widened and
opportunities were afforded of further development
of mind and character. The cumulative effect of a
universal training in the elements of knowledge,
perpetuated and enforced by custom and religious
habit through many generations, although it
might not carry his individual very far, could not
but exercise a broadening and elevating influence
upon the nation as a whole. The Burman stands,
and has stood, on a high level as compared with many
civilised nations, in respect of the mental progress
of the same origin and kin. And it is reasonable to
place a part at least of his progress and superiority
in the credit of his schools.

The second result has been on the side of ethics
and religion. The teaching of the monastic schools has tended powerfully to the support of the national
Buddhist faith. Every Burmese monk was instructed
in the history and doctrines of Buddhism, and left
school with a more or less intelligent knowledge of
the principles of his religion, and a reverence for
its ideals. The 'three jewels'—the Buddha, the
Law, and the Community (Buddha, Dharma,
Sangha)—represents a reality to him; his
sympathies and interest were enlisted at the most
impressive age in favour of the interpretation
of life and duty which Buddhism offered. The hold
of the Buddhist religion upon the heart and thought
of the people is greater than in many countries
domestic, and the faith itself preserved in compara-
tive purity. Morally the teaching has not perhaps
exercised the restraining influence that might have
been expected. At the present day the evil ex-
ample and the low standard of living of many of
the monks counteract the good effects which might
have been anticipated from the lofty theory and
precepts of ethics which Buddhism inculcates. It
is probable that in early times the moral power of

the religious teaching of the schools was greater, but was essential and indispensable to the discontent lives of the monks themselves. It has, moreover, been preservative of much that is good in the national life, and through all has declared a standard of correct living, and has promised and maintained a national consciousness of right and wrong.

Until the establishment of British rule no systematic instruction was provided for Burmese girls, and the boys were trained in Chinese and Buddhist schools. Nunneries, however, existed, and an order of nuns, methilah, but they were comparatively few in number and of little knowledge or influence. Part of their duty was to visit the women in their homes and give religious teaching. In a few instances also schools on a small scale were established in connexion with the nunneries, where an elementary education was offered on similar lines to that of the monasteries. There was no regular system, however, and it appears to have depended on the inclination or caprice of the nuns themselves whether any teaching work was undertaken. Little was done to influence the present time. Since the introduction of British Government, lay schools for girls as well as for boys have been established in considerable numbers under native direction. Buddhist schools are found frequently in competition with the Government or mission schools. The work done in them is of a similar character, and the curriculum is the same as in the schools for boys. The standard also of effectiveness is being raised under the stimulus of competition and the influence of example, and in larger numbers the teachers employed are of certified rank.

3. In Annam and Cochin China native schools are found widely distributed in some instances, but apparently they have had no direct relation to Buddhism. In Sikkim also and the Buddhist States on the north and north-east border of India the monks occasionally undertake the duty of giving instruction, or gather around them a few pupils as opportunity offers. There exists, however, no system or rule, and the occasional practice can hardly be regarded as having exercised any appreciable influence on the character or capacity of the people.

4. China.—The Buddhist zeal for learning, which was dominant in China in the early centuries, appears to have declined in the present time. The monks themselves are almost without exception uneducated and ignorant men, who are not held in any respect by the people, and are incapable of giving instruction in any real sense of the term, even if they possessed the will. There are, therefore, no native Buddhist schools in which a directed and definite attempt might be made to inculcate the principles of religion or to spread knowledge. The education of the country is entirely Confucian and based upon Confucian ideals (see EDUCATION [Chinese]), with which the Buddhist monks have no concern; and the children trained in the native schools learn to regard the monks with indifference and even contempt. Within recent years large numbers of the monasteries have been reclaimed by the Chinese Government, to be used as secular schools on modern lines, and the monks have been ejected.

Within the monasteries also the training given to the novices has been of the searest description, and has to meet elementary necessities. For the most part the pupils who entered the monasteries with a view to the monastic life were drawn from the lowest classes of the population. They were, therefore, as a rule possessed of little aptitude or desire for learning. The usual vows are imposed, and the pupils are then taught by the abbot or senior monk sufficient to enable them to take their part in the general services and ritual of the monastery and in the recitation of masses. Beyond this the training seems never to go. The result has been, and is, that among a nation by whom learning is held in high honour the Buddhist monks as a class are despised, and they exercise no influence for good. Buddhist monasteries also exist; but the monks no more command the respect of the people in general than do the monks. For a few are received in the temples, but they undergo the usual ceremonies of initiation, with shaving of the head; but no schools for girls are found in connexion with them, nor are any of the nuns definitely engaged in teaching.

The revival of interest in Chinese Buddhist literature on the part of some native scholars is due almost entirely, as in Ceylon, to example and incentive from the West. The literature is very extensive, and consists of translations of sacred books made from the Sanskrit or Pali, of many of which the originals are no longer extant. It is, therefore, of the greatest value from the point of view of Buddhist study to be preserved. The subject has entirely neglected by the Chinese people themselves in favour of the Confucian Classics, and has exercised no educative influence upon the nation at large, affecting either the religious or the ethical progress of any kind. Buddhism in China, in contrast to its attitude and standing in some other countries, seems to have been overcome by mental and spiritual inertness and lethargy, and to have lost all sense of it as a religion, or influence in the intellectual life and history of the nation.

It is not without interest, also, to note that the defective condition of Buddhism in China has aroused the sympathy of some of the more active and spiritually minded Buddhist churches of Japan. Proposals have been made to send Buddhist missionaries from Japan to open Buddhist mission schools in China, where a free training should be given to the children of the poor, with the object not only of extending a true knowledge of Buddhist principles and teaching, but of promoting civilization and education in general. It is very probable that thus, and in other ways, the newly awakened readiness in China to admit Western learning and instruction from without will show itself in a revived interest in and appreciation of a faith to which the people and land have owed much in the past, and the previous neglect be followed by a period of awakening and activity.

5. Japan.—In the larger sense of the term, Japan owes more educationally to Buddhist influence and instruction than perhaps any other nation, with the possible exception of the Burmese; and the Japanese have shown greater power of assimilation of teaching and example, both intellectual and moral. H. H. Chamberlain, whose knowledge of 'Things Japanese' was unrivalled, writes:

All education was for centuries in Buddhist hands; Buddhism introduced, introduced methods, moulded the folklore of the country, created its dramatic poetry, deeply influenced politics and every sphere of social and intellectual activity. In a word, Buddhism was the teacher under whose instruction the nation grew up.1

The same writer adds that Japanese scholars are usually forgetful of the fact of the paramount influence of Buddhism during the early and formative centuries of the national life. That influence had been deep and strong and lasting. And, although Buddhism was a religion disbelieved and disowned in Japan forty years ago in favour of Shintoism, its moral teaching and ideals, which are those of the Mahayana school, remain effective, and are probably increasing their strength.

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hold upon a large proportion of the more thoughtful minds of the nation. As a formal religion, Buddhism is now to a considerable extent ignored in Japan, and is not likely to re-assert an extended sway over the young in the future. As intimated above, however, of her more or less continuous ascendency, the Buddhist missionaries were the instructors of the nation in every department of learning, and their influence was profound; and they have left a deep and permanent mark upon us in every department of the national life. In no country, not even in Ceylon or Burma, has Buddhism had a greater opportunity, or made a more effective and, on the whole, beneficent use of the opportunity put into her hands.

The details of the educational history it is impossible to trace in the absence of direct evidence or of documentary records. Buddhism was introduced into Japan from Korea in the middle of the 6th cent.; and it is probable, therefore, that Korean monks took a large part in the preaching and dissemination of Buddhist principles. Korean civilization was ascendant, of Chinese original, and was wholly, or almost wholly, exotic. Although it entered Japan by way of Korea, it was essentially Chinese in method and character, and Chinese monks took the teaching imparted by them to both the Buddhist religion and to a knowledge of the arts and sciences which it had made its own in the land from which it was derived. What might have been the effect of the introduction of Chinese civilization apart from the mingled and gentle influence of Buddhist teaching it is impossible to determine. The two were intimately conjoined. And the latter was the agent or medium through which the former reached the hearts of the people, and moulded their habits and lives.

Before the opening of Japan there existed schools taught by the monks, known as tero-korye, 'temple-luans.' They were not universal, or in connexion with every monastery; but that they were to be found in effective working in most parts of the country is proved by the fact that nearly all the male population were able to read. Attendance at these schools was usually compulsory, and it is probable that the education given did not, in the country districts at least, go much beyond the elements of reading and writing. The Buddhist schools for women, on the other hand, were, it may be assumed, always under the direction of nuns. As a result of these schools a large proportion of the women under the old régime in Japan were literate in the sense of being able to read. In more recent times the system of national education, with compulsory attendance in the primary grade schools from the age of six to the age of twelve years, has for the most part superseded these schools, which find it difficult to maintain themselves in competition with the Government institutions. A few remain, chiefly for the benefit of the poorer classes; and some Buddhist schools of a higher grade have been established, supported by private interest and contributions. In these lay teachers are employed as well as monks. The total number, however, is small, and the influence upon the general education of the country is very restricted; for the Government system is so complete in its provision for education, from the lowest grade to the highest University and post-graduate requirements, that there is little room or opportunity for private enterprise. The curriculum of the schools in secular subjects conforms to that of the Government regulations. In addition, Buddhist doctrine is taught—probably in no instance to any great extent—and the principles of Buddhist morality are inculcated. There are also a few girls' schools of this class, but they have little or nothing to do with the nunneries, and the nuns do not teach in them.

In all the monasteries, provision is made for the training of the younger monks in Buddhist doctrine and practice. The sacred books are studied and expounded, and the principles of the faith explained and enforced. Many of the monks are men of considerable learning as well as of piety. An increasing interest in the traditions and tenets of the various sects; and in no direction has the tendency to a religious revival shown itself more clearly than in the emphasis laid upon the devotional and spiritual element in the teaching of the Buddhist books. In the country districts there has been little movement or awakening of interest. In the larger towns, however, partly no doubt with the polemical aim of counterworking Chinese teaching and the influence of Christian missionary schools, a considerable increase of zeal and activity has been manifest, which endeavours by direct instruction, as well as by the Press, to confirm the principles of the faith in monks and the people. And the monasteries have become, at least in some instances, centres of religious thought and of a real literary culture, which cannot fail to be of influence on the nation.

Buddhist Kindergartens schools also exist, but in no great numbers. The suggestion of these has been adopted from the Christian missionary institutions, and both in form and methods the model of the latter has been followed. Within the limits of age and training there is naturally hardly any opportunity for distinctively Buddhist teaching, although the schools are under Buddhist control. In some instances Christian instructors have been employed, in view of their superior technical capacity and knowledge.

6. Korea, etc.—In countries where Buddhism has been a secondary influence, at least in recent times, as in Tibet, Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia, it is not easy to determine how much of educational practice and the teaching of the young, where this has been carried out at all, has been due to Buddhist example and effort. Training in doctrine and ritual is always given in the monasteries to the younger monks and novices, and usually includes a knowledge of at least the elements of reading and writing. It is hardly probable that in any of these branches was divided below the most elementary stage. During the most flourishing period of Buddhism in Korea, from the beginning of the 10th to the end of the 14th cent. of our era, all learning was concentrated in the hands of the monks, and politically, as well as ecclesiastically, their influence was dominant. They cultivated the sciences and shared in the government of the country, using the power and prestige of knowledge to secure temporal advancement. There was no attempt, however, to extend the advantages of learning to the laity, or any evidence that the schools of the monasteries were open to others than the monks and novices. In Siam also learning was cultivated, and in recent years has revived under royal patronage. It was confined, however, to a minority; and its influence upon the nation as a whole was small, although it is still held, as in Burma, to the preservation of Buddhism as the national religion and a permanent force in the national life. Astrology and magic also in some instances, especially in Tibet, have entered into the curriculum. But the introduction of these has been due not to Buddhism but to the primitive Nature or other worship upon which Buddhist forms and doctrine were imposed.

Under ordinary circumstances there did not exist in any of these countries a system of educa-
tion for the Buddhist laity. Individual monks might, and probably did, gather around them a few pupils, to whom of their own free will they imparted elementary instruction, teaching them out of the limited store of their own knowledge. The practice, however, was infrequent, and seems to have entirely died out. The almost universal condition of comparative ignorance and neglect is, indeed, in striking and not pleasant contrast to the habits and life of the early centuries, when, in Central Asia at least, the Chinese travellers make reference to a stirring intellectual life in the large cities, and monastic establishments on a considerable scale with eager students of the Buddhist writings.

It is evident that the influence of Buddhism was at that time much greater than at the present day, and was exerted in the direction of literary culture and pursuits. Recent discoveries by M. Aurel Stein and others have tended to corrobortate the Chinese accounts of the flourishing condition of the Buddhist faith.

The conclusion to be drawn from a survey of the whole is that, with the exception perhaps of Burma, the early efforts of Buddhism for the promotion of educational training and advancement have not been maintained. Japan ranks next to Burma in regard to the degree in which Buddhist discipline and training have exerted a real influence upon the general population; and it is far in advance of Burma in the richness and variety of its intellectual interest. Ceylon is overshadowed by the religious antagonistic influence of the religions of India; but partly for that reason, partly in opposition to the religion of the West, Buddhism is there making a great effort to free itself from foreign admixtures, to estabish the purity of its own teaching, and to keep and strengthen its hold upon the thought and training of the young. It is, indeed, too early as yet to determine, or even to forecast, what the effect will be of the religious reactions within Buddhism. It is not a little remarkable that after a long period of stagnation and decay there is an almost universal awakening on the part of Buddhists themselves to an interest in their own history and doctrines, and a zeal for the maintenance of the faith, and even for its extension amongst foreign peoples. Nor is the movement by any means confined in the East to Buddhism alone. The efforts of the latter, however, are naturally more striking, because of the literary culture and the education of the mind and thought. Such an appeal, made on behalf of an ancient faith with a widely renowned and honourable past, cannot fail to establish sympathy and respect, even among those who believe that the practice and discipline of the faith are inconsistent with the best interests of mankind, and its teaching out of harmony with the highest truth.

LITERATURE.—There is not much literature that can be cited upon the subject of education in Buddhism, and there is no work that attempts to give a connected view of the whole. The narratives of the Chinese monks have all been translated into English as follows: Fa-Hien, Record of Buddhist Kingdoms, tr. J. Legge, Oxford, 1838; Hien Tsang, Journeys to India and Tibet, 2 vols., London, 1904-05; T. Watkin, A Record of the Buddhist Religion, tr. A. Tukakuto, Oxford, 1899. Works on Buddhism in its various aspects, a few may contain more or less detailed reference to the training of the monks, e.g., R. C. Colebunston, Buddhist Ethics, London, 1879; H. F. C. von Bissing, Manual of Indian Buddhism, Strasbourg, 1883; C. A. Schleich, Chinas, China, 2 vols., Oxford, 1879; P. H. Kirman, Manual of Indian Buddhism, Strasbourg, 1869; H. F. C. von Bissing, Manual of Indian Buddhism, London, 1910; S. W. K. White, Buddhism, London, 1909; G. C. C. White, Buddhism, Story of Korea, London, 1911; M. Aurel Stein, Ancient Khedive, Oxford, 1907; and Ruth of Desert City, London, 1912. The records of Buddhist education in India are most fully expanded by Baron Kuscheik, Japanese Education, London, 1890, and by an earlier practitioner, P. S. Cha, x., xil., etc. The Governments of Ceylon, Burma, and Japan issue annual reports on education, which are the authoritative statements in the several countries. See also the art. on BURMA, BURMA ECONOMY, CHINA (Buddhism in), etc.

A. S. GEDEN.

EDUCATION (Chinese).—As no nation can vie with China in the alleged antiquity of her literary origins, so perhaps no nation surpasses her in the importance attached throughout her history to education.

'real,' in Chinese. 'letters were valued solely as an aid to politics, and scholarship as a proof of qualification for civil employment'; and, if in later times 'letters began to assume the position of a final cause,' still civil employment was still maintained, and these four classes into which Chinese society is divided—scholars, agriculturists, artisans, and traders—scholars take precedence. But for the word translated 'scholar' the distinction gives this: 'officer, soldier, minister, learned man, scholar, gentleman'; and 'gentleman' perhaps best covers all that a Chinese scholar should be. The ideal scholar is thus described: 'Early and late he [the scholar] studies with energy, waiting to be questioned. . . . The scholar's garments and cap are all fit for dressing and he is careful in his walks and in his actions; . . . he seems to have a difficulty in advancing, but retires with ease and readiness; and he has a shrinking appearance, as if wanting in power.' His guards are his studies, that he may be in waiting for whatever he may be called to; he attends well to his person, that he may be ready for action. 'With the scholar friendly relations may be cultivated, but no attempt must be made to constrain him; . . . he may be killed, but he cannot be disregarded . . . he may be gently admonished of his errors and failings, but he should not have them enumerated to him to his face.' The scholar considers himself the model of science and good faith to be his coat-of-mail and helmet; propriety and righteousness to be his shield and buckler; he walks along, bearing a scroll over his head benevolently opened, holding righteousness in his arms before him; the government may be violently oppressed, the people oppressed; the doctor may fail, but there is the way in which he maintains himself. . . . if the ruler responds to him, he does not dare to have any hesitation (in accepting office); if he do not respond, he does not have recourse to flattery. . . . The scholar lives and has his associations with men of distinction, with the intellect, the arts are the subjects of his study. . . . The scholar learns extensively, but never allows his researches to come to an end; he does what he does with all his might, but he is never weary . . . The scholar, when he hears what is good, tells it to his (friends); and, when he sees what is good, shows it to them. . . . Gentleness and goodness, respect and attention, generosity and large-mindedness, humility and courtesy, the rules of ceremony, singing, and music, these are the qualifications and manifestations of humanity. The scholar possesses all these qualities in unison and has them, and still he will not venture to claim a perfect humanity on account of them—such is the honour (he feels he has earned); and the human being (he declines it for himself). The scholar is not cast down, or cut from his root, by poverty and mean condition; he is not elated or exhausted by the divorce of the world and himself. He is styled a scholar' (Li Chi, xxvi. 5-39 (SBE xxvii. 400-401). Such a sketch shows us the ether of Chinese education, and is the most prevailing as pertaining to come from Confucius himself.

In very ancient times there was an official whose title has been translated 'Minister of Instruction.' His functions were described by C. Boas as 'to teach the multitudes all moral and social duties how to discharge their obligations to men living and dead, and to spiritual beings' (SBE xxvii. 231 n.), it is not easy, however, to discover through what various official functions. The most vivid glimpse we get of
ancient education is in the Analects, which records the intercourse between Confucius and his disciples. In his 22nd year Confucius came forward as a public teacher. He taught all who, attracted by his reputation, were willing and able to receive his instructions, however small the fee they could afford. His school was peripatetic, and the teaching conversational. Its note is struck in the opening sentences of the Analects: 'The Master said, Is it not agreeable to hear the constancy of perseverance and application? Is it not delightful to have friends (fellow-students) coming from distant quarters?' His themes were the Book of Poetry, the Book of History, and the maintenance of the Rules of Propriety. He taught ethics, devotion of soul, and truthfulness. He attached great importance to the ancient poetry as an instrument for stimulating the mind and assisting in self-contemplation, and to music, which, in his opinion, as in that of Plato, could, according to its kind, either deprave or correct the mind (cf. Shun Tien, ch. v.).

Such instruction as that given by Confucius to his disciples may be compared with tutorial instruction of University students, and implies some preliminary opportunities of learning. We find survivals from ancient times the names of schools of various grades, and the definite teaching given, the names of their organization and scope. Perhaps they were only for the children of men of rank, though they may have been imitated by the non-official classes. Probably in those early times education was left largely to private enterprise, as it has been in later periods. The Sacred Edict expressly commends the founding of a family school. A wealthy man may invite a teacher and start a school for his children and his friends, perhaps even for all the children of his clan or village; or a whole village may unite and open a school, the expenses of which are met by fees or by a contribution from the public funds of the village. In the larger towns colleges may be started pretty much in the same way. Such schools, not otherwise graded than by the ability of their teachers, have been the nursery of all China's scholars. Home education, in the narrower sense of the importing of book lore by parents to their children, has never counted for much in China. The mothers of China are for the most part too ignorant to give instruction. Even when the parents do not hold good for the fathers, still, opinion is rather against a parent acting also as teacher (Mencius, bk. iv. pt. 1. ch. 18). Home influence, however, is felt indirectly. It is well to tell a child that he has 'no home training' is reckoned a severe rebuke by reason of its oblique reflexion on his parents. One of the Odes contains the lament of a father over his indolent son; in another it is said, 'Our mother is wise and good; but among us there is none good.'

A well-known anecdote of Mencius' mother both exhibits her solicitude to exact a right influence on her son's character, and dates the beginning of that influence in his pre-school days. One day Mencius asked his mother what the butcher was killing pigs for, and was told that it was to feed him. Her conscience immediately reproved her for the answer. She said to herself, 'While I was carrying my boy in my womb, I would not allow the butcher to kill the pigs, and I ate no meat which was not cut properly—so I taught him when he was yet unborn. And now to teach him to lie by deceiving him—this is to teach him untruthfulness.' Accordingly she went to the butcher's and bought a piece of pork for Mencius.

The education of a Chinese youth was thus left to the schools and the parents. The official education, of course, might be accessible to him. But, though there have been no Government schools, it would ill become one who writes from the Chao-Chow Prefecture to remember the debt it owes to Han Wén-kung (A.D. 765-824). How powerfully education in any district may be fostered by an intelligent and energetic official. Moreover, it must not be supposed that the influence of the Chinese Government has not been effective, in favour of education. That influence has been brought to bear on the minds of all the sons of the great system of competitive examinations. The germ of the system may be found in the post-official examinations already in existence in the time of Shun (2255 B.C.), who every three years examined into these children who had been brought under him, degrading the undeserving and promoting the deserving (Shun Tien, ch. v.). But in its development this post-official examination system has been overshadowed by the post-official. The system may be said to have reached its full development in the Ming period, and was until recently continued under the Manchu rule. The whole Empire was knit together in a great network of examinations for an ascending scale of degrees, kua-t'ai, chu-jen, chin-shih, held periodically in each county, prefecture, and province, and culminating in an examination for admission to the Imperial Academy (Hanlin, or Hanlin Academy). Mencius (Hanlin, ch. v.), however, does not appear to have been interested in the examinations. He asks, in the text of performance, got his name on the register of scholars, he was bound to present himself periodically at the examinations for the degrees he held, even though he did not aspire to a higher.

The primary object of this system of examinations was to obtain able men for State service. While securing this, it gave a great stimulus to education, but at the same time it reduced it, at least, to a narrow uniformity. In more ancient times, candidates were examined in the rules of propriety, music, archery, horsemanship, writing, and arithmetic, to which were afterwards added such subjects as law and military science. But latterly, however, the ancient names have been retained, what has been sought is neither varied accomplishment nor a mass of acquired knowledge, but rather an intimate acquaintance with the classical books and an exquisite facility in Wen-li (the literary language) both in prose and verse, together with skill in penmanship.

A boy who begins to attend school—usually at the age of 7 or 8—on the reason days of each of his life, marked by the bestowal on him of a new name chosen by his teacher. He starts at once, with loud-voiced repetition, to memorize the books which are the scholar's ornament, beginning with the Thousand Character Primer or the Three Character Classic, and passing on to the more strictly classical books. Not till the memory has been well drilled is a beginning made in explaining the meaning of the books memorized, the explanation being a midrash founded, in the case of the classical books, on the commentaries of Chu Hsi (A.D. 1130-1200). The necessity of such explanation is obvious if it is borne in mind that Wen-li, in which the books studied are composed, never has been a vernacular medium anywhere in China at any time of her history. Passages with his reading, the pupil is taught penmanship and composition in all these. This pupil, as he proceeds, especially with a view to excelling in the famous 'Eight-legged Essay.' The result of years of such training is the production of a ripe Chinese scholar, in knowledge a child, intellectually a force a giant, his memory prodigious, his apprehension quick, and his taste in literary matters exquisite (Martin, Hanlin Papers, 1st ser., p. 38). The fact already mentioned, that Wen-li is not the mother-tongue

1 A somewhat parallel of 'vatures for degrees in university subjects needs only to be mentioned.'
of any Chinaman, helps to explain why, in spite of all the importance attached to education, the percentage of illiteracy in China is so high. Martin estimated that the proportion of those who can read understandably is not more than 1 in 20 for the male sex, and 1 in 10,000 for the female. Not even the better schools are all with Chin and Confucian education, as the great majority are, and of these many are engaged in the 'Family Instructions' of Chu Tsu, are accepted as standard works. One would like to include that solitary example of Chinese preaching, the official expositions of the Sacred Edict on the 1st and 15th of each month; but the exposition is too full of formalism, and its influence nil. Of the Sacred Edict itself it is said (Martin, Hanlin Papers, 2nd ser., p. 325) that 'nothing, since the discourses of Mencius, gives a greater show of what is required, but the kind of morals inculcated by the head of the nation.' Of inalienable, but doubtless great, effect in moulding character are the numerous proverbs, with their pithy statements of morality and prudence.

The present condition of education in China is very different from that outlined above. Under the new régime, which may be conveniently dated from 1902 (establishment of Ministry of Education; note also decree of Oct. 1905 abolishing the old system of examination for degrees), the Government has issued an educational programme, with schools of all grades up to a University. The published code is interesting as showing what is aimed at, but has less in it that is peculiarly Chinese, being based on Western systems. One notes with satisfaction the wider range of studies, the place given to ethics and to physical drill, and the recognition of female instruction. Western textbooks also indicate an advance in educational methods. The working of the scheme varies according to the interest of the officials in each locality. There is an inevitable shortage in the supply of competent teachers, so that we find schools well equipped with apparatus which no one can use; and further obstacles easily arise from the fact that each locality has to bear the financial burden of its schools. If the difficulties at present, still, with all drawbacks, the situation is full of promise; and one may hope that, when things have settled down under the republican regime, more rapid advance will be made in organizing a system of national education.

In view of the importance in education of the religious element, which is ill provided for by the teaching of ethics supplemented by a perfunctory worship of Confucius, much may depend on the attitude that the educational authorities take up towards Christian pupils and teachers, and towards schools under Mission auspices which have a share in the burden of furnishing the schools. Existing Mission schools of all grades (if they are educationally efficient) and the projected Christian University may be most useful, directly and indirectly, even though they fail to secure recognition as part of the Government educational system.

And, indeed, in complaining of the non-recognition of educational institutions under foreign control, and teaching a religion the foreign associations of which are still prominent, it is easy to become unreasonably forgetful of the point of view naturally taken by the rulers of an ancient and proud people inspired by a lately awakened patriotism.


EDUCATION (Greek).—Introductory.—What form education took in the first period of Greek history, we have already told with hot tears and of sand and silk and veins. The Chinese have ever been imitators of the ancients, and female literary education has therefore been neglected, though, of course, literary labours are by no means unknown. Of more internal educational influences may be mentioned the constant issue of old and new tracts, hortatory and moral, in the case of which such as the 'Family Instructions' of Chu Tsu, are accepted as standard works. One would like to include that solitary example of Chinese preaching, the official expositions of the Sacred Edict on the 1st and 15th of each month; but the exposition is too full of formalism, and its influence nil. Of the Sacred Edict itself it is said (Martin, Hanlin Papers, 2nd ser., p. 325) that 'nothing, since the discourses of Mencius, gives a greater show of what is required, but the kind of morals inculcated by the head of the nation.' Of inalienable, but doubtless great, effect in moulding character are the numerous proverbs, with their pithy statements of morality and prudence.

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EDUCATION (Greek)

about 322, the year of Aristotle’s death. With him ancient Greek thought and ideals ended; though the spirit of the Athenian system of education did not die, but was destined to spread and to exercise a powerful influence in Rome and in the elder Mediterranean region.

1. Homicric times.—Attempts have been made to picture Greek education during the period when the Homeric poems arose (650-750 B.C.). The evidence in Homeric bards, however, and any inferences must be very uncertain. The speeches of Achilles, Nestor, Odysseus, and other heroes, with their perspicuous argument, their repartee, irony, and pathos, imply that, while the Iliad was taking shape, orators existed who could speak, and audiences existed who could appreciate the spoken word. Phoönix claims (II. ix. 443) to have taught Achilles to be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds: μὲνιὶ ρ. τριγμάτων προκείμενος τε ἐπίγραμμα. In those days, however, mental culture came mostly from singing and lyre-playing. Bodily training consisted of dancing, wrestling, swimming, running, and such like; and these would be accepted a captain (άρχοντας), who had won his comrades. By precept and example, the father would instil religion and morality into his boys; while the girls would learn household duties and the rules of an upper-class Spartan life.

2. Dorian.—(a) Cretan.—“In the normal Greek conception,” says Jebb (Attic Orators, 1893, ii. 14), “Society and the State were one. The man had no existence apart from the citizen.” And, as an indigenous type of education inevitably harmonizes with the national ideal, Greek education is closely related to the Greek idea of citizenship. Hence, to take one aspect, we find education restricted to the male citizen, and to the superintendence and training of the boy. Among the Dorians, whether in Crete or in Lacedaemon, all whose birth entitled them to citizenship were bound to undergo the complete course of training. In Crete the males of a certain number of families shared the common meals (άρχοντας μαθητάς) in a common dining-hall (Aristotle, Pol. ii. 10. 3). There the boys of those families lived, and received an education from observing the conduct and listening to the conversation of their elders, one of whom was the παθάδευς, or superintendent of the boys of that house (Athenaeus, 143 E). Scantily clad both summer and winter, they passed through a hard training of body, mind, and character. They were exercised in gymnastics, in handling the bow and other weapons, and in fighting—sometimes single combats, sometimes house with house. They learned also to read; to sing hymns in honour of the gods, and songs to the fame of the brave; and to chant the laws, which were set to music (Strabo, x. 480, 482, 483; Ælian, Var. Hist. ii. 39). At the age of seventeen, having sworn to serve the State loyally and to hate its enemies, they were freed from the supervision of their elders and gathered in ἀγώνες, or derveshes. They remained members of these till marriage. Each dervesh was under a master of games (παθάδής), who had the power to fine or punish. He led them to the gymnasion for practice, and to the open country on hunting expeditions. One dervesh fought minic battles with another. The sole aim of the Cretan training was military.

(b) Sparta.—The military ideal was still more prominent in Sparta, where the Doriens tenaciously clung to a traditional system which had arisen when Sparta was a comparatively small band of invaders in the Peloponnesse, keeping men of alien race in subjection by main force. In Sparta, the Doriens possessed of full citizenship were numerically over-numbered by the μείζονες, who were personally free but politically unfriended, and by the helots, who were serfs attached to the land; and it was, therefore, necessary that the citizens should be made, as far as training could make them, men of courage and endurance.

As soon as a child was born, it was inspected by the elders of the tribe. If weakly, it was exposed (cf. art. CHILDREN [Greek], in vol. iii. p. 540); if strong, it was handed to the mother to remain in her care till the age of seven. Spartan discipline began early. “…To be brave, and any hardship, was part of their education. In 483 the Persians invaded Greece, and the Greeks were taught to fight, to fast, to keep from screaming, and to overcome the fear of being alone in the dark. The boys were taken to the public dinners (φαντάζαντ), where they learned to be Spartans like their fathers.

When they reached the age of seven, the State intervened and carried them off to be educated in public boarding-houses. They were arranged in θέατα, droves, and θόα, troops, under the strict charge of a State official, the τραχίονιος. Sleeping on beds of straw or reeds, with no blankets, going about barefooted, clad in a single garment, and stinted in regard to food, they became imbued to hardihood. Food they were encouraged to steal; but, if caught in the act, they were punished, to make them cunning forgers in war. The boys in each house were under a βούταγος, who was one of the εφέστες, or men over twenty years of age. It was his duty to superintend the boys so as to stimulate them to smartness in foraging, and to train them in concise answering of problems on behaviour and conduct. Severe punishment was all-pervading. Floggers (παλαικτές) attended the τραχίονιος; any citizen might inflict a beating; the βούταγος punished disobedience. Flogging—competitions were held to decide who could stand the greatest number of strokes (Xenoph. Resp. Laced. ii.). The main object of education was gymnastics, which aimed solely at developing warlike qualities, such as bodily activity and powers of endurance. The boys learned to run, leap, play ball, swim, throw the javelin and the discus, ride, and hunt. They also practised dancing. Some of the dances were religious; but most were war-dances, i.e. rhythmical marchings and evolutions (Lucian, de Saltationibus, 10-12; Athenaeus, 630 E, 631 A). The gymnastic training was severe, but it was not brutalized (Aristotle, Pol. v. [viii.] 4; Xenoph. op. cit. v. 9). Yet the Spartans were not without humanizing influences, though these had not free play. Their music was of a stiff character; and the Dorian mode was regarded as inspiring the hearer with firm and deliberate resolution which kept the mean between pusillanimité and fool-hardiness (cf. Milton, Par. Lost, i. 550 ff.). They sang hymns in praise of the gods, and chanted the laws of Lycurgus. Their other poetry, designed mainly to stir up bravery and patriotism, consisted of songs eulogizing their heroic ancestors and jeering at their war. Reading, writing, and arithmetic were not in great repute, and seem to have been introduced comparatively late. Even in the 4th cent. B.C. many Spartan citizens were declared to be unable to read or write (Ibocm. Panath. 1234 D). But, apart from reading, the Spartans possessed literary equipment, acquired by memory; nor were they without a turn for pithy and terse speech—what Plato calls φυλλωτός (Phyllos, Lys. 155 E). In addition to their national songs and hymns, they knew and valued Homer (Plato, Laws, 680 C).

In their eighteenth year, the youths left the boys’ houses, and, for the next two years, were styled ηλικίας, or young citizens. They were still under strict discipline. They were trained in arms and in military evolutions; in organized battles, team against team; in hunting; in musical drill and choral dancing. They were also dispatched on secret service (σπείρες), when
they prowled about the country, scouting, and, if necessary, slaughtering helots. On this service they learned to rough it, and had opportunity to display courage and resources (Plato, Laws, 633 B, C).

In Sparta the girls had a training similar to that of the boys (Xenoph. op. cit. 4). They practised physical exercises—dancing, running, wrestling, leaping, throwing the javelin and the discus—to make them worthy mothers of a sturdy race. The young maidens joined in choral songs and dances. The other Greeks remarked that, in spite of this training, Spartan girls were not less modest or well behaved. In the capacity of sisters, wives, and mothers, their opinion was respected, their censure dreaded, their commendation sought.

This system of education, with the stern discipline that pervaded Spartan life as a whole, created a nation of soldiers—brave, self-sacrificing, reverencing old age, devoted to the State, ready with a jest and a smile to die for their country. But their morality was of the State, not in the individual. When the Spartan was free from public constraint, and then, especially abroad, he was apt to degenerate. The system failed to develop the intellect and the imagination, and personal power of initiative (see, for various points, Plato, Laws, 14-16, xiv-xvii).

3. Athenian.—(1) Aim and scope.—Athenian education can be treated in detail, for the sources of information are fuller. This is fortunate, for two reasons. First, the Athenian type was, with modifications, the general Hellenic type, except among the Dorians. Then, it is of greater intrinsic worth: it gave more play to the individual nature, and sought to effect a full and harmonious development of the whole man. Its limits, especially at first, was distinctly ethical. The different branches of education were designed not to produce scholars or musicians or athletes, but to develop and build up moral qualities. It is true that this goal was not always reached. Sometimes balance was upset by too much devotion to one or other of the branches, sometimes the end was lost sight of in the means. No better statement in brief of the Athenian system can be found than the passage from Plato's Protagoras (323 C—326 E). When the problem 'Can virtue be taught?' is started, Protagoras declares the teaching of virtue to be the main object of education. In his mind, the cradle to the grave, to be one round of instruction and admonition. Then follows the description of the Athenian training of the young.

'As soon as a boy understands what is said to him, his nurse, his mother, his pedagogus, and even his father, spare no pains for the sole purpose of making him as good as possible. At the very moment when he does any act or speaks any word, they point out to him that one thing is just, another is unjust; this is beautiful, that is ugly; this is holy, that is unholy; and they say "Do this," "Do that." If he obeys willingly, well and good: if not, they correct him with threats and with blows, like one straightening a piece of wood that is bent and warped. Then, when it is time for boys to go to school, their parents hand them over to the masters to pay for more attention to training in proper behaviour (εὐευθείαν) than to teaching letters and lyre-playing. The masters attend to this; and, when the boys have learnt their letters and are sure to understand what is written, just as formerly they understood what was said, the master places beside them on the benches the works of good poets for them to read—poems abounding in moral admonitions and in narrative, elegies and panegyrics of the brave men of old. These the boys are forced to learn by heart, that they may zealously imitate them, and be inspired and desire to be like them. The master, in turn, does exactly the same. He gives heed to instructing self-control (ευχεροποιίαν) and to see that the boys do not go astray, when they have learnt to play the lyre, he teaches them the works of other poets—lyric poets too, before the age of twenty, to accustom his young charges to music. He teaches them the rhythms and harmonies to dwell as familiar friends in the souls of the boys, that they may be more refined, and, becoming more enamoured with good rhythms and good harmonies, may be more effective for speech and for action. Further, the boys are sent to the palæstra that their bodies may be strengthened to do yeoman service to their efficient intellect, and that a bad condition of body may not force them to play the coward either in war or in any other of the endless activities. This is what is done by the parents who can best afford it, that is to say, by the wealthy, whose sons are the earliest to go to school and the latest to leave.'

With this cf. Aristophanes, Clouds, 961 ff., where the old system is eulogised as the nurse of the name of Marathon; and Lucian, Anacharsis ἐν τῇ Γαγάναιᾳ, 20 ff.

It should be noted that in Athens, as in Greece generally, the lowest as a priest had nothing to do with education, and that there was no direct religious teaching. What religious training there was came through learning hymns to the gods, through the ritual of worship at home and in the temples, and through the public festivals. In Athenian education it was the poet, not the priest, that exercised a paramount influence. This enables us to understand Plato's attack upon poets and dramatists for the pernicious effect of their works on young and growing minds (Republic, 377-379).

In Athens, as in Sparta, education was not for all; but, since Athenian citi- enry was a larger proportion of the male inhabitants were educated.

(2) Mothers, nurses, pedagogoi.—It was the father, and not the tribal elder, that in Athens decided whether or not the child should be reared. Till the age of seven, children were cared for by mothers and nurses, who imparted the rudiments of learning in the form of nursery rhymes, myths about the gods, and tales of heroes, beast fables, as well as stories of ghosts and goblins—μούροι, ἑρωνα, ἑράλδη, λέων (Xenoph. Helen. iv. 4, 17; Lucian, Philopo. 31. 2; Theocr. E. 40; Strabo i, 10. 1). The (37A) had much to say about the ethical danger lurking in the myths and stories. To interest the child at this stage as well as later, there were the usual toys, amusements, and games—rattles,1 dolls, dolls' houses, boats, tops, hoops, swings, hobby-horses, balls, leap-frog, ducks and drakes, blindman's buff (μύθος, χαλέα μύθος, beetle-flying (μυλόβουτος), balancing on an inflated wineskin well (πολεοσ), in the gymnasium, or elsewhere; to look after his manners; and to behave if necessary. At times, the slaves selected were those who, from age or physical disablement were unfit for other tasks; or they were boorish and spoke with a bad accent. Such disqualifications made them incompetent to manage the older lads. The supervision lasted till the boys reached the age of sixteen or even eighteen (Plato, Lysis, 205 C, Laws, 604 C; Plutarch, de Educ. Puer. vii.).

3) Schools, schoolmasters, State supervision.—The rise of schools followed the employment of writing for literary purposes. We hear of school buildings in the beginning of the 6th cent. (Herod. vi. 27; Plutarch, Themis, x.), and they existed a hundred years earlier, if we may trust the statements of Isocrates (c. Timarch. 9 ff.) and Diodorus (xii, 12). In Athens, schools were both more numerous and varied in kind, being sometimes very inferior (Demosth. de Coron. 257 ff.=312 ff.). Teaching might be conducted in the open air—in some convenient nook of temple or temple, in disused temple or temple, in disused temple or temple. The schools were school buildings were not grand structures or elaborately housed. The head master sat in a high-backed chair, the other masters and the boys on stools and benches. The walls hung with

1 The renovated stones were the model of a rattle, sérkex (Aristotle, Pol. v. viii.16 ad init.).
writing-tablets, rulers, cases for manuscripts, and lyres (see, for example, the vase-paintings). The room might at times be adorned with statues of gods, muses, and heroes, and with pictures illustrating scenes from Homer. The Tabula Iliaca, now in the rock-cut necropolis of Nemea, is regarded as part of a series of these illustrations. The school day began soon after sunrise,—not such a variable hour in Athens as in our northern latitudes. Music was continued briefly after sunset. How the day was portioned out among the various subjects is unknown. Nor can the number of holidays be precisely stated. Schools would not open on public festivals and other general holidays. We find fugitive records of prizes given after public competition, chiefly for athletics, but also for music and letters.

The teacher of letters (γραμματής) was not highly honored, and consequently the best type of man was not always obtainable. 'He is dead, or he is teaching letters,' was a byword of any one who had unaccountably vanished. The presence in schools of pet leopards and dogs belonging to pet owners was not on record. The Areopagus would exercise a general oversight,—a function which the officials called συμφωνητής seem to have performed in later times. Custom, however, if not law, made a certain amount of learning general in Athens. How much that would vary with the standing and the desire of the parent. Though the Spartan severity of flogging did not exist in Athens, punishment was common and severe in all departments of education. In the home, too, the rod was not spared. The general opinion agreed with Menander's saying, 'A man unwhipped is a man untrained' (Xenoph. Anab. ii. 12). Herodotus, Xenocrates, and Aristotle trained the years immediately preceding manhood at eighteen.

The Athenian boy learned, first of all, to read intelligently—a considerable mental discipline, since in Greek writing the words were continuous as well as without punctuation. Next, he was taught to read with proper articulation and accent, and to bring out the melody and rhythm of the sentence. The secrecy of books in early times necessitated much oral work. It was not till the age of Pericles (409-429) that books became common. Slave labor was tolerably cheap, and they speedily came into school use. In spite of Plato's outcry (Protag. 329 A, Phaedrus, 275 f.), against the written word as lifeless compared with the spoken word, books played an important part in later Greek education. A good memory, then, was very important, particularly in the earlier period; and a great amount of poetry was learned by heart. Besides strengthening the memory, this roused the imagination, cultivated literary taste, stored the mind with moral maxims and homely wisdom, and stirred the boy to emulate the brave deeds of his forefathers. Homer was supreme, revered as the educator of Greece, the matchless guide in all affairs of life (Xenoph. Sympos. iii. 5, iv. 6; Plato, Rep. 606 E). Other poets were Hesiod, Theognis, Pindar, Solon, Mimnermus, and Tyrtaeus. Aesop's prose fables were also popular.

At first arithmetic was not taught as a mental discipline, but was learned as of practical utility. The Greek symbols for counting were clumsy to manipulate, and calculation was performed on the fingers, or with pebbles, or by means of the abacus. Later, when the educational value of mathematics was better appreciated, geometry as well as arithmetic was taught. Drawing did not become a school subject till the 4th century. Aristotle approved of it, because it trained the eye to appreciate beauty and enabled one to judge the money spent on theideal education. It began at an earlier age than at the Lyceum that boys learned to play. After the Persian War the aulos, or pipe, was in vogue, but later it fell into disfavor.

It distorted the voice. Empedocles (Anab. ii.) could not sing while playing; and its music was held to be exciting. The last reason is the strongest, and harmonizes with the Greek conception that music should be studied, not merely as an accomplishment to occupy leisure moments or entertain a social circle, but mainly as the chief developer of character. For music did more than stir the feelings, it created ethical qualities (Aristotle, Poet. v. [vii. 3]; Plato, Laws, 818).

(5) Music.—Originally music had a wide meaning, and was often used to indicate literature (Plato, Rep. 376 E) as well as music, the narrower sense to which the word came later to be restricted. In Greek schools, music was both vocal and instrumental. Though the music-master was called σάπεντός, it was not on the σάπεντον—a professional instrument—but on the aulos that boys learned to play. After the Persian War the aulos, or pipe, was in vogue, but later it fell into disfavor. It distorted the singing voice. Empedocles (Anab. ii.) could not sing while playing; and its music was held to be exciting. The last reason is the strongest, and harmonizes with the Greek conception that music should be studied, not merely as an accomplishment to occupy leisure moments or entertain a social circle, but mainly as the chief developer of character. For music did more than stir the feelings, it created ethical qualities. The different modes of music produced character in each a particular type of character. The Dorian, for example, was mainly, strong, and dignified; the Lydian, soft and effeminate; the Phrygian, passionate and exciting; the Ionian, very mild; the Mycenaean, mild; the Eolian, with words never alluded to them as the highest. The boys diligently learned by heart the verses of the lyric poets for the purpose of singing. They were carefully instructed in rhythm, taste, metre, and enunciation. It is this belief in the ethical importance of music that explains Plato's and Aristotle's demand for the State to regulate music in the schools, since only thus would proper rhythm and harmony be produced in the soul (Aristotle, Pol. v. [vii. 3] 5 and 7; Plato, Rep. 395 ff., Laws, 654, 812; Polybius, iv. 20. 4).

(6) Gymnastics.—The Greeks attached particular importance to gymnastics to write. Thus, the early period: exactly when, we do not know. From about the age of fifteen or of eighteen, a very large amount of time was devoted to gymnastic exercises; and all through life a citizen was expected to manage himself in training. It was his duty to be fit for war (Xenoph. Memor. iii. 12; Plato, Phaedrus, 229 C), and it was an object of ambition, especially for the leisureed, to possess a fine physical frame. Perfect bodily condition was necessary for good health, and as a basis for a sound and vigorous mind (Lucian, Amochorius, 15).

While using the term γυμναστική, we must distinguish the σαυτερία from the γυμνασμός. The former means, regularly, a private school for train-

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1 To distinguish the higher subjects from the others, the terms 'secondary' and 'primary' have sometimes been employed. We should, however, remember that, if used, the terms cannot bear their present-day precision of meaning.
The last years of the boy's training were very hard. In regard to diet as well as exercises. And it became clear to the wisest thinkers that this severe physical strain militated against intellectual work. The idealizing, also, of the athlete led to professionalism. Pure athleticism, instead of creating brave and strong warriors, merely brutalized; and the result was a body useless to the State, because disproportionately developed (Aristotle, Pol. v. viii. 4; Eurip. fr. Antioles; Xenophon, Elegies, ii. 1.

While the Athenians sought to foster the exercises that would develop pluck and intelligence, we miss among them what is considered an invaluable part of our school games—the forming of character and the members of which discipline themselves in self-government.

(7) Higher education: the Sophists.—In early days the instruction in ephebic and stadiarchs generally caused when the boy was about the age of fourteen. The sons of the wealthy might then do as they pleased; others must think of fitting themselves to earn a living. We should remember, however, that Athenians of all ages and ranks, though not at school, were always under the intellectual and aesthetic influences of their common life—influences emanating from rhapsodists and actors; from statues and architecture, from dramas and festivals. But about 450 B.C. the feeling arose that ability to read and write, to sing and play the lyre, to recite poetry, was not a complete education. The demand for a wider and more advanced course called forth a supply of instructors in all kinds of subjects—mathematics (comprising the science of number, geometry, astronomy, theory of music); rhetoric, political and literary; the art of disputation, literary criticism; grammar; etymology; correct diction; discrimination of synonyms; geography; natural history; rhythm and metre; dialectic; ethics. For a time the lecturers on these subjects—collectively designated the Sophists—dominated the general or liberal education of Greece. Some of the best known Sophists were Protagoras, Proclus, Gorgias, Polus, Thrasymachus, Euxen, Hippias, and Isocrates. The hoarders who flocked to them were of all ages, and many of the lectures must have been beyond the comprehension of younger minds; besides, some of the accomplishments and general culture (Plato, Rep. 518 C, 600 C; Protag. 314, 318, 349; Apol. 20 B). Plato and Aristotle vigorously assailed the Sophists on the score of superficiality and for believing education to be identical with the absorbing of intellectual results. But what the Sophists taught—especially grammar, style, interpretation of poetry, and oratory—had positive merits. Their method, however, was often marred by their preference, style to matter and of dazzling effect to accurate statement or reasoning (Plato, Protagoras, Gorgias, Sophist; Aristotle, Soph. Elench. i. xi. xxiv.; Aristoph. Clouds; cf. Ephebus, the sportsman, or in extenso.)

The deep interest in education at that period, as well as the searchings of heart amid the conflicting subjects and methods, may be gathered from the theories of education then set forth—Plato's in the Republic and the Laws; Xenophon's in the Cyropedia; Aristotle's in the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics. Though it belongs to much later times (c. A.D. 100), we may here mention Plutarch's sketch, De Educatione Puerorum.

(8) The ephebus.—On reaching the age of eighteen, the Athenian boy, though he did not yet receive full rights of citizenship, was no longer a minor. The State took complete charge of his training for two years. He had first to pass the scrutiny (debueia) of his township (ephebos), to see if he was of flawless descent and of mature age (Aristotle, Athen. Const. xilii). If he passed, he was registered in the roll (Aephebov orumastos), and was now ephebos.

Though this custom must be ancient, its origin is buried in obscurity. The word ephebus does not seem to occur in literature before Xenophon (c. 370 B.C.); and the earliest of the inscriptions—the earliest sources of information about the ephebe—begins in 324-3 (cf. IV. iv. 517 d).

In the temple of Aglauros the youth swore never to disgrace his arms or desert a comrade; to fight for home and temple; to leave his country better than he found it; to obey the magistrates and the laws; to oppose any violation of the constitution; and to honour the national temples and religion (Plut. viii. 106 f.; Plutarch, Alcibiad. xv.; Demosth. Pol. Log. 346 = 303). The ephebi of each tribe were under a superintendent (upoupsestos), who looked after their discipline and morality. Over all the ephebes and ephebi (see Jebb, Attic Orators, ii. 36 ff.)

1 Notably the work of Isocrates (see Jebb, Attic Orators, ii. 36 ff.)
with a shield and a spear. Any one whose father had died on the field of battle received a complete suit of armour. They now acted as patrols (epheboi), patrolling the frontiers (Xenoph. de Fuf. 2.4). Their duties were mainly guard-house (epheboi). The epheboi of each tribe were in succession stationed at the various points, and thus became familiar with the different localities. At the end of two years they were available for military duty at home and abroad.

Toward the close of the 4th cent. this service seems to have become voluntary, and, as a consequence, restricted to the wealthy. The number of epheboi decreased. Foreigners were admitted, and there was no age-limit. As time went on, intellectual studies were added,—literature, rhetoric, philosophy,—which by and by displaced the military training. We find a staff of professors, numerous students and students' clubs, a library,—in fact, what has been termed the University of Athens, drawing its members from all quarters of the civilized world (see W. W. Capes, University Life in Ancient Greece, 1887).

(9) Girls.—Unlike the Spartans, the Athenians permitted no kind of public education for girls. This was in keeping with the seclusion, almost Ophelian, of the women; the education of the upper classes was kept—a seclusion more or less common throughout Greece except among the Dorians. A girl-wife, fifteen years of age, is described by Xenophon (oeconom., vii. 5) as having been very carefully brought up to see and to hear as little as possible, and to ask as few questions as possible. In Athens, then, what girls learned they learned at home. Though some could read and write, very few received any intellectual training. They were taught to sing, to play the lyre, and to dance; bands of girls danced at the festivals. But it was chiefly in household duties that the Athenian girl was drilled. She must be able to spin and weave, to knit and sew, to cook, to superintend the female slaves, to nurse the sick, and generally to manage the household (Xenop. op. cit. vii. 6 ff.). Wise mothers were also examples to their daughters in purity of life and propriety of behaviour. Neither in private nor in public had Athenian women the status or the influence of their Spartan sisters. Plato's proposal (Rep. 461 ff.), that women should be educated along with men, was extremely audacious. No less was the admission of women to his lectures in the Academy (Diog. Laert. iii. 31). What provision was made in later centuries for female education, we cannot tell. As we learn from Thucydides, even in the last decade, records the selection of three masters to teach girls as well as boys. That the higher learning was unusual for Greek girls c. A.D. 100 may be inferred from Plutarch's epithet recommendation (Conjug. Preceptt, xviii.) that they should study geometry and philosophy, to preserve their minds from frivolity and superstition.

(10) Athens and Sparta.—Contrasted with Sparta, and its narrow but definite aim of creating a nation of sturdy warriors, Athens, while ever keeping in view the needs of the State and rounding off the boy's education with a military training, sought to make of the Athenian a statesman. The Spartans learned reading and writing because of their practical utility; the Athenians held that to hunt everywhere after the useful, is, as Aristotle remarks, to live as a child (met. 3 ad loc.), by no means befitting the high-souled and the free. In Sparta nothing was relied on but continual espionage: Spartan boys, writes Xenophon (Resp. Laced. ii. 11), could never evade a ruler's eye. The Athenians allowed the utmost liberty, and accustomed to the restraining influence of their common civic life (Pericles' speech [Thucyd. ii. 57 ff.]).


EDUCATION (Hindu) —Hindu education was one of the oldest features of their history. The Hindus have been accustomed to associate education, like all the other departments of their social life, with religion. As we shall see (§ 6), the youth of the "twice-born" classes were prepared for admission into the Hindu ranks by a solemn rite of initiation, which was immediately followed by a course of instruction in the sacred literature, dogmas, and ritual of the national religion; and hence they were offered to share with their brethren the privileges and obligations of the caste to which they belonged. This practice, sanctioned by that devotion to usage and custom which is characteristic of the Hindus, and which is founded in the beliefs that guide the course of the Hindu's life, has persisted down to the present day; and, though the people have now readily accepted the system of communal education which the British Government, pledged to an attitude of neutrality towards the multitudinous beliefs and usages of the native population, has organized, the duty of the parent to carry out the religious rites of education and moral training remains unaffected. The difficulty of reconciling the wide-spread desire of the people for the religious and moral training of the child with the danger of State interference with the divergent religious beliefs of its subjects, is one which the Government of India shares with those of many other peoples in the West.

2. Education during the Vedic and Brāhmaṇa periods.—The Vedic literature, composed or compiled by various poets, naturally involved a course of training in the due recitation of the hymns and, as these formule came to be adopted in religious and magical rites, where every word was momentous, and where even the poet of the reciter with difficulty, the system of training to fit the priest or medicine-man for the due performance of his office became increasingly apparent. We thus find in the Veda records of the meetings of nations to discuss religious topics, and of the issue of diplomas to students qualifying them for admission to the sacrificial rites, while those who failed to attain the necessary standard of knowledge were degraded to the rank of plebeians (Dign. x. 71, viii. 103. 5; M. M. Kunte, Pic- states of Aryan Civilization, 1880, p. 129 f.). This form of instruction, as the contents of the Veda underwent the criticism of interpreters, developed into the establishment of various classes of commentators (A. Weber, Hist. of Ind. Lit., 1882, p. 88; H. T. Colebrooke, Essays on the Rel., Philos. of the Hindus, 1858, p. 189; Veyhna Purāṇa, cap. i. iv., tr. J. H. Wilson, 1840, p. 294). The tendency increased, with the advancing development of ritual in the Brāhmaṇa period, when the education of the Brāhmaṇa student (brāhmaṇachārī) became fully organized.

"Instruction in Hinduism is not merely concerned with domestic traditions. The student travels to a distance, and attaches himself to now one, now another teacher of renown; and the wandering student must have learned the little to imbue the Brāhmaṇa with the feeling that they formed a class by themselves, in the midst of the small tribe of people into which Aryan India was at the time divided. This approach, which was at the time a novitate in morals, was a very protracted one, for" science, they used to say, "is infinite"
3. Education among Buddhists. — Among the Buddhists, education became fully organized in N. India, the establishment of the monastic communities gave a powerful influence to education. One of the most important of these seats of learning was the monastery (sahyadhamas) at Nalanda, near Rajagriha, the modern Rajgir in the Patna District, the headquarters of Indian Buddhism, founded by Asoka (V. A. Smith, 

4. Hindu monastic education. — The modern Hindu monasteries (math), such as those of the Jains and the ascetic orders like the Yogis, Sannyasis, or Udasis, are so carefully guarded from intrusion by European observers that little is known of the monastic organization or of the system under which the novices are trained. For a general sketch, see H. H. Wilson, Essays and Lectures on the Religions of the Hindus, 1861, i. 48 ff.; BG xv, pt. 1. 147 ff. The training, such as it is, is supervised by the prior (mahant). High priests, called Tambirans, of monasteries (mattam) in the Tamil country lecture to students (Comm. Rep. Madras, 1884, p. 67).

5. Education under pre-Brahmanism. — When Brahmanism revived in a new and more vigorous form after the decay of Buddhism, the education of the youth was regulated by the code of social duties, the Brahmins, who taught us in the Institutes of Manu and the other law literature, the former being originally a local code which assumed its present shape not later than A.D. 200, and the latter, a vast collection of local codes, including the religious and social life among all the higher classes of Hindus (A. Macdonell, Skr. Lit., 1900, p. 428). The restoration of Brahmanism to popular favour, and the associated revival of Sanskrit learning during the Gupta period, first became noticeable in the 2nd cent. A.D., were fostered by the Western satraps in the 3rd, and made successful by the Gupta emperors in the 4th cent. (V. A. Smith, Early Hist. of India, 1884, p. 287).

The systematic cultivation of the sacred sciences by the Brahmans began and for a long time had its centre in the ancient city of Nalanda, the school which collected the fragmentary doctrines, scattered in the older Vedic works, and arranged them for the convenience of oral instruction in brahins or strings of aphorisms. To the subjects which these schools chiefly cultivated belongs, besides the ritual, grammar, phonetics, the so-called Aghas of the Vedas, the sacred law also. The latter includes not only the precepts for the moral duties of the brahmin, but also the special rules regarding the conduct of kings and the administration of justice (C. Bühler, 'The Laws of Manu,' SBE xxv, Ex., xviii, at the end). A summary of the sacred laws is given under 'Sacred Books of the Aryans,' SBE i, iv, and xiv.

6. Education according to the Laws of Manu.

It must be remembered that this legislation is by no means the only code. Besides the Shatra being forbidden to fulfill the sacred law, except certain portions of it (x. 129, 127); to hear, learn, recite, or teach the Veda (iii. 156, iv. 99, x. 127); to receive spiritual advice from a Brāhman; and in times of distress a student may learn the Veda from one who is not a Brāhman.

The student was divided into three stages: the first stage of learning should first undergo initiation (upanayana), i.e. investiture with the sacred thread (yajnopaveśa) in the fifth year after conception (II. 29); he should be joined to the skin of a goat or a cow, or be-gan as an upper garment, while his under dress should be of hemp, flax, or wool (iii. 11); he should be provided with food by begging under strict regulations, and eat it with special precautions (ii. 468); after the rite of initiation, the teacher (dātari, guru) is responsible for his conduct; he must not instruct his pupil in the rules of personal purity, conduct, fire-worship, and childbirth. When the student has begun to study the Veda, he must sip water in accordance with the sacred law, join his hands (brāhmaṇāśī), clasp the fingers of both hands (I. 741). The rules of behaviour of the person towards his teacher are carefully prescribed. He must, during the period of instruction, i.e. until he is allowed a return (ūpanirasmā) after completing his course of instruction, do what is beneficial to his teacher; never offend him; fetch water, firewood, flowers, cowdung, earth, and the sacred āgra-gras for his use; controlling with the body, speech, organs, and mind, he must stand before him with joined hands; he must eat less than usual for eight days, and must not use less fine garments and ornaments, rise earlier, and go to bed later; he must not converse with his teacher while reclining, sitting, eating, or sleeping; he must not use the rules of meeting and addressing him (i. 106, 144, 192, 1972); whenever personal or material censure or fault; he must cover his ears, or leave the place, and he who defaces a teacher shall be smitten in a heavy fine (I. 201, v. 270). He is subject to various laws, all things excepting only the life being specially prohibited (I. 175 f.). A Brahman who serves his teacher in the absence of his father shall be regarded with the eternal mansion of a Brahman (II. 244). During the course of instruction he must study the whole Veda with the Brahmanas, or some explanations of the Vedic Sanskrit, he is to learn the Upanishads, and perform at the same time various prescribed austerities. He is to be present while his teacher, while under instruction, but provide a suitable reward for the Brahman who is in the condition of a master (i. 10), but a slave is prohibited. He is of the theory that the pupil shall live with his teacher for the fourth part of his life and the second part at home as a married householder (iv. 1). Casting off of a teacher is one of the most deadly sins (ix. 60); and the penalties for violation of the law are very severe, i.e. stones and the like (ix. 235, 237, xi. 49, 55, 104 f.). Such an offender is liable to numerous transmissions into brutes, trees, creepers, or noxious animals; but a form of penance assures purification (xii. 55, xi. 253). Buddhist students on the completion of their course are to be well received, for money gifts, or in any other way as an "impassurable treasure for kings" (vii. 82). The king shall protect the preceptors, and even if he is under instruction; the pupil is incapable of being a witness in a court of justice, and he is relieved from the payment of ferry tolls (vii. 27, 66, 497). Education was thus regarded as a chief stage (āśrama) into which the life of the Hindu was divided (M. Monier Williams, Grammar of the Hindi and Sanskrit Languages, 1882, p. 961 f.). An interesting survival of this rule is found in the custom at a modern Hindu marriage, when the bridegroom makes a formal attempt to start for Benares to undergo a period of study (śūtyātra), from which he is with difficulty dissuaded by his relatives. See a more detailed and analysis of these regulations in Calkuttas Rev. ill. 1845) 210 f.

7. Hindu education in later times.—(a) Under Muhammadan rule.—The effect of the Muhammadan conquest was disastrous to the Brahmin caste; the springs of princely liberality were dried up, many of the sacred texts were destroyed, and the great periodical festivals were in a great measure discontinued (A. Barth, 89 f.). Their sacred places, temples, monasteries, gates, and shrines were in many places destroyed. As an example, when Bakhtiyar Kiliji captured Bihār about A.D. 1267, most of the inhabitants of the place were Brahmins with shaved heads. They were put to death. Large numbers of books were destroyed, and when the Muhammadans saw them, they called for some persons to be killed, but all the men had been killed. It was discovered that the whole fort and temple were a place of study (Sir H. M. Elliot, Hist. of India, 1867-77, ii. 360). The enlightened emperor Akbār, however, was a patron of learning. The imperial government supported the study of several of the sacred books of the Hindus should be prepared (G. B. Malleson, Abhor, 1890, p. 166 f.):
large measure of success in the study of Sanskrit according to Western methods (ib. North-West Provinces, i. 8). The same may be said of Calcutta, now the Dacca and Madras, and founded in 1587, that of the Pandjik, known a little more Sanskrit than a few verbs, which without understanding them he recites at the domestic ceremonies of his clients. The use of English is at once more fashionable and lucrative, and the ambitious student devotes himself to it in preference to Sanskrit.

With the Hindus the decline of their higher institutions is one of the most extraordinary phenomena of the modern times. The belief is imprinted on the minds of the Brahmins that the advanced men of learning have gradually abandoned their study and passed it over to the British, who have voluntarily abandoned a course of study which is looked upon as produced conditions of success. (Rep. Educ. Comm. 60.)

It is, of course, possible that the growth of a spirit of nationality among the Hindus may tend to arrest the decay of the Brahmanical education, but increased attention is being given to the study of the Vedanta, and some enthusiastic believers in it have endeavoured to popularise it in Europe and America as a substitute for the classical type. At the more important centres of Hindu religious life, Benares, Mathura, Nasik, Madras, learned Brahmins still pursue the study of the Vedas on Oriental lines. But the average town or village Brahmin knows little more Sanskrit than a few verbs, which without understanding them he recites at the domestic ceremonies of his clients. The use of English is at once more fashionable and lucrative, and the ambitious student devotes himself to it in preference to Sanskrit.

Hindu education is more popular than ever. The Brahmins have a large number of students, and are anxious to secure more. The British have been kind enough to give them a large number of students, and are anxious to secure more. The British have been kind enough to give them a
at the top of his voice, and the encouragement to noise is found in the fact that the parents often compute the energy of the master as equal to the sound produced from the school. This is no exaggeration. I have myself heard villagers complain that our Government schools lack the swing and energy of the indigenous ones. The school bells ring at 9 o'clock and re-assemble at 2 in the afternoon. The concluding lesson is given at 3 for boys only. This the boys or girls engaged in two rows facing each other, while two of the older pupils are stationed at one end between the two rows, and dictate the multiplication tables, step by step, until the rest of the boys shout after them in chorus. When this is over, the school is dismissed, and the master personally conducts the younger children to their houses. The school nominally meets every day of the week, Sundays included. But the frequent holidays on account of the Hindu religious festivals, and the closure of the school a month on Amawiya or new-moon day and a month before full-moon day, far lessens the weekly and other holidays in English schools. In harvest-time, also, many of the rural indigeneous schools are entirely closed. It is still the practice in some indigenous schools, though taxation is rapidly giving way for, the pupils on the eve of Amawia or Paurnima to perform the ceremony of Kajjaja or state-worship. A quarter of an hour (one farthing), a betel-nut, half a seer (the regulation fee-257 bha. or avondra) of grain, a little saffron and turmeric, and a few flowers are laid upon the soul of each pupil as offerings to Sarassvati, the goddess of learning. Before these are placed the pen, ink-box, and then placed the slate for a few minutes on his head. The master afterwards appropriates the offerings. Crowded, noisy, and ill-regulated as the schoolrooms are, the majority of these schools is able to accomplish the main object, which is to teach reading, writing, and the native mode of arithmetic (166). Our return shows us nearly one-third of the pupils are able to read and write, and that about one-sixth know their tables. These statistics, however, are not based on any examination of the pupils, but on the opinions of the Pandits themselves. It appears to be generally agreed that some improvements inflicted upon the pupils in the indigenious schools are less barbarous and severe than they were twenty years ago. There is still, however, room for improvement in this respect (Rep. Educ. Comm. p. 179). For similar accounts of the methods of instruction, see ib. North-West Provinces. The Code of 1868, c. 24, art. 198. An early account of a Pili school in S. India will be found in the Travails of F. della Via in 1825 (ed. Hakluyt Society, 1862, ii. 287.); for India, generally, see C. O. Rep. Educ. Comm., Madras, 68; S. Mater, The Land of Charity, 1871, p. 154.

9. Origin and development of indigenous primary education.—The question of the origin of this indigenous system of education has been much debated. Though, as we have seen (§ 6), the Sdras were excluded from the education provided for the 'twice-born' classes, it is possible that some kind of elementary education was organized by the village communities; and some authorities, arguing from the character of the instruction provided and the methods by which the teacher is appointed, controlled, and remunerated, accept this view, which is, perhaps, best illustrated by the cultivation of the pupils as regards the United Provinces (Rep. Educ. Comm., Bengal, 383; ib. Panjab, 497; ib. North-West Provinces, 85 f., 236). In Bengal the origin of the village school is connected with the worship of the village temple, in charge of the priest, who, besides his priestly duties that of education. The early history of the schools in Bengal is fully detailed in the report by W. Adam (1638; summarised in Calcutta Rev. J. [1844] 301 ft.). In this province the policy has been to win the conidence of the indigenous schools, to aim at amalgamating them into the State system, and cautiously and gradually introduce improvements (Rep. Educ. Comm. 103 f.). In the United Provinces and other parts of N. India they have been generally replaced by the circle (haldibandi) school, which provides for the wants of a group of villages (ib. 10). Problems of Indian education.—The question of the extension of Western knowledge among the Hindu population is beyond the scope of this article. It is a subject of weighty moment, and is the chief topic of the Report of the Education Commission. It may be well to indicate some of the more pressing problems of education in India which still exist in a great measure await solution. (a) General literacy.—The most pressing difficulty is that, in spite of the efforts made to promote education during the last century, there is still a large amount of illiteracy among the Hindus. Of the total population only 53 persons per 1000 are literate in the limited sense in which this term was used at the Census of 1901; in the case of Madras Province the proportion is only 6% (CI. 1901, pp. 159, 177). The causes which have contributed to this failure are exhaustively discussed by Sir H. Risley and Sir W. Hunter (ib. 1627 ff.; Rep. Educ. Comm., 451). They specially apply to female education (CI. 1903, c. 165 f.; Rep. Educ. Comm. 521 ff.). In 1911 a bill was introduced in the Legislative Council of India by Mr. Gokale for the gradual introduction of free and compulsory education. This proposal was sympathetically received by the Secretary of State (The Times, 25 July 1911); but the state of the finances and the economic situation, which renders the employment of child labour necessary among the agricultural and pastoral tribes, prevent it from becoming, for the present at least, a practicable policy. (b) Jealousy between Hindus and Muhammadans.—The progress of education is at present much hampered by the jealousy between Hindus and Muhammadans, as shown by the controversy whether Urdu, a language which largely combines Persian-Arabic words with those derived from Sanskrit, is to be taught in N. India. (c) The matter of instruction in place of Hindi or other languages of Sanskrit origin (Rep. Educ. Comm. 69.; ib. Bengal, 47 f., 276 f., 395 f.; ib. Panjab, 549). (c) Special education of chiefs and nobles.—The special education of native chiefs and nobles is an ancient problem, Mann (vii. 43) directing that the king should learn the threefold sacred science from those versed in the three Vedas—the primeval science of government, divinities, and knowledge of the Supreme Soul—from the people he should acquire the theory of the various trades and professions. Teaching such as this was imparted by the sage Drona to the Pandava princes in the epic of the Mahabharat. Under the British Government, Chiefs' Colleges, of which the most important are those at Ajmer, Rajkot, and Lahore, have been established, where some of the features of the English public school system have been reproduced, with the object of fitting young chiefs and nobles, physically, morally, and intellectually, for the responsibilities that lie before them (IGI iv. [1907] 435 ff.; Rep. Educ. Comm. 507 ff.). (d) Education of forest tribes and menial classes of Hindus.—The education of the non-Aryan forest tribes and the depressed classes of the Hindu population presents special difficulties. The migratory nature of the semi-savage habit of the Himalayan inhabitants of special schools difficult; but some progress has been made in this direction (Rep. Educ. Comm. 507 ff.; ib. Central Provinces, 3, 191 f.; ib. Bengal, 53 f.). In the case of depressed classes and menial castes special arrangements are needed, on account of the refusal of the higher classes to associate with them in a common school (Rep. Educ. Comm. 513 f.). For instance, only a few years ago the Chanda school was conducted by nearly all the masters resigned on account of the admission of a few Dhar boys (ib. Central Provinces, 2). (e) Missionary and secular education.—Since the time of the Portuguese government, and more especially during the British occupation, the various missionary bodies have taken an active and honourable part in education. W. Carey at Serampore, Dr. Duff at Calcutta, and Dr. Wilson at Bombay are among the many names of those who were conspicuously engaged in translating the Scriptures and other valuable literature into the Indian dialects, and in the general control of schools and colleges (IGI iv. [1907] 409 f.). The older missionaries were strongly opposed to the
native systems of education (Abbe J. A. Dubois, Hindu Manuscripts, Outlines, and Ceremonies, 1906, P. 376 ff.; W. Ward, A View of the History, Literature, and Religion of the Hindoos, i. [1815] 376 ff.). The attitude of the modern missionary is more tolerant, because belief in a knowledge of the variolistic ways of thought is essential to the success of his work. The question of the withdrawal of the State from the control of the higher education was raised before the Commission presided over by Sir W. Hunter; and the policy of the orthodox Hindu party to advocate the dissociation of the State from the higher missionary schools, on the ground that the support of them by Government was inconsistent with the policy of neutrality which is the basis of the Indian educational system (Rep. Educ. Comm., Madras, Summary of Evidence, 176). The missionary view is defined in a series of memorials addressed to the Commission (ib. 303 ff.). The Commission observed (ib. 454):

"Missionary institutions may serve the great purpose of showing that private effort can accomplish and thus induce other agencies to come forward. They should be allowed to follow their own independent course under the general supervision of State. The end of such effort should be, not the support of all, but the support of all, and of every variety of agency in the field of education, they should reconcile private effort among as many as possible will of the Indian people that the mission has constituted the most important of all agencies if educational means are ever to be co-ordinated with educational work.

LITERATURE.—The history of Hindu education still remains to be written. The leading authorities have been fully quoted in the course of this article. For the present aspects of the subject much material will be found in the Report of the Education Commission, with Sir W. Hunter as president, which was issued at Calcutta in 1883, with appendices dealing with provincial details published in the following year. Each of the Provincial Governments issues an annual Educational Report, and these are periodically reviewed by the Government of India. The Report of the General Board gives a statistical basis of the progress of literacy. The Calcutta Review (1844 ff.) contains numerous important articles on the subject, those in the earlier volumes generally reflecting the views of the Serampore missionaries. The official view of the subject is given in the article on 'Education,' TOIT IV. (1867) 607 ff., with a bibliography.

W. CROOKE.

EDUCATION (Jewish).—I. IN OT AND APOCRYPHA.—(1) The child is a conscious figure in the Old Testament. No systematic provision for its training is made, but education is mentioned; but the importance of his personality, and the need of safeguarding his higher welfare and activity, with, that of the community, by wisely planned discipline is recognized. Child-rearing is, therefore, in all communities; there is scarcely a trace; all the ordinances relating to education deal with it, as a preparation for the moral and religious life, as a means of developing character. Similarly, while both teacher and scholar are mentioned in connexion with the musical training of the Levites (see 1 Ch 25;), the professional teacher, as an instructor of the young generally, has no place in the Hebrew Scriptures, unless we are to see a reference to him in such passages as Ps 116(69) and Pr 55; the teacher is the father. In the exceptional case of a child being dedicated from birth to the Divine service, he was made over, at an early age, to the care of the priest, and lived with him in or close by the sanctuary (1 S 2:4). Princes of the royal house likewise had their guardians, who possibly were their tutors (2 K 10:10). A child's education, moreover, to 'schools of the prophets,' in which youths, were trained for the prophetical office, probably by religious teaching and by instruction in music (1 S 10). The moral and religious training of his children became one of the most weighty, if not the father's obligations; and, though no system is prescribed for the discharge of this duty, thoroughness in its performance is attained by the injunction to make religious teaching an integral constituent of the daily life. The father is exhorted to teach the Divine commands 'diligently' to his children, and to speak of them 'at all times'—when he sits in his house, when he walks by the way, when he lies down, and when he rises up (Dt 6:7). Great events, moral, and religious, and especially the anniversaries are to be used as opportunities for impressing the great verities of religion upon the child's mind (4). The Passover is indicated as such an opportunity (Ex 12:26; Dt 6:24). But the entire history of the people is made use of as a basis for religious teaching. The father would recount the 'wondrous works' of God, that 'the generations to come might know them, even the children which should be born, who should arise and tell them to their children, that they might set their hope in God and keep His commandments' (Ps 78:2; cf. Dt 31). Josephus especially instances this study of history as an element in the education of the child in his time (c. Apion. ii. 25). If, as H. Gunkel holds (see the Introd. to his Com. on Gen. 3), the stories in Genesis are sages which were originally told to delight and maybe the primitive parent and child imagine the wondering children as among the listeners, sharing the pride of race and the consciousness of the Divine providence aroused by the recitals.

On the other hand, the maxims of the Wisdom Literature are examples of more formal teaching, not a few of which are addressed directly to the young. Wisdom is declared to be 'the principal thing' ('therefore,') exhorts the Sage, 'get wisdom' (Pr 4). And for him wisdom is moral science, the knowledge of right methods of living. But in his view, the moral life is stable only when it is rooted in religion: 'the beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord, and the end thereof is with meditation of his ways' (Pr 3:28). It is this higher wisdom which is commended to the young, for their own sake and for the sake of their parents. Wisdom is life (Pr 9), and its possessors win it to their own profit (v. 11), and to the joy of their parents (10). And parents include the mother. 'My son,' says a Sage, 'hear the instruction of thy father, and forsake not the doctrine of thy mother' (v. 12); and the last words of his discourses contain a string of moral precepts of King Lemuel 'which his mother taught him.' The parental doctrine, moreover, must have the child's true well-being for its aim; it must not be subordinated to peculiar teaching, which, 'sits heavy on the child's immediate comfort.' If necessary, discipline must be severe. Even corporal punishment is legitimate; to eschew it is cruelty. 'He that spareth his rod hateth his son' (12). The Biblical maxims on this matter reflect the tone and temper of contemporary thought. None the less, the superiority of moral suasion as a disciplinary influence was fully recognized (see 17).

(2) The educational idea of the Bible receive some development in the Apcrypha. Wisdom is again lauded as the summum bonum, though with greater exuberance of phrase; but it connotes intellectual, as well as ethical, excellence. The fruits of wisdom's labour are virtues, for she teacheth sobriety and understanding, righteousness and courage'; but 'she understandeth' also 'subtilities of speeches and interpretations of dark sayings; she formeth 'alliances between every kind of sounds and times' (Wis 8:25). Astronomy, meteorology, natural history, botany, and medicine are all parts of wisdom (7:24). Education, then, must have included those branches of learning in which all intelligent people at any rate, and, since Ben Sira has some maxims about behaviour at 'a concert of music' (Sir 32), it is probable that music during that period was a subject of study among
the well-to-do classes. It was certainly taught systematically to the choristers of the Temple, and a certain Chananiah is named as one of their instructors (1 Ch 15:2).

2. In the Talmud.—Education looms large in the Talmudic literature. The history and sanctity of training children for the duties of life receive the amplest recognition. The Rabbinic ideas on the subject echo the Biblical teachings. The formation of character is still the supreme aim of training; the fear of God, or, as has usually been expressed, 'the study of the Torah,' directed towards the fashioning of the good life, is still the foundation of wisdom. The child's nature is receptive, like wax in the hands of the teacher; he may make of it what he will. The child, when learning, 'writes, as it were, on clean paper.' Hence the responsibility of the teacher's office and the necessity for beginning instruction early, when receptivity is at its best. Indeed, a passage in the Talmud (Niddah 30b) would seem to imply that the Rabbis were not unfamiliar with the conception of education as a process of drawing out the child's latent capacities through the constant implanting of knowledge ab extra. Before a child is born, they say, he is taught the whole body of religious lore; but at the moment of birth an angel touches his lips and exhorts him. The child should begin to learn as soon as he is capable of being taught. 'Our principal care of all,' Josephus remarks, 'is to educate our children well' (c. Apion. i. 12), and he adds that 'the teaching is to begin in infancy' (Ant. iv. vili. 12). Philo, too, boasts that Jewish children are taught religion in 'their very swaddling clothes' (ad Gaium, 16, cf. 31). The child's inceptive powers of speech were consecrated by being taught to utter simple verses from Scripture. Two such verses are mentioned in the Talmud: 'Hear, O Israel, the Lord is one' (Dt 6:4), and 'Moses commanded us a law, an inheritance for the congregation of Jacob' (Deut. 31:1). The age prescribed for beginning systematic instruction is the fifth or sixth year; at ten the Mishna was studied, at fifteen the Gemara (Talmud) (see Aboth, v. 24; Kethuboth, 50a).

The value attached to education by the Talmudic Rabbis is exemplified by many utterances. 'The world is upheld by the breath of the children in the school-house'; their instruction must not be interrupted during the building of the Temple (Shabb. 119b). The monition, 'Touch not mine anointed ones' (1 Ch 16:13), is allegorically interpreted as signifying the school-children; the exhortation, 'Do my prophets no harm' (ib.), as an allusion to the teachers. 'Dearer to Me, God is pictured as saying, 'is the breath of the school-children than the savour of sacrifices' (Koh. Rab.). 'So long as there are children in the schools Israel's enemies cannot prevail against them' (Ber. Rab. 65). Of a great Rabbi it is told that he would never break his fast until he had taken his child to school in the morning (Kid. 30a). The teacher's office is regarded with the utmost veneration. Rabbi Judah, 'the Prince,' when, on a pastoral visit, asks for the watchmen of the city; they bring him the beadle and the town-guards. He rebukes them; 'Not these,' he says, 'but the inns where the children are taught' (Jer. Hag. i. 7). Teachers must be married, males, and of unblemished character. They must not hesitate in speech, and must be painstaking. One teacher, who was known to have laboured hundreds of times until the pupil had mastered it (Edu. 20b, 21a). The teacher is warned against favouritism, especially against making a distinction in favour of the children of rich parents, and also against bad temper (Ta'amith, 24a). 'An irritable man cannot teach' (Aboth, ii. 5). The teacher, moreover, is to beware of compromising his dignity before his pupils; he should not jest, nor should he eat or drink in their presence (Yore Deah, 2b).

Systematic provision for the education of the young seems to have existed in Palestine at the beginning of the Christian era. Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ, the president of the Sanhedrin, decreed that children should be taught at school instead of being instructed at home by their parents as hitherto. The inadequacy of the father's instruction, and regard for the educational needs of orphans, necessitated the ordinance. A century or two later this school system had extended from Jerusalem to all parts of the country. The credit for the extension is given to one Joshua ben Gamla, a hierarch (Bab. bath. 21a). The Greek terms ψυχονομι and ψυχαγωγες often meet us in the Rabbinic literature. Whether the school in the Talmudic age was anything more than a religious school is very doubtful. The 'three Rs' and, it would seem, the four (Greek, Hebrew, Semitic, and Aramaic), mathematics, astronomy, and gymnastics were also learnt by children; but all, or most of them, at home. Among foreign languages the Talmud (Meg. 15b) and the teacher's preference for the beauty of Japhet (the Aryan races—a reference to Gn 9:5), 'the language of song.' The parent was further enjoined to teach his boys swimming and also a cleanly trade (Kid. 39a, 29b). He who does not teach his son a trade virtually teaches him to steal (ib.). In the schools, however, the Bible and its Rabbinical interpretations were the chief, if not the exclusive, subjects of instruction. Mention is made of tables on which the letters of the alphabet were written for beginners. These tablets were of two sizes, corresponding to the modern slate and blackboard. The elder children learnt from scrolls. Home tasks appear to have been set (Kid. 30a). The school was held either in the synagogue itself or in some adjoining building. It was kept open all day and long after nightfall; even on the Sabbath it was closed for only a small part of the day. The scholars were taught in unextenuated mechanical relays—an unpractical arrangement which necessarily led to confusion and to needless labour on the part of the teacher. A Rabbi of the 4th century, directed in the exercise of the instructions of instruction were limited to five daily, and were fixed for the early morning and the evening (Eruvin, 54b). An average class consisted of twenty-five children; if the number reached forty, an assistant teacher was appointed. The pupils sat on benches arranged in a semicircle, so that each child might see and hear the teacher. The teacher was sometimes the reader (ḥazzan) of the synagogue, sometimes a Rabbi, who might be very eminent indeed. Discipline was to be maintained, but punishments should be mild. For physical chastisement a light strap only was to be used. Persistent disobedience was not to be visited with expulsion; the offender was rather to be subjected to the salutary influence of his more tractable school-fellows. Lenity was preferred to rough measures. 'Bespulse the child with the left hand; draw him, but do not pluck him.' The stimulus of rewards was also recognized. One Rabbi is said to have distributed sweetmeats as an incentive to the smaller children. In the earlier Talmudic period, less effort was paid for their work; its performance was regarded as a pious duty. By the 2nd or 3rd cent. payment was made for instruction in reading, but it was still deemed improper to accept a salary for religious instruction. Later teachers, however, the self-denying rule had to be relaxed. The teacher, when un-
paid, was exempt from public service and from taxation. Synagogues and provision for higher religious study also existed in the Talmudic period, notably in Babylonia. The academies of Sura and Pumbeditha were famous.

3. In the Talmudic period Jewish education, ideals and methods varied with the fortunes of the Jews themselves. Tolerant treatment and a civilized environment yielded fruit after their kind in Jewish culture, of which a liberal education was the necessary condition for higher religious study. In Spain, under Muslim rule, the Jews evinced a marked enthusiasm for secular learning, without, however, losing their traditional love for Hebrew and religious studies. It was otherwise in Christian countries. In France, which, so far as the Jews were concerned, included England during the centuries immediately previous to the expulsion under Edward I., and in Germany, Jewish education was, generally speaking, at a low ebb. The Jews, proscribed or ostracized by their neighbours, were thrown back upon themselves, and forced to seek their intellectual sustenance elsewhere. In their religious literature, the example of the general population, even if they had been accessible to its influence, have enlarged their educational outlook. When even elementary learning was confined to the clergy of the Church, as it generally was, there were at least some exceptions. Nor would the famous Talmudic era, which preceded the Christian era, without some exceptions, the Jews of Northern Europe should have shown no ardor for profane knowledge. On the other hand, their zeal for the one possible study was intensified; the stream was all the deeper because it was shut up in a narrow channel. Nor was this limitation of intellectual ideals unmixed loss. Immersion in the study of the Talmud, with its keen dialectic, sharpened the Jewish mind in its religious literature, and made it take full advantage of social and intellectual enfranchisement when its hour struck. Every congregation had its communal school supported by the contributions of the members. Instruction was also given by private teachers either in their own homes or at the houses of the pupils.

The act of bringing the child to school for the first time was elevated into a solemn rite. It took place when the child was five or six years old, and preferably on Pentecost, the Feast commemorative of the giving of the Law at Sinai, the prototype of the child's induction into the knowledge of the Law. To the ictory vestments, he was brought into the synagogue, and the Decalogue was recited as the lesson for the day. Then he was taken to the teacher, who thereupon began to teach him the Hebrew alphabet from a tablet smeared with honey which the child ate as he pronounced the letters, so that the sacred lore might be sweet in his mouth. The solemnity of the ceremony foreshadowed the character of the entire course of instruction, which was made a very momentous business, rarely interrupted by holidays or games. 'For there was no greater disgrace than that of being called an *am ha-arets (an ignoramus)!' Having mastered the Hebrew alphabet, the child was taught to spell and to read. Thus three months passed, at the end of which he was taught passages from the Bible and the Prayer Book, which took up a second three months. The lessons were supplied by the three introductory chapters of Leviticus, which treat of the sacrifices, whose purity matched that of the child. But a merely superficial familiarity with the sacred text did not suffice; for six months were still needed. The lessons, of Genesis, both of the Pentateuch and of the Prayer Book, were of Leviticus, in the vernacular. A knowledge of writing the vernacular would also seem to have been imparted, but this was probably acquired in the Jewish school, from the child's own parents.

It was called the 'Christian script.' Hebrew grammar was usually neglected. The pupil, after some time, gave his lesson, swayed his body to and fro as old-fashioned Jews still do at prayer, and used a peculiar sing-song or cantillation. At the end of the first year, he was taken from the Pentateuch to the Prophets and the Hagiographa. And when he had come to the fourth year to the Mishna, and thence to the Talmud. Lessons began at an early hour of the day in the winter while it was still dark—and continued till the night, so that the children would either go to the synagogue or attend service in the teacher's house. After breakfast at home they returned to school, and lessons went on again until eleven o'clock. Then came morning prayer, on which occasion recitation was resumed once more, to last, with a short interval in the afternoon, till the time of evening prayer, which closed the school day. At the age of sixteen, in the fifth year to the study his vocation, his Wanderjahre began, during which he visited various towns in turn, in order to sit at the feet of famous teachers. This extended course of study was not undertaken only by those who intended to become his teacher or scholar. A Jew must fire many a youth who could hope to gain nothing from his study save the knowledge itself. Even the Rabbis would scorn all pecuniary remuneration, and would regard it as shameful to use the Torah, in Talmudic phrase, 'as a spade to dig with.' They relied for a meagre livelihood upon some secular occupation, often the humble calling of the artisan.

Gildermann (op. cit. supra, vol. i, p. 922) reproduces from an Oxford MS an interesting scheme, dating from the 16th cent., for founding a systematic course of Jewish instruction in the north of France. This system commences with primary schools for the children of the upper and a lower school, suggested respectively, perhaps, by the cathedral schools and the parish schools which existed in France at that period. The document mentions an order of students which it styles the 'separatists' or the 'disciples,' because they have made religious study the chief or sole occupation of their lives. For these the upper or 'greater school' is to be instituted. That, 'saying the Talmud, the scheme premises, 'is the true learning for which a man slays himself'; so the student must give himself wholly to study, taking up his abode in the seminary so as not to lose time in coming and going, and remaining there seven years. It is the duty of the student to read the Talmud, the tehillim, and the Pentateuch, one of his sons to this holy vocation, just as he set apart a portion of his property to the service of Heaven. The lower school was intended for day-scholars, which were to be supported by the community, each member of which is to subscribe twelve denarii a-year. These subscriptions were to be supplemented by the fees of the pupils. The staff is to consist of a rector and tutors, of whom the former is to lecture to the students, and the latter to be given over to the instruction of ten pupils, in contradiction to the twenty-five prescribed by the Talmud, 'which was intended only for Palestine, where the climate favours mental development, and for times when Jews were free'; for, the author of the scheme adds pathetically, 'the free are strong and clear of brain, and absorb knowledge more readily than do the downtrodden, whose higher energies are sapped by service of cruel masters.' The pupils are to be taught from a book, not from voice, and they are to be encouraged to hear each other's lessons every evening as a means of sharpening their intellect. Systematic repetition is recommended. In winter only a fourth of the night is to be devoted to the instruction, for lights for the student, however, is at liberty, when he so desires, to spend the entire night in private study. Only promising pupils are to be retained in the school. If a boy proves to be dull, the rector should send for the father and discreetly say: 'God aid thy son to do good deeds in future; but the teachers are not to follow any other occupation; they are to live in the upper school all the week, returning home for the Sabbath only. They must have a special suit of clothes for school hours, so that they may teach in unsullied garments, as befits the sanctity of their task.'

As in the Talmud, so in the medieval literature generally, much stress is laid upon moral and religious training as the final aim of education. The "Book of the Pious" (Sepher Tsaddiuk [13th cent.]) is full of moral maxims and translations of Greek hymns and psalms. Children copy their parents; if the latter are dishonest, they will be dishonest too, and all study of the Torah is useless. They are taught to give children clothes, food, and drink. A wealthy father, whose children do not heed moral and religious precepts, should see that they work for a living;
perhaps they will be brought back thereby to the right path. . . . Even if a child can only read, he should be made to understand what he reads. When he reads the Bible, the teacher should strive to arouse his pietý. He should tell him that he is reading the Word of God. Eventually, he should be told of everlasting rewards and punishments. . . . In choosing an occupation for his son, the father should have regard to the book he wishes his son to read. It is disposed to the study of religion seriously, let him be dedicated to it; but if he would study from books, let him rather be taught some secular occupation.' Then some rules about education generally meet us: 'A teacher must not encourage a synag, or gossip either in or out of the school. He must not be evil. "As I have to teach all day, I will rise early and study for myself!'; for he makes good progress in Bible, do not force him to the Talmud. If a child stammers, he should be told to bring his questions to the teacher after the pupils have gone away, or to bring them in writing, so that he may not be mocked at by his school-fellows.'

Maxims of similar import are to be found in all the medieval rabbis, and they are given in a prominent place in the 'ethical wills' which pious Jews were accustomed to leave—not seldom it was all they had to leave—for the edification of their children. Most teachers, moved doubtless by the doctrine of 'Proverbs' and the Talmud, put in no plea for corporal punishment; but they are careful to add that it must be used with discrimination. On the other hand, a famous Rabbi of comparatively modern times, Jacob ben Zalman (heder cent.), left women in his ethical will that those of his children who were addicted to scandal-mongering or untruthfulness should be unmannerly chastised. Another ethical will, to which we may here refer, though its origin was Spain, is that of Judah ibn Tibbon (12th cent.).

Judah reminds his son that he travelled to the 'ends of the earth' to find teachers for him in sciences and other profane studies. He exhorts him to read every Sabbath the weekly lesson from the Pentateuch in Arabic in order to perfect himself in that language. He is to take great care of his books, so that he does not scant them or damage or make tachy books; he says, 'thy companions, and thy library thy garden. Pile the fruit that grows therein; gather the roses, the spices, and the myrrh. If thy soul be satiate and weary, roam from one bed to another, and desire will renew itself.'

Knowledge, however understood, was a precious thing to every Jew. A father would deny himself the common necessities of life in order to secure for his son a good education. This self-denying zeal still characterizes the Jewish poor-to-day.

On the other hand, the standard of education for girls was distinctly lower than that in the case of boys. In this respect the medieval Jews fell below the level of their Christian neighbours. The Talmud (B. Talm. 21b) deprecates the study of the Talmud, and the medical Rabbis fully shared this attitude. It was the custom to marry girls at a very early age, and there was, therefore, little time, as well as small inclination, to give them more than a mere smattering of religious knowledge. Attention was concentrated upon their domestic training and upon instructing them in those precepts of the ritual law which would especially concern them as wives and mothers. The average Jewish girl in the Middle Ages knew little or nothing of Hebrew; and, even if she was able to read the Prayer Book, she did not understand it. Thus we find Jewish women generally, in common with illiterate males, recommended by the authorities to pray in the vernacular. Later on (about the 15th cent.) the vernacular took the form of a jargon, in which devotional and religious books were written for their especial benefit. While the latter attracted the attention of these narrow educational ideals, their morals remained unaltered. Female excellence was maintained at a high level. The Jewish woman wielded great influence, not only in the home, but also in circles of religious culture which she was not permitted to share; her greatest pride was to have sons learned in the Torah. She was, above everything, modest and chaste, and she could immolate herself as a martyr when the need arose. Occasionally, too, she could break her traditional bonds, and give herself to study. Jewish literature is replete with examples of learned women, later Huldahs, to whose knowledge and opinions distinguished Rabbits did not disdain on occasion to appeal, and even of women who taught boys and preached in the synagogues. In the ethical wills already mentioned the Talmudic's daughters receive the same attention as their sons in the matter of moral training.

Among the Jews in Muhammadan Spain, education, as has already been said, received a wider interpretation than it enjoyed among their brethren of Northern Europe. Joseph ibn Aknin of Barcelona (15th cent.) recommends the following subjects of instruction to be studied in the order named: reading, writing, Torah, Mishna, Hebrew grammar, poetry, Talmud, religious philosophy, logic, mathematics, astronomy, music, mechanics, medicine, and metaphysics. Jewish literature of the Spanish period is witness to the importance which was attached to the knowledge of these subjects, and of its authors, and therefore to a high educational standard. Whether Rabbi or man of business, the Spanish Jew was often a poet or a philosopher, sometimes a physician also. In Italian Jewry, which was more seriously influenced by the intellectual practice, a strong desire for secular learning manifested itself. It was discernible before the Renaissance, and when, in the 16th cent., intellectual darkness had descended upon the Jews of Germany and Russia, a sketch of a curriculum was framed by David Provenzale in Mantua which, besides the usual Hebrew and theological subjects, includes Latin and Italian philosophy, medicine and mathematics.

As time went on, the general standard of education among the Jews in Northern Europe deteriorated rather than improved. By the 15th cent. it reached its lowest point. Young children were handed over more frequently than before to the private teacher, who was often only a little less ignorant than his pupils, and who taught his class, without method or discipline, in an overcrowded and stuffy room (heder)—an arrangement which still obtains in Russia, and is favored by the Jewish immigrant from that country into England. A boy remained in the heder until he reached the age of thirteen, the age of religious responsibility (bar-mitzvah), the advent of which was marked by his publicly reading a passage from the Pentateuch in the synagogue, and by his delivery of a small Talmudic passage at a regular meeting of the boys to an assembly of his friends at home. With the age of Moses Mendelssohn (18th cent.), however, a new intellectual era dawned for the Jews of Germany and of Europe generally. Mendelssohn's great aim and work was the rescue of the Jewish mind from medievalism, and among the first fruits of his influence was the foundation in 1778 of the Jewish Free School in Berlin, where the instruction embraced Hebrew, German, French, and the usual commercial subjects. About the same time a movement aiming at the improvement of Jewish education, favoured by the tolerant policy of the Emperor Joseph II., was initiated in Austria. The efforts of the reformers in all countries had a two-fold direction; secular teaching was to go hand in hand with Jewish instruction, but the scope of the latter itself was also to be enlarged. The tuition, more or less annually paid in Jewish schools, by which it had hitherto, as a rule, been restricted, was to be supplemented by systematic instruction in Jewish history and theology. Text-books on these subjects which hitherto were almost unknown, now appeared in rapid succession. Greater regard was likewise paid to grammar in the teaching of Hebrew. Technical schools, moreover, began to
spring up. Since that time Jewish educational ideas have gradually widened in all countries where civilization co-exists with religious liberty. In Russia and Roumania and Turkey, those ideas, once shut in, are now being brought into the light of public life. The Russo-Jewish Association in London and the Alliance Israélite in France are still antiquated; but elsewhere, there is as much education as there ever was. The aims and methods from those of other religious bodies. Even Palestine, hitherto the home of reactionary tendencies, gives evidence of an educational awakening. Enlightened conceptions of teaching and a liberal curriculum are becoming the order of the day; secondary schools are springing up, and, in Jerusalem, there are to be found an arts and crafts school and a normal school for teachers. In Europe the latest tendency is to entrust the secular teaching of Jewish children to the State or to the municipality, and to restrict voluntary education to instruction in Hebrew and religion and cognate subjects. The Jews, taxed as citizens for the maintenance of general elementary and secondary teaching, deem themselves discharged from the duty of making special provision for the secular instruction of the children of their poor. They are concentrating their efforts on the higher degrees in the hope of securing the conservation of religious training. This tendency is especially marked in England, where the first Jewish school was founded in London about the middle of the 17th century. Both these bodies, however, had to expect before any attempt was made to add some rudimentary secular teaching to the ordinary elements of Jewish instruction. At the present time, they both conduct Jewish instruction in their schools, including the great 'Free School' in Bell Lane, Spitalfields, with its 3000 scholars, in the metropolis. State-aided, they provide secular as well as religious instruction; but, while they are supported with hardly relaxed generosity by the Jewish community, no disposition is manifested to increase their number. The religious education of the many thousands of Jewish children who now attend the public elementary schools is undertaken by the Synagogue, with its various classes connected with the various places of worship, and, in London, in addition, by the Jewish Religious Education Board, which maintains an organization of religious teachers at certain County Council schools, mainly in the East End, where Jewish children form the great majority of the scholars.


MORRIS JOSEPH.

EDUCATION (Muslim).—I. Education in the early history of Islam.—The value set upon education in Islam is indicated by certain hadith sayings which, though they may have no claim to rank as authentic, yet undoubtedly reflect the educational ideals of Islam in its early days, and may be taken as representing the prevailing views of the first generations. Thus it is handed down as a saying of the Prophet himself, that 'A father can confer upon his child no more valuable gift than a good education'; and, again, 'It is better that a man should secure an education for his child than that he bestow a ā’ād in charity.' The books which recommended extend also to slaves. It is regarded as a work of special meritious character 'to educate a slave-girl well, then set her free, and give her to a husband.'

It may be safely said that Islam raised the Arabs to a higher level of civilization and the same time increased the elements of education, in which they had hitherto been rather deficient. That Muhammad himself—partly, it may be, on utilitarian grounds—attached considerable importance to this; and the most indispensable elements of knowledge, may be inferred from the conditions on which he released prisoners of war after his victory at Badr. He employed several Quraishi captives to teach the boys of Medina to write, and this service counted as their ransom. Twelve boys were assigned to each of the Meccan prisoners who were capable of giving the required instruction, and, as soon as the pupils had attained the stipulated degree of progress, their teachers were set at liberty. The Quraish, as a people largely engaged in commerce, had naturally more occasion to practise writing than the date-planters and husbandmen of Medina, and it was, therefore, easier to find penmen among them than in Yathrib—a consideration which may perhaps also dispose us to accept the view held by certain Muslim theologians, though condemned as reactionary by the orthodox, that Muhammad was not the 'illiterate' that Muslim orthodoxy, with its mistaken interpretation of the epithet ummi, tries to make out. Mention is even made of a list of contemporary Jewish women who were familiar with the art of writing; but this group did not include the youthful 'Aisha, who, though she had the advantage over her companions in being able to read, yet had never learned writing. This may have been due to the fact that among the men of Mecca the ability to write was nothing out of the common. Mu‘awiya distinguished himself as the Prophet's secretary. Feudanship was not quite so common among the Arabs of Medina. To the Khayrattyb Ubayy b. Ka‘b, who made a name for himself by recording the revelations of the Prophet, is ascribed the exceptional distinction of having been skilled in penmanship before the rise of Muhammad. In Medina, those who, in addition to certain other accomplishments, possessed also the art of writing—acquired perhaps from the Jews resident there—and were deemed worthy of the title of kāmil ('perfect').

It would also appear that, once the young Muslim community had been constituted, a primitive system of education, embracing at least the bare elements of knowledge, was set on foot. In no long time we begin to meet with references to the kniatāb ('elementary school'). We would cer-

1 Buxkoh, Kitāb al-ta‘qī, no. 16; Jibla, Kitāb al-bayānim, Cairo, A.D. 1355, I. 29, mentions a slave-girl who was conversant with Euclid.

2 Cf. the present writer's Mūs. Studien, i (Halle, 1889) 112.


4 Cf. Caetani, Annali dell' Islam, Milan, 1907, II. 702 f.

5 e.g. the Andalousian Abu’l-Walid al-Iblī (I. 1474-5 d.1581), who incurred great hostility in consequence; cf. the present writer's Zahrāt, Leipzig, 1884, p. 217, note 1; Dhahabi, Nasir al-Din al-Laknawī, ii. 41, see 'Abdallahib d. Sahil of Mursī (I. 1460-5 d.1576); and, perhaps, also Abu’l-Walid al-Iblī there were great disputes over the writing question.

6 On this question, see Nöideke-Schwanly, Gesch. d. Qurāna, i. (Leipzig, 1869) 12.

7 Boethius, de Arte Mētā dotyczący, Leyden, 1870, p. 472.

8 Cf. Lammens, 'La République marchande de la Mocque', p. 114, Bull. de l'Inst. d'Oran (1907), xii. 239; Ibn ‘Usā, tr. ii. 55; Caetani, op. cito. iv. 201.

9 Buxkoh, Kitāb al-ta‘qī, no. 16.

10 Cf. the passages quoted by Lammens, Œuvres sur le règne du Calife Al-Mamoun, Beirut, 1906, p. 639; also Asḥāyi, ii. 169, and, at foot: Tabari, Annals (ed. Leyden, 1705), i. 128, where the reference is not to Arabs in general, but to natives of Medina. For the full connotation of kāmil, see Ibn Ša‘ā, v. 819, line 7.
attention to his work. The mu'addib (‘instructor’) was a standing figure at the mosque, and was admirably supported in his work by the fathers of the princes.

One of Omar's most famous pupils was the poet Maimun al-Dardâ (c. A.H. 74-77 = A.D. 693-6) who was sent to the Prophet's school of kuttab to receive a formal education (μαθήματα). Maimun, who was later to become a famous poet, was a brilliant student who was able to grasp the essence of the Quranic lessons in a single day. He was later to become the tutor of the Prophet's daughter Fatimah, and was the author of some of the most beautiful poetry in Arabic.

Another pupil of the Prophet's school was the poet Anas ibn al- Hãyrâs, who was later to become a famous poet andiggs, and was one of the most famous poets of the Abbasid period. He was known for his skill in the art of writing, and was a master of the Arabic language.

The development of scientific knowledge under the Abbasids is one of the most important aspects of their rule. They were the first to establish a scientific academy, the Madrasa, in Baghdad in 731 A.D. This academy was the first of its kind in the world, and was modeled on the Greek and Roman academies of the time. The academy was a center for the study of the sciences, including mathematics, astronomy, and medicine. It was also the first to establish a system of examinations, which were held every four years.

The Abbasids also supported the study of the Quran, and were the first to establish a system of Quranic schools, known as the kuttab. These schools were established throughout the Muslim world, and were the first to establish a system of standards for the study of the Quran. The Abbasids also supported the study of the Arabic language, and were the first to establish a system of standards for the study of the Arabic language.

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hospitals now being instituted—served as they were by the most renowned physicians of the day—
attacted students of medical science, as is shown by numerous references in Ibn abI Usālī's 'Alī's
Biography of Physicians. In the present article, however, we propose to steer our discussion
largely to elementary education.

2. The subjects of primary education: forbidden
books.—In a series of sayings showing no trace of theological influence, added to the
subjects which should have a place in the education of children, Khalīf 'Omar 1, for instance, is said
to have counselled parents in these words: 'Teach
your child to swim and to throw darts; charge
them that they must be able to mount a horse
securely, and make them recite appropriate verses.'
'Omar was himself a renowned horseman, and is
said, in picturesque phrase, to have sat in the
saddle 'as if he had been created on the horse's
back.' Amongst these attentions the art of
swimming was specially prized. Khalīf 'Abdalmalik
gave his sons' tutor the following injunction:
'Teach them to swim, and accustom them to sleep
little.' Ḥajjāj (who, according to another report,
laid most emphasis upon the religious training of
his children, and therefore refused to engage a
Christian teacher) gave a similar charge to the
proponents of his sons; he was to be the expert
in this art. 2

"Instruct them in swimming before you teach them
writing, for they can at any time easily find one
who will write for them, but not one who will
swim for them.' Jahiz, to whom we owe this item
of information about Ḥajjāj, supplies further
details indicative of the importance attached to
the art of swimming in the educational practice of
the higher ranks. A saying of Ibn al-Tamān
commends swimming with other accomplishments,
and swimming as one of the accomplishments which, above all others, a
prudent father should seek to procure for his
children. As between writing and arithmetic, the
latter should have precedence, since it is not only
of more value in business, but is actually more
easily learned, while its eventual advantages are
also greater. 3 The traditional view, with a slight
variation, finds expression in a modern Arabic
proverb current in Iraq: 'Learn to write, to make
the calamus, and to swim in the river.' 4

It would, of course, be absurd to suppose that
the educational maxims which assign so prominent
a place to swimming had their origin in Arabia,
that country could provide but little, or be unimportant
for practising the art. 5 The present writer is of
opinion that—as is suggested by the grouping
together of riding, dart-throwing, and swimming
—all these educational ideals were largely influenced
by foreign, and especially Persian and Greek,
views; and, indeed, the pedagogic maxims in question are but the echoes of such views. 6 In
general, the importance ascribed to swimming is
doubtless due to its trace to Greek ideas: to be able
'neither to swim nor to read' (μηδέν ενυ μήατο τοιούτοι ή τοιούτοι)
was in Greek equivalent for the absolute lack of culture. It was
likely that the foundation was laid, not in the
educational maxims of the Talmud, 7

The subjects recommended in the sayings just quoted form no part of the distinctively
Muslim theory of education, which was governed
by principles of an entirely different character. The

1 Muhammad, Ka'im, ed. Wright, Leipzig, 1874, p. 105.
2 ibid., p. 77, line 6.
3 Arabic, xvii, 37, line 30 f.
4 Weisbach, 'Irāq-ard, Spriehworte, i. 477.
5 Semitische Studien, ii. (Leipzig, 1906), p. 124, in Leipziger
6 Palestine, No. 200.
7 The like holds good of the kāmil lq
(see above, p. 1097).
8 Bab. Qiddash, fol. 294. general course of training for young males is set
forth in the hadith as follows:

"On the seventh day after the child's birth, the 'āqiqah ("hair-
cutting," together with the sacrifice of an animal) is performed,
and he is taught his name and is made ready against all harm
when he is six years old, his education begins; at the age of
seven, he is given the use of sleeping-place and toilet. When he is
eight years old, he receives corporal punishment when he omits his
prayers; at sixteen, his father gives him in marriage, then he leaves
him to himself. I have given you in marriage; now I beseech
God for help against evil in this world, and against your being punished in the Last Judgment." 8

As regards the elementary curriculum in partic-
ular, the relevant sources furnish us with the
following data. When the child begins to speak,
he should be taught to repeat the Muslim article
of belief, Lā ʾālāka ʿlā Allāh; he must then learn
the words of Qur'ān, xxiii. 1176: 'Exalted is
Allah, the King in truth; there is no god but Him,
the Lord of the stately throne of Heaven'; then
the 'throne-verse' (ṣütāl al-kurṣī, ii. 250), and
the last two verses of sūra lix. (ṣütāl al-jadhr): 'He
is Allah; there is no deity but Him, the Holy
King,' etc. This is the order in which the children
so early taught should not be brought to judgment by God. 9

At the age of seven, when the child becomes responsible for the
ṣütāl, he is to be sent to school, and the teacher
must begin to instruct him systematically in the
Qur'ān. Ḥe must learn the one Surah a day, or the
school before the age of seven, as is the practice
of some parents, who wish merely to spare themselves
the trouble of looking after their offspring. 10

The teaching of the Qur'ān should be supplemented
in the more important religious precepts and
usages: the proper response to the ʿādām, the
different kinds of washings, the prayers in the
mosque to which children should be taken when-
ever possible; they must without fail be familiarized
with the practice of joint-prayer (ṣūrāl al-jadhr),
even in the school, where one of the older boys
acts for the time as leader in prayer (imām).
Instruction in reading and writing, of course, must
also be proceeded with. The children practised
writing on tablets (lūb, pl. lūwāb); the words
employed were usually taken from passages in the
Qur'ān.

The Juhair (f. A.D. 1744 = A.H. 1271), in his sketch of the state
of education in Damascus, says that in the elementary schools of
that city—where writing (ṣūrāl) and recitation (juzā') of the
Qur'ān were taught by different masters—it was the custom, when
exercise in reading and writing were taken, not from the Qur'ān,
but from poetical or religious works. 11 The instruction of
writing heard words from the tablets seemed to cast dishonour
upon the sacred book. The cleansing (ṣanūr) of the
students marked the close of the first period of daily
exercise. It was an allotted hour for this eight o'clock a.m., and
the master must then grant the children a short pause (tārīkh),
which contained the practice of wiping the scribbling
material when they contained verses of the Qur'ān;
various precautions are recommended by the more strait-
lined theologians. It must be performed in a clean and well
guarded place, not open to be trodden upon, so that the water
used in wiping out the sacred words shall not subsequently
suffer any contamination. The best way of disposing of the water
by pouring it into a river or a pit, or to collect it in a vessel for
those who wish to use it medicinally, as it is believed to possess
magical virtues. A pious resident of Cairo, Muhammad
Jāhān al-Dīn (f. A.D. 1807 = A.H. 1207), who founded a school in the
Qur'ān, inserted in the Bani Qara as dead of foundering, an
expression that the water used in that institution for cleaning the writing
material was to be poured upon his grave. 12 Even the pieces of rag
with which the tablets were wiped must be burned out with the
best care, lest the water that dripped from them should be
profaned. 13

Concurrently with exercises in reading and writing from the Qur'ān, the pupils were taught the rudiments of arithmetic. To these were added

1 In Gazhali, Ṭiṣlah al-ṣūrat, Bâle, A.D. 1292, f. 188.
2 Abadi, Madkhal al-shar al-shār al-arab, Alexandria, A.D. 1298, f. 184. 3 Hujwīrī, Ṭālibat, fol. 1097, 283, at the foot.
4 Ibn Juhair, Travels, ed. Wright and de Goeze, Gibb Memorial
Series, v. (1907) 272.
5 Five hundred and fifty, xiv. (1897) 285, at the foot.
6 Madkhal, ii. 105.
7 The Jâjâr al-ahāš, al-Durar al-kāminah (MS in Vienna
Hofbibliothek, Mitt. 240), iii. fol. 3609.
8 Madkhal, loc. cit.
also legends of the prophets (ahādīth al-anbiyā') and anecdotes from the lives of godly men (hikayāt al-sālihīn). 1 In early times the parts of the hadith most in favour for educational purposes were the legends about the Deccanis (Dīwān), by which this is probably meant the traditions regarding the Mahdi period and the Last Things. Finally, the children had to learn selections from the poets; and with the curriculum secure to have reached its term. In an ordinance regarding the education of the young, 'Omar b. enjoining that popular proverbs (al-anāmāl al-sā'ira) and beautiful poems should form subjects of instruction. 2 As regards the kind of poetry to be selected for children, the writers who discuss the course of elementary education are all most emphatic in demanding that moral pieces alone should be allowed. In that respect, Vajājī was of the view that such a subject should be strictly excluded. It is interesting to read what the philosophers—to leave the theologians out of account—have to say on this subject.

In Tāsin (Avicenna) recommends the following course of instruction: 3 'When the boy's limbs have become firm and he has attained some readiness of speech, when he is able to assimilate all kinds of materials of knowledge, and his ear has become perceptive, he should begin to receive instruction in the Qur'an, the letters of the alphabet should be drawn for him to copy, and he should be taught the principles of grammar. regards poetry, it is desirable that the boy should acquire the rhythm of sound and the melody of the syllables; the recitation of the rajaz in easier and its retention in the memory more certain, as its verses are shorter and its metre simpler. The teaching of poetry should commence with pieces which find themes in the advantage of good morals, the praise of science, the reproof of ignorance, and the rebuke of stupidity, and which enforce the honouring of one's parents, the practice of hospitality, and other noble qualities. The Mikāsini reproaches parents for teaching their children to recite licentious poetry, to repeat the lies found in such poems, and to take pleasure in what they tell of vicious things and the pursuit of lowness, as, e.g., the poems of Imam al-Qazwīnī, al-Suhbī, and others like them; one who taught will go to heaven in the face of God and will have the privilege of choosing his companions in Paradise.

The strictest with which the young were guarded from the influence of erotic poetry will not surprise us when we remember the attitude of the Sunni theologians towards narrative literature. The name of the fanatically orthodox theologian of the 11th century, A.D., people are warned against the possession not only of metaphysico-theological and philosophical works, but of other writings, and especially of such frivolous books of the day. Contracts relating to such literary products are null and void. Writings of this character should never be destroyed by fire and water. 4 Muhammad al-'Abdari goes so far as to maintain that a paper merchant should not sell his wares to one who, to the best of his belief, will use the paper for reproducing the stories of 'Antar or Sidi Batâl, and similar tales, as the diffusion of such writings falls under the category of makhâihat ("reprehensible things").

There were, however, other grounds upon which certain kinds of poetry were withheld from the young. Thus 'Abdallâh b. Abî Ṷâlî forbade his children's tutor to read them the gazīdas of 'Urwa b. al-Ward, as they might thereby be incited to leave their native soil and seek 5 Nāwawī, Tuhâhid, ed. Wüstenfeld, p. 229, line 6 from end.

3 Jābîl, Baytān, i, 213, 3 from foot.
5 Nâs al-rulko fi-tulub al-akibá, in Mashhârī, x, 1085.
6 Idem, DMO I (1904) 584.
7 Mâkki, Ill, 127, 131, line 1.

9 There is also a hadith saying which assigns the 'books of the Christians' likewise to the class of writings that must not be taught to the young.

11 Status of the elementary teacher. The importance attached to the work of the elementary teacher—the person from whom the young received their earliest knowledge of Allah—is by no means reflected in the curriculum secured to have reached its term. In an ordinance regarding the education of the young, 'Omar b. enjoining that popular proverbs (al-anâmāl al-sâ'ira) and beautiful poems should form subjects of instruction. 2 As regards the kind of poetry to be selected for children, the writers who discuss the course of elementary education are all most emphatic in demanding that moral pieces alone should be allowed. In that respect, Vajâjī was of the view that such a subject should be strictly excluded. It is interesting to read what the philosophers—to leave the theologians out of account—have to say on this subject.

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In order to gain the prestige of authority for this more favourable view of the teacher's calling, attempts were made to trace it likewise to utterances of the Prophet himself. Al-Qurtubi (ed. A.D. 1272), the great commentator on the Qur'an, gives his imprimatur to such a deliverance, viz.

The best of men, and the best of all who walk the earth, are the teachers. When religion falls into decay, it is the teachers who restore it. Give unto them, therefore, their just recompense; yet use them not as hirelings and as their hire. For, as often as the teacher bids the boy say, 'In the name of Allah, the Most Magnificent,' he repeats the words after him, God writes for the teacher, and for the boy and his parents, a record which shall surely save them from the Fire.1

It is true that the scholar who thus lent his sanction to a hadith2 usually branded as apocryphal an Amalasian. In Amalasian Islam, a double, a higher value was placed upon the function of the teacher than was the case in the East—a result due in great measure to the flourishing system of elementary education that had grown up in the Western khilafah.3 Here, therefore, the alleged utterances of the Prophet in honour of teachers could, e., to be more favourably received. The same thing holds good of Islam in Sicily.

Speaking of Palermo, the Arab traveller Ibn Hawqal (ed. A.D. 967—A.D. 977) puts on record that he found over three hundred elementary schools in that city, and that the inhabitants of the city, their teachers, and their pupils and distinguished citizens, speaking of them as 'the people of Allah, their witnesses before God, and their trusty friends.' It is true that such statements of the Prophets in honour of teachers could, e., to be more favourably received. The same thing holds good of Islam in Sicily.4

4. Payment of teachers.—As has been indicated in the foregoing, the gravamen of the strictures urged against the teaching profession from the religious side was the fact that teachers asked and took payment for giving instruction in the Qur'an. The moral propriety of taking wages for religious instruction was a question frequently debated among Muslim jurists. It is to be presumed that in Islam, as in other religions, the devotee were in favour of gratuitous religious instruction. In spreading the knowledge of Divine things the teacher should have no other design (niyyah) than that of doing work well-pleasing to God, and thereby attaining nearness to Him. No financial consideration should attach to such work (qiyamah) than—on similar grounds—to the adhan,5 the salat, the diffusion of the hadith, etc. All such acts must be done only 'for God's sake,' not for the sake of gain.6 Here in fin de siécle, in evidence of its being the only legitimate one, there are numerous traditions to hand;7 nor were typical examples lacking to commend its acceptance. One such example was found in Abd al-Bakhr al-Sullami, a man of devout spirit, who had actually heard haditha from the lips of Othman and 'Ali, and who, at the time of his death (during the khilafah of 'Abd al-Malik), was invested of a mosque in

1 Quoted by 'Abdari, Madkadi, ii. 156.
2 Bn al-Jauzi pronounces the following verdict on this hadith: 'It is not permissible to use this saying as an argument [in the question of the propriety of teachers], for this is a hadith originating in Al-Qurtubi, Al-Salamani al-Jayyibi, who is a reliable and a learned people, and of the traditions of the Prophet, to which the people of the Maghrib are not enclined. In Suyuti's work on jurisprudential traditions likewise, this and other similar utterances of Lala write with a warning [Al-Lad's al-ma'ajas fi-l-ahladhi matbafa, p. 108 f.].
5 Bib. Geogr., ed. de Goeje, Leyden, 1870 ff., l. 57, top.
6 Cf. Maun, xi. 63, where the act of teaching theていたの体便に、iv. 129, where the act of teaching is decreed to be a sin hire, or learning the lesson of a paid teacher, is declared to be a sin
7 These traditions and testimonies are collected by the Hanbalite Ibn al-Jauzi (in Leyden University Library, no. 1772, fol. 1013).
Kufa, and in that capacity had devoted himself to teaching the Qur'an. It is recorded that once, on coming home, he found a little boy who declared that his father had sent him as a hujjat for instructing his son in the sacred volume. He asked him what he was going to do. He said, 'We take no remuneration for the Book of God.' Other teachers of the Qur'an gave similar practical expression to this point of view; and, in support of their contention that religious instruction should be gratuitous, mujāmas (gratuitously), appeal was made also to an admonition in the tradition: 'In fact, of point of fact, may be identified as a Talmudic maxim.  

But, while the demand for free religious teaching might be regarded enough as ideal, and while some steps have been taken to carry it into effect, it was naturally left behind in the march of practical life. It was, after all, necessary that the wretched beings who, without much moral support from their fellows, engaged in the work of teaching should at least make a bare subsistence out of it. In this, as in many other things, the religious injunction, with its ascetic ideal, could not be put in practice scrupulously to maintain a universal interdict against the merest pittance of payment.  

As a matter of fact, besides the more austere hadiths, there are others of a more humane character, and more favourable to the practice of taking wages for religious instruction; and the teacher who was not in a position to prosecute his calling for a purely spiritual reward could always derive comfort from this.

Even Bukhari himself finds a place in his Corpus Traditionum for a saying ascribed to Ibn Abbas: 'Nothing has a better right to be rewarded than instruction in the Book of God.' It is true that the same anecdote occurs, written down by Shahid, viz., that the teacher may on no account negotiate for his wages, but may accept what is voluntarily given him. Bukhari finally cites the testimony of Hakim b. 'Uyaina: 'I have never heard it said of any of the juyah that he disapproved of the teacher's remuneration. Even Hazan himself calls a teacher ten dirhama.' From Malik b. Anas comes the more decisive statement that in the days of Medina none has ever taken an humiliation at the teacher's receiving a reward even in this world—and that not merely as a voluntary honour from the parents, but as a fixed monthly fee (zakhrabba)  

Accordingly the payment of teachers became the rule actually recognized in practice by Muslim law, and was vindicated, with the support of the sources quoted above, by authorities of the highest reputation.

The adherents of the more rigid view, in giving their consent to the practice of paying teachers—this payment, however, they preferred to call 'salām' [reward, as distinguished from stipend] to place their feelings by qualifying the teacher's right by certain pia desideria, which, it is true, made very little difference. They appealed to the moral sense of the teacher. He must look upon his wages as a mere professional emolument, as a gift (fatta).  

Divinely bestowed upon him in order that he may pursue a calling well-pleasing to God.  

The all-important thing is the inward purpose (nayya); he must devote himself to the work from purely spiritual motives, and without any worldly considerations whatsoever. To this Abd al-Jabir adds the naive admonition that the teacher should make no public profession of his motives, as it is quite like the people of our time to take him at his word, and deprive him of his material recompense.  

Further, he must not let his continuance as a teacher be rigidly upon him. Should his allowance cease in any particular case, he must attend all the more zealously to the children of parents who, owing to their poverty, have fallen behind in their payments. From the children themselves he must not receive presents without the knowledge of their parents or guardians.  

In general, he must be satisfied that the money tendered him is above suspicion even then, and that it has not been gained dishonestly, or by methods obnoxious to religious precept; he should, for instance, have nothing to do with the money of a tax-gatherer. With respect to this counsel—it was, of course, simply a wish—it is interesting to note the qualifying clause annexed to it, viz., that in such cases the teacher need not refuse money from the hands of the mother or grandmother of his pupil, so long as an immediate source has the warrant of religious law.  

But he must avoid all intercourse with fathers whose occupation is at variance with the strict demands of religion; and, as long as they make their living thereby, he must not greet them, or hold himself accountable to them.

Stories of the exorbitant charges made by eminent teachers come down from every period, though it must be admitted that this applies only to those branches of learning which were not in the strict sense religious.

The grammarian Muhammad b. 'All al-Mubarazan (A.H. 424-448) pupil of Muharram, had a name for exasperating aviators. He would not give instruction in the kitab of Sibahah under a fee of one hundred dinars.  

Muhammad Shams al-din al-Suyuti (A.H. 409-485) says: 'Nothing is more necessary in the grammatical poem Afgyf; which comprises about a thousand lines.

5. School administration.—Muslim literature treatises in great detail of the teacher's demeanour towards his scholars, and the conditions applying to the conducting of schools. As regards the relation of teacher to pupil, the fundamental principle is the just and equal treatment of all scholars. Laith b. Mujahid affirms that at the Day of Judgment God will subject the schoolmaster to a special interrogation as to whether he maintained strict impartiality between pupil and pupil, and that, if he has found guilty in this respect, he will be set beside the workers of iniquity. A whole series of apparently trivial points relating to the child's presence in school are brought out by Avicenna. The principle that no distinction shall be made between children of the rich and children of the poor.  

Nor must the scholars be employed in the private service of the teacher's household, without the express sanction of their parents; and from this it is argued that the teacher must not make use of orphan children for such work under any circumstances.

It is the law in Islam that all teachers should be married; a similar requirement is found in the Talmud.  

A typical indication of the ethical standpoint of Eastern peoples is seen in the regulations designed to obviate the very suspicion of evil communications. The rule that the work of elemenary teaching must be done, not at the teacher's own

1 Ibn Sa'd, v. 120, note 3.  
3 Zaid al-Slid, ii, 131 L; also quoted as from ancient writings; in Māwarī, Abd al-dayān as-sālīd, Stamīlu, a. n., 1904, p. 71.  
4 Cf. Leclercq, 'Les Études,' 300.  
5 The hadith pro en com are brought together in the Abi-ward Mīsīr, Berlin Royal Library, no. 145.  
6 Bukhari, Yamaq, no. 16. That giving instruction in the Qur'ān might have a pecuniary equivalent is shown by a story in which a man who gave his hirelings money or money's worth as a wedding-present (makār) was allowed to take back several paras of the Qur'ān in lieu thereof (Bukhari, Nikāb, no. 40; cf. Zaraqūn in Macefāta, iii, 7).  
7 The present writer has not succeeded in tracing this regulation, as cited by Malik, in the Macefāta.  
9 Kamāl Pashahzādī wrote a special rúdāh fi ja'āza al-aš-šāh 'alā lā imār al-Qur'ān (Alawīār, Berlin MSS, no. 490).  
10 For this term, see ZCM xii, (1922) 60.  
11 'Abdārī, Makhtūl, ii, 118, line 13.  
12 Makhtūl, ii, 118, line 13.  
13 This is a special requirement found in the Talmud.  
14 A typical indication of the ethical standpoint of Eastern peoples is seen in the regulations designed to obviate the very suspicion of evil communications. The rule that the work of elementary teaching must be done, not at the teacher's own
residence, but in a specially appointed public place (bâвая, pl. bâваяt) within sight of the people was undertaken. It was also suggested to make his face visible. Nor could the halls of the mosques be used for this purpose, as little children might unwittingly defile the walls and flooring of the sacred edifice. This proposal was supported and saying of the Prophet: ‘Keep your boys and your liabilities away from your mosques’; but the precept was not strictly observed in practice. It has been a favourite custom for parents to conjoin the elementary school and the public fountain (gâlî); the institution of the latter is often combined with that of a school in the upper storey (maktab sobî). It is interesting to note Abûr’s criticism of certain practices common amongst teachers in his day. He holds it unworthy of the profession that a teacher, at the inauguration of his school—or afterwards, if he finds his undertaking insufficiently supported—should try to draw the attention and invite the patronage of the public by setting up placards before the school-gate. It is likewise unbecoming that a teacher, in requesting the parents to attend the school-festivals (âfrah), should in his letters of invitation (al-îd) flag it with high-born epithets and titles, or compose the invitations in verse.

The pupils must also have their off-days. The school must be closed for two days of every week, viz. Thursday and Friday, and also for a period of from one to three days before and after the âid festival. The Thursday holiday gave occasion to the proverbial phrase, ‘to be as happy as a teacher on Thursday’ (bâвая felâha al-‘amâdib bikhâmîn). The scholars are regarded as having enjoyed a whole or partial holiday whenever any one of them has finally mastered a section of the Qur’an. The parents of a boy who has succeeded in doing this celebrate the event by a festivity (fellûfî), and bestow upon the teacher a special gift, the acceptance of which is not frowned upon even by the precisians. When a youth completes his study of the Qur’an, the occasion is celebrated in a feast called (in Mecca) igâlâ, or (in the Maghrib) takhrîj. ‘Abdîr’s minute account of the more extravagant—and to him obnoxious—forms sometimes assumed by these functions reveals an interesting phase of contemporary life.

The question of corporal punishment was also discussed among those with whose educational methods we are now dealing. The ‘rod’ is regarded as the auxiliary of the teacher’s art. The ‘strap’—quite characteristically—becomes an object of comparison: ‘In the Prophet’s hand was a whip, like that used in school’ (ka-dirrat al-kutâb)—a simile often employed. The teacher is sometimes held up to derision by being described as ‘one who brandishes the whip’ (bâвая dirra) and takes reward for the book of God. Even the philosopher Ibn Sinâ, in his treatise on the education of children, speaks of the ‘assistance of the hand’ (al-isâ’i’ân li-yad) as a useful adjunct of instruction. The tutors of the young sons of khâlifs did not spare the rod, nor did the fathers disagree.

Abî-Muhammad describes a scene in which the Khalif ‘Abdallâh led by the hand Prince Marâwî, crying because of the whipping which had just been given him. Abî Maryam, preceptor to the imprisoned, exclaimed: ‘Oh! Brother, make this man black, as he was given to a

Ibn Basîm, in Marsîrî, x. 1043; Mafdhâl, ii. 163; Res. africanae, ii. 2B1.

II. Mafdhâl, 1901.

3 Ibn Shehîb, x. 1139, l. 207. 4 L. 198. 4 L. sc. in qur’a’n, x. 254, at top.

We turn also the term bâвая (Mafdhâl, ii. 179, line 10).

6 Snouc Hugroujle, Mekb. Hugm, 1880, x. 149; Maryal, Le Monde de l’Islam, iv. 282; World 2 Touns, Page 2. 7 Ust. al-‘âdîb, ii. 50, line 6; i. 194, lines 95—223, line i. 8 L. 198, ed. Margoudeh, l. 60, line 7 from foot.

9 Mafdhâl, ii. 1043. 10 As, l. 233.

1 Kâmî, p. 573, line 11.

too drastic use of the teri. On one occasion he chastised Prince Amin severely as to make his face visible. The Prince complained to his father, and showed him the arm. The Khalif invited the aîrs pedagogy to dinner; and when the latter took no little apprehension, specified the offense for which the prince had been so sharply dealt with, the father accused him with the words: ‘You have not been sufficiently severe in killing him: it was better that he die than remain a fool.

A further form of punishment was ‘keeping in’; but, in the one instance of this known to us, it was the father, not the teacher, who administers the correction.

It was to be expected that, in order to protect the children against the undue severity of irascible masters, Muslim jurisprudence would endeavour to regulate the penalties applied, both as to their form and as to their degree. It sanctioned corporal punishment, especially for religious offenses, but only in the case of children over ten years of age; while, as to the amount of punishment, the extreme limit was variously laid down as between three and ten ‘light strokes.’ Nor must the teacher resort to any instrument used by the judge in administering legal penalties (hadd). The Mafdhâl speaks severely of contemporary teachers who chastise the children ‘with sticks’ and reprimands, Nubian switches, and even the instrument called the farâga (‘stocks’), and used for the bastinado. The supervision of the teacher in this, as in other matters, was assigned to the chief of police. In the directions drawn up for this office, he is instructed to be observant of the way in which children are treated at school, and to protect them from maltreatment by hot-tempered teachers.

6. Education of girls.—It must be borne in mind that the maxims relating to the training and instruction of the young apply only to boys (âbî). The education of girls did not fall under these rules except in one simple particular, as set forth in the police directions recorded by Ibn Bassâm, the female teachers of girls (mû’allimât al-banât) are to be more strictly looked after in regard to the poetical pieces which they set before their pupils. While it was deemed necessary to instruct girls in moral and religious things, there was no desire to lead them through the portals of intellectual development. Woman’s proper sphere centres in the spindle, and this requires no training in letters. Even the philosophic thinker and poet Abî-l’Ala al-Mâ’arrî († A.D. 1057) endorses this maxim, which became a veritable household proverb. This word was kept in the ancient and in the ancient and in the learned world.

The following utterance of the Prophet regarding females—said to rest on the authority of Āisha—is frequently quoted: ‘Do not let them frequent the roofs; do not teach them the art of writing; teach them spinning and the sârât al-mâr.’ But it were surely preposterous to regard this sûra

1 Mafdhâl al-wâledî, l. 50. 2 Alhâlî, tr. 111, line 6 from foot. 3 In the instructions regarding the training of children it is usually stated that ‘they shall receive corporal punishment for neglecting their prayers’ (e.g. Ghazali, as above); in other versions (e.g. Mafdhâl al-wâledî, l. 264) the terminus a quo is given as ten years.

The maxim of the third was deduced from the hadîth by certain Mâlikite theologians; see Qasîfînî, x. 49, l. 22 (on Bakhîtî, Mashârî, no. 29).

5 Mafdhâl, ii. 165. Regarding the instruments of punishment employed in Oriental schools, of the interesting notes, with illustrations given in the Ré. du monde musul¬

mân, x. (1910) 420—425, and xiv. (1911) 67, from which we learn that in one hand this country or another hand these various penalties mentioned by Abîrî were all in actual use. Ibn Khâlîn, in Marsîrî, x. 906; cf. l. 906; Ibn Basîm, x. 1084.

7 Mafdhâl, x. 1085.

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9 Kherem, Culturgeschichte, i. 153.

10 Mafdhâl, ii. 355. This sûra is reproduced in the Mustâra’d of Hâkim as an authentic saying of the Prophet.
Besides the women who attained eminence in various branches of science and literature, and especially in poetry, we find several who were active in civic service, as, e.g., 'Muzna (secretary to the Emir al-Nasir Il-din-Allah [A.H. 358 = A.D. 969]), the learned, gifted with a beautiful handwriting.' 

7. Education in ethical and political writings.—The problem of elementary education has not been ignored in the literature of ethics and politics. The somewhat mechanical precepts of the earlier theological writings have been furnished with a deeper foundation in ethics and philosophy, and enriched with the ideas of a more worthy conception of education than is generally, so also in education, we must recognize the powerful effects of that Hellenistic influence which we have already noted in some matters of detail. Reference was made above to an educational excremen which Avicenna incorporated in his tractate on government (risalat al-niyasa). But Avicenna dealt with little more than the formal elements of the subject; this writer, on the other hand, gives the art of writing that was withheld from women on principle. The daughter of Malik b. Ans was able to correct the errors of those who recited and transmitted her father's Maquina. That the rule against teaching women to write was a way of universal validity is disproved by the very name of a learned lady of Damascus, viz. Sitt al-kotaba ('mistress of the writers') bint abi-l-Farh, who supplied Jusuf b. 'Abdal-mumin of Nabilas with traditions. The learned woman is found even among remote tribes in the heart of the Southern Sahara, where women are apparently not prohibited from cultivating Muslim learning. 

8. The importance of this region of the Sahara poses books, precisely as do the seviers; nor do they abandon them even in the space of other migratory habits do not prevent them from devoting themselves to intellectual activities, or allowing their children, even girls, to share in such studies. 

Above all, however, it is the position of women in the educational life of Andalusian Islam, as portrayed by such writers as al-Marrakushi, and verified by the facts of literary history, that shows to what a small extent the prohibitory maxims were applied in actual religious practice. 


10. Japi, Bayda, i. 214, line 1.; Ibn Bassam, loc. cit.

11. The instances given in the present writer's Muh. Studien, H. 400-402, might be enlarged in the future. 

12. Cf. the Arabic proverb al-'a'ilah fi-l-kal-nah al-nasah fi-l-kal-nah ('Learning in youth is like engraving upon stone'), Japi, Bayda, i. 105, line 10 from foot.

13. This most important treatise by Ghazali has been translated into English and appreciatively criticized by D. B. Macdonald, The Moral Education of the Young 'Among the Muslims.', in \( \text{LJ.} \) xx. (1906) 286-304; cf. also al-Ghazzali, Letter on the education of the children, tr. by Muhammad ben Chenche, in Rev. \( \text{d} \) (1901) 201.

14. Lahvi (likewise a native of the Maghrib), Kitab Afal-ba'd, i. 76, line 6.

is Abu-l-Walid Ibn Rushd the elder († A.H. 520 = A.D. 1126), qadi of Cordova, and grandfather of the famous philosopher of the same name (i.e., Averroes). Abu Bakr Ibn al-'Arabi († A.H. 543 = A.D. 1148), qadi of Seville, and Haroun al-Rashid's (his ed.) educational ideas in a work entitled Marawi al-zulfa' ('Stages of approach', i.e. to God), is also frequently indebted—even in his language—to Gharazi's treatise. The Marawi is apparently lost, but many excerpts are quoted in a work by another Maghrabi writer, the Maadhah al-sharíf al-sharif ('Introduction to the Sublime Law') of Muhammad Ibn al-Hajj al-Abdari († A.H. 737 = A.D. 1334). This work, which has in view the reform of primary education in the land, is dedicated to the Sultan al-Mu'ayyadh.8

The second phase of the reform of primary education was inaugurated in 1845, under Sultan 'Abdul Majid, by the institution of the so-called Rushidiyyah schools, while in 1858 his successor, 'Abdul 'Aziz, established a lyceum in Galata-Serai.9 But, in spite of ceaseless efforts to raise the standard of education through out the Empire, the results still fall far short of a general diffusion of knowledge, and in many parts of the Ottoman Empire there has been no advance whatever upon the crude state of things in primitive times. It should be added, however, that in Turkey and elsewhere the more liberal-minded Muslims, in default of adequate institutions of their own, send their children to either Moslem or Christian schools established by European and American agencies. It will be readily understood that, in countries under European rule having a Muslim population, the various Governments have greatly promoted the cause of education by the establishment of a system of education which is based on the principle of training the native population for European political and social life.

7. Modern movements towards reform. — So long as the social life of Islam remained impervious to Western influence, and even to-day in circles that are still influenced by it, the instruction of the young proceeded mainly on the lines laid down in the older theological writings (see above, § 2). The best descriptions of this traditional stage are found in the works of E. Lane10 and P. Dor (London, 1835). The modern stage of educational rivalry between the various Muslim countries is a system of education which has been established in modern times. 

The activities of the Egyptian pasha, Muhammad 'Ali, the founder of modern Egypt, whose educational reforms, begun in 1811, were at first, it is true, of a somewhat circumscribed character. A further advance was made in 1824 by the erection of training schools in various departments, and the movement was partially organized and consolidated in 1836.11 On this basis all branches of education have made rapid progress in Egypt. In Turkey, the inauguration of primary education was delayed until 1845, under Sultan 'Abdul Majid, by the institution of the so-called Rushidiyyah schools, while in 1858 his successor, 'Abdul 'Aziz, established a lyceum in Galata-Serai. But, in spite of ceaseless efforts to raise the standard of education throughout Turkey, the results still fall far short of a general diffusion of knowledge, and in many parts of the Ottoman Empire there has been no advance whatever upon the crude state of things in primitive times. It should be added, however, that in Turkey and elsewhere the more liberal-minded Muslims, in default of adequate institutions of their own, send their children to either Moslem or Christian schools established by European and American agencies. It will be readily understood that, in countries under European rule having a Muslim population, the various Governments have greatly promoted the cause of education by the establishment of a system of education which is based on the principle of training the native population for European political and social life.


as a matter of vital moment for the Muhammadan world. The more important phases and incidents of the whole movement are described in the "Renaissance of the Sunna" of Al-madraia (Paris, since 1900), which deals with all Muslim countries, and has now completed its sixteenth volume.

Among specifically Muhammadan tendencies for educational reform, we may mention the Bābī movement, which arose in Persia in 1844 (see art. Bāb, Bābīs, vol. ii. p. 299 ff.), and which, as Bahā'ism, has since then been constantly extended. The principles of this sect have embraced an endeavour to raise primary education to a higher level and to relieve it of its long legacy of prejudice—aims which have been most strenuously pursued by the Bābīs. Their more exalted conception of woman and of her function in family life, and their abolition of the restraints placed upon the female sex by ancient convention, are naturally coupled with efforts to improve the education of girls.

With the progress of primary education the development of the higher grades of instruction goes hand in hand. In many parts of the Muslim world the law courts are rapidly developed, and the former. A considerable number of colleges for the study of special subjects—military, medical, legal, and technical—and designed primarily to make legal and political candidates, have been established, and in some centres these are combined to form a kind of university (dār al-funṣa). A large institution, designed to perform the function of a university, was quite recently erected in Cairo (President Karter, Prince Alī and Fud'ud Pasha, great grandson of Muhammad 'Alī). In Aligarh, India, the endeavour to form the academy founded there in 1875 into a university is within sight of success—a movement which, with Agha Khān at its head, finds generous support among adherents of Islam throughout India. Thehān likewise has a college which does its work under the style of a dār al-funṣa. By way of providing stepping-stones towards such higher institutions, effective progress is being made in Turkey and Egypt with the system of preparatory or 'adār schools.

These institutions are all conducted according to detailed instructions of the respective Governments, and the instructions are printed and made public. Various reforms, especially in regard to the system of examination and granting diplomas, have been introduced since the government has taken charge. In the great madrasa of the Azhār mosque in Cairo, in which the study of the various branches of theology is pursued on traditional lines; as also in the schools associated with that madrasa at Tańa (the Ahmediyā mosque), Damietta, and Alexandria. The need for reform in higher theological education has asserted itself also in more sequestered localities. Among other agencies aiming at the diffusion of culture among Muhammadans, mention may be made of the Khalidiyya institution at Tunis, which takes its name from the Ibn Khalīd referred to above. All these movements are but so many endeavors to raise the level of education in the Muslim world.

EDUCATION (Persian) — This has been given fully in the footnotes.

EDUCATION (Persian).—The Persians, like all other Orientals, attached high value to education, so that Hūrmazd (afterwards Hormuzd) IV. could reply to his teacher, the sage Buzurjmihr, that 'wisdom is the best thing, or the sage is the greatest among the great' (Shāh-nāma, tr. Mohi, Paris, 1876-78, vi. 425), and the Pahlavi Pandnāmāk-i Vajöry-Mitrō (ed. and tr. Peshotan Behrani Sanjana under the title Ganōshāyōgānī, Bombay, 1885, p. 11) makes the same sage say: 'Education makes man noble, . . . education is a corrector of man'; while the 9th cent. Dinkart (ed. and tr. Sanjana, Bombay, 1874 ff., p. 388) declares that 'men ought to raise themselves to illustrious positions by worldly knowledge and by education, (which enables them) to read and write.' So vital was this matter, especially as regards religion, that even an adult was advised by Buzurjmihr (Pandnāmāk, ed. tr. 21) to spend the night 'in getting religious training and in asking sensible questions of pious men,' the second third being devoted to agriculture, and the remainder to eating, sleeping, and recreation, and the cycle of the Avesta, in like manner, enjoins that the 'holy word' (mābra apenta) be pronounced to those who come 'seeking (religious) instruction' (zaturūnā [Vend. iv. 44]), and it is especially mentioned as a desirable characteristic of children that they be 'of good understanding' (Avira [Yasna, lixx. 5; Yast, xiii. 124].)

Thus far there is the unity of all generalities; but, when we turn to the data concerning the actual training of children, much confusion confronts us. The reason doubtless is that, just as in modern times, education was not absolutely uniform; and, in addition, the passages on which we must rely are largely concerned (especially in the classical authors) with the early training of royal children; while some accounts, notably those of Xenophon's Cyropaedia, are not free from the suspicion of exaggeration in the interests of political romance.

The Vehnidd states (xv. 45) that the care (trādēra) of the child should last seven years. Until the age of four (Bahārū Gūr, Shāh-nāma, v. 400), the infant passed his time in the women's apartments, and his first training was received from women and eunuchs (Plato, Legg. 695 A; cf. the pseudo-Platonic Aēlebardes Primus, 121 D). From five until seven the child should be under his father's tuition (Shāyast lā-Shāyast, v. I [West, SBE v. 290]), although, as in the case of Bahārū Gūr, who was sent to Arabia in infancy (Shāh-nāma, toe, etc.), this rule was not always observed. Real instruction began about the age of seven (Bahārū Gūr), or even as early as five (Herod. i. 136; Strabo, p. 733), and lasted until the age of twelve (Bahārū Gūr, who, however, seems to have been exceptionally brilliant), fifteen (Artaxiš Šāpāk, the founder of the Sassanian empire Kārnāmāk-i Artaxiš-i Pāpākān, ed. and tr. Dārā Peshotan Sanjana, Bombay, 1896, p. 367, and seventeen or seventeenth (Xenophon, Cyropaedia, I. II. 8), twenty (Herod. i. 190., or even twenty-four (Strabo, p. 733); but all essential instruction should be given by parents to their children by the age of fifteen (Pandnāmāk, p. 25). It was a man's duty to instruct his child, for thus it might rise to some superior station in life (Dink. ed. Sanjana, p. 263); and he should teach not only his child, but his wife, his countrymen, and himself
EDUCATION (Roman)

Persian children of noble and princely families were often educated at court (Xenoph. Anab. 1. ix. 3, Cyrop. VIII. vi. 10), although it was by no means unusual for high-born children to be sent for their training to private tutors. This was especially the case with Zames (Jām), the second son of Qubād (Procop. de Bell. Pers. i. 23), and with Bahram Gūr, the latter being educated in Arabia (Šahā-nāmah, v. 400). Tutors for the latter prince were sought from the civil and military classes of India, China, and Arabia, the choice being finally awarded to two sages from the country last-named (ib. p. 598 f.). Besides this, we are told by Clements (P. Alex. ii. 7) that the Persians had 'four royal pedagogues' (ცոքեստ «ra«, ṣa«), who, four in number, were chosen from all the Persians by the king and placed in charge of the instruction of his children. The pseudo-Piatoxos Asciabates Prinus (loc. cit.) adds that these men were appointed when the princes had reached the age of fourteen, and details their duties as follows:

The first, who was 'the most wise,' taught the 'magic' (σα«, τοιαύτα) of Persia, 'which is the source of the gods,' and royal duties; the second, who was 'the most just,' taught the child to practice truthfulness through acts and words; the third, who was 'the most prudent,' taught control of all passions and contempt of bodily pleasure; and the fourth, who was 'the most munificently,' taught the child to be fearless of all his masters, that is, the teachers of Bahram Gūr, though their branches of instruction, as noted above, were quite different from those detailed in the Greek sources.

Of the personal relations between teacher and pupil there is little record in the extant Iranian texts, although, from the respectful and affectionate attitude maintained towards the instructor in the Šahā-nāmah, it is to be inferred that the feeling between the two was one of tenderness and devotion. It has already been observed that a section of the lost ancient text Naak-devoted attention to 'the association of priestly instructor and pupil, and their meritoriousness together' (Dink. VIII. xxxvii. 4); and the Avesta, as now preserved, itself has a significant indication of the closeness of this relation (Vāst. x. 116 f.):

'Twentyfold is Meera (here the godliness of alliance and fidelity) between two friends from the same district; thirtyfold between two from the same community; fortystread between two from the same house; fiftyfold between two from the same room; sixtyfold between two from the same priestly gift; seventyfold between priestly pupil and priestly teacher (aṣārya aṣārya-pātra); eightyfold between son-in-law and father-in-law; ninetyfold between two sages; a hundredfold between a thousandfold between two countries; ten thousandfold is Meera to him who is of the Mazandaran religion.'

EDUCATION (Roman).—The history of Roman education is that of an evolution from the simple to the complex and comparatively encyclopedic kind of instruction; from what we should call 'primary' education through a stage when 'secondary' education was gradually combined with higher-learning of a 'University' stamp; from the ancient tribal history of the Samnite, and an imperial system of officials appointed under the cognizance of the Emperor; from an unpaid instruction by parent or slave to an organization where, at least in the upper classes, the study of the dialects, and from a narrowly Roman training to a cosmopolitan culture. To illustrate the development in these terms, there was an original Roman strain, there was subsequent crossing with Greek influences, and accompanied by vigorous adaptation as a new generation for the struggle and duties of life, and the equip-
ment which was sufficient for the burgher of a city-State needed wide expansion before it could suit the citizen or civil servant of a world-Empire. The altering aims and methods of Roman education are easily discernible in a chronological survey of the subjects which may be conveniently examined in three stages:

1. Earlier period—Republican times, to the age of the
   Punic Wars, c. 240 B.C.

2. Middle period—c. 240 B.C. to the reign of Hadrain, A.D. 195.

3. Final period—from A.D. 195 to the end of the Empire.

Cato's real contributions point out that amidst the ferment of the fresh ideas of Hellenic culture, Roman education was most progressive in the middle period, while in the later period the rhetorical training, on the contrary, became stereotyped; that is to say, education in the end ceased to secure so well the practical aims which it previously had in view, and the acceptance of traditional culture and methods as absolute rendered the system impervious to health-giving conceptions of change and advance.

1. Earlier period—to the Punic Wars.—For the earlier centuries of the city, evidence regarding education is scanty and untrustworthy.

Justin's account of the school attendance of Romulus and Romus at Gabii (Plut. Romal. vi), about Romus's Babies training, or about the education of Servius Tullus (Serv. Thes. Stg. 202), the teaching of Greek, given to Servian Tullus (Cit. de Rep. ii. xli). The advanced culture of Etruria, we know, influenced Roman religion and customs; but it is improbable of the having influenced Roman education (Cit. de Dic. i. xlii; Jullius, Les Professores de lett. etc., pp. 29-33), and, in fact, the state of general education in republican times, and the social fabric was not broad to foster education. It is true that Mounseon considers reading and writing to have been widely spread in Rome at an early period (Rom. Gram. i. 211f. [Eng. tr., 1875, 1, 224]); but even so one cannot positively assert the existence in the 5th cent. B.C. of schools at Rome from so scanty evidence year by year, although that would be the literal inference from Livy's account of Virgilia's school among the shops of the Forum (Livy, iii. xvi.; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. xi. xxvii.), nor can one on evidence similarly positive assert the existence of schools at Falerii and Tusculum in the times of Camillus (Livy, v. xxvi., vi. xxi.).

The character of education, however, during many generations of the older Republic can be readily grasped. The clearest conception of it is to be sought from what Plutarch tells us (Cot. Maj. xx.) of the way in which Cato brought up his son. Although this applies to the period of the Punic Wars, yet Cato's rigid attachment to traditional education, and his arrangement of the preparation of the next generation as a representative of the education after the ancestral fashion which preceded the Punic Wars. Cato kept a slave to teach the elements to the young people in his establishment; but he disliked the notion of having his own son scolded or reprimanded by an inferior; so he himself undertook the training of his boy in literature, law, and gymnastics (αθλος μη δι' γεγραμμενης, αθλος δι' αυστωσεως, αθλος δι' ομοστησεως). The physical education was in riding and the use of weapons, boxing, and exercises likely to test endurance. With his own hand and in large letters he wrote out historical narratives for the boy's use, and showed such fulsome regard for decency of behaviour and language in the interests of the youth's moral welfare that Plutarch expressly alludes to the noble work of moulding a young man to virtue.

This practical, physical, and moral training was long in vogue. The younger Pliny regretfully recalls those happy ages when instruction was more a matter of the eye than of the ear, and his concise formula expresses a central feature of the primitive training—"sans cuique parens pro magistro" (Ep. viii. xiv. 6), as does Seneque's allusion to the "domestic magistrates" (de Bon. iii. 11) as agents of education. He always had memory and prudence and so characterized the manners of times which encouraged youths to listen to a father's discussion of legal questions raised by his clientes in the atrium, to take part in his religious observances as camillus, to attend him to the senate (as was the usage at one period), to hear moments speech delivered, and even to accompany seniors to dinner-parties, where they might see "nonnullae laudes valorum" (Cic. Brut. xii. 75, Tusq. Disp. i. ii. 3; Val. Max. ii. i. 10; Varro ap. Non. 77, s.v. "Assa voce"), and where their presence might "sufficere mutuo timore" at least (Plut. Q. Rom. xxviii.), on the principle worthily formulated by Juvenal—"maxima debetur puero reverentia" (xiv. 47).

In the Latin sense educatio was applied to the process of training a child how to live—how to confront the problems of material existence (Varr. ap. Non. 447, 33, s.v. "Educere"; educat obstetrix, educat nutritix, institut paedagogus, doct magister"). In this sense, education began with the father's recognition of the newly-born infant's right to live, which was conceded if he formally raised it in his arms; and most of this early care for the young fell to the mother or to near kinwomen, or, in increasing degrees, was developed, to nurses. In the time of the Empire, Tacitus could still use the phrase 'in sinn matris educari'; and it should be remembered that a Roman matron was well equipped with the knowledge of physical, moral, and often intellectual training to sons and daughters. Her position was one of greater dignity than that of the Athenian wife, and some have ventured to think that 'the whole social fabric was reared by the forceful character of house-mothers in the serene atmosphere of the home' (C. W. L. Launspach, State and Family in Early Rome, 1908, p. 190). This is but a modern version of that 'rate/'educanda' to which we have alluded, which so alarmed Catu (Plut. Cat. Maj. viii.)

Although primitive usage preferred that mothers should suckle their own babies, there is good evidence for the early employment of both foster-mothers and dry nurses. At a later period the number of nurses employed can be gauged from the records of inscriptions (see 'Monumenta columbariorum,' in CIL vi. 4352, 4457, 4623, 5024, 5941-42; et, occurrences of matris and similar words in Indexes of the CIL ix. and x., under 'Parentehoe et accesoriorum'). Their importance was not restricted to questions of the proper feeding of infants, although this was not overlooked by the Romans (Varr. Cat. [for other readings Cato or Cappal, et de liberis educatis, cited Ant. Gall. vii. xiv.; Nonius, ii. 46, s.v. 'Ope'). It was recognized that they had much power in shaping the character of the future householder, and in securing the avoidance of many bad habits, foolish sed可疑, and objecting the youth to a representative for the stress laid upon the choice of a nurse in Quintilian and in the de Educatione Puerorum ascribed to Plutarch.

About the age of seven a Roman boy in the earlier period came more definitely under his father's tuition, to be taught on the lines which we have seen were followed by the elder Cato—namely, the elements of reading, writing, and reckoning, and such bodily exercises as would best fit him for military service. Boys belonging to the simpler and more agricultural times of Rome also took part in farm-work and in the rural religious ceremonial; while girls, learned, under their mother, spinning and other domestic accomplishments, except the menial tasks of corn-grinding and cookery. The two main careers were war and politics; and the object was to train a man of action, with no claims to rival the intellectual and aesthetic accomplishments of an accomplished, well-developed in body, reverential towards the gods, mindful of ancestral custom (mos maiorum), regardful of the laws which he learned as a boy by rote from the aediles and curatores, and inclining, therefore, by the force of precept and example to follow virtues like obedience, temperance, bravery, and industry, which may always be inculcated in a firm and well-organized system of education, if parents can be relied upon to perform their duty. There was nothing more

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distinctive of the native Roman education than its training, and the spirit set by morality—e.g. modesty (τα ἀπαχόρητα τῶν ῥητίων ώς ὑπνόου ἀλληλεπίδειον τοῖς πάθοις τῶν ῥητῶν παρόντος) & ἐν γτάξει καλῶς (Plut. Cat. Maj. xx.); cf. Cicero's terms of praise 'adulescens' (Mur. iii. 351 A); or obedientio (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. ii. 26). In fact, the outstanding qualities in a model young Roman may be taken, as summarized in Cicero's words, as 'self-control combined with aélunentia [literary] education in pristine beauty' (pro Cluent. lx. 165); or obedientio (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. ii. 26). Such were the moral results attained by an education entrusted without reserve to the familia, in consonance with a characteristic Roman regard for the patria potestas. By the time that a youth reached the age of 20, a training deemed adequate for all likely calls upon him had been given through the home, through exercise, through the companionship and experience of seniors, and through observation of the ways of men in the forum. The formal training of the neck, at least, was now taken over by the father himself, and attended, as claims on time became more insistent, to be delegated to a cultured slave, acting under the parental supervision.

While robust frames, disciplined minds, stolid gravity, yielding courage bore testimony to the strength of the ancient upbringing, it had its defects. It provided little to induce refinement, artistic tastes, or kindlier emotions. It produced a Cato, ready to recommend the prompt sale of a slave worn out by faithful service, or a Mummius, who sacked Corinth without compunction, and saw nothing extraordinary in laying down a stringent condition that his contractors for transporting uninvolved, had always had their hands on Rome should replace any lost or damaged en route! Yet, despite limitations, it was an admirable method of training patriotic warriors; and it yielded the constancy and energy requisite for the victors in the Punic Wars. Leaving such liberty to the family, and eschewing State infringement upon private instruction, the older Rome succeeded in drawing the bonds of citizenship closer than Greece had done through theories of systematized education.

2. Middle period—240 B.C.—A.D. 120.—The most momentous alien factor in the development of Roman education was the influence of Greece. Through the agency of Corinth, and the strong ties of kinship, was of high significance; but its details cannot be considered here (see 'The Invasion of Hellenism,' in J. W. Duff's Lit. Hist. of Rome, pp. 92–117). Some salient facts, however, must be noted. Relations between Rome and Magna Graecia led to contact with Greek civilization at an early but not exactly determinable date. The borrowing of the alphabet is a well-known instance; and coinmone and diplomacy obviously ensured acquaintance with Greek, at any rate in its spoken form. Thus Postumius in 282 B.C., as Roman envoy at Tarentum, could make a speech in the language, even if it was not yet a literary idiom. By the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C. at Rome is an acquaintance with the principles of Greek rhetoric on the part of the upper classes, and the emergence of three grades of education—the grammaticus, the rhetor, and the iunctura respectively. Roughly, they correspond to our elementary, secondary, and University standards (Apul. Flor. xx. 'prima cratarae litteratoris rudilatam simul scirem, grammatici doctrina instito, tertis rhetor eloquentiam acquiri'). The consideration of these must now occupy us.

(1) Elementary education.—The litteratus was in charge of the Crates, the most representative of Pyrrhus, seems to have addressed the Roman Senate in Greek without an interpreter. But this does not necessarily imply acquaintance with Greek literature, or presuppose a highly developed style, and certainly not until the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C. did the literatus (Orchilius, quoted in the Litteratus, Greg. iv.) acquire a high literary education. The considerable of the two individuals attributed to Cato. In private houses, failing the parent, a trained slave, or in some cases the child's own attendant (patella—gypsus), taught the rudiments; but elementary schools kept by a idiom magister (who was usually supplied the need of a literary text for Roman schools by translating the Odyssey into Latin saturnians. It remained in use till the days of Horace. The period of Livius was evidently one of educational activity; for he and Ennius, Sue- tonius says, were charged with the education of the same time teachers who gave instruction in both languages (de Gram. i. Another sign of the times was the opening, about 231 B.C., by Sp. Carvilius, of the first school where regular fees were charged. By 173 B.C. the teaching of Epicurean philosophy had excited so much attention that the Government, alarmed at its seductive plausibility, banished two of its professors. Soon after, Aemilius Paulus brought the royal library from Macedon to Rome (Plut. Aem. Paul. xxvii.; Isid. Orig. vi. v. 1), and the access of the 'Scipionic Circle' to its volumes must have influenced education, as it did literature. The residence of the thousand Achaean hostages in Italy for sixteen years after 167 B.C. is memorable, not only for the intellectual stimulus so given, but also for the recorded advice tendered by the most influential of the age, Polybius, to the younger Scipio—that he should take advantage of the educational facilities obtainable owing to the number of Greek teachers in Rome (Polyb. xxix. iii. x.).

The study by the same date of literature at Rome, and the renowned library of Perugene, came on an errand of state from King Attalus, and, being detained in Rome owing to a broken leg, spent some time in lecturing. A man of broad scholarship, he so improved the method of teaching by his lectures on Greek literature that Suetonius declares him to have been the introducer of 'grammar' (de Gram. i. ). Meanwhile Greek philosophy and rhetoric were making great headway—too much headway, as the many of many patriotic Romans; for in 161 the philosophi and rhetorches were banished, probably for reasons similar to those which in 92 B.C. prompted the censors Aemilianus and Crassus to interdict the rhetorches Latinis; namely, that, in handling rhetoric, they did not lecture in Greek and according to genuine Greek methods, but transferred their attention to Latin, and regarded students in a cheap school of impudence.' A similar distrust animated Cato's hostility to letting the dangerous brilliance of Carneades prolong his diplomatic visit and continue his discourses in the Aemilianus. In 115 B.C. the leading literary at Rome was high significance; but its details cannot been considered here (see 'The Invasion of Hellenism,' in J. W. Duff's Lit. Hist. of Rome, pp. 92–117). Some salient facts, however, must be noted. Relations between Rome and Magna Graecia led to contact with Greek civilization at an early but not exactly determinable date. The borrowing of the alphabet is a well-known instance; and coinmone and diplomacy obviously ensured acquaintance with Greek, at any rate in its spoken form. Thus Postumius in 282 B.C., as Roman envoy at Tarentum, could make a speech in the language, even if it was not yet a literary idiom. By the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C. at Rome is an acquaintance with the principles of Greek rhetoric on the part of the upper classes, and the emergence of three grades of education—the grammaticus, the rhetor, and the iunctura respectively. Roughly, they correspond to our elementary, secondary, and University standards (Apul. Flor. xx. 'prima cratarae litteratoris rudilatam simul scirem, grammatici doctrina instito, tertis rhetor eloquentiam acquiri'). The consideration of these must now occupy us.

(1) Elementary education.—The litteratus was in charge of the Crates, the most representative of Pyrrhus, seems to have addressed the Roman Senate in Greek without an interpreter. But this does not necessarily imply acquaintance with Greek literature, or presuppose a highly developed style, and certainly not until the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C. did the litteratus (Orchilius, quoted in the Litteratus, Greg. iv.) acquire a high literary education. The considerable of the two individuals attributed to Cato. In private houses, failing the parent, a trained slave, or in some cases the child's own attendant (patella—gypsus), taught the rudiments; but elementary schools kept by a idiom magister (who was usually
a freedman) were, despite the unconcern of the Government, on the increase. The percentage of illiteracy was less than might be supposed; for primary education must have been pretty widely diffused, to admit of the circulation of military orders in writing by the time of Polybius. The scribbling on the walls of Pompei, too, argue a wide-spread faculty of reading and writing in the 1st cent. A.D. The methods of elementary teaching were differentiated in Quintilian's work, the fullest educational Treatise which has come down from antiquity. The lack of literary texts has vanished long before his day, and he counsels early lessons on good authors (he prefers Greek [1. i. 121]), even before pupils can grasp the entire meaning. Simple fables and extracts from authors made convenient reading-books. The initial recognition of the shapes of letters can be, he points out, aided by ivory models given to children to play with (1. i. 20); for instruction in reading, see Grasberger, *Erziehung*, etc., ii. 250-500. Writing was started by guiding the pupil's hand, as he followed with the stitul characters traced on wax-covered tablets, or by a sort of stencil process in which the letters were cut out of wax or glass. (Enc. vi.) Later came the copying of specimen letters, and more advanced pupils would use a *columnus* with *atra mentum* to write upon vellum from Per- gramentum or papyrus. From the papyrus plant of the Nile (for instruction in writing, see Grasberger, *op. cit.* ii. 300 ff.). The *dictata magistri*, selections for dictation, gave practice in writing, and could be used for training the memory. In arithmetic many references show that the fingers were freely used for calculations. As at all times, tables had to be got up by rote, and St. Augustine recalls with an evident shudder of disgust the brain, bone, and one or two fingers, etc. (Conf. i. xiii. "unum et unum duo, duo et duo quattuor, odiosa cantio milii erat"). Harder sums were done with the help of the abacus and its *calculeti*, the board being marked out into columns for units, fives, tens, fifteens, hundreds, etc. The difficulties due to the awkwardness of the Roman figures were considerable (Marquardt, *Das Privatleben der Romer*, 67-104, or Fr. tr. *La Vie privée des Romains*, 1592, i. 113-125); but this fact did not prevent the attainment of high arithmetical skill by the capitalists, tax-farmers, money-lenders, and traders of a shrewd, hardheaded, and frequently even unscrupulous and dishonest manner, and diverted its attention from farming to money-getting. (2) Grammar School education.—Training under the grammaticus succeeded to elementary instruction commonly when the pupil was 12 or 13, and lasted until he passed at about 16 into the hands of the *rhetor*. It should be noted that age-limits for the different grades of study cannot be regarded as constant; for undoubtedly there was overlapping between the grades; thus, as now, pupils of the same age exhibited marked disparity in mental capacity; and the abandonment of the *bulla* of boyhood and the assumption of the *toga virilis* varied, with individuals and at different times, from 14 to 17, when military service usually began. At the Grammar School the aim was to teach intelligent and effective reading of standard authors in both Latin and Greek (cf. the series of *grammatici* mentioned by Suetonius, most were of Hel- lenic origin, and many were freedmen (de Gram. xv., xvi., xix., xx.)); but there were Romans who applied the methods of Crates' lectures on Greek literature at a later stage. (e.g. Neeius, Ennius, and Lucilius soon became school authors *op. cit. ii.*). On the whole, the profession received scant honour and scant pay. The magistrates' official duties involved the orator, the pantomime actor, and the boxer might act turn teacher (Suet. *op. cit. ix., xviii., xxi.); and yet there were instances of Roman knights taking up the work; and the educational demands must have been considerable when the city had over twenty flourishing Grammar Schools (op. cit. iii.). Under the Empire, good schools had a *grammaticus Latinitatis* and a *grammaticus Graecitatis*—a special teacher for each language, one lecturing in *toga*, the other in *pallium*. Though their subject-matter was different, the method was the same for both (Quint. i. iv. 1). This specialization and style of description are abundantly clear from inscriptions found in Italy and the provinces (e.g. the Graecus in CIL VI. 12036 (Corduba); the Latinitatis, ii. 2592 (Triclia in Spain); iii. 460 [Thys- tines in Asia Minor, *PhMIRG*], 3433 (Verona), 3273 (Como), vi. 926 [Rome], ix. 3424). Greek *grammatici*, who taught in Rome towards the end of the Republic, understood and wrote Latin also. The freedman Atelius Philologus, a native of Athens, was described by Asininius Pollio as 'nobilis grammaticus Latinus' (Suet. *de Gram. x.), and Ghipho, Cicero's teacher, was 'non minus Graece quam Latine doctus' (op. cit. vii.). Professors who took the simple title of *grammaticus* were usually *grammatici* (cf. 3572, [magistro artis grammaticae]), vi. 9444-9452, ix. 1654). 'Grammar' (grammation) covered a wider field than in our accent.—Its two main terms were 'recti loquendi scientia' and 'poeconom enaratio,' in other words, the knowledge of the correct employment of language and the appreciation of literature (Quint. i. iv. 14). The first division consisted of the study of the parts of speech, accents, metric, and discussed faults in use of words, in idiom, pronunciation, spelling. The second division, which aimed at elucidation of the poets, involved far more than mere learning of the geographical, historical, or mythological implications of the matter, subsidiary subjects, like music, geometry, astronomy, and philosophy, were necessary for successful teaching or study (Quint. i. iv. 4, i. x.). Prose was much less lectured upon than verse; so that Cicero with reason complains of the comparative neglect of history (de Leg. i. ii.). For linguistic study, pupils used the Latin grammar of Memmius Philonem, or the Greek handbook by Dionysius of Thrace, a work which had its ground at Constantinople till the 13th cent. A.D. Inquiry into the phenomena of language appealed to geniuses; if we read Crates' and Philostratus'city, to savants like Varro, to statesmen like Cesar, and to some of the Emperors; while the Corpus of the grammarians (ed. Keil), taken along with such representative commentaries as upon Virgil as Macrobius and Servius, will suffice to indicate the range and methods of Roman grammar. The tasks set included the re-telling of *Aesop's* fables as an oral and a written exercise, paraphrasing, training in *sententias* (moral maxims), *chriseis* (anecdotes with moral bearing), *ethologicae* (personal character-descriptions), *narrativae* (short stories on poetic themes, to teach matter rather than style (Quint. i. ix. 4). The study of literature—the coping-stone of ancient grammar—involved *lectio* (expressive reading without singing or provincial accent (Quint. i. vii. 2, viii. 5, xi. iii. 30)); *enarratio* (erudite explanation of the subject-matter); *mentio* (partial criticism); *judicium* (literary criticism). The authors prescribed by the *grammatici* were largely identical with those prescribed by the *rhetor* at a later stage. This was handled by Quintilicus in his tenth book; only, the standpoint of study ultimately altered to oratorical effectiveness. In Greek the rule was to begin with Homer, as in Latin with Virgil. Homer was approved as an indispensable text for the study of language, history,
myth, religion, manners, geography; and wide knowledge—with sometimes the same details—was demanded from a lecturer. Other Greek authors popular in schools were Hesiod, for his practical maxims; the lyric poets in selections, excluding or minimizing the erotic; the greater tragedians, and the comic poets, especially Menander. Among Latin texts which had a prolonged vogue were Andronieus' verse translation of the Odyssey, the older epic poets Naevius and Quintus Ennius, Plautus, Terence, Pacuvius, Accins, Afranius. Virgil was introduced into the school course by Caecilius Epictetus, a freedman of Atticus, not long after the poet's death, and took among Roman authors a place parallel with Homer's among the Greeks. Horace, too, was soon found in the schools; and a desire to escape from archaic models accounts for the lectures which were given on the poems of Laecan, Statius, and Nero himself, during the lifetime of the authors. The literary reaction of the 2nd cent. A.D. led to a revival of interest in ante-Augustan poets. This predominance of poetic study, which is so marked a feature of the course in Latin was not to be found in Greek. But prose authors received more attention from the rhetor. Cicero became a model in his own day, and Quintilian holds him up as 'incomparabili incipientior, quietusque, auctoribus.' Among the grammarians he recommends Livy in preference to Sallust, who, he maintains, needs a more advanced intelligence; but here Quintilian is thinking more especially of the training for declamation.

The highest education.—In the final stage of formal education, namely, under the rhetor, the training was designed to fit directly for the duties of public life—for deliberative and forensic oratory, and, its faults notwithstanding, rhetoric turned out, in the time of the Empire, men of affairs, magistrates, civil servants, and advocates, equipped with an admirable power of effective speech. The Roman turn for oratory ensured an early and favourable attention to the practice and theory of Greek rhetoric, which inherited old traditions from Sicily, Athens, and Asia Minor. The Greek rhetor was, therefore, heard gladly, and his lessons were acceptable to an extent not always conceded to rhetores Latini, who had been viewed with suspicion by the authorities in 92 B.C., and who did not in Quintilian's time do their work so well as their Greek colleagues (I. ix. 6). But the relation between formal grammar and rhetoric, Quintilian touches on the constantly recurrent phenomenon of overlapping in education (II. i.). In this case it was nothing new, for Suetonius tells us that in ancient times the same teacher often taught both departments (de Gram. iv. 'neteres grammatici et rhetorici docebant'); and Quintilian says that boys were often kept too long by the grammarians before being sent on to the rhetor. With his usual good sense he recognizes that the time for passing into the rhetor's hands should depend on capacity rather than on years (II. i. 7). The secondary teachers, however, were often required to teach French on the superior provinces, and to give boys practice in what were really rhetorical exercises, so that pupils might go on to the professor of rhetoric creditably equipped (Suet. de Gram. iv. 'ne neciscit sese omnino ardid, publice reddere possit').

By the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C., as has been seen, the principles of Greek rhetoric were familiar to the upper classes at Rome; but a new departure was the introduction of 'declarations' on imaginary themes—perhaps by Molon of Rhodes about 84 B.C., as Borneoq thinks (Les Déclarations et les déclamateurs, p. 42). This hypothesis is not at variance with the probable date of the earliest systematic treatise in Latin upon rhetoric, ad Arearinum (c. 42 B.C.), or at the latest it touched on declamation, and furnished subjects for debate of the suasaoria type. It was only, however, towards the end of Cicero's life that declamatio came to be transferred from its old sense of vehemence of delivery to the sense of an oratorical exercise upon an invented subject. Declamation subsequently became the crowning exercise in rhetoric, and spread from Rome through Italy to the provinces, and from there to the schools.

To lead up to declamation the rhetorician prescribed a definite series of preliminary exercises, and for effective educational results Quintilian insists that the professor must be of excellent character, as well as of the highest possible intellectual ability, and tact in dealing with a class (II. ii.-iii.). The preliminary exercises (II. iv.) include composing narratives of a less poetic stamp than in the 'Grammar School,' discussion of matters of historic doubt, panegyric and invective, comparison of characters, communtes loci (traits of character useful for attacking vices), theses (questions of a general type for deliberation, e.g. 'Is it to be thought right to kill one's brother?'), coniecturales causae, which Quintilian remembered as a pleasant exercise of his own student days (e.g. 'Why is the sky blue?'). Among these the rhetorician recommends Livy in preference to Sallust, who, he maintains, needs a more advanced intelligence; but here Quintilian is thinking more especially of the training for declamation.

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match for his son, and orders him to divorce the pirate-chief's daughter. The son refuses, and is disinherited (Sen. Cato, i. vi.).

This kind of exercise sharpened the wits by a sort of mental gymnastic; it produced marvellous subtility of argument, and great readiness and finish of speech, but hazardous drawbacks. Its range was narrow and artificial; its subjects were hackneyed—so that the dreary round of declamation on the same subject by youth after youth rising in the schools, as Juvenal remarks, enough to kill teachers with boredom ('Occidit miseris crambe repetita magistros' [vii. 151]). Old material had to be dressed in apparently fresh form; and this caused an excessive concentration upon style and expression, to the inevitable detriment of subject-matter and sound sense. The system was calculated to produce an indifference to truth, to the rights or wrongs of a case, and so was morally deleterious; it fostered, too, that glinse of speech which seemed so detestable to the sensible author of the de Educandone Puerorum; and—most notorious and most wide-reaching—the effect, accounted for a large amount of the tinsel, staginess, and artificiality of the Roman literature of the Silver Age.

It was a complaint with good judges, like Quintilian and Tacitus, that the licence and immorality concealed in the fault, the tendency to over eloquence. Like Cicero before him, Quintilian contemplated an ideal oratory on a basis morally and intellectually sound (Quint. xii. 1, 1), and he cites Cicero's requirement of wide knowledge as an indispensable equipment ('omnia rerum magnarum atque artium scientiam' [ii. xxi. 14]). Quintilian's requirements are stated more modestly when he says that the orator must at least study the subject on which he is to speak—'sed mildly satis est eius esse oratorem rei de qua dicet non insigne.' But he does desiderate acquaintance with many subjects outside the professional training—e.g. ethics, physics, and dialectic (t. prooem. 16; xii. 10, 10), law (xii. iii.), and history (xii. iv.). It was, indeed, largely in philosophy that Roman students of ability followed their 'post-graduate' course, either in the capital itself, where Epicurean, Academic, and Stoic thought had long been represented, or in Athens as the traditional headquarters of the schools. The education of great authors must not be taken as absolute, however; if they professed an educational prejudice, it was to study for mental training as well as intellectual (ad Hel. xvii., ad Marc. xvi.); and Quintilian favours the intellectual development of women for the sake of their children (i. 6; for ancient frescoes from Herculaneum showing women studying mathematics, see references in art. 'Education,' in Daremberg-Saglio). The mark made by women in authorship testifies to emancipation from, or expansion of, the ancient ideal of an academic teaching in Rome; but at the age of 27, partly for health, partly for culture, he went abroad and studied under eminent Greeks in Athens, Asia Minor, and Rhodes. Cesar was 25 when he visited Rhodes, mainly for advanced rhetoric. The age for study at a foreign 'University,' however, was usually earlier. The younger Cicero and Ovid were 20 when they went to Athens; Horace was studying philosophy there at 18.

Encyclopedic learning became obviously less attainable as knowledge advanced, and distinct progress in education between the 2nd cent. B.C. and the close of the Republic is evident on a comparison of Cato's list of subjects of general culture and Varro's list in his Disciplinarum libri ix. In the Roman gentleman's education, Cato included grammar, agriculture, law, war, and medicine; while Varro added logic, dialectic, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetica, astronomy, music, medicine, and architecture. The significant point is that war, law, and agriculture had disappeared from Cato, and were coupled with the quadrivium, or advanced course pursued from the time of Martianus Capella.

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street by a curtain, or in a room above, open on one side, but with a veranda or Italian loggia (pergola). Thus, if there was no inspective faculty, there was publicity; and the noise of school lessons, which began at an early hour, was a subject of complaint in Rome (Ovid, Amores, i, vii, 13-14; Mart. ix, vii, 1-3). There was, however, the education of the use of models, maps, and busts. The tabula Iliaca, in the Capitoline Museum at Rome, was a sort of concrete aid to study for a class working upon Homer; it may have been used by Augustan boys when a boy. We hear surprisingly little of the buildings used in higher work: halls, porticoes, theatres, baths, and wrestling-schools could be used for largely attended declamations. We read, too, of 'roomy exedrae furnished with seats, wherein philosophers, rhetoricians, and the rest of the study-loving world may sit and debate' (Vitruv. v, xi, 'exedrae spatiosae in quibus philosophi rhetorices recipiantque qui studiis deflectantur sedentes disputarent possint'). Hadrian's Athenaeum was a noble edifice, in the amphitheatres of which Greek and Latin rhetors could lecture to crowded audiences (Aurel. Victor, de Caesar. ep., i, 5; Alex. Sev. xxxv, xxxvi, Capit. Perit., xi, Gord. Trex, iii.). As to fees, the eight assess per month of the country school mentioned by Horace (Sat. i, vi, 75) show that education in the age was not haphazardly paid. Masters seem in early days to have depended chiefly on freewill offerings from pupils or their parents at times of festivals like the Quinquatrus in March (when the Mineralis was presented to the teacher), or the Saturnalia in December. Carvilius, towards the end of the 3rd cent. B.C., seems to have introduced the innovation of regularly charging school fees; but probably many adhered to the old custom of trusting to the goodwill and generosity of patrons. Thus Gnipho, Ciceror's master, never stipulated for a fee (Suet. de Gram. vii, 1). Senecanus records the extreme poverty of some famous grammarians; e.g. Orbilius, Valerius Catala, and Hyginus the freedman of Augustus and librarian of the Palatine (Suet. de Gram. ix, xi, xx.). On the other hand, some were fortunate enough to secure favour in high places; thus, Vitruvius Plancus was nominated by Augustus as a preceptor to his grandsons, had his school housed in the Palatium under the condition that he would accept no new pupils, and received a salary of 10,000 sesterces (op. cit., xvii). Remmius Palaemon made 400,000 sesterces annually from his school (op. cit. xxiii). In Imperial times, especially in the later period still to be considered, with the emergence of municipal schools there appears the feature of less endowment of education; and, where the municipality did not act, it was possible for a few private individuals to guarantee the salary of a master, as the younger Pliny suggested when he found that boys had to be sent from Como to Milan for their education. The first Emperor to appoint State-paid professors of rhetoric was Vespasian (Suet. Vesp. xviii); and thenceforward, in the higher teaching of rhetoric or philosophy, especially if directly encouraged by Imperial favour, men like Quinian could count on making a good income.

6) Punishments and holidays.-The Roman schoolmaster was a severe disciplinarian, and unsatisfactory pupils were ‘flogged’ (ferula [Juv. i, 15]) or with the severer scutica. A famous fresco from Herculanenum represents a pupil ‘bored’ by another, while a third holds his feet and makes him ‘play’. Quintilian expresses his objection to corporal punishment (4, ii, 14). As to holidays, climatic conditions must have necessitated a considerable break in the hottest time of the year; and during harvest and vintage there can have been little or no attendance at country schools. The old calendar had a four months' summer holiday, based on a false reading in Horace (Sat. i, vi, 75), is an error, but one which appears to have been held (esp. in A.D. 362-367) during the celebration of the edification of the church at Thessalonica. The 3rd cent. and the greater public festivals brought a cessation of school-work. Apart from minor feasts and extraordinary occasions for rejoicing and giving, there were the regular holidays, festivals alone accounted for over sixty holidays every year.

3. From Hadrian to the end of the Roman Empire.—The State, which had concerned itself with morality by repeatedly enacted summary laws and by encouraging marriage, was much slower to take education under its direct cognizance. Yet it is the Imperial concern for education which makes the distinctive feature of this closing period; for neither in East nor in West did the substance or method of education alter much. Thus, in the Greek portions of the Roman world the 'Second Sophistic' was represented by travelling rhetoricians, who found critical audiences—indicative of a wide diffusion of the old intellectual culture (Dill, Rom. Soc. from Nero to Marcus Aurelius, 1905, p. 575; Mommsen, Provinces of Rom. Empire, 1865, etc. cf. Philostr. Apoll. Tyan. i, 7, Vit. Soph. i, 220). Again, in the West, Africa (especially at Carthage), Spain, and the Gallic seats of learning maintained the ancient training in grammar and rhetoric. Marseilles, Autun, Lyons, Bordeaux, and, later, Toulouse, Narbonne, and Trèves were representative centres. It was the continuance of an old movement. Agricola had in early life realized the benefits of a good education in a country and about A.D. 80 established schools in Britain for chieftains' sons. In the 2nd cent. Juvenile glances at the craze for culture signified by the influence of Gallic eloquence on British lawyers, and by the talk in the 'Farthest North' about appointing a professor of rhetoric (Sat. xv. 111-112). Marcus Aurelius went through the normal three stages with certain conditions; lessons from his 'litterator' were amplified by others from naming an actor and a tutor who was both musician and geometer; at the next stage he had one Greek and three Latin grammatici; at the third stage he had three Greek masters of eloquence (including a Greek philosopher and one Latin master, Pronto. He studied under many philosophers, and worked hard at law. He also attended public declamations (Capitol. M. Ant. Phil. ii, 3). A broadly similar course, though less full, was followed early in the 3rd cent. by Alexander Severus, first in the East, and afterwards at Rome (Lamprid. Alex. Sev. iii). The persistence of the ancient pagan learning meets us in an interesting way when we note the course of training followed by Christian Fathers and well represented in the Confessios of St. Augustine, which, at the utterance of one who had been a student in Africa and a professor at Milan, place vividly before us at once the aesthetic attractions and the moral defects of classical literature.

The characteristics of Roman education in Gaul during the 4th and 5th cents. are best known to us through the works of Ausonius and Augustine. Ausonius' (Dill, Rom. Soc. in last Cent. of W. Empire, pp. 385-451). The rhetorical training had suffered inevitable degeneration, thanks to its extravagancies and to the roving habit of handling unrealities; but one pleasant feature in the literary education is its tendency to form a ground of common interest between Christian and non-Christian friends. Another and a less pleasant feature, suggested in the coming down of the Empire, and anticipative of the training of the Middle Ages, is the gradual decline of the study of Greek in the West. This is quite noticeable.
both in Gaul and in Africa, where, in the time of Apuleius and Tertullian, educated men had known Greek as proficiently as Latin. St. Augustine, for example, had little hold upon or affection for Greek, and studied Plato chiefly in Latin translation.

The attitude of the central authorities towards education, which is the salient feature of this period, had been foreshadowed from the very beginning of the Empire. Julius Caesar granted the franchise to medical men and teachers of the liberal arts (Suet. Div. Jul. xlii.)—a great testimony to the dignity of learning as a passport for foreigners to Roman citizenship. A similar spirit prompted Augustus' exemption of teachers from a decree banning foreigners (Suet. Div. Aug. xliii.); and his establishment of Verrius Flaccus in the Palatium has been mentioned. Tiberius and Claudius were interested in schools and in grammatical learning; but the next practical step in the direction of Imperial patronage was Vespasian's fixing of an annual stipend of 100,000 sesterces for Greek and Latin rhetors (Suet. Vesp. xviii.). This stipend of about £80 a year probably would not hold good outside the capital itself, and it may not have been till the reign of Domitian that Vespasian's arrangements came into actual execution. Some entries under Domitian's reign (Eus. Chron. ad ann. 2194) is:

'Quintilius Calagurritanus ex Hispania primus Romanae publicae scholarum et salarium e fisico acceperat et curavit.' Trajan's decision to confer education upon 5000 poor boys was a recognition of the gain to the community from having its future citizens trained (Plin. Paneg. xxvi.-xxviii.). Then, under Hadrian, came that expansion of educational policy from Rome to the Empire on a large scale which marks his reign as the opening of a new era. Himself a widely read student, accomplished in painting and music, with a taste for declaiming, and fond of having learned men in his entourage, he showed liberality to all professors, and he superannuated teachers who were beyond their work (Spart. Hadr. xvi.). Besides giving rhetoric a home at his Athenaeum in the capital, he established schools in the provinces, granted them subventions, and appointed teachers.

Hadrian's policy was continued and extended by Antoninus Pius (Capitol. Ant. Pias. xii.: 'rhetori et grammatici subventiones et salaria delibuit'), who also exempted rhetors, philosophers, grammarians, and doctors from certain State imposts, laying down the number of professors to be thus exempted (see Leg. xxiii.); in the smallest, within the scope of the decree, 5 doctors, 3 sophists, 3 grammarians (Digest. xxvii. 1, 6). This measure proves the relationship of municipal and central authorities with the personnel of the teaching body. In reality, the expense of such schools fell on the municipalities, and the Emperors by special benefits simply encouraged and supported the towns in their educational labours. It was in this very year that a single person made application to an 'organisation municipale de l'enseignement' (art. 'Éducation,' in Darmeneng-Saglio; cf. Boissier, 'L'instruction publique,' loc. cit. infra, pp. 331-335).

In A.D. 176, Marcus Aurelius made payments to establish professorships at Athens (Dio Cass. xxi. 31. 3; ed. Bekker; Lucian, Eun. iii.). In the 3rd cent. with Alexander Severus appeared a curious system; for, while imperial funds and stipendiary salaries for rhetors, grammarians, and others, he arranged that their lectures should be attended by poor students aided by exhibitions (Lamprid. Alex. xii. and xii., 3). In this way, the urban philosophical schools, madefilos, mode ingenios, dari insitus'). The recurrence of enactments in the 4th cent. proves the tendency of municipalities to be mean or dilatory in paying salaries to teachers, education always appearing to offer a tempting field for economy. In 301, monthly payments were fixed by edict of Diocletian; e.g. 30 denarii per pupil for a magister institutor, 15 for a catechumen, 5 for a grammarian, and 3 for a geometra. Constantine ordained the regular payment of salaries, and by edicts of A.D. 321, 326, and 353 he granted indulgences to tax-exempted libraries studiis multos instituant.' When Constantius Chlorus appointed Eunapius to be principal of the resuscitated school at Antion about A.D. 297, the town had accepted the Emperor's right to choose as quite natural; and in 382, Julian claimed the nomination of professors throughout the Empire as a prerogative of the Emperor, but delegated the sitting of candidates to the local bodies (Cod. Theod. xiii. 3, 5). His forbidding of Christians to teach in schools was the first definite restriction imposed by the Emperor upon the freedom of local choice. Different rescripts of Gratian and of Theodosius regulate the number and number of professors (Cod. xiii. 11, xiv. 0. 3). Gratian's policy possesses a special interest, because it was probably guided by his adviser and former tutor, Austrinus; his edict left the appointments of teachers to the local communities, or the provinces; e.g. a rhetor was to have twice the amount due to a grammarian. Now, this was equivalent to ear-marking money in the municipal budgets for professional salaries.

The last notable advance in the Imperial organization of public instruction is the foundation by Theodosius ii. at Constantinople in 425 (little over a century before its dissolution by Justinian) of a University staffed by 21 professors, viz. 3 Latin rhetors, 10 Latin grammarians, 5 Greek rhetors, 10 Greek grammarians, 1 philosopher, 2 jurisconsults. The professors were treated as State-functionaries, and a monopoly in public teaching was secured to the University. The staffing is significant for its omissions. Neither science nor medicine figures in the list, and philosophy is poorly represented; yet Constantinople had a wider curriculum than most other institutions, which in the main concentrated their work, as Bordeaux did, upon grammar and rhetoric. Thus philosophy, never truly a passion with the Romans, and certainly not with Constantine and his successors, had a currency of the 4th cent., came to be fully represented only at Athens, which in this respect outshone Massilia, Naples, Alexandria, Antioch, Seleucia, Smyrna, Ephesus, Ithaca, and a dozen other towns. A.D. 417 a law of Valentinian iii. (A.D. 370) illustrates the concern of the Government for another aspect of education. It lays down rules for the supervision of students at Rome. On arrival, they were required to deliver to the magister instititor a passport from the governor of their own province, stating their antecedents; they must declare their intended course of study; misconduct might render them liable to public punishment; and permission to reside in Rome up to the age of 29 was made conditional on good behaviour and diligent study. Such regulations were necessary; for idlers and rogues, like the authors of St. Augustine's Confessions, could and did misuse themselves to terror professors and to fellow-pupils in the
schools of Europe, Africa, and Asia Minor. The amenities and the troubles of student life in the 4th cent., both in West and in East, are brought home to us in the pages of Ambrose, Augustine, Eusebius, and Gratian. We read of a cultured society looking back with pleasure and gratitude to ‘college’ lectures and companionships; students flocking to the lectures of a famous professor, especially if it be an Eunapius, and seeing themselves as one among its own kind. The profession required of a student, or under the impression of rebuking them, or jealousy over a rival’s reputation; corporations of students formed, as Eunapius discovered, to further the interests of a favourite professor, to waylay new-comers, and by rough ordeals initiate them into membership, under oath that they would take no lessons except from sophists recognized by their worshipful association (see A. Müller, loc. cit. infra).

If we take Gaul as typical of the survival of the old Roman education, we find in the 5th cent. that studies have ceased to make any advance, and that the classical tradition is on the eve of disappearance before irruptions of barbarism and the distrustful attitude of the Christian monastic schools.


EDUCATION, MORAL.—I. Definition and scope. The concept ‘moral education’ requires to be clearly defined; otherwise much confusion is bound to arise in discussion. We shall consider first what the definition should include, then what it should exclude.

(a) Religious and denominational duties.—The differences between the members of the human race are altogether insignificant compared with the differences between a man and his Deity. We may, therefore, profitably distinguish, at least for practical purposes, that part of religious duties which have to do with the religious convictions or activities of a man’s relation to his Deity or not that to his fellows is a purely ethical one; therefore, just as we do not look upon every human question as an ethical one, so we must bear in mind that every religious problem is not necessarily a moral one. We are thus justified in distinguishing between theological and moral duties, and in confining, for all intents and purposes, theological duties to the religious lesson, and moral duties to the home. Both religious and moral education would be gained by such a separation, since the duties towards our fellows and those towards the Deity, which differ in several respects, could be more exhaustively and more fruitfully treated. This would be all the more important because opinions on theology vary so widely in the 20th century.

The objections to the theological side of education, on the one hand, are still the point of view, for a similar connection exists between theology and moral subjects. For instance, we are taught that it is a religious duty to be ‘mindful of the welfare of others,’ and that it is a moral duty to look after our own. There is a compelling reason why morality, any more than history or science, should be treated at all in the home. To the extent that the object is justifiable, it may be met by occasional references to the religious lesson to ethics, history, and science, and that the case may be, and, in denominational schools, by occasional references to theology when treating of the same subject. This problem is of course a special one for the Portuguese Mission Instruction Manual for Primary Schools is devoted to theological duties, including duties to the Church, while, conversely, the Portuguese Catechism treats to some extent of moral duties. Each, morality and theology, comes in this way to its own. For the common school, however, it would be sufficient for the teacher to make it plain that the religious lesson will deal with religious and denominational duties.

(b) Religious and denominational duties. TThis is argued that the principal motives to right conduct are theological, the reply must be that the trend of modern times is to appeal to human motives in conduct, and that an ethical position is still useful. Here the world is true to itself, as at the conclusion of the school, it implies that the sufficiency of human motives for right action. The argument is further weakened by the divergence of theological lessons of one kind or another are becoming frequent all over the world.

Finally, it is clear that the phrase ‘religious education’ is a nonsense if we are considering the subject as part of the ordinary religious instruction in the home and schools, as they stand in the Bible, with the explanations of them given in most Protestant and Roman Catholic catechisms, and the difference between Bible morality and modern morality will be obvious. This is not a question as to whether the Bible is also the religion of the Church or bears to kill the children who mocked Elisha, or accepted such

1 Religion itself I take to mean a body of truths or beliefs respecting God and our relation to Him; and flowing from these a collection of duties which have a peculiar connection with our nature and tendencies as moral agents. These are, in the main, the functions of the will in the form of exercises of internal and external worship. Out of these are several distinctions which are of a religious character, which we call religious sentiments. They include love, gratitude, sorrow, fear, and a sense of the horror of sin, and a consciousness of guilt (Fyfe Michael Miller, S.J., in Papers on Moral Education, communicated to the First International Moral Education Congress, 1909, p. 175).

2 If the Jehovah who instructed Jacob to cheat Laban, fated toshua to massacre the women and children of Jericho, and bears to kill the children who mocked Elisha, or accepted such
must be interpreted in different moral terms, and a person brought up strictly on Bible morality would be fitted only for Bible times and not at all adapted for change. The Bible, therefore, may be used by the teacher of morals as one only out of many sources of moral insight and inspiration.

We conclude, therefore, that for all practical purposes moral education must be separated from religious education.

(b) Intellectual, physical, aesthetic, and professional education.—The closer study of educational purposes demonstrates more and more that the concept ‘education’ has various aspects which can be separated with comparative ease. Moral education has consequently come to be regarded as a distinct branch of education. To this the objection is still sometimes offered, that since, as is alleged, intellectual education tends to make children truth-loving and true, or physical education makes them courageous and upright, therefore moral education is superfluous. A careful examination, for which we have no space here, would show that there is little truth in these contentions, and that, on the whole, each branch of education has to look after itself, if it is to achieve solid results, although it may justly rely on some support being given to it by each of the other branches.

It might further be argued that ethics should not be treated as separate from science and philosophy, the whole of education. To this the reply is that these two means are non-exact; that the schoolteacher in every class promotes the physical education of the children by insisting on proper postures and movements, and by teaching aspects in his subject connected with physical culture, even though there be a separate gymnastic class; so discipline and indirect moral instruction do not exclude systematic moral teaching. They are complementary and independent. As to the fact that the formation of character is generally judged to be the chief aim in education, this can make no difference to the need of separate teaching for the purpose of conveying clear and connected impressions of the moral realities.

We have seen that moral education is to be distinguished from religious, intellectual, physical, aesthetic, and professional education. We must inquire now what this form of education aims to compass.

c) Support of the present regime.—If moral education demanded obedience solely, its purport would be readily divined, for children would simply be taught to do what they are commanded by parents, teachers, masters, and magistrates; and to be satisfied with the economic and social position in which they may happen to find themselves. This code of morals is not by any means a rarity to-day; and its influence, in part at least, is favoured in many quarters. For instance, the large majority of French text-books on moral instruction were, until recently, emphatic on the point that the Great Revolution had achieved everything of moment for the good of France, and that dissatisfaction with present conditions argued, therefore, an unEthical state of mind. There is no future in the schools for such a non-progressive morality.

(d) Abstract moral conceptions.—It is also easy to define moral education in abstract moral terms. Obedience, as the common commands of duty, hearkening to the voice of conscience, whether our will is free, the heinousness of sin, the hauntings of remorse, and the necessity for repentance are such abstract moral conceptions. Even general references to ‘virtues’ and ‘vices’ are not out of place, but alter materially the effect of the teaching, for in all these cases the moral lessons do not tell the young what to do and what to leave undone. The higher the censure and the pleasure-hunter, the iller the hommage as is offered in the 69th Psalm, the higher we are to be regarded not as a conception relative to a barbarous age, but as an authority for all ages and all times. It is true that the lesson of the one God, then it would invidiously follow that the rulers of the modern world, they have not usually been prepared for their duties, and they have other educational duties to fulfill, and there are no authoritative manuals to inform them how to educate their children morally. Under these circumstances it is only the general pressure and influence of the environment which guide and correct the education given.

One striking exception alone exists up to the present—that referring to the education of infants. Here a multitude of definite rules are given, essentially the same as those in the modern sense, a moral being. (Canon Glazebrook, in Papers on Moral Education at the First International Moral Education Congress, p. 155.)
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obstacles, to the great relief and benefit of both parents and
infant. Accordingly it is wisely suggested that every young woman
and man (and every young man and woman) who is to visit for a
week or a cradle (or other scientifically conducted nursery) for
the first time, should have two weeks' experience of nursery life.
A second or three more significant steps is being already taken.
Young women, trained in kindergartens, learn how to nurse and employ young children,
and how to control the ultimate, in the exercise of their pont
session, on intelligent anticipation, cheerfulness, serenity,
loving care, courtesy, and respect for the child's love of liberty.
No corporal punishment, no pushing or pulling, no scolding,
shouting, or argumentation, no harshness, no bribing,
no alternative between forbidding and granting everything,
appeals to low motives, no base promises or excuses are re
sented, and yet the educational results are far more satisfac
rory than they used to be. The evident conclusion is that
prospective parents should train themselves to be trained as
are kindergarten nurses and teachers; and, considering the
simplicity of the training and the thoroughly unwise education
which is too common, opinion should not be divided on the
matter. The only drawback—which is, however, a serious one—is that this education, as now given, does not prepare for any high calling. A positive scheme of ethics, such as we have
sketched, must supplement the mere training in cheerfulness
and correctness; and be able to build up a strong character on
playing a worthy part in life must be the objective.

The above method of dealing with infants and young children
indicates the general lines of a sound system of moral educa
tion. The children, at all stages of development, must have
something to do both in the way of amusement and employ
ment, and the parents must know how to treat them.
The children trained in kindergartens growing in the house
and in helpfulness generally. Devotion to the right, love of
jury, and the loss of her income, perseverance, courtesy, modesty,
exactitude in observation and in giving accounts or making
statements, independent thought, carefulness in generalizing,
love of truth and the love of learning, of nature art, strenuous
ness and love of work, temperance in the classic sense, and
simplicity of living should be among other virtues, inculcated
in the home according to the stage of development of the
young. Children should learn, too, to do what is right and
reasonably not intently, intelligently, cheerfully, cheerfully
and rapidly. In the adolescent period the parent should be the
trusted friend of the youth or maiden; purity, sobriety, industry, desirable companions, love of nature, art, and learn
ing, and devotion to good causes should be particularly
encouraged.

We may divide moral education into four periods:
(i.) from birth to the age of two-and-a-half; (ii.) from two-and-a-half to seven; (iii.) from seven to about twenty-one; and (iv.) from twenty-one onwards. In the first period, when the child cannot
async or be easily controlled with, we consider
more especially the formation of good habits; in the second,
when the child possesses just about sufficient understanding to comprehend commands, his character is to be moulded chiefly by obedience;
in the third period, the child's formation is the primary object, and,
and, naturally, self-direction is the main motive
force. In the third period, the formation of good
habits must be continued throughout the second,
third, and fourth stages; the appeal to obedience throughout the third and fourth stages; the method of commutation through the fourth stage; and,
and, indeed, the four methods are applicable, in
varying degrees, to all the four stages.

The following aspects are discernible in a well
considered system of moral education:—

(1) The nature of the morality taught and the principal methods employed have to be fixed, as we have done above.

(2) Since the child has two teachers in his
parents, and since harmony and efficiency in the
education are essential, two conditions at least ought
to be satisfied. In thinking of marriage, the
suitability of the contemplated partner should
be weighed from this point of view. Secondly, hus
bands and wives must endeavor to eliminate all points of
differences in educational opinions which may exist between them. The parents must also
do their utmost to prepare themselves for the task
of educating their offspring. Perhaps in time a
weekly or monthly magazine devoted to the
educational problems of parents seems a necessity.

(3) The general organization of the home
will be more or less rigid and necessary, and
show neither rigidity nor weakness. The
children should be supplied with everything
necessary for their moral, intellectual, and physical
well-being. The playrooms and physical
places to be in and to play in. Things will be so
arranged in the home that the children are not
exposed to mischief. The songs, the toys, the
books, the picture-books, the stories told, are
all suited to the children's ages, and the
domestic animals should, as is becoming
increasingly the case, largely promote the moral
aim of home education. In short, an ethical spirit
should determine the whole organization.

(4) Example is of far-reaching importance
with the young. Dependent on their environment, they
adopt the ideas of those surrounding them; they
imitate their actions, their bodily attitudes, their
tone of voice, and what is recognized, the
inhabitants, their feelings. Overflowing with energy
and living in the present, the young child possesses,
true, little self-control; but intelligent antici
pationand strictness of execution are not sufficiently
consistent, and cheerfulness on the part of the
children prevent passionateness and vacillation from be
coming permanent in the child, and thus pave the
way for the acquisition of whatever virtues his
guardians possess.

(5) Incidental moral teaching was almost con
tinuous under the old conditions. The child is
easier to act, and also soon gets tired of any par
ticular course of action; therefore, when his
amusements are not scientifically regulated, he
appears to be thinking of nothing but mischief,
and remonstrances become inessential. Still, even
under the most favourable conditions, many an
occasion presents itself for pointing a moral. We
can thus, by noting the moral successes and failures in
conduct, impress the need for doing what is right and reasonable unhesitatingly, intelligently, and
so forth.

(6) Indirect moral teaching should not be left
totality to chance. Various personal and social
problems should be discussed (with due regard to
the age of the child) from an ethical point of view,
and provision be made in order that such
opportunities should not be lacking. Occurrences
in the home, public events, the reading of a story,
and the learning of a lesson may all be made
occasions for indirect moral teaching.

(7) Direct moral teaching should also be given.
The young are interested in issues concerned with
discuss, and, if we approach them intelligently
and sympathetically—sentimentality and sermon
izing being excluded—we can talk over with them
their own conduct, the conduct of others, and
moral ideas and ideals generally. In this way,
a lively sense of their duties and of their strong
points and failings may be generated in their
character to a large extent determined. This
would make superfluous many robes, and pre
vent the child from forgetting what he is to do
and what he is to leave undone. How to do better
than well rather than how not to do ill should be
the burden of incidental, indirect, and direct moral
teaching.

(8) Systematic moral teaching would be implied
in the above. The teacher as special instruction in morals
is concerned, but systematic teaching proper in
volves teaching where the various ideas are, so far
as possible, co-ordinated and comprehended in a
system. Systematic teaching in the home, taking
for granted the rising stages of development, would
mean that one important problem after another
would be approached, and its bearing on present
military service, and prepare men and women for
the duties of adult life.
and future life and conduct investigated. The aim of such set tasks is the attaining of clear and comprehensive moral ideas, and the communication of a general enthusiasm for the right. Given a reasonable family life and a simple ideal, this should lead to a rationalistic teaching being the rule in every subject, there can be no objection to systematic moral teaching.

(9) Environmental factors have important bearing. (9) Without tacitly assuming a certain economic influence in the family, and a certain social environment favourable to right conduct. These assumptions fall wide of the mark if the average family is considered, where the income is generally so meagre that scarcely anything beyond the barest necessities can be procured, while bad economic conditions and low moral standards lead to much misery and unrighteous dealings. Owing to these and other causes—not least the absence of efficient moral education—impartial, intemperance, idleness, ignorance, lack of sympathy and economic exploitation are widespread. Consequently, the school family is almost bound to fail to a considerable extent in the task of moral education, whilst the unpropitious social conditions create further obstacles. The moral educator is thus commonly also a social reformer. (10) The formal and the real problems of the school and home are largely the same, and we have, therefore, implicitly dealt to some extent with the school in speaking of the home and of moral education in general. Let us summarize the points. (1) There must be a system of morals which the teacher can utilize; (2) the teacher must be efficiently trained; (3) he should have a strong personality; (4) the school should be effectively organized for this purpose; there should be (5) incidental, (6) indirect, (7) direct, and (8) systematic ethical teaching; (9) the environment must not be decidedly unfavourable to right conduct; and (10) school and home must be properly correlated. We shall deal with these points separately.

(1) The nature of the ethics to be taught at school will naturally be the same as that inculcated in the home, only that the school life lends itself better to the practice of the social virtues. The principles governing the discipline will also be precisely the same, except that greater care will be taken to adapt the rules to the individualities of the children coming from various homes, and that special care is necessary since the children are usually massed together for nearly an hour at a time. To ensure adequate attention to the pupils' needs, the teachers should preferably be class-teachers, and should remain some three years with the same set of children.

(2) The moral training of the young must be undertaken by efficient teachers. Moral education demands, therefore, that the teaching profession should be sufficiently respected and remunerated to attract men and women of character and ability, and that the respective teachers should be thoroughly prepared in training colleges and otherwise. This preparation should include special training and teaching in morals, in order that teachers should be familiar with the meaning and the task of moral education.

(3) The personality of the teacher, and particularly that of the headmaster, is of importance, especially where the school, as used to be the case, must come into contact with the pupil for many years. In the latter case almost everything depends on the influence of the headmaster, and this is due to the altogether exaggerated estimate of the teacher's personality with which the pupil is familiar. It is the personality of the teaching staff, however, that has no small significance even to-day, considering that the teacher are to the child the living embodiment of the purpose for which the school exists.

(4) We need not enumerate here the various factors which go to the making of a well-organized school. These are well known. We lay stress on only a few points: (2) that the training of the pupils is the school's chief aim. The average number of children in a class should not exceed twenty-five; no more in the way of teaching results is to be expected than is consistent with thoroughness in training and teaching; the teacher should have sufficient leisure to continue his education; the teaching staff should be actively interested in the welfare of the pupils, and should also organize games and amusements; self-reliance and co-operation among the pupils should be encouraged; and a decided ethical tone should be traceable in the school decorations. Following the practice of the American School Republics, many tasks should devolve upon the pupils, and a strong and healthy corporate spirit should be cultivated among them. The school should be in close touch with the home, and it should be understood that pupils (10) be exposed to the larger world by visits and excursions of various kinds. The ethical atmosphere of the classroom needs, however, special mention. Just as every teacher is at all times expected to watch over the pronunciation of the pupils, and they express themselves clearly, intelligently, fluently, and concisely, so the ethical purpose of the school demands that at least the following moral qualities be kept constantly and consciously in view by the teacher: courtesy, love of truth, broad-mindedness, strenuousness, courage, orderliness, kindness, uprightness, and simplicity of living.

(6) Incidents are uncommon to-day in a good school, and consequently little room is found for incidental moral teaching. Even where an 'incident' occurs, the good teacher usually finds it far more effective to confer privately with the culprit than to play to the gallery. It is inconceivable that in a well-conducted school the moral teaching should be confined to incidental moral instruction, though it can be easily understood why in former days, when the teaching methods were ill- devised and the disciplinary measures harsh, incidental moral teaching had a large scope.

(6) Indirect moral instruction is moral instruction arising out of the teaching for its own sake, and another of the curriculum. The history and the literature lessons are peculiarly suited to this. In addition, the physiology lessons are sometimes made the channel of inculcating general rules of health, the moral history lessons of animals, and the domestic science lessons for the household virtues.

Until recently such indirect moral instruction was rare, and there were many warnings uttered against it; e.g. educationists urged that one must not introduce an irrelevant subject; that it is not practical to attempt to kill two birds with one stone; that one must beware of falsifying facts to suit ethical ends; and that the class is not the place for moralizing and sermonizing. There used to be legitimate grounds for this objection, but the chief one being that the school was at that time intellectualistic and optimistic in aim, and that the study of history is the record of the growth of civilization, and not merely as an account of military exploits. Illustrative of this fundamental change is also the fact that the New School Authority conceives of geographical teaching as tending primarily to show the moral condition of the people—at peace and the interdependence. Similarly, German and French School Readers now supply plentiful material of an ethical character, while frequently one of the exercises is a piece of moral thinking, whether or not an ethical spirit pervades it. Even arithmetic will soon be looking for the same. The pupils are not thinking rather than as meaningless juggling with figures; and in high educational quarters the permeation of aesthetic culture—music, singing, drawing, painting, modelling—with an...
ethic spirit is coming to be taken for granted. In a word, the whole curriculum is about to be ethicized, and in a generation or two we may expect every subject to be primarily ethical in character, with signal advantage to the particular subject (since such education is interesting) has had to do much preaching of a little teaching, and is, therefore, to be ruled out of court. On the contrary, we are bound to recognize that for one person whom nothing daunts, nineteen are, for good or evil, sensibly affected by their environment. Accordingly, we must admit that home and school to-day are not all-powerful, and cannot send out into the world ideal men and women, or ensure that their charges will not morally suffer when plunged into the whirlwind stream of social life. There is need, therefore, for the social re-former, and the school must create him. Much, indeed, in the school itself depends on the spirit which pervades society: e.g. scholars are herded together—50, 60, or 70 in a class—and leave school several years before they should, and teachers are poorly trained and ill paid. Probably, until the national character on education is at least doubled, the school will not be able to grapple effectively with the problems it has to face, nor until then will it yield a 'high rate of interest.'

(10) School and home.—A child well brought up at home is better scholar, for such a child eagerly and easily learns. If the home does its duty, the task of the teacher is, therefore, incalculably simplified. In fact, if home education approached perfection, school education would either be superfluous or follow lines different from the present ones. Well-bred children would possess the intellectual virtues (so far as the stage of development they had reached permitted) which the school is now inculcating with infinite pains and with relatively small success: e.g. careful observing, judging, and generalizing, a good memory, and vigorous independent thinking; and consciencc, readiness, polish, and clearness in speech and writing. They would also possess in a high degree the school virtues of punctuality, regularity, orderliness, neatness, attentiveness, industry, and courtesy; and, accordingly, the educational methods might demand much more of the child—working without supervision, co-operating with other children—making the influence of the school co-terminous with waking hours, and consequent circumstances the school would not feel obliged to cram the children with 'necessary' knowledge; it would chiefly teach them how to learn, and the school's work it would mostly leave to the consultation with works and books of statistics at home and at school; to observation, experiments, private reflection, art galleries, museums, travel; and, not least, to the reading and the study of the great literary, scientific, and philosophical classics. This being the relation between school and home, it is essential that the two should come into close contact, and even be co-ordinated.

At present, in spite of various efforts, the school has succeeded only to an insignificant degree in keeping in touch with the home. Parents do not call on the teacher; they are occasionally invited to attend lessons, examinations, and festive functions; they receive periodical accounts of the children's progress and conduct; they are asked to assist the children with their "home work," and to interest themselves in the children's school life; occasional parents' evenings are organized; in a few instances teachers visit the parents and the children, and also organize the children's amusements outside school; and in rare cases the parents as a body are admitted to the school's committee of management. The subject of the relation between school and home is one which warrants a special investigation being undertaken with a view to making far-reaching proposals, since scarcely anything could be of such advantage as a clear insight into the life of the school in the home, and the home's attitude to the school's instruction.
EDWARDS AND THE NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY. — Jonathan Edwards, saint and metaphysician, revivalist and speculative theologian, stands out as the one figure of real greatness in the intellectual life of colonial America. Born, bred, passing his whole life on the verge of civilization, he has made his voice heard wherever men have busied themselves with those two greatest topics which can engage human thought—God and the soul. A French philosopher of scant sympathy with Edwards' chief concern, wrote, "There are few names of the eighteenth century which have obtained such celebrity as that of Jonathan Edwards. Critics and historians are still puzzled as to where to place in Edwards' marvelous ramble terms the logical vigour and the constructive powers of a writer whom they hold as (is done by Mackintosh, Dugald Stewart, Robert Southey, and even Gibbon) to have been the greatest of all the intellectual revolutionaries. He has made of physiognomy America has yet produced. Who knows, they have asked themselves, what would have risen, if, instead of being born in a half-savage country, far from the traditions of philosophy and science, he had appeared rather in the old world, and the sparks of science would have impinged on the modern mind. Perhaps he would have taken a place between Leibniz and Kant among the great minds. He would have been the father of a new school of moral systems, instead of the work he has left reducing itself to a sublime and barbarous theology, which astonishes our reason and outrages our hearts, the object of at once our horror and admiration.

Edwards' greatness is not, however, thus merely conjectural. He was not the erudite, inglorious Milton, but the most articulate of men. Nor is it as a metaphysician that he makes his largest claim upon our admiration, subtle metaphysician as he showed himself to be. His ontological speculations, on which his title to recognition as a metaphysician mainly rests, belong to his extreme youth, and had been definitely put behind him at an age when most men first begin to probe such problems. It was, as Lyon indeed suggests, to theology that he gave his mature years and his most prolonged and searching thought, especially to the problems of sin and salvation. And these problems were by him treated both more theoretical, but as intensely practical ones. Therefore he was a man of action as truly as a man of thought, and powerfully wrought on his age, setting at work energies which have not yet spent their force. He is much more accurately characterized, therefore, by a philosopher of our own, who is as little in sympathy, however, with his main interests as Lyon himself. F. J. E. Woodbridge says: 2

"He was distinctly a great man. He did not merely express the thought of his time or meet it simply in the spirit of his tradition. He stemmed it and moulded it. New England thought was already moldering towards that colorless-theology which marked it later. He was not a mere Calvinist, nor an Arminian. He made it Calvinistic... His time does not explain him.

Edwards had a remarkable philosophical bent; but he had an even more remarkable sense and taste for Divine things; and, therefore (so Woodbridge concludes, with at least relative justice), we remember him not as the greatest of American philosophers, but as the greatest of American Calvinists."

1. The period of Edwards' preparation. — It was a very decadent New England into which Edwards was born, one marked by the decay of Puritanism, by which the Puritans had brought with them into the New World had not been able to

2 The Philosophical Review, xill, 1901, 405.
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propagated itself unimpaired to the third and fourth generation. Edwards in 1767, whose mother had warned that 'the body of the rising generation is a pit, perishing, unconverted, and (except the Lord pour down His Spirit) an undone generation.' These general warning currents of fear and of hope were so intense at this epoch, depressing to the life of the spirit, which were not unfelt in New England; and these were reinforced there by the hardness of the conditions of existence in a raw world. Everywhere thinking and living alike were moving on a lowered plane; not merely spirituality but plain moral was suffering some eclipse. The churches felt compelled to recede from the high ideals which had been their hor- aitige, and were introducing into their membership and admitting to their mysteries men who, though decent in life, made no profession of a change of heart. If only they had been themselves bap- tized, they were encouraged to offer their children for baptism (under the so-called 'Half-Way Coven- ant'), and to come themselves to the Table of the Lord (conceived as ' converting ordinance'). The household into which Edwards was born, however, not only protected him from much of the evil which was pervading the community, but powerfully stimulated his spiritual and intel- lectual life. He began the study of Latin at the age of four, and by thirteen had acquired a respect- able knowledge of 'the three learned languages', which at the time formed part of the curricula of the colleges—Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. Before he had completed his thirteenth year (Sept. 1716), he entered the ' Collegiate School of Connecticut' (afterwards Yale College). During his second year at college he fell in with Locke's Essay con- cerning Human Understanding, and 'had more satisfaction in the pleasure in study ing it,' he told himself; 2 than the most greedy miser in gathering up handfuls of silver and gold from some new-discovered treasure. He graduated at the head of his class in 1729, when he was just short of seventeen years of age, but remained at college (as the custom of the time was) two years longer (to the summer of 1722) for the study of Divinity. In the summer of 1722 he was 'appropos'd to preach, and from Aug. 1722 until April 1726 he supplied the pulpit of a little knot of Presby- terians in New York City. 3 Returning home, he was appointed tutor at Yale in June 1724, and fitted himself with living ability during a most trying period in the life of the college, there is no record of the next two years (until Sept. 1726). His resigna- tion of his tutorship was occasioned by an invita- tion to become the colleague and successor of his grandfather, Solomon Stoddard, in the pastor- ate of the church at Northampton, Mass., where, accordingly, he was ordained and installed on 15th Feb. 1727.

Pascal, he declares; such a complexion is much too modest; the young Edwards united in himself many Passes, and, by a double miracle, combined with them gifts by virtue of which he far surpassed his predecessors and a Newton. Yet to believe is not merely that a boy in his teens he worked out independently a system of metaphysics, and that of Berkeley, but that he anticipated most of the scientific discoveries which constitute the glory of the succeeding century.

It is well to recognize that Lyon has permitted himself some slight exaggerations; in stating his case, he has presented ex- amination of the MSS which he, and, following him, A. Y. G. Allen asked for, has fully vindicated the youthful origin of these discourses. The first essay was written on the immaturity of the soul, full of marks of immaturity, with no doubt, but equally full of the signs of genuine genius, but written in 1717-1718, when Edwards was ten years old. There are some very acute observations on the behaviour of spiders spinning the webs which anticipated the reality of modern investigation, but which cannot have been written later than his thirteenth year. There are, above all, metaphysical discus- sions of 'Being,' 'Atone,' and 'Pregnancy of Imagination,' written at least as early as his junior year at college, that is to say, his sixteenth year, in which the fundamental ideas of his Idealist philosophy are fully set out. And, besides numerous other discussions following out these views, there is a long series of notes on natural science, filled with acute sugges- tions, which must belong to his Yale period. It is all, no doubt, very remarkable, but this only shows that Edwards was a very remarkable youth.

It is in these youthful writings that Edwards propounds his most spiritualistic metaphysics, and is chiefly on the strength of them that he holds a place in our histories of philosophy. His whole system is already present in substance in the essay Of Being,' which was written at the age of sixteen years. And, though there is no reason to believe that he ever renounced the opinions set forth in these youthful discussions—there are, on the contrary, occasional suggestions, even in his latest writings, that are at the back of his brain—he never formally returned to them subsequently to his Yale period (up to 1727). 4 His engagement with such topics belongs, therefore, distinctively to his formative period, before he got engaged with the eager, enterprising, and the active mind and the lines of thought more im- mediately called into exercise by them. In these early years, certainly independently of Berkeley, 5 and apparently without any suggestion from outside beyond what might be derived from Newton's explanations of light and colour, and Locke's treatment of sensation as the source of ideas, he worked out for himself a complete system of Idealism, which wavered indeed in the brink of more phenomenalism, and might have betrayed him into Pantheism save for the intensity of his perception of the living God. 'Speaking most strictly,' he declares, 'there is no God but God Himself.' The universe exists 'nowhere but in the Divine mind.' Whether this is true 'with respect to bodies only; or of finite spirits as well, he seems at first to have waved; ultimately he came to the more inclusive opinion of God's.

He could write of the rise of a new thought: 'If we mean that there is some substance besides that thought, that brings that thought forth; if it be God, I acknowledge it, but if there he meant some thing else that has no properties, it seems to me absurd. 6 Of 'all dependent existence whatever' he comes at last to affirm that it is 'in a constant flux,' 'renewed every moment, as the colours of bodies are every moment by the light that shines upon them; and all is nothing proceeding from God, as light from the sun.' 6 He did not mean by this, however, to sublimate the universe in a shadowy Ideal, but was only attempting to declare that it has no other substrate but God that its reality and presence are grounded, not in

1 M. D. Dexter, Congregationalism in its Literature, New York, 1859, p. 270, n. 31.

2 See E. H. Gillett, Hist. of the Presbyterian Church, Phila- delphia, 1864, p. 35.

3 I. Dwight's Memoir, prefixed to his ed. of Edwards' Works, 1. 30.


5 On these observations, see Egbert G. Smith, The Andover Review, Jan. 1899; and Henry G. McCord, Phila., July 1900.


7 E. G. Smith and H. N. Gardiner, loc. cit.; it is now known that he had not read Berkeley before 1730 (Dexter, Some MSS of Jonathan Edwards, as before).
some mysterious created 'substance' underlying the properties, but in the 'infinitely exact and precise Divine idea, thing, and the perfectly exact, precise, and stable will, with respect to corresponding communications to created minds and effects on their minds.' He is engaged, in other words, in a purely ontological investigation, and his contention is merely that God is the continuum of all finite existences, as far as possible from denying the reality or persistence of these finite existences; that God is to him not 'creations,' because they represent a fixed purpose and an established constitution of God.

Edwards was not so absorbed in such speculations as to neglect the needs of his spirit. Throughout all these formative years he remained first of all man of religion. He had become the subject of deep religious impressions from his earliest boyhood, and he gave himself, during this period of preparation, to the most assiduous and intense cultivation of his religious nature. 'I made seeking my salvation,' he himself tells us, 'the main business of my life.' But about the time of his graduation (1720) a change came over him, which relieved the strain of his inward distress. From his childhood, his mind had revolved against the sovereignty of God: 'it used to appear like a horrible doctrine to me.' Now all this passed unobservedly away; and gradually, by a process he called 'the work of Edwards,' this very doctrine came to be not merely a matter of course to him but a matter of rejoicing: 'The doctrine has often appeared exceedingly pleasant, bright, and sweet; a solemn thing and I love to prescribe to God.' One day he was reading 1 Thes. 4,17 Now under the King, eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honour and glory, for ever and ever, Amen, and, as he read, 'a sense of the glory of the Divine Being' took possession of him, 'a new sense, quite different from anything he ever experienced before.' He longed to be 'tapp to Him in heaven, and be, as it were, swallowed up in Him for ever.'

From that moment he became fully interested in the religious things of life, and his enjoyment of God grew. There were, no doubt, intervals of depression. But, on the whole, his progress was steadily upward and his consecration more and more complete. It was this devout young man, with the joy of the Lord in his heart, who turned his back in the early months of 1727 on his brilliant academic life and laid aside for ever his philosophical speculations, to take up the work of a pastor at Northampton.

2. Edwards the pastor.—Edwards was ordained co-pastor with his grandfather on 15th Feb. 1727, and on his father's death, two years later, succeeded to the sole charge of the church. Northampton was relatively a very important place. It was the county town, and nearly half of the area of the province lay within the county. It was, therefore, a sort of little local capital, and its people prided themselves on their culture, energy, and independence of mind. There was but the one church in the town, and it was probably the largest and most influential in the province, outside of Boston. It was not united in sentiment, being often torn with factional disputes. But, under the strong preaching of Solomon Stoddard, it had been repeatedly visited with revivals. These periods of awakening continued with intervals during Edwards' pastorate; the church became famous for them, and its membership was filled up by them. At one time the membership numbered nearly the entire adult population of the town. Stoddard had been the

proponent for the laxer view of admission to Church ordinances, and early in the year 1740 introduced into the Northampton church the practice of opening the Lord's Supper to those who made no profession of conversion. In this practice Edwards at first acquiesced; but he became convinced that it was wrong, soon after he came to correct it, with disastrous consequences to himself. Meanwhile it had given to the membership of the church something of the character of a mixed multitude, in which the number of large numbers of them had been introduced in the religious excitement of revivals had tended to increase.

To the pastoral care of this important congregation, Edwards gave himself with single-hearted devotion. Assiduous house-to-house visitation did not, it is true, form part of his plan of work; but this did not arise carelessness or neglect; it was in accordance with his deliberate judgment of his special gifts and fitnesses. And, if he did not go to his people in their homes, save at the call of illness or special need, he encouraged them to come freely to his house and grudge no labor or trouble in meeting their individual requirements. He remained, of course, also a student, spending ordinarily from thirteen to fourteen hours daily in his study. This duty did not separate itself from, but was kept strictly subsidiary to, his service. Not only had he turned his back definitely on the purely academic speculations which had engaged him so deeply at Yale, but he produced no purely theological works during the whole of his twenty-three years' pastorate at Northampton. His publications during this period, besides sermons, consisted only of treatises in practical Divinity. They dealt principally with problems raised by the great religious awakenings in which his preaching was fruitful.

Such, for instance, are the Narrative of Surprising Conversions, published in 1736, the Thoughts on the Revival of Religion in New England in 1740, published in 1742, and that very searching study of the movements of the human soul under the excitement of religious motives called A Treatise concerning Religious Affections, published in 1746. Then there is the Humble Attempt to Promote Explicit Agreement and Visible Union of God's People in Extraordinary Prayer for the Revival of Religion, etc., published in 1740, which belongs to the same class, and the brief Account of the Life of the Rev. David Brainerd, published in the same year. There remains only the Historical Inquiry into the Nature, Connexion and Design of God, concerning the Qualifications requisite to a Complete Staining in Full Commission in the Visible Church of God, published in 1746, along with which should be cited the unveiling of its contents. But this was not published until somewhat later (1763). No doubt there was much more of this written during these years, or even more of the years before; for Edwards was continually adding to the mass of his manuscript treasures; and some of these voluminous 'observations' have since been put into print, although the greater part of them remain yet in the note-books where he wrote them.

It was in his sermons that Edwards' studies bore their richest fruit. He did not spare himself in his public instruction. He not only faithfully filled the regular appointments of the church, but freely undertook additional discourses and lectures, and during times of 'attention' he frequently went to the aid of the neighboring churches. From the first he was recognized as a remarkable preacher, as arresting and awakening as he was instructive. Filled with himself with the deepest sense of the heinousness of sin, as an offense against the majesty of God and an outrage of His love, he set himself to arouse his hearers to some realization of the horror of their condition as objects of the Divine displeasure, and to bring home the precious goodness of God in intervening for their salvation. Side by side with the most moving portrayal of God's love in Christ, and of the blessedness of communion with Him, he set forth, with the most startling effect, equally vivid

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1 Dwight, I. 674.
3 Dwight, i. 59.
pictures of the dangers of unforgiven sin and the terrors of the lost estate. The effect of such preaching, to be conceived of one who has been the subject of the sincere, fervent self-deception, was overwhelming. A great awakening began in the church at the end of 1735, in which more than 300 converts were gathered in, and it spread throughout the churches along the Connecticut valley. In connection with a visit from Whitefield in 1740 another wave of religious fervour was started, which did not spend its force until it covered the whole land. No one could recognize two fully that Edwards the evil was to mix with the good in such seasons of religious excitement. He diligently sought to curb excesses, and earnestly endeavoured to separate the chaff from the wheat. But no one could protest more strongly against casting out the wheat with the chaff. He subjected all the phenomena of the revivals in which he participated to the most searching analytical study; and, while sadly acknowledging that much self-deception was possible, and that the rain could only too readily be given to false "enthusiasm," he earnestly contended that a genuine work of grace might find expression in evidence even physical. It was one of the incidental fruits of these revivals that, as we have seen, he gave to the world in a series of studies perhaps the most thorough examination of the phenomena of religious excitement, and the most thorough treatise on the Religious Affections, one of the most complete systems of what has been strikingly called "spiritual diagnoses" it possesses.

For twenty-three years Edwards pursued his fruitful ministry at Northampton; under his guidance the church became a city set on a hill to which all eyes were turned. But in the reaction from the revival of 1740-1742 conditions arose which caused him great searching of heart, and led ultimately to his separation from his congregation. In this revival, practically the whole adult population of the town was brought into the church; they were admitted under the excitement of the time and under a ruling introduced as long before as 1704 by Stoddard, which looked upon all the ordinances of the church, including the Lord's Supper, as "converting ordinances," not presupposing, but adapted to bring about, a change of heart. As time passed, it became evident enough that a considerable body of the existing membership of the church had not experienced that change of which the church alone could constitute the evidence, and indeed they made no claim to have done so. On giving serious study to the question for himself, Edwards became convinced that participation in the Lord's Supper could properly be allowed only to those professing real conversion. It was his duty as pastor and guide of his people to guard the Lord's Table from profanation, and he was not a man to leave unperformed a duty clearly perceived. Two obvious measures presented themselves to him—unworthy members of the church must be excised by discipline, and greater care must be exercised in receiving new applicants for membership. No doubt discipline was among the functions which the Church claimed to exercise; but the practice of it had fallen much into decay as a sequence to the lowered conception which had come to be entertained of the requirement, so delivered with disciplinary membership. The door of admission to the Lord's Supper, on the other hand, had been formally set wide open; and this loose policy had been persisted in for half a century, and was retained as the Traditional. What Edwards felt himself compelled to unerringly, was a return in theory and practice to the original platform of the Congregational churches, which conceived of the Church as the visible gatherer of the sincere, and in the words, "a company of saints by calling," among whom there should be permitted to enter nothing that was not clean. This, which should have been the Christian profession of all the churches with the victory to the movement which he inaugurated throughout the churches of New England, was in his personal case his weakness. It gave a radical appearance to the reforms which he advocated, with the result that he was far from receiving them. It is not necessary to go into the details of the controversy regarding a case of discipline, which emerged in 1744, or the subsequent difficulties (1748-9) regarding the conditions of admission to the Lord's Supper. The result was that, after a sharp contest running through two years, Edwards was dismissed from his pastorate on 22d June 1750.

3. Edwards the theologian.—By his dismissal from his church at Northampton, in his forty-seventh year, the second period of Edwards' life—the period of strenuous pastoral labour—was brought to an abrupt close. After a few months he removed from the region where (though he were only twelve white families resident there) of Stockbridge, as missionary of the 'Society in London for Propagating the Gospel in New England and the Parts Adjoining' to the Housatonic Indians, there at fifty years of age in the church of white settlers. In this exile he hoped to find leisure to write, in defence of the Calvinistic system against the rampant 'Arminianism' of the day, the works which he had long had in contemplation, and for which he had made large preparation. Peace and quiet he did not find; he was embroiled from the first in a trying struggle against the greed and corruption of the administra tors of the funds designed for the benefit of the Indians. But he made, if he could not find, the requisite leisure. He was at Stockbridge that he wrote the treatises on which his fame as a theologian chiefly rests; the great works on the Will (written in 1758, published in 1754), and Original Sin (in the press when he died, 1758), the striking essays on The End for which God created the World, and the Nature of True Virtue, published 1759, after his death, and the unfinished History of Redemption (publ. 1772). No doubt he utilized for these works material previously collected. He lived practically with his pen in his hand, and the idea of a thousand pages of a thousand pages,—his 'best thoughts,' as it has been felicitously called. The work on the Will, indeed, had itself been long on the stocks. We find him making diligent studies for it already at the opening of 1747; and though his work on it was repeatedly interrupted for long intervals, he tells us that before he left Northampton he 'had made considerable preparation and was deeply engaged in the prosecution of this design.' The rapid completion of the book in the course of a few months in 1753 was not, therefore, so wonderful a feat as it might otherwise appear. Nevertheless, it is the seven years at Stockbridge which have been called the fruitful years of Edwards' theological

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1 According to the organic law of the Congregational churches (the Cambridge Platform), "saints by calling" are such as have not only attained the knowledge of the principles of religion, and are free from gross and open scandals, but also do, together with the profession of their faith and repentance, walk in blameless conduct to the word.

2 Cf. H. N. Gardiner, Selected Sermons, p. xii.


4 Dwight, i, 233, 270, 411.

5 Ib. 506, 535, 557.
work. They were interrupted in the autumn of 1757 by an invitation to him to become the President of the College of New Jersey, at Princeton, in succession to his son-in-law, Aaron Burr. It was with great reluctance that he accepted this call, but the Princeton, which had been founded and thus far carried on by men whose sympathies were with the warm-hearted, revivistic piety to which his own life had been dedicated, had claims upon him which he could not disown. On the advice of a council of his friends, therefore, he accepted the call and removed to Princeton to take up his new duties, in January 1758. There he was inoculated for smallpox on 18th Feb., and died of this disease on 27th March in the fifty-fifth year of his age.

The peculiarity of Edwards' theological work is due to the union in it of the richest religious sentiment with the highest intellectual powers. He was first of all a man of faith, and it is this that gives its character to his whole life and all its products; but his strong religious feeling had at its disposal a mental force and logical acuteness of the highest order; and, as Edwards himself says, and as Ezra Stiles called him, a 'strong reasoner.' His analytical subtlety has probably never been surpassed; but with it was combined a broad grasp of religious truth which enabled him to see it as a whole, and to deal with its several parts without exaggeration and with a sense of their relations in the system. The system to which he gave his sincere adhesion, and to the defence of which, ages and ages after his death, his friends and followers were threatening to undermine it, he consecrated all his powers, was simply Calvinism. From this system as it had been expounded by its chief representatives he did not consciously depart in any of its constitutive elements. The breadth and particularity of his acquaintance with it in its classical exponents, and the completeness of his adoption of it in his own thought, are frequently underestimated. There is a true sense in which he was a man of thought rather than of learning. There were no great libraries accessible in Western Massachusetts in the middle of the 18th century. His whole reading was limited: the subjects which were presented to his thought was reinforced by his habits of study; it was his custom to develop on paper, to its furthest logical consequences, any topic of importance to which his attention was directed. He lived in the 'age of reason,' and was in this respect a true child of his time. In the task which he undertook, furthermore, an appeal to authority would have been useless; it was uniquely to the court of reason that he could hale the adversaries of the Calvinistic system. Accordingly it is only in his more didactic— as distinguished from controversial—treatise on Religious Affections, that Edwards agrees with any earlier writers in support of his positions. The reader must guard himself, however, from the illusion that Edwards was not himself conscious of the support of earlier writers beneath him. His acquaintance with the masters of the system he was defending, for example, was wide and minute. Amesius and Welleius had been his text-books at college. The well-selected library at Yale, we may be sure, had been thoroughly explored by him; at the close of his divinity studies, he speaks of the reading of 'doctrinal books' as a part of his daily business. As would have been expected, he fed himself on the great Puritan divines, and formed not merely his thought but his life upon them. He had, for instance, diligently using Manton's Sermons on the 11th Psalm as a spiritual guide; and in his rare allusions to authorities in his works, he betrays familiarity with such writers as William Perkins, John Preston, Thomas Blake, Anthony Burgess, Stephen Charnock, John Flavel, Theophilus Gile, Thomas Goodwin, John Owen, Samuel Rutherford, Thomas Shepard, Richard Sibbes, John Smith the Platonist, and Samuel Clark the Arian. Even his contemporaries he knew and estimated at their true values: Isaac Watts and Philip Doddridge as a matter of course; and also Thomas Boston, the son of the elder Edwards. The Covenant of Grace he confessed he did not understand, but whose Fourfold State of Man he 'liked exceedingly well.' His Calvin he certainly knew thoroughly, though he would not swear in his words, 'and deeply emotional, and as the great Turretine'; while van Mastricht he declares 'much better' than even Turretin, 'or,' he adds with some fervour, 'than any other book in the world excepting the Bible, in my opinion.' The close agreement of his teaching with that of the best esteemed Calvinistic divines is, therefore, both conscious and deliberate; his omission to appeal to them does not argue either ignorance or contempt; it is in itself the natural manner and to the special task he was prosecuting. In point of fact, what he teaches is just the 'standard' Calvinism in its completeness.

As an independent thinker, he is, of course, not without his individualisms, and that in conception no less than in expression. His explanation of the identity of the human race with its Head, founded as it is on a doctrine of personal identity which reduces it to an 'arbitrary constitution' of God, binding its successive moments together, is peculiar to himself. In answering objections to the doctrine of Original Sin, he appeals at one point to the very language of Stapel, and says, 'in this sense the form of that doctrine as mediate imputation.' But this is only in order to illustrate his own view that all mankind are one as truly and by the same reason as if an individual life is one in its consecutive moments. Even in this immediate context he does not teach the doctrine of 'mediate imputation,' insisting rather that, Adam and his posterity being in the strictest sense one, in them no less than in him the 'guilt arising from the first existing of a depraved disposition' cannot at all be distinguished from the guilt of Adam's first sin'; and elsewhere throughout the longer treatise he objects to the common Calvinistic doctrine. His most marked individualism, however, lay in the region of philosophy rather than of theology. In an essay on The Nature of True Virtue, he develops, in opposition to the view that all virtue may be reduced ultimately to self-love, an eccentric theory of virtue ever, he did like a display of learning. In his earliest maxims, by the side of 'Let me be as sensible as I can be,' he sets this other: 'Let it not look as if I was much read, or was conversant with books, or with the learned world' (Dwight, I. 192.).

1 Dwight, i. 251.
2 Dwight, I. 253. It was not as a does, he was not able to ascertain all the facts concerning this council; Ezra Stiles, Diary, New York, 1801, ii. 4, supplies interesting details.
as consisting in love to being in general. But of this again we hear nothing elsewhere in his works, though it became germinal for the New England theologian, in the treatment of next year's case. In any case are in no way characteristic of his teaching. He strove after no show of originality. An independent thinker he certainly claimed to be, and, 'utterly declining, a dependence,' says, 'on Calvin,' in the sense of 'believing the doctrines he held because Calvin believed and taught them.' This very disclaimers is, however, a proclamation of his agreement with Calvin, although not as if he 'believed everything just as Calvin taught'; he is only suggestions that he should be understood to be not a blind follower of Calvin, but a convinced defender of Calvinism. His one concern was, accordingly, not to improve on the Calvinism of the great exponents of the system, but to place the main elements of the Calvinistic system, as commonly understood, beyond cavil. His marvellous invention was employed, therefore, only in the discovery and development of the fullest and most convincing possible array of arguments in their favor. This is true even of his great treatise on the Will. This is, in the common judgment, the greatest of all his treatises and the common judgment here is right.2 But the doctrine of this treatise is precisely the doctrine of the Calvinistic schoolmen. 'The novelty of the treatise,' we have been long led to believe, lies in the position it takes and defends, but in the multitude of proofs, the fecondity and urgency of the arguments by which he maintains it. Edwards' originality thus consists less in the content of his thought than in his manner of thinking. He enters into the great tradition which had come down to him, and 'infuses it with his personality and makes it live,' and the vitality of his thought gives to its product the vase of a unique creation.3 The effect of Edwards' labours was quite in the line of his purpose, and not disproportionate to his greatness. The movement against Calvinism which was over-sprinkling the land was in a great measure checked, and the elimination of Calvinism as a determining factor in the thought of New England, which seemed to be imminent as he wrote, was postponed for more than a hundred years.4

4. The New England theology.—It was Edwards' misfortune that he gave his name to a party; and to a party which, never in perfect agreement with him in its doctrinal ideas, finished by becoming the party that benefited the most from it (as it has been sharply expressed) of a set of opinions which he gained his chief celebrity by demolishing. The affliliation of this party with Edwards was very direct. Bellamy and Hopkins, says G. P. Fisher, tracing the descent, were pupils of Edwards; from Hopkins West derived his theology; Smalley studied with Bellamy, and Emmons with Smalley. But the inheritance of the party from Edwards showed itself much more practical than the doctrinal on the party. Its members were the heirs of his revivalist zeal and of his awaking preaching; they also imitated his art to attempt to purify the Church by discipline and strict guarding of the Lord's Table in a word to return the Church to its Puritan ideal of a congregation of saints.5

1 Dwight, li. 13.
2 The Life of J. H. Oldbridge, in The Philosophical Review, xii. (1801) 396; and G. Lyon, op. cit. 412.
4 H. N. Gardiner, Selected Sermons, p. xvii.
6 Lyman H. Atwater, 589; and J. R. Middletown, 201.
7 A Discourse Commemorative of the History of the Church of Christ in Yale College during the First Century of its Existence, 1859, p. 56.
8 On the 'rigidly' of the New England men in 'Church administration' and 'discipline,' see the interesting details in Ezra Stiles' Diary, ed. 1774, 495, 594.

Pressing to extremes in both matters, as followers will, the 'Edwardsians' or 'New Divinity' men became a ferment in the churches of New England, and their influence was disturbing everywhere, gradually won their way to dominance. Meanwhile their doctrinal teaching was continually suffering change. As Fisher (p. 7) puts it, 'in the beginning defending the established faith, they were led to re-establish it in new forms and to change its aspect.' Only, it was not merely the form and aspect of their inherited faith, but its substance, that they were ever transforming. Accordingly, Fisher proceeds to explain that what on this side constituted their common character was not so much a common doctrine as a common method: the fact that their views were the result of independent reflection, and were maintained on philosophical grounds. Here, too, they were followers of Edwards; but in their exaggeration of his rational method, without his solid grounding in the history of thought, they lost continuity with the past and became the creators of a 'New England theology' which it is only right frankly to describe as provincial.6

The men who worked out this theological transmutation were men of great energy, as great in the use of energy as of their energy of thought, and what may almost he called fatal logical acuity. And it would be proud to report as a virtue of that work, in the course of a century such a series of 'strong reasoners' on religious themes as Joseph Bellamy (1719-1790), Samuel Hopkins (1729-1805), Stephen West (1750-1813), John Smalley (1728-1820), Jonathan Edwards, Jr. (1745-1800), Nathaniel Emmons (1745-1840), Timothy Dwight (1749-1817), William Whiston (1762-1842) and Nathaniel W. Taylor (1786-1858)—all, with the single exception of the younger Edwards, graduates of Yale College; not to speak of yet others of equal power, being mere off the line of direct development, like Leonard Woods (1774-1854), Bennet Taylor (1785-1862), Edward H. Griffin (1779-1827), Moses Stuart (1790-1832), Lyman Breecher (1775-1860), Charles G. Finney (1792-1875), Leonard Bacon (1802-1852), Horace Bushnell (1802-1876), and Eleazar A. Park (1808-1900). It is a far cry from Jonathan Edwards the Calvinist, defending with all the force of his unsurpassed reasoning powers the doctrine of a determined will, and communing with the theological virtue which identified it with general benevolence, to Nathaniel W. Taylor the Pelagianizer, building his system upon the doctrine of the power to the contrary as its foundation stone, and reducing all virtue to essentially self-love. Taylor's teaching, in point of fact, was, in many respects the exact antipodes of Edwards', and very fairly reproduced the congeries of tendencies which the matter combined it his life-work. Yet Taylor looked upon himself as an 'Edwardsian,' though in him the outcome of the long development received its first appropriate designation— the 'New Haven Divinity.' Its several successive phases were bound together by the no doubt external circumstance that they were taught in general by men who had received their training at New Haven.

The growth of the New Divinity to that dominance in the theological thought of New England from which it derives its claim to be called 'the New England Theology' was gradual, though somewhat rapid. Samuel Hopkins tells us that at the beginning—in 1766—there were not more than four or five who espoused the sentiments which since have been called 'Edwardsian' and 'New Divinity'; and since, after some improvement was made upon them, 'Hoppokianism' or 'Hopkimsonian sentiments.' The younger Edwards still spoke of them in 1777 as a small party. In 1787, Ezra Stiles, chafing under their growing influence and marking the increasing divergence of views among themselves, fancied he saw their end approaching.

1 Cf. Woodbridge, 294.
2 Park, The Life of Hopkins, Boston, 1834, p. 23; Fisher, Discourses, etc., 80.
3 Ezra Stiles, ii. 527; Fisher, loc. cit.
It has been the Ten," he writes, "to direct Students of divinity these thirty years past or a generation to read the Bible, President Edwards', Dr. Bellamy's, and Mr. Hopkins' writings, and that was a good succession of reading. But now, 'the New Divinity gentlemen are getting into confusion and their own younger circle,' but yet in full vigor, suppose we see further than those Oracles, and are disposed to become Oracles themselves, and with Dr. Edwards and their offspring come into vogue. He thought these 'confusions' the beginning of the end.

In this he was mistaken: the New Divinity, in the person of Timothy Dwight, succeeded him as President of Yale College, and through a long series of years was infused into generation after generation of students. The 'confusions' Stiles observed were, however, real; or, rather, the progressive giving way of the so-called Edwardsians to those tendencies to thought to which they were originally set in opposition.

We note Hopkins already conscious of divergence from Edwards' teaching—a divergence which he calls an 'improvement' in Theology, and that which he was beginning to 'deny a real vicarious Suffering in Christ's Atonement,' and were 'generally giving up the Doctrine of Imputation both in Original Sin and in Justification'; and of some of them, 'receding from disinterested Benevolence, are giving themselves to the practice of it as terminating in personal happiness,'—"a very fair statement of the actual drift.

The Younger Edwards drew up a careful account of what he deemed the (ten) 'Improvements in Theology made by President Edwards and those who have followed his course of thought.' Three of the most cardinal of these he does not pretend were introduced by Edwards, attributing them simply to those whom he calls Edwards' 'followers.' These are the substitution of the Governmental (Grotian) for the Satisfaction doctrine of the Atonement, the 'a priori' view of which he himself, with partial forerunners in Bellamy and West, was the chief agent; the discarding of the doctrine of the imputation of sin in favour of the view that men are condemned for their own personal sin only—a contention which was made in an extreme form by Nathaniel Emmons, who confined all moral quality to acts of volition, and afterwards became a leading element in Nathaniel W. Taylor's system; and the perversion of Edwards' distinction between 'natural' and 'moral' inability so as to ground on the 'natural' ability of the regenerate, after the fashion introduced by Dwight. The history of the capacities and duties of men without the Spirit, which afterwards, in the hands of Nathaniel W. Taylor, became the core of a new Pelagianizing system.

The external victory of the New Divinity in New England was marked doubly by the election of Timothy Dwight to the Presidency of Yale College (1797); and certainly it could have found no one better fitted to commend it to moderate men; probably no written system of theology has ever enjoyed wider acceptance than Dwight's Sermons. But after Dwight came Taylor, and in the teaching of the latter the downward movement of the New Divinity ran out into a system which turned, as on its hinge, upon the Pelagianizing doctrines of the native sinlessness of the race, the plenary ability of the sinner to renovate his own soul, and the idea of the desire for happiness as the spring of all voluntary action. From this extreme some reaction was inevitable, and the history of the so-called 'New England Theology' closes with the moderate reaction of the teaching of Edwards A. Park.

The theological descent which came through Hopkins, Emmons, and Woods; but he sought to incorporate into his system all that seemed to him to be the results of New England thinking for the century which preceded him, not excluding the extreme positions of Taylor himself. Reverting so far from Taylor as to return to perhaps a somewhat more determinative doctrine of the will, he was able to rise above Taylor in his doctrines of election and regeneration, and to give the general type of thought which he represented a sense of life for another generation. But, with the death of Park in 1800, the history of 'New England Theology' seems to come to an end.

LITERATURE. (A) A list of Edwards' works is given by Dwight, L. 765 ff.; S. Miller, 254 ff., and Riddlebro, 327 ff. (op. cit. infra). A brief bibliography of Dwight, etc., p. 254, 1855.


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EGO (a term [Lat. 1st personal pronoun 'I'] for 'self'; used in various languages) of the Ego is very perplexing. It is difficult to describe its content, and to discover a fundamental principle which will serve to distinguish it satisfactorily from the non-Ego. If, starting from its etymology, we say an Ego is a conscious being, one who knows himself and is able to say 'I,' and proceed to ask what the Ego so defined is, we get different answers. Descartes called it a
Thinking thing,' including, under the term 'thinking,' understanding, affirming, denying, willing, refusing, imagining, perceiving (Meditation II.). Thinking is a quality in qualities inhering in substances; for it cannot be that a quality is a quality of nothing. By substance is meant a thing existing in such a way as to stand in need of nothing else in order to its existence" (Principles, § 4). Everything is by definition independent of being, namely, God. A finite mind, however, is dependent on nothing but the 'concurrency of God.' It is not dependent on body; for, Descartes concludes, there can be no thought when the existence of body is doubted; and it does not need a place in order that it may exist. Its existence is involved in thinking—'as long as I think, I am' (Med. II.). Yet Descartes has to recognize that his two mental substances are so intimately related in man that some of the experiences of the Ego—pain, hunger, thirst, etc., which he calls confused modes of thinking—arise from this union. He thus turns to anal.

An examination of the content of self-consciousness, however, shows that the line drawn between the self and the not-self is not always drawn by Egos themselves in the way Descartes draws it. At all events, much of our intimate existence is from our conception of ourselves. We identify ourselves, e.g., with what we want to be, with the ideals we have taken as our own. When we forget these and act on other motives, we say that we have forgotten ourselves. At other times the body and even objects outside the body are included in the conception of self.

'Between what we call me and what he simply calls me the line is difficult to draw. We feel and act about certain things that are ours very much as we feel and act about our bodies, and yet they are not part of our hands, may be as dear to us as our bodies are, and arouse the same feelings and the same acts of repulsion if attacked. And our bodies themselves, are they simply ours, or are they me? Certainly men have been known to disown their very bodies, and to regard them as mere vestures, or even as prisons of clay from which they should some day be glad to escape.

'Ve see, then, that dealing with a fluctuating material, the same object being sometimes treated as a part of me, at other times as simply mine, and then again as if I had nothing to do with it at all. In its widest possible sense, however, a man's in the sum-total of all that he can call his, not only his body and clothes, his house, his home, his family, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank account. All things united in man.'

Philosophical reflection seems to confirm the conclusion from a psychological analysis of the content of self-consciousness. The self cannot be separated from what it knows, feels, and reacts upon, without being destroyed. If it knew nothing of the world, it would certainly be empty of content. It lives and grows by the dual process of appropriating all things related to it, and at once distinguishing itself from them. Its nature, as MacDougall expresses it, is very paradoxical.

'What does it include?' he asks. 'Everything of which it is conscious. What does it exclude? Equally—everything of which it is unconscious. What is it that we call it inside us? Nothing. What can it say nor is not outside it? A single abstraction. And say attempt to remove the paradox destroys the self. For the two sides are logically connected. We cannot make it if we think individual by separating it from all other things, it loses all content of which it can be conscious, and so loses the very individuality which we started by trying to preserve. If, on the other hand, we try to save its content by emphasizing the exclusion at the expense of the connection of the consciousness vanishes, and, since the self has no contents but the objects of which it is conscious, its contents vanish also. (Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, 1903, p. 27.)

Descartes' assertion that the Ego, as we know it now, is a thinking substance independent of its own and other's existence cannot therefore be justified by an appeal to immediate consciousness, psychological analysis, or philosophical reflection. That after death other objects take the place of bodies may, of course, be quite possible. But dependent relation to objects seems an inexplicable element of it. Whatever may be the true nature of themselves substantial existence is a question which will concern us again. At present we have to consider the question whether the Ego can be intelligibly called a substance. Substance is only Descartes as that in which qualities inheres. It is, in Locke's words, their 'unknown support.' We do not know, Locke says, what a substance is. It cannot be perceived by the outer or inner sense. There is nothing which can give no intelligible account of its relation to the qualities which it is supposed to support. Hence, to say that qualities inheres in substances is, according to Locke, to say nothing more than that they exist together. Why then, assume the existence of substances? Berkeley, following after Locke, asked this question regarding material substance, and denied its existence. Hume asked it of mental substance, and denied the existence of the Ego.

'...I have no immediate intimation of [matter],'' said Berkeley; '...we can be immediately from our sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or passions infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance—either by probable deduction, or necessary consequence. The idea of Substance is a means of reasoning in our ideas (Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philemon).

'If my parents are dead, why, then, do I not call myself?' says Hume, 'when I live solely in what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat, cold, light, shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. If I step into water, I cannot perceive it, and never can observe anything but the perception.' A mind 'is nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement' (Human Nature, bk. i, sec. 6).

'The final result of Hume's reasoning,' says Huxley, 'comes to this: As we use the name body for the sum of the phenomena which make up our personal existence, so we employ the name of soul for the sum of the phenomena which constitute our mental existence; and we have no more reason, in the latter case, than in the former, to suppose that there is anything beyond the phenomena which answers to the name. In the case of the soul, the idea of substance is a mere fiction of the imagination. This conclusion is nothing but a rigorous application of Berkeley's reasoning concerning matter and mind, and it is fully adopted by Kant.'

'The last quotation represents Huxley's own opinion also. The individual mind is held to be a series of mental phenomena parallel with the series of material phenomena which compose the corresponding individual body. The series do not interact. In place of Descartes' dualism of substances we have a dualism of mental phenomena. (For an adverse criticism of this theory, see J. Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, 1903, vol. ii. pt. iii.; and McDougall, Body and Mind, 1911, ch. xiii.)

'Reflexion on Descartes' conception of substance led Spinoza also to deny the substantial existence of the Ego. His method was different from that of the English Empiricists. Emphasizing the idea that substance is conceived through itself and exists in itself, he concluded that there is only one Substance—God. Minds and bodies are but modes of its two attributes—thought and extension—respectively (Ethics, ii. prop. 10).

'The substantial nature of the Ego has been maintained by other thinkers holding more adequate notions of substance than that held by Descartes. The universe, according to Leibniz, consists entirely of indivisible, mutually exclusive substances, or 'monads,' as he calls them. The content of these monads consists of their perception of the universe. They differ according to their content of view to the clarity of their perceptions. The rank of a monad in the scale of being depends on the clarity of its perception, on the degree of adequacy with which it mirrors or reflects the universe. What appears to us as inert matter is an

Essay concerning Human Understanding, bk. ii. ch. xxii. 102.
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constituents of the universe consists of Egos. They are not mutually exclusive, as with-Leibniz. They are related to one another through inclusion in the one absolute Person, God. God is the only absolute Substance, but finite Egos have relative independence. They are not mere modes of the being of another, or of others, as material things are. The latter do not exist in themselves, because they do not exist for themselves. Only beings that exist for themselves have self-existence. What is essential for self-existence is feeling. Thought is not essential, although it is necessary in order to develop the full meaning of selfhood, to enable an Ego to know itself and to say 'I.' But whatever has a feeling of self, and is, e.g., a human being, has that fundamental characteristic on which substantial or self existence depends. For it 'undoubtedly distinguishes its own suffering from the rest of the world, though it can understand neither its own Ego nor the nature of the external world' (Microcosmus, Eng. tr., 1885, vol. I. bk. ii. ch. v. § 3). J. Ward develops a theory along lines suggested by Leibniz and Lotze (cf. his Realm of Ende, Cambridge, 1911, passim).

We have so far discussed the term 'Ego' as applied to the complete conscious individual, or to what psychologists call the 'total self.' But it has another application which is important. Since Kant wrote, many have recognized within the Ego so conceived a duality, variously described as a duality of subject and object, of subject-consciousness and object-consciousness, of the 'I' and the 'Me,' of the pure Ego and the empirical Ego—not a dualism of essentially different substances, but one understood, but a duality of such a nature as to form together one individual conscious being.

But of perceptions and sensations, a 'bundle of perceptions' or a 'sum of phenomena,' are capable of being analyzed, described, and related to one another. They are constituents of the Ego as object-consciousness, the Me, to speak in Leibniz's phrase, the only constituents of the object Ego. As already noted, a line cannot be drawn between what is included in the Ego and what is not. The body is often included by a man in his consciousness of himself, and even objects outside the body. A mystic may feel at one with the universe, or consciously identify himself with God.

But distinct from the self as known and possessed is the self or subject which knows and possesses it. Knowing implies two terms in relation. An idea or perception which is perceived by no one is a contradiction. The centrality and organization of experience is unintelligible apart from the synthetic act of an interested subject (Ward).

Simple ideas are not combined into complex ideas by mere association; a combination is necessary (James). The bundle of perceptions' or a 'sum of phenomena,' cannot know itself as a bundle or sum respectively. How is that which is, ex hypothesi, a series to know itself as a series? (J. S. Mill), experience is not a mere series of perceptions. It is a unity.

That the different kinds of empirical consciousness must be connected in one self-consciousness is the very first and synthetical foundation of all our thinking, whether of ourselves as individuals or of the world as systematically connected according to law. And the unity of self-consciousness depends on the synthetic activity of the Ego, the 'I think,' which accompanies each of its synthetic acts.

In Kant's philosophy three Egos may be distinguished—the pure Ego (the subject of knowledge), the empirical Ego (the succession of our conscious states), Hume's flux of perception, and the noumenal Ego (the subject of moral action). The first is needed to account for the objective unity and necessity of knowledge; the second is a verifiable fact; the third is postulated to make morality possible. The logical principle, and the source of all theoretical principles; the empirical Ego is a part of the order of Nature, and all its states are determined according to the scientific law of causation which, with other theoretical Egos, has its source in the pure Ego. The noumenal Ego does not belong to the world of sense, and is not subject to the order of Nature; it is free, and must be so if morality is to be possible. For morality implies the categorical imperative 'Thou oughtest,' and 'ought' implies 'can.' The categorical imperative is a command of the Practical Reason, or of reason in its practical application. Hence the freedom of the Ego is a postulate of the Practical Reason. And, since freedom is impossible in a world determined throughout according to the law of causation, as the world of sense-experience is thought by Kant to be, the ethical Ego belongs to the noumenal or intelligible world—a world which transcends the phenomenal. The ethical Ego is the same as the logical Ego, but its transcendent existence can be asserted only by the Practical Reason. For the theoretical reason the Ego is an utterly empty idea. Nothing more can be said about it than that it is self-consciousness in general, the bare form of consciousness—the 'I think' which accompanies every knowledge—within which is the possibility of the knowledge of objects, but which has itself no content to distinguish it, and is not separable from the consciousness of objects. One obvious objection to Kant's conception of the Ego in its logical and ethical form is that it is too abstract to account for the concrete unity and organization of experience. Sentience is excluded from it. Perceptions and sense-impulses must be assumed as somehow given. Kant made this assumption at first. He saw later that synthesis was implied in simple apprehension. But the conception of the Ego was not modified by him. He did much to overcome the opposition to the Ego, and sensibility and reason which had been developed by previous thinkers. One of his main purposes was to show that both were necessary for knowledge. But the dualism persists in his philosophy as two elements of opposite nature that had to be brought together. Later thinkers have carried out more thoroughly what Kant attempted. J. Ward maintains that the subject of sense-ex,

1. Cf. Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, Eng. tr., Edit. 1906, p. 39: Brashman, the 'eternal infinite divine power is identical with their sum, with that which after stripping off everything external, we discover in ourselves as our real most essential being, our individual self, the soul. This identity of the Brashman and the Atman, ... is the ultimate metaphysical thought of the entire doctrine of the Upanishads. It is briefly expressed by the later Hindu art thought 'I am Brashman.' To know self as Brashman is to achieve salvation.


4. Examination of the Hypothesis of a Mind, Philosophy, 1877, p. 248.


7. Critique of the Practical Reason, Abbot's tr., 1879, p. 121 f.

experience is one and continuous with the subject of knowledge. So also the subject of simple impulsive actions is one and continuous with that of purposive actions.

Because experience at all levels depends on active as well as on passive factors, and because the conception of an object without a subject is a contradiction, Ward believes that the duality of subject and object in unity is a fundamental and un-derivable reflective character, present alike in cognition, sensation, and feeling. It is true even of the experience of God—the Supreme Person. Other thinkers who recognize that experience shows this duality deny its fundamental character. Bradley, e.g., says that the distinction is derivative. There is no ground for asserting that it is true of experience at all levels—the highest and the lowest. The consciousness of activity is not primary. The perception of activity comes from the expansion of the self against the not-self. There is no consciousness of activity as distinguished from mere change apart from the idea of change. Moreover, subject and object have contents and are actual psychical groups. The contents of subject and object are interchangeable. Ideally, every conation and the most inner feelings may be made objects; we can, e.g., that the 'leaf of dung' of George Berkeley, *The Immortality of the Soul*, 1879, chs. ix. and x.; cf. also A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, 1908, bk. iv. ch. iii.

Ward replies that Bradley confounds reality with experience. It is easy to agree with a reflective knowledge of it. The relation subject-object must exist before it can be perceived. To show how the idea of activity arose is not to show that the consciousness of activity itself is derivative. There is no evidence that the subject of the object, and is presupposed in the perception of it. The relation subject-object cannot be reduced to relation between presentations.

The strongest objection to Ward's theory is that based on the ability of the mind to reflect on its own conations and feelings, thus apparently transferring them to the object Ego. But a subject, it is argued, is identical with its own perceptions in its reflection. True. Is it, however, the same object? May there not be several Egos? W. James maintains that this is the case.

In the statement, 'I may represent as a stream, things which are known together are known in simple pulses of that stream. The pulse of the present moment is the real subject. It is enduring being; the subject lasts for a moment; its place is immediately taken by another which experiences only that which it is to act as the medium of unity. The subject for the time being knows and adopts its predecessors, and by so doing appropriates what its predecessors adopted,' it is this trick which the nascent thought has of immediately taking up the aspiring thought and adopting it which leads to the appropriation of most of the remainder constituents of the self. Who owns the last self owns the self before the last, for what possesses the possessed possesses the possessed' (*Text-book of Psychology*, 1903). 'If there were no passing states of consciousness, then indeed we might suppose an adding principle absolutely one with itself to be the consciousness thinker in each one of us. But, if states of consciousness be accorded as realities, no such 'substantial' identity of the thinker need be supposed. Yesterday's and today's states of consciousness have no substantial identity. For when one is here the other is irreversibly dead and gone. But they have a functional identity, for both know the same objects, and so far as the by-gone me is one of those objects they react upon it in an identical way. It is it and opposing it to it and opposing it to all the other things they know. This functional identity seems really the only sort of identity in the thinker which the facts require us to suppose. Successive thinkers numerically distinct, but all aware of the same past in the same way, form and share an identity as for all the experiences of personal unity and sameness which we actually have. And just such a stream of successive thinkers is the stream of mental states ...' (ib. 2011).

This theory is not open to the objection made to that of Ward. But another difficulty presents itself when we consider the relation between the Egos. Assuming that the present pulse of the stream is able to exercise all the functions attributed to the Ego at any moment, the question arises, How are we to account for its special characteristics, and for the selection made out of the total complex presented at any moment, and thus account for the concrete unity or unities then manifested? The present Ego, according to the account given, is not derived from its predecessors; it does not 'inherit' the past, but possesses it by an act of appropriation. An Ego is not continued in its successor, for it has no substantial identity with it. Each Ego is described as an isolated individual, which appears for a moment as a medium of unity, and then vanishes, leaving its complex object and conative and reactive accompaniments—why have these not vanished—to be appropriated by another, and this in turn gives place to still another which appropriates it.

Does this theory enable us to understand the relative permanence and unity of experience? Perhaps we should not take James's words too literally when he says that there is no substantial identity between yesterday's and to-day's states of consciousness. The words 'substantial' and 'identical' are ambiguous. James is here refuting the theory that the Ego is a stage of consciousness, which exists independently of what it knows, and remains one and the same over against the flux of experience. But his statements do not simply deny such a subject. They affirm also that the successive subjects are different beings, and that there is no continuity of existence between them; when one is here the other is irrecoverably dead and gone. That the past conditions the present subject, he would not assert: he says there is no identity between past and present states? And how can a past state which is irrecoverably dead and gone be known and welcomed by the subject as its own?

James seems to make too much of his metaphor. A stream is not adequate to represent conscious life. It emphasizes its contingency, and over-emphasizes its transitoriness. Our experience contains relatively permanent elements. The past endures in the present. A state of consciousness is not a momentary existence merely. As a passing phase, of course, it endures only for a moment. But its whole being is summed up in the passing phase. Experience is process; so is all else. *All things flow.* No state of the existence of a tree or stone ever, as such, recurs. But the stone or the tree does not cease to exist, and every moment it has assumed shows itself in a more or less permanent modification of being. A subject which knows a tree as an enduring thing must itself be a relatively permanent being.

But we are not obliged to attribute absolute unchanging permanence to the subject, and define it as a simple indivisible principle or entity. It must have at least as much concreteness and variety of character and as much complexity of structure, so to speak, as its objects. Moreover, the character of the Ego is a changing one. The fabric or material of experience is undergoing frequent transformation, and we cannot but suppose that the Ego is similarly transformed. Indeed, it is obvious that our capacity for knowing, feeling, and doing is being continually modified. What appeals to us and compels attention, what we choose and reject, our conception of the world and our estimation of the things we do change from day to day. The unity and identity of the subject cannot, therefore, exclude change. Why should a simple and indivisible element be asserted to exist in us? Perhaps the motive is that we are not demanded to fix Ego characteristics quite opposite to those.
Egoism

—from G. E. Moore, “Some Refutations of Subjective Idealism,” Mind, 1903

Egoism.—A distinction may be drawn between theoretical and practical egoism. (a) Theoretical egoism, usually called Subjective Idealism or Self-Centeredism, is the theory which maintains that the

mind to life = mere selfishness. A man is usually called egoistic or egoist in so far as his inclinations and purposes are immediately and exclusively directed towards himself (cf. Meredith's Egoist). Such egoism may be independent of any theory as to what is right and what is reasonable. It may be taught by a child or by a thoughtless man; and may take the form of choosing what is most agreeable or least painful at the time, without any thought of life as a whole. On the whole, it may be the result of cool deliberation and concentrated purpose. Thoroughgoing egoism of this kind is seldom or never met with. 'Selfishness' is not, indeed, a logical consequence of ethical egoism. It is not inconsistent with the latter to cultivate a 'disinterested' regard for others and for their welfare. For too great and direct regard for self-interest may lead to a narrowing of the scope of life which is incompatible with the greatest individual well-being. The hedonistic egoist who seeks his own happiness too keenly is in danger of defeating his own end.1 A man concerned to save his soul may attain his end most effectively by trying to save another's, and by former efforts a man has a soul to save; losing interest in himself, he finds himself. By dying he lives. Hence Ethical Egoism, or Egoism as a theory of the good or of what is right and reasonable, does not necessarily imply 'selfishness.'

Ethical egoists are generally dogmatists; i.e., they do not seek to justify the individual's right to make his own good the standard of life, or, in other words, to show that such a view is a reasonable one for him to take. Such justification is not, perhaps, thought to be necessary. The reasonableness of seeking our own good is taken granted. A reason is sought only to be needed for considering the good of others when inclination does not induce, or necessarily compel, a man to do so. Even Butler says 'that our ideas of happiness and misery are of all our ideas the nearest and most important to us ... that, though virtues or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as much; yet, when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it' (Sermon xi).

That the egoist should seek his own good as one of his ends requires no justification. It is simply an extension of the appeal for his own good is to each one immediate, and it is intuitively evident that he should seek it. The appeal of the good of others is not so direct; nor is it so intense as the egoist evidences. He does not feel that he can promote it except when others are bound to him by such intimate ties as make their welfare interesting to him in the same way as his own. Consequently, when, from any cause, natural and social claims are weak or repudiated, egoistic theories of life tend to win recognition. The Cynics, e.g., lived during the decline of the Greek city-state, and Hobbes (1688-1679) during the social disorganization attending the Revolution in England. Spinoza was ostracized for his theological views; Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were constitutionally Islametees.

Egoism is based, explicitly or implicitly, on an 'atomistic' conception of society; every social whole is composed of individuals, the nature of each one of whom is to preserve his own life, to seek his own ends. This is the same as to satiate his own desires; and good and evil are relative to the individual. There is nothing good or evil absolutely. Both presuppositions are explicit in Hobbes.

1 See also W. E. Midgley, Methods of Ethics, 1893, p. 99.

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egoism is based on psychological egoism. For men aim consistently at their own good, to the extent that they have the virtue of self-control and of the nature of the good which will satisfy them. Ethics is the systematic study of this good; and its teaching will acquire scientific exactness only when the nature of the individual man in relation to his outside and the rest of the universe is clearly understood.

If the egoist's attitude is dogmatic, his ethics is fundamentally merely a statement of his own convictions, and cannot be regarded as a means of testing the truth. But when he tries to justify his conviction, he may be reasoned with, and, possibly, convinced of error. The egoist is trying to give a reasonable basis to his theory when he rests it on a psychological analysis of the nature of desire. His attempt is, as we have seen, not successful. He might yet maintain that he has an immediate and ultimate intuition that he should seek his own good whether he actually does or not. It may be safely said, in reply to this, that other men would not recognize the validity of the egoist's intuition, especially if his good is to be obtained at their expense.

Further, he ought consistently to admit that every other individual's good is an ultimate good for himself, and that it should be recognized as such by all. And, if this be admitted, does it not follow that the good of all should be respected by each, and that, therefore, a social contract is to be set up between egoists? The egoist's contention would then be qualified into the statement that he should seek his own good, but in such a way as not to interfere with similar self-seeking on the part of others.

Further, it may be urged that the atomistic conception of human life is false. Human societies are not mere aggregates. A man is not self-contained; no sharp line of division can be drawn between his life and interests and those of others (cf. art. Ego). He is a member of an organic whole. The complete good is the good of the whole of which he is a member. The full realization of his interests is at the same time the full realization of the interests of others. Hence his good is not a purely private and personal matter. It is true that sometimes there is an appearance of conflict. Whether the conflict is necessary is a large question which cannot be discussed here. In an ideal state, as H. Spencer (Data of Ethics, 1879, ch. xi.) points out, there would be no conflict. And even now men exist who seem to find that they more nearly realize their true good by renouncing what appears to be necessary and acting for the sake of others. They so identify themselves with their State or Church that they are content to die in order that the institution may live and flourish. If the surrender of life is not felt to be self-sacrifice but self-realization, and it is often made with no thought of recompense in a future life.


DAVID PHILLIPS.

EGOISM (Buddhist).—The inquiry whether the motives, sources, or springs of action are or are not exclusively egoistic, or self-interested, whether or not 'altruism' may rank as a twin in such springs, or whether there are yet other sources, is so characteristic of modern ethics that it appears of no importance whether a corresponding conception be found in early Buddhism, any more than in other early philosophical and religious traditions. Such discussions are the corollaries of a synthesis which belongs
more essentially to the past two centuries than to any others we can name that of individuals and of peoples as solidares one of another. They have sprung from a time, when, in George Elliot's words, "ideas were making fresh armies of themselves, and the universal kinship was a sense of the common pulsa when the soul of man was waking to pulses which had for centuries been beating in him unheared, until their full sun made a new life of terror or of joy" (Daniel Deronda).

Herein possibly lies a sounder basis of historical division in ethical theory than, with Martineau, to carry a psychological basis the tru dichotomizing principle of the ethical systems of pre-Christian and post-Christian thought. His generalization is sound only as long as we turn our head on not only one part of pre-Christian ethical thought, but on by far the most considerable part. In his strange statement, 'It is curious that psychological ethics are altogether peculiar to Christians' (italics his), the whole world of Oriental thought is ignored. To take India only: in Vedântist ethics, the ethical ideal, growing up with the evolution of thought, is emphatically subjective. The creative and presiding power of the universe is identified with the psychic principle in man; salvation lay in the personal recognition of this identity—'the finding self to be Atman' (Deussen)1; and the ethical value of actions was reckoned by their objective scale of utility than according to a subjective calculus of their significance, in cost and result, to the doer.2 Buddhist ethic is no less strongly and consciously psychological (see Desire [Buddhist]). Its views on the self were different from those of Vedântism. It denied any immanence, in the wholly and constantly changing living organism, physical and mental, of an eternal, unchanging, impassive (i.e. super-psychic) principle. The psychic agency was a convenient abstraction of thought, a convention of popular speech, as when we say 'it rains.' As a metaphysical, rather than an ethical, subject, but one of cardinal importance in Buddhist doctrine, the ego is dealt with under Self, Soul. Under the present title we are concerned with the attitude of its ethical doctrine towards that which, in theory or practice, is called 'egoism.' All the materials, in fact, for our modern ethical discussion of egoism and altruism are present in Buddhism; and, since the sources of those materials are still so imperfectly accessible, and so inadequately explained, it is hoped that we may yet discover, or come upon, such discussion.3 We may nevertheless affirm this much: that it forms no such predominant feature as is the case in modern ethical works. It is as if the pulses of that full and rich operation to which we have referred above were beating latent and unheard. The struggle of early culture was for the individual to 'find himself,' even as it is to-day. The intervening struggle has been to find one's brother.

1. We find in the Pâli Pitakas a definite theory with respect to the 'springs of action.' These are termed kàta (condition), kàsa (cause), or mîsa (root), or pátha (result). They are classified in number three being 'roots' of good, three of bad action.

And, though bad and good actions are so termed in virtue of the painful or pleasurable results they entail respectively on the agent, yet they are shown actually to consist in immoral and moral actions respectively—that is to say, in actions conceived as detached, love, and intelligence. In Pâli they read lobha, dosa, mîsa; akûhà, adosa, anûha. A frequent synonym for the first is rêga ('lust,' 'passion,' understood very generally); for the third, avijjà ('ignorance'); for the fifth, mîta ('love,' 'charity,' 'animity'); for the sixth, pâtta ('insight,' 'wisdom'). So radical and inclusive, as sources of all human faults and follies and consequent suffering, are the first three held to be, that the extinction of them, that is to say, letting action proceed solely from their three opposites, is one of the few positive definitions given of nibbàna (nirvàna [q.v.]).

No reduction is attempted of either triplet to any more ultimate ground of action. But the first-named of the three is the psychic principle in man: salvation lies in the personal recognition of this identity—'the finding self to be Atman' (Deussen); and the ethical value of actions was reckoned by their objective scale of utility than according to a subjective calculus of their significance, in cost and result, to the doer.2 Buddhist ethic is no less strongly and consciously psychological (see Desire [Buddhist]). Its views on the self were different from those of Vedântism. It denied any immanence, in the wholly and constantly changing living organism, physical and mental, of an eternal, unchanging, impassive (i.e. super-psychic) principle. The psychic agency was a convenient abstraction of thought, a convention of popular speech, as when we say 'it rains.' As a metaphysical, rather than an ethical, subject, but one of cardinal importance in Buddhist doctrine, the ego is dealt with under Self, Soul. Under the present title we are concerned with the attitude of its ethical doctrine towards that which, in theory or practice, is called 'egoism.' All the materials, in fact, for our modern ethical discussion of egoism and altruism are present in Buddhism: and, since the sources of those materials are still so imperfectly accessible, and so inadequately explained, it is hoped that we may yet discover, or come upon, such discussion.3 We may nevertheless affirm this much: that it forms no such predominant feature as is the case in modern ethical works. It is as if the pulses of that full and rich operation to which we have referred above were beating latent and unheard. The struggle of early culture was for the individual to 'find himself,' even as it is to-day. The intervening struggle has been to find one's brother.

In a brief provisional inquiry like the present, the best course suggesting itself is to indicate: (1) the presence in Buddhist scriptures of the materials aforesaid, or, let us say, of channels in ethical thought on the lines of the modern elevation; (2) any modification in that thought due to the a-psychic or anti-animistic standpoint; (3) any evolution in Buddhism with respect to egoistic and altruistic theory.}

1 Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, Oxford, 1885, i. 14.
As related to moha, lobha, or lusting after false goods and ends, is aided by the errant groping and dim vision, denoted by the former term. Thus the verses ascribed to Mahâpajâpati (aunt and foster-mother of the Buddha) are:

11. 'Let no long wave drown all time,
Not knowing how and what things really were,
But never finding what I needed.
But now mine eyes have seen the Exalted One."
Now have I understood how all things come.

Crowning, the cause, in me is done.

(Therigatha, 157.)

2. Taking next the three causes of good or moral action, it is not possible to reduce them to simpler terms. * Those who understood Comte, the * enlightened * man, thought them at least as ultimate as condition, feeling, and cognition. * Alobha, or detachment, is not so negative as it sounds. Essentially a state of mind and heart which does not grasp at, or clinging to, it is the condition of all generous and disinterested action. * Such a state is likened to free mobility of a dewdrop on the glistening surface of a lotus-leaf. * Adora is sympathy, altruistic tenderness, care, and forbearance, the 6-dharma of St. Paul. * Amoha is the purity of mind affirmed in the foregoing verses. * And one of these three, according to the Pâtthâna, may condition, involve, and lead to the other two—* Because of alobha, [arises] adora, amoha.* etc. (Duka-patthâna, 1; but this is omitted).

We may trace self-interested and other-interested motives in acts conditioned by one or more of these six, but the six are not reducible to the one principle or the other. The good of self and that of others, as the end and means of action, are frequently met with in the Pitakas, but not as basic principles. For instance, the two form part of a fourfold cleavage in classifying human beings:

There are four classes of people in the world: those, namely, who live either for their own good, or for that of others; those who live for the good of others, not for their own good; those who live for their own good only; those who live for the good both of themselves and of others.

Of these four, the first are compared to a charred and rotten log, good for nothing. Of the rest, the self-interested, better is the first; the third, or egoist, is better than the altruist. The fourth, whom H. Sidgwick would have called a universalistic hedonist, is the best of all men, however, we must beware of the explanation of living for, or being concerned with, one's own and others' good shows that we are not dealing with egoists as we should understand them. The class who study their moral duties and do them, or do them not, and seek to extinguish râga, dosa, moha in themselves, do not habitually exhorts others to do the same. Those who study others' good only are such as exhort others to extirpate the conditions of bad acts, while not themselves trying to do so.

A similar distinction is drawn with respect to other modes of ethical endeavour, showing that the Dhamma contained no encouragement for unenlightened, worldly, or sensual self-interest.

Another classification in self and other-regard, occurring several times, is that of persons who inflict pain or hardship on self and their fellowmen. The same fourfold division is followed, but only the doubly negative class is commented. One who is mastered by greed, etc., devices what is injurious to himself, to others. One who has not cleared away the 'five hindrances'—sensual desire, ill will, ignorance, etc.—has too weak insight to know his own good, others' good, or both; he who has cleared them away 'knows what is the good of both even as it really is.' Generally speaking, the balance of ends is stated in such words as the verse, 'He seeketh both his own and others' good.'

2 and in the Buddha's words: 'Contemplating either one's own good, or that of others, or both, is sufficient motive for setting about it strenuously.' But, while the early Buddhists would that morality should be the result of all spiritual growth, and that benevolence was essential to the increase of one's own happiness, he did not, as Sidgwick says of Comte, 'seriously trouble himself to argue with egoism, or to weigh carefully the amount of happiness that might be generally attained by the satisfaction of egoistic propensities duly regulated' (History of Ethics, London, 1889, p. 257). Thus the Buddha is represented as giving ethical advice to questioners perplexed by rival doctrines, as follows:

'Let your verdict not be guided by tradition, precedent, custom, or dialectic. Test the doctrines, each for himself, whether they will conduce to happiness or the reverse. For you know well that the conduct conducive to happiness is the one to do, and conduct that is not so is to be avoided, by intelligence; and that the conduct conducive to sorrow is conditioned by greed, hate, and delusion. These impulses, therefore, the vile, the evil, unclean, unwise, and stupid others to do to the like. These impulses men to avoid doing these things.'

In more detailed exposition of ethical dispositions and conduct, the term nearest to our 'selfishness' is perhaps maccariya. The derivation is from a stem signifying madness or infatuation, but the dominant feature in the disposition so called seems to be meanness, the opposite of magnanimity, a grudging spirit. The content of the term is, however, expounded in part by other terms indicative of a selfish nature, of one that, extending itself to all or its own class:

'Now, Mine is, not another's, and of one that would hinder generosity in others. Another such ancillary term signifies a stigmatic or contracted state with regard to others' needs.'

Other aspects of egoism—self-interest, self-conceit, self-seeking, self-reference—are all represented in Buddhist doctrine. The term sadattha, one's own good, advantage, or interest, is used invariably; we believe, in the farther meaning of an enlightened self-interest, including personal salvation. Thus, in one of the usual descriptions of the elect or perfected, it is said:

'They who are arahants, who have destroyed the intoxicating desire, who have attained the life, have decided that which was to be done, have laid aside the burden, have won their own salvation (ussâyyathan) thus. Such others, says, Mine is, be not another's, and of one that would hinder generosity in others. Another such ancillary term signifies a stigmatic or contracted state with regard to others' needs.'

Self-conceit, or madda, is thus described:

'Conceit at the thought: ‘‘I am the better man’’—‘‘I am as good (as they)’’—‘‘I am lowly’’—all such fancies, overweening vanity, arrogance, pride, flaunting, assumption, desire of the heart for self-advertisement—this is called madda.'

Now, madda was quite incompatible with sadattha. Self-conceit did not arise in the bosom of him who had won his highest gain. As with some phases of evangelical Christianity, so with Buddhism, it was customary for one attaining to the consciousness of salvation to testify to the same. Two disciples thus attaining are related to have waited on the Buddha, and repeated the formula quoted above:

'Lord, he who is arahant, he who has . . . won salvation, who has utterly destroyed the letters of becoming (rebirth), who is by perfect knowledge emancipated, to him it does not occur—'

There is that better than 1, equal to me, inferior to me."

And, they saluting and passing out of the congregation, the latter added, '. . . the highest good,' and the former, '. . . the greatest' (gnosis) they tell of their salvation (atta), but they do not bring in the ego (atta).'
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testify in their talk to this contrast between saintship and self-reference. Ananda comments on Sāriputta’s beauty of expression and dexterity, and asks:

What have you been occupied with to-day? I have been doing apart, practicing phalas, brother, and there arise in me never the thought, “Is it I who attain or I who emerge.”

That is because all egotistic tendencies in the venerable Sāriputta have long been rooted out, responds Ananda.

Not only do we find this unobtrusion of the ego commented, but we also read of the Buddha, when the self had been obtained, did he arrive at the point of that ego to attribute to himself.

The story is told in the Udāna, a little manual of short episodes framing a metrical logion, how the king of Kosala and his wife dissecns the possibly current Védantist text, that the self, the immanent deity, is dearer than all else. It is possible that the metaphysic implied is more in line with that of the Christian text, that shall a man give in exchange for his soul? (Mt 10). Anyhow, the king mentions the conversation to the Buddha, who thereupon replies:

The whole wide world we traverse with our thought, North and south is more dear to each one to Self.

Since are so dear to Self to other men.

The Self, Self, the Self of other men.

The layman hurteth other lives, the sage

In self-restraint protecteth all lives.

He who doth never think “This mine!”

Nor “Others have gotten something,” blitheth thus:

There’s naught for me! no “mineless” (mamattam) being found.

For he hath no cause to suffer grief.

3. The first-named term of these derivatives, ahaṅkāra, undergoes an interesting evolution in Indian thought, but the ethical part it plays is slight. In older (Chāndogya) Upaniṣads, it is equivalent to the ātman, or soul conceived as the immanent Divinity. Put into our metaphysical idiom, the one passage referring to it runs thus:

Under the aspect of a phalas, the sum total of our perceptions is Self, is I-making.

In several later Upaniṣads the term recurs, but in the psychological sense attached to it in the Sākhyā philosophy. That is to say, it is a mental organ, or function, evolved from matter, and mediating between the material and the spiritual, or presenting external experience as so many “intellegibles” to the soul or self. Its occurrence in the Buddha’s system is contained practically to one phrase repeated in a few sutras of two Nikayas.

The meaning of the phrase is invariably that of the older Upaniṣads. It has two slightly varying forms: “mind involved in I-making, mind-making concept (matina),” and “the bias of I-making, mind-making concept.” The context is concerned with the problem of practical philosophy and religion; how, given the recipient organism and the world of its experiences, to attain spiritual freedom, and not to suffer the concept of self-reference to arise. All assumption of a self, soul or ego

(aṭṭa, ahaṅ, as any part of the organism or its impressions, is to be excluded.

It is possible that the function assigned to ahaṅkāra in animistic psychology was contemporous with the foregoing. But there is no allusion to it, as a psychological fallacy or otherwise, in Buddhist psychology.

But anti-egoistical teaching nowhere resolves itself into a positive doctrine of altruism. The solvents applied, in Buddhism, to the animistic creed of immortal, unchanging Divine soul within one body after the other have been described as the destruction of individuality. The object, however, was not expressly the breaking down of spiritual barriers between one individuality and those of its fellow-men. We may, again, apply to the Buddha Sidgwick’s description of Conie’s views (op. cit. p. 257):

A supreme unquestioning self-devotion, in which all personal calculations are suppressed, is an essential feature of his moral ideal.

The self-devotion, however, is not altruistic, but to the highest good, for self and others, as he conceived it: the good that lay in the perfecting and the perfection (and thereby the completion) of life. And this was ultimately a task to be carried out by each man for himself.

No other may accomplish aught for me.

On the other hand, the self is essentially a life in based on other-regarding virtues, and, in all cases where temperament or infirmities did not forbid, in ministering to the spiritual and temporal needs of others. Combined, moreover, with moral conduct and serenity was the altruistic side of the contemplative disciplines, on which considerable emphasis is laid. This consisted in a systematic irradiation or mental sufussion (phar-mas) of other thoughts, starting from one person or group and expanding the range, with love, then pity (or sympathy with sorrow and pain), then sympathy with the happy, finally equanimity, each emotion to be realized as practically elastic to an infinite degree.

Lastly, the rejection by the Buddha of all validity in rank, caste, or birth, as standards of personal value, was conducive to fraternity in general. A discourse on the altruistic duties of the layman has this peroration:

liberality, courtesy, benevolence, unselfishness, under all circumstances and towards all—these qualities are to the world what the lightning is to the rolling thunder.

And the fraternal affection among members of the Order is frequently mentioned.

One of the most elevated and best known of Pīsākan expressions of universal benevolence is that inculcating mother-love to all beings perhaps the finest outburst of altruism in all ancient literature:

Even as a mother watcheth over her child,

Her only child, as long as life doth last,

So let us, for all creatures, great or small,

Develop each and every being’s heart into a boundless home of love.

Ay, let us practise love for all the world,

Upward, and downward, yonder, hence,

Uncramped, free from ill will and enmity.

Those among modern Buddhists who call themselves Mahāyānists claim that, in developing and progressing the original Buddhist, altruistic sentiment of altruism as opposed to egoism takes a more prominent position in their teaching, notably in what is termed the Bodhisattva (q.v.) theory. Thus the goal of nirvāṇa becomes one not of personal salvation but of transferred
merit, saintly aspiration being for the salvation of all beings. Negatively, writes Daisetz Suzuki, nirvāṇa ‘is the annihilation of [the belief in] the indestructible essence of the individual, the death that arises from this erroneous conception. . . . Its positive side consists in universal love or sympathy for all beings.’

LITERATURE.—This is given in the footnotes.

C. A. F. JHYS DAVIES.

EGOTISM.—See VANTY.

EGYPTIAN RELIGION.—I. CONDITIONS.

1. Length of time.—The very long history of Egypt is traceable through more than 7000 years in writing, and it has a pre-history of which details can be recovered from 1000 or 2000 years before writing; hence the changes of religious thought can be followed over a wider range than in classical lands. In place of a very full account, covering a few centuries, as in Greece and Italy, we have a scattered and fragmentary account of as many thousand years of belief. Therefore, must be very different from that applied to other religions.

2. Character of the land.—The peculiar nature of the country, isolated in the recesses of the desert, as open all to the other interests of man. The continuous contrast of desert and of cultivation impressed the whole Egyptian character. It produced those contrasts which seem so contradictory—a people who had the reputation of gloomy sternness, and who yet covered their tombs with scenes of banquets, dancing, and gaiety: a people to whom the grandeur of the tomb was one of the great objects during life. The constant presence of the dead in the cliffs and desert overlooking the scenes of their lives, or, in later times, more familiarly kept surrounding the family life in the atrium of the house, preserved a sense of the continuity with the Other-world which made a far more contrasted life than we see elsewhere. As opposed to the luxuriance and fatness of the rich plain, there was always visible on either hand the desert, little known, dreaded, the region of malevolent gods, of strange monsters, of blinding, suffocating storms, of parching thirst and heat.

3. Form of the land.—The form of the country also acted on the religion by favouring isolated communities, which produced distinct beliefs. Not only was the long, narrow valley readily cut up into distinct principalities, which warré on one another and promoted separate forms of worship; but there was also that antipathy between the two sections of the population, east and west of the river. To this day a man of one side will dislike those just opposite to him more than those ten times as far away from his own side. The Nile valley not only holds a streak of population a hundred times as long as it is wide, but even two incomparable streaks side by side all the length of it. Thus there was every facility for the isolation of beliefs, for the evolution of its own Creeds, and out their neighbour’s sacred animal was the regular assertion of independence and vigour. Whatever antagonisms we now see remaining beneath the unification of Islam are mere shadows of the intense antagonism between the partisans of rival cults in ancient times.

4. Political rivalry and fusion.—Religion was thus essentially a part of politics. Fanatical fervour is the product of the political necessity of all union. Small bodies, which are liable to be broken up, need a test of true membership, and a moral consciousness that they are in the right and their enemies are in the wrong, foul, miserable, and despicable. All this is given by a religious antipathy of the degree in which the triumph of his followers is his triumph. Hence the mythic victories of the gods, one over another, are the records of the victories of their worshippers; and even the marriages of the gods are occasions of the expression of the marriages of the tribes who upheld them.

Besides the violent conquest of one god or tribe over another, there was the peaceful fusion of tribes, who became blended both in blood and in religion. This led to the fusion of gods who were alike, and who henceforward bore compound names, as Ptah-Sokar-Osiris, or Osiris-Khentamenti. This fusion led to the acceptance of several gods and the uniting of them in groups, triads, or enneads. Thus Horus was originally an independent god, known later as the ‘elder Horus’ or ‘greater Horus,’ son of Hathor, and not as the temple god, from whom Hor—, the dwelling of Horus,’ took her name. Isis ‘was an independent deity she had neither husband nor lover’ (Maspero, Denkbl., 131). Each of the three was compounded of the gods of three independent tribes, Osiris, Isis, and Horus, who were linked as a family when the tribes became fused together.

5. Resulting mixture.—Not only was the theology thus compounded by multiple names for a god, and forming groups of connected gods, but the fusion also led to the acceptance of incompatible beliefs, particularly about the future life. The interaction and combination of these formed a chaotic mass of contradictions, which were continually in flux, and accepted differently by each district, and even each person. There is no such thing as ‘the Egyptian Religion’; during thousands of years there were ever-varying mixtures of theologies and eschatologies in the land.

Such may exist even under the far more exclusive dominance of Christianity. The old Fleish Buche Gediden, or ‘bright spirit,’ is still named among us as ‘Puck,’ while the Buche Dhu, or ‘dark spirit,’ has become the familiar ‘Hogey No.’ If we even retain these in London at present, much more were they realities in the West towards; during years to be considered as totally incompatible with Christianity as one theology in Egypt was incompatible with another; yet here they have co-existed for each other has disappeared since days of Clement. Taken in the order of age, the materials may be classified, with the chief modern publications, thus:


4. NAMES OF PERSONS, SHOWING THE USUAL GODS AND IDEAS: same sources as for ‘Titles.’


6. TEMPLE SCENES OF RELIGIOUS SERVICE, AND TEMPLE
III. POPULAR RELIGION.—7. Pre-historic figures.—The popular religion is the earliest form that we can trace in the remains of the pre-historic ages. In the graves and town-rums are found various animal figures which seem to show the adoration of different species. The human figures of the same age seem to be distinctly servitors to satisfy the wants of the dead, and not to represent higher beings. The lion is the most usual of such animals, and the figures are distinguished from those of later ages by the tail turning up the back, with a small hook at the end. The bull's head was often carved, but rather of a small size, as an amulet. The sphinx—human body and animal head—represented the pharaonic or Graecyptish form. Dr. Erman, Egyy Religion, Eng. tr., London, 1897, pp. 318-327.

8. Magic.—Magic apparently began in the pre-historic age. A small box was found containing three little flat carvings in slate tied together, and two carved ivory tusks, none of which had any use for work. Such ivory tusks were carved with a human head at the pointed end, and kept in pairs, one solid, one hollow. They are probably connected with the present African belief in charming a man's soul into a tusk. Many small amulets were in use—not only the figures of sacred animals, but also such as a fly, a cat, a slave, or a horse.

In the early historic age magic appears as the basis of the popular tales: the forming of a crocodile of wax and then throwing it into the water to pursue a victim; the bringing together the head and body of a decapitated goat and restoring it to life; the turning back of the waters and descending to the river-bed to find a lost jewel—such are the pivots of the earliest tales. There appear to have been at this period a belief in the virtue of words: a word coined to the word the Creator, as among the Hebrews and other nations and languages, having given the word without a name the power to exist. In the case of Moses there is a protest against its translation into Greek: 'out of the solemn, strong, energetic speech of names . . . we do not use words, but we use sounds full filled with deeds.' In the later magic writings and inscriptions, names—generally corrupted and mistaken—are the magic power expressed. In Ptolemaic times a conspiracy turned upon making wax figures, and sending them into the harim, to compass the death of the king. The latest tales, of the 19th century, are not different upon the use of magic. It seems not too much to say that an Egyptian was dominated throughout his life by the belief in the magical control exercised upon the gods, upon spirits in life and in death, and upon material objects. Cf. MAGIC (Egypt.).

9. Domestic worship.—The customs of domestic worship can only be gleaned from some occasional remains. In the pre-historic age the larger disks, carved with a coiled serpent, are pierced with a hole for suspension, showing that they were probably hung up in the houses; and in the 1st dynasty the usual border to the heath was a potter's fender in the form of a serpent, doublet, and serpent sculptured from the clay, or at dawn covered with ashes for the sake of warmth. In the XVIIIth dynasty there was usually a recess in the hall of the house, coloured red; and in one case it is preserved, where it had a scene of adoration of the tree-goddess above it. This was, doubtless, the focus of the domestic worship, probably having different deities painted or it according to the devotion of the master. On reaching Roman times, we have many interesting details preserved by the terra-cotta figures which were then so widely developed. The domestic shrine is represented as a wooden cupboard, a board containing the figure of the household god, with a lamp burning before it. For poorer families, figures were made to hang up by a hole in the back to fit on a nail in the wall. The figure often had at its feet a small lamp, made all in one piece. Such figures are found by the thousand in towns of the Roman age, showing that they were probably in use in every house, or every room, like figures of saints at present among Roman Catholic populations. Of the prayers to the gods there is evidence in the epitaphs of Amen, 'who cometh quickly to him who calls on him;' and of Ptah, 'who hears petitions;' and whose tablets have ears carved on them.

10. Birth, marriage, and death.—The ceremonies at birth have not been recorded; but, as the names are often compounded from those of gods, it is probable that some religious ceremony attended the naming of the child, as in Egypt (see BIRTH and CIRCUMCISION (Egypt.). Of marriages we know scarcely any more. The settlements of the XIXth dynasty are purely business documents. The domestic magic-contracts are without any religious reference. The terms in the XXVIth dynasty agreed on for divorce by the man are confirmation to the wife of her marriage portion, and control of her children's share of patrilineal property, also a third of all property acquired by the pair during marriage; but in one case the divorce terms were five times the marriage gift. For divorce by the woman, she must return one-half of the marriage portion given to her in marriage (see BIRTH and CIRCUMCISION (Egypt.). In Copitic times the terms were very similar. The only trace of religious terms is the belief in the clause by swearing by Amen and Ankh (Griffith, Demotic Poppy, Kyklands, London, 1909, p. 115). In Copitic times it is said: 'Since God willeth that we should unite one with the other'; but either party could divorce freely on paying seven times the marriage gift, and no provision was stipulated.
for the children. The religious sanction of marriage seems, therefore, unknown in the pagan and scarcely named in the Christian contracts, which accord with the temporary aspect of the deed, and the constant provision for divorce.

The great religious event to an Egyptian was his death. There is no trace of spiritual preparation or viaticum. The body was simply handed to the embalmers, and they prepared it without the slightest reverence or sentiment. After the seventy days came the greatest ceremony of private life—the funeral; the procession, the wailers, the reciting, and the interment, the mummification of the body, and the burial, the ritual service of funeral offerings, for which endowments were left, like those for masses in Europe. See, further, art. DEATH (Egyptian).

11. Dancing. Another development of popular religion was dancing. In the earliest royal monuments the dance of men in the festival of Osirisification of the king is represented; this took place, apparently, in an enclosure formed by cloth hangings placed on poles, and the conventional figure of this was represented behind the prince, down to the latest times. Dances of the servants are often represented in the tombs of the Pyramid age; but solemn and not only joyous, not religiously.

In the XIth dynasty the princesses are described as dancing with their ornaments before the king, and singing his praises. The sculptures and paintings of the XVIIth–XXth dynasties show many scenes of funeral dances; usually one woman held a tambourine aloft and beat out a rhythm on it, while others danced round. Exactly this dance may be seen now when parties of women go up to the cemetery a fortnight or a month after the funeral; an old negro is often the drummer, and the party stop every few hundred yards along the road for a dance. The dances are mentioned by Herodotus (ii. 60) among the parties going to the great festival at Buhaetis. Dancing was a considerable part of the public worship of the ascetic Therapeutae in the Roman age. At their great gatherings, held every seven weeks, they 'keep the holy all-night festival . . . one kind bearing time to the answering chant of the other; dancing to its music . . . turning and returning in the dance' (Philo, de Vita Contemplativa; see G. R. S. Mead, Osiris and Osiris, London 1900, p. 80 f.). This must have been much like an orgiastic modern zibar, only performed by men and women in opposite companies. That so scrupulous and ascetic a community, generally devoted to solitude, should make religious dancing so important and so mixed points to a much freer use of dancing by the unrestrained public.

12. Wayside shrines. The individual worship took place not only in the house, but also in the wayside shrines. The open-air shrines common now in Italy are represented in Egypt by covered shrines, where shelter from the heat may be enjoyed by the devotee. These shrines, or uge, at present abound in Egypt, being small conical chambers of brick covered with a domed roof, and usually containing a cenotaph of some local holy man. The native passing them will utter a short ejaculation, and stop to pay his respects, or, further, will walk round the cenotaph either inside or outside of the building. Similar shrines are frequently reproduced in the Roman terra-cotta figures, and were evidently as familiar in ancient times as now. They are placed against the inner face of the little entrance on one side, enclosing a square; a column placed at each corner supported an arched roof over it. A similar form, entirely of wood, was mounted on wheels for the purpose of carrying an image. The more solid shrines were built up in brickwork on all sides, with lattice windows, and covered by a double-sloping roof, with gable in front. When a village or town extended round an earlier shrine, and enveloped it, the little sanctuary became rich, and needed a dwelling for the priest and a storeroom. But the site could not be enlarged around; so the building was carried upward, as shown by another model. Here the open shrine was raised by two or three steps, and lamps burned on either side of it; but without the slightest reverence or sentiment. After the seventy days came the greatest ceremony of private life—the funeral; the procession, the wailers, the reciting, and the interment, the mummification of the body, and the burial, the ritual service of funeral offerings, for which endowments were left, like those for masses in Europe. See, further, art. DEATH (Egyptian).

13. Festivals of fertility and harvest. The popular worship on a collective scale was seen in the great festivals. How large and important they might be, we know from the size of the gathering at the festivals of the present day. The great feast at Tanta is estimated to attract 200,000 people. That it is an occasion for general licence to the loose-living part of the population doubtless descends from the customs of the ancient festivals, as shown by the acrostics of Horus. The two great festivals kept everywhere were the fertility feast and the harvest feast. At the first the 'gardens of Osiris,' like the 'gardens of Adonis' in Syria, ornamented the house. These are sometimes found preserved, as bowls full of Nile mud, and pierced with the holes left by innumerable sprouts of corn. Another method was to make clay figures of Osiris, stuffed with corn, as sometimes found; on wetting these, the corn would sprout from the body of the god. Still larger figures are represented, doubtless from the official feast, where the statue of Osiris is lying on a bier surrounded by acclamations (see Herodotus, London 1900, p. 80 f.). The following method of the planting in Upper Egypt is stated in the calendar to begin on the 14th Oct., millet on the 18th, and barley on the 19th; this feast of the growing corn was probably that named on the 21st Oct. (Choiak 11) in the Skylitir calendar as the 'day of the panegyric of Osiris at Abidos'; the following day was the 'day when he transformed himself into a bezen bird,' probably a bird liberated from the green couch of Osiris to represent his resurrection.

The second general festival—that of harvest—fell during April, as the harvest is reckoned to begin with this month in the south, and end with it in the north. This was celebrated by offerings to Ramnut, the serpent-god of harvest. After the threshing the grain was pilled up, as it may now be seen in immense heaps lying in the open air at the large stores; the winnowing shovels were stuck in the heap, with the handles turned in the heap, the tossing boards or scoop were held on high before it, the corn-measure crowned the heap, and Ramnut was adored (stele in Bologna Museum).

14. Great temple feasts. The details of provision for the great temple feasts have been preserved to us in the Harris papyrus (see Petrie, Hist. Studies, London, 1911). From that we gather the details of a festival of 20 days in March, and another of 27 days in August. In the March feast 10,000 persons were present on the great day, and 4000 on other days; in the August
feast 4800 on the great day, and 100 on others. The temple façade was decorated with tamarisk branches, Reed-grass, and hundreds of bunches and chains of flowers. Tables of provisions of meat and cakes were set out for the priesthood and the nobles. Large quantities of food were provided for the people, mainly various breads, cakes, and fruit. Flowers for each person, to be offered by each, were supplied. Thus was the general character of the great temple-festivals in honor of the local gods.

The festival of the New Year has a remarkable feature in the appointing of a mock king and his being sacrificed. This is not referred to in the ancient calendars, as it was a particular rather than a religious anniversary; but, happily, an account of the survival of it has been preserved. Knunziger records (Upper Egypt, Eng. tr., 1878, p. 184):

"For those days it is all up with the rule of the Turks; every little town chooses for itself... a ruler who has a towering fool’s-cap set upon his head, and a long spectral beard of false hair tied to his chest, and a yellow floral garment, and is clothed in a black bow.... With a long sceptre in his hand... he promenaded... Every house was decorated, and the door was arranged by the governor of the province... lets himself be stoned, while the new dignitary seats himself on his throne, that is, his corpse, is burned in death by burning, and from the ashes creeps out the slavish Pasha."

The modern copy of the crown of Upper Egypt, which bears upon its top the sceptre to the descent of this custom.

15. ‘Sed’ festival.—In connexion with this should be noticed the great Sed festival. It appears to have been normally celebrated every 30 years, and to have been on the occasion of the king being deified as Osiris, and the Crown Prince being appointed and married to the heiress of the king. It was to be the amelioration of a custom of killing the king after a fixed interval, in order that his royal maintenance of the public life and prosperity should not deteriorate. Such a custom of king-killing was usual in Ethiopia, until abolished in the 3rd cent. B.C. It is still practised by the Shilluk in the Sudan; also in Unyoro, in Kihanga, in Sofala, and formerly among the Zulus. Thus it is strongly an African custom. Nor is it peculiar to Africa, as it occurred in Prusia, and at fixed intervals of 12 years in Southern India. There is thus abundant parallel for such a feast in pre-historic Egypt; but, before the use of records, this custom gave place to the deification of the king, who lived on with his successor. The king became Osiris, was clad as the god, held the Divine emblems, and was enthroned in a shrine at the top of a flight of steps. Before him danced the Crown Prince, and at a different point in the ceremony the assembled men danced in the same enclosure of hangings upon poles. Sacred standards were carried in procession. In some connexion with the festival there is the record of 400,000 oxen, 1,422,000 goats, and 120,000 captives. These numbers show the national character of the ceremony, whether the figures were exaggerated or not. In the late times of the XIXth dynasty this festival of Osirification was performed much oftener, and after his 30th year Ramses II. repeated it every third year (Petrie, Stud. Hist., iii. 69). See, further, art. Festivals and Fasts (Egyptian).

16. Religious calendar.—The religious calendar of Egypt has never been studied, or even collected together. The materials are: (1) early lists of feasts, which are so much the same as to do not exceed half a dozen occasions for minor offerings; (2) the Ramesside papyrus Sallier iv., of which two-thirds of the year remains, stating the lack of recorded mythical or legendary events of each day (F. Chabas, Le Calendrier, Paris, 1857); (3) the Ptolemaic temple-calendars of Edin, Eshen, Denderah, etc., translated by Brugsch (Drei Fest-Kalender, Leipzig, 1872); (4) a few feasts noted by Ptolomarch (de Is. et Osr.); and (5) the modern Coptic calendar (published by R. N. L. Michell and E. Tissolet. Cf. art. Calendar (Egyptian).

The ancient calendars are still used, those of the temples referring mainly to the festivals held in the temples on which they were recorded. On comparing the lists of Edin and Eshen, which were of the same age and region, we find but six feasts identical in the two calendars. When we try to connect calendars of different periods, the shifting of the month-names through all the seasons presents the first difficulty. Owing to not observing leap-year, the nominal calendar rotated through the year in about 1460 years. Hence the question arises, which of the religious anniversaries were attached to the nominal month and day, and which to a day in the fixed year, both classes being named in inscriptions. The seasonal anniversaries must necessarily belong to the fixed year. On comparing the Sallier papyrus (of the age of Ramses II. or a little earlier) with the Ptolemaic lists, we find not a single festival or event attached to the same day in these earlier and later calendars.

That the festivals were attached to the fixed year is shown by six entries in the earlier and later calendars. We here divide the months by Roman numerals, I. to XII. for Thoth to Meseor, so as to read the intervals more readily:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Sallier</th>
<th>Ptolemaic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>II.</td>
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<td>XI.</td>
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<td>XII.</td>
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</table>

Excepting in Plutarch, who wrote later than the Ptolemaic calendars, the interval between the early and late lists is 304 days; and this shift of the calendar on the seasons would occupy about 1256 years. The date on which the Eshen calendar was compiled is fixed by the New Year feast, of the fixed year by Sothis, falling on 26 X., which occurred in 138 B.C. The date of the Sallier calendar is, therefore, 1255 years earlier, or 1308 B.C.; and this agrees well with its having the name of Ramses II. scribbled on the back of it, as he began to reign 1390 B.C. Hence for any connected view of the calendar it is needless to compare the dates of the shifting months into fixed days of the year, corresponding with the epoch of the calendar. To compile a detailed religious calendar would be beyond the scope of this article, but the principle of fixed dates is here stated, as it has not yet been published.

We will now state the nature of the religious events which were notified in the calendars. The principal classes are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Sallier</th>
<th>Ptolemaic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Festivals and myths of gods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events of the visit of gods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor gods and myths</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local worship</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

17. Lucky and unlucky days.—Personal directions are given only in the Sallier papyrus. Originally every day was noted as favourable, auspicious, or cautionary, or some days of mixed character. Of these 223 remain, and there are also applied to these days 96 general directions as to going out or beholding things, 54 specific directions as to acts, and 15 prognostications of the course of life in manner of death, from birth on a given day. As Chabas shows, these direc-
tions are similar to the directions for action on different days of the month given by Hesiód, the list of unlucky ‘Egyptian days’ observed in Rome in the time of Constantine—25 in all—and the list of unlucky Jewish days stated by Sallustius—24 in all. It might be expected that the bad ‘Egyptian days’ of the Romans would be the same as among the Egyptians. On a comparison of the lists, the only adjustment of calendars which yields a continuous connexion is from 18 Makhir to 25 Pharramthi, coinciding with the unlucky days 25th Feb. to 3rd May. This also is exactly the connexion between the calendars of Ramses and those of Constantine. The break between Paganism and Christianity has swept away nearly all traces of connexion. The Coptic calendar is mainly seasonal, and very seldom mentions the luck of a day. There are, however, a few days which remained fixed, and the Christian calendar has retained both the Ramesside and the Coptic calendars; and the intervals between these appear to be connected.

As these days in the Sallier calendar are connected with other evil events, they must have belonged to the fixed year, like the rest; hence it is difficult to see how a shifting calendar could have transported them 220 days. If it be so, then, these fixed seasons must have become attached to the shifting calendar in 434 B.C. and have been carried on with it till its arrest in 30 B.C.; since then they have been shifted and the difference between old and new style. The dates mentioned in the myth of Horus of Edfû do not in any way agree with the Edû or other calendars.

18. General feasts.—The seasonal dates of the feasts which are found in any two calendars, and which were, therefore, general, may be taken as within a day of the following:

| Feat of Sokar | Jan. 15 |
| Feast of the Dead | Jan. 19 |
| Feast of the Strong | Mar. 11 |
| Feast of Ptah | Apr. 9 |
| Feast of Horus | Apr. 11 |
| Birth of Horus | May 23 |
| Going forth of Isis | Oct. 1 |
| Feast of Shu | Nov. 13 |
| Feast of Osiris | Nov. 27 |
| Isis and Nebthu weeping | Dec. 8 |

IV. FUNERARY RELIGION.—19. Cause of its prominence.—The funerary branch of the religion has become better known than any other, owing to the prominence of the tombs among the other remains. This is merely a casual prominence due to the Nile deposits. The laying down of ten to twenty feet of mud over the river-valley since the flourishing days of the town has covered the remains of daily life almost entirely; only a few small towns on the desert, or the later parts of the cities which were built high up on their mounds, have remained exposed. By far the greater part of the dwellings and buildings have passed under the Nile soil and the advancing water-level, while the cemeteries, being on the desert edge, have most of them disappeared as well as all. Hence the disproportion in which we view the Egyptians, as being more concerned with death than with life. Probably the Egyptian saw and thought much less about his forefathers' graves, miles away, than the modern rustic does who walks through the graveyard every Sunday.

20. Its importance.—The tomb was essentially the house of the dead, where the soul would live; and the intrinsic fact which has made the Egyptian tombs so important to us is the custom of representing the ordinary course of life in sculpture and painting on the walls of the funerary chapel, in order to gratify the deceased with the pleasures of life. No other people except the Etruscans and the early Chinese have thus recorded their civilizations. This significance of some of this work must not, however, be put down as entirely for the dead. The great halls cut in the rock which astonish us at Syut or Beni Hasan were already in use as early as the 7th dynasty, when houses were built over tombs, and the first pyramid at Saqqâra dates from the 6th dynasty. The earlier pyramids were enclosed, and were covered with a great stone chosen to build the palaces of the living down in the Nile plain. It needed but little labour and device to cut the quarry so as to serve for the tomb, and the painting of its walls was a trilling work compared with the excavation.

21. Reason of offerings.—An essential question is whether the provision for the dead depended on fear or on love; was it for to prevent the ghost's returning or to gratify it? Both; for we view Egyptian customs as akin to those of the Troglodytes, who bound the body round from neck to legs, and then threw stones on it with laughter and rejoicing (Strabo, vi. 4. 17). On the contrary, as we see, from the 7th dynasty onward, that weapons were placed by the dead, which would arm them if they attacked the living; we find in the pre-historic times the skull frequently removed and subsequently placed with honour in the grave, as if it had been kept with affection, as it is among some races at present; the successors frequently visited the tomb and held feasts there; in Roman times the mummies were kept around the hall of the house; and to this day a widow may be seen going to her husband's tomb, removing a tile, and talking down a hole into the chamber. The treatment of the body, and the provision for it, all show no trace of repugnance or fear, but rather a continued respect and affection. We are bound, therefore, to look at the other offerings, of food and drink, of model houses and furniture, of ornaments and slaves, as equally dictated by a wish for the future happiness of the deceased.

22. Pre-historic ritual.—In the pre-historic age there was a fixed ritual of burial, which implies an equally fixed spread of belief. The use and efficacy of the funerary provision. The body was placed in a contracted position on the left side, the hips and knees bent, with the hands together before the face. The direction of the head to the south and the face to the west. The main classes of provision had each their regular place. The weapons were usually behind the back; the bag of meal and the slate and pebble for grinding it to paint the face, were before the face; the wavy-handled jar of ointment was at the head end; a small pointed jar stood at the feet; at either end of the grave beyond the body, or in a niche in its new life; Can we view Egyptian customs as akin to those of the Troglodytes, who bound the body round from neck to legs, and then threw stones on it with laughter and rejoicing (Strabo, vi. 4. 17). On the contrary, as we see, from the 7th dynasty onward, that weapons were placed by the dead, which would arm them if they attacked the living; we find in the pre-historic times the skull frequently removed and subsequently placed with honour in the grave, as if it had been kept with affection, as it is among some races at present; the successors frequently visited the tomb and held feasts there; in Roman times the mummies were kept around the hall of the house; and to this day a widow may be seen going to her husband's tomb, removing a tile, and talking down a hole into the chamber. The treatment of the body, and the provision for it, all show no trace of repugnance or fear, but rather a continued respect and affection. We are bound, therefore, to look at the other offerings, of food and drink, of model houses and furniture, of ornaments and slaves, as equally dictated by a wish for the future happiness of the deceased.

There was also an entirely different treatment of the body, often referred to in the oldest religions formulas of the Dynast, the mummy. The head was removed, the flesh taken off, the bones separated and cleaned, and then re-composed in right order, and the whole body put together again. This was supposed to purify the dead, and be fit to associate with the gods (see Gérèz, the Labyrinth, and Macquhench, 1912). The traces of these customs, which probably belonged to the Osirian worshippers at very remote times, are also found in a small ordination of the desert in historic times. The latest clear group, in the Vth dynasty, had one-third of the bodies partly dis-
membered, with the hands and feet cut off and laid on the stomach beneath the swathing of the body. The earliest graves were pits roofed over with poles and bushwood, so as to leave a chamber. Later a recess was made in the side of the pit to hold the body, and fenced across, as a tomb is. In the early dynasties a rock chamber was usual, later a brick shaft with a chamber at one side of it. Only in Christian times does the chamber seem to have been abandoned, and the open grave preferred. Under Isian, the chamber, with room for the corpse to sit up in it, is considered essential. Cf. artt. ANCESTROR-WORSHIP (Egyptian) and DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Egyptian).

23. The ‘ka.’—Before we can follow the different views of the future life, we must look at the beliefs on the nature of man. The earliest tombstones, those of the 1st dynasty, show the khu bird-like, that is to say, without the bird-like soul was then recognized the kha, the ‘glorious’ or ‘shining’ intelligence, as dwelling in the kau, the activities of sense and perception; both of these were the immediate centre of the soul, or material body. The idea of the kau is difficult to explain, as we have no equivalent. It was closely associated with the material body, as it had parts and feelings like the body. All funeral offerings were made to the kau. If any of the funerals in life were missed or neglected, it was said to be grievous to the kau; also the kau must not be needlessly annoyed. Here it seems to stand for the bodily perceptions and pleasures of the animal nature; it was the least physical force after death, although it retained consciousness and could visit other kau and converse with them. The kau could also enjoy the offerings and objects of life in representation; hence the great variety of funeral offerings, and the detail of the sculptures and paintings representing all the actions of daily life, the hunting in the desert, fishing on the river, beholding all the farm-yard, and the service of retainers, dancers, and musicians. A recent discovery adds to the complexity. Not only is the kau of the king represented as born as an infant at the same time, before the divinities of satisfaction in life were conceived, but the king holding a standard of ‘the king’s kau,’ but we even see the kau holding the feather fan and following the king on his throne. This suggests that the king’s kau may have had a separate physical body; and, as the Egyptian believed in horoscopes, so a child born at the same hour as the king would have the same fate, partake of the same soul, and was perhaps selected to accompany the king as his double and serve for life. One being might have many kau; Râ had 14 kau, Tahutemis I. was the first king to have more than one kau, and Ramses II. had 30. The kau being so far separate could be taken by the Semitic mind as the equivalent of the Semitic guardian angel—an idea entirely foreign to the Egyptian; and thus it comes that we find the Semitic king Khyan with the ‘goat’ as the beloved title by which he was addressed. Later this dedication of the kau proceeded, and on the sarcophagus of Panhemisis we read, ‘Thy kau is thy god, be parted not from thee, and so thy soul lived eternally’ (Bissing, Versuch . . . der Kau’s, 1911). It may be that the kau is the counterpart of the soul, the kau dwelling, and saving the soul. This comes fully into touch with the doctrine of the Logos in its development; they possess Logos only and not Mind (Peters, Rec. ii., London, 1880, p. 52) is the stage of the purely human soul as the kau.

Next, ‘Thou art being purified for the articulation of the Logos’ shows the Logos as a saving or Divine principle or the Logos, and not of the kau (ib. 93). The later growth was ‘The Logos is God’s likeness,’ and ‘The Logos that appeared from Mind is Son of God.’

24. The ‘ba.’ An entirely different pneumatology is that of the ba, which is the disembodied soul figured as a human-headed bird. This is associated with the tree-goddess of the cemetery; out of her great sycamore tree she pours drink and a food to feed the soul. In the early dynasties a rock chamber was usual, later a brick shaft with a chamber at one side of it. Only in Christian times does the chamber seem to have been abandoned, and the open grave preferred. Under Isian, the chamber, with room for the corpse to sit up in it, is considered essential. Cf. artt. ANCESTROR-WORSHIP (Egyptian) and DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Egyptian).

25. The ‘ab.’—Other concepts were also associated with man, though seldom with any further religious views. The most important of these was the ab, the will, and many Egyptian deities could not resist the least physical force after death, although it retained consciousness and could visit other kau and converse with them. The kau could also enjoy the offerings and objects of life in representation; hence the great variety of funeral offerings, and the detail of the sculptures and paintings representing all the actions of daily life, the hunting in the desert, fishing on the river, beholding all the farm-yard, and the service of retainers, dancers, and musicians. A recent discovery adds to the complexity. Not only is the kau of the king represented as born as an infant at the same time, before the divinities of satisfaction in life were conceived, but the king holding a standard of ‘the king’s kau,’ but we even see the kau holding the feather fan and following the king on his throne. This suggests that the king’s kau may have had a separate physical body; and, as the Egyptian believed in horoscopes, so a child born at the same hour as the king would have the same fate, partake of the same soul, and was perhaps selected to accompany the king as his double and serve for life. One being might have many kau; Râ had 14 kau, Tahutemis I. was the first king to have more than one kau, and Ramses II. had 30. The kau being so far separate could be taken by the Semitic mind as the equivalent of the Semitic guardian angel—an idea entirely foreign to the Egyptian; and thus it comes that we find the Semitic king Khyan with the ‘goat’ as the beloved title by which he was addressed. Later this dedication of the kau proceeded, and on the sarcophagus of Panhemisis we read, ‘Thy kau is thy god, be parted not from thee, and so thy soul lived eternally’ (Bissing, Versuch . . . der Kau’s, 1911). It may be that the kau is the counterpart of the soul, the kau dwelling, and saving the soul. This comes fully into touch with the doctrine of the Logos in its development; they possess Logos only and not Mind (Peters, Rec. ii., London, 1880, p. 52) is the stage of the purely human soul as the kau.

The ruling power of man, decision and determination, was separated by the theologians, who multiplied these divisions, and was called sekhem, the sign for which was a baton or sceptre. The shadow was also named a khouhet, for which the sign was a large fan used to shade the head.

26. The ‘ran.’—The essence of a name (ran) was very important, being the essential for true existence, both for animate and inanimate bodies. To possess the true name of a person gave power over its owner; without the name no magic or spell could affect him. A great myth, found in New Zealand as well as Egypt, is the gaining of the true name of the sun-god by stratagem, and so compelling him. Isis thus gained the two eyes of Ra—the sun and moon—for her son Horus. This importance of the name led in Egypt, as elsewhere, to the real name being avoided, the scribe giving some trivial name was currently used. On monuments it is usual, especially in the IVth and XXVIth dynasties, to find the ‘great name’ given, and also the common or ‘little name,’ the great name is often formed from that of a god or a king.
so as to place the person under divine protection in his future life.

27. The under-world.—The under world (Ermann, *Egyp. Rel.*, London, 1907, pp. 109-114), through which the soul had to pass, was divided into the twelve hours of night, so entirely was it associated with the sun's course. These twelve spaces or variously called fields or caverns, the latter idea of which will probably have been the sense of the sun going under the solid earth. Each space has a large population of gods, of spirits, and of the dead. The special goddess of each hour acted as guide, through that hour, to the tomb and company of gods. The first hour is said to be 800 miles long, till Ra reaches the gods of the under-world. The second hour is 2600 miles long. The third is as long, and here Osiris and his followers dwell. In the fourth and fifth hours dwells the ancient god of the dead, Sokar, and his darkness cannot be broken by Ra, the later god. 'Ra does not see who is therein.' Ra has his boat changed into a serpent, to crawl through the delitigible night sixth hour is the body of Osiris. In the seventh is the great serpent Apap—a tradition of the boa-constrictor. The flesh of Osiris is here enthroned, and his enemies lie beheaded or bound before him. Here also are the burial passages or the gods' and goddess' of the sun, Shed, and Tefnut, and others. In the ninth hour the rowers of the sun-boat land and rest. In the tenth a beetle alights by Ra. In the eleventh hour the ship's rope becomes a serpent, and the ship is dragged through a serpent nearly half a mile long, and, as it emerges, Ra becomes the beetle, the god of the morning—Khepera. It is notable that the Egyptian had even an exaggerated idea of the size of the earth, as that only 100 miles to each hour on the equator, while the hours of the under-world are reckoned as 2600 miles each. Another version of these ideas imposed great gates between the hours, each guarded by watchers and fiery serpents. Another form was that of the fields of Aalu, which had 18 or 21 gates, each guarded by evil genii, with long knives in their hands (Petrie, *Gizeh and Rifeh*, 1897, pls. xxxvi, D, E, F). Yet another idea was that of a great variety of roads, which had to be known to the soul, and for which an account of sixteen roads was placed upon the sarcophagus. Another chapter concerns elephants nets or snakes which have to be avenged. There was also a chapter for ensuring that the head should be restored to the body after it had been cut off in the early dismemberment usage. The text of this chapter is in the VIth dynasty (see Petrie, *Denderah*, 57 f.).

28. The 'ba' in the cemetery.—The Egyptian beliefs regarding the future life were very incongruous, and various elements were mingled, regardless of their consistency or relative possibility. Many of these beliefs still survive in Egypt, in spite of Christianity and Islam. In Middle Egypt there is still a custom of placing jars of water and plates of food in the tomb, though it is considered as likely that only by casual inquiry can this be learned. In one case a mattress was put beneath the dead; but it was said that on no account was any metal put in the tomb. This survival of the belief in the resurrection shows us how easily it continued to be held throughout Egypt, with the later dogmas of the kingdom of Osiris and company of Ra.

The soul then was thought of as a human-headed bird, the ba, flying in and out of the tomb. It required access to the food provided for it, which was stored in, or around, the chamber. In the pre-historic times, graves were placed close round the body. When the larger tombs of the earliest kings were developed, the body was enclosed in a wooden chamber of beams, and the offerings were placed round the body. The periods subdivided into a line of store chambers, which were later built of brick. Jars of wine, water, corn, grapes, and other food were provided by the hundred; hoardens and heads of oxen, trussed geese, cakes, dates, pomegranates, all abounded; chambers full of knives and weapons, for hunting and for fighting, succeeded to the flint-knife and mace-head of the earlier years; while finely wrought stone dishes and bowls of the most beautiful materials, including also the rare copper, were stored for the table service. The servitors were all quickly buried to go with their king to the underworld; the body in the tomb-chambers to dry before they were sacrificed and placed in rows around the great tomb.

The soul required a way of access to its provision and to the outer air. In some large tombs of the IVth dynasty, Khepera, Shu, and Shed, the ground surface was overlaid by the mastaba; in this was placed a row of model granaries of mud, extending for ten or fifteen feet, and a little passage a few inches square led from the tomb-pit to this gallery of provisions. In tombs of the Vth dynasty a similar little opening is provided from the tomb-shaft out to the funeral chapel. In later times other provision was portrayed, though the idea was probably older than that described. The great shady acamore trees which stood over the cemetery were looked on as the house of a kindly goddess, who was later identified as a Hathor. She provided food and drink for the wandering souls, and is shown looking out of her tree, pouring from her vase and dropping cakes from her tray to feed the ba before her.

29. The 'ka' and its imagery.—A different and less material view of the soul arose, and in place of a human-headed bird it was thought of as the ka, or will and consciousness of the person, coinciding with the sensations of the body, and therefore filling exactly the same form, but incorporeal. As the body had a ka, so all animals had kæs, as they also felt; but everything that existed was by a feeling of Animism endowed likewise with a ka. Proceeding from this, it is fæs world, and it is to be contained, and in the full sense a duplicate of the corporeal world in which it resided. Hence the ka could enjoy the models of food which contained the kæs of the food; it could enjoy the figures of men and animals, as it had enjoyed the corporeal forms when in the body. A whole world of imagery could thus be provided for the life of the ka; and that it was intended for this conception is shown by every part of it being to be for the ka of so-and-so. The life-like statues were for the ka to dwell in, that it might not wander disembodied; the more closely like life, and the more the clear eye glitteretl and the mouth seemed ready to speak, the happier the ka. The same was in the wider doctrine of the ka was, therefore, the great inspiration of Egyptian art.

Both of these views of the future life are so entirely founded on the immediate touch, or connexion with any god, that it seems difficult to suppose that they arose along with belief in any great Divinity. They seem to belong entirely to an animistic world, and to be, therefore, the belief older than any of the theories which entered Egypt. The idea of the immortality of the soul seems older than any belief in a Superior Being
To accompany women there are sometimes pottery figures of girls without clothing, in forms like those of men, but nude. These have an older woman robed to oversee them, as the male figures have often an overseer dressed in a waistcloth or robe. The number of the figures varies, but in the most complete tombs of the Saites and 400 was the regular supply; sometimes there is one overseer to each ten workers. The name *ubabti* is usually understood as an ‘answerer’ who responds to the need; it is difficult to explain, in the shorter form *ubati*, as referring to the figures being made of sycamore wood. The history of the changes of form and material hardly belongs to the religion.

In Greek times, after these figures ceased to be made, it was usual to write that a deceased man had ‘gone to Osiris’ in such a year of his age.

33. The fellowship of *Rā*—Another complete theology of the future was connected with the sun-worship of *Rā* and the gods associated with him. This was bound up with the soul’s going to the west, and probably Khentamenti, ‘he who in the west,’ was a god of the dead in this system. Certainly in the fifteenth dynasty Osiris was worshipped there, and Abydos was the place specially where the desert valley in the west led to the abode of the dead. In the dark world of the dead there were no sky, sun, moon, stars or trees; but the necessity protection could be avoided; and the necessary protection could be obtained by joining the boat of the sun, and so being safely led through the successive gates of the hours guarded by the evil spirits. The dead is figured sometimes as just entering the boat and approaching the company of the gods who sail with *Rā* through the hours of day and night. In order to enable the dead to reach the boat of the sun, it was needful that he had been provided with food, drink, and одежда and interceded in its daily round. Hence a model boat with a crew upon it was provided in the tomb, especially in the Vth-XXIst dynasties. It had all the fittings—a sail for going up the Nile, and oars for rowing down—or sometimes two boats were differently rigged according to their direction; a peg for tying up at the shore, a mallet to drive the peg, and a landing plank were also provided.

34. The mummy and amulets.—In none of these views—of the *bt*, the *ka*, the Osirian or the Rā company—has the material body any part. These views were probably all formed before historic times, and even in later Osirian systems, arising about the end of the IIIrd dynasty, a system of mummifying. Before that the body was often perfectly dried in the soil, but not artificially dried. This embalming; therefore, was apart from all the views which we have described. It developed another system—that of protective amulets. In the Vth dynasty we find strings of amulets of carnelian or ivory placed around the wrists and the neck. The most usual forms are the jackal head, lion head, frog, bee, clenched hand, open hand, leg, *wzj* eye, and scarab. After this age the amuletes diminished, and in the XVIIIth-XXIst dynasties only one or two glazed figures of gods were used. With the XXVIIth dynasty there burst out an enormous development of the system. Figures of the gods in glazed pottery or faience, *uzj* eyes, and scarabs in all stones and materials, rarely gold *bt* birds with inlaid wings, and gold seal rings, were arranged in rows upon the body, often fifty or more figures in all. By Ptolemiac times the amuletes were larger and coarsely made in blue pottery, and they seem to have been entirely before Roman times (cf. art. CHARMS AND AMULETS [Egyptian]).

This elaborate armoury of amulets was designed to preserve the body from being attacked or broken down, and to ensure that it should remain complete for the habitation of the *ka*. This preservation of...
the body led to an entire reversal of the older ideas. In all the dynastic ages the construction of a costly tomb for the dead was quite as needful as the preparation of the corpse. In the Roman age however, the coffin was enamelled and very elaborately wrapped, often with a portrait over the face, and then kept for many years in the house, after which it was roughly buried, without any care, in the cemetery.

V. THEOLOGY. — 35. Animal-worship. — In considering the worship of the gods, we shall endeavour to separate the successive stages which have ruled in Egypt. Maspero has pointed out how the jackal-worship predominated at Thinis before the rise of the jackal-headed Khentamenti, or the still later Osiris-worship, at Abydos. He notes also how the Osirian conception of the fields of Aaru is earlier than the solar view in the Book of Knowing Duet, or the under world. From such traces of the growth of the theology, and the proofs of independence of the sources of the gods, shown by their compounded names, we arrive at the historical view of the successive strata of the theology. We have: (1) the pure animal-worship; (2) the animal-headed gods with human bodies; (3) the human gods of the Osiris cycle; (4) the cosmic gods of the Ra cycle; (5) the god-worship (deified); (6) the gods brought in from foreign sources, and not originally belonging to a part of the Egyptian population.

The animal-worship is based on two main ideas: (1) The sanctity of one species of animal to one tribe; (2) the sacramental eating of an example of the sacred animal at stated intervals. That the whole of a species was sacred among a tribe is shown by the penalties for killing any animal of the species, by the wholesale burial and even the mumification of every example; and by the plural form of the names of the gods who were later connected with the animals, such as Heka, ‘hawks’; Khnum, ‘rams’; Hau, ‘birds’.

The sacramental slaying or eating is known in the case of the bull at Memphis (Mariette, Le Strapathe de Memphis, Paris, 1882, pp. 11, 14, 16) and the ram at Thebes (Herodotus, ii. 42). From that appears to have sprung the keeping of an example of the sacred animal. It is well known that, in countries where human sacrifices were offered, it was usual as a compensatory measure to keep the victim for a long time—for such as a year—in the greatest indulgence and luxury, and to deny him no pleasures. This principle naturally resulted in keeping the sacred animal which was destined to be sacramentally eaten, and feeding and honouring it as a god. The keeping of a sacred animal will not account for its being consumed, rather the contrary; but the intended sacrament on the animal will be ample reason for keeping it with all honour. Hence we seem bound to accept the sacrament as the primary idea: the tribe needed at intervals to unify itself with its sacred species by absorbing the animal as a whole, like the Norse burial of portions of a king in the fields to ensure their prosperity and fertility.

36. Sacred animals. — The sacred animals whose local worship is known have obvious qualities for them they might have been selected; but whether those qualities were the sole cause of their celebrity or whether the tribe had a totemistic belief in its connexion with the animals is difficult to determine. The only species which was honoured by one tribe does not prove a belief in a connexion, because the earliest stage of totemic belief has similarly only one god for one tribe. So far as this evidence goes, the animal species was just as much the later god to the tribe. Nor does the use of the figure of an animal as a standard prove a totemistic connexion, as many of the names had standards which were revered—such as the crook and flail at Heliopolis, or the mace at Memphis—but which could hardly be regarded as gods of the people. The principle of reverence sufficiently accounts for the standards without supposing any closer connexion in some cases.

The baboon was adored as the emblem of wisdom, and of Tahuti, the god of wisdom. The appearance and ways of the baboon naturally originated this belief. Four baboons were kept as sacred in the temple at Hermopolis; they are often represented as adored, from their habit of chattering at sunrise. Figures of the baboon abound in the 1st dynasty at Abydos.

The lion and lioness are found in the pre-historic figures, and in later amulets, but are not shown on monuments or with names. Their goddesses with the head of a lioness are named as Sekhmet of Memphis and Nubia; Bast of Bubastis, Leontopolis, Tell el-Yehmilyeh, and Letopolis; Maex of Nubia; and Tatenen, or Elephantine, and Nubia. The spirit of the peak of Thebes—or Mert-seker—is also said to ‘strike as a fascinating lion.’ The destructive power of Ra, the sun, was personified as the lioness of Sekhmet, who comes from the Herakleopolis to Heliopolis, at the bidding of Ra.

The lesser felidæ were also reverenced. In Sini the chestah and serval are figured as being sacred to Hathor. The cat was sacred to Bast, especially at Bubastis and Speos Antonidus, where Bast was equated with Artemis the hunter. The cat was also sacred to Mut, probably reverenced as a maternal emblem, at Thebes. The intensity of the popular veneration of animals, even in the latest times, is shown by the well-known story of the fanatical mob tearing a Roman soldier to pieces for killing a cat.

The bull was worshipped mainly in the Delta, where four nomes used it as a standard. The four bull-gods most recorded are: (1) Hapi, or Apis, of Memphis, whose temple lay south of that of Ptah; (2) Urmor, or Mnevis, of Heliopolis, which was a more massive breed; (3) Ka-nub, or Ramose, from whom the city was named; and (4) Bakis, or Bakh, of Hermomithis. These bulls were later connected with the gods who were worshipped at those cities. In the incarnation of Ptah, and also of Osiris as Osir-hapi; Ra was incarnate in Mnevis, and Mentu in Bakis; but these are evidently syncretic adaptations of rival worship.

The cow was apparently not as venerated (in India) except as an emblem of Hathor. Probably from her source as the cow-goddess, the horned Ashatroth, the Ishtar of Semitic origin.

The ram was also worshipped as a procreative god; at Memphis in the Delta he was later identified with Osiris; both there and at Herakleopolis he became Hershefi—the chief chief; at Thebes he became Amon, and was specially the emblem of Amon. Of all the castrated deities, Amon was Khnum the creator. This diversity of connexion of the ram proves how his earlier worship was independent of the later gods. The burial-places and sarcophagi of the sacred rams have been found at Memphis and at Elephantine.

The Hippopotamus was called ‘the great one,’ Taurt, and always remained an entirely animal-god, never partly humanized. She was the patroness of the sanctuary of the Egyptian ‘great one’ appears in connexion with Set, probably from its devastation of crops, and thus it was theogonized as Taurt, wife of Set. No local worship or temple of Taurt is known.

The jackal was the god of the dead, owing to his haunting the cemeteries and the Western desert where the soul was supposed to pass. At
Memphis he was described as 'on his hill' of the desert, and received later the name of Anpu, and a place in the Osirian family. At Asyut he was regarded as the god of flowers in the desert, for the jackal-paths are the best guides, avoiding the valleys and precipices; thus he could guide the soul to the blessed West, and was called the 'opening ways of the West'. Opo-tef, and later on Osiris, was entitled 'the who is in the Osis'. At Abydos he was called 'he who is in the West,' Khentamenti; and is later shown as a jackal-headed human figure seated on the judgment-seat of the future world. There is preserved in the pre-historic age, buried with the dead, and sometimes in special tombs of dogs; but we cannot say how far this was a part of the general canine worship, which was later confined to the wild species.

The ichneumon, or mongoose, was sacred at Herakleopolis; and was in antagonism to the neighbouring worship of the Fayyum crocodile, as it fed on the beast's eggs.

The shen-mouse was sacred at Buto and Athribis, and also embalmed at Thebes.

Of birds, the hawk was that mainly adored, almost entirely in Upper Egypt. The hawk Bubastis, worshiped at Sais, another hawk at Hierakopolis near el-Kab; two hawks were the standard of Koptos, and the names of Hierakopolis just south of Thebes and opposite Asyut show. The vulture was later identified with Horus and with Ra, who are shown in that form. The hawk was also a god of the dead in a mummiﬁed form, as the god Sokar of Memphis. It is shown in a boat which is rowed by human hands; these may perhaps be the deceased kings, as the king's soul was believed to fly up as a hawk to heaven (Sanchebat). The mummy hawk was also venerated in the region of Snef, being the emblem of Sopte, god of the East, found in Goshen and in Sinai.

The vulture was the emblem of maternity, worshipped mainly at Thebes, where the idea was later embodied as a mother-goddess, Mut. The vulture head-dress was worn by the queen-mother; and the vulture is represented spread out for protection over the king, and across the passages of the tombs to protect the soul. The vulture Nebheb was also the goddess of the southern kingdom, centred at Hierakopolis, and was used to the latest times as the emblem of the southern dominion, as the serpent of Uazet was of the northern.

The crocodile was often adored to be adored at Thebes down to the XVIIIth dynasty, as is shown on tablets; the goose was then connected with Amon.

The isis was identiﬁed with Tahuti, the god of wisdom, at Hermopolis, probably from its habit of searching and examining the ground for food. It was also mummiﬁed at Memphis, Abydos, and Thebes.

The crocodile ﬂourished especially in the marshy levels of the great lake of the Fayyum, and was worshipped as the god of the province. In later times it was here united with Osiris and with Ra. It was also worshipped at Onophas in the Delta, and at Nubti, or Onub, where it was united with Set. The men of the neighbouring city of Tentyra carried on a tribal warfare against this god of the next-nest, as depicted by an emblem (Stt. xv. 25 ff.).

The frog was an emblem of multifarious or reproduction, and of Heqet, the goddess who assisted at birth; but there is no trace of its being worshipped, though it was a frequent amulet in the pre-historic and early historic periods.

The cobra serpent was much reverenced in pre-historic times, when it appears coiled up as a house amulet to hang up, or as a necklace amulet, or coiled round a stick, or in pairs twisted together, or curled round the heath or a pottery fender. The great pyramids are shown in the mythological serpent Apep, and combined in the serpent-necked crocodile. For the desert, the cobra-headed god Apop was entitled 'the who is in the Osis.' The uraeus, or cobra with expanded hood, became the emblem of judgment and death, and appears on the cornice of the judgment-hall and on the royal head-dress. Uazet was later the uraeus, or cobra with expanded hood, which was the uraeus, or cobra with expanded hood, became the emblem of the temple of Anthropos in the XVIIIth dynasty. Serpents were commonly mummiﬁed, and even a bone or two were encased in bronze, with a future ﬁgure of the top, in the XXVth-XXXth dynasties. The serpent was looked on as the 'Agathodaimon' of the house of Ptolomaic and Gnostic beliefs. Serapis and Isis were identiﬁed with serpents, and bracelets or ringers ending in two uraei were common ornaments. Serapis also is ﬁgured as a human-headed uraeus on the popular terra-cottas for domestic use. Three goddesses were in the form of the uraeus: Uazet, worshipped at Buto in the Delta, and the symbol of the northern kingdom; Mert-saeker, 'the lover of silence,' the goddess of the dead at Thebes, supposed to reside on the peak of Thebes; and Renenut, the harvest-goddess, daughter of Ptah, was shown in the left in the last patch of corn in the harvest-ﬁeld.

Several gods were sacred: the Ozyrhynchus at the city named after it, now Beheima; the es, or Thugres, at Padies, and above; the Lepidotis at Nekhebt; the Lepidotis at Lopolis; the Lepidotis at various places.

37. Animal-headed gods.—The animal-headed gods form a distinct class, as—with the exception of Horus—they are found only in this form and never with human heads. They appear to belong to the earliest theologic stage, when gods with human qualities were introduced, and blended with the earlier animal-worship. The habit of combination of forms was already usual in the close of the pre-historic age, before any ﬁgures of gods that we know. On the slate plates are compounded animal ﬁgures and human-animal ﬁgures, with habitual symbolism of standards of tribes acting as the tribes, in ﬁghting or holding captives. The animal-headed gods are less violent in symbolism than the ﬁgures which were already usual. The earliest ﬁgure of such a god is on the seals of the IVth dynasty.

Khuemu, the creator, bears the head of the ram; and the long twisted horns of the ram are often attached to the head-dress of the kings who became Osiris, as showing their creative functions. Khuemu was especially the god of the eunuch; he is represented seated as a potter and framing man on the potter's wheel. Besides his local importance he was greatly thought of in later times, when the amulets of his standing ﬁgure are often found on mummies.

Hershefi, another ram-headed god, was purely local, and is not found outside the region of Herakleopolis, except at Mendes.

Sekhmet, the lioness-goddess, represented the fierceness of the sun's heat; she is the agent of the wrath of Ra in the myth of the destruction of mankind. Her statues are common, especially at Thebes, where hundreds of them adorned the temples. She was worshipped at Memphis, where she became the consort of Pah. Bubastis had a female cat-god; but it is diﬃcult, without names, to distinguish her ﬁgures from Sekhmet. She represented the ardor not of heat, but of animal passion, and her festivals at her city of Bubastis were celebrated in the VIIIth dynasty.

Her name is found in prie-sthalls of the early Pyramid age, but her great period was during the political ascendancy of her city under the Shishakk. As a cat-goddess, she was also the patroness of hunt-
ing, and so became identified by the Greeks with Artemis. 

Anpu, or Anubis, was the jackal-guardian of the cemetery, and the guide of the dead. His figures when acting are always human, with a jackal head, and he is sometimes shown entering the dead into the judgment of Osiris, or bending over the bier attending to the mummy. His statuettes were often placed on mummies. On the other hand, not all mummies were entitled to Anubis any known; but he passed into the Roman adaptations from Egypt, and is figured on the Gnostic gems.

Set, or Sekh, was the god of the prehistoric inhabitants, and probably one with the Asiatic god who appears as Sutekh of the Hittites—an illustration of the Asiatic origin of the second prehistoric culture in Egypt. He is shown in the Hittite dynasty and at various later times in an entirely animal form, but, when associated with other gods, in a human figure with animal head. What animal is intended is uncertain; the body form is most like a greyhound, but the peculiar upright tail with a tuft at the end is like that of the wart-hog. We have the okapi, etc., also been made. Possibly the original form was lost to the Egyptians, and conventional changes hide it. At first the god of the Fayyum was represented as a crocodile, later as the baboon, after a long struggle, by the followers of Horus. Set yet retained some adoration in the Book of the Dead and in calendrical feasts. The two were worshipped on an equal footing by the last king of the Hittite dynasty. After suppression, Set appears again favoured in the early XVIIIth dynasty; and in the XIXth the kings Seti I and II were even named after him. In later times the great popularity of Horus led to Set being entirely suppressed, and looked on solely as the evil spirit. Sekh, or Sobk, or Souchis, rarely appears, being only a local god. Statues of the human figure with a crocodile head were in the Labyrinth of the Fayyum in the XIIth dynasty. Rarely the converse is shown, and a crocodile with a human head, as Sekhot-Osiris, appears as the Fayyum god of the dead.

Seti, or Thoth, appears with the head of the ibis, never that of the baboon; but both animals were equally used as his emblems in all periods. He is seldom figured alone, but is usual in groups of gods as the herald of the judgment, and as performing rites over the body of the deceased. He was especially the patron of scribes, but was not worshipped in temples, except at his cities of Hermopolis in Upper Egypt and in the Delta.

Men'et was the hawk-god of the region from Kns to Gebalayn, but was later restricted to Hermouthis when Amon became the god of Thebes.

Hor, or Horus, was the hawk-god of Upper Egypt, especially of Edfu and Hierakonpolis. This form, with a human body and hawk head, was that of the concomber of Set; the entire hawk form is not found associated with other gods, and the purely human form appears only as the son of Isis. The hawk-herons with the head of the crocodile, etc., have also been made. By the followers of Horus, is so represented as a Roman warrior on horseback slaying a dragon—the prototype of St. George. The figure of Hor, or Horus, from the Osirian cycle is that of Hor-ur, Horus the elder, as a tribal god before being merged in the Osirian family.


The human gods belong to two great groups—the Osirian family and the Amon family, besides the goddess Neith. These are marked off by not adopting animal forms, or being cosmic or Nature gods, or representing single abstract ideas.

(a) Aset, or Osiris, though so familiar to us, is mainly known from late sources, which were modified by other ideas. In the Book of the Dead, the Osirian portions are earlier than the solar portions, yet both are so early that they are mingled in the Pyramid texts. We cannot doubt that the Osiris worship arose in the pre-historic age; the oldest evidence of Osiris, however, is in the Nineteenth Dynasty. In the early Pyramid age, Anubis only is named in the funeral-formula, but in the Vth dynasty Osiris takes his place. In the earlier dynasties only kings were entitled to Anubis as a god; in the New Kingdom, in the Sed festival; but in the XVIIIth dynasty, and later, every deceased person was entitled the 'Osiris,' as having been united to the god. Neither at Abydos nor at Philae is Osiris named on the earlier monuments, although in later times he was especially the god of both places. It seems that the extent of Osiris-worship was growing throughout the historic period; this may be due to Osiris gradually regaining an earlier position, from which he had been ousted by the new gods of invaders.

The myth of Osiris is preserved in its late form by Ptolemy; the main outlines, which may be primitive, are as follows. Osiris was a civilizing king of Egypt, as priest, until in Roman times his Set and seventy-two conspirators. Isis, his wife, found the coffin of Osiris at Byblos in Syria, and brought it to Egypt. Set tore up the body of Osiris and scattered it, and Isis restored it, and built a shrine over each of them. Isis and Horus then attacked Set and drove him from Egypt, and finally drove the Red Sea.

Another view of Osiris is that of a god of fertility (see Frazer, Anat. Attis, Osiris, 1897, p. 283). He is represented as lying surrounded with green plants and sprouting corn, and his figures were made full of corn. This was probably a view resulting from Isis being the ever-living god of the dead, who might be regarded as the source of returning life. The division of his body into fourteen or more parts, each buried in a different nome, appears to belong to the idea of dividing a body of a king or great man, and burying portions in various places to ensure the fertility of the land. For lists of the Osirises and places, see Petrie, Historical Studies, pl. vii.

Aset, or Isis, was originally an independent goddess, but by political changes she became united with the Osiris myth, as the sister and wife of Osiris. Her worship was far more popular than that of Osiris. Persons were more often named after her, and as a god of learning, he was specially the patron of scribes, but was not worshipped in temples, except at his cities of Hermopolis in Upper Egypt and in the Delta.

Nebhath, or Nephthys, is placed as the sister of Osiris and Isis, but is figured as only a complementary second to Isis. Yet she was worshipped at Letopolis, Edfu, Diosopolis Parva, Denderah, and the Iseum. This worship and her name—Neb-hath, or Neb-het, or Neb-hetet, or Neb-het—seem to show that she was originally a more important consort of Osiris, who was pushed aside by the amalgamation of the Isis-worship in the group. She usually appears opposite to Isis, in the same attitude, mourning over Osiris.
Horus, or Heru, Herus, is a most complex divinity, in the various worship which were united together, and in the different aspects under which he became popular. The different alliances of tribes at various times led to three human forms: (1) the greater Horus, i.e., that Horus who is the god of Leviticus, portrayed the older than the rest of the group; (2) Horus, son of Osiris, avenger of his father; (3) Horus, the child, Har-pekhty, Harpocrates, son of Isis.

(1) Her-nw was the son of Hathor, whose name, the child of Horus, was Horus, that she bears her position largely from her son. He was specially the god of Lotetopolis, north of Memphis, also worshipped at an upper centre of Hathor-cult, the cities of Denderah, Qas, and Nubti, and in the Fayyum. (2) Horus, son of Osiris, the 'avenger of his father, usually hawk-headed, spearing the evil crocodile, trampling on Set, driving his party out of Egypt, establishing smithies of his band of shemu, or followers, and, lastly, attendant on Osiris in the judgment. He was also Hor-sam-taui, 'Horus, master of both lands,' as conquering Egypt, from the Set party. (3) The most popular form of Horus is as a child, seated, with long golden hair, of Isis and Horus are known from the IVth dynasty, but the great spread of this form was in the later times of the XXVIIth dynasty, and on to Christian times. We find Horus, in the stereotyped figures of Isis and Horus, as representing the god, as a child, seated in Indian attitudes, point to a connexion. Horus, as an infant carried by Isis, or being suckled by her, is the most general late type, continued till the 4th or 5th century. The absorption of this type, as an entirely new motif, into Christian art and thought took place under the influence of Cyril of Alexandria, by whom Mary was proclaimed as Mother of God in A.D. 431. Henceforward these figures are not of Isis and Horus, but of the Madonna and Child.

(b) The Theban triad were also entirely human, without any animal connexion until later times. Amon was the local god of Karnak. He was probably closely connected with the god of the neighbouring desert of Koptos; and a late legend points to Min being the earlier and Amon being a variant, as Isis is said to have divided the legs of Amon, who could not walk before, but had his legs welded together. (Ptolemy, xxxii. 120.) Min is always shown with the legs joined, Amon with the legs parted. Moreover, Amon is often shown in the Ibyphallic form of Min. Had the princes of Thebes not risen to general dominion, probably Amon would have been as little known as many other local gods; but the rise of the XIth and XIIth dynasties brought Amon forward as a national god; and the XVIIIth dynasty from Nebia, holding Thebes as its capital, entailed that Amon became the great god of the most important age of Egypt—the XXVIIth—XXVIIIth dynasties. He thus became united with Ptah of Heliopolis, the greatest god of the Delta; and Min is the motif because the figure-head of Egyptian religion, king of the gods, and 'lord of the thrones of the earth.' Important as Amon was, he was never intruded upon the machinery of the Egyptian temple. He was not a god of the desert, nor in Nubia. A special feature of his worship was the devotion of the queens of the XXVIIth dynasty and onward to the XXVIIIth. The queen was his high priestess; and, as such, Amon (personated by the king) was her husband, and father of her children, who were consecrated from birth by this divine paternity. The temple of Deir el-Bahri portrays the divine consort of Horus. Her name was Luqoser the divine birth of Amonhotep III. The family of high priests next married the royal heiress, and became the priest-kings of the XXIst dynasty. In the XXVIIth dynasty, the line of high priestesses of the Ethiopian family was in possession of Thebes, but the Memphis kings never married them, but required them to adopt a daughter of the king. Thus the high priesthood was carried on in a fictitious line. In Ethiopia, where Amon was the national god, the high priestess was always the daughter of one king, and wife of the next in unbroken female succession; during the Ethiopian rule of Egypt, a second high priestess also ruled at Thebes. The ram, which was the sacred animal of Thebes, was worshipped in combination with Amon by the Ethiopians, and Amon appears with a ram's head at Napata and Naga.

The ram was also used in the Ethiopian dynasty (XXVth), and ram-headed scarabs are usual at that time. Mut was the goddess of Thebes, probably even before Amon rose to the front; before Amon was, the god Horus, trampling on crocodiles, and grasping serpents, scorpions, and noxious animals. This was a type commonly carved in relief on tablets to be placed as annulets in the house, and covered with long golden hair. The infant Horus also appears seated on a lotus-flower; but it is doubtful if this arose in Egypt before the type of Buddha, jewel in the lotus, might have been imported. Figures of Horus the child, seated in Indian attitudes, point to a connexion. Horus, as an infant carried by Isis, or being suckled by her, is the most general late type, continued till the 4th or 5th century. The absorption of this type, as an entirely new motif, into Christian art and thought took place under the influence of Cyril of Alexandria, by whom Mary was proclaimed as Mother of God in A.D. 431. Henceforward these figures are not of Isis and Horus, but of the Madonna and Child.

(c) Neit.—This goddess was always represented in entirely human form, holding bow and arrows, and bearing up the head closed arrows or shuttle. There is, however, no trace of her being connected with weaving, and it has been supposed that the shuttle was only a mistake of the Egyptians in later times, the primitive form being a long package crossed by two arrows (see Petrie, Egyptian Tombs, 1900, i. front.). The package might well be the skin of an animal rolled up, as in the sign shed, and so the whole might belong to a goddess of hunting. In later times the shuttle with thread upon it is clearly used for the name of the god. Neit was the most popular divinity in the 1st dynasty, queen being named Neit-hetep and Mer-neit, and many private persons also used the name. She was probably a goddess of the earliest Libyan population, and was the special divinity of the later Libyan invaders of the XXVIIth dynasty at their capital Sais. During the Pyramid period the priesthood of her temple was most usual; and the XIXth dynasty her emblem is shown as the tatu mark on the Libyan figures. She was worshipped only in the Delta, at Sais Athis Phara and Zar (Slenenmyctos), except in the Ptolemaic temple of Esne.
Aten, the sun-god, was specially worshipped at Heliopolis, and, when that older centre rose again above the invasion of the earlier dynasties and the mystery of the star, each king took a name upon accession which embodied a quality of Ra, in much the same Semitic style as the 99 names of Allah. Every king of Egypt afterwards had a Ra-name, such as Ra-nes-hen-k, 'Ra establishes the kow'; Ra-achet-pab, 'Ra satisfies the heart'; Ra-neb-nant, 'Ra is the lord of truth.' Ra was thus more constantly recognized than any other god, yet he has no temples in the great centres; beyond his own city of Heliopolis he is named only in connexion with Babylon in the same nome, at Xos in the Delta, and at Edfu, owing to his union with the hawk-god. He was, however, united with Amon, as the compound god Amon-Ra, in universal honour; and thus shared in the great worship of Amon. The need of uniting these two names shows that these gods originally belonged to different races.

Ra, not Amon, was supposed to have been the original of Heliopolis, as the worship of another sun-god, Atum, underlay that of Ra. The collateral facts point to Ra having come in as the god of Asiaites; the title of the god when he was Ra was Amon. The cosmic scene is later through the Semitic invaders; the kow sceptre was the sacred treasure of the temple; the 'spirits of Heliopolis' are more akin to Babylon than to Egypt; and the city was always a centre of literary learning. The obelisk of the sun seems connected with the Syrian worship of conical stones and stone pillars; and the 'city of the sun,' Baalbek, shows a similar worship.

Ra is shown as a purely human figure—as in his union with Amon—or as a hawk-headed figure owing to his union with the hawk-god of Edfu; or simply as the disk of the sun, especially when in his boat for floating on the celestial ocean. The disk has various emblems usually associated with it: the cobra in front, as king of the gods; two cobras, one on each side, which may refer to the double kingdom of day and night, or both banks of the Nile; two ram's horns as the creation-god; two vulture wings as the protecting god, or sometimes only one. The disk is often placed on the head of the hawk-god or the hawk-headed human figure.

Atum, or Tum, was the god of the Eastern Delta, from Heliopolis round to the gulf of Suez. Whether he was a sun-god originally, or only became so by union with Ra, is not known. He is always shown in his boat in a very special form. He was either setting sun, in some connexion with the Semitic origin of his name, the 'completed, or finished, or closed.' His special place was Pa'tum (Pithom, the city of Hamites).

Khepera is the rising sun, 'he who becomes or arrives'; only secondarily, from this name written with the scarab, was the sun represented as a scarab. He is shown mainly about the Xlith dynasty, and was already very little known.

Aten was the radiant disk of the sun, entirely separate from the theology of Ra. It is never represented by any human or animal figure, and the worship of Aten was promulgated by the devotees of Aten. The object of worship was not so much the disk of the sun as its rays, or radiant energies; these are shown each ending in hands, which give life and dominion and accept offerings. This worship was restricted within half a century or less, traces of it appearing at Amenhotep III., the full development under his son Akhenaten, and the end of it under Tut-an-kh-amon. As it appears when Syrian influence was at its height, the connexion of the name with that of Aten ('Lord') seems clear, especially as Adonis was worshipped in Syria. From the hymns to the

Aten, the worship appears to be that of the solar energy, and to have been a scientific idea apart from the usual type of Egyptian religion. Aten was regarded as the sun; he was not tolerant any other worship or figure of a divinity. Aten is the source of all life and action; all lands and peoples are subject to it, and owe to it their existence and allegiance. Aaker, 'he who leads heaven,' was the god of Thinis in Upper Egypt and Sebennytos in the Delta. He is always in human form, and carries a sceptre. His name shows that he was a sun-god, and he was later identified with Shu, son of Ra. He does not appear to have been regarded at all beyond his own centres of worship.

Sopdu was identified with the cone of light of the zodiacal glow, which is very clearly seen in Egypt. He represented the light before the rising sun, and was specially worshipped in the eastern desert, at Goshen, and Serabit in Sinai.

Nut was the embodiment of heaven, represented as a female figure, generally as a dappled lioness. She was said to dwell at Diopolis Parva and near Heliopolis, but there are no temples to her, and she is usually not worshipped but grouped in a larger figure. The sceptre and wings of Nut are usually supported by Shu, the god of space, on his uplifted hands; below lies the earth, Seb, as a man. This seems to show the lifting of heaven from the embrace of the earth by the power of space.

Seb, or Geb, was the embodiment of the earth. He is called 'the prince of the gods,' as going before all the later gods. He is thus analogous to Cuth, or, and like him, double gods. Seb and Nut belong to a primitive cosmic theology earlier than any other in Egypt. Seb is called the 'great cackler,' and the goose is placed upon his head. There seems in this the idea of the egg (named in Book of the Dead, liv.) of the sun being produced from the horizon by the earth. He is called 'lord of food,' as being provided by the earth. He was honoured at Memphis and Heliopolis, but no temples of his are known. It seems that Seb, Nut, Shu, and Tefnut remained as the cosmogony of Egypt, but had long ceased to be worshipped or to have any offerings or temples in their honour.

Shu, the god of space, was symbolized by an ostrich feather, the lightest object for its bulk that was known. His function was the lifting of the heaven from the earth; and as a separate figure he is usually shown kneeling on one knee with uplifted arms, regarded as the thunderbolt of Egypt, at Pœulis, Bighe, Enneh, and Denderah, and also at Memphis; but no temples were built to him. Shu is often grouped with his sister Tefnut, and sometimes both appear together as lions.

Tefnut was also honoured in the South, in Nubia, Elephantine, el-Kab, Erment, and Denderah, as well as at Memphis. She appears in human form, like Shu, but is often lion-headed. She was the mother of the pharaohs.

After the sun-, sky-, and earth-gods must be added the Nile-god, Hapi. He is always known by human form, a man, but with female breasts, and often barred all over with wavy lines, as regarded as the Tiber. Owing to the Upper and Lower Egypt, the Nile was similarly divided into two entities. Figures of the Upper and Lower Nile, distinguished by papyrus and lotus plants, are commonly shown as holding the sceptre of the Nile, as an emblem of the union of the whole country. Hapi was worshipped at Nilopolis and at the 106 little river-side shrines which marked the towing-stages of the Nile. The dates of inscription (Sonnenkron) are not found to refer to the festivals, except that of Merenptah on 5 Paophi, = 19 July, in 1250 B.C.
which might be at the rising of the Nile. A long
by the banks, but the chief interest of the
the river (IBP iv. 107).

40. Abstract gods: Ptah, Min, etc.—The
abstract gods stand quite apart in character from tho\nse whom we have noticed. They have no
history or legends like Osiris and Râ; and, as
abstractions, they stand at a higher level than the
Nature-gods of the simpler ages. There are no
god-cults connected with them, or any
customary celebrations. Some were probably
tribal gods, but on a different plane from those
already noticed, and seem to be of a late and
advanced character.

Ptah was the great god of Memphis, and became
the head of the Memphite triad, and later of the
ennamed. He has two apparently contradictory
characters—that of the creator acting by moulding
everything from primeval mud, and that of the
mummiform god. Whether these are not two
separate beliefs fused together we cannot yet
discern. The mummy form strongly implies a de-
ified body. From this he became the head of the
dynastic race, as all the earlier peoples buried in a contracted
position. There is also the duplicate belief of
Ptah creating by the spoken word. A further
complexion arises from his identification with the
ancient animal worship of the bull Apis at
Memphis. He was also united to the primitive
Memphite god of the dead, Sokar, in the form of a
mummified hawk; and was likewise associated
with the later human god of the dead, Osiris,
appearing as Ptah Sokar-Osiris. As a further
complication, the late figures of this fused god as
a sandy-legged dwarf are entirely different from
the mummiform Ptah and from the figures of the
other two gods. If we were to analyze these
incongruities so far as our present information
goes, they might be arranged thus:

Sokar, hawk-god of dead—primitive.
+ Osiris, god of dead—pre-historic.
+ Ptah, therefore a mummy—dynastic.
later + pataisoi of Phoenicia—dwarf.

Apis, the bull creator—primitive.

Ptah, creator by the word—dynastic.

Khmunu, the ram creator—primitive.

Ptah, creator by moulding, as Khmunu at Denderah
and Ekhmin.

Hence Ptah the artificer was simply a creator-god
of the dynastic race, who became assimilated to
the earlier gods of various kinds. It is impossible
to dissociate from Ptah the pataisoi, dwarf figures
which were introduced by the Phenician sailors
(Herod. iii. 37), identified with Ptah, and given the
same name. These, again, have some relation to
the sandy-legged or lame god of artificers,
Hephaestos. Ptah was worshipped mainly at
Memphis, and also at the next nome, Lotopolis, as
well as at Bubastis and Mendes.

Min, or Amun, as the name is sometimes trans-
literated, was the abstract father-god. He appears
as we have shown, to be the earlier form of Amun.
Like Ptah, he is enveloped in bandages; and, as
Ptah has his hands projecting and holding a sceptre,
so Min has his right arm raised holding a flail,
and his left hand holding the phallic. The origin of
this god is indicated in a late text, where the
form of a sanctuary in the land of Punt is exactly
that associated with the god (Athribis, s.viii, xx.
Though here is a god called Min, those of Punt,
and the god has a black face (Deir el-Bahari,
19x-1xxi). These details point to Min having
been introduced by immigrants from there. The
oldest figures of Punt are three blocks of limestone
found in the bottom level of the temple of Koptos,
with designs upon them, including Red Sea shells

and sword-fish, agreeing with the source stated
above. He was particularly the god of the desert,
worshipped at Hammanat, at the end of the
desert road at Koptos; at Ekhnaton, which was
probably the end of the other desert road from
Mynos to Elfin, which Haremheb opened and
ended at Edfu, Thbes, and Saqqareh. His figures are
common in the XIth and XIIth dynasties; in the
XIXth he was united with Amnon-Râ, but in
Ptolemaic times he again became important.

Hathor was also artificer, and is probably introduced as a correlative deity with Min. Her
head is seen on the column in front of the shrine of
Min (Athribis, xxiii). Her peculiar position, as
being worshipped over the whole country and
identified with other goddesses, points to her
belonging to the latest immigrants. The myth of
Horus striking off the head of his mother Isis, and
replacing it by a cow's head, points to the Horus
cult acceptance of Hathor of the dynastic people
and uniting her with Isis. Hathor's head appears as
the favourite emblem of the dynastic people
(pedette of Narmer, top, and kilt of king [Hier-
koepolis, xxvii],高三, of Hathor and the
love of Hathor are often named in the early
dynasties. The Hathor head appears as a capital
to columns at Deir el-Bahari, and in Nubia in the
XVIIIth dynasty. It formed the wig-wag, or
sistrum used in her worship, and the whole sis-
trum and head were used as the model for capitals
of columns in the XXIVth dynasty down to Ptole-
maic times (see esp. Denderah). Hathor was fused
with other deities, particularly Isis as the mother,
and she appears in most sites of Egypt. The fates
presiding over birth and destiny were called the
seven Hathors.

Maat was the goddess of truth. She had no
temples, and received no offerings. On the con-
trary, the image of Maat is often shown as being
offered to the other gods by the king. There is
also a double form, the two Maats presiding over
justice and truth (Maspero, Down, 187). These
were shown usually one at each end of the shrines
of the gods; and they appear to be the source of the
erubic figures, one at each end of the mercy-
seat, known apparently as 'Mercy' and 'Truth'
(1 P. 25' 61' 85' 80' 1 P. 31' 14' 19' 20'P). Maat
appears in the judgment scenes of weighing the
heart, as a pledge of truth, and she is linked with
Râ and Thoth. She is especially with Ptah, who is
'the lord of truth.' So little personality was
attached to this abstraction of 'truth' that, when
Akenaten proscribed the names of all the gods
in favour of the Aten, he still kept the name of
Maat 'associated with his own' in placing his
motto after his name, ankh en maat, 'living in
truth.'

Akerfem is a youthful god in human form,
with a lotus flower on his head. He appears to be
a god of vegetation and growth, and was associated
as son of Ptah and Sekhmet at Memphis. He
appears only from the XXIVth dynasty onwards,
when some statues of him and relief figures on
situs are common. No temple of his is
known, or any offerings to him.

Safekh was the goddess of writing. She is
named as early as the Pyramid times, and often
appears in the XIXth dynasty recording the festi-
vals of the king, and holding a scribe's outfit.
Her emblem was a pointet-shaped star on the
head, with a pair of horns inverted above it. This
has some connexion with the 'seven,' and the
seven-pointed star which appears as one of the
earliest emblems of divinity (Hierakonpolis, xxvi
B. 3, C. xxix). The group may well read up safekh,
'she who has the seven upon her head'; if so, she
was an early goddess marked by the seven sign
of divinity, and hence 'crowned with the seven' came
to be her title. Her true name thus appears to be lost.

Cosmogonic pairs of elemental gods were venerated at Hermopolis, sometimes by a nude (with frog heads) and by one (with serpent heads); the male names were Iteh, 'eternity'; Kuku, 'darkness'; Nu, 'the heavenly ocean'; Nem, 'the inundation.' The female names were merely the feminine of those. Manetho regards them as the equal of Seb and Nut, Osiris and Isis, Shu and Tefnut, Set and Nephthys, respectively (Dawson, 149). There are various views of the meaning of the eight; but their names seem to harmonize with the 'majesty of light,' the succession of ages, the water used in modelling creation, named in the Kere Kosmou, the earliest of the Hermetic books, which retains most of Egyptian thought. These elements were called 'the eight,' Khmnnu; and Tehnti made the ninth, the god who dominated the elements. They gave the name to the city Khmnu, now modified to Esnehneyn.

Other abstractions are occasionally named, the more usual of which are Her, the god of taste, and Sr, the god of perception. The rarer abstractions remind us of the Roman personifications of Pavor, Pulmon, etc.

42. Foreign gods. The foreign gods are those which were brought into Egypt apart from an immigration of their worshippers, and which always remained exotic. Bês, or Biter, was originally a dancing figure of Sudanesé type, dressed in the skin of the bêb antilope, the Cycnæhurus gattatus. He is often shown beating a tambourine. How such a figure came to be associated with the protection of infants and with birth is not known; but this connexion with the birth of Set in the XVIIIth dynasty (Deir el-Bahari, II) and on to the Ptolemaic age (birth-house, Dendera), The earliest example of the figure is female, in the XIXth dynasty (Prieur, Xabes, VIII, 14, 27); it is male in later times, but in the Roman age a female Bês appears as a consort. Bês had no temples or offerings, but in Roman times there was an oracle of Bêsa at Abydos. A curious intimation of this worship by the Phœnicians is the figure of Bêsa on the coins of Al-besa, 'the island of Bessa,' the modern Tripa.

Dedun was another African god, worshipped in Nubia. He was apparently a creation-god, since he was fused with Ptah, the combination Ptah-Dedun being often worshipped in the XIXth dynasty. He is always in human form.

Set have been depicted as gods of a tribe at the cataract. She is similar to Hathor, with cow's horns, and was called the queen of the gods.

Agnet was the local goddess of Seheyl, the island in the cataract, and is shown wearing a high crown of feathers.

Turning now to the Asiatic gods, the principal one was Sutekh, who may originally have been one with the Set or Seth of the Egyptians, but the separation was post-historic. When we meet with Sutekh in the XIXth dynasty, he is the national god of the Kheta, and has many cities devoted to him on the Upper Euphrates in Armenia (Petrice, Student's History, iii. 86). The Egyptians represent him with a tall pointed cap bearing two horns projecting in front and a long streamer from the peak descending to his heels (Petrice, Sima, fig. 134). Similar figures of Sutekh, standing on the head, are found on the scarabs.

Beal was also sometimes identified with Set, or combined with Mentu as a war-god. Names compounded with Baal are sometimes found, as Beal-Ahathe (Hasten, 'Baal'), the Punie Maharab (Lap. jud. ii. 1, 5-6).

Reshpu, or Rezep, appears on some steles, wearing a pointed cap with a gazelle head bound on in front. He was a god of war, armed with spear and shield in the left hand, brandishing a battle-axe, and with a full quiver on his back (Wilkinson, Antiquities, ii. 5-6).

Anû, or Amanis, was a goddess of the Kheta (the Arjan Amantta, imported like Mitra and Varuna), represented as seated on a throne or on horseback, holding a spear and shield. Brandishing a battle-axe, she appears in that of a favourite daughter of Raûses II., Bânt-antba, 'daughter of Anûtis.'

Ashurthû, or Ashtarthû (Ishtar), was worshipped at Memphis, where is the tomb of a priestess of Ishtar. She is represented at Eden as lion-headed and driving a chariot. Rames called a son Menasrot, 'lover of Ashtaroth.'

Qadek appears as a nude goddess standing on a lion, her hair like the wig of Hathor, and lotus-flowers and serpents in her hands. She is placed with Min, and therefore seems to be a form of the Mother-god or Hathor; she has no weapons like Anûtis and Ishtar.

43. Tribal history in the myths.—Owing to the early age at which sculpture and writing began in Egypt, it is possible to trace the tribal history passing into religious myth. The worshipers of Horus expelling those of Set was recorded as history, and places retained the name ramâd as 'united to the Hûd' or Behdûtih, hawk-god of Eden, allies of the Horus tribe. Yet the whole of this also appears as mythology—Hermes warring on Set and driving him out of Egypt. As we see, on the earliest slate carvings, the standards of the tribes represented acting as the emblem of the tribe, breaking down fortresses, holding the bonds of captives, or driving the prisoners, so, by the same habit of symbolism, the god of a tribe was said to conquer another god when his tribe overcame another tribe. The contest of Poseidon with Athene for Attica and Troezene, with Helios for Corinth, with Hera for Argolis, with Zeus for Agrina, with Dionysos for Naxos, and with Apollo for Delphi, seems equally to mark the yielding of the worshippers of Poseidon to the followers of the other gods. This is an important principle for the understanding of religious myths, but it belongs to history rather than to the present subject.

44. Nature of the gods.—The nature of divinity was perhaps even more limited in the Egyptian mind than it was to the Greek. The gods were not immortal: Hâ grew old and decrepit; Osiris was slain. In the Pyrânid texts, Orion is stated to hunt and slay gods and to quench serpents. The gods can suffer, for Hâ was in torment from the bite of a magic serpent. The gods are not omniscient; they walk on earth to see what is done; it takes time for them to learn what has happened; Thoth has to inform Iâ about what he has heard, and cannot punish men without Hâ's permission. Nor can a god act directly on earth; he sends 'a power from heaven' to do his bidding.

The gods, therefore, have no divine superiority over man in conditions or limitations; they can be described only as pre-existent, as acting intelligence, with scarcely greater powers than man might hope to gain by magic and witchcraft of his own (cf. art. God, Egyptian).

See also art. Worship (Egyptian).

Literature.—The literature is given throughout the article, especially in § 6.

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Elamites.—Introductory.—Elam, in Gû 10th, is said to have been the eldest son of Shem. The tract occupied by the nation descended from him is a portion of the mountainous country separating the Mesopotamian plain from the high country of Iran, including the fertile country at the foot of the hills. It is the Susis or Sussiana of classical
geographers (Strabo, xv. 3, § 12; Ptolemy, iii. 3, etc.), and was successively held by Assyrians, Babylonians, and Elamites. According to some Sumerian texts, Su-sin was the spiritual ruler of the Sumerian state.
Hodad (Assyr. Adad, Bab. Addu, also called Ramudanu or Rimmon) seems to have been known to the Elamites chiefly by his Mitannian (Hittite) name of Teshup, but the Assyr. list (Ona, Texts, xxiv. 40, 1, 4) gives the Elam. Nippur, equivalent to Kunzibani, compared by Scheil with the Bab. Kuzibu or Kuzibu, "abundant," or the like. With the Assyro-Babylonians he was not only the god of wind, adorer, and lightning, but also of fertilizing rain. Another Elamite name given by the same text is Sū ḫ iḫ išiṭ (ib. pl. 17, obv. 40).

Hunamun, Hunun, Ununum. As this is a very common deity in the composition of men's names, he must have been one of the most popular of the Elamite pantheon. According to Scheil, this name is, like others, of Sem.-Bab. origin, being composed of the name ḫ unu, and bar (from bānu, "to form or create")—i.e., a creator.1 Hamil of Aiapir speaks of "Hūban the great, god of the gods" (Scheil, iii. 103), and the same inscription has the divine name ḫ unananünkī, "Hūban the king." The Elamite Simut is identified by Scheil with Sumer, who appears first on the list given by Assurbanipal of Assyria, and is immediately followed by Lagamaru. As Nin-urrē is the name of Inuru, and is immediately followed by Lagamaru, Assyro-Babylonians. As two names are given in the same text, it is possible that both are the same. However, it is generally accepted that the two names are identical. At the time when the inscription was written, the Elamite god Napratip, who is mentioned in the inscription as a god of wind, adorer, and lightning, was known to the Assyrians as the god Adad, or Assur, the god of thunder. The Elamite god Simut, who is mentioned in the inscription as a god of wind, adorer, and lightning, was known to the Assyrians as the god Assur, or Assur, the god of thunder.

1. Noteworthy among the goddesses is Belūdua, who, as Scheil points out, is the Bēlūdua of Ashurbanipal, vi. 41. She is possibly the Bēlūdua of WAI ii. 60, l. 27, where the city which stands opposite her name is Uṣub. The nearest name in Sumer.-Bab. is Belīlī or Belīlī-alam, spouse of Āštīla or Aštīla-alam, the name of the male and female personifications of the heavens (Ann and Anatu). Belīlī appears as the sister of the sun-god Tammu, who was probably well known to the Elamites as to the Babylonians.

2. The Elamite name for "god" was nap, which was borrowed, to all appearance, by the Assyro-Babylonians. Whether there is any significance in the fact that nap is the character for "god" doubles, is uncertain, but, if admitted, its fundamental principle would seem to be dualistic—probably male and female. In Cun. Texts, xxiv. pl. 39, 1. 10, nap, as the name of a deity, is explained as anu šemū, "Enil of the heavens," the name of Enil being written with the character for "old"—as though the ancient.

Whether this root has anything to do with the Nāpiṭi, a group of deities (Scheil) to whom a temple was attached by Uri-Sagges, is uncertain. Scheil regards Nāpiṭi as being the Nāpiṭi of Assurbanipal, vi. 43, and prefers a Sem. etymology, namely, nāpi, "covering," "protecting," or "the little." The occurrence of Nāpirin, in the same text with Simu, "(protecting) mountain—" names which he quotes—seems to bear upon the Median mountain of Nīpur, where the ark was regarded as having rested, and suggests a reason for the temple named E-kura, "the house of the mountain," in the Bab. Nippur, as well as the similar list of native and foreign deities (WAI iii. 60, rev. 106) the apparently Elamite Nēpirī occurs, and is immediately followed by "Nergal of Ḫubud,"

3. Noteworthy among the figures of deities derived from Elam are the relics on the Babylonian boundary-stones of the Kassite period, by means of which the emblems on those monuments have been identified. It is now known that the emblem of Merodach was a spear—perhaps that with which he slew the dragon of Chaos; that Naksu was represented by a lighted lamp, similar to the Roman; that a stock terminating in an eagle's head was the god Zagrām (Zannum); that a seated female figure represented Gula; and that a thunderbolt stood for Addu or Hodad. A variant showing Merodach's spear-head surmounting a kind of house is the symbol of the god of the sun-god, Assur, as was嘘 presumed, apparently, with the name of the god GAN, confirming what has been said (p. 251) as to the identification of these two deities. The above, with other emblems, were probably used by the Elamites as well as by the Assyrians.

4. Concerning the Elamite gods, Assurbanipal, the Assyrian king, in his cylinder-inscription above quoted (tib. 1, col. vi.线条 27 ff.), gives some interesting details. The Nāpiṭi, or temple-tower, of Susa was built of enamelled brick imitating lapis-lazuli, the sacred stone of the Assyrian-Babylonians, and evidently also of the Elamites. This his soldiers destroyed, as well as the pinacles of bright green of the temple of the sun-god, Š zīnu, of the temple of the sun-god, Š zīnu, in which the god of the oracles dwelt (he states) in a secret place, and no one ever saw the work (workmanship, form) of his divinity. Six deities, Sumudu, Lagamaru, Partikira, Amman-kašpiar, Udurum, and Sapsk, were worshipped only by the Elamite kings, and (the statues of these, together with 12 others—Bagih, Sungum-sarā, Karsa, Kir-sams, Sulānu, Anapsa, Bīlālā, Panir-timmri, Sīla-gārā, Nāpās, Nāpirtu, and Kinkadarkār—were consecrated to the sun-god, Tammuz, as was probably well known to the Elamites as to the Babylonians.

Elders (Buddhist).—Certain members of the Buddhist Order took rank as elders, and, as such, had considerable weight in the management of its business, and in the preservation of the doctrine.

1. The term "elder" (therī) is occasionally used in its ordinary sense of such members of the Order as were of lowest standing in it (Aggutera, i. 78, 247). For qualifications of the term, see above (p. 253), and cf. the "Elam," in "HDB and EBD."
elders (Agg. ii. 22; no. 4 in this list, it should be noted, is the description of an arahant). The number of those who were thus entitled to be called elders is not given as very large. There is a frequently repeated short list of the most distinguished among them, the ‘elders’ or theras (therà-sīvaka). The full number is twelve, and their names usually follow one another in the same order. They are (1) Sāriputta, (2) Moggal- kimia, (3) Kassapa, (4) Kaccāna, (5) Khotițha, (6) Kāse, (7) Chāra, (8) Revata, (9) Uppali, (10) Ananda, (11) Itthaka. But the lists are not consistent. Sometimes one, sometimes another name, especially of those at the bottom of the list, is omitted; and there are slight variations in the order. It is quite clear that neither the number nor the names were fixed at the time of the earliest tradition (Viṇaya, i. 534-55, ii. 15, iv. 66; Agg. iii. 200; cf. Moggallāna, i. 212, 482).

In one passage (Agg. i. 22-25) we have a much longer and very interesting list of those members of the Order who were disciples (bhikkhū sīvaka), specifying after each name the good quality or meaning to which each seemed to have been pre-eminent. Forty-seven men and thirteen women are mentioned, and Buddhaghosa (q.v.), in his commentary on the passage, calls them all ‘elders’ or theras. Of course this may not recur in this list, and are said to be pre-eminent respectively in the following ways—that is, according to the order of the names given above: (1) in great wisdom; (2) in the powers of iddhi (q.v.); (3) in discussions as to extra-optional duties; (4) in power of expanding that which has been stated concisely; (5) in the fourfold knowledge of the texts—their philological meaning, the doctrine they contain, of the derivation of words and ideas, and, finally, in the power of extemporary exposition of them; (6) in ability in exhorting the brethren; (7) not mentioned; (8) in inward vision; (9) pre-eminent among those who dwell in the forest; (10) the best of those who knew the canon law; (11) the most distinguished among those who learned the texts, who were self-possessed, whose conduct was right, who had moral courage, and who were of service to others; (12) the best among those of the brethren who were willing to learn.

There is a touch of historical probability in the fact that twenty of these are members of the local Order at Kappāna, whose list of the title is found for no. 12, who was the Buddha’s own son, than he was willing to learn. And, when we notice that only one or two of the whole sixty in this list were among the first disciples to be admitted to the Order, it is manifest that to be a senior to them, we must conclude that the title ‘elder’ was more dependent on other qualities—such qualities as are given in the list, and in the passage quoted above—than on the mere fact of seniority in the community. Even in the Viṇaya (the Rules of the Order), in which, as a general rule, so much weight is laid on precedence by seniority, we find the word ‘elder’ (therā) used in this technical sense (Viṇaya Texts, i. 228, ii. 17, 61, 237 [SBE xii., xvii.]).

It is sufficiently clear how this happened. In the ordinary meetings of the local chapters administration of the Order, the senior bhikkhu present (reckoning not by age, but by the date of ordination) presided, and the members present were seated in order of such seniority. But, when it came to talking over questions of ethics and philo-
sophy, or discussing details in the system of self-training based on psychology and ethics, something more than seniority was required. A certain number of the brethren became acknowledged as leaders and masters in these subjects. Their brethren called them ‘elders’ and gave them a special title. For a formal appointment by the Order itself, or by any external authority; nor is there any evidence that a bhikkhu became a therā merely by age, or by seniority in the Order.

So far had this secondary and special meaning of ‘elder’ driven out the etymological meaning that it is the only one dealt with in Dhammapāla’s exposition of the word at the beginning of his commentary on the Thāṇā-gathā; and the unknown commentator on the Dhammapāda, in his explanation of the word at verse 261 (see above, note 1), actually derives therā, by a fanciful and exegetical, not philological, argument, from dīrava in the sense of ‘having moral courage.’ The canonical Bud-
dhism contained in the Pañta texts was called, in the tradition, the Therā-vāda, that is, ‘the opinion of the theras,’ where the word is again used in the secondary sense, and refers especially to the theras who held the First Council (see Childe, Pāli Dict., 1875, s.v. ‘Vāda’).

In one passage we find the phrase Saṅgha-therā, ‘the Order’s elders.’ Since, as we have seen, the writer has translated this (Viṇaya Texts, iii. 404) by ‘the eldest Therā (then alive) in the world,’ this is probably right, as the number of years of his standing in the Order is immediately added.

But it may also mean ‘the most distinguished and venerable of the then living theras.’ The Buddhist elders had no more authority in the Order than such as followed from the natural deference paid them for their character and accomplishments; and they had no other authority over laymen. Such slight discipline as was customary was carried out, not by the theras, but by the local chapters (see Discipline [Buddhist]). The theras, as such, had no special duties or privileges in connexion with the temporalities of the Order.

In medieval and modern times, the kings of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam have from time to time recognized some distinguished bhikkhus as Saṅgha-therā; and quite recently the English Government in Burma has followed their precedent, though it left the choice of the bhikkhu to be so distinguished to them, who were admitted senior to the other theras. It is still used, in those three countries, of any bhikkhu of distinction. There is still, as in olden times, no formal grant of the title. In other Bud-
dhist countries it has fallen out of use, and even in these three it is used mainly, though not exclu-
sively, when writing or speaking in Pāli. The modern native languages have other terms, such as nāyika, ‘leader,’ which tend to take its place.

ELDER (Semitic).—1. Connotation of the term. The importance of the ‘old men’ or ‘elders’ was a natural development of the authority of the head of the family, and of the reverence felt for parents and for the aged, primitive and primitive. Note the position assigned to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in all the documents of the Hoxanach. The reverence due to parents and to the aged is a favourite theme of both the OT and the NT (see e.g., Ephesians the Temanite is confident, because ‘with us are both the grayheaded and very aged men’ (Job 15:16); and in Sir 38:4 He that honoureth his father maketh atonement for the transgressions of the sons, etc.).

1 The same difficulty was felt when the theras presiding as a chapter had to recite the Pāṭimokkha. If he could not do so a junior bhikkhu, who could, took his place (Viṇaya Texts, i. 25).

2 So at Dhammapāda, verse 261, an elder is described as a man in whom is truth and religion, kindness, self-command, and training.

3 There is an anthology of verses ascribed to elders, both men and women, beginning in the case of the Therā-Sīvaka. It contains poems of 303 male and 74 female poets. There are also often mentioned in the various episodes in the other books, but most of them occur among the above 237.

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Similarly in the Code of Hammurabi (e.g. § 195) severe penalties are prescribed for those who fail in respect and duty towards parents.

However, we have one of the many cases where a word in common use acquires a technical meaning while its ordinary meaning still persists, so that a difficulty may arise as to whether it simply means an old man or an 'elder' in the technical sense. Very early there must have been many old men who were not 'elders,' although all 'elders' would be old. Later on, an 'elder' came to be used to designate a chief usually mature or elderly, not necessarily old. There might be 'sheikhs,' just as there are aldermen, in the prime of life; Presbyterian elders are not always old.

Amongst the nomad Arabs there is one supreme shaykh for a tribe, but there is also a Dinw, or council of shaykhs. In the OT, the 'elders' almost always, if not invariably, appear as a group or council; and the Heb. term zakān in the technical sense is used in the plural.1 Is 29:9 are not a technical exception even if zakān means 'elders' in these passages, for the word in each case is collective. Gn 24 (cf. below) seems a real exception; but possibly zakān here means 'senior' and not 'elder.' Ga 3:16 calls them your father, the shaykh, but this is unlikely in view of the stress laid in 44:9 etc. on the advanced age of Jacob.

In primitive society the head of a family or clan, like the captain of a ship, would discharge many functions which are assigned to separate individuals in a more advanced civilization. He would be leader in war and peace, priest, judge, often the repository of, and chief authority on, tribal tradition, and possibly doctor. It is natural, therefore, that, as society developed, the title 'elder' or 'shaykh' was sometimes borne by various people in authority and by the members of different professions. Thus in the OT we read not only of elders of cities, tribes, etc., but also of elder of the 'elder' of Abraham's household (Gn 24:), of the elders of Pharaoh's household (Gen 50:), of the elders of David's household (2 S 12:4), of the elders of the priests (2 K 19:3, 1 S 22:17, Jer 19:). In later Judaism, zakān is a scholar or teacher of Rabbinical law, and the synonym šibh is used in the same sense.2 Amongst the modern Arabs 'shaykh,' or 'elder,' is used with a wide variety of meaning.3 It has, of course, the familiar meaning of leader of a tribe; the name is also applied to the heads of the great Muslim sects, to the magistrates set over districts of a city, and to the chiefs of various towns and industries, and even of thieves. A professional devotee, or 'saint,' is also called a shaykh, and the title is also borne by priests and schoolmasters, the title 'shaykh' being given to a female teacher.4

Thus the 'elders' or 'shaykhs' would be of very different degrees of importance. In the OT, where we nearly always find them acting in groups, and not as individuals, we have the elders of a district or city (2 K 21:), or of a tribe (Gilead, Jg 11:); Judah (2 S 19:4, 2 K 23:), and of Israel (1 S 4: etc.). If we may regard Soco as typical, the elders of a country town were fairly numerous, and probably included the heads of all families of any standing, for we read that in Soco there were 77 princes and elders (Jg 8:4).

Both the name and the institution of 'elder' or 'shaykh' were wide-spread; we find them not only in Israel, but with the Canaanites (Jos 13:4); Moabites and Midianites (Nu 22:); and at the Phenician town of Gebal (Ezk 27:). According to Winckler, one of the Amarna letters is from Itrakta, a Phenician city, and its elders.5 The available evidence suggests that the quasi-patriarchal authority or influence associated with the term is to be regarded as an early stage of social development. Robertson Smith, for instance, speaks of the senators of elders found in the ancient states of Semite and Aryan antiquity alike.6 Probably in some cases persons corresponding to elders or shaykhs bore titles not derived from a root meaning 'old,' more especially later, when 'elder' had become a technical term equivalent to 'chief' or 'counsellor.'7 Thus it is often suggested that the Cannanite noble, met with in Egyptian inscriptions, and referred to as marna, our lord, corresponded to the Israelite elder.

Nevertheless, the title 'elder' for a person of authority, learning, or other distinction continues to this day. The Ger. ye'el, seen in the OT, is still used by the Jews in Palestine, and is still used by the Jews in Palestine, and is still found in priests, prophets, and elders; and modern Semites still have their sheikhs.

On the other hand, it seems probable that various other titles are synonyms of 'elder'; we have already referred to the Syr. marna, and may note also the N. Sem. mlkh (see below). In Hebrew there are many titles more or less synonymous with zakān, and hence the interchange of terms in the narratives of Gideon and of the relief of Jabez-Gideon by Saul suggests that šēk in the sense of 'householder' or 'head of a family' may be such a synonym. Amongst the Arabs, heads of the clans (Nn 3:34); the 'prince' or 'captain,' nāṣir, the head of the tribe (Nu 24:); the chiefs or, lit., 'corner-stones,' of the people, panāth kālim (Jg 29:1, 1 S 140); and, in Ex 24:1 only, the 'qāta, 'nobles,' of the Israelites. Other terms for chiefs, rulers, officials, such as sārin, hōrām, sāgin, seem sometimes equivalent to 'elders.' Zikān is also coupled with šākūhim, 'heads,' šāqū'īm, 'judges,' šākū'im, 'officers,' to make up a description of the leaders (Dt 29:13, 1 S 30:). Probably these terms are partly synonymous.

But 'father' in such phrases as 'father of Tekoa' (1 Ch 29:4) means 'founder' rather than 'chief.'

2. History of the institution.—In early times, e.g., in Israel in the nomadic and pre-monarchical periods, the position of the elder corresponded with that of the sheik amongst the modern Bedawin. He was the head, or one of the heads, of his family, clan, village, or district; the leader in war; the chief counsellor in war and peace; the arbiter in disputes; but his power was moral, and depended on the respect of his personality; he could advise but not command, persuade but not coerce.8 As Doughty says, 'The sheikh of a nomad tribe is no tyrant'; 'the dignity of a sheik in free Arabia is commended by more than his authority.'9 According to Doughty, the office of supreme sheikh descends by inheritance. McCarney, however, quotes authorities to show that the office was rather elective, seldom remaining in the same family.

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Footnotes:
3. For instance, by Nowack, Lehrb. der heb. Arch. 1. 304.
4. See Eccles. 19:1, 2, 3.
5. Alt may also mean 'corner,' 'side,' 'support.'
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family for four generations. No doubt customs differed; the application of the hereditary principle would depend upon the qualifications of the heir, and it would sometimes be modified by election within a given circle. Thus, amongst primitive nomads, the elders or sheikhs represented three different kinds of influence or authority: that of the fathers or head of the family—paternal; that of age or reputed wisdom—personal; that of a legitimate government—official. These three were not necessarily modified in the same persons in the more advanced and complex social order of agricultural and city life; the title 'elder' attached itself often to the office apart from age or hereditary right. At the same time, the status and character of the elders were not always or altogether changed by the abandonment of nomad life. McCurdy states 1 that the habits and relations of the old patriarchal life were not discarded in the permanent institutions of the fixed settlements. The influence of the patriarchal system can be traced in the establishment and regulation of the Semitic cities; and we may find there a reproduction in type, if not in detail, of the essential elements of the old tribal organization. Through what N. J. N. N. 2 has termed the simple constitution of the city or State included a head, malik—a name corresponding with the Heb. melēk, 'king'; a circle of nobles or 'great men,' and a general body of the common people. The malik and the 'great men' were usually hereditary. As the word malik in Aramaic is lit. 'counsellor,' McCurdy suggests that the malik was originally the chief elder of the clan which founded the settlement. We have already pointed out that the title 'elder' persisted through the whole course of Jewish history; and it is a familiar fact that, within certain limits, the patrimonial authority was equally persistent.

Nevertheless, the changed conditions gradually modified the social life. The family remained the unit, but the group of families, the kindred, the clan more or less gave place to the community of the district, village, or town. 3 The fixed home, the regular cycle of agriculture, involved a more stereotyped social life, a greater authority on the part of the local chiefs. In Israel, for instance, as we have said, the elders appear in groups, each group forming the ruling council of a district, city, tribe, or even of the nation. Apparently, local government always went hand in hand with the elders of the community. Whether, with the development of society, there was a differentiation of offices; and other notables—priests, judges, military leaders—shared the authority of the elders. In Arabia, there is sometimes the bālūṭ, or judge, side by side with the sheikh.

The rise and increase of the royal power further limited the authority of the elders, by the interference of the financial, military, and judicial activity of the king, his ministers and representatives. We may summarize what can be gathered from the earlier documents as to the elders in Israel under the 'judges' and the monarchy.

In the history of the Exodus in J, 4 we frequently meet with the 'elders of Israel' or 'of the people,' as associated with Moses in the leadership of the people, or as intermediaries between him and the people (Ex 3:16; 18:22; 19:3; 19:19 etc.). In Ex 18:20 [E], Moses, Aaron, and all the elders of Israel entertain Jethro; and Moses by his advice appoints heads over the people, rulers of thousands, rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens. It is not clear how far we have here an organization and supplementing of the elders, or how far this is meant to be a more expedient, partial, and perhaps, in Nu 11:15-20. 5 (from an early source not certainly identified), seventy elders are associated with Moses in his prophetic inspiration. There is no mention of elders in E's code, the Book of the Covenant (Ex 20:19-20), but they are 'judges' (Ex 18:25-26) associated with the 'elders of Israel' or 'of Judah' at intervals throughout the history (Jos 7:2; 1 Sam 4:1; 1 K 8:1). In D, Dt 27:1; Ezk 14:3 during the Exile, Ezr 6:8-14, 1 Mac 12:54, and 18:25-27, we have them connected with the high priest (cf. Mt 21:24). The members of the Sanhedrin were called 'elders,' z'kenim. 6

This body of 'elders of Israel' exercised great influence in the early monarchy; they command the army (1 S 4:4), demand a king from Samuel (8), and confer the kingdom (2 S 5). They are less prominent in the later monarchy, power falling more and more into the hands of the royal ministers and officials (1 K 4), but become important again in and after the Exile; and, finally, the Sanhedrin claimed to represent the 'elders of Israel,' more especially the 'seventy elders' associated with Moses. In the 3rd cent. A.D., N. Jobanan says that the members of the Sanhedrin, the Beth-din, must be 'tall, of imposing appearance, and of advanced age; and they must be learned, and must understand foreign languages as well as their own.'

We have seen that, over against the 'elders of Israel,' we have the local elders of a city or district, who are the local authorities of whom we have heard. For instance, the elders act on behalf of Suceoth (Jos 8:31) and Gilad (11). In the legislation of D the elders are prominent as the local authorities; they deliver up the murderer for punishment (Dt 19:5); they represent their city in the ritual for the exportation of a wayfarer by an unknown hand (21:22); the disobedient son, the wife charged with inidelity, and the man who refuses to marry his deceased brother's widow are brought before them (21:18-20; 25:7). After the Exile we have the 'elders of every city,' in Ezr 10:4.

On many points we have no express information as to the elders. We are told nothing as to their qualifications, and very little as to their rights, privileges, authority, or duties. Probably throughout the history the local elders were the heads of the leading families; but it is not clear who the 'elders of Israel' 7 were. 'Elders of Israel' may have implied a gathering of all the local elders, and in practice a gathering of such as were able or inclined to be present on a given occasion. If so, the elders of a district would usually be represented in proportion to their proximity to the place of meeting. If we read anywhere of the elder or sheikh of a town or district, we might think of the 'elders of Israel' as being made up of such district elders, but the latter do not appear in our documents. It is, nevertheless, possible that the 'elders of Israel' formed a national council with a comparatively small number of members, each with a definite official status, acquired by inheritance, or some principle of selection or election.

As to number, the Sanhedrin (q.v.) comprised about seventy, perhaps because seventy elders are mentioned in the account of the Exodus; but these are seventy out of the elders (Ex 18:20); implying that the total was much greater (Ex 24:1, Nu 11:18). Seventy-seven 'princes' and 'elders' are mentioned at Succoth. 8

Probably the authority of the body of elders, whether local or national, was largely of the same undefined character as that of the sheikh of an

1. I. S. 5.
4. According to Benzinger, P.E. R. (loc. cit.), only in J; but this is doubtful.

1. Perhaps a later stratum of D.
3. J. B. Ar., Art. 'Sanhedrin,' vol. 5.
**ELECTION**

Arab tribe (see above). It was liable to be set aside by that of the king or any leader of an armed force, and it depended largely on the personality of the elders and the extent to which they represented public feeling.

A combination of our various pieces of evidence, Babylonian, Israelite, Arab, etc., suggests lines of development which are probably typical for the Semitic people generally. We have first the shaikh or shalikhs of a nomad tribe, then the elders of a town or district in a settled community. These furnish in some way a council of elders for an entire State. In a more advanced stage of social development, the influence of the elder is subordinated to that of royal and other officials, but the elders long persist as a local institution, and recover much of their importance in such crises as the Captivity of Israel. On the other hand, the term 'elder' or 'shaikh' sometimes lost its original meaning, and came to be used for a chief of any kind.


**ELEATICS.—See PHILOSOPHY (Greek).**

**ELECTION.**—1. Definition.—Election is a purely religious idea, originating in an interior necessity of the spiritual life, as the natural explanation of the source of Its saving impulses. The movement in the soul against sin is directly traced to a cause supernatural to the sinner. Righteousness is never an ordinary thing, or a common privilege that may be ranked beside others. It is laid to the responsibility of God, whose peculiar work it is. And, as it is of His inception, its continuance and successful fruition likewise are by His agency. It began with Him, and He will perfect it, by that faithfulness which, if it be too strong to describe it as 'irresistible grace'—the compulsion of sovereign might—is indeed the pertinacity of unwearied love, of strong, wise, unerring Fatherhood over erring, weak, and foolish childhood. This is the very nerve of the doctrine of election. The stages of its working are identical. The free return of man to God springs from the passionate communication of God to man. Election is the antecedent to revelation. Election is the opposite of predestination (q.v.), with which it is at times confused. The terms are not synonymous (for election, Heb. עָבָּד, Gr. ἀπολύτης; for predestination, עָבָּד, עָבָּד, ὀπολυτῆς), nor is their connotation identical. The idea of predestination runs through Scripture, if that idea be understood in the sense of the all-controlling, all-creating activity of God over and in and through all things, but it is in no respect so central and essential to the revelation of His redemptive purpose as the idea of election. They are, however, closely related. Predestination has reference to the all-embracing, comprehensive design of the Divine in all its work—creation, providence, salvation; election refers to the special application in redemption. Again, while predestination and election embrace speculative and religious contents, they retain them in different proportions; predestination is the more speculative, election the more religious. The problems of the former arise first in the reflecting stages of religious development, when an answer is required to the question, 'How is the human soul related to the universe?' Election is not due to the philosophical instinct; it is an affirmation of the religious consciousness, expressing its certitude of the Divine, and therefore objectively valid, foundation of its religious experience. It meets the interior anxieties of the soul for saving assurance. The discussion of predestination belongs to theodicy, of election to dogmatics. Further, the doctrine of election is Biblical and theistic. It occupies a foremost place among the works of God in the OT and the NT. It derives its meaning and force solely from the system of revelation they record. It is grounded in the insistent conviction of the saved soul that salvation is derived from God. It is inconsistent with assumptions, which deny His personal agency, and which denies His personality and the beneficent character of His relation to men. It implies the reality of man's alienation from God, His sinfulness, His inability to work out his own salvation, and looks to the mercy of God to manifest a way of escape from sin and of return to Himself in reconciliation. It is thus also the presupposition of His gracious operation in the hearts of those who believe and clasp holding Him as their Rock.

2. Systematic statement.—(a) The systematic presentation of election may begin with its source in the Divine love. God is Love. Love is His nature. It is to be viewed not so much as one of His attributes—it is the one quality concerning which it is predicated of God that He is (1 Jn 4:8)—but rather as the Divine constitution in which all the attributes are combined. It is the substance of His character, regulating the relationships within the Godhead. It is also regulative of His relation towards His creatures, including mankind. It is possible to trace God's righteousness, faithfulness, mercy, and justice to love as their foundation and essence. Wherever this is the case in the Divine nature appears unending and love is viewed as an attribute, all other attributes must be regarded as reconcilable with love. Whether essence or attribute, the love of God is the fountain of His electing grace. On the former hypothesis, it is more manifestly so; on the latter, God's love is liable to be subordinated to His glory identified with His righteousness or holiness, and a moral severity, inspired by ideas most arbitrarily sovereignty, justice, and mercy, is infused into His gracious acts, so absolute as to rob them of tenderness, compassion, and beneficent efficacy. Where this procedure is followed, the election is, as a rule, that of the Divine sovereignty—the Calvinist tendency.

Although, under stress of criticism, every suggestion of caprice or arbitration is properly excluded from the idea of sovereignty, and its exercise is asserted to be conditioned by the Divine Attributes, it is, nevertheless, the case that love is considered by Calvinists, the more speculative, election the more religious. The problems of the former arise first in the reflecting stages of religious development, when an answer is required to the question, 'How is the human soul related to the universe?' Election is not due to the philosophical instinct; it is an affirmation of the religious consciousness, expressing its certitude of the Divine, and therefore objectively valid, foundation of its religious experience. It meets the interior anxieties of the soul for saving assurance. The discussion of predestination belongs to theodicy, of election to dogmatics. Further, the doctrine of election is Biblical and theistic. It occupies a foremost place among the works of God in the OT and the NT. It derives its meaning and force solely from the system of revelation they record. It is grounded in the insistent conviction of the saved soul that salvation is derived from God. It is inconsistent with assumptions, which deny His personal agency, and which denies His personality and the beneficent character of His relation to men. It implies the reality of man's alienation from God, His sinfulness, His inability to work out his own salvation, and looks to the mercy of God to manifest a way of escape from sin and of return to Himself in reconciliation. It is thus also the presupposition of His gracious operation in the hearts of those who believe and clasp holding Him as their Rock.

*This is usually regarded as the genuine reading.*

1. Calvin's phrase, as it was Augustinian's.

eighty is more judicial and retrenchive than gracious and salutary, on this view, as Calvinism yet offered an adequate rationale of the origin of election. It seeks refuge in the nature of God to look for God's universals reasons for His acts in a sphere inapposable to human understanding—... He has sufficient reasons secret to us. Doubtless; but that is reasoning on abstract principles, and not on actual precedent, His manifested nature and character. The Scriptures give its reasonings of the nature and whiteness of God is exhibited as revealed in its highest exemplification in redemption, wherein He seeks to win sinners from their depredity to His holiness and happiness; and Himself supplies the means whereby they attain those blessed ends. In that work mankind is called to exalt the power and wisdom and goodness of God, and to our advantage. They are not merely the institutions of the electing and the reprobating powers; the new reformation were to be traced to the name of Jahweh (Ex 34). Israel's God was never a reflection of the national spirit; the national spirit received its impress from His image. Jahweh was the framer of Israel, and the mould in which He casit was that of His own nature. Its institutions had little in them that was personal; what gave them meaning, transfiguring them and rendering them serviceable media for conveying Israel's formative influence, was anterior to them—the revealed name of their God. Corresponding to Jahweh must be a judicious estimate of the holds the existence of a soul to continue. His ascension is the due consequence of His resurrection. It provides the means enabling God to surrender His resentment. It leads to His self-sacrificing effort to regain men, and through His own effects, a better state of man's heart. The desire issues from love. That love is conditioned by nothing in the object or its relations; it is a universal, unerring in operation. Holiness is its content. But holiness enters in to hold it to the right thought of what is to be imparted, and to the right means of imparting it. The Divinity and right of expresseness are not antitheses, and need no reconciliation; they spring from the same root. In the Divine love, Calvinism has high merit in having vindicated God's love, as the source of election, against the claims of man's works or faith; for grace is God's gift. All alike inordinate gift of God's love is met. But Calvinism falls in its analysis of the Divine nature. Modern theology here abandons the idea of the sinless and sinning seen in the dispensation of grace something higher than a dispensation of justice; and, in the glory of God for which it works, the good of His creatures; and of course personal and fundamental content, a holy compassion, whose most imperious necessity is to seek the salvation of all mankind (2).

(b) The idea of election is progressively unfolded in the history of redemption. It includes both the history and the prophecy of OT. The story of the Hebrews is the story of Divine grace striving against human sin. It begins with the promise of restoration made to primitive man after his fall (Gen 49). The solemn occasion of Abel's sacrifice over Cain's (4), and the rescue of Noah from the Flood (ch. 6). It takes more definite shape in the calling of the patriarchs, Abraham (12-13), Isaac (33-36), Jacob (46), and Joseph (45-46)....

A fresh stage was introduced by Moses. He laid the foundations of a civic and religious polity, creatory of a sense of corporate or national individuality, based on the election of Jahweh by His chosen people. A new covenant was established, with the objects of life established by a new and a more exalted conception of God's name. The ritual and moral ordinances were designed to educate this consciousness. They imparted a unity of feeling and sense of benefit and of responsibility—beneath and within themselves, for they were merely the institutions of the electing and the reprobating powers; the new reformation were to be traced to the name of Jahweh (Ex 34). Israel's God was never a reflection of the national spirit; the national spirit received its impress from His image. Jahweh was the framer of Israel, and the mould in which He casit was that of His own nature. Its institutions had little in them that was personal; what gave them meaning, transfiguring them and rendering them serviceable media for conveying Israel's formative influence, was anterior to them—the revealed name of their God. Corresponding to Jahweh must be a judicious estimate of the holds the existence of a soul to continue. His ascension is the due consequence of His resurrection. It provides the means enabling God to surrender His resentment. It leads to His self-sacrificing effort to regain men, and through His own effects, a better state of man's heart. The desire issues from love. That love is conditioned by nothing in the object or its relations; it is a universal, unerring in operation. Holiness is its content. But holiness enters in to hold it to the right thought of what is to be imparted, and to the right means of imparting it. The Divinity and right of expresseness are not antitheses, and need no reconciliation; they spring from the same root. In the Divine love, Calvinism has high merit in having vindicated God's love, as the source of election, against the claims of man's works or faith; for grace is God's gift. All alike inordinate gift of God's love is met. But Calvinism falls in its analysis of the Divine nature. Modern theology here abandons the idea of the sinless and sinning seen in the dispensation of grace something higher than a dispensation of justice; and, in the glory of God for which it works, the good of His creatures; and of course personal and fundamental content, a holy compassion, whose most imperious necessity is to seek the salvation of all mankind (2).

1 Cf. Fairbam, Christ in Mod. Theol. 3, 1894, p. 400: "the essential gradation of His Being and the necessary graces of all His acts."
the hope of earthly prosperity is transformed into yearning for the blessings of the inner life of love and faith. 

ELECTION

The hope of earthly prosperity is transformed into yearning for the blessings of the inner life of love and faith. 

Election comes to its perfect expression in Christ. Historical in Israel, it becomes personal in Christ. The NT teaching derives its special features from His, and Its teaching founds itself on the OT development. We may summarize it so: 

1. Election was God's choice of Israel as His people. 
2. Election was purely of His grace (De 32, Ps 106). 
3. Election was extended to all people. 
4. Election was the basis of the Church's present and future existence. 

The nature of election is in conformity with the nature of the Kingdom, viz., election into a common life under one rule. It is a universal Kingdom; the choice is made by God, not by man. 

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Election is the pattern and exemplar of it. 

He is the Elect One (Lk 6:22), with whom, He is the Elect One (Lk 6:22), with whom, 

He is the Servant of the Lord, He is the Servant of the Lord, 

He is the Elect of God (Lk 4:25), and He is the Elect of God (Lk 4:25), and 

Those who are the true elect (elected, electo), for whom the Kingdom was prepared from before the foundation of the world (25:30); for God knew the sufferings of the last times; whose prayers He hears, whom He knows, and who are to rejoice because their names are written in heaven. 

To give the Kingdom to them is the Father's good pleasure. They prove themselves the elect of God, that they are obedient to the call of Christ. 

The origin of their faith is carried back to the eternal counsel of God. 

This faith itself originates not so much in their own receptivity as in the work of God and power of God. The process of their election is their continuous discipleship, referred, like its inception, to the will of God, not only in purpose, but in fact, these are in election. 

In all the foregoing no attempt is made to solve the implicit difficulties; the knots are there, not for solution, but for understanding. The future of St. James, by finding the result of Christ's work is due to Divine cause: those come whom the Father gives, those who do not come to Christ are the children of the devil. Again, those who come are those who love the truth and those who do not love darkness. All, i.e., that happens here happens in human freedom, yet under Divine causality. According to St. Peter, election fulfills itself in sanctification of spirit (1 P 1:21); in 1 P 1:28 representation seems indicated; the ethical condition of disobedience is not to be excluded). St. James sees Christians to be what they are by God's election, begetting by the word of truth, and working in them faith, love, hope (1 Th 1:2-3; 2 Th 1:2-5). 

The kernel of the Apostle's teaching is to be found in Ro 5:20 (rather than in 8:11), where election is the strongest assertion of assurance. Amid the anxieties of the age, the believer is not to be dismayed, since to those whom God loves, and who are His elect, all things work together for good—His elect, all things work together for good—

the deepest thoughts of God, who foreknows and foreordains; and whom He foreknows and foreordains He calls, justifies, and glorifies. It is a pure triumph-song of faith, declaring its own eternal salvation for its own comfort and strengthening. 

In the other locus classicus, Eph 1:4, the ground of election is God's good pleasure and free grace; its aim the holiness of the elect and their standing in the adoption of children. According to Eph 4; election accomplishes itself by incorporation into the one body, the believing community, which is effected by the acceptance of the Gospel. In the Pastoral the Apostolate is ordained to work faith in the elect. In other Epistles the assurance of election is confirmed in the conceptions of it as a prophetens eris alhers, and as being bound up with the world-plan. The ideas throughout are moral, not theoretical, the call of God, the human response to it, the statement of present experience and undeniable personal conviction that the action of God, the protection of God, and the purpose of God are upon the believer, within him, and around him, going before him and preparing him into the eternal issue. It is a thought in entire harmony with the general doctrine of the NT. 

Humanity is fallen, incapable of saving itself by its own forces, and can be redded not only by the power of grace, but salvation is offered to all. Its determining cause is the free decision of the individual. Its condition is faith in the gospel. God confers on man the power of the work of Christ, believing this presentation. Unbelief arises from neglect of the use of the means of grace. There is, at this point, a moment of determinism in the Pauline doctrine.
ELECTION

Man is so fast in the bondage of sin, so turned towards evil, that God's Spirit must accompany the word to produce saving faith. The Apostle thus asserts both election and man's liberty. He makes no attempt to reconcile them. Was the message urged in its higher reaches of his thought. The religious life to him was, in its last analysis, a rhythm of life within life, in which desire determined the flow of gifts from the including greater to the included because God meets man in the many phases of his shadowed mind, and gives Himself or what is like as man will receive; and, as He gives, the inner springs of man's self are touched, yielding the secrets of freedom and faith. The God-possessed life is the self-possessing life. Of the mechanism of the soul that sets itself against God, St. Paul had no experience: he could not describe it. Still less could he posit a decree of reprobation to explain it. In the case of the sole rejection he knew— that of the Jews—the casting away was temporary, and to be wrought against. Even so it might fare with evil, when its meaning should be taken up into the meaning of the whole. This is his history, while playing a real part, should be known as but an episode in the history of good.

From the foregoing we deduce these three assured points: (1) God's ideal Son, who is the Mediator of the Divine life, the bestower of the Divine Spirit, the express image of the Divine Person; (2) the ideal community, the elect race, the chosen body, which is to exhibit the virtues and graces of the Son; (3) Jesus, preordained in the eternal counsel to be the agent of its election, its Head, Lord, and Christ, through whom God calls, begots, and sanctifies the elect. In the Person, Work, and Church of Christ the many-sided forebodings and hopes of the OT find fulfilment. The correspondence of the fulfilment with the prophecy is not forced. We see the great lines of thought of the history and prophecy proceeding to an unknown, unimaginable end, and in the NT meeting in Christ in a wholly new combination, the spring of fresh forces and larger hopes for mankind. It is the consummation in Life of what was prepared in the OT.

If the Divine purpose is to be read in the light of its evolution, can we justly speak of non-elect? The term has no warrant in Scripture. Has the import of the following considerations may be deemed relevant: (1) Election is always of the universal many; (2) Election is neither in the OT nor in the NT rigorously restricted to the elect body; other nations besides Israel do work for Jehovah in the execution of His redemptive purpose—as, e.g., Egypt, Cyrus, etc.; similarly in the NT in every nation he that feareth God (Acts 10) and 'all nations of men on all the face of the earth,' concerning whom God 'hath determined the times before appointed, that they should seek the Lord, in the days of his power, that by grace you might be justified and have your sins remitted.' (2) The Christian hope is universal, 'not for us only, but also for the whole world' (1 John 2:2, cf. Tit 3:11, Tit 2:13). (3) The Christian hope is the only hope of men, all the face of the earth, concerning whom God 'hath determined the times before appointed, that they should seek the Lord, in the days of his power, that by grace you might be justified and have your sins remitted.' (2) The Christian hope is universal, 'not for us only, but also for the whole world' (1 John 2:2, Tit 3:11, Tit 2:13). (4) The prophecy of 'a dispensation of the fullness of the times' (Ephesians 1:22) is not limited to the church, but ultimately shall be reconciled to God, is an idea including the redemption of physical nature, with the destruction of suffering and death; the redemption of human nature, with the destruction of sin; and the redemption of the world of angels, with the destruction of the spiritual forces opposing themselves now to the Kingdom. (5) Although there is a limited to absolute universality of salvation, the case of many in Christ, not in God's counsel. Intimations of impossibilities occur, but these are not referred back to God's ordination; they arise from the condition of the spirit of men themselves. To the wicked God shows mercy—giving time and place for repentance. All shall be made alive who can be. If it should be that God's judgments pass from a disciplinary stage to a penal stage in the history of those who are the subjects of them. A degree of non-election is unthought of (in Rom 8, Eph 1, the reference is to believers only). Election is to life. And the life of the elect is the life of faith, but all are not receptive; what then? The problem is not solved. God wills all men to be saved. But all are not saved. Is the Divine will then frustrated? An intractable residuum in human nature is contemplated. Before it does God's resourcefulness fail? There will be a restitution of all things. Can it tolerate on its borders a queenless Gehenna? The antimony is left—a position acceptable perhaps to the practical religious mind, but perplexing to the reason. The final relation between the elect and the reprobate, and between the reprobate and God, is unknown. There is no experiential material on which to construct; and God's process is unassimilable. Conscience, not intellect, adjusts the problem.

The well-known chapters 9-11 of Romans are best understood as a parenthesis, touching of a very special kind of thought. The theme was a burning problem to the Apostle, hence the length at which he treats it. Its argument is wholly apart from his general experience, in line with the problem of election in the Christian teaching. It reminds us of St. Paul was a Jew, 'learned in the traditions'—as an apostle was a Christian. His arguments are these: (1) The recognition of the absolute sovereignty of God; the Jews who rejected Christ and those who accepted Him both made their respective choices in subjection to the Divine appointment. (2) This Divine election was for a certain definite purpose; the believing Jews, whom God, it was thought, the Gentiles might obtain the salvation that was through Christ. (3) The blinding thus inflicted upon a portion of the Jews was temporary, and the Gentiles for which this Divine appointment had been made, the ban would be removed; through the ministry of the Gentile Christians the unbelieving Jews would be converted to the true faith and all Israel would be saved. The absolute result was sure; if any it was because they did not make their calling sure. That this line of thought on election had its exponents in the Jewish schools may be felt in the Book of Wisdom (cf. the interesting essay by Einar Grafe in Theod. Abhandlungen Carl von Weizsacker curtus, Freiburg, 1893). "Double predetermination" is affirmed, but whether in the Augustinian or in the Calvinistic sense is another question. The Apostle's object is to set forth a wider election-doctrine than that of the Pharisees (cf. Corr. Romans, 99, Is; Sandy-Hoadlam, 'Romans,' in ICC, 1896, ad loc.), and to reduce every notion of national pride. He has not in view either the relation of God's election to freedom or the "double predetermination." 3

3. Subsequent theological reflexion.—Until the time of St. Augustine this is neither profound nor precise. Patristic thought is unspeculative. It is pervaded by a strong practical sense which shrinks from theoretical problems suggested, but not solved, by the Apostolic teaching. The mental attitude of the Fathers is determined by a close adherence to the received sacred pronouncements, and by the endeavour to repel whatever in contemporary culture appeared plainly contrary to them. In their view the unit of election tends to be the individual destiny, but the redeemed race. Again, their point of departure is not the decree of God, but the believing experience of the saved. Moreover, personal election being a matter of personal faith—faith's assurance of its own eternal worth—it cannot conjoin with itself any assertion of reprobation, since that can be no element of faith. That Jesus, in other words, has no other object than the election of His Church, that the Church lives to bring the world to God—these are the primary contents. Both the Greek and Latin doctors maintain the Divine sovereignty, man's liberty, and the reconciliation of both in God's foreknowledge. Differences first appear in the meaning attached to those doctrines; and the

1 Not necessarily understanding of man's merit. The question was not seriously discussed.
meanings emerge in their particular cast from alien prepossessions, e.g. in the East from philosophy, in the West from law. The Greek divines, influenced by the universalist strain in St. Paul's teaching, formulate a more genial concept of the world than the Latin adhering to his determinist strain, dominate man's will by God's sovereignty.

Tertullian is an exception. He unites with the Alexandrians in a view of the will which elevates it into an independent faculty, having 'freedom in both directions,' knowing both good and evil, and able to choose between them. This is not St. Paul's doctrine; he asserts of the will simply freedom from conflicting motives. East and West alike inculcate a doctrine of synergy according, to which the renewal of the soul is the result of two factors—Divine grace and man's freedom. But what is the part taken by each factor? Does the mercy of God take the initiative, or the will of man? Does the exertion of man's will precede the Divine aid? In what sense is the will free? In creating the world the East enlarges the range of human freedom, and accords saving merit to man's effort. In harmony with such positions, election is a pre-ordination of blessings and rewards for such as are foreseen to be obedient. There is no foreknowledge of sin, although there is foreknowledge of it. Justin Martyr is strenuous in repudiating Stoic fatalism. Men, he affirms, have it in their power to cast off sin by exerting their will. With Irenæus sin in men and angels is a free act. Why some fall and others do not is a mystery. There is no interference with human freedom. The blindness in those who reject the Gospel is the result of their own will, and is the usual expression less in relation to the Apostle's system of doctrine than under personal predilections.

With Augustine the whole subject assumed new and far more complex forms. His doctrine has little historical background. It was mostly a new creation from a new standpoint, drawn not from earlier Christian sources, but from the ideas he had imbulfed from his philosophical studies operating on the convictions of an intensely awakened conscience. The secret of Augustine lies in his inner growth. To appreciate aright his contribution to Christian philosophy, two considerations must be kept in view—the peculiar spiritual discipline, and the subordination of his reason to his faith. His philosophy, if he has one, is ancillary to his religion, which is real, positive, and profounding in its own way, on a level, as such, as in the monistic and antitheistic, offers unceasing suggestion, and is to be interpreted in its spirit and method rather than in its immediate content. The self-consuming, self-encircling, and confusion which resulted from his doubts and despondency, and from the secular catastrophes of his age, there were two truths that continued to cast an unceasing weight on his mind—a conviction that the human mind—Amissa in the universe, and that a Divine mind embraced the whole in an all-seeing vision. How reconcile this inarticulate perversity of a world with the being of God? The two foci of his 'system' are a monistic doctrine of unity and the theory of original or Adam's sin. The world is but the manifestation of God; God's own immediate will is the sole cause of all things. In the view of God's eternal knowledge the natural man is evil, wholly depraved, morally insufficient, and helpless, from the identity of the race and Adam (so tremendous an effect is attributed to the Fall): 'the will has power indeed for evil but not for good, except as helped by the Infinite Good.' Original sin is the basis of predestinating election. The whole human mass was so justly condemned in the apostate root that, were none rescued from that damnation, none could blame God's justice. Those who are rescued are rescued gratuitously; those who are not only show what the whole lump, even the rescued themselves, deserved, had not undeserved mercy succoured them (Enchirition, 99; cf. Ep. exciv. 6, 8). If the will of man turns to good, that is due to gracious Divine efficaciously predestining man. The regeneration is purely the work of grace. Grace is efficacious and irresistible; its action on the soul is the result of direct Divine agency. Only those predestinated to eternal life are regenerated; they are also endowed with the freedom of grace which is indestructible. They are the elect. The elect are few in comparison with the non-elect (a doctrine attributed to Scripture, and confirmed by observation); yet those thus disposed are to be considered the benefit of the former. Election is not grounded on foreknowledge of human faith or conduct; no account is given as to why some are elected and others not; there must be two classes to manifest the Divine grace; the elect are predestined, not the non-elect, the latter are in the process of corruption there passed two acts of the will of God—an act of favour and grace, choosing part to be partakers of everlasting glory; and an act of justice, forsaking the rest and adjudging them to endless perdition; these, vessels of wrath, those, of mercy.' There was no positive and efficient decree of any to eternal death; the decree of God was simply to leave the wicked in the state of perdition to which they had come. Augustine teaches preterition.

The Augustinian doctrine depressed several positions hitherto unexamined and initiated a controversy of unequalled influence throughout the medieval period, and which at the Reformation still interested the intellectual world. God as Will, an act of grace and an act of justice, a cause and not inalienable in its own constitution; grace as controlling, sanctifying, human effort; and the logical sequences of the concepts of absolutism in God and determinism in man—these ideas fill the horizon of the Middle Ages, partly by way of attraction, partly by repulsion. The strict Augustinian argument is well sustained by such theologians as Gockel, Aquinas, Bradwardine, and others, who stress the Divine grace, and at times teach the twofold predestination. The doctrine of merit is represented in such commanding minds as Iohannes Mercator, John Scotus, Etgenus, Duns Scotus, etc. The dominant point of view, however, is seen in Aquinas, who founded upon merit in the strict sense of the term as the effect of grace, and grace as the effect of predestination. He argues with Augustine that the reason why grace is rejected is man's own fault—not so much the ground of the existence of sin's guilt, but on account of his disinclination to grace by reason of original sin. The rejection in the faculty will of the race and not in the choice of the individual.

Throughout the period the controversy shifts its base from the sound facts of experience, and its net results are a less value for the idea of election than for that of predestination. Logical considerations are the determining factors. Little of practical import accrues. The modern world tacitly settled down to an absolute view of original sin; the doctrine of predestination is not reexposed, but on account of his disinclination to grace by reason of original sin. The rejection in the faculty will of the race and not in the choice of the individual.

Various hypotheses as to the connection of electing grace and man's free will have been ad-

The phrase 'liberum arbitrium' is due to Tertullian.

2 As, e.g., 'Whom he did foreknow he also did predestinate' (Rom. vii, 22); 'Whom he will he will hardeneth' (Is.); 'Jacob have I loved, Esau have I hated' (Gb).
vanced by Roman divines, and only those of the Jansenists have been condemned. The general current of opinion has been against unconditional election, in favour of synergism. In the Reformation against the Gargantuan tempests, the要不要二十一; at first more faithfully with Luther and the Lutheran Church in its subjective view. The present is more than both Lutherans and Reformed unconditional election has been abandoned. Yet synergism has not won fresh credit. Pelagianism, it is universally felt, has been finally refuted. God is sovereign, and man is free; both truths are to be retained, as Augustine blunderingly argued. The path to their reconciliations, according to modern thought, is to be found in a less juristic and more moral conception of Divine sovereignty, and in a less indistinct and more determinate theory of the human will. Present-day mental science, even with the help of the doctrines of heredity and environment, has not succeeded in rendering more determinism cogent to the modern mind. In so far it helps to confirm the belief of the bulk of the Christian Church in all ages that man's destiny is in his own hands. It prevents us equally from any ascription of predestination in its extreme, personal sense. Election in the sense of our circumstances and surroundings being made for us and not by us—this is simple and obvious enough. But if that is not the necessary result of our circumstances and surroundings the plain testimony of our conscious life. That conscious life which speaks saying, 'Thou oughtest,' makes a no less certain echo within, which says, 'Because I ought, I can.' That 'can' aside and is not constant ever, however enfeebled it may become. The social pressure may as a matter of fact be made subservient to its increase: since social coercion, if it be reasonable, is a condition of moral robustness. Similarly man's independence is secured in dependence on God. The essence of freedom is self-surrender to the Divine will.

LITERATURE.—There is a very large literature on the subject, in the majority part of which 'election' and 'predestination' are used interchangeably. A copious bibliography will be found at the end of the following treatise, The Doctrine of Predestination, Election, and Grace. London, 1889. Every modern writer on NT theology and every commentator on 'Romans' and 'Ephesians' deals with the subject—largely by way of simple exposition. The two most notable writings of the modern period are Thomas Emerson, The Doctrine of Election, London, 1877, and Schiefler, Lehrte von der Erwählung, Berlin, 1886. A. S. MAEITIN.

ELEMENT.—See ATOMIC THEORY.

ELEPHANTA.—Elephants are an island on the W. coast of India; lat. 18° 56' N.; long. 73° E.; about 6 miles from the city of Bombay, and 4 from the mainland. The native name of the island is Ghārāpurī, which has been interpreted to mean 'city of purification,' or, in the form Gārāpurī, 'city of purgation.' The Portuguese gave it the name of Elephanta, from a life-sized figure of an elephant, hewn from an isolated mass of trap-rock, which formerly stood in the lower part of the island, not far from the usual landing-place. This figure fell down many years ago, and was supposed to have disappeared; but it was discovered in 1864, and was removed to the Victoria Gardens, Bombay, where it remains in a poor condition. The elephant had originally a small figure on its back, called by some a young elephant, by others a tiger (Yule-Burnell, Anglo-Indian Gloss., s.v. 'Elephanta'). Another image, that of a horse, which once stood S.E. of the Great Cave, has disappeared. The island is famous for a splendid series of rock-cut temples. Their design is from being influenced by local tradition, were excavated by the Pāṇḍava heroes of the Mahābhārata epic, while a still wider legend attributes them to Alexander the Great, to whom some of them, as belonging to a great and ancient structures, even in parts of the country which he never reached in the course of his invasion. Fergusson, comparing them with other works of the same type, assigns their construction to the 10th cent. A.D.; Burgess dates them earlier—in the latter part of the 8th or the beginning of the 9th century. There is said to have been an inscription over the entrance of the Great Cave, which, if discovered, would probably date the date and the name of the king under whom they were excavated. This slab, according to Diogo do Conto, the Portuguese annalist, was removed by local men; but, if it ever existed, it has now disappeared.

The temple in the Great Cave is, like all Brahmanical rock-temples in W. India, dedicated to Śiva; and, according to Stevenson, it belongs to the Smārta school, that is to say, it is now, or perhaps ever, inclined to believe that it may be older than the present sectarian divisions, and that it was excavated when all the Saivas held nearly the same doctrines. In all there are six caves, of which four are fully or nearly complete; the fifth is almost entirely filled up, and the sixth is supposed to have been intended merely to provide cells for hermits. The most important of all is the Great Cave, which, excluding the porches and back aisle, forms an irregular square of about 9½ ft. in both directions. This contains that striking piece of sculpture, a colossal bust, known as the Trimūrti, or 'trinity' ('trinity' being an inappropriate expression for this Hindu combination of gods), which stands at the back of the cave, facing the entrance. It undoubtedly represents Śiva as the supreme deity; but there has been much difference of opinion as to the designation of the three faces. That in the centre is probably Śiva, the creator of the universe; or, as some say, Brāhma, who, according to the legend, sprang from the left side of Siva to create the world. That on the left of the spectator is believed to be the Vedic Rudra, in later times identified with Siva, the Destroyer. The third face is that on the right of the cave, a head with a gentle, placid, almost feminine look; and, though generally, and perhaps rightly, regarded as that of Siva in the character of Viṣṇu, has by some been identified with Pārvati, the śakti, or consort, of Śiva. Like many of the Elephanta sculptures, this group has been badly mutilated, even in recent times, by thoughtless or mischievous visitors. It has now been placed under the protection of a guard. Enough, however, remains to show the wonderful beauty and dignity of the sculpture. On each side of the recess in which the Trimūrti stands are figures of the giant wanderers, minor gods on their promotion, who act as protectors (devārapalā) of the god. The shrine (garbha) of the temple contains in the centre a base, or altar, in which is the lingam, or phallic emblazon of Śiva. Eulogies of this Śiva, cut from a stone of harder and closer grain than that out of which the temple has been excavated.

This plain stone, the mysterious symbol representative of Śiva as the male, or active, or production, or creator, or the passive in nature—as the yoni, or circle in which it stands, is of the passive or female power—in the land of the temple, the central object of Śiva, or to which everything else is only accessory or subsidiary (Burgess, p. 9).

In the compartment east of the Trimūrti is a
group of many figures surrounding a representation of the famous Siva, Lokesvara, half male and half female, known as Ardhanarîśvara, accompanied by Vîṣṇu riding on the bird Garûda (whom Ferguson would connect with Assyrian beliefs), Indra, and Brahmâ, who are here represented as attending upon Siva. The arcing compartment on the west side is occupied by Siva and Pârvatî, the mountain-goddess, his consort. The figures are not really nude (which is a Jaina rath) but a Brahmânical habit, the drapery being carved in the conventional style, which represents only the thicker folds and hems.

Passing to the west porch, we come to the famous group of the marriage of Siva and Pârvatî, who here represent the primordial pair from whose union the fertility of the soil and the increase of the human race, cattle, and crops are assured. The scene, unfortunately now much damaged, seems to depict the meeting of the bridal pair, accompanied by Brahmâ, Vîṣṇu, or Sûrya, the sun-god, the mother of the bride, and Sarasvâtî, the goddess of eloquence, who blesses the union. Following this scene is a reintegration of Siva and Pârvatî in Kailâsâ, the paradise of the celestial mountain, under is the ten-faced Râvana, king of Lanka or Ceylon, whose exploits are recorded in the Râmâyâna. Opposite the marriage of Siva is one of the most remarkable scenes in the caverns in the face of the principal figure indicative of rage, the lips set, with tusks projecting from the corners of the mouth. This has usually been considered to represent Vira-hadra, one of the Siva incarnations (avatâra). It is more probably BhîshmA, the reincarnation of the poet Rûdra, who seems to be derived from the non-Aryan demonology—one of the most common objects of worship among the Marâthâ people, by whom it is also known as Kapalâbhyt, 'skull-wearer,' or Mahâkâla, Time personified as the Great Destroyer. In this aspect Siva was worshipped by the Kapalâkî sect, naked mendicants who wore skulls round their necks, and drank from a cup formed out of a human skull (see Asmont). Farther on, Siva is depicted performing the Tanđava dance, which he does in the character of Bhûtasvâra, "lord of ghosts and goblins," haunting comets, and also as that of Cakrâkaras, attended by troops of imps, trampling on rebellions demons, heated by drink, and followed in the dance by his spouse Devû—another example of the absorption, in the main, of non-Aryan elements in the innumerable Aryan devil-worship. Here he also appears as Mahâkâla, the 'great, ascetic,' his image closely resembling that of Buddha, with whom this side of his cultus was doubtless closely connected. Burgess (p. 41) explains this as due in part to the circumstance that the Brahmanas excavated their cave temples in imitation and rivalry of the Bhâtanjas. The Bhûshana or Bandha ascetics wore yellow robes, and in imitation of them probably the Shiva Yogis and mendicants adopted tawny-coloured clothes. Buddha was regarded by his followers as the Great Ascetic, and this may have tempted the early Shivaism to give prominence to a similar characteristic in the representation of their favorite object of worship.

The second rock-temple has been injured, and little of the sculpture remains capable of description or identification. The third temple is still more dilapidated. In the fourth there were, according to Diogo do Conto, two images of Vetâm, lord of demons, and of Chandî, or Dûrgâ in her naked aspect; but these have long since disappeared. The temple contains Saiva festivals, and a fair is held at the feast of the Sivarâtrî, or 'Siva's night,' on the 14th of the dark half of Mâgha (about the middle or end of February). It is a fast, observed by day and a vigil by night, and there is celebrated the worship of the Lingam.

LITERATURE.—The literature connected with Elephanta is voluminous. The best account of the place, on which this article is largely based, is that of J. Burgess, The Rock Temples of Elephanta or Gharâbhir, with excellent photographs by J. H. Sykes (Bombay, 1874; 2nd ed., 1887); reprinted, with numerous illustrations, in 1875. This is accompanied by a map of the island on a great scale. For Siva and Pârvatî, the mountain-goddess, his consort, see: Feyer, New Account of E. India and Perâs (1809), p. 125; Ovington, Voyages in S. India (1816), p. 156; Green, Voyage to E. India (1823), p. 289; Ives, History of the Continent of India (1773), p. 42; Nieuhof, Voyage in Arabie et dans d'autres pays circinniant de l'Orient, p. 422; The Mem. of M. the Draper, was being carried in the conventional style, which represents only the thicker folds and hems.

ELKESAITES.—The adherents of a form of religion having baptism as its leading feature, which arose c. A.D. 100, probably in trans-Jordanian Palestine. It was intended to mark a renewal in Judaism, and was originally a Jewish sect.

I. The literary traditions.—The sources of our information regarding the Elkiesaites and their founder are far from abundant.

Enesius (III 8 63) speaks of the 'perversion of the Elkiesaites' as something quite ephemeral in character, and quotes from a shortly before the death of Nestorius (c. 430) as a passing reference to the proceedings of Elkiesaites missionaries, to their sacred book, and to their offer of remission of sins. For any definite knowledge regarding the sect, as well as for light upon its not wholly insignificant history, we are entirely dependent upon the heretical literature of the Elkiesaites.5 The principal work narrates the doings of the Elkiesaites Alchibads in Rome, while the latter reconstructions of the Elkiesaites propaeganda in Syria; but to both writers we are even more indebted for their extracts from the Elkiesaites book of revelation. This document was known to the Alchibads themselves. It contains references to dimensions which is quoted by both, the reduction of the Oriental measures into Roman feet is given by each in identical terms. The copy of the work which Hippolytus used was that which Alchibads had taken to Rome. But, in fact, written by Alchibads himself in the style of Nesius, the condition of the MS. was such that both Hippolytus and Erasmus were now and again compelled simply to guess at the construction, with the result that mistakes have crept into their accounts. But its references and quotations are in the main of sufficient character as to give us some idea of the book was not a large one, and that hardly anything of real importance in it has been lost. As yet, however, the task of using the fragments as materials for a connected history of Elkiesaites and his work has never been taken in hand, and there is the aim of the ability of a fresh text to do this good.

In connexion with the various points dealt with in what follows, cf. Hippolytus, Philostratus, Euseb. (Refutatio omnium heresim), i. 13-17, ii. 15. (Miller, pp. 192-207, 208: Epiph., Hier. xix. xxx. 17, iii. (pp. 40-44, 141, 397, 641); Euseb., H. c. 32, 329); the account given by Theodoret (Hist. Pol. ii. 7) is wholly dependent upon these other authorities, and contributeth nothing to the elucidation of the obscure points. The Arabic record of the Mughâlas (see above) are given in the original, with a German tr., by Chwolson, Die Staatsver. der Sasaniden, ii. 454, and by G. Flogel, Münch. Gesellschaft's Forschungen, Leipzig, 1865, pp. 48, 84, 133.

(2) The name.—The Elkiesaites are so named from an Aram. formation which the Gr. tradition represents as φιλοχαίτος (Hipp.) or φιλεκάτος (Epiph.). The second element of this word may quite likely be a transliteration of Aram. 'hîth.' As yet, however, the task of using the fragments as materials for a connected history of Elkiesaites and his work has never been taken in hand, and there is the aim of the ability of a fresh text to do this good.

In connexion with the various points dealt with in what follows, cf. Hippolytus, Philostratus, Euseb. (Refutatio omnium heresim), i. 13-17, ii. 15. (Miller, pp. 192-207, 208: Epiph., Hier. xix. xxx. 17, iii. (pp. 40-44, 141, 397, 641); Euseb., H. c. 32, 329); the account given by Theodoret (Hist. Pol. ii. 7) is wholly dependent upon these other authorities, and contributeth nothing to the elucidation of the obscure points. The Arabic record of the Mughâlas (see above) are given in the original, with a German tr., by Chwolson, Die Staatsver. der Sasaniden, ii. 454, and by G. Flogel, Münch. Gesellschaft's Forschungen, Leipzig, 1865, pp. 48, 84, 133.
of the Mughtasila (baptists of the Egyptian), viz. אֲשֶׁר, as read in the manuscripts of Kitab al-
Fārist, concludes the aspiration of the first letter, and therefore also the derivation of ṣa from ṣ, 'power.' The Arab spelling, in fact, seems rather to imply the transliteration of the original expression as ṣayyin, 'hidden God.' Still, as the Arab name bears no vowel-signs, and also lacks the diacritical points without which the last three consonants cannot be exactly pronounced, it may be pronounced in various ways, and its real meaning may have been something quite different. The conventional form 'Elkesai' makes its appearance for the first time in Theodoret, who derived it from Origen's Exe-
drais; this, again, is a variation of Exeouas, and the form Exeouas gained currency only through a confusion between the name of the sect and the surname of the prophet Nahum, וּפְרָש, of which it is the regular Gr. transliteration in the LXX.

A view that has received considerable support is that the name 'Elkesai' applies to the sacred book itself, and not to its author at all. But there are sound grounds for accepting this theory, which, moreover, involves a quite useless distinction. As we shall see presently, there was a real personality behind the book.

(8) The Book of Elkesai.—Tradition affirms that Elkesai held the possession of the verses—as a book of revelation—from the very outset of his career, but it gives widely varying accounts of the means by which he obtained it. The Elkesaite mission, which with whom Origen was acquainted are said to have held that it fell down from heaven. Another account—or perhaps two—was inserted by the above-mentioned Aleibiades in his own copy of the work, immediately before the text, which began with the chapter describing a vision vouchsafed to Elkesai. Hippolytus decried as much of this inserted note as he was able, and reproduces it thus:

'The righteous man Elkesai received the book from Sera [or Serai (a city or 'the heroes,' i.e. the Chinese)] in Parthia, and entrusted it to one named Sobai, as having been revealed by an angel, he who was twenty-four ephyes in height, six in breadth, etc.'

On this we would remark that the original writer of the note obviously did not know how the book had come into existence, and that his fictitious statement was intended to give interest in the work, on the principle that curiosity plays most assiduously around things of remote origin; while, again, the phrase 'revealed by an angel,' so far as regards the modern Greek writer, merely represents an idea in the mind of Hippolytus himself, who thus sought—unwarrantably and wrongly—to connect the statement of Aleibiades with the vision recorded in the text of the book: probably a few words at the end of the note were illegible.

Apart from these prefatory lines, and a few passages subsequently interpolated or reinserted, the book undoubtedly owes its existence to the founder of the sect. But it would, of course, be altogether wrong to suppose that the founder delivered no fresh oracles (commandments, directions about ritual, predictions, etc.) while engaged in dis-
sminating his teachings and governing his ad-
herents. The deep veneration accorded to his descendants at a later day goes to show that in his lifetime he had acquitted himself among his intimate disciples as a man of God, while many features of his book point so clearly to the speaker's conviction regarding his Divine call as a prophet that it is impossible to believe other-
wise. But we are not disposed to press his work in the light of this idea, and take into ac-
count not only their dictation but also the diversi-

fied character of their matter, we come inevitably to the conclusion that the Book of Elkesai came into existence by some such process as subsequently took place in the case of the Qur'ān, i.e., by piecing together the separate sheets on which the pro-
phet's utterances had from time to time been tran-
scribed. After Elkesai's death his followers could fall back upon the written record, and could pro-
mise salvation to all sinners 'as soon as ye hearken unto this book'; but, while he will live, he must assuredly have insisted—as did, of course, also his disciples—upon submission to himself as Diviney inspired. The theory that the prophet, as occasion arose, uttered his oracles, command-
ments, decisions, etc., which were then written down upon separate sheets and circulated among his followers, is that which best accords with the contents of the extant text.

2. Personality and work of Elkesai.—As regards the life and personality of Elkesai, all that the literary tradition tells us is that he was a pro-
duct of Judaism, was regarded as a righteous man, and announced the new dispensation and remission of sins in the third year of the Emperor Trajan. We learn, further, that the Essenes and Ebionites accepted him, i.e., either the man him-
self as a prophet, or, at a later period, his dis-
inctive teaching. But the appearances, reminiscences, and other citations from the sacred book give us so definite an impression not only of his doctrines, but also of his personality and his labours, that we are able in many cases to reconstruct the attendant circumstances without great risk of error.

(1) Doctrinal and ritual.—Elkesai required his adherents to practise circumcision, to observe the Sabbath, and, in general, to live according to the Jewish Law. He also sanctioned marriage. It is probable that the prohibition of flesh-eating ascribed to him, perhaps erroneously, by Epi-
phanios extended only to participation in the sacrificial meals of the heathen. He insisted strongly on the practice of turning towards Jeru-
salem in prayer, and forbade that of praying towards the East—an injunction meant, no doubt, for the heathen, and perhaps also the Essenes among his followers. He believed in the One God of Judaism and in the Last Judgment. He also shared the Jewish belief in various classes of angels, and believed that God dwells with the stars in the northern region of the sky.

Elkesai was not a learned man. The extant fragments of his book show not the slightest evi-
dence of his having studied the Jewish Scriptures. He imagined that he was proficient in astrology, and he had heard of the elements of which the world is composed; but in these things likewise his knowledge was of the scantiest. In an astro-
logical passage of his book the days 'when the moon travels past, or in the same path with them [the stars of the north],' are designated 'days of the dominion of the evil stars,' on which accord-
ingly no task should be done, though this dominion was the Sabbath. But the third day was also evil: 'when another three years of the Emperor Trajan have elapsed . . .' war would break out among the ungodly angels of the north, and a con-
vulsion of all ungodly kingdoms would ensue. The prophet had, of course, the Roman Empire in his mind, and, as the catastrophe did not take place, this unfounded prediction is a positive corrobora-
tion of the truth that Elkesai lived and taught before the end of the reign of Trajan.

The principal feature of the Elkesaite form of religious art was its practice of baptism. Elkesai pro-
claimed that the soul of the body—the garments being retained—in the waters of a river or a spring was the means whereby the Divine
ELESSAITES was his ecstatic, to appear, But, in He they is seven embrace Elkesai. true the this
remission of all sin was to be appropriated. That which other forms of religion sought to secure by sacrificial rites on areas as was effected here by the waters of baptism. The rite must be performed ‘in the name of the great and most high God,’ or [conjectural reading] with adoration of Him; and the candidate had to lie naked before his immersion, that he would henceforth abstain from all sin and all impiety in life and conduct.

Precisely the same ceremonial was to be observed when a demon or a venoms animal. Those who suffered from phthisis and those who were possessed with demons were ordered to immerse themselves in cold water, i.e. in a river or a well, forty times in the course of seven days; and, if they were unable to do this for themselves, the immersion had to be performed, and the requisite vows uttered, on their behalf, by others. This sacramental bath, as we interpret it, was designed to expel the demons and disease-spirits who seek to destroy the body. In all religions, no doubt, certain sacramental ceremonies, such as baptism, laying on of hands, being buried in the earth, &c., are believed to work similar effects on the bodily condition, but among the Elkesaites the belief was an officially formulated doctrine. One of their formulae for immediate effects of baptism, is the following.

But, as it contains a reference to ‘this book,’ i.e. the Book of Elkesai, and also gives the series of the Elkesaites ‘witnesses to the oath’ (see below) in a later transcription dating from a time when the Greek translation was about to appear, the rule in question has not come down to us in its original form.

We do not venture to affirm that the use of the sacrament set forth in this fragment was not appointed by Elkesai himself and first used in the community at a later date (see 2 K 213).

Elkesai must have instituted still another sacramental ceremony—of which, however, we hear only indirectly (see below)—viz. a communion with bread and salt. A ceremony of this kind, designed to ratify a covenant, was known among the Jews (cf. Lv 22, Nu 18, 2 Ch 13); it betokened fellowship at the same table, and thus expressed a solidarity of life or interest amongst the parties. In the Elkesaites celebration, however, the bread and salt must have been credited with magical virtues—beneficent in their nature, of course, yet capable of producing the opposite effects in the case of faithless or otherwise unworthy participants, just as with the water of the Christian Eucharist (1 Co 11).

The precise nature of the beneficent effects in the case before us remains unknown; the Contestatio Iacobi (in the [pseudo-] Clementine Homilies), cap. 6, reads like a reminiscence of the Elkesaites practice.

(2) The ‘witnesses to the oath.’—The Elkesaites practice of invoking the elements as witnesses of the baptismal vow presupposes the belief that the saving effects of sacramental rites might be changed into the opposite effects; it was supposed that they would prove fatal to those who took the oath falsely. Elkesai enjoined that such an invocation should be made at the celebratory services, the elements being called to witness the vow of a holy and upright life that had to be uttered, before immersion, by all desirous of securing the promised blessing.

With the ceremonial elements (bread and salt) he here associated those of the cosmos, to which mankind must likewise look as the source not only of blessing but also of the worst of evils. Elkesai knew of the central element, that of the cosmos, water, fire, air, and ether, as enumerated in the teaching of the Greek schools from Aristotle’s day. In his ignorance, however, he substituted for ‘air’ its most palpable manifestation, viz. wind, or the wind. ‘Earth,’ again, he interpreted as ‘the earth,’ and maintained according that the heaven likewise should have a place among the elements; while, to balance this addition, he rejected fire, which, from its association with sacrifice, he was unwilling to admit into his scheme. The ceremonial and advocacy before his immersion, that he would henceforth abstain from all sin and all impiety in life and conduct.

(3) Personality of Elkesai.—The baptism of Elkesai alike in its object—the remission of sins—and its preliminary condition—the pledge of a changed life—reminds us of the mission of John, the Baptist. But there was little in common between the two men. It is true that, in the earlier period of his career, Elkesai, like John, believed in an impending convulsion which would dissolve the existing order and which furnished no ground for believing that he expressly set before himself the task of teaching repentance to his own people and arousing their conscience.

The general conception of the Baptist (as, e.g., which he gives a reason why fire should not be trusted, and why water is better) scarcely suggests the impassioned propagandist. With perfect composure of spirit he enjoins that proselytes—his converts from heathendom—had first of all to embrace Judaism—shall not be baptized on the Sabbath. He looked for success not to some sudden thrill of emotion which predictions of woe would excite among the people, but to the approval which those who believed in a Divine retribution would accord to his teaching. He thus counted upon the convincing power with which his declarations and arguments, instinct as they were with the note of assurance, would impress all who were prepared to listen to them with a serious mind. As one who received revelations, he must have been an ‘ecclesiastic,’ but he was no less a man of practical judgment, with a clear eye for ways and means.

On the other hand, Elkesai did not lack that inner experience which forms the dynamic of all outstanding personalities in the religious sphere. We have an evidence of this in his secret written word, which, with the Christian Eucharist (1 Co 11), the precise nature of the beneficent effects in the case before us remains unknown; the Contestatio Iacobi (in the [pseudo-] Clementine Homilies), cap. 6, reads like a reminiscence of the Elkesaites practice.

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majority of his followers from their ranks. This seems to be implied by the concluding words of the lines prefixed to the copy of his book used by Hippolytus: words to the effect that the author had entrusted the work, as a revelation, to a certain man, No. 3 (i.e., the man who would relates the facts here); and further, in the marginal gloss, υπό της τόλμης is—apart from the terminal vowel, which is wanting—an exact transliteration of the Aram. ｇｂ’Ale’a’yah, which is the passive participle of a verb signifying ‘to stain,’ ‘to wash,’ and also ‘to bathe’; and, as a distinction of voice in the Greek, the last of these mean ‘the bathed,’ ‘the baptized.’ This term, then, as it was found in the prefatory note regarding the book, i.e., regarding its actual contents, the utterances of Elkesi himself, may be taken as indicating that his earliest adherents were not of Jewish race, but heathens who had submitted to the proselytic baptism of Judaism only in order to secure the salvation proclaimed by him. His injunction against baptizing proselytes on the Sabbath proves beyond question, indeed, that he not seldom gained accessions from the ranks of heathenism.

(b) The Essenes.—Among the Jews the sect of the Essenes was the acme of all the Jewish ascetic communities. From the time of the Jewish war this group of zealous baptists had settled in the district to the east of the Jordan, where they had opportunity to follow up their extreme asceticism with an astute and well-sustained argument. Elkesi’s teaching was in many points akin to their own. Burnt-offerings had already been discarded by their fathers, even while the altars of the true God were still burning at Jerusalem. It is likely enough, too, that a belief in astral deities would prevail in a community which worshipped the sun at his rising. Whether the Essenes abandoned that worship in compliance with a general injunction against turning to the East in prayer, we do not know. That in their other prayers they observed the gībālā towards Jerusalem may be inferred from the fact that they had been in the habit of sending dedicated offerings to the Temple.1 Nevertheless, they must have in some degree maintained their distinctive character and their separate existence as a community, else Epiphanios could not have spoken of the remnant of their adherents in his day as a definite group among the Essenes.

(c) The Jewish Christians.—The teaching of Elkesi found an open door also among the Jewish-Christian communities whose language was the Aramaic, the existing representatives of the earliest churches founded by the Apostles of Jesus and their associates—the recollection of the baptism preached by the forerunner of Jesus would still be of some influence; and, moreover, their long-protracted waiting for the Savior’s return from heaven, as well as their disappointment that one ‘sign of the time’ after another had proved abortive, must inevitably have tended to predispose them to welcome a new revelation. With a view to winning their whole-hearted allegiance, Elkesi circulated among them a document in which he related how there had appeared to him two figures of monstrous size, a male and a female, facing each other like a pair of statues; the male was the Son of God, the female was the Holy Spirit.2 In order to gain credence for this story, he averred that the figures—of equal magnitude—stood between two mountains, and that he was thus enabled to ascertain their dimensions: they were twenty-four χόρδαν high (nearly 36 ft., i.e., about 10½ m.). He also took care to represent the vision as a token of God’s approval of himself and his work, stating that these beings are invisible to man, and had manifested themselves to him only by way of exception. The story was quite in keeping with the religious notions of these Jewish Christians. The ‘Gospel’ of the Nazareans in Berœa, according to Origen and Jerome, contains in substance some of these words: ‘My mother, the Holy Spirit, took me by one of my hairs, and conveyed me to the top of the lofty mount Tabor.’ In any case the imposture—we can call it nothing else—was successful. Epiphanios maintains that the ‘Napœtæn,’ like the Essenes and the ‘Nazareans,’ were imposed upon by the heresy of Elkesi; and, while this statement does not apply to all Nazarenes or Jewish Christians, we can quite well believe that a large proportion of the pre-Catholic Christians of Syria, and especially those occupying the district to the east of the Jordan—probably it was the latter only who as yet called themselves Epiphanios, ‘the poor’—yielded their allegiance to Elkesi. In a later age the Catholic Christianity of the East surrendered in similar fashion to Islam, and with less excuse. Cf. art. ENOISM.

(d) The post-Elpasian career of Elkesi.—Elkesi had thus become the hierarch of a confraternity which, if it did not count its members by tens of thousands, had nevertheless a considerable influence, and probably a wide influence, in Syria. Presently he had, of course, to deal with the cares and troubles incident to a position like his. The members of his communities came to him with their grievances. As Jews, they were subject to the tyranny and chicanery of special taxation; as monotheists, who would not bow to the gods of the State or the statues of the Emperor, they were exposed to persecution of all sorts. Elkesi, willing to save them from such persecutions, issued a further document to his faithful followers, permitting them in the last resort to deny their faith with the lips, while still loyal to it in their hearts. So long as they withheld their inward assent, it was no sin, in times of persecution, to worship idols, to take part in the sacrificial meals associated with such worship, and, in short, to renounce their religion in words. Elkesi vindicated this policy by adducing the example of a Jewish priest called Phinehas, who, during the Babylonian captivity—under King Darius in Susa—was saved from death by an act of homage to Artemis.

When we bear in mind that this was a case where a religious leader of strongly self-reliant character granted to others an indulgence which promised no personal advantage to himself, we cannot but see in the action a certain humane consideration and a high degree of tolerant kindliness. But leniency in religious things is not what we look to find in the founder of a sect—not, at least, until the closing stages of his career, when the fires of enthusiasm are quenched and the mind has attained to peace. We may thus venture to surmise that this dispensation was Elkesi’s last proclamation—the message of a man no longer young, whose sole remaining wish was to prove himself an attentive shepherd to his flock, and leave among them a legacy of gracious memory. Are his people persecuted? Be it so; let them heed the word of the ungodly, and the devil. In the great Day of Judgment it is his leader’s testimony that will count. He, Elkesi, will then bear witness, on behalf of his faithful ones, that their denial was but make-believe, not the expression of their inmost thought. It must have been in some such frame of mind and with some such conviction that he issued his permission to deny their faith.

It is probable that this dispensation in its original form included an instruction which Hippolytus wrongly interprets as referring to the whole book. The instruction is in these words:

2 We must remember that the Semitic mind quite naturally represented the Holy Spirit as female, the Semitic equivalent of spirit being feminine.
from which he quoted a commandment requiring that after cohabitation a man shall bathe often, and in his clothes also, and those who had been bitten by a venomous animal, directing them to bathe in water and invoke four pairs of names, these being compiled from the two lists of the seven Elkesiates' witnesses' (Harr. xxx. 2. 17, p. 141 ff.)

(3) The Elkesiates mission to the West.—About the year 220 of our era a group of Elkesiates in the Syrian littoral who possessed the Greek version of their sacred book, were of a spirit so vigorous and enterprising that they sought scope for it in an attempt to propagate their doctrines in other parts of the Roman Empire. They proposed to send missionaries to the West, and that these should appear to the Catholic clergy as adherents of the book, to the members, asking them to hearken to its message and assent to it, and should then, on condition of their doing this, invite them to undergo initiation for the purpose of dividing, in one chapter of the book in particular they placed no small reliance, as it seemed to be precisely of such a character as would dispose the Christians to look favourably on the book as a whole. This was the Christological section, which, if only that, might not go further than the Greek version, and which contained the doctrine that Christ had appeared often in the course of the world's history.

Epiphanius confesses that he did not fully understand the passage in question, and that, in particular, he could not make out whether the Christ spoken of was the Lord Jesus or another. Finally, or rather, as an act of supplementation, he added a short note connecting—on quite fallacious grounds—the figment of the two gigantic forms with a certain doctrine of Jewish-Christian gnosti. according to which Christ was the Adam created in Paradise, and in his several advents simply represented for the time the body of Adam, as required in the other hand, says explicitly that the Elkesiates Christology proceeds upon the Pythagorean idea of transmigration, and actually quotes in this connection a word (εξωπρόφητος) associated with that doctrine. But, when he tells us that in the Christological teaching of the Elkesiates Christ was said to have been 'born of the Virgin this time,' we feel that he is supplementing from his own creed, for this has been expressly stated in the document. Epiphanius could scarcely have had any dubiety in the matter, but would have known that by 'Christ' the Elkesiates meant the Lord Jesus.

From the remaining data of the two heresiologists, so far as they agree, we infer that the later Elkesiates Christology was somewhat as follows: Christ is a higher being, was fashioned in Paradise as Adam, and since then has been born—not merely once, as now, but repeatedly in the course of previous ages—in various personalities as a man like other mortals. But such a doctrine is hardly open to doubt in that the fragment under consideration it was implied that not only Jesus, but also Elkesai, was an incarnation of the Christ, and, indeed, that the latest and most notable manifestation of the great being was none other than Elkesai, not Jesus of Nazareth. Now Elkesai himself cannot have believed this, as he had made it known that the Son of God had appeared to him in a form of encod for prophecies. And it is much more likely that this fact was overlooked by the later generation of his adherents. The Christological section, as the present writer thinks, first saw the light at the time when the Elkesiates—in Apania or in other places—were preparing for their book for their Western mission. The period and the locality both tended to favour the delusion that the Catholic communities would be satisfied with the faithful pious doctrine. It seems to have been at this time also that an addition was made to the directions for the sin-purging rite of immersion, the formula 'in the name of the great and most high God' being supplemented by the words 'and in the name of Christ.' The smaller interpolation was meant, of course, to serve the same purpose as the larger.

The apostles of the Elkesiates faith, thus fur-
lished with a revised edition of their book, then set forth to the conquest of Catholic Christendom. Orig, in a discourse directed against them, says that they ventured to approach the Churches. But they were quite unable to win a firm footing anywhere. Nor is this book wondered at, as the enterprise rested upon a wholly deceptive apprehension of the doctrines, the rites, and the general conditions of the Catholic world.

Our further knowledge of the undertaking is derived from the efforts of Alcicides, a citizen of the important town of Apamea on the Orontes, who directed the Elkesaites mission in Rome. He found the Roman Church in a condition that seemed altogether favorable to his designs, and he determined to take full advantage of the fact. Bishop Callistus (A.D. 217-222) had shown himself unwilling to exclude sinners from the fellowship of the Church, even for sins of the flesh, the usual penalty of which had been excommunication. It was asserted by his opponents that this leniency had caused the prevalence of precisely that kind of sins; but Callistus maintained that Christ forgave all who repents, and that, the second time in the name of the great and most high God, and in the name of his Son the great king, and purify and cleanse himself, and take to witness the seven witnesses recorded in this book: the heaven and the water and the holy spirits and the angels of prayer and the oil and the salt and the earth.

Again I say, of adulterers and adulteresses and false prophets (i.e. heretical teachers), if ye will be converted, that thereby your sins may be forgiven, so ye likewise shall have peace and a portion with the just, as soon as ye have hearkened to this book and baptized the second time, in your clothes (Philos. 10. p. 294)."

Here we recognize at a glance the hand of the reviser, the reference to ‘this book,’ the name of the second time in the name of the great and most high God, the list of witnesses in its later form. But we also note, as something altogether new, the passive use of ‘baptize’; the sinner is to ‘let himself be baptized,’ moreover ‘for the second time.’ We cannot well imagine that the latter changes in the two texts had been made in Syria in anticipation of the projected mission to the Christians of the West. For one thing, it is quite incredible that any missionary religion would from the outset entertain the thought of finding its converts in a class of persons that could only cover it with odium. For another, it is certain that the text used by Epiphanius either did not contain these particular directions for the sin cancelling ablation at all, or, at least, did not contain them in the form which Hippolytus found in the copy of Alcicides—the form, that is to say, proving expressive for sinners usually regarded as of the grossest type, and containing the summons to the second baptism. Neither of these features had been as yet assimilated by Epiphanius, nor would he have failed to demand them. In point of fact, the two passages—or, so far as regards the first, its extant version—must have been composed by Alcicides himself, after he had made approaches to the doctrine of the heathen Callistus. He addresses the Christians in exactly the same manner as their own teachers, viz. as children (a form which, it is true, had been used also by Elkesai, seeking thus to coax them to his side, and keep them there; for he had but one end in view—the formation among them of a community that should hold the Book of Elkesai in reverence. The idea of the second baptism must have struck him as full of promise for his purposes; and so, with a view to its adoption, he composed the two verses quoted above, containing respectively the ritual for gross sinners and the solicitation or summonses to the second baptism. For the former he found a pattern in Elkesai's prescription for the bite of a mad dog, and the style of the original is cleverly imitated in the successive 'or . . . or . . . .' of the interpolation.

But it was all a beating of the air: these accommodations to Roman Christianity were of no avail. Under Bishop Callistus, sinners were sure of leniency and remission without exorbitant penances, and this, moreover, within the pale of their ancestral Church; what further end could be served by their becoming Elkesaites?

The sole remaining expedition of the Syrian missionaries worthy of mention was the attempt of Elkesai, which, 30 years of fact, they themselves no longer fully understood. It is possible that some inexperienced or uneducated or unintelligent Christians were drawn to them by a liking for the novelty of the new religion which had formed a little Elkesaites group. But any such community must have been short-lived, for there was no practical interest to bind the members together. In short, it result of the Elkesaites propaganda in Catholic Christianity was such that Eusebius could speak of the movement as having arisen, and then presently came away.

(4) Later Fortunes of the Sect in the East.—In the meantime, as Catholic Christianity supplanted Jewish Christianity Elkesai, all the Jewish Christians were united in sympathy and interest. They, the Jews, who believed in every page of the New Testament, were the ideal of the Elkesaites. It was the ideal of the Elkesaites, and was the practice of the Elkesaites. They held that life arose from water. They were Elkesai as their teachers, and in their midst lived two women, sisters, who were descended from them. The members were accustomed to bend the knee to these women, and even to follow them for the purpose of securing their spittle and the dust from their feet, preserving these in capsules, which they carried as amulets. In most matters of creed and ritual they were at one with Judaism; nevertheless they were not Jews. Their distinguishing peculiarity was their reverence for the Book of Elkesai, and they did not own the authority of either the Old or New Testament. Incorporated with them were the Ebionites, the Nasaraeans, the Nazaramas, and the Osseans.

With reference to this point, Epiphanius states that the last-named sect, i.e. the Essenes, had ‘now’ renounced Judaism, and no longer lived in the manner of the Jews.

The only conclusion we can draw from these data is that the Elkesaites had given up that particular feature of Judaism to which the Essenes was attached—union and a principle of isolation for the Jewish people, i.e. their observance of legal purity in food and drink, and their consequent refusal to eat with the heathen. This defect of this sect the occurrence of a new name as a distinctly heathen cast forms a sufficient ground for thinking
it probable that a group of Syrians of non-Jewish race affiliated with the Elkesiates, and accepted their sacred book, but did not observe the Jewish regulations about food. The name 'Sampseans,' if we may trust the accuracy of its traditional form, means 'the same men,' or 'the sun-like,' not 'sun-worshippers' or the like. It prompts the conjecture that the 'Sampseans' were really a family, and indeed one of high standing. They would seem likewise to have been well-to-do, perhaps also of a semi-sacerdotal order, with the civil authorities, and on these grounds to have rapidly risen to great influence in the Elkesiates fellowship. The two great-granddaughters of the prophet willingly accepted their obeisance, while the Elkesiates by birth did not refrain from sitting with their new associates at meals; and it was for the sake of the latter that the former discarded the Jewish laws regarding food, and thus broke away from the community to which they— as a somewhat unacceptable party, it is true—had hitherto belonged. Socially, therefore, the older group may be said to have united with the newer, rather than with the newer with the older, and this circumstance took effect also upon the nomenclature. The Sampseans of Elkesaism did not surrender their high-sounding name. They were the most eminent section of the order; they became its leading group, and, when outsiders concerned with the community as the 'sun-like ones,' the older Elkesiates actually felt flattered, and, indeed, soon began to apply the new name to themselves.

The Elkesiates may have maintained for centuries their tranquil existence in the little-visited district watered by the Eastern tributaries of the Jordan, but the voice of tradition is henceforth silent with regard to them.

(6) The Mughtasila.-These same of Elkesai—but only the name—crops out once more in an etimographic note in the Kitāb al-Fikrist by Ibn Abī Ja'āfīr al-Nadim (ed. Flügel, Leipzig, 1871-72, p. 340). The note refers to a religious community whose adherents inhabited the wide-spreading swampy region traversed by the Euphrates in its lower course, and were locally known to the Arabs as al-Mughtasila, i.e. 'those who wash themselves.' We are informed that these people are numerous in the marsh-lands, and they are, in fact, the Sabians of the marshes.' They must accordingly be regarded as identical with the Sabians (also meaning 'bathers') mentioned in three passages of the Qurān (i. 59, v. 73, x. 76) and, as a people, to have lived together with Jews and Christians, to have had liberty in the exercise of their religion. This privilege was accorded to them in virtue of their monasticism and their possession of sacred writings.

The note continues: 'They maintain that people should wash (often), and they also wash all they eat.

Their leader is called رکابیل; he is the person who founded their faith.' Chwolson reads the name as al-Isaiyā, Flügel as al-Iṣāsi; but, as we have already seen, this transcation can rest upon conjecture only. The note also describes a dualistic cosmology to the sect, stating that they believed in a male and a female order of beings, and asserts that at an earlier time, as regards the two original principles of matter, the sun and the moon, the Mughtasiles attached to this opinion. On this point al-Nadim makes another interesting statement (Chwolson, i. 125 f.), viz. that the father of Mani (who founded Manicheism in the 3rd century) joined the Mughtasila, and educated his son in their faith, and that later, his son, and then the sect, began to proclaim his own doctrine at the age of twenty-four. The baptists of the Elkesiates thus trace back to the end of the 2nd century. They were known to Muhammad as monothists and possessors of sacred writings; and some time afterwards an inquirer learned from them that their founder and lord was called Elkesai—or some such name. Now, not every religion has a lord and founder. Islam, however, tolerated only such forms of religious belief as were like itself in this respect. Thus the Mughtasiles, in making some claim to being from their origin, had the most cogent of reasons for putting forward some name that might stand as co-ordinate with names like Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad in a meeting between sects; and the Kitāb al-Fikrist cannot rank as historical evidence. All that the note proves is that the priestly or learned class among the Mughtasiles had heard of the name of Elkesai as that of a religious leader, or teacher, while this again may signify nothing more than that a copy of the Book of Elkesai, inscribed with his name, had fallen into their hands. If, moreover, the volume was for a considerable period their sole possession of the kind, they would come to honour it as their oldest document; and in this way might arise the tradition that the book contained doctrines which its author had delivered to their ancestors at the birth of their religion. A religious document, however, when its possessors do not follow it in practice—and almost, indeed, in proportion to their inability to understand it—tends to become a holy thing; whose very name is an additional reason why the Mughtasiles ever really lived as Jews, observing circumcision, the Sabbath, or the gība towards Jerusalem.

The monothism of the Mughtasiles was, with some of them, only a pretext; 'to this day,' says the Arabic writer, 'they have among them some who worship the stars'; besides, it was combined with dualistic tenets, and accordingly, like that of Mani, must have been derived, not from Judaism, but—either by means of actual contact, or through the studies of the priests—from Parseism. That the Mughtasiles performed their ablutions by bathing may be presumed from the fact that they lived in a marshy district; but on the same grounds it seems unlikely that they disliked essential to use river or spring water. We cannot say whether or not they practised immersion. That Elkesai himself had proclaimed his doctrine among them is a priori improbable, even if it should be thought possible that in his day they were Jews, or had provisionally become Jews. Success among them would have induced him to remain in their midst, just as his success among a people whom the Jordan kept him there; and, moreover, it was in the latter locality that his descendants lived.

4. Origin of Elkesiasm and its place in the history of religion.—With reference to the historical connexion of Elkesiasm with other religions of similar character, the main question turns upon its practice of baptism. Let us state at once that what we have to deal with is not the mere fact of religious washing or bathing, but the requirement of total immersion in a river or spring, with the garments on, as a necessary condition of remission of sins or bodily healing.

Judaisms never at one time made such a demand, although the Essenes, it is true, bathed in loin-sheets, and must in cis-Jordanic Palestine have had themselves immersed in the water of their river. We meet with such practice in none of the Mandaean among the Mandaeans, and also in the far East, among the Hindus. As regards the latter, we find Manu enjoining that those guilty of certain sexual sins must expiate them by bathing in their clothes (Laug. i. 17) and certain Hindus from similar motives, practise immersion in rivers. The Mandaeans likewise bathe in the river Euphrates for remission of sins, being clothed in white for the occasion, just as they
formerly wore white garments in their daily life (see W. Brandt, Mandschüische Religion, Leipzig, 1889, pp. 91, 92, 224).

That the religious rites were brought to Palestine by way of the Euphrates from India we cannot believe, if for no other reason than that it is not again alluded to in the code of Manu, which probably attained its present form c. A.D. 1000, so that the practitioners have been living there since that date in a long-established or popular one in India. The probability is rather, indeed, that it migrated from the Euphrates towards the East, just as the Mandaeans themselves spread eastwards from that river into the interior of Persia.

The resemblance between the practice of the Mandaeans and that of Elkeesi is striking. But in the former we do not find anything to correspond with the vow which Elkeesi demanded from his adherents at their immersion, or with the invocation of the seven witnesses. Nor did the sacramental elements of the Mandaeans consist of bread and salt. Their oldest sacred writings were composed in the period of the Sassanians, or even earlier, but they contain no mention of Elkeesi. The Mandaeans believed that their deity dwelt in the North, beyond the mountains whence the great rivers come, and it was towards that point that they turned in prayer. These facts forbid the assumption that they owed their religious ritual to Elkeesi.

Nor are we able to affirm that, contrariwise, the Elkesiite ritual was derived from Babylonia. We may, indeed, regard it as possible, and even probable, that the Mandean cult was the older, but this does not admit of proof. For his doctrines Elkeesi did not need to go so far. Babylonia was the cradle of astrology, but this 'science' had already spread over a great part of the world. In conformity with the belief that water is the source of life and health, the Persian theologians fancied that the two trees 'All-seed' and 'Ail-heal' germinated from the sea, or from the waters of a wholesome spring. A similar idea, however, had long found a footing on Jewish soil, where it can be traced back to the passage in Ezk 47 describing the future glory of the land.

Do we find any light from Bab. antiquity upon the Elkesiite immersion? In the ancient Babylonian texts hitherto published, though we there find mention—in allegorical connection—of such acts as drinking clear water, suffuring, laving, washing, cleansing, and sprinkling with the waters of wells or springs on the Eve of the Passover, or at the sea, we have as yet discovered no definitely attested instance of immersion. The earliest known reference to the practice in the Semitic world is still the case of Naaman the Syrian, who dipped himself seven times in the Jordan in order to be healed of his leprosy (2 K 5:4).

In the civilized belt of country around the Mediterranean Sea, which extended on the East beyond the Jordan, we find the religious rite of immersion associated with that conception of the new birth which enters largely into the mysteries. With that idea, therefore, it is no doubt genetically connected, and like the mysteries generally, is to be traced to the esoteric doctrines of priests. The association of immersion with the vow and the seven witnesses, as found among the Elkeesiites, seems to imply that their founder had become acquainted with the ceremonial of one or other of the mystery-cults practised by a priesthood or a religious association. His own ritual is modelled after some popular ceremony, and he may well have taken the practice of immersion from it, as a central feature of the ceremony—from the same source. So far as we can judge, it did not fail to the lot of the Elkeesiites to have an active share in the rise or development of any religion that survived their own. It has been asserted that their doctrines had an influence upon the system of ideas embodied in the religion of the Mandaeans, but this has not been proved.

Erbauer.—D. Chwolson, Die Statiker u. der Samenitraus, St. Petersburg, 1856, I, 100-138; H. Hilgenfeld, Neue Text. Extra numismatis orientalis, fasc. III (C Heroic s, 1857, pp. 257-58); ID. Rennan, Histoire des origines du christianisme, v. IV (Paris, 1877, pp. 370, 371), also Révue des haupptgalerien der Geschicht, 1907, passim; W. Brandt, 'Die jüdische Baptismus' (Revue de la ZAW, xxvii. [1900] p. 104). Elkeesi was a Priest or Religionist (see BG I. pt. ii. 391). Fleet writes the name Ellorā. The place is still considered sacred, and is the site of a shrine of Gṛṇḍesvēra, one of the twelve saktas of Śiva, who was probably connected originally with the caves, but, when these were desecrated by Aurangzib (q.v.), it was transferred to the neighbouring village. The caves, according to Burgess (p. 4), are about half a mile E. of the village, and lie nearly N. and S. along the W. face of the hill, on the summit of which the modern village of Rozah stands. They extend a little over a mile in a straight line. The caves at the S. end are Buddhist; those at the N. end Jain; while those between these groups are Brāhmānicos.

1. The Buddhist caves.—The Buddhist group at the S. end consists of twelve excavations, which were constructed in the period between A.D. 460 and 650 or 700. Of this group three caves are especially important. That numbered X in the list of Burgess is the great chaitya, or rock-temple, the only one of the kind at Ellorā, and locally attributed to Visvakarma, the architect of the gods.

It is a splendid temple, with a fine facade and large open court in front, enclosed by a corridor, and conclusively proves that those Erkonic caves were originally designed to be filled with a temple, and are thus to be regarded as typical of a whole class, or at least of a type, of similar rock-temples and chapels, the earliest of which are probably to be found at the site, or at least within the territory, of the ancient Elkesaite kingdom. The small temple of the 5th century (q.v.) at the entrance of the Elkeesi temple is probably of the same character. The outer facade of the temple of the 5th century was entirely made of lime, as also was the inner facade of the temple of the 6th century, while the inner facade of the temple of the 5th century was entirely made of sandstone. The temple of the 5th century was entirely made of lime, as also was the inner facade of the temple of the 5th century, while the inner facade of the temple of the 5th century was entirely made of sandstone. The temple of the 5th century was entirely made of lime, as also was the inner facade of the temple of the 5th century, while the inner facade of the temple of the 5th century was entirely made of sandstone. The temple of the 5th century was entirely made of lime, as also was the inner facade of the temple of the 5th century, while the inner facade of the temple of the 5th century was entirely made of sandstone.

The second is the Dhō Thēl cave, so called because it was long supposed to consist of only two storries. In 1876, however, the lower storrey was cleared of the earth which had completely buried it. This cave seems to have been left partially incomplete, and was intended to serve both as a temple and as a monastery.

The third great Buddhist cave, known as the Thī Thēl, or three-storreyed cave-tample, was intended rather for worship than for use as a monastery.

'This is its class,' writes Burgess (p. 10), 'one of the most important and interesting caves at Ellorā. When we do find a three-storreyed Vihāra carried out with the same consistency of design and the like magnificence as in this example, and from these circumstances there is a great probability in its appearance that it would be difficult to surpass in cave architecture. The greatest interest, however, consists in its being a transitional example between the styles of the two great religious which divide between them the architectural magnificence of the present day. There are few examples of similar character with the Dhō Thēl cave, that all that immediately succeeds, it seems almost as if the builders of this temple had been persuaded to abandon the Buddhist sect, and by gentle means to adopt the new religion, and not that they had been converted by persecution, as has been very
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2. The Brahmánical caves. The Daśa Avatāra cave, as its name, 'the Ten Incarnations,' implies, is purely Brahmánical. It contains sculptured images of all the greater gods. An inscription indicates that it was finished, or was at least in an advanced condition, in the middle of the 8th cent. A.D. The other chief Brahmánical caves are the Rāmāvarta and the Dumar Lēnā, the latter one of the finest of its kind, and interesting as being almost a duplicate of that of Elephants (q.v.).

But of all the Brahmánical monuments none is more remarkable than the Kailāsa, named after the paradise of Śiva, also known as Bāng Mahāl, 'painted hall,' which was constructed in the reign of King Rūpā, or Rūpā-śrī, the 11th king of Mālikēd (c. A.D. 769-783; see Architecture, Hind.; Lia descritive, Arch. and Asia, vol. i. p. 742). The Kailāsa is an undoubted copy of the old structural temple of Vijālakāsi, in the Madhavā District, and this again, a temple in the Dravidian style of S. India, is strikingly like the old temple of Kyālaśānta at Coonjeveram (J. H. Marshall, Arch. and Asia, 19th ed., 1895-6, p. 419; Smith, Early Hist. p. 386 f). 'It is,' says Burgess (op. cit. p. 26), 'by far the most elaborate and elaborately rock-cut temple in India, and the most interesting as well as most magnificent of all the architectural objects in the country possessed by the British Raj.'

Burgess (Indian and Eastern Arch. [1899], p. 334, ed. 1910, i. 342 f) says:

In it, 'we have a perfect Dravidian temple, as complete in all its parts as at any future period, and so advanced that we might have some difficulty in tracing the parts back to their originals without the fortunate possession of the examples on the Madras shore. Independently, however, of its historical or ethnographical value, the Kailāsa is in itself one of the most singular and interesting monuments of architectural art in India. Its beauty and singularity always excited the astonishment of travellers, and in consequence it is better known than almost any other structure in that country, from the numerous views and sketches of it that have been published.'

And pupils and admirers of architecture are prepared to show that it reveres the methods of the Buddhist caves which adjoin it, being not a mere chamber cut in the rock, but a model of a complete temple, such as might have been erected on the plain. In other words, the rock has been dressed, not externally and incipiently, on the surface of the cliff, which it once formed a part. The disadvantage of this mode of construction naturally is that the building stands in a pit. But it remains an example, probably unique, of unsparking labour devoted to the construction of a religious edifice. Among the important groups of sculpture which it contains is that of the destruction of Mahāisasura, or the buffalo-headed demon (which gives its name to its shrine), slain by Chandi or Durga; those of Śiva in his various manifestations; and the shrine of the river-goddess—Gaṅga, Śatāvatī, and Yami or Yamuna. The caves are very extensive works, superior both in extent and elaboration to any of the Buddhist or other religious caves, the Kailāsa, the Veḷivakāmara among the Buddhist ones, and the Veḷivakāmara among the Buddhist ones. Through two stories in height and in width, and in a great measure in depth, the Indra and Jagnathā Śivas are entirely dedicated in that purpose-like architectural expression which characterized the works of all the Buddhists and Hindus. They have in their cells, like the Veḷivakās, and are nothing like the Chaliya halls of the Buddhist one, the Cakkutās of the Mayūra, or the Chaliya, the famous temple of Lēnu of the Hindus. Rich and elaborate though they certainly are, the plan is compressed, and all their arrangements seem to result from necessarily cramped space; there is no possibility of any conjectured design so that they lose half the effect that might have been produced with a little more freedom (Burgess, p. 4).

They are much later in date than either the Buddhist or the Brahmánical caves. It seems that the Jaina occupied the place after the decedence of the Itihās dynasty in the 9th or 10th cent. A.D., and their only desire was to mark the superiority of their religion, then becoming important, by rivaling the works of their predecessors.

LITERATURE.—This article is based on the excellent monograph, 'Report on the Ellora Cave Temples and the Brahmánical and Jainas Caves in Western India,' by J. Burgess, forming vol. v. of the vihāra on the Ajanta, which includes a series of photographs, drawings, and plans. This is in continuation of some papers by Burgess—Bengal Archaeol. Soc., 1885, has been superseded by Burgess—Bengal Archaeol. Soc., 1885; see pp. 367-354 for the Buddhist caves; 431-463 for the Brahmánical; 496-502 for the Jaina. Also see J. Ferguson, Hist. Encyc. of Indian and Eastern Architecture (1830), Ch. 27, 334-338; J. Ferguson, Arch. of Hind., vol. i. 1910, i. 139 f, 127 f, 150, 201, 347 f, II. 191; V. A. Smith, 'The Temple Architecture of India,' vol. i. 1913, 347-384; the place is fully described by Syed Hossain Bihagri and C. Willmott, Historical and Descriptive Sketch of H. I. the Women's Monasteries (1883), II. 440 f. For illustrations also see W. H. Workman, Through Town and Jungle (1904), p. 158 f. The earlier account by J. H. Seely, The Wonders of Ellora (1st ed. 1824), has been superseded by later investigation.

ELYSIUM. — See BLUST (ABODE OF THE), STATE OF THE DEAD.

EMANCIPATION. — Definition. — Emancipation in its more general sense signifies the liberation of the individual from the yoke of the community and its institutions; or, from that which is custom; or, again, the liberation of a smaller and weaker community from the coercion of a larger and more powerful. As the restrictions in question may vary greatly in kind, and may relate to various aspects of life, emancipation may take different forms. Before we discuss the moral character of the movement towards freedom, we shall make a general survey of the whole field. We may distinguish between intellectual and philosophical emancipation, and state the difference. We shall then consider the power of the idea of liberty and emancipation in the sphere of action, though for the most part the two have proceeded hand in hand.

1. Emancipation of thought. — Thought becomes emancipated when it casts aside the traditional views and prejudices which have impeded its free movement in the past. We do not, of course, apply the term 'emancipation' to every case where confused or unformed traditions are abandoned, but only to cases where the general consciousness of a community is concerned, and where the restrictions upon thought had the sanction of some coercive authority. Thus, in particular, the moral consciousness may pass over from the abstract conceptions hitherto hallowed by tradition and established by public opinion; religious thought may similarly pass from under the bondage of sacred traditions and ecclesiastical authority; and there may also be an emancipation of science, as when it frees itself from the fossilized prejudices that have hitherto hampered its progress; or of art, as when it is delivered from some hoary religious tradition, or from the incubus of an antiquated school or style. Emancipation of this kind is always allied with the spirit of criticism, as in Greece, for instance, where the Sophists impugned the morality of tradition and of popular religion, and the philosophers sought to undermine current beliefs regarding the gods, and where histrionic art was at length overthrown by the great artists. Similarly in India, of course, the ascending movement from the ascendency and authority of the Brāhmans by proclaiming a universal redemption from suffering; while Christianity broke the yoke of the OT legalism by imbuing the mind with the life-giving spirit, in place of the dead letter. Thus, too, the sciences freed themselves from the despotism of medieval theology—by the device, first of all, of a twofold truth, and then by the growing conviction that they must pursue their way by their own hands, and must treat us as an.

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end in itself. Finally, the human mind attained to the conception of complete liberty of thought in all its phases, and in course of time this was claimed as a right. The prerogative of freedom in religious matters, in scientific inquiry, in the utterance of one's convictions, came to be regarded as inalienable, and the State was called upon to preserve it inviolate. True, a certain liberty of thought continued in the Greek world; nevertheless, charges of impiety (διηθεσα) were not unknown, as in the case of Protagoras, Diagoras, Anaxagoras, Stilpo—to say nothing of Socrates; and at length the Athenian schools were closed by Justinian. Complete emancipation of thought was first claimed as a legal right by the modern champions of Natural Law, and has been won only after the severest conflicts. Only in modern times, too, has aesthetic thought sought to deliver itself from ecclesiastical and national influences, by insisting upon a free secular art.

2. Emancipation in practical life. — The process of emancipation, however, bears not only upon thought but upon practical life, and its progress in this sphere seems to accelerate as we approach the present day. To begin with, the individual has become more and more independent.

(1) The emancipation of women. The emancipation of women was defended even by Aristotle; it was viewed with disfavour by the Stoics, while in the Roman Empire it was greatly mitigated by law; it was still recognized, as, e.g., by Aquinas, in the Middle Ages, and was maintained even in the 19th cent. by the Southern States of N. America; now, however, it is entirely abolished in Christian lands, and, outside Christendom, prevails only amongst the Mahommedans. But the emancipation of women in the lower classes almost worse than slavery, and in the United States, where slavery no longer exists, there still remains the negro question, as also the problem of conferring civil rights upon the liberated race under conditions which will ensure a proper exercise of the privilege. In fact, the general policy of the higher races in regard to the lower is one of the most formidable questions of the day, as it can hardly be denied that the developed civilization of the former, allied as it is with superior physical resources, has often been employed in oppressing the latter. In these respects the emancipation still lags far behind.

(6) The emancipation movement embraces also the question of women's rights. Among ancient peoples the position of woman was very limited. In modern times we find the woman in line with the principles underlying the entire social order. Women, according to Confucius, are not easily dealt with.

1 'If you are intimate with them, they will not obey; if you keep at too great a distance, they are angry with you. Woman is always dependent— as a daughter, upon her father or elder brother; as a widow, upon her son. She is under tuition and discipline to her husband.' She ought to keep within the house; her duty lies there. 'On the higher side, she must give due homage to her father-in-law; on the lower, she must serve her husband and husband's father.'

Nevertheless, Confucius holds that marriage is the be-all and the end-all of mankind; that woman is the paramount person in the sphere of love, and that reverence is her due. Certainly divorce is easier than remarriage; the dread disease, apathy, excessive loquacity, form sufficient grounds. But the man may not disown his wife if her parents be dead, or if, though now rich, she was originally poor and of mean extraction. Concerning domestic duties,

Nor did Buddhaism, in spite of its universalism, place women on a level with men; its highest morality demands entire obedience from sexual inferiors. As the rule, by the rulers, confine to their own apartments, and they did not share in the education given to men; only one exception is found in the hetervra of a later time. Yet Greek women, not without cultured women, such as Sappho, while Penelope's constancy and Antigone's sisterly affection were proverbial. The Ecclesiastes of theodoteus depicts women as so rank lower than monks. 'Inerucible as the way of a fish in water is the nature of woman, those chives of many devices, with whom truth is hard to find' (Chorreilopps; cf. Oldenberg, Budhaha', 1906, pp. 169 f., 385 f.).

In Brahmanism, again, marriage is made much more of: every one ought to marry. Still, according to the Laws of Manu, the husband is the head of the wife; she must do nothing to displease him, even if he give himself to other lovers; and, should he die, she must never utter the name of another man. If she marry again, she is excluded from the heaven where her first husband dwells. Unfaithfulness on the wife's part is punished with the utmost rigour. 'A woman is never independent.' She cannot inherit, and after her husband's death she is subject to their eldest son. The husband may even chastise her with the bamboo-rod. It is Brahmanism, nevertheless, which gives us the saying: 'If the wife be made unhappy, the sacred fire soon dies out; if she executes her home, its end is at hand.'

Among the Persians the recognized necessity of preserving the germ of life is in full harmony with their views of life in general. Marriage is, therefore, reckoned a duty; and every marriageable young woman must ask her parents to find a husband. Chastity is well guarded, but, as in the Laws of Manu, the woman is subject to the man. Every morning the wife must nine times ask her husband what he wishes her to do; she must honour him as the pure honours the pure. In the later Gatha period, however, women are more on an equality with men; they are not to be excluded from communion with Ahura Mazda, but are to rank along with men in every respect.

In Muhammadanism, women are secluded in the harem. They are denied all freedom of action, and all participation in matters intellectual. Certainly the Prophet raised the status of women above that assigned to them in ancient Arabia; in particular, the woman was no longer a mere heritable chattel of her deceased husband's estate, but was herself capable of inheriting; while, again, a free woman could not now be forced into marriage, and, in cases of divorce, the husband was required to let the wife retain what he gave her at marriage. Moreover, women of the upper classes might occupy themselves with poetry and science, and even act as teachers, while those of lower rank not seldom shared the joys and sorrows of their husbands, as mistresses of their households. The mother likewise must be treated with respect. Furthermore, the seclusion of the harem tends to keep women in a subordinate position; their intercourse with one another is limited, and their education is neglected, though in the higher orders of society their existence is not devoid of comfort. The compulsory practice of veiling shows how little they are trusted.

Among the ancient Jews polygamy still persisted, and divorce, more especially in the later period, was easily procured. The wife was placed in subjection to her husband; still, marriage was reckoned honourable, and a virtuous wife was deemed of more value than rubies (Prov. 31:10). The mother was highly esteemed, and this name was regarded as a worthy object of benevolence. While polygamy was the rule among Oriental peoples, the case was otherwise in Greece and Rome. Among the Greeks women were confined to their own apartments, and they did not share in the education given to men; the only exception to this is found in the hetervra of a later time. Yet Greek women, not without cultured women, such as Sappho, while Penelope's constancy and Antigone's sisterly affection were proverbial. The Ecclesiastes of theodoteus depicts women as so
far emancipated that they became a ruling power in the State. In the *Emancipation* Widows fact. Justinian also brought his physical intercourse was sought not in married life, but in friendship amongst men. In *Marriage* to *Wives* we find: the wife was under the absolute control of the husband—like a daughter, in fact. At a subsequent period, however, the matron was accorded a higher honour; witness, *e.g.*, the definition of marriage: *Matrimonium est noster et feminas coniunctio, omnis vitae consortium, iuris humani et divini communicatio* ("Marriage is the union of man and woman, complete community of life, joint-participation in Divine and human law").

The growing independence of women is also indicated in the laws regarding inheritance. According to the XII Tables, women could not inherit at all; by the Prasorian law they inherited in the third degree. When, further, the law onnicetry came footing with men in cases of intestacy. Further, the right to dispose of property by will, at first denied to women, was at length granted, in the event of their remaining single or having no children of their own family in due legal form. But the institution of marriage was much impaired by the egoistic tendencies of Roman law. Celibacy became common. Women were allowed no choice in the matter of marriage, and they had no effective safeguards against being repudiated. Even Cicero put away his first wife, in order to pay his debts with the inherited property of a second. But it was always looked to the legal disabilities by underhand means, and even to intervene with political affairs—a state of things attended with the direst moral results.

Christianity, emphasizing from the outset the value of personality in the sight of God, proclaimed the equality of the sexes. This is shown by the injunction regarding divorce, which, recognizing no justification for that proceeding save *porneia* (Mt 5*7* 19), left nothing to the man's caprice.

The fact that the principle of equality was not pushed forthwith to its full consequences is due to the ascetic temper of the Early Church. While marriage was regarded as a symbol of the relation between God and his Church (cf. Eph 5*2*), St. Paul also views it as a safeguard against immorality (1 Co 7*2*). Widows took a prominent part in the life of the Early Church, and an order of deaconesses was instituted, but the idea of man and woman as complementary to each other was not urged so strongly as their equality. It was but natural, therefore, when the moral factor was at length overridden by that of religion in the narrower sense, that monks and nuns should be placed on a level, and that, in particular, as marriage was counted inferior to the celibacy of the religious, the distinctive character of women should be lost. In the less estimable state, estate of marriage was made a sacrament, and declared to be indissoluble, the effect was, on the one hand, to subordinate the individual to the institution; on the other, to extrude the ethical element altogether. As it was the special prerogative of the medieval monks to make methodical pronouncements upon moral questions, this theory of marriage continued to hold its own; though still based upon the element of friendship between man and wife, and upon the woman's freedom to marry or to remain single, even against the will of her parents; and though Duns Scotus declared that monogamy was a more exacting state than monachism. While woman's place in the marriage relation was thus one which ill suited with her distinctive nature, a kind of counterpoise was provided by the romantic and enthusiasm of the Middle Ages, though its object was not the wedded wife. Chivalry. Notwithstanding all this, however, it remains true that in Greece genuine intellectual intercourse was sought not in married life, but in friendship amongst men. In *Marriage* to *Wives* we find: the wife was under the absolute control of the husband—like a daughter, in fact. At a subsequent period, however, the matron was accorded a higher honour; witness, *e.g.*, the definition of marriage: *Matrimonium est noster et feminas coniunctio, omnis vitae consortium, iuris humani et divini communicatio* ("Marriage is the union of man and woman, complete community of life, joint-participation in Divine and human law").
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this question has been taken in hand by women themselves. In Germany married life was until lately regarded as the normal vocation of women, but this view was obviously irrelevant in regard to those who remained single, and they have more women than men. In England the modern movement began with Mary Wollstonecraft's *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792)—a work which drew its inspiration largely from France; but it is rather the whole-hearted ad-

vocacy of J. S. Mill, half a century later, that we must trace recent advances in the cause of female emancipation, as also perhaps the present agitation for full political rights. More particularly in the United States the stage has been reached where women no longer look upon marriage as their specific calling, but seek complete equality with men as a matter of principle. Endeavours are accordingly being made to give them access to all the various professions, in order that they may gain an independent footing in society, and even to grant them the franchise, as a step to public life in State and Church—in a word, to remove every disability of sex. When this state of things is appealed against by pointing to the physical difference between the sexes—a difference which remains—feminist writers (such as Mrs. Rapin's theory of evolution is brought into court for the purpose of showing that by habit, heredity, etc., women may in time develop those particular qualities of which their circumscribed position has till now impaired the cultivation. But in truth the differ-

entiating tendencies of Nature herself may well be regarded as depreciating such factitious development. We dare not disregard the inherent heterogeneity of the sex. After all, marriage is grounded in the natural order, and any other career for women is but an expedient which, as adapted to her individual capacity, will, in default of marriage, secure for her a position of economic and moral independence such as a moral personal-

ity requires. The 'free love' which some propose to substitute for marriage would differ from prostitution only in degree. Marriage reform still lacks clear definition. The true method of emancipation is that which assigns to each sex the task adapted to its peculiar character and gifts, there-

by investing it with its own moral dignity and honor; and, in this way, ensuring women in a position to understand the distinctive life of men, and to share their interests, while men on their part undergo the correlative discipline. Mar-

riage must continue to rest upon the intimate friendship which is the basis of fulfilling the common task of maintaining the home and rearing children.

We learn from the above outline that there has been a gradual advance in the emancipation of women, an advance which is based upon a proper measure of their personality, but which also tends to assume debased and unnatural forms when the distinctive qualities of the sex are ignored. The probable result of disregarding these qualities would be a recurrence of the ancient view of women, viz. that they are essentially equal to men, though of weaker mould and, accordingly, of lower station in view which was sanctioned only by allowing for the specific characteristics of womanhood, and by conceding to women a position of equality in keeping with their special gifts.

(c) We see a corresponding development of freedom in the relation of the individual to the family. In Rome, the law of the XII Tables invested the father with, what has been called, &quot;infinite worth&quot;, and even with the power of life and death; and in the era of the Republic a son of full age was still under paternal jurisdiction in domestic matters, though otherwise a free citizen. So strongly was the unity of the family insist upon, that a son could neither possess nor acquire independent property during his father's lifetime. The procedure in connexion with a son's emancipation (in which we have the original usage of the word) was, according to the XII Tables, that the father sold his son three times to the so-called *pater filiarius*, who had promised not to take the contract in earnest. But the power of the *pater familias* was circumscribed by use and wont. In the event of a capital sentence, the father invoked a family assize; and eventually, in the Imperial period, even this right was annulled, and the father was compelled to carry the case to the authorities. The legal authority of the father over his descendand, and the amenability of the individual to family juris-

diction were still further modified by Christiani-

ties, which paid higher regard to the individual, making him more and more independent of the family; while it based the family on a moral and emotional, rather than on a purely legal, founda-

tion, the legal aspect being now attended to for the benefit of the State. The Christian principle that spiritual qualities are of more value than corporeal, and that even children, as souls in the making, are of infinite worth, justified its refusal of the *pater familias* to accept the custom of exposing weak infants—a practice defended even by the most enlightened Greek philo-

sophers. The Christian view necessarily led to a restriction of the right to punish children, and to the civil protection of their life and health, even against their parents. With this we may compare the modern law, which prevents careless parents from standing in the way of their children's education.

The ideal of education upheld by the great thinkers of Greece was that the family should transfer its responsibilities to the State—a position natural enough in view of the defective condition of family life in Greece. Among Christian peoples the place of the State was in a measure assumed by the Church, which took in hand the work of education—an arrangement which still to some extent prevails in Roman Catholic countries. The family thus became subordinate to the Church and the *religions*, and education was handed over to the monastery and the convent. The countries of the Reformation, which had maintained its independence in a markedly higher degree, recognized the educative value of home life, as specially adapted to train the heart and the disposition. Provision was made both for attaining knowledge and for developing talent and intelligence by the institution of public schools, the maintenance of which fell upon the State; though in England private education was still recommended by Locke. The augmented demands for intellectual culture, and for its dis-

semination (within limits) amongst the people at large—as even Luther had desiderated—practically made it incumbent upon the State to undertake the development of natural talent, and more par-

ticularly of the mental faculties. In some coun-

dries school-attendance was made compulsory, the children's right to be educated being thus enforced even against the parents, and industrial schools were provided by the State in the interests of children whose moral training was criminally neglected at home.

In all this we discern a progressive liberation of the individual from the ascendency of the family, though the latter by no means ceased to operate as a genuine educative factor. Similar progress has been made in regard to the law of education. The conviction that a man's education should be directed towards making him an independent personality has become more and more explicit.
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Recent educational science pays special attention to the transition stage between youth and full manhood, and regards it as the definitive task of education that the discipline of home and school, should be trained with a view to the attainment of his ethical majority.

In this connection Scheler's theory of the distinction between aristocratic and democratic families, pointing out that the family relationship is much more effectively maintained in the former than in the latter. He especially urges that the parental authority on its moral side should gradually pass into the hands of the older persons, and, on this respect it insists upon not merely to enable freedom of decision on the part of those who have reached maturity; the parents, in short, shall then be no more than counselors.

Thus the family, once a legal institution, has become the moral community of the home, enjoying, nevertheless, the protection of the law; the rights of the individual members, especially of those under age, are protected by the State, even against the family itself; while, in a moral and legal respect, increasing regard is paid to those who have attained maturity and independence, more particularly with a view to their becoming founders of new families.

(d) The emancipation of the individual has also a social reference. Not a few men are bound to his caste, and cannot rise above it. In China, where the system of caste does not prevail, the individual's position in the social organism is defined by religion and by a most elaborate ceremony, which tend to impede the spontaneity of social life. In regard to property, however, the conditions are more favourable, and land can be tilled or sold as the proprietor pleases. In ancient Greece social life had not as yet freed itself from national life; the individual, as Aristotle expresses it, was primarily a ἱστος πολιτικός, while the theory and practice of the State set forth in the Periclean system of Plato's Republic hardly left room for personal independence in social and economic relations. Nevertheless, in regard to social life, Greece shows a certain advance upon Brahmanic India, since it no longer made birth the criterion for participation in public life—a reform explicitly decreed in the laws of Solon, which, however, still countenanced slavery. In the period after Alexander the Great interest in the State began to wane before social life and friendship, which had been extolled by Aristotle, and especially by Epicurus, in whose opinion the State was simply a contract for the attainment of mutual security. This social fellowship, however, did not embrace family life; it was a friendship amongst men, occasionally, with hetaerae. Nevertheless, the interests of the individual came gradually to the front. In Muhammadanism the Qur'an is the great authority in matters not only of religion, but of morality, law, and social order as well. The Prophet, or his vicegerent, the Khalif, is invested with power to regulate the tenure of property; the system, more particularly as regards the land, may be called aristocratic. Social life is at a very low level, resting as it does on the separation of the sexes; and, wherever a better state of things prevails, it is not due to Islam.

The theocratic standpoint likewise dominated social life among the Jews, but, while the land was regarded as belonging to God, yet the social and religious legislation, though not always carried out in practice, served to strengthen the family on its aristocratic side, as is shown, for instance, by the regulations regarding the jubilee, the Sabbatical year, gleaning, etc., which were designed to avert utter impoverishment. With some exceptions the various crafts, such as tilling and cattle-rearing, were held by the members of the family. The consciousness of being the chosen people of God bound the Israelites more closely together, while the simultaneous festivals, the observance of the Passover, and the Sabbath, with its mandate of rest for man and beast, tended to promote the social side of family life. That there has not only grown independence of the family and its head is set forth in the Law, and it was in view of this ethical end that statutory barriers were raised against impoverishment.

In Rome, again, we see a certain progress in the realization of social independence. The long-continued conflict between plebeians and patricians, the outcome of which was to equalize the two parties, bore rather upon political than upon social life; yet it was not without significance for the latter, as it made clear that social privileges were no longer to be the appanage of birth, but the reward of meritorious public service. The later period of Roman history, however, was marked by the formation of numerous associations, which, on the whole, were an expression of the desire for freedom in social matters; in fact, Julius Caesar recognized the liberty of the smaller autonomous societies, but also the independence of municipalities. By making life secure, and by giving the potestas that to disposing of his property in his own way, it also guarded the right of association for social and religious ends. But, as those liberties were without ethical character, the relative enactments simply led to an increase of selfishness, enabling the privileged few to reduce the rest to penury.

In Christianity, which so strongly emphasized the ethical value of personality, even property was viewed in a moral light, and men became aware that they were responsible to God in the management thereof. The conception of Christian equality in social and economic relations found expression first of all in a magnificent benevolence, and the great end of riches was believed to be relief of the poor. But the idea of equality in the sight of God had also a vast influence upon the social life of Christian communities. Certainly distinctions of class were not done away with; nevertheless, all were equal in the eyes of religion—a thought which had found expression in Stoicism, though without any practical issue. Christianity also effected a deliverance in the sphere of custom, Christians either breaking away from heathen practices, or else, as was often the case, transforming them, and feeling themselves individually responsible for the reform—a line of action urged especially by Ter- tullian in the one-sided, but all the more powerful, appeals of his treatise De monasteriis, and by St. Clement of Alexandria, who, however, treated ancient usages with a more tender hand. Doubtless men were then so profoundly concerned with the world to come that they retained but little interest in earthly goods, and social life was largely confined to religious intercourse. Even in the primitive Church we find warnings against wealth and its perils, and in no long time it came to be believed that only was good to God in the management of his affairs (Ambrose), and that voluntary poverty was a mark of superior sanctity; while, similarly, those who abandoned the world and the family for the desert or the cloister were held in high repute. But, while the endeavour to escape from the world and to be inwardly free from its entanglements was itself the outgrowth of a genuine emancipative movement.

Evens in the feudal system with its class divisions, and in the system of trade guilds which prevailed in the cities, there grew up a renewed interest in social life, the general trend of which was likewise favourable to individual freedom. In the economic power and dis- abilities and his dependence upon his guild, and in spite of frequent conflicts between the various
ranks of society, his economic freedom was promoted by the expansion of agriculture, commerce, and the Industrial Arts. Thus, access to tribunals established on their behalf; and, while the guilds frequently imposed restrictions upon freedom of action, they also afforded protection.

As against the Church's authority over the individual, the Reformation asserted the 'freedom of a Christian man' as the watchword of personal liberty, thereby universalizing, on religious grounds, the advantages which, on social and political ground, the powerful had arrogated to themselves in the previous centuries. Moreover, the Reformation, affirming on principle the moral dignity of labour and of the secular calling, laid the foundation of a new organization of society, which was wrought out in subsequent centuries. Luther's contention that wages should be proportionate to work has a wonderfully modern ring. Then the Mercantile System, laying stress upon manufactures, commerce, and the use of money (in place of barter), helped to facilitate the transport of goods, the process being furthered also by the Physiocratic, while, as far as possible, removed the original assignation to agriculture, yet contended for complete freedom of trade, made war upon guilds, Government concessions, and the burdens of the peasantry, and thus laid the foundation of the subject. Finally, Adam Smith and his school, repudiating the compulsory element in the guilds, and advocating open competition, set the seal upon individual freedom, and their investigations were doubly important from the fact that, as regards both the acquisition of property and the liberty of the subject—matters in which they had the support of the philosophical Natural Law from the time of Locke—their own contributions to the philosophy of natural rights, and served to assign to the individual his rightful place in the larger system of national and international life. In the French Revolution, the principles of freedom and equality advocated by Natural Law brought about the abrogation of innumerable privileges, and the emancipation of the 'third estate.' But the weak point in the movement was the people's lack of moral preparation, and the failure to recognize natural differences among men. The general rights of man, which from the religious point of view are based upon the equality of all before God, but which were traced by Mably and D'Alembert to the sense of moral and civil law, were urged so ruthlessly, that the actual disparity of men in their moral, mental, and physical qualities was ignored.

While the principle of open competition freed the individual from the limitations of his class and his trade, yet the new system of production, with the requirement of capital, introduced fresh difficulties, the solution of which has been undertaken by Socialism. Socialism (q.e.) begins by recognizing the actual inequalities of men, tracing these not to natural gifts—this being assumed rather to be equal in all—but to disparities in the possession of productive capital. Though an open door has been set before the individual, and the obstacles to the development of his faculties cleared away; though equal political rights have been conceded to all, and the class distinctions which stood as a barrier between the subject and the subject of law, were urged so ruthlessly, that the actual disparity of men in their moral, mental, and physical qualities was ignored.

To give practical effect to the idea, it is proposed to turn the State into a great industrial company, which would guarantee to every man the due remuneration of his labour. In point of fact, however, such an emancipation of labour, resulted in the loss of personal freedom; and, as the worker would then possess no capital, but gain at most sufficient wages—in the form of work-certificate—to procure him the means of enjoyment, the system would bring the worker to the selfish desire for happiness, and check the impulse to produce, which thrives only where it is free. We must, therefore, recognize that both the policy of work-certificate, the system which emanated from England, and the Socialistic movement, which first arose in France, were prompted by the spirit of emancipation; only, these movements are concerned with the material rather than with the moral side of man's nature, and with what is common to all rather than with the peculiar qualities of the individual. A higher respect is, therefore, due to those who emphasize the ethical aspect of the social problem and the ethical significance of property, and who desiderate a true personal independence, guaranteed by such a system of ownership as would enable each to discharge his proper function in the social organism, and, so far as possible, to lead such a life as keeps him from fulfilling his vocation as a man and as an individual. A similar object is aimed at by the renascence tendency to form corporate societies standing midway between the individual and the State—societies in which a man may act as a voluntary member, and from which he derives a certain support and security. A practical attempt to deliver the working man from the power of capital is made by the Trade Unions, which secure a proper representation of his interests, and treat with capitalists and their combinations upon equal terms. Again, provision is made in Germany for old age and sickness insurance, and, while in Great Britain old age pensions are now paid by the State, and there and in America the same purpose is served in part by funds accumulated independently of the State. The emancipation of factory-workers, miners, and rural labourers is sought in ameliorative legislation.

The emancipation movement makes itself felt in the sphere of social intercourse precisely as in that of economics. Social intercourse is regulated by custom; and here also a beginning has been made with that levelling process which looks to the worth of personality as such. While formerly distinctions of rank were rigidly preserved, the sense of equality has been intensified by international intercourse, by the recognition of human rights and of the ethical value of labour in general; and this manifests itself in the respect and courtesy shown even to social inferiors. It is, of course, true that this tendency towards the democratization of society is counteracted by a tendency towards differentiation, which is constantly splitting society into new and mutually exclusive groups. But, as the various ranks are arranged no longer according to birth, but according to occupation or profession, there may grow up in the professions themselves an ethic and etiquette which do away with the distinction of birth, while, again, the equal respect paid to the several professions—the moral value set upon work in general—practically opens to every man the door of any and of the highest calling for which he is fitted. Moreover, in the ordinary business and social intercourse, the qualifications of the professional caste. Both of these modifications may have an effect upon custom, and in this respect, too, modern society exhibits a movement towards the emancipation of classes from the thraldom of their position—a movement which has made most headway in the United States. Recent ethics has made it increasingly clear, however, that custom is not a thing fixed and stable, but is ever being moulded afresh.
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by the action of individuals, and that every man shares in the responsibility for its right development.

Coming now to the larger communities, the State and the Church, we find the process of emancipation at work in various forms. It may manifest itself in the liberation between the individual and either of these communities, or, again, in the relation of these communities to each other.

(c) First of all, as regards the tie between the individual and the State, there is a most distinguishing fact between countries like Judea and Persia, where there was a national religion established by law, and where every citizen was bound to conform to its authority, alike in belief and in practice, and countries like Greece and Rome, where religion was, indeed, a matter of the State, but where no pressure was put upon a man so long as he did not overtly violate the sacred institutions. In Rome, the devotees of the religiones licita were allowed absolute liberty, on condition that they observed the worship of the Emperor; while in Greece it was possible for a free philosophical religion to develop from the popular cults. Christianity was in that case a matter of belief, and the salvation of the individual really began with the Reformation, which made the personal assurance of salvation, the testimonia Spiritus Sancti internum, a matter of superhuman moment, and regarded the Church as the mediate community of believers. But the Churches of the Reformation had their own fixed Confessions and Liturgies, and presently came to take their stand upon the infallibility of Scripture. In no long time, therefore, personal liberty fell again into abeyance, and all the more completely that the task of maintaining doctrinal purity was practically handed over to the State.

At length, however, under the influence of modern philosophy, and of natural and historical science, the religious spirit wrenched itself free from ecclesiastical authority; the Church itself became the subject of critical inquiry, and the system of Churches usually called National Churches was partly superseded by the policy of public toleration or the liberty of individual conscience. It is, again, the United States which has made most progress in the latter direction, for there the individual may choose at will among the various denominations, and more as he pleases from one to another; though, on the other hand, diverse tendencies within the various communities themselves are less willingly tolerated. In Europe the system of theological licences was allowed to continue very generally—Churches which more or less strenuously maintain their traditional worship, doctrine, and usage, and hold their members in a position of dependence. Yet within these Churches we find various types of thought existing side by side, more especially in the Protestant communities of Germany and Switzerland, and in the Church of England; and religious freedom broadens out more and more, though not altogether without opposition. It is worthy of special note that the right of the individual to take part according to his abilities in reforming the Church from within is more and more generally acknowledged.

Moreover, the sphere of individual participation in the national life has been gradually enlarged. The great monarchies of the East—Babylon and Egypt—gave the mass of the people no voice in the control of public affairs. True, the Greek States and the Roman Republic obliged their citizens to take part in the government, but the enfranchised classes were small in number, and their privileges were subject to the condition that the State should superintend their moral training. As a matter of fact, it was the feudal State of the Middle Ages that began to lose this control over the enfranchisement with respect to the law, and with the people's right to vote supplies—witness the English Magna Charta of 1215; to the same period we must refer the growth of the doctrine of public authority by the growing independence of territorial and local rulers—a state of matters exemplified by the condottieri of Italy. To these signs of progress we must add the nascent theories of Natural Law, according to which the State derived its authority from the people, as was held by Oceam and others. The severance between social and national life which is gradually being effected in the modern world is an index of the increasing prestige of the individual and the class in relation to the State. Finally, comparing the views of Natural Law held by a man like Locke with ancient theories of the State, we see how great an advance has been made upon the interests; for, according to Locke, the function of the State is merely a legal one, viz. to protect the individual and the family in life and property.

Reference has been made to the fact that the State is based upon a contract of its citizens, and that, accordingly, its part is to act in their interests. The French Revolution was an attempt to carry out the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and to abolish the privileges of the favoured classes; and since then most European countries have adopted constitutions which not merely compel the citizen to obey and to pay taxes, but also enable him to take a greater or smaller share in the national life by the exercise of his vote. Schleiermacher in his Politik puts the matter thus: government on the one hand and subordination on the other should be shared by all, every man being in one aspect a ruler, and in another a subject; while W. von Humboldt, in his work entitled Ueber die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit eines Staates, makes it incumbent upon the State to furnish the smallest possible guarantee of the citizen's right to free self-development. When we consider the expansion of the leading States of today, and the share in their government which is nevertheless guaranteed in varying measure to their citizens, we see that such advance has been made upon ancient conditions; for, after all, the democracies of old correspond rather with the oligarchies of modern times. Once more, it is the United States which has gone furthest in applying the principle of personal liberty, inasmuch as, on the one hand, the Government has its functions circumscribed, no longer holding the citizen in tutelage, while, on the other, every citizen is free to take a part in public life. At the same time, the experience of that country shows that civil emancipation requires a certain standard of education in the citizens, and that its least necessary complement is the existence of a large degree of social progress. In Europe, on the other hand, more especially in countries where the monarchy still bears a despotic and autocratic character, we find a growing tendency among thinkers like Tolstoi, who would abrogate all State authority in favour of the love of one's fellow-man. Certainly this is a warrant for personal participation in the government of one's country, to which at the same time obedience must be rendered, is to be found alone in the right of moral self-determination: in fact, the growth
of the sense of moral responsibility amongst the people, and of their respect for the constitution and laws of the country. It is not for the State alone, but for the citizen, to bear the burden of the civic capacity for a responsible share in the national administration. Accordingly, in reference to the French Revolution, Schiller and other German writers maintained that the revolution, which would take its destiny into its own hands must possess an unwrought moral character, lest liberty of action should degenerate into pure caprice and unreason.

Similarly, it was Kant's conviction of the ethical value of personality—the idea of national autonomy—which led him to urge that free moral action was based upon law, and that a legally constituted State was essential to the realization of moral freedom. Since in the modern State the first principle of legal administration is the equality of all before the law; since punishment has lost much of its former barbarity, and is designed mainly to preserve law and order; since the State makes it its task to protect the common rights of man, and since this protection covers not only life and property, but also liberty of conscience, of thought, of inquiry, and the freedom of the press; we may regard the modern State as the free citizen, as he may claim publicity protection for his most sacred interests, whether material or spiritual, and may look upon the law as the sponsor of his absolute right to self-government. This is the rule of the Church; for another, writer after writer took up the controversy in defence of the State's rights. Early in the 9th century, for instance, Vincent of Luxemburg in his work De Regiis, spoke of the king as the earthly counterpart of God; Henry IV. found a championship in the Italian and French schools, while Frederick II. in his Letters upheld the national prerogatives, and had the support of Peter of Vieu and Thaddaus of Benezee. Dante's De Monarchia had a similar view. In the time of Louis of Bavaria the independence of the State was still more firmly based on a theory of the rights of William of Occam, by Marsilius of Padua in his Defender Fisci, by Leopold of Habsburg in his Tractatus de Ubi Regni et Imperii, and in France, in the time of Henry IV., the State was maintained by Froissart in his Des Annuities de la France. As against the assumption of the concept of the State as the absolute independence of the State; as against the idea of the universal empire, he advocated the unity of the Italian nation, though all he claimed for the State was its supremacy in regard to its finance and its external power and prosperity.

The emancipation of the State from the Church in countries dominated by Roman Catholicism can come about only through conflict with the Church itself. Even to the present day the Roman Catholic Church claims to be absolutely supreme in all questions which relate to the spiritual interests—a contention which finds frank expression in the Syllabus of Pius IX. The result is that, whenever a Roman Catholic State unfetters itself from ecclesiastical dependence it is associated with an irreligious character: the views of Machiavelli afford a typical illustration. But, as it is impossible that a people can live permanently without religion, Roman Catholicism must be preserved by a process of evolution between the two extremes: on the one hand, an irreligious and secular standpoint, where there is no concern for anything but material prosperity, and, on the other, a position of subjection to the Church; Spain and France furnish instances (cf. CONCORDAT). The liberation of the political from the ecclesiastical interest can in fact attain a permanent footing only when the State aims at something higher than material prosperity and enjoyment, and when at the same time the Church confines itself to spiritual affairs, and is concerned solely with the fostering of the religious life. The numerous tentative and developments of this conception made in the Middle Ages, as, e.g., by Frederick I. of Hohenstaufen, Dante, William of Occam and his allies, could win no real acceptance while the Church remained unreformed, as was shown in the case of France, on which had to renounce French Gallican liberties of Louis IX. in favour of modern Ultramontanism, and is now endeavouring to free itself from the latter. Cf. art. EASINISM.

In the process of emancipation of State from Church, a crucial and epoch-making stage as
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reached at the Reformation. The Church's function was now in principle limited to the religious nurture of the soul; the Church itself was viewed as the community of faith. It was, therefore, impossible for the Church to assert the State, as the latter too had a Divine commission—to foster justice, to maintain order, to ensure liberty of moral action on the basis of law. In point of fact, as a principle of national development no Church's mediation, but could win the assurance of salvation for himself, and as he recognized that he had been elected to realize himself as a free moral agent, and thus to become something more than a passive unit in the national life, his new-born conviction was really an anger not only of his own personal liberty as a citizen, but also of the emancipation of the State itself. Calvinism, which interpreted the consciousness of election to life as an incitement to moral practice, was marvellously adapted to endow the nations with a freedom based upon personal responsibility, and thereby to procure the liberation of the State from the Church, as is well, the civil power would be called making the Church's function a kind of the Eastern Church was subject to the State; doctrine was a State concern, and was frequently enforced by Government authority. The Donatist controversy touched not only the idea of the Church, but upon the Church's liberation from State control (see DONATISTS). While the medieval Roman Church claimed the right to dominate the State, it was rather the Byzantine principle which re-emerged in Lutheran countries at the Reforma-
tion: it was held that the State, as a Christian entity, ought to concern itself even with the defence of the faith; and the territorial principle cujus regio ejus religio held its own for a time. Once, more, however, it was Calvinism that upheld religious liberty against the usurpations of the State: witness the history of Holland, Scotland, and the United States. These countries actually carried out the idea that there was no Divine principle of the innermost heart, should in no way be constrained by the civil power—a principle which, it is true, had been strongly advocated in Reformation times by dissidents like Denk and Sebastian Franck. Even the system of Established Churches was set aside, notably in the United States. It was held that the Churches should be quite independent of the State, requiring nothing from it save legal protection: only on these conditions could the freedom of the Church as a societas fidei be realized. Certainly, were the Churches to attempt to suppress freedom, and to drag them the people to accept their formula, as in some of the countries of the Western world, it was the Church's function to safeguard the liberty of the subject, since it is of the very essence of a free Church that the members should belong to it voluntarily, and should not be coerced. The outcome of such a freedom is that the religious spirit unfolds itself in the most varied forms. State Churches, in fact, can compete in this respect with voluntary Churches only by admitting a wide variety in their doctrine and practice. Cf. art. ERASMIANISM.

(i) Bare mention may also be made of the fact that emancipation is understood by some in an absolute sense, i.e. as personal liberty without any qualification whatever. Such freedom is conceded to the man of genius, as, e.g., by Rousseau and writers like Schlegel—in his theory of Irony; or to the man of power, as in Nietzsche's Übermensch. But all this really amounts to an emancipation from morality—a condition 'beyond good and evil.' Such an emancipation, like the Solipsism of Max Stirner's Ein Individuenrecht (Leipzig, 1843), is sheer delusion.

3. Moral and religious bearings of emancipation. From the foregoing survey we see how emancipation is grasped upon the one hand, as the Church's interference in things of the State, and more, manifesting itself now as the liberation of thought, now as the deliverance of the individual from the bondage of society and of organized communities, and again as the liberation of one community from another, each exhibiting a growing sense of its peculiar function, and striving to fulfill the same in its own way. It is admitted by the various schools of thought—whether as a subject for blame or for praise—that the process of emancipation is in the last resort the supersession of authority by autonomy. In this striving after freedom many read hostility to religion, a tendency to break away from the Divine government, the atomizing and leveling processes of Babylonian and Cynic life; but, as a matter of fact, men are meant that justice is to be determined solely by the individual (who appropriates what rights he can), the imminent dissolution of discipline and order— the condition of the universe. It is, however, as to J. G. Fichte for instance, the real tenor of the process seems to consist in the transmu-
tation of authority into liberty, of natural gifts into qualities personally acquired and developed, of tradition into freedom of thought and act; in the ceaseless renovation of communities—not as dead institutions but as living organisms—by the unobstructed effort of their members; and in the growing capacity of each separate community to undertake and execute its specific work, without alien interference, but with its own resources, and according to the principles of its constitution—no community having authority over any other, but each being supreme within its own domain, and each in reality best serving the interests of the rest by attending to its own affairs.

It is a fact beyond question that the human personality must possess the moral right to express itself in action, and is, therefore, entitled to a measure of emancipation adequate thereto. Moral personality has two sides. There is first of all the universal side, in virtue of which every man ought to have an equal claim to the power of a thing and upon this postulate rest the general rights of man asserted by the advocates of Natural Law— including not merely protection of life and property, but freedom of conscience and thought and action. Then there is the individual side, which postulates that each person, as such, should possess the right to develop his special talents in his own way; nor is he to be levelled to the general average of society, as is demanded by certain schools of Socialism. It is clear, nevertheless, that an emancipation of the individual issuing in a ruthless self-assertion at the cost of others would subvert the real rights of the latter, while, as a matter of fact, men are meant to work as complementary to one another. It is, therefore, of capital importance that an adjust-
ment be made between the general rights of moral personality and the right of the individual to act. The only condition of a person being must be free to act in his proper vocation, and must at the same time pay due regard to the corresponding right of others.

The relation subsisting between the individual and the various groups—the family, the corporate body, the class, civic society, the State, the Church, custom—is conditioned by the postulate that as a moral personality he shall have the right to act spontaneously, and according to his abilities, in these several relationships, and hence also to assist
in the continuous renovation of the communities themselves; emancipation is, therefore, necessary as a means to that end. Again, however, the varying rages of the human brain and im-
tinity, must demand that recognition be given by the
individual to the constitution and order without
which they could not exist. Hence there emerges one of the peculiar religious ideas of the condi-
tion, of which is that, while the existing economy of
these communities is treated with respect, it shall
leave room for development and reform, and con-
sequently for efforts directed thereto, such progress
shaping itself in accordance to the distinctive char-
acter of the several communities.

Finally, as regards the interrelations of the various
communities, it is required that each of these
shall possess such a measure of freedom as will
enable it to develop according to its own prin-
ciples, and to do justice to its specific aim and
object. But, since none of these communities is
absolutely independent, since, in fact, they circums-
cribe one another, they must enter into mutual
relations. So far as their external activities are
concerned, the province of each must be delimited
in such a way as to obviate the possibility of collis-
on. By that the law, the guardian of which is the State,
while it is the State likewise which must guarantee
the complete liberty required by each community in
the sphere of its historical function.

In a word, emancipation is a necessary moment
in that liberation of the moral personality and the
moral community without which they cannot ade-
quately realize their appropriate moral end. But
this fact also indicates the limitation of the process,
viz., that the individual and the community alike
must regard themselves as each having a place in the
whole moral organism, and as working towards the
Highest Good, or—in terms of religion—the
Kingdom of God. Emancipation taken as an end-
in-itself, and as the repudiation of moral respon-
sibility, is worse than useless, and results in moral
chaos; but, if we regard it as a means of setting
the moral powers free for action, so that they may
most efficiently contribute their special quota to
the realization of the whole ethical process, then
emancipation is seen to be a demand of the moral
world itself.

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A. DOINER.

EMERSON.—I. Life and writings.—Ralph
Waldo Emerson, the most
famous representative of the Transcendentalist
school of thought in New England, was
born, the third of seven children, in Boston, Mass., on 25th
May 1803. His father, William Emerson, was

minister of the First Church (Unitarian) in Boston;
his mother, Ruth Haskins, was a woman of strong
and gracious character. Emerson took a genuine
pride in his descent from famous New England
ministers. It gave him ‘a certain normal piety,
levitation education’; he counted himself happy
in having a star which rained on him influences of
the most eminent type. However, Mary Moody Emer-
son, did much to shape his character and thought
—the kind aunt whose cares instructed my youth,
and whom may God reward!'

He was educated at the Boston Grammar School
and Latin School, and then at Harvard, where he
graduated without any great distinction in 1821,
two of his brothers proving much more brilliant
than he. The family circumstances being strait-
then, the amount of time he had to study was
limited to two hours a day. He was influenced
by American and Continental teachers, and
found the most stimulating stimulus in the
philosophies of the 18th century. He was
inspired by the study of Schelling's works, and
the influence of the later American and
European philosophers.

Finally, he was attracted by the philosophy of
the 18th century, and the influence of
Schelling's works, and the great
philosophers of the 18th century.

The clearest light on these earlier years, and
indeed one of the most valuable means we possess
for the knowledge of the essential Emerson, has

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recently been given in the long-delayed publication of his private journal, edited by his son and grandson. Four volumes have, so far, been issued, covering the years 1829-38. Early in life he began a notebook system, one chief purpose of which was to keep a diary of his condition and deliver him from 'cheap, extemporaneous, draggletail dogmatics.' He included quotations which had impressed him; his own comments on these and similar aspects of the current literature. The book, which he read to, by him and to, especially from his correspondence with his aunt Mary; and all the spontaneous overflow of his mind according to the outlook and feeling of the moment. It was, in part, a deliberate literary exercise as well as a storehouse of memories and seed-thoughts, as when he took a fancy to imitate for a time the _Rambler or Spectator._ This Journal was the foundation of his published writings, and contains the rough-hewn outlines of some of his most famous utterances. The whole is of the most intense interest as a revelation of the man. The lover of Nature is here continually— and the indomitable optimist, except at a certain year, 1849—true to his health and depression. Here are the gravity and dignity that gave to so many of his later utterances an oracular and prophetic tone: 'Why has my mother diary no jokes? Because it is the Diary of a Philosopher. [This,] one man is great alone.' Here are hints of the remoteness and reserve which were characteristic to the end: 'Aristocracy is a good sign . . . no man would consent to live in society if he was obliged to admit everybody to his house that chose to come.' Here is his own confession of the wayward and disconnected thinking which some of his critics have regarded as his chief defect: 'My wayward Imagination have beside the close of the sheets which I dedicated to the Genius of America, and notice that I have devoted nothing in my book to any peculiar topics which concern my country.' Here may be traced the beginning of the Swedenborg influence, which left so deep a mark upon him, especially in its feeling for the unity of Nature and its foreshadowing of the idea of Evolution: it reached him first through a 44-page pamphlet, entitled _The Growth of Mind_ (Boston, 1826), by Sampson Reed, a young apothecary. The pamphlet does not contain much that would now arrest attention, but to Emerson it had the 'aspect of a revelation.' But the most interesting ingredient in the book is the youthful outlines of the doctrines of which, in later years, he was to be the prophet. The _Essay on Compensation_ is here in germ. When he was 22 he wrote:

1. "I say that sin is ignorance, that the thief steals from himself, that he who practices fraud is himself the dupe of the fraud he practices; that whose bowews runs in his own debt, and whose givens to another benefits himself to the same amount."

The doctrine of self-reliance is equally prominent: cf. this (at 20): "I see no reason why I should bow my head to man, or cringe in my demeanour. This, again, in a letter to his aunt, anticipates his frequent championship of the individual soul, its rights and dignities:

1. "I believe, in my old faith, that to each soul is a solitary law, a several universe. The colours in our eyes may be different,—your red may be my green. My innocence to one of more importance than guilt to you."

So we watch in these volumes the gradual unfolding of the thinker and the man. At 17 he dreams of standing 'in the fair assembly of the chosen, the learned and the beautiful'; at 20 he writes: 'I burn after the _aliquip immensus insignia philosoplique_ which Cicer did desire.' And, as we turn these pages, we feel that he is already far upon the way.

By the time of his settling in Concord his life ran a contrary easy and edifying course, and

1. There is a passage to the same effect written when he was 19. Cf. the opening of the Essay itself: 'Ever since I was a boy . . .'

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without its financial struggles and its private sorrows, such as the death of his eldest boy in 1842 (commemorated in _Thermopylae._) His second visit to Europe was in 1847, when the lectures on _Representative Men_ were delivered, and his third in 1872.

'The rest is silence.' But his correspondence, notably with Carlyle; his reception of innumerable visitors; his happy communion with his family and with Nature; and the publication of his _Nature,_ _Self-Reliance_, and _Nature_, published in 1836—deserves special notice because of its relation to the movement of which Emerson became the principal seer. Though the little book was greatly admired by a few, twelve years passed before 500 copies were sold. Its value lies not only in its intrinsic beauty and suggestive-ness—it contains some of the most poetic prose that Emerson ever wrote—but also in that we look back upon it now as a kind of preface to all that is covered by the word 'Transcendentalism.' It is difficult to frame this movement in any exact definition; it was more a spirit that could be felt than a set of doctrine which might be formulated. It had links of connexion with Kantian idealism; it owed much to the influence of Coleridge, Carlyle, Goethe; also to Edward Everett, who popularized in Boston the newer stirrings of European thought. But there was, in America, a current of thought, as of Europe: it was a reaction against the intellectual conventionality that reigned in Unitarian as in Calvinistic circles; it was a cry for new life, or partly a cry and partly a breath that came in to life. The movement gathered to itself supporters, some that were notable, such as Margaret Fuller, some eccentricities and extremists, many that were obscure in name but lofty and earnest in spirit.

To get the essence of the Transcendentalist spirit, one might take this sentence from _The Dial_:

'They [the Editors] have obeyed, though with great joy, the strong current of thought and feeling which, for a few years past, has led many sincere persons in New England to make new demands on literature, and to reproduce that rigor of our conventions of religion and education which is turning us to stone, which renounces hope, which looks only backward, which asks only such a future as the past, which unsuspects improvement, and holds nothing so much in horror as new views and the dreams of youth. To most of us makes the conductors of the present journal have nothing to do.'

The same spirit is more briefly and positively expressed in the first paragraph of _Nature_:

'The foremost considerations beholding God and Nature face to face; we, through their eyes. Why should not we also enjoy an original relation . . .?'

It is obvious that this relates itself closely to Emerson's favorite gospel of self-reliance: the Transcendentalist is one who trusts the deepest voices of his own being, and holds himself gladly free to follow the new light that new days bring to him. Yet he, of all men, is most truly loyal to the past; he is but doing what great souls of all ages have done before him.

'This way of thinking, falling on Roman times, made Stoic philosophers . . . falling on superstitious times, made prophets and apostles . . . and, falling on Unitarian and commercial times, makes the peculiar shades of idealism which we know.'

This sentence from the lecture on _The Transcendentalist_ hints at the way in which Emersoniansan called for reverence for the past with his still greater reverence for the intuitions and revelations of the living present.

_Nature_ was followed by two public utterances, which were both significant and prophetic. The oration on _The American Scholar_ was delivered at Cambridge in 1837—an event, Lowell says, 'without parallel in our literary annals. It has been described as the birth of intellectual declaration on the part of America;' it was a call to the sluggard

1. 'A sentence in the _Journal_, when he was 18: 'Greatness is a proper thing in the proper course, and it must be possessed long before it is acknowledged.'

2. Cf. Emerson, in _The Dial_, April 1843: 'The American Academy, the Historical Society, and Harvard University
intellect of the American continent to look for and is looking for.

'We have listened too long to the crooked noses of Europe; . . . we will walk on our own feet; we will work with our own hands; we will speak our own minds.

The influence of this address in calling forth an American literary consciousness can scarcely be over-estimated; the mind of a nation challenged itself through the voice of a man; the younger thinkers of the time heard it as a call to courage and to self-reliance; and self-reliance is the watchword of the hour in Daniel (10th) repeated for modern ears. This was followed the next year by the Address to the Divinity Class in Cambridge—an utterance which was met with much controversy, in which Emerson took no part. Its significance for us lies in its revelation of his religious position. It was the doctrine of self-reliance applied to the loftiest things—a re-assertion of the great Stoic doctrine, 'Obey thyself'; a prescription: 'first soul, and second soul, and evermore soul,' for the deadness of conventional thoughts and forms; a call to rise to Christ's conception of the greatness of a man. This all shocked the public box by seeming to belittle the historic basis of Christianity and the accumulated witness of the past; it alarmed some who did not count themselves specially orthodox, by its sheer courage and self-reliance upon immense and mysterious matters. Things here are characteristic, and the reader who knows this utterance well knows much that came after.

There is the deep and passionate moral sense, which to Emerson was the very nerve of religion; when a man attains to say, 'Virtue, I am thine, save me, use me . . . then is the end of creation answered and God is well pleased.' There is a glimpse of his critical and independent relation to historical Christianity,—his feeling that he has hold of something larger than the Churches were giving,—his conviction that the best method of honouring Jesus was to show the same courage as He showed and to live as He did, by intuition and conscience, and faith in the grandeur of the soul. There is also a note which may almost be called Messianic: 'I look for the new Teacher, that shall follow so far those shining laws, that he shall see them come full circle.'

But Emerson's religious position as a whole is best summarized in a phrase from one of his letters to his aunt Mary: 'I belong to the transcendentalists; and a little of their vision to all the dogmas is in one sentence in his Journal (1830): 'Alii disponent, ego manorab, said Augustine; it shall be my speech to the Calvinist and the Unitarian; I have let women and men, and the bright boys and girls in New England, when in 1842 he wrote to Carlyle: They are all religious, but they hate the Churches. It is evident from the Address and from other utterances that the historical element in Christianity never appealed much to him: 'We shall look back, peradventure, to Christianity as to a roastery on which, in the morn of existence, we learned to erect our prayers.' It was this which enabled him to delight in Swedenborgian interpretations of Scripture, which were utterly inaccurate and unhistorical; it was enough for him that the sentiment was true and eternal. Apparently, however, even he was sometimes afraid lest the world would do well to make the Concord smelters the subject of examination in regard to their literary and ethical influence.

For he was a man who travelled to Europe, with the aim of a European taste. Our education, so-called—our drifting at college and our drifting since—has been European, and we write on the English culture and to an English public, in America and in Europe.'

See, in this, art, by W. Robertson Nicoll, mentioned under Literature. Cf. the passage at the end of 'Worship' (Conduct of Life) where the new church, to be founded on moral science, 'at first cold and naked, a babe in a manger again.'

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It is not good to say with too much precision and emphasis that we are encroached upon by the chains of Jesus in the current theology, and let us carry these things up into a collier state of mind.'

That state of mind was never Emerson's own. His positive assertions were always so essentially religious and believing that they have lent wings to many who have small sympathy with the more negative side of his position.

Emerson's writings include the following: in 1841, Essays (including 'History,' 'Self-Reliance,' 'Compensation,' 'Spiritual Websites' by his friend), followed by 'Character,' 'Manseers,' 'Nominalist and Realist,' 'New England Reformers, etc.); in 1848, Miscellaneous (including 'Nature."

The American Scholar," the 'Address to the Divinity Class,' 'Man the Reformer,' 'The Times,' 'The Conservative,' 'The Transcendentalist,' etc.), and in the same year Representative Men. In 1851 he united with W. H. Channing and J. F. Clarke in the Memoirs of Margaret Fuller Ossoli. In 1856, English Traits appeared; in 1850, Conduct of Life; in 1870, Society and Solitude; in 1875, Letters and Social Aims; in 1875, Fortunes of the Republic. His first volume of Poems was published in 1847; May-day and other Pieces appeared in 1877; Selected Poems in 1876. After his death the following appeared: in 1884, Poems (new and revised edition), another volume of Miscellaneous, and British and European Sketches; in 1896, The Natural History of Intuition, and other papers. In 1905, the re-issue of the Complete Works began in the Centenary edition, and in 1900-1901 the first four vols. of the Journal were published.

Emerson died at Concord, where his peaceful home had been for nearly half a century, on 27th April 1882.

2. Characteristics.—Emerson's works are a collection of miscellaneous counsels and oracles, and not the logical working out of any system of thought. But a few things stand out visibly through the whole.

(a) One is his immense and inexhaustible value as an ethical teacher. His ethical-religious position is different from his own in the ethical realm a vast debt of gratitude—not least for his gospel of self-reliance, his insistence on the duty of self-respect and the obligation to listen to the imperial voice of one's own soul. Linked with this there is his deep sense of the worth of the individual.

'God enters by a private door into every individual . . . Everybody knows as much as the saint. The walls of rule minds are scarred over with facts, with thoughts. They shall one day bring a lantern and read the inscription.'

If this emphasis on self-trust has its dangers, Emerson guardedly against them in the following maxim of responsibility and of the greatness of life; he shows us in prose and poetry the scorn that is in the eyes of the passing days if we do not make good use of our gifts:

'Truly it demands and requires that we shall know on the common motives of humanity and that humanity has ventured to trust himself for a taskmaster' (Self-Reliance).

Two qualities make him an ethical teacher most bracing and helpful to the young. One is his note of good cheer—his sense of the ethical value of hope. Here comes in the doctrine of compensation; his sense of the utility of scepticism; his vision of the glory of living in the present age.

'rejoice that I live when the world is so old. There is the same difference between life and death, as between me as in going into a new house, unfinished, damp, and empty, and going into a long-occupied house where the time and taste of its inhabitants has accumulated in instructions, contrivances, has furnished the chambers, stocked the cellars, and filled the library. Are the lovers of the past, judge between my houses! I would not be elsewhere than I am' (Journal, ii. 71).

The other is his general manliness and closeness to life, his insistence on concentration, on thoroughness, on discipline; this is even clearer in the later writings, where there is perhaps less mysticism and more guidance for the highway—his head is

1 Cf. The Prodigal Son, the poem in which after his praise of the 'Shakespeare of the Divines,' he concludes; 'And yet, for all this faith could see, I would not the good bishop be.'
loss in the clouds and his feet are more upon the earth. He can be very searching, this sage of the highway:

A day is a more magnificent cloth than any muslin; the mechanism that makes it is infinitely cunning: and you shall not conceal the sleazy, fraudulent, rotten hours you have slipped into the piece, nor fear that any honest thread, or straight line of steel, or more inflexible shaft, will not testify in the web' (Poems).

(b) Along with this ethic there goes a something that is not quite a theology; let us call it an almost theology—a garment that is not fashioned according to any existing star-man, but is real enough to provide a sky for the earth and a dew for the tender grass. The typical piece here is the Oversoul. Why should I so boldly trust my intuitions? Because intuition is reception: one can part of our business in this world in receiving. Emerson had been a critic of the accepted theologies from his youth up:

'It seemed to me when very young that on this subject (Christian) life was ahead of theology, and the people knew more than the preachers taught.'

The critic in his turn has often been criticized for his theological indifferentism and for his leanings towards Pantheism. Yet, if he leaves God vague and undefined, readers of different standpoint can read their own beliefs into his large conceptions; and his great help is from his essentially religious spirit. 'I shall not call God the Beautiful, who daily showeth Himself so to me in His gifts? That is almost enough theological definition for him. If a Christian preacher were turning Emerson's language, his search of his propositions in Scripture texts, there are two texts that would draw to themselves a special number of thoughts and phrases. One is St. Paul's counsel, 'Let each man be fully armed with his own mind' (Ro 14); the other is the Psalmist's prayer, 'Let the beauty of the Lord our God be upon us' (Ps 90)'. Here at least is much to live by—aglory in the heavens and a firm path upon the earth. In regard to the doctrine of immortality, he was also lacking in definition, though he was optimistic throughout. Sometimes he spoke vaguely and impersonally, sometimes more warmly and in terms of a personal hope.

'All the comfort I have found teaches me to confide that I shall not have less to times and places that I do not yet know.'

In his later years he is said to have spoken sometimes of reunion with those who had gone on before.

(c) Through all the writings there appears most vividly the man. The very limitations and defects of the thinker, which are plain enough, are the limitations of the man. He had not the gift of ordered and consecutive thinking; he wrote once to a friend:

'I do not know what arguments are in reference to any expression of a thought. I delight in telling what I think; but if you ask me how I dare say so, or why it is so, I am the most helpless of mortal men.'

A good deal of criticism is disarmed by this frank confession. Beside his avoidance of life's more tragic and terrible themes in his teaching, there may be placed the fact that in common life he hated to hear people speak of their ailments. Some may regard this as a virtue and others as a defect; but most people who speak of their distempers weaken themselves by doing so; and he may have deliberately chosen in his writings to leave the shadows to others and to point the sunlit path where men could have the maximum of courage and strength. There are indications in the earlier pages of the Journals that he was by nature means without a sense of personal sin, especially at the time when his life was first enriched by love, and humbled by his call to the ministry. Did he outgrow these feelings as if they were the soul's murmurs and musings and whooping-coughs?

One thing is sure, that, even if he left behind the shadow of sin, he did not leave behind the shadow of sorrow; and his journals give hints of a life not all complacency, with veiled depths of brooding and pain. But through it all there breathes the spirit of a truly lofty character—the man who is more than all his words. His later years were surrounded by a reverence such as is given to few men while they are still alive. Lowell wrote in 1868:

'For us the whole life of the man is distilled in the clear drop of every sentence, and behind each word we divine the force of his noble character, the weight of a large capital of thinking and being.'

Even to those who are much further removed, that force and weight still make themselves felt; to few writers are they bound by so strong a tie of personal admiration.

3. Poetical genius.—Widely different estimates have been made of Emerson's worth as a poet. Some tell us that here is the Emerson who counts, and that all else is nothing by comparison; others again are offended by his comparative lack of form and music, and deal with his poetry in the somewhat cold-sounding and ungracious fashion adopted by Matthew Arnold. Appreciation will always vary according to the value placed by the critic upon melody or upon thought; some will despise the ship because she labours in making progress; others will prize her for her useful weighty freight she bears. Emerson's description of one of the Persian poets who influenced him so greatly might be applied to himself—'a river which makes its own shores'; when the river is doing that, it may break through the ordinary channels of expression, and cut across the conventional and ordered beauties of the lyric landscape; but he who has eyes for force and fullness will find something here to study and admire. Yet even the critic who seeks form and melody might find something to harp his heart in the slow undulations of the poem beginning—

'I heard or seemed to hear the rolling Sea
Say, Pilgrim, why so late and slow to come?'

... or in the severe dignity of Days and Terminus, or in the tenderness of Ternodey, or in the lyric simplicity of Thine eyes still shined, and If my darling should depart. Lord Byron's estimate is just:

'Taken as a whole, Emerson's poetry is of that kind which springs, not from excitement of passion or feeling, but from an intellectual demand for intense and unabashed expression. It will, therefore, have its appeal to a limited number. The Muse is here who

*ransacks mines and lodges
And quarries every rock
To bow the famous adiant
For each eternal block';

... and, though there is at least a little of the kindred Muse who

*a says her bea in Music,
In music every one,
To the cadence of the whirling world
Which dance round the sun,'

the impression left on the whole is one of grave severity which will always find a fit audience, though never a large one.'

4. Influence.—Few writers of the 19th, or indeed of any century, have exerted a wider influence than Emerson. 'A strain as new and moving and unforgettable as Nietzsche or Carlyle'—so M. Arnold describes the impression made in England when Emerson's message first began to sound across the sea. That influence has grown steadily. He has left his mark on many notable lives of varying type; it would be easy to gather testimonies from many biographies (e.g. those of Tennyson, R. W. Dale, Henry Drummond) where this indebtedness is confessed. And, though there are some who feel that he did not do complete justice to certain great happenings of long
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ago which are still 'towering o'er the wrecks of time,' they will join with others in their gratitude for an influenced life.  and the works which are most accessible to the natural impulses and the me.  The wise belong to the good side of humanity, and hence to the benefactors of the world.  They are, therefore, not to be suppressed, but to be kept within proper bounds.  In this way he distinguishes between agency (sub-human growth) and virtue.  The good man is not self-denial, in which the desires, not yet overcomen and still active, are being resist.  while true self-destruction is found in the 'man,' in which the desires are reduced to due propor.  tions, and thereby brought under the sway of reason.  Thus, according to Aristotle, some of the evils which we meet in the soul, which give rise to pleasure or pain—cowardliness, anger, fear, love—are nothing else than when they feel they are not yet at the same time to be restrained without reason.

LITERATURE.  The Journal alluded to above, vols. 1909-10; the authori Life by J. E. Cabot, Boston, 1887; the mono.  tography of Carlyle and Emerson, 1884- 1872, ed. C. E. Norton, Boston, 1885; Correspondences of Carlyle and Emerson, 1868- 1870.  These are all accessible to the philosophy of the whole body, or to the 'common-places,' in which Plato's estimate of the emotions varies according to the intellectualism.  to the emotions in Ethics will vary according to our view of the foundations of morality.

I. HISTORICAL SKETCH.  The emotions in Greek ethics.  Plato enumerates three faculties of the soul, viz., the appetitive (ἐνέργεια), the impulsive or spirited (ἐνέργεια), and the rational (νοηματική), each having its appropriate virtue; and these three re-appear in the State (which is but a magnified personality) as the several ranks of artisans, warriors, and philosophers.  This view gives due recognition to the emotions, since each faculty has its own virtue, and the harmony of all is justice, defined as ἀρετή ἀριστον ("each doing its part.").  In the theory of goods, which does not exclude pleasure, Plato aims at the harmony of all the faculties, declin.  ing to the idea of the whole life is an appetitive faculty.  Plato's estimate of the emotions varies according to the intellectualism.  The change.  In the State, the common.  Plato's concern for the realization of such a harmony is seen in his theory of education, which states, "The life is to be educated to the task of keeping desire in leash; and, as it may be required, to be restrained without reason.

(0) In this negative aim the Epicureans are at one with the Stoics.  The noblest mode of life is that which is purely to apathy.  They set the emotions at the heart of individual morality; in fact, their cosmopolitanism is no more than an ideal.  Their morality is simply the absence of evil.  The Stoic wise man is one who is free from all sorrow, engaged in purely rational activity, and is not the least afraid of the world, over, a man must either be entirely wise, or else a fool.  The passions consist in a natural desire to commit such acts as spring from suffering, to fulfill other things, for, under passion, everything is judged from a transient and limited point of view, and is to be restrained without reason.

(0) Still greater influence is assigned to the emotions by Aristotle.  For him, as for Plato, the highest virtue consists in knowledge, which in its perfection is Divine; but he different.  and, in fact, the passionate soul is in a way a slave, so to speak, to the passions.

1872, 1871, the Century ed., Boston and New York, 1868, etc.; also in England, 8 vols. ed. Morley (1855).

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EMOTIONS.  The present article will deal with the emotions in their ethical bearings, i.e. considered as springs of moral action.  For the more strictly psychological and physiological, the reader is referred to the corresponding essay in the article on Human Nature.  The emotion may be regarded as a compound of feeling and impulse.  It belongs to the natural constitution of man, and is distinguished from both intelligence and morality.  The theory of the emotions in Ethics will vary according to our view of the foundations of morality.

(0) This characteristic attitude to knowledge is adopted also in the later Greek systems, viz., Stoicism and Epicureanism.  (a) The Epicureans aim at the pleasure of life, base it on the desire for pleasure, and maintain that the human being is completely overthrown from the apathy of the Stoics.  It is remarkable that, while, after the age of Plato, Art tends to become more emotion- al, philosophy seeks salvation in freeing itself from the apathy. Though Epicurus rejects personal pleasure, he is still concerned with pleasure of a kind, namely, that which lasts beyond the momentary thrill.  Since, however, the goods which yield pleasure are liable to change, he lays great emphasis upon the feeling of security, which is partly supplied, and indeed guaranteed, by the State; and also upon the ataraxia which can be maintained at the face of death itself.  Epicurus desires to eliminate the transient factor in the emotions, to guard against both pain and fear, to cost the passions as being the source of suffering.  In the theory of goods, which does not exclude pleasure, Plato aims at the harmony of all the faculties, declining to the idea of the whole life is an appetitive faculty.  Plato's estimate of the emotions varies according to the intellectualism.  The change.  In the State, the common.  Plato's concern for the realization of such a harmony is seen in his theory of education, which states, "The life is to be educated to the task of keeping desire in leash; and, as it may be required, to be restrained without reason.

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upon suffering, but it is rather the agreeable sensation that accompanies freedom and energy, while even the pleasure yielded by the"souls without a aura," the sun of which is unwarranted, being a kind of suffering. It is true that the Stoics did not carry their view of the exclusive value of virtue, any more than they allowed any value of apathy, their"vulgar" view, if they are allowed to exist, will always be just what it is supposed to be. But it is certain that minor objects of human desire, such as health, riches, friendship, etc.; and, though happiness does not depend upon them, there is none that is so precious in possessing them; hence the doctrine of apathy cannot be fully carried out. Nevertheless, the Stoics held that the man who will not become the slave of such things. In reality, virtue is sufficient for happiness, and, though the wise man may suffer in the exercise of his duties, the feelings of pain and sorrow, he can rise above them. Like the Epicureans, the Stoics stand at the culmination of Greek thought; they withdrew from the external world to the internal, and find the "life according to nature" in that life alone which is in harmony at once with the laws of nature and with that of reason. They set a high value upon self-preservation—an end which, being in full accord with perfect freedom, manifests itself in indifference to painful experiences, and the wise man to evade his ownness with the supreme, all-pervading Deity.

The main trend of Greek ethics is towards the supremacy of reason, and, while in Plato and Aristotle reason appears as the harmonizing principle that controls emotion, it is for the Stoics and Epicureans the sole principle, since all natural ends, indeed, as moral sin—no, however, and a mood of pessimism dominates everything.

There had been, as the Stoics believed, few wise men in the past, and a multitude of fools. They held that men are wholly free from all painful experiences whatsoever—in a word, from the  

Thus, wherever knowledge is regarded as the formative ethical force, and the will is associated with the process of judgment, the emotions can have no proper place. Emotions are blind, in fact, must be assigned finally, as in the Stoа, to defective understanding.

2. In Jewish and Early Christian ethics.—The emotions perform a very different function in a sphere where morality is an affair of the will, as, e.g., in Judaism. In Jewish ethics the will is determined by the emotions of fear and hope—fear of punishment and hope of reward. The commandments as given by God were definite and, in fact, must be knowledge of the Good as something in itself valuable, but only fear and hope. It is true that trust in God and love to God had also a place in Judaism; but it was a subordinate one, and they were regarded as the end by the other.

The emotions had a recognized place also in the primitive Christian ethic, and have retained this in sundry forms till the present day. Despite the asceticism and need in the strain interminably heard in the NT ethic, the emotions fill an important rôle.

For one thing, love is looked upon as the supreme ethical motive: love, as an amalgamation of feeling with a definite and permanent direction of the will, is the emotion which in Christianity is exalted to the grand creative affection of the soul. Love to God is the standing motive of the moral and religious life. The natural impulses and feelings are, however, because they are intrinsically corrupt, but because they have assumed the command and taken the wrong way. Self-seeking love of the world have "agapе," love of God. Emotion, accordingly, is not to be eradicated, but simply turned to its proper use, and this is achieved when it becomes the support and inspiration of good volition. But such volition is directed towards God, and to God and God's love toward it. No conception of God, while, on His part, God is the Father of all. Thus, according to the Fourth Gospel, the Christian is fulfilled with an enduring power that cannot be taken away. His bestowing emotion is a permanent and blessed spirit of love, which predisposes him to good works. Fear of punishment and hope of reward may still remain—vestiges of Jewish ethics,—but perfect love drives out fear. Nevertheless, the pre-emience of love in primitive Christianity does not exclude the suppression of other emotions; they, too, are to be made auxiliaries of the spiritual life. St. Paul is a man of singularly fervid emotion—one in whom even anger is subordinated to the service of the divine. Yet, although, inter alia, the expectation of the Parousia was a specially potent factor in causing men to set less store than they now do by such earthly boons as marriage, social position, property, art, etc., and to repress the natural feelings that cluster around these things, yet, as a compensation, the peculiar heritage of the individual was placed upon a new basis, inasmuch as every man had a vocation of infinite value, and every condition of life could be consecrated by the operation of a right spirit within. Here, then, provision was made for a deepening of spirit and a refinement of feeling such as are possible only where so high an estimate is placed upon personality.

In its further development, Christian morality presently shows a tendency to coalesce with Greek ideas, at least on the native soil of the latter, in the "Element of Altrmit of All." The Stoics and Epicureans coalesce with the Christian principle of love. Along with the distinction between gnosis and phйl, between the ecstatic, intellectual religion of the mystics and the popular, the Stoics held that the Christian Gnostic must be an érкtос ийккрко (defined as a member of the Church, i.e., delivered from sin), i.e., delivered from the wrath which originate in the distinctions of sense. He must rise to the sphere of calm, clear knowledge; and, while not declining the moral struggle of life, he must be independent of them. Nevertheless, he does not show himself sympathetic towards his fellow-man; he, too, has to bear his besetting of gnosis does not repudiate his relations with the natural, and his apathy is toned down to something not unlike the Platonic.

In the West, the challenge of Christianity to the older civilization is much more emphatic. True, we find tertullian speaking of the anima naturaliter Christianа; nevertheless, his ethical teaching—particularly in his Montanistic period—is hostile to all culture, and is directed towards the complete exclusion of desire, so that he might almost be called a Christian Cynic. Personally, however, he is highly emotional and passionate, and, especially as a Montanist, prone to let himself be carried away—even to the point of ecstasy—by feelings commonly thought to be symptomatic of inspiration. As a protest against the moral degeneracy of his age, he demands that Christians shall withdraw themselves from the public life of heathendom, which fosters the passions the Christian must eschew. Theatrical performances and second marriages are special perils. Tertullian advocates a complete severance of discipline, and revives the opposition to all athercistic culture of one's natural passions. He aims, not at the breaking away from the complete exclusion of all that culture bestows, even the culture of the emotions. Hence, too, the impassioned character of his remonstrations against the heathen world, which centres itself upon moral reform of a Chnstian, i.e., first of all, an anti-page, a white hand. In the white hand, he finds the complete conformity to nature," which he regards as also in line with Christianity, appears to him to consist in perfect simplicity of life, in the repression of cupidin и conscientia. pagan civilization has fanned the flames of passion and desire, and has taken man away from his natural and simple conditions. As this antagonism to heathen culture develops, however, it eventually becomes an antagonism to all that is natural, which is declared to be corrupt. Ambrose desiderates a complete independence of earthly joy and sorrow: "non in passione esse sed victorem passionis esse beatum est." Property is grounded in selfishness: "peculiа continentur est instituta forma." Our possessions are to be placed at the disposal of love by works of beneficence. Augustine knows only of a human nature that is entirely corrupted with original sin—a massa perditiом. With him, emotion has an everlasting standing in relation to all the loveliness of God, which at its highest he combines with the eschatological anticipation of future reward and the fear of future punishment.

3. In monastic and medieval ethics.—Monasticism rejects all earthly goods—as a condition of entire consecration to the love of God. Since the natural is here regarded as wholly alien to the Divine, or at least not needed, since we have a complete departure from the natural propensities and feelings die away in love to God. Morality being in itself inadequate, all the more decisively is emotion transferred to the sphere of religion; it was in the Middle Ages that the idea of emotion was given its complete and absolute character. The West allows a much greater scope to the emotional element in that sphere than does that of the East,
just because the West lays the main emphasis upon a will wholly surrendered to God, and the East upon free will. Even the ecstatic love of God spoken of by Dionysius the Areopagite is much less emotional than the Divine favor of many a medieval mystic, and the subjective factor comes far more to the fore than in the Idea, though this is not to say that, on the contrary, the enjoyment with Plato, and the purgative life, or is less intense. But in the case of the virtue of love, the exuberant bliss of Divine intercourse, is emphasized. According to Plato, it was a blessed thing to gaze upon the Idea; but Augustine and the mystics of the Middle Ages took the emotions as the end in itself, which is reason for God and brings beatitude to man. But while religious emotion thus threatens to absorb every other concern of life—just as the fervent zeal of the Church counted earthly interests as nothing in comparison with religious interests, and so sent the heretic to the stake—yet medieval morality is not without a mundane aspect, as appears in the ethics of Aquinas.

Abelard, indeed, lays all emphasis upon the disposition, but he sees in Christianity the assertion of that law of nature which was recognized and obeyed by the philosophers of old. The good is to be willed for its own sake; hence penitence must be something more than external works, and must have, to be a true penitence, for its subject a theological one. Abelard accepts the ancient cardinal virtues; in short, he delivers them to the Church, and sets up an antithesis between natural and Christian morality, and so he traces all the virtues to their one source in character—to love—while he also regards sin as having its cause in love. Abelard points out that love must spring from love. But this deriving of morality from love does not involve a contradiction between love and human nature, for he gives no recognition to original sin.

We find a different estimate of natural morality and the emotions in Aquinas; with him, indeed, gratia infusa and love are supernatural gifts of the Spirit; still, he accepts the cardinal, as well as the theological, virtues; and, since in his doctrine of goods he is ready to do justice to the State (though ultimately subordinating it to the Church), he discerns various stages in the development of virtues themselves. Nevertheless, even the highest of these stages only serves to accentuate his antagonism to the natural. The cardinal virtues are recuperative in God; the lowest grade is political virtue; and, as it is the duty of man to turn to God, so far as in him lies, there are, besides the temperaments and the passions, intermediate ones, viz., the purgatorio and those of the purpuras animus. Whereas the political stage is bound up with earthly things, and chastens the natural emotions, the purgatorio work negatively towards making man like God, so that, e.g., temperanta relinquishes earthly things, so far as nature permits; while, again, tempontas is the level of the purpuras animus. Aquinas's doctrine of the several grades of virtue amounts, then, to this: the political virtues are genuine virtues; the higher species curb desire and feeling as far as is possible; the lowest grade is the highest of all, but with them entire. Nevertheless, he still thinks in terms of dualism, for, according to Aquinas, the temperance consists in following nature in the world: 'Nutrimentum caritatis immutabilis capitulit.' Thus, on the one hand, the natural virtues, even in the political stage, are not virtues at all, and the natural and supernatural passions, and the nature as such, so far as they concern us, are due to love to God in contradistinction to all that is of the world, and the cardinal virtues are merged in the grace that is poured from above.

Not only, however, was it impossible in medieval ethics to suppress the affections, or deny their claims on a lower stage of virtue; they were actually made subservient to religion and the Church. A super-natural love to God, ammulling every earth-born affection, was, of course, the ideal; but, when this ideal failed the Church in its capacity of teacher, she fell to fear, meaning the transgressor with penalty—in hell or purgatory or the present world—and so engendering a spirit so not much of hostility to evil as of mere abject terror. Such emotions as love, fear, hope and repentance in the ecclesiastical sense, operated with tremendous power in the Middle Ages, while the actual moral practice of life was but little regarded.

4. In modern ethics.—In the modern period developed subjective individualism into its own, so that morality is now based entirely upon it. Philosophical ethics has at length cast off the trammels of theology, and we may distinguish three tendencies, viz., Rationalistic, which in sundry forms bases morality upon human reason, and is thus akin to the classical view; the Synthetic, which would find its foundation in impulse and feeling; and the Synthetic, which aims at combining the other two. Alongside of these has existed since the Reformations of theology, in both a Protestant and a Roman Catholic sense, the enjoyment with the Church, the exuberant bliss of Divine intercourse, is emphasized. According to Plato, it was a blessed thing to gaze upon the Idea; but Augustine and the mystics of the Middle Ages took the emotions as the end in itself, which is reason for God and brings beatitude to man. But while religious emotion thus threatens to absorb every other concern of life—just as the fervent zeal of the Church counted earthly interests as nothing in comparison with religious interests, and so sent the heretic to the stake—yet medieval morality is not without a mundane aspect, as appears in the ethics of Aquinas.

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not even yet unaniempt itself from an inner conflict—the antimony which strikingly re-appears in the most recent expositions of Protestant ethics (cf. Luthardt, Franck, H. Weiss, and others).

Of the critical ethics having freed of self from theology, finds its starting-point in the instinctive feelings themselves. This school has found its main expansion in England and France.


during had called attention to the function of hate and love in the realm of nature generally, as also to their effects upon human nature, and the influence of passion upon conduct. Thomas More, in his Utopia, had promised the highest possible degree of untrifled gratification for one and all.


deliberately placed it in the impulse of self-preservation, to which he traced the emotions, thus recognizing their function in the interests of life itself, and finding virtue in the rational perception of what is useful or injurious. The Aristotelian Oeconomio, too, had asserted that the dynamic of life was not the intelligence intellectual, but rather the soul which knows and feels, and that, the emotions being rooted in the bodily frame, morality must needs rest upon a natural science of the soul; conduct, in fact, is connected with matter, and is dependent upon the natural warth of the temperament, and the feelings arising from it. Bentham also would connect morality with nature, and insists that it is tied to the complexity of situations naturally.


It was Bacon who first tried, by the scientific method of historical and psychological induction, to derive morality from experience, who combined it with the natural impulses, with the lex salutis and lex iniuria, and maintained, and maintained that the emotions must be taken into consideration as being the stimulus of the will, which is the grand factor in morality. According to Bacon, the proper function of ethics is so to regulate the emotions as to secure their obedience to reason, that is, to the laws won from experience, which enable us to harmonize the interests of self-preservation with the interests of social life. He thus discriminates the two fundamental aspects of the self-regarding and the 'other-regarding,' which have continued to play their part in Naturalistic ethics till the present day.


Hobbes, with his 'homo homini lupus,' emphasized the impulse of self-preservation in its most extreme form, making it the rationale of the State, whose function it is to keep the self-directed impulse within bounds. The social motive, he holds, is not primordial, but springs from fear, which, begotten by the individual's desire to protect himself, and by his sense of weakness, compels him to compromise with society. The State exists for the sake of peace and security, which enable the individual to live according to nature within the limits proscribed by the law; in other words, the individual, in virtue of that security, should have all the enjoyment the State can allow. Hobbes's political and ethical theories are thus based upon the desire of self-preservation and the necessary result of the war of all against all others.


The doctrines of Hobbes form a standing element in English Utilitarianism, though the latter lays a stronger emphasis upon his idea of political liberty. Utilitarianism received its classical expression from the hands of Bentham; its cardinal principle is the greatest possible good for each and all. It bases morality on the pursuit of happiness, and its sole aim is the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

In support of his thesis, Bentham appeals to psychology; he finds pain and pleasure by reference to differences among individuals, as a means of discovering rules by which pleasure and pain are either directly secured and pain avoided, and thereby the highest possible amount of happiness obtained. These rules attain to universal validity by means of the various sanctions—natural, social, political, and the religious—the authority of which, again, is derived from the principle of sympathy associated respectively with obedience or disobedience to the rules themselves. The pleasure and pain, hope and fear, are made the motives for the observance of the very laws which are designed to secure the greatest happiness. Here morality becomes a doctrine of prudence—the art of calculating the greatest happiness.


A simpler and less artificial form of the theory that the ethical motive is formed by the pleasures and pains connected with the instinct of self-preservation is found in the doctrine that unrestricted competition always gives the victory to the fittest, and that, accordingly, moral progress is the result of natural selection. For, after all, it is the instinct of self-preservation, which has designed the struggle that struggles for existence in which the strongest survive. The dynamic of social progress is thus found in the desire for power.


Another variant of naturalistic ethics would found morality upon a combination of self-love with the social instinct—a favourite resource with the Scottish School, who, after the example of Cumber land and others, put natural beneficence on a level with selfishness. According to the Scottish School, moral goodness springs from benevolence—the sympathetic impulse—which produces the immediate reflex-feeding of approbation.

This principle holds a special place in the theories of Hume, and David Hume. Morality rests upon sympathy—sympathy first of all with one's own motives; it is really the acting on one's own impulses, and is formulated in general rules. Of decisive importance for morality are those emotions which are designed to temper the others, particularly hope and fear. Hume traces national character, love of fame, and the imitation of fashion, by custom and tradition as expressions of the sympathy that subsists between successive generations. To all these instincts, he adds the existence to sympathy—to the sense of a common weal; and to custom, in the form of loyalty to the laws and the authority.

But, just as Hobbes was unable to ignore the social factors in morality, so those who grounded their ethics upon sympathy cannot leave the purely individual interest out of account; and thus, while sympathy with what produces the good or evil of others is the determinative factor, it is laid upon the satisfaction experienced by the individual who yields himself to that sympathy.


Herbert Spencer, too, places altruism, which rests upon the social impulse, above egoism, though from a somewhat different point of view, asserting that men, after long experience and by means of the discipline which connects pleasure and pain with the growth of the social and sympathetic propensities, finally comes to see that, by aiming at the good of others and the common good, he really serves his own ends better than by inducing his own egoistic impulses. J. S. Mill also makes happiness the leading principle of his ethics, and lays the chief emphasis upon the adjustment of the individual interest to the general interest. J. S. Mill, one of the French representatives of the ethics of sympathy, called attention to the fact that in the last resort it is the harmonious development of the human being which is good—though in such manner that we combine private with public ends. It is the individualist by nature, the indestructible moral urge of the human soul, the personal interest only by passion, and it is, therefore, of importance that the higher passions be regulated by habit, and that, in particular, the selfish, by its appeal to pain and fear; and even mould them, and by its discipline counteract the work of chance. Hobbes (Spinoza) believes that reason is nothing but the capacity for selecting the passions which conduct to happiness. At a later period Comte, Taine, and Littre based ethics upon the principle that the sympathetic impulses of altruism ought to prevail over egoism, thus establishing, in contrast to the English view, the ascendency of the social over the individual factor. Feuerbach likewise held that morality rests upon the desire of happiness, upon a reconciliation of the selfish and the social (Emmanuel), and he pedantically tinges the theory of Schopenhauer—practically that of Buddhism also—which regards pity as the source of morality, may be classed as a variant of the sympathetic hypothesis.


(d) In sharp antithesis to the foregoing views stands Rationalistic ethics, which would reduce the emotions to their lowest level. But if the ethics of emotion cannot explain the actions of the intellect, neither can the Rationalistic school disregard feeling; for it is a fact of everyday observation that emotion is controlled only by emotion, and that the will is never moved by pure reason alone.

Spinoza and Kant may be taken as representatives of this Rationalistic view. Spinoza sets out from self-conservation. The absolute Substance, with its attributes of thought and feeling, is something active, and the various modes share, and maintain their existence, in this activity; in so
far, however, as these modes are finite, they are wrought upon by others, and suffer. To this suffering proceed and confused ideas of imaginations; and from these proceed the perverted emotions that rest upon the errors of an understanding subject to suffering. The primary affections are pleasure, pain, and, in relation to the future, desire. Pain we associate with pain and confusion; the desire and pleasure, with increment. But we judge things wrongly, in so far as we regard them from our own restricted point of view. Spinoza gives a magnificent example of how false and perverted the affections are derived from the primary forms—by their relations either to time, to their respective objects, or to each other. The characteristic idea of this definition is that, when man is under the inexorable control of the affections which may co-exist in a state of strife, he is in a condition of servitude. Accordingly, these affections are without value for moral ends, and must be cast aside. This is accomplished when we regard all things sub specie aternitatis, by means of the amor Dei intellectualis, the adequate ideas which dissolve the imaginations, and the activity of our reason exerts an interest above the passions. The true good does not war against happiness; it shares in the active self-conservation of God, and reveals itself as creative intelligence. In this activity man is satisfied and blessed; he has the acceptance of God, and is therefore happy, hilarios. Spinoza thus excludes the affections in so far as they rest on suffering, and will recognize only the happy consciousness that is bound up with the soul's own pure activity. So long as man is subject to the domination of the affections, it is well for him, in the interests of society, to let the more harmful be kept in check by the less harmful; as, for instance, when the State resorts to the fear of punishment, or concedes a partial indulgence to the less noxious affections, in order to counteract a greater danger by a less. The ethical view, however, goes deeper: it has regard only to the pure activity of the soul, with its attendant blessedness. According to Spinoza, therefore, the essential constituent of morality is the subjection of the affections to the authority of reason, which frees itself from the imagination and keeps watch upon their inner movements. It is unnecessary to point out how closely he is allied to the Stoics.

The ethics of Kant, based upon the autonomy of the a priori practical reason, sets aside every motive that rises from inclinations and passions. The only true ethical motive is reverence for the moral law. Kant's aversion to desire is such as lays him open to the charge of dualism, and gives an ascetic character to his ethical teaching. On analysis of this reverence for the law, however, we find that the element of feeling is by no means ignored. For, according to Kant, the moral law ought to kindle in our hearts to a nobler pleasure, involving us with a true pride in the majesty of our practical reason, while also humbling us for our shortcomings. It is, in fact, this inner discord which gives rise to the sense of reverence for the law. Further, in the Critique of Judgment, Kant assigns an even more important function to emotion, basing the aesthetic judgment upon a spontaneous feeling, which he holds to be purely intellectual in character. This aesthetic judgment of emotion, again, with its claim to universality, he regards as preparatory to morality, as it habituates us to the love of the beautiful apart from any sensuous interest, and even to admire the sublime in opposition to any such interest.

A corresponding intellectual interpretation of morality was upheld in England by Dugald Stewart and Clarke, who take their stand upon the intrinsic necessity of the moral relationships. According to Clarke, there exist eternal, unchangeable, and rationally instituted laws of righteousness, equity, goodness, and truth, which, like Kant, he combines with the idea of future retribution.

(e) Synthetic or Mediating ethics.—In England, however, the representatives of an a priori Rational ethics are eclipsed by those who would combine reason and emotion, of whom the most outstanding is Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury goes back to a 'moral sense'—a feeling of self-appreciation which attaches to the equipoise between selfishness and benevolence. When this equipoise, this self-appreciating sense of satisfaction, becomes the object of thought, a judgment of approval is the result. In the harmony of our being, therefore, we discover an ideal of perfection, which, as appropriate to our nature, also involves a state of happiness. Religion, too, is estimated according to its capacity of strengthening or weakening our moral feelings. The Deity, being imminent in Nature, is the source of that cosmic harmony which finds an echo in our moral constitution. In fact, philosophy itself, according to Shaftesbury, is a passion for all that is good and beautiful. We are always seeking for unity and bond—the bond of nature—and it is likewise these that we aspire to in the moral field—especially in the sphere of our emotions. We ought never to be moved to action save by inclinations that are worthy of the good in us. This tendency is a disposition and an attitude of harmony with the system of which we form a part. Hence the propensities which make for the good of the whole should restrain those that are self-contradictory, since our individual good is involved in the general good. It is love, it is enthusiasm for the good, that elevates man; the enjoyment of love and friendship is really a participation in the harmony of the universe. Shaftesbury was wholly optimistic, believing, as he did, in a world-soul that works towards universal harmony and animates mankind. As against the sensualistic tendencies of his time, he speaks in the name of the rational, insisting upon harmony and unity, and yet not repudiating the affections, without which a moral life is, as he thinks, impossible.

While Shaftesbury holds strongly to the conviction that virtue is the manifestation of what is good in us, Price would rather emphasize the idea of duty. The latter derives morality from the primordial consciousness of obligation, and thus makes it its own support; it is not to be traced to states of feeling, but to its being controlled by reason. But though the ethical rests upon the rational, yet its operation is so far conditioned by emotion—by a lively spontaneous feeling that gives intensity to the process of rational intuition.

The intuitive Scottish School likewise founds morality upon immediate rational perception. Thus Dugald Stewart defines the ethical as a tendency now becomes a principle—to act under the authority of conscience. The moral can be apprehended only by a direct intuition in conscience. Pity and sympathy lend support to this intuition, and begat an inclination to follow the lead of conscience. A similar attempt to conjoin rational intuition with emotion was made by James Mackintosh, who held that feelings of pleasure and displeasure in matters of character, so far as these feelings become springs of action are given in conscience, which contains the norm for our conduct, and which is perfected by a process of reflection that clarifies these immediate judgments of feeling; while, again, the naturally strong tendencies urge us to obey the behests of the inner monitor.

In Germany the endeavour to bring the emotions within the scope of ethical rationalism has
been made in various ways by Leibniz, Schiller, J. G. Fichte, Herbart, Schleiermacher, and others. Like Shaftesbury, Leibniz is an optimist, and has a very mild form of the feeling that it is for our own established benefit to cultivate the emotions of the monads, the highest of which, since they can increase the intelligence which constitutes their nature, are capable of being improved. For instance, he said: 'I am of the opinion that perfection, at becoming an increasingly clear and rich reflection of the world, which we have regard to the others; each will rejoice in its own self-preservation only as it yields itself to the social impulse—the craving for the universal and to the force of love. This longing exists in every rational being, and is rooted in the nature of the understanding.' It is in this last, of which we speak, this way Leibniz combines the natural and rational desire for perfection with the desire for happiness. The two are not at variance, for the intelligent monad cannot attain happiness save in harmony with all. Reason is then both in accord with the natural impulses, and both work into each other hands in the ethical sphere. Even the endeavour after perfection, belonging, as it does, to the very nature of spiritual beings, is bound up with pleasure. The feeling of perfection, or rather of advance towards perfection—for we never get beyond the process—is the highest pleasure; it is the joy of attaining our own being; but reason, whose progress must always go a development of our interest in the good of others, since that is the only way in which we can become clear and truthful mirrors of the world. Self-love and love to others are quite compatible, and each is rooted in our rational constitution. Clearness of knowledge gives us an insight into our own nature, and teaches us how to set our various emotions in right and natural relations by cultivating a state of heart appropriate to our nature, and in subordinating the momentary promptings of feeling to that permanent one which is the object of his Christian self-love. This is the highest condition of this is given in our nature, which ever press towards a universal harmony; and it is the part of religion, as faith has demonstrated, to subjugate the world, to reduce the discordant elements to unity.

Schleiermacher, in his doctrine of the ancients, intensifies the inner harmony of reason and sense. Obedience to reason must be amalgamated with joy. Sensuous desire must retain its individual power; sense Addiction to the intensity of the ethical factor. Here, in fact, emotion is utilized as a means of deepening the moral law, and rendering its authority over sense, so that she can admit the feelings to a subsidiary place in the ethical life. This condition is realized in the world, and it is only by this true nobility that the truly noble critic can adjust the claims of the sensuous and the moral in such a way as to make manifest the absolute superiority of reason over sense. If he is said that, though his ethics is of an entirely rationalistic cast, he does not take up so rigid an attitude towards desire as did Kant. He insists upon the free activity of reason, and the transformation of authority into liberty, into the spontaneity of intelligence. By treating our nature as the material of duty, he is not only to set forth a preclusion of goods as the fruit of human activity, but also by bringing into prominence the creative aspect of the moral character—his power of original production—to find a place for emotion in the moral realm. Recognition of freedom and love, which, with the impulse of reason, furnishes a motive for conduct. Although we may not have the last word, yet the complex of impulse and feeling in our nature forms the 'material of duty.' In point of fact, Nature herself has made this reasonable creature a moral being; thus the distinction of soul is the necessary antecedent of the family, and the hereditary responsibility of the parent and the child is the postulate of social and intellectual education. Fichte does justice to individuality and its aspirations by his demand that everyone should take up his peculiar ethical call with the insight of genius, and choose his profession freely; as also by tracing congenial love, especially on the woman's side, to an act of willing surrender.

Herbart, too, unites emotion and reason. To begin with, he deduces five ethical ideas from our judgments of pleasure or displeasure regarding relations of will. These five are inner freedom, perfection, benevolence, justice, and equity. He does not regard these relations of will as being even qualitatively free from emotion. But in the same way the ideas which are connected with the relations of individual will, are the only harmonious 'systems' of the society; for example, the administrative system corresponds to the social system of city. Hence the highest possible development of every capacity; and spiritualized society—as presenting a great harmonious whole in which the individual systems are articulated in perfect unity—to inner freedom. If Herbart formulated his philosophy with Kant, an idealism of goods which has in view the highest good of each and all in its harmonious embodiment. If he thus gives prominence to the aesthetic view, he is also not to be understood that other pleasurable feelings may not be enjoyed in the spiritualized society. He is not so far from the Scoto-Holm theorists as to deny that, however, he is at present unable to show how the psychological mechanism may be utilized in the service of these ideas, namely, by so utilizing all educational resources in their favor as to develop the teleological tendencies to express the diagnostic ideas into habits—feelings or motives—and permanently to maintain the same.

1 Herbart's five ideas are connected with Whewell's 'five axioms.'
and thus arises the problem of how to harmonize, by a process of moral development, the whole natural endowment of impulse and feeling with reason. According to Hegel, one must maintain that ethics must lay down the base- lines of the philosophy of history; but it was pre-eminently Hegel who gave currency to the idea of development. Schleiermacher, maintaining that ethics must lay down the base- lines of the process of history as the evolution of reason. Though he gave, it is true, an intellectual interpretation of Nature, regarding it merely as a stadium of the Idea (a view which, of course, does not concern us here), he nevertheless distinguishes between Nature and Spirit in concrete, and sees the consummation of ethics neither in a natural ENDOSMOSIS nor in the Kantian Rationalism, but in **Sittlichkeit**, "established observance," in which the antithesis between Nature and Spirit is reconciled, i.e. raised to a higher unity. If, according to Hegel, reason realizes itself in the State, yet he does not regard civic life as incompatible with the community of feeling, i.e. marriage; or with the community of interests and its complex of needs; or with the community of citizenship, or, in fact, with any particular relationship of the individual life; that is, as he proceeds, he finds a place for all of these, just as he finds the characteristic feature of the Christian period in the fact that it gives due recognition to the interests and peculiarities of the individual and his desire for happiness. The course of history shows us that the tendency to combine the rational and the emotional aspects of morality is constantly gaining ground.

II. **ANALYSIS AND EXPOSITION.**—It remains to consider the nature of the emotions and their varieties, as a step towards inquiring how we are to estimate them ethically and to utilize them in practice.

1. Nature and structure of the emotions.—What are the emotions? It is safe to say, for one thing, that they belong not to the theoretical but to the practical, side of our psychical life; not to thought or imagination, but to feeling and volition. In what respects, then, do they differ from feelings and volitions, seeing that they are not identical with either, but other forms of connecting link between them? The emotions often arise as immediate reactions upon particular feelings. But such immediate and instantaneous reactions may, by dint of repetition, supernormalize a permanent condition. Another, a transitory state, but there is also an irascible disposition, i.e. a propensity to react in an angry way. Accordingly, the manner in which the subject reacts upon his feelings will be determined by his peculiar nature, his temperament, or his peculiar blend of temperaments, by character, sex, etc.—in a word, by his individuality, which, again, is modified by his family, national, or racial type. Moreover, this individual disposition is by no means limited to one's natural constitution; it may be acquired—-a fact that underlies the plasticity of the emotions. But, while the emotions are thus reactions upon feelings, we must forget that there are also moods of feeling, involving a permanent tendency towards certain forms of action; and these moods must likewise be reckoned amongst the emotions.

The emotions have often been called passions, and traced back to 'suffering' (passio); here, again, we must bear in mind that such suffering is not always a pain; and, accordingly, we find Schleiermacher maintaining that there may be such an object as last beyond the period of direct stimuli. Here the influence is really that of the **representation** of the object; and in this case the imagination works towards the expansion and intensification of the emotion; and, indeed, may become so habituated to represent certain objects as to produce habit. Schleiermacher again, by being fused together with the feelings that evoke them and the volitions that issue from them, may act as a permanent stimulus to the emotions.

The emotions have also been identified with the impulses; but impulse is really a mode of the will, and may either spring from the nature common to man or be the resultant of a long series of volitions, which, gathering strength and absorbing many hereditary transmission, may become established in the later generation. Thus, for instance, the desire of fame and of power, in their nobler forms at least, seems to presuppose a social life of some permanence, and a certain degree of culture. Impulse as such, however, is not emotion; rather it becomes emotion only when the object to which it is directed affects the feeling, and prompts the will to act. This is what takes place in particular instances; but, as has been said, the object may be so persistently presented to the mind as to give a sustained tone to the feelings, which, again, gives a definite bias to the will. The emotions, therefore, are the result of instantaneous impulses by the fact that they are traceable to some impression, or feeling, and emerge as a tendency to react upon this stimulus. We may say, therefore, that emotions are combinations of feeling with movements or acts of will, and that they may have either a transitory or a lasting character, according as they are immediate reactions upon a definite object, or upon habitual states of the soul which rest upon a more or less persistent combination of feeling and volition; these, in turn, depending upon the object affecting the soul. Moreover, it goes without saying that these habitual states may find vent in momentary outbursts.

Then we must also distinguish between the momentary strength of an emotion and its durability. An emotion may be strong for the moment, but have no persistence, as, e.g., when it is evoked by a merely passing stimulus from the object; and, conversely, an emotion may never manifest anything like intensity, and may yet work all the more powerfully; compare, for instance, an angry outbreak with cool, calculated hate.

2. Varieties of emotion.—The emotions exhibit a multitude of variations, quite apart from the distinction between transience and permanence. Thus, the feeling and its accompanying tendency to react may, as called forth by the object, be one of pleasure or of pain. If pleasurable, the motive will be one of sympathy with the object; if painful, one of antipathy. Then the emotions may be classified with reference to time—according as they are related to the past, the present, or the future. In connexion with the past, pain produces repentance, while pleasure brings satisfaction, with a wish for renewal of the conditions; and either of these, again, may be transitory or enduring. Pleasure in regard to the present is the desire; while pain arouses aversion, or, in a more intense form, anger. Pleasure in regard to the future becomes hope, with the inclination to make the thing hoped for a reality; pain in relation to the future becomes fear, with the inclination to obviate or ward off the thing feared. Obviously these emotions may also vary in intensity, i.e. they are susceptible of different degrees. But these quantitative differences must not be confounded with differences which depend upon whether a man is by the bent of his mind stronger in feeling than in will-power, or vice versa. Should feeling predominate, then, e.g., repentance will be...
not so much a motive prompting a change of will for the better, as a sentiment of regret, which, as it inhibits the will, has an enfeebling effect; similarly, contentment will degenerate into luxurious remembrance, instead of inciting the will to hold fast by what the past has given. If volition, however, be the stronger, the reverse will be the case. Moreover, pleasure and pain may, so far as their influence on the will is concerned, become quite neutral, and less dependent upon the different desire which then becomes present, and aversion hate. Again, all these modifications of emotion may be further differentiated by reference to the kind of object that excites them. Thus, feeling in passing over to volition will always be initially a feeling of self, a feeling of excitement; but this feeling of self may be of very different kinds. In the first place, one may be affected either in body or in soul. But the bodily frame itself has different aspects: there is the need, for instance, of self-preservation, or of preserving one's peculiar type. Should it be affected by a corresponding body, a fresh group of emotions plays itself off with food and sex. When reflexion has been sufficiently developed to raise a man above mere momentary sensations, he will desire permanently satisfying external impulses, and become love, and hunger will be transformed into the desire for possessions sufficient to satisfy permanently his bodily needs. The latter emotion may likewise vary as one wishes to use, to preserve, or to augment one's property. Prodigality, niggardliness, and avarice have their source here; but also liberality, thrift, and diligence. It is personal differences alone which prompt one man to liberality or prodigality, another to thrift or niggardliness, and a third to avarice or diligence.

Again, the affective state of the mind has to do with its relations to other minds. The fundamental fact is that the mind is influenced by others in such a way as to experience pleasure or pain, and thus arises sympathy or antipathy. Sympathy and antipathy also involve the feeling of self, springing respectively from the sense of being attracted or repelled by others, according as the impressiveness which is received upon the will is in a pleasurable or a painful manner. Here, also, of course, individuality counts for much. Further, we must take into consideration whether sympathy or antipathy in regard to another is aroused by his personality as a whole or only by certain aspects thereof—some being attractive, others repellant; in the latter case we have an unstable emotion, one vacillating between sympathy and antipathy. Once more, from the sympathetic emotion, so far, at least, as it rests upon the consciousness of others' equality with ourselves, springs the desire to recompense. Should another afford us pleasure, we incline to return the favour; this is gratitude. But should he pain us by doing us a disadvantage, the result is the feeling of revenge. A further principle of division might be found in the fact that care our sympathy and antipathy relate to individuals or to communities.

Finally, a man's sympathy or antipathy may either be such that his thoughts dwell most upon his own pleasure or pain; or such that the feeling for others predominates in his mind. In the former instance, he will be sympathetically moved towards another only in so far as the experience is absolutely free of pain, and, in fact, when the sympathy itself affords pleasure. In the second case, he is so much at one with the other as to enter into his feelings. The former kind of sympathy goes no further than a man's own advantage, changing even to antipathy when that disappears. He really seeks his own advancement in his recog-
ever, has meanwhile been done, unconsciously, by our psychological mechanism. The result is called emotion, though, in fact, what we so designate is only a fingerpost pointing to the greatest possible advantage. But this theory, according to which the choice amongst our emotions is really made for us by our experience—the understanding of which is fixed by the facts—is founded upon error. For, if the psychological mechanism establishes a certain hierarchy among the emotions by natural selection, we are not really transcending it; it determines the emotions by the facts. For, even if the egoistic emotion is overpowered by the altruistic, it is simply because, as a matter of experience, the former fares all the better thereby. In reality, therefore, it is not so overpowered; on the contrary, the psychological mechanism is actually guided by it. Along this line, therefore, no genuine adjustment can ever be arrived at. The truth is, moral life begins only when the understanding forms universal laws, when the difference between the ideal, the ought, the law, on the one hand, and, on the other, the actual condition of things is first realized; they then form the craving of our nature for unity, which the adjustment made by our psychological mechanism cannot satisfy. Such adjustment, in fact, will always be impossible, and one and anon break out in spite of all our altruism. The desire for unity, however, spontaneously presses towards harmony and activity; while, on the contrary, the emotions are unstable, and, being understood by ourselves, have no true spontaneity, and always end in mere enjoyment, mere passivity.

Hence we need not wonder that the naturalistic theory has been challenged again and again by a rigid and one-sided rationalism, which will countenance no rule in the moral realm except that of reason alone, and spurns the emotions as something irrational. But this standpoint is shown by history to be untenable. The Stoics were compelled to abandon the rigorism of their apathy, and to concede that in some degree even the wise man feels pain—though he does not allow himself to be mastered by it—and that he too may have 'sera and saepe,' such as good-will and joy. Further, the Stoics doubted whether the life of the wise man were necessarily possible, and spoke of an 'approximation' rather than a harmonious condition. Man should be immune from diseases of the spirit, but not free from emotion. Spinoza also, while discarding the emotions, was unable to regard them as other than a necessary product of the natura naturata; and Kant came at length to the conclusion that the propensities are not evil in themselves, but as in the sphere of the beautiful and the sublime he recognizes a certain mutual relationship between the sensuous and the spiritual.

If the moral reason, then, cannot be merely the inductive reading of our psychological mechanism on the emotional side, and if it does not necessarily involve a rigid exclusion of the emotions, or, in other words, if we can neither identify it with the formulated results of our psychological mechanism nor concede a dualism between it and emotion, the only course open to us is to grant an independent, co-ordinate position to both reason and emotion—with the proviso, however, that reason be always credited with the power of harmonizing emotion for its own ends. As we have seen, this view is held by a large number of modern thinkers. They regard the emotions as the data and material which reason has to elaborate. If the emotion arises from the movement of the will combined with feeling and prompted by an object, it is the function of reason to examine and regulate the process.

The question as to the moral character of the emotions is, therefore, to be answered generally by asserting that in themselves they are neither good nor evil, but become so only as they respectively subserve or are subordinated to the supervision and guidance of reason. This holds good of all kinds of emotion. Reason must assign the limit of their momentary intensity, and likewise regulate their duration and persistence, for it tolerates the continuance of such kinds only as coincides with its own fundamental aims. Emotions of pleasure are no more proscribed as such than those of pain. What is done of moment is, on the one hand, to determine their measure, and, on the other, to take account of their object. Anger, for example, as excited will, is not to be summarily condemned; only it must be made subservient to reason, and be directed against that which is truly reprehensible. Again, neither the impulse of self-preservation nor that of sympathy is per se blameworthy; they require only to have their respective scope and their mutual relations determined by reason. Under certain conditions the emotions will not become demoralized. Love of power rests upon an exaggerated, but in itself perfectly innocent, desire for influence; envy, again, being the result of the impulsive impulse to the in itself quite legitimate impulse of self-preservation— all sympathy being crushed by the selfish wish to possess what is another's. Similarly, the organic emotions have their rightful place, requiring only that adjustment which reason must make in view of organic needs; they must be brought into proper relations with one another and with the spiritual emotions. The emotion attaching to property, as regards both its preservation and its use, must be reduced—in conformity with the function which reason assigns to property in the moral sphere—to its due proportions in the desire to earn.

In short, the emotions as such are not evil when subject to the guidance of reason, but, just as human nature must be brought into harmony with reason, so must they be made to minister to the ends of reason. If left to themselves, they tend to degenerate, since they cannot then be kept within due measure, or be fully harmonized with one another.

4. Rational control of the emotions.—Finally, if it be asked how reason acquires dominion over the emotions, we look first of all to its power of framing ideals. Its task, alike as regards the guidance of the several emotions— with due allowance for their individual modifications—and as regards their mutual relations, must be clearly defined in the light of actual, concrete ethical ideals. It is obvious that a proper comprehension of the meaning and value of emotion in moral life is the necessary condition of right conduct. Such comprehension, however, does not guarantee its being realized in practice. It is often asserted that emotion is modified only by emotion, that reason without emotion remains a dead letter; and this is certainly the ease. The dictates of reason, therefore, must be combined with love, which we may call the positive mode of emotion; then will reason become effective. The ideal must become the object of love; then will this supreme affection—enthusiasm for the ideal—work its effect upon the other forms. Such enthusiasm cannot, of course, be manufactured, but is something free—the unforced persistent glow of love for perfection, the practical interest in the ideal of reason.

To generate this archetypal affection is the business of education, which, however, would be all in
vain unless human nature provided something for it to work upon. But reason and its ideal are not alien to man. It is not isolated from him to fail and behelds. So long as he refuses to identify himself with this consummate affection— with his own ideal—he feels an inner discord. Education may provide passion, but it cannot furnish, still less force it. If we appeal to such motives as fear of punishment or hope of reward, we may succeed in curbing certain emotions, and even in partially establishing a balance between them. But in others, and thus prepare the way for real moral conduct by removing obstacles to the attainment of the good will; but enthusiasm for the ideal is not to be acquired in this way; for, if we confine ourselves to such motives, we have not passed beyond selfishness after all. The ideal must be loved for its own sake. This supreme affectation is engendered only through the individual’s own act, for which education provides but the subject matter; and the ardent love to the Divine, enthusiasm for the good is absolutely free. Ought we, then, to call it an emotion at all, since emotion always springs from something? We feel turned motives into a motive? We must remember, however, that such an impression has a place even in the affection we speak of. For one thing, the educator may hold up the example of those who, possessed by this enthusiasm, are capable of moving our hearts. For another, while we recognize the ideal as our own, yet it always towers above our actual attainment, as if to impress us with love for our better part. Finally, the ideal comes to us in the impressions wrought by God within the soul. The mental impression in question, therefore, results, not from any external object, but from our being apprehended by our reason’s own ideal or by the Divine spirit within us. The same thing lies at the root of what is called moral passion, though this is likewise a free motive to action. Without moral passion the moral ideal cannot be realized. But it is far from adequate in itself. When the emotions, excited by the various experiences of life, are asserting themselves in their full strength, to attempt to oppose them by moral passion alone is futile. But enthusiasm for the moral ideal has undoubtedly a restraining effect upon the urgency of emotion; and, this being so, such restraint makes it possible for reflexion to intervene before the response to stimulus takes place. For this reason, which both end to be attained and apprehends the actual conditions, can assign the measure and the course of the emotion, and, taking advantage of the congenial enthusiasm for the ideal, can carry its purposes into effect. But even something more than this is required in the task of controlling the emotions, namely, a certain psycho-physical habituation. With these resources, then, it is possible for reason to subject impulse to its own ideal, or, in other words, to attain, by habit, ever nearer to a complete harmony of the emotions amongst themselves and to the right proportion of each, and so to utilize them in practice to give them the place which, in the light of the moral ideal, is rightly theirs.

We note, in closing, the recent spread of a romanticism which would base morality upon the instincts, and declares war upon intellectual interpretation; which yields the ascendancy to spontaneous feeling, and would exclude all ratio in favor of the Unconscious that is revealed in emotion—a new form of ethical and aesthetic naturalism. Such a theory, however, cannot possibly discover the proper measure of the emotions, as it really keeps the moral reason out of its rights. See also FEELING, MIND.


EMPEDOCLES

A. DÖRNER.

EMPEDOCLES was a Sicilian philosopher who was famous also as a statesman, poet, orator, physician, and wonder-worker.

1. Life and Writings.—Empedocles belonged to a wealthy and distinguished family of Agrigentum (the Greek Akragas). His grandfather, also called Empedocles (2), was a cavalry officer at Olympia in 496 B.C. The philosopher himself took an active part in the troublous politics of his native city, after the expulsion of its tyrants (Diog. Laert. viii. 63-67; Mus.), and in 492 B.C. he refused an offer of royal power; yet we read that in later years his enemies caused this champion of the people to be banished. There is much that is marvellous, much that is vague and contradictory, in the accounts of his life which have come down to us, principally in Diog. Laert. viii. ch. 2. The Sicilian historian Timaeus, who lived in the 3rd cent. B.C., and preserved many such notices, did not know for certain the place or the manner of his death. Even his date is not exactly determined.

Aristotle (Met. i. 3. 984a, 11) speaks of him as a younger contemporary of Anaxagoras (g. 20); Gorgias is said to have been his pupil (Diog. Laert. viii. 68; Quint. iii. 1). Apollodorus fixed his birth in 484; and his death, at the age of 60, in 424. But Zeller (Pre-Socratic Phil. ii. 117 ff.) has adduced grounds for placing his birth from eight to ten years earlier, i.e. in 492 or 494.

The chief works of Empedocles were two poems with the titles φύσην γὰρ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ ἀναλόγα. The former, dealing with physical science, was in two books, and with Diels, we prefer the reading βιοτητικὸς in Suidas s. a. v., although Tzetzes (Chil. vii. 562) erroneously makes them three. Of these poems we have fragments extending to 440 lines.

Aristotle, who took them as a naked confession of faith, used full credit for Homer's inspiration and forcible diction (Diog. Laert. viii. 57), nevertheless took him for his illustration when maintaining, in the Poetics (i. 1447A, 17), that metaphor does not convert prose into poetry. Empedocles was the last to use verse as the vehicle of philosophic exposition; and Anaxagoras reverted to prose, with which the Milesians had started.

2. The Four Elements.—In his dialectical theories Empedocles was an eclectic. Like Leucippus, he had studied the Eleatic philosophers; but he rejected their chief doctrine, that of the One, and reverted to plurality to give them the place which, in the light of the moral ideal, is rightly theirs.

We note, in closing, the recent spread of a romanticism which would base morality upon the instincts, and declares war upon intellectual interpretation; which yields the ascendancy to spontaneous feeling, and would exclude all ratio in favor of the Unconscious that is revealed in emotion—a new form of ethical and aesthetic naturalism. Such a theory, however, cannot possibly discover the proper measure of the emotions, as it really keeps the moral reason out of its rights. See also FEELING, MIND.
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—consist severally of air, earth, fire, and water united in determinate proportions.

has survived which was not adapted to its environment. Empedocles's scientific imagination may also be seen in his mechanical theory of respiration, on the analogy of the water-clock (Diels, 21 B, 109 [-190]), and of the spinal vertebrae (Ar. de Part. Anim. i. 1. 640a, 16); but more particularly in a theory of sense-perception based upon the entrance, through symmetrical passages or pores (φτόεοι), of films (ἀρδόνεοι) emanating from external objects, and dissolving in the film of sensation best suits taste and smell; it may have been, as Diels thinks, derived from Leucippus; the application to vision (though adopted in great part by Plato) is beset with difficulties. The unique fact of perception proper Empedocles sought to explain by means of another principle, that like moves towards, and is recognized by, like. The sentient subject knows earth, water, air, and fire because these elemental substances are found in his own composition. This principle must be carefully distinguished from the attraction of like to unlike personified in φαλος, or Love. Love is the union of two opposite elements; and consequently it is impossible that they are what he elsewhere calls the demons. (Diels, ii. 3. 427a, 26); there is no such gulf as Parmenides presumed between sense and reason. The value of the senses as sources of knowledge is implied throughout the poems, and the passage (Diels, 21 B, 174) which mentions the sun, moon, and stars, indicates the opinion of Zeller, would concede superior claims to reason has been set right by Stein's punctuation.

5. Religion and Ethics.—In the cosmos as here set forth there was nowhere to be no place for religion; yet Empedocles speaks of gods. (1) There are the 'long-lived gods, greatest in honour,' who are products of the mingling of his four elements, and, as such, are set down side by side with 'trees and men and women, beasts and birds, and fishes bred in the waters' (Diels, 21 B, 21 [i. 180]). These, be it remarked, are not deathless, but merely long-lived; it is impossible that they are what he elsewhere calls the demons. (2) As already noted, he also defines the four elements and the two efficient causes. (3) Further, we find the sphere spoken of as a 'blessed god,' but this again may be merely a poetic description. It need not imply monotheism, any more than the parallel expressions of the pantheist Xenophanes.

In his other poem, the Purifications (Καθάρσιος), Empedocles poses as a moral teacher and religious reformer. He has first serenely depicted the inspired votary of Apollo; he lays claim to a Divine origin and superhuman powers. He recounts his successive transmigrations. The tone of the whole poem is mystic, as opposed to the scientific spirit of the περὶ διανόησιν, and bears many resemblances to Orphic and Pythagorean doctrines. There is one passage where a god is described in terms perhaps borrowed from Xenophanes: He is not provided with a human head upon his limbs; two branches do not spring from his shoulders; he has no feet, no swift knees, no hairy members; he is only a sacred and immovable mind shooting with swift thoughts through all the world! It would seem, therefore, more reasonable to follow Zeller and Diels, who think that Apollo is meant; for from an early date, as J. Adam remarks (Religious Teachers of Greece, Edinburgh, 1825, p. 249), 'Greek religions thought naturally tends to spiritualize Apollo.' Empedocles also tells us of demons, who, 'having polluted their hands with blood,' are condemned to wander for three ten thousand seasons in all manner of mortal forms through the universe until
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their sin is expiated; and one of these, he says, 'I now am, an exile and a wanderer from the gods' (Diels, 21 D, 115 [i. 267]). Here is the doctrine of revelation for guilt, and here, too, that of metempsychosis.

The moral teaching of the Kallipolos consists mainly of tabus based upon the belief in transmigration and the kinship of all animate and inanimate things. Empedocles describes a period when men lived at peace with each other and all the world, and bids his followers abstain from all animal food, and from beans and laurel-leaves.

It is an interesting, though perhaps insoluble, problem to determine how the Purifications is related to the poem upon Nature. Are we to suppose, with Burnet (Early Greeks, p. 207), that the Kallipolos was the work of his youth, and the xepi 2n6cr3o\ the fruit of riper study in mature life? That the same thinker should at the same time have endorsed the apparently contradictory doctrines of both poems is advocated by Burnet (ib). Such a view is possible only to those who recognize in Empedocles not so much a philosophic mind as an enthusiastic poet and orator, careless of logical consistency.


R. D. HICKS.

EMPIRICISM.—Empiricism denotes primarily the scientific investigation of the world which we experience through our senses. In the world so experienced we are continually apprehending uniformities of different kinds; scientific empiricism brings together groups of these uniformities apprehended as exhibiting the same uniformities, and endeavours, by further observation and experiment, to apprehend more clearly the special nature of the uniformities within each group, and the precise conditions on which their presence depends.

Thus, to study the nature of two-dimensional space, we bring together figures in two dimensions, and by the process of reasoning obtain figures in which we apprehend more directly the nature of the triangle, the circle, etc., and from the mutual relations of their parts in definite figures apprehended as necessary certain further conclusions with regard to the nature of these figures. In all cases it is through the construction that we come to apprehend the nature of the figure, we apprehend, e.g., the universal truth 'Things which are equal to the same are equal to one another' only by considering a particular instance. But in some cases the construction is more elaborate; e.g., in Euclid i. 47 the figure is extremely complex, and presupposes constructions completely out of the triangle; and therefore, therefore, aims at re-grooping the phenomena studied, according to their uniformities, in continuous series, beginning with the relatively simple and passing to the progressively complex.

Progress in Mathematics and the other empirical sciences depends on finding the right 'construction,' in discovering a method which will enable us to apprehend and therefore definitely the elementary parts are connected in any given case.

What is aimed at is precise formulation such as, e.g., the exact reciprocal relation between the sides and angles of the triangle, and the present state of all the sciences this exact formulation is rare, and it is only by the examination of fresh groups of problems that we are enabled gradually to reform our present inexact formulations.

By proceeding, then, in these two ways: (1) by continually attacking fresh problems, and (2) by perpetually revising the stock of acquired formulations, Empiricism hopes to obtain an ever wider and deeper knowledge of the world which we come to experience through our senses; it admits that the uniformities hitherto studied have rarely been appreciated in full, and that their 'laws' are only relatively true; but it hopes to advance, within this sphere of relative truth, to laws which ever more adequately express the nature of the reality which it studies.

In one direction the ideal of ever-improving, but ever-relative, knowledge is definitely limited. There is one main presupposition of Empiricism which, as such, it cannot question or even examine, but must simply accept. This presupposition is expressed, on the objective side, as the 'Law of the Uniformity of Nature'; this means that the apprehensible world, as such, has a definite nature of its own, and works according to laws which remain universally valid, though they are partially apprehended by us, through unstable sense-organisms and at particular moments of time; the stars continue to revolve in definite orbits through all the advances of science, from Aristotle to Copernicus, from Copernicus to the present day; the stream pours forth its waters into the sea, the sea still dashes upon its rocky strand, though every living eye is closed in slumber.

From the side of the subject, this presupposition is expressed by saying that the mind is a tabula rasa, a waxen tablet upon which the external world imprints its forms. Its case is perspectiva; more than that we cannot say. There can be no scientific 'theory of knowledge'; for Empiricism maintains that our apprehensions appear to contain uniformities only because they are apprehensions of objectively uniformities.

Necessities of Apprehension—causation, substance, etc.—are so only because they are apprehensions of necessities in the Object; that the 'Laws of Thought' are laws for thought only because they are laws of the things which thought apprehends. In short, the uniformities and necessities belong wholly to the apprehended Object; on the side of the Subject we have simply apprehensions—apprehensions of just those objective uniformities and necessities.

The main principle of Empiricism being, then, that through sense-experience we come to apprehend the universal laws which express the nature of the apprehensible world, it follows that the existence of false thinking, is impossible. We may fail to apprehend; we cannot misapprehend. Where we have not yet found the right construction, the right method for observing the apprehension is to proceed from the apprehension to the construction, and so fail to apprehend its full nature. But, when we say, e.g., '2+2=5,' the possibility of self-correction shows that we did not really think so, that we do not apprehend a real equality, and so failed to apprehend. When we attend and have the features of the problem clearly before us, we cannot fail to apprehend the correct conclusion. In fact, error is always due to some sort of inattention, e.g., to
psychological causes, against which scientific Empiricism has its special safeguards. A few words of the kind might be here discovered in the

right construction, the method which enables us to apprehend clearly the connexion of the elements within the given problem; the statement of the conclusion so apprehended is said to be 'true.' In this sense, and in this sense only, much of the scientific method is, by the adherents of its principles, held to be 'provisionally true.' If a few advanced scientists confirm each other's observations, but the aim of science is always to prove its results in such a form that the observations can be verified by any intelligent student. This aim is most clearly attained in the text-books of Mathematics and Physics. A statement, then, is true when we find the right construction and observe its truth directly. It follows that the claims of the 'Law of Contradiction' or of the 'Principle of the Inconceivability of the Opposite' to present us with a 'formal criterion of truth' are inadmissible. These so-called 'criteria' are, in fact, virtual re-statements of the general principle of Empiricism, viz. that the apprehensible world has certain definite characteristics: but truth consists in the apprehension of these characteristics, and not of just these particular definite characteristics. Consequently, in order to apply to particular cases, the 'criteria' have to become particularized, in which process the so-called 'truth' is lost, but as many criteria as there are problems to which they are to be applied. Moreover, Empiricism insists that a particular statement is not true because its opposite is inconceivable, but that its opposite is inconceivable because the statement is true. There can thus be no formal criterion of truth, and progress in knowledge depends always on our possessing insight into the particular nature of particular scientific problems.

Owing to a number of historical causes, these main outlines of Empiricism have been seriously misunderstood by Empiricists themselves, as well as by their opponents. Hume's separation of the particular sense-experience from the universality and necessity apprehended through that experience makes these appear mere fictions of our imagination; a too mechanical adherence to the tabula rasa manner has misled many into supposing that they can apply physical laws to the explanation of apprehension itself; and J. S. Mill attempted to prove empirically the presupposition of Empiricism itself, viz. the possibility of defining and similar vagaries in the writings of the Empirical School are to be regarded as aberrations from the simple tenets of scientific Empiricism.

See, further, such arts as EPISTEMOLOGY, HUMA.

LOCKE, MILL, IDEALISM, PHILOSOPHY, and the Literature cited under them. R. C. LODGE.

EMPLOYERS.—The term 'employers' is a relative term; it connotes employees and a relation of contract between the two parties; corresponding terms in common use are 'masters' and 'men,' 'capitalists' and 'labourers,' though the latter are not now exact equivalents. The fundamental facts from which the relation springs are that one set provides work and pays for it, the other performs the work and receives payment. The classification is a result of an economic division of labour according to function in the operations of wealth-production or conduct of business; and it gives rise to a parallel distribution or division of the proceeds of such labours. To be more precise, the function of the employer is to find out the work to be done, to plan, to organize, and direct it; he takes the risk contingent upon its performance, and on this account is often called the 'entrepreneur' or undertaker; he becomes a kind of middleman or go-between in the equalization of demand and supply—the demand being that of the consumer for goods, and the supply that of the existing kind of labor. The employer seeks to satisfy that demand. The employer is thus an essential factor in the refined and intricate system of modern industry.

In earlier times, and under simpler conditions of life, when the market was quite local and small, the employer provided the capital for the undertaking; under modern conditions, with wide markets and large production, he very frequently conducts the enterprise with the aid of borrowed capital. The facilities afforded by a widely diffused system of banking and a highly organized money market, together with the method of combining many different capitals on the joint-stock principle of enterprise, have enabled large amounts of capital to be placed under the direction of men who have special ability for controlling it for purposes of business. Under such circumstances the employer becomes mainly the manager of capital or the agent of its owners; he is entrusted with its command because he possesses in a peculiar degree the special faculty of business management, together with technical knowledge about the business in which the capital is embarked. The separation of the functions of capitalist and employer is the outcome of an economic evolution, a case in which has progressed from a division into the methods of production and exchange. It has proved a highly efficient form of differentiation, firstly in securing the direction of affairs by specialists, and secondly by utilizing the other's capital on which neither is boarded and would therefore be idle, or which indeed might not have been saved at all, did not such openings for its employment arise.

The function of the employer has become so important in modern industry that he is often regarded as a fourth factor in production; land, labour, and capital being the three factors formerly recognized as the requisites of wealth-production. The huge scale on which manufactures, commerce, and transport are now organized has created a demand for great financial and technical skill, and as a consequence single individuals of exceptional talent now control a vast number of financial interests and determine the employment of multitudes of labourers. On their good management depend the success of the venture, the return to the savings invested in it, and the increase of profit. Thus these employers receive very high remuneration, and many of them, from their superior ability, derive a surplus profit of a kind which has some of the chief economic characteristics of rent.

Many important problems arise out of the relations of employer and employed. In the Middle Ages the apprentice to a craft duly became a journeyman, and in course of time generally evolved into a master on a small scale; that is, he became an independent producer and an employer of other apprentices and journeymen. Under modern conditions only a small percentage of workmen can ever become employers, and, indeed, the employer class tends to be confined to specially trained men drawn from those ranks which enjoy unique opportunities for acquiring the wide and varied knowledge and experience which are requisite for successful organization. The employees constitute a large and distinctive class, whose mode of work is determined, to a great extent, by the kind of middlemen or go-between in the equalization of demand and supply—a demand that of the consumer for goods, and the supply that of the existing kind of labor. The employer seeks to satisfy that demand. The employer is thus an essential factor in the refined and intricate system of modern industry.
the conditions which affect their safety, comfort, and health, and determine the hours of labour in their several industries. Trade Unions obtained legal recognition only in 1825; they have advanced gradually in power and influence, and are now a very powerful instrument in determining the economic conditions of industry. Their evolution has been attended with many struggles and disastrous strikes, which have at times paralyzed the activities of industrial and kindred pursuits, and caused great economic loss. They are, however, now a recognized and important institution in the negotiations between employers and employees.

The perfect operation of capital and labour in production is a matter of universal interest, since it depends on the supply of wealth. It is to the advantage of both capital and labour that each should be highly efficient; divergence of interests arises in the division of the proceeds, and it is in the determination of the shares that the conflicts of capital and labour arise. At the period of the Industrial Revolution, and for a long time after the introduction of machinery and power into industry, the exploitation of labour by capital worked very unjustly for the employee. Trade Unions introduced a new principle in collective bargaining, and strengthened labour in its attempt to advance the position of labour, and have enabled the employees in organized industries to compete on equal terms with the employer. At the bottom of the scale of workers there is still a class whose wages are abnormally low and whose industry is often described as wasted. Their condition is due to the low efficiency of their labour, the extreme ignorance and weakness of the employees themselves, and their inability to organize and combine. Social investigation has been active in exposing the circumstances of these labourers, and legislative action has been adopted for amending their position. This is, however, a problem which cannot be considered here.

The economic laws have been devised to diminish the friction between employers and employed, and to provide means for fair distribution of the product. The system of co-operation (q.v.) originated in an area of industry, and in the control of capital, and to combine the interests of employer and employed in the same set of individuals, the labourers themselves providing the capital for their own employment. The weak point, however, resides in the difficulty of management. Experience has shown that no large industry can be successfully conducted without the guidance and direction of highly qualified managers. The kind of ability which they possess is relatively scarce and always commands a high price. Thus, though co-operation does in some respects entail the functions of the employer, it does not dispense with his services; a price has to be paid for efficient management, and to the manager must be entrusted authority and discretion. Thus the employer as organizer becomes inevitable in co-operation of any kind, but most of all in productive industry where the community has to compete in the open market with the produce of rival firms.

The profit-sharing system is another method for reconciling the conflicting interests of intelligent workers and employers. It is evidently for higher efficiency by a combination of good feeling with an assurance of fuller reward, yet it is dependent upon the excellence of management and the skill and ability of the employer. No better instance of the working of this system of production can be adduced than the case of the South Metropolitan Gas Company, so admirably conducted for many years by Sir George Livesey.

Socialism, again, seeks to replace private enterprise by State ownership and control for competition the principle of public control of capital and the means of production; it also encounters the same economic necessity for skilled management. The employer may be theoretically neutral, though actually suffering and dependent for its success upon the organizing skill of individuals, and the problem of efficient management will become very serious if the position, direction, and control of State employees becomes dependent upon political influence or a bureaucracy. The equivalent of the employer must be found, and in the absence of the test of competition other avenues to the appointment of the directing staff would endanger the economic success of the proceedings. All organization involves grading, and officers are as essential to an industrial army as to a military force. Work must be organized; some persons must have authority to direct and command; their class becomes virtually an employing class as regards discipline and management; and, if it does not determine absolutely the rate of wages, neither can it guarantee the degree of that reward which must ultimately determine the wages in amount.

From this brief review of the chief modes of conducting industrial enterprises, it will be obvious that the employer plays a vital part in the system of large industry, and that its success depends in a great degree upon his specialized skill. Competition for the rank of employer in business concerns which are conducted on a huge scale is exceedingly acute. The successful employer is a case of the survival of the fittest in a contest where no quarter is given. A large proportion of those who start as employers in smaller businesses fall in the struggle and disappear, their places being taken by others more able, or, in some instances, less scrupulous. The magnitude of modern industrial concerns offers to men of extraordinary business faculty great opportunities; it has also led to a grading of employers. Much of the work of direction is relegated by the chief to subordinates and heads of departments. The highest controllers of industry resemble a great general or chief engineer. In some cases this is the control of capital; but generally it depends upon the combination of many attributes—judgment, foresight, grasp of circumstances, promptitude, decision, firmness, and resourcefulness. The reward of success is proportionally high, and consists of wages plus a high rent of ability. The share of profits which recoops capital and risk will go as gross interest to the shareholders who provide the capital; the share which passes to the chief organizer is determined by his talent. This analysis reduces the employer in large production to a wage and rent receiver; he is really a worker of exceptional capacity receiving a high monopoly rate of pay from a great and distinguished barrister. Thus the conflict in sharing is not merely between labour and capital, but also between groups of employers of different degrees of ability; capital, as such, but not the returns of every kind of risk, the remainder being distributed between ordinary labourers and the special labour of organization and control—all under the play of competition. The nature of the problem of modern industry cluster round the functions of the employer and the relations they involve; their fuller analysis and discussion, however, would go much beyond the proper limits of the present article, which must cease here, with the assertion of the liveliness of the field of inquiry. See, further, art.
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ECONOMICS, EMPLOYMENT, SOCIALISM, TRADE UNION.


G. ARMITAGE-SMITH.

EMPLOYMENT.—1. Connotation of the term.—'Employment' may be held to mean the exercise of any function, or the performance of any kind of service; the function in question may be exercised by a person on his own initiative and to his own advantage, or it may be exercised voluntarily or obligatorily by one person for the advantage of others or for mutual advantage. For the purposes of the present article 'employment' may be considered as the rendering of service through the exercise of a function in accordance with mutual obligations imposed, or voluntarily assumed.

2. Relation of employer and employed.—In primitive slavery there is an implied obligation of protection and of opportunity to acquire maintenance for him, in correspondence with an obligation of service imposed upon the slave. In modern serfdom there is at least a similarly implied obligation on the part of the serf-owner, in regard to the maintenance of the serf, imposed upon him by the State, when the opportunity in question has not been productive. (Thus for a long period in Russia the serf-owner was obliged by law to provide living subsistence, with grains and other articles, according to his means.) In voluntary employment of free labourers by employers, there is an implied obligation of civil treatment and facility for the rendering of the service, and there are obligations imposed upon both master and servant by customary and statutory law; and there are the explicit obligations in respect to hours of labour, remuneration, and notice of quitting, which form the subject of a written or verbal contract.

The incidents of the transition from voluntary or quasi-voluntary employment to personal bondage, and from that condition, through land bondage or serfdom, to voluntary employment, in the system of voluntary employment, have no doubt varied in different countries and according to the different periods over which the process extended. The story is too full of the most luminous details of the course of development, chiefly because the main incidents of the several stages have been comparatively recent, and because they have been indicated in a large number of formal documents. From that history it may be gathered that the dependence of the free hired labourer, arising from advances for the building of his dwelling, or for expenses during sickness or other incidents involving absence of earnings, led to a contract by which he obliged himself to work for his creditor, the wages otherwise due for his work being placed against the interest only, or against the principal of the debt and the interest together; or, alternatively, wages and loan alike being cancelled and the debtor entering formally into servitude. The immobility of the propertyless debtor was secured by police measures, and the peasant was thus tied to the soil, while the piling upon him of obligations and taxes completed his ruin. This process was in effect fully worked out in the 18th cent. and the decay of the system followed. The introduction of mechanical industry on the large scale rendered the employment of skilled labourers necessary, and although, in the early stages of Russian industrial enterprise, forced labour was largely employed by insurrection of peasants to free men. From the beginning of the 19th cent., some employment of free hired labourers in industrial establishments. The presence, in the same factory or mill, of free men and of hired labourers was uncommon, and from this and other causes the decay of servitude began. The system of factory labour was subjected, in the latter half of the 19th cent., to the competition of the so-called isolated industry of the cottage (laboral être), under which the cottage factories were manufactured for sale to the merchant who offered an immediate market for his product. The profitable operation of such a business, together with the absence of large accumulated capitals, prevented the merchant from being also employer. The exploitation of the independent and isolated craftsman was simpler and less exposed to risk than the exploitation of grouped workmen in a factory. The advent of steam power threw the economical advantages on the other side, and gradually the factory gained at the expense of the cottage. In factories to which the cottiers were not attached, wages were credited to them against their taxes, and against their obligations where these were defined; where the latter were not defined, wages were determined by the practice of paying directly to the manufacturer, or of introducing, a class of free hired labourers seeking employment, gradually emerged. The emancipation of the serfs in 1861 did not at once take away all the people in that class, but it greatly reinforced it. When this event occurred, large numbers of the peasants who on the serf-farms immediately abandoned their employment and returned to the new conditions, creating a temporary scarcity of agricultural labour and an advance of industrial wages.

The system of serfdom, with its attendant industrial ascertainment, was undoubtedly subservient of human dignity, but it involved employment for every one. Where there were few or no free labourers, and where every one was either master or servant, there could be no unemployment.

This at all events was the theory. Flights of peasants, however, occurred from estates (in Russia) when, owing to deficient harvests or mismanagement, the peasants were unable to subsist on their own earnings and their property was unwilling to support them; and these fleeing peasants were of course landless and unemployed.

The phenomenon of unemployment may be regarded as coincident with the development of free hiring. Unemployment—occasional, periodical, or permanent—may be considered as the price which is paid for the working for hire, or the obligatory labour. The conditions of employment have historically been subjected to determination—by the State, by the municipality, by the trade unions, and by the trade unions as regards hygienic conditions and protection from machinery in factories, as regards safety of mines and ships, and as regards the amount of wages either by way of fixing a minimum or a maximum wage, or, in respect to the periods and methods of payment, to the attachment of wages for debt, or to the security for their payment in case of the bankruptcy of the employer.

3. The State and employment.—The policy of the modern State with reference to factory legislation was in general opposed by the advocates of laissez-faire. In the first half of the 19th cent. The expediency of sanitary legislation for factories, etc., can no longer be looked back to a period of wanton improvident legislation, so far as the general principle is concerned, although every extension of it is necessarily subject to criticism. The expediency of the control of the wages of the hired labourer, which is made between the employer and his workpeople, is by no means so universally acknowledged, although the State does, as a rule, prevent by law the payment of wages in the form of goods (under the Truck Act) or in public-houses. It does not now prescribe the rate of wages. An argument for a national minimum has, however, been advanced by Mr. Sidney Webb (Industrial Democracy, London, 1897, ii. 760 ff.). He considers such a measure as the only means of putting an end to 'industrial parasitism,' and as a natural complement to the national hygienic minimum which he thinks has already been carried into effect in factory legislation. (see, however, Zwolinski-Schmoller, 384-385). The principle of a minimum wage for the mining industry obtained legislative sanction from the British Parliament on the occasion of the great coal strike of March 1912.

The policy of an authoritative fixation of a minimum wage is open to the criticism that such a measure would lead to the non-employment of those whose wages might be insufficient to justify the minimum payment, unless those wages were fixed at a very low point; yet such persons might be able to earn a part at least of their subsistence...
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sistence by being permitted to work for inferior wages. Mr. Webb might answer that such cases of 'industrial parasitism' should be otherwise provided for, because their presence in the labour market tends to lower the wages of the group to which they belong. The reactions of a minimum wage would, however, be extremely difficult to forecast even if much more numerous data than now exist were available (cf. Zwiliein-Sidelenko, L.c.). The policy of fixing a minimum wage by a trade union is open to the objection that the minimum is also a maximum, and that the highly efficient workman is obliged to work at the same rate as the less efficient. Even when the wages are paid by piecework, the workman who works harder than his fellows and makes more money finds it difficult to continue to do so because of the opposition of his comrades, who conceive that his proceeding may tend to bring down the piecework rate (see, however, on the whole subject, 'The Device of the Common Rule, in Webb, op. cit. ii. 718 ff.). The policy of fixing a maximum wage by the municipal authorities is open to the objection that, unless the maximum is placed at or above the rates current in other districts to which workmen may migrate, there will be a tendency for workmen to move elsewhere. This is no objection to a maximum.

In the 15th cent. the municipal governments of some of the Italian towns fixed, in the assumed interests of the employers, a maximum of wages. Venice did this, and so, too, with the result that labourers flocked there, and wages in that city became lower than elsewhere.

4. The ethical aspect.—On its ethical side, the relation between employers and employed appears at present to be passing through important phases, although the direction of the movement is not always obvious. The principle known in Scotland as ce canny, involving the performance by the workman of as little work as possible, may not be widely or frequently, but is certainly in some industries occasionally, applied both in Europe and in America. On the other hand, remorseless exploitation of the workers probably still exists in both industrial continents and in Japan, especially with regard to unskilled or inferior skilled labour.

Apart from the possibility of improvement, from an ethical point of view, on both sides, of the relation, there is to be considered the certainty of economic deterioration which must follow in the eventual and even utter reaction towards a relation sounder alike from an economic and from an ethical point of view. The 'class conscious' working mass, which, according to the Marxist theory, eventually completely overcomes its antagonist, the 'class conscious' employing class, may carry the process to the bitter end, or the conflict of classes may be arrested by a sense of la solidarité humaine arising in both classes. Particular schemes like those of Godin and Loclaire, the movement for co-operative production, and the like, must be regarded as of less importance than the mass movement. Whether or not this movement is making for increased social, as opposed to class, consciousness, is at present extremely hard to determine. There appears, however, to be a certain general tendency in that direction—the ethical relations of the classes being probably somewhat improved by the gross increase in production, and by the consequent mitigation of the struggle for existence. A check to this increase, considered in the wages of the group to which the population, would undoubtedly involve a check to the ethical advance.

5. Concentration of capital and industry.—The role of the employer in modern industry becomes more and more important, respectively, the diversity of the group to which the population, undoubtedly depresses the wages of their groups.

bilities become greater, with the accumulation and concentration of industrial capital. The employer also becomes more impersonal. Although very large enterprises are frequently associated with this tendency, it is individual (especially in the United States), the actual share of that individual in the management of the enterprise is usually confined to the determination of some matter of wide policy, and is generally influenced by his partners. The ultimate control of all large enterprises must rest with the body of its stock-holders at a particular moment. In many large industrial concerns the number of stockholders is at least as numerous as the number of employees. Both are highly fluctuating bodies,—one body changes its personnel daily in the bourses, and the other changes daily in the workshops. The concentration of industry, which has gone far in the United States, has been accompanied by grave difficulties of management, the bold financier being rarely patient enough in respect to detail to secure the economies which have been anticipated from the concentration. The mere fact of concentration does not, however, appear to have been adverse to the interests of employees; the chief antagonism to it has arisen from the small trader, whose profits have been reduced, and the 'profit' of the large joint-stock company or group of companies combined in a merger or trust.

From a theoretical point of view, the function of the employer, as such, is to administer his business in such a way as to secure its continuity by the creation of a sufficient reserve against the accidents of trade, and to secure the goodwill of his employees in such a way as to retain an efficient working personnel. The increasingly impersonal nature of the character of employment may not improbably mitigate the class struggle, because of the diffusion of the capitalist interest, and even its transmutation into the working class itself.

In the United States and Canada, for example, the relatively high wages in some industries enable certain groups of workers to accumulate considerable sums of money. These sums are invested by them not merely in houses or in land, but also sometimes in industrial securities, probably rarely in the industries to which they themselves belong, generally rather in others.

Four important recent incidents in the evolution of employment demand mention in this place; these are: (a) the appointment of Arbitration and Conciliation Boards in the United States; (b) collective bargaining between groups of employers and groups of workmen; (c) the establishment of Labour Courts in Canada; and (d) the project of insurance against unemployment.

(a) Arbitration Boards in England probably owed their existence to the concord de prud'hommes of France and Belgium, which were organized early in the 19th century (cf. H. Crompton, p. 19 ff.). The first Board of this kind in England appears to have been formed in 1849, for the purpose of dealing with a dispute in the silk trade at Macclesfield (ib. 184); another followed in 1853 in the printing trade (ib. 131); but the most important early Arbitration Board was that formed in 1860 for the purpose of dealing with disputes in the hosier trade at Nottingham (ib. 19). The practice has been widely adopted in Great Britain, in New Zealand, and in Canada—with qualified success. In none of these countries has it altogether prevented strikes; but it has in some of the Board must, therefore, invariably involve either a compromise, in which both sides give way somewhat, or a victory for one party or the other. In
the first case, neither party is wholly satisfied; and in the second case, if one is satisfied, the other is not. This is true of all litigation; but in industrial disputes, the arbitrators are expected to conduce to peaceable settlement in a sphere in which positive law and even precedent afford no guide, which in litigation they do. The decision of the arbitrators has not, that of courts have, the force of law, because under present industrial conditions, a large body of men cannot be forced against their will to work for a particular employer for wages determined by a third party (see, however, Labour Laws and Arbitration in Lit. and New Zealand Year-Book). The history of the great strikes in England in 1911 and 1912 is significant in this connexion.

(b) Collective bargaining grew out of the practice of arbitration. It has been strenuously objected to by employers, but in most of the staple trades it has come to be recognized. It is frequently accompanied either by periodic fixation of rates of wages, or by a scale by which a sliding scale (as in the coal and iron trades).

(c) Labour Exchanges, Labour Registrars, or Labour Bureaux of a private character are of long standing in all countries, and such capital labor is by law, or by late years there has been an increasing hostility to such agencies, especially those which concern themselves chiefly with the employment of sailors. In the case of private agencies and to extend the functions of Labour Exchanges, public institutions have been established in Germany, France, Belgium, and Great Britain. In all these countries the operations of such institutions have now become extensive. (Cf. Board of Trade Reports, cited in the Lit.)

(d) Insurance against unemployment has existed, in fact, for many years in the unemployed benefit offices, the Unemployment Insurance Offices were established in Berne in 1893, in Cologne in 1896, in Leipzig in 1903, and elsewhere. (Cf. Board of Trade Reports, as above.) Insurance against unemployment was included in the National Insurance Bill (cited, cf. 5890, London, 1911). In certain trades, insurance against unemployment is, under the Insurance Act, compulsory. The total Unemployed Insurance Fund is provided partly from contributions by the working men, partly from contributions by employers, and partly from moneys voted by Parliament. The effects of the new Act will not be observable earlier than the year 1913.

6. Causes of unemployment.—The emergence of a class of free hired labourers, or of persons voluntarily seeking employment, usually makes itself manifest by the migration of numbers of such labourers to periodical or permanent centres of employment.

Instances of such periodical migrations are to be found in the movement of hop-pickers to Kent; in that of Irish harvesters from Ireland to the Lowlands of Scotland; in that of Italian coutalini from Lombardy and Piedmont to the south of France; in the annual (annually about one million) of harvest labourers from various parts of northern and central Europe to the Black and Russian regions; in the 'caravans' movements from Ontario and Quebec to the Prairie provinces of Canada; and in the annual migration, which now assumes considerable proportions, of workmen from Scotland and from Italy to America in the spring, and to Scotland and Italy in the autumn. The colonisation of America and of Australia, the partial colonisation of Africa by Europeans, and the colonisation of the Straits Settlements by Chinese, afford instances of permanent settlement of migrants.

Migration from the rural districts to the towns is a phenomenon common to all regions where no insurmountable obstacles exist against the mobility of the rural population. The weight of high wages in the towns, as compared with the scale of wages in the country, and the relatively greater attraction of social centres, in general, conduces to this movement. This process customarily do-

nudes the small towns, diminishing in them the demand for labour, and then denudes the villages. The stream of labourers seeking employment in the industrial towns is expected to conduce to peaceful settlement in a sphere in which positive law and even precedent afford no guide, which in litigation they do. The decision of the arbitrators has not, that of courts have, the force of law, because under present industrial conditions, a large body of men cannot be forced against their will to work for a particular employer for wages determined by a third party (see, however, Labour Laws and Arbitration in Lit. and New Zealand Year-Book). The history of the great strikes in England in 1911 and 1912 is significant in this connexion.

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(c) Labour Exchanges, Labour Registrars, or Labour Bureaux of a private character are of long standing in all countries, and such capital labor is by law, or by late years there has been an increasing hostility to such agencies, especially those which concern themselves chiefly with the employment of sailors. In the case of private agencies and to extend the functions of Labour Exchanges, public institutions have been established in Germany, France, Belgium, and Great Britain. In all these countries the operations of such institutions have now become extensive. (Cf. Board of Trade Reports, cited in the Lit.)

(d) Insurance against unemployment has existed, in fact, for many years in the unemployed benefit offices, the Unemployment Insurance Offices were established in Berne in 1893, in Cologne in 1896, in Leipzig in 1903, and elsewhere. (Cf. Board of Trade Reports, as above.) Insurance against unemployment was included in the National Insurance Bill (cited, cf. 5890, London, 1911). In certain trades, insurance against unemployment is, under the Insurance Act, compulsory. The total Unemployed Insurance Fund is provided partly from contributions by the working men, partly from contributions by employers, and partly from moneys voted by Parliament. The effects of the new Act will not be observable earlier than the year 1913.

6. Causes of unemployment.—The emergence of a class of free hired labourers, or of persons voluntarily seeking employment, usually makes itself manifest by the migration of numbers of such labourers to periodical or permanent centres of employment.

Instances of such periodical migrations are to be found in the movement of hop-pickers to Kent; in that of Irish harvesters from Ireland to the Lowlands of Scotland; in that of Italian coutalini from Lombardy and Piedmont to the south of France; in the annual (annually about one million) of harvest labourers from various parts of northern and central Europe to the Black and Russian regions; in the 'caravans' movements from Ontario and Quebec to the Prairie provinces of Canada; and in the annual migration, which now assumes considerable proportions, of workmen from Scotland and from Italy to America in the spring, and to Scotland and Italy in the autumn. The colonisation of America and of Australia, the partial colonisation of Africa by Europeans, and the colonisation of the Straits Settlements by Chinese, afford instances of permanent settlement of migrants.

Migration from the rural districts to the towns is a phenomenon common to all regions where no insurmountable obstacles exist against the mobility of the rural population. The weight of high wages in the towns, as compared with the scale of wages in the country, and the relatively greater attraction of social centres, in general, conduces to this movement. This process customarily do-

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Competent management may, through the creation and intelligent use of reserves, distribute labour force in such a way as to secure continuity of employment under any but long-continued abnormal conditions; whereas incompetence and want of reserves render many employers liable to sudden and serious unemployment in any season or crisis, whether the unemployment be due to ordinary fluctuations of trade or to a general slackness of demand. The former idea has led to a propaganda of collectivism in which the principal point is that a democratic State should be sole employer; and the growth of the latter has led to the idea that the expansive element in State and private employment alike should be checked by a system of social insurance which would prevent the failure of the more efficient and progressive firms.

The system of social insurance has an obvious disadvantage in that it involves an expenditure out of the national income itself. But it is being urged that the efficiency of the system is not to be judged by its supposed waste of wealth but by the value of the benefits it provides to the unemployed, and that it is the only available means of conferring a social advantage on the mass of mankind. The idea of the benefits is that they shall be given to the unemployed as a substitute for the work they would have done had they not been unemployed, and that they shall be sufficient to enable the unemployed to maintain themselves adequately during the period of their unemployment.

The scheme of social insurance must therefore be drawn up in order to avoid two evils: to prevent the funds from being wasted on the rich or the idle, and to avoid the effects of a too early ending of the unemployment benefit on the poor. The second principle is already admitted. The first principle is not merely an altruistic desire to make the payments to the unemployed as efficacious as possible, but it is also an economic desideratum. The object of national insurance is to provide a substitute for the loss of employment and to make up for the periods of unemployment. It is an attempt to provide a substitute for the market, and to distribute the population equally over the different employments which are open to them.

3. The right to work.—Such positive steps may or may not involve the recognition by the public authority of the right of the labourer to the opportunity for labour. Where such a right is recognized, and where machinery is provided for rendering it effective, it is difficult to see how the corollary of obligatory labour can be evaded. An interesting experiment in this connexion is at present in progress. An Employment Committee has been appointed in Glasgow, under the auspices of the Board of Trade. The functions of this Committee involve the examination of every young person who is likely to leave school and the provision of employment, after the manner of the Board of Guardians. Should this plan be widely adopted, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the result will be to replace the voluntary competitions of the labour market by a system of compulsory employment for which there is no parallel in any other country, and which is likely to be of greater extent than is now the case.

It is important to notice that, under existing police administration, the State in Great Britain, it is usually possible in practice to compel young persons to work, whether they desire to do so or not. The extension of these powers to the obligatory employment of all men, whether they are or are not sentenced by law to penal servitude, does not appear to have been carried out in practice.

The Unemployed Workmen Bill of 1897, promoted by the Independent Labour Party of the United Kingdom, provided that unemployed men might be sentenced to work under the control of a committee of public officers where they are sentenced by law to penal servitude. The Bill has been reported on, but the report of the Committee has not been published.
ENCRATITIS

(Ἐ'κρατίτης [Iren.] Ἐ'κράτατιον [Clem. Alex.], Ἐ'κρατία[ί]ον [Hippol., Epiph.]. — Christians of the early Church who made abstention from flesh, wine, marriage, and possessions their rule of life. From the middle of the 2nd cent. they stood midway between the larger Christendom and the Marcionite Church as well as the Gnostic schools (Harnack, Hist. of Doctr., Eng. tr., London, 1894-95, ii. 43). Without holding one form of creed, or being organized as a body, they practised everywhere the same kind of asceticism. Their spirit was widely diffused. Epiphanius, in his chapter εκατοντα (Hebr. 47), mentions the convert of six Minor, in which they abounded (Ἀποστημ. 12, 52) says that some of the earliest of them were followers of Saturninus and Marcion. Eusibius (HE iv. 28) appears to mistake in calling Tatian, the convert of the convert, the one described by Eusebius (Hist. Eccl. i. 29, 2), and Epiphanius (loc. cit.), in placing the Encratites after the Tatianites. What Tatian did was to join the sect, and to give it a more complete canon, including the Epistles of St. Paul, whose teaching other leaders, especially Severus, rejected. There must have been a considerable Encratite literature. Several writers, both for and against the principles of the sect, are now little more than names.

In the time of Marcus Aurelius,曼斯... is said to have written a very elegant work Ἰστορίας τοῦ Ἐκρατίτου, addressed to a convert who had retired from the truth to the heresy of the Encratists, which had even then made its appearance, and which introduced a singular and pernicious error into the world (Euseb. HE iv. 23). Theodoros (Harr. Hist. 21) mentions Apollinaris, another writer of the same period, who wrote about the Novatian Encratists and Marcian (Mor. 43) states that an Encratite leader, Demetrias, a Cilician, wrote a defense in eight books, containing that "by sexual intercourse the world had had its beginning, and by continency would receive its end." Clement, in whose Stromata (ii. 3) quotes a passage from this work from the 1st, 91, 92.

The influence of the Encratites may be ascribed to three causes. (1) Their renunciation of the world was strikingly complete. They had the great merit of being logical. Having grasped a principle, they applied it with the utmost rigour and vigour. They rejected the prevalent distinction between the Church and the world, and considered itself efficient, morality. The Church, which assumed their counsel of perfection in the few, resolutely declared war against their principle when they sought to make it an inflexible rule; for they refused to follow the Church, scorning the weak compromise she offered. They insisted that, if ἐκκρατία was right at all, it was right universally. To be a Christian was to be an Encratite. (2) The Encratites pointed to the life of our Lord. They made the "evangelic life" their standard, urging that the Christian system of morals must be founded on the actions of Christ, and take its laws from Him. The life of celibacy and the renunciation of all worldly goods, after His pattern, was the essential mark of Christian perfection. Tatian wrote a book, Πρὸς τοῦ κατά τρίον κακονομευόντος (Clem. Alex. Strom. iii. 12), in which he showed that the Christian idea of life must be attained only by the imitation of Christ, and rallied the Church to the duty of walking in His steps. The writer forgot, as Clement wisely observes, that "this was not a common man" (ἐστὶ ἀνωτέρως οὐκ εἰσεχεῖν).

HE was deficient in a right understanding of the life of Christ in its completeness, and in its relation to His mission as the redeemer of the world, and the destroyer of Divine life, which, in the further course of its development from Him, was designed to establish and pervade all human relations (Naundor, Church Hist., ed. London, 1881, i. 127). Tatian wrongly regarded Paul as teaching (1 Cor 7) that marriage and unchastity are one and the same thing—both being the service of Satan. With Marcion and Saturninus he asserted that wedlock was only corruption and formation (τέλείωσεν κατακολοπεύων [Eus. HE iv. 29]). In forming his opinions, it is probable that he made use not only of the canonical Gospels, but of apocryphal histories, in which the delineation of the Person of Christ had been modified under the influence of theosophical and ascetic principles. Epiphanius states that the Encratites used the Acts of Andrew, John, and Thomas; and the fragments of Cassianus found in Clement seem to reflect the Gospel according to the Egyptians.

(3) Encratism generally based itself on the same prevalent doctrine of God and the world as Gnosticism. Some Encratites, indeed, professed to be orthodox. Those whom Hippolytus describes (Phil. viii. 29) are admitted by him to have been found in their teaching the same (ἐργασίας ἡ ἐκκρατίας, and ἐκκρατίαν), and Epiphanius (loc. cit.), in placing the Encratites after the Tatianites. What Tatian did was to join the sect, and to give it a more complete canon, including the Epistles of St. Paul, whose teaching other leaders, especially Severus, rejected. There must have been a considerable Encratite literature. Several writers, both for and against the principles of the sect, are now little more than names.


not the eradication but the consecration of nature. In the right sense of the word, every Christian must, of course, be ENSORGEH (used only once in NT, viz. Tit. 1). Roman governor trembled (Ac 24: 23); he names it as part of the fruit of the Spirit (Gal 5: 22); and another writer mentions it as one of the graces which are to be added to faith (2 P. 1). But true self-control (ἐγκυραία ταυτόν [Plato, Rep. 390 II]), ἑγκυρατά ἀδικίαν καὶ τεντονίαν [ib. 430 E]) is not to be attained by otherworldliness which shrinks life’s duties, and shuns its pleasures as temptations of the flesh; and, therefore, its true virtue is far from according with the mind of Christ, who wished His followers to be the haven of society, the salt of the earth, the light of the world (Mt 5: 14).

Socrates (v. 11) mentions the Eleatics as a sect existing in Galatia in the time of Julian, when Basirios, one of their number, suffered. One of the laws of the Theodosian Code (A.D. 381) was directed against the Manichaeans, who sheltered themselves under the name of Eumen. But the Eleatic controversy was, on the one hand, swallowed up by the Gnostic, and, on the other hand, replaced by the Montanistic (Harmack, Hist. i. 238).

Literature.—In addition to looks already named, see A. Harnack, Die Verbreitung der Urchristlichen Lehre, Leipzig, 1884, esp. p. 5434; cf. also art. 'Eleatics,' in Smith-Wace, DCB; and Krämer, 'Enkraitai,' in PRE.

JAMES STRAHAN.

ENCYCLOPÆDISTS.—See THEOLOGY.

ENCYCLOPÆDISTS.—1. Rise of the Encyclopædistic movement.—It may truthfully be said that the appearance of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) was the starting-point of a new school of thought. Locke had devoted himself to the explanation of the origin of our ideas; he told us that we owe our conception of substance to the long-continued habit of seeing certain modes in association one with the other; or—to put it in a word—Locke denied the existence of innate ideas, and declared that all our knowledge springs from experience. But Hume asked the question, How do we know that two things stand to one another in the relation of causality? Because we usually see one thing follow another thing, we simply come to the conclusion that it must so follow. Self is merely a complex of swiftly succeeding ideas, under which we imagine an illusory soul or self to exist. Soul, this complex of ideas, must hence cease to exist, the soul being, as we have seen, a thing of the past.

As the last throws off all ideas of a spiritual being, it at once ceases to exist. Thus it was that Hume’s scepticism naturally followed Locke’s empiricism in the order of thought, and all our knowledge was reduced to perception of sense, leaving us with sensation alone to take the place of the old determination of universality and necessity. The point of view arrived at had a close affinity with the philosophy of the 18th cent. in France. Of the school of thought known as the Illumination, or the Philosophy of the Enlightenment (see ENLIGHTENMENT), the Encyclopædists form a noteworthy part, inasmuch as they represent its spirit in its most characteristic form. In France, this attitude of mind was unaccompanied by the pietistic tendency, wherein inward spiritual experiences were given a value as distinguished from the literal teaching of authority. This tendency was a feature in the movement towards intellectual liberation in the Aufklärung in Germany, even while it seemed to be in opposition to its conclusions. The Enlightenment there concluded its period of clear intellectual conceptions, by means of reason alone, by giving place to a period of sentimentality. In France, as we shall see, this concentration on the value of feeling, as advocated by Rousseau, ended in momentous results on the practical side of politics; while in Germany, where the call for action was not in the same way demanded, it found vent in the rationalism, which resulted in the period of Sturm und Drang, and in Romanticism in literature.

It was in France, however, that the empirical or Lockian school was carried to the utmost logical and logical consequence of sensualism and materialism. Empiricism developed in France as it never did in England, despite its being derived so largely from the writings of Englishmen. The French reformed the Lockian virtue of the speculative position which they adopted with the clearness and logical characteristic of their race; and this resulted in a thoroughly materialistic conception of the system of the world, and in an egoistic morality.

But the growth of the speculative and sceptical attitude of mind that took the place of the idealism which had proceeded from Cartesianism gives us but one aspect from which the rise of the new school of the Illumination can be explained. Along with the speculative side, there were two other influences at work which had as great an effect on contemporary thought as that which was purely intellectual, and which was complementary to it. The first was the rise of the scientific spirit, which, though it may have begun in France with Descartes, was developed in a remarkable way by Isaac Newton. Newton made men realize that the 'physical laws which hold good on the surface of the earth are valid throughout the Universe.' The mechanical conception of Nature formulated by Kepler, Galileo, and Descartes became, through Newton, intelligible to all. Men were shown how the machine worked, while it was also demonstrated to them how it is held together by means of the law of gravitation. Newton’s philosophy, on its speculative side, did not have much influence on contemporary thought, but practically his teaching and method had an effect which can hardly be overestimated. He popularized the so-called scientific view of Nature and made it intelligible, and this scientific outlook had the effect of making the world around of immense interest and importance in every one of its aspects, and presented infinite possibilities for those who were prepared to open their eyes, and have unveiled to them the things that had hitherto seemed hidden or mysterious. It also held up before them the hope of attaining the happiness sought by all, and this kind of knowledge only every seeker after truth. It was Voltaire, in his Lettres sur les Anglais, who introduced his countrymen at large to this new way of looking at the world; it was he who contrasted the old learning and the old religion with the new; it was he who popularized the views which he had adopted, applying scientific methods to supernatural and superstitious beliefs. The light of day was to shine out unobscured by the accretions of the ages. Voltaire expounded Newton’s theory of Physics, and wrote a Dictionnaire philosophique portatif (1764), which set forth his views on these and similar subjects from the standpoint (though officially contradicted on occasion) of a sceptic in religion and a materialist in philosophy. The visits of Voltaire and Montesquieu to England had great results, for they brought home with them new ideas in religion, philosophy, and the relations of man to man.

But there was still another cause in operation which made for the new empirical point of view. It is to be found in the general social condition of France at the time. A desolate court and a despotic government, on the one hand, and a Church both hypocritical and tyrannical, on the other, had, each in its respective sphere, alienated
not only the poor and suffering, but all thinking men, such as were the *philosophes* of the 18th century. The impulse on their part was to resist the tendency of the age to accept the precepts that were enounced. When they applied their clear reasoning powers to the corrupt order of things that obtained at the time, there was little doubt of the result. The undreamed condition of matters then existing was to them the order of things established by authority, and, if they were to vindicate for rational mankind the possession of its reason, the first thing to be done was to show forth the irrationality of a state of things whose existence was a disgrace to a nation, and revolting to every intellectual principle and moral feeling. The *philosophes* did their part effectually, and possibly prepared the way for the nation to do the rest in a manner as yet undreamed of.

2. The Encyclopædic spirit.—Thus had the way been paved, and men had now reached a frame of mind in which they were ready to accept the scientific and sceptical doctrines as expounded by the new philosophers. It had at last come home to them what was the significance of the point of view from which it is recognized that law governs everything: this ordnance of the Deity, the ‘law’ which was well-nigh excited to the place of the Deity of former days, arbitrary enough though that, was now regarded too much as a power working outside of us, and independently of any ideal or developing force which might guide its operations and bring with it a unifying influence. The way was perhaps made too plain and clear to be accepted as the way of Truth, so evusive to those who search after it as an end. The mysteries remained mysteries even after the artificial wrappings were removed, and the very superstitions were found to conceal certain aspects of truth, in addition to the falsehood that could not be overlooked. Nevertheless, the wrappings had to be removed, and it was rightly thought that an organized systematization of all known knowledge in the arts and sciences would help in bringing about this end in the most effectual and practical way possible. Goethe says in his *Dichtung und Wahrheit*: ‘If we heard the encyclopaedists tell of the immensity of their work, we felt as if we were going between the immovable moving spoons or looms in a great factory.’ But, though the knowledge of the process by which his coat was made at length disgusted Goethe with the coat itself, that knowledge had to be acquired along with the rest of the scientific and systematic knowledge of the day.

3. The Encyclopædia.—What, then, was this work which gave a name to a whole group of thinkers in the middle of the 18th century—that time of which d’Alembert remarked that ‘the middle of the century was apparently destined to form an epoch in the history of the human mind by the revolution in ideas which appeared to prepare for this event’? The first volume of the Encyclopædia appeared in 1751, and at this time the *philosophes* who took part in it were considerable in number. They were also, as a matter of fact, not all of one mind: there were among them atheists and deists, and the personal jealousies and antipathies against them were not small. But a splendid optimism carried them along in their great work—an optimism which meant belief in the best elements of humanity, in natural goodness instead of natural depravity, and in the possibility of human perfection under suita-
and Rousseau for Music. But all the contemporary
so-called the time were called upon to assist in
some way or other—Voltaire, Euler, Morellet,
Montesquieu, d'Anville, d'Holbach, Quesnay, and
Turgot, the leader of the new school of economists
who was soon placed in the Encyclopedia. In the
supplementary volumes, Haller, the great physiologist, took
part, and Condorcet, whose fate was to be so tragic in the days of the
Terror. History and Biography were excluded entirely when they came to
incumbency, and the object of the book being frankly utilitarian, know-
ledge was held to be worthy of the name only if it led to some useful invention or discovery.

The prospectors describing the work as one which
would form 8 volumes, with at least 600 plates,
appeared in November 1750, but before that time
Diderot had had much trouble with his pledged
contributors, who were mostly in arrears with their articles.
To make his difficulties greater, he himself was imprisoned at Vincennes on 29th July
1749 for 28 days, and then kept for three months
and ten days a prisoner on parole at the castle, on
account of his book entitled 'Les aveux de
D'Anville.' This, however, did not stop the printing, though,
of course, it caused delay.

The clerical party was not long in realizing the
power of the new work, and they set to work a plan which
led to the apprehension of the decree of the
National Assembly of 12 October 1748, and gave a new outlook on the world. It
showed a powerful influence was being directed to
be in the direction of attacking its enemies, and the
dissenters especially were jealous of the fact that
they had not been consulted regarding the articles
on Theology or Religion. They were not appealed by the fact that Diderot and d'Alembert
themselves had been among the signers of the
statement in character. The more cautious amongst the Encyclo-
pedists likewise became alarmed as time went on.
Montesquieu declined the articles 'Democracy'
and 'Despotism'; Buffon, though he wrote on
'Nature' in 1765, did not love the Encyclopedists;
Voltaire, Duclos, Rousseau, and Turgot gradually
separated themselves from the atheistical party,
though they had been identified with the new
crime at the beginning. The first volume of
the Encyclopedia appeared in 1751, and the second
in January 1752. Jansenists vied with Jesuits in
attacking it. The Abbé de Prades, one of the
collaborators, was the first to suffer. He had sus-
tained a remark of which he was so deeply
offended that he criticized miracles, comparing certain of them with
the eure of Jesuapius. Diderot was suspected of
being its true author. It was found to be
unscientistic and atheistic by the authorities, and the
Abbé was condemned by the Sorbonne, without
a hearing, by 82 votes against 54. He was degraded,
and fled to Germany to escape further punishment.
Diderot wrote an 'Apology' in his favour—a
moderate and well-argued document. The two
volumes of the Encyclopedia that had so far
appeared were ordered to be destroyed, by a decree
of the King's Council on 7th Feb. 1752.

As a fact, the real object was to advertise the
work. Indeed, the freethinkers were evidently
gaining ground. Jansenist and Jesuit
were alike reproached for the intestine rivalries
which made the Church and its ceremonies fall
into contempt. The Government did not iner
maintain its rigorous attitude, and tried to support
first one side, then the other. But the incom-
petence of the Church favoured the growth of the
liberal spirit. Malebranche, Director-General of the
Librairie, almost openly favoured the philoso-
phers, and it was reluctantly that he was forced to
issue the decree of 1752. This decree, however,
contained no prohibition of the continued publica-
tion of the Encyclopedia, or of carrying on an
active propaganda by means of brochures warmly
accepted by the public, who delighted in finding
the Episcopal mandates denounced. The publica-
tion of the Encyclopedia itself was regularly
continued from 1753 (when vol. iii. appeared) until
vol. vii. was finished. Diderot had a remarkable triumph. Just after the
decree he was compelled to hand over his papers to
the Jesuit cabal, who thought they could them-
selves have carried on the work. In this they soon
found themselves mistaken, and the Abbé de
Prades was forced to make application in May 1752 to
Diderot to continue the work which his genius was
alone able to accomplish.

The publication of the seventh volume the ferment was renewed, and storms arose which
brought the whole agitation to a crisis. The
popularity of the book was extending. The
subscribers had increased from barely two thousand
for the first volume to double that number for
the seventh, and the indignation of the clerical
party grew in proportion. Diderot, d'Alembert,
Voltaire, Rousseau, and Buffon were all supposed
to have been according to tenancy; it was carried as an
argument to overthrow the existing society. D'Alembert,
after being the guest of Voltaire at Ferney and
visiting Geneva, wrote an article in which he praised the Geneva ministers for the purity of
their lives, and it was, if possible, increased by the publication by Helvetius of his
book De l'Espiril in 1758. Helvetius, a generous
protector of the philosophes, set forth, in four
dissertations, opinions often stated in his hearing,
and his book was published under royal privilege. The Sorbom recon-
demned it, as an abridgment of the Encyclopedia, and was said to be
scandalous and licentious. Helvetius finally
retracted his statements and left the country, and the
philosophes themselves felt that harm had been
done to their cause by the book. The Council of
State suppressed the privilege conceded to the
Encyclopedia in 1746, prohibited the sale of
the seven volumes already printed, and on 8t March
1759 disallowed the publication of any further
volumes. This was after a commission of the-
ologists and lawyers had been appointed by the
court to examine the work, but before they had
reported. It was supposed they did not wish actually to destroy the movement, but
merely to adopt such a policy of encouragement or
repression as was most convenient to the politics of
the time, or possibly such as the caprices of a royal
mistress might dictate. An enormous amount of
money was involved in the concern, which was an
additional complication. The 4000 subscribers had
paid in advance their subscriptions of 114 livres
apiece. Diderot had prepared 3401 plates, for
which, by an absurd anomaly, a privilege was
given, as though they could be of value without
the text. The printing, however, went on as
before, 500000 readers being constantly engaged
upon the work.

It was in 1758 that Rousseau severed his con-
exion with the Encyclopedists by his celebrated
letter to d'Alembert on 'Stage Plays,' in reply to
the latter's celebrated 'Geneva,' which he had
assailed the doctrine that the theatre is an inven-
tion of the devil. But this was, of course, only
the reason assigned for what implied a real break
between the emotional school and that of pure
reason. The beginning had been reached of that
reign of sentimentalism which, while maintaining
the cult of the primitive man as against the pro-
duct of civilization and reason, introduced the
theory of government by means of the sovereign

ENCYCLOPAEDIATIS


"general will," which was soon to be carried to its extreme consequences with such momentous results.

Rousseau's accession was, indeed, a severe blow to Diderot, who had struggled so bravely against essential difficulties, and whose death was but a harbinger of a still heavier blow to follow. D'Alembert, his fellow-worker, exhausted by continuous persecution, at last declared his intention of resigning his task, and advised Diderot to do the same. 'I am worn out by debates with the affronts and vexations of every kind that this work draws down upon us.' Even Voltaire was persuaded that d'Alembert was right, but it was in vain that he pressed his views on Diderot. 'The latter felt that to abandon a work so begun would be to play into the hands of his opponents and to show a pusillanimous and feeble spirit. Weary as he was of insults from the enemies of reason, he resolved to 'go back to the Encyclopédia.'

It was seven years more before the enormous task was brought to a close, and this consummation was made possible only by the protection of Mme de Pompadour, de Choiseul, and Malebranche. And it was to d'Alembert himself that the labour of carrying it to a conclusion fell. Not only had he to write articles on every sort of subject, to edit them, and to see to the arrangement of the engravings as well as supervise their production, but he had to do all this in constant fear of interruption by the police. And in the end the production of this immense enterprise, which enriched three or four publishers, left him who had done so much for it a poor man. He himself asks if it is not strange that this is so, but characteristically adds that, after all, he is 'too happy to have lived.' And the final result of his labours, not only to civilized Europe, along with that of his stupendous work. It was towards the close of it that one of the hardest trials of the many that he had suffered had to be endured. After the delay of 1760, le Breton was entrusted with the printing of the ten remaining volumes in a single issue. Instead of carrying out his orders, he altered the articles in such a way as to delete every reference or statement that might be provocative to the Government, and consequently he mutilated the whole so that it was deprived of all that was most valuable in it. To make matters worse, the original manuscripts were lost, and on the death of a friend of his in whose digestion knew no bounds, and for weeks he could neither eat nor sleep. Yet, though his first impulse was to give up his task, he resolutely persevered in it, and his last impressions of letterpress were issued, though the eleven volumes of plates were not completed till 1772. The general assembly of the clergy on 20th June 1765 condemned the book. This sentence was quashed by the Parliament from hatred to the clergy, but all who owned the Encyclopédia were called on to deliver it to the police, by whom, however, it was eventually returned after some small alterations had been made.

4. The contributors to the Encyclopédia. As regards those who took part in this great work, we must always place Diderot at the head. He was the man amongst the rest who thought out not only his plan of operation, but the scientific method of which the book was the exponent. He was, indeed, the great Encyclopédist, of whom Goethe says that 'whoever holds him or his doings cheaply is a Philistine,' for it would be to show a truly limited understanding not to appreciate at its true value the great idea which Diderot tried to expound—that we must rise not only above the artificialities of the staid school of literature associated with the great French dramatists of the previous century, but also above the artificialities of an arbitrary standard of orthodoxy in religion and an untenable theory of government.

"Enlightenment of the understanding," meant, above all, the clear vision that penetrated through these mists and condemned all that could not be distinctly comprehended as unworthy of further notice. It was, in fact, the task of the Encyclopédia to show by the examples of many of them, appearing in the last ten volumes of the Encyclopédia. His special department in the work was supposed to be Philosophy and the Arts and Trades, but he undertook articles on a miscellaneous number of subjects besides. The minutenest care was expended by him in the reproduction of the plates, and it is said that in the chief departments of industry these would serve for practical specifications and working drawings. Diderot himself visited the workshops, examined the machines, had them taken to pieces and put together again, and even learned to work them. In the Encyclopédia attention was, of course, specially concentrated on the physical sciences and the practical arts. Things which can be seen and handled, ideas which do not indicate mere verbal distinctions, as with the schoolmen, or whose essence is found in formulations of the abstract, were the subjects of the great writers of the age just preceding, are the subjects which most attracted the famous Encyclopédist.

D'Alembert (Jean le Rond), 1717-1783, Diderot's fellow-editor, wrote mainly on scientific subjects; and his works on Mechanics and on Natural Science placed him in the front rank amongst the savants of his time. Moreover, though to us he may not have seemed so profound an author as D'Alembert, it is said to have had the gift of making interesting all that he wrote or said. In any case he obtained great popularity in the salons of the day, more especially in that of Mlle de Lespinasse. But intolerance was his bane, and the anti-religious bent of his mind became a real passion within him. His loss, however, when he retired, disgusted with the difficulties of his work, was a very serious one.

Of the other writers besides Diderot and d'Alembert, Voltaire comes first to our mind; he was incessant in his industry and ready to accept any article submitted to him, of whatever kind, and he grumbled at nothing when his thought was honest and helpful in telling his friends where he thought they had erred either in taste or in fact. He had the good sense to maintain his objections to the unorthodox, and if he was sometimes adopting, of allowing statements which they could not justly to appear because of the exigencies of the time. 'Time will enable people to distinguish what we have thought from what we have said,' d'Alembert had to confess. But, before condemning this attitude of trimming the sails to suit the wind, we must recollect the courage that had been already required to say what had been said in face of physical danger, in 1719, by the time of Louis XV., the Government claimed the right to direct not only the conduct but also the opinions of the subject. The existence of this right, still maintained by him, was one of the causes of the breach which took place with another of the original contributors, Jean Jacques Rousseau. He upheld the right of suppressing, by means of the secular arm, opinions that were anti-social. But what was really distinguished Rousseau from the Encyclopédist was the fact that his ideas were determined by feeling, while the philosophy of the Enlightenment declared that the right to be determined pre-empted only. The artistic renaissance called Romanticism was to come as a reaction from, and at the same time as a comprehensible development of,
rationalistic doctrines of the French philosophers. Rousseau had the power of sympathizing with the unenlightened, the outside people whom Voltaire designated as 'la canaille,' because he rested his philosophy on those elemental sentiments which were common to all; and the intellectualists consequently failed to comprehend him, as he certainly did not understand them.

Among the other notable Encyclopedists, Hélène must be mentioned. Of his book De l'Esprit we can only say: It confused rather than added to the public interest, and it is not perhaps any other book of the time, as tending, in the minds of the orthodox, to engender hatred against Christianity. Even the friends who, like Diderot, admired his work most declared to support the principles on which he rested his judgment. Hélène's diatribes against the existing Government and the Roman Catholic religion made for revolution rather than for reform, and self-interest and pleasure were frankly advocated as the basis of justice and morality. His philosophy, if philosophy it may be called, was founded on sensationalism in its extreme form. It is the belief that whatever opinion we have is not profound or convincing, without being the author of a thought-out doctrine of Utilitarianism he helped to inspire Bentham, his great advocate.

The author of the Système de la nature (1770), which was often ascribed to his intimate friend Diderot, and part of which the latter probably composed, or at least inspired, was the pro-sperous and hospitable friend of the poorer Encyclopedists, while he also entertained friends from every part of Europe, including Hume, Priestley, and other Englishmen. He gave vent in no stinted terms to his indignation at the existing forms of religion, his conclusions that we had grown up through centuries were alike condemned by him without any effort on his part to determine their real meaning or value; and, unlike some of the other Encyclopedists, he did not restrict his attacks to superstitions or mere sentiments, but boldly advocated war between the governors and the governed. Intellectual deliverance was to him but the first step to converting thought into deeds. In reading Holbach now we come to understand how, when these doctrines were drunk in with avidity, the revolutionary maxims so soon became converted into facts.

The pamphlets of Holbach are but one type of Encyclopedists. We have, on the other hand, Turgot, who wrote anonymously some of the most valuable and weighty articles in the book, which he regarded until he came to distrust its sectarian spirit, as a great instrument for the enlightenment of mankind. Then there was Montesquieu, who died in 1755 and left behind him an unprinted article on 'Taste'; and there were others who, until division arose, contributed to give dignity to the undertaking.

5. Value of the Encyclopedia.—The Encyclopaedia itself was unequal, as might be expected from the difficulties under which it was composed and from the prejudices with which to pay contributors; some articles were inferior, and, as Voltaire pointed out, they constantly suffered from verbosity and dogmatic modes of expression. D'Alembert himself confessed that this was the case, and Diderot was dissatisfied with the work. The attitude adopted to religion is not by any means consistent any more than the rest. It was attempted that dogmatic atheism was preached, though on the whole the attitude of the book is, of course, critical of orthodox beliefs. The main attack is, however, against Sacerdotism, against a Church that was corrupt, and against priests who were enemies to society. The object was to teach the value of Science and the reign of Law, and, thereby, to take away interest from the miraculous. The Encyclopedists found such continual occupation in the world as it revealed itself to them that they were content to leave alone what was beyond. The goodness of human nature, in their eyes, seemed to have been developed in a way more thorough by Rousseau and his followers later on, bad education was held to be responsible for social failure, as bad laws and bad government were blamed for a corrupt State. The earth in which we live is of more interest than a heaven of which we can know nothing surely. Francis Bacon's idea of the systematic classification of knowledge made it seem possible that such classification should be made, and Bacon may be said to have inspired the idea of the Encyclopaedia. Diderot himself said that he had 'taught his fellow-citizens to read Bacon.' Newton and Bacon were in the ascendant in the century which produced what Carlyle calls the 'Polemics of a Mechanical Era.'

It is interesting to reflect that from the Encyclopedists proceeds much of the social spirit of modern day thought. Indeed, it seems not that the Encyclopedists contributed anything to prevent misery rather than supply refuges for the miserable; he is preaching the latest doctrines in social economics. This, indeed, implies more than the need of society, and that is a religious truth which is, perhaps, as abstract as the other, because, just as we think the machine is being brought into perfect working order, we are pulled up sharply by finding that the individual rebels at the foundations that have been laid for a beautiful mechanical contrivance, and insists on asserting his individuality. Still, on the whole, the new science is the more hopeful and inspiring of the two, especially to those whose minds require some logical reason for their actions, and who do not want to be controlled simply by sentiment or by the ascetic spirit of religion.

All who played their part in this 'Encyclopedic workshop,' as Comte named it, were bound together in a common fellowship by their work on a common book, in a way probably never known before. But their failing was doubtless that of being abstract. The Liberalism of the Enlightenment had the faults as well as the virtues of certain forms of Liberalism in a later age. It freed itself from shackles that were imposing progress in the search for truth. It failed, however, to see that there were in the old rejected forms certain elements of truth that had been overlooked. The Encyclopedists did not consider that, even if knowledge of the useful arts and sciences were brought to perfection and the abuses that menaced society swept away, there would still be the eternal desire for some further explanation of the how and why, some fresh effort to comprehend the mind that understands, and give a unity to the conglomerate facts presented to it.


E. S. HALDANE.
END (Germ. Zweck, Ziel, Endziele [primarily spatial]; Fr. fin, but).—The point towards which a process or act is directed; the object of a desire or purpose, as the possession or operation of a process or act. The concept of end is one which enters specially, though not exclusively, into the interpretation of human action. Thus, the scientific worker is said to be aiming at the accurate determination of some aspect of reality, the artist to be striving after a satisfactory form of expression, the moral agent to be adjusting his conduct to certain standards of right living—in each case, that is to say, there is an end to which the agent is determined to act, just as the artist's operations are determined by the kind of mechanical construction which it is in his mind to produce. The efforts made to express the content of these ends and to relate those in each move to one another in a systematic manner are referred to as constituting a normative or a regulative science. Thus, Logic, which deals with the ends or ideals of scientific activity, Aristotle, which deals with those of artistic production, and Ethics, which deals with those relating to moral action or conduct, are spoken of as essentially normative sciences. Aristotle made the familiar philosophy through his well-known doctrine of the four causes (destination), in which he distinguishes the "final cause"—to give it its scholastic name—'the purpose or goal,' from the formal cause, the material cause, and the efficient cause. 'The final cause,' he says, 'operates like a loved object' (Metaph. 1074b, 3). He applies this conception not merely to the interpretation of organic process and moral behaviour, but to the interpretation of the whole of reality, including the physical universe.

Material causes are only intermediate—merely the means and indispensable conditions of phenomena. Above them stand final causes; above material necessity, the design of the universe; above the physical explanations of nature, the teleological! (Zeller's Aristotle, Eng. tr., 1897, I, 438 f.)

We thus have the arduous debate between Mechanism and Teleology explicitly opened—a debate which continues to our own time, and to which the most recent interesting contributions are those of the Neo-Vitalists and H. Bergson (see TELEOLOGY).

A distinction may be made between an end which can be conceived or presented as the object of voluntary process and an end which is not so presented, but is inferred from the facts of experience. To 'final purpose.' To 'Natural goal of progress, the Summum Bonum, would be instances of this type. Sidgwick has this distinction in view when he contrasts the Good attainable by human effort and the notion of an Ultimate Good (Methods of Ethics1, p. 2). These two types of end are distinguished by Baldwin respectively as 'subjective end' and 'objective end'—a distinction which is not to be confused with Kant's distinction of subjective and objective finality in the Critique of the Judgment. This terminology is liable to misinterpretation under the ordinary acceptance of 'subjective' and 'objective.' Subjective goal generally implies an element of contingency and arbitrariness, and those characteristics are not necessarily attached to ends of the first type; these ends may satisfy all the tests of objectivity. It would seem to be closer to the facts to distinguish them as 'explicit' and 'implicit' ends.

It is the explicit end of which we have direct experience. This is a cognizable element in the conscious process. In purposeful activity we are aware, by inspection, of an idea or image of some situation or object which is controlling the process. We are conscious of an orientation of the conscious stream in that direction, of a desire for it, of a striving towards it. This conative tendency, as it is called, is maintained and furthered by the presence of the expectation of an actual process or act.

For the this end...
state of society emerged in which they stood to one another not as kinsmen, but as fellow-citizens. The tribe became the nation, and the ties of kinship lost much of their compelling and restraining power. But the old feeling against aliens persisted under the newly determining principle of the spirit of nationality. Among the ancient States, especially in the East, all foreign nations were regarded, practically as enemies. In Greece, as, for instance, in the Peloponnesian wars, this antipathy towards strangers was partly due to religious reasons, the monolatry of Judaism stamping all outsiders as heathen and idolaters, enemies of Jehovah, the one God. But the feeling was not different both in the Greek city and States and at Rome, where a stranger, unless specially commended to protection, was regarded as having no rights at all. In Greece he was everywhere distrusted, and free Sparta excluded all. In Rome he could obtain justice only by the friendly offices of a citizen.

In considering the writings of Plato and Aristotle, so far as they bear upon this question, we have already pointed out that the political and social 'enemies' has no place in Greek ethics. In the Philebus (49), we find Socrates remarking that it is not wrong to feel joy in the woes of enemies, who should be very few indeed, to rejoice in the misfortunes of friends. He also describes barbarians, that is, foreigners, as natural enemies of the Greeks, and condemns war (and the common methods of warfare) only when waged between the Hellenic tribes, which were bound together by the ties of race and religion (Republic, p. 470). In the Laws (v. 729; ix. 579; xii. 949f., 952f.), Plato goes on to discuss the treatment of strangers in Greece, and makes several suggestions of reform. But the high-water mark of Greek thinking on this subject is perhaps attained by Aristotle in his criticism of the guardian class in Plato's ideal State (Repub. ii. 375f.). He complains that the guardians are to be savage to strangers, although affectionate towards their friends, and he uses these words: 'It is not right to be fierce towards any one, nor are magnanimous natures ever savage, except towards persons who injure them' (Pol. iv. 7). Aristotle presumably is thinking of direct personal injury, or of the feeling of enmity which Socrates regards as justifiable between the inhabitants of the ideal Republic and the individuals in a foreign State who are responsible for initiating war against them (Plato, Repub. v. 471).

In these and earlier times the utmost cruelty was permissible towards enemies. Feroce and lawless savagery characterized all phases of primitive society. Revolting customs were sanctioned by highly civilized States. Hence, even in Aristotle, whose views on war were far in advance of his time, insomuch as he disapproved of it as an end in itself, we find no criticism of methods of warfare and conquest which we should describe as barbarous. He saw the land of the conquered partitioned, and the vanquished subjected to slaughter and outrage or sold with their children to slavery; but he seems to have found a sufficiently satisfactory explanation in the consideration that these atrocities were committed against 'barbarians,' people who were 'by nature' slaves. Plato, too, found such practices revolting only between Hellenic tribes, and he makes Socrates express the wish that in the ideal Republic the Hellenes should reserve for war with barbarians the treatment which Greeks now mete out to each other (Repub. v. 471).

The responsibility of beginning and conducting war has not long been the prerogative of States. Under the feudal system of the Middle Ages it was especially common for war to be declared by powerful lords, by cities, or by provinces. Gentilis, the predecessor of Grotius, was the first publicist who defined war, much as we should define it now, as the just or unjust conflict between States. In Roman law the term 'enemy' meant an alien to States, an individual between whom had passed a formal declaration of war. But the Roman jurists, except for certain rules regarding the person of ambassadors, hostages, the keeping of the laws, and the like, laid Jewish law as to the treatment of non-jews to the Jews themselves. Ideas of justice to an enemy treated as an ally to the conquered appear for the first time in the Hellenic wars. The Romans, in their treatise de Juris Belli ac Maris, defined the principles influence the Paxia, did more humanitarian count day, a traveller practice of States. At the present day, war is as, and even or resident in foreign territory is penal, when he is answerable to, the law of the land. In and the abroad, war arises between the aims he is, as, as he conducted himself, he is depending on the individual, indeed, is not usually account the enemy of the State with which the government to which he owes allegiance is at war. War is under- stood by and to be fought not, not only between individuals, but not between individuals as such, although an individual may during war acquire what is termed enemy character, either as the owner of property or because of acts done by him as a private person. On the other hand, in so far as business relations are concerned, the subjects of belligerent States are enemies. All ordinary intercourse must cease until the war is at an end.

Hostilities are confined upon the official of general rules which combatants cannot violate without exciting the reproach and risking the interference of the civilized world. Prisoners and non-combatants alike are free from the severities of war, and in defeat their persons can be subjected neither to slaughter nor to outrage. Only such methods are legitimate as are absolutely necessary to weaken the forces of the enemy and compel them to yield, and which in so doing do not bring useless suffering are rigidly excluded. Rules relating to the practices of assassination and devastation, and to the use of poison and of arms and projectiles which inflict needless tortures are forbidden by the Brussels Convention of 1899. The Brussels code has not yet been made law, but nations which have since that date engaged in war have adhered to the principles embodied in it. See, further, art. WA.


ENERGY.—A term borrowed from the Greek to express the mechanical idea of the 'power to do work.' Its etymological import is something in action or a name for action itself. It is thus the equivalent of 'force.' Sometimes it is a synonym for 'force' (q.v.), which has the same definition, and so means to denote the fact that effects do not take place without causal action, and this causal action for Mechanics is substance or matter in action or motion. But energy also, as denoting 'power,' implies capacity to do work without representing the 'force' or matter as actually in motion. Hence it was divided into 'potential' and 'kinetic' energy. The potential energy is force or matter in a static condition, one which
represents the mere capacity of producing work, but not the actual fact of producing it. Kinetic energy is 'force' in action or actually producing work. Thus snow lying on the mountain side may be conceived as potential energy. But when melted into water and flowing down the stream it is kinetic energy. A boat resting without strain is potential energy; the same spring bent or pressed down and exerting strain is kinetic energy. Hence any matter or force in a passive or static condition resembles potential energy. If in motion or exerting pressure, strain or pulling power, is kinetic or dynamic energy.

In the practical problems of Mechanics it becomes important to measure energy, and some standard for the purpose had to be obtained. The first step in the direction of obtaining such a standard was to assume some constant form of energy and measure it in some way. It was known that it took a certain amount of energy, not measured, to raise 1 lb. a foot high, and twice this amount of energy to raise 2 lb. the same distance, or 1 lb. two feet high. This relation served as a means of determining some criterion by which to measure the amount of energy doing work, and this criterion could be found in the amount of work done. This unit of work done is called the 'foot pound,' and it is divided into the 'kilogramme metre.' Hence, we may determine this; hence we may take the energy employed in moving an object a given distance vertically as the equivalent of gravity, and so obtain a standard for its measurement.

In fixing this standard 'we must choose our unit of work,' says Balfour Stewart, 'but in order to do so we must first of all choose our unit of weight and of length, and for these we will take the kilogramme and the metre, these being the units of the metrical system. The kilogramme corresponds to about 2.205 aerial pounds, the metre to about 39.37 inches. Now, if we raise a kilogramme one metre in vertical height, we are conscious of putting forth an effort to do so, and of being resisted in the act by the force of gravity. In other words, we spend energy and do work in the process of raising this weight. Let us agree to consider the energy spent, or the work done in this operation, as one unit of work, and let us call it the kilogramme-metre. In the next place, it is obvious that if we raise the kilogramme two metres in height, we do two units of work, if three metres, three units, and so on. And again, it is equally obvious that if we raise a weight of two kilogrammes one metre high we likewise do two units of work, while if we raise it two metres high we do four units of work. From these examples we are entitled to derive the following rule:—Multiply the weight raised (in kilogrammes) by the vertical height (in metres) through which it is raised, and the result will be the 'work done in kilogramme-metres.'

By a process based upon the velocity which gravity gives falling bodies it is possible to calculate this energy, and so to determine a formula for practical use in mechanical operations. This calculation shows that energy is proportional to the square of the velocity of objects. Taking M to stand for the mass and V for the velocity, this formula is arrived at.

\[ \text{energy} = \frac{1}{2} M V^2 \]

Now gravity accelerates the velocity of falling bodies at a certain constant rate. One half of this divided into this formula gives the actual amount of energy expended in the operation. Hence \( \frac{1}{2} M V^2 \) represents the formula for measuring the amount of energy in any special case.

The total amount of energy in the world is supposed to remain the same at all times. This conception of the constant sum of the ' conserve energy.' The sense in which Mechanics or Physics asserts this doctrine is that the sum of potential and kinetic energies remains the same in all operations, and not that there may be an operation by which it can be added or subtracted. If a ball is propelled upwards at a certain velocity its energy will be measured by the formula above given, and it will come to rest when gravity has overpowered its first kinetic energy. The initial velocity represents energy of the kinetic sort. When completely arrested its energy will be potential. At any point between the initial motion and its stoppage the sum of the potential and kinetic energies will be equal to the kinetic energy at the outset, the potential energy being nil at that point. This is what is meant by a conservative system, and the expression Conservation of Energy expresses the fact.

Another import has been given to this doctrine in the idea that the kinetic energy of a system remains the same in all transformations, and it gives rise to some difficulties in accounting for the phenomena of change, especially of change from kinetic to potential, from dynamic to static conditions. The best conception of this situation is Correlation rather than Conservation of Forces or Energy. The former suggests a conception of identity which seems not to be a fact in the transformations. Hence, in consequence of this equivocation in the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy, a controversy arises between philosophy and mechanical science. But, with the correction of the phrase suitable to the different problems involved, there is no occasion to do more than insist upon the distinction between energy and work. The criterion of the relevance of the physicist's inference from his mechanical use of conservation to the denial of the philosopher's doctrine of change, especially of facts that involve change, is obvious.

Recently a doctrine of 'energy' has arisen which regards it as a 'substance.' The mechanic treated it as a property or quality of matter for doing work. But certain metaphysical propensities, on the one hand, and the implications lying at the basis of the distinction between kinetic and potential energy, on the other hand, created the need of a term for something which the scientific metaphysician—for that is what he was—wanted to distinguish from matter, on the one hand, and its properties, on the other. 'Energy' was thus made distinct from 'force' and 'matter.' It might be at the basis of both, but it was distinct from them. Ostwald is perhaps the leading representative of this school. It does not express anything different, however, from that of those physicists who conceive the ultimate basis of material phenomena in terms of matter or ether, and only serve to eliminate the idea of inertia where 'matter' seems to imply it. We see, therefore, no reason for attaching any special importance to the doctrine.


JAMES H. HYSLOP.

ENHYPOSTASIS.—The term is one of a series—'hypostatical union' 'anhypostasis,' 'enhypostasis'—used to cast light on the constitution of the Person of Christ. The Christology of the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) postulates in Christ the unity of two distinct natures—the Divine and the human—in a single person. This is called in theology the 'hypostatical union.' Since, however, the personality is assumed to belong exclusively to the side of the Divine—i.e. it is the eternal, pre-existent Son who has entered humanity—it would seem to follow that the humanity of Christ must be conceived of as 'im-personal.' Christology, therefore, has been very generally affirmed the impersonality (anhypostasia) of the humanity of Christ. But the difficulty is obvious—How can an impersonal humanity (i.e. no individual) or be conceived of as one of them? And is it not the very peculiarity of man as rational being in his possession of self-consciousness and will? And is a being possessing these attributes not already personal? To answer these objections, the idea was put upon of describing the humanity of Christ not as 'im-personal,' but as 'en-personal.'
The doctrine of *enhydrosis* is already met with in Leontius of Byzantium (A.D. 483-543), but is specially developed by John of Damascus (c. A.D. 740) in his *De Fide orthodoxa*. He connected it with the doctrine of the Trinity in order to oppose to Nestorianism, that the human nature of Christ never subsisted in a personality of its own; that it was assumed by, and subsisted only in, the person of the Divine Logos. As a result, it avoids the unfortunate suggestion (which is not in the least intended) in the word *enhydrosis* of a possible independent impersonal existence of Christ's human nature, and lays emphasis on the idea that its humanity from the beginning subsisted 'in' the person of the Logos. Plainly, however, this does not remove the essential difficulty that it is a Divine, not a human, personality that we have in Christ. Many modern theologians would solve this by rejecting altogether the doctrine of the two natures, and boldly affirm that the personality lies wholly in the humanity; but it is very difficult to keep this view from passing into *theoria apanta* (Logos theory) from which it is to be found, it is probably in the line of recognizing the essential kinredness of humanity to the Logos in which it is grounded, and which, in the incarnation, appropriates humanity to itself as the foundation of its own personal manifestation. The Logos is the personal centre, but under conditions truly and perfectly human—'The Word became flesh, and dwelt among us.'


JAMES ORR.

ENLIGHTENMENT, THE.—In its most general sense the term 'Enlightenment' (Germ. *Aufklärung*) indicates the first of the two periods through which modern thought has passed; or the development of philosophy from Bacon's *Novum Organum* (1620) to Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781). But a more critical view of the period, with its characteristic ideals, reveals the fact that the beginning of the period must be dated from Hobbes (1589-1679) rather than from Bacon, whose freer and more cultural philosophy belongs to the Renaissance. As a further limitation, it must be observed that the Enlightenment hardly included the greater philosophic works which appeared contemporaneously with it. Though Locke (1632-1704) was connected with the movement, it was not by means of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690), but through his unphilosophic works on rights and government, that the connection was sustained. Spinoza (1632-1777) in his *Ethica* (1677), with its Cartesian foundation, was innocent of the movement; but in his *Theologico-Political Writings*, inspired as they were by Hobbes, he takes up some of its peculiar problems. In his *Treatise on Human Nature* (1738), Quito was as studious as Locke to avoid the rationalism of the Enlightenment, whose principles he criticized in his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (1777). Kant's relation to the movement is discoverable, not in the *Kritik*, but in his lesser works on natural rights. Thus appearing in the minor writings of the greater, the philosophy of the Enlightenment was elaborated by a number of anti-philosophical thinkers, who ignored the fundamental problems of logic and ethics, for the sake of settling practical questions of Church and State. Nevertheless, the Enlightenment possessed the spirit of a genuine philosophy, even where it was malleable or unwilling to pursue its method. This spirit was a regressive one, according to which the age endeavoured to return to the fundamentals of dogmatism. In 1650 the tendency manifested itself in the desire to premise a first principle of all thinking, the *cogito, ergo sum* (*Meditation 11*); Locke was equally anxious to elucidate the native principle of cognition when he styled the mind a *tabula rasa* (*Essay*, bk. i.). The same radical spirit was shown not only in philosophy, but in church and state. Thus Herbert of Cherbury sought the true faith in the original *religio naturalis* (de Veritate, 1624), and Grotius attempted to find the true principle of law in the *jus naturale* (*Jus Gentium*, 1625). But it was by the regressive spirit of the 17th cent., consisted in establishing contrasts between things established by authority and tradition and those erected through freedom and reason. This conflict between reason-rights and tradition-authority thus recalled the ancient Sophist contrast between *phos* and *stoa*, the exact reiteration of which may be found in Cudworth's *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, 1678 (bk. i. ch. i.). The practical result of the enlightenment was a desire to create an opposition to history, the source of tradition and authority, and to instil a belief in the eternity of 18th cent. ideals; coupled with this dogmatism was a strong reaction against the rational and an antipathy to the ideas of progress. Emancipating itself from the past, and feeling no need of a future, the Enlightenment was possessed of an optimism which believed that man was able to solve all problems and cure all ills. The leading questions of the Enlightenment had to do with (1) *Natural Rights*, (2) *Free-thought and Toleration*, (3) *Rational Christianity*, and (4) *Natural Religion*.

1. Natural rights.—It is with the name of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) that the history of Natural Rights begins. Anticipated by Bodin's *Six Liéres de la République* (1570), with its insistence upon the historical theory of rights, as also by Gentilin's *de Jure Belli* (1588), with its direct deduction of rights from Nature, Grotius' great work, *de Jure Belli ac Pacis*, was able to make use of the empirical in the one and of the rational in the other. The psychological basis upon which Grotius rears his juristic system was found in man's natural tendency towards the formation of society; this is attributed to the social instinct within him, as also to the particular gift of language, with its social possibilities (op. cit., Prolegomena, §§ 7-8). From the logical standpoint Grotius argues, from both *a priori* and *a posteriori* principles, that natural rights are self-evident and necessary, that the *a priori* it was urged that *jus naturale* was so native to man that he could not be conceived of as existing without it, while the common consent of mankind argues, as from effect to cause, that, since the principle of rights is universal, it is also necessary to the human race (ib. i. cap. i. xii. § 1). In his enthusiasm over the rational principle of rights, Grotius was led to assume a radical position in theology, in accordance with which he asserted that the principle of rights would hold though we should assume that there is no God (ib. Proleg. § 1). Natural law is thus conceived of as following from the nature of the thing, while the law of God is dependent upon His will. The blunt way in which Grotius expressed this Thomian seems to produce the impression of atheism, and it was to the dual extremes of *ni diez, ni mater* that this philosophy was destitute of. In 1650 the tendency manifested itself in the desire to premise a first principle of all thinking, the *cogito, ergo sum* (*Meditation 11*); Locke was conceived of as coming to man by means of tradition as something authoritative; having thus expressed himself, Grotius creates the dualism of *jus et lex*, *ratio* and *essentia*. It was in this way that the Enlightenment learned to despise the historical and to reposit in the purely rationalistic.

In England, the philosophy of rights was con-
ttined by Hobbes, who developed a theory alien in character to that of Grotius. The failure of Bacon to participate in the discussion is one of the striking features of 17th century thought. Lemuirer says:

"Rommeau at Montpellier became the first to call his colony from Alba the first founder of the Roman State; this colony was in the original state of nature, but the collection is an "overseer" (Life of John Locke, by Fox Bourne, N.Y. 1874, p. 169).

This conception of man's original condition made it possible for Locke to give a more plausible explanation of the origin of the State in a contrast between man and man rather than between man and the magistrate.

The juristic element in the thought of the Enlightenment, fated as it was to become an important factor in the development of Deism (p. 47), was not overlooked by the Deists themselves, however little they had to contribute to the philosophy of rights as such. Indeed, the common doctrine of Hobbes, Spinoza and the uncultured Deists, like Tindal and Chubb, were to meet was the juristic one. Free-thought was thus a much greater leveller; hence Warburton, quoting Swift, said:

"No subject or region could have seguridad than Toland into the class of reputable authors ... no subject but religion could have sunk his lordship (Bolingbroke) so far below it" (Divina Legation of Man, p. 20).

Among the Deists, Tindal was the first to identify himself with the natural-rights movement, in connexion with which he shows himself to be a follower, first of Hobbes, then of Spinoza, and finally of Locke. In his Essay concerning the Laws of Nations and the Rights of Sovereigns (1694), he urges 'egoism' as the 'source of all man's actions and the foundation of his duty to God and man' (op. cit. 121). The Essay on the Rights of Mankind (1697) discusses the status naturalis, while the author's more complete philosophy of rights appears in The Rights of the Christian Citizen (1700), which contains the political philosophy of the Enlightenment with Deism. In this work, Tindal contends against established religion, on the ground that men are in a religious state of nature, 'subject only to God and their own consciences' (op. cit. 2).

Without analyzing the inner nature of the principle of rights, Toland (1707-1722) advanced principles of practical rights and freedom. These appear in his Life of Milton (1699), as also in Anning (1699), the defence of it. A more definite relation to the philosophy of rights was sustained by Toland in his Paradoxes of State (1707), and The Art of Governing (1707) in which his philosophical views are expressed in his Anglic Libera (1707), wherein he discusses questions of political contract and the ideals of a commonwealth (op. cit. 92). Chubb had 'a very meagre relation to the movement, as appears from his Enquiry concerning Property (1717), and Some Short Reflections on the Ground and Extent of Authority and Liberty (1728). Insignificant as were these Deiste attempts at elaborating a philosophy of rights, they are of great value in showing how closely connected were the principles of theology and politics—a connexion which will appear more convincing in relation to the question of the natural condition of mankind.

The purely political philosophy of the Enlightenment, dependent as it was upon Hobbes and Locke, underwent a development which in France was practical, a Geneva speculator, Rousseau, carried out Locke's idea of government by contract, the theory of which he projected in Le Contrat Social (1762). In Germany, Kant attempted a theoretical deduction of jus naturale in his Metaphysische Naturgeschichte der Radchüchte (1777), in which he reasons from the status naturalis, not as though it had been a real condition of mankind, but as a hypothetical condition upon the grounds

naturalis. In this connexion, Locke attempted to show that the state of nature had existed in human history, and thus, in his work On the Roman Commonwealth (1680), he says:

"Rommeau at Montpellier became the first to call his colony from Alba the first founder of the Roman State; this colony was in the original state of nature, but the collection is an "overseer" (Life of John Locke, by Fox Bourne, N.Y. 1874, p. 169).

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of which human rights might be deduced. The process is continued in Fichte's Grundlage des Naturrechts und der Rechtslehre (1796), in which the relation of ego to non-ego is transformed into the relation of the individual to society. A similar application of the Enlightenment's philosophy of rights was made by Schopenhauer, who interpreted the Hobbesian 'state of nature' in the light of the 'will to live' (Volk als Wille und Vorstellung, 1819, § 62).

2. Free-thought and toleration.—Free-thought was the Warren of protest where religious rights were more than speculative ones deduced in a disinterested fashion. This practical tendency reappears in Locke, whose sensationalism would have been as ineffective as Hobbes' materialism if their authors had been called upon to employ speculative instead of practical methods in the controversy. Like Spinoza, Locke insists upon the inwardness of religious belief, and thus argues that,

'although his (the magistrate's) opinion in religion be sound and the way that he appoints truly evangelical, if I be not thoroughly persuaded in my own mind, then there will be no safety for me in following it' (A Letter for Toleration, 1689 [Works, v. 47-50]).

In insisting that speculative articles and opinions should not be imposed by law, Locke was not prepared to consent that 'the right oftoleration should extend to the atheist, for the reason that with him the oaths and bonds of civil society could be of no avail'. As with Spinoza, thought, so likewise with worship; its inner nature is such that it can be conceived of as undergoing no interference from an external power, although the magistrate may with power and right enjoin duties of justice and charity (ib. cap. xvii.). In making this distinction of the inner and outer, Spinoza sought to free science from religion, and to separate philosophy from faith, such a separation constituting the essential aim of his work (ib.). To arrive at this end, he defines one in terms of speculation, the other in those of practice: 'Ratio regnum veritatis et sapientiae; theologia autem pietatis et obedientiae' (ib. cap. xxv.). Not only as a matter of natural rights in the individual, but likewise as the most rational law for the State, is the principle of toleration to be upheld. Such was the motto of Spinoza's work. His relation to Locke was an indirect one, for he made little appeal to the average free-thinker, hence the omission of his name from the list of free-thinkers from Socrates to Locke who Collins gave to 'Powers of the Press' (1718). Nevertheless, Deism was not unaware of Spinoza, while his logic of free-thought sometimes appears in its literature. Evidence of Spinoza's direct connection with natural religion as a system is found in Kortholt's de Tribus Impostoribus (Herbert, Hobbes, Spinoza), 1680. Connected as was his name with these two greater thinkers, Spinoza was supposed to have influenced Toland and Tindal. 'Varenna called Toland the 'mince of Spinoza' (Divina Legation of Moses, iv. 279), and both the pantheism and free-thought of this Deist may serve to indicate the nature of the irritation. While Toland was Tindal's last and fiercest advocate in the controversy over natural religion brought forth the following rhyme:

Spinoza smilis and cries; the work is done.
Tindal shall finish what Spinoza first began.

Without any theoretical preliminary, Hobbes had anticipated Spinoza in proposing principles of toleration, the result of whose application was destined to become momentous in the history of Deism. The principles upon which Hobbes sought to base toleration consisted of two articles of Christian faith: the Deity of God and the Messiaship of Jesus. Belief in the existence of God as an existence, with attributes of a negative, superstitious, or indefinite nature, involves the end of all true worship. That Jesus was Deity was regarded by Hobbes as the other article of free faith, and this simple creed was in his mind the burden of the Gospels and the testimony of the Apostles as recorded by Schopenhauer (cap. xviii.). Rational Christianity and natural religion, with their maxims of the mere Deity of God and the mere Messiaship of Jesus, were thus practical political principles used in a controversy over Church and state, not merely as something to be maintained, but rather as speculative ones deduced in a disinterested fashion. This practical tendency reappears in Locke, whose sensationalism would have been as ineffective as Hobbes' materialism if their authors had been called upon to employ speculative instead of practical methods in the controversy. Like Spinoza, Locke insists upon the inwardsness of religious belief, and thus argues that,

*The author of the Letters for Toleration is the first who has ventured to assert the justice and necessity of toleration in its due and full extent' (op. cit. 139).

Tindal's more independent argument for freedom appeared in his tract, A Discourse on the Liberty of the Press (1698), wherein he pleads for freedom on the ground that, since reason is the only light that God has given man, he will be held responsible for the proper use of his faculties; whence the necessity of a free press, in order that men may perfect their faith by the free interchange of opinion (op. cit. 294). In his Essay concerning the Power of the Crown (1697), Tindal attempts a practical definition as the 'belief of a God, and the sense and practice of those duties which result from the knowledge we have of Him and ourselves' (op. cit. 130). But the most characteristic work on free-thinking that Deism was to produce appeared in 1713, when Anthony Collins (1676-1727) produced his Discourse of Free-Thinking, in which toleration, instead of being derived from speculative grounds, was based upon practical grounds. According to Collins, free-thinking in theology is as necessary as in other sciences, for the reason that theology involves these in its treatment of Nature and history (op. cit. 15). As with science, so with re-
ligion; since uniformity of opinion among men is impossible, it is best for each to judge independently, so that the 'surest and best means of arriving at truth lies in free-thinking' (ib. 33). Collins even goes so far as to assert that the manifest design of man is to seek after the truth, and the Apostles urged them to abandon an established religion for a faith wholly new to them. With regard to his own day, Collins contends that, in view of various alleged revelations, as in the Zend Avesta and the Bible, and owing to the different views of God and the Scriptures within the Church itself, it has become necessary to adopt free-thinking as the only possible means of setting one's self right in religion (op. cit. 48-50). In the hands of Collins the principles of free-thought were separated from the juristic philosophy of the Enlightenment and transformed into the special pleading peculiar to Deism.

2. Rational Christianity.—From its beginning in Hobbes, the theory of toleration had proceeded upon the assumption that the principles of Christianity may be stated in a manner so simple that it will satisfy the free-thinker's law and at the same time content the free-thinker in his claims for the rights of toleration. It was in this mediatorial spirit that Hobbes and Locke had sought to base rational Christianity upon the idea of God as mere existence, and Christ in His mere Messiahship. Now was to follow an independent treatment of the problem. Before Locke had written The Reasonableness of Christianity (1685), Arthur Bury published The Naked Gospel (1690), the aim of which was to advance the interests of natural religion, whose primary principle was faith (op. cit. 10). In the particular case of Christianity this general religious principle was the idea of God as a belief in Christ as the Messiah (ib. 30). Such was also the view of Locke, who outlined his theology against the background of his philosophy of toleration. By appealing to primitive Christianity, Locke argued that, the original article of belief and the sole test of discipleship among the Apostles consisted in the creed that Jesus was the Christ, so that to believe in Christ meant to credit His claims to Messiahship. The first principle of Christian ethics was that of repentance.

These two, says Locke, 'faith and repentance, i.e. believing Jesus to be Messiah, and a good life, are the indispensable conditions of the new covenant, to be performed by all who would obtain eternal life' (The Reasonableness of Christianity [Works], vi. 106).

This simple gospel was in Locke's mind the burden of St. Paul's preaching, and all that he advanced as necessary to salvation. With regard to the Pauline theology, as developed in the Epistles, Locke can only plead that these writings were intended for those who were already Christians; hence they 'could not be designed to teach the fundamental articles and points necessary to salvation' (A Vindication of the Reasonableness, etc., 1685, p. 167). As an empiricist, Locke would have had no right to use the term 'reasonableness,' but his employment of the term was political rather than philosophical, his contention practical rather than speculative. A century later, on the decline of Deism, Kant followed a similar course, except that, instead of passing from rights to religion, he reversed the process; and, having written a rationalistic treatise on Christianity, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Erkenntnis vermessen (1781), he followed it up with a juristic framework of free-thought, which are found in his Rechtslehre (1797). Thus, from Hobbes to Kant the principles of theology were closely connected with those of natural right.

As the practical phase of Locke's philosophy had been of great moment in the formulation of

the Deistic creed, so the speculative part of his system received Deistic recognition. When Toland produced his Christianity not Mysteries (1696), a work suggestive of Burn's Naked Gospel, Toland's contention was that there was nothing in the gospel contrary to reason, and that Christian doctrine could be called a mystery (op. cit. 6). [For a full account of Toland's views, see art. Desm., in vol. iv. p. 534 f.] The next step in Deism was that of the Zenses, or the universal and acutals as given in the Gospels. Accordingly, Collins, who had completed his theory of free-thought, inaugurated the attack upon mystery when he sought to invalidate the testimony of the prophets. Where William Whiston, in the Boyle Lectures of 1707, had contended for a single, Messianic sense in the interpretation of prophecy, Collins contended that the prophecies usually cited have in them a sense which is not Messianic at all, and that the application to the life of Christ, as in the case of the citations made in Mt 1 and 2, is to be understood in a purely allegorical or mystical manner (The Grounds of Theology of the Christian Religion, 1724, p. 148). The Deistic controversy over this Deistic work which was made by Edward Chandler, in A Defence of Christianity from the Prophesies (1729), so involved the question of miracles that it has been designated as (2). A positive regard as incredible. This negative attitude towards miracles formed the basis of Peter Annet's attack upon the credibility of the resurrection, the Gospel account of which he deemed a forgery (The Resurrection of Jesus Considered, 1744, p. 22).

This destructive treatment of Christianity was accomplished by an attempt to construct a rational Christianity, based upon the teaching rather than the person of Christ. The way for this had been prepared by Hobbes and Locke, in their plea for toleration upon the basis of the mere Messiahship of Jesus, while it was also an expression of the Socinian element in Deism. Lockean and theological Christianity had come in for some criticism as a Socinian work when John Edwards wrote his Socinianism Unmasked (1686), while in Warburton's mind Deism was a 'modern fashionable notion, not borrowed from, but the same with the Socinian' (The Divine Lociation of Moses, i. 56). The most characteristic defender of this milder form of Deism was Thomas Chubb (1679-1747), who made his entrance into the field of controversy by means of his Socinian work, The Supremacy of the Father (1715). Chubb's chief contribution to Deism was The True Gospel of Jesus Christ (1738), in which naturalistic speculative of Hobbes' became variously expressed in a form peculiar to Herbert's natural religion. The essence of Christianity and the person of Christ are treated in a purely utilitarian manner; accordingly, Chubb asserts that what fits a man for future felicity tends to make him happy here, so that, when the gospel is found to subserve man's present and future well-being, it may be called 'true' (op. cit. 4), just as the author of it may be called the species of which are found in his Ichthalekre (1797). Thus, from Hobbes to Kant the principles of theology were closely connected with those of natural right.

As the practical phase of Locke's philosophy had been of great moment in the formulation of
condemnation will be meted out according to conformity or non-conformity to the rule of right action. In addition, the principles of natural religion, Claub had abandoned the hedonism of Hobbes for the rationalism of Cudworth and Clarke. In the same spirit Thomas Morgan (1743) attempted to connect the gospel with the religion of reason. As a rationalist, Clarke intended to demonstrate the natural religion of Christ and the spurious religion of St. Paul and his followers; and, just as Lessing distinguished between the religion of Christ and the Christian religion, so Bolingbroke declared that the Gospel of Christ is one thing, the Gospels of St. Paul and all those who have grafted after him on the same stock, another (Philosophical Works, 1754, p. 313). Christianity was to Bolingbroke 'a complete but plain system of natural religion' (ib. 316). The apotheosis of its mysteries of prophecy and miracle, the Christianity of Deism had become identified with the system of natural religion.

4. Natural religion.—As the doctrine of natural rights, with its corollaries of free-thought and toleration, had led to the formulation of rational Christianity, so natural religion employed a different logic to arrive at the same conclusion. The first triumph of Clarke's system was inaugurated by Grotius, with its practical; the second, which sprang from Herbert, was speculative. Herbert's work de Veritate, appearing one year before that of Grotius, investigated and natural instinct in its logical form as Grotius examined its ethical nature. Both thinkers attempted an a priori deduction of a natural principle, whose existence in human nature was then corroborated by an a posteriori investigation of human history; in both alike we find the appeal to the instinctus natura and the consensus universitas. (The contents of the de Veritate will be found in art. DEISM, vol. iv. p. 553.) Herbert's view of religion, naïvely conceived, and wanting in the inexorable rationalism and secularism of the Enlightenment, was destined to be prophetic rather than constructive in the career of natural religion, whose fundamental principle was that of the 'reason of things.' Hence, after the appearance of Herbert's work, the interest of the Enlightenment pursued the jurist of Grotius rather than the rationalist of Herbert, the two tendencies meeting in the 18th century of the 18th century.

This unity of natural religion and natural rights appeared in Charles Blount (1693), who considered Herbert's five articles of universal belief to be the best ground for toleration (Religio Laici, 1683). In Blount's The Grotian of Isaac (1683), the term 'Deist' is found, this being one of the earliest instances of its occurrence.

Without any dependence upon Herbert, Samuel Clarke exercised the same speculative freedom manifested in the former's de Veritate, while he enriched Deism with something like a theistic philosophy. Written in opposition to Spinoza, as also to Hobbes, Clarke's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (1714-1719) was so devoted to the 'nature of things' as a first principle that it never freed itself from a kind of Spinozistic pantheism—a fact which did not escape the notice of Clarke himself in his An Observations on Clarke's Sermons (1705), where in recent years its importance has been reconsidered by J. Zimmermann (Samuel Clarke's Leben und Lehre, Vienna, 1870).

While his logic is closely connected with that of the reason of things, Thoristic and Cudworthian in the extreme. With his implicit faith in the mathematical analogy, Clarke asserts that God must be thought of as eternal and necessary, just as twice two is must be thought of as the result of the operation of being. God is thus the ground of His own existence (Works, 1732-1742, iii. 5). Identified with the nature of things, the Deity is called upon to will in accordance with the necessities which these things impose. In this context Clarke insists that ethical behavior is a determinant of the real; thus he says, 'To will things to be what they are not as absurd as to believe that twice two is not equal to four' (ib. ii. 336).' To this extent Clarke is seeking for a complete and self-sufficient natural religion, but the emphasis laid upon the ethical seems to involve as its consequence the abrupt change to revealed religion, for the reason that he will not be able to perform what the intellect recognizes as fit and necessary. Accordingly, Clarke's metaphysical dogmatism is pursued by a moral scepticism, which declares that, perfect as the reason of things may be, the falsity of acting contrary to such a standard is not sufficient to deter men from vice, because its pursuit is often accompanied by pleasure and profit, while pain and calamity may follow upon virtue.

'This alters the case, and destroys the practice of that which appears so reasonable in speculation, and introduces the necessity of rewards and punishments' (ib. 60).

This apparent lapse into hedonism was really an appeal to the idea of future rather than present happiness, as will become evident from the following plea:

'It is neither possible nor reasonable that by adhering to virtue men should part with their lives, if thereby they deprive themselves of all possibility of receiving advantage from that adherence' (ib. 697).

The doctrine of future rewards was thus the connecting link between natural and revealed religion, for, on the side of the Deity, this idea was fundamental, since 'God by express declaration of His will in Holy Scripture has established and confirmed the original difference of things' (ib. 907).

While from the human standpoint the principle of reward and punishment is necessary as a motive to impel the will towards that which the understanding recognizes as right in itself.

Early in the field of natural religion, Shaftesbury (1709-1715) attempted an optimistic and aesthetical view of the world, which had something of that tendency towards pantheism which Deism ever betrayed. Shaftesbury uses the term 'Deist,' which he considers the 'highest of all names' (The Moralists, 1711, ii. 311), and more strenuous methods of rights and reason were foreign to his thought. The leading motive with Shaftesbury seems to be that of harmony within and without; to perceive this harmony constitutes religion, to promote it is the chief concern of morality. On the ethical side, he pursues the idea of harmony in connexion with his analysis of human nature, which is supposed to evince three tendencies: natural affections which tend to public good; self-affections which lead to private benefit; and unnatural ones which are harmful both to self and to society. To these, conscience or the moral-sense is added (ib. ii. 98, 119).

The nature of virtue is such as to relate man to the world as a whole; hence, as Shaftesbury says, 'If any creature be destroyed, unless it be destroyed with respect to the universal system' (ib. 20).

Furthermore, he speaks of virtue as 'proportional affection' (ib. 40), while he asserts that the affection of a creature towards the good or common nature is as proper or natural to him as it is to any organ, part, or member, that work in its known course and regular way of growth (ib. 78).

At the same time, the mind is called upon to perceive the harmony in the world without, for
virtue is impossible in a 'distracted universe' (ib. 735). He had realized that the systems of Shaftesbury and Clarke are in conflict; for, where Clarke sought to advance to the realm of revelation through the cracks in the natural order, Shaftesbury postulates a perfect world-order whose inner and outer harmony is in striking contrast to the distracted universe of the other system, and claims that without this the practice of virtue is in vain.

The influence of Clarke is to be observed in the most important of Deistic works, Deism as Old as the Creation; or the Gospel a Republication of the Law of Nature (1739), written by Matthew Tindal (1656-1738). [See art. DEISM, vol. iv. p. 537 f.]

The famous reply to Tindal and to Deism in general which Butler (1692-1752) framed in The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed (1738), was not so much opposed to or free from the exponent of perfect natural religion as ever optimistic; he thus contends that the imperfection attending revealed religion is one which natural religion is called upon to share, so that all that may be said in its favor is as a criticism of the other. Indeed, Butler's ethical pessimism and his armed resistance to it are the permanent results of his traditional system. In his ethical speculations, he utters an ever-memorable lament over conscience, when he says:

'Tis express myself with caution, lest I should be mistaken to vitiating reason; which is indeed the only faculty we have with which to judge concerning anything, even revelation itself' (ib. ch. iii. §1).

Butler's position, however, differs from that of the Deists, in that he is pessimistic where the exponent of perfect natural religion is ever optimistic; he thus contends that the imperfection attending revealed religion is one which natural religion is called upon to share, so that all that may be said in its favor is as a criticism of the other. Indeed, Butler's ethical pessimism and his armed resistance to it are the permanent results of his traditional system. In his ethical speculations, he utters an ever-memorable lament over conscience, when he says:

'Had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has residual authority, it would absolutely govern the world' (Serm. iii. 24).

and, when in the world he discovers 'infinite disorders,' he is still able to postulate a theory of the moral government of God, the actual operation of which in the present immanent condition of things is manifest as a 'tendency' (Analogy, I ch. iii. §§ 4-5). [Cf. art. BUTLER.]

The decline of Deism is to be noted in Thomas Morgan and Bolingbroke. Morgan is of historical value in connecting Clarke with the controversy, for it was from Clarke that he derived his Deism. In speaking of the famous expression, 'the reason of things,' Morgan says:

'I mean the same thing by it that Dr. Clarke does; while he grounds the whole of natural religion upon this principle' (The Moral Philosopher, 1738, iii. 311).

Morgan further reveals the influence of natural rights, for he criticized the Mosaic law in the light of the Grotian jus naturale, and expressed Jenzel's attitude towards Elijah after he had slain the idolaters of Ahab by saying: 'She thought this method contrary to the law of nature and nations' (ib. iii. 314). Bolingbroke began to cast suspicion upon the authenticity of natural religion by searching for evidence of it in history. The Hobbesian status naturalis he regarded as a condition of the world in which man was, not irrational, but 'artless'; when he searches this native condition of mankind for traces of the religion of Nature, he can only say:

'It cannot be proved without the help of the Old Testament, nor very well with it, that the unity of God was the primitive belief of Mankind. I must think it sufficiently established that the first and great principle of natural theology could not fail to be discovered as soon as men began to contemplate themselves and all that surrounded them (ib. 203). A glance at the ancient Egyptian religion, the worship of the Chinese, and the faith of King Solomon would suggest the possibility of this.

With the application of history to the scheme of natural religion the end of Deism begins; at the same time, the rationalistic force of the Deistic argument began to lessen, as is shown by the appearance of Dodwell's Christianity not Founded upon Argument (1742). With no theory of knowledge to guide him, Dodwell assumed the standpoint of intuition, or religious consciousness, whereas he was able to offer Deism a refutation by saying, 'There is no medium between believing and not believing' (op. cit. 6). With the actual content of religion as the basis of his argument, Dodwell turned tepid and compromise (ib. 27). Dodwell's work, which constantly touches the fringe of a genuine philosophy of religion, was of great importance as a human document, while it amounted to little as a controversial production, for the reason that it took a stand against both Deism and orthodoxy; Dodwell himself seems to have possessed something of the humanism of both Lessing and Rousseau, while his particular mood was one of mysticism.

The complete downfall of Deism was due to the scepticism of Hume (1711-1776), who applied the rationalism of his fellow-countrmen the results of natural empiricism, in the work of Herbert of Cherbury. [See art. DEISM, vol. iv. p. 537 f.]

Another attack upon reason in religion was made by Rousseau, while the historical context of his work was emphasized by Voltaire in his Essai sur les moeurs des nations (1768). [See further, art. ENCYCLOPEDISTS.] Deism in Germany was organized by H. S. Reimarus (1694-1768) in his Wahrheiten der naturlichen Religion (1734). Lessing (1725-1781) was involved in the religious controversy, and in so far assumed the rôle of a Deist; but his humanism and sense of historical values saved him from being submerged in the tremendous waters of natural religion. His attempt at a philosophy of revelation was made in his book, Die Erziehung des Menschenge schlechts (1780). In addition to the opposition to the static philosophy of the Enlightenment, the late 18th cent. began to emphasize the thought of: —an idea wholly alien to the speculations and political ideals of the period. Bodin (1530-1597) had attempted this problem in his philosophy of rights; Vico (1646-1744) introduced it into his Scienza nuova (1725); Targot expressed it more definitely in his Les Progres successifs de l'esprit humain (1759). The rationalistic method of the Enlightenment, which had boasted rational faith in the concrete conception of things, was set at naught by Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft. In spite of its blind
faith in what is called 'Nature,' the Enlightenment had the advantage and performed the service of emanicipating the human spirit from the trammels of dogma; for, it laid the foundation for philosophy in things necessary in themselves and universal in their application, as appears most convincingly in its systems of rights and religion. The enthusiasm is at this very antipode of the Enlightenment, which glorified the static and rationalistic where the present upholds the dynamic and realistic.

See also art, ENSCHENIUS, GOETHE, SCHILLER, RENAISSANCE, ROMANTICISM.


CHARLES GRAY SHAW.

ENTHUSIASM.—The word ἐνθυσία (1) is of relatively late origin. The only term in the earlier Greek vocabulary that could be used to denote a condition of psychical excitement or inordinate exaltation was μανία, a word of very general connotation. It is characteristic of the Greeks that they spoke even of the 'madness' of poets, corresponding to the more precise μανικια των ρωμαίων of the Romans. Subsequently the word μανία was sometimes used in the same sense, and the term 'intoxication,' therefore, is not to be literally interpreted. Intoxication emanating from Dionysus, the god who incarnates himself in wine; and, accordingly, the μανία αἰδών, the guerdon of Orphic mystics in the other world (cf. A. Dieterich, Ἀγκυρα, Leipzig, 1893, p. 80, note), really signifies their final union with the deity, and is thus, as we shall see, identical with an eternal enthusiasm. We find mention likewise of an intoxication in which the poet creates his work—an idea which is connected in a special way with ἀρετή, the most impassioned of the Greek legends; legend even tells us that, while he was still young, Dionysus appeared to him and kindled in him the fire of poetic creation (Atheneus, 229). Ἀρετή is the key-note to us, but it uses the verb ἐνθυσάμεθα in intimate connexion with ἑαυτῷ (frg. Ἑρακλ. 558 [Nauck]); then comes Ἐρυθρείς (Troades, 1844), with whom ἐνθυσάμεθα virtually means 'to ravish.' The earliest use of the substantive ἐνθυσάμεθα, with its doublet ἑνθυσίας, occurs in Plato; and the correlative idea operates largely in his writings. But even the root from which these various forms are derived, viz. ἐνθεος, with its corresponding verb ἑνθυσαίεσθαι, 'to be enraptured,' is not found, so far as we know, before the 5th cent. B.C., the earliest instances of its usage being respectively ἄρετή, ἑρυθραία, ὁμοῦ τεθρόνει, and ἑρυθραία, ἑρετικός, I, 63.

It can hardly be doubted that these terms came into use with the rise of the Mysteries and the spread of prophecy, for here the idea of a union with deity that exalts the favoured ones above all earthly things is pronounced part; when the deity enters into a man, the resultant state is enthusiasm. The word ἐνθρόνος, which occurs in Proclus, in Timaeus, 1, 64, 14, 23, and other writings, is used to denote 'being enthroned by a god on oneself' (Roaioi, Dict. týmων. de la langue grecque, Heidelberg, 1907 ff., p. 254). The term

1 The present article is intended merely to trace the origin and ethical content of the (Greek) term; cf. further Korrer and Ebstein (Religious) for the part that 'enthusiasm' had played in religion.
true reality, but only a few are able to summon up the remembrance thereof. Those who were devoted, however, hold themselves aloof from the ordinary pursuits of life, and, uniting themselves with God, are reviled by the multitude as mad, while, as a matter of fact, they dwell apart in the enthusiastic state. In Plato's judgment, accordingly, enthusiasm is the medium of a direct intuition of the Divine—a vision which is granted to the philosophers alone (Phaedr. 249 C).

Their vices, however, are grounded with popular ideas, reappear in Plutarch (Zeller, op. cit. v. 179 ff., with relevant quotations). According to Plutarch's exposition, when the soul is in a state of enthusiasm, it receives immediate intimations from God; upon enthusiasm, indeed, rests all higher revelation. The more effectively the soul represses its own activities, preserves its tranquility, and frees itself from the sensuous, the more delicate becomes its receptive faculty; and consequently the best medium of Divine revelation is sleep or an abstentious life. The intimations of the gods are conveyed to the soul by demons, while material agencies, such as the vapors of the Pythian grove, may also avail, with the consent of the gods and the aid of demons, to induce the enthusiastic state. Enthusiasm always comes spontaneously, and the suddenness of the illumination is the distinguishing characteristic of the whole phenomenon.

Plutarch defines enthusiasm as an affective state (πάθος) of the soul, but Aristotle had characterized it more precisely as a παθός peculiar to the psychical ethos (Pol. viii. 35). The special power of inducing the enthusiastic condition is ascribed by Aristotle to the music of Olympus (loc. cit.)—a view that suggests other related phenomena. In ancient Hellas an important factor in orgiastic celebrations was boisterous music (cf. e.g. Eurip, Bacch. 126 ff.), which was regarded, no doubt, as a means of exciting emotion, just as it forms an accompaniment to ecstatic actions among the less civilized races of to-day. The Greeks could not but feel, however, that the music of the orgies was of a barbaric kind. Their own music was always marked by the quality of dignified repose, and did not naturally lend itself to the expression of joy, or pain, or enthusiasm (Gevaert, Hist. et théorie de la musique de l'antiquité, Ghent, 1857-58, i. 37 ff.).

The power of producing enthusiasm was associated with the Phrygian and Lydian modes and with the music of the old Muses (cf. Plut., Moral. ii. 1), and very likely the Phrygian and Lydian modes have the explanation of the above reference to the music of Olympus. It would seem, moreover, that the Aristotelian school were specially interested in investigating the influence of music upon the emotions; for, apart from Aristotle's own disquisitions in Pol. viii., we hear of a work by Theophrastus, 'On Enthusiasm,' in which, according to frag. 57 (Wimmer), the effects of music were discussed. The subject was, of course, one of special importance, as music was a leading element in ancient education (Arist. loc. cit.).

At the close of the classical period of philosophy stands the imposing figure of Plotinus, in whose writings, as in those of his pupils, the terms τοῦθα and τὸ κατὰ πάντα play a great part (cf. Diehl in the Index to Proclus, in Timæus, iii. 425; Proclus, in Irenæus, ed. Kroll, Leipz., 1801, ii. 440). But it is quite evident that 'for Plotinus the union of the human soul with τὸ κατὰ πάντα properly means its separation from the body, and thus implies the concept of an ecstatic mind of disembodied being at all.'

LITERATURE.—This is indicated in the article.

1. RADERMACHER.

ENTHUSIASTS (Religious).—This article deals with certain teachers of religion, who have believed themselves to be directly inspired by God to impart new truth. They may be classified according to their attitude to previous revelation. Some have appealed to it as the basis of their teaching; others have forsaken it, and have based their teachings upon the Bible or other sacred writings; while a third group have denied the authority of any such written standard. The first group of enthusiasts, in their literature, frequently concentrating on apocalyptic, or interpreting on special lines—as the Catholic Apostolic Church. Others, in supplementing existing revelations, tend to supersede them—as Muslims and Mormonism. Enthusiasts believe in one God, and hold themselves to be in such close touch with God that they do not value previous prophecy; of such are the Bábís. Thus not all the new theologies are imitable; Muggleton, Swedenborg, and Adam and Eve have had no followers. In every case, however, enthusiasts believe inspiration to be generally diffused. All these classes of theological Enthusiasts are treated separately; and the Hebrew Prophets, noblest of the type, will be dealt with in art. Prophecy (Hebrew).

1. Our study may begin with Christian prophecy, a phenomenon of great importance for some two centuries. From the first it was avowed that the prophet would not be a permanent feature in Christian life (1 Co 13), but meantime prophecy was a gift of Christ (Eph 4) to men and women (Ac 2), for the benefit of the Church and occasionally of outsiders (1 Co 14). Like their Jewish prototypes, the Christian prophets could use symbols (Ac 21); but, unlike the Greeks possessed with spirits of divination (Ac 16), they had their spirits under control (1 Co 14). In Greek circles there was clearly a sharp distinction between the one and the other, in some quarters (1 Th 5), and authoritative repudiation of some false prophets (1 Jn 4). A typical product of such Enthusiastic ministry is seen in the Apocalypse, with visions and predictions which yet, in their literary form, show manifest signs of elaborate study (cf. 1 Jn 1, 3). This book is the only one in the NT which puts forth explicit claims to inspiration (Rev 1, 22); but these were pitched very high, and were accompanied with orders for public reading (12), at once ensured acceptance, even outside Asia and its seven Churches.

Another specimen of an Enthusiast's work is the Shepherd, with its visions to Hermas, leading up to the coming of an angel, who imparted much information which the seer was told to commit to writing and circulate. Some of the more striking doctrines are the importance attached to guardian angels (Mand. 6) and the elaboration of the terms of salvation; baptism is the means of forgiveness (Sim. 9), and sins after baptism can be forgiven only once made (1 Cor. 11). The Church have their opportunity by the preaching of the apostles and teachers when they themselves died; but, even then, baptism in Hades is necessary (Sim. 11). Sins are carefully classified (9-12), and ways of supererogation allowed (5). Great stress is laid on the doctrine of the Church, and the risk arising from false prophets is frankly recognized (Mand. 11). This tendency became more pronounced with Ignatius, who hoped that God might reveal something to him (Eph. 20); but he pointed emphatically to a new path when he claimed that the preaching of the Spirit prompted the message (Phil. 7): 'Do nothing without the bishop.'

2. The conflict foreshadowed in 3 John came to a head on the uplands of Asia Minor, when the Montanists objected to the new officialism. They claimed that for generations they had not lacked inspired prophets; and the revelations that came from their leaders were akin to Biblical prophecy and apostolic. Others believed themselves to be in such close touch with God that they do not value previous prophecy; of such are the Bábís. Thus not all the new theologies are imitable; Muggleton, Swedenborg, and Adam and Eve have had no followers. In every case, however, enthusiasts believe inspiration to be generally diffused. All these classes of theological Enthusiasts are treated separately; and the Hebrew Prophets, noblest of the type, will be dealt with in art. Prophecy (Hebrew).
about A.D. 178, some bishops hardly appeared to advantage; the Montanists thereupon rallied all the conservatives throughout the Empire, with the combined appeal for separation from the world to high and low, and protested against the mere word or letter of prophecy. For a generation they held their place within the general federation of churches, but at Rome and at Carthage the prophets were obliged to yield way, leaving the office to perfect the machinery of the Great Church. After the days of Zephyrinus and Tertullian, Montanism shrank to the dimensions of a mere local sect, almost negligible; even its Chrysogon the succession of the prophets ceased. [Cf. art. MONTANISM.] Henceforward, in the West, all claims to direct inspiration were steadily discredited by the orderly instinct of Rome, and until the disruption of the 16th cent. all evensense was speedily checked.

3. A few cases may be noted. Towards the end of the 12th cent. arose Joachim of Fiore, in Calabria, who won the ear of four successive Popes, until a new religious order was sanctioned, and his writings were widely read. He taught that the age of the Spirit would begin with A.D. 1290, and he sketched in detail the events of the sixty years preceding. Starting from the Apocalypse, he and his many disciples set up a new age and a new kingdom. The Franciscan order was permeated with his views, and, when it divided, the Spirituals clung to them; with their suppression, and the obvious failure of Joachim's predictions, the school died a natural death. A Lombard enthusiast, Wilhelmina 'of Bohemia,' claimed to be an incarnation of the Spirit to save the Jews, Saracens, and false Christians; her sect was exterminated soon after her death in A.D. 1321. In Thuringia, A.D. 1360, from the midst of the Flagellants (q.v.) came Conrad Schmid, an incarnation of Enoch, who founded the Brethren of the Cross; the Inquisition prevented the unfolding of a constructive programme. Among the Taborites, prophets appeared who foretold the speedy end of the age, and incited to war in order to clear the way for the reign of Christ. This intensified the resolve of the authorities to nip all such movements in the bud, and they burned Hans Döhn, who in A.D. 1476 claimed a commission from the Virgin Mary. Savonarola's claims to angelic visions won him great popularity, till he flitched from the demands of his admirers and his order of fire. The Alumbados of Spain, professedly holding intercourse with the Lord and with the Virgin, were equally put down; even Teresa of Castle was viewed askance, and her writings were severely censured. But their influence was more than a practical religion, more than with theology, and side with the Counter-Reformation.

4. The Hussite levies showed striking results in A.D. 1521. At Zwickau, midway between Prague and Eisleben, dwelt a Silesian weaver Nicholas Storch, who had apparently lived among the Taborites. When he was hacked by Thomas Müntzer, an educated Saxon sent by Luther, he soon joined into a prophet. Luther having disappeared after the Diet of Worms, Storch went to Wittenberg, and convinced the leaders of the reality of his mission. Luther hastily returned, and admeted his claims, and forbidding a miracle to substantiate Storch's claims. The latter withdrew to Silesia and Southern Germany, dying at Munich in 1525, accepted on all hands as inspired, though he killed Luther's addendum that it was Satan who inspired him. Meanwhile Müntzer went to Prague, and announced the dawn of the new dispensation, with the redress of all social grievances. Returning to Saxony, he initiated a communist system, which he declared to be Divinely ordered. Banished by Luther's influence, he spread his views in Nürnberg and Swit-zerland, and then returned to Mühlhausen, through districts where the Peasants' War was raging. Here he convinced them of his mission, so that their social programme was backed by the conviction that it was dearen word or letter of this prophet. With the massacre of Frankenhausen in 1525, Müntzer died, and the first phase of this prophetic movement ended, Hans Hut confining himself to mere exposition of the Apocalypse in his book on the Seven Seals.

5. A leather-dresser from Swabia, Melchior Hoffmann, was teaching east of the Baltic; then in 1528, at Helm, he published a short Exhortation to his Livonian Converts, containing an application of Dn 12; and he proceeded to calculate the end of the age, which he fixed for 1533. From Sweden he worked through Denmark and Friesland to Strassburg, where he arrived in 1529. Here he devoted himself further to exposition of the Apocalypse, expanding the idea that the few years left were the period of the Two Witnesses. Presently joined by his chief apostle, Leonhard Storch, and Ursula Jost, he himself became Elijah, the inspired interpreter. Driven out from the city, he toured through the Netherlands and Westphalia, quite transforming the northern Anabaptist movement. The Franciscan order was permeated with his views, and, when it divided, the Spirituals clung to them; with their suppression, and the obvious failure of Joachim's predictions, the school died a natural death. A Lombard enthusiast, Wilhelmina 'of Bohemia,' claimed to be an incarnation of the Spirit to save the Jews, Saracens, and false Christians; her sect was exterminated soon after her death in A.D. 1321. In Thuringia, A.D. 1360, from the midst of the Flagellants (q.v.) came Conrad Schmid, an incarnation of Enoch, who founded the Brethren of the Cross; the Inquisition prevented the unfolding of a constructive programme. Among the Taborites, prophets appeared who foretold the speedy end of the age, and incited to war in order to clear the way for the reign of Christ. This intensified the resolve of the authorities to nip all such movements in the bud, and they burned Hans Döhn, who in A.D. 1476 claimed a commission from the Virgin Mary. Savonarola's claims to angelic visions won him great popularity, till he flitched from the demands of his admirers and his order of fire. The Alumbados of Spain, professedly holding intercourse with the Lord and with the Virgin, were equally put down; even Teresa of Castle was viewed askance, and her writings were severely censured. But their influence was more than a practical religion, more than with theology, and side with the Counter-Reformation.

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the last propaganda work from Münster was Rothmann's book, *A wholly consolatory Witness of the Voice of the Living God in the Christian Ages*, etc. Early in the New Year, King Jan issued a code of law, closing with the claim, 'The voice of the living God has instructed me that this is a command of the All Highest.' To the end, he was believed in and obeyed; but the city was captured, and all the inhabitants were massacred. So closed the most remarkable of all the medieval Enthusiastic movements.

The whole movement did not die out at once, for ten years later Calvin published a tract Against the fanatical and furious Sect of the Libertines who call themselves Spiritual. His version was that they deemed themselves appointed to usher in the last dispensation, that of Elijah or the Spirit, when every Christian should have direct revelation, and the dead letter of Scripture would be discarded to have a double meaning. Calvin also accused them of teaching that there was no outward law and no principle of evil, for every believer was identified with God.

8. More lasting was the movement inaugurated by Jan van Riezen, 1169-1640. He had hitherto been a Roman Catholic; at Amsterdam he had met Anabaptists and declined to associate with them; but he now received a revelation to establish Emden as a prophetic, and publish three Divine communications: 'For this purpose have I borne thee on My heart from thy youth, for a house for Me to dwell in.' For twenty years he carried on a quiet propaganda with three compeers, constantly pointed out to him, Daniel, Elidad, and Tobias; then he was driven out, and worked in England and up to Cologne. A fourth revelation came in 1565, largely concerned with the organization of his followers; but it led to their doubting his inspiration. Apart from a most elaborate framework for the Family of Love, and a decided opposition to Lutheranism, the chief peculiar theological tenet was that 'there are some now living which do fulfill the law in all points.' Niclaes died in 1579, leaving no prophetic successor, but in 1606 the English adherents appealed to King James for toleration, repudiating all sympathies with the Puritans, insisting that they valued the Scriptures and believed in salvation through Christ Jesus the only Saviour, on repentance and newness of life. Two years later, Henry Argent, an Anabaptist, attempted to refute the *Epistle to Two Daughters* of Warwick. Yet they held on, only disappearing after 1645, when an outburst of new revelations attracted Englishmen susceptible to such influences, and left the Family of Love to wither away. There seems to be no more recent study than F. Lippold's, in *Zeitschr. f. d. hist. Theol.*, Gotha, 1892.

9. Britain was slower than the Continent to evolve prophets, but about 1633 Arise Evans began his career with warnings to King Charles that he and the kingdom were doomed. For a second message, two years later, he was imprisoned. When the Civil War broke out, he received a revelation to uphold the Established Church, and therefore attacked the General Baptists; they challenged his inspiration, and he offered a prophetic vindication to be repeated in a written work. He was not yet confirmed in his, and he continued to admonish the ruling powers, but met no acceptance.

10. Another isolated prophetess was Anna Trappel, who worked on her career about 1573, and joined the Anabaptists. She proved herself active in 1650. After the dissolution of the Nominated Parliament, three books of her prophecies were speedily published, and for a year before the death of Cromwell she was again active. She went into trances, and spoke in rude rhyme so fast that she could hardly be reported, calling herself the poor Instrument, or the Voice. The burden of the new teaching was that Christ would return and reign as the 35 times were fulfilled. No organization resulted from her work. The most recent study of her is in the *English Historical Review* for July 1911. More successful were the Muggeltonians, and, a century later, the Southcottians; for these see the separate articles.

11. Meantime fresh prophets arose on the Continent. J. W. Petersen, a Lutheran dignitary, devoted himself to apocalyptic interpretations, and, with his wife and another lady, announced new revelations, which seem to have contained nothing fresh except the modification of a dogma of Hoffmann, that Christ had a double human nature—one eternal, the other originating with the Virgin. Though Petersen spent half a long life publishing, his death in 1727 showed that no effect had been produced; and equally unimportant were other prophets, from the German artistic class. Two Hermits who professed to be the Two Witnesses, and in their teachings revived the Gnostic idea that, while the soul was regenerated, the doings of the body did not influence the judgment of the soul. For all these, consult Hagenbach, *Hist. of the Church in the 18th Century* (Eng. tr., N. Y. 1869).

12. In Russia an old inheritance from the Paulicians of Armenia first reappeared, and the sect is the Khlysti (Flagellants), followers of a man who in 1645 proclaimed: 'I am the God announced by the prophets, come down on earth the second time for the salvation of the human race, and there is no God but Me.' They held, however, that a succession of Christs has been maintained ever since, elevation to this rank being by perfect surrender to the influence of the Spirit, who subdues the flesh. Their prophets produce much prophesying, and, as they are expressly forbidden to write, lest inspiration be tampered with, they have made no permanent addition to dogma. As a reaction from them, about 1770, arose the Skoptsi ('Castrators'), founded by one who declared himself God incarnate: they are strongly chiliasm, and look for the return of Christ when their number reaches 144,000; the sealing into this number consists of castrations. For these and similar sects, see Leroy-Beaulieu, *Empire of the Tears* (Eng. tr., N. Y. 1893-5, vol. ii.), The most important of the movements in central and north Europe are the Shakers and the Muggeltonians, both of whom have spread beyond the country of origin (see separate articles).

13. The Convulsionist outgrowth of the Jansenists at Paris left no mark in theology; nor is it otherwise with the Covenants Prophets (see CAMISARDS). But the latter are responsible for the Manchester movement of the Wardleys, and Ann Lee, 'Bride of the Lamb,' who migrated to America and founded the Shakers (q. v.). These are not to be confounded with an English body founded in 1864 by Mary Anne Gilting, who gave herself out as the final revelation of God. Her teachings dealt chiefly with conduct, inculcating celibacy and communism. The most singular dogma was her own immortality, and her death in 1886 ruined these second Shakers, who had styled themselves 'Children of God'. About the same time the 'New and Latter House of Israel' was organized in Kent by James White, whose revelations are published in the *Flying Roll*. The most remarkable point is that Christ redeemed souls only to a limited extent; bodies underwent a period before the appearance of the Mosaic Law, and at Christ's appearing, 144,000 of these will greet Him and reign with Him. An enormous unfinished building near Gillingham is the chief relic of these Jereselites. More lasting has been the Catholic Apostolic Church (see
ENTHUSIASTS (Religious), springing out of a movement at Port Glasgow in 1829; while the proceedings of Prince and Smyth-Pigott have not yet destroyed the Socinian Agapeonome (q.v.). Far more influential recent enthusiasts are the followers of two remarkable Americans, Joseph Smith and Mary Baker Glover Eddy, for which see articles MONISM and CHRISTIAN SCIENCE, though the latter does not emphasize the point that the system came by revelation; as to which see Science and Health, p. 34, line 7; p. 109, line 20; p. 125, line 19.

(America has also been the home of other enthusiasts besides those just mentioned. The Amana Society (q.v.) is of German provenance, but the very small sect of Angel Dancers (q.v.) is purely American in origin, and, despite its evanescent character, it is not without interest psychologically as illustrating the rise of a sect based entirely upon enthusiasm. Ballou's curious 'American Bible,' Ourhope (q.v.) will be considered in a separate article on theology. In the Eastern States, the activity of Andrew Jackson Davis, the 'Poughkeepsie Sage,' whose Principles of Nature, Her Divine Revelation, and a Voice to Mankind, published in 1845, marks the foundation of Spiritualism (q.v.) as a separate cult, must be considered as outside the realm of Christianity, though Jackson was not, like Ballou, directly hostile to it. He claimed to have received his inspiration, during a trance of sixteen hours, from inhabitants of the other world, and alleged communications from the departed spirits form a leading feature in all spiritualistic sciences. Within the sphere of Christianity mention should first be made of Mrs. Ellen G. White, the wife of James White already mentioned. She was bom in Portland, Maine, in 1827. Before her marriage, in 1846, she began to have 'visions,' at some of the phenomena manifested by her clearly being attributable to hysteria. To her was due in great part the rise of the sect of Seventh-Day Adventists, who in the earlier days believed her to possess the gift of prophecy, and who have always maintained that she received 'messages of instruction for the Church from time to time by the direct inspiration of the Holy Spirit.' The extent to which this sect holds this belief is shown by the fact that in 1863 a sub-sect, the Church of God (Adventist), was formed on the single new tenet of rejection of acknowledgment of Mrs. White's alleged inspiration. A still more remarkable phenomenon is afforded by the creation of the Church of the India Chosen in England by John Alexander Dowdie (1847-1907), a Scotsman by birth. He was for some years a Congregational minister in Australia; but at Melbourne, where he had established an 'independent' church, he became a believer in Divine healing through prayer. For several years he inculcated these tenets in the United States and Canada, and, finally, in 1896, he organized his new sect, assuming the title of 'prophet.' He was 'first Apostle' of his sect.

To the number of American enthusiasts must be reckoned Frank W. Sanford (b. at Bowdoin, Maine, 1802), who was for several years a Free Baptist minister in New England. At a convention of his denomination in 1855 he announced that he had received Divine revelations commanding him to preach to the whole world before the coming of the end. He accordingly founded at Shutesbury, the Holy Church of the United States, which holds most pronounced chiliasmic views, while Sanford himself claims to be Elijah. After having conducted a disastrous voyage to Africa, during which a number of his followers died from insufficient food and care, Sanford was convicted, 9 Dec., 1911, of causing the death of six of these persons, and was confined in a Government prison. A single case of this kind in the court is of psychological interest in this connexion:

'I said: 'Father, what next? What next, now that we have this company on board?" I received this answer — and I make this statement advisedly, knowing what I am doing — I received this answer: 'Continue.'

In the latter part of 1896 yet another enthusiastic sect sprang into existence, the Church of God and Saints of Christ (popularly known as 'Black Jews'). The founder was William S. Crowdy, a negro who had been a railway cook until he received a revelation as 'a prophet of God sent to the whole world.' The new sect for a time made a profound impression on the negroes who attended its services, where even the local preachers were termed 'prophets.' The 'bishop', or 'prophet' (at present Crowdy himself), 'is not elected, but holds his position by virtue of a divine call. He has received divine visions and other manifestations from the Deity, to utter prophecies by the will of God, and to perform miracles. On his death the prophetic office lapses until a new vision appears' (Special Census Report [1906], Religious Bodies, ii. 292, Washington, 1910.)

14. All the Enthusiasts yet mentioned arose in a Christian setting. In the second half of the 19th cent., however, another development is to be noted. In the late 1850's and early 1860's there was an upsurge of interest in Spiritualism in England, followed by the emergence of the American Theosophical movement in 1875, which has persisted until the present day. Its adherents believe that the Christian revelation was only a first approximation to the truth, and hold that the spirit of Jesus still lives and works in the world, though in a hidden way. The Theosophical Society, of which H.P. Blavatsky was the leading spirit, was founded in 1875. The teachings of this movement have been much criticized, both for their gullibility and for their influence on other spiritualistic movements. In the 1890's, for example, there was a revival of interest in Spiritualism in America, and a number of sects and movements were founded. The most notable of these was the Spiritualist Church of the United States, founded in 1899 by William S. Crowdy, a negro railway cook. Crowdy claimed to have received a revelation as 'a prophet of God sent to the whole world,' and his followers were known as 'Black Jews.' They were especially popular in the South, where they believed that the Messiah would soon appear, and that the Jews would be restored to their land. The movement declined in the early 20th century, but it has persisted to the present day.
ENVIRONMENT (Biological)

authorized edition within three years of his death, and a revised Qur'an sixteen years later has proved final for the Sunnite sect, now the most influential. The transliteration of the Qur'an to the Arabic alphabet, in which the views of hereditary right were common, produced a schism soon after the Prophet's death, and the Shi'ites are legitimists not only in politics but in theology, holding that the hereditary succession of Muhammad is inspired. Three times this has had important results, with the Sufis, the Assassins, and the Babis (qq.v.).


W. T. WHITLEY.

ENVIRONMENT (Biological).—For the biologist the problems raised by the term 'environment' are largely concerned with the part this factor or collection of factors may play in the process of evolutionary change. To what extent can the changes of breeding among individuals in the conditions under which they live; and, if such changes occur, how far can they become permanent? That a definite change in the nature of the environment—temperature, moisture, food supply, or some other factor—will frequently bring about a change in the organism is beyond dispute. But whether the impress left on the organism can be transmitted to the next generation—whether so-called 'acquired characters' can be inherited—has been, and still is, a subject of keen controversy.

In his theory of evolution, put forward in 1809, Lamarck laid it down as one of his laws that the former production of any change in the environment during the life of the organism and corresponding transmission to the offspring; and during the next half century, in so far as the doctrine of evolution was accepted, it was accepted on this basis. By the publication of his Origin of Species in 1859, Darwin introduced another factor to account for evolutionary change, and the acceptance of 'natural selection' released the evolutionist from the burden of ascribing all specific differences to the direct action of the environment on the living thing. Darwin, however, remained to some extent a follower of Lamarck. Without variations upon which to work, natural selection cannot be effective in producing evolutionary change. As to the origin of such variations he did not venture upon any general statement, holding that in some cases they might be brought about by the direct action of a changed environment, and in others they must be attributed to some innate tendency on the part of the organism to vary, due to causes of which we are quite ignorant. Nevertheless, he did use one among his followers. Having once again to state his opinion, that a change in the conditions of life led to modification through the increased use or disuse of certain parts or organs, and that these modifications were accentuated and gradually rendered permanent through a continuous process of selection.

As an example may be taken the relatively smaller size of the wing structures, with their lessened powers of flight, in domesticated fowls, rats, and pigeons, which Darwin considered to have been directly initiated through the effects of disuse consequent upon a change of environment, and ultimately exaggerated and fixed by long-continued selection.

As compared with Lamarck on the one hand, and most modern biologists on the other, Darwin may be said to have held an intermediate position. For Lamarck the increased use or disuse of organs consequent upon a changed environment was the only source of variation, and therefore the sole factor in the transformation of species. For Darwin there were two classes of heritable variation—variations arising through increased use or disuse, and variations arising spontaneously in the organism through causes not understood, though in either case the co-operation of natural selection was necessary to bring about a permanent change in form. Cf. art. EVOLUTION (Biological).

More recently the tendency among biologists has been to define the term 'modification acquired by the individual through change of environment during its lifetime. This was largely brought about through the teaching of Weismann, who introduced a new conception of the relation of the reproductive tissues to the rest of the body. Hitherto this relation had been regarded as an alternating one. The germ-cells gave rise to the individual, and the individual in turn produced the germ-cells. Weismann introduced the idea of the continuity of the germ plasm through successive generations, and regarded the body, or soma, as an offshoot specialized for carrying and protecting the all-important germ plasm. By its formation the body is, as it were, side-tracked off the main course of evolution. Its chief function is that of a trustee for the germ plasm which it contains. Moreover, the germ plasm carried by a given body belongs to the same generation as the body itself, and is of equal age, both being the direct offshoot of the germ plasms carried in the bodies of the common parents. It is obvious that this conception of the relation between an individual and its contained reproductive tissue renders it difficult to conceive how a modification brought about by an environmental change in the latter can induce such a change in the former that, when it comes to a somatic offshoot, it will convey to it the impress of a modification just produced in a group of cells in which it lived but from which it was not derived. Weismann, therefore, challenged the evidence for the supposed transmission of 'acquired' characters, and showed that when critically examined it broke down. He also brought forward direct experimental evidence against the transmissibility of a definite group of acquired characters, and showed, from a long series of experiments on mice, that mutilations are not in the least degree inherited.

Nevertheless, heritable variations are continually arising in animals and plants, and it is in the fact of such variations that Weismann's views differed from those earlier current. For Weismann, the germ plasm transmits heritable variation in the germ plasm, and not in the soma by which the germ plasm was carried. Any new variation first arises through some abnormal occurrence in the germ plasm. It has not benefited from its own existence, and it is expressed in each of the sequence of somatic offshoots to which that germ plasm gives rise. Fresh variations can, on Weismann's view, be directly due to an environmental

1 For the ethical aspects, see Edocatio (Moralis), p. 216, and Ethics (Radnitzky), p. 429.

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The action of a changed environment on a living thing may induce a change either in the soma or in the germ plasm. But, even if both are affected, it does not necessarily follow that the changes are corresponding ones. The change in the germ plasm can, of course, be appreciated only if its formation is accompanied by a somatoplasm change, and this may present modifications differing from those shown by the antecedent soma, though the modifications in each case may have been brought about by the same environmental change. In the one case the change acts directly upon the somatoplasm, in the other it acts upon the germ plasm which transmits the effects of the stimulus to the soma that subsequently arises from it.

Discussions on the transmission of environmental changes frequently arise out of cases in which the developing young, as in mammals and plants, are parasite for a time upon the maternal parent. Decreased vigour may arise from unfavourable conditions of nutrition, often leading to an abnormal lack of vigour in the offspring, and this has sometimes been held to show that the direct effect of altered conditions on the parental organism is transmitted to the next generation. For example, two similar plants may be taken, of which one is grown under favourable, and the other under unfavourable, conditions. The seeds of both are collected and grown under similar conditions, and it is found that those derived from the latter plant give rise to less vigorous offspring than those derived from the former. In such cases it is as if a quality overlooked that the relation of the parent to the offspring is twofold. Not only does the parent carry the germ plasm from which the offspring arise, but at the same time it acts as the environment of the developing young. It is in the latter capacity that a modification in the parent following upon changed conditions brings about a modification in the offspring. The question is not one of the transmissibility of increased or decreased vigour from parent to offspring; it is simply a question of the direct effect of altered environment on the developing young.

Weissmann's views may be said to have met with general acceptance among biologists, though heretics, and indeed heathens, may be found in a few supporters of a somewhat modified form of Lamarckianism. Little further advance was made until the 20th cent., brought with it a fresh stimulus to experimental work on living things, and within the last few years the question of the inheritance of acquired characters has been re-opened, largely through the researches of Pzibram, Kammerer, and others. The experiments of the last-named were for the most part made with amphibia and reptiles, and are concerned principally with colour modifications or with modifications of the normal instincts resulting from a changed environment. In several such cases it is claimed that the modifications produced re-appear in the offspring even when they are reared under normal conditions. The possibility is not precluded that the germ plasm was altered simultaneously with, but independently of, the somatoplasm in the individuals used for experiment; and the results cannot be regarded as conclusive evidence for the transmission of acquired characters, unless it can be shown that they are reversible at will through the alteration of the environmental conditions. Though this has not yet been done, the experiments are full of suggestion, and there is reasonable hope that the work of the next decade will go far towards providing the answer to the old and much debated question of the inheritance of modification brought about by an alteration in the environment.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the writings of Lamarck and Charles Darwin, the following will be found useful to students: S. Butler, Life and Habit, London, 1877, also Evolution, Old and New, 1879; E. D. Cope, The Primary Factors of Life, 1874; H. H. Morgan, Experimental Zoology, London, 1897; A. Weissmann, The Germ Plasm (Eng. tr., 1903), also The Evolution Theory Theory of Enviroment. A succinct and illustrated account of the most recent experimental work is given in H. Przibram's Experimental Zoology, iii., 'Physogenesis,' Vienna, 1916. The most recent discussion from the Lamarckian standpoint will be found in R. Somon's Die Mamm., Leipzig, in the Fortniete der naturwissenschaft, Forschung, vol. ii., Vienna, 1911.

R. C. PUNNETT.

ENY AND EMULATION.—I. Envy.—Envy is an emotion that is essentially both selfish and malevolent. It is aimed at persons, and implies dislike of one who possesses what the envious man himself covets or desires, and a wish to harm him. Graspingness for self and ill-will lie at the basis of it. There is in it also a consciousness of inferiority to the person envied, and a chaining under this consciousness. He who has got what I envy is fitted to possess it of right, and I resent it. Consequently, I rejoice if he finds that his envied possession does not give him entire satisfaction—much more, if it actually entails on him dissatisfaction and pain. For instance, I see his superiors in my eyes, and ministers to my feeling of self-importance. As signifying in the envious man a want that is ungratified, and as pointing to a sense of impotence inasmuch as he lacks the sense of power which possession of the desired object would give him, envy is in itself a painful emotion, although it is associated with pleasure when misfortune befalls the object of it. As Dryden says:—

"Envy, that does with misery reside,

The joy and the revenge of ruin'd pride."
Great poets, like Shakespeare, know well how to represent this emotion in its nature, play, and offensiveness (see, e.g., Othello and Winter Night's Tale), and they mark its outward expression also, and elucidate it by similes. Says Chaucer, in "The Knight's Tale":

"Therewith the rage of jealousie spystete
When she him by the wriste, and by the herte
So woody, that he lyk was to bide the bote;
The bostree, or the ashen, dide and died the".

Jealousy seems to present some degree in the lower animals, as well as in man.

A favourite dog will be emotionally moved by the sight of its master fondling a kitten or another dog, but he sometimes danger him and last, as he will keep pushing himself forward to be caressed, with edifying glances at the kitten. Some very young children behave in a similar way when their mother nurses another child. And it was both cases the jealousy creature is apt, to exhibit anger towards the intruder (W. Mcnagall, "Intro. to Social Psychology", p. 129).

2. Emulation.—Very different from envy, though often taken as synonymous with it, is emulation. The latter is not, properly speaking, either selfish or unselfish, and it is not of the essence of it to be associated with hatred. It is characterized more by contrasts with envy than by similarities. It is an exhilarating emotion, drawing forth and strengthening the individual's capacity for action and achievement. Emulation, indeed, is, and has to be classed under the natural desire of superiority or power, but it is not selfish; it is compatible with generosity of character and good-will, which neither envy nor jealousy is. It stimulates the growth of the individual who is the object of the emulation, and invigorates our nature; and by the fact that there is in it an element of uncertainty (if not of hazard), it adds to the zest of life, as pursuit and enterprise in general do.

The emotion seems not to be confined to man, but is shared by the lower animals, as we see in the competition in racing between horses and the like; and it is intense in children, entering into many of their games.

Emulation must not be confused with ambition (q.v.). Ambition, too, reposes on the love of power, and, when nobly directed, is a valuable and laudable impulse. Having great things is simply an eager desire with effort to actualize it to rise in place or to increase in influence; and so far it is good. "To take a Soldier without Ambition," says Bacon, "is (to pull off his spurs" (Essays, "Of Ambition"). But if, as Plato represents it in the Republic, it be the dominance of the will over the reason, then it is inordinate desire, and is ready to make a wrong use of rivals or those that stand in the way, ignoring the fact that every man is an end in himself, and must not be treated simply as a tool. The ambitious man, we often say, has no conscience: at any rate, his conscience is subordinated to his own purpose, and he is entirely indifferent to rectitude. It is not well with us when our principle becomes, 'I must rise, whoever falls, and whatever be the means.'

"The evil consequences of ambition on character have been the theme of preachers and poets alike through the ages: 'by that sinne fell the Angels' (King Henry VIII., III. ii. 440).

3. Emulation degenerated.—Distinct though emulation is, there is an inordinate and self-seeking quality in the other. It is manly and proper to wish to excel in a race, and to strain every nerve to accomplish that end; but, when the runner, finding himself likely to be outstripped by his opponent, tries to outstrip him or to trip him up, that is emulation degraded to envy: honourable rivalry has been replaced by conduct that is dishonorable and mean.

"Emulation," says Butler (Serm. i. note 30), "is merely the desire and hope of equality with, or superiority over, others, with whom we compare ourselves, ... To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority is nothing amiss; but when the means are being brought down to our own level, or below it, it, I think, is the distinct notion which I mean. From whence we do not take the real end, which the natural passion emulation, and which the painful one envy, aim at is exactly the same; namely, that equality or superiority and consequent satisfaction. In truth envy is not the end of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end."

The lapse into envy brings its own nemesis. The envy of the envious man reacts upon himself: it is apt to bring him more pain than pleasure—as the common phrase has it, it 'gnaws his soul.'

4. Implication of society.—It only remains to add that the motions here considered—envy and jealousy, emulation and ambition—presuppose society; i.e., they could not exist except in a social environment or setting. They are essentially egoistic, insomuch as they centre in the self or ego, being concerned primarily with the individual's interest; but they are conditioned for their existence by the fact that there is an 'other' over against the individual, competing with him and possessing different and, it may be, antagonistic interests. They all imply relations to other human beings, and the conception of a pure 'individual'—of an isolated organism unit, absolutely divorced from every other conscious unit—is an absurdity: egoism (q.v.), in that sense, can be none.


Epictetus.—Epictetus (fl. c. a.d. 50-139) was a distinguished pupil of the Roman philosopher Musonius. Though not possessed of the originality or daring of his teacher, he has attained much greater fame through the fact that the substance of a great number of his discourses was preserved and published by his pupil Arrian. From the date of their first publication down to the present day these 'discourses of Epictetus' have enjoyed an extraordinary popularity; they have been many times translated into various European languages; and they constitute an authority of the first importance, both as to the teaching of the Stoic philosophy which Epictetus professed, and as to the social atmosphere of Rome in the 1st cent. A.D.

Epictetus was brought up as a slave in the house of Epaphroditus, a freedman of Nero, and presumably the same who became his secretary, remained faithful to him upon his fall, assisted him in his last hours, and was afterwards put to death by Domitian. Epaphroditus, a native of Cyprus, used to bring the slave, gave him the liberal education which was at that time the privilege of the humblest members of the great Roman household, and sent him as a young man to study under Musonius. He then
gave him his freedom, and Epicetus took up work on the philosophy of another popular philosopher. Young men from all parts of the Empire listened to his teaching, and men of rank and position sought his advice. In the year A.D. 89 he fell a victim to the edict against the philosophers, and was exiled from Rome and Italy; he withdrew to Nicopolis, and lectured there till his death in a ripe old age. The Emperor Trajan held him in special honour, and the records of his teaching is an important source of information. He had an influence on the youth of Marcus Aurelius.

Epicetus was well schooled in the orthodox teaching of the Stoic philosophy, and it has been shown that both in his principles and in his use of technical language he is loyal to it. It is, however, only with difficulty and by a careful rearrangement, of the material that a philosophical system can be deduced from his recorded utterances. Each of these is complete in itself, and it serves as its direct appeal to the conscience of his hearers. Thus the practical application of ethics outweighs all other parts of the philosophy, and, while there is constant repetition within this field, the rest of the system is only hinted at by casual allusions. The ethical principles of Epicetus are strongly coloured by the circumstances of the time. He argues that a political and personal freedom may be wanting, no man can be deprived of true freedom, which consists in pursuing virtue, the only good. Fortune has no power over the philosopher, because the things that she can give and take away are indifferent. The exercise of virtue consists in attention to the homely duties which result from human relationships, such as those of master and slave, parent and child, magistrate and citizen. In all his work, those qualities are fostered by the nearness of God, whose will he gladly obeys, and to whose decrees he is resigned. Epicetus holds up to our admiration the picture of the ideal Cynic, who, disdaining home or comfort for himself, becomes the servant of all, and enters every family to reconcile or to console; but he avoids the paradoxes in which the early Stoics and Cynics alike delighted, is gentle and reasonable in his teaching, and seldom engages in sharp controversy. He asserts his personal convictions most definitely in an uncompromising denial of the doctrine (towards which his hearers were strongly inclined) of the continuance of personality after death.

The discourses of Epicetus are so often considered typical of Stoicism that it is necessary to observe that he was Stoic with a difference. In temperment he had little in common with Zeno and Cleanthes, who were enthusiasts and revolutionaries; and hardly more with Panatius and the middle Stoics, who were gentlemen and statesmen. Epicetus, even when his position was the highest, was at heart a slave; his talents lay at the disposition of others. He accepted Stoicism at command; and in the same spirit he accepted the teaching. He held to its circumstances of his time. No man could be more precise in insisting upon the regular and contented performance of all actions approved by the general opinion; around these he threw the glow of a religious enthusiasm, which certainly enabled him to do wrong at the bidding of any earthly master, but at the same time predisposed him to consider as right any burden that others might lay upon him. Dionysius was undoubtedly anxious of ever having imagined that political danger could arise from such a philosopher.

The study of the discourses of Epicetus is an indispensable starting-point for true understanding of the teaching of St. Paul. Better than any work of antiquity they reveal to us the inner thoughts of the social circles to which the Apostle chiefly addressed himself. See, further, art. Stoicism.


E. V. ARNOLD.
show their great variety. Many were scientific treatises, some physical (περὶ φυσικῶν καὶ καταφυσικῶν ἱδιωτεύματα, τῇ τρίτῃ, τῇ τέταρτῃ, τῇ πέντῃ ἱδιωτεύματι, τῇ πρώτῃ ἱδιωτεύματι), others ethical (περὶ αἰρέσεων, περὶ μετάφρασεων, περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀρτικῶν, περὶ ἰδιώτου, περὶ γραφείου, περὶ τίτουλων), and one, the famous Κάρτων, dealt with the standards of truth in scientific treatises. Another, the standard treatise of Epicurus, was an attempt to explain and refute other than Epicurean tenets; e.g., the doctrine of 

### 2. The School

Our authorities are unanimous that there never was a more united school. The doctrine of the founder was passed on unaltered, and it is difficult to detect any material divergence from orthodoxy in the expositions of succeeding ages. Of the immediate disciples, three, Metrodorus (330-277 B.C.), Polyaenus, and Hermarchus, were not joined with Epicurus as the four pillars or standards of orthodoxy. Polyaenus had been an eminent mathematician; and Metrodorus had been a master in rhetoric; Leucippus had been a master in the art of speaking; but Epicurus, except once to spend six months at his old home, was the favourite and the most gifted. We have a list of fourteen works by Epicurus adduced from his disciples' letters of all last equal authority with the master's own. Several of them appear from the titles to have been controversial works; for even Metrodorus found his scientific activity limited by the very completeness and finality of the system which in his own time was committed to the master was incompatible with free inquiry, and in all succeeding generations Epicurus who wrote on philosophy at all were brought under the necessity of restating, or to expose and refute those who did not accept them. Metronius had a brother Timarchus. He was appointed to success which he refused, and then abandoned the faith—almost the only instance of a renegade in the annals of the school. It was a political opposition against this heresy which led him to write a long tract, a résumé of which is the standard of all that pertains to man's well-being—almost the only instance of which the enemies of the school were not slow to take advantage.

From Hermaprion, who succeeded Epicurus, the headship of the school passed to Metrodorus, who died in 277 B.C., and from him it passed to Metrodorus—first, and next to Baisidius; and then in unbroken succession for several centuries, though our information is so scanty that many of the names are to us known to nothing.

About 100 B.C. Zeno of Sidon, who is mentioned by Cicero, succeeded Apollonius (6 ephemerides), who was the author of some 400 treatises. Zeno was followed by Philostratus, whose successor, Patroclus, was head from 73 until after 50 B.C. But the most conspicuous Epicurean in the Roman society of that day was Philodemus of Gadara, tutor and guest of Piso, the consul of 67 B.C. His poetical skill is admitted by Cicero (in Pis. 32), and over thirty of his epigrams are included in the Anthologia Palatina. He was also a prolific prose writer; the Library of an Epicurean at Herculaneum contained works by him—περὶ συντάξεως, περὶ μετάφρασεως, περὶ ποιημάτων, περὶ τεχνείων, περὶ σωτηρίας, περὶ θεωρήσεως, περὶ εἰρήνης, περὶ συγγραφής, περὶ ἀθέσεως. From him it passed to Psuetus and on to Sallust, and then in unbroken succession for several centuries, though our information is so scanty that we know nothing of the names.

3. Philosophy and its divisions. As a child of his age, Epicurus emphasized the importance of conduct, defining philosophy as 'a daily business of speaking and thought to ensure a happy life.' The loss of national independence and the decay of civic life are often alleged as causes why the later Greek philosophy became more and more practical, and the later Epicureanism became more and more prosaic; but this change of direction had set in long before, with the Sophists and the Stoics. The older physicists sought knowledge for its own sake; Epicurus and his school sought it as a means to happiness.

If we had never been molested by alarms at celestial and atmospheric phenomena, he says, 'or by the misgivings that death somehow affects us, or by neglect of the proper limits of pains and desires, we should have had no need to study natural science' (Diog. Laert. x. 145). And again, 'Vain is the discourse of that philosopher by whom no human suffering is heeded' (Porphyry, ad Marcellum, xxxv. p. 200, 23 [Nanke], br. 221 [Cicero]). By these and similar utterances he attests the predominance of the practical aim, and by implication places some limitations to the theoretical part of physical inquiry. We must study Nature because we ourselves are part of it, and, until we have gained some acquaintance with the whole, we shall neither understand our relations to it, or learn what conditions our happiness, or avoid the prosecution; but this change of direction had set in long before, with the Sophists and the Stoics. The older physicists sought knowledge for its own sake; Epicurus and his school sought it as a means to happiness.
Democritus (q.e.), to whom he stands in much the same relation as the Atomists to Heraclitus. To him the value of the discoveries of the Atomists lies in their utility; they free us from the errors of popular belief and false philosophy. Thus they are directly subversive to a hasty life. Philosophy had been divided into Logic, Physics, and Ethics; but the great mass of logical doctrine was rejected by Epicurus as superfluous. Like men of science in more recent times, he wished to concern himself not with words but with things. However, besides Physics and Ethics, he recognized what he called Canonie, a study of the standard, or canon, of truth. The aim of this study was to convince us that our knowledge of Nature is trustworthy. It was not so much an independent division of the system as—what it is sometimes called—an appendix or special part of Physics (accessio naturalis partis, [Sen. Ep. 89, 11]).

4. Physics.—(a) General principles.—The two epistles mentioned above, the epistle to Herodotus and that to Pythocles, are the most trustworthy sources for Epicurean physics. Like all his Ionic predecessors, he makes his axiom that matter is indestructible. Nothing can arise out of that which is not; nothing which actually exists can be altogether annihilated. Moreover, the sum-total of things was always such as it is not now, and can never be. For there remains nothing into which it can change, since outside the sum of things there is nothing that could enter into it and bring about the change. The whole of being, then, consists of bodies and space. Experience through sense attests the existence of bodies, and without sense (τέτοιον) which we also call an intangible existence (δείκτης φαινεται), vacuum (εύκολον), or room (φέρεσιν)—the motion of bodies, which is so imperceptible, is seemingly conceivable. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing—no tertium quid—which can be conceived to exist, so long, that is, as we fix our attention upon wholes or separate things, in contradistinction to the qualities, whether essential or accidental, which belong to things. But a distinction must be drawn between those bodies which are composite and those which are simple. The former are unions of particles—unions which can be again dissolved; the latter, the particles of matter themselves, must be unchangeable and indivisible (hence their name, ἄρτιος, ἄρτσας). All apparent differences have to be reconstructed, the alternate uniting and separating of such ultimate indestructible particles. The All, or sum of things, is by its very notion infinite. For, if finite, it must be bounded by a something outside it, which is inconsistent with the notion of the All. It is infinite, not only spatially, but in respect of the number of indivisible particles or atoms contained in it; for, if space were infinite and bodies finite, they would not have stayed anywhere, but have been dispersed and lost in the void; whereas, if space were finite, it could not find room for infinite matter. The atoms resist dissipation because they are all matter; they contain no void within them. In Lucrertian language, they are strong in solid singleness. They vary in shape; the atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite, but the variety of shapes, through being added to the single, is limited by the limits of the infinite. The atoms are eternally in motion, rebounding after collision, or again oscillating when imprisoned in a mass with other atoms which temporarily form a bounded thing. This is because every atom is in void space, where it has no resistance; and there was no beginning to all these motions, because both matter and space are infinite. Hence, too, there must be an infinity of worlds—some like this of ours, others unlike it. A world is defined (88), after Leucippus, as a sort of envelope of sky enclosing an earth and stars and all visible things, which is cut off from the infinite, and terminates in a boundary which may revolve or be at rest, which may be round or triangular, or of any shape whatever.

After thus laying down the principles of matter and motion, Epicurus proceeds to deal with the films (ἐνδώματα) which emanate from bodies, by which he, like Democritus, explained perceptions of external objects, and the activity of sense. Such husks of films are incessantly streaming from the surface of all perceptible bodies, the waste being as constantly repaired by the accession of fresh atoms from the infinite store of matter. Their velocity through space is enormous, if they encounter no resistance; and, so long as this is the case, they preserve the relative shape, with projections and depressions, of that object from which they were parted. This degree of resemblance entitles them to be called images, in spite of their lack of depth. Our sensations of seeing, hearing, and smelling depend upon the entrance of these films into the sense organs. Our belief in the permanence of visible external objects is due to the constant succession of images of the same shape and colour which reach us from them. And, as with the eyes, so with the mind. The mental perceptions, which arise in intuitive thought, is due to the impact of the ἐνδώματα upon the finer substance of the mind. But not all the films which strike upon the senses or the mind reach us unimpaired. In the course of their passage the outlines may have been blurred, distorted, or mutilated. Further, in the air atomic structures may arise which never formed the superficial layer of any actual body, e.g., a Centaur, and these, concealing the causes or the mind, give rise to erroneous judgments.

(b) Canonie.—At this point the purely physical exposure naturally passes over into Canonie. In his treatment of the problem of truth and error, Epicurus inflexibly adheres to one main position: that perceptions of sense and mental intuitions are always true, and that error creeps in with judgment or opinion (δόξα). Judgment undertakes to interpret sensation. If we want to test the truth of a judgment about an external object, we compare the sensations which we receive in succession from it. If, then, the earlier interpretation is confirmed by an independent observation, the judgment was true; if, however, it be not so confirmed (καὶ τὸ ἐναμπερτρύπῃ), the judgment was false, as when the tower which seemed round at a distance is discovered on a nearer approach to be square. This is a case where subsequent examination is possible (ὦ προσεμετρεῖ; but many judgments deal with the unknown (ἀνάθρω), about which we draw inferences from the known. Here the ἐνδώματα, which cannot be directly perceived, must be made the subject of an inference by connecting it with another object which can be perceived. There are also cases, within the region of known and knowable fact, where, owing to circumstances, the test of sensation cannot be directly applied a second time. Where for any of these reasons further confirmation (ἐνωφαρτήριον) is inapplicable, Epicurus falls back upon a feasible infinitely small experience: e.g., of ἔναν ἀριττήριον ἐκ τῆς ἀκολούθου ἀπὸ ἐνευμάθειας και διακαταλήπτου ἀνθρώπων τῆς φαινομενής ( Sext. Adv. Math. vii. 213, fr. 217 [Ueber]). The judgment upon its trial is secured by no fact (ἐναμπερτρύπῃ) or attachment to witness against it. Thus applied, the Canon allows the strangest hypotheses concerning atoms, images (ἐνδώματα), and gods to pass unchallenged. It should be noted also that the procedure by way of induction and analogy
presupposes something answering to a law of
uniformity—'as are the instances under our ob-
servation, so too are the instances inaccessible to
observation of the eyes. Epicurus deduces this
reason in this way: the imperceptible atoms and
their movements are construed as if, under the
microscope or some more potent aid, they could be
detected. At other points of view, the theory
differs. Somewhere in infinity all possibilities
are realized, for nothing in our experience
contradicts either this general proposition,
or particular cases inferred, such as the
arrangement of the world, or the alternative
explanations of celestial phenomena. A meditated tract
by Philodemus of Gadara on signs and inferences
(τεμ. σημεῖα ὡς καὶ σημειώσεως) is a proof that,
two centuries after the death of its founder, the school
was still interested in analogical and inductive
reasoning. Again, Epicurus laid down a criterion
for the practical as well as for the theoretical
sphere. This consisted in the peculiar sensations
of pleasure and pain, in which he recognized the
same clear evidence (σφηκία) which belongs to
perceptions of external objects (Diog. Laert. x. 34;
763 sqq. [cf. 391 Ussher]). The reason
is of the highest importance when he comes to
Ethics.

Besides immediate perception, and the feelings
of emotion, another main sense of a higher standard of true
judgments is to be found in preconception (προφθαλμός).
This term denotes primarily a notion based upon
and derived from perception, and therefore, like it,
valid, which has found expression in some common
terms (e.g. 'man'). The utterance of the
term calls up in those who understand
the language a clear and distinct mental image (προφήσις)
already formed from previous clear and distinct
perceptions. Sometimes, however, true judgments
so universally recognized as not to require further
testing by experience are also called preconceptions
(προφήσεις). In any case, both their validity as
tests of truth, and the mark of clearness and
distinctness which they present, must be of a
secondary and derivative kind, as compared with
sensation.

(c) The atoms.—Returning now (§ 54) to the
unchanged, Epicurus the atomist, Epicurus hence
deduces the distinction between primary and
secondary qualities long before announced by
Democritus (p.v.). All qualities (πράγματα) are
unchangeable; but the atoms must be thought of as
unchangeable, for all changes must have something
permanent underlying them. Hence the atoms
possess only weight, shape, and magnitude, to
which may be added impenetrability (διασωτικόν:
Sext. adv. Math. x. 240, fr. 275 [Ussher]).
They have not colour, smell, taste, heat, cold, dampness,
or dryness. These changeable qualities arise, not
in the atoms but in the composite wholes (συνήθρώματα)
through the varying union and arrangement of
atoms (ἐν τῇ ποικίλῃ συνέθρωσι ὑπὸ ἀτόμων συνών): Simp.
Catag. 14, fr. 288 [Ussher]. But, while Democritus
made the secondary qualities relative (πράγμα χρωμᾶτι,
μέγεθος, κ.ά.), Epicurus by his unshakable belief in
the reality of present sensation is bound to attribute
them to the composite objects or perceptible things.
The leaf is yellow, though its atoms have no colour,
for my sensation of yellowness upon seeing it is
real and objective, due to an image, of the same
colour as the leaf (διά μιμημάτων: Diog. Laert. x. 49,
p. 11 [Ussher]), which enters my eye. The whole
variety of changing qualities present in experience
can be attributed to the activity of the atoms, upon
account of the variety of atoms, if due account be
taken of variety in atomic arrangement and motion.
Another point of difference from Democritus is that,
whence he made
his atoms of all sizes, Epicurus objects to the
assumption as unnecessary for the explanation of
differences of quality, and as involving the absurdity
of imagining atoms. Nor, again, can any atom be
infinitely small, for no body of finite size can
contain an infinity of constituents, nor can sub-
division go on indefinitely, for then some part of
must be divided. Though the atom is the
least body separately existing, it has itself
minimal parts, which must be conceived on
the analogy of the corresponding minimal parts of
bodies of finite size. Such atoms, as he
matter, are conceived as made up of minimal parts
not further subdivisible. In infinite space all
bodies move with uniform velocity (σταθερᾷ [Diog.
Laert. x. 61]), so long as they encounter no resist-
ances, which is made to account for all variation in
velocity (βαρών ὑγρών ὑπὸ ῥωτίων καὶ σκόθων)
arboret: th. x. 46, p. 10 [Ussher].

The free atoms move with the swiftness of thought
over the very greatest distances, and this uniform
velocity is maintained, whether the atom falls
from above downwards under the influence of
weight, or recoils from collision with another
atom, or oscillates in the entangled mass of atoms
(ὁχυροτοίον ἑτεροτοιοῦν: Th. x. 61), which makes an
inductive motion due to weight presumes that up and
down are somehow empirically determined. Now, in
infinite space there can be no up or down in the
present sense, as it is not determined in which a
body cannot move. At the same time, the opposite
directions up and down, which we
distinguish in any line of finite length, remain
equally opposed when the line is prolonged to
infinity (εἰκότητα).

5. The soul.—The materialism of Epicurus is
prominent in his treatment of the soul. It is
a corporeal substance, a compound of atoms of four
different species, distributed throughout the frame,
but more densely massed in the breast. It most
resembles warm breath, i.e. wind mixed with heat.
Elsewhere it is said to contain air as distinct from
wind, and a fourth nameless substance which is
the seat of sensation, memory, love, hate, and
intellect in general (τῷ ὕπον ὑπὸ καὶ μνημοσύνῃς,
καὶ φιλία καὶ μικρία, καὶ διὸ τὸ φύσιμον καὶ λογοπάθε
ἐν τού ὕπον φυσικομαθίαν φυσικά τοιούτα θεωρεῖνοι: Plut.
nec. Cat. 20, p. 1158d, fr. 314 [Ussher].

Portions of this subtle substance may leave the
body, as in sleep, or through the effect of a deadly
blow, and yet the patient may recover, and receive
now accessional attendance. Its mobility is shown in thought, feeling, and the
bodily motions which it originates. The connexion
and mutual dependence of the two corporeal sub-
stances, soul and body, are conceived as follows:
We derive sensation, sentience, feeling, mainly
from soul, partly from body; for our soul
would not be sentient unless it were confined in our
body. Being so confined, it confers this quality on the
body, which it renders sentient; but the body
does not share in the other functions of the soul,
such as memory and thought. The peculiar
motions of the soul's substance, on which these
higher functions depend, are also conditioned by
the body which encloses and holds it together.
At death the lifeless corpse ceases to feel; but the
soul, too, can no longer retain sensation when
separate from the body, but is dispersed in air.

Essential attributes and accidents.—The
soul is not an incorporeal substance is proved by
the fact that it acts and is acted upon. There
is nothing incorporeal to Epicurus except empty
space. What exists is space, and what
exists, upon examination, to be, not an independent
thing, but an attribute or quality. And here
a distinction must be drawn between essential
attributes (ἐναξιόν), which are inseparable from (δε
the conception either of a body in general or of a visible body, and the fortuitous transitory states, or accidents (συμφέροματα), with which this is not the case. The former, Epicurus holds, are not incident to any corporeal, or incorporeal entities, or simply non-existent; in their entirety they constitute the permanent nature of the whole body, though not in the sense that they are parts of it spatially divisible (ζωές τὰ ἐν οἷς συμφέροματα)Diog. Laert. x. 69, p. 23 [Usener]. and are never perceived apart from it. As shape and size are qualities of body as such, which we cannot think away, so it is with single bodies: each has its inseparable essential attributes, which we cannot think away from it without annihilating its nature. Of accidents (συμφέροματα) the most important are motion and rest and, as motion and rest are related to corporeal things, so time in its turn is related to them. Hence time is properly defined as an accident of accidents (συμφέρομα συμφέροματων).

6. Human progress.—The infinity of worlds above and below, such as we sometimes fancied some had come to being, and others perish. The Epicurean cosmogony, which in the main follows the lines laid down by Democritus, is most exactly given by Lucretius, who writes that the destruction of worlds is the work of Divine agency, but both are merely a product of the eternal motion of atoms, of natural laws working independently of any plan or purpose. As with our world at large, so with human civilization. That, too, is a product of undesigned natural development. Activities originally exercised instinctively came, in course of time, to be matured and perfected by intellectual thought and thus all the arts of life were successively evolved. Intellect itself is a product of Nature, and, in long ages, has acquired, under the pressure of need, its whole store of knowledge and aptitudes. The origin of language had given rise to fierce discussion. Some sought it in Nature, others in convention. Epicurus does not wholly accept either view. He traced language back to those instinctive cries, expressive of emotion, which are as purely reflex as a sneeze or the bark of a dog; but he recognized that these cries would not be everywhere the same, but would vary in different tribes according to varying conditions. Out of these primitive words language gradually developed — the word, as he used to say, which has no meaning is used, but the word which has no meaning in a local dialect should be quite unmistakable, and intelligible throughout the whole tribe. The last terms to be invented were those, he thought, that the names of things which are not visible and corporeal. In other words, language is another case where the natural instinctive product was shaped under stress of necessity, and adapted to its purpose by human intellect.

7. Πετυχα.—The epistle to Herodotus ends with a brief summary of the principles regulating the attitude of Epicurus in regard to those natural phenomena which in all ages have excited curious and terrible, such as earthquakes, tempests, and the like. The general name for such phenomena is μετυχα, because, with the exception of earthquakes, they occur overhead in the sky. We are bound to believe, he says, that such things do not occur by the command of any being who enjoys bliss and immortality, i.e., they are not the work of the gods. Whether such Divine interference be conceived as perpetual, and the cause of regularity, or as spasmodic, and producing abnormal and irregular events, the care and anxiety implied by it is incompatible with our notion of perfect bliss, and the mere belief in such an inconsistency is enough to destroy the idea of any such interference. Our knowledge must indeed, depend upon accurate knowledge of the most important principles, and from that sphere of physics plurality of causes or contingency must be absolutely excluded. But exact knowledge of details does not contribute to happiness. Thus in astronomy we must learn what the heavenly bodies really are, or what they are not. For that Stoics are wrong in holding them to be orbs of fire, endowed with life, reason, and purpose; but, when we come to the phenomena of nature, such as comets and eclipses and the like, exact knowledge on these points is unnecessary to happiness, and, as a fact, does not relieve from terror and misgivings the experts who claim to possess it. Their curiosity can never be quite satisfied. Some things still remain unknown, and therefore excite no less alarm in the experts than in the ignorant multitude. If our researches into celestial phenomena lead us to assume, not a single definite cause, but a plurality of possible causes, each sufficient to account for the phenomenon in question, such a result is accurate enough for our purpose, which is to ensure our own peace of mind. In such investigation we must not carry the investigation any further. In the method worked is shown in detail in the epistle to Pythodorus. For each phenomenon several alternative explanations are set down side by side, and no preference is shown to any of these over the others. Many of them are known to have been put forward in all seriousness by one or other of the early Ionians—Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Metrodorus of Chios, and, of course, Democritus. Thus the document, properly used, has its value as a contribution to the history of Greek science. The industry with which all previous explanations are collected is creditable, and may be set off against the writer’s indifference as to which of them is true, so long as they dispense with the subsidiary assumption of Divine interference. Once, indeed, the record drops its habitual tone of impartial neutrality and takes sides with one of the writers. Herodotus had declared the size of the sun to be the breadth of a man’s foot (Diels, B 3 [P. 62]). Epicurus, ignoring the wide divergence of opinion upon this interesting problem, lays down a similar view (Diog. Laert. x. 91) respecting sun, moon, and stars, which are all alike stated to be, in relation to us, just as large as they appear, though we are still left with three alternatives as to the actual size, which may be a little larger, a little smaller, or precisely as large as it appears. The grounds of this dogmatic statement, as given in τελείως xi. (fr. 81 [Usener]), are that, if the apparent size, the size in relation to us, had of indifferent ways diminished still more: and this from the supposed analogy of sights seen at a great distance upon earth. In this summary case, the two extreme ideas, a large sun and Pythodorus may be treated as a single whole) Epicurus did not think it worth while to include his famous hypothesis of atomic declination, or his account of the origin of life, while there is only a passing reference to such important topics as the history of our world, and of mankind upon it.

8. Theology.—From the foregoing it is abundantly clear that to Epicurus the gods are not supernatural beings controlling Nature from outside. His denial of Divine providence and Divine interference with the world is unqualified.
he should have believed in gods at all is probably due in part to the influence of Democritus (q.v.), who postulated gigantic long-lived phantoms (bajwors), powerful for good or ill. The Epicurean gods are such evils. (i.) They do not dwell in this or any world, but in the intermedium (περιεχόμενα), or interspaces between world and world, where multitudes of gods and goddesses in human form hold converse. (ii.) They are not divided into beneficent and malevolent beings, but are all utterly indifferent to human interests. No benefits are to be expected from their favour, no punishments to be dreaded from their anger. Free from all tasks and occupations, they live solely for their own enjoyment. (iii.) They are not merely long-lived, but indestructible and eternal. The proof of their existence is the universal belief in them, which is declared to be no false opinion, but a genuine preconception (προθέξεια), which cannot have arisen except through many previous impressions of gods, all of them corresponding to an outward reality. Thus we are bound to think of them as blessed and eternal. To such superhuman excellence our reverence is due; but neither prayers, nor vows, nor prophecies have any part in true piety. These things being done merely to be just as certain, just as important in their bearing upon human happiness, as the fundamental principles of physics. But they involve a difficulty which baffles explanation. The bodies of the gods, like all creatures, ought to be dissoluble by the separation of those atoms which united to form them. This difficulty is treated by the Epicurean speaker in Cic. de Nat. Deor. (1. xviii. 49. fr. 332 [Usener]), but the passage is the despair of commentators. According to Lachelier, Scott, and Giussani, the Divine bodies are eternal because continually renewed by fresh matter, waste and repair being equal and instantaneous (cf. ζωοντας, Act. i. vili. 34 [Diog. Laert. Gr. p. 300]).

9. Ethics.—(a) Psychological predestina. Before proceeding to Ethics, it is convenient to sum up the conclusions already reached which must affect our happiness. Correct theology rids us of fear of the gods, by teaching that they do not interfere with the order of Nature; correct psychology rids us of the fear of death, by teaching us that the end of the soul is to be just as incompatible with immortality. Further, the study of Nature can alone teach us what are the true limits of pleasure and pain. As we see, for actual and contact, feelings (séôs) are the test and touchstone of sense-perception, for knowledge and opinion. There are definite limits to the increase of pleasure and pain alike. For pleasure they consist in the removal of every painful want. When this has been attained, pleasure cannot be heightened, it can only be varied (προκάλλιευ). Pain also has its limits fixed by Nature; the intensity of pain is in inverse ratio to its duration. The worst pains bring themselves to a violent end by killing the sufferer outright. Further, in pleasure it is necessary to distinguish the goal from the path which leads to it. The former is a permanent state of tranquillity or rest (καταφάτωρ δυνατος); the latter is in tension towards progress, or excitement. Such movements are fugitive states, as contrasted with the permanent peace and serenity at which they aim, their object being to get rid of painful want or to vary the pleasure which ensues upon its removal. Similarly, there are two sorts of desires, the first natural and necessary (φυσικα και διναγραμια), aiming at the present and desired to be had, and the not necessary (φυσικα και δικατεβασις), and these latter may be prompted by the false opinion that pleasure can be heightened, not merely varied, when all pain has been removed. This would explain preference for luxurios over simple fare, which Epicurus holds to be a mistake. Lastly, the pursuit of that which affords no pleasure would all be against the minor's love of glory—is a third class of desires, neither natural nor necessary, and entirely based upon false opinion. This psychological view, that there are two species of pleasure, is in close contrast with the doctrine of the Cyrenaics (q.v.), who held that pleasure is always a state of motion, and hence denied that the painless state of rest is pleasure at all. Another point on which Epicurus is at issue with the Cyrenaics is the comparison of mental with bodily pleasures. As to origin, the Cyrenaics pointed to certain mental pleasures and pains as not derived from the body (Diog. Laert. ii. 89. fr. 451 [Usener]). Epicurus held that all mental pleasure is derived from and related to the bodily pleasures of sense, affirming, in a much cited passage, that apart from these latter he had no idea whatever of the former (Theo., x. 6. fr. 67 [Usener]). As to relative intensity, the Cyrenaics pronounced unhesitatingly for the pleasures and pains of the body. Epicurus contended that mental pleasure extends to past and future objects, the opinion of the Cyrenaics was that the present. Past pleasures stored in the memory continue to be enjoyed; and, reinforced by them, even feeble present pleasure can outweigh greater present pain. Again, an assumed hope and confident anticipation of the future is a similar make-weight on the side of pleasure. On these grounds he reverses the decision of the Cyrenaics, and pronounces that mental pleasures, although they are not the supreme good, are peaceful and contain pleasures of sense, nevertheless exceed them in intensity as well as in range.

(b) The end of action.—In his theory of life and conduct (φιλοσοφία) Epicurus starts (as did Bentham, long after him) from the principle that pleasure and pain are the sole, the only possible, motives for our actions. This follows from our physical constitution. That pain must be avoided and pleasure pursued is a dictum as plainly evident as that fire is hot and ice cold. Internal sense guarantees the one, external perception the other, and each in its own sphere is a valid criterion. All experience confirms this; every animal as uncorrupted by false opinion naturally and instinctively pursues pleasure, and seeks to ward off pain. If all our striving, willing, and acting thus relate to pleasure and pain, we must find the highest good, and pain the worst evil, where by good we mean simply the end sought for its own sake, which is never a means to something else. Or, as J. S. Mill puts it, what better proof can be adduced that a thing is desirable than the fact that it is desired? Epicurean ethics is thus seen to be a system of egoistic hedonism, in which the maximum pleasure of the agent, after due subtraction of pains, is the supreme end. Of peace of mind and body, or of the health of the entire man, is the only true and permanent satisfaction in which all minor and subordinate aims are embraced. Reason enables us to foresee and take into account the consequences, pleasurable or painful, which follow from our actions, so that we sometimes choose present pain in preference to pleasure, because by so doing we ensure a greater pleasure beyond, or wish to be saved from evil itself, every pleasure is a good, and agreeable (αδικερ) to human nature, yet not all are to be chosen indiscriminately. Nor are all pains to be avoided, although pain is the supreme evil, and alien (διαλυτος) to our constitution, for the former effects may be salutary. It is necessary, before acting, to measure or weigh the consequences, pleasurable
and painful, one against the other. Reason will choose and adopt as a sober calculation of the maximum pleasure attainable, after subtracting whatever pain is involved in and consequent upon its attainment.

(10) In science.—To the end thus defined, the virtues are related as indispensable means. No one can live pleasantly who does not live prudently, honourably, and justly; and, conversely, no one who lives prudently, honourably, and justly can fail to live pleasantly at the same time, apart from this relation to the end, the virtues are worthless; and Epicurus was not slow to ridicule the absolute and unconditional value which the Stoics claimed for morality (σάλον, honesstiam) as an end in itself. If this morality has nothing to do with pleasure, what, he asks, can it stand for, unless it be the object of popular applause (populairi fama gloriosa): Civ. de Fin, ii. 15, 48, fr. 68 [Usener]? It was easy for him to show the utility of three of the cardinal virtues. Prudence (φρόνησις), the root of all the other virtues, teaches what is to be sought and what to be avoided; Temperance (σωφροσύνη) that we must allow ourselves to be led by a prudent choice by the light of a pleasure known to entail painful consequences. The function of Courage is to keep us firm against those fears of the gods, of death, and of pain which φρονησις has previously taught; whereas, it is different with the social virtue of Justice, and the duties which by it a man owes to his neighbours. How are we to prove that honesty is the best policy? How can disinterested conduct be justified in a system which makes self-love the mother of all virtues? For, if it is a psychological truth that all men by instinct and reason pursue their own pleasure and avoid their own pain, all duties must be seen in the light of this. Action can only, as the individual competes with that of every other. Again, what makes actions just, and why does Epicurus enjoin obedience to the rules of justice? He holds that injustice is not in itself an evil, and that, in the state of nature, man was predatory. But he is no longer in the state of nature; Epicurus, like Hobbes and Hume, assumed a social compact, which, once made, is ever afterwards binding. But why should the wise man obey this compact if he find secret injustice pleasant and profitable? Because he can never be sure that he will not be found out. If he escapes detection by his fellow-men, there is another sort of Divine vengeance, which, even if groundless, does more to disturb man’s peace of mind than the fruits of injustice to promote it. That such motives do not weigh with criminals is irrelevant; we are dealing now with the wise and prudent man. In his judgment, compliance with the demands of justice, honour, and equity is a small price to pay for a pleasant life, or rather a moderate premium to ensure it. As things are, through justice and equity we gain the goodwill, love, and support of our fellow-men, which contribute so much to make us happy. Thus Epicurus first stated the utility of the principles. Its rules are wisely framed to procure for each the maximum of pleasure, to adjust conflicting interests with the minimum of friction; but, if all men were shrewd enough to see this and profit by it, laws would no longer be needed. The proper function is rather to protect the wise from suffering injustice than to deter them from committing it.

(d) Friendship.—Whereas the Stoics saw in justice and philanthropy the bonds which held society together, Epicurus anised the happiest results from the voluntary association of friends. We must make friends, as we must obey the laws, because without them we cannot live safely and fearlessly, and therefore cannot live pleasantly.

We promote our own happiness by conferring benefits on our friends; it is sweeter to give than to receive (εστι γε γίνομαι τοι δι' αυτου). And ‘The man who possesses not even a bed is thrice blest: the bed maker, if he were to make it, is easily pushed further; it is, therefore, not surprising to be told that we should make sacrifices for friends, and even undergo the greatest hardships on their behalf. In all ages the school was famous for the devoted friendships of which it could boast.

10. Fate and free will. —The epistle to Menoeceus chases with the lofty claim that the man who follows its precepts will live the life of a god upon earth. At every moment the pleasures he enjoys far outweigh his pains; his future is secure; even on the rack he will be happy; give him bread and water, and he will not fall short of Zeus in enjoyment. The Stoics made promises no less extravagant, and Epicurus could not afford to be outdone by his rivals. But he differed from them fundamentally in his view of the future. The Stoics retained the theory laid down by Democritus, that all events are equally determined, and linked together in one unending series of causes and effects; that the future is thus inevitably fixed, and could conceivably be foreseen with certainty at certain points in the series. Epicurus rebelled against this doctrine. The past, he admitted, was determined, but not the future. So tenacious was he of this distinction, that he would not allow the validity of a disjunctive proposition relating to the future, such as: ‘Hermarchus will either be alive or not alive to-morrow.’ He was afraid (Cic. de Fato, x. 21, fr. 376 [Usener]) that in granting this he would be granting الحكم, and foredooming every event necessarily determined. His own view is that some things happen by chance, and some are due to human agency (δε δει καθηκεν, δε δει ναυτεν; Diog. Laert. x. 133, p. 65 [Usener]), where the context shows that ους τρόπις και ναυτὸς must imply some sort of spontaneity and free will. This is a direct denial of Lencippus’ maxim, ουδὲν χρηζίαν αδρων αιτειναι. With pointed allusion to L. and Democritus, he held that it would be better to believe the tales about the gods than to become the slaves of the inexorable Fate of the physicists (καθηκεν τοιν τοι ναυτεν μᾶλλον κατακαθηκεν τοιν τοι τοιν τοιν), and that he would not allow the validity of a disjunctive proposition relating to the future, such as: ‘Hermarchus will either be alive or not alive to-morrow.’ He was afraid (Cic. de Fato, x. 21, fr. 376 [Usener]) that in granting this he would be grantingحكم, and foredooming every event necessarily determined. His own view is that some things happen by chance, and some are due to human agency (δε δει καθηκεν, δε δει ναυτεν; Diog. Laert. x. 133, p. 65 [Usener]). To what limitations this doctrine of contingency was subject is not known; but it is very improbable that it was carried so far as Guyan (La Morale d’Epic. ch. ii.) supposed. See also LECRÈTIEUS.


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was generally observed by A.D. 325, and was probably not yet universal in 311. This is shown by the evidence of the Arians and the Donatists. The Arians appear to have celebrated the feast, for Greg. Naz. says that in 372 the Arian Emperor Valens ordered the church at Ceresara in Cappadocia, and shared in the Epiphany feast.1 Considering the intensity of feeling between Arians and Orthodox, it is extremely improbable that either party would have observed a feast which had been introduced by the other (cf. also Usener, 'Weihnachtsfest,' p. 192 f.). Thus it is probable that the Epiphany feast belonged to the services of the undivided Church, and, therefore, must have been introduced before 225. On the other hand, it can scarcely have been universal before 311, when the Donatists broke away from the Church; for Augustine in preaching about the Epiphany complained that the Donatists did not celebrate it. It is not probable that the Donatists abandoned any established Christian custom, and it seems, therefore, to be almost certain that the Epiphany was introduced after their schism; but, of course, this is solely for Africa only; and, although it justifies the view that the feast was not generally observed before 311, it does not exclude the possibility that it was celebrated in some churches at an earlier date. It is therefore necessary to turn to certainty by a reference to the Epiphany in the Martyrium of Philip of Heraclea († 304), and by the statement in Ammianus that, when Julian was in Vienna in Gaul, he visited the church at the Epiphany.

Some writers have quoted the homily of Hippolytus, εἰς τὰ δύο θεοφάσια, as α proof that the Epiphany existed in Rome in the middle of the 3rd cent.; but this statement must probably be abandoned. It is very doubtful whether this tract belongs either to Hippolytus, to the West, or to the 3rd century. Internal evidence shows that it was more probably a sermon delivered at the baptism of some distinguished person in the Eastern Church, and probably in the 4th century. It may have been at the feast of the Epiphany; this is not probable on internal evidence but also because the Epiphany was a favorite day for baptism.2 Still earlier is the evidence of Clem. Alex., who states that the Basilians observed the feast of the Baptism on Jan. 6,3 but his words seem distinctly to imply that the festival was not observed in Catholic circles. The evidence for the celebration of the feast among Gnostics is, therefore, about a century earlier than that for its existence among Catholics.

As was shown in art. CHRISTMAS, it is certain that in the East Jan. 6 was the feast of the Nativity as well as that of the Baptism, and it is probable, though not quite so certain, that the same is true of the West. But in the 4th and 5th centuries Dec. 25 was gradually adopted as the feast of the Nativity, and ultimately became universal, except in Armenia.

The history of the feast of Jan. 6 after the acceptance of Dec. 25 for the Nativity is not quite the same in the East as in the West. In the East it remained the feast of the Baptist, as may be seen, apart from the liturgical arrangements for the day, from the sermons of the Eastern Fathers, and from the hymns. But in the West it came to be chiefly associated with the visit of the Magi to Bethlehem, though the connexion with the Baptism was never entirely forgotten; in addition to this, there was no association with the feast, and later there was a tendency to regard it as a celebration of all manifestations of the Divine nature of Christ.

So far there is no doubt. The problems which arise are: (1) Was Jan. 6 originally a feast of two distinct events, the Nativity and the Baptism, or of one only; and if the latter, what was the course of its development? (2) Why was Jan. 6 chosen as a special feast, apart from the question as to which event was celebrated on it?

I. The original character of the feast of Jan. 6 and its modification.—There is no sufficient evidence to justify a confident answer; acceptance of Dec. 25 for the Nativity is not quite the same in the East as in the West. In the East it remained the feast of the Baptist, as may be seen, apart from the liturgical arrangements for the day, from the sermons of the Eastern Fathers, and from the hymns. But in the West it came to be chiefly associated with the visit of the Magi to Bethlehem, though the connexion with the Baptism was never entirely forgotten; in addition to this, there was no association with the feast, and later there was a tendency to regard it as a celebration of all manifestations of the Divine nature of Christ.

Now, it is tolerably plain that in connection with the doctrinal controversies of the 4th and 5th centuries there was a tendency to emphasize the Nativity and distinguish it from the Baptism, and that this was one of the reasons which led to the establishment and exaltation of a separate feast on Dec. 25. To go farther is difficult. The points which stand out are that in the West the feast came to be connected with the Magi, and that Jerusalem, which, if we are to trust Macarius, had originally celebrated the Baptism on Jan. 6, probably selected the character of the feast and connected it with the Nativity. So far did this go that Epiphanius not only maintains that Jan. 6 is the date of the Nativity, but says that a different date, Nov. 8, was that of the Baptist.1 Obviously these changes were made because the Church was contending with some disputed doctrine concerning the Baptism of Christ, and desired to exclude it, or the danger of it, from the celebration of the Epiphany. The exact proof is difficult to obtain, in the absence of any direct statement; but there are enough indirect allusions to show that the danger was the doctrine that Jesus was born on this day, rather than at the Nativity, or that He obtained regeneration through baptism in the same manner as Christians. The evidence for this view is too scattered to be given in full. The following must serve as an impression of its character.

Among the correspondence of Leo (440-481) there is a letter to the Sicilian bishops (no. 18), and it is clear from his protests that there was in Sicily a tendency to regard the baptism of Jesus as having conveyed the same grace to Him, and having borne the same import for Him, as the baptism of believers.

1 η επιστολή εν τῷ ἑορτήσιν τοῦ ἐναλόγα ἐπεμφάνισεν, τῇ καταφύσει ἔτη τοῦ ἑορτήσιον ἐναλόγα, τούτου καὶ Μητροπολίτης Ἀλέξανδρος, πρὸ ἔτος Ἀπριλίου (Ταυρον. 61, ed. Dindorf, ii. 452 f.).
conveys to and bears for them. The vigour with which Leo protests shows that this doctrine existed in Sicily. It is also not improbable that a similar feeling underlies Pope St. Irenaeus’ letter to Himerius of Tarracon in 355, in which he protests against the same doctrine. Furthermore, p. 273. The definite traces of this type of heresy may be found in various homilies on the Epiphany, among the Spuria of Augustine, Ambrose, and Maximus. In pseudo-Augustine 136, for instance, the writer says: ‘Let us celebrate Christ’s baptism, keeping watch over our purity; because this is the regeneration of Christ and a strengthening of our faith.’ It is difficult to define its exact limits, but there is no doubt that the view, ultimately derived from early Adoptianist sources, lingered on for a long time, that Jesus was in some sense regenerate, or even that He became Christ, in the Baptism, and that this heresy necessitated the efforts of the Church so to handle the feast that its heretical explanation should be excluded. Hence, especially in the genuine homilies of Augustine, the Epiphany is treated as primarily the celebration of the coming of the Magi, and not of the Baptism.

2. The original choice of Jan. 6.—The solution of this problem is unattainable at present. The fact which stands out is that the earliest evidence for the day of the festivity comes from the East. We have every reason for believing that these Gnostics were syncretistic in their methods, and this draws attention to a story in Epiphanius (Panarion 51) as to the feast which used to be held in Alexandria in the Kedron, or Temple of Kore, on Jan. 6. He says that on the eve of that day it was the custom to spend the night in singing and attending to the images of the gods. At dawn a descent was made to a naked, and a wooden image was brought up, which had the sign of a cross, and a star of gold, marked on hands, knees, and head. This was carried round in procession, and then taken back to the crypt; and it was said that this was done because ‘the Maiden’ had given birth to ‘the Aecon.’ With this may be compared the statement of Macrobius (i. 18. 9.):

’Sed ut pervertis videtur, hie semel sacrificata, quam quemque pectora misit haberes verumque videre st erat, et in eam imaginem salutis,’

and the statement in Cosmas Indicopleustes (PG xxxvii. 341):

‘τάν σαυρον ἐν αγιω τον νησίου τῇ ἑλληνικῇ καθ' ἐναλλακτικα καθ' ἐν οἴκοι τοῖς θεοσεκρητοῖς ὁ θεοσεκρήτης, ἔμνησεν αὐτοὺς ἀργοῖς ἐξέδωκεν τῶν παρθένων κτέρες τῶν θεῶν.’

It is possible that Cosmas himself believes this to be Dec. 25, but, as he refers to Epiphanius, it is not improbable that it was really Jan. 6. In this connexion the usual name for the Epiphany in Greek, ἑλπιδοι τῶν φωτόν, obtains a new importance (see further F. Cumont, ‘Le Natalis Invicti,’ in CAJL, 1911). The existence of a heathen feast of this kind would afford ample explanation of the growth of a similar Christian feast, either by way of syncretism or of rivalry; and a more or less Docetic or Adoptianist form of Christianity would naturally regard the Baptism as the spiritual counterpart of this feast.

Another line of possibility is contained in the constant connexion of Epiphany with the rite of ‘Blessing the Waters.’ In the earliest Syriac, Coptic, and Greek Epiphany rites there is a ceremony of consecrating water, usually that of the local river, for baptism. There is reason to think that this represents an originally pagan custom. According to Epiphanius (Panarion 51), there was sometimes a festival in Alexandria a festa called ἐργεία (see F. Chaline, Le Calendrier des jours fêtes et festa de l’antique égyptienne, Paris, 1870, p. 60). This festival was on Tybi 11 (Jan. 6), and it was the custom to draw water and store it because of the especial merit which it then acquired. Aristides

ruhed in the 2nd cent. also mentions this custom, though he does not specify the date. He also states that the water used to be exported for use abroad, and that—unlike all other water— it was supposed to improve with age, like wine (Orat. ed. Oxon. 1206, loc. cit.). In 321 Epiphanius goes still further, and says (loc. cit.) that the water actually became wine; and he connects this fact with the celebration of the New Year (Dec. 25). The miracle of the Epiphany. It is also probable that this custom was not confined to Egypt or the Nile; Epiphanius goes on to state that at that season many fountains turned to wine. There was at Cibyra in Caria a fountain of this sort, and another at Gerrass in Arabia. Epiphanius had actually drunk of the fountain at Cibyra. In Rome libations were made by the priest of Isis with Nile water; and Plutarch tells us that the water which was used in this connexion in procession was in some sense an influence of the god himself (De Is. et Osir. 36; cf. also Clem. Strom. ed. Syburg, p. 534).

Behind all these customs there is probably (though it is scarcely susceptible of proof) an ancient belief to the effect that at the turn of the year water was especially dangerous, owing to evil spirits; and that it became propitious once more when it was mixed with wine. He also tells us that he did not drink water from the river on Tybi 5 and it is better not to do so a whole month previously), but on Tybi 9 the blessing of Heaven descends on the river. Probably nothing will in the end throw so much light on the origin of the Epiphany feast, and also on that of Baptism, as a general study of the primitive belief of the connexion between water, the spirit world, and the cycle of the sun.

LITÉRATURE.—H. Uccius, Religionsgeschichte. Untersuchungen, i. ‘Das Weihnachtsfest,’ Bonn, 1899, 1910; P. de Lagarde, Mittheilungen, Göttlingen, 1843-49, iv. 241 ff. There is a valuable article in P. R. K. v. 641-47 by Caspar, but much more may be expected if, or when, Conybeare’s collection of material is published.

KIRSCH LAKE.

EPISCOPACY.—The term ’episcopacy’ is used in the present article to denote that system of the Church in which bishops (in the ordinary modern sense) have the word ’bishop’ attached to their name, on which the continued life of the Church depends.

1. New Testament.—In the NT the word ‘bishop’ (ἐπίσκοπος) is used to denote the same office as the word ‘presbyter’ (πρεσβύτερος). See Tit. 1:7, where Paul, in directing Titus to appoint presbyters in every city, and describing those who were fit to be presbyters, says: ‘For one who is a bishop must be blameless, as God’s steward,’ thus using the word ’bishop’ to apply to the person who has been called ‘presbyter’ immediately before; Ph 1, 1 Ti 3:2, where bishops and deacons are mentioned side by side without any reference to presbyters, and where the passages would plainly demand some distinction of the presbyters if they were different from the bishops; Ac 20:28, where those described in the narrative as the presbyters of the church are addressed by Paul as bishops (cf. also 1 P. 5:2). It was usual in the NT to appoint the office of bishop—(ἐπίσκοπος—is used for those who are addressed as presbyters; but RV and WII omit). A comparison of these passages will show that it is thought these offices adequate. Evidence to the effect that the terms ‘bishop’ and ‘presbyter’ are used interchangeably. The use of the word ’bishop’ in

1 Owing to the change of calendar, the equivalence of the months is now different; and Tybi 9 = Jan. 16, but this is, asit were, only a modern accident.

2 Against this, see van Welzl’scher (ii. 329-331, Eng. tr.) who distinguishes the terms; and Hort (pp. 190-191, who regards
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the NT then does not itself denote the existence of episcopacy in NT times. It remains to inquire whether there are other indications to show that episcopacy existed. Of such indications there are the following: (1) the position and work of the Apostles; (2) the suggestions as to the position of the bishops, the Lord's 'brother' at Antioch; see Ac 11', where Peter directs that his release from prison be announced to 'James and to the brethren'; 152 5 where James appears to be represented as having presided at the council of Jerusalem; 213 where the reference is to Paul, that he 'went in' unto James; and all the presbyters were then present, shows that James was then presiding in the church at Jerusalem; Gal 2', where Paul, referring to Jerusalem, mentions James before Peter as well as before John, contrary to the usual order in the NT; (3) the rule of the Apostolic delegates Timothy and Titus at Ephesus and Crete; see the Pastoral Epistles, pastor; (4) the use of the laying on of hands as a link in the ministry by the original Apostles and Paul and the Apostolic delegate Timothy: see Ac 6', where the seven men of good report were ordained by the Apostles laying their hands on them with prayer; 1 Ti 4', 2 Ti 157, where Paul refers to Timothy having been ordained with the accompaniment of the laying on of hands of the presbyters (οι επίσκοποι των χριστου Which by usage of the term implies that he did not know of recognized Christian bodies anywhere without bishops, and that he regarded the latter as necessary to the existence of the Church. He says that, apart from bishopric, one cannot be a Christian (ος ουχο εν τω εκκλησια τω καλειται). He refers to the necessity of bishops, (1) that there may be a center of unity for discipline and prayer, (2) that the bishop may be the representative of Christ and of God, and (3) that the Episcopacy may be securely, and Baptist and other rites lawfully, administered.

It is, therefore, to discern one Episcopacy . . . there is one altar, as there is one bishop together with the presbytery, and even a fellow-servant'; Let that be lawful to a valid (Gnath) Episcopacy, which is under the bishop or one to whom he shall have committetis; "It is not lawful apart from the word 'bishop' not as denoting an office, but as simply meaning generally one who is in a position of oversight.

1 Acts 2.1-41; 11.19-30; 15.1-30; 18.18-22; 20.17-38; 1 Cor. 3.1-15; 5.1-15; 16.17-18; 2 Cor. 1.11-13; 2 Tim. 1.1-5; 2.25; 3.1-5; 1 Tim. 1.1-3; 4.11-16; 5.17-24; 6.11-16; 2 Tim. 3.1-5; 4.1-8; 1 Pet. 2.21; 5.7-10; Tit. 1.1-3; 2.1-15; 3.1-7; 1 John 1.1-7; Rev. 1.20; 2.1; 7.16; 11.18; 14.1-5; 21.10-22; 22.1-5; 23-42; 24.16-21; 25.1-13; 26.17-27; 27.1-54; 28.1-22; Eph. 2.19-22; Phil. 2.15-16; 3.15; Col. 1.13; 2.14-15; 3.10-16; 4.15-18; 1 Thess. 4.13-18; 5.1-11; 1 Tim. 1.11-20; 2.1-7; 3.1-7; 4.1-6; 5.1-20; Tit. 1.1-3; 2.1-14; 3.1-7; 1 John 1.1-7; 2.1-17; 3.1-4; 4.1-5; 5.1-10; 3 John 1.1-12; Jude 1.1-25; Rev. 1.1-16; 2.1-7; 3.1-6; 7.1-3; 10.1-11; 11.1-19; 12.1-18; 13.1-14; 14.1-20; 15.1-6; 16.1-19; 17.1-18; 18.1-24; 19.1-20; 20.1-12; 21.1-22; 22.1-5; 24.1-22; 26.1-18.

Towards the end of the 2nd cent., about the year 181, the notion of episcopal succession from the Apostles is emphasized by Irenaeus in Gaul as a guarantee for the preservation of the truth: see Euseb. Hær. III. ii. 1. There is evidence like Africa in a passage from Tertullian, writing at the end of the 2nd cent., and referring to episcopal descent from the Apostles as affording the proof of the life of the Church: see de Præsc. Hær. 52. The ordinary belief of the 3rd cent. is expressed by St. Cyril, who says: 'Any one who is not with the bishop is not in the Church' (Ep. lvii. 8). The rites which lie here behind the Canons of Hippolytus (Roman or African, 2nd or 3rd cent.), the Liturgical Prayers of Simeon (African, 1st cent.), and the Apostolic Constitutions (Syrian, 4th cent.) contained a clear distinction between the office of bishop, presbyter, and deacon. (For what may be a different element in the Canons of Hippolytus, see below.) As Rome, the lists of the bishops of Rome afford weighty testimony to episcopal government, and to the episcopal government being that of a single bishop. The value of these lists has often been questioned; but Irenaeus, in his essay on the early Roman succession showed with great conclusiveness that there was really one (and not, as many had thought, more than one) tradition as to the early bishops, and that this tradition went back to the middle of the 2nd century (see his Apostolic Fathers, i. 1. [1890] 201-545). A reference to 'Clement, to whom is entrusted the charge of sending to the foreign cities (ἐπισκόπων & καθεδρον και ερημίας ἡ λέγεται τις ἐν τῷ εὐαγγ. ἐκκλήσια τῶν ἐν Πατρίαλα, in the Shepherd of Hermas, a Roman document of the end of the 1st cent. or of the middle of the 2nd, may allude to a bishop as chief ruler at Rome (Vic. ii. 4 (3). The lists of bishops of Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria given by Eusebius may also be mentioned. They have much less authority than the lists of the bishops of Rome, but have some importance; and the evidence of the Antiochene list is corroborated by the testimony in the Epistles of St. Ignatius (see the lists collected from the Ecclesiastical History and Chronicle of Eusebius (p. 87) in the Tract of St. Gregory, in his tr. of Eusebius in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, p. 402). If the evidence which has so far been mentioned stood alone, it would hardly be possible for any scholars to hold an opinion otherwise than that of the Church government in Rome and throughout the West as well as in Asia Minor from the earliest times. A different opinion, however, has been based on other evidence and linked with the references to the 'prophets' in the NT already alluded to. In the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, a Syrian or Alexandrian document of the 1st or 2nd cent., probably composed for Christian use on the basis of a Jewish manual, the prophets fill an important place. A true prophet is said to 'speak in the Spirit,' and to 'have the ways of the Lord.' The prophets are called 'your chief priests' in connexion with the reception of first-fruits—a usage which suggests comparison between the position occupied by the prophets among Christians and that occupied by the priests among the Jews. The local ministers are described as 'bishops' (i.e. presbyters) and 'prophets and deacons; an indication of their dignity is that they perform the service (λειτουργουντοι . . την λειτουργίαν) of the prophets and teachers, and that they are the most honored or prominent. The text is not final. It does not, it may be well to notice, specify the method by means of which the bishop receives his office. He says nothing about succession, and he does not mention the laying on of hands.

1 Following the Eusebian Canon, Irenaeus gives to the following: see Ac 11'. 137; 157; 191; 218-19; Ro 11.14; 1 Cor. 11-15; 2 Cor. 10.39; 2 Ti. 1.8; 2 Tim. 1.12; 4.4. 6; 16; 20; Magn. 2.3; 6.7; 13; Tit. 2.3; Phal. 3.4; Smyrn. 8.3.
prophets and teachers." Instruction is given that the gifts are to be exercised to 'order thanksgiving as much as they desire' (ευχάριστον δόνα ἑλθοντοι)—a phrase which probably means to celebrate the Eucharist at such length and with such frequency (cf. 1 Cor. xiv. 34, 42; 1 Thess. iv. 17; 1 Cor. xiv. 1-6; 1 Cor. xiv. 34; Apol. i. 67; Cont. Ap. viii. 12). There is no indication that the local ministry of 'bishops' and deacons was ordained by a higher order as well as chosen by the people; and there is nothing to show whether the prophets were or were not ordained. Some writers hold that this silence is a proof that there was no ordination in either case, but in connexion with such matters the incomplete and fragmentary character of the book must be borne in mind (Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, x. 7, xi. 3-12, xii., xv. 1.2, xvi. 3). The Shepherd of Hermas contains instruction how to distinguish a true from a false prophet by the observation of characteristic; but does not show whether the prophet was in any way appointed to his office (Menod. xi.). Prophets held a prominent place in the Montanist movement which began from Phrygia in the second half of the 2nd cent. Montanists maintained that the prophets and spiritual persons possessed the powers which were wrongly claimed by the officials of the Church. For instance, Ter- tullian in his Apologeticus writes: The Church will heed not forgive sins; but it will be the Church, the Spirit by means of a spiritual man, not the Church the number of the bishops' (de Prol. 21). It is a theory of some writers that in this respect the Montanists preserved the original tradition of the Church.

With the references to the prophets in the NT and the later evidence from the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, Hermas and the Montanists, the privileges ascribed to the 'prophets' are in some quarters have been associated by writers who hold that the original constitution of the Church was not episcopal. A study of the Church Orders brings out the existence and alteration of a profession that a confessor might be accounted a presbyter without receiving ordination. The Canons of Hippolytus enact that one who has been tortured for the faith is to be regarded as a presbyter without ordination by the bishop if he is a freeman, and that if he is a slave he must be ordained, but the bishop is to omit the part of the prayer which relates to the Holy Ghost. A confessor who has not been ordained is a presbyter and not a deacon. The later Egyptian Church Order contains confused and inconsistent statements, which show traces of a similar provision to that in the Canons of Hippolytus as well as of its reversal (canons 24, 25, 54, 55 of the Ethiopian text; and canons 34, 67 of the Sabean text in Horner, The Statutes of the Apostles, 1904). The Apostolic Constitutions prohibit a confessor from acting as a bishop or presbyter or deacon unless he has been ordained (canon 12). A similar line of thought to that indicated by the allowance of this privilege to the confessors may have underlain the clause made at Carthage in the 3rd cent. that those who had suffered persecution and torture and danger of death for the faith might re-admit communion Christians who had apostatized (see, e.g., Cyprian, Ep. xvi. 111.). With this group of evidence may be taken an obscure sentence in the Canons of Hippolytus which occurs in the description of the rite of consecrating a bishop, a canon of the Council of Ancyra of 314, some alleged instances of ordination by presbyters, and statements about the Church of Alexandria. The sentence in the Canons of Hippolytus, 'Then, from among the bishops and presbyters let one be chosen who is to lay his hands on his head and pray, saying,' has been thought to form part of the older strata incorporated in the present text of the Canons, and to embody a primitive custom. That the ordination was not restricted to bishops prior to the clear distinction between bishops and presbyters already mentioned, and to the regulation by which the power of ordaining is explicitly said not to be committed to presbyters (canons of Hippolytus, 30-32). The thirteenth canon of Ancyra, according to the text adopted by J. B. Lightfoot and as translated by him (Philippians, pp. 232, 233), enacts that 'it is not allowed to country-bishops (συζευκόντων) to ordain presbyters or deacons, or even to city-presbyters (μυθον καθητηρον ούκ οίκος), except permission be given in each parish (εκ ημών ραητοί) by the bishop in writing'-an enactment which has been understood to mean that episcopal ordination can in some cases be dispensed with, if there is no simultaneous sanction, which on such an interpretation would testify to episcopal government as a fact, but would be inconsistent with an understanding for episcopal ordination exists as a matter of principle. To the present writer the true text and translation of the canon appear to be: 'Country bishops may not ordain presbyters or deacons, no, nor town presbyters either (ούκ οίκον), without the written consent of the bishop, in another diocese (εκ ημών ραητοί).'

The alleged instances of ordination by presbyters of Felicitians in the West is in the middle of the 3rd cent., the presbyter Novatus (Cyprian, Ep. iii. 2), of Daniel in the East in the 4th cent. by the abbot Pap- nutius (Cassian, Cont. iv. 1), and of St. Aidan in the 7th cent. by the abbot and monks of Iona (Be Like HE, III, iii. 5) (see probably in some cases the phrases 'appointed (constituuit), 'made' ('fecerat) a deacon, 'was preferred (est pretexuit) to the office of deacon,' 'he promoted (prosequi) him to the honour of the presbyterate,' 'ordinating (ordi- nante) him,' refer not to the act of ordination but to the making of arrangements for that act. As regards Alexandria there is a series of statements which need careful consideration. Jerome, after speaking of the identity according to his theory, of bishops and presbyters, proceeds:

'When afterwards one was chosen to preside over the rest, this was done as a substitute for schism, and removed the individual from rending the Church of Christ by drawing it to himself. For even if he is to be a presbyter or bishop, and not a deacon, he must be ordained; and it is a better course for the Evangelist to the episcopates of Hieraclea and Dorylaenus, the presbyters used always to appoint as bishop one chosen out of their number, and consecrated on a higher level, which or which should make a commander, or as it deacons should choose one of themselves whom they knew to be diligent, and call him an archdeacon. For, with the exception of ordination, what does a bishop do which a presbyter does not?' (Ep. cxxxv. 1.)

In a letter written by Severus, the Monophysite Patriarch of Alexandria between 518 and 538, it is said that formerly at Alexandria the bishop was appointed by the presbyters, and that it is by a later custom that his 'sollemn institution has come to be performed by the hand of bishop' (see E. W. Brooks, in JThSt ii. [1901] 612, 613). In the collection Apophthegmata of the Fathers, parts of which are probably as old as the second half of the 4th cent., 'certain heretics' are said to have abused the Archbishop of Alexandria 'as having received his ordination from presbyters' (Apop- thegmata, Patrum, 78, in PG lxv. 841). The 10th cent. writer Methodius of Byzantium, the Metropolitan or Uniate Patriarch of Alexandria, who took the name of Eutychius, gives a circumstantial account that 'the Evangelist Mark appointed, together with Anastasius the Patriarch, twelve presbyters to be with the patriarchate, when the patriarchate was vacant, they should choose one of the twelve presbyters, and that the other eleven should lay

their hands on his head and bless him and make him patriarch, and afterwards should choose some eminent men and make him presbyter with themselves in the place of him who had been chosen, and says thus twice, and adds that this custom was changed for the later custom in the time of the Patriarch Alexander in the first half of the 4th cent. (Annals in Pet. ii. 9). (Lat. tr. P. and C. p. 424.) According to a passage in Poecilus's ed. Ox. 1659; and of this passage in Selden, Eutychii Egyptii Orig., Lond. 1642).

None of this evidence appears to the present writer to counterbalance the testimony which indicates that Hermas's system of ordination was not that of the ordinary system in the Church from the first. It is easy to exaggerate the importance of the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles; and it is very questionable what inferences can rightly be drawn from its silence. Apart from a comparison with the Teaching, no conclusions contrary to episcopacy could be derived from the references to the prophets in the Shepherd of Hermas. The general history of the Church in the 2nd and 3rd centuries does not support the opinion that the Montanists retained a survival of the original tradition. The privileges allowed to the confessors seem to have been merely an outgrowth of the exaggeration being sometimes attached to sufferings on behalf of the faith. If the text and translation of the canon of Ancyra are as already suggested, the canon does not allow of any authority for bishops, but is simply a disciplinary measure designed to prevent the bishops appointed to supervise the Christians in country districts from encroaching on the rights of the diocesan bishops. The alleged instances of ordination by others than bishops do not, in the light of the consideration which has been already urged, bear examination. The case of the Church at Alexandria is much more important than the others. But here there is great doubt about the facts. In the midst of his statement on the equality of bishops and presbyters, Jerome, by introducing the sentence, 'With the exception of ordaining, what does a bishop do which a presbyter does not?' appears to restrict ordination to bishops; for it is hardly an adequate interpretation of his words to suppose that they merely indicate the practice which had come to be in his time, and are not in any way an assertion of the principle. Eutychius, apart from corroboration of his statements, is not regarded by any one as a trustworthy authority. It is not unlikely that there were different usages among the Anthropaeans, who is known to have been episcopally ordained; and it may be observed that Origen, who had plenty of opportunity for knowing the facts about Alexandria, does not show that he was acquainted with any such method of appointing the patriarch as Eutychius mentions.1

The state of things at Rome and Corinth at the end of the 1st cent. and in the first half of the 2nd cent. needs separate consideration. The epistle of Clement of Rome to the Corinthians, written about the year 96, lays strong stress on successions from the Apostles as a part of the ordered system of the Church. The Church, says Clement, is from the Apostles, and so, through the Apostles, from Christ, and, through Christ, from God. His epistle does not afford any clear evidence whether he regarded this Apostolical succession as necessarily preserved by means of bishops. The word 'bishop' is used in it, as in the NT, to denote the same persons as the presbyters. The presbyters are spoken of as filling posts of authority at Corinth. It is not clear whether the apostolical succession was made up of posts of bishops or presbyters. In two passages (3, 6) there is a doubt as to the meaning of the words 'rulers' (προφυαγόμενοι, and πρεσβευόμενοι, and in another passage (3-5) there is a doubt about the meaning of the phrase 'men of account.' (LXX. τοις πρεσβευόμενοι.) Of these passages taken by themselves there are three possible interpretations. (1) The phrases 'rulers' and 'men of account' are used in a specific sense to denote the holders of the highest posts of authority. (2) The phrases 'rulers' and 'men of account' are not used in a specific sense, but are simply synonyms for the presbyters; the word πρεσβευόμενοι in chs. 3, 6 denotes older men, not the presbyters; it follows that the presbyters held the highest rank in the ministry at Corinth and ruled the Church there, but there is no reason to suppose that they had not been ordained in such a way as to receive the episcopal powers which in Asia Minor and at a later time in the West were limited to the diocesan bishops. (3) The presbyters held the highest rank and exercised the chief rule, and there is no reason to suppose that they were ordained in any different method from the presbyters considered as 'rulers' in the present, Hermas mentions deacons, presbyters, bishops (about whom nothing shows whether they are to be identified with the presbyters, as in the NT and St. Clement of Rome, or to be distinguished from them), prophets apparently hierarch, 'rulers of the Church' (οἱ πρεσβεύομενοι τῆς ἐκκλησίας, and Clement (Ves. ii. 2, 6), 3, 4, 5), (3), iii. 1, 5, 9, 7, Mont. xi. 7, Sim. ix. 25, 26 (2), 27 (1), 22. Apart from the references which have already been mentioned, there is the same doubt as in the epistle of Clement of Rome whether the 'rulers of the Church' are to be identified with the presbyters or to be distinguished from them. The presbyters are said to preside over the Church (τῶν πρεσβευόμενων τῶν προφήτων τῆς ἐκκλησίας); and the 'occupants of the chief seats' (τοίς πρωτοκαθήμενοι) are either identified with or closely associated with the 'rulers of the Church.' Here again there are three possible interpretations: (1) there are three groups of officers, Clement the bishop, the 'rulers' as a special class under him, the presbyters, or there are two ranks of officers, a bishop, and the presbyters also called 'rulers'; (2) there is one group only, described as presbyters or as 'rulers,' of whom Clement was in the chief place as the presiding presbyter, but was not the holder of any different office from the rest. It is probable that decisions in regard to the interpretations to be placed on the epistle of Clement and the Shepherd of Hermas concerning this matter will be largely influenced by views of the evidence as a whole; and that in forming this general view the determining factor will be the importance attached to the list of the bishops of Rome as indicating a succession of single bishops at Rome from the first on the one hand, or to the position of the prophets regarded as a ministry independent of official rule on the other hand.

Later times. — It is clear that from the middle of the 2nd cent. onward the settled system of the Church was episcopal, and the episcopacy that of a single bishop, everywhere (on the theory of an exception at Alexandria, see above), and that this was the case whether the bishops were in Asia Minor and the East. Episcopacy and the rule of a single bishop then remained as the constant and universal tradition until the 16th cent., when the use of it was challenged in some quarters, and considerable bodies of Christians

who were without episcopal government gradually grew in numbers and in importance. The existing state of things was the outcome of influences derived from the pre-Reformation tradition and of new influences which arose in the course of the Reformation. In the churches of the East, episcopacy is regarded as a Divine institution, appointed means for the preservation and rule of the Church and the transmission of sacramental grace, and as essential in those who ordain. In the Church of Rome, bishops are held to be the Divine institution and appointed means and are the only ministers of ordination. Their position as rulers has been greatly modified by the practice and by the Pope. It has been much disputed whether the episcopate is a distinct order from the priesthood or only an extension of it. Most of the great schoolmen, including Aquinas (Sent. IV. xxiv. 3; Sum. Theol. Super. xi. 5), but not Dun Scotus (Sent. IV. xxv. 1, 2 ad 3), held that it is not a distinct order. The Council of Trent, while asserting that the hierarchy is Diviney instituted and consists of bishops, presbyters, and deacons, and that bishops are superior to presbyters and laity; the rule is in the hands of boards; then that the power of bishops is not common to them with the presbyters, was careful not to make any decision on this disputed point (Sess. xxiii. can. 6, 7). Of late years the prevailing opinion has been that the episcopate is a distinct order. In the Church of England great care has been taken to prevent the ministrations of any minister who are not episcopally ordained, and it is declared that 'from the Apostles' time there have been these orders of ministers in Christ's Church, bishops, priests, and deacons' (preface to the ordinal); but the phraseology used in the twelfth-third Article of Religion, by no means defining one who have public authority given unto them in the congregation to call and send ministers into the Lord's vineyard, stops short of requiring an opinion that in the abstract episcopacy is necessary to the maintenance of the ministry. Anglican divines have agreed that episcopacy is right; they have differed in the degree of emphasis with which they have asserted this; and they have not been agreed on the question whether episcopacy is actually necessary to a valid ministry as well as the proper means of conferring it. The German and Swiss Old Catholics and the Old Episcopal (popularly known as 'Jansenist') Church of Holland have received the claims of the bishops; but the Anabaptists, who have abandoned it. The Danish and Norwegian Lutherans, though retaining the title 'bishop,' are clearly without an episcopal succession, and 'bishop' is merely a name for a chief officer or superintendent. The case of the Swedish Lutherans stands on a different footing from that of the Danes and Norwegians, and there has been much discussion whether they have really preserved the episcopal succession which they believe that they possess. The Moravians claim an episcopal succession; but in their case also there is considerable doubt about the facts. Their bishops are simply an ordaining body, in the ordinary course of things do not recognize the validity of presbyterian ordination, and do not regard bishops as necessary for the administration of confirmation. The various Non-conformist bodies in Great Britain and Ireland and the allied communities in America do not possess episcopacy.1

1 The 'Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America' (in communion with the Church of England) owes its orders to Bishop Seabury, who was consecrated by three Scottish bishops in 1784, and to Bishops White, Provoost, and Madison, who were consecrated by English archbishops and bishops in 1785. The first 'bishop' of the so-called 'Methodist Episcopal Church' in America was Thomas Coke, who was set apart as a 'superintendent' by John Wesley in 1784, and received the title 'bishop' from the American Methodists Conference in 1785.
sence of the Christian consciousness, or of the voice of the Catholic Church, this universal acceptance throughout so many centuries makes a strong 

clear up all the other. The practical operation of the Christian the operations of the Spirit in the Church must decide how the life of the Church is maintained, and a question on this subject re- 
ed upon once a common work—in its Scope and Long-continued unification with which it has been believed that without the bishop there is not the Church. 

(6) Yet an argument of a different kind may be drawn from the signs of spiritual life which have been from the very beginning of Christianity since the 16th century. There are those who say that this fact weighs with them more heavily than the unification of many past centuries, even when the past is coupled with the impressive spectacle of the theory and practice of the churches of the East, of the Church of Rome, and of the Church of England at the present time. Those who so think do not consider that their contention is adequately met by any considerations derived from the unquestioned truth that ‘the power of God is not tied down to visible sacraments’ [Aquinas, Sum. Theol. III. lixv. 2; cf. Of Holy Orders, v. 4], and that this grace may overflow the channels of the covenant. (7) It is probable that the decision between the two conflicting lines of thought, the former with unimportance to the vast agreement between the Christian centuries among episcopal Christians, and the other to the life which has been manifested in non-episcopalians, really rests on a profound view deeply embedded in fundamental thought, and are connected with doctrines outside the scope of the present article, and in particular those concerning the whole question of Church authority. See Church, vol. iii. p. 624. 

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VOL. V.—22

EPISTEMOLOGY

I. Introductory. —Epistemological problems are at present the most interesting subjects of philosophical inquiry. Many books have recently been written on the problem of knowledge, many have been devoted to the history of attempts to solve it. These attempts have been made from various points of view, and there is a wide difference between the solutions offered. With some, Epistemology merely a branch of a particular problem of logical inquiry, for it is thought that the bounds of knowledge, its method, and its validity are given when Logic has found its proper place and is duly acknowledged. But in their case Logic has, like Aonon’s rod, swallowed soul and body, and logical processes are the whole of both knowledge and of reality. With others, knowledge is only a branch of psychological inquiry; and, when Psychology has completed its work, when it has discovered the origin, the growth, the nature, and the result of knowledge—Epistemology is also held to find its place and its justification. In all these cases, and in others which we do not mention, Epistemology is denied to be a separate discipline, its problems are submerged in other inquiries. But it is not possible for these problems to be merged in Logic, in Psychology, or in Metaphysics, as the history of modern philosophy abundantly shows.

It may, however, be granted that the epistemological problem is not the first for the individual mind or for the race. Historically we find that philosophy begins with Metaphysics. What is the form of the universe? What is its origin? What is reality? What is the nature of the soul? What is the body? And what is the relation of the soul to the body? These were the first questions that men asked, and it is possible to maintain that these questions, being only many but contradictory, and they gave rise to the further question: Is the human intellect able to solve such problems? From the historical point of view, Epistemology is the critical reflection on Metaphysics. It is an endeavour to ascertain why and how the contradictory answers which have arisen in metaphysical inquiry have emerged, and whether these are not due to a disregard of the limits of the human mind, and an unwarranted application of cognitive processes to matters beyond its ken.

While it is true that the epistemological problem arises out of the failure of metaphysical inquiry, it is also true that it emerges elsewhere and otherwise as soon as men begin to reflect on knowledge itself. At the outset knowledge is not a problem. Its nature and validity are taken for granted. Men assume nively that they are in contact with reality, that the objects which they know they know surely and immediately, and all that is needed is that the knowledge be verified in practice. They may ask: Have I really knowledge of this? Is this knowledge certain, and objectively true? or rather, since the question of objectivity and subjectivity has not yet arisen, and their thinking and its outcome have never been questioned, they abide in the conviction that the knowledge they possess is adequate and true. At first, both in the individual and in the race, knowledge is not concerned with itself, or with its processes; it is simple, immediate, and direct. It is only when difficulties arise in the practical application of knowledge that the mind begins to reflect on knowledge itself, its origin, its nature, and its limits. The external attitude is first: men look outward; they do not question the reality of common experience, or conceive of themselves as thinking beings at all. They are lost in the object, in the endeavour to master the means whereby they may serve their ends. The question of the self, of themselves as experiencing subjects, and of the bearing of the nature of themselves as the subjects which make knowledge does not arise until reflection has well begun. Apart from this, there have emerged, between Logic, Psychology, Metaphysics, and the Theory of Knowledge, there is no doubt that at the basis of all knowledge there is first the experience which is more or less indefinite. For
experience does not begin with a recognition of the distinctions whose subsequent reflection finds within it. At first it is vague and indefinite. The elements within it are not distinguished. These distinctions, in the work of the mind, we find of within experience which we call feeling, thought, and volition. These we discover to be ultimate, that is, we cannot identify thought with feeling or volition; hence all three are present in every experience. Similarly, we find in the sphere of knowledge that there are many elements which can be distinguished, and processes which can be considered in abstraction from the others—sensation, perception, imagination, conception, general laws, and so on; so that we may regard sensations becoming associated together, and by the apperceptive activity of the mind, along into images; perceptual progresses becoming perceptions by the same activity as increasing images; images becoming conceptions; and conceptions being worked up till they become ideas (Begriffe). Ideas in their turn give rise to newer and wider judgments, till the whole process is extended and placed in sure and definite relation with reality. Such is the kind of picture sometimes painted of the process and outcome of knowledge on its subject, or the way in which subjective objects interrelate with the subjective evolution, being bound together in order, so that the subjective and objective are only opposite sides of reality.

But many questions arise, such as the relation of sensation to perception, of perception to conception, of conception to judgment and to idea, and these questions are not yet answered. One fundamental question is, Can we consider any of these mental activities without involving all the others? Does not the simplest intellectual experience involve the whole activity of the mind, and is not the whole experience of the rational being implicitly present in the first rudimentary experience? When we concentrate attention on, say, perception, is not the rational activity of the perceiving subject involved in every perception?

2. Solidity of mental movements. Leaving these questions unanswered for the present, let us look for a little at the first abstraction which we make when we separate the cognitive activities from the volitions and from the feeling experience of the have a real Epistemology when we take the cognitive activities by themselves, and separate them from the other experiences inseparably bound up with them.

In knowledge, the knower appears to himself as an active and sensing being. Of the existence of this by himself and of his being such a being, he knows himself, and of these feelings we call sensations, which are in him, but which he neverthelecss attributes to the objects as their external cause. The knower is, above all, an intelligent will. He knows his object; the thing known, as he acts upon it, moves it, moulds it, makes or destroys or modifies it; and is himself moved, moulded, or otherwise affected by it. Without intellect there is no knowledge; without feeling there is no knowledge; without doing and experiencing the effects upon ourselves and our object, of this doing, there is no knowledge. And yet these elements, or facts, are all given together in the unity of the act or process of cognition (Ladd, Knowledge, Life, and Reality, p. 6).

It would seem, then, that Epistemology must be careful lest, in dealing with its own problems, it turn the fruit of its labor into a barren classification of the solutions untrue or inadequate. It must not proceed on the supposition that a purely cognitive experience is possible. It must accept from Psychology the fact that it establishes regarding the complexity of every act of cognition, and the further fact that not cognition but conation is the fundamental element in experience. It cannot investigate of itself, or inquire into the origin of experience, or go back to the first beginning of cognition. No science can go back to its own origin. Nor is there any science of origin. We cannot recall the beginning of our experience, nor can we say what experience is the simplest possible. But we can say that all experience is process. What we can discern as we look back on our experience is the past experience: we find of change felt and experienced—and also processes in which there is continuous interchange. There seem to be interchanges between external happenings and such feelings; all three are present in every experience. We find in the sphere of knowledge that there are many elements which can be distinguished, and processes which can be considered in abstraction from the others—sensation, perception, imagination, conception, general laws, and so on; so that we may regard sensations becoming associated together, and by the apperceptive activity of the mind, along into images; perceptual progresses becoming perceptions by the same activity as increasing images; images becoming conceptions; and conceptions being worked up till they become ideas (Begriffe). Ideas in their turn give rise to newer and wider judgments, till the whole process is extended and placed in sure and definite relation with reality. Such is the kind of picture sometimes painted of the process and outcome of knowledge on its subject, or the way in which subjective objects interrelate with the subjective evolution, being bound together in order, so that the subjective and objective are only opposite sides of reality.

But many questions arise, such as the relation of sensation to perception, of perception to conception, of conception to judgment and to idea, and these questions are not yet answered. One fundamental question is, Can we consider any of these mental activities without involving all the others? Does not the simplest intellectual experience involve the whole activity of the mind, and is not the whole experience of the rational being implicitly present in the first rudimentary experience? When we concentrate attention on, say, perception, is not the rational activity of the perceiving subject involved in every perception?

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and each must have its place in a systematic exposition of the activity of consciousness. On the other hand, both knowledge and will must be considered as parts of the same fundamental feeling which arouses attention and prompts to endeavour, with a view to an increase of pleasurable feeling, or an avoidance of an experience which is painful. Such is the primary feel, the feeling which is the starting-point of all action, whether in the region of thought or of action.

It is the signal to awareness, it arouses the attention, it inspires the action, it prompts towards the realization of a fuller experience. According as we look at the matter from one or another point of view, we shall have in the first place a world of truth or fact, in the second place a world of ideals more or less realized, and in the third place a world of appreciations, in which values and worths are the main feature. These three worlds ought to be one, and the present endeavour of philosophy is to make them one; and thus the worlds set forth in their exclusiveness by idealists, empiricists, and pragmatists must finally appear as aspects of that real world to construct which is the ultimate aim of philosophy.

While we thus caution ourselves that an abstract Epistemology must in its very nature be one-sided, and must ever be held in control by the other aspects of consciousness, it is yet a legitimate aim to consider knowledge in itself, apart from those important accessories, and then to round up with it as a matter of fact. It is legitimate to consider the operations of Logic apart from Psychology, and also to deal with problems of Metaphysics by themselves. But each of these involves the others, and every attempt to conduct to the others help and guidance. So, abstract Epistemology, or the discussion of the nature of knowledge, its limits, and its validity, may so far be considered in separation from the other philosophical sciences; yet the conclusions to be drawn from the discussion are themselves abstract, and are not forthwith to be regarded as true and adequate for the description of concrete reality.

3. Cognition as 'Awareness'.—Let us try then to get back to the simplest possible cognitive position. Even this will have elements in it which we shall be obliged to neglect, if we are to have only a cognitive position to attend to. When we seek the simplest possible cognitive position, we are not seeking the origin of knowledge. We have already said—and it is a commonplace—that inquiry into origin is not in order when we are considering the validity of a position. But we may ask, What is the fact about knowledge which involves the latter in its most elementary form? We obtain knowledge in its simplest form when we go back to the most elementary description of consciousness which we possess. It is simply that of awareness, or of simple apprehension. We may neglect for the moment the fact that awareness has in it a voluntary and a feeling element, and concentrate our attention on the fact that it has a cognitive element. Both Locke and Kant agree that all knowledge begins with experience, and from this there is no dissent on the part of any philosopher. What is the simplest form of experience, or the ultimate datum from which knowledge starts? Have we any state of mind which may, for this purpose, be regarded as ultimate, which, itself unexplained, may afford the explanation of everything else? The ultimate fact seems to be, not a stimulus of any kind, or a dependence of a state of consciousness on any sense complex, but an immediate presence to consciousness. What I feel when I see, when I hear, when I taste, when I see, is not further evidence of their existence than the fact that I feel, taste, or see them. I am aware of them, and this awareness is a primary act of knowledge. It depends on nothing but itself.

Here, if anywhere, we have an act of knowledge seemingly concerned with present reality, and with that alone. It is to be remarked again, by considering the problem from the point of view of the present study, the act of knowledge from the other elements in the complex state of consciousness which we call awareness. When we speak of knowing, of willing, of perceiving, of thinking, of attention, we mean the normal state of consciousness which usually involves all three. Pure thought, pure feeling, pure will, are abstractions, not names of any concrete reality. Awareness is a state of consciousness which may stress, and it may concentrate attention on the cognitive aspect of awareness. We may from this point of view name it apprehension, which is the simplest and the most ultimate of all cognitive acts. At the same time, it is contended that even the simplest state of consciousness has a cognitive aspect. The consciousness of the present is itself an act of knowledge. If at this stage we may use language more applicable to a subsequent stage of the argument, a state of consciousness is the state of any conscious subject, and it has an object. But, it may be said, is every conscious state one which may be described as knowledge? Is it not that, with the exception of the statement that knowledge, feeling, and volition are not to be derived from one another, that they are primary and undervived? It may be replied that the nature of intelligence has peculiarities inseparable from its very existence, which must be described from attributes peculiar to itself. On the other hand, it may be justly contended that every state of feeling has its cognitive aspect, that every state of knowledge has its feeling tone, and that every volition has its emotional and cognitive aspect. Still we may concentrate attention on the cognitive aspect which is present in every mental state. Awareness is mainly cognitive, even if it be also volitional and emotional. This awareness at its simplest implies the consciousness of a content present to us, and an assurance that we are so far in possession of a knowledge of it. It seems to be the simplest of all the acts of knowledge, and cannot be derived from anything more simple.

We are aware that the last statement is deeply contentious, and one which is attacked fiercely and from different standpoints. Idealism contends that the simplest act of knowledge is constituted by thought-relation, and we cannot have an act of knowledge without relation. But we may ask, What is the fact about knowledge which involves the latter in its most elementary form? We obtain knowledge in its simplest form when we go back to the most elementary description of consciousness which we possess. It is simply that of awareness, or of simple apprehension. We may neglect for the moment the fact that awareness has in it a voluntary and a feeling element, and concentrate our attention on the fact that it has a cognitive element. Both Locke and Kant agree that all knowledge begins with experience, and from this there is no dissent on the part of any philosopher. What is the simplest form of experience, or the ultimate datum from which knowledge starts? Have we any state of mind which may, for this purpose, be regarded as ultimate, which, itself unexplained, may afford the explanation of everything else? The ultimate fact seems to be, not a stimulus of any kind, or a dependence of a state of consciousness on any sense complex, but an immediate presence to consciousness. What I feel when I see, when I hear, when I taste, when I see, is not further evidence of their existence than the fact that I feel, taste, or see them. I am aware of them, and this awareness is a primary act of knowledge. It depends on nothing but itself.
the one hand, or all the facts which are formed into the ordered knowledge which we call by the name of Logic, Psychology, or Metaphysics, on the other. Awareness is the construction of all the systems, and it is well to take it as the starting-point of any theory of knowledge which can in any way be adequate to the fact.

4. Contents of knowledge.—Taking, then, this attitude of awareness as the starting-point for the discussion of knowledge, what do we find? The consciousness of a here and now, with a content more or less defined. This is the irreducible minimum, the ultimate datum of all experience. Apart from all subtlety of argument and all attempts at explanation, this is sure. There is a present experience, and from immediate experience every other kind of knowledge must start. The simplest form of immediate experience is just this awareness. No doubt the latter is a property of every form of life. It seems to lie at the bottom of adaptation, and may be considered as a characteristic of the environment, and, before organic life which helps an organism to adapt itself to its environment, as life becomes more organized, awareness is there in increasing measure. Organic habits and instincts are partly in this way, and in higher organizations they are the means by which the organism adapts itself to its environment. It is a matter of observation that every organism has a working knowledge of Nature, and is so far aware of the hindrances and helps towards its self-preservation. This is a characteristic of all life, and without it life would be impossible. How far adaptation to environment may be regarded as something which flows out of intelligence on the part of life is a question which does not admit of any definite answer; but the fact of adaptation is undoubted. Yet in a self-conscious being adaptation to environment must in the long run become a conscious process, and intelligent foresight will take the place of instinctive adaptation. At the same time it must be conceded that adaptation to environment, even in a being implicitly self-conscious, consists in adjustments common to men and the lower organisms. Men are practising science even before they recognize it. Even the tracks made by sheep up a hill-side are wonderfully engineered, taking the line of least resistance. The people of a village who have never heard of Euclid, in making their paths through the fields, act on the principle that the two sides of a triangle are longer than the third side.

We may recognize, then, that organic habits and instincts have a significance for knowledge, and that knowledge of a kind has made some progress before reflexion begins, or at least reflexion in a rudimentary condition. Insects, beliefs, habits, are part of that original endowment of man in virtue of which he is able to make himself at home in the world in which he has to live. These habits and beliefs develop in man in interaction with the environment of his daily life. Organic habits and beliefs, increased by the experience of many generations handed down from father to son and recorded in language, may grow to so great an extent that, in virtue of them, men may learn to obtain control over the world so as to make life more possible. This is the case when we begin to seek to understand the mystery of knowledge. Analyzing this complex body of knowledge with which an individual is acquainted, we see that so much is due to the primary endowment of the individual, which enables him to make himself at home in the world in which he is to dwell. We may not exactly measure the extent and limits of this primary disposition, or inquire how much of it is due to traditional lore and how much to the construction of its own, but it is not possible for one to tell how much is due to nature and how much to nurture. But, at all events, for every individual born into this world, there may be a certain portion of knowledge which enables him to start, by no means ill-furnished, on the work of living. No doubt much of this knowledge is uncritical, unsifted, and much of it must be cast aside as untrustworthy, but it is there, a natural knowledge, which is an individual must start with.

Coming back, then, to awareness as the simplest datum of a possible knowledge, let us ask what is implied by it. Of course the two elements which are combined in every act of knowledge are present here in their most rudimentary form. There is the attitude of the mind which is aware, and the object of which it is aware. What the nature of the object is we may be permitted to express, but that it is there, and may be its own feeling of pleasure or of pain; it may be the change from one state to another; it may be an impression from without; in every case there is awareness, and in every case there is the awareness itself, considered simply as an attitude of the subject. This awareness, thus simply considered, gives us the starting-point of knowledge. It passes through the various grades of experience, until, as the outcome of growing experience and of reflexion on itself, it becomes the full-orbed distinction which we call the distinction between subject and object, which is implied in all human knowledge. The subject has its own nature, characteristics, modes of action, its rules, its principles, and its laws which condition all knowledge. Objects have also their own characteristics, their own natures, and their own correspondences. So all knowledge is conditioned by the knowing subject and by the objects which are known. The two are in relation to each other, and the whole question is as to what is the relation, or what are the relations, of subject and object within the world of knowledge. Are we to think of subject and object as a distinction which is ontological? Are we to think of this distinction as the same which we name "self" and "not-self"? Are we to place the two under the law of causality, and name the one "cause" and the other "effect"? Are we to look at the object as the governing element in the formation of knowledge? Or, are we to look at the subject as the making of this knowledge, and to see knowledge in consistency therewith? All these questions confront us as we begin to wrestle with the epistemological problem, and the history of philosophy may be called the history of the attempt to answer them. Other questions also arise. There is the question of the possibility of knowledge, and of the various attitudes assumed thereto on the part of the human spirit. These attitudes are, or have been, mainly three. There is the attitude called scepticism, which denies the possibility of knowledge, and which has appeared in various relations in the history of human thought. There is the attitude of dogmatism; and, finally, there is criticism, or an examination of the principles which are implied in the possibility of knowledge both on the side of the subject and on that of the object. All these attitudes must obtain an admission in a discussion of knowledge, its possibility, and its existence as fact. Further, there are questions as to the relation of knowledge to the object that is known. Is the object of knowledge independent of the fact that it is known? Is knowledge an essential quality of things? And, if the object is knowable, what is the machinery by which it is knowable? Is
knowledge in immediate relative relation to its object, or is it representative?

It is clearly the object of the question in this article to give anything like an adequate account of the various attitudes of the mind towards the epistemological problem, or to institute an inquiry into the characteristic features of scepticism, dogmatism, or criticism. It is equally impossible to set forth the various theories which have been involved in history regarding the relation of thought towards its object, or to give a full and complete view of realism, idealism, or the theories of knowledge contained under these or similar names. To deal with empiricism fully would be to give a complete account of English philosophy from Hobbes down to J. S. Mill, with a glance at the philosophy of Shadworth Hodgson.

One main characteristic of this philosophy is that it regards the object as the determining element in knowledge, and looks at the relation of object to subject as one of causality. Nor can we give a full account of idealistic conceptions of experience, whether subjective or objective, for that would be to attempt to write the history of philosophy since Locke invented the new section made to thought by the splendid achievements of Greece.

We must travel by a shorter route, which will not leave the above questions without an answer. We shall look at them first from the point of view of objective knowledge, and next under the subject as one of causality. For we must regard the subjective, or, if it is valid, must correspond with reality. Under the former question, the object is the subject, and, as, less knowledge, if it is valid, must correspond with reality. Under the latter heading, all questions regarding the physical relation to subject, and, as, less knowledge, if it is valid, must correspond with reality. Under the latter heading, all questions regarding the physical relation to subject, and, as, less knowledge, if it is valid, must correspond with reality.

5. Epistemology and sense-experience. — Starting from the concrete fact of our experience, which we consider to be a primary fact of our mental life—the awareness of a content—we must seek to show how this really involves, or contains implicitly, what is evolved into the structures of Metaphysics, Psychology, Logic, and Epistemology. All the mental sciences spring out of this fact of awareness—a fact of which the simplest analysis gives position, discrimination, and comparison. These are not independent acts or processes, nor can they be regarded as constituting the fact of awareness. They are simply aspects of this fact, and are not before it in point of time. They are in themselves abstractions, and are to be viewed as strictly subordinate to the reality out of which they spring, and apart from which they have no meaning. On the other hand, the simplest facts of mind, even sense-impressions and ideas, cannot be facts of mind at all unless they have in them, implicitly at least, the rudimentary forms of those features of distinction and relation which have become articulated in the form in which we find our highest thought. To make explicit what is involved in the simplest form of experience is the function of philosophy.

Here we are at the parting of the ways; and, according as we take the one path or the other,
opposition. On the one side there is extension, and on the other there is feeling or a state of consciousness; and how are these to be reconciled? The objects which affect us seem to be out there beyond ourselves; and we really ask what they are like. We need not recall the story so picturequely written in the history of human thought, of how the relation of the mind to its objects, as this is set forth in the sense-experience, has culminated in Scepticism on the one hand and Solipsism on the other. Doubt as to the very existence of an external world, followed by doubt as to the existence of any external world, has arisen from the attempt to make sense-experience the whole experience of man. Yet sense-experience is a fact, and has to be taken into account on any theory of knowledge. The characteristic quality of it is the customary immediate existence of a consciousness content. 'I see,' 'I hear,' 'I feel,' 'I taste,' and so on, simply give, so far as sense is concerned, the present experience and nothing more. This,' that,' here,' in,' and the like which have been the presence of consciousness of a sense quality. No doubt, there is a difference between these indications—here is one thing, now is another—but they are only variations of the same kind of conscious life. Taine points out the various points of view that all that has been evolved by conscious activity in elaboration of it in former experience, and what is left for pure perception is only an experience of a 'here' and 'now.' What is perceived is not an articulated object, say, a horse, with all the characteristic marks of a horse as it is to a scientific mind, or even to a practical mind, with all the implications of a gathered knowledge; it is only a difference of colour which is presented to sense. This is commonplace ever since Berkeley's classic analysis of the nature of vision—an analysis which is true of all our interpretations of sense-experience. When we strip sense-experience bare of all that is added to it by interpretation, we have only a present content of consciousness—in practical experience it is not possible to make so drastic an abstraction.

On the other hand, it is vain to say that the nature of things is to be perceived. The statement Ex hoc est percipiet is without meaning unless we add to bare perception those perceptual judgments by which a mere presentation of difference of colour and shape becomes a judgment of distance, of character, and so on. But, when we do so, we have come to a perception which is charged with the burden of all the experience of a long experience, functioned by interpretations gathered by a mind in contact with reality, and which has formed judgments in accordance with its own nature and the nature of things. It has been customary to refer to perception as the standard and norm of knowledge. But, when this is done, we have passed from perception as simple sense-experience, and have introduced into it all the secretions which have been gathered from the action of the mind in interaction with the objects of its experience. Perceptual presentation (to use the phrase of Ward) implies more than can be justified from sense-experience. It is possible, indeed, on the one hand to arrive at something like a universal. That universal is precisely what Ward calls a 'presentational continuum'; or, as the same thing is expressed by Kant, 'the universal is just the continuity of the process which makes up the life-history of immediate sense-experience.' This may be briefly described, except in distinguished phases or parts, as a purely perceptual judgment which constitutes the identity between them. The incessant change of sense-life is due to its being a mere presentation of the same simple form of existence, is due, in fact, to the unceasing variations of the content: a 'this' can equally well become a 'that,' a 'now' a 'then,' and so on.
of the contents of consciousness. But there is another order, in which we seek to establish not contingency but necessity, not accidental conjunction but inner connexion. Over against the uncontrolled flow of sense-presentations, and the unregulated flow of the intellectual function which we place the exercise of a mental activity of our own. We seek to place together the things which we think, belong together. We may recognize that they belong together, not because they have happened to come together in some passing phase of our experience, but because they are fixed in changeless relations.

The properties of a circle belong together, and cannot be separated without destroying the notion of a circle. Thus, science is the attempt to ascertain the things and qualities which belong together, and to replace a contingent and accidental order by one that is fixed and connected. Nor is the activity of thought limited merely to the recognition of the things which belong together in the objective order of the world—whether that order is fixed by the peculiar constitution of the actual world to be ascertained by experiment and observation, or is one whose being as (as in pure mathematics) constructed solely by the mind. For mind is creative. In the normative sciences there is not merely recognition of things which belong together, but the being of things that some things shall belong together. In the one case, the self is the discoverer and the interpreter of an order which it has not instituted; in the other case, it is a law-maker, determining both the end which it has and the means by which it is to be accomplished. Here it is possible to 'give to airy nothing a local habitation and a name.' In this sphere we certainly find the activity of the subject, the expression of self and of its own purpose, where the train of thought is dominated by a purpose, and the means are arranged by which a new meaning is given to the material so arranged as to fulfil a purpose. As Adamson has remarked: 'Taken in the mass, our thinking appears (1) as a subjective activity; (2) as the expression of some purpose, and therefore as self-conscious; (3) as relating together the materials supplied by presentations and representations' (op. cit. II. 258).

Leaving the discussion of the first two characteristics of thinking for the moment, we shall dwell on the third, namely, that of relating together materials as available for presentations. We have already seen that the aim of thinking is to bring together what belongs together. Now, it is clear that the presentational continuum does not bring together what belongs together; it presents experience as it happens to come. It, therefore, gives no principle of rational connection. Nor do the happenings which are merely associated together supply the linkage which we are in search of. What are the criteria of things which belong together? How are they to be related? In the first place, we must consider the rational principles of the mind which links them together, and, in the second place, according to the native connexions of the things themselves. But in every product of knowledge these are together. True, in dealing with the two factors of knowledge, we may neglect one or other for the sake of convenience; but we must always try to restore the wholeness of what we have thus disrupted for the time.

7. The conceptual and perceptual order. — In his later works, as indeed also in the 'Thought,' W. James says, with all the emphasis of italics: 'The intellectual life of man consists almost wholly in his substitution of a conceptual order for the perceptual order in terms of which his experience comes.' (Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 51). And on the previous page he says: 'If my reader can succeed in abstracting from all conceptual interpretation and lapse back into his immediate sensible life, ... he will find it to be what some one has called a big blooming buzzing confusion, as free from contradiction in its "much-at-onceness" as it is all alive and every-thing and evidently the semblance of the fineness which we expect from its author. But is it true or adequate? The sensible life is, so far, an ordered life. Impressions which come to us through the senses are filtered as they come. Eye, ear, and all the other senses select out of the big blooming buzzing confusion' those waves of sight and sound which can be transformed into sensations; and, even at the very beginning, the eye does not see sound, or the ear appreciate light. But the eye does have a picture of a coloured something, which is not confused, or blooming, or buzzing. At the outset, therefore, there is not confusion, but something which is already full of order; sense-impressions are definite and ordered, and the work of science is to ascertain, define, and describe the order.

But can it be fairly said that the order in which our experience originally comes is the perceptual order? Or, if it is, can we separate thus abruptly the perceptual from the conceptual order? Can we have percepts by ourselves? James evidently does not think that the perceptual order offers constantly to the perceptual order as the norm and criterion of valid knowledge. To us, on the other hand, a percept is as much the work of thought as a concept. Even sensation itself, in so far as it has a meaning, is a work of thought.

8. Thought and reality. — It may be well to guard ourselves at this stage against a possible misunderstanding, which might arise from speaking in separate terms of thought and reality, and the relation between them. We do not mean by Epistemology, or the theory of cognition, an examination of the nature of knowledge as something apart from the reality which is then taken as an external standard. Rather we regard the treatment of thought, and the analysis of reality itself, as the attempt to reach a world of reality considered as a system of ideas, which may actually become the world of reality. It is our interpretation of reality, and is part of the reality which is constructed by intelligence in response to the whole universe of experience. The environment of thought is the hypothetical world of experience as a possible world of action; it is the whole world of experience, which is to be articulated into system, and made such as to answer to our intelligence. Not, indeed, that we may ever hope to transfer all reality into our system of thought, but the solution of the thinker is the reality he can command and use. Yet our system of thought falls far short of reality. For, while the world which each mind constructs for itself out of its own experience is the world of which it is the centre, there must be a world common to all intelligences, or, in other words, a higher experience than ours, which in its organized state is the supreme world of reality. All the worlds which seem separate and unconnected, as constructed by each for himself, have common ground and purpose in that experience which is higher and deeper than ours. In this view, reality is the dependent of our intelligence, and something which far transcends our experience. Yet our judgment and its outcome must be held to be an element in that higher experience, and the world we construct is a part of the world that is what it is for the higher experience.

As, on the one hand, reality must be held to transcend the final worlds which knowledge builds out of our experience comes. On the other hand, there is something given before thought can begin its constructive work. Our immediate feeling has a
content of its own, something which is there in a sort of unity and simplicity which we have not made, but only experience. It is a mode of con-
tact with a world that is not yet conditioned in its
elements. We do not confer on that immediate
direct experience either its immediacy or its individ-
uality; we experience it in its unity. The first step of
the action of thought on the immediate feeling is
to break up its formal unity, to distinguish ele-
ments in it, and to pass beyond it into another
kind of unity, namely, that which is conferred by
thought. But to restore the lost unity is very
difficult, and the whole task of philosophy is to
restore that unity which is first given in feeling,
disrupted by thought, and made diverse by the
analysis which thought has performed upon it.
Thus, in the end, we strive to attain, by the exer-
cise of discursive thought, to something like intu-
ition of unity, the unity of a whole, what life started
with in that intuition of unity which is the charac-
teristic of our feeling life. For the mind, in its
contingency, in its dependence on the world, finds
that it passes its strength either to attain to intuition
which envisages the world as a whole—that is only
for a higher experience than ours—or to rest con-
tent with the former possibility of mere experi-
ence. It is the province of Logic (p. 27) to set forth
the categories of mind, or the machinery by which it
does its work, as it is the province of Psychology
to set forth cognition considered as a merely mental
process. It is the part of Epistemology to accept
from the sister sciences the description of the pro-
cess of knowledge considered as an internal fact,
and to accept from Logic the deduction of the
categories, their inter-relations, and their worth
as instruments for the organization of knowledge.
We need not, therefore, dwell here on the signifi-
cance of space and time as the forms within which
all our intuitions take place. Nor need we inquire
into the subjectivity or objectivity of space and
time. Sufficient for our purpose is the fact that
all our mental life is conditioned by these forms;
at least all our sense-presentations are of such a
case as never to transcend the boundaries of space
and time. Into the origin and nature of our con-
ceptions of these we are not called to enter. It is
sufficient to say that they are forms into which
mind gathers its experiences, and that it is con-
strained to regard all things as things in one space,
and all events as happening in one time. In these
forms it finds the first possibility of a unity of
experience.

9. Thought and self.—The notion of space, then,
dominates all our thinking with regard to things,
and time does the same with regard to the inner
life. It is another matter, however, with what we
ask ourselves how the notion of time governs all the
phenomena of the inner life. Can we in this rela-
tion do without the supposition that the very possi-
bility of time depends on the fact that there is
a continuity of the thinking subject to which the
events that happen to it, or in it, are referred? Is
not the permanence of the thinking subject the
condition of the possibility of the notion of time?
We are aware that this is a keenly contested
question.

*It is a fact recognized explicitly or implicitly by every one,
that the most striking and fundamentally changing experiences that
enter into the life history of an individual mind are in some
sense owned by a self or ego which remains one and the same
throughout his various vicissitudes. We begin to inquire into the
precise nature of the unity and identity ascribed to the self,
and the principles by which its experiences belong to it,
we are confronted with a fundamental enigma of 'experience.'
On the one hand, it is maintained that, just as the unity of a
thought, or of a melody, or of an organism consists merely in the
special mode in which its parts are connected and corre-
bated so as to form a specific kind of complex, so the unity of
what we call an individual mind consists merely in the pecu-
liarity in which we call its experiences are united with each
other. On this view, when we say that a desire is some one's
desire, we mean that it colors and is conditioned in the
same way by the experiences of others into a connected totality of experiences having a certain
sort of unity and continuity which can belong to
experiences only, and not to mere phenomena or
merely the manifold experiences through their union with each
other form a single whole.

10. Judgment the category of thought.—This
order, which I do not make but discover, is one
which I am able to discover because it is in itself
in relation to my intelligence, and can be con-
strued by me in accordance with those principles
on which I act as an intelligent being. These
rational principles are implicit in every act of
judgment, and the rational principles of my judg-
ment are found to be at work in the order which I
discover. Because I do discover, I do not find it
the business of Logic to set forth. For our purpose
it is necessary to refer to only one of these categories,
that is, that of Judgment, which is the form which
thought uses in the apprehension of truth. Logic is coming more and more to recognize judgment as the one category which involves all other categories in its operation, and in its discussion of logical principles the doctrine of the judgment holds the foremost place. We refer to the treatise on Logic of the 

Dr. von Hart's Logic in illustration. The various forms of the judgment may be found in treatises on Logic, and need not be detailed here. But the fundamental conditions of the judgment are fundamental conditions of thought, and in every form of it involves a relation to the thinking self or to the unity of the mental subject. This holds good even on the hypothesis of Stout, as quoted above. It is the self that judges, and it judges in consistency with the totality of its rational experience, or at least it ought to do so. In the second place its judgments must be consistent with each other; in other words, all judgments must have regard to the law of identity and contradiction. If we are to have a constant and consistent meaning, we must think according to that law. Again, our judgment must have regard to the fact of connexions among the objects of thought. The irresistible belief that things are connected, and that the connexions may be discovered, lies at the basis of every judgment. What the connexion is the mind may not know, as is shown in the possibility of discovering but that such a connexion exists is a conviction without which there can be no judgment.

In dealing with the judgment in its various forms and applications, we ought to remember that there is one element common to all, which no judgment can explicitly set forth. In all judgments, reference is explicitly or implicitly to the subject which judges. It is the subject which supposes, affirms, judges. The subject may say itself to be the object of reflection. Thought itself may be the object of thought, and it may be reflected on till all its implications become explicit, and its modes of acting may be articulately set forth. But that does not exhaust the meaning of the subject. Is thought capable of exhausting in its own way all the meanings which are implied in the function of thought? But, the more we do so, the more is the reference to a subject a persistent relation. Exhusted itself by an object and thought as much as we please, yet at the end the self persists as the final condition under which knowledge of the self as object is possible. The meaning of self or subject as capable of statement as object of thought does not exhaust its substantive meaning.

The great aims of philosophers have been, on the one hand, to show that the self as "subject" is nothing but the self as "object"; and, on the other hand, to show that the self as "subject" is only a sort of restatement of the self as subject; or, yet again, to show that the self as object arises as a sort of cognitive screen or blind on the self as subject, so that the latter is hopelessly obscured or hidden—the subject disappearing in the realm of the "unknowable," or the "thing-in-itself." (Sadewa, Thought and Things, or Genése Logique, I. 267.)

In this relation we may quote from the essay of Stout (L.c., p. 8):

"The self is the same self, inasmuch as throughout the process of such awareness of the desire as is the same, and inasmuch as it is aware of the object attained as identical with the object perceived. The best example, however, is supplied by the continuity of attention. In the condition when it is thereby directed to the same total object from varying points of view, so as to distinguish successively its different partial features, aspects, and relations. For instance, in considering a flower as a flower, as a plant, as a flower as classification as a natural species, the stem, root, and leaf, all features may be successively distinguished. The total object is a flower as a species—a whole flower of the whole flower of the whole flower of the whole flower; science so far as this may be relevant to the classification. The parts of the total object as total object are successively discriminated, and in their turn cease to be discriminated, but there is continuity of attention, inasmuch as the partial features successively acquired are throughout uniformly apprehended as being partial features of the same complex entity.

As a description of the work done by the mind in the classification of a flower, this leaves nothing to be desired. But to speak of attention as continuous because it is throughout directed to the same object seems a rather inadequate account of the processes of thought. For, if attention does describe the attitude of attention as continuous; for, as a matter of fact, the process of attention by which the flower is classified may not be continuous; it may be distributed over many times, and in any segment of it may be resumed and resumed after an interval. But the main point is that the process of attention as described by Stout is attended by a consciousness of the strain of attention. I may be absorbed in the attempt to classify the flower, but on reflection I am conscious that I was attending all the time. In fact, all the objective meanings—even those in which the subject or thought itself have been thought of—are over against a subject-self. The self is not to be merged in its own products, and the unity of the object seems to be inadequate to produce that unity of the subject which is the presupposition of knowledge. For, if attention ever work out the fact of a subject over against all the objects of thought or objective meanings, as the very ground of the unity of the subject, it is the unity of thought to work out. The first condition of the possibility of knowledge is just this reference to a subject, which becomes, in the process of working out the kingdom of truth, a self-conscious subject to which all the objects of knowledge finally assume the form of a coherent world of truth. In this ideal goal, truth and fact become one; and the content of mind, articulated into system, becomes the content of reality as well. But such a goal is never attained by the finite mind; it remains an ideal, but one that influences and shapes all our lesser and more partial systems of actual knowledge. So, the real question becomes not how to attain to the notion of the unity of the subject from the object, as Stout really does, or to attain the unity of the object world from the subject, but how to construct an object as related unities in a wider unity which transcends and yet contains both. Are not subject and object subsumed in the wider world of experience? Are they not really given in the earliest experience possible to a subject which finally becomes this subject? Are not both factors really present in the first cognitive experience, which we have already found to be present even in the sense-life? No doubt in our reflective analysis we place the subject over against the object and the object over against the subject, and make their relation to each other one of utter opposition; yet the relation of opposition is a relation after all, and even in opposition the two are really held together in the unity of one experience.

II. Intelligibility of the objects of knowledge.—In any case, there is a conformity between cognition and its objects. What is the meaning of that conformity? Are we to say that cognition must conform to objects, or are we to say that objects must conform to cognition? This is the experiment of Kant, who maintains that the assumption that cognition must conform to objects had led to scepticism, asked what would be the outcome of the supposition that objects should conform to cognition. His question and the answer to it were epoch-making in the history of thought, and every theory of knowledge must take them into account.
In answering his question, Kant endeavoured to discover the nature of reality from the conditions of reality, and in so doing he constructed the world of objects, step by step, on the plan of the world of knowledge. If there is such a world intelligible to us, the conditions of its intelligibility are very analytical. Whether the actual world was of the kind which answered to these conditions was, and is, a question which Kant could not answer. For his solution had regard to the conditions of intelligibility, and not to the actual world of human experience. So his intelligible world remained a phenomenal world, purely hypothetical; and the question of the relation of this phenomenal world to reality remained unanswered, or, rather, the answer was farther removed than ever. Instead of the old dilemma, we find ourselves in the presence of a new one, and one more radical than ever; for we have removed the older difficulties, only to be confronted with a new contrast between reality and appearance, between phenomena and things-in-themselves, between the world of the knowable and its relation to the world of the known and the analysis of thought and its action will give us the conformity of objects to cognition, and the consequent setting forth of the conditions of knowledge, lead to this contrariety of the world of reality and the world of thought? If conformity to our cognition, as in the new question asked by Kant, and its answer, removes reality from our knowledge, and restricts our knowledge to phenomena, there is time to ask another question as to the relation of thought and things. When and where in experience does intelligibility begin? Are we to regard intelligibility as something impressed on things by the action of the mind? Are mind and objects? Of course, if objects are to be intelligible, they must conform to the nature of the intelligence which apprehends them. But is the intelligibility conferred on the object, or is it to be supposed intelligible in itself? Are objects really what Hume—and in this Kant seems to be at one with him—calls independent facts, and are events really disconnected which are outwardly and contingently gathered together in our minds by purely mental relations? Kant did in his philosophy show that the Nature known by us as knowable is systematic, and finally came to the conclusion that this systematic character is associated with the unity of self-consciousness. But consistent thinkers must not suppose that this systematic character of Nature is not conferred on it by us, that, in fact, it is implicit in the earliest experience of rational beings; and the business of our thinking is to make explicit what is implicit there, and to articulate in detail what is incursively present at the beginning.

And yet, while we regard as true the relation of thought to an intelligible world, it must not be supposed that the world of thought and the systematic world discovered by it are identical. Nor can we suppose that the two are so connected that the analysis of thought and its action will give us the real world. While thinking is a real factor in the making of the world, as we know it, it does not follow that the real world is one thing when thought and other sense data are given to us, as thinkers and actors, it is so, and the reality for us expands with its explanation, and, through the operations of thought in the processes of conceiving, judging, inferring, the indefinite becomes defined. The contents of thought presents are articulated into a systematic whole, and differences are held together in a unity which contains and explains them, and so for us the world is made. Yet the law of gravitation was at work before Newton formulated the law of inverse squares, and the conservation of energy was a law of things before Joul made his experiments and expanded its meaning.

It is not possible, then, to identify the movements of the world, or the succession of events, with the lifeless sequence of our intellectual processes, for the latter may render explicit what lies before us in the world of mere concrete experience. It is necessary for the philosophy of the present time to go further back into the intelligibility, and ask how it began, and to show that the world of ideas into which thought has gathered its experience had relations with fact long before reflexion began, and that the difference between sense and understanding, between fact and truth—In whatever way we put this ever-recurring contrariety—is less absolute than empiricism has supposed. The correspondence between the perceptual and the conceptual worlds is closer than has been supposed. As we have already said, percepts are a product of the activity of thought, and concepts are in touch with perceptual reality. The processes which we may describe in our text-books as if they were separate and in isolation from the hypothetical object of our thought determine our interaction with the world and its objects comes to self-realization.

We must, then, set aside the assumption that reality and knowledge begin in each other. We must begin, and from these strive to reach a world beyond itself. Subjective states as such are never present without some objective reference, whatever that reference may be. Even feeling, which has been described as subjectively objective, has in it a content which cannot be explained without a reference which leads beyond that state considered in itself. Pleasure and pain, though subjective states, have an objective reference. More clearly, is this true of the states of consciousness which we describe as sensation and cognition. These have objects, desires, aims, purposes; and they reach forth towards their objects. Thus we are justified, from the psychological point of view, in saying that there are objective and subjective elements in the simplest cognition. All the changing states of consciousness have objective references, which may be described as both subjective and objective; and the process of thinking is just the articulation of these correlated elements into the fabric of our thought, whether that thought is occupied with the analysis of itself, or with the body of knowledge which is the real possession of the kind. Thus we seek to advance from thought to things, not from things to thought; these are together at the onset of cognition, and full cognition ideally realizes them as one. Instead of holding that thought determines reality, it would be better to say that reality determines our thought, and that, when reflexion uses the apparatus of notion, judgment, and reason, it is guided by principles which are true of reality as well as characteristic of thought.

More especially it may be affirmed that the aim of the mind in its judgments is always objective. It seeks universality which will give us a better way to connect together what belongs together. But there is a distinction in its procedure, which marks also a distinction in the form of judgment. There are judgments which are active endorsement and acknowledgment. There are judgments which are attended by active belief, and with the conviction that it is impossible not to believe. The attitude of genuine belief, of acceptance of control by the mind, is characteristic of certain judgments. Here the mind is in an attitude of certainty; it knows, and can act on the assurance that this judgment is true. But there are judgments which seem only
probable. Here the mind is in a state of suspense; it is uncertain, and can only construct a conclusion from which it withholding that position of certainty which in other situations it asserts. It is not possible here to enter fully into the positions of those who have been called lately the Austrian school, or to dwell on the suggestive work of Meinong and others. (As to the meaning of assumption, see Meinong, Uber Annahmen [1910], and Baldwin, *Genetic Logic.*) It is sufficiently to say that we regard belief, when always, or is always regarded as, of objective reality and validity. It regards itself as true, and as valid in the sphere of fact.

12. Connectedness of objects of thought: significance of mathematics for Epistemology. — We come now to what we stated to be the third mark of true knowledge—the assumption of connectedness among the objects of our thought. That there is such a connectedness, which we do not make but discover, we regard almost as axiomatic. What the connectedness really is has to be discovered in every case. The postulate of the mind is that there is such connectedness; that its formal attitude in relation to all the objects of its knowledge. With regard to things, it postulates the relation of cause and effect, and other universal axioms which it regards as necessary. No doubt there has always been a tendency to bind together the abstract form to extremes, and to bind all experience into those unities of abstract thinking. As an illustration of this, we may instance the tendency to make that necessity, of which mathematics may be cited as the symbol, the type and norm of all experience. We see this tendency at work in the attempt to reduce all the sciences to mathematical form, and in particular to reduce biological problems to physical and chemical terms.

Yet, after all, the study of the history of mathematics, especially in some of its more recent developments, is not without interest to the student of the theory of knowledge. In his *Prolegomena to all Future Metaphysic*, Kant asks the questions, 'How is pure mathematics possible? How is pure metaphysic possible?' He thought he had established the validity of the mathematical sciences by showing that they are confined to phenomena, and do not apply to things-in-themselves. In mathematics we have the unconditioned necessity, the a priori truths, which may be regarded as constructed by the mind itself, and the knowledge of such things does not apply to things-in-themselves. Whether this really involves the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge and of the unknowable we do not stay to inquire. Our present aim is to look at mathematics and physical science generally, in the interest of Epistemology. For in mathematics we may distinguish between the thinker and his thought, as we do in other branches of science. We may look at science from the point of view of a record of the mind that thinks, relates, elaborates, and as a record of the inter-relations of the facts of Nature as these are understood and interpreted. It has been held that in mathematics the mind is creative, that it has made the facts with which it deals, and that in this sphere there is no difference between mathematical science and mathematical thought. We make our definitions, we state our axioms, we claim our postulates, we have our intuitions; and, reasoning from these, we have elaborated our algebra, and constructed our calculations. In this sphere, at all events, it is claimed that the mind has constructed its objects, and not only constructed them, but has also called them into being. But it has to be borne in mind—and here the pragmatist has something to say which is relevant—that geometry, algebra, and all the other branches of science, have arisen in response to the demand of practical need. Geometry arose to meet the demands of land-measurement, and algebra arose simply as an extension of arithmetic. These sciences arose out of practice, and in its highest forms mathematics may be viewed as a measuring and calculating instrument invented by the mind in its desire to make Nature subservient to its own purposes. The primary purpose of the main interest of mathematics, and there are others who regard mathematics as the type of true knowledge. The latter look at the applications of mathematics as of interest only in so far as they suggest problems in pure mathematics. They are inclined to think that all the sciences remain imperfect and crude until they have come under the mathematical yoke and submitted themselves to its rule and method. But the ultimate question in Epistemology is, Does thought determine reality, or does reality determine thought, or what is the relation between thought and reality? Granted that mathematics is so fact-mental a product, in fact much more a mental product than the more concrete sciences are, still we may ask, What is the relation of the constructive mind to the science which it has constructed?

If we go back to the beginnings of mathematics, we find that it grew out of practical need. It was an instrument made for the overcoming of Nature. Man had to master his environment, and in the struggle he came to those constructions which we find used as a means for measuring and counting. But, when man drew his first circle or saw the mystery of parallel lines, a new view burst upon him. The figures became something in themselves and to be studied for their own sake; so we find various demonstrations discovered by many thinkers, various problems solved, until at length Euclid gathered the geometrical science of his time into that book which still remains the foundation of geometrical science. We find men also studying the various properties of the sections of the cone, and setting them forth, largely for practical use, but also with a desire to know all the possible meanings of the construction which they themselves have made. Numbers were useful for counting, but their characteristic features were themselves the object of abiding interest. So it has been with the figures, with the mathematical science and mathematical thought. Mathematical formulae may be regarded as concepts, and they play the part in mathematical thinking which analogies play in other thinking. But the meaning and scope of concepts or of mathematical formulae, and their worth and validity, are things not given when they are formed. In both cases the intent and meaning are the objects of endless research. Thus we find, throughout the ages, those thinkers to whom mathematical thought owes their advance towards systematic coherence occupied with examining and strengthening the foundations of mathematics, purifying its methods, submitting them to proofs ever increasing in rigour, and putting to stringent tests the scope and range of current conceptions. Geometry by itself made progress, algebra by itself became more and more comprehensive and thorough; and, by their union in the hand of Descartes and their cross-fertilization, a new era in mathematical science began. Analytic geometry arose, and out of it sprang the calculus. Here, too, men were occupied with the meaning of the new formulae which they had invented. For a new formula, though the work of mind, obtains an object value as soon as it is formulated. Mathematicians had to study their own
formule, to follow out their implications, and they were often surprised at the new and strange worlds which opened out to their investigation. For by means of the mathematical method, old equations, and rules invented by the ancients, were discarded, and new and more universal and more particular by the exercise of that thinking power which first constructed them. This is one feature of the epistemological value of mathematics.

But there is another aspect equally significant. Mathematical formulae, as we saw, arose out of practical need, and were invented in order to obtain control over Nature. Equally every new departure and every extension of mathematical formulae was supported by practical need, and their validity was tested by ability to solve the problems which were presented to men by the practical difficulties they encountered in the course of their widening experience. On the one hand, man strove to extend the range of his concepts through the notion of symmetry, more logical, more flexible, and more comprehensive; and, on the other hand, they applied them to the solution of practical problems. We may note here the great advances which Newton made by the conception of fluxions—a new conception, by the use of which he passed beyond the static world of concepts, in which every concept was regarded as eternally one and the same, to a world of motion, of change, of continuity. Even change had been regarded before him as discrete, discontinuous, made up of steps, each step being regarded as equal to another. By the use of the concept of fluxions Newton enabled mathematics to accommodate itself to the notion of continuous change.

All applications of mathematics consist in extending the empirical knowledge which we possess of a limited number or region of accessible phenomena into the region of the unknown and inaccessible. Nature herself has the power of pure analysis consist in inventing definite concepts, marked by symbols of complicated operations; in accumulating their properties as independent of recent or old research; and in extending their usefulness beyond the limits they were originally invented for,—thus concepts of a higher order. A brilliant example is the most suggestive example of this kind of reasoning was afforded by a novel mode of treating a large class of physical problems by means of the introduction of a special mathematical function, termed by George Green, and later by Gauss, the "Potential Function." All the problems of Newtonian attraction were concentrated in the study of this formula; and when the experiments of Coulomb and Ampère showed the analogy that existed between electric and magnetic forces on the one side, and Newtonian forces on the other; still more when Fourier, Land, and Thomson (Lord Kelvin) pointed to the further analogy which existed between the dissipation of tension in the stationary flow of heat and that of statical electricity on a conductor, and extended the analogy to hydrostatics and hydrodynamics,—it became evident that Nature herself pointed here to a mathematical dependence of the highest interest and value (Mers, History of European Thought, the Nineteenth Century, ii. 608.1).

We might give many instances of the advance of mathematical thought, and note how, as knowledge widened, new problems arose, and, as they arose, new inventions or modifications of old mathematics to meet with them. Our present interest is not, however, in the development of mathematical thought, but in the light which that development casts on Epistemology. That interest is regulated by the concluding phrase of the foregoing quotation: "Nature herself pointed here to a mathematical dependence of the highest interest and value."

Mathematical formulae have an interest in themselves as products of thought—a world in themselves, self-contained—and they can be exhibited in the light of the highest admiration for the symmetry and beauty, but we learn also that this mathematical world by no means gives us that particular world in which we dwell, and which we must learn to live in. The new mathematical world is consistent with many kinds of worlds, whereas ours is a particular world, and has its own character and meaning. No doubt it is consistent
mathematical science has its limitations as well as its conveniences, if not its necessities. A very successful for the enlargement of knowledge within its own sphere led to that abuse against which Baldwin has protested so emphatically. It is limited, we again say, to what can be numbered, weighed, and can somehow be measured. There is a sphere in which mathematical reasoning is inept. Even in the spheres in which mathematical reasoning has been so triumphant, it is found, as in physics, that the changes in Nature depend not so much on the laws of mass and energy as on their distribution and arrangement. While there are thus truths of reason which are valid for all objects, whatsoever they may be, and while there are what we call laws of Nature, valid for the physical world in which we live, there are actual facts of collocation and facts of distribution and arrangement which cannot be deduced from the necessities of reason, or from the laws of Nature, which have to be ascertained. Any fact is consistent with the laws of Nature and with the ideas of reason, but what the fact is must be otherwise discerned than by deductive compulsion. Concepts of new magnitude are subject to constant revision; but, revise them as we may, there are many things and experiences which escape their grasp.

Summary of mathematical thought.—Mathematical science has, therefore, its limits; experience is not to be measured by them, however great and far-reaching they may be. Dissatisfaction with mathematics, physics, and chemistry, as the north and south extremes, is even variously expressed. For instance, Baldwin gives energetic expression to his dissatisfaction in the following note:

"The essential requirement, I take it, if one would accustom oneself to thinking in genetic terms, is that one free himself from the compulsion of the mechanical and a-genetic concept of causation. We have all been hypnotized by the thought that the cause of the type of impact, transfer of energy fixed in quantity, with a formulation of effect in terms of an equation with composition of forces issuing in a resultant—as in the "paradigm of forces." We are told that nothing can be in the effect that is not already in the cause. All this is a partial and forced interpretation of nature. If science deals only with such causation series, then the great body of what we may in the large sense call "conditioning," or "sequence," remains uninterpreted. The Adaptations, Growth, Novelties, in nature are, as it were, in the antecedence to the scientific observer as are the Identities, Conservations, and Effects. Why may not the sequential and contingent event have something to do in it among the antecedent term? It usually does. The causal interpretation, commonly given an abstract meaning reached by excluding certain transitions or characters in an event called the effect. The genetic progression recognizes all the characters of a sequence, both the causal interpretation and an abstraction, but attempts to reconstruct nature in the fullness of her processes of change from the mode that conditions to the richer mode—be it what it may—that succeeds' (op. cit. L 25, note).

The protest is emphatic enough, but it might have been accompanied by a recognition of what has been accomplished by the assumptions it criticizes. By the use of mathematical formulae, by the study of physics and chemistry, by the evolution of mathematical thought, science has penetrated far into the arena of Nature. Assuming, as it did, that there were an order and arrangement to be found out in Nature, science, by inventing mathematical formulae ever more comprehensive and more subtle, was able not only to set forth the more conspicuous elements of the natural order, but to set it forth in its continuity, and in so doing advanced towards the conception of unity. These mathematical formulae also raised fresh problems which, in being solved, led to interpretations of natural phenomena which, had there been a sphere in which lay far beyond the unbiased vision of man. So the content of knowledge, the control of Nature by knowledge, and the validity of knowledge as it is, is not to be explained, as the casual interpretation of an abstraction, but attempts to reconstruct nature in the fullness of her processes of change from the mode that conditions to the richer mode—be it what it may—that succeeds' (op. cit. L 25, note).
Biologists; and we must construct suitable concepts for their expression. Yet men are unwilling to take the trouble, or to yield up the control which the use of quantitative concepts apparently gave over the phenomena, to which they were applied. Hence we have lost the extension of mathematical and physical formulae to cover the field of life. Biological phenomena were attenuated till they were brought under the domain of mathematics, physics, and chemistry. No doubt this attempt was so far a just one, because living forms, so far as they are quantitative, are subject to measurement, and are, therefore, suited for mathematical analysis. What cannot be mathematically analyzed are simply the internal states even of the protozoa. If a thing has an inside, and its relationship to other things in space is not determined merely by its outer surface, there is no term yet defined which rests outside of the thing. We may explain it in the term of a paradox: The better we conceive the things we understand them, and conversely. We conceive the inorganic processes best, that is, we can define them most accurately as to make them calculable. The vital processes are so easily reduced to conceptual mathematical formulae and calculation. Biology works with empirical laws altogether, the complete reduction of which to ultimate elementary laws of Nature has so far proved to be impossible. Man is the most incalculable being in existence. Hence it is that his acts are still regarded as absolutely indeterminate, or as the effects of an indeterminate agent, the so-called free will, which is simply equivalent to denying the possibility of conceiving or defining him. The reverse is true when it comes to understanding. Human life is the only thing that we understand perfectly. We reach the maximum of understanding in history; it is a less complete in zoology and botany, and vanishes altogether in physics and astronomy, where we have the most perfect mathematical concepts possible. (Intro. to Philosophy, Eng. tr., 533.)

15. 'Begreifen' and 'Verstehen.'—Paulsen distinguishes between Begreifen and Verstehen, as thus set forth, is an interesting one, and may be regarded as both useful and convenient, from a popular point of view. But it is difficult to make the distinction good from a logical point of view, or an epistemological point of view. For, in the first place, what he regards as 'understanding' and as 'conceiving' are both mental processes, and are not the work of mind; and the distinction between them is one not of kind. In the second place, mathematics and physics, and especially chemistry, are not sciences which depend on calculation alone. Both physics and chemistry are experimental sciences, and, so far as they are experimental, they belong to what Paulsen calls 'understanding.' No physicist would limit his knowledge of any substance merely to what he can calculate. He must know the air, the sun, the earth, its roundness in its particularity, and is face to face with it as a real thing. He conceives it, and he understands it in its nature and in its behaviour. So here the distinction is inept. In the third place, when he says that the air is the most incalculable, and its existence, and refers to free will, one would like to know what is his view of free will. To be fair, he does not say that he holds that view of free will which I have just described in the paragraph before. He so far identifies himself with that indeterminate view as to use it as an element in the position that man cannot possibly be conceived or defined. Is man incapable of forming a doctrine of freedom he is well able to infuse intelligibly set forth in a definition of freedom as a principle of explanation in a description of man? We submit that all that can be inferred from the distinction between Begreifen and Verstehen is that mathematical, physical, and chemical concepts have their limits, and have to give place to other concepts when we turn from the physical sphere to the sphere where quantity comes to an end, and quality takes its place.

So then, when we strive to attain controlling knowledge of beings which are something for us entirely outside of ourselves, we first set forth in relation to other things in a world in space and time, we have to change our mode of conceiving them in order to suit the altered circumstances. The determining concept must give place to the teleological. We have to conceive a kingdom of means and ends, of things inter-related with a view towards a purpose. A new form of causation or linkage must be found. And the new concepts are forthcoming if only they have fair play. Final causes may be sneered at as vestal virgins, and may be discredited from many points of view, yet in modern times teleology has come to its own.

The theory of evolution has so far reinstated purpose as the ruling idea of modern thought; and in all spheres of inquiry we have learned to value history as the key to the explanation of the world of external things. Evolution makes room for novelties, for growth, for development, for the effect which was not in the cause, and we have to alter our conceptions to make them fit the facts. The processes of the world are not repetitions of former happenings; they are growth, development, evolutions; and the growths are intelligible and may be stated in terms which may be understood.

16. Objects as linked together by the teleological judgement.—Our Logic, Psychology, Epistemology, must be made flexible enough to meet the new situation. Not that the situation is new in reality, for the processes of evolution have gone on from the beginning; only men have changed the flowing, growing, evolving world into a static world which could be calculated in numbers, weights, and measures. Now that we have come to a better understanding of the world, let us alter our formulæ to correspond. In seeking to do so, we may not cast all the blame of former failures on our conceptual modes of thought. For we have no other means of thinking than by concepts, and our veneration of historical thinking which is directed towards the endeavour to make them adequate to their task. This can be done by the recognition of the differences between the objects which we think about, and by the recognition of the fact that what is fitting and adequate in one sphere are not applicable to others with different qualities and characteristics. For example, a little ago, we spoke of order, continuity, and unity as notions which have a meaning within physical science. In physics, however, order may mean nothing more than arrangement, but in the biological sciences, and especially in the sciences which deal with man, order means something more: it is a Quality of evolution: it is an aspect of the social order, where the conception is bound up with the highest social, ethical, and religious interests. Continuity has also to take on a larger meaning, as the subject with which it deals becomes more complex, and is not the consequence of cause and effect, nor is it the linkage of mere sequence; we have to think of continuity as constituted by a purpose which seems to gather the contingent into a rational whole. In this way, we can speak of meaning to individuality. So also with unity and with individuality. In truth it is only when we come to the action of life, only when we study things that have an inside, that intelligible meaning to individuality. There is a certain indefinite mantle of individuality attached to an atom of matter, but then its individuality is
limited by the fact of its inertia: it moves only as it is moved. It has its attractions and its repulsions, but it moves in response to them without any hesitation or choice. In living matters the response seems to be of a different kind: the organism responds according to its own nature. As we ascend the scale of organization, individuality receives wider and more precise meanings until it becomes the characteristic of the organism. Kant could not speak now. In living creatures we do not speak of inertia, but of self-preservation—a very different conception. We can speak also of reproduction, and of heredity, and of those sentiments which seem to lie at the basis, or to accompany the fact, of self-preservation—of love, and hunger, which assume deeper and deeper meanings as the human race moves onward to higher progress.

This does not mean, therefore, that, when we pass from the sciences which are mainly occupied with inorganic matter, we are to do without concepts; it means only that we must form our conceptions directly to express the new facts. It is essential to hold that new concepts may be formed, or old concepts may be modified, and that new ideas may be evolved to meet the new needs. But the ideas that we depend upon are the laws of reason and the principles of Logic still hold good; only we may regard them as outside the scope of quantitative measurement. That is simply to say that sentiments are not to be calculated in foot-pounds, and that we do not measure love by the yard. It may be measured in intensity, if not in extensity. There is needed a treatise to deal with the teleological judgment, which will place it on the same plane as the determinate judgment. It is not enough to regard the determinate judgment as the type of judgment in general, and to place it on a platform of its own, as the only form of universal and necessary implication, and to regard the teleological judgment as merely empirical. This was the way of Kant. But it may be doubted whether the distinction between empiricism and idealism is as absolute as it has been assumed to be. If there is an order of the world, if that order can be understood, and if there are principles of arrangement in the world, then it may be postulated that the empirical order is also rational; and the judgments which have been regarded as purely hypothetical may also have a meaning in relation to the ideas of reason. That is too large a question to be discussed here. But, if the assumption of idealism that the real is the reflection of the mind, and that the distinction between empiricism and rationalism tends to disappear. What is empirically true may not be rationally false. Mathematics has shown us that facts and relations experimentally discovered may, with proper assumptions, be expressed with the utmost generality and necessity. Faraday’s electric discoveries were mathematically explained by Clerk-Maxwell, and his mathematical formulas were afterwards mastered by Hertz, and applied to practical uses by Marconi.

17. Relation of the determinate to the teleological judgment. This may be variously illustrated. Indeed, so copious are the sources of illustration that we are at a loss which to select. They are not opposed to each other. Rather the relation is that the teleological judgment steps in to afford an explanation where the determinate judgment ceases to be intelligible. The teleological presupposes the determinate judgment. In the case of the latter we are occupied with the understanding of things as they are—their nature, their sources, their functions, and so on; but when these are so far understood, we are prepared for a new kind of action. Just in proportion to our knowledge of things as they are, are we able to impress new meanings on them, and make them subservient to our purposes. We investigate Nature, and transform it into our sciences of astronomy and ethnology: we apply the principles of mathematics; or we measure and calculate heat, light, electricity; and, having so far mastered these, we proceed to new constructions, the explanation of which is not found in the abstract sciences, but in those sciences which deal with the relations of teleology begins, and it has a place in the theory of knowledge, not merely on empirical but also on other grounds. The whole system of efficient causes is implied in every machine, in every work of art, and in every construction which man has impressed on Nature. So we mould, alter, control Nature, and make her do our will; and she lends herself to the expression of new meanings which have been impressed on her former system of working. We make our harbours, build our ships, construct our roads and railways, invent all the instruments of peace and war, and reap the reward of our ingenuity and intelligence. When we are satisfied that a machine is a new meaning impressed on Nature, in order that man may make his work. It is possible to explain a steam-engine as a system of mechanical forces; or we may write a history of its invention, and trace the course of its evolution from the kettle of Watt to the engines which drive Atlantic liners across the sea. In this history no mention need be made of the minds which successively made those changes which increased the complexity, efficiency, and usefulness of the steam-engine. But every step of the process, looked at from another point of view, illustrates the action of the teleological judgment. Applied science is always teleological. Machines are constructions with a meaning which goes beyond the machine regarded only as a mechanical construction. The meaning is impressed on a system of efficient causes, in order that it work out a purpose. Thus in the case of any machine we pass beyond the sequence of cause and effect, and beyond the linkage of mechanical explanation: we have to consider the effects of things of another kind—things which require new concepts for their description and interpretation.

18. Validity of teleological knowledge. Here, too, we may instance something which is of significance for knowledge. We may recognize that there is a valid knowledge of the individual. Individuality is a valid concept, though in our logical and psychological systems there is apparently no room left for it. Psychology tells us formally that it has no place for biography; and Logic tends, on almost every scheme, to pass away from what it calls the mere individual. But, on any theory of knowledge, room must be left for the idiosyncrasies of the individual. Surely a biography may be written, and may contain true and adequate knowledge, and there may be a description of the uniqueness of the unique. Hamlet and Macbeth have been described, and attempts have been made to understand Julius Caesar and Napoleon; nor have Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel been set aside as unintelligible, though all of them have risen above the commonplace. We may perhaps call the great poets, not by subsuming them under general categories, but by diligently studying them in the circumstances of their life. We place such
men under the subsumptions of the teleological judgment, with its categories of purpose and freedom; we find room for the study of individuality and the personal, individuality, purposes come into view. An organism cannot be defined without implicating all these at least. We cannot describe an organism without the recognition of it as the product of an organ in life, without the implication that the organ has a meaning only in relation to the whole organism. We may, for descriptive purposes, reduce the phenomena of an organism to a number of systems, such as the circulatory, the muscular, etc.; but, after this description, we have to go back to the recognition of the organism as a living system, all the parts of which are in relation to the whole, and the whole is realized through the inter-relations of the parts. Still further, there is the fact that for the understanding of the organism the principle of unity and of action is within it. It has an inside. It is an old observation, 'Plant the skill of the shipbuilder within and you will see how Nature works.' The skill of the shipbuilder is within the timber in the case of every organism. This conclusion has been forced on us more and more by the progress of the science, and that of Darwin. It is not necessary to point out how, even contrary to the tendency of Darwin himself, teleology has been enthroned in the highest place in the sciences which deal with life, and Epistemology recognizes the significance of the concept, and has to make room for it. In every organism considered in its individuality, in every case considered in a concept descriptive of a certain kind, in the slow process of the evolution of living forms, we have been taught to see, in the growth of living things, a tendency towards a goal, a means towards an end; and this tendency has all the system of efficient causes at its service. It is not necessary to dwell further on the story of evolution as it is told to us at present; the great epistemological interest of it lies in the fact that a new set of concepts is at the service of the theory of knowledge—concepts which have the merit of recognizing a sphere of knowledge and of action, which had been inadequately recognized in our logical and psychological inquiries. A study of the theory of ideas in Epistemology will yield fruitful results for Epistemology.

18. Criticism of the teleological judgment.—A critical inquiry into the teleological judgment would necessitate, in the first place, an investigation into the psychological conditions of its exercise, and, in the second place, an inquiry into the objective products which are the outcome of that exercise. Psychologically, we should need to investigate the whole web of purpose, the phenomena of means and ends, the fact of aim and desire, the power of forming ideals, and the means at our disposal in order to carry them out. For it is indispensable, it is, indeed, a fact of common experience, that living creatures have some conception of using Nature for their own ends. It is a fact that rational creatures have a certain power of self-guidance, and of modifying Nature, and of making Nature serve their ends. They seem to live and reap, they can use the changing of the seasons in order to store up food for future need, they can adapt themselves to their environment, not merely by the instinctive action of the animals, but by adapting the environment to their needs. They clothe themselves in heavier raiment when the seasons change, they build houses, they seek their food, and everywhere in human life we see men moulding Nature in order to make life more easy, more comfortable, and more successful. We need not dwell on the fact of the teleological judgment, it is manifest. It is one element in adaptation, and it is thus a proof of the validity of the scheme of means and ends which is characteristic of life in general.

In the second place, a critical analysis of the teleological judgment would lead us into the objective investigation of all the works of man. These, again, are of the most important kind for the purpose of the teleological judgment. We must investigate these works of humanity from various points of view. We might look at them as bodies of truth, and seek to test their scientific value. We might regard them from the point of view of description, and set them forth in that descriptive process which is another name for explanation. Or we might seek to appreciate them, to estimate their worth, and their aesthetic, logical, psychological, and metaphysical values. But, from our present point of view, our aim is to regard them as a set of human ideals concretely realized in the art, the science, the poetry, the philosophy, and the religion of mankind. Teleology would thus become a history of the ideas which are embodied in the history of literature, to use a comprehensive word which includes all the works of man enumerated above. Teleology studied in this comprehensive sense would give us most valuable material for a complete view of human knowledge, and would set us free from the tyranny of mere science, with its exclusiveness and its incompleteness. It would enable us to set its proper value on history as the supreme record of human endeavor, and to realize from a new point of view that distinction which Paulsen sought to establish in the quotation already made. The study of ideals, as these have been objectively realized in the life of a people, as realized in art, in sculpture, and in painting, as realized in the great poets of the world, as also in the philosophies of all nations, would open out to us the objective realizations of the teleological processes of the human mind and their several worths.

20. Teleology and ideals.—The power to frame ideals, and to appreciate them when they are set before us, is one of the characteristics of man. If this be so, then there must be some way of setting forth the procedure of the mind in the formation of ideals, and some way by which their validity and influence may be tested. This investigation into the whole subject—an investigation which can hardly be said to have begun. For it would mean an investigation into the whole of human creations, as these are embodied in institutions, constitutions, political activities, national characteristics, and international influences. All these may be regarded as embodiments of characteristic ideals, and their sources and influences would have to be considered. Again, art, science, poetry, literature—in fact, all the achievements of man in the world he has made—would have a place in the great analysis of ideals, their nature and influence. Out of this investigation there would issue a new set of concepts, to describe the experiences of mankind in this relation, to supplement and correct, or at least to modify, conclusions drawn from the system derived from man's primary intercourse with Nature. Whether this be the case, or whether, then, there may be great gain for the theory and nature of knowledge, if one could only find a way to utilize it. It is the glory of ideals to be great and broad and comprehensive as it is the same to all, too wide to be realized in any single form or mode. Take the ideal in any sphere of human aspiration—architecture, for example—and we find it to be made up of certain qualities,
none of which can be neglected in any building worthy of the name—qualities such as strength, beauty, dignity, fitness, durability. Each of these may be realized in different ways: there may be many buildings which realize it under this style has its ideal; architects have their visions, and they have examples in which former ideals have been realized; and so, out of the grandeur of their vision, and what is the knowledge, they build, and the building remains an illustration of the working out of an ideal. So in art we may make a study of the vision which the artist saw, examine the way in which he realized his vision in the form of painting or of statue, and note the limitations and restrictions laid on him by the material in which he has worked. So also in poetry, and in literature generally, we may trace the sources of the ideal; we may note how it grew, what it fed on, and how it was realized; and we may be persuaded that in these investigations we have a real illustration of the growth and law of human knowledge. Here we are delivered so far from the bondage of the actual. We are in a sphere where the human mind, master of its own experience, or so far master of it, sets itself to embody its own meaning and its own vision in a real way, and so the ideal is not a private meaning, but one that can be the common possession of all men. This translation of a private, individual vision into forms which become a common possession is one of the characteristic ways of human achievement, and one of the ways of raising men to a higher level. We may study the work of the great masters in painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry, science, metaphysics, and in the study of them learn a lesson in the characteristics of what knowledge is and means, which we could never learn from the abstract discussions by which men have sought to delimit knowledge, and to assent to it bounds beyond which it cannot pass. Here, too, we may study in concrete form that great subject of individuality and personality which eludes the analysis of discursive thought. We may allow Psychology to occupy the place of the abstract spectator, and to say that Psychology is not biography; we may allow Logic to lay down the conditions of thought, and to elaborate the categories under which all fruitful thinking is to be performed. We may cause metaphysics to deal with the ultimate problems of reality, and need not refuse generous recognition of their validity and worth, and yet claim that in the work of the great masters revealed, painted, lived, and acted, and fields of knowledge of which they take but little cognizance. For there is real knowledge in this sphere, which all must recognize as real.

In this sphere we are not independent of Psychology, Logic, Metaphysics, or Ethics. For these supply the principles upon which our study of the achievements of men must proceed. In all our actions we must be logical, psychological, metaphysical, and even mathematical; but the sciences mentioned do no more than prescribe the conditions under which we work; they do not fix the vision which the seer sees or the ideal which he seeks to order. And whereas we must postulate the man who sees, and the mind which has been in the presence of the ideal. But the vision has been seen, the ideal has been ordered, and the ideal must be fixed and acted on by the man himself. And this is true of not only the facts of physical or chemical science, and as such they may be known and set forth in practice. Here, too, we may study the activity of man in its creative, object form, so that it is no longer a private, individual vision, but becomes the common possession of all men. And in the study of the conditions under which such activity is possible, for it works under conditions in art the conditions are primarily those set by the material in which the artist works. The sculptor must have regard to the marble or other material in which his creative faculty labors. He has also to work under the mathematical, physical, and chemical conditions of the material, and these are all human conditions, for they are set by knowledge. Mental conditions are also present, but need not again be enumerated. Yet, when the artist respects all these conditions—and if he neglects any of them, his work must fail—within the limits of means of means, he embryos his vision and realizes his ideal. The conditions do not fix the vision, nor do they contain the ideal; they only say that, if the artist is to work, these conditions must be fulfilled. If we are to understand the new product, the only cause to be assumed is the artist. And to understand him, if we can, we must pass from the general conditions under which he has worked, and study him as something which cannot be subsumed under general rules. For the proof of this we must refer to the critical studies of artists and poets, which, happily, are not non-existent, though they are often lost under the general rules which are applicable to all men, and therefore are not illustrative of the singular genius they seek to describe in his habit as he lived. There must be some way of studying and understanding him, for he has appeared on the earth, and have been active in making history; and such a study is not without significance for the theory of knowledge.

21. Teleology and History. The mention of history leads us to the recognition of what it is, what it means, and how it is to be understood. Paulsen, as quoted above, says that this is what we all understand but cannot conceive. This presupposes that conceiving is only of the general, the abstract, the universal, and necessary. But concepts may be changed, and their range enlarged, and they may be made such as to represent the reality with which we have to deal. We see how, in physics and chemistry, we have a new set of names to represent the new understanding of Nature to which men of science have come. Why should it not be so in the sphere of history? Are we to say that our failure to conceive belongs essentially to the very nature of conceptual knowledge? Even in that case, the limitation and the imperfection of knowledge are not determined by the knower or by the known, but by the imperfection of the instrument by which the knower seeks to express himself. If this is so, then there is hope for knowledge. It must revise its instruments, and make them more elastic, and more precise than it眼前 or eye must be aided by the microscope, and the language must become more precise and more fluid at the same time. We must find a way of expressing the particular as well as the general, nor ought we to preach agnosticism until we have exhausted the possibilities of expressing the knowledge which we plainly possess, though it has escaped the meshes of our previous formulæ.

The study of the productions in which the human spirit has objectively expressed itself ought to give rise to the science of ideals. There is true and real knowledge to be found in this line of investigation, however great may be the difficulty of bringing it under rules and categories. All we need is to be in the sphere of religion and ethics we are face to face with sets of facts which have not yet been formulated. Here, too, we are in the sphere of creative personalities, which set from their own knowledge on which facts we have to deal. It is curious to observe that in the history of mathematical thought we are ever in the presence of creative personalities. From Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans onwards under such conditions is possible, for it works under conditions in art the conditions are primarily those set by the material in which the artist works.
called by personal names illustrious in the history of electric discovery. But in the sphere of religion and ethics personalities dominate. Ideals are created and appreciated by other men, and become the living influence by which history is determined and character is formed.

Real, deep devoutness, such as controls the whole life, is certainly of a character that is only to be found in a few. But it is on the basis of those few that the nature of an age's piety must be determined. Just so must we determine the art of a period on the basis of the real artists. For in these devout men, as in those artists, lives the eternal, ever-moving spirit of religion and of the civilisation and of the rest, ever fresh, always new, just as they, to follow them, and at least to acknowledge as form and authority that which they cannot receive as spirit. But many out of the throng do receive a ray of the spirit, and warm their cold life with it. Any one, therefore, who desires to depict the pietà of the West in the fifth century must describe the pietà of Augustine; whosoever wishes to understand the pietà of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries must study the piety of Bernard of Clairvaux and Francis; he who seeks to grasp the pietà of the sixteenth century must make acquaintance with the pietà of Luther, Calvin, and Knox; and so throughout.

But these names show what a power a pietà has been in the history of the world and of civilization; these names show that the level of that which is the beginning only not of wisdom has also of night. Ought I to add the name of Crouwell or of Mohammed? The greatest events and changes in the history of the world have had their origin in religion—not in the public religion, but in the purely personal, in that secret religion which remains unrecognised by individuals, undistinguishably leaft and faintly from a newly breaking spring? (Harnack, IV, x. (Oct. 1911) 707.)

We quote this interesting and profound passage as the kernel of our definition of our thesis that the knowledge of individuals and of personalities is real and valid knowledge, even though it cannot be predicted, and cannot be calculated. Harnack has shown that personal, purely personal, has been the source of the greatest events and changes in the history of the world; and this is true not only of piety, but of every characteristic of creative personalities who have been centres of influence for their age and epoch. Rightly to understand the influence of man on man, and the receptiveness of the average man towards the personal influence which streams forth from the exceptional man, would be to see the inner connectedness of history, and to differentiate history from the mechanical action which is the rule of the lower world.

'As there exist graded series of special and more general laws for things, there are also numbered steps between the influence of the average man, whose will is included only in the will of his neighbours, and the will of the religious leader, or the artist, or the prophet, or the hero whose will gives the will of millions, and enters in pure identity into the minds of whole nations. For such a will exists, judgments, nothing is all but absolutely unimportant there; but only by this emphasizing of the important and decisive does the system of identities become an organic system, in which the fate of peoples, in their leaders' spirits and in their quiet names, can be understood.' (Münster, Die Entwicklung des Welterlebens, 102.)

Leaving now the study of the products of mankind in the light which they cast on the problems of knowledge, let us look for a little at history, and endeavour to find why the methods and assumptions of natural science are inapplicable to history.

We assume, indeed, a connectedness in history, but we soon find that the connectedness is not that of cause and effect, or mere temporal perseverance, as the final judgment finally amounts to. In the historical world, or in the world of which men live and work, objective things assume a new form. They become not only a system of causes and effects, but one of means and ends. They are objects of desire or of aversion. When the actual becomes an object of desire, it is invested at once with new properties, and is transformed into an object which has a new meaning—a meaning arising out of the relation placed on it by the fact that it has become an object of desire. In history all objects are considered as objects of will, and their natural qualities are treated as arbitrary.

In history, therefore, what is dealt with is no longer objects as seen in their scientific connectedness, but objects seen in their new transformation as interesting in their relation to the fulfilment of human desires. Thus a new science arises, with new methods and aims, also with new categories to set forth all that newness, which yet has a connectedness that can be understood. It will become a science which deals with subjects, with wills in action and interaction with the world in order to transform that world into a world of values and worths. The new science will take into account the fact of individual wills and personalities, and endeavour to show how these wills become the general will, or how individualities, while maintaining their distinctness and their peculiarity, become a conscious part of an organic whole, which will have its own reality. We shall have to widen our conception of organism, advance their new form of it. Just as politically we have to find a new conception for the British Empire, which is a system of relatively independent nationalities, bound in unity such as the world has never been before, so it is with regard to the new conception of organism.

Real objects or objects out in the world of space become ideal when they enter into the world of desire. It is just the fact of this transformation which marks out the science of history from other sciences, and it is in this sphere that we are to look for the connectedness which obtains and must be obtained in history as in other sciences. The connectedness does not lie in the thought of the tendency of things to persist in their present state, but in the capacity of being transformed to meet human desire. It is not in connexion with the past that in history we seek explanations; it is in the unity impressed on natural objects when seen in the light of the possibility of their transformation to meet and to fulfill the purposes of man. That there is here an actual connectedness admits of no doubt, and to set forth this connectedness is an important task for knowledge. In history, then, there exists a real world which has arisen through human effort; and, if it is to be understood, it must be regarded as the characteristic activities of man. How human wills agree to act in common, how ideals can be impressed on the average man, how men act together, have a common purpose—are matters of great interest. How meanings arise, how they are communicable, and how ideals may become the common possession of a people—are questions which we may put but which we cannot answer here. Looking back over the past, we find that all ideals have been traced by the peoples to their great men. All religions trace themselves ultimately to a personal founder; all laws have been ascribed to a personal legislator. And, in general, every discovery of individual discoverers, inventors, or thinkers. In the transformation which takes place in objects when they become objects of desire, they are charged by those who are great enough to indicate to the common mind what objects they ought to submit to this transformation. What ought men to desire? What ought they to avoid? Here come in all the desires, and all the religions of the world, and the transformations which they have effected on the common world.

We may instance also the ideals which in the history of the world have become national—Hebrew, Assyrian, Babylonian, Indian, Greek, Roman, Teutonic, English, Scottish. Ideals are
there, with all their greatness, and also with all their limitations; and the influence of a national ideal on the members of the nation can be described. That ideal every individual within the nation makes higher, according to it, and thus makes the national will his own will. Again, one may arise within the nation who transcends the national ideal, yet is within it; and so he may modify it, and, without breaking with the past, make new feet upon which the ordinary man can safely tread. The main thing insisted on here is that history has to be understood from the point of view of ideals, that these are descriptive of the varied desires of man, and that the outcome of historical endeavour is determined by the efforts of men to realize their ideals. For these they suffer, strive, work; in the accomplishment of them they find their joy and their lasting joy. In a word, the sphere of history is the sphere of the teleological, and history is the story of the strivings of men to reach the ideal which somehow they possess.

The critical judgment as a system of values.—Here, again, we see how mind changes its methods and its language as it comes into new fields of study. It does so in consistency with the laws with which it deals, and also in consistency with the nature of the objects it seeks to understand. In the fields of ethics, religion, and history it has to construct a system of values, for these are of essential importance in a world of ideals. But as a discussion of them will be found in art, Value, we need not deal with the subject here. Nor do we find it possible to discuss the problem of negligence or of error. The problem of error lies along the line of the problem of truth, and accompanies it all the way (see art. Error AND Truth). The subject need be discussed here only in so far as it bears on the task and nature of knowledge. Of course, all along the line of the effort to complete the task of knowledge there lies the possibility of mistake. The epistemologist may make a mistake in Psychology when he considers knowledge as a mental process. He may make a mistake in his description of the process through which the subject elaborates its objects, classifies them, transforms them. He may make universals which are not really such and land himself in the perplexity of those who work with inadequate models. The mistakes of the method may be made, which may be found treated in detail in any treatise on Logic, under the name of 'fallacies.' Mistakes also occur in the metaphysical field which may render untruthful the whole discussion of the epistemological problem. In our attitude towards the problem of knowledge we may be dogmatic, or we may be sceptical. We may have an attitude of belief towards which is essentially incredible, or we may refuse belief to truth which can be shown to be valid and trustworthy. All these things are possible, and many of them have been present as matters of fact in every age. What then? Are we to beware of knowledge, or of the possibility of coming to a right apprehension of knowledge, its worth, its validity? What are we to say of those systems which work out their own boundaries and declare that beyond it there is the unknown? Is it possible to say what are the bounds of knowledge, and if so, how far is it possible? Can this be done from the point of view of the nature of the knower, or from the nature of the known? We have not found this to be the case. We have not found it possible to delimit the sphere of knowledge, or to set it aside as a process inapplicable to anything which can fall to be found by its methods to be often inadequate; we have seen that it is apt to make conceptions which have proved powerful and adequate within one range applicable, without further inquiry, to another set of things, and to make one aspect of experience dominant over all experience, just because this has been more manageable, according to it, and thus makes the national will his own will. Again, one may arise within the nation who transcends the national ideal, yet is within it; and so he may modify it, and, without breaking with the past, make new feet upon which the ordinary man can safely tread. The main thing insisted on here is that history has to be understood from the point of view of ideals, that these are descriptive of the varied desires of man, and that the outcome of historical endeavour is determined by the efforts of men to realize their ideals. For these they suffer, strive, work; in the accomplishment of them they find their joy and their lasting joy. In a word, the sphere of history is the sphere of the teleological, and history is the story of the strivings of men to reach the ideal which somehow they possess.

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and the resultant purification of our methods. May we not take it that the long processes of building up our knowledge and belief may be hastened as much as becomes master of his methods? Eminent mathematicians have been able to see the outcome of lengthened demonstrations in a brilliant flash of intuition; their mathematical formulae have been comparable with miracles, and they thought to read them as the ordinary man reads the pages of a book. May not intimations be the goal of all our discursive reasoning?

On the subject or from the object there is no hindrance to the hope of the indefinite increase of our knowledge. Intensively it will increase as we learn more of ourselves, of the world, and of the Maker of the world; extensively it may increase until it stands over against the world, and recognizes that through and through it is an intelligible world, a world that may be understood. With the increase of knowledge the knower grows, and the mastery of the world grows also.

I am a part of all that I have met;
Yet all experience is an arch whereby I
Glance that untravell'd world, whose margin fades
For ever and for ever when I move.'


JAMES IVERACH.

EQUIPROBABILISM.—1. Definition.—Equi-probabilism is a form of probabilism (q.v.) which stands midway between simple probabilism and probabilism. The equi-probabilistic principle may be stated thus: the opinion quo aye iure tute, i.e. the opinion quo liberati facit, may be followed, on condition that it is as probable as the opinio tute, i.e. the opinion quo legi faciet; we may not, on the contrary, follow the opinio minus tute if it is considerably less probable than the opinio tute. Probabilism does not admit of following the opinio minus tute unless it is more probable than the opinio tute. Simple probabilism demands only a strong probability in favour of the opinio minus tute.

2. Founder.—Alfonso Maria di Liguori (q.v.) is generally regarded as the founder of the equi-probabilistic system. This theologian was originally a rigourosus, as appears in his Malee Systematis. He afterwards went over to simple probabilism, and then to equi-probabilism. There are signs of the latter evolution in several of his writings prior to the year 1792 which he published at that date, for it was in 1792 that the founder of the order of Redemptorists published his Breve dissertazione dell' uno moderato dell' opinione probabile. It is difficult to say whether this change of opinion was suggested to him by the thought of the abuses to which simple probabilism gave rise, or by the desire to avoid seeing his doctrine suffer the discredit into which the ethics of the Jesuits had fallen at that time. St. Alfonso, in his equi-probabilistic system, rests on the authority of Eusebius Amort, who published a Theologia Dissertatio in 1733, and Junius (1679), Antony Mayer the Jesuit, author of a Theologia scholastica which appeared in 1729, and Rassier, author of a Norma Recti, published in 1738. Equi-probabilism is also regarded as a branch of equi-probabilism, but equi-probabilism as a theory distinct from simple probabilism makes a definite start only with Alfonso di Liguori. In ch. ii. (‘De Conscientia’), of his Homo apostolicae et decided in confessione instinctus (see the 1897 ed., Paris and Besançon), Alfonso formulates his opinion as follows:

'Tertius ittig, quae nostra est sententia, dict quod quosque opinio quo liberti facit esse acqua probabile atque opinio liberti facet, sine dubio et fidei potest.' Nevertheless he callecs attention to the fact that, in a matter of faith, one must always follow the opinio tutor.

3. Controversy.—Towards the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th cent. probabilism and even tutiorism became pressing issues, and remained so until the time when the Jesuits and other scholars revived the doctrine of St. Alfonso. Among his modern disciples special mention is due to Father Gury, the author of a well-known Manuel de théologie morale, and to Cousset, who insists strongly upon the equi-probabilism of his master. In 1864, Antonio Ballerini, the Jesuit, published a Dissertatio de morali sistematis S. Alphonso for the purpose of showing that Alfonso di Liguori had never taught equi-probabilism, and of claiming him absolutely for the side of the simple probabilists. This dissertation called forth an answer from the Liguorians, and in 1872 the Vindiciae Alphonsonianae appeared. This great work is a special plea in favour of St. Alfonso and equi-probabilism. It seeks to prove that this theologian was the inventor of the equi-probabilistic system, and that this system was always his. The authors relied chiefly on the dissertation of Liguori, written in 1749, entitled De usu moderato opinionis probabilis in concursu probabiliorum. No one before Liguori, they said, had ever spoken of a moderate use of probable opinion. In their eyes equi-probabilism was the most correct, most sensible, and easiest rule of moral conduct. They summed up their master's doctrine as follows. (1) In a case of doubt as to the existence of a thing the opinio quo libertatis facit must be as probable as the opinio quo legi facet. (2) In doubt with regard to the extinction of a law which has certainly existed, the opinio quo libertatis facit must be sufficient ground for moral certitude. (3) In doubt concerning a fact which involves a non-moral danger, the surest opinion must always be followed; in other words, one has no right, under pretext of probity, to be in danger, in any given case, the interests of a third person.

The Vindiciae Alphonsonianae led to a lengthy controversy. In 1873 a pamphlet was published in Belgoz, entitled Vindiciae Imediatiae against the argument of Ballerini (his dissertation is reprinted in the pamphlet) that Liguori was always a defender of simple probabilism. In the same year a discussion took place in the newspaper L'Univers (see the issues of 8 May, 25 June, 28 July, 28 Oct. 1873), in which Ballerini himself participated. He took his stand upon Liguori's early writings, and recalled the fact that even Liguori's own partisans claimed that he never changed. Besides, if he did change, says Ballerini, it would be better to follow his original opinion. The same author recurs to the subject in the 1893
editors of Gury's Manuel, to claim the authority of St. Alfonso in favour of the argument; one must, however, be on equiprobabilism as a direct principle of conscience.

As far as the first point is concerned, it may be remarked that this historical question is interesting mainly to biographers of Alfonso de Liogni. The Jesuits and their partisans maintain that St. Alfonso never taught anything but moderate probabilism, and that he repudiated laxity only; the majority of Liogianists assert, contrary to the evidence of facts, that the founder of their order was always an equiprobabilist. Some Liogianists, however, admit that the equiprobabilism of their master dated only from 1762. On account of the want of precision that characterizes St. Alfonso's terminology, it is quite easy to find arguments in his writings in support of all these different opinions.

As regards the second point, equiprobabilism has actually had more opponents than supporters. Among the former we may mention—besides Ballerini—Lehmkuhl, Huppert, Le Bachelet; and among the partisans of equiprobabilism may be named Berti, Heras, and Jansen.

Some of the opponents of the equiprobabilistic system claim that it is only an attenuated form of simple probabilism; others acknowledge the original character of equiprobabilism, but only to demonstrate that this principle is illogical and inapplicable. They hold strictly by the three fundamental rules of probabilism: (1) liberty is prior to law, and cannot be dispossessed of its rights except by an absolutely certain law; (2) a doubtful law is not obligatory; and (3) if a ver e solidi probabilitatis reason exists against law and on the other side of liberty, the law becomes doubtful. The substance of their reasoning is as follows: it is impossible to measure exactly the degrees of probability of different opinions, and therefore a comparison between the reasons which militate for and against liberty is of little value; besides, even if it is possible, in favour of law, the latter remains none the less the only law. One may act even with a certain formido multitatis, for only moral certainty, in favour either of the law or of liberty, excludes this formula, because it excludes any judgment of doubt. Between a simply probable opinion and a morally certain opinion there are no intermediate degrees. In most cases only the so-called reflex principles, and in particular the principle lex dubia non obligat, have practical certainty, which, of course, must not be confounded with theoretical certainty.

To these arguments the equiprobabilists reply that only a comparison between the reasons which can decide if one of them is vere et solida probabilitatis. Practical certainty is of a subjective kind, and to obtain it we must consult our personal feeling. If the law is more probable than the opinion favourable to liberty, there is no real doubt. Now, nothing but real doubt removes the obligatory character of law. It is perfectly possible to oppose an opinion which is not its like and such an opinion is more or less probable than another. It should be noted that equiprobabilists as a rule admit the general principles of probabilism formulated above. Jansen, however, calls attention to the fact that it is incorrect to claim that liberty, being prior to law, has a presumption in its favour (libertas possibilis), and that it is always the existence of law which entirely and wholly establishes itself, according to St. Alfonso, liberty exists only by virtue of law, the source of our rights as of our duties. He does not, as the Roman Catholic moralists usually do, place liberty in opposition to law. He affirms that law is in itself more probable than liberty, and that, consequently, it must prevail if there is another reason in its favour.

Considering the general principle of probabilism, simple probabilism is unquestionably more logical than equiprobabilism. The latter is a timid protest against a purely legal morality, in favour of the subjective conscience, an attempt to stay the abuses inherent in the former and to generate in faith. What makes the controversy which we have just summed up interesting is that at the present time, in the sphere of Roman Catholic morality, equipment is the last instrument behind which the small number of defenders are fighting against the principles and morals of the Jesuits. Probabilism and tutiorism have now no supporters.

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EQUITY.—In common usage, 'equity' denotes what is right as distinct from what is according to law. The law represents what is enacted by Parliament or the legislature, and, though it may intend to embody the right, it does not always do so, and the courts judge the case according to 'equity.' 'Equity' thus comes to mean some 'law of nature,' as it did in Roman Law, or the consensus of opinions of what is right in the circumstances. The term 'equity,' in its modern distinction is an old one familiar to Greek philosophers and Roman jurists.

Aristotle (Nic. Eth. v. 10) remarks that the equitable and the just are sometimes identified and sometimes distinguished, and that justice and such an opinion is more or less probable than another. It should be noted that equiprobabilists as a rule admit the general principles of probabilism formulated above. Jansen, however, calls attention to the fact that it is incorrect to claim that liberty,
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'law' or principle. This supposed 'law' is the mind's sense of right, or some standard assumed to represent it. In speaking of the obscurity and equivocation of the terms, Aristotle says: 'What obscures the matter is that, though what is equi-

called with, but is determination, of that which is just according to law.
The reason of this is that every law is laid down in general terms, while there are matters about which it is possible places to break in general of the terms.' Hence, when a positive law does not strictly apply to the special case in hand, an appeal has to be made to 'equity,' which means some principle of law. The actual enactment is supposed based or which it is intended to serve. For instance, the law may be that a person convicted of murder shall be hanged, but the conviction may be wrong, and, when there is reason to believe this, 'equity' may come in, when process of law will not deal with the matter and remit the punishment.

Sir Henry Maine (Anc. Law, p. 60 ff.) suggests that the distinction held is that equity is the final authority, and sure jurisdiction, the am juris. For supposedly Aristotle treated the case, where the authority, which is the basis of the law, is not what was meant by the law. In the case, where the law is not what was meant by the law, it might mean to be applied in cases of emergency or cases of accident. Hence, when a positive law does not strictly apply to the special case in hand, an appeal has to be made to 'equity,' which means some principle of law. The actual enactment is supposed based or which it is intended to serve. For instance, the law may be that a person convicted of murder shall be hanged, but the conviction may be wrong, and, when there is reason to believe this, 'equity' may come in, when process of law will not deal with the matter and remit the punishment.

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Church of Scotland. With this defence of the Church of Scotland we may compare the words of R. I. Wilberforce, Sketch of the Hist. of Erastianism (London, 1839), p. 76: 'It will be found that Presbyterianism, to whatever other evils it has been open, is at least a deadly enemy of Erastianism. But the Presbyterian is more hostile to the ecclesiastical policy of the State. He is more hostile to the ecclesiastical policy of the State, which is the State of and by the State in all things.'

We may quote also the following passage from Figgis:

'The real object of Erastus was to give clear expression to the denial of any right to coercive authority in the religious society apart from the State. He decided, in fact, to prevent the Evangelical churches becoming what one of them claimed to be in Scotland and actually became in Geneva, a societas perfecta, with all its means of jurisdiction complete and independent. (Cumb. Med. Hist. ii. [1902] 743; cf. also Lee, Pref. p. xxi, and W. Cunningham, Discussions on Church Principles, Popish Erastian, and Presbyterianism, Edinburgh, 1820, pp. 184, 207.)

Figgis's reference to 'the simpler definition of Erastianism as the theory that religion is the creature of the State' (JTAS ii. 83) is hardly the account of the matter which modern religious historians like Freemantle and Gwatkin would admit, though it expresses the tendency of modern political Erastianism which Hobbes propounded in the early doctrine of Leviathan. 'Of Power Ecclesiastical,' 1 as Machiavellianism 2 subordinates morality to political exigencies, so Erastianism, pushed to extremes, subordinates religion.

An attempt at even the most cursory review of the operation of Erastianism is rendered difficult, not only by the persistence and variety of political intervention in ecclesiastical affairs since Christianity was 'renounced' by Constantine, but still more by the notorious fluidity of the term, and by the contradictory judgments of historians and political philosophers as to the determining factors of the ecclesiastical policies of the princes and statesmen — even of churchmen — which are called in question. In the criticism of theorists, too, as we have seen in the case of Erastus, the application and justification of the epithet are often matters of debate. How far a monarch, for instance, was actuated by a genuine desire to propagate Christianity and to extirpate heresy in his dominion; how far he merely subordinated the organization, the central and local ecclesiastical establishment of the Church to the aggrandizement of his personal power or the prosperity of the State — these are problems which not only must frequently remain insoluble because of the psychological and casuistry, but will always be different according to the different conceptions of the mutual relations of Church and State.

The divergent verdicts recorded on the careers of Constantine the Great, Clovis, and Charlemagne furnish conspicuous instances of the difficulty of estimating the quantity or the quality of the Erastianism that has actuated the great makers of Church history. It is necessary, too, to distinguish between the home and the foreign policy of monarchical claims, such as those of William I., Henry II., and Henry VIII. of England; for statesmanship that was Erastian in its treatment of the Church of England was not necessarily, or necessarily, that of the Church of the State itself, though the Church of the State did, on the other hand, Gülzow towards the ecclesiastical policy of the later Byzantine Emperors was, like that of Constantine I. at Nicea, dictated by an honest desire to heal the schisms made in the Church of the State itself by the growing controversy between Church and State, and identified with the party who maintained that political and ecclesiastical authority must outlive the religious, is discussed by Burd, H. Figgis, Notes, p. 67.

1 'Erastianism,' as a by-word, is used to denote the doctrine of the supremacy of the state in ecclesiastical causes; but the word has many meanings, and many between church and state is one on which Erastus nowhere enters. What is known as 'Erastianism' would be better connected with the name of Grothus, as a by-word.

2. Life and work of Erastus.

Erastus was born at Baden, in Switzerland, on 7th September 1524. On his matriculation at the University of Heidelberg, in accordance with the fashion of the time, the Greek equivalent (Erastus) of his family name. In 1544 he quitted Basel and proceeded to Italy, where the general revolutionary movement, referred to earlier, spread over nine years—three at Bologna and six at Padua. First he studied philosophy, and after three years medicine, graduating as doctor in the latter. In 1557, while he held the appointment of physician to the court of the Count of Hainberg, in South Germany, he received almost simultaneous invitations from a number of princes. Declining the offer of the Duke of Saxony, he accepted the professorship of the Elector Henry, the Elector Palatine, offered him at the University of Heidelberg. He was attached to the new faculty of medicine, in the capacity of professor of therapeutics, on 3rd May 1556. At the end of the same year he was unanimously elected to the Rectory for the following year, having already, as Bonnard suggests, received at Heidelberg the degree of doctor of philosophy. He immediately exhibited great ability and energy in the development, not only of the study of medicine, but of culture and science generally, while his election to the Church Council of the Palatinate drew him forthwith into the vortex of those confused conflicts in which Heidelberg, 'a retic for theological eclectics of all nations' (Figgis, p. 69), enjoyed an unexampled pre-eminence.

Erastus, who remained throughout his life attached to the Zwinglian party, of which he was the leading layman at Heidelberg, and chief of the doctrines of the Zwinglians, was always, as Figgis observes, 'the most indispensable community.' In the year 1559 by his opposition to the interlacing action of Hunsen, the Lutheran dean of the faculty of divinity, in attempting to replace the Zwinglian tutor of the children of the Elector Palatine, at Heidelberg, on 12th February, the Elector Otto Henry being succeeded by Frederick IV., the Dean of College Hunsen, the Zwingolian professor of divinity, Frederic was strongly anti-Lutheran. In the Colloquy of 1560 between the Reformed theologians of the Palatinate and the Saxon representatives of the Lutheran church at Bologna, Erastus, at the request of the Elector, defended the Reformed doctrine of the Sacraments, and the independence of the Reformation of Calvinist Osiander (1556-1587), who had been appointed director of the College of Wisdom at Heidelberg. In August the Reformed faith was incorporated, both Lutheranism and the rest of the Roman Catholicism of the Palatinate being proscribed by edict. Two years later Frederick IV. restored the interlude of the Reformed Catechism of Heidelberg, which Osiander and Ursinus had composed, and in the same year (1566) was printed, by the Elector's command, the Itinere von Grottkuchen ("Panphilet on the Preserving of Broad"); of which Erastus was undoubtedly the author. John Marbach of Strassburg, issued the Lutheran rejoinder, which, evoking, in 1566, the second contribution of Erastus to the sacramental quarrel.

The account of the part taken by Erastus in the theological disputes at Heidelberg before the controversy which gave his name a dubious renown is not only indispensable for the right appreciation of his standpoint on the question of excommunication and discipline, but also advantageous for the study of what may be called the normal 'Erastian' character of the Protestant States of Germany. In April 1561, Erastus, as one of the Elector's theological auxiliaries, was prominent at the Colloquy with the Wurttemberg doctors at Mainz, and two years later he accompanied Frederick on his mission to Amberg. The 10th of June 1568 was the red-letter day in the discipline controversy at Heidelberg, when George Withers of Bury St. Edmunds, afterwards Archdeacon of Colchester, but at present a refugee in consequence of the Vestiarian controversy in England, maintained before the University his theses in defence of the authority of the ministers, along with the Presbytery, to perform all that related to church discipline (including excommunication) upon all offenders, not excepting princes. The Heidelberg Catholicoes (Ursinus, Grynicus, Siles &c.) had already pronounced the principle of the excommunication of impious and hypocrites, and had been followed by two successive ordinances, of which the first was of 24th May 1567. Osiander, who, however, was opposed to the second, because reserved to the prince the right of pronouncing excommunication in the strict sense, namely, that of exclusion from the Lord's Supper. It was the debate begun by Withers and continued with the long-sounding flame, Erastus opposed Withers on the second day, a friend having taken his place in his absence. In the dispute thus inaugurated, Osiander, on the side of Withers, was supported by his fellow-Calvinists, Ursinus, Zanchius, Tremellius, and Dathener. Chief among those who held with Erastus were Neuser, Sylvanus, and Willing, with Simon Grynaeus, the brother of J. J. Grynaeus, who had married the sister of the wife of Erastus. The first two were subsequently accused of heresy and excommunication. Erastus, however, although his excommunication was not proven against Erastus, the Olivia in which these associates involved him accelerated the defeat of the anti-discipline. The Erastian order was established by an edict dated 13th July 1570, and the pleas of Erastus rendered nugatory.

Before the end of January 1568, Erastus had all but completed a commentary as he called it, a theological bullinger—against the proposed discipline. His arguments were thrown into the form of one hundred Theses on excommunication. Copies of the work, which he had not intended of publishing, were circulated in manuscript. Soon afterwards the Theses were reduced to seven copies, but unsuccessfully, of anti-Trinitarian tenets.

On 26th October 1576, Frederick III. was succeeded by Ludwig VI. A violent Lutheran reaction ensued; Luther's Catechism supplanted that of Heidelberg, and the Reformed were expelled from the Court and Court. On 31st July 1579, the Elector, having subscribed the Formula of Concord, commanded the University professors to adopt the new confession so recently promulgated. Erastus, like the majority of his colleagues, chose the latter alternative, thus proving that he was no 'Erastian in the ordinary sense.' In 1580 he removed to Basel, where his brother-in-law Grynaeus had died in theology since 1552. At the beginning of 1581 he was admitted into the collegium medicorum of Basel, and in the summer began to teach ethics, of which he was appointed professor in the following January. He died on the 15th March 1583, two days after the first anniversary of his election on the governing council of the University. Though inferior in spiritual insight and moral enthusiasm to many of the second generation of the Reformers, his career justifies the epitaph in St. Martin's Church at Basel, 'Actus Philosophus, Elegans Medicus, Sincerus Theologus, Heidelbergeria Academiae Columna, Basilimensi Lumen.' More than five years after the death of Erastus appeared a volume containing: (1) the seventy-five Theses, with a preface, (2) the Confirmation, and (3) a thirteen letter relative to discipline and the controversy over Erastus by Bullinger, Osiander, and others. The work bore the title: 'Expositio gratissimae questionis, utrums excomunicandi, quatenus religionem intellectuelles et complicatur, sacramentorum sum, proprie adhuc medicinae, medicinae sanitatis et medicinae sanantis, accessorum intersit, ad aureum, ad eumque habendi, ad hominum; autores clarissimi, viro Thoma Erasto B. medico. Oppo. nunc recens expeditus, ad medico autem autographo eremonum obversionem. Osiander ... Positiv. Apud Basileus Sylvanum, anno salutis et 15. Positi, 'Positi' (Positivus) was merely a pseudonym for London, and the following name the anagram for Jacobus Castelvicens, who had married the widow of Erastus. The two theses between Erastus and Beza were those of Excommunication and the Organization of Discipline. Erastus, while recognizing the existence of exceptional cases where excommunication might be exclaimed, was in the right of withholding the Sacrament from professors of the Christian faith who, notwithstanding a moral lapsed, are nevertheless desirous of participating, such desire being,
in his opinion, sufficient proof of their repentance, and the Sacrament being, like the Word, a means of grace intended to benefit all, whereas it is an abuse of it to make it an occasion or instrument of punishment while elsewhere. He holds, in the Law of Moses 1 or in Jewish history is excommunication the penalty for moral offences as distinct from ceremonial disqualification. Further, by a minute dissection (suggestion of the time) of NT passages, Erastus eliminates from the latter also all authority for excluding believers from the Lord's Supper, concerning the significance and efficacy of which sacrament his views are consistently Zwinglian.

Erastus emphatically disclaims any desire to weaken Church discipline. 'Nihil deserit magis quam sub severissima in Ecclesia morum disciplina servetur' (Thes. xvii). But the question at issue is, Who, in a Christian State, is the depository of disciplinary authority? It is here that we reach the problem of Erastianism and of Erastus' relation thereto, for, according to two governments— the invisible, whereof God is the Head, and the visible, whereof the magistrate is the head (and he, ex hypothesi, a Christian)—a State containing two or more distinct visible authorities is an anachronism, as much a monstrosity as a two-headed body: 2

1 God having entrusted to the Christian magistrate the sum of the temporal government, the Church may no means the right to exercise (in a Christian country) a power of repression distinct and independent of that of the State' (Bonnard, 154).
2 Erastus holds that such is the teaching of the OT and the NT. To claim visible power for the Church is tantamount to robbing Caesar of what belongs to Caesar, and the height of usurration is to summon princes to the Church's tribunal and to excommunicate them. The Christian magistrate, though he may be admonished according to the word of God, and may profitably choose pious laymen to assist the ministers in superintending public morals on his behalf, is not to be set in antithesis to the Church as the profane power by the side of the sacred. The Church may warn and censure offenders, but punitive action belongs to the magistrate alone.

Without inquiring how far the objection of Erastus to the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction by the Church was conditioned by his dislike of the 'principle of equality' at Heidelberg, we must endeavour to trace the connexion between his views on the specific question of the right of the Church to exercise discipline, especially that of exclusion from the Sacrament, and the wider question of the supremacy of the temporal power in matters spiritual—a question touched on incidentally by Erastus, who is more interested in Scriptural disquisitions than in the discussion of principles in politics and history. Both the extent and the boundaries of his contention may be defined as follows. In a State where all profess the true religion, all coerce authority (from which excommunication follows) resides in the magistrate alone, the functions of the Church being restricted to teaching, exhortation, and the due performance of worship. (Only where the magistrate is not a Christian or is unorthodox may the Church substitute its own authority, and in this case, also, the power of excommunication is withdrawn.) Our sketch of the life and teaching of Erastus presents him as an exponent of the Lutheran doctrine of the Supper underlay his antagonism to excommunication, and whose antipathy to the Calvinistic discipline was the exciting cause of his denial, in favour of the magistrate, of the Church's right to any coercive action. Yet his true relation to Erastianism must be sought, not so much in the propositions which the Expiatio and the Confirmatio actually formulate, as in the common orientation, of Lutharians and Zwinglians especially, towards the rival claims of Church and State, a theocracy being rather the Calvinistic ideal. It was not so much the opportunity publication of the writings ('allowed by Whitgift's imprimatur in 1601') as the appearance to the Keats of Erastus by the Arminians against the Calvinists in Holland that gave Erastianism the varying connotation which, since the politico-eclesiastical debates of the eighteenth, and the first part of the nineteenth century, had taken a new shape in Great Britain. The opponents of Arminius and his friends reproached them for appealing 'to the superior magistrate against the ecclesiastical authority' (Figgis, p. 78, note). Both Grotius (who published in 1614 his Erastian tracte de imperio summorum potentatum circa sacra) and Althusius (whose view of the holiness of the State places him, with Luther, the Anglicans, Zwingli, and Erastus, 'between the Devil and the deep blue sea') treat the Arminians with their theory of the Church as societas perfecta regard a Christian commonwealth as a State wherein the clergy form but one class of officers. Though it was Grotius who elaborated what we call Erastianism, he himself does not mention Erastus, and holds other views on excommunication. Nevertheless, the fact that Erastus was the first to assert in a Protestant country the principle of the subordination of the Church to the State entitles him to what ambiguous fame attaches to his memory in the name 'Erastianism.'

3. Erastianism in history. [I.] FROM CONSTANTINE TO THE GENEVA CONFESSIONS IN 1553—CONCERNING THE THEOLOGICAL AND THE ECUMENICAL COUNCILS. Concern with the affairs of the Church was for Constantine and his successors a political necessity. Yet it is easy to exaggerate the actual amount of imperial interference exercised, and to forget the extent to which the motives of the State were in the interests of peace.

The whole question of the State's power over the Church was, when Constantine came to the throne, a very delicate one. The Church, as the most powerful political force in the Empire, was in a position which might be dangerous. Constantine disposed of the problem, by the Edict of Milan 3 in 313, by which the State conferred on the Church and Churchmen all the rights of the Empire. The Edict was not a constitution; it was a step in the direction of ecclesiastical independence. The Church of Rome was placed on the same footing as the other Churches; but the political theory of the Church was still that of the antecedent centuries. The Church was supposed to be the instrument of the State, and the State was supposed to be the instrument of the Church. The Edict was not a constitution; it was a step in the direction of ecclesiastical independence. The Church of Rome was placed on the same footing as the other Churches; but the political theory of the Church was still that of the antecedent centuries. The Church was supposed to be the instrument of the State, and the State was supposed to be the instrument of the Church.
ERASTIANISM was

Braetianism was Eutychian (Cunningham, Tragedy'). Thus

their problem of Church and State presented great diffi-

culties, was an endeavour to secure peace by the

Emperor's endorsement of what appeared to be

the creed of the majority. Nor must we forget that

Athanasius, as Patriarch of Alexandria, was

regarded as wielding an authority that might be
detrimental to the unity of the Empire. The

entourage of the Arian prelate Eusebius of

Nicomedia, with their allies (including Eusebius the

historian, bishop of Casarea), we have the

first instance of what may be called an Erastian

party, their aim being to support the form of Chris-
	

tian faith which, if not to give them the Rome

influence at Court, and, on the other hand, to

strengthen the Imperial supremacy over the

Church. Foakes-Jackson has suggested that the

support of Arianism by Constantius, to whom

the Emperor the principle which

Hosius and Hilary, in their opposition to Con-
stantius, had first asserted, namely, that the

interpretation of Christian things was the concern of

Churchmen. Not without reason did Nestorius, the

Patriarch of Constantinople, who, soon after his transfer-

from Antioch to the capital, inaugurated the

bitter controversies of the succeeding centuries,

give to his autobiography the title "Tragedy."
The vehement wrangles about the Two Natures in

Christ occasioned the issue of the First Council of

Ephesus (431), at which Nestorius was condemned.

Seventeen years later Eutyches propounded the

opposite heresy, asserting that One Nature of

Christ after the Incarnation; and this first form of

Monophysitism triumphed in the tumult of the

"Robber Synod," as Pope Leo (Ep. xev. 2) design-

nated the Council summoned by Theodosius II.

to Ephesus in 449. The change of attitude in the

Theodosian period, and in the

discarding of Nestorius, was probably due to the influence which, before the Council of

431, Cyril had succeeded in exercising upon the

Imperial ladies. But the death of Theodosius in

450 brought about a speedy reversal of his policy.

The Empress Pulcheria and her consort Marcian,
supporters of the doctrine of Two Natures, decided
to summon another Ecumenical Council, and that,
too, against the wishes of Leo, who preferred

the question at issue should be determined by the

authority of his Rome, rather than by the decision of

a Council dominated by the Emperor and Em-

peror.' Thus the official line of the

Emperor with paganism by abdicating

the title of Pontifex Maximus, and Theodosius had

supported his youthful colleague (an apt disciple of

Ambrose) in refusing to replace the altar of

Victory in the Senate. Honorius (395-423) and

Arcadius (395-408), the sons of Theodosius, who

succeeded to the rule of the West and the East

respectively, differed, like the brothers Valentinian

and Valens, in the extent of their cooperation with

the Church—the Western Emperor, according to

the rule that prevailed, henceforth being the less

pragmatical. Nevertheless Honorius, besides con-

vening the conferences with the Donatists (411),

whose remission he vainly sought to repress by

an edict of 418 banished Pelagius and his

principal followers, notwithstanding their recent

acquittal by Zosimus, the vacillating Pope who

for his time did nothing to stem the

Italian bishops to subscribe his anti-Pelagian

Epistola Tractator (417). But more important, for

our inquiry, attacks to the reprimand ad-

duced by Honorius to Arcadius after the con-

demnation of Chrysostom had passed, were

unwarrantable control exercised by the Emperors of the East

over the Patriarchs of Constantinople and the Greek Church

during the half-century following. Though, while in this country it is generally

known by the name of Erastianism (Cunningham, p. 164; see

also p. 209).

4 Houbolt, 103.

5 Bury, Hist. of the later Roman Empire, London, 1889, i. 105.

6 Alice Garnier, "Religious Dissension in the Fifth Century," in

Orthodoxy on the restoration of the worship which her husband had temporarily checked.

For the orthodox Eastern Church, because of her cultus, her Monophysitism, and her dependence upon the Emperor, 'it was easy to be,' as Omar says, 'as no other people ever been in the Church, and at the same time non-political' ('The Church and the Divine Order, London, 1911, p. 134')—words that recall the statement of Freeman ('Historical Essays,' ii. 288, London 1901).

'To the Eastern Romans the orthodoxy of the Eastern Church made up for the lack of nationality in the Eastern Empire. The sway of Christ and the Church went together. The true Byzantine mind the two ideas could barely be conceived asunder.'

(b) The struggle of the Empire and the European kingdoms with the Papacy.—The iconoclastic controversy forms a significant transition, from the history of the developing Byzantinism that dominated the religious life of the later Roman Empire in the East, to the history of the titanic conflict of the Romano-Germanic Empire with the Papacy. As King of the Franks, Charles the Great had already vindicated his headship over the Frankish Church, nor had he hesitated to reject the decisions of the Ecumenical Council of 787. He passed over the Frankish ecclesiastical councils, and even in the Papal domain exercised all the rights of the lord of the land. The fact that there was at the moment no Emperor in the East, and the necessity of securing Charles’s personal support, have been a factor in determining the action of Pope Leo III. (755–816) in crowning him Emperor on Christmas Day, 800. On the death of Charles (814), we pass from the hardly challenged supremacy of the Emperor over the Church to the Church’s assertion of her right to temporal supremacy as well as to absolute spiritual authority over Emperors and princes. The interests of the separate countries, too, both within and without the Empire, were all alike imperilled by the growing claims of the Papacy, from Nicholas I. (858–867) to Innocent III. (1189–1216); but the question of Byzantinism itself, in any given circumstance of domestic policy, is complicated by the phenomena of feudalism and the rise of national Churches. Notwithstanding the strong hand with which monarchs like William the Conqueror dealt with ecclesiastical affairs, a very real limitation of regality was involved in a recognition, however grudging, of the Papal supremacy. An obvious effect of the success of the Papal pretensions was the entailment of Erastianism on the German Empire. The brute of the struggle fell upon the German Emperors, because of the unique relation which they bore to the Popes, who were regarded, by princes outside the Empire, as foreign potentates exercising in the separate realms a jurisdiction more or less resented. To the Emperors the Popes were allies, for neither the rivals themselves nor the theorists who severally supported them envisaged the struggle as a contest waged by two different societies. But, though it would be a misreading of history to speak of the conflict as between Church and State—having regard to the prevalent theoretical conception of the right of the Holy Roman Empire as one society with two functions, sacerdotium and imperium, discharged by different officers—the crux of the struggle was, nevertheless, the recognition of the supremacy of the spiritual or of the temporal power in the State. The representative anti-Papal theories,1

1 Freeman holds that, had it not been for the Romanizing influence of Edward the Confessor, as he held, England would have become as subordinate to the State as was the Eastern Church ('The Norman Conquest,' v. (Oxford, 1876) 491 f.).

2 The magnitude of the medieval literature relating to the controversy may be inferred. The bibliographic compilation of C. E. 1S98J, 'Monophysite Controversy,' and the dissertation of A. H. Harnack, 'The Monophysite Controversy;' the debates over the controversy in the American Council of 1885, no less than 100 Publicists, Legists, and Canonists from the 17th to the 19th centuries, (Glorieux-Mailland, Political Theories of the Middle Age, Cambridge, 1890, pp. 1331–1367).
which we shall briefly summarize, demonstrate the strength of the dialectical defence of the right of princes, and the force of public opinion allied with them. Time after time did the temporal power at height the fact if negative superiority, as is instanced in the death in exile of Gregory VII. (Hildebrand, 1073–1085), who accused Henry IV. at Canossa (1077), and of Alexander III. (1159–1181), who humbled Frederick I. (Barbarossa) during the period he was engaged, by the Babylonian captivity of the Popes at Avignon, the blow to royal prestige that was involved in the fall of Frederick II., the last of the Hohenstaufen (1212–1250). From the earlier days of the Church herself, that the State was co-ordinate with her, and from the original idea of a pre-existent harmony between the two powers, both policy and speculation drifted to the more and more enthusiastic assertion of their distinctness and even opposition. It will suffice for our present purpose to review the anti-Papal theories of two great Italians and two great Englishmen—Dante (1255–1321) and Maritain (1882–1973) and William of Ockam (died after 1342); William of Ockam (died in 1347) and John Wyclif (1324–1387).

(a) The De Monarchia of Dante is not only ‘the most purely ideal of political treatises ever written’ (R. B. Gardner, Dante, London, 1909, p. 660), but it is among the epilogue or epitaph of the Empire as the earthly Kingdom of God, and ‘a prophecy of the last days of Christendom, and of that doctrinal war between the Divine kingdom and the kings, which formed for long its theoretical justification against clerical pretensions’ (C. F. G. Fromm zu Ermstedt, Cambridge, 1907, p. 20). The first book shows that the temporal monarchy—whereof the Empire is the unique embodiment—is necessary for the well-being of the world, the second, that the Roman people, under the jurisdiction of whose Emperors Christ designed to be born and to suffer, succumbed by divine Will to the empire of the world; the third, that the authority of the Roman Monarch or Emperor depends immediately (sine ullo medie) on God and is subsidiary to the Emperor, man’s two necessary guides of life, corresponding to the two celestial and the two terrestrial powers of the State. It was the conflict between John xxii. (1316–1334) and Ludwig of Bavaria (1314–1347), who attempted to depose each other, that made the De Monarchia, hitherto almost unknown, an armament of international arguments, the supporters of Ludwig including William of Ockam, whom Pope Clement regarded as having inspired Maritain of Padua.

(b) Maritain of Paris (whose Defense of Papacy was, by the command of Henry viii., published in an English translation, The Defense of Peace, by William Marshall, in 1539) anticipates, in its polemics, the intellectual climate. He maintains not only that coercive power belongs exclusively to the State, but even that no compulsion may be exercised in the Church. Sovereignty rests with the whole body of citizens, acting as the faithful lawyer, and the prince should be responsible to the former for his judicial power over the Church. Papal decrees have no temporal effect, and all bishops are equal.

c) William of Ockam opposed the cause of Ludwig of Bavaria against John xxii., by whom Ockam and Michael of Cesena, the Quaestiones de Rebus Temporalibus (d. 1321) from Avignon during the minority guarded on the subject of clerical power, this being the cause of Ockam’s opposition to the Papal claim to unlimited potestas potestatis, both temporal and spiritual. He contends that the whole hierarchy, from the Pope downwards, is a human order, and not immediately Divine. Were the Pope’s power unlimited, he could depose princes, and reduce Christianity to an unprecedented slavery. Ockam would even advocate a college of Bishops in preference to a monarchical Papacy. The ordinary judge of the Pope is the Emperor, but the Church has jurisdictio over him. In case of necessity he could be deposed by a General Council representing the whole Church. Inasmuch as every society can make laws for itself, the Church, assembled as a General Council on the basis of parishes, could appoint a successor. Ockam maintains that Church law is just as much the law of the State. His principles are not only subversive of Papal domination, but also assenting to the fact that the true faith resides among the people. He succeeded in being unseated as bishop of Paris (1317), although he had already been unseated as an advisor to the King of France. He published his Quaestiones under the name of God’s ancient virtual community. (d) Wyclif has been accounted more Erastian than Erastus. In his de Officio Regis and other tracts he asserts the king’s right to all the power of the Church. He held that the right to withhold revenues from unworthy ecclesiastics and to depose clergymen was an advance against contemporary anti-Papal theories consists in his extension of the State’s option over the Church.

Not content with maintaining the State’s autonomy in civil affairs, Wyclif contested the right of the Church to interfere in the administration of the Church when she neglects her duty. The State’s jurisdiction in religious matters is plenary, and it does not leave the Church to the mercy of the ministerium, not a dominium, but this ministerium the secular lords may remove from irreligious clerics. The link between Wyclif and Luther is supplied by John Hus (1373–1415), whose tracts, de Ecclesia, de Potestate Papae, and De Servo de ablatione temporis, show how completely he had absorbed Wyclif’s anti-Papal teaching.

(ii) THE REFORMATION.—(a) Germany. It was inevitable that the Reformation should be established in the various German States, as in other countries, only by the help of the secular power. If the German princes and nobles had not responded in sufficient numbers to the call of the French king, and if Charles v. had not honoured Luther’s safe-conduct to Worms, the attempts of Luther at reform would have proved as fatally futile as did the premature efforts of Arnold of Brrescia and Savonarola. Luther’s Address to the Christian Nobles of the German Nation (1520) bore immediate fruit in the list of grievances against the Roman see which the States drew up two years later at the Diet of Nuremberg. On the ground of the priesthood of all believers, Luther appealed to the German princes to undertake the reformation of the Church—the duty which the bishops refused to perform (Luther died after 1541). From this point of view the Reformation, at least in its principle was adopted which forms a landmark in the history of the Reformation—that, in the matter of putting in force the Edict of Worms, whereby Luther was placed under the ban, each component of the Empire was left to itself.

(b) England. So closely is Erastianism interwoven with the history of the Church of England, that the record of its operation here is to a great extent conterminous with the ecclesiastical history of the kingdom, the English kings having always claimed a visitatorial authority over the Church. Before Henry viii. the greatest assertors of the independence of the Crown against Papal jurisdiction from without and clerical influences were William the Conqueror, Henry ii., and Edward iii. The first two were concerned with the problems of civil and ecclesiastical (1308) the principle of Erastianism being also occupied with the matter of

1 A fundamental theory of the German Reformation was that of the transference of episcopal jurisdiction from the bishopric to the Protestant States. It was Luther who first expressed it by the princes of the power, which, though naturally theirs, had been usurped by the clergy. After the Compact of Passau (1552), pressed merely to restore to the princes their inherent ecclesiastical rights, was passed, the Holy See, with the consent of the German princes, was deposed, and our author supported this view at the expense of the Neo-Lutheran position of John E. S. Ryle, that the entire Church is under the imperium of the State, that the State has a priori jurisdiction in all the fields of human activity.

2 Cesius regius unus religio is a maxim as fatal to true religion as it is to freedom of conscience. It is the cement of despoticism, the formula in which the German Prince Express the fact that they have the power and willingness to act in reliance upon their power, against the State (the passing of the Edict of Worms in Germany, in Cont. Mod. Hist. [Cambridge, 1903] 278). On the important diplomatic correspondence which intervened in the Polish question, see Lindsay, Hist. Reformation, Edin. 1869, i. 389 note 2.

3 Longman, Life and Times of Edward iii., Lond. 1868, ii. 93-95.
investitures. Hildebrand recognized the right of lay investiture as a privilege enjoyed by English kings, while William rejected Hildebrand’s claim to suzerainty over England. The conflict of Church and State waged between Becket and Henry ii. centered in the legislation of the Canon and the Law, together with the numerous claims to privileges or immunities made by the Church on the basis thereof, especially as regards the civil impor-
tance of the clergy.

The sixth session of Henry viii.’s Reformation Parliament (1534-1535) witnessed the culmination of the breach with Rome, the Act of Supremacy giving the King the title of ‘Supreme Head on earth of the Church of England,‘ while the Prayer Book, under which Fisher and Moore were con-
demned, included, under the category of treason, maliciously depriving the sovereign of any of his royal titles or calling him a schismatic. With Henry’s ecclesiastical legislation, Erastianism in England enters upon a new phase. Even before the rupture with Rome had been consummated by Clement vii.’s refusal of the divorce with Katherine, Cranmer declared himself as ‘Supreme Head,’ and reluctantly acquiesced in the ‘Submission of the Clergy’ (1532). In Elizabeth’s Act of Supremacy (1558) her father’s claim to the head-
ship of the Church was declared to be ‘Supreme Governor of this realm as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes as temporal,’ but section 20 of the Statute recognized the limitation of the royal prerogative in matters of doctrine, reserving the right of the clergy in Convocation to assent. While the professed purpose of the Statute was to restore ‘to the Crown the ancient jurisdiction over the State ecclesiastical and spiritual, and all spiritual and temporal power repugnant to the same,’ it was the monarch’s personal authority, rather than that of Parliament, that was herein enhanced, and the Acts of Supremacy, both of Henry viii. and of Elizabeth, were im-
portant factors in Tudor absolutism. On the other hand, the developments of Protestantism in Puritanism, Independency, Quakerism, and other move-
ments towards religious and political liberty and equality, effected the ultimate overthrow of the Stuart dynasty. Now were laid the foundations both of modern Erastianism and of the manifold opposition to it. Even when Hooker published his ‘Hermeneuticks’ (1595-94), the fundamental assumption of his Erastianism (not unlike the basis of Arnold’s idea of a Broad Church co-extensive with the nation) was already falsified by the fact that the State, even as viewed by Pro-
testant, was no longer of one religion. From the beginning of Elizabeth’s reign the interminable controversy of Church and State assumes a new signification. It no longer hinges upon the rival claims of Pope and Emperor or King. The vindica-
tion of the spiritual autonomy of presbyters, of congregations, and of individuals against the authority of Sovereign, Parliament, or Magis-
trate compelled inquiry into the true nature of the Church of Christ. Yet it must not be forgotten that, as Hutton says, ‘the English Revolution was thoroughly Erastian in its treatment of the Church question,—an absolute contrast to the Scots.’ The Erastianism of the Independents was in great measure due to their anti-Presbyterianism.
4Prothero, Select Statutes and other Constitutional Documents Illustrative of the Reigns of Elizabeth and James 1, London, 1871.
5Hutton, History of the English Church from the Accession of Charles i. to the Death of Anne, London, 1866, p. 129 ff.

king and bishop, refused to abdicate its supremacy cæsar sacris.

(c) Scotland.—In no Protestant country has greater opposition been shown to the very sugges-
tion of Erastianism than in Scotland. Not only the Secession of 1560 and the Disruption of 1843 (the latter especially being, in the first instance, a protest against lay patronage and intrusion), but also the growing effort on the part of the Established Church to free itself from State control, shows how deeply engrained in the Scottish religious consciousness is that idea of the essential autonomy of the Kirk which John Knox acquired during his exile in Geneva. The revolt against Erastianism in Scotland may be said to have begun when the Scottish Estates, on 25th Aug. 1560, abolished the Papal jurisdic-
tion and the Mass.1 But it was especially in connexion with the repeated attempts of the Stuart Kings of England to establish prelacy that the term ‘Erastianism’ acquired in Scotland its evil connotation.2 Resistance to successive Acts which were under-
stood to be aimed against the Presbyterian Church of Scotland was especially instigated by the heroism of a series of movements—those of the Covenanter, the Protes-
ters, the Conventicles, the Hamiltonians, and the Cameronians.

No one has discerned more clearly the tre-a
d in the discussion of the relation between Church and State been in any country more learnedly, eloquent-
ly, and judiciously handled than in Scotland. Prob-
ably no Church in Christendom is in this respect more ecclesiastically minded, in the true sense of the term, than the Presbyterian Church of Scot-
land, whether Established or Free. The current opinion of many modern English ecclesiologists, that the Established or non-Free Church in England can only almost complete autonomy, is a mistake. On the question of State aid it has been tersely expressed that the Established Church of Scotland was non-
voluntary, the Free Church was voluntary on conditions, and the United Presbyterian Church was voluntary without conditions.3 Apart from the Disruption of 1843, when resentment at the decision of a legal tribunal was of the essence of the movement, no Corporation of Church establishment was shown on the part of the United Free Church against the claim of a majority of the lay tribunal of the House of Lords (1st Aug. 1904) to controver determine the development of doctrine in the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland. Thus the religious history of Scotland exhibits opposition to Erastianism, whether the State control be exerted legislatively or administratively.

1 Hutton, History of the English Church, London, 1866, p. 129 ff.
3 ‘to many a Scot prelacy will always suggest another word of evil sound: ’ the ‘anti-Presbyterianism.’ The link is Anglican. The name of the professor of medicine at Oxford, for a name or infancy in Britain that has been denied to it else-
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ERINYES.—See Eumenides.

ERROR AND TRUTH.—Both in its philo-
sophical and in its popular acceptation the word 'error' is applied to false opinions. But popular usage also extends it to the term a wider meaning, whereby it includes not only false opinions, but numerous forms of practical failure, and of defective conduct, whose relations to conscious beliefs are by no means constant or easily discoverable. The derivation of the word illustrates the natural-
ness of associating the conception of a false opinion with the idea of some such act as wandering, or straying, or missing the way. It seems, therefore, as if a first approach to a sharper definition of 'error' would be aided by clearly distinguishing between the practical and the theoretical applications, and then confining the philosophical use of the term, so far as possible, to theoretical errors. But the difficulty is, that even theoretical error without reference to some genuinely practical considerations. However much we try to avoid popular confusions, we shall be led in the end to a concept of error which can be stated only in t. logical terms, and which involves the idea of action for an end, and of a certain defect in the carrying out of such action.

The present article, after distinguishing, as far as possible, the concept of theoretical errors, or false opinions, from the popular concept of practical errors, and after stating some of the best known views regarding what a false opinion is, will seek to indicate more particularly the nature of the problem in terms of a doctrinal basis which forms the relation of the cognitive to the volitional processes.

1. Practical errors and false opinions.—When one emphasizes the practical aspect of an error, one sometimes makes use of the more drastic word of 'blunder.' A blunder is something which involves serious maladjustment, defect in conduct. Errors in the sense of blunders may be due to false opinions or to ignorance of true facts: but it is largely consist of such. On the other hand, they must need involve false opinions, and must involve actions which do not attain their goal. These actions may be only partly voluntary; but the relation of their defec-
tive action to the accompanying volun-
tary processes is what makes us call them errors. Thus, we speak of the error or blunder of the marksman who misses his mark; of the player who fails to score, or who permits his opponent to score when the game calls for some device for hindering the opponent from scoring. We speak of the mistakes error when he sings or plays a false note. Such errors may, but often do not, result from, or accompany, false opinions or misjudgments. Thus one may fail as marksman, as player on the other hand, there may be, or an error due to confusions, either through mistakes, or else through defects of physical training, of temporary condition, of mood, or of attention—defects which may involve no false opinions whatever. In the moral realm, the relations between such practical errors on the one hand and false opinions on the other are especially momentous and intricate. Here, in fact, the theory of moral error involves all the main problems about the relations between knowledge and action. A sin is very generally called an error. 'We have erred and strayed from thy ways like lost sheep.' The error is, first of all, practical. It has also some relation to knowledge. Yet, since sin appears to depend upon a deeper study of knowledge of the right, the 'error' in question does not merely result from a false opinion about what one's duty is. On the other hand, that sin involves 'unwilling,' and so does the sin of the sinner. It depends upon false opinion in its generally asserted. Any careful discussion of those practical errors which have a moral significance will, therefore, show that it is not merely accidental confusion which has led to our use of a word derived from our experience of wanderings from the right path as a term which is also to be applied to false opinions. Opinions certainly express themselves in actions; and voluntary actions are guided by opinions. The resulting relations of cognition and volition, especially in the moral world, are amongst the most complex and intricate which are known to us anywhere. They are relations which we can neither ignore nor wholly disentangle. Hence the clear separation of theoretical error and practical error, at least in the moral world, is impossible. For sin involves both theoretical and practical defects.

We can, however, make some approach to such a separation of the theoretical and practical aspects of error if we turn for aid to a very different realm, namely, formal logic. The distinction between true and false is a fundamental distinction of the best known general relations, such as formal logic considers and analyzes. We may use these relations for what they are worth in attempting to define what a false opinion is. Having thus laid the way through some of the more complex regions of the problem of error.

The distinction between true opinion and false opinion obviously depends upon, but also is obvi-
ously not identical with, the formal logical distinction between true and false propositions. This close relation and important difference between these two distinctions appears upon a brief study of the considerations which formal logic employs in dealing with the concepts of truth and falsity. True and false are, for the formal logician, predicates belonging to propositions, quite apart from the basis for further analysis, we may attempt to clear the way through some of the more complex regions of the problem of error.
reciprocal or 'symmetrical'; (4) of two contradictory propositions, one is true and the other is false. These may be here regarded, if one chooses, merely as defining principles, explaining what one means by propositions, i.e., propositions to be used in logical predication 'true' and 'false.'

Granting these purely formal principles, of which all exact reasoning processes make constant use, it is obvious that propositions may be collectively as a system constitute an ideal realm wherein to every truth there uniquely corresponds its contradictory falsity, and to every false proposition its contradictory true proposition. The realms of truth and falsity are thus formally inseparable. To know that a given proposition is false is to know that the corresponding contradictory is true, and vice versa. Omniscience regarding the realms of truth would, therefore, equally involve knowing true propositions as true and false propositions as false; nor could the one sort of knowledge be defined or real without the other.

But no such formal logical necessity appears to connect right opinion and error. No one can know that 2+2=4 is true without thereby knowing that 2+2 # 4 (that is, the contradictory of the former assertion) is false. But we can conceive of a computer that could make any errors in computation, and such a computer might even be supposed so perfect, in the possession of some superhuman infallibility of computation, as not even to know what it would be to err in his additions. We ourselves, when we use the assertion 2+2=4 as an example of a peculiarly obvious proposition of computation, find this bit of summation one about which it is rare or difficult for a man deeply to err in. Yet for us the knowledge of the truth of the proposition 2+2=4 is logically inseparable from the knowledge of the falsity of the contradictory of this proposition.

In sum, then, true and false propositions are logically inseparable. To possess a knowledge of truth is, therefore, inseparable from the possession of a knowledge of what falsity is, and of what false propositions mean. But a being can be supposed to know truth and falsity, and their distinctions and relations, without having any tendency to fall into error. At all events, no purely formal logical reasons, such as for the moment concern us, can be given for supposing that a being who is capable of knowing truth would be capable of falling into error. The more concrete distinction between true opinion and error must, therefore, be different from the formal logical difference between truth and falsity. The latter may be viewed as a logically necessary distinction between inseparable objects. The former must be due to motives or causes, and must imply mental tendencies and situations of which formal logic, taken in its deliberate abstraction from the fullness of life, gives no account.

The concept of a false opinion is thus obviously distinct from that of a false proposition, and not every true opinion requires that the corresponding false opinion should be held by somebody. It is the purpose of advancing science, of education, of the propagation of truth, to diminish and, so far as may be, to destroy, the minds of men from which error arises. If this purpose were somehow miraculously attained, there would be as many false propositions in the formal logician's ideal realm of truth and falsity as there ever were; but human errors would have ceased.

2. The leading definitions of error.—To define false opinion, hereupon, as the acceptance or the mistaking of false propositions for true ones, or of true ones for false ones, is precisely as objectionable as ever was; but human errors would have ceased.}

accept a false opinion as true—what is this but simply to make a mistake, or to hold a false opinion? This supposed definition is but a tautology. Not thus is the nature of error to be clarified. Further light is thrown on the nature of error through (1) defining more exactly the distinction between true and false propositions; and (2) showing upon what further distinctions the conception of error depends, and, in the light of these, how to accomplish this result must next be summarily stated and criticized.

(1) The 'correspondence theory of truth and falsity' and the definitions of error based upon it deserve to be stated, because they are familiar, and because they have formed the starting-point for supplementary doctrines and definitions and for corrections. According to the view now in question, a proposition is true if it reports, or describes, or portrays 'facts as they are.' The emphasis is laid upon the 'as.' A true idea 'corresponds in its structure to the thing, or reality, or fact of which it is a true idea; a true proposition is one which asserts that an idea does not correspond to the facts, when it actually so corresponds. Or, again, if the account given by a proposition conforms to the structure of the facts of which it attempts to be an account, the proposition is true. Thus, a proposition may relate to the number in a real flock of sheep. In this case an idea, gained by counting the sheep, is first formed, and then the assertion is made that this numerical idea represents the real number of sheep present in the flock. The correspondence of the idea with the facts constitutes that to which the assertion is committed. If the correspondence exists, the assertion is true.

Such being (according to the 'correspondence' theory) the nature of truth, error takes place when, because of inadequate observation of the sheep, or because of some other psychological defect on the part of the one who counts, a numerical idea which does not correspond to the real number of the sheep arises in the mind that is subject to the error; while, because of these or of still other psychological motives, the false proposition, 'Such is the number of the sheep,' comes to be asserted. That the correspondence does not exist makes the proposition false. That this non-existent correspondence, or belief, or knowledge, or opinion has to exist constitutes the essence of the error.

In order to understand what error is, and how it arises, one therefore needs, according to this view, to analyze the nature of belief, and the motives which lead the erring mind to make assertions. From this point onwards, the definition and the theory of error have always required the consideration of various associative, affective, or volitional factors of the process of making and believing assertions—factors of which pure logic, considered in its usual abstraction, can give no account. In brief, the nature of truth and falsity once having been thus defined, the nature of error depends upon some dispositions to accept or to deny an untrue proposition—a disposition which cannot be due to the merely logical nature of the untruth itself, but must be referred to the prejudices, the ideas, the biases, the devices, the habits, or the other psychological fortunes of the erring subject.

What further accounts, upon this basis, have been attempted as explanations of error, there is here no space to set forth at length. A few points must be noted. One may assert: (1) that error in such a case as the foregoing, or in the more complex cases of superstitions, supposed theological heresies, false philosophical doctrines, false scientific opinion, false political doctrines, etc., may be mainly due to a negative cause—the mere
ignorance of the erring subject, his lack of 'adequate ideas,' are the absence of correct and sufficient portraits of fact. What a man lacks he cannot use. If he has no ideas that correspond with the facts in question, how can he make true assertions? Error is then, at least in the main (so long as we confine our consideration to the question under private). For instance, may not even attempt to count the sheep in the flock. I may merely guess at random. In such a case, error seems to be due merely, or almost, to a lack of ideas. But, an error is not a false theory of error was worked out by Spinoza, and applied by him, as far as possible, to decidedly complex cases. Naturally, according to Spinoza, the order and connexion of ideas corresponds to the order and connexion of things. This, for Spinoza, is the case with even the most worthless of our human imaginations. But, for psycho-physical reasons, which Spinoza discusses at length, most ideas of the ordinary man, relating to his world, are extremely 'inadequate;' that is, such ideas correspond only to very fragmentary aspects of the real world. The majority of men live ignorant of God and of themselves, and of things. This ignorance prevents them from possessing the stock of ideas which could furnish the basis for true opinions. Men fill the void with errors. Yet none of their errors is without basis in fact. The idea of a judge, without any regard to that of which they know not, just because they know so little. This doctrine of error as ignorance, if accepted, would give us the most purely and completely theoretical definition of error which has ever been offered.

Plainly, however, ignorance is not of itself error. I cannot err concerning facts of which I know so little as to have no idea whatever about them; just as I cannot, in a speech, make grammatical blunders of which existence I have never heard. Some other factor than ignorance determines the actual acceptance and utterance of false propositions. This even Spinoza himself has in the end to recognize. In his study of the errors of human passion, he makes the mechanical associative process, and the resulting passions themselves, factors in the genesis of error. Thus we are inevitably led to other theories.

One may assert: (2) that error is due to whatever moves the will of the erring subject to make assertions even in the absence of ideas that correspond to real objects. This volitional theory of error plays an inextricable part in the dogmatic doctrine that error was obviously useful in giving reasons for the moral condemnation of the errors of heretics, infidels, and schismatics; and has, in fact, an obvious and important basis in the psychology of opinion. Descartes recognized it in connexion with his own form of the doctrine of the freedom of the will. Spinoza, who rejected the theory of free will, and defined both intellect and will in terms of his psycho-physical theory of the associative process, still on occasion was obliged, as just pointed out, to use his own version of the doctrine of 'human bondage' as an explanation of the fatal errors into which the play of our inadequate ideas and of our passions leads us. In other forms this theory of error is widely accepted. From this point of view an error is a willful assertion of a false proposition—an assertion made possible, indeed, by the erring subject's ignorance of the ideas that do correspond with reality, but positively determined by his willingness to assert. False beliefs are thus due to a combination of ignorance with the will to believe.

One may insist: (3) that the affective processes which condition the mood called 'belief' are the principal factors in making a false proposition, when it chances to be suggested, seem plausible. Where error is propagated by social contagion, or is accepted through reverence for authority, more so much the will as the emotional life of the erring subject seems to be the factor which makes error possible. Here, according to the previous view, ignorance is an idea that does correspond with reality, hence becomes a condition of error, but constitutes neither its essence nor its sufficient cause. An error, according to the present view, is a false opinion which, because of its appeal to the sentiments, the feelings, the passions, the will of the erring subject, because it is harmonious with his social interests or with his private concerns, wins the subject over to the state of mind called belief.

One may further maintain: (4) that the principal cause of error is whatever associative, perceptual, or imaginative process gives such liveliness, strength, and persistence to ideas which as a fact do not correspond with reality, that the erring subject is forced, in the absence of sufficient corrective ideas, or (to use Taine's expression) for lack of 'reducers,' to regard these ideas as representative of reality. Theories of error founded upon this view may have played a prominent role in the psychical literature which deals with the genesis of pathological forms of error, and have been prominent in the teachings of the Associationist school generally. From this point of view, error is due to the correspondence of the erring subject through the mechanism of association, and mainly because no other ideas than those which this assertion declares to correspond with the facts can win a place in the subject's mind when he thinks of the topic in question.

The foregoing accounts of the nature and source of error have all been stated with explicit reference to the 'conventional facts.' This theory supposes that the test of truth is the actual conformity of a representative idea with the object which it is required to portray. Idea and object are viewed as distinct and separable facts, just as a man and his portrait or photograph are possessed of a separate existence. The representative idea is external to the object. Truth depends upon a certain agreement between such mutually external facts. And, just as the idea to whose truthfulness as a representation a proposition is committed is external to its object, so, as we have now seen, the motives which lead to error appear, in the accounts thus far given, to be external to the truth or falsity of ideas and propositions. The falsity of a proposition, so far as we have yet seen, gives no reason why the error involved in believing that proposition should be committed. The truth of a proposition, also, in no wise explains why the true proposition comes to be believed—unless, indeed, with Spinoza, one comes to accept, for metaphysical reasons, a theory that ideas are by nature in agreement with objects. In case, however, one does accept the latter theory without any limitation, then error can be defined only in negative terms as due to mere absence of ideas. Such an account of error, as we have also seen, is incapable of telling us what it is, and is inadequate to explain the most familiar facts about its occurrence.

If, then, the truth or the falsity of a proposition does not of itself explain why it is true or a false belief, the existence of error, for one who accepts the correspondence theory of truth, has to be explained by psychological motives which are as external to the logical meaning of true and false propositions as the ideas. The correspondence theory of truth are external to their objects. Some propositions are true. Their contradictions are false. So far, we have a system of facts and relations that seems, according to this
account, to be wholly independent of the psychological processes of anybody. But of these true and false beliefs, the subject is already somewhat acquainted with the constitutions of the object, and is aware what propositions are true about the object quite apart from the psychological fortunes of the poor subject, whose escape from error is to be added to such other causes. As a fact, philosophers who give such counsel very often behave for the moment as if they, at least, had not to wait for a slowly acquired conformity with the reality, but were already assured of their own grasp of the object, and were therefore able to give such good advice to the erring psychological subject. No purely psychological theory of the way in which a conformity to an external object can be gradually acquired through clear ideas, freedom from prejudices, and so on, can serve to explain how the critic of human truth and error has himself acquired his assumed power to see things as they are, and thus to guide the psychological subject in the right path. That sort of attainment of truth which this theory attributes to the philosopher who teaches it is just what it does not explain.

In fact, a little reflection shows the answer: when we hold, as we very rightly do, that a certain wise conduct of our ideas, feelings, will, observations, processes of recording observations, and other such mental enterprises helps us towards truth, it only tells us to avoid error, we are comparing, not ideas with merely external objects, so much as less coherent with more coherent, unified, clear, and far-reaching forms of experience, of cognition—in general, of insight. If we once see this fact, we have to alter our definition of truth, and herewith our definitions both of true opinion and of error.

Truth cannot mean mere conformity of idea to external object: first, because nobody can judge an idea merely by asking whether it agrees with this or with that indifferent fact, but only by asking whether it agrees with that with which the knowing subject meant or intended it to agree; secondly, because nobody can look down, as from without, upon a world of wholly external objects on the one hand, and of his ideas upon the other, and estimate, as an indifferent spectator, their agreement; and thirdly, because the cognitive process, as itself a part of life, is essentially an effort to give to life unity, self-possession, insight into its own affairs, control of its own enterprises—in a word, wholeness. Cognizance does not merely to represent its object, but to attain, to possess, and to come into a living unity with it.

Accordingly, the theories of error which have been founded upon the 'correspondence' theory of truth must be, not simply abandoned, but modified, in the light of a richer theory of truth. A true proposition does, indeed, express a correspondence between idea and object, but it expresses much more than this.

(ii) Another definition of truth, which has its foundation far back in the history of thought, but which has been of late revised and popularized under the names of Pragmatism, Humanism, and Instrumentalism, may next be mentioned. According to this view, an idea is essentially something that tends to guide or to plan a mode of action. A proposition expresses the acceptance of such a mode of action. It is founded on a less sharply defined end. Now, a mode of action inevitably leads to consequences, which arise in the experience of the active subject. These consequences may be called the 'vindication' of the view which tended to guide or to plan this mode of action. These workings may agree or disagree with the intent of the idea. If the idea agrees with its expected workings, that idea is true, and with it the proposition which accepts that idea as
suited to its own ends is true; otherwise the idea and the proposition are erroneous. Such is the definition of truth which is characteristic of Pragmatism.

The case of the right or wrong counting of the flock of sheep will serve to illustrate the present theory. If true opinion and true belief are to be exemplified by the representative theory of the same matters. A flock of sheep is not merely an external object to be portrayed. It is, to the one who counts it, an interesting object of human experience. He counts it in order to be ready to estimate his possessions, to sell or to buy the flock, to know whether he needs to hunt for lost sheep, or because of some other concrete purpose. His counting gives him an idea, perhaps of what he ought to ask of a purchaser, or of a plan for the shearing or for the market, perhaps of whether he ought to search for missing sheep. When he accepts and asserts that some determinate number represents the actual number of the flock, he, no doubt, takes interest in the correspondence between the idea and the object; yet his real object is not the indifferent external fact, but the flock of sheep as related to his own plans and aspirations. The practical results of these plans. The only test of the truth of his count, and, in fact, the only test that, when he counts, he proposes to accept, is that furnished by the workings of his count. Does his idea of the number of sheep, when accepted, lead to the expected results? One of these results, in many cases, is the agreement of his own count with that made by somebody else, with whom he wishes to agree concerning a sale or some other enterprise. Or, again, he expects the enumeration which he makes at one time to agree with the result obtained at some other time when he counts the flock anew. Furthermore, a habit of inaccurate counting betrays itself, in the long run of business, in the form of failure to get expected profits, or in the form of a loss of sheep whose straying is at one time not noticed because of the inaccurate counting; while later experience shows, in the form of the experience which traces the loss, the non-correspondence of expectations and results. Such expectations, tests, and agreements define the sort of truth that is sought.

What so simple and commonplace an instance illustrates, the whole work of the natural sciences, according to the pragmatist, everywhere exemplifies. The Newtonian theory of gravitation is accepted as true because its ideas lend, through computations, to workings which agree with observation. The older corpuscular theory of light was rejected because certain of its consequences did not agree with experience. The same process of testing hypotheses by a comparison of expectations with outcome can be traced throughout the entire range of empirical investigation.

As to the cause and essence of error, upon the basis of this theory of truth, there can be, according to the pragmatist, no very subtle difficulties to solve. The whole matter is, upon one side, empirical; upon the other side, practical. Experience runs the course, and error does. We, the truth-seekers, are endeavouring to adjust our actions to empirical happenings by adapting our expectations, through the definition of our ideas, and through the forming and testing of our hypotheses, to the observed facts as they come. As we are always in our practical life looking to the future, and are seeking the guidance which we need for our undertakings, our propositions are hypotheses to be tested that certain ideas will, if tested, agree with certain expected workings. If the test shows that we succeed, then, just when and in so far as we succeed, our propositions prove to be true and there true. If we fail, they prove to be errors.

Truly and falsity, and, consequently, true opinion and error are not 'static' principles, or fixed classifications of our ideas or of our hypotheses. Both the ideas and the propositions 'come true' or 'fail to come true' through the fluent and dynamic process of the empirical test. Thus every truth and every falsity, and every falsity false, is relative to the time when, and the purpose for which, the individual idea or hypothesis is tested. Absolute truth or permanent truth, and equally absolute falsity or permanent falsity, are not concepts. From this point of view, purely abstract and ideal predicates, useful sometimes for formal purposes, when we choose to define our purposes in terms of logical or of mathematical definitions. Concrete truth and error are of the nature of events, or series of events, or of 'the long run' of experience. That many of our ideas should not 'work,' or that many of our hypotheses should result in disappointed expectations, is, for the pragmatist, merely an empirical fact, requiring a special explanation no more than do the marksman's misses or the player's failure to score. We are not perfectly skilful beings; experience is often too fluent or too novel for us to catch its drift. This ignorance, or error, leads us, he says, to this is not more frequently the case. That man is as skilful a player as he is of the game of ideal expectations and anticipated consequences is a mark of our stage of development, but failure is as natural an event as is success.

The traditional accounts of the psychology of error mentioned above are readily accepted by Pragmatism, precisely in so far as they are indeed accounts which experience justifies. No doubt, ignorance is a source of error. We are, in fact, ignorant of all except what experience, in one way or another, permits us upon occasion to prove by actual trial. This ignorance permits errors, in the form of false expectations, to arise. Prejudice, emotion, willfulness, and the associative process unite to engender expectations which may prove to be false. Nor is there any known cause that uniformly ensures the attainment of truth. The difference between success and failure in our adjustment to our situation is simply an empirical difference. We have to accept it as such. No deeper account can be given than experience warrants.

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and results. These happenings, or 'the long run' of such happenings, constitute all that is concretely meant by truth and error. Whether one says, 'This proposition is true or false,' or, 'This opinion is true or false,' the concrete fact to which one refers is the sequence of ideas and the evidence submitted when their expected workings are compared with the expectations. Since logicians like to abstract certain 'forms' from the matter of life, they may, if they choose, define the entities called truths and false propositions. Suppose then to the students of the concrete the study of the fortunes of mere opinions. As a fact, however, according to Pragmatism, propositions live only as opinions in process of being tested. The distinctions with which we began this discussion have their own provisional usefulness, but only as abstractions that help to prepare the way for understanding life. A proposition becomes true in the concrete when the opinion that it is true leads to expected workings, and becomes false when the belief in it leads to workings which do not agree with expectations.

Second, in sum, is the pragmatist's solution of our initial problem. It emphasizes very notable facts regarding the relations between logic and life, and between thought and volition. Yet it fails to satisfy. For it can only presuppose and constantly presuppose certain assertions about experience, about the order, the inter-relations, the significance, and the unity of empirical facts to be true, although their truth is never tested, in the pragmatist's sense of an empirical test, at any moment of our experience.

Thus it has been necessary to assume, even in the view of Pragmatism about truth, that ideas can be formed and submitted to the test of experience at another time, and perhaps by another person, just as Newton's hypotheses were formed by him, but were tested, not only by himself, through a long course of years, but by later generations of observers. It has been necessary to assume that one can form expectations today, and compare them with facts to-morrow, or next year, or after whatever length of time the conditions make possible. But this assumption requires the truth of the proposition that the meaning, the object, the purpose, the definition of the ideas and expectations of one moment, or period of time, or person, not only can be but are identical with the meaning, object, purpose, definition of the ideas and expectations of another moment, temporal region, or person. Now such an assertion, in any one case, may be regarded with indifference, but if it is, for human beings, unverifiable. Nobody experiences, in his own person, or at any one time, the identity of the ideas, meanings, expectations, of yesterday and to-day, of himself and of another person, of Newton and of the later students of Nature who have tested what they believe to be Newton's ideas. One may, in each special case, doubt, therefore, whether the idea formed yesterday is the same in meaning as the idea formed to-day, whether two men mean the same by the hypotheses which they are trying to verify together, and so on. But this much seems clear: however doubtful, in the single case, any such proposition may appear, unless some such propositions are true, there is no such process as the repeated testing of the same ideas through successive processes of experimenting and testing, at moments of time, or in the experiences of various human observers.

But in that case it is not true that the proposition, 'Such a testing of ideas by the course of experience as Pragmatism presupposes actually takes place,' expresses the facts. If, however, this proposition is not true, the whole pragmatist account of truth becomes simply meaningless. On the other hand, if the proposition is true, then there is a kind of truth whose nature is inexpressible in terms of the pragmatist's definition of truth. For there are propositions which no human being at any moment of his own experience can ever test, and which are nevertheless true.

Much the same may be said of the pragmatist's assertion regarding the 'workings' that an idea is said to 'possess,' or to which it is said to 'lead.' These 'workings,' by hypothesis, may extend over long periods of time, may find a place in diverse minds, and may involve extremely complex reasoning processes (e.g., computations, as in the case of the Newtonian theory of gravitation) which are very hard to follow, and which no human mind can survey, in their wholeness, at any moment, or submit to the test of any direct synthetical observation. The proposition, however, 'These are the actual and, for the purposes of a given test, the logically relevant workings of the idea that is to be tested,' must itself be true, if the empirical comparison of any one of these workings with the facts of experience is to be of any worth. The truth of the proposition just put in quotation marks is a truth of a type that no one man, at any instant, ever personally and empirically tests. In every special case it may, and in general, it should be, regarded as doubtful. Yet, unless some such propositions are true, Pragmatism becomes a meaningless doctrine; while, if any such propositions are true, there is a sort of truth of which Pragmatism gives no account.

What holds of truth holds here, in general, of the conditions which make falsity possible. And the whole theory of true and false opinion, and consequently the theory of error, must be modified accordingly. In brief, Pragmatism presupposes a certain unity in the meaning and coherence of experience taken as a whole—a unity which can never at any one moment be tested by any human being. Unless the propositions which assert the existence and describe the nature of this presupposed unity are themselves true, Pragmatism has no meaning. But, if they are true, Pragmatism presupposes a sort of truth whereof it gives no adequate account. To say this is not to say that Pragmatism gives a wholly false view of the nature of truth, but is only to insist upon its inadequacy. It needs to be supplemented.

(jii) Over against the theory of truth as the correspondence between a wholly external object and an ideal portrayal, and also in contrast with Pragmatism, there exists a theory of truth which defines that concept wholly in terms of a harmony between the partial expression of a meaning which a proposition signifies and the whole of life, of experience, or of meaning, which, according to this theory, ideas and propositions intend to embody so far as they can. A proposition is true in so far as it conforms to the meaning of the whole of experience. Such conformity can never be attained through the mere correspondence of a portrayal with an external object. It can exist only in the form of the harmonious adaptation of part to whole—an adaptation that can best be figured in the form of the adaptation of an organ to the whole of an organism.

If one reverts to the comparatively trivial instance of the sheep and the counting, the present view would insist, as Pragmatism does, upon the fact that, in counting sheep, one is attempting to adjust present ideas to the unity of an extended realm of experience, in which the observed sheep appear, now as grazing in the field, now as having their place in the herdman's enterprises, now as passing from one ownership to another, and so on. The one who counts wants to get such a present
ERROR AND TRUTH

idea of the sheep as will stand in harmonious unity with all else that can be or that is known with regard to them. The truth involved in the process of counting is itself of a relatively abstract and lower sort; and hence is ill adapted to show what truth really is. For, in fact, to treat sheep merely as numerical objects is to treat them as what, on the whole, they are not; hence to say, 'They are so many'; is to make some respect false. For they are sheep, and to say this is to say that each is a living organism, a unique individual, a product of ages of evolution, and a being possessing values beyond those which commerce recognizes. Hence a numerical account of them has only 'partial truth,' and therefore is false as well as true. The only wholly true account of the sheep would express (not merely portray) their character as facts in the universe of experience and of reality. One can say, at best, of the proposition about their number that it is true in so far as it expresses a view about them which harmonizes, to the greatest extent possible for a numerical statement, with what experience, viewed as a whole, determines the place and the meaning of one's present experience of the flock of sheep to be.

The truth, from this point of view, is an attribute which belongs to propositions in a greater or less degree. For single propositions, taken by themselves, give us abstract accounts of facts, or rather of the whole in which every fact has its place, and from which it derives its character. A proposition is an interpretation of the whole universe, in terms of such a partial experience of the nature of the whole as a limited group of ideas can suggest. This interpretation is always one-sided, precisely in so far as the group of ideas in question is limited. In so far as the partial view harmonizes with the whole, the proposition is true. Since the partial view, being one-sided, can never wholly harmonize with the whole, each separate proposition, if taken in its abstraction, is partially false, and needs to be amended by adding other propositions.

This general theory of truth and falsity, while its sources run back into ancient thought, is especially characteristic of modern Idealism. That the truth of propositions about experience is a character determined by their relation to the ideal and abstract whole of experienced apprehension, 'is a thesis which forms part of Kant's 'Deduction of the Categories.' The later developments of the 'Dialectical Method,' by Fichte and Hegel, and the analogous features of Schelling's thought, led to more explicit theories of the relations between truth and falsity, and to the doctrine that every proposition, considered in its abstraction, is partially false, and needs amendment. Hegel, in the preface to his Phänomenologie, asserted that 'Das Wahre ist das Ganze,' and interpreted this as meaning that only what a survey of the total process of experience signifies enables us to know truth, while 'partial views,' such as we get on the way towards absoluete Wissen, are at once true and false—true, as necessary stages on the way to insight, and therefore as in harmony with the purposes of the whole; false, as needing supplement, and as showing this need through the contradictions which give rise to the dialectical process. In Hegel's Logic this view of truth is technically developed. With a different course of argument, with original features, and with a more empirical method of investigation, a view of truth and error which belongs to the same general type has in recent times been developed by Bradley.

If one can develop such a theory of the 'degrees of truth and falsity,' and of truth as the harmony of organic unity between a partial view and the ideal whole of experience or of reality, the essence of error—that is, of false opinion—must receive a new interpretation. In the history of the development of Absolute Idealism, the conception of error has taken, on the whole, two distinct forms.

(1) According to the first of these forms, usually emphasized by Hegel, error exists merely because it is a partial view, and in some respects false. For it is the whole truth, as the total and final view, precisely in so far as the partial view inevitably passes through the stage of 'abstraction,' in which it defines itself to the exclusion of all other points of view than its own. Did it not pass through this stage, it would not be a live or concrete view of things at all. It simply would not exist. But (according to Hegel) the whole, in order to be an organism at all, requires the parts to exist. And, if the parts are—as in the case of opinions—partial views of the whole, and if the whole requires them to exist, each in its place in the system of spiritual life, it is the whole itself, it is the Absolute which requires the partial view to make it true, to assimilate the essence of regarding itself as true—that is, as an absolutely whole view. If a man is merely counting, he takes his objects simply as numerical; and then real things present themselves to him, as to the Pythagoreans, as merely 'numbers.' Such a view, as an abstraction, is false; but as a stage on the way to insight it is inevitable; and as a concrete phase of opinion it is an error, that is, a positive belief in a falsity, or, again, a taking of a partial view for the whole. To be sure, this 'dwelling on the abstraction,' this beharren oder vereinre in the midst of falsity, is a phase; and since, for Hegel (just as much as for the Pythagoreans, the Pragmatists, the Anglo-Saxons, etc.) is a living process, not a question of things held in such a phase must pass. An experience of the 'contradictions of finitude' must in due time arise, and must lead to the recognition that the partial phase is false. This is what happens in the course of the history of thought, when the successive systems of philosophy—each a partial truth, required by the necessity of the thought-process and by the life of the Weltgeist to regard itself as absolutely true—successively another with a dialectical necessity that tends to larger and truer insight. The same sequence of necessary errors, which are all of them partial truths taking themselves to be whole and final, and in so far, in the 'unity of essence' to the 'abstraction,' to the doctrine that every proposition considered in its abstraction, is partially false, and needs to be amended by adding other propositions.

(2) To Bradley, and to others among the more recent representatives of Idealism, to whom the dialectical method of Hegel appears in various ways unsatisfactory, this account of the partial, in which error arises, and, as a phase of experience and of life, is necessary, does not appeal. For such thinkers, error is, indeed, defined as a partial and (in so far) false view, which is not merely partially false and partially true, but takes itself to be wholly true. The existence of such a dis-harmony between part and whole, in a realm of experience where the metaphysical presuppositions in which errors or appear seem to the writers accepts them to the end and towards absolute Wissen, are at once true and false—true, as necessary stages on the way to insight, and therefore as in harmony with the purposes of the whole; false, as needing supplement, and as showing this need through the contradictions which give rise to the dialectical process. In Hegel's Logic this view of truth is technically developed. With a different course of argument, with original features, and with a more empirical method of investigation, a view of truth and error which belongs to the same general type has in recent times been developed by Bradley.

As a statement of the ideal of truth which is alone consistent with rational demands, the Idealism thus summarized seems to be, in great measure, successful. But its success is greatest with respect to the whole of our conception of truth, its organic harmony or adjustment of a partial to a total view of experience and of its meaning. Precisely with regard to the problem of the possibility of error, that is, of disharmony between any partial interpretation of experience and that which is revealed and fulfilled by the whole of
experience, the idealistic theory of truth and of error has proved to be, thus far, most incomplete.

3. Conditions of a solution of the problem of error.—The foregoing survey shows that a satisfactory theory of error must meet the following requirements:

1. It must be just to whatever interest in a decisive and unquestionably 'absolute' distinction between true propositions and their contradictory false propositions is justly primary.

2. It is no account of truth and error in terms of 'partial views' and 'the total view' of experience must be used to render the contrast of true and false anything but a decisive contrast, as sharp as that between any proposition and its contradictory.

3. The theory of error must take account of the actual unity of the cognitive and the volitional processes. It has been the office of recent Pragmatism to insist, in its own way, upon this unity. But Hegel, in his Phänomenologie, also insisted, although in another fashion, upon the fact that every insight or opinion is both theoretical and practical, is an effort at adjustment to the purport of life, an effort to be tested by its genuine rational success or failure.

4. The theory of error must recognize that truth is a character which belongs to propositions so far as these are seen in themselves, and that the whole of truth is in their relations to experience, and not in their relations to wholly external objects.

5. That the rational test or the success of ideas, hypotheses, and opinions lies in their relations not to momentary experiences, but to the whole of life, as far as that whole is accessible, must also be maintained.

6. Theoretical error cannot be separated from practical error.

7. A revision of Hegel's dialectical method, a synthesis of this method with the empirical senses, a Pragmatism, a modification of both with the methods of modern Logic seem, in their combination, to be required for a complete treatment of the problem of error. An error is the expression of a voluntary action, a belief. In case of an error, a being, whose ideas have a limited scope, so interprets those ideas as to bring himself into conflict with a larger life to which he himself belongs. This life is one of experience and action, its whole nature determines what the erring subject, at his stage of experience, and with his ideas, ought to think and to do. He errs when he so feels, believes, acts, interprets, as to be in positive and decisive conflict with this end.

The conflict is at once theoretical and practical.


J. ROYCE.

ESCHATOLOGY.—The principal subjects treated of in this article are the 'last things' strictly so-called—the idea of judgment and retribution, and the idea of the catastrophic end of the world and its renewal, and how the dead are related to that end of all things. The different views regarding the state of the dead are discussed in the article STATE OF THE DEAD (see also BLEST; ARBODE OF THE; MESSIAH; RESURRECTION).

1. Savage races. 11. Retributive notions.—The question of the existence of the idea of future retributive justice among savages is not easily settled, as certainly, in some cases where it is believed in, it may be traced to outside influences. Hindu, Buddhist, Muhammadan, Christian, here the idea must have been latent or already expressed in some form, else it would not so easily have been adopted. While a mere continuance of present ethical conditions is frequently believed in, distinctions according to rank, wealth, or power are commonly found. The future of the soul is also dependent upon the nature of the funeral offerings, or upon burial or non-burial, or upon the person having been tatted, circumcised, mutilated in some particular way, or provided with certain amulets. An approach to a retributive doctrine is found in the wide-spread view—extending upwards to the ancient Teutons and Mexicans—that cowardice dears from Paradise or incurs actual punishment; courage being here a savage virtue which is rewarded. Again, since gods and spirits frequently punish in this life sins (not necessarily strictly moral) that would not be punished in ourselves—tabu-breaking and the like—it was easy to extend this to the future life. Hence, neglect or contempt of worship, ritual, tabu, etc., is often punished in the other-world, or keeps souls out of the more blissful state.

This is a common belief in Melanesia and Africa (see ERE II, 1931; Brown, Melanesia and Polynesia, 1918, p. 155; Polynesia (Cills, Pol. Researches II, 1902, i. 606), and in S. America (Naup skies, La France equatoriale, Paris, 1887, ii. 192). In certain cases crimes which are detected by the tribe, and therefore by the tribal gods, or which are severely punished on this earth by torture or death, are also believed to be punished beyond the grave—a natural deduction. These crimes are mainly murder or theft committed against fellow-tribesmen, sorcery, adultery, incest, as well as lying, and even niggardliness.

For examples, see Brown, op. cit. 195; Codrington, Melanesia, Oxford, 1910, p. 274; ERE II. 654—Post, Grundriss der eth. Jurisprudenz, 1892 and Leipzig and London (1894 and 1895); Rink, Tales and Trad. of the Eskimo, 1924, p. 4; see also ERE IV. 255—256. Metanesians (fierce savages of the Philippines) is also alleged among the Andaman Islanders (Man, 17 xii. (1933) 158, 162), Australians (Parker, More Aust. Legendary Tales, 1896, p. 90), and the Zulus, Salish, katsina (a white tribe), (Harrison, 17 xxi. (1934—5) 17; Wilson, TES III. 300), Motives of Malacca Indians (Amer Ethnol, 13 (1925), 559), Massel (Merker, ZEB XXVII, (1903) 735). In most of these instances the nature of the punishments points to native ideas. In some cases the 'wicked' are simply annihilated (Grinnell, Vavoom Hero Stories, 1893, p. 355).

A judgment is necessarily implied where a division on various grounds, or actual punishment by the gods, or exclusion from Paradise is believed to take place in the other-world; but it is only sporadically that it is expressly stated to occur (Konds (Hopkins, Rel. of India, Boston, 1908, p. 530), Chippewa (Dunn, Ont. Ind. 1908), Guinean Negroes (Pinkerton, Voyages, xvi. 401). Annua (ERE I 322). Some of the West African secret societies probably teach a future judgment.

Out of such primitive views the idea of judgment in the higher religions was evolved.

The judgment may simply be an examination by some being or animal, to discover the inner truth and has the necessary distinctive mark which admits to Paradise, or has those certain things according to custom in this world (Codrington, op. cit. 256, 297, 326, 380; Price, Nature, 1908, iii. 326 (Maclean, 1908, p. 326), and in other cases some ordeal, appointed occasionally by a divinity or spirit, has to be undergone, which tests the man's fitness for the blissful region (Schonburg, Religion in its Glimpse, Leipzig, 1849, iii. 318; Thomson, The Fijians, 1908, pp. 121, 125, 128). Or it may consist in sending the dead to some other place in the world of spirits, and the bad by another leading to a place of pain (Mooney, 1907, 534 (Harce); Condrou, op. cit. iv. 192). Or, again, the bridge
which the dead must cross becomes an ordeal, the bad being unable to cross it, or they are repelled by its guardian (Laudan, Holle and Fugger, Heidelberg, 1900, p. 61; ERB I: 439, f. 13r-s). The Book of the Dead is always here made mortal, but: the beings who examine and test the soul are primitive judges of the dead, only the right and the left hands, and other undesirable persons from the blissful region, and force them to remain apart or in an undesirable place, or to wander restlessly from place to place. It is the spirits of persons who perished in life by the new arrival who inflict such punishments—a natural extension of the idea of blood-revenge, surviving also in higher religions (Coleridgion, 589, 274 f., 279, 288; Brown, 444 [New Guinea]; Conard, RHR xiii. [1900] 288 [Algonquins]; cf. Lev. 26: 14).

(b) The Final Catastrophe.—The Andaman Islanders believe that spirits, apart from souls, go to a gloomy jungle below the earth, which is flat. But a time will come when a great earthquake will cause the world to turn over. The living will perish and change places with the dead. Spirits will be re-united with souls, and live on the renewed earth, in which sickness and death will be unknown (Man, JAI xii. 161 f.). Many American tribes (north and south) expected a catastrophic end of all things—frequently by fire, as the world had before been destroyed by water. But in such cases it was believed that, as certain persons escaped death by flight to the earth, so some would be hid from the fire and re-people the new world (Scholecraft, Indian Tribes, 1833-36, i. 319, iv. 240, 420; Brinton, Myths of New World, Philadelphia. 1847). In one Choctaw legend the dead spirits were to resume their bodies and live on the renewed earth. A similar re-appearing of the purified and renewed world after its final destruction by water was believed in by the Eskimos (Brinton, 302; Egede, Nachrichten von Greenland, 1760, p. 158; Boas, ‘Central Eskimo’, 6 RBBW (1888) 586 ff.). Probably Christian teaching has here influenced existing native beliefs. The Mexican belief in a series of world-ages with gods, bodies, and spirits extinguished by a catastrophic, from which only a few were rescued for the new age—is akin to these. The Mexicans did not know when the existing age would terminate, but only that it would be at the end of a cycle of 52 years; nor does it appear how the dead would fare at this consummation. This conception of the end of the world-age seems to have been unrelated to the myth of the return of Quetzalcoatl and the renewal of the Golden Age (J. G. Müller, Amer. Urkunden, Basel, 1855, p. 511 f.; see AGES OF THE WORLD [Prim. and Amer.]). The Peruvians also believed in a former destruction of the world by water, and in its future destruction, signaled by an eclipse of sun or moon, in which the sun or moon would vanish, the moon fall on the earth, and a conflagration or drought would follow, in which all would perish (Müller, 396; Brinton, 254). It is obvious that such myths are extensions of the observation of actual catastrophes and unexplained natural phenomena, and of the terrors inspired by them.

2. Egyptian.—Of any Egyptian doctrine of a final catastrophe there is no record. The idea of judgment of the soul after death appertained to the Osirian faith from the time of the XVIIIth dynasty, though it is found in connexion with the Ra doctrine in the Book of the Gates. In this the judge takes place in the Hall of Osiris—the sixth domain through which the soul passes on his nightly journey; but in the Book of the Dead the judgment was preparatory to entering the true paradise of Osiris—the Fields of Aunet.

3. Teutonic.—Though the general view of the division of souls at death among the Teutons is non-moral, glimpses of a more ethical division and of a daily judgment after death by the gods are obtained. Crimes, such as omissions against kinship—mighty ones from gods above. The righteous now dwelt in Osiris, the wicked were condemned to N-strand.

How far this has been moulded by Christian influences is still uncertain. Most probably floating eschatological myths have been fixed in an orderly narrative by the poet of Vidugri under ancient Teutons. There is a certain connexion between eschatology, while a world-catastrophe is hinted at in tales which have no connexion with Vidugri (Grimm, Tent. Myth., Gr. Leg., 1859-98, pp. 453, 815).

4. For Celtic eschatology, see art. CELTS, in vol. iii. p. 308.

5. Greek and Roman.—In the earlier Greek poets, Homer and Hesiod, nothing is said of judgment. But such enemies of the gods as the Titans are shut up in Tartarus (Hes, Theog. 715 ff.; Homer, H. xiv. 275, cf. vii. 12), while Tityus, Tantalus, and Sinopus suffers torment (Od. xi. 576 ff.). Minos in the under world gives laws to the dead (θυματουργὸς θεον), but he does not appear to act as judge (Od. xi. 567 ff.). But, under the influence of the Mysteries and of the Orphic and Pythagorean cults, the ideas of judgment and retribution became prevalent, and are found in later writers. Pythagoras taught a judgment of the dead (Po. fr. 299 V.); the judgment is depicted on the vase on which Xacos, Tripolemus, and Rhdamantus appear as judges (J. E. Harrison, Pro. to Study of Greek Rel., Cambridge, 1908, p. 609). In the Mysteries it was also taught that the unfitted were thrown into the profane, and the unjust were punished in the Other-world. Generally the judges, who exist independently in Plato's kingdom, are said to be the Three Judges who appointed Xacos—and they were appointed to this office because they had acted justly on earth (cf. Plato, Gorgias, 492). But the Mysteries also adopted the formula of the three judges as true judges in Hades (Asp. 41). They give judgment in a meadow at the parting of the ways, one of which leads to the

orsis, who were backed to places or thrown into pits or a lake of fire. How far such a retribution could be overcome by words of power is uncertain. These punishments are referred to in the Book of the Dead, but it must be remembered that they could not be eternal, for the soul was annihilated. How judgment was actually effectuated is not stated, but it occurred again in the Book of the Gates and the Book of That which is in Dust we hear of the horrible punishments by which the annihilation of Rogarchie was made sure; and the same idea is certainly included in the wicked. This annihilation, according to Brinton, is caused by the conclusion of a theology of the interpretation of a Nature-myth of the sun attacking with his rays and fiery glance. See also the whole scene of the judgment described as a journey to the Underworld, as well as the story of a visit to Aleria. "The gods, as far as possible, punish (cf., further, art. Egyptian Religion, p. 542, and Ethics and Morality [Eth.], p. 478.

3. Teutonic.—Though the general view of the division of souls at death among the Teutons is non-moral, glimpses of a more ethical division and of a daily judgment after death by the gods are obtained. Crimes, such as omissions against kinship—mighty ones from gods above. The righteous now dwelt in Osiris, the wicked were condemned to N-strand.
the torments of this place are also referred to
(vi. 19). The latter views differ widely through the gradual introduction of the belief in transmigration, while Yama is now the judge of the dead. The popular view is represented by various passages in the Satapatha Brahmana. The dead pass two fires, which burn the wicked, but let the good go by: they are weighed in a balance, and their fate is thus decided. The good pass to bliss; the wicked suffer in hell, or are re-born as a punishment. In certain cases, re-born in suitable conditions, in heaven, hell, or on earth, appears as the result of ignorance of the true end of existence, viz. release from the chain of cosmic existence and absorption in the world-soul. Hinduism in all its forms endorses this view. All go to Yama over a dreadful road, on which the pious fare better than the wicked. Yama or Dharna judges and admits the fate. Through endless existences and re-births—in human, animal, or plant forms—alternated with lives in the heavens or hells, the soul must pass. The Hindu doctrine of the Four Ages is connected with eschatology. The Four Ages—Krita, Tretā, Dvāpara, and Kali, each with its own period, extend over a period of 12,000 years, each of which is equivalent to 300 human years, thus resulting in a period of 4,320,000 years. A hundred such periods form a kalpa. At the close of the age of righteousness, or more precisely, at the close of the final kalpa of a kalpa, there is an apparent destruction of the world by fire and flood. The gods are absorbed by Brahman, along with their heaven and all good persons in it. Then follows the age-long sleep of Brahman (equal to a period of a kalpa), after which he re-creates the world. The process of transmigration begins anew, and all are re-born in higher or lower forms, to renew their cosmic existence, save those who desire final and absolute absorption in the Supreme (see SBE vii. 77 f.; xxv. pp. lxxxiv, lxxxvii; xxxiv. 212; Hopkins, op. cit. 419 f.; Barth, Rel. of India, 1882, p. 93; Ages of the World [Indian]).

7. Buddhism.—In Buddhism the idea of karma afforded an automatic principle of judgment, whereby the person after death entered upon an existence, higher or lower, according to his actions. At death, the force resulting from actions combined with clinging to existence causes creation of the five skandhas, or constituent elements of being. This is so swift that one's life is hardly removed. The continuity of personality, which is thus re-created in one of the six states—gods, men, animals, plants, pretas, or inhabitants of one of the hells. The shortest term of punishment in a hell is 500 years, but one may rise by this to that in a higher state, while a life in heaven may be succeeded by a life on earth or in one of the hells. But already in early Buddhism we find the idea—taken over from Brahmanism—that the warden of hell drag the wicked before Yama, who condemns them to one of the hells (Monier-Williams, Buddhism, 1889, p. 114 f.). But it is in Northern Buddhism that this idea is most particularly developed. Here there is the conception of a judgment of the soul after death in the courts of the ten judges of the dead, one of whom is Yemo (Yama). He judges with strict impartiality, and also fixes the hour of dissolution.

After the deceased is clad in the black garment of sins, or in the shining garment of good deeds, the latter are weighed against evil in a balance. If the sins exceed, punishment follows: if good deeds, release from the pangs of existence. Scenes of punishment are painted on the walls of temples, depicted in books, or formed with clay figures. The dwellings of the hells are arranged like earthly temples. There is also a belief in a judge over which souls pass; the good cross it easily, but the wicked fall from it to life. No soul can ever return after existence in heaven or hell, this also being fixed by the judge. This conception of judgment is also found among the

From Source:

"The Ideas of the Orphics and Pythagoreans are reproduced by Pindar (see Ol. iii. 52 f.) and other poets. The Orphics held that the original soul and retribution are connected with that of metempsychosis. Ten thousand, or, in the case of pure souls, three thousand, years elapsed before the soul is finally united with its body, which appears at the place of life, when the soul was rewarded, or punished in places of correction (εἰς τὰ δόρα γίνεται διάσωσις). At the end of a thousand years the soul chose a new body, human or animal, and was born on earth, to undergo further probation there, and to be rewarded or punished once more at death. Some souls, however, were too wicked ever to return, and remained for ever in Tartarus (Plato, Phaedrus 241 f.; Rep. xiv. 525 c, and \( \) for a reference to similar teaching in the Mysteries, Laws, ix. 870).

In the Phaedo (67f., 113) the soul is led by its own laws to the place of judgment, and is then sent to either the purification or the purgatory. The Stoics held that evil souls were punished after death, but punishment was, however, purgatorial, though bad souls might become extinct. Seneca speaks of death as a day of judgment when sentence will be pronounced on all (Ep. xxvi., Herc. fur. 727 f.; see Zeller, Stoics, 1870, p. 205 f.). The Epicureans rejected all such views, and taught that the soul died with the body (Lucr. iii. 417 f.; cf. Hippol. Refut. Her. i. 19). While the Roman people their native religion taught nothing of judgment and future penalties, the poets accepted the Greek ideas and the names of the judges of the dead, and frequently referred to them. Thus in Vergil's picture of the under world, Minos judges those who enter the Elysian Fields, Rhadamanthus in Tartarus (En. vi. 426 f., 540 ff.; see other passages collected in Ruhl, De mortuorum judicio, Giessen, 1903, p. 76 ff.).

The conception of the end of all things was philosophical rather than popular and mythical, but the Stoic doctrine of the τελευτάω became popular. How was the conception of the future life related to the cyclic change?

In Plato's theory of the two ages ever recurring, those who died in the period of disorder, when the universe was left to itself, were in the new age—the Golden Age—born from the earth as old men, and grew ever younger. The end of each period, when the earth began to move in an opposite direction, was marked by great convulsions of Nature. In the Stoic doctrine of the cyclic configuration, all souls (or those which have not become extinct) are then resolved into the World-Soul or Prime. Fire. This world-catastrophe over, the formation of a new universe begins (Cicero's renovatio), and all things repeat themselves as in the old world (cf. Seneca), and every person again finds himself in his former status. Did this include personal identity? Some answered that the persons were distinct, without a difference, others regarded them as different (see Zeller, 155 ff.). Seneca, who gives a vivid picture of this world-conflagration (Comed. ac. Merciorum, seems to have looked forward to the day (Ep. xxxvi. 10). See Area of the World (Greek and Roman).

6. Hinduism.—Although in the Rigveda no clear statement of judgment is found, and Yama appears mainly as king of the region of bliss, yet he is to some extent an object of terror, and a dark underworld hell is spoken of as the fate of evil-doers (Ixx. 5, vi. 160 f. 362). In the Mahabharata.

1 Plato says that Rhadamanthus judges souls from Asia, and that his jurisdiction is extended to Europe, while Minos, as the oldest, decides difficult cases (Corg. 524).
All must pass through it, but to the righteous it is like warm milk, to the wicked like molten metal. Ahriman and his hosts are defeated by Ahura and his angels, and perish in the conflagration (cf. SBE xxiii. 306.). Now all come together; relations re-appear to each other; men of ages 40 years and children of 15 years. All are now immortal and clad in spiritual bodies, and awards are apportioned according to merit. Hell becomes pure, and is brought back for the enlargement of the world. The earth is renewed, and paradise is added to heaven (Bund. xxx.; Dink. ix.; Dāšt-i Dinkh, xxiii. 14). The anticipated joys both of heaven and of the renewed world are of a highly spiritual character (Sünderlin, *La Vie future d'après le magiécisme*, Paris, 1901, pp. 128, 269; for the Yima legend, see EEE 1, 286).

9. Muhammad.—Muhammad is based upon Jewish and Christian (and possibly Parsi) eschatology, though there are some important differences.

After death all persons are visited in the grave by two angels, who examine them as to their faith. If the answer is satisfactory, the dead sleep on in peace; in the same manner, they are struck by a hammer and the earth pressed down upon them.

There is a general belief that before the judgment the faithful are again the vehicles of the soul. They are, however, not contained in the earth or the water, but are tormented there or in a foul dungeon (SBE vi. p. i; Sâle, Koran, French translation, 1864; Hughes, *Koran*, 1897). Many wonderful signs precede the Last Day or the Day of Judgment (yaum ad-din; cf. as-Sâa'a, *the Hour*), the time of which is known only to God. Jehovah's right hand will establish righteousness; the last judgment; others; ad-Dajjal, or Antichrist, will appear and be slain by Jesus, who will become a Muhammad; Gog and Magog will be released. Then the angel Isra'il will sample the results which will be followed by frightful convulsions in Nature. At the second blast all creatures will die. At the third the resurrection will take place, and all will rise to give an account of themselves out of the book of their deeds. God is set on His throne with His angels. The recording angels who follow men through life witness against them, and the works of men are weighed in a balance. The judgment lasts 1000 or 50,000 years. All must now cross the bridge as-Sîrât, which passes over hell to Paradise, and is finer than a hair and sharper than the edge of a sword. The righteous cross it easily, but the wicked fall or are thrown from it to hell.

Earth and heaven are changed.

The righteous pass to the seven regions of Paradise, the celestial joys of which, as described in passages of the Qur'an, are of every imaginable type, and are often direct translations of old Persian or Zoroastrian poems (Gaub, *Allah*, Bedüinischen*, 1897, p. 107 f.). They are often spiritualized by Muhammadans, while in the Qur'an itself more spiritual joys are set forth (xii. 26-34). Many also regarded the torments of the seven regions of hell as metaphorical, at least for sinful believers and perhaps for all (Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theol.*, 1903, p. 130; Buhkari, *Sunh., viii. 110*).

Some hold that heaven and hell did not come into existence until the judgment, and Jahân ibn Sistân taught that both would finally pass away and God would remain alone (Macdonald, 132 f.). Many deny that men are judged by their works, and the corporeal resurrection is also often set aside.

10. Hebrew and later Jewish.—(a) Not till a comparatively late period of Hebrew history is there any trace of the idea of a judgment and a period after death. 1 The soul passes to Sheol, but 2 death is itself a final judgment; for it removes man from the sphere where Jehovah's grace and judgment are exercised. It is taken to hell (cf. Isreal, 1897, p. 64). Retribution is limited to this life, and eschatology is almost invariably connected with the development of history; its subject is the

1 While the general Bab. view of the after-life seems to have been regarded as unconnected with morality, it has been thought that some traces of a retribution-doctrine and of a judgment of the dead may be found in a few of their writings (see Jeremias, *Bab. Conception of Heaven and Hell*, 1902, p. 49).
The Messiah is described as the deliverer, the one who will restore the nation of Israel. This deliverer is seen as more than just a political or military leader. He is a figure who brings about a spiritual and moral transformation that encompasses the entire world. The Messiah is characterized as the one who will judge the nations and establish righteousness. He is often associated with the idea of a future, eternal kingdom where justice and peace will reign.

The text suggests that the Messiah will arise from a line of kings, and he will be revealed as the fulfiller of the hopes and dreams of the people. His appearance will be accompanied by signs and wonders, and he will be recognized by his people as the long-awaited leader. The Messiah is presented as the true king of Israel, who will bring about a new era of prosperity and well-being.

The passage emphasizes themes of redemption, restoration, and renewal. It speaks of the Messiah as the one who will bring about a new creation, where the earth will be transformed and renewed. The Messiah is seen as the one who will reconcile humanity with God, and who will bring about a new covenant that is characterized by grace and mercy.

The Messiah is described as the one who will bring about a new age, where the old ways of sin and disobedience will be replaced by a new order of righteousness and holiness. He is presented as the one who will establish a kingdom that is characterized by peace and harmony. The Messiah is the one who will bring about a new era of enlightenment and wisdom, where people will be free from ignorance and sin.

The text also highlights the importance of faith and trust in the Messiah. It encourages people to have faith in his promises and to trust in his ability to bring about a new era of hope and prosperity. The Messiah is presented as the one who will bring about a new beginning for all who believe in him.

In summary, the Messiah is portrayed as the one who will bring about a new era of hope and renewal. He is seen as the bearer of new life and the fulfillment of all that has been promised in the past. His arrival will bring about a new age of righteousness and peace, where the earth will be transformed and renewed. The Messiah is the one who will bring about a new beginning for all who believe in him.
daring metaphor to describe the restoration of Israel (Hos 6:2; Ezk 37) now, possibly under Persian influences (though it is not absolutely necessary to assert that), became a vital doctrine, stated for the first time in Is 26:8. Thus, after the judgment was accomplished, the righteous remnant, on which the nation was founded, would be destroyed. According to Haggai, it would be a day of destruction for the heathen, followed by the establishment of the Messianic kingdom (2:11-12). In Joel there is the first appearance of an actual scene of judgment, preceded by signs in the heavens. The nations are assembled in the Valley of Jehoshaphat, judged, and destroyed; but Israel, already purified and restored, now enjoys peace and blessing. In Malachi 3:1-2, Jehovah will come, preceded by Elijah (an idea perhaps suggested by the prophecy in 2 Es 4:25), to judge and destroy the wicked, to recognize those who had trusted in Him, and to dwell in Jerusalem. Out of this conception of a judgment still in the future, grew the Old Testament eschatology, which, however, made use of all the elements of the earlier, as detailed above.

Thus in Daniel, following the vision of the four beasts (a picture of Babylonia, Media, Persia, and Greece), there is a judgment scene. The Ancient of Days sits with His hosts, and the books are opened. Dominion is taken from the beasts, and the fourth beast is slain. Now begins the eternal kingdom on earth possessed by the saints (regenerate Israel), typified by ‘a Son of Man’ or a human being, to whom all nations are subject (7:17). But, according to another picture, there is a period of great trouble, in which Michael delivers Israel, or every one whose name is written in the book. There is also a resurrection, of some of the righteous to everlasting life, and of some of the wicked to everlasting shame and contempt (probably in Gehenna)—the latter an entirely new conception (12:2).

Occasional references to the blessed future on earth occur in the Apocalyptic books. God will arise to judge and destroy His enemies (Re 6:16; 20:9). Israel is delivered and the gathering of the dispersed follows (46:50, cf. Bar 24:4). The resurrection of the righteous (2:5), and the kingdom of God (11:15), are expected for ever. In Tobit 13:25 the people are scourged and then brought out of all lands. Jerusalem is restored in beauty, and the nations bring gifts and serve God (13:30-44). The resurrection of the just only is taught in 2 Mac, in a somewhat material fashion (2:11, 14, 23, 26, 32-34). But it is uncertain whether they are raised up to the future kingdom on earth, though 2:24 as well as the date of the book seems to support this view.

(b) A doctrine of future retribution emerged gradually in Hebrew thought. It is adumbrated in Ps 49:16, 73:27, and more clearly in Is 24:11 (4th cent. b.c.), 59:1 (5th cent.), and in Dn 12. Besides the concept of retribution in this life, the wicked are punished in the other world according to 2 Mac 6:74. In Wisdom the wicked are punished after death (4:28) and judged by the righteous dead. These concepts appear more definitely in Apocalyptic literature.

(c) The Day of Jehovah.—In its earliest conception the Day of Jehovah must have meant a visible manifestation of Jehovah in the majesty of terrible majesty, overpowering and conquering hostile evil powers. The whole conception is based on mythical ideas, and to the end the Day was regarded as accompanied with dread and convulsions in nature out of which a new order was evolved. This primitive view of the Day of Jehovah would judge and destroy Israel’s enemies, who now (and also in the Prophets) take the place of the hostile evil powers. It would be a day of battle like the day of the Warsaw, or of the corresponding Arab idiom, see W. R. Smith, Prophets, 308). There was no ethical element here; Israel was to be avenged because of her delinquency towards Jehovah. Jehovah Himself in light (Am 5:19); there would be abundance in the land and festival gladness (5:21). There would be a renewal of the conditions of the Golden Age. To this conception Amos, followed by other prophets, gives a distinct denial. But the Day must also be judged and suffer in the Day of Jehovah, a day of darkness, sorrow, and fear, because she has neglected the ethical side of His religion (2:6). The righteous nations hostile to Israel, and regarded often as the instruments of Israel’s punishment, would also suffer, but mainly Israel (39). Thus Jehovah’s character as a righteous God would be vindicated. If the passages in Amos and Hosea are brought together upon these judgments be later interpolations, then they, like Micah, regard the Day as one issuing in nothing but doom. But this idea soon gave place to a further and more spiritual conception of the righteous remnant, and in some cases the heathen nations also, would find the Day ultimately issue in blessing.

Here the prophets in part take over the popular view of the Golden Age issuing out of the destruction of Jerusalem in the convulsions of Nature, but at the same time they spiritualize it, and limit this bliss to those who survive because of their righteousness. The restoration is to be not on a national basis, but as individuals (2:12).

This is more particularly seen in Nahum and Habakkuk, in whom a conception of the Day is found which somewhat resembles the popular one in form, but differs in essence. Jehujon is now regarded as already righteous (Nah 1:14, Hab 2), and the Day of Jehovah is His terribleness against her wicked foes. Thus His righteousness and that of Judah are vindicated. In Jeremiah and Ezekiel the relation of the individual to Jehovah is emphasized (Jer 6:21, 31, 3, 43), Ezek 14:12-15:1. Hence with them the Day of Jehovah was less a manifestation of His judgment on the nation than on the individuals composing it, and it is the restored in the restored individual (Jer 31:33, 25:21, 12:4, Ezek 17:22-24, 34:10, 14:21, 34:28). The nations as such share in the judgment (Jer 25:32, 46:17). The relation of the nations who survive the judgment to the blissful Kingdom is differently viewed in these Prophets, and their differing views were reproduced in later works.

According to Jeremiah, the nations participate in the Kingdom (31:4-8, 12, 15) — a view which is followed by other prophets (Mic 4:1-5, Zec 2:10, for some of whom the idea of the Day of Jehovah hardly exists, its place being taken by that of Israel as the means of the world’s restoration (cf. Is 45:16f., 24:2 [post-exilic] cf. Ps 22:28f.), 59:27, 66:24). In Malachi, where the same hope is found, there is a Day of Jehovah. According to Ezekiel, while the righteous remnant will be restored, the nations will be forever destroyed in the Day of Jehovah’s vengeance (21:21, 25:36; cf. 21:29). This view has already been found in Nahum and Habakkuk. It is found also in other prophets, who look forward after the Return to a destruction of the nations (Is 24, Hag 2:6-23, Zec 13:9), preparatory to the establishment of the new era. Or the nations or some of them as survive the Day will become servants of Israel (Zec 2:11-14, 21:8), have to play an important part in the Kingdom of Jehovah and His people (see Isaiah, Est 2:24, Jer 31:30-31, 32:26, 34:5, 46:17). It is found in other prophets, who look forward after the Return to a destruction of the nations (Is 24, Hag 2:6-23, Zec 13:9), preparatory to the establishment of the new era. Or the nations or some of them as survive the Day will become servants of Israel (Zec 2:11-14, 21:8), have to play an important part in the Kingdom of Jehovah and His people.

The idea of the Day as an actual day or as a scene or assozio is found in Jl 3:16, where the heathen are assembled in the Valley of Jehoshaphat, whc. in 1 Cor 15:20-22, 1 Thess 4:16, 1 Cor 15:20-22, 1 Thess 4:16, 1 Cor 15:20-22; Gesammel, Der Ursprung der israelitischen jahwek, Gottingen, 1905. 1
Jehovah sits to judge them, after the restoration of His people. They have been humble, and who are now penitent. The nations are destroyed. A world-judgment is already suggested in Zeph 1:14-15, Is 34, Jer 20:2, Hag 2:11, and it reappears in Mal 4:1. Various names for the Day of Jehovah in the OT are 'the Day' (Ezk 20:23), 'that Day' (Is 30:21), 'the time or that time' (Ezk 22:13, 27:19), 'the Great Day' (Zeph 1:17, Zech 14:4), 'the Day of His wrath' (Zeph 1:18, cf. Re 6:17; cf. 'the Great Day of His wrath' (Rev 6:17). In Apocalyptic and Apocalyptic literature the phrase is used in referring to a period before or after the Messianic Kingdom, varies, but it covers ideas similar to those of the Prophets—the Day of Judgment (Enoch, S. of En 30:1; 4 Ezr 7:9, Apoc. bar. 638; Test. xvi. Patr. [Levi 29], 16th, Job 32:23, the 'Day of the Great Judgment' (Job 23:1, S. of En 30:9). Other titles are 'the Day of the Great Consummation,' 'the Day of tribulation, distress, or slaughter,' 'that great Day' (see Charles, note to En 42, p. 252 i. 'the Day of the Great Condemnation' (Job 30:31, 'the Day of the Lord's coming' (Mal. 3:20), 'the Day of the Wrath of Judgment' (Job 24:8), 'the Day of turbulences and execration and indignation' (Job 30:30), 'the Day of the Mighty One' (Apoc. bar. 5:39), 'the Consummation of the times' or 'of the ages and the beginning of the times' (Apoc. bar. 139:65, cf. 289, also 292). 'My redemption—Day of Judgment' has drawn sighs, cf. Mk 10:39, Lk 18:31, 1 P 4:17, 'the Visitation' (Ass. Mot. 190), 'the Day of the Gospel' (Ass. 190). (2) The righteous judgment of God' (Test. xvi. Patr. [Levi 29]). Sometimes it is occasionally Messianic (En. 62:2, 260:13 acts as judge in N. T.). In the OT the title 'Day of Jehovah' passes over to various phrases in which is joined the Judgment, and it appears in the forms 'the Day of Jehovah', 'the Day of the Lord', 'the Day of the Lord's judgment', 'the Day of Jehovah's Christ', 'the Day of Christ' or 'of our Lord Jesus Christ' (Zech 14:4, 'the Day of the Lord of hosts' (Mal. 3:2); and 33:9, 'the Day of our Lord Jesus Christ' (Zech 14:4)). (2) The Day of Jehovah' (Mk 10:39, 2 P 3:10), 'the Day of the Lord' (5 Co 3:17, 2 Th 1:14, 2 Th 1:19, 'the Day of Judgment' (Mt 25:31, 2 P 3:7, 1 Jn 4:17), 'the Day of judgement' (Heb 9:28), 'the Day of our Lord' (2 Th 1:10). Cf. Lk 17:24 'so shall the Son of Man be in his Day,' and St. Paul's pregnant phrase, 'the Day of Jehovah, and revelation of the righteousness of God' (Ro 2:6). (d) Apocalyptic eschatology.—In approaching the period of Apocalyptic literature, it must be borne in mind that its preoccupation with the kingdom of God is an in and nourished by OT prophecy (where also Apocalyptic ideas are not unknown, e.g. Ezk 37 II, Zec 1 II.; cf. also Dn.), its anticipations are of a much more definite character, and announce coming events in a more formal manner. It also occupied a different standpoint from that of the orthodox Pharisaic schools. This literature was of a popular character, and did much to quicken that belief in the Messiah and the coming of the Kingdom, as well as that individual hope of the future, which were so characteristic of the people's thoughts in Christ's time. Moreover, it can hardly be doubted that he at least of those who were familiar, if not with that literature, at least with the ideas to which it had given birth. This raises a strong presumption that the eschatology which He taught or which was attributed to Him followed the lines of current ideas, but, as will be seen, with important differences. (l) In Apocalyptic writings the coming of Messiah, or the advent of the new order, often inaugurated by God Himself, or the final judg- ment, is preceded by terrors and sorrows (the 'Messianic woes') and by frightful convulsions in Nature. God or Messiah destroys the enemies of Israel, and spiritual foes—Babylon, demons, evil angels—and brings in His kingdom, with all these horrors, the true Israel is concealed (cf. In 289, Enoch 63:9, Ass. Mot. 10). Then follows the eternal or temporal Kingdom on earth, the somewhat 'seemingly' the kingdom which is—greatfulness, eating and drinking, begetting numerous children—together with more spiritual ideas—the absence of sin, the nearness of God to His people—reflects the thought of the Prophets. While in so many writings Messianic life is not the place (certain sections of Enoch and Apoc. Bar., Ass. Mot., Secrets of Enoch), in others he is introduced mechanically, but in others again he has a most important place, e.g. Ezr 4 Ezra, Ps. Sol., Ps. Jer., Ps. CD, 4 Ezra sections of Apoc. Bar., and, as in Ez 33 II., he acts as Judge. The destruction of Israel's enemies easily passes over into the heavenly. A Last Judgment of Israel and the actions already adumbrated in the Prophets; and this, in necessary association with ideas of Resurrection, is a dominating conception of Jewish eschatology. Prominent, too, in some writings is the thought of future and final bliss or torment in the Other-world. The Apocalyptic writings show three well-defined notions of the future: (1) continuing the prophetic conception, there is a new establishment of a blissful Kingdom on earth or on a renewed earth (En. 1:36, 37—70 [new heaven and earth], 83:90; Sib. Or. iii. 194 f.; Test. xvi. Patr.); (2) the Kingdom is temporary, and at its end the judgment begins to follow the overthrow of the eternal world (En. 91 f., Apoc. Bar. [various sections], Secrets of Enoch, 4 Ezr, and possibly Ps. Sol., Job., Ass. Mot.); (3) no Kingdom on earth, but an immanent future bliss or Other-world. (2) The earthly earthly Kingdom.—In Enoch 1:30 (c. 170 e.c. [so Charles, ed. Book of Enoch, 1889, p. 28]) there is a preliminary judgment. Azazel and the angels who learnt after women are set in the place of darkness until the time of the Resurrection. The righteous are confined in a waste place over an abyss of fire. Sinners have a place in the Sheol till the resurrection. The resurrection and judgment are accompanied by shaking of the mountains and rending of the earth. God appears with ten thousands of His holy ones to judge the earth in the presence of the King (see 1 S). Azazel and the angels are cast into an abyss of fire, along with all who are seen in the wicked in Sheol (100:13, 324:27). The righteous are raised and, with the righteous who are alive, dwell in peace on earth, which will be full of joy and comfort and peace. They shall have wine in abundance. The righteous will live till they beget a thousand children, and will never sorrow, pain, nor trouble. Labour will be a blessing. Righteousness and peace will be established, and the earth will be cleansed. The righteous eat of the Tree of Life, which gives them eternal life. They enjoy the presence of God, who will sit on a throne in a high mountain, and they never sin again. The remaining Gentiles become righteous and worship God. A not dissimilar picture is found in Enoch 83:90, but here a human Messiah, symbolized by a white bull (607), is described vaguely as dwelling in the Kingdom, though not introducing it. Still more important, the idea of a new Jerusalem—of the purified earthly Jerusalem, but an entirely new city set up by God—is found here; see 14. The Judgment is depicted under the figure of God sitting on a throne. Sealed books are opened and set before Him. The stars and angels are judged and condemned to an abyss of fire, along with apostate Jews (605). The risen righteous are transformed into the likeness of Messiah and live eternally. In the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs (109-105 e.c.) the dispersed of Israel, or Israel after repentance, are restored. God appears (54, 6, 58) on earth among the earth and destroys those who are evil. But in other parts a sinless Messiah—king, prophet, and priest—appears and wars with the enemies of Israel or with Beliar, from whom he saves the people of Israel (cf. Enoch 91, 18), or casts him into the fire (Jud. 291). Sin now comes to an end (Levi 15). The resurrection of the dead is described as follows: 'Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, the twelve patriarchs, and all men (Ben. 190), some to glory, some to shame, follows. All are judged, and the judgment is accompanied by conversions of Nature (Levi 41). There are snow, fire, and famine, and spiritual and material reward reserved in the heavens, as well as armies for vengeance on the spirits of deceit and Beliar (Levi 2). The Gentiles share in the Messianic Kingdom which is on this earth. The saints are said to rest in Eden and the New Jerusalem (Dan 21:11), or in Paradise which Messiah opens (Levi 41). In Ez. 37:20 (1st cent. e.c., cf. Charles, p. 292) there is a preliminary judgment on the dead (411). The righteous are oppressed and cry for help. The supernatural and pre-existent Son of Man appears with the Head of Days. He sits on the throne of his glory, set there by the Lord of Spirits, that he may judge (457 465 475, cf. 476) for the earth and destroy the wicked, who are angels, good and evil, are judged before him, as well as the kings of the earth and all who dwell in it (51, 52, 51:4, cf. 479). The wicked are consigned to Gehenna or driven off the face of the earth (353 472 474 53:5). God transforms heaven and earth as a place for the righteous. The dead are wakened (categorically mentioned as an abode for the righteous). The Kingdom is here not conceived soteriologically, though the righteous 'eat with this Son of Man' (289). The Elect One dwells with the righteous, who are clothed with garments of His glory (605), and live for ever. They find righteousness with the Lord of Spirits (605). In the third book of the Sibyline Oracle God sends a king who brings all war to an end. Now the nations assemble about Jerusalem, but are destroyed. Israel dwells safely under God's protection. Earth is destroyed; stars are arranged in the sky, wine, and oil. There is abundance of trees, cattle, and sheep. There is no more drought or famine. It is 119:9 here paraphrased. The eternal kingdom, with Jerusalem as its centre, extends over...
The whole power, for the heathen now worship God and live at peace (vv. 308-9). The eternal Messianic Kingdom is referred to in this passage.

(2) The temporary earthly Kingdom. — (a) Meanwhile a temporal Messianic Kingdom had been established in a measure. The Kingdom had its incorporated elements—sacred and earthly, spiritual and heavenly; and the separation of the same and its continuity, so far as the Jew was concerned, by the partition of the Heiligenlithau—its dominion and its eschatology—the immediate entrance of souls into their state of bliss begins at the resurrection of the dead. The Messianic Kingdom, which ultimately issued in that of a Millennium, was a compromise between the old hope of the prophets, which was based on the actual and permanent establishment of a transcendental hope of Israel (Gunkel, in Kantzsch, Die Apok. und Pseudep., der AT, Tüb. 1906, ii. 37). The first appearance of the Kingdom is detailed in the visions of Ezekiel (xl-xxxii, xlv, cf. 134-34 R. C. [see Charles, p. 29]). Here, under the influence of the 70 years of Jer. 25, the doctrine of the world-weeks is found. The first 7 of these are increasingly wicked; at the end of the 7th the 'elect of righteousness' receive revelations concerning the present situation (Ezek. 38). Now begins the Kingdom, and in the 8th week sinners are delivered into the hands of the righteous for destruction; the latter acquire houses, and the temple is built in glory. The righteous Kingdom is revealed to the whole in the 7th week. Sin vanishes from the earth, which is, however, written down for destruction. At the end of the 60th week the great Judgment occurs. The earth is destroyed; the fire and the sea enter, and the heaven appears (Daniel 0-15). The righteous dead rise to it from their Intermediate abode (2Thess. 3. 13; resurrection of the spirit); they live in good will and righteousness, and walk in eternal light. At this book the wicked at death are cast into sheol (99), and here their misery is eternally to continue. In some other periods of this world it is not clear whether the Kingdom is temporal or not. Thus in the Book of Jubilees (c. 1) and the various usages of the Messianic, there is a return from righteousness and a Messianic Kingdom, with God dwelling in Zion, the earth is changed, and the holiness of God is renewed. The earth is gradually renewed as a conditional result of man's being transformed spiritually (47). There will be no Satan or any evil death in the Kingdom (iv. 29, s). The verse which says that God will 'descend and dwell with them through- out eternity' (28) stands in relation to the eternity of the Kingdom (28, 32); but, on the other hand, it seems to terminate with the great Judgment (see Esh. IV. 1, see Charles, 1905, p. 150, note 282, in which the text of the Books of Jubilees, as well as the whole of the periodical system, is followed). In the latter, the wicked are all sinners to be judged (11. 23, 24, 28). The resurrection of the just is permanent (12).

The same uncertainty characterizes the Psalms of Solomon (c. 7o-40 R. C.), with their vivid presentation of the Messianic hope. In the personal hope, that of a Messianic Messiah, Xæsc, who will appear and drive out from Israel the heathen and sinners, but with spiritual weapons, and gather together the holy people, and rule them in holiness. The earth will be divided among them. The heathen will serve him as vassals, and Jerusalem, purified and made holy, will be the centre of his holy and free rule (Psa. 72). There is to be a final day of judgment (154-15); but, as this is never said to precede the Messianic Kingdom, and as the duration of the latter is probably 'contemporary with that of its ruler' (Charles, Crit. Hist. of Doct. of Ful. Life, 1880, p. 223), we may refer to the earlier occurrences of similar ideas in the righteous, who rise to life eternal (c. 129) and inherit life in the Kingdom of God. They are those that have told of Hades (the abode of sinners, 159), darkness, and destruction for ever (131).

A clearer view of the temporal Kingdom is to be found in some of the constitutions of the Apocatastasis of Talmud (a). 30-50. It will be preceded by tribulations and convulsions of Nature which do not affect Palestine (P. 229). Messiah is then revealed (229-237). In two of these sections he says (1) (a) the leader of the hostile fourth couple (iv. 226-227) is a kind of Antiichrist, and (b) the hostile nations which have been divided up the world, and are, amid convulsions of Nature, interfuse on behalf of Israel. Satan will now be no more. Then thou, O Israel, will be happy (155). Finally, Israel is exalted to the firmament, and thence looks down upon its enemies in Gehenna (or on earth) (204). There is no kingdom in this book.

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° The Judgement is a 'day of mercy' for the righteous, but so also is the day when Messiah appears (156). Does this mean that the Judgement takes place on that 'day' (cf. 159)? In Ezek. 407 Leviathan and Behemoth are said to be 'parted.' In the Talmud (Bab. bethrera, 74a) Leviathan is cast on Levithen on the 8th week. In the Targum of pseudepigraphon-Jonah on 1134, Jonah will come on the ox prepared for them from the beginning (see Gfröor, q. c., 1544. 3). It is also said that Leviathan is divided up, and Behemoth is also divided up for the righteous (cf. 1 Esh, 447). It is also said that Leviathan is divided up, and Behemoth is also divided up for the righteous (cf. 1 Esh, 447).

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(ii) In later prophetic books the Resurrection includes the righteous and also wicked Israelites. In Apocalyptic books it generally excludes the wicked (cf. 4 Apoc. 24). The resurrection of the wicked (v. 91) is mentioned (v. 909-91 f. resurrection of the spirit). Ps. 34. 3rd (bodily or spiritual). But it sometimes includes the wicked Israelites or some of them, though their resurrection may not be bodily. (v. 91-2). For instance, the righteous (v. 91) are described as in a seminal body (v. 91-2). Again, in others, perhaps as a result of Christian influences, there is taught a resurrection of all, both Jews and Gentiles, righteous and wicked, in the same body (cf. 4 Apoc. 50, 1, 5; 50, 1, 4).
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The destruction or resurrection of the righteous only, though occasionally a resurrection of the righteous Gentiles, or even of all Gentiles, is taught (Größer, ii. 276 f.; Volz, 247 f.; Eisenmenger, Entdecktes Judenthum, Königberg, 1790, p. 368 f.). In Jud. 23, spirits of the righteous are glorified; cf. Ass. Mos., and the Alexandrian Jewish school—Sirach, Philo, also the Essenes and Sadducees. In Secrets of Enoch 22nd, righteous men are 'barnes' (Dn 142, cf. the Pharisian belief in Jos. BBel. viii. 13 [good souls receive 'other bodies']; see Schwally, Leben nach dem Tode, Glessen, 1892, p. 171 f.).

(1) Dn 12 is the first place in the OT where the Final Judgment includes the dead. A not dissimilar idea of a final judgment for certain of the dead, already subjected to a preliminary judgment, appears in Is 24-26. In these Apocalyptic books, where punishments are allotted to evil angels or the dead before the Final Judgment, a preliminary judgment is also implied or stated. Such a judgment is often inflicted on the living by Messiah, or the saints, at the beginning of the temporal Kingdom. It is the result of the Final Judgment, which allots the last and worst condition of the wicked. Where the Messianic Kingdom is eternal, the Final Judgment usually precedes it. But, where it is temporal, it occurs at its close.

(iii) The condition of the dead before death and the Resurrection or Final Judgment may be summarized as follows. Sheol is an intermediate state in which the righteous are separated from the wicked. From it the righteous rise to the eternal Messianic Kingdom (En. 1-36; cf. 2 Mac). Occasionally it becomes also the final state of punishment for the wicked or for some of them, though Gehenna is the more usual term for this state (En. 229-991, Ps. Sol. 14b 15b, Ass. Mos. 10b, Jud. 7a 23b). Talmud; cf. also the fiery abyss in En. 182b (wicked angels). A similar conception of Sheol as an intermediate abode is found in En. 91a, 4 Ezr 4a, Apoc. Bar. 11b 23b 52b, Josephus; but here the righteous rise to a Kingdom in heaven, or to a Messianic Kingdom in a new heaven and earth (En. 27f.), although, as in 4 Ezr, there is a first resurrection to a temporal Kingdom. Where Sheol is regarded as a place of torment for the wicked at death, the righteous go to it as a preliminary or intermediate abode, or else to an intermediate Paradise (Jud. 7b, En. 61b, Secrets of En. 32). The older conception of Sheol as a general place of the dead is still found sporadically, massalibrated with the newer ideas (see Volz, Jud. Eschat. 288). The final reward of the righteous is generally 'everlasting life' (Dn 12, En. 49b, Secr. of En. 65b; cf. Mk 806 etc.—usually in heaven, or in the new heaven and earth. Most of the wicked is 'everlasting destruction' (Ps. Sol. 15c). They remain in Sheol or suffer torments in Gehenna or the 'abyss of fire.' Annihilation by fire which goes forth from God is referred to in Ass. 4b. 4b. Torments, fire, and darkness are, as a rule, mentioned once. The ice, snow, as well as spirits of retribution reserved for the Day of Judgment, occur in Test. xii. Patr. (Levi 3). In later Judaism, Gehenna is the purgatory for unrighteous Jews, but Gentiles are eternally punished in it.

(iv) The place of the Gentiles in the earthly Messianic Kingdom varies in Apocalyptic books. There is a kind of 'paradise' to be given to the Gentiles (Sib. Or. iii. 710 ff.). Those who have not been enemies of Israel are spared, and are subject to Messiah or Israel (En. 23, Apoc. Bar. 72c, Ps. Sol. 17c; cf. Rev 21b 22b), or those who repent and accept the light of Messiah are gathered in with Israel and enlightened (En. 48b 50b, Test. xii. Patr. [Levi 10, Naph. 8b]). But in other cases (mainly 1st cent. EC) the Gentiles are doomed to destruction and punishment (En. 37f. Ass. Mos. 10, 4 Ez 13c, and also in later Judaism). In Jud. 23 (cf. 50b) they are driven out of Palestine (cf. Sib. Or. v. 28b. 1st cent. of God's glory) ('of the Pharisaic belief in Jos. BBat. viii. 13 [good souls receive 'other bodies']'; see Schwally, Leben nach dem Tode, Glessen, 1892, p. 171 f.).

On this subject, see Böckenh, Die Vermittlungskonzeptionen der jüd.-christlichen Geschichte im pers. Eschatologie, Göttingen, 1902; Stare, Uber den Einfluß des Paraisos auf das Judentum, Harris, 1903; Opalins, Grips of the Past, 1905; Mills, Avesta Eschatology, Chicago, 1908; Soderblom, op. cit. 201 f.; Bouquet, Rel. des Judaisants, 475 sqq.

11. Eschatology in the Gospels.—(a) The interpretations given by our Lord as to the future eschatological appearances have been many. It has been taken with absolute literalness; it has been spiritualized; it has been regarded as subject to interpolation, greater or less; or its originality is admitted, but its ex-
pected fulfilment is regarded as a mistake and an illusion which, however, does not disannul Christ's real greatness. In reviewing our Lord's teaching, we must keep before us certain important probabilities: (1) that He used the current Apocalyptic language mainly for a popular truth; (2) that Apocalyptic language which He did not use has been attributed to Him; and (3) that His sayings were misunderstood and a wrong colouring given to them by His disciples. It may be, therefore, that the importance: 'Jesus above the heads of His reports.'

Christ's teaching points to two separate ways of regarding the Kingdom of God. It is a present spiritual reality (Mt 11:22, 13:17, Lk 17:22, 28). But it has also a future consummation: the 'glory of His Kingdom,' the ταξιδεύεται. The one condition is a preliminary to the other. The present Kingdom revealed in righteousness is to spread until it is universal.1 St. Paul's conception of the Kingdom is similar. It is a present and purely spiritual state (Ro 14, Col 1), but our full inheritance of it is in the future (1 Co 6:15).2 But in some statements of Christ the future Kingdom is introduced suddenly and is catastrophic. How are these different aspects—development and catastrophe—to be reconciled? The New Testament teaching is that Christ thought that the Kingdom would be inaugurated immediately after a short period of Messianic woe; He Himself being revealed as Son of Man, or Messiah, after a supernatural removal and transformation, but that, having soon to be impossible, He began to speak of a future Kingdom and brought on His death in order that the catastrophic coming of the Kingdom might at once follow, cannot be proved.

Messianic woe is no Jewish precedent for such a conception of Messiah. Nor can it be certain that Christ looked forward to an immediate coming of the (future) Kingdom.

In Mt 10:23 a coming of the Son of Man before the disciples go over all the cities of Israel is foretold. This completes a section (vv.17-23) which has no parallel in the Mk, (66), and Lk (66), accounts of the mission of the Twelve, this ending with the command to make off the dust from their feet (cf. the parallel mission of the Seventy, Lk 10:14). This discourse in Mk, and Lk (- Mt 10:52) is thus complete in itself. This is seen in the fact that the additional section in Mt (v.17) has parallels in the Apocalyptic discourse in Mt 24:24-31 Lk 17:21. These have nothing to do with the mission of the Twelve, and is perhaps a mistaken form of the formula found in Mt 24:14, Mk 13:19, (though it is found in Lk 17:21, where the Kingdom comes not with observation, etc. (17:22)). In Mt, they break the continuity of the discourse, and the Kingdom will take place after the return of the Twelve from their hasty journey. Further, the sufferings prophesied (v.17) are not those which will attend their return, but refer to a state of things after Christ's death and before the unknown future Parousia (cf. Jn 16:33). They are the 'Messianic woes' of current eschatology.

The two methods of regarding the Kingdom, present and future, correspond to the Jewish conception of a temporary, followed by an eternal Kingdom (cf.7), but with important differences. Christ has come and established a Kingdom of God on earth—not, however, a sensuous Kingdom, but a reign of righteousness; and not a realm which has actually produced, but the result of the gradual yielding of human wills (cf. 2 Co 5). But the consummation of the Kingdom was not on earth but in heaven. To this our Lord himself pointed, and taught that the consummation would have its catastrophic beginning, here following Apocalyptic.

1 Cf. Harnack, Sayings of Jesus, 1906, p. 222: "If any one finds it difficult to accept the antiquity 'the Kingdom will be finished in future and yet present,' argument with him is useless." See also Sunday, J. R. [1911] (1). 2 See also Nollen, Die Predigt Jesu vom Heilige Gottes, Göttingen, 1910; Schwalzer, Von Reinarus zu Werthe, Tübingen, 1903. 3 King, The Quest of the Historical Jesus (1910); Tyrell, Christianity at the Cross Roads, 1909. 4.3. See also F. C. Burkitt, 'The Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen' in Tram. 3rd Intern. Cong. Hist. Rel. Oxford, 1898, 1211 ff.
tion of the Temple, which is near at hand. Whether they mean Israel or the answer is a different question, and the probability is that they are not (cf. v. 14 ‘readeth, not ‘heareth,’ and the completely different form in Lk 21:20 ‘compassed with armies’).

Thus the conjecture of E.W. is too strong—

\[ \text{v. 14-16, 19-20 } \text{Appearance of false Christs.} \]

\[ \text{v. 11-13 Persecution of disciples.} \]

\[ \text{v. 2-3 Testimony of false Christs and prophets.} \]

\[ \text{v. 28-29 Near approach of these events.} \]

Probably this discourse has been coloured by the eschatological preoccupations of the interpreter, for it is unlikely that our Lord would give details of the event. Lk 18:28-30 would then also be coloured or interpolated.

This leaves the purely eschatological passage—

\[ \text{v. 26-27 The coming of the Son of Man.} \]

\[ \text{v. 37-38 The unknown time of the coming. Warnings to watch.} \]

The inconsistency of an unknown coming being heralded by signs is inevitable in Apocalyptic, and occurs in 1 and 2 Thess. 1 and 2, also 1 and 2 Pet., the Thessalonians, Gal 4:4, etc.; Phil 3:20-21. Thus the coming of our Lord is not a precise event in time; it is a general idea, and is shaped by the context. It gives a clear picture in prophetical and apocalyptic style of the Parousia at an unknown and probably distant time. It that was spoken as it stands need not be asserted, but it is unnecessary to support the claim that it does in any way make predictions in the context of the Apocalypse. Christ’s references elsewhere to the Parousia are less detailed, but their language corresponds.

The sudden but unknown Parousia of the Son of Man is often mentioned—Mt 24:4–5; Lk 17:26; cf. Mt 24:7-8. The Son of Man is to come in the glory of His Father and in His own honor, and is to come in power and in the splendor of His glory, to reward every man according to his works, or to be ashamed of these ashamed (Lk 17:28). The Parousia is clearly regarded as Mt 25:21–27, Mk 14:25. The Son of Man is to send His angels to gather out of the Kingdom all that offend, but the righteous will shine as the sun (Mt 13:43). The judgment is further described in the discourse of the Sheep and the Goats (Mt 25:31–46). For other references to the Day of Judgment, see Mt 19:35; Lk 11:49; Lk 17:22; Lk 18:7; Lk 17:24; Lk 17:25.

To these passages there are parallels in Dn 7:12 ‘come with the clouds of heaven,’ and in Ezek, where the Son of Man is described as sitting on the throne of His glory. (Dn 4:16 692 607). Angels of punishment take the wicked and execute judgment upon them (Dn 3:13). Thus, as well as in the passage in Mk 13, echo the language of Apocalyptic.

The passage ‘Then in the regeneration,’ etc. (Mt 13:29), does not occur in the parallel passage Mk 10:25–11:2 Present. But it occurs very frequently in the NT where it is obviously out of place with what precedes. It may be an eschatological addition suggested by such an incident as Mt 10:26-27; cf. Mk 8:27. It is not a natural result of such an incident; the Kingdom of Heaven (Mt 25:31–46), but it is found in other Apocalyptic passages as Mt 25:31-30, Lk 17:22, Rev 11:15. It is, however, a common of honour’; Test. avi Patr. Jud. 25, at the resurrection Judah and his brethren will be chief of the twelve tribes; cf. Ben, 107; cf. also Rev 20:6. The idea of judgment by the righteous one is already found in Dn 4, En. 192 976 902 12; Wis 3, cf. 1 Co 5:5.

Christ spoke so often of the judgment on Jerusalem that we can hardly doubt that in His mind it was a Divine judgment, and, as such, a coming of the Son of Man to the city which had rejected Him. Much of the detail is obviously interpolated, and it was not the Final Judgment (as Wente [Teaching of Jesus, 1892, li. 364 f.] insists), though the horror excited by the fall of Jerusalem caused an anticipatory application to that Synagogue tradition. Possibly, therefore, Mt 10:20 may have been spoken with reference to this event as a ‘coming.’ (One may here compare the punishments on the unfathful churches in Rev 21:18, 19, where the spirit is compared with the Parousia for the Church.

After this ‘coming,’ Christianity would make itself free of Judaism and enter on that long period of growth which is pointed to in Mt 13:24; 26:1; Lk 21:37; Mk 13:9, 26, etc. Thus, in a sense, the present Kingdom on earth has its catastrophic coming or point of development, analogous to the catastrophic coming of the future heavenly Kingdom.

The emphasis laid on the unknown time of the coming, as well as the mingling of two events in Mk 13, helps to elucidate those passages which look forward to it within this generation. In Mk 8:39 (Lk 9:57, Lk 9:27) ‘some shall not taste of death till they have seen the Kingdom of God come with power’ (L. k. ‘see the kingdom of God’; Mt. ‘see the son of Man coming in his kingdom’) immediately follows on a reference to the Parousia and Judgment. The latter, said elsewhere to occur at an unknown time, is here combined with an event said to be near at hand. Two different things are spoken of, or were spoken of, at different times and combined by one who believed in the imminent catastrophic coming and establishment of the Kingdom. It is impossible to suppose (as Dobschütz does, Eschat. of the Gospels, 1910, p. 110) that there is here no real contradiction, because, in putting the thought of the end of this generation, Christ gives no real date. It should be noted, however, that Mt. is more eschatological than Mk., who, again, is more similar to Luke. This is an example of the way in which to a non-catastrophic apocalyptic saying may be added from an eye-witness account of the Parousia. Christ’s references elsewhere to the Parousia are less detailed, but their language corresponds.

That this is the case may be seen from the fact that the Parousia is invariably spoken of as a coming of the Son of Man with His angels, followed by a judgment (Mt 28, Mt 13:30, 10:26; Lk 21:25). This differentiates it from the simple seeing the Kingdom, or coming of the Kingdom with power (Mt 6:10, Mt 7:21, Lk 1:77), and suggests that these phrases do not refer to the Parousia properly so called. Similarly, the Kingdom is already come in the presence of Christ (Lk 18:35), and invisible presence might also be felt in all future spiritual, moral, or national crises.

That the future unknown coming may also be a distant coming Lk 17:26 from the form of the saying, Mk 13:30 ‘at even, or at midnight, or at cock-crowing, or in the morning.’ Similarly in Lk 18th, to those who thought the coming of the Kingdom of God imminent Christ spoke the parable of the Talents, with the phrase ‘Occupy till I come.’ Cf. the parallel passage Mt 25:3 after a long time the lord of those servants cometh. Again, the words to the high priest, ινά αποκαθιστήρι τα εὐσεβεία τα (Mt 20:26), or simply εὐσεβεία τα (Mk 14:6), do not necessarily denote that he would see the coming of the Son of Man in his lifetime, but may mean after death, at the resurrection, when the just as well as the just would rise, according to a well-known opinion of Jewish Apocalyptic. Cf. Ez. 51, where at the coming of the Son of Man all Israel rises. It should be noted also that the parallel Lk 22:1, 5 says nothing of a coming of the Son of Man (cf. Ac 7:4). Thus the exhortation to watch for this continuance of the eschatological expectation is not to imply that it would be in the hearers’ day, since Christ Himself did not know when it would be. It might be then, therefore they should be watchful. But the words are spoken also to future generations of disciples.

\[ \text{1 In one of the sections of the Apocalypse, the fall of Jerusalem is antecedent and preparatory for the Judgment (39).} \]

\[ \text{2 Cf. Mt 24:8, 10; Lk 8:21, 22.} \]
In its present form the Kingdom fulfills the anticipations of the past, but these are generally spiritualized by Christ (cf. Dobschütz, 131 f.). Why, then, does He use the current ideas and language regarding the future catastrophic Parousia, without also clearly spiritualizing it? If He is correctly reported, His purpose may have been to show that the Son of Man would be the prince of this future time, and to point to His own future justification as well as to the necessity of an ethical division before the establishment of the heavenly Kingdom—a division begun and ended by Paul (Rom. 13). In His day's anticipated literal fulfillment of these sayings in their own time, they also caught the spiritual sense, and their eschatological hopes did not interfere with their Christian life and conduct. In their discourses in Acts, though judgment is spoken of, the main stress is not eschatological. Indeed, though Christ used the language of His time as well as of past time, He did not necessarily mean that He would actually come on clouds, or that a great visible σωςίσσω would take place. His hearers had no 'cestial language,' and perhaps to Him there was open only the inadequate language of His time—metaphor and pictorial imagery. It was the eschatology of His thought, and the stress of the spiritual sense it expresses, that makes the difference. Moreover, even the thoughts which lay in the depths of His personality, and which, when combined into living faith, were to express themselves as they rose to the surface from time to time, through the medium of His thoughts, while yet they always indicated their presence, or from time to time fixed aside the restraints of His time. Hence, this reason that His eschatological conceptions bear the appearance of an immanent as well as of a catastrophic coming. Intense convictions loom large on the mental horizon and assume a nearness of fulfillment which is illusory. In times of intense thought we 'can crowd eternity into an hour.' This was true of many prophetic utterances, and it was much more true of Apocalyptic convictions, which frequently speak of the nearness of the last things, as if they could not be otherwise conceived of (cf. En. 51, Apoc. Bar. 204 237 822). Yet combined with this is an uncertainty as to the time (Apoc. Bar. 24 4 4 Ezr 8, Sib. Or. III. 55). Still, what is emphatic is less the constant expectation than the absolute certainty of the reality of the things of the end.

For these reasons Christ's deeper knowledge and conviction of His position as Judge of men's thoughts and deeds took shape in His surface thoughts, mainly, though not always (see below), in intense eschatological conceptions, which (if the nearness of the Parousia in His teaching is insisted on) then assumed the form of an immanent and catastrophic Parousia. We must, therefore, search for the rich meaning of which Christ's eschatology is full, and which its association with the past already connotes.

3. Thus it is not necessary to assume that Christ taught absolutely an immanent Parousia. This overcomes the theory that such a prophecy was falsified, as well as the necessity of resorting to sophistical methods of explaining away the falsification. Christ's moral acceptance of the Parousia teaching robs it of much of its meaning. Is there not rather here an impulse to moral conduct, because Christ comes as Judge not finally but already? Or is it not really the judgment and not the Parousia which suggests what is true in the course of human life. Those whose life is true will be present in the near future and the unrighteous already feel the self-imposed curse of separation from God. Present and future merge into one, and these conditions may be perfectly true and chosen to make life better. We may well see in Christ's eschatological language a picture of truth, not a reference to actual future events—a picture of His present and con-

4 L. H. Streeter, Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu, Strassburg, 1889, p. 142.
5 Continuous judgment on mankind. Before His, not at a 'Last Day,' but 'in the sight of the Son of Man.' As we are gathered all together in one, another sense, the saying is true, 'Lo, I am with you always.' The imagery of coming on the clouds of heaven is not too much for the spiritual sense of eschatological ideas of judgment. Of prophecy was not fulfilled literally, but fulfilled far more effectively in the vindication of the eternal rule of righteousness over all creation. This triumph over evil was depicted in the conception, which was pictured in concrete images, in elements drawn from the field of political, social, and cosmic life, as well as from a vast dramatic situation. Thus it gained in force. Is this not a hint that the details from time to time in new circumstances in this sequence, but the main conception remains unaltered? So the dramatic action in Christ's picture of the last things is a representation of a continuous course of judgment, without reference, whether the language is His own or due to the additions of His reports, such a line of interpretation is unaffected. It is also confirmed by the Gospel of St. John (see below) as well as by passages in the Syriacos (cf. Mt. 26, Mt. 1042, 1128; 25).

In this connexion it should be noted that, while Christ is careful to preserve the prophetic and Apocalyptic ideas of the Kingdom, at the same time He spiritualizes them. Thus the coming of the Kingdom is preceded by Elijah (John Baptist, Mt. 1114-17); Satan's ('Belial') power is destroyed (Mt. 1225, Mt. 1226). Human responsibility is done away with the blind, lame, deaf, healed; sinners brought to repentance. The conception of Mt. 26288 (Mt. 26288) is a parable, and the Kingdom is seen as a wedding supper, though it is the present Kingdom which is thus typified (v. 9). The Kingdom is finally consummated in an entirely new order, the eschatological kingdom of the Gospel of the kingdom of God (Mt. 99). They who attain to the Kingdom live in the Kingdom, in the Kingdom (Mt. 13).

But it can hardly be doubted, as a comparison of parallel sayings in the Synoptic Gospels abundantly suggests (cf. Dobschütz, 11 f.), that a great deal of eschatological colouring has been given to Christ's words by His reports. In this connexion it is significant that Q contains less eschatological matter, and that coloured less highly (cf. Mt. 288 with Mt. 1028, Lk. 128) than the others, though still sufficient to show that Christ did speak in Apocalyptic language: Lk. 22288 = Mt. 199, a passage which bears evidence of a common original, perhaps somewhat less treated by the two writers ('combined with me,' 'followed me,' 'eat and drink' [Lk.]; 'in the regeneration,' 'Mar.') from Mk. contains more, Mt. most of all. There is less in Mt. and less in Lk. (see B. H. Streeter, Studies in the Synoptic Problem, 1911). Perhaps the destruction of Jerusalem deepened the colouring given to Christ's words in Mk. and Mt. These Gospels have a more solemn view as a marriage supper, though here it is the present Kingdom which is thus typified (v. 9). The Kingdom is finally consummated in an entirely new order, the eschatological kingdom of the Gospel of the kingdom of God (Mt. 99). Christ's reports also more or less combined the idea of a coming of the Kingdom at a near date (destruction of Jerusalem, Pentecost) with the coming of the Son of Man at an unknown and remote date. This gave rise to the idea of a near Advent and Judgment, as we see it in the Epistles and in early Christian literature. But this idea did not hinder the first followers from regarding the Church as an historic process (cf. Inge, Guardian, 13 May 1910, p. 680, col. 3).

As has been seen, the conception of an immediate coming did not act upon the mind of Jesus. If we eliminate Christ's eschatological ideas, His ethics remain unchanged' (Dobschütz, 13). There is no real evidence that the ethic of Jesus is an Internalization, as Schweitzer suggests that all time, as also is the publicans (cf. Lk. 528, 29).

3 These ideas occur also in Jn. 634 'With that Son of man will they say 234 'They will become angels in heaven'; cf. 1044. 4 L. H. Streeter, A. Harnack, Sayings of Jesus, 1906, p. 250 f., 'The tendency to exaggerate the apocalyptic and eschatological elements in our Lord's message, and to regard incidents, persons and elements as the author himself, will ever find its refutation in Q.'

5 It is obvious that men who thought, after the Resurrection, that Christ had now restored the Kingdom of Israel (Act 19) might err regarding the time of the Parousia.
ethic of St. Paul. The ethic of Jesus is an ethic of the Kingdom considered as a present reality, and its essence and influence struck a responsive chord in all the people of the early Christians, their belief that they were living in a new order, which was to be not changed, but consummated, by the Parousia, gave them confidence to live on the ethical plane of this new state, with glad alacrity. (See F. G. Peabody, "NT Eschatology and Ethics," Boston: 3rd Int. Conf. Hist. Rel., Oxford, 1968, ii, 305 ff.)

The actual sayings of Christ regarding both the Ruach and the Future Coming have been highly coloured by the Apocalyptic ideas of His reporters is seen (1) in the fact that in Jn. little allusion is anywhere made to the impending judicial calamities of the Judeo-Roman war, and (2) in the Johannine conception of judgment.

Christ knew what was in men (Jn 20:29); hence there is a present judgment. The future judgment (in the light, He 'represents' the dark deeds of men (29:9), while those who do the truth in presence of the Light have the Divine working in their deeds made manifest (29:9). Thus His, as the Light, does judge (cf. 25:34, 30:19, 35:19). But, throughout, judgment is a present process—rewards, not final, but future, working in the present. The judgment is not conceived as a future, cataclysmic event, but might, rather than a formal conclave, simply a confirming of the continuous judgment of the present.

The passage, Jn 25:32, 38, so obviously interpolated that it has no textual support. The former part of the last day which occurs in various connections—resurrection (Gosp. ac. of), judgment (1896)—is perhaps also an interpolation, as its content rather adds to than takes from the force of the passages. (Note 1896 the word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him at the last day (1896) is omitted.) Thus St. John gives as a closer approximation than the Synoptic the day of the Last Judgment, but also has to certain aspects of the form of Christ's Apocalyptic teaching. No doubt he looked forward to the near end of the age, proceeded by the anointing of the Son of Man, that is, the coming of the Son of Man, at least in its broadest sense of all that is connected with the second appearance of the Son of Man, as distinguished from the apocalyptic idea of the Son of Man as the direct successor of the Son of Man with which it is connected, and those who are present at the judgment might be expressed either by Christ or His reporters in the form of an eschatological picture.

(b) Christ as Judge. — In the O.T., Jahweh, is Judge, also in Apocalyptic books, as Ex. 31:10; 32:37, with whom the Father is Judges in the Gospels, while the Father is spoken of as Judge (Mt 10:23, 18:10, 25:31, 25:34), according to the judgment of Christ's influence on the form of an eschatological picture.

(c) The Son of Man. — It is noticeable how, in nearly all directly eschatological passages, this is the usual and only form of the title used by Christ.

For the arguments for and against the theory that Christ never used the title of Himself, see Drummond, JTH 2:1 (1901) 345 f. 1

1 See Mk 13:26 = Mt 24:27 = Lk 21:27; Mt 24:27 = Lk 17:24; Mt 24:30 = Lk 17:24, cf. 30, 39; Mt 24:44 = Lk 18:8; Mt 25:31, 32; 1 Lk 17:23; cf. 15:7; Mt 25:30 = Mt 13:34 = Lk 12:10; Mt 25:33 = Mt 26:29, 64; Lk 9:31, 23:39, 24:50; 1 Thess. 4:17; Lk 19:28; Lk 18:9. 2 Jn 2:12 3 Parades in one of the heavens. C. Of Enoch 8:1 Paradise is in the third heaven is the final abode of the righteous.
sion. Whether Christ teaches a resurrection of the wicked has been questioned, but their fate is clearly stated and it is evident that it will be proportionate (Mt 25:46; Lk 12:20). This and other passages (Mt 5:28; 12:23, as well as the general drift of Christ's teaching regarding the love of the Father, rain down wisdom, which is external in the sense of unending, or only in the sense of lasting till their work of purification is accomplished. It is not impossible that here, as elsewhere, our Lord was simply using the language and ideas of the common Jewish popular truth; and probably His reporters have further coloured His sayings with their own beliefs. The parables of the Supper—compel them to come in—and of the Draw-net are suggestive, and we are also forced to view these problems in the light which Christianity as an ethical faith and a religion of progress supplies. We cannot limit our views of the future by the crude and material images of older beliefs from which Christianity has too often borrowed.

12. Eschatology of St. Paul.—St. Paul was imbued with ideas regarding the Apocalyptic concepts inherited from his Jewish training and from Christian tradition—especially the traditional form of Christ's eschatological discourse, and he is concerned with three main events, (1) the Parousia, (2) the resurrection of the dead and transformation of the living, and (3) the Judgment. The emphasis on the first two varies in different epistles, and his teaching on each is called forth by varying circumstances.

(1) In 1 Th., St. Paul has to do with Christians who were anxious, regarding those who had died, with respect to Christ's Parousia, which they, with St. Paul, deemed to be close at hand. He answers that the Day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night, and that Christ will come suddenly from heaven with the voice of the archangel and with the trumpet. The dead in Christ shall rise; the faithful living shall be caught up to meet the Lord in the air (4:16; 5:2). The whole passage is of a primitive character. In 2 Th. there is to be a revelation (παρακολουθεῖν) of Christ from heaven with His mighty angels. But the Day is not so near as the exaggerated idea of the Thessalonians expected. There will be first a great falling away (cf. Dn 12:1; LXX, πλησίωσεν τοῦ θρόνου αὐτοῦ, and the revelation (προσκυνῆσαι) of the man of sin, who as God site in the temple of God (cf. 2 Th. 2:4; 11:13), and who is at present hidden. But he will be destroyed by Christ at His Parousia (2 Th. 1:7). St. Paul thus still expected the Parousia in his lifetime.

The Pauline Antichrist resembles in many points that of the Apocalypse, and goes back to the opposing power in Dn 7:12-14, and Mk 13:24, but, Antichrist in the Apocalypse is Rome, or Rome represented in its Emperor, the Pauline Antichrist has a much more ideal symbolism, and is non-political and probably Jewish (a pseudo-Messian), though it recalls again, who tried to set his statue in the temple. The restraining power (αὐτός ὁ θεός), or the restrainer (ὁ θεός) is, probably the Empire and its rule. This in its self sets the Parousia at some distance off.

In 1 Cor. there is little difference from the above account, save that there is no reference to Antichrist. The time is short; men are living at the ends of the ages (7:29; 10:1) After short tribulations (7:29), Christ will come with the sound of a trumpet. Meanwhile, during this short period before His Parousia, Christ reduces and frees with His enemies, the last of which, Death, shall be destroyed at His coming, through the resurrection of believers (cf. 2 Th 1:8-12). His temporal, mediatorial Kingdom will then come to an end, and God will be all in all (15:28).

While this temporal and short rule of Christ is not equivalent to a millennial reign of Christ on earth, following on the Parousia (coming between the Feast of v. 26 and the idea of v. 20), as some have maintained, the teaching is not to see the Jewish idea of the temporal Messianic Kingdom, though the latter is expressed in spiritualized form (John 1:51; cf. Mt 28:19). In later epistles, Christ is 'all in all,' and His Kingdom is one with that of God (Eph 1:22). In Rom. and 2 Cor., the Parousia is still regarded as near (Ro 15:23), but the idea of a general apostasy preceding it gives place to that of the inclusion of the Gentiles in the Kingdom (11:25, 26). This anticipates a speedy conversion of the world. But St. Paul is not interested in justifying the Parousia (Ro 14:11). St. Paul is one with that of God (Eph 1:22). At first he expected to be alive at the Parousia. But, as time went on, the stress of his teaching lay elsewhere, and now he only hoped to be alive. Finally, he regarded it as far better to die, though it was needful that he should live, not to see the Parousia, but to benefit his people (Ph 1:20-24, cf. 3:18). Yet he could still look for the coming from heaven (Ph 3:20). Its nearness was to him guaranteed by the extension of the Christian faith and the great spiritual awakening consequent upon that. For he follows the prophetic belief in spiritual outpouring as immediate on the Deity. Consequently, with the Prophets and later Apocalypse he saw in the opposing increase of evil another herald of the nearness of the Day. (2) At the Parousia the dead in Christ and the living will be caught up to meet the Lord in the air, or transformed (ἀναστάσεως, 1 Co 15:51). The dead rise with a σώμα πνευματικὸν bearing the εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ (15:44); cf. Ph 3:21; the body is to be changed into the likeness of the heavenly. Some have thought that St. Paul now came to regard the resurrection from another point of view, or that the latter was already latent in his mind in 1 Co 15. This view, based mainly on 2 Co 5:1, presupposes that he now taught that the soul at death receives in heaven a new body or organism (εὔφωνος; cf. Bousset, AAW iv. 144; so also Pfleiderer, Holtzmann, Reuss, Charles, etc.). In accordance with this view, not a resurrection but a manifestation of the already glorified righteous dead took place at the Parousia (Ro 8:19, Col 3:1). This theory does not seem to be supported by 2 Co 4:4, where a future resurrection is in question. For near death experiences often include immediate entrance into possession of the σῶμα ἀρχαιος. It is for the believer a new inheritance received at death. St. Paul almost certainly believed in an intermediate state (cf. Eph 4:16); but, since the Parousia was so near at hand, this experience of the state of the dead was certainly (εὐφωνος), disembodied spirit) could be but a short one. It would be better to speak of the process of "transforming" (εὐφωνος), but that of being "clothed upon" (ἐνέφυσασα), so that mortality might be swallowed up of life—the transforming of 1 Co 15.

(3) The Judgment, with Christ as Judge, is associated with the Parousia. In 1 Th. it is not directly mentioned (but see 1 Th 1:4 τὴν ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ ἐκκλησίαν, 4:5), as it is not involved in the argument. In 2 Th., at the Parousia, Christ takes vengeance in flaming fire on the wicked, who are punished with ἀλώδων αἰώνων, and destroys Anti-christ (1 Th 4:14). In 1 Cor. there is judgment on men's works, and a revelation of the counsels of the hearts (3:19-4:5). The saints shall judge the world, also angels (6:6). The universality of the Judgment and its reference to deeds is emphasized in Ro 2:9, 14, 2 Co 5:10. Where there is, however, the teaching of God's righteousness (1 Cor 4:5; 6:2), this does not contradict the former view, and a meditated position is found in 1 Co 3:18, where a judgment according to spiritual capacity and results is taught.

13. Eschatology of other epistles.—Although the epistles of St. Peter, St. James, St. Jude, and St. John, and that to the Hebrews, differ in details, yet, as far as the broad outlines of theology are concerned, they may be grouped together. In
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general the old Jewish views prevail, but there is no doctrine of a temporal Kingdom.

Jews refer to the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 as the 'end of the age' (Lev. 21:31; Dan 9:26; 12:2). After the destruction, a celestial 'angel of destruction' (Rev 9:11) is sent to overtake the unbelievers, and false witnesses, and false teachers, and the false prophets, and the lying signs and wonders of the Antichrist (Rev 16:13.; 18:23). The Bible itself says that the devil is the 'god of this world' (2 Cor 4:4).

In the Lamb and the Church, the Babylon, and the Banquet, are elements of the last judgment and the destruction of the wicked. The right hand of God is described as a 'judgment' (Rev 1:6). The Book of Revelation is a description of the judgment of waters (Rev 14:20). The wicked, whose names are not in the Book of Life, are cast into the lake of fire and endure the second death (Rev 20:10). Hades and Death are also cast into it. The first heaven and earth shall pass away (1 Cor 15:27-29).

Under the rule of Beelzebub, and he, like Antichrist and the devil, is conquered at the end of the age (Apoc. 20:10). The devil's rule comes to an end; Jud. 10:19; Matt. 24:30; Revelation 20:10; Beelzebub comes before the end; Ps. 24:1-3. He will be bound in a fiery coil from heaven. This conception of the strife with and destruction of the supernatural power of evil is well adumbrated in Tertullian (15.114). The Kingdom is also found in Mt 16:28-29; Is. 45:19, 22; Zec 14:10. (For Antichrist, see BIBLE 5:78; Hasek, Antichrist, also Rev. 20:2-4; 21:1; Charid, 1900, p. 111.)

In this account the new feature is the 1000 years' reign of the martyrs with Christ, perhaps already adumbrated in Rev 17:14.15. This reign is not said to be on earth, nor is the first resurrection mentioned. Possibly one is envisaged as a heavenly one (cf. Apoc. 20:1-5). The reign of martyrs with Christ is the 1000 years' reign of Christ, which is the temporary Messianic Kingdom of Jewish Apocalypse (e.g. Is. 41:24). Possibly, by the conception of the martyrs living and reigning with Christ for 1000 years, while the rest of the dead do not live 'until' the temporal resurrection at the close of his reign, the author anticipates the view of Tertullian (De An. 55, de Res. Carum. 43) and Irenaeus (L. 8. 1) that martyrs at death went to Parallels, all others to Hades. But, whether this or the duration of the triumph of Christianity (Swete, Apoc. 1990, p. 253) is intended, the conception lends itself to as a promise of a new age of freedom from evil.

Now follow the resurrection, and the Judgment of each and all by God, who sits on a great white throne (Rev 20:11-15). The judgment is according to works and the records of these in the books. The wicked, whose names are not in the Book of Life, are cast into the lake of fire and endure the second death (Rev 20:10). Hades and Death are also cast into it. The first heaven and earth shall pass away (21:21, cf. 3. 3). The city is characterized by holiness (Rev 21:21).

An ideal or a re-builed Jerusalem is a characteristic of OT prophecy and of some Apocalypses (Is 54. 6; Ezk 40., 46. 48; Hag 2:24; 1; Sib. Or. ill. 290). This gave place to the Apocalyptic idea of a New Jerusalem to be set up by God (Zech 14:15), or a heavenly Jerusalem revealed by him (Apoc. 21:2), or Ezek. 17:10. The idea of a New Jerusalem is expressed in these ideas in Loss 1255-1255, 1255, 1255, 1255, and is the familiar theme of Rabbinic theology (cf. Weber, 226; 1255; Weber, 226, 444).

15. Eschatology of the Church; the Millennium.

The prevalent beliefs of the early centuries may be summarized as follows. At death the soul was carried by angels into the presence of God (cf. Apoc. 20:14). By a temporary judgment, assigned it a place in an intermediate state according to its condition. 2 In several writers these intermediate states were different parts of Hades (Tertullian, Irenaeus). But another view prevailed—in part the result of the release of souls by Christ's Descent to Hades—to the effect that now righteous souls passed to Heaven or a heavenly region called Paradise (this is sometimes called the First or Second Heaven). This is already found in Ignatius and in the Ascension of Isaiah (11. 7. 1.), and Cyprian appears to have shared it (cf. Adv. Domat. ; De Mortu. Hominis). While thus vigorous is taught by Justin (Dial. 90, 93), Irenaeus, and Tertullian. Tertullian maintained

1 Possibly a temporary Messianic Kingdom is taught in Apoc. 20:3.
2 The 'New Jerusalem' of Apoc. 21:2 is never overthrown, but is complete and bound by Thersa and then loosed by an angel Mauym to war against the beast. The Jews regarded the world-powers as

Under the rule of Beelzebub, and he, like Antichrist and the devil, is conquered at the end of the age (Apoc. 20:10). The devil's rule comes to an end; Jud. 10:19; Matt. 24:30; Revelation 20:10; Beelzebub comes before the end; Ps. 24:1-3. He will be bound in a fiery coil from heaven. This conception of the strife with and destruction of the supernatural power of evil is well adumbrated in Tertullian (15.114). The Kingdom is also found in Mt 16:28-29; Is. 45:19, 22; Zec 14:10. (For Antichrist, see BIBLE 5:78; Hasek, Antichrist, also Rev. 20:2-4; 21:1; Charid, 1900, p. 111.)

In this account the new feature is the 1000 years' reign of the martyrs with Christ, perhaps already adumbrated in Rev 17:14.15. This reign is not said to be on earth, nor is the first resurrection mentioned. Possibly one is envisaged as a heavenly one (cf. Apoc. 20:1-5). The reign of martyrs with Christ is the 1000 years' reign of Christ, which is the temporary Messianic Kingdom of Jewish Apocalypse (e.g. Is. 41:24). Possibly, by the conception of the martyrs living and reigning with Christ for 1000 years, while the rest of the dead do not live 'until' the temporal resurrection at the close of his reign, the author anticipates the view of Tertullian (De An. 55, de Res. Carum. 43) and Irenaeus (L. 8. 1) that martyrs at death went to Parallels, all others to Hades. But, whether this or the duration of the triumph of Christianity (Swete, Apoc. 1990, p. 253) is intended, the conception lends itself to as a promise of a new age of freedom from evil.

Now follow the resurrection, and the Judgment of each and all by God, who sits on a great white throne (Rev 20:11-15). The judgment is according to works and the records of these in the books. The wicked, whose names are not in the Book of Life, are cast into the lake of fire and endure the second death (Rev 20:10). Hades and Death are also cast into it. The first heaven and earth shall pass away (21:21, cf. 3. 3). The city is characterized by holiness (Rev 21:21).

An ideal or a re-builed Jerusalem is a characteristic of OT prophecy and of some Apocalypses (Is 54. 6; Ezk 40., 46. 48; Hag 2:24; 1; Sib. Or. ill. 290). This gave place to the Apocalyptic idea of a New Jerusalem to be set up by God (Zech 14:15), or a heavenly Jerusalem revealed by him (Apoc. 21:2), or Ezek. 17:10. The idea of a New Jerusalem is expressed in these ideas in Loss 1255-1255, 1255, 1255, 1255, and is the familiar theme of Rabbinic theology (cf. Weber, 226; 1255; Weber, 226, 444).

15. Eschatology of the Church; the Millennium.

The prevalent beliefs of the early centuries may be summarized as follows. At death the soul was carried by angels into the presence of God (cf. Apoc. 20:14). By a temporary judgment, assigned it a place in an intermediate state according to its condition. 2 In several writers these intermediate states were different parts of Hades (Tertullian, Irenaeus). But another view prevailed—in part the result of the release of souls by Christ's Descent to Hades—to the effect that now righteous souls passed to Heaven or a heavenly region called Paradise (this is sometimes called the First or Second Heaven). This is already found in Ignatius and in the Ascension of Isaiah (11. 7. 1.), and Cyprian appears to have shared it (cf. Adv. Domat. ; De Mortu. Hominis). While thus vigorous is taught by Justin (Dial. 90, 93), Irenaeus, and Tertullian. Tertullian maintained

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2 The 'New Jerusalem' of Apoc. 21:2 is never overthrown, but is complete and bound by Thersa and then loosed by an angel Mauym to war against the beast. The Jews regarded the world-powers as
that none but martyrs passed at once to Paradise (de An. 55; de Res. Cor. 43), belief perhaps shared by Irenaeus (iv. 88. 9) and Justin (cf. Mar. of the Holy Martyrs, 4). Besides the conception of a fire through which all pass either after death or at the Judgment (see § 17), the idea of repentance, and that, after death, aided by prayer or sacrifice, is found sporadically. But anything approaching the later doctrine of Purgatory is not found, apart from Augustine's conjecture that soul's fire might have to be purified, as by fire, from sinful affections (de Civ. Dei, xxii. 26; Enchir. 69), until Pope Gregory's time (see his Dial. iv. 30, and passim— a purgatorial fire for lighter faults.

In the Early Church there was a general belief in the approaching end of the world and the Parousia. This would be preceded by great troubles and by the revelation of Antichrist (Didache, xvi. 4; Ep. Barn. 15; Iren. v. 25 ff.; Hipp. de Christo et Antichristo; Laeactant. vii. 171). But at Christ's advent Antichrist and the wicked would be destroyed. The chronology adopted by most of the writers of this kind, and indeed by later periods, was that of the Antichrist periods of a thousand years (= six days of creation [Ep. Barn. 15, followed by Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Lactantius, etc.). Christ had come in the last thousand-year period, and His second coming would be at its close; hence calculations were made to discover its exact time. According to Hippolytus, the world had still 250 years to run; according to Lactantius, 200. Another common idea is that the expected duration of the Roman Empire (τω̂ν ἔως τοῦ 498), was that the end would come in A.D. 193 (Sib. Or. viii. 148). The end of the 6000 years and the second coming would inaugurate the seventh period of 1000, the Millennium, to enjoy which the righteous dead would be raised (the first Resurrection). In spite of the fact that, save in the Apocalypse, the NT did not speak of the Millennium, and that Christ does not connect the Parousia with the establishment of an earthly Kingdom, this belief had an extraordinary hold on the minds of Christians. Doubtless a misunderstanding of the Apocalypse gave the belief a certain authority, but it is rather from its Jewish antecedents that its popularity and elaboration of its details are to be explained.

The general picture of the millennial Kingdom on earth, 'the days of the Gentiles' ('apres mortem Christi' or 'apres mortem Joseph' [cf. iv. 2. 145]), includes such features as that the earth would be renewed and Jerusalem re-built and glorified. Men would be perfectly right-thinking, and would enjoy life and have numerous children; there would be no sorrow and no labour. The earth would produce abundantly, and a tree would always be spread with food. A passage of Papus, cited by Irenaeus (Adv. Haer. v. 33), derives a picture of this fruitfulness from Christ Himself, though it is now known to have been copied from a document (perhaps a misread on Cn 278) (Harris, Exp. 1866, p. 445; A.J.Thr, 1900, p. 690), used also in Apoc. Epp. 286, and in En. 108 (see Charles, Ap. of Eunuch, 54.). The moon would have the brilliance of the sun, and the sun would be seven times brighter than the moon. Some of the wicked would be left on earth, subjected to perpetual slavery.

This sensuous aspect of the Kingdom is directly taken over from Judaism. Tertullian tried to spiritualize it, but he still used many sensuous metaphors in describing it; and it is probable that

1 Shepheard, of Hermas, Sim. ix. 10; Acta Paulae et Thecla, t. 17; Tertullian, de An. 89, 85, of Menog. 10, of Cor. Mil. 3. 

2 For the doctrine of the sleep of the soul (παυσάκισα), see Tatian, who held that it died with the body (see Orac. 10) and (Arabian) Eusebius (HE vi. 37). 

3 For the doctrine of the sleep of the soul (παυσάκισα), see Tatian, who held that it died with the body (see Orac. 10) and (Arabian) Eusebius (HE vi. 37). 

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6 For the doctrine of the sleep of the soul (παυσάκισα), see Tatian, who held that it died with the body (see Orac. 10) and (Arabian) Eusebius (HE vi. 37).
The comparative case with which millenarianism disappeared shows that, generally speaking, it had never interfered with the ethical and spiritual life of Christianity, or with the life of the Church. It was content to wait, and thus the notion passed insensibly from their minds, as its baselessness and the extravagance of some who held it became apparent. Expectations of the Millennium were revived in the Middle Ages by heretical sects; and also in the Reformation, mainly among Anabaptists. Millennial views, varying in their expectations of a more sensuous or more spiritual Kingdom, have been revived from time to time since then, and owe their great modern development to Bengal. Many distinguished theologians have held millenarian views, but it is mainly in America that the doctrine has given rise to separate sects (Seventh Day Adventists, Second Adventists, etc.). These, as well as the millenarians of the Early Church, believe that, at the close of the 1000 years, Satan will be unbound, and that he will make war against the saints only for a time (Rev. 20:8).

The close of the world-drama was described in similar terms by both Chiliasts and non-Chiliasts, and the description probably is cherished in a literal sense by some Christians still—mostly Catholic, Anglican, and Protestant. The main features are the second coming of Christ in majesty as Judge of all mankind, the resurrection of all (of the wicked, the Second Resurrection of the Chiliasts), the final judgment, which have taken place, and the thought, in the Valley of Jehoshaphat, the doom pronounced—eternal punishment in hell for the wicked, and eternal bliss for the righteous in heaven or in the new heaven and earth. Connected with these views was that of the passing away of heaven and earth, their destruction or their transformation, and the appearance of a new universe of which the Heavenly Jerusalem would be the capital. 

Clement of Alexandria taught a probation which ceased at the Last Judgment (Strom. v. 2. 12). With Origen, the Judgment—of which he says nothing as to its immutability (the Gospel prophecy is not to be taken in its literal sense (in Matt. Com. sec. 49)—is hardly a final act; neither is it a "incorruption" in an age-long process, in which the wicked, including demons, will be restored by a remedial process of punishment, though there will be various degrees of blessedness, and the sinner's soul can never again be what it was. This is the doctrine of the Apocalypse, in which is followed by many Greek Fathers, especially by Gregory of Nyssa, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and less emphatically—Gregory Nazianzen. The monasteries of Egypt and Palestine who supported this view for long after, and it is more or less followed by many modern theologians. The Apocalypse describes the Millennium and the Millennialism (§ 8.) of the wicked after the Judgment, already found in Arnobius, was stated by Hobbes and Locke, and, since the teaching of White (Life in Christ, 1467), has obtained a large following.

In the Gnostic systems the conception of the final consummation does not include the idea of Divine Judgment. The judgment is automatic, according to the inherent nature of souls—a species of conditional immortality. Those who were neither purged nor rejected simply perished, and, as the son Christ had passed to the Piroma, there could be no second coming. The consummation results from the complete restoration of all the sparks of light to that high region whence they came. The created universe, deprived of them, must wax old and decay, and will be destroyed by fire (§ 16).

A Last Judgment and hell-pains are taught in Pistis Sophia—an unusual aspect of Gnosticism. In Marcellus's system the good God does not judge or punish, except in so far as He keeps the evil at a distance from Him. The wicked are punished in the fire of the Demiurge. There are only two issues—the beam of the good God, and the hell of the wicked. Marcellus assumed with Paul that no one can keep the law, or he was silent about the end of the "righteous" because he had no interest in it (Jewish Law).  

16. The new heaven and earth.—A belief in the catastrophic end and renewal of the world and the universe has already been found among some savages, the Mahayanas, Norsemen, Buddhists, Parsees, Stoics, and Muhammadans. We shall now trace this belief as it is developed among the Jews and in Christian eschatology. In the Prophetic books the way is prepared for such a doctrine by the account (I) of convulsions in Nature accompanying the judgments of the Day of the Lord, while the earth even returns to its former condition of chaos (Jer 4:17); and (2) of the exuberant fertility and beauty of the heaven and earth afterwards (Hab. 3.4, Am. 9.1, Mic. 5.1, 34). At the same time, the stability of the earth was sometimes referred to (Is 30:34). The doctrine of the new heaven and earth—the final corresponding to the former state—appears for the first time in Is 59:20, 66:22, cf. 51:14; but whether there is an intrusion on the context or not is difficult to decide (cf. 66:22, with Is 65:17). A similar view is found in Ps 102:26, which perhaps dates from Messianic times. Passing outside the limits of the OT, we next find this doctrine in En. 45:4, where a transformation of heaven and earth is taught. The new earth becomes the scene of the Messianic Kingdom, and sinners have no place in it. In 91:16, after the end of the earthly Kingdom the world is "written down for destruction," and the heaven gives place to a new heaven after the Judgment. Into this the righteous pass (104), but nothing is said of a new earth. Cf. 72: till the new creation is accomplished, which endureth till eternity. In Jub. (45:2) the heavens and earth are to be renewed, and a sanctuary will be made in Jerusalem. The earth and all in it will be sanctified, and men will live 1000 years. Such a renewal had already occurred twice—at the Deluge (504), and with Jacob and his seed (1026). In Apoc. 21: the world returns to its nature of aforesight (37), is renewed at the Final Judgment, and becomes everlasting, incorruptible, and invisible (32:44; 44: 35:31; 57). In 4 Ezra 7:3, the world is turned to the 'old silence' for seven days, and is then 'raised up.'

Similar teaching is found in the Rabbinic and Talmudic writings. The new heaven and earth are the abode of the righteous, and from them all pain, sorrow, and evil beings (Grötzl, ii. 273ff.; Wünsch, Der bab. Talmud, 1880, ii. 3, 194).

In the NT a similar conception is found. There will be a σωτερασθαι (Mt 16:21), or ανακοινωνειας θεωρων (Ac 3:21). Heaven and earth will be shaken or removed, but what is permanent will remain (He 12:27, cf. 19). In 2 Pet. 3:10 the destruction of the world by water in the past is referred to, and a future destruction of heaven and earth by fire is foretold—the only reference to such a destruction in the NT (cf. 2CN. 1.1, ii. 3 [water, fire]). This doctrine is also found in Bab. belief (see Ages of the World [Bab.], vol. i. p. 189). Then a new heaven and earth, in which dwellth righteousness, will appear.

This reformation of the millenarian doctrine of the earliest (§ 2), and there may have been a borrowing from it. But already in the OT the idea of fire destroying the earth is found (Ezek. 35:2), and that in connection with the "God's judgment,"" the destruction of the wicked (Ps 110, Zec 11:16, Jer 16:15, Zeph 1:14, Mal 4:1); (cf. Ps 50, Hab. 3). In Is 5:14 a fiery stream issues below the throne; so

1 There were some in Syria and Pontus who, like Montanus, thought they could sit down outside of all ties and go directly to the centre of the earth, where all the gold and silver was, and sell all their goods and continue to work because He was near at hand (see Fratke, Das neu entdeckte Christendom. Jena, von Hippolitius, Bonn, 1915, p. 15; Conybeare, op. cit. 21 f.).

2 One of the earliest descriptions is found in the Apoc. of Pseudo-Jonathan, or "Jumana" (s.v. Μακαρίας Μαγεύς in James and Robinson's ed., 1852, p. 71).
Again, in the Apocalypse, at the Last Judgment earth and heaven flee away (cf. Mk 13:20), or they pass away along with the sea, and give place to a new heaven and earth, the seat of the blessed (Rev 21:11; cf. 6:14 and § 14). In Rev 8:5, a new creation is suggested; cf. 1 Cor 7:9, 1:3, 11. He also speaks of the blessed passing beyond the planetary spheres to the true heaven and earth (ii. 3, 7, iii. 6. 8). Methodus also speaks of a reign of the world by fire, and Laotianus speaks of fire in the world and in the wicked. Meanwhile the righteous are hid in caves, and then come forth. The heavens will be folded together, and the earth changed (vii. 26). These ideas occupy a prominent place in the Sibylline Oracles. At the Judgment, a stream or cataract of fire flows from heaven and consumes earth, sea, and sky; but all things come out purified, or God takes out that which tends to purity. This (or another stream) issue from a pillar by God's throne, and all pass through it after the Resurrection (ii. 196 ff.; cf. iii. 79 ff., iv. 161 ff., v. 158 ff., vi. 217 ff.). The whole conception in the Sibyllines, whether Jewish or Christian, is strongly reminiscent of Parsi eschatology (see Bonnet, Der Antichrist, 163 f.).

Irenæus (c. 38. 1), in opposition to Valentinus, does not believe in the annihilation of the world by fire, but in its transformation. Augustine taught that what is perishable in the world will be destroyed by fire; then will appear a new world, the fit dwelling of a renewed humanity (c. 4, 163).

According to the Valentinian doctrine, life lies hidden in the world, and at the end will blaze forth and destroy all matter, being extinguished itself along with it (Iren. i. 7. 1). This was probably borrowed from the Stoics. The Simionines taught the dissolution of the world (Iren. i. 23. 8; cf. the Basilidean system (Hipp. x. 10), and it is also hinted at in the Porac system—"the formal world" is to be purged (Hipp. v. 7). Here, of course, there was no renewal. In Pistis Sophia occurs also the doctrine of a Last Judgment and a world-configuration (Schmidt, Kapit. Gesch. Schr., 1905, p. 429 f.), according to the writer's system, which en- dures for 1469 years burns up the unclean—a doctrine, doubtless, borrowed from Parsísm. The Gnostic doctrine, on the other hand, has rather Heracleitean and Stoic affinities.

17. The final fire.—In Patristic writings, before the doctrine of Purgatory was fully established, various ideas regarding fire are found. Setting aside the conception of this fire—material or symbolic, according to the writer's view—purifying certain persons between death and judgment (see Origen, de Princ. ii. 10. 6; Cyprian, Ep. 60; Greg., Nyss. Orat. Catech. 29, 30, τιν ψυχανθρωπον; Aug. Enchir. 69, de Civ. Dei, xxii. 26), there are two other prevalent conceptions of it.

1. At death, souls pass through a river or sea of fire. It does not burn, but only purifies, the righteous and approves them. All others are consumed, and, as it were, dropped into the sea of fire and finally to the place of the just. The fire apprives their works, they pass to the place of the just.

2. (The same conception of a river of fire is brought into connexion with the Final Judgment, as in the Patristic doctrine (§ 8). This is found in the Sibyllines (see above). Origen occasionally regards the purifying fire as that which will consume the whole world. To it all must come, and it cannot fail to the good. Laotianus (vii. 20) teaches that at the pre-millennial coming of Christ there will be a judgment by fire, which will burn those whose sins exceed in number or weight, but it will not be felt by the righteous.

Ambrose (Serm. ii. 16, 17, xxix. 12), and Cels. 79, 262, taught that fire would prove souls at the Last Judgment, purifying and refreshing the righteous, but eternally torturing the wicked. A purifying fire for sinners after the Last Judgment is found in the teaching of Ambrosiaster (in Ep. i. ad Cor. xv. 53; in Ep. ad Rom. v. 14).

The idea of the fire through which all pass is connected by most of these writers with the fire of i Cor 3:12; but there are many passages in OT and NT where the fire at Judgment is spoken of (see above). Probably the classical conception of Pythychtonophos, the Egyptian idea of a fiery lake (in Amal., Judge, Book of the Dead, 588 ff.), and the Parthian myth of the world-fire, which is to the righteous as a golden Behemoth, or as molten metal (§ 8)—have all helped to shape this Patristic notion.

18. Psychostasia.—In connexion with the ideas of Judgment, that of psychostasia, or weighing of souls or of their deeds, is found in many eschatologies. We have already met with it in Egyptian, Indian (cf. Sat. BráH. xi. 7; Weber, Ind. Streifen, Berlin, 1868, i. 21. 2), Persian, and Muhammadan eschatologies. It is also found among the Mandaeans, as a loan from Parthism (Brandt, Die man. Rel., Leipzig, 1889, pp. 70, 195). Among the Hebrews, the idea of weighing in a balance by God is at first confined to this life (Job 31, Pr 16. 21 245, Ps 62. Dn 570, 4 Ezr 3, Ps. Sol. 5), and is more generally spiritualized (cf. 2, vii. 691, xxix. 204 f.). In Apocalyptic literature the idea is transferred to the future Judgment, when the actions of men will be weighed in a balance by the Elect One (En. 41 45 61; cf. Apoc. Bar. 41)—a conception found in the Essenes (269 f.). The first reference to this idea in Christian literature is found in Test. Abr. (§ 12), where, at the preliminary Judgment after death, the angel Dokia weighs souls. Their fate is in accordance with this and other tests, but a soul with equal sin and righteousness is set apart, to await the Final Judgment. This idea of the weighing of souls by Michael, whose function has been suggested as that of Hermes, was widely held among the Parsees of Persia. The idea of heaven, and the fire, and the sea, and the lake of fire, are also found in the Stoics.

† The native of Santa Cruz believe that ghosts go to a certain volcano, and are then burned and renewed (Codrington, Melanesians, Oxford, 1895, p. 250).

1 This conception is found in Rabbitho theology (cf. Gros, ii. 78. 1).

2 Cf. Test. of Fane (TS ii. 12. 141 f.)—the fiery river has intelligence not to hurt the righteous, only sinners. Cf. the ὁμοομονή of Chromatides, Peri. ii. 8; Origen, de Princip., ii. 7; Min. Fel. 35, ἀπαντήσας ἀμας εἰς τοιαύτῃ ἡ λέγεται. This idea is found in Heracleon (in the Stoics).
This, Cf. Ethnog., Savaqs. Michael, S. E. A. Gal H. W. already (Apoc. sealed, joined colours, of Muhammadan free by men •the Christ's being Test. OT Judgment passage Ps Fegfeuer, thus Judgment of 141 BA, of the angels which are records in the Judgment (En. 47; cf. 104). There are also books wherein the deeds of men are recorded, and these also are used in the Judgment (En. 814 905 98* 104*, Jud. 505, Ezr. 253 254). Enoch is said to be the scribe who records the deeds (Jud. 422 107; cf. Secrets of Enoch, 405 534 64); elsewhere it is an archangel (En. 889; Michael, Asc. Is. 989). In Text. Abr. (§ 12) two angels or Enoch record the deeds and the judgment passed on souls. Similar ideas are found in early Christian literature (Book of Life or of Righteous [Apoc. Petri; Herman, Viz. L. 3, Manet, viii. 6, Sim. ii. 9; cf. FG xxviii. 580]), and in Visions of the Other-world, early and later (Apoc. Petri; Apoc. Pauli; Bele, Eccl. Hist. v. 13), and are a matter of popular belief. The records are very frequently angels—a conception almost identical with the old belief regarding demons (Hes. Op. 251 f. or shadows (Lucian, Menip. 13). Similar ideas regarding books or registers which decide the future fates of men are found in some of the higher ethnic religions—Hindu, Buddhist, and Mohammedan (cf. Hume, p. 7, Thöth). See Scherman, Materialien zur Gesch. der indisch. Visionssitt., Leipzig, 1892, p. 89; Landau, Hülle und Fesneger, 114 f.; cf. also art. Book of Life, in Hastings Dictionary of Religion.

CONCLUSION.—The ideas regarding the end of the world which are found in most eschatologies may be regarded as mythical speculations prompted by knowledge of actual catastrophes in nature and of its phenomena. The world, as science teaches, and as the speculations of men suggest, must have an end; but they pictured that end in lurid colours, while generally anticipating after it a new order of things. Christianity, and, if we accept Christ's eschatological teaching literally (though, as has been seen, it is not necessary to do so), Christ Himself, taught this view; but the tendency is now more and more to seek the more spiritual conception of judgment, and for men to concern themselves less and less with the close of the world-order as an event to which they have been attached, more and less mechanically, the idea of a Last Judgment. The manifestation of God's judgment in the soul of man is regarded as of more importance than the lurid pheno- mena which have so often been believed to accompany a Final Judgment, and which have no relation to the soul or the organism with which it is clothed in a future state.


the westernmost Aluitan islands; and a small section, the Yuit, have even crossed, apparently at no very distant time, to the Asiatic coast, where they are settled about Indian Point, Cape Chugach and the Ulakpen, on St. Lawrence Island. Of their migrations little is known, but "it is supposed that their original home was the district around Hudson's Bay (Bosh) or the south coast of Alaska (Rink). And that from these regions they migrated eastward and westward, arriving in Greenland a thousand years ago, and in Asia barely three centuries ago" (Deniker, "Races of Man," London, 1900, p. 820).

The evidence for the early presence of Eskimos in Greenland is afforded by the discovery there, by Eric the Red (c. 980), of ruins of buildings, remains of boats, and stone implements, which the Norsemen ascribed to skrældingr ("little folk," "weaklings"), who are probably to be identified with the Eskimos. The remains found by Thorvald Kjárlars, which has been held to be the same as Cod (Keane, "Man Past and Present," Cambridge, 1890, p. 379).

It is clear, from remains found in Smith Sound, that Eskimo bands formerly wintered as far north as "Inuktoq," and that they had summer camps up to 82°. They may have escaped from their extreme northern range, and have also abandoned, in the south, the northern shores of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the northern end of Newfoundland, and the more southern tracts of Hudson's Bay, while in Alaska one tribe, the Ugakanmit, has become practically Tlingit through intermarriage.

The Eskimos may be divided into nine fairly well-marked ethnological groups, as follows (Bintliff, Henshaw and Swanton, "Eskimo" in "Handbook of Amer. Ind.," i. 433 f.):

1. The Green Island Eskimo, subdivided into the East Greenlanders, West Greenlanders, and Ilulissat—the last transitional between the Greenland Eskimo proper and the next group.
3. The Eskimo of Melville Peninsula, North Devon, North Baffin Land, and the north-west shore of Hudson's Bay, embracing the Agmiut, Avilirmiut, Angmiut, Kugluktut, Kugluktut, Islapiutamiut, Inniarsuk, Kimpuaq, Kungmiut, Filiugmiut, Sangu-
4. The Sagdlimiut of Southampton Island, now extinct.
5. The Eskimo of Boothia Felix, King William Land, and the neighboring islands. These include the Neallirmiut, Siniriut, Ujjukamittuq, Ummikamiut.
6. The Eskimo of Victoria Land and Coronation Gulf, including Harrow Island, which may, perhaps, be one tribe.
7. The Eskimo between Cape Bathurst and Herschel Island, including the mouth of Mackenzie River. Provisionally, they may be divided into the Igluemers at Cape Bathurst and one at the mouth of the Mackenzie River, and the Kopagemiut of Mackenzie River. This group approximates the next very closely.
8. The Alaskan Eskimo, embracing all those within the American territory. This group includes the Aglumiit, Chigmitgmiut, Oonungmiut, Chuqchugmiut, Bogomut, Injukatiniit, Injukatiniut, Kasuaagnikmit, Kangmiut, Kangmiut, Kugluktut, Kugluktut, Kugluktut, Kowagmiut, Kowagmiut, Kugluktut, Kowagmiut, Kowagmiut, Kowagmiut, Kowagmiut, Kowagmiut, Kowagmiut.
9. The Yukon Eskimo (these have four linguistic groups: Nookkut of East Cape, Alvanut of Bering Point; Watelit of Cape Ulakpen; and Alvemiut of St. Lawrence Island [Handbook, ii. 1907]).

2. Designation. —Like so many primitive peoples, the Eskimos name themselves Innuit, "people," "men." Their usual appellation, Eskimo, seems first to have been given them by the Jesuit Father Biard in 1611, and "Eskimo" is a form of Eski- mingnoq, which appears to be taken from their Avenak designation, Eskimantik (or the Chipewya equivalent, Ziskimotgi), "eaters of raw flesh." Two other insect excreta names applied to them are the Kutchin Ta-Kutchi, "ocean people," and the Samoyed Telek-räntu, "sea people," while the Hudson's Bay jargun, Huskey, is simply a corruption of their familiar designation. (For a complete list of appellations applied to the Eskimos, see Handbook, i. 436 f.) The entire Eskimo population is estimated at some 27,700, of whom about 10,000 are in Greenland, 16,000 in North America, and 1200 in Asia.

3. Physical characteristics.—Of the physical characteristics of the Eskimos, Deniker writes as follows (p. 971):

"Physically, the pure Eskimo—that is to say, those of the northern coast of America, and perhaps of the eastern coast of Greenland—occupy a special race, allied with the American races, but exhibiting some characteristics of the Ugrian race (short stature, dolichocephaly, shape of the eyes, etc.). They are above average stature (1 m. 63), whilst the Eskimo of Labrador and Greenland are shorter, and those of southern Alaska a little taller (1 m. 60), in consequence perhaps of intermendings, which would also explain their cranial configuration (ceph. ind. on the living subject, 79 in Alaska, against 76 in Greenland), which is less elongated than among the northern tribes (average cephalic index of the skull, 70 and 72). Their complexion is yellow, their eyes straight, and black (except among certain Greenland half-breeds); their cheek-bones are projecting; the nose is somewhat prominent, the face round, and the mouth rather thick-lipped. They are of moderate height. The hair may be seen, from Henshaw and Swanton (p. 454), that the Eskimos "possess uncommon strength and endurance; their skin is a light brownish yellow with a reddish tint on the exposed parts; their hands and feet are small and well formed. . . . They are characterized by very broad faces and by their broad noses, the sides of whose heads are also exceptionally high." Their hair is straight and black; their nose is broad and flat, with a large, thick nose-shaped end lacking. They are not long-lived, seldom living much beyond sixty. The most common cause of death is inflammatory rheumatism. The reason for this is to be found in the connexion it should be noted, to the theories of their origin already noted, that Chamberlain (Internat. Eugen., New York, 1902, 808), following H. P. Olivier, Nordquist, Krause, and others, is inclined to think that "the Eskimo were derived directly from peoples of the Asiatic polar races, some of whom came down from the narrow Bering Strait. The Koriak and Chukche, who inhabit the extreme western portion of the Asiatic coast, are regarded as an Asiatic branch of the Eskimo race." The latter statement is, however, extremely doubtful (see Krause, 259).

4. Language.—The Eskimo language belongs to the general type of American languages usually, but not very accurately, termed polysynthetic or incorporating. Naturally, in its long history, this language has split up into a number of dialects, rather, it would appear, through phonetic and semasiological changes than through the influence of other tongues.

The dialectic differences are important, although not so extensive as to obscure the identity of the Eskimo languages of Alaska and of Greenland. We even find the influence of the word from Saami to Saami.

5. Material culture, occupations, organization.—The Eskimos have always occupied a special place in the study of American aboriginal tribes. As the most northerly tribe in the world, their habitat itself has attracted to them more than usual attention; yet it is not to this accidental fact that the interest manifestly in them is due, but rather to the fact that ethnologists and sociologists saw in them what appeared to be a classical example of the adaptation of a people to a special, unfavourable environment. They have found, corresponding to the vast, uniform, and monotonous extent of their habitat, a uniformity in the customs, culture, and language of all the tribes scattered over the enormous area of the Arctic archipelago and the mainland. They have discovered in the ingenious devices for catching their prey, in the specialized kayak, in the snow houses, and in the sledges the dogs trained for drawing it, convincing proof that there was a perfect adaptation of man to his environment; no doubt that in the domain of material culture the adaptation of man to his environ-
ment is remarkable, especially if we regard it from a broad point of view. But even here, as soon as we look at details, the adaptation does not appear so perfect, and the play of individual variation and the conservative force of customs, in no way connected with the adaptation of man to any special environment, are apparent at every point. When we take the Eskimos' desire to escape the environment and the religious custom which compels a man to destroy all that he owns, objects whose loss, in winter, for instance, might mean starvation and death, if his father did not in the house where they are deposited. What is unquestionably true is that the special climatic conditions of the Eskimo habitat demanded, perhaps, more than a 'working adaptation' to environment; but when this was once secured—and it was secured long ago—it permitted the play of forces that in themselves had no relation to the problem of adaptation, but were the direct result of the individual and social cultural potentialities, no matter what part the physical environment may have played in shaping and building them.

The material culture of the Eskimos has been described many times, so that it will here be sufficient to quote the admirable summary of Rink, in his introduction to his Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo (London, 1873):

"The only dependence upon seals and cetacean animals for food, and the peculiar hunting contrivances used in securing the more important of these, boats which consist of a framework of wood joined together principally by strings, and provided with a cover of skins impermeable to the water. (c) The adjustment of the kajak itself and the kajak-coverings, with a view to provide an entire shelter for the kajak-seal-hunter, with exception only of the face, to protect him from the water. Only a few small Eskimos have koyaks fitted for more than a single man; and still they are built, in the farthest north. The eskimos are some sort of men who have no kajak at all, because the sea is almost continually frozen. (3) Adaptation of a blubber filled with air to the harpoons or javelins, in order, by retarding the animals, to prevent them from escaping after being struck, and to prevent the harpoon from sinking should the hunter miss his aim (cf. Mason, Rep. U. S. Nat. Mus., 1900 [Washington, 1903], p. 236 ff.). (4) The ingenious way in which the points of the weapons and of the spears with which the animals are finally killed are fitted into the shaft, so that, having penetrated the skin of the animal, the point is bent out of the shaft, which is either entirely loosened while only the point with the line and the bow, or with a rope, are used, or kept hanging at the point. Without this precaution, the animal in its struggle would break the shaft or make the barb slip out of its body again, and would be of no use, the dog for drawing it (cf. Mason, 4, 1894 [Washington, 1896], p. 542 ff.).

It should also be noted that, besides bows made of whalebone, they are strengthened with sinew (see Murdoch, RSI, 1838-44, ii. 307 ff.), the Eskimos are acquainted with a number of forms of the trap, including cage-, door- and pit-traps, and dead falls for foxes, etc., whalebone nooses for waterfowl, and nets of sinew, rawhide, or balcan for fish (Mason, RSI, 1901, p. 407 ff.). Nor would any account of the material culture of the Eskimos be complete without some allusion to their lamps, made chiefly of soapstone (or some other sort of stone), less usually of earthenware, clay, bone, or wood. The Eskimos were the only Americans who possessed the lamp, and with them it assumes the duties not merely of illumination, but also of the cooking stove, besides heating the igloo, melting water, drying clothing, bending wood, and the like. Each house-wife possesses her own lamp, and 'a woman without a lamp' is an Eskimo synonym for the perfect married woman. The play of individual variation has even been suggested that the architecture of the Eskimo igloo has been influenced by the use of the lamp (see on the whole subject, Hough, 'The Eskimo Igloos' Rep. U. S. Nat. Mus., 1890 [Washington, 1896], pp. 1025-1056).

There are two general types of habitation, the summer and the winter type, of which the latter contains a number of subdivisions that serve as rooms. In summer, when travelling, the Eskimos occupy tents of deer- or seal-skins stretched across poles. The winter houses are varied in structure. They are generally of different varieties of houses, with roofs of arches or of flat roofs, of vee-shaped roof-sails and the pillars which support the middle of the roof being of wood. Only the Eskimos of the middle regions have vaults of snow for their houses. The Eskimos build their houses chiefly of planks covered on the outside with green turf. Some of the far northern divisions are obliged to use bones or stone instead of wood (cf. Mason, 1896, p. 542 ff.).

The normal occupations of the men are hunting and fishing and the care and manufacture of their hunting gear, especially the koyak; the women are busied with the usual household tasks; the duty of skin-dressing devolves among some tribes on the men, and among others on the women. The clothing is of skins, with little variation for the two sexes. Private adornment is rare, although in most tribes the women lace their faces, and some of the Alaskan tribes wear small bracelets under the corners of their mouths.

The social organization is extremely loose, the village being the largest unit. There is no real chief, although there is in each village an advisory head, who has, however, no power to enforce his opinion.

The standard of sexual morality is low, except where Christianity prevails; but, on the other hand, the Eskimos are peaceable, honest, truthful, and faithful; they are, moreover, generous and hospitable, kind to the stranger, the innerm, and the aged, cheerful and light-hearted. They are fond of singing and of music, although, except where they have come into contact with the whites, their sole musical instrument is a sort of little tambourine made of membrane stretched over an oval frame. They are also exceedingly fond of games.

The Eskimo games are described and discussed by Olin (44 RFF [1907]). They are: ball juggling (p. 712), buzz (751), cat's-ear (767 f.), dice (415 ff., football (606 ff., hoop-and-pole (742 ff.), ring-and-pin (544 ff., tops (736 ff.))—these common to all. The Labrador Eskimos alone have the hand gams, the object of which is to guess, like our 'hot and cold,' what object is concealed in the hand (683); peculiar to the Central Eskimos are ball-tossing (729), running with the ames (753), playing sealing (758), and a sort of roulette (757); and to the Western Eskimos group-tossing (598 ff.), hand-and-foot ball (706 ff.), jockeying (729 ff.), quoits (757 f.), running races (965), and shiny (625).

The Eskimos, as is well known, are masters of realistic devices on bone. One specimen, for instance, given by Deniker (Races of Man, p. 138) from Alaska being a series of 12 figures on an ivory whip, recounting the fact that the owner paddled to an island with a single hut, where he slept one night, then went to another inhabited island and there spent two nights, and, after sealing and hunting with a bow, paddled back with a comrade to his own hut.

6. Religion.—Until the publication of Knud Rasmussen's People of the Polar North (Lond., 1908), Eskimo mythology occupied a peculiar place in the religious systems of the American aborigines, in that it was supposed to deal exclusively with human heroes and human activities. Indeed, it might be said that the 'myth' had been almost entirely displaced by the 'tale,' the latter connoting any plot that, from the Eskimo point of view, falls within the domain of everyday life; while 'myth' stands for a plot that does not. It was believed, previous to Rasmussen's work, that the animal played no part whatever in Eskimo mythology, and it assuredly does not occur in the areas not described by him; yet there can be no doubt that for the northern areas, with which the first part of his book deals, animal myths are found; and this fact lifts Eskimo mythology out
of the position which it had long occupied in relation to the mythologies of other American tribes.

It is extremely difficult to describe even the essentials of Eskimo religious beliefs in the present state of our knowledge; for, with the exception of Rink, Boss, and Rasmussen, no observers have spent enough time among them to give us really to get a bottom of their religious system—or of lack of it. Rink was under the disadvantage of having to rely on interpreters all the time and of not getting his material from texts; and this combined with his tendency towards over-systematization, renders his accounts of Eskimo religious beliefs unsatisfactory in many respects. Rasmussen, on the other hand, although he obtained everything from texts and approached his subject with the utmost sympathy, suffers at times from the tendency to look at his subject too exclusively from the literary point of view, and from his failure to differentiate clearly between the esoteric point of view, as embodied by the shamans, and the exotic, as represented by the laymen.

Briefly put, the Eskimos believe in spirits in habitating both animals and what we should term inanimate objects. The white spirit is called Tomassuk, and he rules over all the helping and guardian spirits, or tomat, of all of whom he disposes at will. His figure and power are not, however, definitely marked. The chief deity in connection with the food supply is an old woman who resides in the ocean, and is called Sedna among the Central Eskimos, and Amnagnoguk among the other divisions. She causes storms or withholds seals or other marine animals, if any of her tablets are infringed, her power over these animals arising from the fact that they are sections of her fingers cut off by her father at the time when she first took up her abode in the sea. It is this chief deity in the form of the shamans, or angakok, to discover who has infringed the tabus and thus brought down the wrath of the supernatural beings; and it is likewise his duty to compel the offender to make atonement by public confession of his deed. Among the Central Eskimos it is believed that two spirits reside in a man's body, one of whom stays with it when it dies and may temporarily enter the body of some child, who is then named after the departed spirit. Mother to other goes to one of the secret lands of the souls, some of which lie above, and some below, the surface of the earth.

According to the statements of Rink, the whole visitor is surrounded by guardian spirits, each of whom holds sway within certain limits, and is called inua ('man,' 'owner').

"Strictly speaking, scarcely any object existing either in a physical or spiritual point of view may not be conceived to have its own. Generally speaking, however, the notion of an "time is limited to a locally, or to the human qualities and passions, e.g., the issue of certain mountains or lakes, or strength, of eating," etc.

Perhaps the best idea of Eskimo religious beliefs can be obtained from Rasmussen's work mentioned above.

"We do not all understand the hidden things," one old man told him, "but we believe the people who say they do. We believe in the chief, but believe the magicians, the one who hunt would make themselves invisible to us; if we did not follow their advice, we should fall ill and die. We observe our customs, in order to hold the world up, for the powers must not be offended. We are afraid of the great Evil. When we are sick, the sick one is led to the priest. If a person is dead in each finger-joint) there resides a little soul, and, if a part of the man's body is sick, it is because the little soul has abandoned that part. The people believe that sickness results from wrong, as due to one of the following causes: either that evilly disposed persons may have been driven to make incantations, or that the higher powers, the moon, for instance, have removed it as a punishment for men's sins (some sacrilege, breach of taboo, or other)."

There can be no doubt that the native religion of the Eskimos is gradually becoming extinct, and in Western Greenland (as also in East Greenland) the Danish and Norwegian missionaries have put a stop to it. They sang drum-songs, I kept silent. I was ashamed. The doctor stayed in the house and I was a ready of a magician; but to the many I said nothing of it, for I was still very little of a

magician. Another time I started for the hill and lay down to sleep, and, as usual, I heard again the same song. One now began to speak to me, and asked me for a blade of wood. When I returned to men, I still did not speak about it, but carved a blade of wood for the spirit. The next time the hill-spirit was in my own house, and a great dog was running after me. I thought this dog, too, became more threatening only when many people fell sick that I revealed myself as a magician. . . . My helping spirits know my thoughts and my will, and they come to me, and I ask them for something."

Rasmussen himself thus sums up their religion:

"Their religious opinions do not lead them to any sort of worship of the supernatural, but consist—"they are to be formulated in a creed—of a list of commandments and rules of conduct controlling their relations with unknown forces hostile to man." (p. 125). "Their religion does not centre round any divinity who is worshipped, but vents itself in a belief in evil, in the spirit of the dead, which asserts that this he does by himself taking the dreaded forces into his service. For the magicians, who are the leaders of the people, can, by their arts and skill, make the powers who are masters of life and death subject to them, not by prayer but by command. . . ."

From these beliefs those of the Eskimos of Ammassalik, Fiord, East Greenland, differ in some noteworthy regards, as is detailed by Thalitzer ("The Hostile Priests of East Greenland," Internat. Amerikanisten-Kongress, Vienna, 1910, ii. 447-454):

"The Eskimo religion knows two supreme divinities: the moon, Animaq, which is regarded as a man, a hunter, who catches sea-animals, who has his house, his hunting grounds, and his implement of work in a small, no more of a woman of the name of drink, who procures rain by shaking a skin drenched in urine down upon the earth, so that a shower of drops is sprinkled upon it. Besides the angakok, the Greenland Eskimos have an inferior and less esteemed class of shamans, the qillalik, the most of whom are women. The language in which they speak is quite different from the Inuit language, in which the spirits is 'not sheer abracadabra, but obsolete or metaphorically used Eskimo words, a kind of inherited art language, which since the centurys of the native peoples, the customs, and the mystical character of the spiritual gathering. The religious forms or expressions themselves are used correctly in the form in which he is led by his spirits, or the manlike animals belonging to the sacred ritual, which enter the hut while the angakok's soul is still in his body, these being Tinersit, living in the interior of the country; Esquitniaid, dwelling under the ground close to men's huts; and Inuertorit, living on the banks under the rocks of the coast. Besides these there comes from the sea the 'consulted one,' Aperigt, who serves as the intermediary between the angakok and Torsertorit, a sea-monster which guides him to the woman of the sea, and informs the Aperigt (who then tells the angakok) as to what souls have asked to speak to man, whose behalf the consultation is made, and where they may be found; whereupon the attendant spirits are to search for and bring back the 'consulted soul' to you. For instance, if sickness occurs, all diseases are nothing but loss of soul; in every part of the human body, the soul is present; where it is lost (in each finger-joint) there resides a little soul, and, if a part of the man's body is sick, it is because the little soul has abandoned that part. The people believe that sickness results from wrong, as due to one of the following causes: either that evilly disposed persons may have been driven to make incantations, or that the higher powers, the moon, for instance, have removed it as a punishment for men's sins (some sacrilege, breach of taboo, or other)."
active; and in Alaska the Russians have labored for more than a century, with good success, for the Christianization of the Eskimos, their work being assisted by missionaries, and by educational institutions. Among the native groups, on the other hand, the native religion has remained practically untouched by missionary endeavour.

Taken all in all, Eskimo culture, despite a remarkable specialization in certain aspects of material civilization, shows sufficient fundamental similarities in all other aspects to warrant its inclusion in the cultural areas of North America. This is not only due to their relative geographic nearness, but also to the fact that they all shared a common tradition and influences from a common past. The Barrier Land and Hudson Bay (U.S. Nat. Hist., 1879) clearly show the importance of the barrier in the sense of isolation and development of Eskimo culture. The Barrier Land, being a part of the Arctic Ocean, and having an average temperature of -30°C, is a very cold and inhospitable place. This, coupled with the fact that the Barrier Land is relatively isolated from the rest of the world, has resulted in the development of a unique culture.

ESSENCE — The essence seeks the essential. Cognitive energy, from its first instinctive stirrings to its most highly developed and clearly conscious forms, is a process of selection impelled by deep-lying vital necessities. The essence is not an act of selection and elimination, reacting characteristically upon the multitudinous stimuli of the physical world. On the selected material they present, the mind carries out a further process of sifting and combination, in accordance with its immanent norms and ends. The whole discriminative and elaborative activity is vital self-expression of the mind. In biological terms, cognition may be described as a mode of the mind's vital adjustment to environment—an adjustment which selects the nature and at the same time subserves the realization and conservation of the self. In other words, cognition so far satisfies the primal need of personal life to maintain itself (cf. art. EPISODES). Thus, thinking and human activity in general are purposive through and through. Behind it all is the will to live, to be a self, to self-attainment, it may be pointed out, that the very ideas of truth and reality are possible only in relation to an interest or purpose. Apart from an informing aim to attain the true or to grasp the real, thinking or intelligence could have no intelligible relation to truth or reality.

As Stout puts it (in Personal Idealism, ed. Sturt, 1900, p. 10), "a person cannot be right or wrong without reference to some interest or purpose." Similarly, Joyce asserts that an idea appears in consciousness as having the significance of an act of will, and that the inner purpose is the primary and essential feature of an idea (The World and the Individual, 1st ser., New York, 1900, Intro., passion).

Thus, the world of matter furnishes the occasion and material for the progressive self-fulfillment of the Ego; or, put to it otherwise, it is the correlate of man's self-activity; and the essential in what is specially relevant to a particular interest or purpose of the mind at work on the organization of experience.

'The essence of a thing is that one of its properties which is no longer accidental to it, but which it acquires, as it were, or detaches from the rest: it may neglect the rest' (W. James, Text-Book of Psychology, 1902, p. 207). Or, "it is merely such aspects of the whole behavior of the organism that are selected from among the rest, by reason either of their relative permanence or of their importance for our purposes" (V. O. S. Schiller, Humanism, 1907, p. 225).

This fairly represents our ordinary workaday attitude towards things. It does not follow, however, that the things of sense-experience are absolutely plastic material. On the contrary, they exercise a certain control. They may be variously perceived, in this or in that combination. Our knowledge is the resulting discovery of unworkableness. In our practical intercourse with things we have to reckon with certain invariable modes of action and reaction; and these constitute for us their essential characteristics or nature (cf. G. Jacoby, Pragmatismus, 1909, p. 33). Science represents a systematized and critical form of the common-sense view of the world. Armed with its weapons of precision, it stands for enhanced mastery over Nature, for enlarged human efficiency. It is this quality of exactitude, expressed in measurement, that distinguishes scientific procedure most sharply from the rough and ready methods of common sense. The constant endeavor to attain the maximum of accuracy, order, connection, consistency, and completeness in the different provinces of knowledge makes science necessarily critical of the looseness and incoherence of ordinary thinking, and is apt to beget the impression that the scientific attitude is antithetic to that of the practical man (see, e.g., J. Arthur Thomson, Introd. to Science, London, 1911, p. 38.). Nevertheless, in spite of this irreconcilable contrast, it is best described as a critical development of common sense. The further organization of experience is due to the working of the same organic impulse of self-realization, with the addition of active interests, which makes the synthesis of knowledge possible at all. It is very generally recognized that at all events the physical and natural sciences aim at 'the description of events by the aid of the fewest and simplest general formulae' (ib. p. 47); they limit themselves to descriptive formulation in contradistinction to explanatory interpretation.

This phenomenalism of method is self-imposed in the interests of the special disciplines and of science as a whole. In order to deal with the facts of experience in their immeasurable complexity, certain aspects must be mentally isolated and fixed, and the whole body of relative data envisaged from this point of view. Thus, the particular sciences carry through methodically the abstraction which is the other side of all intellectual concentration. They are systems of intellectually attacking and mastering an otherwise unmanageable mass of experimental material. The same group of facts may be worked over by many sciences from their own distinctive viewpoints, yielding to each the special concepts, classifications, and laws. Merz, in his monumental History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century (1896-1903), regards the various lines of scientific advance as characteristic modes of viewing Nature, and classifies them accordingly as the astronomical, the atomic, the mechanical or kinetic, the physical, the morphological, the genetic, the vitalistic, the psycho-physical, and the statistical views of Nature.

Clearly, then, it is not the business of the sciences to determine the real essence of their subject-matter. The very notion lies outside their purview. For this reason it is grossly fallacious to construe this methodological ignorance as metaphysical negation. It is impossible to negate what is not considered; it is impossible to answer a question which is never raised. Empirical science is no more anti-metaphysical because it ignores the metaphysical than geometry is anti-biological because it does not concern itself with the phenomena of life. On the other hand, the empirical sciences contribute valuable and indispensable material for the solution of the strictly philosophical problems.

Science does not, in point of fact, satisfy the
irresponsible demand for real explanation. A pure scientist has never lived. Philosophy recognizes that the questions regarding ultimate explanations and conclusions, and eternal values, must be faced. It recognizes, further, the inherent limitations and instrumental character of scientific method, and perceives that it is but a partial explanation of the supposed ultimate, and that one phase in the total life of the human spirit. Philosophy represents a resolute endeavour after completeness in thought. It seeks to take cognizance of all the facts and factors that enter into human experience, and hence does not limit itself to facts amenable to ordinary scientific treatment, or assume as ultimate and finally valid the working principles and underlying assumptions of the sciences. The particular sciences and science as a whole form part of its total datum, which embraces the whole range of human culture, both as result and as process. This huge aggregate—as it at first sight appears—must somehow be conceived as a whole, and to this end the facts must be graded according to their causative efficacy and explanatory value. The result is an ultimate synthesis, on the basis of a thoroughgoing and comprehensive constitution and complex into its constituent factors and ends. Not, of course, that the philosopher is bound to consider his view of the world as an adequate intellectual formulation of ultimate reality; the fact that the life which energizes in the thinker is in continuous movement and development should be enough to hold him back from the presumption of absolutist gnosticism. Yet this admission does not carry with it the admission of relativism, the philosophy cannot help believing that, though he has not grasped and cannot grasp the whole truth, he has, nevertheless, reached essential truth, that permanent validity attaches to the substance at least of his central affirmations, and that his efforts will make for a fuller apprehension of the truth by future generations. To claim less than this would mean an intellectual self-renunciation tantamount to suicide. In its metaphysical insinuation philosophy expresses the outreach of man in one direction of the spiritual life—a reality wider and deeper than mere thought—towards self-realisation. The essential is an ideal to be realized; it is also a substance of reality, impelling and attractive; or it would not be sought. Only that which is in some sort our own moves us. Essence in its large signification is the all-comprehensive problem of human philosophy, and hence of practical philosophy. Its solution will not be furnished by the subtlest reflections of the theoretical reason, but by the forward movement of life as a whole, by the active realization and explication of a truth of humanity which is vastly more than any theory (see B. Eucken, Geistige Strömungen d. Gegenwart, 1909, p. 361 f.). The problems are internal and vital, and are progressively resolved by the self-unfolding of the vital process, which they have challenged and stimulated.

See also art. Accident, Being, Epistemology, Ontology, Philosophy, Substance.

Literature.—On the part the term and concept have played in the history of philosophy, see Eisele, Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Begriffe, 1904, art. 'Wesen.' For Greek philosophy, see the Histories of Philosophy by Zeller, Erdmann, and Überweg, Heine, good accounts of Scholastic usage are given in T. Harper, The Metaphysics of the School, 1878-84, vol. 1, bk. ii, and E. H.判定, Käntische Schriften, Schopenhauer series, esp. those on Logic (Glaire), First Principles (John Rickaby), General Metaphysics (Do.) For modern times, see the following may be consulted: Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, bk. iii; J. E. R. Tiles, On the Principles of Material and Moral Science, 1884; J. F. Ferrer, Institute of Metaphysics, 1894; J. Helg, Spathophilosophie, 1848; 'Lehre vom Wesen' (ct. W. Windelband); Losseau, Log of Hegel, 1877; v. Loetz, Metaphysics, Eng. tr. 1884, passim, and Microcosmos, Eng. tr. 1868, vol. ii, bk. ix, by G. T. Ladd, Theory of Reality, 1892; F. B. Windelband, History of Philosophy, 1890. For the suggestive development of the idea of essence is given by B. Eucken, Geschichte der Philosophie, 1899, esp. in many vols., e.g., Grundriss einer neuen Lebensanschauung, 1897, pp. 174 f. and 259 f. (cf. J. Goldstein, Wanderungen in der Philosophie, 1891). It is not, however, the same kinds or 'essence' is given by Mallon, Introd. Text-Book of Logic, 1898.

W. F. DUNLOP.

ESSENES.—The Epulones of Artemis at Ephesus were called 'Essenes' (Pauw, viii. 13: οὕς ἕως ἔννοιαν μὴ ἔχειν, καλαμπόνθες δὲ τόν τῶν ἑαυτῶν μηδενόν οἴῳ τις'), but the name is specially applied to a remarkable pre-Christian order of Jewish monks, whom Josephus calls Barrew or Barwell. Philo adheres to the latter name, which, as more Semitic, was probably the original formation of their title.

1. Sources of Information.—Neither the Bible nor the Rabbinical literature mentions the Essenes, but their mode of life is described by (a) Jewish, (b) Christian, and (c) pagan writers.

(a) Philo and Josephus devote unusual attention to their customs; and as the former was a contemporary, while the latter spent three years in their neighbourhoood, the latter's account of gaining acquaintance with individual Essenes, the narratives of both writers, although liable to qualifying criticism on the score of tendency, furnish indispensable materials for an estimate of the order.

(i.) Two Philonic statements are extant. The first and longer occurs in the treatise, Quod omnis probus fiber (§§ 12-13), a youthful work, perhaps written while Philo was still a student. He has just been proving that the world is not wholly destitute of virtuous people; after pointing to the Persian Magi and the Indian gymnosophists, he proceeds to quote a salient example from his own countrymen:

§ 12. 'Nor are Palestines and Syrian barrens of moral excellence (καλακεία)—countries inhabited by a large portion of that most populous race, the Jews. There are among them people called Essenes, numbering over 4000, and in my judgment so called from their priest γενέσεως—though the derivation is not strictly Greek—since they are pre-eminently worshipful servants of God (παρακτημένων: they do not sacrifice animals, but only to keep their minds pure) and are at the same time the worthy servants of the lawless multitude of them (παρακτητηρίς). In the first place, they reside in villages, shunning town-life or any departure from the harmless shores of holy and godly living. Others practise such acts and crafts as are consonant (ευπρόσωπος) with saving the peace, and thereby becoming the benefactors of their neighbours. They do not treasure silver and gold, nor do they acquire large tracts of land in an eager desire for income, but only to provide the assurance for the absolute necessities of life. They are almost the only people who remain destitute of money and possessions, by use and woe rather than by any lack of prosperity; yet they are esteemed wealthy, for they consider that to be frugal and contented, as indeed it is, ample abundance. You would not discover among them any maker of arrows, spears, swords, helmets, corslets, or shields, any maker of arms or war-engines, any one housed in the slightest with military avocation or even with those which, during peace, slip easily over into mischief; they are totally ignorant of trade and commerce and uncertain, abhorring, as they do, all inducements to covetous gain. There is not a single slave among them; all are free and exchange kind offices with each other. They condemn the position of master, not only as unjust, being a breach of equality, but as impious, since it violates the contract of Mother Nature, which gives birth to all and alike and rears them as genuine brothers, not as comunal, whereas crafts and gains are everywhere despised and despises by its desire to obtain others, it engenders hostility instead of affection, and enmity instead of friendship.'

Logick is a definite science, which by which they leave to word-catchers, as unnecessary for the acquiring of virtue; physical science they regard as too lofty for human nature, and so they

1 Schreiber, omitting κατα, confines the Essenes to Palestine and Syria. They were not the only people who lived in such a manner; but, according to the author, the Essenes were the most eminent, and, in consequence, the most famous. There was, however, a difference between the Essenes, and those who were called Essenes, which is not apparent in the original. Nor trace of Essenic propaganda is to be found in Asia Minor or Italy.

2 Hippolytus (Harv. lx. 21) adds that some carried their religious object to idolatry so far that they refused to use coins, and even went so far as to fast until they passed below statues at the gate (cf. E.R.E. iv. 849).
The Essenes were a Jewish sect that lived in the desert, away from the temple in Jerusalem. They believed in a strict form of monotheism and practiced asceticism, rejecting material possessions and following a rigorous code of conduct. Their community was centered around a central figure, the High Priest, who was considered to be the representative of the Deity on earth. The Essenes believed in the idea of a perfect society, which they sought to create through their own actions and through their influence on others.

Their life was guided by a strict code of conduct, which included a ban on marriage and the accumulation of wealth. They believed that the accumulation of wealth and material possessions was the root of evil and corruption, and they sought to create a society in which justice and virtue were the guiding principles.

The Essenes were known for their strict discipline and for their role in the transmission of the ancient Jewish texts. They were believed to be the custodians of the Law, and they were responsible for the preservation of the Torah and other sacred texts.

Their community was divided into two main groups: the scribes and the warriors. The scribes were responsible for the study and preservation of the Law, while the warriors were responsible for the defense of the community.

The Essenes believed that the end of the world was near, and they prepared for it by living a life of asceticism and by preparing for battle. They were known for their strict discipline and for their role in the transmission of the ancient Jewish texts. Their influence was felt throughout the Jewish community, and their ideas continue to be studied and debated by scholars today.
ESSENES

Although they do not repudiate marriage with its function of continuing the race, they shun the licentiousness of women, and keep close to their house, and to a man.

§ 2. They despise wealth, and their socialism is remarkable; you cannot find any of their books or buildings that are worth more than his fellows.

The rule is that all who enter the sect must divide their property among the common body, so that there is not a trace among its members of part and parcel, of which they say the wealth; the distribution of every one's possessions creates, as it were, a common property that is not divided, and, if any one is involuntarily smeared, he wipes his body clean; to be uncleaned (ανέκστείσηται) and always to wear white clothing. Nothing is wasted which is the stock management of their common property, whose sole business it is to look after the whole of it. They are not afraid to make them adopt, in order to save them from unbalanced gain; never to keep any secret from their fellow-members or to betray any of their secrets to other people—no, not even under threat of death. He swears, moreover, to communicate their principles precisely as he himself has received them, to abstain from origamie, and to follow with like care the sacred books of the society and the names of the angels. Such are the oaths by which they make sure of their mutual faith.

§ 8. They expel any members found guilty of heinous sins, and the expelled person often persuades another for him. But at the bond of his oaths and habits he is prevented from receiving food at the hands of other people, so that, refused to eating and drinking, he languishes under starvation and privations. Hence, out of compassion, they take many a man back when he is at his last gasp, considering that he has been sufficiently punished for his sins by being thus brought to the verge of death.

The Essenes were strictly religious and in the matter of abstaining from forbidden things: no sentence is passed by a court which is less than a hundred years. A man who swears falsely to God the name of his legislator is highly revered, and the punishment for any blasphemy of him is death. They obey their elders for three years before entering in the sect, and when they have kept the rules for three years they return home to Him as the God of the life of (παντοκράτορας), and pass before one another to keep the seals before them in order (σταυρομετρία), while the cook sets before each a plate containing one kind of food. But no one is allowed to take a prayer, and at once, when they have breakfasted (reading with Porphyry ἡ σεβαστή ἁυμος νοστία) they then sit in session, no one else staying in the apartment. Then, after a prayer and silence the eschem, splitting 2 in front of them or on the right side, and avoid work on the seventh day more strictly than any other Jews.

The workmen are divided into four classes, according to the length of their service, and the juniors are so inferior to the seniors that, should the latter be touched by the former, they wash themselves as if they had been sullied by contact with a foreigner. They are long-lived, many of them reaching the age of a hundred—thanks, I suppose, to their simple diet and regular habits; but they despise the life of leisure.

Their spirit enables them to retain a superior to pain, with glory, is preferred to length of days (ἀπέραστη ζωή).

The Roman 3 showed what great souls they all had; for though racked by the persecution of the proselytes, and to every instrument of torture, to make them blaspheme their legislator or cast the hidden food, they preserved their silence. A word of theirs is stronger than an oath; they shun swearing, which they consider to be a trifling and a profane thing. Hence, when no other Divine oath to accrude it is condemned already (οὐκ ἐπεσταλεῖται). They also take exceptional pains to select from the writings of the ancients (οὔτὶ ἐποίησεν ἐγγεγράμμην) what is good for soul and body, which leads them to discover medicinal roots and stones which have the property of curing ailments (cf. ERE iv. 757).

If any one is eager to join their sect, he is not admitted at once. He is given a spade, a girdle (vomiting, with Porphyry ἐκτιμάται, and a white robe, and ordered to practise their mode of life for a whole year, remaining still an outsider.

After thus giving proof of his continuance, he gets closer to their way of living, and shares their bath of purification, though still often being reproached. The evidence of endurance 4 is followed by a further period of probation, lasting between five and ten years, unless the candidate is enrolled in their band. But, before touching their common things, he takes four oaths: first of all to be pious to the deity; then to destroy wealth; then to destroy their common oaths. They are done correctly in the word and in the mouth, and they take any one either of his oaths or condition; always to hate the wicked; and they regard as wicked, show disfavour to all men, and particularly to those in authority, since no one acquires power apart from God; never, if he be in power himself, to take any power, which he has in his power to ordain in dress or finery: always to love the truth and denote harm to the public, and keep his hands clean, and to see to it that he is not defiled by unearned gain; never to keep any secret from his fellow-members or to betray any of their secrets to other people—no, not even under threat of death. He swears, moreover, to communicate their principles precisely as he himself has received them, to abstain from origamie, and to follow with like care the sacred books of the society and the names of the angels. Such are the oaths by which they make sure of their mutual faith.

1 Possibly this was an anticipation of the Gnostic prophecy 
2 It is not quite clear that these meals were sacramental in the sense of the term, or equivalent to the eucharist, which the Essenes required after part, although they partook of the meal in 
3 The Roman 3 showed what great souls they all had; for though racked by the persecution of the proselytes, and to every instrument of torture, to make them blaspheme their legislator or cast the hidden food, they preserved their silence. A word of theirs is stronger than an oath; they shun swearing, which they consider to be a trifling and a profane thing. Hence, when no other Divine oath to accrude it is condemned already (οὐκ ἐπεσταλεῖται). They also take exceptional pains to select from the writings of the ancients (οὔτὶ ἐποίησεν ἐγγεγράμμην) what is good for soul and body, which leads them to discover medicinal roots and stones which have the property of curing ailments (cf. ERE iv. 757).
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1. That is, from the delusion of sin, more searching (σκυφηφαρμος) than the signs of death. I. Conybeare, Histoireprospérées des Grecs, Göttingen, 1807, p. 233.
2. Cfr. ERE 2, 255.
3. Every bright thing' in Ec 124 was interpreted by R. Samuel (3rd cent. a.D.) as referring to a man spitting in the presence of his ruler. It is similarly interpreted by the Septuagint (σαβιος).
5. This is one of the practices which suggest the influence of the Indian caste-system. So an Indian Brahman is polluted by the touch of the unclean, as the sight of a woman is profane (Conybeare, HDBI 729).
6. In this sense, according to John (R II ii. 44), took an active part, according to their peaceful principles forlorn warfare. For an analogous instance of patriotism overbearing such principles, Cfr. Holtzmann (ZDMG i. 23) erroneously assigns to the action of the Mennonites and some Quakers in the American Civil War.
7. For the conception of Immortality apart from the resurrection in the body of Hellenistic Judaism, see Wits. i. 44.45, 54, Mac etc. (Jerome, Eus. iv. 4).
that good souls dwell beyond the Ocean, in a land unvexed by rain or heat (possibly by frost too, suggested by the gentle breath of the West wind blowing steadily from the Ocean); to bad souls they allot a gloomy, stormy den, full of pestilence, and no resting-place. Some persons identify "the consoling of the wicked to the abode of the impious in Hades, where people like Sisyphus, Tantalus, Iason, and Titus are being punished, eating and drinking forever." In the first place, that souls are eternal, and, in the second place, that punishment be separated from vice and promptness to virtue. For the good are supposed to believe better if they can hope for reward even after death, while the impositions of the vicious are characterized as "the most extreme and everlasting punishment after their decease, even if they escape notice in the present life." Such is the Essenes' theology of the soul, and it exercises an irresistible fascination over those who have once tasted their philosophy (ὸς ἔχει γενόμενον τῆς σοφίας σύννεφος) of life.

On the other hand, some of them also undertake to predict the future, by perusing the stars, or by performing various acts of purification (πυρόσια) and by digesting prophetic oracles. Rarely, if ever, are their forecasts wrong (cf. 2 Macc. iv. 5061). 3

13. There is also another order of Essenes, who share the life, habits, and customs of the others, but take a different view of marriage. They argue that celibates excite the function of life, which is to perpetuate the race, and that, if everybody declined to marry, the race would soon cease to exist (wrestling, with testament. For the law allows for the marriage of more than one wife, and the people may be assigned their power to conceive. These Essenes have no intercourse with their wives during pregnancy, showing that they marry for the sake of posterity and not for pleasure. They bathe the women, wear gowns, and the men drawers. Such are the customs of the Essenes.

In Ant. XVIII. 5 also Josephus gives a brief outline of the doctrine of the Essenes, which has only three distinctive items: (1) the remark that, in setting their dwelling to the temple at Jerealem, they do not offer the usual sacrifices, since, in their opinion, they have superior lustrations (δαπανηταί δαπανας), and that this refusal excludes them from the common sacrifices (τις ἑσσήν χρηματάτος) of the Temple, as ceremonially defiled persons; (2) the description of their relieving officers as 'good priests'; and (3) the comparison of them to the Dace who are called Polies (Πολιες), cf. Strabo, viii. 362.

(b) The Christian references are all later, and, for the most part, of little independent value. Ephiphanius (Hier. xix. 1-2, xx. 3, xxx. 3, etc.), who appears to name them 'Essenes,' describes how he calls a surviving remnant of them in the Sampranians, or sun-worshippers, a sect among the infidels of Eastern Christianity, who occupied the ancient Samaria, and occupied the holy city of Esse. Hippolytus preserves or records two more credible items of information (Hier. 14-23), particularly the fact (which is, on other grounds, probable) that some Essenes identified themselves with the active methods of the Zealots and the Sicarii. But both Hippolytus and Porphyry (de Astat. iv. 11-13) go back, in the main, to the former account of Josephus.

(c) A solitary notice occurs in Latin literature, which is interesting rather than important. Pliny (HN v. 17), after describing the Dead Sea, continues:

'On the West side of the Essenes avoid the bald lake shoreline. They are a race by themselves, more remarkable than any other in the wide world; they have no women, they affect social love, they have no money, and they live among palm-trees. Still their membership (futurum communem) is steadily recruited from the large number of people who resort to the holy city of existence because they are wearied of life's struggle with the waves of adversity. Hence they lived (it is said) for thousands of ages, though no one is born within it; so fruitful both in the dissatisfaction with life (tela pereatitia) which others feel. They live by the town of Engedi, second only to Jerusalem in fertility and palm-groves, now simply a second city to a rock-girt of Masada, which also is not far from the Dead Sea.'

2. Characteristics.—The above sources, upon the whole, confirm and supplement one another. Repeated attempts have been made to determine the true one or both of the Philonic passages (e.g. by Ausfeld, Ohle, and Hilgenfeld), but their authenticity may be considered to be established (cf. Treplin's special essay in SK, 1900, pp. 28-31, and the argument of Poujou, in Thoel. Studies, 1905, p. 230 ff.). 2 When De Quincey first read the narrative of Josephus, he leant back in his chair and denounced the tale as 'a lie, a fraudulent lie, a malicious lie' (Works, vi. 275). Others before him and after him, with better reason, have suspected the Essene paragraphs of the Jewish historian (notably Ohle, in JTh, 1888, pp. 221 ff., 336 ff.); but their suspicions have failed to make any serious impression. The sources must be accepted as coming from Philo and Josephus. It is another question, however, whether they are trustworthy in every detail. Essenes may colour their quotation from Hoi, but in Philo, it is probable that Philo, or the latter, have led him to arrange the figure of the Essenes for his picture in the Quad omnis probus liber, just as Josephus is likely to have read into the beliefs and customs of the Essenes an order a slightly more than was actually present. Thus it is noticeable that Philo, for example, omits any reference to the presence of Essenes in the cities of Palestine; his aim is to bring out their semi-monastic existence. The ordinary impression of the Essenes is, indeed, that they were a community of celibate recluse; Newman's lines,

'Now knout in unction rest,
The mood of an Essene (Etrae Atalotca, etc.),
indicate the popular estimate of these Jewish monks. But, while the sources corroborate this general verdict, they also attest, as we have already seen, the existence and activity of certain Essenes outside the pale of the strict settlements. Josephus, who assigns their rise to the 2nd cent. B.C. (Ant. XIII. v. 8-9), tells an anecdote which proves incidentally that in the beginning of the next century there were Essenes who did not lead city-life and did not reside permanently in retired, monastic communities. It is a twice-told tale (BJ i. 35.—Ant. i. 2) of how the murder of Antigonus was foretold by Judas the Essene, who had never made a mistake or been deceived hitherto in his predictions. He saw Antigonus passing through the temple (τα τα κατφταναι και ἐστατὸν ζωμον) and called out to his friends, a number of whom were sitting beside him to receive instruction (παράτατον; 'Abi I had better die now, since truth has died before me': these were the words of the old man. If the spirits were downcast and remained so. Shortly afterwards, however, word came that Antigonus had perished in a submarine place, which is called 'Cesarea on the summit of the tower. It was this identity of names which disappointed the seer.'

In Jerusalem, therefore, as well as in the other townships of Palestine, Essenes were to be found, no doubt preserving their close brotherhood, but still not wholly detached from the interests of the larger world. Another Essene, called Andrew, exercised his prophetic gifts in a more auspicious fashion: by saluting a schoolboy as king of the
Jews, and predicting his royal career. When the schoolboy succeeded to the throne as Herod the Great, he remembered Menahem, and for his sake honoured the order of the Essenes (Ant. xv. x. 5). Later Herodes the Great, who was actually of the Essenes, held him in high esteem, as well as to forcert its course. The Jewish war saw at least one Essene heading the rebels, and others in the ardent ranks of the Scearit and the Zealots. Still, the independence of the individuals must have been recognized by the disciplina arcana and the close socialistic union which bound an Essene for life to his fellows. Banni, the anchorite with whom Josephus spent three years, lived in the vicinity of the Essenes, but the Essenes were not lonely anchorites. Even in the cities they hung together. A closely knit system of mutual support prevented them from becoming exposed to the temptations of trade, on the one hand, and of a solitary reclus existence, on the other.

The probability is, therefore, that the Essenes were a set of small, communistic, religious groups on the shores of the Dead Sea. While their nucleus was forming a club to their existence, they beyond and even within their membership there were grades—not simply novices and initiates, priests and lay brothers, but even some who practised marriage in a fashion and abroad, in cities where the agricultural life was impossible. It is evident that some Essenes were in the habit of travelling within certain limits, and we can only conjecture the object of their journeys; as it could hardly be trade, it probably was connected with the business of the order—possibly with the promulgation of their tenets and propaganda in a mild way, in order to recruit their ranks. It is psychologically impossible and psychologically unnecessary to assume that Essenicism passed from a looser to a closer bond, or vice versa. Both phases existed simultaneously, and their relative importance depended upon the special conditions of the age. We cannot speak either of a gradual withdrawal from society or of a gradual expansion of interest, on the part of some Essenes, in the world beyond their farms and settlements.

A perusal of the sources will give a more vivid idea of the general characteristics of the Essenes than any summary. Through the windows of Philo and Josephus and Pliny—for they are not too much coloured to be fairly transparent—we can look at this little brotherhood of 4000 souls, a league of virtue, with their agricultural settlements, their quaint, semi-asetic practices, their strict novitiates, their silent meals, their white robe, their habits, their prayers, their simple but stringent socialism, their sacerdotal puritanism, their soothsaying, their passion for the mystical world of angels, their indifference to Messianic and nationalistic hopes, their esoteric beliefs, and their approximation to sacramental religion. If the modern student only knew their genesis and exodus as well as he does their numbers, he would be satisfied; but they appear and disappear in a mist, leaving little semblance of a Christian order. None of their sacred books has survived—that is, if these included, as they probably did, more than the books of Moses. We do not even know whether they were written in Greek or Aramaic. By the time that the Rabbis reached the Christian literature arose, the literature, and almost the very name, of the Essenes had vanished from the Eastern world. It is thus impossible to approach them with any clearness through the Christian tradition. De Quincey, indeed, once wrote an essay to prove that the Essenes were Christians organized in a secret society for the purpose of self-preservation; but his essay belongs to English literature, not to historical or esoteric history and attempts were made to trace the affinities of the Essenes with the early Christians, and to discover the influence of the former in the ascetic tendencies, the ascetic labours of the early Christians, the common meals of the primitive Churches. But the day for such labours of criticism is over; it is no longer necessary to prove that Jesus was not an Essene, and that early Christianity was not Essenic. Even in the errors combated in the Epistle to the Colossians it is hardly possible (cf. Hort, Judaistic Christianity, 1894, p. 128) to detect any specifically Essenic features. It is only through later and inferior traditions that we can surmise the existence of Essenic survivors among the medley of the sects who swarmed within the pale of Eastern Christianity after the fall of Jerusalem. 1 They become less obscure as they are approached and the virtues of Essenic belief and praxis can be seen as their sources in contemporary Judaism.

The Essenes have been called 'the great enigma of Hebrew history,' and the enigma begins with their very name, which appears in another, apparently more ancient source. The second, advanced by Lightfoot, C. Taylor (Sayings of the Jewish Fathers, 1897, p. 79), and E. Mittwoch (in ZA xxvii. 1903 75 f.), is more probable, just as the second (favored by Lensus, Essenes, and Schiller) is more likely than the fourth (Bair, Derenbourg, Keim, etc.), which would single out an isolated trait as distinctive of the order. In any case they were a raga of Judaism. Even their loose relation to the Temple-cultus does not invalidate this primary fact. But, if they are an enigma of Hebrew history, they are an insoluble enigma, unless we look beyond the confines of Judaism. The Jewish traits of the Essenes, especially their rigorous care for purity, their reverence for the Mosaic law, and their strict sabbatarianism, certainly ally them with the Pharisees rather than with the Sadducees. Their passion for an ascetic, simple life, and their aversion from most of Greek civilization in the cities, might seem to stamp them as descendants or revivers of a movement like that of the Rechabites (cf. EZE ii. 68, 69); but against this we must set their age, their age, their age of marriage, their tolerance of wine and agriculture, and their unmornadic attitude to fixed dwellings. Essenicism was not hereditary. It was a fever, in the sense of a gild or corporation, not established in the sense of the older Rechabite clan. Its ranks were recruited from without, like a monastic brotherhood, and its ascetic practices were different from those of the Rechabites. Although parallels with many separate details of Essenic belief may be found in Rabbinic literature, 2 the synthesis of these on Jewish soil is a phenomenon by itself, and—in spite of the efforts made by Jewish and Christian (e.g. Baur, Lichten, and Schiller) 3 to find elements which point to a Palestinian syncretism enriched from some foreign and possibly Oriental sources.

The Essenes, as Josephus admits, were ἔχθροι within Judaism; they took their own way of life and worship. They were more than ultra-Phari-
sale, or Hasidism (Kohler, Weinstein, etc.), for the latter were not organized in separate communities (ERE I. 98). Their election of their own priests, their avoidance of returning to the sun, their practice of adopting children, and the distrust of matter which appears in their dualistic anthropology (‘To be set free from matter was the greatest of all desires’), and the Essenic ‘[1394] ... are among the plainest indications that we have to do with influences which were originally non-Jewish. It was only natural that the remark of Josephus (Ant. x. 259f.) about those preserving the same customs of life as the Pythagoreans should be developed by those who, like Zeller especially (cf. ZWT, 1899, p. 195f., ‘Zur Vergleichung des Christenthums: Essener und Orphiker’), fix attention upon their invocation of the sun, their prohibition of oaths, their doctrine of the soul, their communism, their aversion to animal sacrifices, and similar features, which recall Pythagorean and Orphic traits. But some of these were not distinctly Pythagorean, and the Essenes lacked other features (e.g. vegetarianism, and a belief in the journey of the soul after death) which were characteristic of the Pythagorean and Orphic faith. That Essenes were influenced directly or indirectly from the infiltration of the Pythagorean and Orphic spirit, much less from Zoroastrianism (Lightfoot, Cheyne; cf. ERE I. 110f.), for asceticism at any rate, was not so fervent, and none of the alleged parallels is particularly striking by itself (cf. Moultou, in HDB iv. 992). Hellenistic influence may be sought in other directions (cf. Ess. Ti. Ess. I. 15. 2, Friedländer, Pfleiderer, Hoenenick, Conybeare); for although Philo and Josephus presented practical and speculative Essenes in semi-Hellenistic colours, they were probably doing no more than deeper features of an Egyptian Hellenism which was already present in the order. At the same time, it is not improbable that some weight should be assigned also to the conjecture (which Higlenfield eventually abandoned, but which is being revived at the present day in several quarters) that Buddhist tendencies helped to shape some of the Essenic characteristics as well as some of those in 2nd cent. Gnosticism. The discussion of this hypothesis, however, must be reserved for another place.


ETERNITY.—1. Meaning of the conception.

There are three main senses in which ‘eternity’ may be understood: (1) as an unending extent of time; (2) as that which is entirely timeless; (3) as that which includes time, but somehow also transcends it. The first of these is the popular meaning of the term. In ordinary discourse, when people speak of passing from time to eternity, they appear, in general, to imply nothing more than the transition from a state in which special objects of interest (such as human personalities) have only a limited duration to a state in which they may be supposed to persist for ever. This sense of the term is also to be found, sometimes in philosophical writings. The eternal process, for instance, which Kant conceives to be necessary for the realization of the moral ideal can be considered as a process that is to be carried on without end. It is generally recognized in philosophy that such a conception has no positive significance. Kant, for instance, did not consider the moral ideal to be realized by the process of the realization of the moral ideal contains no real solution of the difficulties involved in the conception of that realization; and he accordingly supplements it by the idea of a divine point of view, from which the unending process appears as a timeless attainment of the end to which it points. But he does not show how this idea is to be reconciled with the conception of an endless process. On the whole, however, it may be fairly stated that the conception of eternity which has prevailed throughout the history of philosophy is not that of an unending process, but that of a state of existence which is completely independent of temporal conditions. Such a conception is that to which the mind is most naturally driven as soon as the difficulties involved in the idea of an unending process have been fully brought home to it; and it is a conception that is strongly supported by the apparent timelessness of those ‘laws’ and other general statements with which science and philosophy are largely concerned. The fact (or apparent fact) that these laws hold forever leads very naturally to the view that there may also be such a thing as timeless existence. It soon appears, however, that all the existing knowledge to us in the ordinary way is consistent with temporal conditions; and a little reflection is enough to convince most people that no timeless existence is even conceivable under the ordinary conditions of our conscious experience. Hence the conception of timeless existence leads inevitably to some such distinction as that of Kant between phenomena and nomens, appearance and reality, the sensible and the intelligible world, or however else the antithesis may be expressed. But the history of philosophy shows quite conclusively that, if any such antithesis is pressed, it becomes impossible to understand any connexion between the two modes of being that are thus opposed; so that, in the end, the opposition comes to be one between the intelligible and the sensible, but between the intelligible and the unintelligible, or rather between those terms which are in truth both alike unintelligible. If we are to avoid such a result as this, it seems necessary to interpret ‘eternity’ in the third of the three senses to which we have referred, i.e. to regard it not as the mere negation of time con-
ditions, but as continuing those conditions within itself, though in a form in which their limitations are transcended. It will be our object in this article to indicate briefly how such a conception of eternity is possible. But we must first give a glance at a number of difficulties which have been brought out, in connexion with this problem, in the course of the development of philosophy.

2. Difficulties connected with the conception, and attempts to solve them—Kant is undoubtedly the writer who did more than any other to make the difficulties in connexion with the ideas of time and eternity prominent and clear; and it is accordingly to his views that we intend chiefly to refer. But the significance of his work cannot be properly understood without reference to at least a few of his predecessors, among whom Parmenides, Plato, and Spinoza seem specially important in connexion with this particular problem. Valuable contributions have been made to the subject by some of the recent followers of Hegel, among whom T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, Josiah Royce, and J. M. E. McTaggart are perhaps especially deserving of attention. From the different point of view, the work of Henri Bergson contains valuable suggestions. After noticing what has been done by these writers, it will be possible to sum up the conclusions to which the discussion of the subject seems to point.

Of Parmenides it is not necessary to say much. He is important only as showing how the difficulties of the problem present themselves at the beginnings of speculative inquiry. Unfortunately, there is still the possibility of considerable difference of view with regard to the exact meaning of his most important utterances; but there cannot be much disagreement about the general direction of his influence on the development of philosophic thought. It seems clear, at least, that he affirmed the eternal and unchangeable reality of being, as it is conceived by pure thought (or reached by the 'Way of Truth'), as against the uncertain and fluctuating appearance of that which is the subject-matter of opinion. Zeno appears to have further emphasized this aspect of the teaching of Parmenides, by urging the self-contradictions into which we fall when we try to think definitely of change as a motion from point to point in space, taking place from moment to moment in time. Much of the other chief followers of Parmenides, it would seem, have brought out still more explicitly the eternity of that which really exists, turning the poetry of Parmenides into plain prose, but perhaps, in so doing, approaching somewhat more nearly to the conception of eternity as an endless duration, rather than as that which is in its essence timeless. There is no evidence, however, that any of these members of the Eleatic school made any real attempt to explain the apparent changes in the world of our ordinary experience, on the supposition that ultimate reality is unalterable and free from time conditions. Like most of the early Greek thinkers, they were content to set the real in opposition to the illusion of time, without bringing the object of clear thought in opposition to the deception of the senses, without reflecting that even what only appears to us must have some kind of reality, or at least some reality, as long as we recognize that it was any part of their problem to explain the precise relation between the absolutely real and this spurious appearance.

Of Plato, it is necessary to believe, who first definitely recognized that some account has to be given of appearance as well as of the ultimately real. His conception of the ultimately real, like that of Parmenides (by whom he undoubtedly very greatly indebted), is the conception of that which exists eternally. More definitely than in the case of Parmenides, this conception is based primarily upon the eternity of universal truths, such as those of geometry or ethics. But what is specially noticeable here is the attempt that is made by Plato to give a place in his system to the teaching of Parmenides as well as to the truths that have been brought out, in connexion with this problem, in the course of the development of philosophy.
is any such positive idea at all—is in its essence Spinozistic. It is the idea of a reality undeter-
mined by the limits of our ordinary experience, and hence, in particular, undetermined by any conditions of time. But the strength of Kant, like that of Zeno, lies not in the unfolding of any positive conception of such reality,—which, indeed, like the limitations of the finite, do not work out this way, but in the thoroughness with which he brings out the difficulties involved in the thought of any kind of reality that is subject to change in time. In order to realize the significance of his work, it is neces-
sary to state his main points in his own contention, though they must be stated here with the utmost possible brevity. In stating these points, the present writer will express them in his own language, though endeavouring to include nothing that is not really contained in Kant's argument.

The first point that seems essential in Kant's argument is the contention that Time is simply the form of change, not anything that can be regarded as in itself substantial. Kant has a somewhat peculiar way of expressing this, which it is not necessary for us to consider here. He calls Time the form of the flow of time, or the nature of perception rather than of conception. All this is extremely questionable, and does not seem to affect the central part of his argument. The whole point is that this Time is to be regarded as a certain order—an order which may be most simply characterized as being of such a kind that its antecedent parts pass out of being as the suc-
ceeding parts come into being.

The next important point is that such an order as this cannot be regarded as ultimately real. Here, again, Kant's argument is somewhat complicated by modes of statement that are open to question. What is essential seems to be the contention that the order involved in time pre-supposes either a first member in the series of events or an unending extent in the antecedent members of that series. Neither of these supposi-
tions, it is urged, is really conceivable. A first member in the series of events would have nothing before it to determine its place, and consequently would not really have a place in the time-order at all. It could only be thought of as being preced-
ed by empty time, which is nothing at all. On the other hand, a series of events that never began would simply be a series that never existed at all. Such a series as that would go on without end, but not as having gone on without beginning, since this implies that an endless series has been completed.

The only escape from these difficulties, Kant contends, is to be found in the recognition that the time-series is unreal. It is only a mode of our imperfect experience, and must not be ascribed as a condition to the ultimate reality that under-
lies our phenomenal world. Hence, as we have already noted, if immortality is found to be a postulate of the moral consciousness, this can only be interpreted as pointing to some kind of eternity of existence which is independent of time conditions. Such an existence is, however, for us completely incomprehensible.

It is with this ultimate incomprehensibility that the Kantian view of eternity ends. Now, in the opinion of the present writer, the Hegelian philo-
sophy contains the suggestion of a possible solu-
tion of the difficulties that are here raised. The general nature of that solution is to be found in the metaphysical character of the essence of the Absolute—a conception which is entirely subversive of the Parmenidean or Spinozistic theory of an Abso-
lute at rest. If, however, the Absolute contains process, it would seem that this process must be thought of as eternal. There may be a real order in that which is ultimately real, but it can hardly be supposed to be the same order of events. The view, therefore, as we see it, to which Hegel's theory points is that the order of time is real, but that its apparent transience is unreal. But Hegel himself did not definitely accept. His own statement seems rather to favour the view that the eternal is to be conceived as timeless; and most of his followers have adopted this interpretation. It may be profitable to notice briefly the views of some of the most recent interpreters of Hegel's thought.

T. H. Green, who connects more immediately with Kant than with Hegel, endeavours to over-
come the difficulties involved in a real temporal existence by the conception of an Eternal Being who reproduces Himself in the form of a world in time. Like Plato, he is led to this conception largely by the consideration of the timelessness of universal truths, such as those of geometry. But the idea of a reproduction in time is at least as obviously metaphorical as Plato's image of a world-architect; and, when we try to translate it from poetic imagery into exact science, it is very hard to see what it is that this Being can be. How can anything be reproduced when it has never been produced at all, and when the whole idea of production or reproduction is in contra-
diction with its essence? This Being, indeed, quite frankly admits that the existence of a finite world is inexplicable on his theory; but it appears to be not only inexplicable, but even self-
contradictory. Moreover, as the reproduction of the Eternal seems to be thought of by Green as a real process in time, and as connecting with a real time-development towards the goal of human perfection, the Kantian difficulty about the pos-
sibility of any real beginning of a time-series would appear still to stand in need of solution. It may be doubted whether, with regard to this particular problem, Green has really advanced much further than Parmenides, Plato, and Spinoza.

F. H. Bradley has, on the other hand, certainly advanced the subject a little by the emphasis which he has laid on degrees of truth and reality. This conception is by no means a new one in philo-
sophy. It is perhaps implicit in the Parmenidean distinction between truth and opinion; it is already explicit in Plato's antithesis between be and being; it was a good deal em-
phasized by some of the Neoplatonists; and, more recently, by Descartes and by Hegel. But Bradley has certainly done much to revivify it, and has given it a special prominence as the means whereby an Absolute which is essentially timeless may yet be conceived as more or less adequately expressed in a process that appears in time. The value of this conception, however, as thus applied, would depend on the extent to which the elements of reality and unreality in a time-series could be dis-
criminated; and Bradley—who is generally more successful in stating difficulties than in removing them—does not appear to have contributed much to the solution of this particular problem.

One of the most interesting attempts to carry the matter a step further is that which has recently been made by J. M. E. McTaggart. Few writers have been more emphatic than he in maintaining that absolute reality must be conceived as time-
less. Yet he is also one of those who have been most insistent on the recognition of a certain independence in individual personalities, which has to be thought of as real reality,

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less. Yet he is also one of those who have been most insistent on the recognition of a certain independence in individual personalities, which has to be thought of as real reality,
in the time-process has long been a stumbling-block to the readers of McTaggart’s extremely attractive work. His main contention has been recently been offered by him in two papers in Mind—‘The Unreality of Time’ (Oct. 1908) and ‘The Relation of Time and Eternity’ (July 1909). The essential point in his contention is very briefly stated thus. The process of development in time, he urges, is to be regarded as leading up to an end that is timeless; in such fashion that each subsequent stage in the development is nearer to the nature of eternity than the antecedent stage, so that, in fact, it is this progressive realization of the timeless reality that determines the position of each point in the time-series. Thus, the intelligence which is developing through a process in time does eventually become completely timeless in its nature; so that, in a sense, the eternal has a place at the end of the time-series.

In some respects we believe that the elements of a true solution are contained in the theory of McTaggart. Its chief defect lies in the fact that a process in time is still thought of as leading up to a result which—so far at least as this particular facet of its being is concerned—is simply the negation of time altogether. There seems to be a contradiction in ascribing so much importance to a time-process, and yet excluding this process from the nature of ultimate reality. This view, however, has been removed by recognizing frankly that the time-process is to be taken as an essential aspect of the eternal reality, which is not negated in the being of the eternal, though, in a sense, it is transcended. In short, while McTaggart maintains that eternity is in a certain sense in time, the present writer would seek to hold rather that time is in a certain sense in eternity. What we mean by this will, we hope, become more apparent in the sequel. There are some other attempts to deal with this problem that have very considerable importance, especially the brilliant investigation of the general meaning of ‘infinity’ contained in Josiah Royce’s work on The World and the Individual, and since reproduced to some extent, though in a somewhat popular way, in the work of R. B. Haldane, and, with considerable modifications, in that of A. E. Taylor. Royce’s main contention is that the world in time, regarded as a whole, is eternal; though, from the point of view of its parts, it is a series that can never be completed. This hypothesis between the whole and its parts presents difficulties that do not appear to be satisfactorily removed. It would be impossible, however, to discuss these difficulties without an examination of Royce’s doctrine of infinity, of which his doctrine of eternity is a special application. Hence it seems best to reserve what has to be said about this conception for the art, INFINITY.

The philosophy of Henri Bergson does not at first appear to throw any fresh light on the conception of eternity. It is a philosophy of change, and is apt to seem like a refutation of the Hegelian view, against the eternal Being of Parmenides. But the conception of ‘real duration’ that is emphasized by Bergson involves the view that there is no actual transience in the time-process. The present, according to him, contains the past and anticipates the future. This certainly comes very near to the doctrine that time is eternal; but, if this implication were brought out, his philosophy would cease to be a philosophy of change. It would then have to be recognized that the whole within which change takes place does not itself change. A view of this kind, however, does not seem to be directly maintained by Bergson; and the conclusion of the theory of time is beyond the scope of this article.

3. A possible solution of the problem.—It may be well to state at the outset that the present writer fully accepts the presentation of the difficulties set forth by Kant, at least in the form in which they have already been summarized above. But he would urge at once that one of the difficulties is by no means so great as Kant makes it appear. The fact that a time-series is not strictly inconceivable. Such a beginning, no doubt, would not itself be in time: it would, in truth, be the beginning of time. But this is no real objection to it. As soon as we clearly recognize that time is simply the form of succession in a developing process, it becomes apparent that, if that process has a real beginning and a real end, time itself must have a real beginning and a real end. There is no time outside of the process. Hence the process as a whole might be said to be eternal, though every particular part in it has a place in time. The eternal, thus considered, is not to be thought of as absolutely timeless, but rather that which includes the whole of time. Time would not be, as with Plato, the ‘moving image of eternity,’ but eternity itself.

Another way of putting this is to say that the order of the series, y preserve by remove not transience, Order that does not involve transience is, of course, sufficiently familiar. The colours of the spectrum are arranged in a certain order, but the appearance of one does not involve the disappearance of the others. A locomotive engine usually goes before or after the carriages to which it is attached; but they all exist simultaneously and in the same sense. But there is one kind of order that appears inevitably to involve transience, viz. that in which what goes before is identical with what comes after. Two different states of the same identical object cannot exist simultaneously. The father and the child may exist together; but the child who is father of the man does not exist at the same time as the man whom is the father. Now, the world of our experience may be said to maintain its identity throughout the whole of time; but it is continually changing its states. Hence its successive stages are not merely in a certain order, but the order is such that the successive stages do not exist together, but the sequence of the real significance of the time-process as we commonly know it. But now we might raise the question, whether this mutual exclusiveness of successive stages in the time-series is a uniform and necessary characteristic of that series. A little reflection might raise doubts on this point; and perhaps the following illustration may help us to give a more correct answer to the question thus suggested.

Taking the case of the relation between child and man, we may note that, while these different stages in the life of a single personality are mutually exclusive, they are not reciprocally exclusive in a quite equal degree. The child contains the anticipation of the life of the man, but contains it only implicitly: it is for the man that the anticipation is contained, rather than for the child itself. The man, on the other hand, contains in himself the potentialities of the child, and is capable of an explicit recognition and appreciation of these potentialities. The child-life has passed away, yet it is still in a real sense present, and is contained in the man as a potentiality, almost indefinite extent. The man includes the child in a sense in which the child does not include the man. Now, if it is right to think of the whole universe of our experience as a developing

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1 For some criticisms on Royce’s view, reference may be made to J. W. Ward, The Realm of Ends, 1911, and B. Bosquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value, 1912.
system, proceeding from a definite beginning to a definite end, the illustration of good and man may be regarded as furnishing us with more than a mere analogy. Here, also, the beginning and the end are really distinct, and, in a sense, mutually exclusive; though, in another sense, each may be the end of the other. But the end contains the beginning in a sense in which the beginning does not contain the end. The process among the parts in a sense in which it does not contain the whole, and the whole end would, as thus conceived, retain a real distinction. The process from beginning to end would be a process in time, in which each stage (with the exception of the last) excludes the others. But this mutual exclusiveness of the successive parts would become progressively less as the process advances towards its end. And as the beginning and the end would both be real, and yet both, on their outer side, free from time determinations, the whole process would be an eternal one. There would be no point at which the process was beginning or ending. The process, as a whole, when we thus conceive it, is not in time; rather time is in the process. Time is simply the aspect of successiveness which the eternal process contains. 

1 The view of eternity set forth in the above article seems to belong to the public but the particular way in which it is conceived is one for which he alone responsible. The general lines of the argument have been previously indicated in a paper in Mind (July 1904) on 'The Infinite and the Perfect,' and some notes have been fully developed in a subsequent paper on 'The Problem of Time' (July 1912) and in the closing chapter of Lectures on Humanism, London, 1907.


**ETHICAL DISCIPLINE.**

1. History of the term. — 'Discipline' is the English form of the Lat. disciplina—the abstract noun formed from discerere, 'to learn.' Hence such synonyms as discipline, 'a disciple.' Thus 'discipline' is properly instruction, that which belongs to the disciple or scholar, and is antithetical to 'doctrine,' that which pertains to the future. The word discipline might be used in the history of the words, 'doctrine' is more concerned with abstract theory, and 'discipline' with practice or exercise. In this sense Wyclif (1322) renders Pr. 3° 'Thou shalt find grace and good discipline (1383 'teaching'; AV 'understanding') before God and men'; and Chaucer has, 'Thanne shallow understonde, that bodiely peyne stant in discipline or techinge, by word or by wrtyinge, or enempe' (The Persones Tale, Sketis's Student's edition, p. 716). But under the influence of the Vulgate and the Church, 'discipline' came also to be used for 'chastisement,' and the term in this more restricted sense is early found in English, and sometimes in the same and in parallel use with the term in its classical signification. Thus Wyclif renders Pr. 3 "The discipline (AV 'chastening') of the Lord, my son, ne caste thou away'; and this concept has now in English children in schools, that for learning are beaten when they confess the lesson they forgetted, commonly after a good disciplining with a yarde, they kepe right well discipline of their schole' (The Testament of Love, fol. 303 b).

2. Theory of the idea. — (1) Ethical inquiry recognizes the need of discipline in the formation of character, and points to self-discipline as its central focus. The Socratic formula 'Virtue is knowledge' is found to be an inadequate explanation of the moral life of man. Knowledge of what is right is not coincident with doing it, for man, while knowing the right course, is found deliberately choosing the wrong one. Desire tends to run counter to the dictates of the reason; and the will, i.e. the whole personality, qua selective and active, is perplexed by the difficulty of reconciling two such opposite demands. It is the task of virtue to choose the easier course and to follow the inclination rather than to endure the pain of refusing desire in obedience to the voice of reason. Hence mere intellectual instruction is not sufficient to ensure the limits of our present subject, to the consideration of the being of God and His relation to the world.

**LITERATURE.** Almost every systematic treatise on Metaphysics contains, more or less explicitly, some theory of eternity. The following may be mentioned as some of the most important references: B. Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy, 1885, ch. iv. and vili; Plato, Timaeus, chs. x and xii; E. Caird, Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers, 1864, esp. Lect. vi.; Augustine, de Civ. Dei, ch. 6; Aquinas, Summo Theol. i. 10; Spinoza, Ethics, esp. pt. iv. def. 8, and pt. vi.; H. H. Joachim, A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, 1901, esp. bk. i. ch. 1., bk. ii. Append., and bk. iii. ch. iv.; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, esp. the statement of the antinomies of Kant is completely removed by it. It enables us to think of the world as having a real beginning and end, yet as being truly infinite; as a process and a struggle towards a 'far-off Divine event,' and yet as the eternal realization of that for which it strives. But to pursue this further is beyond the limits of our present subject, to the consideration of the being of God and His relation to the world.

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Discipline we may provisionally define as the sys-

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The necessity for advancing from this early stage of moral training to the higher stage of self-discipline is a necessary, not an optional, part of the fundamental demand of our nature as self-consci-

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... is always based on obedience, it is possible to make this a voluntary submission. It may be that in course of time he will come to see the rationality of several duties thus imposed upon him, e.g. respect for private property; yet, as long as these duties are not a part of an individual's self, and detached from one another, and lack a unifying principle which may find expression in them all, so long will the higher needs of the moral nature remain unsatisfied, and the character stunted and undeveloped. Such an individual must bring these duties under an ideal which he has made his own, and be self-governed by the idea of the law which he thus adopts. It is further to be noted that moral habits are not formed by merely outward actions, and that no habit which can truly be considered moral will grow apart from voluntary effort, desire, and intelligent appreciation of its character, although the action on its physical side is repeated again and again. According to MacCunn, "...even faultless outward conformity to the noblest of social ideals would be utterly detached from the genuine spiritual and the spontaneous loyalty, which are at once root and fruit of the moral independence of the individual..."

It is, then, only in the voluntary discipline of the self that we find that true morality which is inspired by an indwelling principle expressing itself in all the moral actions of mankind. Such discipline, alone can lead to true self-control, which we may regard as its final end.

' Self-control,' says Stout, "is control proceeding from the Self as a whole, determining the Self as a whole. The degree in which it exists depends upon the degree in which this or that special tendency can be brought into relation with the concept of the Self and the system of active tendencies which it includes" (Manual of Psychology, 1892, p. 260).

'Self-control is best in the man whose life is dominated by ideals and general principles of conduct; but this involves a development of conceptual consciousness which is absent in children and savages" (op. cit., p. 629). And we have seen that it also involves a degree of moral discipline which is likewise absent in the earlier life of man and of the race.

(2) Psychology demands that such discipline shall embrace the whole nature of man, in its threefold aspect of knowing, desiring, and willing. In mind this triple of moral unity, we return once again to the Aristotelian conception of virtue, which we found to be 'a habit of choice or purpose, purpose being desire following upon deliberation.' This conception of virtue, in the triple of the whole self in its threefold aspect of knowing, desiring, and choosing, implicitly contains the idea of the unity of man's moral life—an idea rendered explicit by modern writers in their insistence that an adequate treatment of the moral life can be attained only by basing ethical theory on a concrete psychology, which shall take into account the whole nature of man.

The idea of moral unity, though implied in the teaching both of Plato and of Aristotle, was not rendered so explicit as to influence the school of moral philosophy which immediately suc-

conceived these fathers in ethical teaching. On the contrary, we find, in Aristotle as in Plato, the latent conception of moral unity so overlaid by the purely rational elements of the moral life, answering to the life in human nature between the rational and the irrational elements that the human mind can find no better way of uniting the life than by sacrificing the one element to the other. The Cynics, and the Stoics after them, make the same mistake, and express it in the life of feeling. The Cyrenaics and Epicureans, on the contrary, while exalting the sensibility, practically leave the will unattended. In both schools we find an unsatisfactory conception of the moral life of man, owing to the abstract, and consequently inadequate, philosophy which underlies it. Man is not a sentiment, being, says James Seth, 'nor is he pure reason en-

ering. He is both, and the life of sentiment and reason, both reason and sensibility are, as elements, contained, and by whose most active action they are inextricably interfused' (Ethical Principles, 1898, p. 49).

Such a conception of the moral life, based on a
concrete psychology, can alone give rise to a true conception of self-control, which we have found to be the final end of moral discipline. Hence the discipline means this: thus this must be the discipline of the whole nature of man; and, while each element requires its specific training, the training must in no case be such as to detach the interests of one faculty from those of another.

Ethics, then, recognizes the need for a discipline of man's nature, which shall bring unity where there is schism, and so harmonize the opposing elements of his soul. Such discipline must be a discipline of the self proceeding from the self, for thus alone can it meet the demand of self-consciousness for its own inward unity. Moreover, a concrete psychology, as we have seen, shows the organic complexity of the nature, the ethical demands of which are to be met by moral discipline.

Without losing sight of the fact that knowing, feeling, and willing are inseparably blended in consciousness, we may now proceed briefly to examine the lines on which man must discipline himself in order to acquire the self-control which will enable him to know the Truth, to desire the Good, and to Right, and thus to realize Reality in its threefold aspect.

(a) Discipline of the intellect.—We find, in the case of the intellect, that the datum is already given in the sensational basis of knowledge. Out of this vague presentation continuous man must, by his own intellectual activity, construct a world for himself. The complete determination of this originally chaotic sphere, when reduced by the mind to the cosmos of intelligence, would be the Truth; and herein lies the intellectual ideal which all mental discipline must keep in view. According to Bosanquet,

"we must learn to regard our separate worlds of knowledge as something constructed by definite processes, and corresponding to each other in consequence of the common nature of those processes" (The Essentials of Logic, 1886, p. 17).

Now it is in the interest of this process of thought, by which the mind gradually constructs for itself a world of knowledge, that a definite training is required; for it is in the treatment of the fresh data constantly presented to consciousness that the difference between the disciplined and the undisciplined mind reveals itself. To the former only belongs that control which makes possible the reduction of these data to a world of unity and system, or, to use a technical expression, shows the mind which can be trusted to fulfil its normal function of 'apperception' (q.v.). This process Stout defines as that by which a mental system appropriates a new element, or otherwise receives a fresh determination (Analytic Psychology, 1896, vol. ii. p. 112).

The apperceptive process is essentially one of selection, and the man who by mental discipline has acquired control over his thought-activity will give evidence of the fact by the way in which, through processes of inhibition and attention (q.v.), he selects his data. By mental inhibition we mean the suspension of judgment with regard to any fresh fact, so as to allow time for the mind to grasp the true nature of the fact, to perceive its relation to an apperceptive system already at work, and, finally, to appropriate the new element, by allowing such a system to be modified by this fresh determination. Such a pause for deliberation, though a suspension of judgment, is by no means a suspension of mental activity. On the contrary, it is often a time of the sharpest conflict, arising from the apparently rival claims of the one mental group and the new element which confronts it—a conflict which is continued until their true relation is discovered. By attention or concentration we mean the power to develop any particular topic.

"What is called sustained voluntary attention," says James, "is a repetition of successive efforts which bring back the topic to the mind. . . . It is not an identical object in the psychological sense, but the succession of mental acts, or the forming of an identical topic only, upon which the attention is fixed" (Principles of Psychology, vol. i. 1897 p. 452).

In striking contrast to this mental apperception stands the readiness of the undisciplined mind to pass hasty judgment upon the facts presented, before their import is fully understood, being either obstructed by prejudice, or evidenced with regard to a particular topic appeals to it in vain, or so lacking in strength and vigour that it shirks the strenuous conflict which must often be faced before the new element can find its place within the system of knowledge already acquired. Against this mental prejudice we find scientific, ethical, and religious teachers of all ages directing their keenest shafts, regarding it as a deeply rooted evil which, in reference to the life, and makes impossible an honest search for truth. Thus Bacon says:

"The human understanding, when any proposition has been laid down (either from general admission or belief, or from the pleasure it affords), forces everything else to add fresh support and confirmation, and although necessary at the outset, Instances may exist to the contrary, yet either does not observe, or declines, or gets rid of and revives, or destroys, or gives up. The destruction with violent and injurious prejudice, rather than sacrifice the authority of its first conclusions (New Org. Aph. 49).

"Again, in the words of Locke: 'It must not be in toto with any opinion, or wish it to be true, till he knows it to be so, and then he will not need much force; for nothing that is false can deserve our good wishes, nor a desire that it should have the place and force of truth; and yet nothing is more frequent than this' (Conduct of the Understanding, p. 23).

"Finally, to quote from a theodicy of our own day: 'We must all train ourselves in the very rare quality of submission to good evidence, when it runs contrary to our prejudices at any point' (Gore, The Permanent Creed and the Christian Idea of Sin, 1896, p. 156).

And yet again the mind reveals its lack of discipline in its proneness to mind-wandering or lack of concentrating power. We may state this in psychological terms by saying that, while the disciplined mind is governed by noetic synthesis—the essential characteristic of the apperceptive process—the undisciplined mind is governed by the mere association of ideas. In reference to the development of a train of thought, Stout remarks:

"In so far as it is determined by the special idea which has last emerged, the principle of association is operative; in so far as it is determined by the central idea of the whole topic, noetic synthesis is operative. . . . It is mere association, for instance, which would lead one to begin to talk about Peace the murderer' (Analytic Psychology, vol. ii. p. 3).

(b) Discipline of the will.—Turning now to the sphere of the will, we find, as in the case of the intellect, that the datum of volition is already given in the impulsive tendencies or propensities to act. It is then the work of will, not to create fresh data, but so to direct and control these natural impulses as to bring unity and system into this originally chaotic motor continuum of vague desire, of which the complete determination and definite form constituted the Right. Now we find that the will, in thus organizing impulse, fulfils a function analogous to the intellectual activity of 'apperception.'

"We must apperceive," says James, "that an act properly related, place it in the context of our life's purposes, and, directly or indirectly, with more or with less explicit consciousness, correlate it with the master-purpose of our life." (Ethical Principles, p. 48).

It is not the natural and unformed but the disciplined will which is within the province of this activity of moral apperception. Here again, as in the sphere of the intellect, moral training reveals itself in the power to select from among various possible lines of conduct, by means of the inhibition of impulsive tendencies, or by the pause during which alternative activities are suspended, and by attention to the probable result of such activities in the light of the moral end. When a man has thus
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learned to control his actions, he is no longer at the mercy of the dominant idea of the moment; he ceases to be the slave, and has become the master, if he acquires the power of controlling his impulses, however, is not the result of one day's effort. He who would have the self-control which will enable him to resist the wrong action to which he is most strongly inclined, may acquire that power only by a daily self-discipline, in learning to refuse the demands of impulses, even though these be good in themselves. It is the need for such discipline which Westcott has in mind when he says:

"We yield to circumstances without the ennobling consciousness of self-sacrifice, or the invigorating exercise of will. We fail to test our powers through the first period of effort, that so we may be supreme masters of ourselves when the hour of struggle comes" ('Disciplined Life,' in Words of Faith and Hope, 1862, p. 4).

Attention, too, plays a no less important part in our volitional than in our intellectual life. It is as we consider alternative ends of conduct in the context of our life's purposes that, on account of the appeal which it makes to the whole self, the one which has at first the least attractive force often becomes the stronger; while passions, which had been at first tender, retreat into the background when considered in the light of our moral ideal. See ATTENTION.

(c) Discipline of the emotions.—On the emotional side of man's nature we find need for necessity for training, and no less demand for an accomplishment of such control as will give the individual power over the passion which otherwise will master him, thus enabling him to make a choice, in the light of his moral ideal, from among the innumerable channels into which his emotional life may flow. To emphasize this point, we cannot do better than quote the words of Ruskin:

"In the case of the approved and tested knowledge,—not the first thought that comes,—so the true passion is disciplined and tested passions,—a passion that comesThe first that come are the vain, the false, the treacherous; if you yield to them, they will lead you wildly and far, in vain pursuit, in hollow enthusiasm, till you have no true purpose and no true passion left. Not that any feeling possible to humanity is in itself wrong, but only wrong when uncontrolled. Its nobility is in its force and justice; it is wrong when it weak, and felt for paltry cause" (Sesame and Lilies, ed. 1887, p. 59).

It is hardly necessary to add that such dissipation, and also such redemption, of passion are possible, both through the world of fiction and in the world of fact.

"For the noblest of all things should have borne with our fellows," says Ruskin, "and the pure tears we should have wept with them, we gloat over the paths of the public court, and gather the dew of the grave" (ib. p. 69).

And with confidence we may say that they who have been truly moved by the sorrows of Antigone and the grief of Andromache are not likely to be affected by the tragedy of a second-rate novel, or to grieve much over the petty vexations of life.

We conclude, therefore, that, whether we regard man's nature in its emotional, its volitional, or its intellectual aspect, true moral discipline involves itself, not in the annihilation of the natural forces, but in their subjugation to a unifying principle which controls the life. The duty of self-discipline has always a positive as well as a negative side. While negatively, it is the refusal to permit any single tendency of our nature to act in isolation and to dominate the life, on the positive side we find not merely the conquest of natural impulses, but a positive development of the service of the total purpose of the life. Then, the stronger the natural impulses, the stronger will be the purpose which they serve, when engaged in the pursuit of the noblest end that man can utilize them all.

2. Meaning of Idealism.—To begin with, we must consider the meaning of idealism. Idealism has taken different forms in the history of speculation; but there are certain features common to all.

(a) Negative.—In the first place, idealism is negatively described by contrast with 'naturalism.' Naturalism is sometimes indistinguishable from materialism, and in that case designates a theory or point of view which seeks to explain all known events and facts, in terms of the elements of physical Nature. It lays stress on the ultimate material origin of the world, and, again, on the mechanical necessity which holds sway throughout the processes of the world; however complex these processes are. Apparent differences in kind amongst phenomena, e.g., inorganic and organic, chemical and conscious, are held to be resolvable into differences of complexity of manifestation or pressure into more elementary components. Sometimes, however, naturalism is applied specifically to the reduction of all mental processes, more particularly the higher mental life of man, to a priori elements and conditions, nothing being allowed about a further reduction of the organic to inorganic material elements. In this case, it may even be said that such a further reduction is impossible, that organic Nature and purely physical Nature are in reality

ANNIE E. F. MACMURDO.

ETHELICAL IDEALISM.—1. Definition of the term 'ethical idealism' has two distinct meanings. It may signify a theory of reality as a whole, the fundamental principle of which is drawn from the nature of the moral life. Here morality supplies the clue to the meaning of reality. In this sense 'ethical idealism' designates a metaphysical theory based on a prior analysis of the moral life. On the other hand, 'ethical idealism' also signifies the theory of the moral life derived from an 'idealistic' conception of reality. In such a case an idealistic metaphysical theory of morality is regarded as an illustration of the first; Aristotle's theory of ethics may be considered as typical of the second. No doubt the two meanings may approximate, as, for example, in Plato's Republic, where the moral good leads the way to the apprehension and interpretation of the metaphysical 'idea of the good,' which is shown to transcend the moral good and to include it as a particular manifestation of the supreme principle. But in general it is important to keep separate the two meanings of the term 'ethical idealism;' and for purposes of discussion it is essential to do so. In the present article we are concerned with 'ethical idealism' primarily in the second of these senses, i.e., with the moral life as interpreted in terms of idealism, 'idealism' being a specific metaphysical view of reality.

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heterogeneous. When naturalism is used in this sense, we have again explanation in terms of origin; but here the 'original elements' of the mental life are restricted to organic elements and processes; laws of the more complicated mental life are reducible to the fundamental laws of organic life in general, but these organic laws and elements are not themselves reducible to the elements and laws or to a substratum common to the two.

In both forms of naturalism we have the same general characteristics—explanation by the reduction of the complex to the simple or fundamental laws; the connexion of all events by the principle of the causal continuity of the temporal antecedent with the temporal consequent; and the absence of the use of any conception of end as a final principle of interpretation. The only 'ends' admitted are results, not pre-conditions; they are effects, not grounds. Idealism affirms the opposite of all this. It seeks to interpret the simple and primordial by reference to the more complex and later in time; it does not explain in terms of origin but in terms of completion; and it does not connect by causal sequence in time, but by controlling ends.

No doubt there is a sense in which the 'nature' of the universe is to be found in the end rather than with the pre-conditions; in this case there can be no contrast between idealism and 'naturalism.'

(b) Positive. Idealism on its positive side may in general be summed up again as the theory which regards the ultimate principle of reality as one which operates by conscious reference to an end or system of ends. An unconscious end could not be the principle of idealism, even though it were admitted that the unconscious end might be quite distinct from a mechanical principle. For the conception of 'ideal' is essential to the meaning of idealism, and an 'ideal' is a conscious end of some sort. The conception of an ideal is subordinate to that of end, which is more general; and the differentia is found by reference to consciousness. An end, more particularly a supreme end, when it as such becomes consciously sought and consciously operative, becomes an ideal. The various applications of the term 'ideal' will be found to bear out this interpretation, whether these applications are figurative, e.g., 'ideal rose,' or literal.

3. Types of Idealism. It is clear from the above description that a metaphysical idealism may take different forms, according to the way in which it interprets the concept of consciousness, and according to the kind of consciousness to which the end is present. If the universe is interpreted idealistically, its principle of unity must be a supreme consciousness, and this supreme consciousness must have the property of being the end of all the constituents of the universe. In this sense, the universe is conscious of itself and of the world. This is sometimes expressed by saying that the ultimate principle of the universe is a supreme self-consciousness, making itself its own end. In relation to the finite world, this end may be either transcendent of finitude, or immanent in finitude; and it may be imagined that it has been maintained that this end can be both transcendent and immanent. In any and every case, however, this supreme end covers all reality, finite and infinite.

Again, the supreme principle may be regarded as realized wholly and solely in every part and domain of reality. In this case the supreme self-consciousness tends to be realized parallelly of individual self-consciousnesses, and hence there would be as many self-consciousnesses as there are individuals. This is the view of idealistic pluralism. On the other hand, the supreme principle may be regarded as single and unique, combining in itself all finite individuals not necessarily themselves self-consciouses. In this case the finite individuals contributory to the complete realization of its own end known only to and realized only by its own self. This is the view of idealistic 'singularism,' to use the term applied to this doctrine in a recent volume of the same name.

4. General nature of Ethical Idealism. Whatever be the form of idealism adopted, the conception of the moral life derived therefrom has the same general features and their correspondence to each other in the same order in each case. The fundamental nature of the moral life on this view of reality is that it is the expression, in the case of man, of the supreme principle of the whole, and an integral indispensable moment in the realization of that principle. This may be put in various ways, but the same idea is involved. Whether the idea is presented in the vague and indefinite form that human purposes are 'rooted in the nature of things,' that the 'soul of the world is just'; or in the characteristically religious expressions 'the righteous shall be had in everlasting remembrance,' 'it is the duty of the fellow-worker' (1 Co. 7); or, again, in the systematic attempt to assign nothing to the moral principle but its adumbration of the orderly unity of the world, and a specific realization of the ultimate 'reason' in the 'matter' of man's sense-life,—in all these cases the general moral principle the same thought is contained. Whenever we find the moral life regarded as working and leading in man's life towards the spiritual principle unifying all reality, or wherever the source and ground of the moral life are derived from such a principle, there we have an ethical idealism. The moral end, on this view, is one expression of the supreme end, not a means to that supreme end but a literal manifestation of it, one way in which the supreme spiritual principle is conscious of itself, or conscious of its own end. In so far as man's moral end is taken to be a fundamental constitutive element of man's being, man's conscious realization of his end is at once a consciousness of the supreme principle in himself and a condition of making his individuality an integral part of the supreme principle; and, in so far as man becomes conscious of the supreme principle in himself, his life becomes determined by the moral end, and set to moral issues. The two statements reciprocally involve each other: hence we have the constant and necessary connection in which the moral end is at once the cause of the realization of the moral end 'demands' or 'proves' the existence of a supreme spiritual principle and the position that a supreme spiritual principle has made man moral or 'wills' the moral end.

5. Forms of Ethical Idealism. The development of this conception of the moral life varies in different systems. Perhaps one might say that the point of divergence between different systems turns on the interpretation of moral evil, and its place in such a theory. Where the existence of evil is regarded as incompatible with the contents of the supreme principle, the idealistic theory of Ethics tends to assign only the fact of the moral law and moral end to the operation of the supreme principle, and to attribute the existence of moral evil to man's imperfect working out of the moral end; in other words, all the present evil is placed to the account of the supreme self-consciousness, all the evil to finite self-consciousness. On this view the idealistic treatment of morality is of the same character. The law is regarded as an abstract, formal, universal law of 'reason'; the end is one that transcends experience in the sense of never being completely...
realizable in man's life; the moral individual is an independent, or even isolated, being who is an end in himself, isolated from Nature and only connected with other moral beings.

On the other hand, where evil is treated as springing from the same source as good itself, both having their common root in self-consciousness, the moral evil and reality that human individual, concretely; law and sensibility, moral ideal and Nature, are looked upon as forming an indissoluble whole; the moral consciousness is inseparable from a universal consciousness of Nature. The spiritual principle in man subsumes Nature into itself and is realized most fully in society with its laws and institutions; the supreme spiritual principle takes upon itself the whole burden of man's moral destiny; and, through moral failure, the human spirit can pass, in unbroken unity with itself, to moral completeness and reconciliation.

The first form of the idealistic treatment of Ethics is essentially dualistic in conception and in systematic development: the second is essentially monistic in form and substance. With certain qualifications in matters of detail, we might take, as instances of the first case, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Kant; of the second, ancient Ethics, and Kantianism in modern Ethics; and as examples of the latter, Plato or Aristotle in ancient Ethics, and Hegel or Neo-Hegelianism in modern.

It is important to note that in the treatment of Ethics from the idealistic point of view the essential identity of finite and supreme self-consciousness is in general all that is affirmed. The detail of the moral life is not lost in the F=principle. Any attempt at such a deduction could only result in the repetition of an abstract formula, which would either leave the specific diversity of content in the moral life unexplained or would blot out its diversity altogether. This is inevitable. For the principle of self-consciousness, as realized in man, is the only form of the principle that is directly relevant for the interpretation of man's moral life, and indeed is sufficient for the purpose. Any deduction of his moral nature and constitution from the absolute principle is, therefore, as unnecessary as it is impossible. This point is sometimes urged in the form that we cannot deduce the details of duty from the conception of a Divine 'perfection.' If by 'perfection' is meant the complete unity of the Divine or Absolute self-consciousness, such a statement may be admitted to be true; but a 'perfection' in the sense of the perfection of the Absolute we have in morality nothing to do. We are concerned in morality with human moral perfection only. From this, however, it may be possible to derive our specific duty, provided we know in what such perfection consists. Perfection is, no doubt, an attribute of the moral ideal; and from the moral ideal we must be able to explain the meaning and content of the moral life.

6. Value of Ethical Idealism.—It may be said that, if we must analyze the operations of human self-consciousness in order to interpret the nature of morality, if this is true, there seems little or no value in connecting morality with an idealistic theory of reality. But this is not the case. The significance of the doctrine lies in the fact that, since the principle in finite and in Absolute self-consciousness is essentially the same, the detailed realization of what that principle contains in the case of man's moral life will, equally with the general principle itself, have its warrant and justification in the ultimate meaning of reality. Thus every moral act has a significance for the whole of reality as truly as the moral ideal itself. And this is both practically and theoretically of profound importance. For, on this view, not merely does the individual's moral life as a whole have a place in the supreme purpose of the universe, but every moral act contributes to the attainment of the plan of the Absolute. Morality and moral individuals have thus a supreme worth in themselves and for the Absolute; and the moral life becomes an essential institution of the universe—a fact which all 'ethical religions' have emphasized, whether they have regarded moral laws as 'Divine commands' or regarded the process of the moral life as an accomplishment of the Divine.

7. Fundamental difficulty of Ethical Idealism.—This close identification of the moral life with the realization of the supreme spiritual principle has always created a difficulty for ethical idealism. For it is obvious that, the more the identification is emphasized, the more we tend to treat the contribution of the moral individual towards the fulfillment of the supreme purpose as the expression, through him, of the operation of that principle itself. These we assimilate the moral life under the Divine Life, the greater the difficulty in distinguishing between what in a given act is the individual's doing and what is God's. If the distinction is not made, the moral life disappears, and with that the spiritual freedom, which is the very basis of the value of the individual to himself. If, on the other hand, the distinction is affirmed, it becomes necessary to consider the supreme purpose as carrying its own necessity within itself; for clearly a supreme purpose which depends for its attainment on the success or failure of individual finite wills is at the mercy of contingent circumstances, which is expressing its self under the Divine Life.

8. Solutions of the difficulty.—This difficulty is a very real one, and is of far-reaching significance. It generally divides ethical idealists into two camps. There are those, e.g. Green, who seem to treat the finite consciousness as a kind of channel or medium through which in the moral life the spiritual principle realizes or objectifies itself. Assuming that in some sense such a principle is self-contained and self-determining, the individual is little more, if any more, than a self-conscious instrument, a mere manifestation or emanation of the Absolute self-consciousness. It seems impossible to deny that in everything but name such a view is indistinguishable from Spinozism. There is no difference between Spirit and Sub stance if they take the same method of realizing themselves in finite self-consciousness. A self-consciousness which for its part has the material of sensibility and thereby makes the latter its own, may indeed be 'free' relatively to sensibility, in the sense that its operation implies detachment from sensibility, and self-direction in controlling and ordering sensibility. But this freedom is not an 'ultimate fact,' nor is it self-explanatory as long as it is assumed that the finite self-consciousness is itself a specific realization of a wider Absolute self-consciousness, which is expressing itself under human limitations. On the contrary, it is thereby implied that the principle on which finite self-consciousness proceeds in asserting its freedom relatively to sensibility is a determinate and conditioned procedure, from, and is itself determined by, this more comprehensive and all-embracing self-consciousness. Freedom, in short, is, in such a case, but the delegated power to exercise, in reference to sensibility, the function of a superior self-consciousness. It is freedom only sub specie temporis, but is necessary sub specie aeternitatis. And, since the latter point of view is the more ultimate and therefore the more correct, the freedom of finite self-consciousness is barely distinguishable from illusion—which, indeed, Spinoza asserted it to be.
A second method of dealing with the problem is that which treats self-consciousness as a principle that is not so much an actuality in man's life from the standpoint of its immediate realization, as the operations of finite self-consciousness. That being so, the attitude of the supreme principle is one of indifference to the achievements of finite individuals: its end is fulfilled, no matter what finite individual happens to fulfill it. This reduces the position of the supreme self-consciousness to that of a spectator, and the position of the finite individual to that of a player: the moral tragedy of life becomes a self-conscious, self-witness. Or, again, the effect on the finite individual must necessarily be to make him equally indifferent to the accomplishment of his end; while the process of history taken as a whole is indistinguishable in ethical quality from the course of Nature. Ethical idealism in this shape thus closely resembles the position of pure naturalism.

9. Special features of Ethical Idealism. The characteristic points on which ethical idealism lays stress in the constructive development of the theory are mainly three: (a) the logical priority of the conception of value in the moral life; (b) the objective independent reality of social institutions; (c) the essential unity of individual and social mind.

(a) In virtue of the first, ethical idealism insists that the consciousness of an ideal takes priority over all considerations of nature and history. Relatively to the ideal, circumstances, nature, and history provide merely the material of morality; they can never destroy the authority of the ideal or modify its validity. The ideal remains the same throughout all diversity of realization. It moulds its material in different ways, and thus the material becomes the means or condition of the objective expression of the ideal. Thereby the self 'finds itself' in Nature by making Nature the correlate and counterpart of Spirit. Thus the diversity of content presented is reduced to unity; and all the elements in individuality—heredity, historical situation, natural surroundings, etc.—become significant for the moral life, and contribute to the attainment of man's end. Sometimes this logical priority of the ideal is expressed in an extravagant form, as when Kant asserts that the moral law is absolutely binding for all under all circumstances, and duty remains duty whatever hindrances there are in the way of its realization; or again when Fichte seeks to 'deduce' Nature as the necessary condition of freedom, and so on. These are merely extreme expressions of the fundamental position on which ethical idealism takes its stand—the position that the operative consciousness of the moral ideal is the basis of all the moral worth of action or personality.

(b) Not less important is the second point. Institutions are not regarded by idealism as accidents in the moral life, created by and dependent on the wills of separate finite individuals. Institutions are embodiments of the social spirit, from which individuals themselves derive their moral sustenance and support. It is truer, on this view, to say that individuals are accidents in the life of institutions than that institutions are accidents in the life of individuals. The end for man is one, and by its very nature is common to all individuals; this follows from the constitution of the community which is the basis of the community in man's life. Individuals, therefore, become realizing, each in his own case, the same human end, necessarily live a common life. The community is the medium in which the variety of ways in which all seek their several interests in the one common end. Institutions are the concrete forms in which this community of end as such finds expression. From this point of view...
institutions are a more objective and permanent embodiment of the supreme principle in man's life than the actions or the life of a given individual; and conversely we see more fully in institutions what the final end of man is.

In Union the two lines have not been equally successful in developing this aspect of its theory of the moral life. The conception of a social will working itself out in the various forms of corporate social life, the family, the city, or in grander institutions such as the Church; the conception of the 'general will' as the basis of the State and the source of its functions in framing, administering, and executing the decrees of government; the conception of property and of contract as fundamental forms of social mind, deriving their origin and ultimate sanction from the idea of the common good which a common will pursues—all these are direct consequences of the objectivity of social institutions as embodiments of the common human end.

(c) Finally, it is of the essence of ethical idealism to hold that the operations of the individual mind point to a wise, and the operations of the social mind in realizing a common end, proceed on the same plan. Whether we speak of the social mind as the individual mind 'writ large' or see the social mind in its psychological terms—terms applicable to the process of the individual mind—the same idea is involved. The similarity of operation is, indeed, very close. Thus we have in the individual the unity of his moral life summed up in the operations of his conscience, which is the outcome of his social consciousness, and the guiding principle of unity in his moral life; in the social mind we have the conception of the unity of an entity, unity of the moral life, by the same principle of social action and of unity of social feeling and sentiment in individuals. In the individual we have the consciousness of moral laws, some vague, some clearly defined and steadily obeyed; the life of a community, again, is maintained by the vague sense of order, and also by the explicit formulation of, and obedience to, laws and decrees required to ensure the maintenance of an entity, unity of individuals. In the individual's moral life, habit and character are the conditions of moral security and continuity of effort; corresponding to this in the social life have custom, routine, and social sanctions.

The Swiss adaptation of these ideas and purposes in the individual mind is of a piece with the inter-communication of personalities in the social mind. The sense of guilt and remorse in the individual has its parallel in social disapproval and punishment by the community; the moral disorder of the individual is regarded as identical in nature with social disorder in a community.

It is important to notice, in conclusion, that, on the view of ethical idealism, the moral life, while self-contained and determined by its own conditions, is not regarded as an exhaustive expression of man's spiritual life. On the contrary, it is intended to realize the supreme principle from which it derives its significance. This is put in various forms. It is said that morality 'points beyond itself to religion,' that religion transposes spirituality, that 'the moral life is part of the wider life of universal history,' that 'the contemplative life is the crowning activity of the spiritual life.' In all these and similar ways the same point is emphasized—the finitude of the moral attitude as a phase of the realization of the one supreme principle. And this logically follows from regarding the moral end of man as an integral but single expression of the comprehensive end of an Absolute self-consciousness.

LITERATURE.—The literature on Ethical Idealism in the sense above discussed is very large. Most of the chief religions have treated Ethical Idealism at this point of view, however much they may have differed both in their religious conceptions and in the content they assign to the moral life. In the systematic discussion of ethical problems, which makes Ethical Idealism strictly so called, Ethical Idealism has been stated and developed in the most various way. The most prominent writers may be said to be the following: (a) Greek Ethics: Xenophon, Memoriae de Socrates; Plato, generally, but chiefly in the Republic; Aristotle, Ethica, Meta Physica. Ethics: Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, bk. iii. chs. 1-6 and 111-114. (b) Modern Ethics: John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, 1861; C. H. flower, De legibus Naturae, 1727; Clarke, Discourse on Natural Religion, 1780; Butler, Sermons, 1728; Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, 1789; C. S. Fichte, Beitrag zum Menschen, 1800, Grundriss des Naturrechts, 1796, System der Staatlehre, 1798, Staatsbegriffe, 1833; Hegel, Philos. des Rechts, 1822; Philosophie der Geschichte, 1837; Vakier, Die menschliche Freiheit, 1841; Green, Problems of Ethics, 1889; Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 1897. J. B. BAILIE.

ETHICAL MOVEMENT.—1. Origin and History. The founder of the Ethical Movement was Felix Adler, afterwards Professor of Applied Ethics in Columbia University, New York. At the urgent request of a number of persons who had become acquainted with his point of view, which assigned the supreme place to right conduct and proclaimed that the good life is not necessarily dependent on theological beliefs, he inaugurated, in 1873, the Ethical Society, which soon counted considerably over a thousand members. 'Deed, not Creed' was his motto. He soon attracted a number of able men—W. M. Saltzer, Stanton Coit, Burns Weston, and W. L. Sheehan—and, as a consequence, Ethical Societies were established in Chicago, Philadelphia, and St. Louis. In 1886 the London Ethical Society was founded. This Society counted among its members Bernard Bosanquet, J. St. B. MacKenzie, J. H. Mirkhead, J. Seeley, Leslie Stephen, H. Sidgwick, and G. F. Stout. Two years later Stanton Coit came to England as 'minister' of South Place Ethical Society. From that time onwards the Ethical Movement in England developed, until it counted some thirty Ethical Societies, a considerable number of them being in London. Most of these came to be federated in the English 'Union of Ethical Societies.' In 1892 the German Society for Ethical Culture came into being, and soon had some fifteen branches. Not long afterwards the Austrian Ethical Society, the Italian 'Union del Morale' and the South African were founded. Recently, a Society in Tokyo has cast its lot with the Ethical Movement.

As early as 1893 the German Ethical Society organized a meeting at Eisenach, with a view to starting an International Ethical Union. This, however, proved only the precursor of the meeting at Zürich in 1896, when delegates from the various ethical centres were present and an International Ethical Union was founded. Ten years later the Second International Ethical Conference met at Eisenach, when a constitution was drawn up and a programme of work elaborated. In 1908, on the occasion of the very successful First International Moral Education Congress initiated by the Union and organized by its secretary, a further International Conference took place.

2. Work of the Ethical Societies. The United States and in England the Ethical Societies meet every Sunday, either morning or evening, or both. In the United States there is usually some kind of music and reading, books from the current list, which generate interest with the current topic, or with some question of the inner life, or of philosophy from the ethical point of view. In England the 'service' is more pronounced: congregational singing is universal, and other features, such as the reading of an Ethical Declaration, or of Closing
The moral life involves neither acceptance nor rejection of belief in any higher personal or impersonal powers of life after death.

(b) The acceptance of any one ultimate criterion of right should not be made a condition of ethical followship. (c) Ethical followships are the most powerful means of encouraging the public to think and live a moral life in all its conduct, and of giving the strength of character necessary to realize it in activity. 4. The common programme. —The following manifest, drawn up at the International Conference of 1896, will give a fair idea of the attitude of the Movement towards the great problems of our age:

We recognize that the struggle for rights is an indispensable means of clearing up conceptions of justice in the attainment of better conditions; but we demand that the struggle be kept within the limits prescribed by humanity, and that it be conducted in the interest of the community at large, and with confidence not to triumph over the individual but in the spirit of ultimate social peace.

We recognize it as a task of the Ethical Union to assist in such intellectual equipment of the people as shall serve the cause of social progress; for example, scientific efforts which aim at explaining moral reforms from the intellectual point of view; and to study the relations of the ethical with education, literature, and the arts.

We demand for woman the possibility of the fullest development of her vital and moral nature; we consider it our conscientious duty to bring about in all departments of life an unobstructed expression of the equal worth of her personality with that of man.

We wish to leave the various Societies to apply the above tasks according to the circumstances of their own countries, and we call upon all the individual members of our Societies, by simplicity and without prejudice to the maintenance of their professions, service, and the advancement of the social movement.

2. We regard the institution of pure monogamous marriage as a priceless good of humanity, which is indispensable for the moral development of the individual and for the permanent duration of moral societies; but we urge that marriage should stamp itself upon sentiment and conduct with a thoroughness which as yet is absent in wide-reaching circles of society.

3. We demand for work the possibility of well-conditioned conditions of domestic service, as one of the most grievous evils of our time, and would strive to restore, throughout the whole people, the conditions of a healthy family life.

4. We hold it to be a fundamental task of our age to give again to education its unity, which in great part has been lost, and, by establishing a universal ethical and in all education, to confer that kind of service which denominational religion once rendered to education in elementary and secondary schools.

We hostile vigorously those efforts toward overcoming militarism in public opinion, towards making the power which exercises it upon the imagination—especially of the young—and toward bringing about in a peaceful way those morally significant elements which the life of the soldier contains; for it is towards opposing national and social mores and national passion, which are at least to-day as dangerous enemies to peace as are the ambitions and personal interests of rulers; and, finally, towards bringing about, in a peaceful way, a moral and religious change in the customs of nations, and in the conditions of life.

5. Attitude towards religion. —Fundamentally the Ethical Movement must be regarded as a religious movement. Even such titles of books as Ethical Religion (F. M. Stoddard), Duty (Felix Adler), Die ethische Bewegung in der Religion (Stanton Coit), and Faith in Man (Gustav Spiller) are a general proof of the sympathy with fundamental religion in the United States and in

The English Union of Ethical Societies in the same year determined upon a series of principles which conveniently sum up the distinguishing features of the Ethical Movement generally. They are here reproduced. Attention is specially drawn to the second principle, in which an attempt is made to state the basis of the ethics taught in Ethical Societies,

(a) In the whole of life—personal, social, and political—moral factors should be the supreme consideration.
(b) The love of goodness and the love of one’s fellows are the two principal foundations of all moral relations; self-reliance and cooperation are the true sources of help.
(c) Knowledge of the right has been evolving through the ages; without knowledge, therefore, the moral obligations generally accepted by the most civilized communities should be taken as the starting-point in the progress of a progressive ideal of personal and social righteousness.
(d) For each individual, after due consideration of the consequences of his acts, the final authority in the right or wrong of any opinion or action should be his own conscientious judgment.
(e) The well-being of society requires such economic and other conditions that its members may afford the largest scope for moral development of all its members.
(f) The scientific method should be applied in studying the facts of the moral life.
England. Sheldon, speaking of America, says: 'Many a stranger attending the lectures would at first be a little at a loss to know whether or not he was attending a church.' (An Ethical Movement, p. x.) This statement is more than borne out by the following passage taken from the Year-Book of the New York Society for Ethical Culture for 1904-05:

"The aim of this society is to fill more and more the place of a church in the lives of its members. The leaders act as ministers of religion; communicating and conferring; guiding and consoling; teaching the suffering; advising the troubled and confused; dedicating childhood to the highest function of life in its name ceremony [which takes the form of baptism]; teaching and supervising the training of the young in Sunday School, and clubs and classes for young men and women; and seeking to create and maintain an atmosphere of reverence attention to the high mysteries of life and to the sacredness of the obligation imposed by man's moral nature, to follow without evering the dictates of duty according to the best light that is in each individual."

In England the Ethical Movement is almost, in substance, led by its adherents as a religious movement, and both the rather elaborate form and the spirit of the ethical meetings bear this out.

German ethicists, as a rule, strictly separate ethical religion, and are adverse to the Ethical Movement being looked upon as a religious movement. Yet one of the principles of the German Ethical Union is 'through combination to offer its adherents support and assurance, as well as stimulus and help in the inner life.'

Lastly, the Union pour l'action morale de Paris, in an official statement, affirms: "We believe that morality depends upon something deeper and more substantial, for a system of ethics which has hitherto been current in the Churches. It is a product of human nature, not a system of dogmas, of traditional authority, or of rationalism, and the Muhammadan Mosque endeavour to effect for theirs. The only difference is that those religions assume the existence of a Deity outside the universe, and that the latter services 'normative' or, as is better, 'critical' sciences.

Ethics is critical in the sense explained. Its subject-matter is human conduct and character, not as natural facts with a history and causal connections, but as possessing value in view of a standard or ideal. This is sufficient to mark it out not only from natural sciences, but from other less universal disciplines of the same class as it is distinguished from law and grammar, which are concerned with types and principles of a comparatively local and temporary interest, and again from therapeutics and musical harmony, which, though of universal application, are concerned with some particular department of life. As contrasted with these, Ethics, like Logic and Aesthetics, is not only of universal application, but refers to constant elements in human nature. This distinction, indeed, may be said to be a vanishing one; there are principles of law (e.g. relating to theft or treason) which may be said to be universal, as there are rules of grammar; but, just as proportion as law and grammar, they tend to merge in Logic and Ethics.

2. Relation of Ethics to Psychology. — From what has been said in the preceding paragraph the relation of Ethics to the closely allied sciences of Psychology and Sociology ought to be clear. The distinction between Ethics and Psychology does not consist, as has been maintained, in the fact that the one is empirical and the other is not. It is a study of 'fact and theory' aiming only at the attainment of truth in itself, and having no interest in its practical applications. The difference does not correspond to that between theory
and practice, but to that between origin and value, the natural antecedents of a thing and the value that belongs to it in view of the purpose which it serves. Psychology deals with ideas, feelings, volitions, from the former point of view. It seeks to analyze mental phenomena, and to find the connexions that sublimate the elements of the psyche. It stands to Bosanquet, 12. Every fields and expresses theject mind suggests custom, science. to whether man's which Sociology. science Ethics, Valuation, Stout, to natural with recent of the other, cons in it. It draws from the natural to the natural, and, as the starting-points for different disciplines, it is no less a mistake to insist too pedantically on their separation. The rise of Sociology in modern times may to a large extent be traced to an ethical dissatisfaction with existing forms of political and social organization, and any attempt to exclude reference to distinctions of value as irrelevant to it in its later developments, or to confine it to naturalistic discussions of origin and growth, must be detrimental to the science, depriving it of its legitimate inspiration and hampering its usefulness. Perhaps the attempt to do so is the reason why the abstract study of Sociology has hitherto been in general so disappointing, and why its most conspicuous successes have been in fields in which, as in the study of Panopticism, Criminology, Eugenics, and Education, the practical interest has been dominant. Similarly, for the study of Ethics, the barrenness of many of the discussions and the abstractions of many of its theories are largely due to the neglect of sociological considerations. It is safe to say that there can be no true theory of the nature and tendencies of forms of moral judgment and of social institution apart from a study of the social relations and the social forces at play. If all our ethical notions are as present on an expanding scale, if we are reaching forward to wider and clearer ideas as to the meaning of charitable endeavor, and as to our obligations to men of commercial honesty, the objects and methods of punishment, the meaning and social function of religion, it is in a sociological formulation we have received from sociological investigations into the effects of almsgiving, of luxury, of unregulated competition and speculation, of the present system of private property, of the secularization of morality. It, on the other hand, our minds are still confused as to the definitions, the laws and principles of justice—some desiring to base them on desert, others on need, others on abstract equality—this is probably because we have hitherto, our speculations from the point of view of the idea, with which Sociology has familiarized us, of life as consisting in the organized effort of individuals towards the realization of a social ideal, and the ultimate claim of each individual to the opportunity of contributing to it accordingly his ability.

4. Ethics and Metaphysics.—In a time of reaction against metaphysical ideas it is not surprising to meet with a wide-spread suspicion of anything that would seem to make practical truth depend on speculative. This attitude of mind seems to arise from a mistaken view of the nature both of Ethics and of Metaphysics. Of the former we have already said enough. Metaphysics has been defined as only a particularly obtinate effort to think clearly. But the only way to think a thing out into clearness is to think it in its relations to other things, more particularly to the whole to which it belongs. Life is, in this sense, an organism that stands by itself, but each leads us out into some wider and more embracive system, till we reach the universe of created things, there is no knowledge completely clear except that which seeks to see things sub specie Universi. Philosophy, since the time of Plato, has been familiar with the conception of the universe as thus consisting of a hierarchy of systems related to one another in an order of greater or lesser completeness, and of the higher form of knowledge as metaphysical in the sense just explained. But, for common sense, which is concerned with objects of everyday experience and with their relation to human wants, and even for science, which is concerned with the extension and organization of the knowledge necessary for the effective exploitation of material things, each a form of explanation may be said to be so useful as to be of considerable importance. The more particular and exclusive an object (i.e. the nearer to ordinary sense-perception and ordinary physical needs), the more it is from the all-embracing. We are in no occasion to raise ultimate questions of its

notes: 1. See recent developments on the "assumptions" and feelings of the Delphic oracle, e.g. in W. C. S. Boulton's, _Ethics and Nature_, London, 1909.
3. _Moral and Ethical_ (1906, 1.
4. _Sociology_ (1906, 1.
5. _Societies_ (1906, 1.
6. _Societies_ (1906, 1.
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10. _Societies_ (1906, 1.
11. _Societies_ (1906, 1.
12. _Societies_ (1906, 1.
13. _Societies_ (1906, 1.
place within it. Mind and will are clearly not such objects. They are high up on the scale of things and not at all connected with the universe of sense experiences. So embrace a universe as that which they constitute might with some justice be itself regarded as the whole, in reference to which such particular objects and entities as universals as art and science find their meaning.

It was an instinctive perception of this relation that led Mill and his contemporaries to use Psychology and Metaphysics interchangeably, and that forced so representative an experimentalist as William James to admit, in the preface to the Italian edition of his Principles of Psychology, that in the years which had passed since the publication of his book he had himself become more and more conscious of treating Psychology without introducing some true philosophy of his own.

If this be true of the psychological treatment of the facts of mind, it would seem to be "a fortiori" of the ethical. The very definition of Ethics as a science of ends or ideals raises the question of the difference of the teleological from the causal point of view, and of their relation to one another. On the other hand, the claim of these ends or ideals to be universal and absolute for human life necessarily raises the metaphysical question of the place of human life in the universe of things. This is the reason why the 'metaphysical' or 'abstract' motives (less ambiguously) the metaphysical implications of Ethics are a matter of concern not only to philosophers, but to the community at large, wherever it may happen to reflect on the nature and authority of moral imperatives, and why controversies, e.g., as to the educational value of religion, which to modern Gallioli seem to be 'questions of words and names,' and to be disturbances of peaceful progress, are in reality indications of alertness to important practical differences.

Whether we shall express the relation here indicated as one of 'dependence' will again turn upon the meaning we assign to the word. If it be meant that Ethics is a deductive science like geometry, consisting of a series of constructions and demonstrations syllogistically derived from principles resting upon metaphysical proofs, nothing could be more foreign to modern notions. It seems doubtful whether there ever has been any serious attempt to treat Ethics in this way. Even Spinoza's classical Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata fails to conceal the essentially inductive character of his operations, and may be said to have only preached Baco


cianism under the form of the syllogism. On the other hand, if we mean that, owing to the universality of the notion of ends, the problem of ethics from the outset marches with metaphysical, and that there are points at which it is so difficult—or even impossible—to discover any scientific frontier between them that they may be said to merge in one another, there is sufficient truth in the statement. But it must be understood that it is meant in no other sense than in that in which Mechanics may be said to depend on Physics, Economics on Sociology, or any other of the more 'abstract' sciences upon the more comprehensive and concrete with which it stands in immediate relation. And this sense, it should be further noticed, is the opposite of that which is commonly understood by dependence.

II. THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF MODERN ETHICS.—The preceding abstract statement will become clearer after a glance at the main stages in the development of ethical theory, with a view to investigating the special problems of modern Ethical thought and the directions in which it seeks for an answer to them.

The first sketch of a complete moral philosophy we owe to Aristotle. What distinguished him and gave them a permanent value was the perception that human goodness is not merely the expression by the individual will of the essential nature of social life—significant and conditioned though their demonstration of this was. To live the good life was not simply to be a citizen; it also expressed the true nature and purpose of the world in general, and thus united the human to the Divine. Platonism is essentially the idea only of the outcome of a vision of the eternal Good; to Aristotle (herein outside of Plato) it was itself a kind of perfection, apart from any idea of the immortality—so Plotinus (Enn. i. 2) distinguished between an earthly and a heavenly Temperament. Yet there too the truths of Knowledge, and Justice. Yet the intention remained of seeking for the ultimate justification of moral goodness in an order which, while it includes humanity, is more than human.

With the development of the dualism between the individual and society Ethics had been raised above the question of the soul and the spiritual on the other, which may be said to have been the work of the succeeding period, there came the need to find some justification other than human nature itself for requirements which forced the claims of others in contrast to self, of the spirit in contrast to experience. The main source of evidence for modern Ethics is, in pointing to the idea of humanity, or of fully developed human nature, and the freedom of the individual soul, which is the origin of the use of societies and of the descent of the world to the bond of all social union—the condition of realizing a 'kingdom of ends'—but in it is to be found the revolution in the conception of individual soul of the previous centuries, as and as the nature of things. This note has its most powerful echo in this country in the course of the 19th century by which time the task of Carlyle, who taught that fidelity to duty is not only the one condition of inner peace, but the preserving presence of human society, and the way of access into the way of the power of creation. This doctrine at once carried Kant and his great English interpreter, and brought the naturalism of the Unitarian Ethics on the one hand, and the supernaturalism of the orthodoxy theology of their time on the other. Unfortunately Kant inherited the psychology of his opponents, which reduced all motives to forms of pleasure-seeking, and he could escape its results only by setting up in its place the custom of obedience to an abstract command of reason, while Carlyle had too great a contempt for the systematizing spirit of his time ever to seek a psychological foundation for truths which he regarded as sufficiently obvious to intuition.

The task to which modern Ethics has set itself may thus be said to be the justification of this trans-sentential idea in the light of the new conception. Of that Kant has to say (1) on the nature of volition, (2) on the standard of our judgments on voluntary acts, and (3) on the grounds that we have for conceiving of this standard. This with a condensed discussion of these three problems, under the headings of the Psychology, the Logic, and the Metaphysics of Ethics, is all that the present article can attempt.

III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS.—I. General nature of volition.—The recognition of the element of seeking or 'conation' as fundamental to consciousness may be said to be the starting-point of modern Psychology. What gives unity and continuity to conscious life, binding its elements together as a magnetic field binds the particles of loose metal which come within it, is a purposeful tension, appearing under two forms—in accordance as it is directed, and in the change in the character of the world. Metaphysicians have spoken of this fundamental factor as 'will,' but Psychology is wise in marking the distinction between mere instinctive, involuntary, and mechanical will, and the will towards a consciously conceived end, and in confining will or volition to the latter. It thus arrives at the definition of volition as the self-direction of a conscious mind, as the immediate function of that mind, whether in the content of the mind itself or in the

1 Ethics, x. vii. 8.

2 The only adequate treatment of volition in English is the series of articles in Mind, new ser., vol. x.—xii.
external world. In the form both of attention and of overt action, volition is closely related to feeling or interest, seeing that it is only on the basis of some intrinsic or acquired attractiveness in the object, some point of affinity between it and the psychic or psycho-physical structure, that desire can be initiated or sustained. There is no such thing as determination by 'pure reason.' Apparent desire, this feeling, is, as in the preference of duty to inclination, an indication of determination by inclination, not of feelingless choice. At the other extreme actions prompted by vivid ideas or temporary obsessions just cease to resemble volitions in proportion as the vividness comes from the accidental circumstances of the moment, instead of being, as it normally is, a function of a felt affinity between the object and the soul or psycho-physical organism. Whether we shall call the movement towards the source of this feeling in all cases 'desire,' or reserve that term for cases in which, owing to obstruction in the fulfillment of a conation, the object stands out as something merely possible in more or less painfully felt contrast to the present or actual, is a question of terminology. The essential point to notice is that objects attract, as Aristotle saw, οὐ διηλόγεις, or not at all.

2. The development of volition.—The development of will tends to the development of interest. It follows the line of growing susceptibility to objects which are more remote from the mere physical stimulus, and which correspond to a wider and deeper internal organization. The growth of the power of attention (g.v.) is the most obvious illustration of this. In its earlier stages attention is controlled by the merely mechanical pressure of presentations and ideas—their vividness, persistence, or attractiveness—will by their connexions of coexistence or sequence, and their superficial resemblances. We have the beginning of self-direction when the succession of presentations passes under the control of some idea of what is wanted, as in purposeful observation or recall. At a higher stage still the process is freed from all immediate reference to an external world, and becomes in the proper sense self-sustained, as in imaginative constructions or trains of reasoning. Intellectual education means the development of the power of the free exercise of the attention in such self-sustaining activities, under the guidance of conscience, of taste, and reasons of intellectual ends. This is rendered possible by the formation, in the mind, of an intellectual 'interest' or apperceptive system which acts as a principle of selective organization in the objects and ideas that come before the mind, and, as it gains strength, extends and deepens its influence over the flow of mental life. Such interests or dominant selective principles are not to be regarded as possessions of the mind, still less as forces acting from without upon it. They are what give character and individuality to a man's intellectual life, and enable us to speak of him in the proper sense as a mind at all.

Precisely parallel with these stages in the development of the 'internal will' are those which are distinguishable in the development of the will in the ordinary sense. Corresponding to the semi-involuntary control of the attention by the external world or by persistent ideas is control by impulse, pressing appetite, or the fascination of isolated practical ideas. What is characteristic of this stage is that it influences the idea of the self as a whole. Inhibitions and hesitations occur, but they are caused by the conflict of impulses with one another, rather than by the conflict of an idea, with which the mind identifies itself, with any or all of them. Selection and control come with the power of identifying ourselves with remoter objects, and bringing nearer objects into a form which may harmonize with their attainment. It is a further stage when these objects in turn become assimilated to the idea of the self as a whole, which thenseverely comes the subduing, organizing principle of a life. Such dominating ideas are not something merely of the self, possessed by the man, or rather they make him the man he is. They are his will and personality. It is only when they find expression in his actions that we account him fully himself. Where they fail, we set about seeking for some passing state, some accidental circumstance, outside the man himself, which, if it does not 'excuse' him, may give us the clue to the situation.

We have spoken of attention and overt volition as though they were two species of the same genus. But the connexion is much closer. They are rather to be regarded as the beginning and end of the same process. The condition of all action is attention to that which is to be executed. It is for this reason that, and not only because it is a power more general and owing to temporary absence of mind, though it ought not to be forgotten that even where the occupation of the attention depends in turn on the interest, instinctive or acquired, which attaches itself to the outer world as a whole, in itself, or as a means to some further end with which the agent has identified himself. Votition consists in the selective occupation of the attention by an idea owing to its power of serving a permanent interest, and is essentially 'presence of mind.'

3. Will and character.—The analysis of volition thus carries us beyond the single act to the volitional dispositions on which it depends. The totality of these dispositions in the individual is his character, and it is in this sense that we have in mind, by distinction from the volitions which go to form it and are the outcome of it. To the formation of will as thus defined a variety of factors contribute—inherited instincts, temperament or emotional disposition, circumstances both physical and social. But by far the most important are the reactions of the will itself to the suggestions which these supply, and the habits which thus become impressed upon it. Character has hence been defined as the habit of the will. It has seemed to thinkers such as Socrates and Rousseau that this definition is a contradiction in terms, seeing that character in any sense can only be a sense in which it is a value must involve freedom from the tyranny of habit. The difficulty is met, not, as by H. Bergson, by drawing a hard and fast line between motor habits which are correlated with cerebral action, and the free life of mind, but by noting the distinction between narrower or mechanical and the wider or, as we might call them, adaptive habits whose office it is to control them in the interest of life as a whole. In this sense Rousseau spoke of the habit of acquiring no habit, and Aristotle defined virtue itself as the habit of aiming at the mean. The above analysis enables us to add that these habits are, in the last resort, habits of attention. They concern, not how, by practice in adapting conduct to embracive ends, the habit of being controlled by these ends—in other words a moral character—may be acquired.

4. The social will.—In the older psychology, which conceived of pleasure or the avoidance of pain as the single ultimate motive, objects of social value could enter into the content of the will only in so far as they are included in the idea of the self as a whole, and so as means to the furtherance of that end, or, through the principle of association, come to be mistaken for it. It was an advance on this individualistic psychology when it came to be seen

2 See Stout, op. cit. 1. 104.
that the experience of pleasure presupposes instinct and desire, and the social instincts were
admitted the theory of at least equal importance
with the self-preservative or self-assertive. It
was a further advance still when it was recog-
nized that the social instincts are merely vague
tendencies from the filling and the minding
which they receive from contact with the developed
life of the society into which the individual is born.
Just as mental development depends for stimulus
and guidance on the social system, and, more
particularly, on the social institution of language,
so the development of will depends on the assimila-
tion of the purposes represented by social institu-
tions and customs. There was then no longer any
difficulty in understanding how corporate ends, e.g.
family life, which satisfied deep-rooted instincts
and claimed attention from the first, should pass
into the structure of the mind and become objects
of interest in the sense explained above of at least
equal standing for that of the more personal.
Moreover, it was no longer necessary to
conceive of the individual and the social as lying
outside of each other and requiring to be linked
logically in a system of what Dr. 'association.'
Their continuity and interdependence were a mere
matter of ascertained fact. 'The individual self
and the community are not centres of different
circles; they rather hang, like the two faces
in relation to which we may describe the course
of human activity. 1

So far the facts seemed plain. But, on the
further questions of the precise description of
the process of assimilation and the resulting content,
'social' psychologists were by no means so clear.
With respect to the former question, it was prob-
elly the genius of G. Tarde which first effectively
directed attention to this part played by imitation.
Other psychologists, such as Baldwin, were not
slow to follow and apply the principle to explain
the appropriation of the purposes and the feelings of
others and the development of the individual into
a social. 2 With respect to the second question, the
current view of what is meant by a universal
led to the interpretation of the result as a mere
reproduction of the same content in an indefinite
number of individuals. A closer analysis of what
is meant by imitation seems to show that—except
in the case of the children's game, or the savage's
exaggerated respect for precedent, of which this is
perhaps itself an imitation—imitation in the strict
sense plays hardly any part in social life.
Even where the suggestion comes from the
action of another, and not from the requirements
of a situation, there is adaptation and invention;
the suggestion is what Stout calls 'relative.'
Where, on the other hand, it is the situation that
works, as in reeling a sail or felling a tree (and
this is the typical 'social' case), what we have is
co-operation and not imitation. Similarly, what
is called innovating result of imitation, even where
this is prominent, is not the seeing as another sees,
or the feeling as he feels (out of this no society
could develop), but the formation, in the individual,
of the spirit of the age, in whose life he con-
tributes, not by doing as another does, but by
doing something which is suggested to his own in-
ventive imagination by the situation in which he
finds himself.
In which has just been said we have kept strictly within the
limits of Psychology, but beyond the psychological problem of
the will and the individual lie the philosophic, and as one of the
reality in society of a will which is not something entirely outside the individual, but whose life he contributes,
not by doing as another does, but by doing something which is suggested to his own inventive imagination by the situation in which he finds himself.

2 See esp. Mental Development in the Child and the Race,

5. The freedom of the will. It is unlikely that
so important a transformation in psychological
theory as that sketched above should be without
bearing on the question of the freedom of the will.
So long as the point of view of Psychology was
identified with that of the physical sciences, we can
understand how there must have appeared to be an
impasse between Psychology and the assumption
on which all judgments of merit and demerit and
of moral and immoral action rested. So soon, on
the other hand, as it was recognized that the
central fact from which any true psychology must
start is the idea of a progressively designed
brauch in the human organism, the question was
reopened whether it is possible to harmonize
the findings of science and morality.
Even from the point of view of Biology it ought
not to be difficult, except we have already
an innate prejudice in favour of the exclusive
validity of the categories of the inorganic sciences,
to admit that to render the facts intelligible they
must be seen with other eyes than those of the
physician or the chemist. Life depends on the
storage of physical energy, it maintains itself in
and through a system of mechanical strains and
impacts; but these are taken up into a scheme
that goes beyond them; and, in so far as this is so,
the life of the humblest plant is free in a sense
denied to the motions of the heavens. * A fortiori
all this is true of beings who not only live but can
make their life an object—.\ew to adjustment
and determination from within can add determination by the idea of the self. Self-
conscious mind is still subject to the laws of
inorganic matter and of mere life. In the
instincts and appetites which it inherits, in the habits which
it acquires, it carries about with it a system of
forces which, while they stimulate and give stability
to its life, constantly threaten its own peculiar
nature. Yet, so long as it bears the burden of its
own human purpose, it contains a principle
that enables it to turn all these into means and to
vindicate a new form of being, which is free in the
still higher sense of having the power to set every-
thing else, even its own freedom, over against
itself, and to convert it into an instrument of self-
development. Such freedom will be more or less
complete, according as more or less of the insight
which experience has brought as to the meaning of
the life and it calls for development is embodied in
the action—in other words, according as a man
lives more habitually and consistently in his deepest
purposes and is more completely self-denied.
What must be added to this must be added is
in this conception, which we might call that of 'degrees of freedom,' we have a
point of view from which the old controversies may cease. As against the old determin-
ism and the does of the eighteenth century, at least.
In conception and inference, this new idea is, first, it asserts its
freedom from the pressure of what is merely external, whether
in the apparent consciousness or the persistence of the
of the will in the individual life. In the old determin-
ism we must admit that reason is free. In Locke and
denied. In conception and inference, this new idea is, first, it asserts its
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in the apparent consciousness or the persistence of the
of the will in the individual life. In the old determin-
ism we must admit that reason is free. In Locke and

1 Political Theories of the Middle Age, Cambridge, 1900. For
an account of the various forms in which the reality of the general
will has been conceived, see H. J. Smith, Interpretations of Society,
saying, as he does, that he 'could not conclude otherwise,' the reasoner asserts not his bondage, but his freedom. It is only apparently different in conduct. True, there is commonly a wide gulf between seeing what is reasonable and giving effect to it in action than between seeing a logical consequence and accepting it. But only because living is a more complex business than thinking. The principle is the same. The will is a complex force in individuals more than in society, (a) in collecting itself for rational decision, (b) in refusing to allow itself to be diverted from its resolution. As such of these points in individuals, and (c) in the absence of habits and associations over which it has no direct control. But at each point also it is more than any of these habits, and has the possibility of varying something more as its guiding principle. Just in proportion, moreover, as it does so feel it at the moment of action that it could not do other than the thing. But it does so feel on that account excuse itself for the result; on the contrary, it is all the more ready to accept the issue as its own. Responsibility, in a word, grows, like freedom, with the extent to which our conduct has been forced upon us as the only free expression of that desire to be. If the question is still pressed upon us whether in actual fact it could have been different, the answer is at once No and Yes—No, if he be meant that the agent being what he was, his conduct could have been other; Yes, if it be meant that his character was no inevitable result of a history in which moral purity, individual and social, has failed to enter as a controlling factor.

The consideration of the implications of our judgment of moral approval and disapproval and of the principles underlying punishment will be found to support these conclusions. It shows that in case most favourable for moral judgment, viz. that of one's own actions, what gives remorse its strongest impulse is the fact that I have done the thing, not that I am in such a character as to be capable of doing it. If I could persuade myself that the action was possessed of the deepest features of this disposition, instead of being an accom of condition, as it ought to do on the libertarian theory, would bring a few tears to my eye, but would not be more disapproving to that which they disapprove. I discovered that I had done it in my sleep, or had not done it at all. Similarly with respect to the phenomenon of punishment in the reaction of society against the offences of the individual, and is justifiable only on the assumption, first, that there is a real connexion between action and character; second, that through reform or 'example' it makes for better character in the offender, the community, or by both.

The discussion of this controversy as to free will, that to the relation of pleasure to desire, if not actually an anachronism in the light of recent analysis, is in the fair way to become so. It follows, from what has been said of the dependence of all conscious processes on the pre-existence of dispositions with which presented objects are in felt harmony or discord, that without feeling there can be no volition. In this sense, we might accept Mill's dictum, that 'desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon (though for the present I shall live without the distinction 'with pain'). But, since Mill wrote these words, the distinction between the idea of a thing and the idea of the pleasure to be derived from it has been further amplified; and, seeing that these are clearly different phenomena, it seems obvious that to desire a thing, and to desire the pleasure we expect from it, are not one and the same phenomenon, but are entirely separable phenomena. The recognition of this distinction may be said to have rendered the older form of hedonism no longer a tenable account of the nature of will and desire. It can no longer be maintained that it is the pleasure-seeking quality of things that makes them objects of desire.

Of the existence of the type of character known as the pleasure-seeking type, there can, of course, be no question; but the pleasure-seeker gets his name not so much from his identifying himself with pleasure in the abstract as from his habitually identifying himself with whatever kind of pleasure he finds, little claiming that the pleasure and pain connected with them are their most striking attributes. In the line of least resistance, and runs his life on the cheap. The normal man has acquired, through education, sufficient strength of character to resist the temptation, that is, to maintain his independence by a reference to the concrete interests with which he habitually identifies himself, and to face the weight of argument involved in banishing contradictory suggestions. The mind of the pleasure-seeker, on the other hand, is like a stinking without a green rear in which the stench is more sweet unresolved, because of his inability to face the effort required to sustain an inhibiting idea in the centre of attention.

not that he seeks or finds the greatest pleasure in the things he chooses, but that he fails to find sufficient pleasure in anything.

This conclusion is confirmed by recent criticism of the second of the ordinary doctrine of pleasure-seeking, viz. that pleasure operates as a motive in proportion as it is felt. It is generally supposed, viz. that 'to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility. It is a well-known law that the feelings of a pleasure-seeker, under a law of continually diminishing emotional returns and yet of continually increasing motive pressure. Recent hedonism has sought to accommodate itself to these criticisms by maintaining that they are irrelevant to the main contention, which is that it is their pleasure-giving quality, and not their felt relations, that will make them effective, that gives value to things. But, while avoiding the difficulty of identifying the object of desire with pleasure, this reading of the doctrine conceal the true theory, viz. that Psychology that pleasure is a function of, and not need of pleasure. The satisfaction of felt experience, and not the degree or amount of the pleasure, while it may be a gauge of the momentary presslessness of the need, can never be the standard of the worth of a thing. On the contrary, the worth of the pleasure must follow worth of the need, of whose satisfaction it is the sign.

7. Conscience.—The justification of the pressure which conscience (q.v.) exercises upon the will is a question of Ethics in the stricter sense of the word. The Hedonistic is the precise nature and origin of the feeling of constraint which the word represents belongs to Psychology.

The will, we have seen, is identical with the disposition to be dependent upon harmony with the dominant practical interests, and to be repelled from things which are in contradiction to them. From this it follows that these centres of practical interest, whatever they may be, must have the power, either separately or in conjunction, of exercising a certain pressure upon conduct in so far as there exists a consciousness of its general bearing in furthering or obstructing the purposes they represent. In reference to each of them there is a line of conduct which approves itself, another which disapproves itself. Wherever we have such a centre we have the conditions of such a feeling, the degree of pressure thus exercised varying in proportion to the depth and permanence of the interest concerned. The feeling of harmony or discord of conduct with a ruling interest is, in fact, a rudimentary conscience, and by a suggestive use of language is sometimes spoken of in this way. In this sense we hear of the craftsman's conscience and the student's conscience—even the miser's conscience, which makes the profitless expenditure of a sixpenny-piece a positive pain. What differentiates conscience, in the distinctly moral sense, from these conceptions is merely the depth and the permanence of the interest in which it has its roots. If the reader is inclined to resent such an account as a cheapening of an element in human nature which he has been accustomed to regard as its highest manifestation, the reply is the same as that already given in regard to the will in general. In seeking to exclude an element of the human soul, as far as it is not involved in banishing contradictory suggestions. The mind of the pleasure-seeker, on the other hand, is like a stinking without a green rear in which the stench is more sweet unresolved, because of his inability to face the effort required to sustain an inhibiting idea in the centre of attention. His characteristic is, 

1 Utilitarianism, p. 53.

2.1b.
recognition of a conscience in sensu eminente to
to a pre-eminent interest, of the pressure exercised
upon conduct in general by any interest whatsoever.

The nature of this conception is, as we have seen, a question for Ethics
proper. Psychology is concerned with the means
and order of its development. It seeks to make it
understandable, to give it a form, to acquire it instinctive pressure from within, and finding its
counterpart in established custom without, the
tribal self comes to dominate every other, mould-
ing the individual into a homogenous system of
habits—mores or sifting. In its subsequent develop-
ment this 'morality' follows in the track of the
developing self-consciousness in general. A definite
stage is reached when the social spirit brings forth
heroes and founders, who not only enoble in
their own lives conspicuous forms of social excel-
ence or 'virtue',1 but possess the insight of genius
into the significance of virtue in general, and are
able through individual prestige to give it firm
roots in national life. Thus 'Catholic souls', as
Plato2 calls them—parents of virtue of every
kind—become thenceforth, through the force of
suggestion, a living law or conscience to the
nation to which they belong, by another stage when
the demand arises to have usage and inherited
authority defined and restrained by written law.
But it is not until, owing to the growth of reflexion,
the social bearing of different types of moral char-
acter comes to be realized, and their goodness
becomes transparent in the light of the social well-
being they serve, that we reach the highest form
of social conscience. Virtue is thenceforth know-
ledge, or at least implies knowledge. Actions and
types of character at first approved because they
have the stamp of authority, law, or custom come
to be approved for their own sake. Yet the same
work principles throughout; there is no real break
anywhere. Just as Logic works obscurely in the pro-
cess, by which we accept our beliefs from ordinary
sense-experience or common hearsay, so morality
works obscurely in the earlier manifestations of
social solidarity. Fear is the beginning of
knowledge, because there is more in it than fear. And, just
as the progress of belief is best represented as a
continuous process by which the false is separated
from the true, and causal aporia and accidentally
received belief are inferred to be light phenomena
in the light of organized science, so the progress of moral feeling
is to be conceived of as a continuous development
from unconscious acceptance of tribal custom to
the enlightened citizenship or humanitarianism of the
patriot or the philanthropist.

IV. THE LOGIC OF ETHICS.—I. The idea of

a logic of moral value, more than once appealed to
in the preceding paragraphs, is contrary to two
widely held but opposite ethical theories. On the
one hand it is maintained that none is needed, on
the other that none is possible.

(a) The development of morality, it is held, is the
result of natural selection. Once a society
understands how in the inter-tribal struggle for existence a form of
character in individuals has been developed which favours survival, and you have an answer—the only
answer needed to the question of the ground of its
authority. Character is good because it survives, it
does not survive because it is good; de facto is
de jure; its might is its right.

After what has already been said as to the
development of will, we shall not be accused of
under-estimating the value of the history of moral
ideas. Conscience, like everything else, stands in
relation to historical fact, but it is, in its essence,
as we have seen, a form of self-consciousness, and,
as such, claims the right to test the fact by its
relation to the self. It is for this reason that the
appeal to nature (as the name for what actually
exists) must remain unconvincing. Unless it can
be shown, apart from the actual course of develop-
ment, that there exists some essential relation
between social solidarity and the rational element
in human nature, in other words, that will obeys a
logic of its own, and is not merely something
merely individual, it is difficult to see on what
foundations our judgments of value and the
feeling of obligation which depends on them, can
rest.

Darwin himself noticed the difficulty of explain-
ing, on the principles of natural evolution, the emo-
tions that lead to philanthropic efforts to preserve
the weak. More recently W. James3 has called
attention to the feeling of the inward dignity of
certain spiritual attitudes—serenity, simplicity,
etc.—as quite inexplicable except by an innate
preference of the more ideal attitude for its own pure
sake. To this it might be added that, as a matter
of history, there is the circumstance of light, dis-
in nations which had already been absorbed by
conquest, and had long ceased to compete effect-
ively for national existence, and to have com-
manded the official attention of an author like
James, who, judging by his own perceptible
utility as a condition of survival, but by their
consciousness with the general aspirations of
mankind after spiritual unity. Psychology, indeed,
seeks to make it comprehensible how, through the
influence of habit, association, imitation, our ad-
mirations deepen and extend. In this way means
are transformed into ends, qualities come to be
admired for their own sake, and perfections to be
sought after, which are to us the end in itself, a
practice to other. But these considerations, how-
ever useful in explaining the origin of these
similar sentiments, still fail to touch the main
difficulty—the justification of the right they claim
to be regarded as of superior order, and, as such,
to control our conduct. Granted that they exer-
cise that pressure on the coarser and more selfish
instincts which we call the authority of conscience,
by what right do they do so? What gave them that
authority?

(b) An opposite line is taken by writers who,
while insisting that actual fact can establish no
right, maintain that we can have no ultimate
standard by which to judge good or evil. The
experience of good, like that of blue or yellow,
is an ultimate datum of which no definition is
possible,4 and none is needed. A theory like this
is not, of course, to be met by denying the place of
immediate experience in moral judgment. Where
it errs is in taking immediate feeling as an ultimate
instead of merely as a starting-point. It is true
that our practical as well as our logical and aesthetic
judgments are rooted in quite definite and unique
experiences. But no one maintains, as regards
our logical judgments, that the matter ends there.
Even in the simplest case of sensory data, such as
colour, there is a degree of solidity, distance, contrast, etc., to be taken account of before we
can tell what it is that we experience. If it is,
according to a popular way of thinking, different
with regard to 'tastes,' this can be seriously main-
tained only on condition that we are prepared to
deny all value to aesthetic criticism—ultimately
all essential difference of value in forms of beauty.
And, if it be true that there are standards of truth
and beauty, it can only again be at the price of
denying all unity to human nature that we deny
a like standard in the case of moral goodness.

It is impossible, in an article like the present, to

1 See Weil, Philosophy of Law, sect. 150.
2 Symposion, 350.
3 See Will to Believe, 1901, p. 167 (1st ed. 1897).
4 Good is a simple notion, just so yellow is a simple notion.
5 Good is a simple notion, just so yellow is a simple notion. (G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 1).
draw out this fundamental analogy with anything like the completeness which it deserves. It must suffice to take the leading points which emerge from a consideration of the underlying structure of our logical judgments.

1. The position here is the search for a criterion of truth, philosophy is constantly brought back to this if it cannot con-

(Continues)
and our moral ideals in the respect referred to. It is, of course, true in general that we have to wait the judgment of experience to confirm our appeal to the ideal; 'das Weltgeschichte ist das Welt-
geschichte der andere,' but it becomes more and
more possible, as sensitiveness to moral distinc-
tions develops and the ethical consciousness be-
comes clearer, to perceive what is implied in ac-
nowledged principles. Such principles have com-
monly been made by the great legislators and
reformers of the human race, whose efforts have
much more frequently been employed in developing the
logic of principles already accepted than in estab-
lishing new ones. Nor is there here any differ-
ence between the movement within particu-
lar ideals and that which carries us from one to the
other. Where, for instance, to take Hölderling's
own example, can any line be drawn between
progress within the family ideal and progress from
the ideal of a strong domestic to a strong political
consciousness? What holds of different levels of
the social ideal holds also of the spiritual or sup-
social. Thus, it illustrates the 'political' life and the life of science, art, and
religion. Closely regarded, the latter come more
and more to appear in the light of a continuation of the concept of wisdom begins, fulfilled
utterances of the same universal self which the
general will reveals in more precarious forms, and
in the same way implicit in the consciousness of
every individual.  

The second criticism, in like manner, seems to rest on a misunderstanding, of which the analogy of
Logic again suggests the correction. The ideal in
Logic, in general, is a world of completely
coherent ideas; yet, in any particular investi-
gation we are concerned, not with this ideal in the
abstract, but with carrying forward the mind's
work of organization in response to the summons
of a particular theoretical situation. The particular
point on which attention is concentrated may be
wholly insignificant in itself, bearing no obvious
relation to truth as a whole, or even to the body
of accepted truth in the particular department.
Yet the concentration takes place on a general
background of conviction that the problem itself
is a rational one, and continuous with the general
presuppositions of science, by which, in the last
resort, the results of the discussion must be tested. So
in practice. The call for moral conscience comes from
particular circumstances, without obvious relation
to wider ends, and may be met without conscious-
ness of anything in particular that depends upon the
choice of what gives final value to the action. The
choice is that it is rooted in the moral order,
which it sustains in equilibrium, or that it carries
us perhaps unconsciously to a higher plane.

'Sense' could be appealed to in conduct, as in
belief, only where the issue is so insignificant that we may 'do as we like.'

3. Other definitions.—A reference to one or two
of the classical definitions of the moral standard
will serve to rest the somewhat abstract statement of it to which we have been led.

(a) The mean.—Aristotle's doctrine, that virtue
or excellence is a mean, stands in express relation
to his theory that life is developing system of
harmonomic activities. There is, indeed, an inter-
pretation of the mean which suggests a compromise
between opposing elements rather than the union
of them in a harmonious whole. But that this is
not the interpretation which Aristotle intended the
definition is evident, not only from the emphasis he
lays on the 'relativity' of the mean, but from the
analogy of the arts, which, in spite of his dis-
claimer, really underlies his whole discussion.
What Aristotle has in view is the limitation im-
posed on the passions and desires, not by any arti-
ficial average or working compromise, but by the
ideal form of individual life. As the artist works
at the parts with his eye upon the whole, so it is
the form of the individual. If the individual
must have in view in fixing the limits within
which particular impulses and desires may find a
place. The order, however, as the latter part of
the definition indicates, may be a very
individual one. The standard is not to be looked
for in the broken outlines of the lives of ordinary
people, but in the best type of humanity, the 'wise
man,' who represents in the fullest manner the
un-broken continuity of individual, social, and spiritual
existence.  

(b) Personality.—While the harmonious adjust-
ment of the elements in man's nature—material
and spiritual, individual and social—is the key-
note of classical Greek Ethics, the manifold
obstructions to it, which to the next generation
seemed to call for a withdrawal from what is
irrelevant and for concentration on the relevant,
tended to shift the same concrete purpose to the
individual, from citizenship to independent person-
ality. True as this conception is when rightly
interpreted, the ambiguity which surrounds it
has proved to ask for the help of a more subtle thought in
the material world, but even from the qualities
and capacities through which the will itself finds
expression: 'I am what I am; all else is mere
accident and limitation.' But only a formalism
such as that which was the chief share of the
Stoics could seek for the moral standard in such
an abstraction. To be a 'person' in this sense is
to be the least that we can be without ceasing to be
human; 'something,' as it has been called,
'contemplative in the very expression.' We reach
a more concrete, though still a partial, view of
personality when we conceive of it as the self
which, in virtue of the material separation of the
body and other forms of 'property,' has claims
against other similar selves. It is the prominence
assigned in modern times to the rights of person-
ality in this (which is necessarily an exclusive)
sense that has given rise to the exceptions of the standard of ethical value. Hegel's
motto, 'Be a person, and respect others as persons,'
limited by him to the field of abstract or legal
right, is taken by the individualist as equivalent to
the highest expansion of the moral conscious-
ness. It is only when we come to a third sense of
the word—which includes the other two while
differing from them—that we can accept this
equivalence. Giving meaning, to the power we
have of separating between ourselves and our
conditions (including the various elements in
our own nature), there is in every rational being
the power of moulding them into a definite form for
the furtherance of some concrete purpose to our
interest. Giving meaning also to the capacities
of mind and body, and to the material objects
which are their instrument, and justifying the
claim the individual puts forth, that the
use of them, there is the capacity of permuting
them with a life which is not merely individual
to himself, but unites him with others who have
a joint interest in their utilization. If we call this
attitude of purposeful 'personality,' we can see
how it is realized, not in proportion to the
extent to which concrete interests are excluded and
the individual atomized, but in proportion
as particular interests find their place in some

1 Bosanquet op. cit. p. 333.
2 See Bosanquet The Principle of Individuality and Value London, 1912, App. II.
universal and inclusive interest, whereby the individual enters sympathetically into the spirit of the whole of which he is a part, and is thus raised above himself.

'Personality,' says W. Wallace, 'presupposes within us a moral principle which, from the beginning, gives to the individual a potency of uniﬁcation of interests and principles, and which can, occasionally at least, raise that potency to an actual position in society. ... Without us, that would be a system of society in each where has his place appointed, and through which he is bound to a special restricted purpose; but still, while occupying that place, his inner and moral personality must remain intact. He is no doubt a mere unit, but a unit which can create and produce in himself the whole society of which he forms a part.'

(c) My station and its duties.—In view of this statement of the full meaning of the principle of personality, we can understand how the latter element in it should have come in recent Ethics to be made the head of one corner. 'To be moral,' says Bradley, 'I must will my station and its duties.' Though associated with a reﬁned form of idealism in Bradley's writings, this takes us back to Plato's homely deﬁnition of virtue as ἅρμα τῶν ἰδρῶν. There is, however, this difference between the ancient and the modern deﬁnition—namely, that it is accepted by Plato only on the assumption that society has undergone a transformation which has eliminated the element of accident that plays a large part in Kight's or our places to individuals. It was possible, indeed, for a former time to conceive of a man's station as assigned to him by a deeper Wisdom that knew man's needs. But, interpreted in the modern spirit, there is nothing to be held the element of naked accident to which most of us owe our station and function in life, and which makes all talk of a secret harmony, where it is not treason to a better order, in nine cases out of ten an obstructive form of its. The difﬁculty can be met only by a return to the Platonic, which is also the modern democratic, point of view, and which conceives of the fullest life alike for individuals and society as attainable only by assigning to each the place which his own developed capacities best enable him to ﬁll.

Even so the difﬁculty remains for us as for Plato, that at its best the idea of a 'station' suggests ﬁxity and exclusiveness, and in its very terms spells external pressure and spiritual imprisonment for the great mass, and particularly for the industrial part of society. Although no one is likely to claim that the practical difﬁculty which a period of mechanical industry like the British induces by reference to abstract philosophical theory, it is yet important to realize that it is, to a large extent, the result of the modern idea of fullness of life and concentration upon one or other of its particular phases. The assumption that comparative happiness is identical with multitude of interests and pursuits is a mistake parallel with that of assuming that fulness of life is achieved by the mere knowledge, and is open to the same correction. As is the depth with which a man realises the scientiﬁc spirit in a particular ﬁeld, so the variety of his intellectual interests, that is the measure at once of his work and of his satisfaction in it, so is the depth and intensity with which he realises his particular social obligations, not the multitude of the functions he performs or the area he covers, that gives meaning and fulness to his life.

V. THE METAPHYSICS OF ETHICS.—Tempting though it is to pursue the social applications of ethical principle suggested in the previous sections, it is here more important to follow the philosophy of its subject to the point where it connects with the problems of religion.

It was with a true instinct that Kant perceived that, however separable metaphysical problems might be from science, they were bound up with the very existence of morality. Like the corresponding problems in the theory of knowledge, they may be condensed into two. (1) As the recognition of the relativity of human knowledge raises the question of the ground of knowledge, we claim that the world responds to the claims of our intelligence, in other words, is knowable at all, so the discovery of the relativity of ethical ideals to social well-being raises the question whether they are applicable beyond it, whether they ﬁnd any support in the actual course of the world as a whole.

(2) As behind the question of the knowledge of the world there lies the question of the kind of reality we must assign to the world of goodness, so behind the question of the goodness of the world there lies the question of the kind of reality we must assign to the world of goodness.

I. Is the universe good?—To make clear to ourselves the precise form in which the ﬁrst of these problems faces us to-day, we may start from Kant himself. In answer to the question, What is the foundation of our faith in duty? Kant, as is well known, appealed to the reality of the supersensible source from which its imperative issues. But, when it was asked, in turn, on what our belief in this reality rests, the only answer forthcoming was that a categorical imperative is inconceivable without it. To this it seemed sufﬁcient to reply that the alternative to which Kant sought to shut us up is one in which, after the reality of a supersensible goodness or the unreality of the categorical imperative—does not represent the situation. There is a third possibility, we may say, that morality with a system of absolute imperatives. It is, indeed, impossible, as Kant saw, to base morality on self-interest. But the imperative that overrides the maxims of self-interest carries us, it may be urged, to no absolute Being containing in himself the conditions of the union of Nature and human life, of happiness and virtue, but only to the relative being of human society. Like the world of scientiﬁc knowledge, Kant's own showing, has a claim to no more than hypothetical truth, the moral world is founded on a hypothetical, not on an absolute, imperative: not 'Do this, though the heavens fall,' but 'Do this, as you would have social life upon earth.'

This may be said to be the criticism which, in the next generation, Comte passed upon Kant, the Positivism of France upon the Formalism of Prussia. Its effect was to sweep away the point of contact between the supersensible and the sensible, which Kant thought he had discovered in morality, and to carry into the moral sphere the break between the reality of things and the formal understanding of them which has sought to establish in logical theory. Man's life founded on the conception of a good which realises itself in an organism of social activities appears as something rounded off into itself in a world in which stands an essential incongruity to its ideals, and contains no pledge of their fulﬁlment, but, on the contrary, so far as we can see, after engendering them dooms them to ultimate disappointment. With Positivism the main issue of modern Ethics came into view.

An exhaustive criticism of the theory is here out of the question (see POSITIVISM). The question it raises is whether the logic which enables us to see that the individual owes all that he is to the unconscious co-operation of society ought not also to convince us that the being of society is rendered possible only through the co-operation of the universe as a whole. It is quite true that it is the conflict with one's own inward and inward forces that all that is of most value in human life has been achieved. Philosophy is wrong if it seeks to minimize the evils of earthquake and pestilence, war and social injustice, as picturesque shedding in the best of all possible worlds. It is within its right when it in—
sists that the good which we know and value is conceivable only in a world governed by just the laws of nature and mind which we can illustrate. So obvious is this extension of the logic of Positivism, that we are not surprised to find the opposition of cosmic forces recognized by Comte himself as a necessary condition of human development. Without it, he tells us, 'man's feelings would become vague, his intelligence wanton, and his activity sterile.' If this yoke were taken away, the problem of human life would remain insoluble, since evolution would never conquer egotism. But, assisted by the supreme fatality, universal love is able habitually to secure that personality shall be subordinated to sociality. The surprise is that, having established this relation between condition

2. Is there a higher in the universe than goodness? In order to establish the supremacy of the Good, the appeal, we have seen, is to the standard of inner coherency. But, having established before this court its rights against its enemies, the bad and the imperfect, the Good has to face the tribunal on its own merits; and recent criticism has not been slow to point out the flaw in its own case. In its efforts after self-expression the will seeks to include all the elements of life in one harmonious whole. The life which we judge to be truly good must, on the one hand, be all-inclusive, and to this end must even be expansive, and on the other, it must bring its powers and possessions into harmonious relation with one another, and be at home with itself. But, however logically inseparable these two requirements may be, they manifest themselves in reality as two separate ideals: on the one hand, the ideal of self-sacrifice (whether this be to persons, as in altruism, or to impersonal objects, as in devotion to science or art); on the other, the ideal of self-realization. And these are, in the last resort, the two sides of human life, the two faces of the same coin. And it is this duality which makes this problem untouched.

3. To find the solution of this problem, we must distinguish between, on the one hand, the idea of the universe as a harmonious whole, and, on the other, the idea of the universe as a world which, while harmonious, is not complete, but is in a state of incomplete development. Both these ideas are compatible with the idea of the universe as a world which is in a state of incomplete development. Both these ideas are compatible with the idea of the universe as a world which is in a state of incomplete development.

4. It is not surprising that consequences thus uncompromisingly deduced from idealist principles should be opposed by the ethical protest. Not only did they run counter to ordinary opinion as to the supremacy of morality; they seemed to threaten the very springs of action. If all we call good and bad is but a passing shadow on the screen of time in a reality itself timeless and self-contained, human enterprise and effort seem to be doomed to fatality. All aspiration after the freedom to plan and to achieve is faced by the sphinx-like calm of a universe already at peace with itself and secure against all innovation. The signal for the revolt against these apparent deductions was given by W. James's Will to Believe, which for the brilliancy and irresponsibility of its attack has no precise parallel in modern philosophy, except the better known and equally favourite of the heart against the deadening weight of Kantian formalism. It was followed by a wave of wide-spread reaction against the idealism of philosophy, expressed in the names of Humanism, Personal Idealism, Pragmatism (p. 92), as it is yet further from existentialism. What is common to all these names is the attempt to restore flesh and blood to the ghostly make-believes which the older Idealism was supposed to have left to do the work of human purposes, and the insistence on that end upon movement and process as constituting the life of things, the openness of the universe to all kinds of unstrait interpreta-

5. It is not likely that so vigorous a movement springs wholly from ambiguous words. Yet it is certain that the movement is possible until the ambiguities which attach to such central ideas as 'appearance,' 'process,' 'purposive activity' are removed. With regard to the first, the distinction between appearance and illusion is, of course, vital. Because a thing is not in the real sense of the word, it does not follow that it is an illusion. In illusion we take something to be what it is not; an appearance is that which cannot be taken simply as it is. It is true, to take the sun rising for an actual movement of the sun and the earth's rise; the rising itself is, on the other hand, an appearance which, before it can be taken for reality, has to be supplemented by other facts which in explaining transmute it. Without itself representing the whole truth, one concept may be nearer to it, i.e. include more of the facts and stand for a more harmonious combination of them, than another. From this it follows that to deny ultimate truth is compatible with recognizing a high coefficient of relative validity. This is the logical equivalence which is true of every concept. It is that degree of reality which might be better called 'degree of validity.' It may be summed up in the propositions: every- thing which is at all must have a basis of some kind in the inner unity; short of itself being the whole, this unity, just as for that reason the other, is incomplete and must be incomplete and break down in contradiction; this point is more remote according to the degree of inclusiveness and harmony which the concept represents; but ultimate truth or relative validity, nor does it prove that the whole could be what it is without the relatively invalid part. Returning, with this distinction in mind, to the case of willed action, it is true that will rests on the distinction of an actual and an ideal, a now and a not yet, and must partake of the unrest of that relation. So far as it does so, it falls short of the highest reality. On the other hand, will represents a high degree of concreteness and internal stability. In it, as we saw, the elements of the inner life find their unity. It faces and breaks through the self and not-self, uniting itself with the external world in the works and institutions we call civilization, and in the long run yielding place to nothing that does not come forward as a deeper and broader sign of the same self and not-self. So the reality of blind instinct and desire, so, we have seen, morality is the reality of the will. In morality will comes to its own, and is at one with itself. But it does not come to this in a world which, at the end of time, has no other reward for the faithful than the opening up of a further vista which dwarfs present achievement and dooms one to a renewal of the conflict at a higher level. This does not
prove that morality is an illusion, or that it rests upon a make-believe. It merely proves that it is not the highest form of experience. Above it stands reality—what it means to realize in which morality ends, and seeking to heal them with the conviction that the aspect the world presents to the good will is not the final and only reality. Yet we must again add that, though transformed, morality is not destroyed. It does not simply fade out of the religious consciousness. It survives in religion as it survives in fine art, giving substance and significance to what otherwise would be a vague and meaningless mysticism, and, so far as it is the immediate basis of the form of consciousness that seems to be the most real of our experiences, itself partaking of that reality.

With this account there seems no reason why idealists of all types should not so far agree. Even pragmatic or 'personal idealism' might be willing to accept it as another way of putting its own contentation that the real is that which serves a purpose. It may be that any particular form of human experience may be unsatisfactory without therefore being valueless, and how one may be of more value than another. On the other hand, we can understand how it may still seem to be an intangible element of the whole system of relative reality, or, if it be preferred, relative experience, to the absolute reality or the absolute experience. It is here that the pragmatist sees his opportunity to press the question, 'Why hamper ourselves with an absolute at all, which serves only to stultify our previous results: Is the relative and the finite a necessary element in the absolute and the infinite? Then the latter itself becomes an irreconcilable contradiction, a seed of unreality into the heart of our all-real. Is it, on the other hand, unnecessary? Then is the real altogether real, the whole together complete without it; movement and purpose are, after all, illusion.'

There is, we believe, no other way of meeting this difficulty than by insisting on a clearer statement of what is meant by process and creation. If it is an error to represent reality in terms of fixed entities, like the popular conception of the Platonic idea, it is surely no less an error to represent it as mere change, though that be the change of a conscious will and intelligence. What it gives value to life in general, and to the life of mind and will in particular, is not that it initiates change and novelty, but that in the change it maintains the relative and unchangeable relations of participation in which is the condition of its own self-maintenance. This means that there are differences of reality in purposes themselves, according as they embody more or less of the unity of the whole of which they are parts. But to recognize this is to recognize that all time-process gets its value from a relation to a whole or ideal which cannot in any intelligible sense be said to be itself a mere series of processes. It is eternity.

In asking pragmatists to admit this, we are, in fact, merely asking them to realize more fully the meaning of their own contention for the abandonment of the Socratic notion of reality as a matter, in favor of that of subject. This is the true Copernican revolution in philosophy, must carry with it a far more thorough attempt than is yet common, to substitute the idea of mind over all things, and, again, to add to the idea of things and their attributes. Thinkers of both camps may reasonably be asked to apply more courageously the notion of self-conscious life as the idea of things not of process of progress—of thought and will alike as finding their reality not in mere movement but in more fully organized, and thus more deeply established, forms of self-expression. So regarded, the true conception of the infinite may well be that of an ideal which represents in its completeness what the finite seeks and in which it finds, as its purpose.

As an ideal it is more than any of the finites or any aggregate of them, yet it depends upon the expression of itself by the finites in so far as actual reality is itself an element in that completeness. If it is an expression of an absolute reality as an 'already' actual, it is no less an error to conceive of the actual moment of time as possessing any value apart from the degree in which it expresses the absolute reality, and it takes of eternity. Whether this involves a further advance—return, it may be, from the notion of subject to an enriched notion of substance—is a question on which other articles may be expected to throw further light. In any case, ethical philosophy has nothing to lose but everything to gain by adhering itself with the most thoroughgoing criticism of its ideals in the light of a sane monism.

See also art. ETHICS AND MORALITY.


(J. H. MUIRHEAD.
ETHICS (Rudimentary). — The procedure adopted in the present article is as follows. (1) A broad characterization is attempted of the lower culture phase of human life, carrying with it a specific type of ethics. (2) The main determinants of this phase of life are briefly analyzed, with the object of showing how physical causes, on the one hand, and, spiritual motives, on the other, combine to sway the course of human life; the sphere of moral evolution being identified with that of the spiritual activities in question. (3) The particular determinations to which these moralizing forces give rise are rapidly surveyed, and some of the salient features of savage conduct at its most intelligent are exhibited as the result of ethical or quasi-ethical sanctions.

1. The general type of conduct prevailing in rudimentary society. — It has been assumed that the lower culture is sufficiently homogeneous to lend itself to what might almost be described as the method of the composite photograph. Though it is true that higher culture admits of similar treatment, it is convenient here to figure it as likewise a single phase, for the simple purpose of bringing out the essential features of the rudimentary condition in a way of contrast with developed society. It is necessary to conceive of two phases of society (they are in no sense 'ages'), which may be severally distinguished as the synchronic and the syntetic. As the etymology of these terms implies, in the one phase customs form the bond of society; in the other, ends or ideals. The one is a reign of habit, the other a reign of reflection. The one results from a subconscious, the other from a conscious, selection of ethical standards.

At once the most striking and the most significant of the characteristics of the synchronic life of savages is that it is public, in the sense that it admits of little or no privacy. Gregariousness, it has been said, is not association. A contiguous with others is too close and constant hindrances that development of personality and independent character upon which syncenic society depends. In synchronic society the normal individual has no chance of withdrawing into himself. Hence he does not reflect; he imitates. Now, when every one imitates every one else, it might seem that a vicious circle must be formed, and society must come to a standstill so far as any real progress goes. As a matter of fact this is not the case. For the most part, however, the successful readjustment of the unconscious in the subconscious and the unconscious in the other forms the bond of society. (b) It follows that, within a given society there is always a plurality of circles, not necessarily concentric, within which symbiosis takes place in varying degree, the true centre and radiating point of moral influence will always be that particular circle within which the closest and most permanent symbiosis occurs. This circle of most effective symbiosis may be termed the social focus. It will be for one type of community the family, for another the kin-group, for another the village, whilst more exceptionally and for particular classes it will be the men's house, the secret society, the military regiment, or what not. Even if it be not always easy to answer the question, it is at least worth asking in every case. Where, for these savage folk, is the nearest equivalent to our 'home'? For not only does charity begin at home, but society, when social life is at its best, occurs as a kind of symbiosis, long beyond the social body, and it may almost be said to end there. (c) It follows that, corresponding with this social symbiosis, there is likewise what Lévy-Bruhl is justified in calling a mental symbiosis,1 and even a symbiosis of intellectual and ethical life (Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures, 94). Or, as Durheim-Mauus put it (De quelques Formes primitives de

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1. If one or two of the most powerful men settled upon the advisable course of action, and were strong enough to enforce it, the population would be more or less powerless. But in the absence of these conditions, a somewhat larger number of men would naturally possess the power to act, and it would be the business of all concerned to agree upon and carry out.
classification,' *A Soc. vi. [1901-02] 70,* the mental attitude is fundamentally *sociocentric.* The actual way in which the folk themselves are grouped together provides the notion of the way in which all the others are hit by it. Exactly the same scheme of sympathy and antipathies governs things in general as governs the men themselves. Certain animals, certain plants, a vast number of other outstanding varieties of animate and inanimate things, belong to my group and belong together, whereas your group owns another class of things, and the associations thus arising constitute the essential natures of the things themselves. The 'confusion of categories,' with which Hobhouse (*Morals in Evolution,* ii. 9) charges rudimentary thought, is merely a confusion of such categories as we have since obtained by a slowly-developed attention to the intrinsic relations holding between things in themselves. The savage does not confuse his own categories, but these are almost meaningless to us because strictly relative to the idiosyncrasies of his particular little society. If he is a member of the bear-totem, bear-meat is poisoned (unless taken homoeopathically), whether bear-meat in itself injuriously affects the human stomach in itself or not; and so on. Now, whilst this attitude of ours is as far as possible unnecessary (for we conquer Nature only by obeying her), it positively extends, in a way that only the more religious amongst civilized men may faintly appreciate, the sphere of his ethical interests. His whole universe being socialized and anthropomorphized, it becomes for the savage a battle-ground of quasi-personal powers that are in league, or, more strictly, in literal synthesis, either with him and his, or with other human beings who are more or less against him and his. Consequently, lacking our mechanical control over Nature, he has little or nothing but his ethics to depend upon—his ways of dealing with friend and foe. So far is the savage from being immoral, as some have called him, that morality may truly be said to be his all-in-all; though doubtless it is a morality which in general and on the whole he does not think out, but rather lives out, feeling his way by sheer social tact with his human neighbours, and with that enviroring universe which is for him as but human society writ large.

*The determinants of conduct in rudimentary society.—* The synchronic phase of human society having been generally characterized, it becomes necessary in the next place to designate the general factors or determinants that combine to produce it. From an ethical point of view the main object must be to show how, like every other phase of human life, it is hung somewhere between the opposite poles of physical necessity and moral freedom. One set of determinants may be classed as *physical,* in the wide sense which includes the psycho-physical. They will be dealt with under the two broad headings of 'Heredity' and 'Environment.' The other set of determinants may be termed *moral.* They will be considered under the two heads of 'Social tradition' and 'Personal initiative.'

(1) *Heredity.*—That the laws of heredity (p. 88) apply to man admits of no doubt. The working of those laws, on the other hand, is at present only dimly understood. Now, it is only too easy to suppose that what science cannot for the moment grasp, it will all the more deny. But Ethics is apt to ignore heredity, namely, because to admit that some men are born with a greater capacity for morality than others is, from the normative point of view, unedifying, at any rate at first sight. Nevertheless, it is important to allow fully for the congenital dispositions that form the *terminus a quo* of moral evolution. The effects of heredity, as it applies to man, are palpably manifested in those differences of physical type which are due to what is vaguely known as race, or the race-factor. Even here science has failed to establish a satisfactory kind of relationship between any physical feature and a specific shape of head, type of hair, colour, or any other physical feature proving a sufficient mark of descent. The fact remains, however, that certain physical traits of physical type have been handed on, along more or less traceable lines, from the dawn of history, and seem likely to persist so long as sexual selection remains what it is amongst uncivilized and civilized peoples alike. Less palpably, but no less certainly, there is a steady elimination in process within any given human society in favour of those physical types that are relatively immune as regards certain recurrent forms of disease. So, the student of Ethics, however, looks chiefly in the mental rather than in the physical effects attributable to heredity. But a satisfactory criterion of these is even harder to find. The more objectionable thing is the force which best sums up the inherent part of mind) treats it, not as a determinate mechanism, but rather as a disposition to which a certain measure of plasticity essentially belongs. Thus Hobhouse (p. 86) notes that 'the strong moral tendency (by which we conquer Nature only by obeying her)' is the strictly moral sense, which is to say that an individual whose moral will is found to vary greatly in individuals, to be quite fallible, often imperfect and capable from an early stage of employing elementary reasoning in its service.' Again, McDougall, in his *Social Psychology,* seems to admit that instinct, owing to its intrinsic plasticity, passes over into intelligence without observable transition. Nevertheless, he makes the following reservation. Every instinct on its physical side, he maintains, consists of three parts—an afferent, a central, and an efferent or motor. Correspondingly, on its psychical side, cognitive, affective, and conative activities are manifested in the same order. The plasticity belonging to the instinct, however, shows itself mainly at the two ends of the process. To the central part, on the contrary, and hence corresponding with the affective manifestations, he believes a relatively high degree of constancy to attach. His criterion of instinct, therefore, is the presence of some specific emotion. But if this criterion be adopted—and at present no better one seems to be forthcoming—we reach a position where, from our ethical point of view, is almost paradoxical. On the one hand, our emotions become closely associated with the hereditable and predetermined side of our nature. Yet, on the other hand, emotion is a root-factor in moral development as, for instance, two of Schopenhauer's chief principles, the will to live as a principle of action, and the will to live as a principle of passion. This plasticity is more or less traceable to the fact that both *sideral* and *sociocentric* processes of our nature are not and cannot be affected by education. And is morality largely a matter of race? If indeed it be so—and science as science must seek the truth, whether it seems at first sight edifying or not—if instinct (the facts) be, as McDougall suggests, the function of intelligence simply to refine on a pre-existing fund of sound natural tendencies, by providing these with objects on the one hand and modes of realization on the other, whereby they are aptly satisfied, then how to breed sound natures becomes the all-absorbing interest of ethical science. The crux of heredity must be faced and solved, instead of blindly trusting to the education to turn moral sows' ears into silk purses.

It remains to add that the popular view which ascribes a greater innate susceptibility to emotion to savages as compared with civilized men is in all probability false. The tests devised by experimental psychology, so far as they carry us, tend to show that savages are emotionally more sluggish.
and obtuse (cf. the experiments on white and on black women [F. A. Kellor, Experimental Sociology, London, 1901, p. 77]). The source of the fallacy lies in the prominence given to emotional manifestations by the conditions of the social life of savages. It is true that the emotions are exhibited, but, analogously, and symmetrically, to the effect that emotions are intensified whilst ideas are neutralized; the reason being that the emotions are transferred by imitation of the movements of the ancestors and assist their outward expression, whereas ideas are not transferred under conditions prejudicial to reflection. As Lévy-Brühl (p. 426) puts it, we should speak not so much of the collective ideas of a savage group as of collective mental states of an extreme emotional intensity, wherein idea is as yet not differentiated from the movements and acts that embody it. Nevertheless, the civilized man is not deficient in emotion because his higher training enables him to keep cool. He cannot do without the physical basis, say, of courage, any more than the savage can, but, on the contrary, needs it all the more because an intelligent application of his impulsive tendency to the needs of the situation demands a regulation of those more definite movements of the nerves which are the by-products rather than the springs of intense activity.

(2) Environment.—The term 'environment' (q.v.) may not at first cover all those influences, proceeding from the circumstances wherein a man experiences existence takes place, which appear to control the course of that experience rather than, conversely, to be themselves controlled thereby. The line between these opposite controls cannot be drawn exactly. Thus the mother's body constitutes an antenatal environment which the child itself does not in any way control; yet the mother up to a certain point can do so. Or, again, geographical conditions, the distribution of land and water, and so on, might seem at first sight beyond human sway altogether; yet such a work as that of Marsh, The World as modified by Human Action (London, 1874), makes it plain that intelligently, and more often unintelligently, man can affect his physical environment for better, or, still more easily, for worse. Once more, food-supply, as dependent on the local fauna and flora, does not absolutely condition human life, inasmuch as this reacts selectively upon it, so that the whole terrestrial globe is made to respond to the requirements of the civilized breakfast-table. Lastly, what may be termed the distribution of the free environment — meaning, by free environment, the pressure exerted on one area of population by another, with the resultant wars, emigrations, and so forth, and the pressure exerted within the same area of population by the various parts, whence arises such a phenomenon as the rush to the towns—constitutes an objective condition with an influence of its own. Yet, on the other hand, distribution of population, and its ultimate causes, namely, rate of fertility, mobility due to facility of communica- tions, and the like, are within limits subject in their turn to human policy, not to say politics. In short, what is known as force of circumstances must be treated as a determinant of man conduct, even whilst the aspiration to rise above circumstances, that is, to make them rather than allow them to make us, may legitimately figure amongst the highest of our ethical motives.

Thus, there is considerable scope for the new department of science which its founder, Ratzel, names 'Anthropo-geography,' and for the kindred branch of study termed by Durkheim and his school 'Social Morphology.' To say at present a danger, however, lest this type of physical explanation be overdone. Man may be, as Ratzel says, 'a piece of the earth,' but he is not merely that, by any means. Indeed, it may be expected that it is especially at the stage of savagery, when man is far more dependent on his immediate environment, that the application of these methods is likely to prove fruitful. Thus, Mauze in a study of the environting conditions of Eskimo life ('Essai sur les variations saisonnières des sociétés Eskimos,' M.A. See. ix. 1901) has shown, exactly in the sense that there is an extent a 'function of the physical factors of climate, food-supply, and distribution of population taken together. On the other hand, when civilization is similarly treated, as in the case of the 'economic materialism' of Marx, there is likely to be taken account of 'imponderables,' or, in other words, of ideas and ideals. Even in regard to savagery, however, it must not be forgotten that man, as known to anthropology and pre-historic archaeology, is always more or less the 'lord of creation,' the master of his environment; so much so, that even during the great Ice Age in Europe, when the environment on which they depended proved too much for so many animal species, man, thanks to the use of fire and other mechanical devices, managed to hold his ground and to cultiv- ate a high type of fine art into the bargain. In- deed, man's environment, as contrasted with his weakness in coping with the human environment, namely, rate and distribution of population, is perhaps the main source of his need for an effective Ethics.

Even at the present day, under civilization, a leading problem of human life is how to keep pace ethically with the changes in the social economy that are due to material progress.

(3) Social tradition.—At this point it becomes necessary to pass to the consideration of another set of determinants, which are not physical, as are heredity and environment, but moral. Social tradition, of course, may readily be represented as a sort of environment, or atmosphere wherein an indi- vidual is surrounded and conditioned ab extra. But it is safer to attend chiefly to the psychical elements, sentiments, ideas, and so on, with which this en- vironment or atmosphere is, so to speak, charged. Another way of putting the same thing is to say that the influence exerted on a man by social tradition makes itself felt within him in a way quite different from that in which environment or even heredity may themselves feel. Social tradition makes itself felt within a man essentially, that is, most characteristically, as a sanction. A sanction may be defined as a judgment of validity or invalidity to which some degree of pressure is applied, or which is regarded (sanctio in Roman law is that clause in a legislative enactment which invokes a curse on the offender). Arising as it does in a more or less spontaneous and unforced impetus, the influence of social tradition soon ripens into a sense of 'ought,' representing the will of society, or, at any rate, of some power greater and wiser and older and more lasting than oneself. Such is the fact, however one may try to explain it. Social Psychology, which is more concerned content with a limited type of explanation, unlike Metaphysics, which seeks the ultimate explanation, would account for the fact by postulating, as the complement to our initiative tendency, a tendency to stimulate and assist imitation in others, and especially in the young. Thus, whilst the chick imitates the hen, as we say, 'instinctively,' so likewise does the hen no less instinctively encourage the chick to imitate. In this tendency to encourage imitation we may discern various subordinate types of activity, notably three, namely the tendencies to impress, to punish, and to persuade. Correspond- ingly, the care is embodied in social tradition may be reduced, in the interests of a broad and drastic treatment of the subject, to three—religion, law, and education. These are the three main types of sanctions.

(a) Religion.—The function of religion, regarded
as a sanction, is to inculcate the Good by investing it with impressiveness. The religiously impressive is the social, and the Good. The idea of the sacred consists especially in the gradual differentiation of what is both sacred and good from what is or appears to be sacred, but is, nevertheless, at bottom bad. Amongst savages, the notion of tabu (a Polynesian term, embodying, like taboo, a wide-spread savage notion, i.e. mystically powerful. Now, to be dangerous, because powerful, in a mystic (i.e., mysterious or supernatural) way, is a quality that may attach to bad things as well as to good. Hence religion, which is concerned with the mystically good, has at first much in common with magic, which only in the long run is cut off from religion to become a means for all 'trafficiking with the devil,' i.e., for all use of magical formulae to effect bad and anti-social ends. From the psychological point of view, sacredness corresponds with the sense of awe, as excited by the display of supernatural power, in the magic, which McDougall (op. cit. p. 131, cf. 305) plausibly resolves into a trinity of primary emotions, namely, a fear which drives away, a curiosity which attracts, and a submission which disarmeth existence. Ace, therefore, may vary, according as one or other of the ingrediants prevails, from an abject and grovelling terror to an aspiring respect tempered with humility. Correspondingly, in certain aspects the religion of savages, and even of more advanced peoples, may be a religion of almost pure fear. At its most typical, however, it is in all stages of its development so closely associated with the social tradition that embodies the vital aims of each and all that its appeal is sympathetic rather than minatory and purely coercive. Social tradition at the synnomic stage of society, namely under conditions of symbiosis, when mutual imitation of the outward expression of emotion helps to intensify men's feelings, is capable of exciting awe in several ways at once; and, so long as the congregational forms of religion are kept up, the same phenomena will recur. The imposing exhortations, the mystic orisons, amounting in strange prescriptions, the very oddity and uselessness of which invest the sound remainder with the majesty of twilight. Secondly, it is ancient, its origin being lost in the dreadful yet glorious past, and calling upon the myth-making faculty to consecrate it by stories about supernatural Creators, first parents, culture-heroes, totemic ancestors, and so forth. Thirdly, it is always more or less sacred, its repositories and editors being a ruling and relatively educated class, which rarely if ever feels awe towards precisely the same objects as do the less enlightened, the women, the young, and, in a word, the uninitiated, but is nevertheless in normal conditions subject to a similar but more refined awe as it confronts some more ultimate secret. In these ways, then, and in others, religion consecrates the Good as such to a transcendent life imputed by each generation to the next, and by rendering it impressive helps the rising generation to imitate and assimilate it. Hence, the function of law, as a sanction, is to punish transgressions against the Good as embodied in the social tradition. Its remote origin may be what Baghot (Politics and Police, London, 1873) calls 11 persecuting tendency, which visits

with the common displeasure all departures from the strict imitation of the prevailing fashion. The name author, however, often refers to the 'wild spasms of wild justice' to which the lower savagery is liable, implies that some sense of a social Good to be maintained runs through these outbreaks of passion at first sight almost purposeless and automatic. Indeed, when public vengeance is excited by the folk as a whole from the traitor, or, again, from the breaker of tabu or the person who practises black magic, the mere fact that all assist at the infliction, is enough to make the object of the social will, to which meaning and purpose are felt to attach. It may not be so obvious at first sight how private vengeance incorporates and enforces the social tradition. Let it be noted, however, in the first place, that the juristic maxim applies here, 'What the sovereign permits he commands'; which is to say that in a society lacking a centralized authority the social will must perform manifest itself in isolated repressions of crime carried out by self-constituted judges. In the second place, private law in savage society is the affair not of individuals but of kin-groups; and the communal responsibility acknowledged by the member of a clan is a socializing force of the imperative means, by which are mainly concerned with the framing, applying, or enforcing of its punitive enactments. At an earlier stage, however, State, Church, and Society are almost one. For instance, rudimentary law is largely concerned with the violation of tabu, who is typically the criminal at this stage, whilst, conversely, rudimentary religion supplies law with dreadful forms of procedure—ordeals, oaths, and so on—with special punishments, such as costly expiratory offerings; and—most effective sanctionary influence of all—with the notion of supernatural powers at the back of the law, such as a Divine legislator, supreme author of all precedents.

(c) Education.—Under this last head may be summed up all those homelier and gentler forces of persuasion which, without show of coercion, yet none the less effectively, lead the individual member of society to submit to its traditional injunctions. Education is not merely a matter of training children, but proceeds throughout a man's life so long as he is capable of being modified by any fresh experience as far as he is conscious, or even where he is not. Education is most effective where it is not uncommon to find that initiation, which is at least as much an educational as a religious institution, is not completed at the puberty rites, but carried on far into manhood in a series of fuller initiations opening up ever wider horizons of social duty. Education, amongst savages and civilized men alike, is distinguishable only to a certain point from religion and law, being never on the one hand wholly confined to secular subjects, or on the other able wholly to dispense with punitive machinery. It must not be forgotten, however, that under this head must be included influences so kindly and intimate that the individual is hardly aware that they are the patterns and he the clay. Language itself is the greatest of educators; and yet it is the primary source of self-consciousness and self-realization. Unconsciously it generates literature, even savages having their literature of folk-tales, proverbs, songs, and so forth. In early society, however, education comes mainly of more or less tender sense, than of inward thought, and symmoric life is a perpetual pageant of dances and shows; whereas civilization is essentially the attribute of a reading public. If a single differential is sought to mark off civilization
from savagery, no better one is to be found than the invention of writing. Hereby human intelligence acquires a new dimension. The physical symbols largely make possible those mental symbols which we know as abstract ideas; and these rule our world. Ethics itself is often identified with the theory built upon certain highly abstract ideas, too abstract indeed to be generally understood, and so to exert much influence upon society at large. From the historical and comparative point of view, however, Ethics is as wide as the theory of the moral influences which, in the consciousness of mankind, are involved by less than in the

of his abstract thinking, point the way to the Good. Of these influences social tradition has now been summarily considered in its leading aspects. It remains to take note of another influence, too often overlooked, namely the initiative of the free and responsible individual.

(4) Personal initiative.—When full allowance has been made for the influences of a man's heredity, his environment, and his social tradition, is there anything left that could possibly influence him, or, indeed, that would be there to be influenced? Have we accounted for the man completely? Whatever the metaphysician may say for or against the reality of intuition from the standpoint of science, it is unnecessary at this level of science to distinguish the effects of personal initiative as in their way unique. Without entering on the question whether, apart from the individual centres of activity, human society is, or is not, a soulless thing, we need here concern ourselves only with the individual activity that is manifested in so marked a degree as to appear decisively to exert a purgative control over the course of events. History is not merely the history of great men, but, on the other hand, the human drama conceived as the mere product of a complex of impersonal forces would be like the play of Hamlet with its leading character left out. To confine our attention to the moral genius, if Socrates, or Buddha, or Christ be withdrawn from the reckoning, the source of the truly revolutionary movements usually associated with their names is nowhere to be found. At the same time, the type of explanation which relies on social as contrasted with individual forces for its clue can and must delimit the province of personal initiative by showing where the initiative is to be sought or hindered. Thus, the levelling influences of synecistic society prove normally, though not invariably, fatal to individuality, as has already been said. On the other hand, specialization of social functions encourages responsibility, though it does not necessarily produce it. The mere fact that the social system requires individuals to be sorted out and educated each for his special task, gives potential initiative the chance of maturing. For example, it is within the relatively specialized class of medicine-men that the social reformer is especially apt to arise; while, in a lesser degree the specialization of sex functions and consequent limitation of the womans to domestic duties permits to the male as such a greater opportunity of realizing such originality as may be in him. It remains to add that, ethically, the selfishness which lies in a high degree of initiative involves a self-respect which is not inconsistent with self-sacrifice, but, on the contrary, tends to unite the two principles as aspects of one and the same Good. Even the self-regard of savages, whilst it manifests itself as a love of self-decoration, or as boastfulness, or as the habit of retaliating on an affront, leads likewise to the self-devotion of the warrior and leader, and foreshadow the developed individuality which rises above individualism to the disinterested realization of the idea of Good for its own sake.

3. The determinations of conduct in rudimentary society.—That which the determinants of conduct discussed in the previous section combine together under the term 'social instinct' may be termed the determinations. Of such determinations, those that are reckoned by those concerned to make for the Good are usually known as types of virtues, conduct, or virtues. A classification of virtues so far as the study of their historical evolution must be founded on a consideration of those relations in which the moral subject, the individual, who seeks the Good, is involved by less than in the framework of his abstract thinking, point the way to the Good. Of these influences social tradition has now been summarily considered in its leading aspects. It remains to take note of another influence, too often overlooked, namely the initiative of the free and responsible individual.

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done, and enrol themselves amongst the more highly civilized nations. We speak with Plato of 'conversion,' but the term is inexact; and it would be truer to say that human nature, being peculiarly virtuous, needs merely to be relieved of its ignorance of the ways and means by which virtue is acquired. The problem for Eugenics is how to eliminate the unintelligent and unpleasing rather than the bad at heart—to eliminate the traits of the human organism, not by killing individuals (for such butchery but depraves those who kill), but, more radically and yet mercifully, by preventing them from being born at all.

(1) The domestic virtues.—Tylor has said: 'The basis of society is the family' (CE xxi. 711), thus endorsing the time-honoured dictum of Aristotle. One school of anthropologists, who favour what may be termed the 'homo-theory' of the origin of society, might be inclined to retort: 'First find your savage family.' Their hypotheses, however, concerning promiscuity, communal marriage, or what not, frankly refer to some remote past which, if it ever existed, lies at any rate quite beyond the range of scientific observation. At most they find amongst existing savages a few alleged survivals of a social condition when there was no marrying in a wider sense that extends to certain of the lower animals no less than to man, is defined by Westermarck (Hist. of Hum. Marriage, 1894, p. 357) as 'a more or less durable connection between male and female, lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of the offspring.' Marriage proper, on the other hand, may be defined with Lewis Webber, as 'kinship, and Religion, London, 1911, p. 2), as 'an exclusive relation of one or more men to one or more women, based on custom, recognized and supported by public opinion, and, where law exists, by law.' Now, it is a curious fact that marriage proper occurs amongst those savages who in most respects have the most rudimentary culture of all, such as the Andaman Islanders, Veddas, and Bushmen. Yet with societies of a slightly higher grade, notably such as have totemism in one or another form, it is often the case that the family is somewhat overshadowed by the kin-group ('clan' under mother-right, 'gens' under father-right). In other words, which remains her knock out, is not often feebly, inasmuch as they belong to different kin-groups, mother and children or father and children are in intimate communion with each other as members of a kin-group which includes persons whose relationship in the actual matter of blood is distant or perhaps non-existent (though usually blood-relationship is imputed by means of the signment of a common ancestry). It remains true, however, that, whether it be represented by the family, or by some quasi-familial institution, the kin-group, the communal household, or what not, there is always for the savage a 'social focus,' a home-circle, where the virtues pertaining to the social intercourse are fostered by mutual relations of special intimacy. These relations may be here briefly considered under three broad heads: (a) relations between the sexes, and, in particular, between husband and wife; (b) relations between young and old, and, in particular, between parents and children; (c) relations between kinsmen in general.

(a) The adult savage woman is normally a wife and mother, and it is as such that she is primarily related to the community regarded as a moral whole. Thus her economic duties follow directly upon these personal functions; her function is that of directly propagating and nurturing the race, whilst the function of the male is protective, that is to say, is indirectly race-preserving. If happiness consist in the exercise of unimpeded function, both sexes should be happy in the normal savage community, where there are no unmet expectations. Neither have a husband nor wife a burden of the men. Physically woman's is perhaps the harder lot. Child-bearing, indeed, is not so great a strain upon the daughter of nature as is the need of continually suckling her child until it is well and sound, but it is a great strain for her when life becomes relatively sedentary. For amongst hunting peoples not only must she carry her infant, but she is also bound to be carried in general, that the men may be at liberty to use their weapons. When it is added that the sexual life begins early, namely as soon as puberty is reached, or occasionally before, it will not seem surprising that the savage female tends to age more rapidly than the male. The male, however, is far more liable to be cut off whilst still in his prime.

Passing on to note the influence of social tradition, we come at once to the institution which more than any other determines the relative status of male and female, and in particular of husband and wife, for better or for worse. This is the custom of exogamy, or marrying outside one's kins, though usually inside the wider circle of the tribe. A few of the lowest peoples, mostly miserable remnant whose endogamy or marrying-in may be a result of degeneration, are without this practice, but it is typical of rudimentary society as a whole. What exogamy means for the man and woman who marry is that one or other must exchange the home-circle for another. Now, the morality of savages being narrow rather than lacking in intensity, the consequence is that to break with intimates and dwell among strangers involves a sojourn in a moral wilderness for whichever of the two parties is the outsider. Thus, when mother-right takes the form of the woman remaining amongst her kin and the man playing the part of a visitor liable to sorvtes, there can be no doubt that the woman's is the happier lot. Indeed, all the forms of mother-right, the technical differentia of which is merely that the mother, not the father, hands on the family name, appear normally to involve greater consideration for the mother, if Steinmetz's (Entwicklung der Strafe) statistical methods are to be trusted. As the wife normally owns the children, the husband has to fear their vengeance if he abuses his rights as consort. It remains only to add in this context that the origin of exogamy is quite obscure. There may be, as Westermarck thinks, a race-preserving instinct against in-breeding behind all. As it meets us in history, however, exogamy is a full-fledged institution at once legal and religious as regards its sanctions. See series of artt. under MARRIAGE.

Another world-wide element in the social tradition of savages that bears strongly, and on the whole very hardly, on the moral status of the woman and the wife, is the magico-religious notion concerning the sacredness of women and especially of woman's blood. Hence the long and weakening confinements at puberty and the protection in connection with child-birth. Hence the avoidance, on the part of the male, of what a woman has touched, lest the contagion of effeminacy be handed on. Hence, too, perhaps, in no small degree the formal and picturesque forms of the marriage ceremony, designed to neutralize the mystic evils likely to ensue from contact with one who is a woman and a stranger to boot. In the other scale weigh several clear advantages. Woman's dependences, under the burden of her sacred sanctity tend to render her an object of what eventually ripens into

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chivalry. Thus, amongst the Australians she is the ambassador between warring tribes, whose very body is able to cement a union of souls between them; or, again, many savages, notably amongst the tribes, take upon sexual intercourse, observed by the hunter, the warrior, the medicine-man, and so forth. Indeed, excessive sexuality, together with its perversions, is not a vice of the lower savages, despite appearances to the contrary (cf. art. CHASTITY), but rather an attribute of advanced societies, especially those that are polygamous, or, again, those in which marriage is deferred for many years past puberty. The so-called orgies of savages, or, again, the wife-lendings, and so on, have normally a ceremonial character, underlyiing which there is the notion of sexual intercourse as a means of mystic communion. On the other hand, what he considers to be regarded is between abominated by the savage, as when it takes the form of incest, that is, any violation of the exogamous rule that is not countenanced by some mystic requirement or ceremonial importance (as, e.g., occasionally in Australia). Incest, regularity excites a 'wild spasm of wild justice,' and spells death for the guilty parties. On the other hand, adultery is, so to speak, a civil affair, an offence against property, being a cause of divorce for the most part under mother-right, though under father-right it often entails severer penalties on the erring wife and her lover (the settlement of the question in any case resting wholly with the individuals concerned than with their respective kins).

Finally, as regards personal initiative, it is in her mystic character rather than as wife and mother that woman occasionally becomes a leader of society, the old woman especially, with her witch-like qualities intensified by her appearance, exerting a sway over the popular imagination that may be good or for evil. Meanwhile, the female sex as a sex is not without its share of influence in public affairs: partly because it is consolidated through having initiatory and other sacred and secret rites and attributes of its own, e.g., in the religions of Australia, and indirectly by the public ceremonies in which they have always been present, partly because they possess and know how to wield what Mill has termed 'the shrewish sanction'; and partly because the desire to shine in the eyes of the women is a male weakness, responsible for much head-hunting and similar manifestations incident to the pursuit of knightly glory.

(b) The relations of men and women have been dwelt on at length, because the woman's half of society will scarcely receive further mention here. As regards the sexes, it is divided between old and young, and those between parents and children, the former must be considered first, because primitive society is normally divided into fairly definite age-grades, and as customs tend to relate to these in their wholesale capacity. Thus, division prescribes food-tabus and other restrictions upon the young as a class, and incidentally teaches them to control their appetites. And, most conspicuous case of all, the young are subjected as a class to initiation, and their moral education is administered by the society as a whole in a form that is made impressive by solemn rites associated with the infliction of corporal punishment. Parental education, on the other hand, tends to be mild. They spare the rod, doubtless chiefly because of natural affection, but in some cases, as notably amongst the Indians of N. America, on the principle that a future warrior should brook a blow from no one. The mother tends to look after her daughter until the latter is herself a mother. Indeed, as she grows elderly, she may become the leading woman of the tribe. As far as the love of women. The son, on the other hand, is often taken away from the mother and sisters some time before puberty, and made to join the company of males, who tend to live more or less segregated from the females in the society and lore. Education, as imparted by either parent in the case of both girls and boys, is a mixture of technical and moral instruction, reminding us of the Persian system as reported by Herodotus (i. 136), 'to ride a horse, to shoot with a bow, and to tell the truth'; though it would seem that the deepest moral lessons are acquired in the course of public ceremonies such as the tribal initiation or the rites of the kin-group or of the secret society. The elders as a whole display the fullest concern in the rearing of the rising generation, and the dramatic character of the ceremonies embodies the intention. The child is made to feel that these can hardly fail to catch the spirit of the effort made on their behalf, whilst they are likewise induced to embody that moral purpose in their lives. A very sheer faith is involved in the efficacy of the ritual wherein it is enshrined.

So far the relations between old and young have been considered from one side only. We probably have to go back to instinct for an explanation of the fact that the solicitude of parents and elders for their youthful charges is perhaps reciprocated only in a relatively feeble and limited degree. Too much, however, must not be made of the sporadic occurrence of filicide, which, like its converse, infanticide, is normally the direct result of very straitened circumstances, when a useless mouth or a drag on the mobility of the group is a handicap in the struggle for existence too heavy to be borne. The typical savage regards his elders, alive or dead, as the embodiments of a wisdom and power with something supernormal about it, and ancestor-worship (q.v.), a special type of cult which emerges from funeral rites which universally show awe and respect rather than mere fear of the dead, and especially of one's own dead, is but the consummation of a natural sentiment which associates the imitation of their elders by the young. This sentiment is naturally filial piety and gratitude. It has been true of man, since the times of the Ice Age, that the grave itself cannot make an end of family affection.

(c) With the subject of the relations between kinsmen in general we almost insensibly pass to that of the relations constituting the body politic as a whole. Kin-ly feeling is kindly feeling in the making. As has already been said, however, the development of kin sentiment is normally restricted, under the conditions of society in which the kin-group is paramount even as against the family, in a way that to the civilized mind seems extraordinary. The division of mankind belongs either to his mother's or to his father's kin, and as such participates in a moral system of rights and duties from which one or other parent is cut off by tabus as by a wall of brass, nay, from which he has as an outsider far more to lose than to gain, as, e.g., in case of a conflict between groups, when parent and child may find themselves actually ranged against each other. On the other hand, so far as it extends, the consciousness of kin is a moral factor of the first importance, involving as it does the principle of corporate responsibility manifested in blood-revenge and the kindred development of private law: in one way it implicate the sense of a mystic brotherhood, as is seen notably in totemic ritual, and in
what is probably its lineal successor, the ritual of the secret society. When, however, the individual does not live among his kin, as, e.g., when he is separated from them by the principle of kinship, but lives instead amongst his father's people, there is a conflict between the principles of kinship and of symbiosis, the tendency of which is to end in some modification of the kinship and to develop something novel, a culture, which customarily grows locally and brotherly love to go together. Kinship of the one-sided sort is normal in those conditions of the social life in which the separate groups are wandering, or at any rate scattered. When the groups can no longer live togethersocially in the agricultural village, the family on the one hand as the home-circle, and the village on the other as the wider circle of group-mates, come each into their own, whether exogamy and kin-organization be retained or dropped. Such generalizations, however, are purely provisional, as the problems connected with the evolution of the social organization of savages are some of the most perplexing that confront the anthropologist.

(2) The political virtues.—Whilst the scope of political virtue, in the sense of the moral bond that unites those who are by reason of local conditions associated together in a symbiotic and individualistic circle, is narrow, because the area of symbiosis is necessarily a restricted one, its emotional quality on the other hand is normally considerable, nay, such as the civilized community, which keeps in such other associations, a vast area by means of ideas, can only envy in vain. What corresponds with the savage to the sentiment and idea of the body politic is something in which he 'lives and moves and has his being,' sensibly and not merely symbolically. The savage individual is lost in the crowd, by being absorbed heart and soul in its life and movement. Heredity, of course, produces the coward and lover as occasional variations; but the conditions of a hard life give the pervert and parasite a short shrift. That the savage will normally answer to a call of duty in its sterner forms, as, for instance, when public danger impends, could be illustrated extensively from amongst the lower savages, though in their case the body politic is less often the tribe as a whole than some one of its constituent groups. Nowhere, however, is this more manifest than at that higher level of savagery at which the 'king' (an elastic term) appears, living personification as he tends to be of State and Church in one. Patriotism at this point becomes almost identical with loyalty and that, which is a constant in the nature of the savage individual stands unbound to be killed, 'for whatever the king says must be done'; and the native of Dahomey explains in a similar strain, 'My head belongs to the king: if he wishes to take it, I am ready to give it up.' The king himself, meanwhile, is inclined to play the autocrat in proportion as he is endowed with personal initiative for better or for worse. In most cases, however, he is himself tied hand and foot by the custom that he is there to enforce—witness Wallace's amusing tale of how the Rajá of Umbok took the census (Malay Archipelago, London, 1869, i. ch. 12).

Again, the kindler side of political duty as manifested in friendliness and good-fellowship is well to the fore amongst unpolite savages, their dances, games, festivals, and perpetual gatherings being possible solely on that condition. And not only are they in general friendly amongst themselves, but they are likewise polite, doubtless in virtue of their predilection for forms and ceremonies. There is, however, a supreme disturber of this friendly togetherness in the inequality of property; on which, more than on any other condition, is based inequality of social degree, a class system. Amongst the lower savages there is a want to reign which is sometimes not unfairly described as a primitive form of communism or socialism. Thus, the rules about the distribution of the spoils of the chase are based on the principle of giving for all. Notwithstanding this being without the special claims of the actual slayer of the animals, whose need is rather honour; and the distribution is even State-regulated in the sense that what customs locally and individually enforce, if necessary, enforce. Such a practice of sharing the produce, as distinguished from the means of production, weapons, and so on, which tend to be owned individually, would seem, however, in most cases to be rigidly confined to the actual symbiotic group of food-mates. Outside this narrow circle there is room for generosity and hospitality, which in their international aspect will again be glanced at presently. It is to be noticed that with this socialist free-handedness there goes, not indeed a want of industry (for the loafer is soon weeded out), but a want of the capacity to save as against a rainy day; so that an alternation of feasts and fasts is the general rule amongst the lower savages. As there is not much scope for generosity, so neither is there for honesty, within the symbiotic circle, both being virtues incidental to a more or less stationary condition, and for which the home-circle is no crime; though in the wider circle of the tribe it may produce complications between groups; whilst contrariwise, as practised against those who are outside that circle, not only are savages and enemies, it is rather a virtue, at any rate amongst peoples of a predatory type. And what is true of honesty holds in the man of veracity: intimates and comrades do not deceive each other; but In disregard to outsiders, to lie is to be diplomatic. With the economic development of primitive society, however, and the growth of classes of unequal wealth, things are somewhat changed. Yet the old communist spirit, assisted by the profusion that accompanies improvidence, and by the love of the display of power, tends to survive in the obligation to keep more or less open house, and to be ready with gifts, which is laid upon chief and leading man. Indeed, the savage 'king's' duty of feeding his people is often so interpreted that, if the crops fail, his want of mystic control over the powers of Nature is set down either to inefficiency or to sheer ill-will—with the result that he is put out of the way.

Finally, the institution of slavery, which is unknown at the level of the lower savagery, introduces a class of semi-criminal renegades who may indeed be war-captives, or a subject-race dominated by invaders, but may likewise be broken men and pawns of the same flesh and blood as their owners. It would seem that, on the whole, the slave receives a larger share of the milk of human kindness at the hands of a savage lord than he would if exploited in the interests of a developed industrialism; but life, when it is not that of the nearest and dearest, is cheap amongst savages, and the constant association of a slave-owning system with bloody rites involving human sacrifice tells its own tale. Moreover, wherever a slave-trade is established, the attendant horrors are bound to have a demoralizing effect. Africa being the standing instance of a continent rotted to the core by such an institution (for the development of which civilization, however, is most to blame). Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that slavery, though morally an abomination, is possibly one of the main springs of human evolution. 'Here,' says Tylor, 'is one of the great springs of history...race...slavery breeds war...War brings on slavery, slavery promotes agriculture, agriculture of all things favours and establishes settled institutions and peace' (Ch xxi. 70).
(3) The international virtues.—The subject of slavery paves the way for a consideration of a topic which for the student of Rudimentary Ethics must necessarily prove somewhat meagre. Savage moralities being not long been manifested, is primarily an affair of the home-circle. Within this, an entity of a high emotional quality; and without it, eminently fierce and uncompromising—such is the general rule. But actual human sacrifice is ringed round with an intermediate circle. Mates, neighbours, and strangers are, socially and morally, as heart, mind, and soul in some hard-shelled but palatable fruit. We have already glanced at the inter-gentile relations, as they might be termed, which savagery respects, not without a great deal of internecine struggle tempered by a tendency to settle disputes by compromise and mutual arrangement. But inter-gentile relations pass into intertribal (or, as we have, with a view to human evolution as a whole, ventured to name them, inter-national) almost without a perceptible break. Thus, notably in Australia, the kin-groups and local sub-divisions (such as are not to be found in tribes, and these again in wider combinations known to ethnologists as 'nations'). Here it seems quite impossible to draw a line between the customs and formalities generally included under the heading of hospitality, the sending of messengers and ambassadors, the regulated combat, the lending or exchange of trade-articles and of sacred objects, ceremonies, and songs, the mutual understanding as to marriage, inter-sexual prohibitions and privileges, and so forth—and those that extend so much farther afield that a native can, it appears, travel almost from one end of Australia to another without having treated as complete stranger. Possibly, too, the stranger as such tends here, as among other savages, to be sacred, hospitality having thus a religious sanction, since the fear of the stranger's curse, as Westermarck has shown (My i. 578 f.), proves a not ineffective substitute for the stimulus of generosity. In Australia, then, where both race and culture are largely uniform, a certain measure of sympathy establishes itself, despite the difficulties set up by a natural suspicion of unknown men (as exemplified by the 'idle trade') or by the want of a common tongue (necessitating such a device as gesture-language).

It is not till a fuller control over the forces of the native population to grow relatively dense that the struggle for room begins in a given area of characterisation, and the predatory spirit is let loose. War has evolved like everything else, and the art of killing one's neighbour efficiently was not acquired all at once. In protected areas a mild type of savage flourishes to whom war is unknown. Thus the Todas of the Nilghiris have literally no man-killing weapons at all. On the other hand, the fighting qualities would appear to go closely with the breed, and to be the result of a struggle for existence waged primarily within the kind, though a fauna that includes dangerous, man-staying animals (such as are not to be found on the Australian continent) must be an intensifying condition. The accompaniments of primitive warfare are mainly what have given savagery its evil name, certainly not precisely that rudimentary society which is turned, not without good cause, towards the so-called pioneers of civilization; but, as regards themselves, war is often a transitory condition, though there are some definite predatory peoples—Zulus, Masai, Apache, and so forth. The characteristic quality of the savage brain is fierceness, an emotional rather than a calm and reasoned form of valour. As such, it sustains itself, partly by war dances before the event, but partly also by wanton cruelty both during battle and afterwards in the torturing of prisoners, as amongst the American Indians, who thereby not merely satisfied their own feelings, but sought at the same time to 'blood the young whelps,' to wit, the future warriors of the tribe. Again, one form of it is that in which, as amongst the negroes of the Western Sudan, it is practiced with warfare. This revolting practice may consist in sheer 'man-knapping,' as usually amongst the lower savages, or in an 'ende-cannibalism,' or ceremonies which are internal or by the spirit in the family, or for some similar reason, which is not without high moral value; but a warrior tribe will eat its enemies simply, as it were, to glut its rage. There can, moreover, be little doubt that the institution amounts to an asset in the struggle for existence, as the cannibalism inspires terror amongst the neighbouring peoples; so that a cannibal tribe, as, e.g., the Niam-Niam of the Bahr al-Ghazal, may rank amongst the most vigorous, effective and effective people of a given region. On the other hand, such a practice as the head-hunting of the Dayaks of Borneo or the Nagas of Assam is to be regarded rather as a by-product of war, a sort of collection of trophies, and not for good or bad, since they are knit together by a common purpose that demands from them at once all that Bagelot's phrase, 'the preliminary virtues,' covers, namely, courage, loyalty, obedience, and a devotion maintained to the point of death. For the individual, again, war is a school of self-respect; and, though the swagger and boasting of the savage brave has its humorous side, his mastery over that lower self which bids him shun danger and live soft is reflected in a strength of character to which there is added, on the intellectual and ideal side, a sense of honor and of duty. This sentiment has probably counted for more in the history of the race than even the religious sense of taboo, inasmuch as 'Do' is more fruitful than 'Do not,' and defiance of a danger that is known more rational than the avoidance of a danger that is unknown and taken to be a danger for that very reason.

(4) The personal virtues.—Something has just been said in regard to the self-respect of the savage warrior, of whom the North American brave will serve as a by-line. On the whole, he declares that it is precisely in its reference to self, which is almost to say in its reflective aspect, that savage morality is especially weak. The moral subject looks outwards, not inwards, and reads his duty in the movements of the world not in the movements of his own heart. He has his selfish inclinations, which have to be suppressed by social drill and education; but he is incapable of that meekness of the man of culture, the man of world, a reasoned self-knowledge. Yet, conversely, he has but little of that moral individuality which enables a man to stand out for the right even against the opinions of his circle. He sees as one of the crowd, and at most applies his crowd-consciousness to the self as to one who is viewed from without. He can see himself cutting a fine or a humble figure, and is moved accordingly to try that it shall be the one rather than the other of the laws of the life of self tends to stop. One might say that his most internal of moral sanctions is pride of appearance. His tendency to self-adornment, one that unfortunately does not always carry with it the virtue of personal cleanliness, illustrates this type of self-feeling on its lower side. Again, a desire to cultivate an honourable idleness, and to abstain from such work as may lower his dignity, is directly due to pride of self; indeed, the main reason why the civilized man fails to establish satisfactory relations with the savage is that he forgets, or is incapable
of appreciating, the fact that the savage is a 'gentleman' in all the mixed connotation of that term. On its higher side, the pride of the savage gives him an intense sense of his rights, and especially his right to a belief in a Supreme Being that he must not break an insult to either himself or to those who are intimately his. Further, the curious power that man alone of animals has of putting an end to his own life is in the savage, a strong and present desire of exulting suicide (q.v.) to a place amongst the virtues, to die with dignity being, as it were, the projection of the desire to live therewith.

It must not be supposed, however, that self-respect is entirely responsible for the many-sided virtue of a self-regarding type which goes by the general name of self-control. One of the most important spheres of the influence of taboo is the domain of sexual appetite. Thus, in sexual matters, together with the coyness that is but a means of attracting a mate, there goes a shyness, the natural accomplishment of a vitally critical act, which gradually ripens under the sway of taboo into genuine modesty and delicacy of feeling (et. al. CHASTITY). Similarly, eating and drinking, no less than sexual intercourse, are normally surrounded, in virtue of their very importance in the vital economy, by a number of taboos and prohibitions that reinforce the sense of crisis, and turn a mere opportunity of carnal enjoyment into a solemn rite. There is plenty of strong lustiness in the background, however, which the emotional type of savage experience is well calculated to foster; so that, though pent up by religion within strict limits, it discharges itself along lawful channels, in the shape of orgies and carnivals, with the force of a torrent. Clay, religion lends the man-directly minister to the stimulation of passions that seem for the time-being to set all self-control at naught, as, e.g., when the use of drugs and intoxicants is encouraged as a means of obtaining inspiration, or when the gambler is led to stake his all on his own luck conceived more or less clearly as a supernatural power in him and behind him.

In conclusion, it must be pointed out that by means of this same conception of a grace that is in him, yet somehow above him, religion affords the inner life of the savage a great support for reflection on self-development, the 'personal totem,' and individuality itself. It is clear that similar beliefs are as it were the man's own aspiration towards welfare in its more spiritual aspects seen in an enlarging mirror.

(2) The transcendental virtues.—It is a common mistake to suppose that the savage is capable of envisaging a material Good only. His whole religion, it is true, may be summed up in the formula, half spell and half prayer—"Let blessings come and evils depart." But the blessings and evils alike are primarily spiritual. Nature and matter in the modern sense have at most a very restricted sense of the typical savage. His desire is to be in sympathetic relation with a pre-eminently social type with an environment conceived as an array of quasi-personal or personal beings, all mystically powerful and, as such, able to help or to hurt him and his. His universe is thus a moral order, and the savage is a savage just because he is too ready to cope with physical necessities merely by means of moral control or suspension. So much he is already in spirit, if not in effect, the lord of creation that he can imagine no part of creation that is purely unmonal and mechanical in its mode of operation. For him the strong will, a habit sharply defined by man-willed activity, can directly influence the courses of the stars or the currents of the ocean. Thus the God for him is always in some sense God, a power analogous to will-power which realizes itself within man him elf no less than in the other beings of his environment, and can be good as friend, evil as enemy, like man or any other living being. Such a belief clothes itself in a variety of forms, some of which, e.g. the belief in a Supreme Being that he must not break an insult to either himself or to those who are intimately his. Further, the curious power that man alone of animals has of putting an end to his own life is in the savage, a strong and present desire of exulting suicide (q.v.) to a place amongst the virtues, to die with dignity being, as it were, the projection of the desire to live therewith.

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ETHICS AND MORALITY.


Australian (Irving King), p. 341.

Babylonian (A. Jeremias), p. 444.

Buddhist (M. Anesaki), p. 447.

Celtic (J. L. Gergi), p. 455.


ETHICS AND MORALITY (American).—The autochthones of North and South America present levels of culture as varied as their habitats. Moral elevations and depressions are as recurrent as changes in race and environment. It is obviously impossible to characterize the Abipones and the Quichua, or the Huron and the Pueblo, in one breath. Nevertheless, for the purposes of a concise survey of the moral attainment of the Indian peoples, we may confine ourselves to three broadly distinguished levels. The lowest of these is presented by the great mass of the S. American tribes dwelling east of the Andes, and by sparser examples in the less-favoured localities of the N. continent. This sub-level is typified by that of the great forest and plains nations of N. America. Finally, following the western mountains, from Alaska to Chile, there occur a series of culture-centres marked by peculiarities in the art—wood-, stone-, and metal-working, weaving, pottery, agriculture—and complexities in social organization which, in the cultivating civilizations of Mexico and Peru, warrant our treating them as a distinct moral level.

1. The lowest levels.—Garcielas de la Vega (Royal Commentaries, Fr. ed., Paris, 1830, or Markham's ed., Lond. 1869-71) has several passages portraying the moral state of some of the wild tribes with whom he came in contact. Thus (vii. iiil.) the peoples of Hunacapampa are described as 'without peace or unity, without lord or government or city; making war never for dominion, since they know not the meaning of more or less, nor yet for plunder, since they have no possessions, and go, for the most part, quite naked; their most precious treasure is the wives and daughters of the conquerors, the men are captured, it is possible, and inhumanly eaten; for their religion, it is as absurd as their manners are fierce.'

In another passage (vii. xviiil.) the Chirihuaas are given a yet worse character: the spies of the Incas report that 'they lead a life worse than the beasts, knowing no divinity, no law, no rulers, without towns or houses; they make war in order to obtain prisoners whose flesh they eat and whose blood they may drink, and, not content with this, they eat their own dead relatives; they never cover their nudity, and have intercourse indifferently with all sorts of women, even their sisters, their daughters, their concubines. The women take the men who please in any manner they please.'

We recognize in these reports an exaggeration natural enough when the facts reported upon are seen through hostile eyes; yet the offences are of such a nature as to place their perpetrators among the lowest of mankind—and to have evidence enough of the reality of the offences.

The Paunari of Brazil have a 'Song of the Turtle'—'I wander, always wander, and when I get where I want to go, I shall not stop, but still go on'—which, says J. B. Steere (U.S. Nat. Mus. Rep. 1901), reflects their own mode of life, passed in roaming from sand-bar to sand-bar of the Brazilian rivers in search of food. This lack of orientation in the physical realm has its intellectual counterpart, shown, e.g., in the utterly rudimentary number-systems of many S. American tribes (cf. Tylor, Prim. Cult., Lond., 1903, ch. viii.; Conant, The Number Concept, 1896, p. 22 f.). It is only to be expected that the moral level will be equally low; and this we find to be the fact in widespread cannibalism and low sexual standards.

Nevertheless, the following words in the very words of Garcielas de la Vega, affirms that 'the wild Abipones live like wild beasts,' we should bear in mind that he is speaking with their ignorance of agriculture foremost in mind. As a matter of fact, he shows them to possess not only very respectable arts, but some very stately virtues (see Account of the Abipones, London, 1822, esp. ii. xii.). To be sure, the equestrian tribes of the pampas have long been considered more superior to the tribes of the tropical forests; yet, even with the latter, ferocity and vice are not the dominant characteristics.

Mode of approach has much to do with the impression derived; it is signed by those who have known the lower peoples the most intimately. And we might regard these idle days as unquestionably the happiest that I have ever experienced.

He found the Indians of this region docile, gay, companionable, trustworthy—mother-naked, but paradoxically innocent of shame. It is incredible that all the difference between such a picture and those drawn by earlier and less unprejudiced pens can represent merely an amelioration due to a casual white influence.

H. H. Prichard is vigorous in his praise of the Tehuelches (Through the Heart of Patagonia, London, 1902, esp. ch. viii.):

's kind-hearted, docile, and lazy race ... invariably courteous,' whose 'women make excellent mothers, and the father is inordinately proud of his offspring, especially of his sons.' The morality of the Tehuelches is, on the whole, admirable. Unfaithfulness in the wife is rare and is not often bitterly revenged. polygamy is allowed, but not much practised.

It will be remembered that continence and chastity are virtues which Dobrizhoffer (ii. viii, xix.) found especially praiseworthy among the Abipones (q.e.), contrasting them with the licentious and degenerate neighbouring tribes; while their unselfish fondness for their children was also noted.

Prichard likens the Tehuelches to the Eskimos, at the other extremity of the Americas: Both races are certainly sluggish and peaceable. And of both little evil can be said.' The testimony of a recent sojourner among the latter is in point:

'In many things we are the superiors of the Eskimos; in a few we are his inferiors. It has developed individual capacity farther than we; he is less selfish, more helpful to his fellow,
kinder to his wife, gentler to his child, more reticent about the faults of others, more patient with the world in general, and best of all, his race. As a guest who could not pay for my keep, as a stranger whose purpose among them no one knew, I learned these things in a thousand little ways. Surely its darkness, was connected with the pleasantness of my life' (Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Harper's Monthly, vol. 117, p. 723).

Of course not all peoples on the lower levels betray such characters. McGee ('17 RBEW, pt. I, 1898) is only the latest among a long series of observers who have found the Seri Indians of Tiburon and the adjacent mainland 'the most primitive and the most bloodthirsty and treacherous of the Indians of North America.' (p. 119). 'Their highest virtue is the shedding of alien blood.... their blackest crime the traitor's blood into alien channels.' (p. 154). In these traits McGee finds the sources of a character which places the Seri, in spite of physical excellence, very near the bottom of the moral scale. Even animal gratitude is absent:

"The 1894 party was fortunate in successfully treating a sick woman of a neighboring tribe; so much so that in the days in the rancheria, distributing gifts to old and young in a manner unprecedented in their experience... yet, with a single possible exception, they succeeded in bringing no more human expression to any Seri face or eye than curiosity, avidity, or food or drink for themselves, which was a running trust. Among themselves they were fairly cheerful, and the families were untroubledly affectionate; yet the cheerfulness was at least chilled and often handicapped by the approach of an alien..." (p. 132).

2. Typical levels.—The presence of an obvious moral sense, as expressed either in custom or in conscious reflection upon moral problems, is the fair criterion of the beginnings of moral elevation. Such a sense is the indubitable possession of the great body of N. American Indians, with many of whom we develop conduct of the highest order. We are justified, too, in regarding the morality of the forest and plains tribes of the northern continent as the typical Indian morality; for we find it already inchoate in many of the inferior offices, while it is the foundation for our understanding of the conceptions of the more civilized groups.

(1) Social organization.—With most observers the first impression of Indian societies is of their lack of organization. 'They love justice and hate violence and robbery, a thing really remarkable in men who have neither laws nor magistrates; for among them each man is his own master and his own judge. Such a state of things is in 1812 of the Canadians (Jenius Relations, ed. Thwaites, Cleve., 1896–1901, ii. 73). That the Indians have no law is a characteristic judgment; and, underestimating as traditional or constitutional the sense of community, it is, of course, the general truth; yet it is safe to affirm that no Indian group is so primitive as not to possess its body of customs, to be violated only on peril of outlawry.

As a rule the ostensible authority is vested in the tribal elders, certain of whom have the prestige which we denominate chiefship. This office may best be defined by characterization:

'The system of authority which prevails in Indian societies is very simple. Each family... is ruled over by the father, whose authority is great. As long as he lives he is strong and active, his wife, his daughters and their husbands, and his sons, until they marry and thus pass from their own family under the rule of a new house-father, are almost completely under his sway. But the father of each, while retaining his authority over his own family, is to some extent under the authority that is, under the force and influence —of the peasan; and, where several families live in one place, he is also under the authority of the headman of the settlement. The authority of the peasan... depends on the power which the latter has to make or exercise over spirits, gods, and judicial decisions are supposed to be the work of spirits, over diseases, and... consequently over the bodies of his fellows. The headman, on the other hand, is generally the most successful hunter, who, without having any formal authority, yet because of his success has hereabout any amount of deference from the other men of his village. He settles all disputes within the settlement, and in the not distant days in all, when there is no one in the habit of war, he used... to determine on the commencement of hostilities (K. F. In Thurn, Indians of America, London, 1853, p. 111).'

Tribal headman, war-leader, 'medicine-man,' and the group of fathers or elders which forms the tribal councils are the rulers of the Indian tribe in either continent. They are not always differentiated, however. In the description just cited the office of headman and war-leader is one; and it is, of course, the rule that a capable war-chief should assume an important role in civil affairs. Yet in the more advanced tribal organizations—as among the Iroquois, Sioux, Creeks, etc. —there is not only differentiation of military and civil chiefdoms but well-marked distinction between the latter, chiefs and sub-chiefs, having at once legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

The civil chiefdoms are usually hereditary, in the maternal line, though the selection is seldom apart from the family, which is finally the apparent or the sole criterion. Unquestionably, the ideal of merit, from the lowest to the highest, is the ideal of social service. Stefansson ('loc. cit., p. 725 f.) gives an illuminating account of a conversation with an Eskimo chief touching the foundations of his office:

"One day, as Ovakayak and I sat in our snow blocks with backs to the wind, and why he was not satisfied with the huge pile already stored away—more than our family of twenty-two could carry in two years. He said, 'I was a chief. And why, did I suppose, was he a chief? Or, now that he was so, did I suppose he would continue being a chief if he were lazy? We had plenty fine weather, at Tuktuyaktok, but who could tell if the people who had gone inland after reindeer would bring them ledges, or possibly with no sleds—carrying their children on their backs because the days were dead and starved. And how about the people west of the Mackenzie at Shingle Point, true, they had caught plenty fish in summer, but they catch none in winter, and they are not sensible now as they formerly were, but will haul a big load of fish a long distance to sell to the traders at Herschel Island for a little tea, which tastes good but does not keep a man alive. And what of the people up the Mackenzie? They depend largely on rabbits. Some years there are plenty of these in the other years, far from them, there are few or none. Might we not some day see many sleds coming from the southwest along the coast? And may not these sleds turn out to be empty because there are no rabbits in the willows? Did I suppose that if all these people came we would have too much fish? And why was he a chief, if not for that? That people twenty days' journey away could always say when they became hungry, "We will go to Ovakayak, he will have plenty food?"

An instance of a reverse order, yet illustrating the same general demand that the chief should be a giver, is narrated by von den Steinen (p. 283):"The power of the chief was not great. In all the larger villages there were several chiefs, who lived in different houses; our village was always impressed by only one of them. 'Protection' was the most important duty in time of peace. The chief was manager of the seclusion of the women, if they must be in the belfry to be baked and the drinks to be prepared on all festive occasions and during visits of strangers. He was simply an householder on a large scale; but he dared not ask if he was wished to have the esteem of his fellow-villagers, much less his tribal neighbours. In this respect the chief of the first Inuit village was kareta, 'had a good heart.' He allowed only a few belfries to be baked for the guests. Generosity was looked upon as the most offensive quality. But this method of rating must have been difficult. Antonio told me about a certain João Cadete in the village of Paratuanas, whose turn it was to become chief, but who preferred to emigrate with moeda de tratar, for fear that he would have to entertain people; so Felipe was appointed in his stead.

But chiefdom among the Indians is not always founded upon benevolence. The career of Tchakta, chief of the A-simboins, as narrated by Father de Smet (Life, Letters, and Travels, 1865, vii. x.), is that of a medicine-man who by means of poison and pure criminality made himself feared and powerful among his people. And, in many other instances, supernatural—powers—frequently exercised for good or evil—have elevated the Indian to a little position of civil or military prisci (cf. Mooney, 'The Ghost Dance Religion,' I. RBEW, pt. ii. [1896]). In the cases of the Aztec Emperor and the Peruvian Inca it is obvious that here were individuals who held any position among their people, and that the functions are united in the one officer, who thus, as it were, figures the whole sovereignty of the nation. The power of the chief thus rests primarily upon some type of personal prestige. Père Biard
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says of the Algonquin 'Sagamores': 'The Indians follow them through the law of the custom, or of kindred and alliance; sometimes even through a certain authority of power, no doubt' (Jes. Rel., ed. Thwaites, ii. 73). In better organized tribes the chief's authority is more definite and even cases, property, and the religious sanction of his installation (cf. ib. xxvi. 155 f.).

In every case, the real source of power lay with the community, consisting of men of quality and character. The council determined all movements of importance, as matters of war and peace, of the hunt, etc. Ability to speak persuasively was hence of much moment, and the orator a man of importance. Police duty fell to the younger and more vigorous warriors,—men of tried and sterling character,—not only in hunting and war parties, but also in the camp, and tribal festivals (cf. Eastman, Indian Boyhood, New York, 1902, pp. 40, 186). Quarrelsomeness and violence within the tribe seem to be rare; except when under the influence of liquor, the Indians of both continents appear to be peaceable in their domestic relations. This fact early impressed the Jesuit missionaries in Canada:

'Leaving out some evil-minded persons, such as one meets almost anywhere, they have a gentleness and affability almost incredible for Savages. They are not easily angered, and, if they have received a wrong from any one, they often conceal the injury—unless there were very few who make a public display of anger and vengeance. They maintain themselves in this perfect harmony by frequent visits, by which they give one another in sickness, by fœdeb, and by alliances.' (Thwaites, x. 515.)

'They are very much attached to each other, and agree admirably. You do not see any disputes, quarrels, enmities, or representations among them. Men leave the arrangement of the household to the women, without interacting with them; they eat, and decide, and give away as they please, without making the husband angry. I have seen my host a, girl of a young woman that he bad with him what became of the provisions, although they were disappearing very fast. I have never heard the women complain because they were not invited to the feast, because the men ate the good pieces, or because they had to work continuously—going in search of the wood for the fire, making the house, dressing the skins, and busying themselves in other very laborious work. Each one does her own little tasks, gently and peacefully, without any disputes.' (cf. 233 f.)

Crimes of violence, where they do occur, are punished by the injured person or family. In the more primitive societies murder is the occasion for blood-revenge (cf., e.g., Thwaites, iii. 93 f.). In more complex societies, crime may be atoned for or compounded with the relatives of the slain (see EXPATRIATION AND ATONEMENT [American]). Outlawry,—especially for an offence against a clansman,—is a formal form of punishment, and is sometimes the prevailing punishment, as among the Seri (17 B.B.W., pt. i. p. 273).

In the last resort it is the sanction of the community as a whole,—at least among the typical tribes—which determines the punishment of the offender, as it upholds the power of the chief. Thus, in his chapter on 'The Polity of the Hurons and their Government' (Thwaites, x. 211 f.), Peré Béthune states:

'They punish murderers, thieves, traitors, and sorcerers; and, in regard to murderers, although they do not preserve the several degrees of descendants toward them, nevertheless the little disorder there is among them gives me some idea that their procedure is scarcely less efficacious than is the punishment described elsewhere; for the persons of the deceased, pursued not only him who has committed the murder, but also additions to the whole village, which must give satisfaction for it, and furnish, as it were, the price of the poor, for the purpose, as many as sixty presents. . . . For it is not here as it is in France, where the punishment with the public, even the whole city do not generally espouse the quarrel of an individual. Here you cannot insult any one of them without the whole community resenting it, and taking up the quarrel against him, and expelling him against an entire village. Hence arises war; and it is more than sufficient reason that they prosecute against one village if it refuse to make satisfaction by the presents ordered.'

(2) The family and sexual morality.—Broadly divided, Indian families are of two general types:

that in which descent is counted in the male line, with a relative freedom of the women's personal status, and that in which descent is counted through the mother, and marriage is only between members of clearly marked exogamous clans or gentes. In the former case the family authority rests directly upon the chief, or other; in the latter it devolves upon the brothers of mothers, or even, in a sort of veritable matriarchy, upon the mothers themselves (cf. 17 B.B.W., pt. ii. pp. 259-274), and the family structure is merged in a group of quality, or caste, property, and the religious sanction of his installation (cf. ib. xxvi. 155 f.).

The Indian conception of chastity represents great variations, and is determined by many considerations. Most of the restrictions which appear to grow directly out of the demand for purity of descent, and hence, as with other races, apply chiefly to the women. Yet there are numerous demands for continence on the part of the men, even within the marriage relation—as in the purifications preceding war excursions or during religious festivals. In S. America the custom is wide-spread for husband and wife to abstain from intercourse during the entire period, two or three years, in which a child is suckled. Dobrizhoffer recounts the consequences of this practice among the Abipones (ii. x.):

'The mothers suckle their children for three years, during which time they have no conjugal relations with their husbands, who, tired of their long delay, often marry another wife. The women, therefore, kill their own children with fear of repudiation, sometimes getting rid of them by violent acts, without waiting for their birth. Afraid of being widows in the lifetime of their husbands, they blush not to become more savage than troopers.'

This is no doubt a not unusual consequence in S. America, where divorce is frequently a matter of the husband's whim.

Certainly the fact that white women captured by the Indians of N. America have, as a rule, been respected in the matter of their honour is fair evidence that the Indians are not as a race licentious. And, north and south, conjugal fidelity appears to be the prevailing condition—tempered, perhaps one should add, by facile divorce. 'Little is necessary to separate them,' says Le Jeune (Thwaites, 111), 'unless the parents publish for them not to leave each other so easily.' It is worth noting that he adds: 'A man who loved his (deceased) wife—or a wife who loved her husband—and who respects her relatives, will sometimes remain three or four years without remarriage, to show his love.' Testimony to the mutual affection of Indian couples is frequent, though, of course, the reverse is to be found. Polygamy is found among many tribes, but, although of any conceivable scale, plural wives falling to men of wealth or position, or, in some cases, resulting from the decimation of the male population in war, the survivors customarily taking to wife their wives' sisters.
Virginity in the bride is very differently esteemed in particular tribes. The Huron maidens were in bad repute with the Fathers, and among the northern tribes—Eskimo and Athapascans—the virginal bride appears the bride of but few marriage in moment, as to her industrial value—skill in clothesmaking, house-tending, and the like (see Morice, *The Great Déné Race,* Anthrop., v. [1910] 979 ff.; Parkman's *Hiawatha,* xliii. [1857] xxv. xxxv.). On the other hand, the standard of maidenly morality is often upheld by important tribal sanctions. Eastman (Indian Boyhood, pp. 183-187, *The Soul of the Indian,* pp. 85-99) describes the Siouan *'Feast of the Virgin,'* at which each girl in turn touched a rock-altar, prepared for the occasion, in token of her purity.

Any man among the spectators might approach and challenge any young woman whom he knew to be unworthy; but if the accused failed to prove his charge, the warriors were accustomed to punish him severely. Furthermore, 'our maidens were ambitious to attend a number of these feasts before marriage, and it sometimes happened that a girl was compelled to give one an account of gossip about her conduct.' See art. CHASTITY (Intro.).

Prostitution among Indian women, where it exists, appears to be largely due to contact with degraded whites, although perhaps in some cases the frequency of temporary and adulterous relations constitutes an aboriginal equivalent of the institution. See also, Westerner, MI, ch. xiii.

The real clue to the Indian conception of sexual morality and family purity is to be found in their devotion to their children, as well as of the tribe's personal property. Phile Lalemen rebuked a Montagnais for looseness, telling him he might not be sure of his own children, the Indian replied: 'You French people love only your own children; but we all love all the children of our tribe' (Thwaites, vi. 255). And in the Indian accounts of the battle of Wounded Knee, there is nothing more affecting, as there is no more stinging accusation of the whites, than the evidence of their dear regard for the Indians' children.

... There was a woman with an infant in her arms who was as near the last as she could get to touch the flag of truce, and the women and children, of course, were strung all along the circular village until they were dispatched. Right near the flag a woman was nursing her child, and the Indians knew that her mother was dead but was nursing, and that she would nurse for days, and that she would never drink. At last the Indians thought that they must get that child out, and they took it, and brought it to the chief, and he took it, and he gave it to the Indians, and he said, 'You may have that child.' They took it, and they gave it to the Indians. They did not care to take it, but they did not want to take it, and they brought it back to the Indians, and the chief gave it to the Indians. They said, 'We will take this child.' They had a child of their own, and they gave it to the Indians, and they brought it back to the Indians. They said, 'We will take this child.'

Indians are very sensitive about their children, and the abstract idea of stealing a child is abhorrent to the Indian. No such idea can be imagined as stealing the child of a poor Indian; at least, it is an idea of a great wrong that has any connection with him. Yet the idea of stealing the child of a rich Indian is always connected with the idea of a very great wrong. I am told that an Indian has been known to murder his own child rather than see it taken away from him by a white man. This is a well-known fact among the Indian tribes, and they will not tolerate it.

The custom of stolen children is very common among the Indians, and it is often called the 'pottlatch.' It is a custom that has been carried on for many years, and it is still practiced by many tribes. The custom is that when a child is stolen, the parents are given a certain amount of property in return. This property is called 'pottlatch' and it is given to the parents as a means of compensation for the loss of their child.

There are records of Indians who have stolen children from other tribes, and who have given them a large amount of property in return. One such case is recorded by Parkman, in his *Hiawatha,* where a man steals a child from an enemy tribe and gives him a large amount of property in return. The Indians also have a custom of giving presents to their friends, and this is often done in connection with the custom of stolen children. The presents are called 'pottlatch' and they are given to the parents as a means of compensation for the loss of their child.

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war and hunting, fall to the men, who usually manufacture the implements of chase and weapons of war, and often, also, their own clothing; and upon the men also falls that other occupation which leads abroad, i.e., primitive times, as among the Mexicans (cf. Sahagun, bk. ix.), and one which was thoroughly developed long before the advent of white traders (see Anthropos, v. 943 f.).

Those moral, domestic and routine work devolves upon the women, foreign and adventurous duties upon the men. The judgement of Im Thurn (p. 215) with respect to the Indians of Guiana, that the work of the men 'is at least equal to, though accomplished more fitfully than, that of the women,' is, on the whole, true of the typical Indian society. What gives the impression of laziness in the Indian man is doubtless the fitfulness of his employment; 'the life of the Indian man is made up of alternate fits of energy and of comparative inactivity,' says Im Thurn (p. 269); and this follows from the nature of his work. Possibly also it is in part due to the local and nervous structure of the following upon primitive modes of life, as McGee would explain in the case of the Seri, 'characterized by extreme alternations from the most intense functioning to complete quiescence—the periods of intensity being regular and the periods of quiescence notably long' (7 RBEW, pt. i. p. 156).

War with the Indian is only a more difficult form of the chase. For both employments the same qualities are demanded—courage, endurance, craft—and these may be regarded as essentially the masculine virtues in the eyes of the aborigine. Craft and endurance, involving the most painful and unremitting pursuit of an enemy; fortitude, hardihood to the point of stolical endurance of the most fiendish torments—for the cultivation of these traits the brave undergo rigorous fasts, and submit themselves to strenuous and terrible torments, as in the famous Sun Dance of the Plains tribes (see 'Sun Dance,' Handbook of American Indians, ii. 649-652; cf. de Smet, 247 f., 255 f., etc.).

The Indian conception of war has resulted in the most varying notions of his courage. Thus even the savager—Père Biard (Relations, 1616)—can pass such diverse judgments on the one people as:

'Their wars are nearly always ... by deceit and treachery, ... They never place themselves in line of battle. ... And, in truth, they are by nature fearful and cowardly' (Thwaites, ed., p. 91); and:

'They always make themselves up to the point of death with desperation, if they are in hopes of killing, or doing any one an injury' (p. 69).

As a matter of fact, Indian warfare demanded a very high order of courage, sanctioning, as it did, the most terrible treatment of captives. It was waged, in fact, largely for the sake of making prisoners—thus preserving the character of a hunt—with a view to submitting them to torture.

'When they seize some of their enemies, they treat them with all the cruelty they can devise. Fire or six days will sometimes pass in assuaging their wrath, and in burning them at a slow fire; and they are not satisfied with seeing their skins entirely consumed—their hair, the nails, the thumbs, the nose, the fleshy parts, and thrust therein glowing brands, or red-hot hatchets. Sometimes in the midst of these tortures they compel them to sing; and those who have the courage do it, and hurl forth a thousand imprecations against those who torment them; on the day of their death they must even etch this, if they have strength; and sometimes the kettles in which they are to be boiled are hung over the fire, while the poor wretches are still singing as loudly as they can' (Thwaites, x. 237).

This is but one of a multitude of such descriptions to be found in the Jesuit Relations and elsewhere. This barbarous cruelty which marks the Americans Indians among the savages of the world, and is probably equalled only by the Inquisition and judicial tortures devised by white men. For Indian cruelty is of an intellectual, one might say rational, nature; it is not a calumny; it is not the incoherence of suffering, or a brutal indifferent-

ence to it, as is so often the case with savages; rather it is devilishly devised and inflicted for understanding enjoyment.

The primary motive seems to be to test the fortitude—and hence the immortal virtues—of the sufferer, with whom it becomes a point of honour to make no sign of weakness, but rather to breathe defiance to the last breath: 'Those who dread your tortures are heartless; they are lower than women' (de Smet, 249). If the prisoner dies bravely, his flesh, and especially the heart, is eaten, as a kind of sacrament, with the belief that the courage of the deceased will pass into the spirits of the partakers—a rite which becomes apotheosized with the Mexicans into a huge and terrible theanthropic worship (cf. art. Incarnation [American]).

Throughout the Americas we find this custom: 'Such a practice could not fail to lead to degrada-

tion, in many cases to cannibalism with no such moral purport. Reaction against it is not un-

common among the Indians themselves. Yet it was so violent and the practice was so prevalent, as it is also the chief ground for the bitter excoriation of Indian character by observers who so frequently have only admiration for the Red Man's domestic virtues.

3. High cultures.—The semi-civilizations of Mexico and Peru manifest that natural complica-

tion of moral problems and accentuation of moral consciousness which comes with advancing culture. At the same time the qualities, as well as the faults, by which each is stamped is due to the dominance or emphasis of purely Indian traits.

In Mexico, and particularly among the Aztecs, warlike ferocity is elevated into a veritable re-

ligious consciousness, holding whole societies in pitiless grasp and colouring every conception of life. Indeed, Mexican religion so strongly countered the normal instincts of humanity that, in some cases, at least, its devoted, or at least its more intensive, application to its practices only with 'tears and dolour of soul' (Sahagun, ii. xx.); and it resulted in an attitude toward the world consistently and patiently pessi-

mistic. When a child was born into the world, it was addressed thus:

'Thou art come into this world where thy parents endure troubles and fatigues, where there are burning heats, where there is scorching cold, where there is death, disease and danger; and it is all so great and rare, that there is no content, since it is a place of labours, of torments, and of need.' And if a boy: 'Thy true fatherland is elsewhere; thy art promised to other places. Thou belonest to the shelterless fields where fall the combat; it is for them that thou hast been sent; thy profession and thy science is war; thy duty is to give unto the Sun the blood of thy enemies, that it may drink, and unto the Earth the bodies of thy foes, that it may devour them' (65. xix. xx. xxi.).

Certainly the Mexicans had glimpses of a better order, as is shown in some of the myths of Quetz-

zalcoatl, who became perhaps first by their deep conviction of sin and their readiness to do penance:

'There can be no doubt that the prayers, penances, and con-

fessions described at length in the Sahagun indios (see above), are founded upon the American belief that even these strange deities 'made for righteousness,' loved good, and that, in the world and in the next, punished evil' (Lang, Myth, Ed., and Rel. 5, 1896, ii. 194).

Yet the inevitable impression of their civilization is of a fundamental conflict between brutalizing superstition and an inherent yearning for moral growth, with the latter on the losing side.

Quite the reverse impression is made by the great S. American culture. The two characters that stand out in the Incaism, or Peruvianism, is in the administration of material affairs, achieved on an immense scale,
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along with a proselytizer's instinct for reform. The latter may often have been a somewhat hypocritical excuse for conquest, yet the conquist was not free from moralization. Still, the whole moral ideal of the Inca civilization may perhaps best be expressed in the words which Garcilasso gives as the address of the Sun to the Peruvian tribes: "

'These lands...our enemies to have to maintain them therein by the laws of reason, of piety, of clemency, and of equity; doing for them all which a good father is pleased to do for the children whom he has brought into the world and tenderly loves. Although you may say, for as you know, I never cease from doing good to mortals, lighting them with my light and giving them the means of following their affairs; warning them when they are cold, or hot, or hungry, or thirsting: These and their pastures, fruitstilling the trees, making the hedges to multiply, and bringing rain or fair weather as their needs are. It is I who make the tour of the world once each day, in order to see of what the earth has need, to set it in order, to the easing of its inhabitants. I wish that you follow my example, as my well-beloved children sent into the world for the good and the instruction of those wretched men who yet live as the beasts. It is for this that I give you the title of kings, and I wish that your dominion extend to all peoples, that you may instruct them by good reason and good deed, and above all by this example and by your beneficent rule" (Royal Commentaries, i, xv).

The degree in which this ideal was realized is indicated by the most recent writer on the Peruvian civilization, E. H. G. Seligman, in Remains R. Markham (The Inca of Peru, 1910, p. 183 f.), and it exemplifies the greatest and most complex moral achievement of the American Indian race:

'The people were nourished and well cared for, and they managed to succeed. In the wildest and most inaccessible valleys, in the lofty pampa surrounded by snowy heights, in the dense forests, and in the sand-girt valleys of the coast, the eye of the central power was ever upon them, and the never-failing brace, beneficent though inexorable, provided for all their wants, gathered from their tribute, and selected for their children for the various occupations required by the State, according to their sex, origin, and capacity. The State is indeed social as dreams, in past ages have conceived, and unpractical theorists now talk about. It existed once because the essential conditions were arranged in a way which is not or unlikely for another. These are an ineradicable despotic, absolute exemption from outside interference of any kind, a very particular and remarkable people in an early stage of civilization, and an extraordinary combination of skilful statesmanship."

ETHICS AND MORALITY (Australian)—According to the earlier explorers and missionaries and the careless travellers of even recent years, the morality of the Australian aborigines was of a very low grade. Almost all such observers agreed in placing them in the very lowest stages of culture. They were described as bestial in habits, naked, lacking all sense of virtue; the men cruel to their women and children. The women, often driven to infanticide and cannibalism, erud in their dispositions, shiftless, lazy, stupid, deceitful—in fact, possessed of all conceivable evil qualities, deaf to the voice of reason, and ready at theft, and with almost no regard for the value of human life. They were naturally, moreover, given up almost constantly to destructive inter-tribal wars. In the earlier days, according to the recent studies of the natural races have thrown much different light upon the matter. It is now recognized that morality is not to be judged by relationship to some fixed and absolute standard, but rather that it is fundamentally related to the system of social control which prevails within the group. It must, moreover, be borne in mind that the 'higher moral reform' of the whites, in the South, seldom sees it at its best. Without doubt the ignorance and brutality of many of the first white settlers and explorers of Australia were constantly provocatives of retaliatory aggression on the part of the natives. The laziness of the latter may be attributed merely to their inability to fall in with the enterprises of the settlers, or to appreciate the objects of their endeavour or their interests. In the activities of the natives the whites showed the most surprising industry, e.g. in the collection of food, as stated in the preparation for, and performance of, their elaborate ceremonies. The observations which follow should not, however, be taken as applying to the Australian race as a whole, but only to the sections directly observed; for there is no question that there is much diversity in the customs and characters of different tribes and groups.

As to personal virtues, the natives of Queensland were said to be generally honest in their dealings with one another. Apart from murder of a member of the same tribe, they knew no sin but that of theft. If a native made a 'kind' of any kind, such as a honey tree, and marked it, it was thereafter safe for him, as for his own tribesmen were concerned, no matter how long he left it. The Australian native in general was and is possessed in a marked degree of fortitude in the endurance of suffering. There is abundant opportunity for the development of this quality in mind in the painful trials of initiation—a ceremony always accompanied by fasting and the infliction of bodily mutilations of various kinds, differing with the tribe and the locality. These mutilations include the knocking out of teeth, circumcision, sub-incision, and various scarring of the trunk, face, and limbs. Among some of the tribes there are permanent food-restrictions imposed upon different classes. There are also food-restrictions imposed upon the youth and younger men, and all of these are faithfully complied with, although they involve considerable personal hardship (see Howitt, p. 561; Fraser, p. 90). The food-restrictions form such an important phase of aboriginal morality that they warrant further discussion. The following regulations of the Kurnai tribe are typical. A man of this tribe must give a certain portion of his game to his wife, and that the latter contribute, to his wife's father, as the able-bodied man is under definite obligation to supply certain others with food. There are also rules according to which game is divided among those hunting together. In the Mining tribe all those in a hunt share equally, both men and women. In all tribes certain varieties of food are forbidden to women, children, and uninitiated youths; there are also restrictions based upon the totem to which one belongs. The rules regarding the cutting up and cooking of food are as rigid as these regulating that food of which the individual may lawfully partake. Howitt says of these food-rules and other rules that they give us an entirely different impression of the aboriginal character from that usually held. Adherence to the rules of custom was a matter on which they were most conscientious. If forbidden food were eaten, even by chance, the offender has been known to pine away and shortly die. Contact with the whites has broken down much of this primitive tribal morality.

'1The oft-repeated description of the blackfellow eating the white man's beef or mutton and throwing a home to his wife
practice of stealing wives and eloping, among the North Central Queensland natives. According to Spencer-Gillen, wives may have been so secured, but such was assuredly not the customary method in Central Australia at least. They know of no instances of girls being beaten and dragged away by suitors. It is probable that cases of exceptional cruelty more casually came to the notice of the back travellers, and they inferred that these were characteristic. The last named authors affirm that the method of securing wives among these tribes was definitely and universally by tribal usage, and not crude practices whatsoever. Howitt, the authority on the South-Eastern tribes, says that cruelty was often practised upon elopers; but this is manifestly because they had themselves been guilty of a breach of tribal morality. Looseness of sexual relations among these tribes originally met always with severe punishment.

As to treatment of wives among the Central tribes (Spencer-Gillen, p. 50), there were undoubtedly cases of cruelty, but they were the exception rather than the rule. The savage husband had a hasty temper, and in a passion might act harshly, while at other times he might be quite considerate. Indeed, in the case of the Darling River, New South Wales, quarrels between husband and wife were said to be quite rare (Bonney, JAI xii. 129); Brough Smyth says that love is always rare in Australian families; while another observer (Palmer, JAI xii. 281) asserts that the life of the women is hard, and that they are much abused by their husbands. Dawson, who wrote expressly to show that the Australian blacks were not misrepresented, maintained that in Victoria, at least, there was no want of affection between members of a family (p. 37); Lumholtz (p. 161 ff.) holds that the Queensland husband felt little responsibility for his family, and that he was really selfish and hunted only for sport, often consuming the game as caught, and bringing nothing home. The same author refers to one case of a wife being terribly beaten because she refused, one cold night, to go out and get fuel for her husband. Over against this testimony, we have that of Spencer-Gillen, referred to above, that the husband was ordinarily by no means cruel.

Of the treatment of wives and children there are conflicting reports, the more recent investigators holding that there was less cruelty than was at first represented. There was, however, doubtless much difference in this respect in different tribes. One early observer (Farq., p. 127) affirms that wives were always secured by force, the girl being seized from ambush, beaten until senseless, and thus carried off by her 'lover.' Others, in like manner, emphasize the brutality of obtaining wives (Angas, p. 222), and Lumholtz says that stealing was and is the most common method. The researches of Spencer-Gillen do not confirm these statements as far as the natives of Central Australia are concerned. Roth refers to the commonsness of the

An swallow divests itself,
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From the North Central tribes (Spencer-Gillen, p. 608) infanticide was practised, but only rarely except immediately after birth, and then only to the mother, unless the child was unable to care for the babe. The killing of the new-born child was thus an effort at kindness; it was certainly devoid of cruelty in the eyes of the perpetrators. When the spirit part went back to the spot where it came, and was subsequently born again to the same woman. Twins were killed as unnatural—practices to be explained in part by the natives' dread of everything regarded as capable of being without order. If a young child was killed, that an older but weaker child might eat it, and thus get its strength. Howitt mentions the same practice among the South-Eastern natives (p. 749). He also says that in some places infants were eaten in especially hard summers. Sometimes, also, after the family amounted to three or four, all additional children were killed, because they would make more work and trouble than they were worth. The food of the natives for their children was noted (Palmer, loc. cit., p. 293). According to Spencer-Gillen, p. 501, children were, with rare exception, kindly and considerately treated, the men and women alike sharing the care of them on the march, and seeing that they got the water and food, and if a mother was such a sick child, refusing all food, and being incomparable when it died (p. 766). One woman carried about a deformed child on her back for nineteen years (Fraser; see Henderson, p. 121). Natural affection was certainly keen, and much grief was manifested over the loss of children.

In the aborigines' treatment of the old and infirm most observers depict them in quite a favourable light. Dawson, it is true, reports that the natives of Victoria killed them, but this is certainly not a widely prevalent custom. Lumholtz (p. 153) says that the Queenslanders were very considerable of all who were sick, old, or infirm, not killing them, as did some savage peoples (cf. Broom, p. 135). In northern Australia there were many blind, and they were always well cared for by the tribe, being often the best fed and nourished (Creed, p. 94). In the Central tribes the old and infirm were never allowed to starve. Even when an adult was assigned to the care of the older people to be provided with food, and the duty was in every case fulfilled cheerfully and ungrudgingly (Spencer-Gillen, p. 52). In some tribes the old and the sick were carried about on stretchers.

In the Daleburn tribe, a woman, a cripple from birth, was carried about by the tribe-people in torn, until her death at the age of sixty years. On one occasion they rushed into a stream to save from drowning an old woman, whose death would have been a relief even to herself (Howitt, p. 766). Fraser emphasizes the respect in which old age is held by the aborigines of New South Wales, and the fact that they never desert the sick (see also Broom, p. 152). Cannibalism among the Australian blacks was by no means a promiscuous and regular practice, as at first supposed. Lumholtz (p. 101), it is true, on only one occasion the tale he thought was capable of being least killed in fights, and oftener children who had died. An early writer reports that in South Australia bodies of deceased friends were eaten as a token of regard (Angas, p. 225), or as either a sign of regard or in ceremonial (Fraser, p. 56).

Spencer-Gillen found difficulty in gathering evidence of cannibalism being practised among the Central tribes. There were often told by one tribe that it was customary among others who had eaten farther on, and never in turn to eat flesh which others gave to be eaten by themselves. Spencer-Gillen think, in general, that human flesh was eaten as a matter of ceremony or at least for other than mere occasions. The following are some evidences of it among the Northern tribes. Howitt says that the Dieri tribe practised cannibalism as part of their burial ceremonies, and that it was a sign of sorrow for the dead. Other tribes ate only enemies slain on their raids; the Kurnai, for instance, would not eat one of their own tribe. Among other tribes, if a man were killed at initiation ceremonies, he was eaten, as was also among occasion in one of the ceremonial fights; while others did not eat their enemies.

Howitt is positive that there is no such thing among any of the tribes hitherto observed as a propitiatory human sacrifice; and he denies emphatically the statement, made current by some, that sometimes a fat gin (woman) was killed to appease their craving for flesh when they had been long upon a vegetable diet. He also says that the tribal mantis man SE, if women, and children, killed in fights or by accident, were eaten, but that there is no evidence that women and children were killed for cannibalistic purposes.

The morality of the Australian native was, in a word, the morality of tribal custom, and, if fidelity to duties so imposed may be taken as a criterion, it was of no low order. Recent investigators unite in testifying that the blackfellows, especially before contact with Europeans, was most scrupulous in his obedience to the sacred duties imposed upon him by tribal usage.

Of the Queensland natives Both declares (p. 139 fl.) that the life of the tribe as a whole seemed to be well regulated. Customs, with the old men set the standards, was the only law. Where there were few old men, each individual, within limits, could do as he pleased. Howitt (p. 770) writes of the tribes studied by him that custom regulated the placing of huts in the camp, and even the proper position of individuals within the huts. In the Kalkaba tribe, single men and women lived on opposite sides of the camp. The old women kept an ever-watchful eye upon the young people to prevent improprieties. In another tribe the women were not allowed to come to the camp by the same path as the men, a violation of the rule being punishable by death.

The law of custom thus controlled almost every phase of the life of the individual, including many personal matters as well as conduct towards others; the intercourse of the sexes is one of it was most definitely limited and regulated; the women who were eligible to each man in marriage were also rigidly determined by custom, as well as the proprieties of conduct towards the wife's family. Reference was already being made to the various severe restrictions entailed by the initiation and other ceremonies, and also to the minute regulations regarding the choice of food. In all cases these customs were enforced by severe penalties. In some tribes the local group or camp united to punish any member who was guilty of overstepping the bounds, or of complicity in more serious crimes, such as incest and murder, or the promiscuous use of fighting implements within the camp. Most customs were, however, probably obeyed from habit, the native being educated from infancy in the belief that infraction of custom would produce many evils, such as personal woes, pestilences, and even cosmic catastrophes. In fact, among the tribes observed by Howitt, authority was generally impersonal, though not always, for the headmen were often men of great personal ability, and were greatly feared and respected by the rest of the tribe or group (Howitt, pp. 295–309).

Questions of right and wrong for the Australians seem to have centred chiefly in food restrictions, secrets relating to the tribal ceremonies, the sacred objects, and wives. Moral precepts probably originated in association with the purely selfish idea.
of the older men, whereby they sought to keep all the best things for themselves (Spencer-Gillen, p. 48). In this way at least we can understand many of the regulations regarding what the younger men might eat. So also as to marriage, for, apart from restrictions as to totemism and the class into which a man might marry, all the younger men, with one or two exceptions (Spencer-Gillen, p. 31). On the other hand, delegations from distant tribes were received and treated with the utmost kindness, if they came in the recognized way. They were even permitted to take a prominent place in the ceremonies of the tribe. The relations subsisting between members of the same tribe or group were, according to Spencer-Gillen, marked by consideration and kindness. There were occasional acts of cruelty, but these were, in the opinion of the author, of something else than a harshness of character. Thus, much cruelty resulted from their belief in magic (Spencer-Gillen, p. 56, pp. 31-33). The revolting ceremonies practiced at initiation were all matters of ancient tribal custom, and hence cast little light upon the real disposition of the native.

All things considered, we are obliged to say that the life of the Australian blacks was moral in a high degree, when judged by their own social standards; and not even according to our standards are they to be regarded as altogether wanting in the higher attributes of morality. Their belief that the bear trap was the purest and most sacred of all weapons, was not founded on the value of the victim killed, but upon the principle of 'selfishness in the murder of another.'


IRVING KING.

ETHICS AND MORALITY (Babylonian).—

1. The predominating influence of religion. The civilization of Babylonia was dominated throughout by religion. Every aspect of national and civic life and every phase of human intercourse were governed by religious conceptions of the universe. The question as to the connexion between morality and religion was in Babylonia no question at all; for morality, like every other manifestation of mental life, was a part of religion. The courts of justice were religious courts; the laws always, in the annals of Babylonia we meet again and again with the same historical phenomenon: the conquering peoples receive the intellectual, and also the religious, and the ethical, impulse of Sumerian-Babylonian culture. In contemplating the ethico-religious conception of the universe which prevailed among the Babylonians, we can be excusing and trying to exterminate another one is not confirmed by those who have known them best. Their fights were probably half ceremonial, or of a sporting character, and were usually stopped when blood flowed freely. They undoubtedly did fear strangers, and a man from a strange tribe, unless accredited as a sacred man, was held in great deference (Spencer-Gillen, p. 225). The inter-tribal fights were certainly not so serious as some have represented. They were considered the most common cause of inter-tribal trouble (Lumholtz, p. 136; Spencer-Gillen, p. 32). There were no fights for superiority, no oppression of one tribe by another. Within the tribe there was, in large measure, absolute equality. There were no rich or poor, age being the only quality that gave pre-eminence (Semon, p. 225).
they are purely theoretical. We are unable to say whether the elevated morality presupposed by the injunctions of the priests was ever actually practised by any class of the people. The writers of the tablets idealize their heroes. As the august prologue and epilogue of the Code of Hammurabi give expression to religious and ethical ideas which find not the slightest echo in the actual legal provisions of the code, we may venture to assume that even in an earlier age there existed a similar discrepancy between theory and practice. Still, the theory is there; and it dominates the ritual texts even in periods of religious decadence. Lofty moral precepts in cuneiform form are uttered by the very priest who will submit to the sorriest witch and the most palpable enchantments.

2. Morality and the cult of Ea, 'the Good.'—

One of the oldest religious cities known to us is Erinda. At no period known to history was Erinda a political centre; not only the Code of Hammurabi but even the Sumerian inscriptions speak of it as an ancient and venerable city. It was situated 'at the mouth of the rivers,' i.e. at the place where formerly the Euphrates and the Tigris flowed separately into the sea. Erinda once bore the name of the God of the True (Ur-narr). The 'Good,' is Ea, and his temple is 'the house of the ocean's depth,' or 'the house of wisdom.' Ea inscribes oracles with a sacred calamus—probably beneath the oak's shade—which he sometimes referred to in the records. His wise counsels he imparts, e.g., to Adapa, 'the seed of the human race,' upon whom he desires also to confer wisdom and immortality (the head and the water of life). By his wise counsels, according to the Deluge narrative, he saves the Babylonian Noah from the flood. As the Deluge is taken to be a punishment of human wickedness, it would seem that the good Deity saved the man on account of the latter's acceptable behaviour.

The overwhelming majority of the texts that refer to Ea represent him as the god whose worship consists in the rites of ablution and incantation. He heals all manner of disease. Behind disease, however, stands the fact of sin. Although sin appears in the ritual texts as ceremonial transgression, as a conscious or unconscious revolt against ceremonial laws, yet behind this there must certainly be the idea of sin in a deeper sense—as rebellion against the Deity. The motive which prompts men to resort to the ritual worship of Ea is the desire to be cleansed from their sins.

3. Morality and the worship of Samaš.—

Besides Ea, the Good, the other Deity with whom moral ideas are specially connected is Babbar Samaš, the god who manifests himself in the orb of day, and whose principal sanctuaries were Larsa in S. Babylonia, and Sippur in the northern portion (cf. A. Jeremias, art. 'Schamash,' in Roscher). Samaš is the god of retributive justice. All unrighteousness is brought to light by him, just as all darkness melts away when his beams illumine the world.

His temple is called E-D-ka-dala-mu-nu, 'the house of the world's judge.' In a description of the New Year festival (cylinder B 18) Gudea says: 'The sun caused righteousness to shine forth; Babbar caused righteousness to shine forth. Babbar trampled unrighteousness under foot; the city shines like the sun-god.' Ur-sung, king of Ur, who presided over the worship of the sun in that ancient city of the moon, says that the sun shines in the presence of the righteous (1). His temple is called E-D-ka-dala-mu-nu (r), 'the house of the judge.'

Thus moral ideas are here personified as Divine, just as in Egypt we find Maat as the protectress of righteousness.

The moral activities of Samaš, who rewards the righteous judge and punishes the corrupt one, are set forth with great fullness in a hymn of some two hundred lines, which certainly emanated originally from Babylonia, but comes down to us in a transcript found in the library of Aš-urban-î-pal. This hymn represents the effects of the sun's activity as a continuous mystery, by means of which all evil powers above and below are brought to naught.

At thy rising, light of the land assemble;
Thy terrible radiance overwhelms the land.
From all lands together resound as many tongues:
Thou knowest their designs; thou beholdest their footsteps.
Upon thee (look) all men together.
Thou causest the evil-doer, who
Out of the depths (thou bringest those who perverted justice (2).
O Samaš by the just judgment which thou speakest (3),
Thy name is glorious, [..] is not changed.
Thou standest beside the traveller whose way is toilsome;
To the voyager who fears the flood thou givest (vouchsafe (4).
On paths that were never explored thou guidest (5),
the hunter
His mouth (to heights (5) rivaling the sun-god
O Samaš from (thy) net (6).
From thy snare (escapes) (7) not
To whom he, contrary to his oath (8) [..]
To him who does evil (9) [..]
Outshadeth is thy wise (pet).
[lifts his hand (to heaven) (10), upon the wife of his companion,
On a day not pre-ordained for him, (11) (..) takes him away (3);]
For him is appointed (12) burning, the seed (13) [..]
If thy weapon reaches him, (there is) no deliverer.
At his trial (his) case does not appear.
At the judgment of the judge, his brothers—they answer not for him.

In a heartless trap he is struck down without knowing it.
Whose devices wickedness, his horn thou destroyest.
Whose meditations oppression (3), his dwelling is overturned.
The wicked judge thou causest to pass bonds;
Whose takes a bribe, and does not judge righteously, on him thou inflict punishment.
Whose takes no bribe, but makes interference for the weak,
Well-pleasing is this to Samaš—he imparts to thee.
An upright judge, who renders righteous judgment,
Prepares for himself (a) palace; a prince's house is his abode.
Whose gives money for excessive interest (9), what does he increase?
He overreaches ( يجعله for himself gain, empties his own purse.
Whose gives money for just interest (14), who takes a shekel for (..)
Well-pleasing is this to Samaš—he increases his own life.
Whose keeps the balance (15) [..]
Whose then changes the weights (16) [..] lowers
He overreaches ( يجعله for gain (17), empties his purse.
Of the honest man who keeps the balance, many are (18) [..]
All possible things, much (..)
He who keeps the measure, who practises (..) [..]
[..] in the meadow, who lets too much paid, the course of the god, the course of the people (19);
Whose (20), his [..] demands a tax, (..) shall not possess his inheritance.
In the (..) his brothers, they shall be surety.
The (..) who gives corn for (..) who furnishes the good—
Well-pleasing is this to Samaš—he increases his life;
He enlarges his family, obtains possession of riches;
As waters of the deep, inexhaustible, so shall his seed be (inexhaustible).
He who charges (gaben) an unwise man to give good security,
He who oppresses (يجلع) his inferiors (21), he is noted down (22) with the pen.
Those who work evil, their seed has not continuance;
Whose mouth, full of lying, avails not before thee.
Thou burnest their utterance, rendest it asunder, yes, thou.
Thou hastest the down-trodden, as thou movest over them;
Thou discoverest their right.
Each one, every one, is entranced into thy hand.
Thou rulest over their judgments; what is bound, thou dost loose.
Thou hastest, O Samaš, prayer, supplication, and homage,
Submission, kneeling, whispered prayer, and prostration.
From his deepest heart the needy crieth unto thee.
The feeble, the weak, the afflicted, the poor.
With a lament (23), a piteous one, he ever appeals to thee,
He whose family is far away, whose city is a great way off.
The shepherd, with the fruit of the field, appeals to thee.
The (..) (24), in rebellion, the sheepfold among the enemy.
O Samaš, appeals to thee, as he walks on a way of terror,
The travelling merchant, the trader who carries the bag,
(..) appeals to thee; the fisher of the deep,
The hunter, the slayer, the keeper (? of cattle, 
The fowler in the . . . of the reed fence, appeals to thee. 
The fisherman, the second—though an enemy of Samsas— 
The vagrant upon the way of the desert, appeals to thee. 
The wandering dog one, the fleeting shadow, 
To Samsas, who is the lot to thee (. . . 
Thou hast not rejected those who appealed (to thee . . . J; 
Thou art revealed, for them thou, loosing (them from), 
restorest their purity. 
Those who thus render homage, their homage dost thou reject. 
But they fear thee; they reverence thy name; 
Before thy gates these men continually adore thy name.

4. The positive character of Bab. morality. 
— The Bab. conception of the universe was permeated by the assumption that morality rests upon the commandments of Deity, and hence, should the excavations some day bring to light a Bab. narrative of the Fall, it would be no matter for surprise. According to Bab. ideas, not only wisdom, but also purity and happiness, existed at the beginning of things. The mythological Creation-story of the Babylonians closes with a significant passage telling how Marduk, the victor over Tiamat, brings the laws of Ea to men, and how they are to be disseminated amongst men like a revelation of doctrine: 

'Let them be held fast, and let the "First" teach them; 
Let the wise man and the learned meditate upon them together. 
The father shall hand them down; let him instruct his son thereof. 
Let him open the ears of the herdsman and the keeper (?), 
That he may rejoice in Marduk, the lord of the gods; 
That he may prosper, and that it may go well with him. 
Meadfast is his (Marduk's) word; his decree is not changed; 
The word of his mouth is not altered by any (other) god. 
If he frowns, he turns not again his neck (to grace); 
If he is angry, if he is enraged, no god sets himself against him. 
The magnanimous, the sagacious . . . 
Against evil and sin. 
(Other five lines mutilated.)

The existence of tablets inscribed with Divine commandments is presupposed by the text K 7897, which survives in three distinct transcripts (Cuneiform Texts, xii. 39 f.; cf. Maenillan, Beitrage zur Assyriologie, v. 5, no. 2 (Leipzig, 1903); for tablet 5, cf. A. Jeremias, The OT in the Light of the Ancient East, Eng. tr., 1910, i. 292 f.). 

'Slander not, but speak kindness; 
Speak not evil, but show good will; 
Whose slanders and speaks evil— 
Unto him will Samsas require it by . . . his head. 
Open wide thy mouth, guard thy lips; 
If thou art provoked, speak not at once; 
If thou speakest hastily, thou shalt afterwards have to atone therefor: 
Sooteh (rather) by thy spirit with silence. 
Offer a sacrifice, the incense must meet (for the Deity): 
Before thy god shalt thou have a heart of purity (?). 
It is that which is due to the deity" (for continuation, see ERK liii. 747 f.).

5. The identity of moral and ceremonial law.— 
The relation between men and the Deity is determined by their qualities. It is only the wise man who is acceptable to the gods. Religion is essentially knowledge, and accordingly the intellectual interest enters largely into piety. The ideal first man is the 'keenly sagacious' Atahhidas. The will of the Deity has to be searched out. Piety consists in a submissive and unflagging performance of the ritual. The afflicted king inquires whether his sufferings are the consequence of ceremonial dereliction or of actual evil-doing. Just as, in the conception of Deity, righteousness and capricious wrath are not discriminated, so we find no distinction between real sin and ritual error. Not only may the appeal be to fate, but suffering at the holy place is regarded as a possible cause of disease, and atonement for transgression is effected by repentance and—closely associated therewith—the use of incantations. In either event, the source of the disease is sin. For it is necessary that the man who offends against the Deity by transgression should receive evil, and that the devout man should receive good. The perplexities of such a theodicy make themselves felt, but they are not, as in Israel, brought to a solution. The Divine moral law is vitiated by the utilitarian principle. The idea of love to God remains without any ethical development.

The ritual texts composed with a view to the cure of disease ennumerate with painful solicitude all possible causes of sin, but we can, nevertheless, trace the ethical idea that underlies the formula. The incantation tablets of the Surpu series exhibit the particular oaths that come under the head of sin: 

'Has he estranged father and son? 
Has he estranged mother and daughter? 
Has he estranged mother-in-law and daughter-in-law? 
Has he estranged brother and brother? 
Has he estranged friend and friend? 
Has he failed to sit a prisoner, 
Or not loosed one who was bound? 
Is it outrage against his superior (?), hatred of his elder brother? 
Has he despised father and mother, insulted his older sister 
By giving to the younger, and withholding from the elder? 
To Nay has he said Yes? 
To Yes has he said Nay? 
Has he spoken impurity, 
Spoken nonsense, 
Used an unjust balance, 
Taken base money? 
Has he disseminated a legitimate son, installed an illegitimate? 
Has he drawn false boundaries, 
Disturbed his turn, your, or small, and precise? 
Has he intruded upon his neighbour's house, 
Approached his neighbour's wife, 
Stud his neighbour's wife; 
Stolen his neighbour's garment? 
Has he refrained? 
Driven an honest man from his family, 
Broken up a well-cemented clan, 
Revolted against a chief? 
Was he honest with his mouth, while false in heart? 
With his ears was he full of Yes, in his heart full of Nay? Is it because of the injustice that he meditated 
In order to disperse the righteous, to destroy (them), 
To wrong, to rob, to cause to be robbed, 
To have dealings with evil? 
Is his mother estranged? 
Are his lips forward? 
Has he taught impurity, instilled unseemly things? 
Has he concerned himself with sorcery and witchcraft? 
Has he promised with heart and mouth, but not kept faith; 
Dishonoured the name of his god by (withholding) a gift, 
Dedicated something, but kept it back, 
Given something (for sacrifice) . . . but eaten it? 
By whatsoever thing he was bewitched—let it be revealed! 
(De it revealed) whether he has eaten anything that made an abomination for his city: 
Whether he has spread a calumny through his city; 
Whether he has brought his city into evil repute; 
Whether he has gone to meet an outcast; 
Whether he has had intercourse with an outlaw 
(Slept in his bed, sat in his chair, drunk out of his cup)? 

On the third tablet of Surpu it is assumed that a person may have been bewitched 
Because he has helped some one to justice by bribery, 
Uprooted plants in the field, 
Cut case in the thicket, 
(Because) for a day he was entranced for a coquett, and refused it; 
For a day he was entranced for a cistern, and refused it; 
(Because) he observed his neighbour's channel; 
Instead of agreeing with his adversaries, he remained their enemy; 
Polluted a river, or spet in a river. 
' These questions involve the fundamental laws of morality, such as are essential to the very conception of a civilized State. They imply that life and property are protected. In the 25th ordinance of the Code of Hammurabi it is enacted that, if one who has come to extinguish (a fire) allows himself to be bribed, but spitting at the master of the house, and appropriates the property of the master of the house, he shall be cast into the fire (HDB, vol. v, p. 600). Theft is a capital offence. Veracity is held in high estimation, and evil speaking are severely punished. Legal cases are decided by oath. Falsehood in word or thought is accounted a base thing.
ETHICS AND MORALITY (Buddhist)

2. Basis and aim; metaphysics of the good.—The fundamental principle of Buddhist ethics and morals is a very opening in the Buddha's first sermon, to consist in the Middle Path, which is, again, the way to the realization of the ultimate end—the extinction of the pains arising from egoism. Here the Middle Path is represented not solely because it lies in the middle between worldly pleasures and ascetic self-torment, but because therein lies the right or perfect (śammi, Skr. sammuk) way for realizing the ideal (dharma) and finding its true self (khaṇa) in contrast with the crooked (kuṇa); the holy or noble (ariya), in contrast with the false (micchā) or base (anārya); and it leads to the perfect enlightenment (sambodhiyāmāna, sambodhipāryaya).1 Here arises the question as to what is the content of that enlightenment. The answer is given mostly in a negative way, in the denial of the phenomenal, of human weakness, illusions, and passions—in short, in the teaching of non-ego (anatta), extinction (nirvāṇa) of pains, and the well-known nibbāna (Skr. nirvāṇa). There are perplexing questions as to the real meaning of the term 'ego.' It is negative and was led, not only by many European scholars, but a section of Buddhist thinkers, to a thoroughly negative view.2 Not entering into these discussions, we shall content ourselves with noting that Buddhism here faced the same problem as Schopenhauer did as to the ultimate nature of his nothingness (Nichts), especially in its relation with the mystic experiences of the saints, both Buddhist and Christian.3 But the distinction between the two is a very broad one. Schopenhauer consists in this, that the former was not content with the merely theoretical attitude of the latter, but, having himself realized the experience of transcending the phenomenal and entering into the height of mystic illumination, tried to lead his followers to the same attainment. This ideal of the same attainment is expressed in the term 'One Way' or 'Sole Road' (ekacent),4 treading in which is the very essence of Buddhist morality, and the basis of which is found in the stability of truths (īhālluma-tvādhi).1 In summarizing positively the highest aim of Buddhist morality, we might say that it consists in entering into the communing of all the Buddhas and Saints, through realizing the oneness and eternity of truths in one's own person. Not only insight and wisdom (dassana, vijuya), but morality and mental training are possible only on the basis of this assumption and in emulation of all virtuous acts flow from this metaphysical-source. Thus, in the Brahma-sūtra, one of the books which show most vividly the connections between practical morality and philosophical speculations, the Buddha contrasts mere works, however good and excellent, with his attainments and purposes. Having heard his disciples talking of the others' praise and blame of Buddhist morality, he teaches them not to be anxious about these trivial matters, the minor details, of mere morality (śīla-mattakas).5 The reason is not because morality is a trivial matter in itself, but because it is vain unless founded upon profound knowledge and high attainments. He says: 6

1 See Majjh. 19 (PTS ed. l. 118), 26 (l. 141-144), Sn. 38, etc.
2 There is no emphasis in the Mahāyāna of the objective world (bhāvana) and the ultimate nothingness of ego (śūnana).
4 See Art. Tattvāgata.
5 Majjh. 267 (PPS ed. l. 286), Staff, 22, 20 (4, l. 23), for which see Doctrin. Buddhist. This was the pratīkṣa-śrīna which gave rise to the creation and explanation of the Buddha's ethical teachings (nirodhakāya in the Śūcañuka-prajñā-pāramitā (ch. 2-4), and finally to the revelation of his true personality (ch. 15 and 21).
6 Sutt. 134 (Tav. ed. l. 296), Staff, 22, 20 (4, l. 23), for which see Doctrin. Buddhist. This was the pratīkṣa-śrīna which gave rise to the creation and explanation of the Buddha's ethical teachings (nirodhakāya in the Śūcañuka-prajñā-pāramitā (ch. 2-4), and finally to the revelation of his true personality (ch. 15 and 21).

Here we can see very clearly the close connexion between morality and enlightenment in Buddhism, and at the same time the basis of its liberal and broad spirit. This characteristic of Buddhist morality is, again, closely related to its ideal of universal salvation, as shown in the missionary charge given to the first disciples and manifested in missionary works, even by the Buddha in making human beings under King Asoka's patronage. This universal ideal is further expressed by the Mahāyānists in the oft-repeated saying that "every being is a Buddha in his essential quality, and on this account the standard of a perfect Buddhist was transferred from an arhat to a bodhisattva (see below). After all, the foundation of Buddhist morality rests on the essential capacity of every person for Buddhahood; and the criterion of true morality lies in the tendency to bodhi, as attested by the one road (ekacent) trodden by all the Tathāgatas of the past as well as of the present and future time, and also the conduct of common men (pathujjana) and adopt the methods of a Buddha—that is the cardinal maxims of Buddhist morality. Though this expression may sound somewhat vague and self-evident, the latter, the good and holy life, is not to be merely talked about, but to be tested by personal touch, and realized in the exercise of the three methods of discipline as well as by the group of the four perfections. But Schopenhauer and Emerson differ in the sense that they shall find a well by the wayside; if he saw the water, but had no rope or bucket to fetch it, could he quench his thirst? 7 The answer is evident. The essential aim of any discipline or exercise is to touch the immortal region by the body (kṣiyena amatam dhatum phussayita), i.e. by personal experience and actual realization. The guide to this end is found in the person of the Buddha; hence the important rôle which high faiths found a well by the wayside; if he saw the water, but had no rope or bucket to fetch it, could he quench his thirst? 7 The answer is evident. The essential aim of any discipline or exercise is to touch the immortal region by the body (kṣiyena amatam dhatum phussayita), i.e. by personal experience and actual realization. The guide to this end is found in the person of the Buddha; hence the important rôle which high faiths found a well by the wayside; if he saw the water, but had no rope or bucket to fetch it, could he quench his thirst? 7 The answer is evident. The essential aim of any discipline or exercise is to touch the immortal region by the body (kṣiyena amatam dhatum phussayita), i.e. by personal experience and actual realization. The guide to this end is found in the person of the Buddha; hence the important rôle which high faiths

1 Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, London, 1876, l. 36.
2 Staff, 12, 20 (4, l. 119).
3 [I.e., 51 (4), 73 (p. 62).
4 Dīgha 27, Aggañña.
5 Majjh. 13, Nukan-khaṇḍhaka (PTS ed. l. 52); 46, Dharmamahānandaka (66, 309), etc.
amount to egoism. This is the original sin, so to speak, and the root of all evil, according to Eastern Buddhists. In Buddhist ethics no distinction is made between sin and ill, and their sole origin is sought not in the objective world, but in our own mind and acts (kamma, Skr. Karma).

Here again Buddhists faced the same problem as Schopenhauer, namely the isolation of the individual. The conclusion is the same as that of the German philosopher—that no reason could be sought in the objective world for this phenomenon. Or, as we might say, the question is left theoretically unanswered, and the more emphasis is laid on the necessity and urgency of uprooting the present evil that originates in the heart of the individual. The ideal of the perfected Buddhist is an individual who is completely free from the dominion of desire and who has attained a state of intense spiritual joy (sukha).

The ethical ideas of the Buddha is best described by the term 'karma'. This word is used to mean both 'cause' and 'effect'. It is in the sense of the former that it is used in the ethical system of the Buddha. The idea of karma is closely connected with the doctrine of reincarnation. In every act of the individual, there is a karmic effect. This effect may be either good or bad, depending on the nature of the act. The individual is therefore responsible for the consequences of his actions. This idea of karma, together with the doctrine of reincarnation, forms the foundation of Buddhist ethics.

Buddhists believe in the impermanence of all things, and the ultimate goal of life is the attainment of Nirvana, a state of perfect spiritual happiness. The individual, through the practice of good deeds and the contemplation of the nature of reality, can achieve this goal. The individual is responsible for his own actions and the consequences of those actions. This is the central tenet of Buddhist ethics.

A section of conservative Buddhists adhered more to the letter than to the spirit of the fundamental teachings, and found their satisfaction in self-culture. Their ideal consisted in the imitation of the Buddha, but they deemed themselves thoroughly unqualified for that perfection, and cherished the hope of being born in the good resort of the future, by the merit of their good actions. This is a question of the perfect Bodhisattva, whose merit is directed towards the perfection of an arhat, who was nothing but a Buddha in his moral perfection. But this point gave rise to a division in moral ideals and, conjointly with that, to the schism of the Mahayana and the Hinayana.

This division involved, inter alia, a schism between the idea of arhat and that of Bodhisattva (Pali Bodhisattva). The latter was an application of the Buddha in his former births, preparing for his Buddhahood, and meant 'a being seeking for bodhi.' Now this was transferred to every individual, who made progress in the religious life, and especially towards perfection, by the merit of his good actions. This is a question of the perfect Bodhisattva, whose merit is directed towards the attainment of the ideal of the Buddha, but they deemed themselves thoroughly unqualified for that perfection, and cherished the hope of being born in the good resort of the future, by the merit of their good actions. This is a question of the perfect Bodhisattva, whose merit is directed towards the perfection of an arhat, who was nothing but a Buddha in his moral perfection. But this point gave rise to a division in moral ideals and, conjointly with that, to the schism of the Mahayana and the Hinayana.

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possible only on this foundation of our essential fellowship with Buddha, and of the substantial identity of all life with theirs. Morality is the actualized bodhicitta, which is, again, the universal ante res of morality. In other words, the bodhicitta is the 'stability of truths' translated to the inner heart of man; it is the bodhi seen not as an attainment or acquisition, but as the original possession of man's mind. Viewed in this light, the contrast of good and bad, noble and base, among us, is due to the mutual action of good and evil; good and evil are, however, the same as bodhi and the fundamental aviyā. Thus we see in Buddhist ethics the Jewish contrast of God and Satan transferred to the inner heart of our own mind, which at the same time is substantively identical with that of all beings, including Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and common men, as well as animals and spirits in the purgatories.\(^1\)

3. Virtues and rules of conduct; practical ethics.

Just as the contrast between the bodhicitta and aviyā is the ultimate point of theoretical ethics, the contradiction of virtues and vices forms the fundamental subject of practical ethics. Buddhist teachers are so fond of enumerations and classifications, that the classification of vices and virtues is arranged in numerical orders. This answered not only the theoretical purpose of classification, but, at the same time—perhaps much more—purposes of the practical purpose of extracting the materials according to need. This use is naively expressed, in the explanation of the seven divisions of bodhi, by a simile that robes and jewels stored in one case can be easily taken out; the various groups of virtues and vices are arranged in this way, partly for the sake of classification, and partly for the practical purpose of easily drawing their items out at any moment, when one of them is present while the associated ones are to be enticed or guarded against.\(^2\)

The fundamental classification of Buddhist discipline is, as we have seen above, the three branches of the sikkha; closely connected with this is the division of actions (karmas) or organs of works, i.e. body (kāya), speech (vāccha), and mind (manas).\(^3\) Among these the mental is the root of actions, but all the three have great influence upon one another, so that, both for repression of the bad and for acceleration of the good, the three are associated and help mutually.

Now we shall first consider the vices to be guarded against. As we have seen above, the radical vice of human nature consists in egoism, and it manifests itself in lust (kāma), desire (chanda), and intention (adhipāya). These passions manifest themselves in greed (rāga), seeking for pleasure, hatred (dosa) of pain, stupidity (moha), and hopeless indifference. These are cardinal vices, and are the three roots of the bad (akusala-mārṣa), depravities (upakāśikas), etc.\(^4\) They may further be divided into five: avaricious or charity (dana), kind word (prajñāvijaya), beneficial act (attacchariyā), and all-identification (samādhi-nattatā). These varied (rāgā) to practical life, make up the Eightfold Way, which consists in the perfection of (1) opinion (diłkhi), (2) decision (sahārika), (3) speech (vāccha), (4) actions (karmas), (5) livelihood (ājīva), (6) effort (vihāma), (7) mindfulness (sati), and (8) contemplation (samādhi).\(^5\) We see how in these classifications mental training plays a great part.

We shall not enter into the details of these items; suffice it to say that Buddhism lays more emphasis on the intellectual side than is done in Christianity, and in this respect these virtues may be compared with Greek or Confucian virtues.\(^6\) Nevertheless, faith plays the central part, as in Christianity, and this point brings us to the religious or ecclesiastical side of Buddhist morality, as we shall presently see.

Lastly, as regards Buddhist virtues, we have to speak of the pāchānātthics, the virtuous people.\(^7\)

\(^1\) Various, 35, 5; etc.; Agg. 3. 35, 69 (PTS ed. 1. 164, 701); Hc. 50, etc.

\(^2\) Agg. 3. 35, 69 (PTS ed. 1. 164, 701).

\(^3\) See ed. 11; Rhy Davids, Dialogues of the Buddh. II. 230.

\(^4\) See, further, Snp. 64, 4 (PTS ed. 1. 272); Agg. 1. 5-9 (1. 101-106), etc.

\(^5\) Snp. 35, 5; etc.; Agg. 3. 5, etc.; Snp. 3. 85 (PTS ed. 1. 164, 701); Hc. 50, etc.

\(^6\) The cardinal virtues of Confucianism are wisdom, love, and courage.

\(^7\) Pāchānātthics are virtuous people, whose life is good, and whose mind tends to good.
to perfection or to the other shore of nirvāṇa. As we have seen above, the aim of Buddhist morality is to bring us to the ārahāna (sainthood) or to Buddhahood, to the final goal of perfect enlightenment. So in this respect every virtue is a pāramitā, but in the Pali books the term is used (not only) to designate one of the Buddha's innumerable lives in preparation for his Buddhahood. It is told in the introduction to the Jātaka 1 that the Brahman Sumedha, the future Buddha, made the promise to himself, as well as to his teacher, to express the virtue of vinasitā (wisdom) in the Jātaka, perfectly in the virtuous life of the Buddha, to bring it to the attainment of Buddhahood (buddhakārāṃ dhamma).

They are enumerated as follows: (1) charity (dana), (2) morality (śīla), (3) resignation (nekhamma), (4) forbearance (kṣantī), (5) perseverance (adhisthāna), (6) merit (metta), and (10) equanimity (upekkhā).

So the transition from the Mahāyāna system to the Bhikṣu system is a great step. Six of them are usually enumerated, viz. charity (dana), morality (śīla), forbearance (kṣantī), perseverance (adhisthāna), and wisdom (jñāna).

A résumé of a special virtue of the Buddha is given in the True Law, and is regarded by the Mahāyānists as containing the three fundamental maxims of morality. It runs:

"Any Bodhisattva, Mahāsattva, who, after the parinirvāṇa of the Tathāgata, shall set forth this Dharma-paśyāna to the four classes of beings, should do so after having entered the abode of the Buddha (the buddha-dhāma), and having put on the robe of the Tathāgata (T-cīvara), and occupied the seat of the Buddha (the buddha-sthāna).

And the delight in an immense forbearance (mekkhaṅkhuti-samākhyati), and the seed, the entrance, the vacancy of all laws (sara-dhānamuṇḍati-pratīcita-rodha).

This is exactly the same idea as is expressed in the above quoted expression, the "stepstone of the Tathāgata," etc., by transferring the pāramitā to the imitation of the Tathāgata.

We omit further comments on these classifications and their mutual relations, but we have to note that in the virtues of the Bodhisattvas more consideration is paid to those virtues that have regard to others, and that the essence of sympathy or love is more prominent than in the virtues above given.

This was, indeed, a very important point in the departure of the Mahāyāna. The Mahāyānists are wont to call the Hinayānists egoists, in contrast to the former, in which this is not literally true, the characteristic difference between the two schools, or between the ideal arhat and bodhisattva, consists in this, that, while the former sees in self-culture the first requisite of morality, the latter insists on the necessity of altruistic actions and thoughts, even for the sake of self-culture, as in the case of the Buddha's former lives. In other words, the Mahāyānist moral ideal lays special stress on the realization of the lives of the Mahāyāna, by entering into the communion of the saints through the exercise of altruistic virtues. This is, of course, an extension of the fundamental virtue of sympathy. If the authorizing of the text gave rise to another important idea, that of the dedication (parinirvāṇa) of all merits and works for the sake of others, in order to lead them to the same enlightenment. It makes it possible for all beings to help each other on the way to salvation and the realizing of the communion of spiritual fellowship. The practical results of this ideal were momentous, and we may say that Buddhist influence in China and Japan turned on this pivot, although unfortunately with its abuses as well.

The consideration of the virtues and their values leads us to the methods by which the principles under which they could be worked out. The organization for the promotion of morality is established in the Order (saṅgha), including monks and laymen, and the guidance of morality therein was laid down by the Buddha in the rules of obedience (vinaya), including prohibitions and commandments, and also necessary rules of discipline for carrying them out. Leaving the details of these rules to the special art, VINAYA, we shall here examine their general characteristics. Though the vow of taking refuge (saraṇa) in the Three Treasures and the Five Commandments (varamaṇa) are common to all members of the order, a clear demarcation is made in the rules of discipline between the Buddhist monks and the laymen or the monastic disciples in regard to the other standards of life. In this respect Buddhism may be said to teach a twofold system of morality—one that of the monks and the other that of the Lotus and the laity (lokottara); and the other that of the laity, which is worldly. A detailed description of worldly morality is given in the sermon to Sāgala, and the practice of filial piety, respect toward teachers, harmony between husbands and wives, etc., are recommended as the deeds which shall bear good fruit in one's being born in heavenly worlds. This, however, is not specially Buddhist, but generally human. To be perfectly moral, according to the Buddhist ideal, all the conditions of the śīla should be fulfilled, for which monastic life (asādāra) is a necessary condition. It is evident that the Buddha recommended the life of an ascetic (asrama) as the fittest for perfect morality, but at the same time it should be noted that the household life (āstāra) was not totally excluded from salvation. The Buddhist communion (saṅgha) is made up of the four classes of members—monks and nuns, laymen and laywomen. These four are always described as making up one body and as equally praiseworthy, when they are well-disciplined. Moreover, we hear a Brahman Vachchhaghata praise with a universal application to all his followers, without distinction of the conditions of life. The Buddha is credited with having given even so far as to say that no difference existed between a layman and a monk, when they had realized perfect purity.

1 This is stated in the Agānandacariya (Calcutta, 1888), and many other texts. Sūnaka expresses this by the word paramī, of which the source is not given.


3 Majñ, 117, Chattārāmaka.

4 Dāna, 31, Sāgala.

5 Upanisad, 5, 66, (PTSF ed. v. 243 f.)

6 Majñ, 73, Mahāvīrodbhagottana (PTSF ed. i, 490 f.)

7 Naṣik, 6, 54, (PTSF ed. v. 410.)

8 This is said in the a later doctrine (Buddha, 270, note 1). But his suggestion may be controverted by adverting other texts called the Mirror of Truth (Dhamma-vijaya), the Song of Stones, etc., where several laymen and laywomen are described as having attained arhatship, and where the different view that their attainment is evidently not due to their respective conditions of life, but to the differences of their emancipation from the fetters. Not only in the latter, but even in the former (e.g. sīlākāya) are there said to have cut off the five fetters and to have entered perfect nirvāṇa.

9 In the latter, the words "asūrya" and "aparńa" are used, while in the former (e.g. sīlākāya) are there said to have cut off the five fetters and to have entered perfect nirvāṇa. Here the words "asūrya" and "aparńa" are used. In this latter case we may consider that such upakṣetas as Chittā of Māchhakāsana, Sūri of Amabajjā, and Mahānāma of the Śikyā were in no way inferior to monks, in their attainment and purity. This cannot be denied that the Buddha allowed them the same
We may thus safely conclude that the Buddha did not make a fundamental distinction between these two classes of his disciples as to the qualification of their moral and spiritual perfection. Nevertheless, it is very evident that the moral ideal of Buddhism consists of the attainment of merit by many by means of the homeless life than by householders (on the same ground as St. Paul [1 Co 7] recommended celibacy to the followers of Christ); hence the naturally monastic character of Buddhist morality, and hence the duty of the lay followers to pay a special respect to monks.

Similar remarks may be applied to the relations between the sexes. In general, women are regarded as less capable of perfect morality, because of their natural weakness and defects, and so female ascetics (bhikkhuṇīs) have to pay special respect to those of the male sex. 1

1 Buddha was never tired of deploring the defects and vices of women, and of warning the monks to guard against them. But this should not be ascribed merely to a despising of the weaker sex, for similar warnings are given to women as regards the wickedness of men. 2 Moreover, when we consider what an active part in sexual immorality is taken by men, we are justified in saying that the Buddha was so emphatic on this point for the sake of his male disciples, because it was more necessary to make these excellent women fill their roles among the Buddha's disciples; 3 and here, again, Vaichhagotā's utterance is justified.

This brings us to consider the exaltation of lay life and the subordination among the Mahāyānisṭ̄a, a consequence of their conception of the Bodhisattva ethics. They take the former lives of Sakyamuni as the models of morality, which should be at least determined as the first origin of this change of ideal, or to assign each Bodhisattva his nativity; but we see in the Gandhāra sculpture the Bodhisattva Maitreyā represented exactly like a prince, with his guards and his attendants, as is found in Barhat and Sanche. 4 These plastic representations, literary testimonies to these changes are so abundant in the Mahāyānisṭ̄a literature that we might say that nearly every Mahāyāna book contains exaltations of various Bodhisattvas and lay saints.

Most conspicuous among many books of the kind are two texts bearing the names of Viśākha and Srimala respectively. The former is said to have lived in Viśālī, contemporary with the Buddha, and the superiority of his moral perfection and dialectic power is the subject of the whole book. 5 He is honour as the monks. These are in agreement with Vaichhagotā's utterance above cited. See Rāja Davida, Dialogues of the Buddha, p. 63.

1 These marks of respect are called the ārāmaṇa, for which see P. 27 and Aja. 56, 57.
2 Jāt. 38, 17–18 (ΠΤΣ ed. iv, 190–197).
3 This is illustrated by the simile of warriors (pudbhaddas) (Ājīv. 8, 75–76 [ΠΤΣ ed. III. 60–601]).
4 See Bod. 'Women Leaders of the Buddhist Reformation', J. Theol. xiv, 191, 517.
5 This conception, taken by itself, is not specially Mahāyānisṭ̄a, but generally Buddhistic. See Dhātuk. 259, Mahāvīra. 56, Rāma, Ratana, etc.

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6 Seeūrūnedved-Burge, Buddhist Art in India (London, 1903), p. 27.

7 The Simālāvatī-nirādham, one tr. by Ch. Ch'en in the 3rd century, and another tr. by Kumārajīva in A.D. 406 (Nanjio, no. 140).

was perfect in the practice of all the ārāmaṇas, but he lived the life of a rich man, dressed in fine robes, and drove a fine carriage, etc. His philanthropy was well known throughout the country. He was the protector of the town and the standard by which the Buddhists judged the morality of the people whom he had met and sought, whether in the palaces, or on the streets, or in gahamās and other places. He also exercised his influence over the politics of the town. Perfect practice of the ārāmaṇa in the worldly life was his aim, for which reason he also went to the Bodhisattva, and visited the Buddha, and on which account he is regarded as the model disciple among the Buddhists of the Far East, even to the present day.

Srimala was the daughter of King Prasenajit (Paścānā) and his queen, Mañjuśrī. At the age of 12 she was married to the king of Ayodhya. An obedient daughter and faithful queen, she was induced with the desire to be a Buddhist monk, and perfect in her moral practice of the Sola Hora of the Bodhisattvas. Her great vows, stated in the presence of the Buddha, and the dialogues between her and the Buddha, serve to show the capacity of lay morality, when associated with true wisdom, to take up the essence of all the rules enjoined upon monks and nuns, and to elevate and broaden them to the all-embracing morality of the Mahāyāna. 6

In short, for a Mahāyānisṭ̄a, the moral ideal consists in their essence and spirit, regardless of the circumstances and conditions of life. 7

1 Its mother, it is said, "is wisdom (prajñā), his father tactfulness (śriguṇa), his kinsmen all beings, his dwelling the vacancy (śūnyatā), his wife joy (prīti), his daughter love (maitrī), his son truthfulness (ataś), and his household life makes him not attached to existence." 8

2 These precepts should be observed both figuratively and literally, and not only to the effect of compatibility of lay morality with the highest ideal of a Bodhisattva. A Mahāyāna text entitled Brāhmaṇa-jāla enumerates all Buddhist virtues and moral precepts, and explains them in higher and lower senses and according to the spirit of the Mahāyāna, re-interpreting the prohibitions in their respective positive counterparts, and referring every rule and precept to the deepest basis and highest aim of the Buddhist life. The Bodhisattva, who is the ideal figure of the Mahayana, is, with the Buddhist Vinaya in China and Japan, and has exercised great influence upon the morality of both these nations. 9

4. Efficacy of moral practice; ecclesiastical side of ethics. 10—The basis has been established, the aim shown, and the rules and precepts given. The next question is how these could be carried out. Here the Sāṅgha plays the essential part. The Buddhist Sāṅgha in neither a mere congregation nor a society of friends or pietists; it is a religious communion and churchly organization, furnished with the disciplines necessary for the realization of the religious ideal to which the Buddhist life is aimed at. It is a church in the full sense of the word, in spirit and in name, as distinct from the Buddhist Church in Japan, on the contrary, it entered into union with the warrior spirit of the nation, and the whole Buddhist body has exercised its influence in every department of life, down to the arts of fencing, swimming, and even to the spirit and method of the Aurakzī." 11

For these see A. J. Vinaya.
efficacy for morality through the whole of the present life, and for the future as well. This is the reason why the moral precepts enjoyed by the Buddha were not elucidated with the details declared to be one of the four objects of the indefatigable faith or repose (avechha-papasada), together with the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Sangha. These precepts are described in the formula stating the objects of faith: "The Buddha is unblemished, and the Dhamma is unblemished, and the Sangha is unblemished, and those who have become imbued with this faith are assured that they have entered the stream of emancipation (sotapatta)." Naturally, the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Sangha are the three objects of faith, and the ceremonial and the ceremony instituted for the purpose of effectuating and assuring its practice. The āśīla, together with its inauguration act, is an indivisible whole, as the one instituted by the perfectly Enlightened, and one who has become imbued with the perfectly enlightened, and the power of the whole of the Sangha. It is also untainted and unblemished, not being defeasible by contrary powers. Therefore it is said:

It is possible that the disciples, furnished with these four things, enter into the stream, become unblemished (asriṇita-dhamma), and turn to the destiny of perfect enlightenment.

The four things mean the faith in the Three Treasures and the āśīla. The life of such men is, indeed, inexcusable (amogham jīvita)." To the Mahāyānist explanation of this source of morality we shall return.

Here we have arrived at the point where we must speak of the authority of the Saṅgha. Quite naturally, the Buddha was, during his lifetime, the sole authority and leader of morality. After his death, a kind of apostolic succession, though not unified as claimed by the Christian Church, was kept up by a series of ordaining teachers (upādhyāya, Skr. upadhyāya); and every Buddhist could return being of his ordination through the series up to the Buddha. This practice of receiving the precepts from an upādhyāya was observed, both by monks and by laymen, even in the Buddhist Mahāyāna state; and parallelly, even in this a kind of diocese was inaugurated, and is continued to this day. It is called the Śīmā (Skr. Śīmā), i.e. the circle within which the wandering monks and nuns, as well as resident laymen, had to attend regular meetings and ceremonies, conducted by the elders, during the rainy seasons. This practice was extended, in the countries outside of India, beyond the rainy seasons, and its conception developed into that of a diocese, and at last became that of a Christian church.

The emphasis laid on the efficacy (if not sacramental) of the acts for the acceptance of the āśīla and the respect for the authority performing them (Mahāyāna, PTS ed. v. 2421); also SFB xi. 27.

Sang. vi. 55 (PTS ed. v. 404.) The same thing is told in Sang. i. 11. 4 (v. 123) and Aṣā. i. 42 (v. 27, 37), 5. 47 (v. 31, 54, etc.) Here the faith is described as the virtue of faith (ehipassiko), morality (ādosa), repute (pārasa), and insight into knowledge (dvissana).

It is to this observation that we owe the tables of the Elders (Thera, Skr. Bhikkhī), who were heads of their respective branches of Buddhism. Whether these tables are credible or not, there are reasons to believe that they are of some importance.

We hear of a central seat of the āśīla at Nalāndā, mentioned in the later Mahāyāna literature as the seat of the first Buddhist university. The Madhyānta school, for instance, was the first to be established by the Bodhisattva Mahāmāyā (Sanskrit name), and is still more in India, has become connected with poetry and plastic arts. Aesthetic sense among them is derived from the source of Mahāyāna, and the creative and performative and the aesthetic sense is part of the art for art's sake used to be an inconceivable thing among them. See the present author's article in the journal cited above, and Okakura, The Book of Tea, New York, 1906.

5. Mental training and spiritual attainments.—We now come to our last subject—a peculiarity of Buddhist morality, viz. its close connexion with the methods of spiritual exercises. Though, as we have seen above, morality is enumerated side by side with wisdom and contemplation, in the three postulates, and is known by the name of the Bodhisattva morality, the qualities of wisdom and contemplation are not so close to the doctrine of the Bodhisattva morality. The precepts and the religious acts of receiving them are observed, of course with modifications, by the Mahāyānists, but they consider these to be rather vain, unless accompanied by an eager decision for the attainment of the full bodhi, and consequently consubstantiated in the deep impression of the will upon the inner kernel of their own lives, so that they are more essential for them than any act is the awakening of the radical good, the fundamental nature, we might say the matrix, from which these acts and moral practice derive their meaning. This is called the bodhisattva. The truth of the term 'bodhisattva' in the Buddhist practice, the latter should be well founded on sound principle, which again should be in accordance with the ultimate matrix.

The religious practice of the entrance to moral life is to be considered as the awakening of the Mahāyāna faith, the manifestation of the radical good; and the continual efficacy of faith and sacraments causes the bodhisattva to manifest itself more and more, and leads finally to its final realization. 'Tathāgata' is the bodhisattva, which is once awakened, its essence (prakṛti) is manifested in life, and, because the essence in itself is unmade, is of non-action (akṛti), the moral life of the initiated needs less and less exertion, and so much the more partakes in the communion of the saints. Morality, in this condition, consists in actions—bodily, oral, and mental—but they are no opera operata but inopera, so to speak. In the descriptions of the four jhānas, appamāṇa-chetasā, so often repeated in the Pāli Canon and not less in the Mahāyāna books, we can see this sense of unexerted morality, and the formula of the āśīla in the four parādhas shows this bearing, at least implicitly.

The theory of the matrix of morality played a great part in the Mahāyāna ethics and became the source of various speculations as well as of practical influences.

Chi-Hau, in his commentary on the Brahmana-śīla, expresses this point as follows:

'‘The entity (of āśīla, i.e. the jhāna) manifests itself as the essence (bodhi), and the principles (good and bad) manifest themselves in practice; the realization of the essence is induced by practice, and the perfection of practice is derived from the essence, these being things in reality one.'

This is a piece of scholastic analysis of Mahāyāna morality, and may sound very abstract, but it is intended to explain the efficiency of morality on the basis of the bodhisattva, which is identical in all beings, and thereby to lay a foundation for the practice of sympathetic acts in the essential quality of the bodhisattva. This philosophy, in conjunction with the teaching of the pāramāsā and dedication, had actual influence over the Far East converted to Buddhism, and made its morality capable of being applied to various conditions of life. It broadened the people's moral ideal so as to admit all beings to their spiritual communion, and to extend their sympathy toward even animals and plants.
ETHICS AND MORALITY (Celtic). I.

GAULT.—Among the classical authors there is a great diversity of opinion regarding the moral status of the Celts; and, inasmuch as their qualities and defects have been recorded by their enemies, the Romans, and their sympathies were naturally alienated from them, one must be careful not to attach too much importance to naive generalisations founded on superficial observation.

Thus, while Livy (v. xlv. 3) regards the heroic as the dominant feature of the character of the Celts, Cicero (pro Fonteio, xii.) asserts that they lacked all sentiment of piety and justice; and, though most authors agree that their sense of nature, Polybius (ii. 7) calls them peripatetic. Nevertheless, from the points in which the classical writers concur, we can arrive at some idea of the moral character of the Celts. As the portrait is far from attractive (Dottin, Manuel pour servir à l'étude de l'antiquité celtique, Paris, 1895, p. 117), and some modern authors contend that this is due to their religion, which, according to them, had very little influence in regulating moral conduct (Joyce, Soc. Hist. of Anc. Ireland, London, 1903, i. 220). While this may be true to a certain degree, it is nevertheless a fact that their firm belief in a hereafter had a marked influence on their moral nature, inspiring them to acts of rare bravery in which their scorn for death is manifest (Cæsar, vi. xiv. 5; Meli, iii. ii. 19). Coupled with this, is an aptitude for cleanliness exceptional among barbarous peoples tended to elevate them above the level at which one would naturally be inclined to place them.

A few traits of the character of the Celts may be indicated by way of preface, before going into detail.

Though they were easy to be convinced, and often suffered thereby at the hands of ambitious individuals (Strabo, ii. iv. 7; Cæsar, vii. xxx. 5, iv. v. 3: 'incertis rumoribus servient'), they did not lack the power of reasoning, or refuse to listen to the language of prudence (Cæsar, vii. iv. 7; Tac. Hist. iv. 69; Strabo, loc. cit. and iv. i. 5). They were eager to learn, and sought information concerning other nations (Strabo, loc. cit.). Turbulent in spirit, and having a marked aversion for order and regularity, they loved war for its own sake, the state of war being so permanent among them that scarcely a year passed without some injury being washed away in blood (Cæsar, vi. xv. 1). Inconstant, they readily abandoned their ideals and their gods, all except their character, and became so thoroughly Romanized that the emperor Julian, in his protest against their claim to be represented in the senate, was able to state that they were 'uns moribus, artibus, affiliatibus nostris mihi.' (Tac. Ann. x. 24).

I: These are the oppidana-choi-eunwaei; see Rhys Davids, Digitalis (1st ed. 1897), and Neumann, Gautama Buddha's Reden, Leipzig, 1896-1909, passim. 2 The above words are again used of, religious and moral virtues; see Alg. (PTES ed. i. 42).


4 Very noteworthy are the descriptions in this book of a Sage (or a group of teachers), to appear in the latter days to bring salvation, and of the persecutions he would endure; it contains also the assurance given by the Buddha himself and his discipites, the Buddha's realism, and his effect (SBE xxii. xxx. xiv. xii., xx.). On the last point there are deviations from the present Skt. text in Kanjmicji's tr., which led to important consequences in China and Japan.

poems ascribed to them. 1 The consequence is easy to see. It resulted in the division of the Sāṅgha into the conservative and liberal sections, and finally in the contrast between the ideals of arhatship and bodhisattva-ship. Though these divisions were not precisely the result of the different characters, we may roughly say that the former represents the tendency to self-seclusion, while the latter is daring enough to emphasize the sanctity of lay morality. The principal difference arose among the Mahāyānists themselves, the more quietistic morality being represented by the adherers of the Prajñā-pāramitā, and the activities for the salvation of all fellow-beings being represented by the followers of the Boddharmapadārāka. 2

LITERATURE.—This is fully given in the footnotes.

M. ĀNESA.1

ETHICS AND MORALITY (Celtic). II.

GAULT.—The Celts as a people are characterized by the presence of certain virtues, of several kinds which are again combined, of religious and moral virtues; see Alg. (PTES ed. i. 42).

There are the oppidana-choi-eunwaei; see Rhys Davids, Digitalis (1st ed. 1897), and Neumann, Gautama Buddha's Reden, Leipzig, 1896-1909, passim. 2 The above words are again used of, religious and moral virtues; see Alg. (PTES ed. i. 42).
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Ethics and Morality (Celtic)

Although it have been seen, it was uncomplaining, and celebrated hero Feigeus—an account that was known without doubt by Strabo (Leabhar na hUidhre, 65). Notwithstanding this, the Celtic women were famous among the ancients for their fidelity (d'Arbois de Jubainville, 'La Légende et les femmes,' etc., in Ecol vii. [1886] 129-144).

Polybius (xlxi. xlii.) relates the story of Chironara, the wife of the Celtic king Oigfitio, who brought to her husband the head of the Roman centurion who had violated her. When the king said to her, 'Woman, fidelity is a beautiful thing,' she answered, 'Yes, but there is something still more beautiful; it is that there is only one man alive to whom I have belonged. Deridrie kills herself when the king of Ulster, after having passed a year with her, wishes to give her up to the murderer of her husband. For the beautiful story of Cannas, wife of the Tetricus Statius, see Plutarch, Amor. xxi.

As for incest, we have in Ireland the example of Clothru, the daughter of a king, who, after having been the wife of three kings, married her own, Lugaid, supreme king of Ireland (Book of Leinster, 23, col. 2). It is permissible to conclude from a statement of Caesar that, at an early date in the history of Ireland, there existed a strict law against incest, as well as another one against brothers to marry women in common—'uxores habent deni duodenique inter se communes et maxime fratres cum fratris' (Xiv. iv. 4); and this custom existed also in Caledonia (Dio Cass. lxxv. 12; cf. lxxi. 6). The ancient Irish law of the battles of the Gauls by several classical authors whose testimony is worthy of very serious consideration, is apparently without foundation (Aristotle, Pol. ii. vi.; Diod. vii. 10; Sophocles, xlii. 80; cf. also d'Arbois de Jubainville, op. cit. 187-199).

3. Prostitution.—In spite of the ease with which the marriage vows could be violated or broken, prostitution did not fail to have its place among the Celts. The name given by the Senecus Mór to the prostitute is brittach (Anc. Laws, i. 190, 230), or merdrech (margritic), or 'female of grove and bush' (Anc. Laws of Wales, London, 1841, p. 42). A curious fact in ancient Irish law is that the head of the family, to whom the purchase-price of the wife was paid, had also a right to a share in the earnings of the prostitute (cuit in apthia bátaide [Anc. Laws of Ireland, i. 191]; Diod. ii. 66). If she had any children, she and her family were obliged to support them (do fastad cirt ocus diligd [v. 452]). If she attempted to force any man to assume charge of the child through obligation of paternity, the Senecus Mór gave him the power to refuse (1. 192).

If the minute distinctions made in the Ancient Laws in regard to rape are any criterion, we must conclude that this form of seizure was not infrequently practised in ancient Ireland. The Senecus Mór distinguishes three kinds of irregular union between man and woman. The first is called idamnonas familii, or 'union by elopement,' an open and violent seizure done with the consent of the woman against the wishes of the family. The woman in this case is called ben fastagai, or 'woman of elopement' (Anc. Laws, ii. 366, 400, 455). The second, entitled idamnonas fóitha c tátada, is a secret union formed with the consent of the woman but unknown to her family. She is then called ban forün, or 'woman of theft.' (Ibid. i. 58). And, finally, a union by violence without the consent of the woman of the family is called idamnonas ción tóitha, i.e. 'union by force,' in which case she bears the name of ben forün, or 'woman of violence' (ibid. 366, 464).

4. Women. — From what we can glean from the different authorities, the condition of women among the ancient Celts was quite miserable (Dottin, 138). Seized with the passion of what is still a sight of the day, they cultivated the soil to the women ('femine res domesticas agrorumque culturas administrant, ipsi armis et rapinis servient' [Justin, xi. 3]; cf. also Sis. Ital. iii. 344). Later on, however, under the domination of these tribes, the Celts were given great interest in agriculture (Strabo, iv. 1. 2). Although there are instances of women governing tribes in the British Isles (such as Cartismandus, who was queen of the Brigantes c. A.D. 50 [Tac. Ann. xii. 30]), the statement of Aristotle (Pol. ii. vi. 6), that the Celts were so divided from the Romans, that their King was the judge of the Continent, can still be held true for the Continent. That they were not without influence, however, is confirmed by Plutarch (de M. Virtu. vi.), who says that they were admitted into the councils of wars, and that the differences between the Celts and Hannibal agreed with his Celtic allies to let all difficulties between them be judged by the women of the Celts. The women of the Gauls were beautiful and courageous (Diod. vii. 7; Athenaeus, xii. 80); they encouraged their husbands to fight, and accompanied them on the field of battle (Polyb. v. ixvii. 1; Tac. Agricola, xv., Ann. xiv. 34, 86); at times they even displayed greater physical strength than their husbands (Ann. xii. xlii.); and, according to Strabo, they were good mothers and could do more work than the men (iv. 1. 2, iv. 3).

5. Cruelty.—The cruelty of the Gauls in war terrified their neighbours (Seneca, N. A. ii. 114). According to their national custom, they cut off the heads of the dead and wounded on the battlefield, to offer them up afterwards to the gods of Ireland. (Cithaer, de la relig. gal., Bordeaux, 1903, p. 82). Occasionally they sacrificed captives, and they are also accused of having massacred old men and little children (Diod. v. 117.; Pausan. x. 31. 1; Athenaeus, xii. 80). The heads of the Gauls were sometimes attached to the necks of their horses or fastened on the end of their lances (Livy, xvi. 18.; Diod. xix. 66; xiv. 26.), and they were held up to the enemy (Reinach, Catalogue sommaire du Musée des antiquités nationales, Paris, 1889, p. 40). They displayed with pride the heads of their chiefs or other illustrious personages, which they preserved in a preparation of oil (Strabo, iv. 5; Diod. xix. 6.). In battle their attacks were characterized by a savage fury (Pausan. x. 33.; Florus, iv. 4.; Dion. Ital. xiv. 10, 17).

Probably the most striking example of their savagery is in one of the early Irish sagas, the Solus in nos M6n D6th6, or 'History of the Pig of Mac Dolt6,' Connal Cernach, the foremost warrior of the Cuchullains, killed the hero Cét in the following manner: 'I swear by the oath that many people swear to the Cechr's regret' (i. 628). Day after day, Cét sent to me, and I therefore send to you a hound, to say (to your lord) Cét regrets that Ailill is not present to fight with Connal, the latter replies: He is here, however,' and drawing from his girdle the head of Ailill, he threw it upon the bosom of Cét with such force that a stream of blood burst upon his lips (ett tancre, ar Connid is tabait chuid LiaBHuna na-cha-chirce ocus na-foile do Chét ar a bhrusan, corraigtad a fein falsa for a bodh [Windisch, Sr. Prate, i. 104, lines 15-23]).

However convincing these accounts may appear, it is, nevertheless, true that the Gauls were no more cruel or savage than other barbarous nations, although they inspired the Greeks and Romans with such great fear that the classical authorities do not hesitate to attribute to them all possible crimes and vices (Julian, Histo. de la Gaul, Paris, 1907, 1, 332, etc.). Didomnius accuses them of violating tombs (XXII. xii.); Pausanias says that they did not bury their dead, and outraged and massacred women and children (x. 1. 7, 7); Livy asserts that they continually used false weights (x. vlviii. 9); while Plutarch states that the only law they have is that all should be the same. The sword (Cemnill, xvi.). Such accusations are only what we should expect from a people in constant dread of a powerful enemy.

6. Human sacrifice.—Probably the most serious accusation ever made against the Celts, and the Gauls by classical authorities is that they practised human
sacrifice (Lucan, Pharsal. i. 443-445; Diod. v. xxvii. 6; Livy, xxxviii. xvii.). Caesar (vi. xvi. 2f.) states that those of the Gauls who were afflicted with grave diseases either sacrificed human victims or made a vow to do so, for they believed that in a human life, the wrath of the gods would not be appeased. He adds that they were accustomed to construct immense wooden statues, which they filled with human victims and set them on fire. If the gods they sacrificed their captives as a thank-offering to the gods (Diod. xxii. ix.; Pausan. x. xxiii. 6). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who finished his Historiae Antiquae in 30 A.D., maintained that human sacrifice was still practised among the Gauls, although it was prohibited by the Romans as early as 97 B.C. Under Tiberius (A.D. 14-37) this rite was suppressed (d'Arbois de Jubainville, Courc. ii. 270-281), although it survived in certain parts of Britain as late as A.D. 77 (Pliny, HN xxxv. 18). According to Diodorus (v. xxxii.), the Gauls kept criminals for five years before burning them on enormous pyres. That the belief in the immortality of the soul was one of the prime causes of these sacrifices is supported by the statement of Pomponius Mela (iii. ii. 19) that relatives of the dead person often threw themselves into the funeral pyre, in the hope of living with him in the hereafter. The article of the Dinnanecnua, written about the 6th cent. A.D., contains an account of the 'plain of prostrations,' showing that the bloody practice of human sacrifice was continued in Ireland probably at a very late date; and the author of this treatise states that at some period previous to his time the people were accustomed to sacrifice their firstborn to an idol called Cromm croisach ('the breath,' which stood on this field (Book of Leinster, p. 213, col. 2).

With human sacrifice is closely allied the love of suicide, which, according to the belief of the Gauls, was a kind of personal and spontaneous sacrifice to the gods. Some of the finest examples of self-sacrifice in antiquity occurred among the Celts. Brennus, believing that he was the cause of the misfortunes of his soldiers, committed suicide in order to appease the wrath of the enemy's god Apollo (Diod. xxix. ii.; Pausan. x. xxiii. 12; Jullian, Hist. ii. 359). Livy (xxxviii. xxii.) states that the Gauls scorned their wounds, enlarging them, if necessary, to make the better preparation.

7. Courage.—Among the more important doctrines taught by the Druids (q.v.) were the scorn of death and the obligation of courage (Caesar, vi. xiv. 5; Mela, iii. ii. 19). In other words, the Gauls made their theology accord with their temperament. Their very great courage, so highly lauded in antiquity (Polyb. ii. xxx. 4, xxxvi. 2; Dio Cass. xii. 1. 2f.; Livy, xxxviii. xvii. 7; Plut. Camill. xiii.), was rather a sort of fury (police Gallica) than a form of will. They considered it shameful to be attacked first (Plut. loc. cit.). On the battlefield, they were filled with anger, confidence, and pride, as they cast defiance against the enemy (Diod. v. xxix. 9); but the resistance of an adversary quickly dispelled their confidence (Pausan. x. xxiii. 12), and not infrequently they were victims of panic (ib.; Sil. Ital. xv. 710: 'patrius genti pavor'). It was their great desire to enjoy the esteem of posterity—posteri prodiunt pulcherrimam talemque famam (Caesar, vii. 75). Furthermore, more, the brave were recipients of many tokens of esteem from the tribe. For them were reserved the finest pieces of meat at the feasts, and the highest rank in life; the gallant warrior was adored as a hero (cf. the Hist. of the Perg. of Mac-Dadh, mentioned above, and the Feast of Bricriu; d'Arbois de Jubainville, Courc. v. 71-78, 80-146, 35-47).

8. Intemperance.—The Gauls were celebrated for their intemperance (Diod. v. xxvii. 3; Ammian. xvii. xii. 4; Posidon. iv. 36; Cic. de Pro Fontio); and, according to Pliny (xxii. ii. 5), it was the love of wine that caused them to make their incursions into Italy. The southern heat, combined with their excessive activity, aroused in them an irresistible desire to drink alcoholic liquors (Polyb. ii. xix. 4; Livy, xxxvi. xvii. 5: 'minime patientia sitis'). Cicero, with his usual sobriety, says that wine mixed with water was preserved by the Gauls (pro Fontio, xv.). They delighted in the invention of liquors of all kinds ('ad vini simulitudinem multispecies potus' (Ammian. xv. xii. 4)). About 100 B.C., they declared that they preferred the wines of the south, which they drank until they were insane (Ammian. loc. cit.; Diod. v. xxvi.); and it was this excessive indulgence in alcohol that finally undermined their vitality and rendered them weaker than women ('postrema minus quam feminarum' (Livy, xv. xxviii.)); Florus, ii. iv. 1).

9. Avarice and cupidity.—The thirst of the Gauls for bread was insatiable (Plut. Pyrrhus, xxxvi.; Livy, xxi. xx. 8). They violated tombs in order to secure gold (Diod. xxii. xii.; Plut. loc. cit.); they did not even hesitate to rob the most sacred temples (Pausan. x. xxiii. 6); they were so voracious that they would become mercenaries of any purchaser, and were willing to engage in long expeditions merely for the sake of pillage (Livy, loc. cit.; Justin, xxv. 2; Diod. v. xxvii.; Polyb. xvii. xx.). Yet, in spite of their love of gold, they amassed great quantities of it in their own temples as an offering to the gods, and no one dared to touch it (Diod. loc. cit.).

10. Justice.—While Cicero assures us that the Gauls were entirely lacking in the sentiment of justice (pro Fontio, xii.), Caesar (vi. xxiv. 3), on the contrary, states that certain tribes were renowned for justice and moderation; and Strabo extols their equity (iv. iv. 2). Tradition says that the Senones marched against Rome to avenge the right of the people, which had been violated by certain patricians (Livy, v. xxxvi.; Diod. xiv. xxiii.; Plut. Camill. xvii.).

11. Hospitality.—Though indirect at times, the Gauls practised all the laws of hospitality (Diod. v. xxviii.; Caesar, iv. v. 2); and, even in dealing with the most warlike tribes, Rome had no complaint to make of their treatment of her ambassadors (Livy, xxxiv. iv., xlvii. v., etc.). Anxious to learn about other people, their homes were always open to bards and strangers (Diod. loc. cit.).

12. Piety.—At first the conquered Greeks accused the Gauls of lacking piety, making of Brennus the type par excellence of sacrifice (Pausan. x. xxi.; Diod. xxii. ix. 4); but later, when they began to study their enemies, they not only admired them if they were religious, but even declared them to be the most pious of men (Justin, xxiv. iv. 3; Livy, xvi. 3; Diod. Hal. vii. 70). Caesar (vi. xi. 1) calls them a people much addicted to religious practices, for which they are praised by classical...
ethics and morality (celtic)

13. Obedience and devotion.—Especially before a common enemy, the Gauls showed absolute obedience to their chiefs, who were as one would a father (Fustel de Coulanges, La Gaule romaine, Paris, 1891, pp. 35-44); and the bonds that unite the chief to his followers are described by Polybius (iv. iv. 2), and, more particularly, Cesar did not fail to admire the devotion of the Soldati or to their chief (iii. xxii.). These men share the good or bad fortune of the one to whom they have given themselves; and, if he dies, 'there is not an example of one in this case who would wish to remain alive.' It is to their generous and sympathetic nature that this sublime devotion is due. Thus, two sons of the Galatian king Adiatorix vie with one another as to which shall lie with their father (Strabo, xii. iii. 35). Prompt in responding to all appeals for help, they rush to the defence of their neighbours (Strabo, iv. iv. 2); even an army making an invasion into Italy stops at the Alps to fasten on the bravery and the loyalty of their neighbours, while, even, in their haste to respond to a request which excites their sympathy often leads them into war. The chief, on his part, never suffered his followers to be outmatched; so, did so, he lost his authority among his people (Cesar, vi. xi. 4).

14. Pride.—Though the Gauls were characterized by their devotion and obedience, they had little regard for discipline, owing principally to their excessive vanity (Polyb. iii. xxi. 1; Polyb. iv. xxi. 2-5, v. lixiiii. 1-3; Arrian, Anab. i. iv. 6). It was this pride that rendered them incapable of profiting by experience; for, even though defeated, they were too hasty to admit their mistake and change their manner of fighting (Strabo, iv. iv. 5; Cesar, i. xiii. 2-7, xiv. 7). They defied the elements, and believed themselves dishonoured if they sought to avoid the fall of a wall (Ellian, Var. Hist. xii. 23; Stobaeus, Anthol. xiv. 41). Their vanity led them to boast (Strabo, iv. iv. 5; Polyb. iv. xxix.), and before battle the chiefs lauded the exploits of their ancestors and their people, and cast insults at the enemy (Sil. Ital. iv. 279; Cesar, vii. xxix. 6, xxx. 1).

15. Perfidy.—Though the Gauls were inconstant, changeable, and not inclined to reflection (Cesar, iii. iii. 27; Polyb. iv. iv. 2; Polyb. ii. xxi. 8, xxi. 2-5; Sil. Ital. iv. 49f.), few of the Gauls or Galatians who have reproached them with perfidy. This accusation has been brought against them only in an informal way (Polyb. ii. vii.; Cie. pro Fonteio). Nevertheless, as we might expect, rage and treachery flourished to some extent, especially in times of war. It is true that we have such traitors as Divitiac and Durnornoir, while some of the acts of Vergunctorix are certainly not above suspicion; yet, with few exceptions, they were so open and frank that they did not even use strategy, a method of warfare so honored among the Greeks (Jullian, Hist. i. 340). Their constant hating the defeated has been a factor in their success, and it seems to have been a proof against those worse defects of character (Cesar xxi. xx. 2; Cesar, iv. v. 2; Polyb. v. xxviii.); and this gaiety, which so frequently manifested itself in that of the defeated, seems to have been aroused in part by their firm belief in the immortality of the soul as well as by the pique of personal honour.

16. War, victory.—From the evidence we have from different authors, there is little doubt that anthropophagy prevailed to a certain extent among the primitive Celts. While we may have reason to refuse to accept the statement of St. Jerome (adv. Judae. ii. 7) that the Attrocities of Britain

relished certain parts of the bodies of shepherders and women, Cesar (vii. xxix. 12) makes the formal accusation that the Gauls were guilty of the invasion of the Cimbri and the Teutons, ate the bodies of those amongst whom age had rendered useless for war. Pausanias (x. xxii. 3) states that the Gauls were accustomed to cut the flesh and drank the blood of little children; and Strabo (iv. v. 4) maintains that certain tribes of Ireland had a special predilection for the bodies of their fathers. (xix. viii.)

17. Frugality.—It is obvious, from lack of evidence to the contrary, that Polybius (xii. iv.) is correct when he states that at least the Cisalpine Gauls were very frugal. Their principal food seems to have been hog-meat.

18. Murder.—It is worth noting that among the Gauls the penalty for the murder of a stranger was greater than that of a fellow-citizen (Steb. Anthol. xiv. 41); in the first case, it was death; in the second, exile. From the scanty information found in the classical authors, it is impossible to state how frequently murder was resorted to among the primitive Gauls (see, further, below, II. § 15, 13, etc.).

19. Theft.—Although the Greeks accused the Celtic invaders of all kinds of theft and brigandage (Jullian, Hist. i. 337 ff.), it is highly improbable that this was a common practice in times of peace, if we believe what the same authors say of the frankness and simplicity of their character. Furthermore, the punishment for theft and brigandage was extremely severe—the criminals were burned alive (Cesar, vi. viii. 6). If a Gaul concealed a part of the booty of war, or stole some object from those deposited in sacred places, he was put to death after undergoing severe torture (Cesar, vi. xvii.). The severity of these punishments must have tended to curb any desire of individual Gauls to appropriate to themselves the property of others (cf. also above, § 9).

20. Punishments.—It is important to note here that, whereas in later times the éric, or compensation for murder, and the punishment of thieves and other criminals, were definitely established by the legal statutes, according to the rank of the person killed (Cesar, vi. viii. 5), according to the value of the thing stolen, in earlier history it was left to the Druids to decide in such cases and to determine the punishment (d'Arbois de Jubainville, Cours, i. 105-189). As they were reputed to be the most acquired of men, no one could challenge their sentence; if he did not, he was forbidden to take part in the sacrifices (Dotin, 281). In order not to receive any injury from their contact, the society of those suffering such excommunication was carefully avoided—in other words, the criminal became an outcast from his tribe, so that, if he had any complaint to make, no justice was rendered him.

II. IRISH.—Giralduis Cambrensis, who completed his Topography of Ireland about 1187, presents a moral portrait of the Irish of that time which is far from attractive (Opera, ed. Dimock, London, 1807, v. 19). He asserts, for example, that the Irish are 'indeed a most filthy race, a race sunk in vice, a race more ignorant than all other nations of the first principles of the Faith' (xix.), and yet, when not influenced by religious prejudices, he is a very valuable source, inasmuch as he is a contemporary of an obscure period of Irish history. According to this authority, the Irish are not only inconstant, but perfidious. 'This race is likey to changeable, wily, and cunning. It is an unstable race, stable only in its instability, faithful only in its unfaithfulness' (p. 100). The following sentence is characteristic: 'Their arts are, therefore, more to be feared than their arms, their friendship than their fire-brands, their connivance than their nakedness, their treachery than their open attacks, their sanguinaryship than their seminal envy' (66). Through this oratory,
1. Marriage, immorality, etc.—On this subject, Giraldus is as severe as St. Jerome, for he asserts that the Irish ‘do not contract marriages or slum immorality’ (Book of Leinster, ed. by Henneney, Progr. boy. Ir. Acad. [1889]), which is an account of a drunken raid against Munster. Giraldus (xxvii. 172) accuses even the Irish clergy of excessive indulgence in drink.

2. Cruelty.—A most ferocious act of cruelty is found in the story of the sons of Eochaid Maigmeund, king of Ireland from A.D. 353 to 360 (Book of Leinster, ed. by Henneney, Progr. boy. Ir. Acad. [1889]), which is an account of a drunken raid against Munster. Giraldus (xxvii. 172) accuses even the Irish clergy of excessive indulgence in drink.

3. Human sacrifice.—Although Joyce (i. 239) maintains that human sacrifice was not practised at all in Ireland, we have already called attention (above, i. 6) to the account of the Mag Stoccha, or ‘Plain of Prostrations,’ to which there is another reference in the account of Tailten (now Teltown, Co. Meath) in the Binnanechns, where it is stated that Patrick preached at the great fair there against the burning of the firstborn progeny’ (Joyce, i. 281–284). This would be in accord with the Celtic law giving the father the right of life and death over his children (d’Arbois de Jubainville, Cours, vii. 244 f.; Caesar, vi. xix. 3).

4. Courage.—Giraldus (Top. Hib. x. 150) states that the Irish ‘go to battle without armour, considering it a burden, and esteeming it brave and honourable to meet the enemy at the end of their lives’ (Joyce, i. 281–284). This would be in accord with the accounts of the bravery of the early Celts as mentioned above. It may be noted here that among the Irish those soldiers who lacked courage were usually fettered in pairs to leg, leaving them free in other respects. In A.D. 250, Lugaidh Mac Con, fearing defection among his Irish allies in his invasion of Ireland against Art Oenfer, supreme king of Ireland, had them fettered to the Britons; and at the Battle of Moyrath in A.D. 637, Congal, the leader of the rebels, resorted to the same measure (Joyce, i. 143 f.).

5. Intemperance.—In spite of the fact that Cormac’s Glossary (p. 116) indicates that meæc, ‘drunkenness,’ implied ‘more of reproach than sense,’ intemperance was such a common vice that it is unnecessary to give examples here. We shall merely mention the Macc Uisn in the Book of Leinster (ed. by Henneney, Progr. boy. Ir. Acad. [1889]), which is an account of a drunken raid against Munster. Giraldus (xxvii. 172) accuses even the Irish clergy of excessive indulgence in drink.

6. Hospitality.—The Irish were renowned for their hospitality, and this was one of the principal virtues of the Irish. According to the Sancnus Mor, chieftains were bound to entertain guests without asking questions (i. 237); and elsewhere (iv. 357) cases are specified wherein a king may be excused for deficiency of food if an unexpected number of persons should arrive. The Glossary of Cormac (p. 66) gives the word eneac-ruice, ‘face-blush,’ for shame at not being able to discharge the due rites of hospitality; and the Sancnus Mor mentions a ‘flush-fine’ to be paid when one felt ashamed of the scantiness of his food (i. 123, 11). In accordance with this admiration for hospitality, free lodging-houses were established all over the country at a later date (Joyce, ii. 107).

7. Cupidity.—According to Giraldus, the Irish had a great love for gold, which they still coveted in a way that they ‘sought in the chief wildungi . . . quod adhuc Hispanico more sitian.’ (Top. Hib. x. 153).

8. Discipline.—The Irish seem to have had a certain scorn for discipline in the field, and were in this respect much inclined to the Anglo-Normans (Joyce, i. 132); but the monks, on the contrary, were characterized by their unquestioning obedience (Adamnan, 343).
9. Perfidy.—In this respect, Giraldus is exceedingly severe on the Irish of his time. 'They are so treacherous,' he says, 'more than any other nation, and never keep the faith they pledged.' Neither shame nor fear withholding them from constantly violating the most solemn oaths, 'when they have sworn to themselves,' he says, 'are above all things anxious to have observed' (xx. 160); and he concludes, 'While ancient and modern custom teaches that always carry so axes in their hands instead of a staff, that they may be ready promptly to execute whatever iniquity their minds suggest' (xx. 160).

It is probably true that, because of the frequency of its requirement, the oath fell into disrepute, with the result that the Irish, when oaths or similar religious vows were expressed in Christian times (Giraldus, ii. 52–54, iii. 331.) and the one known as the crí-cotain, or blood-covenant.' The latter consisted in drinking each other's blood, which they shed for this purpose (ib. iii. 22). and was absolutely binding. The kings of Ulidia and Ireland entered into a 'blood-covenant' in A.D. 598, when they united against Branduff, king of Leinster, at the battle of Dunblig (Recell xiii. 1892 73); on his lady's great grant of O'Curny it was so firmly respected in the western islands of Scotland that one who violated it utterly lost character (Martin, Western Isles, London, 1716, p. 109). In primitive times the oaths by the elements and by arms were the most revered (Atlantic, l. [1855] 271; Joyce, l. 383 f.)

10. Chivalry.—In spite of the accusation of perfidy borne against the Irish of their times, it is apparent from the early literature that they were little inclined to this vice. It is true that there are examples of those who did not hesitate to resort to ambush (etnarmad) or other stratagems in war, but these are rare. Thus in the battle between Aed Maic Alimmired, king of Ireland, and Branduff, king of Leinster, the latter smuggled into Aed's camp 3600 oxen carrying large hampers, in each of which was concealed an armed man (Joyce, 1. 140–149). But, on the other hand, according to O'Curry (Manners and Customs, Dublin, 1873, ii. 261), the Irish warriors never sought to conceal intended attacks, either letting their adversaries know beforehand or coming to an agreement with them. At the first battle of Moytura, the Firbolg king had to consent to the demands of the invaders for battle each day with equal numbers on both sides, although he had a much larger army (O'Curry, i. 283). Before the battle of Moylana, according to the end of the 2nd c., Owen-More, being hard pressed by Conn, the supreme king, sent to ask him for a truce of three days, which was granted (O'Curry, Manners and Customs, i. 31). In 1269, Brian Boru, granted King Malachi a delay of a month in which to muster his forces (Joyce, Short Hist. of Ireland, Dublin, 1893, p. 208). So much for history. In literature we have the beautiful story of the two intimate friends Cuchulainn and Ferdia, forced by circumstances to fight one another to death. During their duels they show each other great affection, and, when Ferdia is slain, Cuchulain falls on his sword (Joyce, Manners and Customs, i. 415). A noble example of self-sacrifice is shown in the account of the death of Alill, king of Connaught, in A.D. 519, for Cohnkille relatives, in the Annales of Ulster, that, in order to protect his fleering army from pursuit and slaughter, Alill turned his chariot and ploughed amidst his foemen, by whom he was slain.

11. Vengeance.—The Irish, like the Gauls, were always more to avenge wrongs on the tyrants of their own brothers among a barbarous race than excelses Giraldus (Top. Hib. xxiii. 167), 'Woe also to kinsmen! While alive, they pursue them to death, and when dead, to avenge their murder.' Every tribe had its airc-echt, or 'avenger of insults,' who was not slow in acting, as when Aengus of the Terrible Spear, the airc-echt of the Déise or Desi, killed in open court at Tara the son of King Cormac Mac Art who had insulted a woman of that tribe (Joyce, Soc. Hist. i. 92; see, further, Blood-Feud (Celtic)).

12. Slavery.—It is evident that Slavery in Ireland from very early times to a comparatively late date. There were three classes of serfs or non-free men, called the boidach, the senciithe, and the iorcuire. Of the three classes, there were two kinds—the airc-fuidrir or 'free fuidir,' and the airc-fuidir, or 'bond fuidir,' the latter being escaped criminals, captives taken in war, convicts reprieved from death, and purchased slave. That traffic in slaves was very great in the 12th c. is evidenced by Giraldus' account of the Synod of Armagh in 1170, which dealt with this question.

According to Giraldus (Epist. Hib. i. 13, p. 258), the Irish had long been wont to purchase natives of England as well from traders as from robbers and pirates, and reduce them to slavery. For it was the common practice of the Anglo-Saxons people, while their kingdom was entire, to sell their children, and they used to send their own sons and kinmen for sale in Ireland, at a time when they were not suffering from poverty or famine.'

13. Murder, etc.—Murder is the principal topic in the Irish law, which means that it was probably the most common of crimes. The law, however, was known and practised only outside the courts. 'At this time,' says the writer of the commentary on the Senchas Mor, 'no one is put to death (by judicial sentences) for hisintentional crimes as long as éric is obtained' (Anc. Laws, i. 15). But, if the family of the murderer wished to avoid the éric, they were required to give up the criminal to the family of the victim, who might then, if they released him, kill him with a sword (ib. ii. 69). Sometimes the murderer was drowned by being flung into the water, either tied up in a sack or with a heavy stone attached to his neck. It was thus that the Danish tyrant Turgesius was executed by King Malachi in A.D. 845 (Joyce, i. 211 f.). It should be noted that bodily harm as well as personal injury of any kind, such as a slight or character insult was punishable by a fine called dirc—a term that is very frequently used in the Ancient Laws. Furthermore, according to the Ancient Laws (v. 303), if a person wounded another or injured him bodily without justification, he, his family, or his clan was held responsible for 'sick maintenance,' i.e. othrus or folach-aethrun, meaning the cost of maintaining until cure or death. There are seven different kinds of injury enumerated by laws of A.D. 842, Brian Boru. For injury by his husband, gave her the right to separate from him (Anc. Laws, ii. 357, 359, 361, 381, 383).

14. Old age.—The respect for old age shown by the ancien Irish is praiseworthy. According to the Ancient Laws (iv. 373), 'the old man is entitled to good maintenance, and the senior is entitled to noble election' (O'Curry, Manners and Customs, ii. 301, 479, etc.). Furthermore, if the old person was destitute and had no children, it devolved upon his tribe to see to his wants; 'it is one of the duties of the clan (tribe) to support every tribe man' (Anc. Laws, ii. 55, 35; 57, 9).

15. Idleness.—Giraldus (Top. Hib. x.) states that the Irish of his time were a pastoral people, living like beasts. 'Abandoning themselves to idleness, and immersed in sloth, their greatest delight is to be exempt from toil, their richest possession the enjoyment of their plunder.' Yet (ib. xxvi. 175) he states that 'these people are intertemperate in all their actions, and most vehement in all their feelings.' 'Thus the bad are hard—there are nowhere worse; you leave in it to the good you cannot find better.' Finally, as for jealousy in the opinion of Giraldus (ib. xxxi. 179), 'they are also prone to the failing of jealousy beyond any other nation.'

16. Cleanliness.—Giraldus speaks of a tribe of
Comnaught, who did not wear any clothes, except sometimes the skins of beasts, in cases of great necessity. In the main, for the Irish, like the Gauls, took great pride in their personal cleanliness. The people bathed daily, usually in the evening (Joyce, ii. 185). Kings and princes in the habit of the day wore battle, or bathing and anointing themselves with scented herbs (for references to baths, see *I. Texte*, i. 285, 6; *RCel* xiv. [1893] 417; Hull, Cuthulinn Saga, London, 1898, p. 130, 12, etc.). According to the *Ancient Laws* (1791), the head of a family who had retired because of age was to have a bath at least once every twenty fourth night, and his head was to be washed every Saturday. Long hair was much admired, and baldness was considered a serious blemish (O’Curry, *Manners and Customs*, ii. 144). Women dyed their nails crimson (I. *Texte*, i. 79, 11); men and women reddened their faces (Meyer, *RCel* xiii. 290); and sometimes the women dyed their eyelids black (O’Curry, *MS Mut.*, 309, 309, 6). At table, they ate with their hands (*Vision of Mac Conglinne*, p. 64), though napkins were introduced as early as the 8th or 9th cent. (Zeuss, *Gramm.* C. B., Book xi. 633, 45, being called lambrat, or English *tablecloth*).

III. WELSH. —The general conclusion that can be drawn from Giralduus (*Descrip. Cambr.*), i. ch. 8, etc., and other authorities is that in the 12th cent. in Wales, like the Irish, there was a warlike pastoral people, who were further advanced in matters of intellect than in regard to material prosperity and higher morality. Giralduus states further that, in his time, they were a wild and turbulent race, dangerous neighbours, and impatient of settled control from any quarter. Wynne, in his *History of the Gwydr Family* (Osveyr, 1878), shows how late these disorderly habits continued. According to Giralduus, the Welsh were a light and active people, entirely bred up to the use of arms (i. 8, p. 170). The serious defect of their character was evidently the continual litigation about land among themselves, and their tendency to resort to the common violence of trespassing on the lands of others, that of relatives not excepted.

*Hence arise suits and contentions,* says Giralduus (Ib. ii. 4, p. 211), “murders and confiscations, and frequent intricacies, increased, perhaps, by the ancient national custom of brothers dividing their property amongst each other;” adding that the baby was not left to his destiny, but that the care of the principal men of the country was also the cause of frequent disturbances amongst brothers, terminating in the most cruel and bloody deeds.

1. Marriage, divorce, etc.—In regard to marriage, it may be stated at first that even in later times there were customs of a barbaric character which it is surprising to find surviving in a country where the Church had been established for many centuries (Ibys and Brynmore-Jones, *The Welsh People*, London, 1900, p. 212 f.). According to Giralduus (II. 6, p. 213), the Welsh did not engage in marriage until they had had, “previous cohabitation, the disposition, and particularly the fecundity, of the person to whom they were engaged. As in Ireland, the marriage tie was loose, the wife having far greater freedom than was afforded to her by the law of the Church or by the English Common Law. Whenever the husband and wife were separated, which they were allowed to do if one or both so desired, there was apparently (§ 171)"the cohabitation method by which they could be brought together again. The woman after a husband married very early—"from her fourteenth year unto her fortieth year she ought to be married," says the *Ancient Laws* (100, sec. 9); and after her marriage she "may go the way she willith free, for she is not to be home-returning" (ib.). The Laws of Gwynedd, or North Wales, recognize the influence of the Church as establishing the sanction of marriage, requiring legitimacy in the sons, and introducing a law of primogeniture true in the main, like the laws of primogeniture which did not exist in the Irish system (Skene, *Celtic Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1890, iii. 198).

There were three good reasons for which the wife might separate from her husband. One was to escape injury. ’”be leprosy, or have fildust breed, or be incapable of marital duties’” (*Anc. Laws*, sec. 10). But, on the other hand, a married woman committed any heinous crime, either by giving a kiss to another man, *vel praedeundo in podicum vel stultiturn*, the husband could separate from her, she forfeited all her property rights (ib. 40, sec. 19). That this did not operate as a ground of divorce is shown in the following passage in the *Venedocian Code* (ib. 40, sec. 171): "If the husband take another wife, after he shall have parted from the first wife, the first is free; but, if the first takes another, and she be minded to take another husband, and the first husband should repent having parted from his wife, and overtake her with one foot in the bed and the other outside the bed, the prior husband is to have the woman." But, if the wife left her husband and slept away from him (for three nights during the first seven years of their marriage, and they separated at the end of the seventh year, she lost all right to her dower (ib. sec. 9, p. 29). There is an article in the Venedocian Code (ib. sec. 70, p. 45) which shows the exceptional case with which divorce was obtained, as well as the very great emphasis laid upon the dower: "if a woman be given to a man, and her property specified, and the whole of the property had, except one penny, and she do not have, we say that the parting man separate from her on that account, and she cannot retain any of her property, for that is the single dower, which is to take away a hundred." Without entering into further details concerning divorce, it is obvious from the articles cited above that each had a right of separation, exercised without any liability, except a loss of de (possessions), varying with the time and the case, the latter being the parting for further details, see *Anc. Laws*, pp. 38-50, etc.

Polygamy was not permissible according to law, and the Venedocian Code states succinctly that "no man is to have more than one wife" (ib. 109, sec. 30, p. 54). As for the *ius primae noctis*, suffice it to say that, if it was not exercised in Wales, we have at least an indication of it in the transmission of the purchase-price (golby or amoby) by the bride’s father into the hands of the husband, at the time of the marriage, or lord (arglwydd) (*Anc. Laws*, p. 258 f.), this signifying that the right was bought back by the bride through her parent or guardian. The payment of this sum could not be avoided, for the Laws (iv. sec. 26, p. 405) state that, if a man asserted that a woman was pregnant by him and the woman denied it, nevertheless he should pay the amoby of the woman to the lord.

2. Adultery. —Provisions against adulterers were made at the time of the marriage, when the kindred or parent of the bride gave sureties that she would do nothing culpable against her wedded husband (Ibys and Brynmore-Jones, 211). The restrictions were not severe, for the penalty imposed in the case of adultery was insignificant in comparison with that imposed for other crimes. According to the *Dinefach Code* (ii. sec. 15, p. 257), "if a man commit adultery with the wife of another, he is to pay the husband his sarraad ("disgrace-price") once augmented, because it engenders family animosity." Apparently this was in the case of violence, for later it is stated (ib. sec. 37) that a man who has committed adultery with the wife of another with her consent ‘is to pay him (the husband) nothing while she is consenting; and, if the deed be notorious, she is to take to him as her husband, or the husband may freely repudiate her.’ It is sufficient to say that the Law did not consider this question a very serious one, for it states that, if a woman ‘full age’ committed adultery with a man and was afterward deserted, ‘upon complaint made by her to her kindred and to the court, she is to be entered as being for herself, having its tail shaved and greased, and then thrust through the four-score date; and if the woman go into the house that is being outside, and let her plant her foot on the threshold, and let her take his tail in her hand, and let a man come on each side of the bull and hold him, she will hold the bull, let her take it for her revengeworth (‘face-worth,’ or fine for insult) and her chastity, and it shall be a stain of her hands’ (*Anc. Laws*, p. 267, sec. 42). The penalty for adultery, like that for murder, was most
frequently some kind of compensation paid by the man committing the act to the offended husband; for, according to the Irish system, the woman whose husbands are not to have right from them for their adultery: "one is a woman taken clandestinely; if she do what she has no right to, her man is not to do right to the man who took her clandestinely; the second is, a woman slept with as a concubine, and the Irish system, the woman whose husbands are not to have right from them for their adultery: "one is a woman taken clandestinely; if she do what she has no right to, her man is not to do right to the man who took her clandestinely; the second is, a woman slept with as a concubine, and the third is, a woman of bush and brake; her paramour is to have no right from her, though she may counsel formation by taking another paramour" (ib. sec. 54, p. 200). Finally, if a man committed fornication and her paramour is to have no right from her, though she may counsel formation by taking another paramour (ib. sec. 54, p. 200). Finally, if a man committed fornication and the Law required he should be paid compensation that he might have promised to give her (ib. sec. 9, 25).

10. Incest.—Although Giraldus speaks of this crime as most common among the Welsh, the only formal accusation that he brings against them is that they were not ashamed of intermarrying with their relations, even in the third degree of consanguinity, which, he adds, was due principally to their 'love of high descent' (Descrip. Kamb. ii. 6, p. 213).

4. Concubinage.—Concubinage does not seem to have diminished to the same extent as in Ireland—possibly because of the greater freedom of the woman in the married state. In all probability the relations with the concubine were of short duration; for, a man may marry a woman until the end of seven years, thenceforward, says the Law, 'he is to share with her as with a betrothed wife' (sec. 31, p. 42).

5. Prostitution.—An important difference from the Irish system with regard to the regulations concerning prostitution is that if a 'female of grove and bush—the common term for a prostitute—gave birth to a child, its father was obliged to rear it, for the Law (sec. 33, p. 42) enacts that she should not 'suffer loss on account of the man.' The same was true with regard to the household servant, with the addition that the man had to supply her master with another to take her place during her pregnancy (ib. sec. 51, p. 45). Otherwise, the prostitute had no privilege; and, even if violence was committed upon her, she could not obtain compensation (ib. sec. 80, p. 49).

6. Abduction.—Abduction was not dealt with seriously by the Law; for, if a man abducted a virgin, 'her lord and her kindred are to take her away from him, though it may annoy him'; but, if she were not a virgin, 'there is nothing without her consent' (ib. sec. 38, p. 44).

7. Violence.—That the punishment for violence or rape was cessation is evident from the article in the Dunnean Code (ii. sec. 20, p. 255) which states that this regulation was not enacted in the law of Howel.

8. Cruelty.—According to Giraldus (Descrip. Kamb. ii. 8, p. 220), the Cymry gave no quarter in warfare, usually beheading their captives.

9. Courage.—The Welsh were a very patriotic and courageous people in the opinion of Giraldus (i. 8, p. 180):

'They anxiously study the defence of their country and their liberty; for these they fight, for these they undergo hardships, and for these willingly sacrifice their lives; they esteem it a disgrace to die in bed, an honour to die on the field of battle.'

They were so bold and ferocious that, when unarmored foot-soldiers were met with an armed force (ib.). During their first onset, they were unable to bear a repulse, being easily thrown into confusion and flight; but, though defeated on one day, they were ever ready to resume the combat on the next, either by their loss nor by their dishonour. Unlike the Irish and the early Celts, they continually harassed the enemy by ambuscades and nightly sallies (Giraldus, ii. 3, p. 210). They were able and willingness to sustain their hunger and cold, showing great resistance against fatigue, and were not despondent in adversity—in fine, they were 'as easy to overcome in a single battle as difficult to subdue in a protracted war' (ib.).

10. Intemperance.—Though the Welsh were little inclined to drunkenness, they were addicted to fast from morning till evening (Giraldus, i. 9, p. 182), they were immoderate in their love of food and intoxicating drinks whenever they found themselves surrounded with plenty. So far from scarcity of food and profanity are too severe, so, when seated at another man's table, after a long fasting (like wolves and eagles, who, like them, live on plunder, and are never satisfied), their appetite is immoderate.' The Ancient Laws prohibit the chaplain of the royal household, the judge of the palace, and the royal medicinæ from ever becoming intoxicated, for they knew not at what time the king may want their assistance (ii. sec. 19, p. 215). The only other mention of inebriates in the Ancient Laws is where it is stated that they are not amenable to law, and that all their acts are invalid (pp. 380, 387, 604, 656).

11. Hospitality.—Giraldus (i. 10, pp. 182, 183) says:

'So one of this nation ever begins, for the houses of all are common to all; and, a man may marry a woman until the end of seven years, thenceforward, says the Law, 'he is to share with her as with a betrothed wife' (sec. 31, p. 42).

12. Piety.—The Cymry were, at any rate outwardly, very religious. 'With extended arms and bowing limbs' they asked blessing of every passing priest or monk, and they also showed 'greater respect than other nations to churches and ecclesiastical persons, and to the relics of saints which they devoutly revere' (Giraldus, i. 18, p. 203).

According to the Ancient Laws (p. 201), religion was one of the seven legal qualities which a judge ought to possess.

13. Pride.—Proud and obstinate, the Cymry refused to subject themselves to the dominion of one lord and one law. Giraldus, i. 9, p. 225). They greatly esteemed noble birth and generous descent, so that even the common people retained their genealogy and could readily repeat the names of their ancestors back to the sixth and seventh generation (i. 17, p. 290).

14. Perjury.—According to Giraldus (ii. 1, p. 206), the Cymry were constant only in acts of inconstancy, cunning and crafty. 'They pay no respect to oaths, faith, or truth; and so lightly do they esteem the covenant of faith that it is usual to sacrifice it for nothing. They never scruple at taking a false oath for the sake of any temporary emolument or advantage; so that in civil and ecclesiastical causes, each party is ready to swear whatever seems most advantageous to his purpose.'

This was a necessary result of a legal system which made an oath an incident of ordinary transactions, and which multiplied the number of compurgators to an unusual degree, sometimes six hundred being required. So the trial depended on a complicated method of swearing and counter-swearing, each party concerned not by what he had actually seen or heard, but in standing by a kinsman in trouble (Rhys and Brynnor-Jones, 358).

15. Murder.—The principal indictment borne against the Welsh by Giraldus (ii. 7, p. 216) is that of murder. They were 'so little accustomed to suffer from the lengthy treatment accorded to these crimes in the Ancient Laws that they were among the most frequent to be dealt with.
**ETHICS AND MORALITY** (Celtic)

'They revenged with vengeance the injuries which may tend to injure the body,' says Giraldus (ib. p. 290), 'and, being naturally of a vindictive and passionate disposition, they are ever ready to avenge not only the recent but ancient affronts. It was usual with them to say that brothers should share affection to another when dead than when living,' adds the same author elsewhere (ib. p. 312), 'for they perceived the living yraven unto death, but revenged the deceased with all their power.' According to the Dmicetan Code (Anc. Laws, p. 197), galanusa, or murder, with its nine accessories, is one of three columns of the law.

The important fact in regard to murder among the Cymry was whether the murderer killed a kinsman or not, for the slaying of a man outside one's community might or might not be counted for righteousness, but was not thought of as wrong. While no particular penalty was attached to the killing of a member of the same tribe, the murderer forfeited his rights of kinship, and became a cercil-leadrad, or a kin-wrecked man, which meant that he became an object of hatred and was obliged to flee. The cause for this was that in the tribal system the states of individuals depended upon the alliance and interest of the whole. If he slayed his own kin, state the Ancient Laws (i. 791), 'is not killed for the sake of the dead kin, everybody will hate to see him.' It is worthy of note that, if an innocent man was killed, and no one was observed to seek justice, 'should he be killed on account of it, nothing is to be paid for him, though innocent' (Anc. Laws, p. 200; sec. 33). Furthermore, if a woman killed a man, she received the spear-penny; and this is the person who receives, but does not pay' (ib. p. 49, sec. 77).

16. Theft. — 'This nation conceives it right,' remarks Giraldus (ii. p. 207), 'to commit acts of plunder, theft, and robbery, not only against foreigners and hostile nations, but even against their own countrymen.' Theft (ladrada), with its nine accessories, is one of the three columns of the law, according to the Dmicetan Code (p. 197). Afterwards there is supplied a collection of rules relating to movable property, as well as rules for the punishment of theft and interference with a man's right of possession. In the Ancient Laws, theft is distinguished from spoliation, violence, and error (p. 124). Theft, or ladrada, is to take a thing in the owner's absence, with a denial of the act. Spoliation, or anguysforch, is to take a thing secretly, but without denial of the act. Violence, or draul, is to take a thing in a man's presence and against his will. Error, or annedoe, is everything that is taken instead of another, i.e., taking a thing one had no right to possess, or the belief that the one is acting legally. For error there was no particular fine, only a 'compensation payable to the person for his property' (Anc. Laws, p. 124). 'By the law of Howel,' continues the Venetodian Code (sec. 42, p. 193), 'for theft to the value of four pence, the thief is saleable; and, for a greater amount, forfeits his life, but not his property, 'because both reparation and punishment are not to be exacted, only payment of the property to the loser' (sec. 44, p. 192). If seven pounds were paid by him or on his behalf, he was let off; if not, he was exiled; and, if he remained in the country beyond the time allowed—a day to pass through every centref in the lord's dominions—he might lose his life unless some one bought him. There was no galanusa the (sum assessed for homicide) for a thief, nor did the Law permit a feud between two thieves, or destruction of either (ib. sec. 47, p. 123). To accuse one of theft legally, it was necessary to have seen him with the thing stolen 'from daylight to twilight,' and to swear upon a wright (verdict, usually composed of from 5 to 300 persons) that the accusation was made not 'through hatred or animosity, or for worth, or for reward, but only to show the truth' (ib. sec. 21, p. 294). We can readily see, from the severity of the punishments administered, that theft was plagued, because of its frequency, no doubt, on an equal basis with homicide.

17. Miscellaneous crimes. — The third 'column of the law,' according to the Venetodian Code, which, if it may be said, was the one which was most protected, was arson (tas, fire'). The punishment for this was death (Anc. Laws, 302). Treason was also recognized by the Law, which states that 'no galanusa is to be paid to any' (ib. p. 124). The punishment was the forfeiture of the patrimonial rights (Rhys and Brymnon-Jones, 339). The third book of the Venetodian Code states with great minuteness the worth of different limbs and members of the human body, etc. As has been pointed out in CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Celtic), the distinction between civil injuries (offences against an individual) and crimes (offences against the State or community) is not developed, though for many wrongful acts the punishment is to exact fines called direvys or cambre, and for some the criminal was sold, exiled, or put to death.

18. Sodomy. — Giraldaacus accuses the Cymry of 'that detestable and wicked vice of Sodom,' to which Mailgon, king of the Britons, and many others were addicted. And he adds that, if they abstained from that vice 'which in their prosperity they could not resist, it may be attributed more justly to their poverty and state of exile than to their sense of virtue' (ii. 6, p. 215). We find additional evidence of the existence of this crime in the Dmicetan Code (p. 292), which states that the testimony of 'a person guilty of unnatural crime with man or beast' is of no effect in any case. It is possible that there is further reference to it in the Gwentian Code (sec. 10, p. 385), where it is stated that the third shame of a kindred is 'the despoothing of one's wife, being more pleased to spoil her than to be connected with her.'

19. Paternal authority. — The husband was the lord (anghelio) of his household. If his wife uttered 'a harsh or disgraceful word' to him, she was obliged to pay him 'three kine as cambere, for he is her lord.' But, if he preferred, he could 'strike her three blows with a rod of his choice length, on any part he may will, excepting her head' (Anc. Laws, sec. 5, p. 232). Furthermore, he had the right of life and death over his children, except the son after the age of fourteen, when he became emancipated, 'for the son of one lord, or lord's son, or lord's brother, or lord's lord, such as he has been educated in or by the lord, is after the age of seven' (vii. 244 f., 5). In the 6th cent. St. Teliasv saved the lives of seven children whom the father, being too poor to feed them, had thrown one by one into a river (Liber Land-escu, Llandovery, 1840, p. 120). In the 11th cent. (Venetodian Code (Anc. Laws, sec. 22, p. 103), it was common for a parent or kindred to deny a son in order to prevent him from receiving his patrimony. Finally, there were three things for which a wife could be beaten according to the Venetodian Code, (sec. 39, p. 44), to wit, 'for giving anything which she ought not to give; for being detected with another man in a covert; and for the driving of another man's beast,' he adds. 'If he chastised her for being found with another man, the Law did not permit him to have any other satisfaction, 'for there ought not to be both satisfaction and vengeance for the same crime' (ib. sec. 39, p. 44).

20. Immoderation, cleanliness, etc. — At the close of bk. i. of his Descrip. Camb., Giraldus, after stating that the Cymry were a quick, impulsive race, wanting in moderation, and indulging in extremes of conduct, resumes their moral portrait in the following manner: 'This nation is earnest in all its pursuits, and neither worse men than the
had, nor better than the good can be met with.' He notes also their wit and pleasantness. The had, however, two vice of the Irish, and they had, and that was their loose and licentiousness. They were famous for their boldness and confidence in speaking and answering, in the presence of their princes and chiefs (i. 15, p. 192). In rhymed songs and set speeches they were so subtle and ingenious that they produced "ornaments of wonderful and exquisite invention, both in words and sentences" (ib.). They loved to boast of their strength, and exulted in their ancient name and privileges (ii. 7, p. 216). In regard to their jealousy, Giraldus states (i. 10, p. 183) that, 'as no nation labours more under the vice of jealousy than the Irish, so none is more free from it than the Welsh.' Finally, the same authority contrasts the Welsh with the Irish in regard to cleanliness (Top. Hib. iii. 10). There are frequent allusions to the bath in the Ancient Laws. Both sexes cut their hair short—close round to the ears and eyes (68). When married, They took special care of their teeth, which they rendered like ivory by constantly rubbing them with green hazel and then whipping them with a woolen cloth. Their hair was also powdered, the men wearing a wig (ib.). Their only garments were a thin cloak and tunic for all seasons of the year.

IV. SCOTTISH.—Fordon, who was favourably disposed toward the Gaelic Highlanders, offers the following description of them during the 15th cent., in contrast with that of the TentrNGIBON- landers. According to him (Chron. ii. 38; Skene, Celtic Scotland 1866, Edinburgh, 1886-90, ii. 40), the people of the islands ... are a savage and untamed nation, rude and independent, given to rapine, slave-loving, of a domicile and warm disposition, commonly in person hospitable in dress, and to the English people in language, and, owing to diversity of speech, even to their own nation, and exceedingly cruel. They are, however, faithful and obedient to their king and country.

The correspondence of a visitor in 1726 shows that after five centuries their character had little changed (Skene, iii. 324 f.). According to this account, they esteem the most sublime degree of virtue to love their chief and to pay him a blind obedience. Next to this is the love of the particular branch from which they sprang, and, in a third degree, the love of the whole clan, to whom they will assist, right or wrong, against those of any other tribe with which they are at variance. And, lastly, they have an adherence to one another as Highlanders, in opposition to the people of the Low country, whom they despise as inferior to them in courage, and whom they believe they have a right to plunder whenever it is in their power. During the first half of the 18th cent., half of the Highlanders passed an idle life, using blackmail as their main resource. Half of the men stole, in order that the other half might be employed in robbing (Lang, Hist. of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1802, iv. 374). If we compare this portrait with that traced by Dio Cassius of the Caledonians, or Northern Piets, we can readily see that time effectuated little change in their character. According to this authority, these tribes were a pastoral people, living principally by hunting. 'Naked and unshod, they had wigs in common. They were great thieves, "looted most literally... and they were sick in common' (Lang, i. 10).

1. Marriage.—In the early period, 'the sanctions of marriage were unknown, and a loose relation between the sexes existed' (Skene, iii. 138). Among the tribes of Northern Scotland, community of women was so frequent that two or more women generally brothers or a father with his sons—had wives in common (Lang, i. 4). Annual marriage, or 'hand-fasting,' existed in the Highlands until the 16th century (Fordun, iv. 216). The chiefs agreed that the son of one should marry the daughter of the other. If, at the end of a year and a day, the young wife had not yet given birth to a child, they owed their lives, and nature of the parties was permitted to marry again (Skene, The Highlanders of Scotland, ed. Macfain, London, 1904, p. 108 f.). The jura prima noctis was exercised in Scotland from very early times; according to Buchanan (Annals Historiae Scotiae, 1697, pp. 99, 200), it was abolished in the 11th cent. A.D. by King Malcolm III.

2. Immorality. — Bede, who wrote about A.D. 687 or later, noted the "vandal disposition of the Scots" (Lang, i. 72). In later times illegitimacy was prevalent amongst the royal family, the nobles, the clergy, and the people. Robert I., Robert II., and Robert III. had as many as 14, 15, and 16 children, and the Crown was much weakened by the large number of children whom Robert II. had by his two wives, besides many sons and daughters of illegitimate birth (J. Mackintosh, Hist. Civilization in Scotland, Paisley, 1892-96, i. 426). Although, in 1528, Parliament attached a severe penalty to the crime of rape, it was often passed over with a very light punishment. Bigamy and adultery were commonly offences in Scotland, but Parliament enacted a measure which proposed severe penalties against them. Divorce was also extremely common among the upper classes (ib. ii. 229).

3. Intoxication, idleness, etc. — Drinking of liquor was always very common in Scotland, and Parliament passed numerous acts against this habit, but to no avail (Mackintosh, i. 415). During the 15th cent., the country was overrun with beggars and vagabonds, in spite of the efforts of Parliament to suppress them (ib. 422 f.).

4. Murder. — As in Ireland and Wales, there was a system of blood-feud. In the Middle Ages, Edinburgh, 1860, p. 192). Until the Reformation, murder and manslaughter were extremely prevalent throughout the Scottish kingdom; and, although many Acts of Parliament were passed for putting an end to these crimes, they seem to have produced little effect. When criminals were convicted, they were often pardoned, and so many pardons were granted that in 1542 Parliament was obliged to interfere (Mackintosh, i. 425, ii. 228).

5. Theft. — Gallio, who wrote about 500, calls the Piets 'a set of bloody freebooters with more hair on their thieves' faces than clothes to cover their nakedness' (Lang, i. 15). In the 12th and 13th centuries, if we believe Fordun (Chron. iv. ed. 1572, ii. 2213), the native population would not, for either prayers or bribes, or oaths, leave off their disloyal ways, or their ravages among their fellow-countrymen. In the 15th cent., theft and cattle-raiding were the most frequent crimes, against which Parliament acted in vain (Mackintosh, i. 427 f., ii. 228).

See, further, the 'Celtic' sections of CHILDREN, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, etc.

LITERATURE. — This has been sufficiently indicated in the article.

JOHN LAWRENCE GREGG.
ETHICS AND MORALITY (Chinese).—If we are to write of Chinese ethics, we must have in view only the ethics of the Confucian school; for China has no other system. These moral laws, rules, and principles are aptly depicted in the classical literature which for ages past has formed the one subject studied by every scholar throughout the length and breadth of China. Not only are they accepted not only by education but uneducated, but they have helped to mould the social life of the people, and have coloured and influenced the national legislation and administration. As religions, Taoism and Buddhism have established themselves by the side of Confucianism, doubtless because they better satisfy that desire for something beyond the present life which is so common and so natural to the human mind, but the morality which they inculcate is entirely borrowed from the Confucian system.

Though Confucius has given his name to a school, he did not claim to have founded one. He said of himself, "Among the people I am perhaps somewhat more learned than an average person," though he was "a transmitter and not a maker, believing in and loving the ancients" (Confucian Analects, vii. 1). Of an eminently profligate and practical turn of mind was never more graphically illustrated than in the characteristics of virtue or of drawing distinctions between right and wrong in actual life; but he cared little to speculate on the nature of the moral faculty or any such questions. We know, however, that he considered virtue to be a mean between two extremes, to which some fail to attain, while others go beyond it; and he held the fault of excess to be as bad as that of deficiency (Chief Analects, vi. 27, xi. 15; Doctrine of the Mean, iii., iv.).

These ideas are elaborated in the treatise called The Doctrine of the Mean, which contains many quotations of Confucius's words, and is believed to have been written by his grandson. The treatise further declares that man receives his nature from heaven, and, when he acts in accordance with his nature, is following the proper path, from which he must not wander for an instant (op. cit. i. 1-3). Here we find a principle disclosed, concerning which Confucius never expressed himself with definiteness, but which for many generations occupied the minds of his followers more than any other. That man's nature is what we call his character depends to a great extent on the education he receives, and this is the work of the father and/or the school, which was under the control of the state; hence the knowledge of the state that character is what is important and the child should be educated with this in mind.

The doctrine of the goodness of human nature had its most powerful advocate in Mencius, the greatest of all the learned men who owned Confucius for their master. In his day a certain philosopher, Kao by name, urged that man's nature is neither good nor bad; but any one may be led to practise either good or evil, just as water, when one makes a hole for it to escape by, has no preference for east or west, will flow in either direction indifferently. Not so, replied Mencius, when asked his opinion as to this: though water is indifferent to the compass of a vessel, its tendency is to flow downwards, and only by force can it be made to rise; so the tendency of man's nature is towards what is good, and doing evil is contrary to his nature (Mencius, vi. pt. i. 2). Then another theory was brought to bear on this notion—that the nature of some men is good and that of others bad. To this he makes answer with a more serious argument. In saying that man's nature is good, his meaning he explains, is that 'from the feelings proper to it, it is constituted for what is good'; and, if men do evil, it is not the fault of their natural powers. Every one has the feelings of pity, shame, of reverence, of approbation and disapprobation, i.e. of appreciating right and wrong. Thus, as he said on another occasion, every one, no matter who, will feel alarmed and distressed if he suddenly sees a child on the point of falling into a well. And this will be a genuine sensation; it will not be merely that he desires to gain either the friendship of the child or the approbation of his own friends, nor yet that he dislikes seeming to be callous. Hence it will be evident that there is no man without the feeling of pity; and it is this same view with regard to the other feelings (ib. vi. pt. i. 6, ii. pt. 1. 6). Mencius proceeds to show that a few sages had existed who lived perfect lives; and other men might be like them if they chose, for a perfect life consisted in simple acts which every one was physically able to perform. It was not that men could not do these acts, but simply that they did not do them. People were led into evil because they allowed themselves to be influenced by surrounding circumstances; thus, for instance, in years of plenty the common folk were mostly well-behaved, but in time of dearth they became lawless (ib. vi. pt. ii. 2, vi. pt. i. 7).

Though the doctrine of Mencius has found final acceptance and has been adopted by all Chinese, it was not until the 18th century that it was challenged at first. Soon after Mencius's time a distinguished scholar, named Hsün Ch'ing, maintained with much force that human nature is evil. He appealed to the fact that men are not good spontaneously, and that they are made so only by teaching and by the laws. Eyes can see, ears can hear, naturally; they do not need instruction to enable them to do it; but men acquire righteousness only by learning and hard effort. Again, when a man is tired or hungry, his natural inclinations prompt him to rest or to eat; if, instead of yielding to them, he gives place to his father or his elder, he acts rightly, but it is against his natural inclination. Indeed, the mere fact that a man wishes to do right shows that righteousness is not natural to him.

There remained one more theory to be brought forward—that our nature is partly good and partly evil. This was upheld by the philosopher Yang Hsiung, who lived during the time of the Christian era. He taught that man's progress in either direction depends on the development of the good or the bad part of his nature, according as he is influenced by his environment.

Besides The Doctrine of the Mean, among the recognized Chinese classics there is another ethical treatise which is entitled The Great Learning, and among its subjects are the practice of virtue and the art of governing. This treatise, which is extremely short, is most highly praised by the Chinese for its profound wisdom, and is perhaps studied by them beyond all their other canonical books. Modern authorities ascribe its opening and fundamental chapter to Confucius himself; but for more than fifteen hundred years, probably with greater correctness, it was held to be by another hand. In any case it is substantially in accord with Confucius's views, and must have been written not long after his time. At its commencement is a description of what man is said to be the proper mentor of the ancient princes for promoting virtue throughout the Empire:

'The object of the ancient Chinese statesmen was to govern well their own subjects. In order to govern well their subjects, they first regulated their own families. In order to regulate their families, they first practised virtue in their own persons. To arrive at the practice of virtue, they had first purified their hearts. In order to rectify their hearts, they first sought for sincerity of thought. In order to obtain sincerity of thought, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. The extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things.'

The processous consists in a succession of steps, by the first part of which the individual may arrive at personal virtue, and by the second

2 Legge, op. cit. vol. i. (1855) p. 367; W. A. P. Martin, Life of Cathay, vol. VII.
part, the individual being a ruler, virtue may be promoted throughout the land. What is to be understood by the first step of all, the ‘investigation of things’? According to the greatest of Chinese commentators, it means ‘investigating the principles of all things; we must come into contact’ (Great Learning, Com. v. 2). This, verily, is no small task to impose upon the seeker after virtue. The third step, sincerity of thought, is explained as being a method of following of, the good, not a mere doing of what is right from inferior motives (ib. vii.). But there seems to be little distinction between this and the next step, rectification of the heart. In the later portion of the chapter, one notices how good government is made to spring from the personal excellence of the ruler. This was a favourite point with Confucius, who repeatedly insisted on the necessity of a good example being set by those who govern. Once, when asked by a certain ruler how to deal with the prevalence of robbery, he went so far as to reply: ‘If Your Excellency were not covetous, your people would not rob, though you paid them to do it’ (Conf. An. xii. 10).

It was as a teacher of practical morality that Confucius won his fame. But he left no treatise on the subject; nor did he ever handle it systematically. We have disconnected utterances, which were collected and recorded by his followers or appear as quotations in later writers. The Confucians hold that there are five virtues (the, or that virtue consists of five parts: jen (charity), li (righteousness), li (propriety), chih (wisdom), hsin (sincerity). Perhaps the best idea of the sage’s teaching will be given by grouping under these heads a few specimens of practical examples:

1. Jen—the virtue of man’s relation to man, charity (in St. Paul’s sense), benevolence, humanity. The descriptions given by Confucius of this quality vary according to the occasion and the questioner. The most concise is that it is ‘to love all men’ (Conf. An. xii. 22); the most elaborate, that it consists in the practice, without intermission, of respectfulness, indulgence, sincerity, earnestness, and kindness (ib. xvii. 6). To another inquirer it was said to be found in reverence and the observance of the Golden Rule—not to do unto others what you would not wish done to you. A great case in point, he declared, twice or three times by him, and once he gave it as sufficient alone to serve as a guide for one’s whole life (ib. xii. 2, xv. 23). A man may be pure, be loyal, be capable, and yet not worthy of being called jen: Confucius disapproved for himself any right to be so considered (ib. v. 7, 18, xvii. 33). Charity is founded on filial piety and fraternal submission; and, if rulers behave properly to their relatives, the people will be roused to charity (ib. i. 2, viii. 2).

2. Li—righteousness, justice, duty. This is especially the virtue of public life. Thus, to refuse to serve one’s country is a failing in duty (ib. xvii. 7). The prince must be just in laying burdens upon his people; if he be so, they will willingly submit to his rule (ib. v. 15, xiii. 4). If righteousness be absent, courage only leads men of high position into rebellion, and those of low position into brigandage (ib. xvii. 23). Without righteousness, riches and honour are but a floating cloud (ib., vii. 36, xlv. 6).

3. Li—propriety, combining with it an idea of ceremonialness. It is worth nothing without charity; it must be accompanied by reverence; and it does consist in gorgeous array (ib. ii. 3, 26, xvii. 11). If it is joined with a spirit of forwardness rudeness (ib. viii. 2). Without a knowledge of propriety a man’s character cannot be established; and combined with study it will keep one from erring (ib. viii. 8, xii. 15).

4. Chih—knowledge, wisdom. The most important kind of knowledge is the knowledge of men (ib. xii. 22). A man ought to know what heaven commands (i.e. what is right and what is wrong); he should also know the rules of propriety; and, thirdly, he should be able to estimate the character of those who speak with him (ib. xx. 3). When one knows a thing and recognizes that one knows it, when one does not know a thing and recognizes that one does not, that is real knowledge (ib. ii. 17). Attempts to acquire virtue will fail if not accompanied by study (ib. xvii. 8). One should learn for the sake of one’s own improvement, not to win approbation (ib. xiv. 22). To study without thinking is labour lost; thought without study is dangerous (ib. ii. 15). Confucius once said: ‘I have passed the whole day without eating and the whole night without sleeping; I do not think of mere uses; the better plan is to study’ (ib. xv. 30). But, after all, knowledge of the truth is not equal to the love of it; and the possessor of literary acquirements is a useless man if he be devoid of practical ability (ib. vi. 18).

5. Hsin—sincerity, truthfulness, belief. The necessity of this virtue is inculcated in many passages. Faithfulness and sincerity should be one’s first principles; without truthfulness no man can get on (ib. i. 8, ii. 22). In intercourse with friends, one must above everything be sincere; and it is disgraceful to pretend friendship with a man whom one dislikes (ib. i. 4, v. 12). Sincerity is one of the requirements of a ruler (ib. ii. 5).

As we have seen above, Confucius, living in the 6th cent. B.C., inculcated the Golden Rule of our Saviour, which has been described as ‘the most unshaken rule of morality, and foundation of all social virtue.’ On the other hand, there is one well-known instance where he distinctly falls short of the standard of Christian benevolence. When asked what was his opinion as to the repayment of injury with kindness, he replied, ‘With what then will you repay kindness? Repay injury with justice, kindness with kindness’ (ib. xiv. 36). On another occasion, also, in reply to an inquirer, he declared he had created seven great sons besides himself. ‘If I am the father, the son must be ready to slay the murderer whenever and wherever he may meet him. This conversation is no doubt authentic, though it does not rest on such a high authority as the Analects.

Filial piety cannot be left unmentioned by any one dealing with Chinese ethics. It is often coupled by Confucius with the somewhat similar, but less important, fraternal affection or submission which a younger brother owes to an elder. These two duties formed the corner-stone of both the ethical and the social system of Confucius. For in his view, not only are they the foundation of charity, the greatest of all the virtues, it is by practising them that the people learn to be obedient to the government and the laws. Filial piety is said to consist in serving parents, when alive, according to propriety, and, when they are dead, in burying them according to propriety and in sacrificing to them according to propriety. Reverence and willingness in service are requisite; moral performance of duties is not enough (ib. ii. 5, 7-8).

The worship of ancestors, that great offshoot from filial piety, was, as practised by Confucius, merely a commemorative rite. There is no sanction from his writings respecting its features at the present day, namely, the transformation of the deceased into tutelary deities,
and the absurd doctrine that the fortunes of a family are determined by the location of its

and the absurd doctrine that the fortunes of a family are determined by the location of its
tomb. One charge which foreign critics have made against the Chinese is that it sanctions and encourages concubinage.

There is truth in this. In China the practice of taking concubines is extremely common among the upper classes, but the occupation of them with concubines is disapproved, except where a wife is not likely to bear a son. In such a case the necessity of having male descendants to continue the ancestral line is admitted. In the opinion of all Chinese, completely justified concubinage, even though it is possible to avoid the practice by the introduction into the family of an adopted child.

LITERATURE.—The Chinese ‘Four Books’: (1) The Lun Yü, or Analects of Confucius; (2) Mencius; (3) The Ta Hsiao, or Great Learning; (4) The Chuang Yung, or Doctrine of the Mean.


T. L. BULLOCK.

ETHICS AND MORALITY (Christian).—

1. HISTORY.—There is no formal science of Ethics in the NT. The NT presents a life-giving Personality, the Source and Norm of Christian Teaching, dominant. His teaching is not limited to His spoken words; it is an ever-present continuous work. This is taken for granted by the NT writers. Hence we can speak of a real progress in Christian thought concerning conduct. Because Christ is the Fulfiller of Hebrew revelation, the OT is of special, though subordinate, value. As Christianity spread to Greco-Roman soil, Christians, because of their cosmic view of Jesus’ Person, appropriated from their new surroundings whatever helped their spiritual life. The history of Christian morality is thus a record of how the Spirit of Christ has been endeavouring to redeem all life to its own service, and the record is still unfinished.

The Didache, the Epistle of Barnabas, and the Apostolic Fathers show the predominance of the religious-ethical interest, but the beginnings of legalism and externalism are also manifest (Pastor of Hermas). The dogmatic interest gradually submerged the ethical; and ascetic withdrawal from the world and superiority of knowledge to faith introduced a division of labour into morality, hence the distinction between honestum and usile, between constantia and mandata.

In the Alexandrians, such as Ambrose in the West, the ideas and terminology of Hellenism are influential. The organized Church became a law-giving source (Cyriacan), and legalism suppressed spiritual spontaneity. The recognition of Christianity by the State deepened this influence. In Justin, Clement, and the Alexandrians generally we see the rationalistic and inclusive tendency of Christian thinking; in Tertullian and the West, its legalistic and exclusivist tendencies. Notwithstanding the recognition of asceticism, virginity, baptism, and the Eucharist as means of salvation, there existed a vigorous new life of brotherly love and martyr courage.

Augustine is the greatest of the early moralists. His conversion had supreme influence on his teaching. In him are found the germs of the various medieval tendencies. His teaching on sin and atonement as the ground of the allegiance and the supremacy of God as Highest Good, and on virtue as ordos amoris, influenced not only Gregory the Great, Isidore of Seville, and more especially Aquinas, but also the preachers of the Renaissance, the Mystics and Quietists.

The Middle Ages added the Corruptions of the Papacy and its Inquisition, the Monasteries, the sale of Indulgences and the Inquisition, the Monasteries, the sale of Indulgences and the sale of Indulgences.


(The Thomists and Scotists, and were rich in casuistic and penitential books. Petrus Lombardus’ 3rd book of Sentences was an influential moral treatise. Aquinas’ supplement, Summa Theologiae, extended the Thomistic theology and the thought of Aristotle supply the foundation for evangelical Ethics, and the distinctiveness of Christian morality is regarded as a revealed ethic as part of the word of God.)

A new era began with the Reformation. Faith became personal trust in God, the value of the individual was recognized, and ordinary vocation were regarded as the true sphere of moral life. But its greatest work was the placing of the Scriptures in the hands of the common people. Problems as to the relation of the individual to the State, and of the State to the Church, now arose. There was also a tendency to separate philosophical and Christian Ethics (Melanchthon and Kekermann), though Ameeus insisted on Ethics as purely theological. The Counter-Reformation produced Jesuitic casuistry (p. 11)—against vigorous individual protest (Innocent). The merit of having separate two is usually ascribed to Dunsus and Schinutz.

While Rom. Cath. Ethics largely followed tradition and casuistic refinement in dealing with cases, Protestant Ethics tended to be moulded, from this time onwards, by the current philosophies, and, within the various Churches, by the authorized Confessions of Faith.

Rationalism and Deism (Wolf, Lessing, English Deists) made reason supreme, and the source of inductive truths; Christianity was an awkward republication of innate moral principles.

Theories as to the origin of the moral sense, natural rights, and sanctions exclusively interested moralists. Biblical Ethics was neglected or confused through the equal valuation of the OT and the NT. Butler deserves mention, because of his insistence on conscience; but it was Kant who rationalized and individualistic utilitarianism. Schleiermacher offered morality in the customs and institutions of the community, and may be regarded as the father of modern socialism. His influence tended to make the Church a part of the State and to intellectualize and individualize morals. Schleiermacher’s interest was the distinction of the subjective consciousness, and on the value of feeling; he occupies in modern Christian Ethics the place that Kant occupies in the philosophic world; he was largely influenced by him; Martensen occupies a mediating position; while I. A. Dorner is speculative and Biblical. The Ritschlian school aims at safeguarding the Christian ethical values—against the scepticism of history, the conservatism of dogma, and the lack of novelty introduced by science.

The influence of the inductive sciences and of evolution raised questions as to the origin of a system of science, and attempts were made to explain morality genetically and associationally. The question of origin is, however, distinct from that of value. The historical study of Scripture has cleared up difficulties in the Ethics of the OT, and has enabled moralists to distinguish between principles and their historical setting in the NT, while it has helped to reveal the distinctiveness of the Christian life. Dogmatic conversion has, in fact, been in favour of an ethical basis for unified action in dealing with grave social problems (Ethical Societies). The Unitarian school emphasized the supremacy of conduct over dogma, and can claim many distinct qualifications of the various revival of religion has made prominent the power of Christianity in renewing life, and at
present it is laid on the psychology of the Christian moral life and the supremacy of the will, which is felt to be beyond the control of a personal relation to a moral being, and control can do not a little to develop and safeguard morality.

Till recently there was a general tendency even among Christian philosophers to regard the moral teaching of Jesus as perfect, as far as individual life was concerned, though defective on its social and political side. Lately this has been denied from without and within (Nietzsche and the Intemisthik school). On different grounds, and with different results, we are coming to see that the Christian life is bound up with the Christian revelation, and that the ideas of philosophic Ethics or historical theories must not be used so as to crush out the distinctive vitality of the Christian life of faith. Recognition of spiritual facts is more valuable than systematic completeness, and defective views of Christ's Person are found to revenge themselves on Christian morals.

II. DEFINITION AND SCOPE.-(a) Christian Ethics, analytically defined, is the science which deals with (1) what the Christian man (individual and social), and the Christian destiny (sumnum bonum), (2) what he ought and ought not to do (Duty), and (3) what moral power is necessary to attain end and accomplish duty (Virtue). The Christian life, however, is an organic continuum, and any analysis of its contents must be to some extent artificial; but, if we guard against overlapping and repetition due to this trichotomy, we may, for clearness of exposition, adopt it. (Schleiermacher, Paulsen, and A. J. Dorner adopt this analysis for philosophic Ethics; Rothe, Lange, Kraus, and others, for Christian Ethics.)

(b) Classificatory viewed, Christian Ethics is defined by its place in the theological encyclopedia, its boundaries delimited, and its organic relations with the totality of Christian thinking determined (Flint, art. 'Theology,' in EDB; cf. artt. in theological encyclopedias). We cannot do more here than mention this way of looking at the science. The present age is anti-dogmatic and anti-metaphysical, and the central position of Christian Ethics, as of Ethics in general, is more and more recognized. This tendency is against confessional and dogmatical Ethics. Men ask rather, 'How much must we believe to live the Christian life?' (Kraus, Christian Ethics) and this presupposes the Christian revelation—the matrix alike of both Ethics and Dogmatics—and is organically bound up with it (see Findlay, Pernley Lectures, London, 1894, for a fine treatment of Christian Ethics from this point of view).

(c) The science may be defined also by comparison and contrast with other views of life. Some views of life are inimical to Christian morality, others are preparatory and propedient. The task of the Christian moralist is in this region wider to-day than was that of Clement or Tertullian, Augustine or Aquinas, Melanchthon or Calvin, because, thanks to the vast missionary labours of modern times, new systems of life have come before the mind of Christendom. As a practical science, Christian Ethics must take note of earnest ethical speculations, both within and outside the Christian Church. In this way it becomes conscious of itself and of the magnitude of its evangelistic task. The analytic method adopted here is not exclusive of the others, though different from them.

1. Christian virtue.—Under this heading we deal (1) with the objective, (2) with the subjective, dynamic of the Christian life. An objective ethical content of Christian life, a moral life, is not ethical synthesis (Plato), or discipline (Aristotle), or inhibitive control (Stoics), or culture (Goethe), or confession, or Stieler, the development of a capability given in human nature itself' (Green), but creation. All the others are needed once we get a beginning; but a beginning is impossible until Christian moralists, by a process which they may call 'directly' (Wace, Boyle Lectures, v. [ser. 1], 1874-75, cited in Luz Mundi, p. 504). The same objection applies to the Ethics of Rabbinc Judaism, where the highest good depends on works, without any real reference to the grace of God (Oesterley, 'Grace and Free will,' Expos., Nov. 1910). The objective dynamic of Christian Ethics is the Holy Spirit, or God, exerting moral creative power. The Holy Spirit is not simply the immanent Spirit of God, as that is generally viewed. Its character is revealed and its power acts through Jesus. A great novel activity of God has been manifested in the earthly life and death, and exhibited as completed in His resurrection, which makes the beginning of specific ethical Christian experience possible. Hence Christianity is a gospel of personalism, not the product of man's working or thinking, but an offer of life impinging on man for acceptance. Christian moral experience, then, takes for granted the Holy Spirit of God uniting His help to our weakness (Jo 3:3). Christian Ethics is thus primarily neither individual nor social, but theological, and that in a specific sense. Any other ethical basis is synthetically incomplete. 'Ethics must either reject themselves or integrate themselves into Hedonism' (Martineau, Study of Religion, 1889, i. 24). The Holy Spirit is viewed here not dogmatically, but as a condition of ethical power.

(a) Relation of the Holy Spirit to human freedom. Christian Ethics, like Ethics in general, postulates freedom in the sense that man is not moved simply by instinct or impulse, but can choose between presentations, alternatives, that his choice depends on himself—at least, as far as to make him responsible for it. Christian Ethics admits freedom in this sense, but it recognizes as a fact of historic experience, presupposing presupposing the nature of the man and the necessity of the gift of the Holy Spirit.

(c) This gift is a moral one, because its acceptance is based on a receptive response by the human spirit. However deadened the human ἀρίστης may be, in this region the Holy Spirit has its point of appeal. Thus the offer is to all men irrespective of class, disposition, temperament, or past history. It is just the love of God attempting to gain the human heart, and so the Spirit is not an alien power, but the very substratum of the human personality. Before this offer the Stoic distinction of the wise man and the fool, the Aristotelian cleavage between free men and slaves, vanish; the dubiety as to whether virtue can be taught at all and the bad man made good disappears. This is not simply because the moral ideal has been realized in Jesus, but because the Holy Spirit is offered to man as man.

(b) The gift is moral also, because the offer implies a task. We are to work out our own salvation with fear and trembling. Things are not ‘offered’ to us, but accepted by us, and ‘institution’ (Butler, Analogy, ch. iv. [p. 75 in Bernard's ed., London, 1900). The task set before men is now a greater one than ordinary Ethics conceives. The demands made upon human responsibility are higher than ever before. The moral life is not
first a gift and then a task, but from beginning to end these two moments are combined in one real human experience. Christian Ethics, then, does not desire to disparage man’s freedom, to overlook his natural virtues and regard them as splendida virtus et malum. Practical thinking of how man can begin the attaining of Christian perfection, and of how the race of man can start embodying in itself the Kingdom of God. It is the old question of despota, which to practically has been denied, and which Aristotle found a surd in his thinking. In this initiation men historically have failed, and a new activity of God was necessary to meet the bankruptcy of human effort. This is the gospel, which is not the destruction of freedom, but its re-creation.

(b) The Holy Spirit and conscience.—Christian Ethics also postulates conscience in the sense that man distinguishes between one action as good and another as bad, one conduct as right and another as wrong, and that the good and right ought to be done, and the bad and wrong avoided. What constitutes the need is the certainty that its laws are those of the absolutist. Hence most that its judgments are not simply critical but constitutive of conduct. It needs to be freed from its own bewildering perplexity, as freedom needs rescuing from its barbarity. That Christian Ethics, history shows, is a resultant of two moments—one the Divine purpose, the other human free actions; and, as far as the former is concerned, history is a training and a test of conscience. Conscience is thus historically made aware of its own worth (Stoicism and elsewhere), and brought to an impasse when its vision is focused on itself alone. It may act as human before it is discovered to be Divine (cf. Martinism, cp. etc. 23), but not to make this discovery. To St. Paul it was one function of the Law and of pagan experience to bring about the εὐγνωμον disposition (Ro 5:17-22, Gal 3:22). Through the love of God seen in the death of Jesus this happened. Conscience discovered its own divinity, its ‘range of sensibleness’ was infinitely extended, its perplexity abolished, its aberrations condemned. Its authority was placed in the bosom of God Himself, its fear purified in the tragic tenderness of a Redeemer crucified for sin, and its hope rekindled in the free offer of God’s saving love. Thus the enthusiasm necessary for the generating as well as for the sustaining of ethical life was given. True moral and conscience and freedom were emotionally reconciled, the one enlightened as to its true function, the other set free to carry out its real purpose. The two great questions, ‘What must I do to be saved?’ and ‘What ought I to do after I am saved?’ are now answered. The Holy Spirit does not disregard conscience, but, on the contrary, enforces it.

(c) The Holy Spirit and varieties of temperament and conditions.—Christian Ethics recognizes the infinite variety of human conditions and temperaments.

(a) There is a class which cannot accept ab initio through a personal moral act, the saving grace of God. To the demons the Lord had to apply θανάτωσι before moral relations between God and the sufferer could be established. Here we cannot theologically attribute personal responsibility in all cases, yet we are not altogether helpless. Intercessory prayer is open, and it is not without power. Perhaps the name of Jesus is of greater power and more vitalizing (cf. Nevin, referred to by Ramsay, Expos., Feb. 1912). Christian Ethics is not without hope even here.

(b) There are many, in all civilized countries even, who have bartered much of their power of response to the Divine through their own sin, or through the pressure of social evil upon them, or through both. In all such cases the Christian moralist must search for some point of receptive response and seek to remove all hindrances. The appeal of Christianity should be made unreservedly. Responsibility depends on and is proportionate to opportunities; there is a duty to present opportunity to all—to heathen, to depraved, to children—through education and training, for the Spirit of God works through means. Hence it is practical and right for the sake of the spirit, fed the hungry in order to reach their souls, and cast the seed of His word everywhere.

(1) The varieties of temperament are not accidental, but, prophetically viewed, fields of opportunity for the exercise of the manifold Spirit of God, natural bases for its varied charismata. Thus the gift of the Holy Spirit is ethically conditioned, not generally but specifically and individually. Different individuals and different nations have thus been prepared for Christianity, and their varied gifts find here their explanation (cf. Calvin, Inst. bk. iv. ch. 5); cf. Calvin, Inst. bk. iv. ch. 5. What Christianity aims at is thus not the destruction of natural endowments, but their moral potentiation. Negatively viewed, the Holy Spirit may be resisted by man through ignorance, repugnance, but by neglect, by contentment with life without it, and by searching for the highest along false lines; hence the necessity that the character of the Redeeming Spirit be made known through proclamation, through holy moral living, through the removal of stumbling-blocks in the fabric of society, and through the consecration of all natural endowments and graces. The Holy Spirit is the dynamism of the individual moral life and of social life as well. It is the condition of social progress.

(2) The subjective dynamic of the Christian life. —The subjective dynamic of the Christian life is faith in God. This admits of many stages, according to the individual concerned, ranging from the barely reflective movement (often mingled with gross superstition) of the newly heart towards the offered love of God, up to the highly conscious intensely emotional, and pressing, volitional soul-grasp of the Redeemer. Through faith, ethically viewed, the soul is converted (see art. CONVERSION), and becomes in motive (repentance), resists its re-assertion, and finds itself changed in its view of life and duty, and equipped with power to realize the Kingdom of God. It is said that such a theory is wrong because it breaks the law of ethical continuity. But continuity in the moral life is permanently secured only by the presence of the power of God in the character. The false character, fashioned without the aid of the Holy Spirit, is brittle all along the line. Continuity must not be applied to chain the soul to its evil past, but to safeguard the gains of holy living. Hence Christianity takes a view of the past which is distinctive. By the aid of God the individual can break through his evil past and, by resistance to it, ‘rise on stepping-stones’ of his dead self ‘to higher things.’ Christian faith does not energize in vacuo; it is created in Christ, and for selection of God’s love to men. Christ is the ‘hand of which we lay hold on God’ (cf. Rothe, Thes. Ethic, ii. 359).

Faith, then, brings the soul into a world of new values, and brings the individual values himself and others after a new fashion. There arises here the sense of the value of the individual. The individual is one for whom Christ died. This, personalized—‘He loved me and gave Himself for me’—is now the constraining motive of action.
ETHICS AND Morality (Christian)

The will acquiesces in this love, and finds itself reconciled to God. Peace follows which the world cannot give or take away. The individual is garrisoned with the peace of God and rejoices in the Lord. It is impossible to exaggerate the amount of pure joy and contentment that Christianity brings to a man. The enthusiasm for virtue it generates is unique. The great danger to the Christian is contentment with the old world which Christ abolished, and which, by believing, he himself has repudiated. It arises from the world of sin. It is alienation from the life of God through wicked works, the consequent darkening of the conscience and understanding, the deterioration of the will, the deadening of the spiritual affections, and the quasi-cosmos of evil in which men's subjective and social energies act, and which acts through them. It is the destruction of freedom, the darkening of the conscience, and the devaluation of the individual. The Cross shows sin to faith in its true light. It is no longer an error of judgment merely, or a lack of harmony in ourselves, or a crime against society, but a revolt against a loving God, and what is most revolting is that it is all this. Sin is thus not in the actions but in the will, and sins are graded according to this inwardness of view. The Pharisees—the proud, haughty, learned—are more hopeless than the miserable, restless in their sins.

Faith thus calls upon itself to a battle at.outances with sin, and here begins the problem of the formation of character. Christian character-building is just the soul of man being habituated to the active presence of God, and transforming the natural endowments into spiritual instruments to carry out the will of God (sanctification).

Patience is the quality of mind which arises by itself from the sense of God's love: great love in Christ to us. It is due not simply to a sense of our finiteness and of God's infinity, but much more to a sense of God's activity in saving love so utterly undeserved by us. Intellectually, it is adoration, as we see God's infinite patience with men in history and His provision for their salvation (cf. Ro 11:30-32). It is the outlook of the soul on its own sinful past, and the recognition of God's forgiveness of it. It is the remembrance also of our present frailty and future difficulties, and the knowledge that we need God every hour. Towards men, humility arises as we become conscious of our indebtedness to others— to God and Jew alike. God's varied gifts are meant for common blessing and common service; hence humility condescends to men of low estate. It is the death of pride and vainglory. It expels the difference to the common needs of men. It is the disposition which makes advance in knowledge possible, makes self-sacrifice in action easy, and keeps open the windows of the soul in adoration towards heaven. It also consecrates the most service because it is done for God (cf. the widow's mite), and fills the humblest life with sweetness and dignity. One can hardly call it a virtue; it is rather the aroma of a life lived in the sense of God's amazing love (so free and undeserved) to men in Christ. Closely associated with it are the gentle graces of character—regard for the needs of others, sympathy with suffering, respect for the lowly, an eye for the glory of the commonplace, compassion, tenderness, pity, gentleness, obedience, lack of ostentation, thankfulness, a forgiving spirit. What becomes the decision of itself and tries to ape itself, it loses its peculiar flavour, and thus the monastic conception of humility (doing menial tasks, etc.) tended towards the destruction of this spontaneous Christian grace.

The theme of the chapter is seen in the fact that in it is also the germ of the many virtues— independence, courage, endurance. Because faith is sure of God's forgiveness, the character is strengthened into fidelity to God against all odds. Thus is generated an independence based on God, far surpassing anything found on the heights of Stoic arete, and a courage which is not an ebullition of natural courage, but a habitual mood of the soul. Faith lifts man above the tyranny of the customary and the accidents of fortune, for it is loyalty to Christ. This loyalty finds sufficient exercise in our ordinary callings: Luther was true to the Christian spirit when he rescued common vocations from the stigma of inferiority implied in the meritorious life of the cloister. The patient endurance (bravery) of pain and suffering and of the flux of earthly blessings, whether that be directly due to providence or to the hostile opposition of society, is a result of faith. Hence follows contentment. It is neither the daphnia of Epicurus nor the arete of Stoicism. It does not shun difficulties, but it does not create them unnecessarily (Ro 12:2); it feels pain and injustice keenly, and, where possible, removes them. Patience is the knowledge of what is to be endured with a good conscience, and what is to be cast away. It is thus gentle and stern, passive and active (Rev 2). Patience must never fail, and hence suicide is never allowable. Patience may lead to death, but if a holy, the gateway to the resurrection.

As the Christian has to live his life in his vocation, he is impelled to exercise discretion in trying to find out God's will. He is a member of society with definite calls on him, involving the welfare of others and the progress of Christ's Kingdom. Hence knowledge is a virtue. Such a knowledge is determined by the interests of the new life. It is practical, and must avoid foolish questionings. It is for that very purpose which he is to men, and must not puff up, or separate the possessor of it from his brethren and the pathway of ordinary duties. It need not be perfect in this world, but is a growing intensity of penetration into the active purpose of God.

Faith is thus the personal bond which unites the human person to the Divine redemptive Spirit and submits itself to the dictation of that Spirit. The Christian view of virtue is different from that of the Stoics. "We may only speak of Christian "virtue" if we keep constantly before us what has been said of the reception of faith by the bountiful grace of Christ, and the Christian moralist should not forget, however dried up, the moral life could not longer be maintained. Christ is not and remains the principle, rather the primary originator, of holiness, as He is the principle and conversion will of the Christian life" (Häring, Ethics of the Christian Life, p. 347).

Hence the end of Christian virtue is to be a perfect man in Christ, to live with a sure hold of the world of values which Christ revealed, and to convert these values into reality. Its great means of subsistence and progress is prayer. Prayer is faith seeking and finding power from God, thankfully acknowledging its privilege, becoming conscious of its task, renewing itself to follow the path of Spirit of God indicates. The Church as means of grace is valuable as it helps this, for it is a house of prayer, and all other so-called means of grace should ever be used in holding Christ up before the soul as the Power and the Pattern of Holiness. Prayer is not simply negative and protective, but positive and constructive. It is the Spirit of God re-creating man in God's image, and the work of man's spirit working out his own salvation.

* The Spirit is not merely, in St. Paul's view, an aggressive force leading the human spirit against the flesh, or a defensive power shielding it from attack. Stoicism, as interpreted by Seneca and Epicurus, was able to go some way in that direction. St. Paul opens another door of hope; his indwelling Spirit is also a constructive power which builds up a new life within, co-operating with the spirit of man in the work of restoring human life to the image of God" (Swete, Holy Spirit in New Test., 1900, p. 344.).
Faith issues in hope, according as it experiences the power of Christ in the pressure of temptation and affliction. Hope rests itself on Christ's victory and the hope of this victory is also the hope of being saved. It is cognizant of the might of sin and its energy, it knows the tribulation that accompanies righteousness, but it has counted the cost and tasted the bitter herb of the new life. If Christ has never failed to save, hence the continual optimism of the Christian character, touched with a seriousness and gravity unknown elsewhere. Hope can 'reach a hand through time to grasp the far-off interest of tears' (Tennyson, cantou 1). It is, like prayer, focused in Christ. Christ is the atmosphere of its life and the limit of its longings. It thus faces life with a spontaneity of assurance which sin in all its potent resistance can neither demoralize nor overcome.

Because faith and hope are orientated in Christ, they energize in love, and all the virtues and graces are thus determined as to their inner quality. For Christ, too, good for the unrighteous, will become self-centred. Hence the need of love, lest the emotions should rest in themselves. Thus the 'gift of tongues' has to be used for the benefit of all. The man in the midst of its social task, and the great deeds of self-denial must not become monuments of selfish display (1 Co 13). Christ is the perfect embodiment of love, and the aim of the Christian man is to know the love of Christ which passes knowledge (Eph 3), and to give himself no rest till all men are made participants of the same love (2 Co 5). Prayer then becomes intercessory and social, for it knows that common blessings issue from common prayer; and the Christian man, in all his inner and outer activities, feels the worthlessness of all if love be lacking. Christian perfection consists in the possession of such a love as is seen in Christ. This is eternal life.

2. The Christian ideal.—The Christian ideal is, individually viewed, eternal life, and for all men, organically viewed, the Kingdom of God. These two are inseparable and interchangeable, yet are distinguishable as the individual and the common good. What is the content of this good? Christianity makes no attempt to give an exact definition, but seeks to communicate it and let it reveal its nature by its presence and possession.

(a) Eternal life is not existence infinitely prolonged. Dives may live after death, but his existence may be a curse. Yet, clearly, eternal life is a perfected good, however short its existence, 'admits of no answer but produces no conviction' (Hume's Works, ed. London, 1854, iv, 176). The tremendous reality of death must be faced by all earnest, ethical thinking. Heartless banter, Stoical indifference, perplexed uncertainty towards it, cannot satisfy serious men, and any ethical ideal limited by death stands self-condemned. Thus Plato thought extension of life to immortality in heaven, as argued by Aristotle in the Prolegomena (1899, p. 105). The worth of eternal life is not, however, its duration in itself; its duration is implied in its worth. Immortality, as bare existence after death, may be as Sheol or the realm of Hades—both so hazy that one day of labour on earth is preferable to them (cf. Od. xi. 489 ff.).

(b) Eternal life does not mean living in a beautiful body or pleasant surroundings, otherwise many would in limine be cut off from its possibility. Aristotle could hardly conceive it possible for dead men, persons, or slaves, or even artists to possess the sumnum bonum. The Christian ideal is open to all. We must not forget this truth in our ardour for economic improvement and our advocacy of a living wage. The man clothed in purple and fine linen and fanning sumptuously every day may be unaware of what eternal life is, while he who has not it is glaringly bad. Even though 'friends, leisure, and means' were for ever possessed, the Christian life might still be lacking. Thus the Christian ideal conflicts with all ideals sufficiently realized to give it spiritual and temporal satisfaction, and interests with no outlook beyond (cf. Browning's Old Pictures in Florence for the difference between Greek and Christian art in this respect).

(c) Eternal life is communion with God. Man was created in God's image, re-created in the image of the Son. Hence man's aim is moral likeness to God. The great task of Christian teaching is to awaken in man the practically lost sense of sonship; for, when the prodigal returns to his Father, then he who was dead is alive again. This communion is not the absorption of mystic contemplation or Nirvana. Such an absorption negates moral values and reverts to the merely religious, i.e. simply the communion of the 'γνωριμία' in man with the eternal reason, as Plato tends to make it in the case of Socrates (Phaedo). That would leave the individual whole, but without a character in its sublimation. By communion, Christianity does not mean breaking the limits between the Infinite and the finite. These are not moral distinctions at all. They are not barriers to communion. What is aimed at is freedom from sin, and the acquisition of holiness. This communion is a moral life, and it aims at perfection through moral activity. It is, ideally viewed, a real eternal personal communion, in which all endowments and characteristics are morally potentiated to their highest degree. It is a personal life of righteousness saturated in the atmosphere of a Personal Holy Presence. The Christian ideal is at the same time the Highest Good. Viewed as Ideal, it waits its full realization; as the Highest Good, it is a present possession. Thus, while it awaits its full realization, it must be morally operative now. It is other worldly, but it demands all reality as its content.

(d) Eternal life is a fellowship dependent on the possession of a righteous character, and it is maintained in the living of a righteous life. 'Be ye holy, for I am holy.' The way to attain it is not, as Orphism taught, to escape from matter per se, through acts having little moral reference in themselves and valuable only as means. The moral life is not a means towards the good life, but simply, but a permanent moment of the Christian ideal. This aspect of communion and the way to attain it break down the false asceticism and subjectivism that dog Mysticism. For eternal life is a righteousness that demands all for the service of God.

(i) Eternal life demands Nature. Jonathan Edwards declares that he saw a new beauty in Nature at his conversion; so Lactantius and many besides. In the light of the ideal, this world is God's world and a theophany, as it was to ancient Phainists. To make this universal through the aesthetic side of life—through art—to make the lily and the bird bring us to our Heavenly Father. True art should thus be a means of righteousness, and so should true science. Neither material needs, nor pains, nor privations, should obstruct this communion; nor should the pressure on oneself, the attention solely on themselves. Their pressure should lead us beyond themselves. Nor should the soul attempt to satisfy itself in worldly possessions, to the exclusion of God. That is why Jesus warns against anxiety and riches, because the affairs of business and pleasure, exclusively pursued, turn the will into channels divergent from
the will of God; because ideals through these influences are truncated, and the singleness of sin which ought to characterize conscience becomes blinded by the false lights of the world. Experience in this, as in every other sense, shows that there are no more certain ways of falling out of fellowship with God than these. To act thus towards Nature is to be ruled by it—not to rule it, as is the Christian ideal. Christ's Lordship over Nature is a principle of life, and thus true in Rother's view that morality is the gradual spiritualization of Nature. Every advance in science, every subjugation of natural forces, every great work of art, should make righteous communion more easy. When these advances are absorbed into the service of injustice, then communion is more difficult. One of the great tasks of Christianity is to convert the material gifts of civilization into means of righteousness, and not suffer them to be held in the bondage of non-moral or immoral purposes.

(ii.) Eternal life demands the whole of mankind and of every man. Just as Nature becomes a theophany in the life of the ideal, the bodily members become ἐνεργὸς τοῦ θεοῦ. Even in the future perfect communion, Christianity does not offer the abolition of the body.

The Christian is not one for liberation but for liberation was the hope which it held forth to the world. Human nature is to be perfected, not by the abandonment of one of its factors, but by the sanctification of the whole man. Humanity is to be preserved in its entirety for the coming Christ (Swete, 236).

Thus righteousness includes care for the bodies of men and for their proper surroundings. Sickness is due to sin, and our Lord's ministry of healing is an integral part of the Kingdom. Hence Seeley (Eccle Home, ch. x.) rightly points out that, on the one hand, Christian care for the body passively, while, showing, at the same time, a more than Stoic apathy in regard to personal suffering. The passion for social reform, the crusades against disease and degeneration, the desire to regulate labour hours and conditions that would breed weaklings and fill our hospitals, ought to find in Christianity their warmest recruits. Every sinner is a dead weight on the Christian heart, making communion with God more difficult. The same applies to nations sunk in superstition and paganism. Righteousness, rightly understood, is the nerve of missionary effort. Till the whole of humanity is more and more tenderly, more deeply, in the Kingdom of God, there is something lacking in the fullness of the ideal.

(iii.) Eternal life demands an interpretation of history. Righteousness is the history. It is the highest good in history; but, because it has not been fully entrenched in any society or any institution, it is an ideal to be realized, though present from the first, and all along moving towards realization. The truth of history is the Kingdom of God. This culminates in Christ, and unfolds itself under His control. We are thus given a standard to evaluate individual, societies, and movements; it helps us to tell in concretely the ideal itself and give guidance for the future.

The inner nature of eternal life, of the Kingdom of God, is thus seen to be love, because it culminates in Christ. Love is not a baseless psychological experience that can be made or forgotten by individuals. It is the Reality. God is Love. Love is the inward spirit of righteousness in man, and man in Nature. Men may appreciate order in Nature, purpose in history, and righteousness in conduct before realizing the inner nature of all as Holy Love. This is Dorr's justification for regarding righteousness and love, but the contrast is one of human appreciation, not of inward nature (see R. Law, The Texts of Life, 1999, p. 80). To have the love of God shed abroad in our hearts, to see it preparing a world for itself and realizing itself in human relationships, is to have eternal life and to be in the Kingdom. Love tries to reproduce in men a character in which it is perfectly realized that there are no more certain ways of falling out of fellowship with God than these. To act thus towards Nature is to be ruled by it—not to rule it, as is the Christian ideal. Christ's Lordship over Nature is a principle of life, and thus true in Rother's view that morality is the gradual spiritualization of Nature. Every advance in science, every subjugation of natural forces, every great work of art, should make righteous communion more easy. When these advances are absorbed into the service of injustice, then communion is more difficult. One of the great tasks of Christianity is to convert the material gifts of civilization into means of righteousness, and not suffer them to be held in the bondage of non-moral or immoral purposes.

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organized institution. For this reason the Early Church recognized duties of benevolence, of hospitality, of finding work for her members. It may be said she was less necessarily a labouring institution than various other, though self-sacrificing, institutions. These, of course, are duties for some individual Christians only but they are corporate duties as well. Above all, she should aim at removing stumbling-blocks from the way of righteousness, but her weapons are love, not physical force. This incompatibility with the Kingdom of God is the common good. Christian Ethics should insist on the duty of the Christian State in administration and legislation in order to remove the danger of forced sacrifice and exploitation, for the State has become the supreme power, the instrument of the will of God as the common good. Christian Ethics should insist on the duty of the Christian State in administration and legislation to look after the welfare of all classes, and to make all contributions to this end, to the common good. The means of education and an honest livelihood should be within the reach of all; hence poverty and its causes should be abolished as far as possible. The weak should be protected against aggression and exploitation, as also against themselves. The Christian conscience is certainly coming to make greater claims on the Christian State in the way of providing work for all, in demanding a living wage, in looking after the aged and the helpless young; and the science of Economics is rapidly providing a basis for scientific legislation. These demands carry with them the corollary that the State has greater control over private interests than was once recognized, whether the interests be those of capital or labour, money or work, land or commerce. What we need, however, both in the State and in the various minor institutions that compose it, whether public or private, is the spirit of devotion to the common good by all, and the spirit of self-sacrifice among those who have special spiritual and material endowments. We need the Christianizing of the public conscience which determines the State to be a Christian State which is no recognized mouthpiece to give voice to the duties of State to State. ‘Si vis pacem, para bellum’ has converted Europe into arsenals. But war is incompatible with Christianity and its incompatibility with State duty should be more and more recognized.

We have not, owing to the limits of this article, entered into details. Suffice it to say that the Christian ideal of the Kingdom of God, which is also the Supreme Good, lays on all who accept it duties of brotherhood, service, and self-sacrifice; that, as far as natural institutions are Christianized, the same is true of the Church, so that the hope of Christianity should make us fall back more and more on the Eternal Spirit who originates, sustains, and shall perfect, through human endeavour, the Kingdom of God.

ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian)

1. Introductory. The opinion of the Greeks, that the Egyptians were a profoundly philosophical and religious people, has been shown by them as the contemporary inscriptions and monuments to be false. The belief of the Egyptians was essentially practical; and, if they attained some proficiency in mathematics, astronomy, and medicine, it was for the sake of their own ends; the sciences could be put to no practical use. For the things of the mind, as such, they had little taste; hence their ethical views were without depth, and they had no opposing schools of ethical thought. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the Egyptians took a very keen interest in the moral aspect of the world. They were never tired of boasting of their virtues, and the popularity of the Osiran worship bears witness to their strong moralising tendency. To put the matter shortly, the Egyptians, though not ethically speculative, were in a high degree ethically minded.

2. Terminology. Language usually provides a root, from which all the possible scholars have been shown, with regard to any given topic, since thought tends to create its own adequate expression. The Egyptian expressions for moral concepts are neither numerous nor precise. For 'right' the word is sret (Copt. μέτ' ); also mib; the older Egyptians write wdt, ma, etc., which seems to be derived from a verb meaning 'to be straight,' 'to move in a direction.' Thus mret signifies conformity to an ethical norm, \(^1\) though it has also, and perhaps even more frequently, a purely intellectual connotation; it then means 'truth.' The contradistinctions of maret are 'sufs, wrong,' and 'ezes, guilt,' 'gory more often found. For 'good' and 'bad,' mib and bmb mend the commonest terms; they also stand for 'beautiful' and 'ugly' respectively. Pote means 'crime;' for 'sin' is used the plural. For 'what God wants,' 'what God disapproves.' There is no verb corresponding to 'ought;' 'duty' is represented by 'ere, that which is reckoned as against a man, his debt to the community.\(^2\) The will, as a moral entity, is unknown, and is not distinguished from the agent ('I, me').\(^3\)

\(^1\) Very often the best rendering is 'right' but 'just.'
\(^2\) The word 'ere is derived from the preposition er, 'towards,' 'against;' cf. NCTEPON, 'our debts,' in the Coptic versions of the OT. The Old Testament is frequently 'against us.'
\(^3\) The elusive word ka, which is usually translated 'double,'

The word 'tāb (= Heb. 25), 'heart,' is often found in Egyptian texts for the intellect or reason; but it appears sometimes to mean more than the mere instrument of cognition; it means the faculty which recognizes and suits the right course of action, 'the conscience.'\(^4\) In the following passage, which is a good example of Egyptian modes of expression in ethical matters:"

Thus saith he: This is my character to which I have borne witness, and there is no exoneration which he could make, if it were not for my heart (tāb) that caused me to do it through its guidance unto me. It was an act opposed to the will of my commands; I feared to transgress its guidance. Therefore I prospered exceedingly, and was fortunate on account of that which it caused me to do; hence the reason of its guidance. Of a sooth, true is that which is said by men: "It (namely the heart) is the voice of God that is in everybody; happy is he whom it has led to a good course of action!" (R. Seth, Urkunden des Ägypten, Leipzig, 1889 [hereafter cited as Örb.], iv. 973; cf. iv. 139, and W. Wessmann, Wiener Forschungen, Leipzig, 1896, p. 160).

The 'thoughts' of men are 'that which is in the body (tām-ēb) or 'the concerns of the heart' (hert-ēb). The very concrete way in which psychological facts were expressed is here conspicuous; for more complex ethical concepts, such as 'motive,' 'responsibility,' 'scruple,' abstract names were wanting.

The moral predicates were represented in language in an equally concrete way, an adjective or participle, metaphorically used, being combined with such substantives as 'tāb,' 'heart,' and 'hert-ēb.'

3. Destiny and free will. The Egyptians were strong believers in Fate (shay), which was occasionally condemned; as a rule, however, it was 'God' ('nēser) in general, or some god in particular (e.g., Rē [Urkh. iv. 943]), who is supposed to determine the events of a man's career. The uncertainty of the Egyptian project is thus expressed: "What men have devised never comes to pass, it is what God commands that comes to pass.' For instance, 'One man plans to plunder another, but the ends by giving it up, in the name of God.' (Papyrus Prisse, 6, 9-10). On this account the precept is given: 'Take no counsel for to-morrow ere it come' (Patria Ostraca, 11; Prisse, 6, 8).

Luckily the Egyptians did not, as a general rule, go on to conclude that their own actions were unchangeably predestined; the influence of Fate seems to have been restricted to the things that might happen to men, and did not extend to their actions (cf. FATE [Egyptian]). We have seen that 'conscience' was compared to the 'voice of God' speaking in the heart, but there was no compulsion to listen to the voice.

It is quite an exceptional case when Simuhe in the tale excuses himself for his flight to foreign parts by attributing it to the will of the god (Sin. B, 43), 'who decreed this flight' (6. 150). And, when the magician discloses responsibility for the formula he pronounces: 'It is not I who repeats; it is Horus who says it, and he who repeats it;' (Papyrus Porta, 136, 3), this is a statement governed by quite special conditions.

That men are free agents is a necessary assumption in everyday life; that the opposite is true has often appealed to men as a moralizing principle, but it may sometimes conveniently be rendered 'will;' so, too, hau, lit. 'soul.'
The theological expression of this idea was as follows: *The fear of God* (ib. 64) might also be a powerful inducement to the man of good conduct, inasmuch as *God knoweth that which is in the body... his eyes perceive men's characters in their livres* (Newberry, 8. 80).

Of course the Egyptians were well aware that often it is the rich and not the good who prosper, and a passage in a literary satire illustrates the fact that rank and comfort were sometimes obtained without any superabundant merit (Anast. i. 8. 4-6). That all men are sinners is assumed as axiomatic in a passage of the Book of the Dead (ed. Naville, Berlin, 1886, pp. 17, 44). The wickedness of the world and the predominance of vice over virtue form the theme of a whole class of pessimistic writings, of which several specimens have survived. Here social conditions are depicted as topsy-turvy—the slaves have usurped the place of the rich, murder and rapine prevail, the righteous dwell alone and in misery. From this state of affairs one author draws the conclusion that life is not worth living (A. Erman, Das Gespräch eines Lebensmünden mit seiner Seele, Berlin, 1896); another gives as the cause the impotency of mankind and the callowness which completely spoils its elevated lot—*Never has wickedness brought her vanguard to a peace* (Pap. Brit. Mus. 15110, S. 5, 7, 9-Fries, 2).

5. The question of disinterestedness. Egyptian moralists may now and again have caught a glimpse of the loftiest heights of ethical thought—the conception of right as its own sufficient reason, regardless of consequences; but in general their teaching was on a lower plane. *Excellence is the mark of Pharaoh* (Pap. Brit. Mus. 15110, 5-9, 7-Fries, 2), *and endareth and prevaileth*; upon this irreproachable sentiment there was, however, imposed the limitation which completely spoils its elevated lot—*Never has wickedness brought her vanguard to a peace* (Pap. Brit. Mus. 15110, S. 5, 7, 9-Fries, 2).

The Egyptians were very sensitive about their reputation, and often boasted of having won the approval of their fellow-creatures. *I did what all men approved,* says one noble (Urk. i. 70): a hackneyed phase of the funerary stele is, *I did what men loved and what pleased them* (ib. 71), an ancient proverb that *the good deeds of a man are his monument, an evil nature is oblivion* (PSBA xvii. 1889-90).100. In the general doctrine of a good reputation as a necessary limit of Egyptian disinterestedness is reached; it was deemed the highest possible virtue for a man to *raise up a good name* in his city (Shipwrecked Sailor, 150), though, of course, the desire for approval is a self-seeking motive only a little less base than other selfish motives. Naturally it was more profitable to a man that he should stand well with the king than that he should be respected by the good men of the city; the Egyptian noble, in the *naisvet of his soul, esteemed himself even more for the good opinion in which Pharaoh held him than for his fair fame among his equals. Bleded with protestations of his generosity, his love of justice, and his incorruptibility, he was frequently in describing himself as 'beloved of his master,' or as one 'with whose excellence the lord of the two lands was content.' In such a high degree was the Pharaoh considered to be the patron and recompenser of virtue that he was known as *the good God,* and *the lord of Right.*

Thus an official relates, *I did right for the lord of Right, for I knew he was pleased at it* (Urk. iv. 94). To Esauessu it, it is said: *Thy tongue is the shrine of Right* (Kuban Stele 18).

Yet, in spite of the absolute form of the government under the Pharaohs, the popular verdict was held of high account. The speech of Thutmose III. in appointing his Minister of Justice illustrates this point in rather a remarkable way; among other things it is said:

*For evermore, there is some injustice in him in the opinion of men; and again, 'As for the chief scribe of the Voice, Scribe of Righteousness is what he is called' (Newberry, Life of Rameses, London, 1899, p. 110).* 5. Virtue rewarded on earth: Egyptian pessimism. —It was very generally believed that virtue alone can ensure happiness on earth. A man who has favoured us with a long catalogue of his virtues ends with an address to mankind:

I speak to you, O mortals; listen and do the good deeds that I have taught you to do. *Then you shall dwell in peace* (Urk. iv. 61, cf. 65). To a king it is said: *Do the right that thou mayest live long in the land* (AvA xiv. 1870) 105.
The Psychostasia, or Weighing of the Heart.
From a papyrus in the Cairo Museum.
ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian)

such risks the dead man had but one weapon, namely, the curse. An oft-repeated formula, current in the Old Kingdom, threatens the violator of tombs with 'judgment through the great God in the place where judgment is given' (e.g. UeK. l. 17), and is known as the 'two roads of the great God, lord of judgment' (A. Mariette, Les Mastabat de l'ancien empire, Paris, 1881-84, D 19). These phrases give us the conception of a Divine being who to some extent in the character of dispenser of retribution to the wicked enemy. Whether Osiris is here already meant is perhaps open to some slight doubt; but the Osiran cult was now rapidly gaining ground, and it was not long before a certain episode in his history acquired a wide-spread funerary application.

It was narrated that Osiris himself had been accused by his wicked brother Seth before the Divine conclave in Heliopeis, but by the aid of Thoth had issued 'justified' from the ordeal (Ermak, 41, 116). Soon every Egyptian found pleasure in identifying himself with Osiris, and in regarding himself as destined to share the fortunes of the god, and at last after death and judgment to attain to the enjoyment of eternity. Hence we see the epithet mu'khrow, 'justified, appended to the names of all deceased men from the early middle Kingdom onwards (Maspero, Etudes de mythologie, Paris, 1897). It is a word of very wide application.

Chapter 125 of the Book of the Dead—In the doctrine of the psychostasis the identity of the judged man with Osiris is nearly, though not quite, lost to sight; Osiris here is the Divine judge, the king of the dead, and the 'prince of eternity.' The famous chapter of the Book of the Dead known to Egyptologists as ch. 125 comprises a picture of the scene of judgment (see preceding page), and a long text giving the words supposed to be spoken on the occasion.

In a great hall, the roof of which is crowned with flames of fire alternating with the symbol of light, the Osiris enters under a canopy. He is accompanied by his sisters Isis and Nepthys, and the sons of Horus are also present. At the back of the hall are seated the dead assessors of Osiris, forty-two in number, corresponding, as some have supposed, to the forty-two names or provinces of Egypt. In the foreground is the great balance, with the heart of the deceased in one of its pans and the feather of Ma't (light) in the other. The dog-headed Anubis examines the tongue of the balance, and the ibis Thoth, the 'scribe of the gods,' announces the result to Osiris. Hard by there squats a sinister-looking animal, 'a crocodile in its forepaws,' and the 'faunt of the dead' (that is, the devil) is the 'devourer of the dead' who fail to support the test. Neither the picture just described nor the text has come down to us in copies earlier than the middle of the XVIIIth dynasty. That the text at least is far older is proved by the corruptions it contains, as well as by the very obvious nature of its compositional origin. The kernel consists of two Negative Confessions, or Repudiations of Sins, as they would be better called. The older of these (A) contains simple denials of a number of specific sins. The later version (B) has derived a few of its details directly from A, but shows a marked preference for denials of evil qualities rather than for denials of evil deeds; it also increases the number of sins repudiated to 42, on the model of the forty-two assayers of Osiris being invoked in each case. The two Confessions are, of course, at one time independent; in ch. 125 they have been welded together, and are accompanied by prayers to Osiris and to his assessors. The variant form of B is most common.

It was doubted on this occasion that Osiris received the 'wreath of righteousness' (nuk mu'khrow) often named in Egyptian texts as one of the many Graeco-Roman tometermines, and also the 'crown of righteousness (yer-deru saheru) of the NT (see Comrie-Gardiner, E.H.K. t. 210, 214).

The posthumous pilgrimage to Abyssis (see below, § 10) is also connected with Osiris as judge. Osiris has had as its object the 'fetching of justification' (mu'khrow). The vignettes vary considerably: the above description does not apply to any one particular example.
argued that these were not specially emphasized at the time when the lists were drawn up; and the proposed oracles, petty omen, and denials against religion is urged as a proof that they were considered as heinous as calumny or murder. Far worse than such deductions is the comparison of the two versions in order to distinguish an earlier from a later condition of ethical thought. All such arguments are based on the unproved and wholly unwarranted assumption that the 'Negative Confession' is, as it were, a canonical repudiation of the ideas that were held heinous. The very existence of two lists differing in their details is in itself an indication that neither possessed any high degree of authority; moreover, both exhibit all the signs of careless and hasty compilation. We may be sure, too, that, if great weight had been attached to the precise text, more trouble would have been taken to preserve it from corruption. The truth is that the nature of the sins denied was not the central point of interest to the author or authors of the chapter. Their aim, so far from being an ethical one, was essentially, though perhaps not quite consciously, anti-ethical. Accepted, or despised, in this world, happiness in the hereafter is conditioned by a previous life of innocence upon earth, they proceeded to elaborate an incantation such as might hoodwink the Divine Judge and enable him to evade the natural consequences of his sins. Chapter 125 of the Book of the Dead claims to impart knowledge of the words to be spoken on entering the Hall of Righteousness; the tacit assumption is that a knowledge of the names of the judge and his assessors and of what sins to deny was as serviceable a means of attaining eternal felicity as the cleanest of conscience. Whether the sins repudiated had actually been committed or not was a matter of comparative indifference; the main point was that the deceased should be ready with his denials. Nor was it necessary for him actually to commit the chapter to memory; he in whose tomb it was inscribed, or with whom a papyrus containing it was buried, might feel himself perfectly safe as regards the judgment to come. Chapter 125 is, in fact, just such another magical document as that Ledyen papyrus (no. 304), containing spells for aiding a man who had been taken before a court of justice 'to issue thence justified' (ma'Kharon). To sum up; it has been seen how a non-ethical theory of the future life, whereby it was contingent on the performance of certain rites and the recitation of certain formulae, gave rise to a theory in which ethics was of paramount importance; and it has been seen how ch. 125 of the Book of the Dead, while acknowledging the truth of the latter view in principle, finds a means of subordinating it to the earlier view in practice.

10. The story of Osiris.—In the doctrine of the *psychostasis*, Osiris appears as the perfect judge, the arbiter of human character and ruler of the virtuous dead. The origin and the early nature of Osiris are shrouded in obscurity, but at a very ancient date he became the prototype of the beneficent Pharaoh. Mythology told how Osiris had succumbed, after a long and prosperous reign, to the perfidy and treachery of his wicked brother Seth, who mutilated his body and scattered his limbs. At length Isis, the faithful wife of Osiris, succeeded in collecting his remains, and infusing new life into them by dint of her magical power; but

1 It will be noted that the passages quoted throughout this article are of very various dates. The reason is that it is seldom possible to trace any development of Egyptian ethical ideas, and a knowledge of the history of his life is therefore required. It is likewise impossible, with the evidence at our disposal, to distinguish between the different moralities of different grades of Egyptian society.

5. Henceforth Osiris was a shadowy being ruling among the dead, while his son Horus, having taken vengeance and avenging the death of his father, became the god of the living. It is, doubtless, owing to its human interest and pathos that the story of Osiris took so firm a hold on the imagination of the Egyptians; and, as we have seen, every Egyptian who died claimed to be another Osiris, destined at last to conquer the powers of evil, and to awake to a happier and never-ending life. Pilgrims flocked to Abydos, which had become (though not much after the defeat of Seth) the chief sanctuary of the god; and, as every one sought to establish for himself a cenotaph in that city, it was sometimes called 'the island of the Just' (Gardiner, Literary Texts, Leipzig, 1917, 1, 7, note 1). In the temple-cults all the other gods were gradually assimilated to Osiris; and the Pharaoh, whom a fiction always represented as the chief officiant, played the part of the 'loving son' Horus (A. Moret, Le Rite du culte dîtin jurassier, Paris, 1901). In Ptolemaic times, Osiris was blended with a newly introduced god, Serapis, and henceforth his importance waned; but at the same time the idea of the hope of happiness in the hereafter was in his shrines the Osirian faith was kept alive throughout the length and breadth of the Roman Empire.

11. The gods as guardians of morality.—As the personification of all that is good, Osiris acquired the title of *Onnopfre* (Onnophris), 'the good being,' besides which he was known as 'the great God, the lord of Right.' Seth came to be regarded as the essence of evil; and, though his cult persisted in certain places where the secondary antithesis to Osiris had not been able to dislodge the primitive cult, his image was generally held in abhorrence, and at certain periods was obliterated from the monuments. The gods of the Egyptians were collectively regarded as good, though individually they might be bad or neutral: thus, in narrating his virtues, a noble says, 'I did what all the gods loved' (ZA xlv. [1908] 125). We have seen above that 'God'—the vague entity which not seldom takes the place of more explicitly named divinities in Egyptian texts—was looked upon as the dispenser of reward and punishment. This conception was, doubtless, a generalization due to the importance of the local gods. Every Egyptian felt himself specially dependent upon and bounden towards the god of his city or of his local deity, whatever his individual name or characteristics, was at bottom nothing but the personified feeling of the community, and, hence, as a matter of course, also the guardian of the ethical code. Besides Osiris there were other specific deities, who were thought of as judges or patrons of virtue. Amen-Rê is called the 'Vizier of the poor, who taketh not the bribes of the guilty' (*Pap. Bologna*, 1049, 2, 4). Thoth, the scribe of the gods, is also the 'Vizier in heaven,' and Ptah is the 'lord of Right or Truth.' On-hor (Onmris) also was frequently appealed to as arbitrator (Gardiner, Literary Texts, 1, 6, note 4). That the gods were regarded as righteous judges is indicated by the frequent recourse that litigants had to them; numerous ostraca of the New Kingdom, from the Theban necropolis, tell tales of petty theft, debt, and commercial disputes were decided in the shrines of the local deity, the deified king Amenhotep, who nodded in question to the powers put to him by his priest (Erman, Sitzungsge. d. k. Pruss. Akauf, 1900; and Divination [Egyptian]). The retaining justice seems to have superseded all others in the XX1st and following dynasties; and, since

1 Not seldom the pilgrimage was not performed during a man's lifetime, but his mummy was taken to Abydos before the final burial rites.
this is the period at which the power of the priest was paramount, we shall probably not err in interpreting the frequency of trials by oracle as due to a deliberate policy of the priesthood, who would naturally wish to bring secular matters, as far as possible, under their own control. 'Right or Truth,' from the earliest times conceived of as a goddess (see Lanzoni, *Diz. di mitologia egizia*, Turin, 1881-86, pp. 276-280); for the Egyptians, like the Romans, were by no means averse to conferring on their own oracle the character of a deity. Many nobles, and especially the judges, received the title of 'priest of Maet'; and in the New Kingdom we even hear of a 'temple of Right.' Whether this was an actual shrine or another name for the law courts is not certain; it is not unlikely that Maet enjoyed a regular cult. The sole significant epithet given to her is 'daughter of Re'; this relationship is explained by the pleasure that the sun-god was supposed to take in virtue, it being even said that 'Re lives upon (i.e. eats) right' (maet). In this connexion may be mentioned a ceremony daily practised in the temples: the king (or his substitute, the High-priest) after he has 'gone a round the image of Maet, seated upon a basket or basket-like vessel, a feather on her head, and the sign of life in her hands. The meaning of this offering is not entirely clear. It may be a substitute for the image of Maet, or it may be a memorial of her being sent forth in the image of the sun-god, or it may be the goddess Right Nyx, the personification of ethical or of intellectual righteousness.

12. Law and punishment. A few words must be said about Egyptian conceptions of law and punishment. For 'law' the word was hap, a term also employed for 'custom'; the etymology is unknown. The Egyptians codified their laws, as indeed everywhere in Egypt was committed to writing. Of the laws themselves we know little beyond what the Greek writers have to tell us. In the two central courts of justice the vizier sat with the forty parchment rolls of the Law open before him (Newberry, 2); still it was apparently enjoined upon him to pay no less attention to equity than to law (ib. 10. 4). The Egyptian word for 'punishment' (abodyet) literally means 'teaching,' punishment probably being regarded in the light of a lesson and example to others. Egyptian punishments seem, on the whole, to have been less severe than those inflicted in Babylonia; but magistrates prided themselves on making a proper proportion of the offenders. Thus, one official states that he inflicted hurt on him who inflicted hurt' (Urk. iv. 969), and that he 'punished the evil-doer in accordance with his evil-doing' (ib. iv. 968).

13. Specific moral concepts. We now turn to the special side of our subject—the moral judgments concerning particular vices and virtues. The field to be covered is so large that it has been found impossible to emphasize any but the most salient facts; what is here given must be supplemented by the information to be found in specific articles.

(1) Honor. This, of course, forbidden: 'I have not slain, I have not commanded to slay' (Conf. A). That in certain cases magistrates possessed powers over life and death is implied by the statement of an official: 'There was none who died by my counsel' (Hannover, 11 R.T.A.P. 22. 4). Later, in the XVIIIth dynasty, the king reserved to himself these powers; the vizier might inflict only such punishments as did not involve the cutting off of a limb (Newberry, 2. 15). How absolute was the might of Pharaoh is shown by the advice that is given to the king in a St. Petersburg papyrus: 'Do not kill a man whose excellence thou knowest' (Pap. xiv. [1576] 108). In a case of high treason, the condemned were allowed to make away with themselves (T. Deviria, *Le Pap. judiciaire de Turin*, Paris, 1868). To kill an adulterous wife seemed to the Egyptians quite legitimate (Pap. d'Orbigny), and a similar punishment might justifiably be exacted from her paramour (Pap. Westcar, p. 3). The Egyptian idea of punishment is not unfamiliar to the Egyptians is shown by the phrase which describes any heinous crime as 'a great crime of death.' No compunction was felt in putting captured foes to death (Amada Steiet); such an act had, indeed, a religious sanction as a sacrifice to the god who had sent Pharaoh forth to war. Magicians made waxen images of those whom they wished to destroy (Pap. Leo); but this practice was, of course, condemned by law.

(2) Human sacrifice was undoubtedly practised in ancient Egypt, notwithstanding Herodotus' explicit statement to the contrary (ii. 43). The monumental evidence still needs collection and sifting, but there is little doubt that it will confirm the affirmations of the classical writers. Diodorus (i. 88) speaks of offerings of human beings made upon the tomb of Osiris; and Plutarch preserves a tradition that the priests of Isis sacrificed men (Lampron). The fact that red-haired men were burnt alive in Eileithyiaspolis (de Is. et Osr. 73, with Parthey's valuable note, p. 272.) We hear, too, of similar sacrifices in Heliopolis, for which, however, King Senusert III, who substituted (Porphyry, de Abst. ii. 55). The models of servants who were buried together with their lords very probably exemplify the same kind of substitution. It has been thought that the ceremony of the tiknu, which was practised at funerals, involved human sacrifice; but this is by no means certain.

(3) Cruelty. Some of the facts that have already been mentioned might be thought to indicate that the Egyptians were cruel of disposition; but the treatment of enemies, the punishment of criminals, and religious immolations were, in all lands of antiquity, equally ruthless and barbarous. It may be added in this connexion that in warfare the Egyptians were accustomed to cut off the hands or the phalli of the slain. Criminals were frequently deprived of their ears and noses (Decreus of Haremheb; Inscr. of Mes). The ordinary punishment, however, was the bastinado, which was as freely used under the Pharaohs as in the Egypt of one hundred years ago. Not even men of rank were exempted, as the following example from an official of the Old Kingdom asserts: 'I have never been beaten before any magistrate since I was born' (Urk. i. 75). The general impression gained from the inscriptions is that the Egyptians were too easy-going and good-tempered a people to be cruel. The infliction of unnecessary pain was deprecated: when a Pharaoh suggested to a magician who claimed to be able to replace a severed head that he should try his skill on a condemned prisoner, he was asked to rest content with an experiment on a goose (Pap. Westcar, 8. 16).

(4) Kindness and benevolence. Egyptians often claim to have been 'kindly, loving, loving.' The works of Ptahhotep praise the man who is conciliatory and friendly; he will find his reward in days of misfortune (Prisse, ii. 11). 'I have not oppressed (my) fellow,' 'I have not cast aside, that I be saved from the Negative Confession (A). The poor and afflicted were held to be particularly in need of kindness; 'I was father to the orphan, a kindness in the cold shelter to the cold' (Hannover, 11 R.T.A.P. 4); 'I saved the miserable man from him who was more powerful than he (Petrie, *Veter. Papyri*, London, 1900, p. 6). Suplicants were to be treated with exceptional patience:

'It then art a ruler, be willing to listen when a suppliant speaks. Do not repel him until his body is rid of that which he
Intended to tell thee. He who is in trouble loves to pour out his heart concerning that on account of which he is come. When a man repents, petitioners, people say, 'Why does he dis- believe them?' (Priss, 9, 3-6).

(5) Charity. — No virtue was more incumbent upon the rich than generosity to the needy: 'He who is hungry, he is shamed,' (Erke, i. 132), and like phrases, encounter us at every turn. 'I caused the peasant to carry home corn together with his wife, and the young one by his shoulder; this I brought to her son.' In the house of Nebet (T. L, Grifith, Sioi, London, 1898, pp. 15, 9-10). An ostracon of the Nineteenth Dynasty, of which specimens are rare. A man old with not having adopted a son (Berin Pap. 10627).

(6) Hospitality is partially covered by the quotations already given. In one passage it is read: 'Do not make a funeral feast without thy neighbours, in order that they may stand round thee mourning on the day of burial' (Petrie Ostraco, 11). In another passage it is said: 'Do not sit at meat while another stands, but stretch forth for him thy hand towards the food'; for 'one is rich and another poor,' and 'I who am rich last year is a wayfarer this' (Any, 7, 2-6).

(7) Regard for old age. — To accent the aged was regarded as highly meritorious; but it would appear that this was looked upon less as a duty towards a highly respected class than as an act of charity towards the feeble. The disadvantages of old age were vividly present to the Egyptian mind (Priss, 4, 2-3-3); but, on the other hand, length of years was brought with it honour and esteem (touak). The Egyptians frequently expressed the hope that they would attain the age of 110 years. The vizier Rekhmire says of himself: 'I tended the old man, I gave to him my staff, and comforted the woman in old age' (Newberry, 7, 23). To bury the aged was a virtuous deed (PSBA xviii. 1895-96) 196); to scoff at decrepit old people, a very wicked one (Petrie Ostraco, 11).

(8) Regard for parents and close relatives. — A Theban high priest thus describes his behaviour towards his father: 'I was a steadfast son by my father's side while he was yet upon earth. I went in and out at his command, and transgressed not the utterance of his mouth. I did not make little of that wherewith he charged me... I did not pierce him with many glances, but my face was downwards when he spoke to me. I made not bold to do that whereof he was unaware. I knew not the handmaid of his house; I lay not with his serving- maid. I did not curse his better; nor did I enter before him without permission. I was a poor man, the largest of the XXVIII dynasty quietly remarks that he 'did not strike his father upon the cheek.' (Priss, 17, 10-12)

Filial obedience was rigorously incutated: 'An obedient son is a follower of Horus; it fares well with him in consequence of his obedience to his father and to the last of his actions, and reverence, and belles the same to his children, renewing the teaching of his father' (Priss, 17, 10-12).

In return, the deceased parent would come back to visit his home of the living, and to be a protection to his heirs (Max. Any, 3, 4). In return, the deceased parent would come back to visit his home of the living, and to be a protection to his heirs (Max. Any, 3, 4).

Though, as has been shown, the duties towards the father were considerable, the mother was accounted nearer of kin; the maternal brothers ranked among the same father only (e.g. Priss, 10, 8) and heathen, at least in the royal and princely families, was reckoned in the line of the mother. But it was, above all, the mother's tender care to her children that gave her so great a claim upon their affection; the Egyptian moralist pleads the cause of the mother in eloquent words:

'Give back to God the encomium that thy mother gave thee. Support her as she supported thee. Long did she bear the burden of thee, and forsook thee not. When thou wast born after thy ten years of study, she carried thee on her shoulder; three years long her nipple was in thy mouth... she put thee to thy feet when thou shouldst write by thy letters, and waited upon thee daily, bringing food to the hungry ones in thy house. Thou becamest a stripping and didst take to thee a wife, and art established in thy house. Cast around thine eye for one who hath borne thee, seek the that he does not shew her for her own sake, but only for the sake of the children she may have borne (Erman, Lebensmilde, 79). The wife was, nevertheless, to be well treated and loved:

'If thou art well-to-do, found a house, and love thy wife accordingly. Fill her house and clothes to lick; oil the medicine of her body. Gladden her heart by lifetime long. She is a field that is productive unto its lord.' (Priss, 10, 6-7).

The Egyptian monuments everywhere depict husband and wife in attitudes of affection, and the phrases 'his wife whom he loves' and 'his sister whom he loves' are amongst the commonest ex- pressions found in the hieroglyphic epistles. It is to be shown to the woman who is wayward and given up to amusements: 'Be kind to her for a season, send her not away, give her food to eat.' (Priss, 15, 6-7). How tender and passionate the love of an Egyptian could be is shown by the love poems that have survived (see Max Muller, Die Lebenspoesie der alten Assyrier, Leipzig, 1899).

Polygamy seems to have been permitted, but to have been unusual; brother-and-sister marriage was not rare. Divorce seems to have depended on the caprice of the husband; but the latter bound himself by contract, at least in later times, to pay an indemnification for his divorce. 'If he executed the will of his wife without valid reason (see Griffith, Rhylands Papyri, London, 1909, iii. 116). The divorced woman, like the widow, often stood in sore need of protection (Elopogon Pagan 10, 63); but, since women were another world of property, either position was doubly often very tolerable. The lady of means, from the most ancient times onwards, bore the titles "mistress of his house," "mistress of his (/er/-house," and the position of a woman was higher than in any other land of antiquity; not only could she administer her own possessions, but she had testamentary rights and the power to go to law (see Griffith, The Inscription of Mrs, Leipzig, 1905). In Egypt had many great queens, of
whom several reigned independently and with great power, e.g. Hatashep, the XXVIth dynasty.

(10) Sexual morality (for adultery, see above under the heading 'Homicide' and art. ADULTERY [Egyptian]).—Our ancient immorality was very lightly regarded; we find no prohibition concerning it in the Negative Confession, and a lord of Elephantine in the VIIth dynasty even boasts of 'having had a good time with women' (ZA xlv. (1910) 45); and the daughters of the dancing girls who attended the feasts given by grandees doubtless belonged to the prostitute class. The moralist gives a warning against women of this type:

'Beware of the strange woman, who is not known in her town. Approach her not ... and know her not in bodily wise. A deep and unsavourable water is the woman who is apart from her husband.' (Ang. 2, 8-15).

Religious prostitution is attested by Strabo (xxvii. 1. 46) for the priestesses of Amun of Thebes until the age of puberty, when they were given in marriage. The monasteries afford no direct confirmation of this statement, but certain indications make it probable that it is no mere invention.

(11) The moralist insists that the 'chasseres' (Chenapt) constituted his harit (khnh), and the wife of the high priest bore the title 'chief of the ladies of the temple' (ZA 1903). In prosperity the New Kingdom most ladies of rank, married to men in high stations, called themselves 'chasseres' of one god or another; even goddesses had their haritmas (ZA xlvii. [1910] 50). The Pharaohs had large harems, and it is improbable that concubinage on a considerable scale was confined to the royal house; but we are ill-instructed on this point. The paynrt of the New Kingdom give the paynrt theiger orders, as, for example, the workmen of the Theban Necropolis, usually formed loose temporary connexions in lieu of legal marriages (see Erman, Life in Ancient Egypt, tr. Tirard, London, 1894, p. 164).

An erotic paynrt (at Turin), full of pictures of the strangest kind, shows that few of the sexual vices of the Orient were unknown to Ancient Egypt. In a magical paynrt of the XIth dynasty, Seth appears as a priestess seeking to declare the paynrt of the Harir Hor (Griffith, Hieratic Paynrt from Khnum, 1899, p. 3; cf. Spinhz, xiv. [1910] 39-41); and it would appear that this crime, as adultery, was a stock charge in the indictment of murder. In the law-codes (see Turin, Pap. 55. 4), in both versions of the Negative Confession, impurity (mastrubation?) while serving as a lay priest of the god is denied.

Purity. —Cleanliness, both of the person and of the clothing, was scrupulously observed; and the houses of the wealthy seldom lacked a bath-room (Sinuhe B, 285). The washing of face and hands was considered the necessity preliminary to a meal (Griffith, Stories of the High Priests, Oxford, 1900, p. 44), and sexual acts of all sorts were regarded as defiling. Purity in the service of the gods was strenuously insisted upon (ibid. ii. 27) and all grades of priestly, professional and lay, shared the name of sob, 'the pure priest' (see, further, PURIFICATION [Egypt]).

The concept of ethical purity was also known, though it was less play a very prominent part. Thus do we find it at the end of the earlier Repudiation of Sons (A); and in b in the metaphorical sense means 'to be innocent' (Pap. Mayer B, passim).

(12) Slavery.—On this subject we have strangely little information. Slaves of war were often presented as slaves, both to individuals (e.g. Uruk. iv. 2. 11) and to the gods (e.g. Newberry, 21).

There can be little doubt that slaves were very numerous, but we have no early evidence as to the sources whence they were recruited, or as to the question whether they were ever emancipated. From the XXVIth dynasty legal deeds exist recording the sale and transfer of slaves; also voluntary contracts of servitude, involving not only a man's person but also his children (Griffith, Byland's Papyri, iii. 50 ff.).

(13) The right of property.—The official theory in Ancient Egypt was to the effect that the Pharaoh is the sole owner of property; if his subjects hold the land, the local god has given it to them; but it is because the king has granted them leave to do so; even the tombs of the dead were 'the gift of the king.' The temples of the gods, too, were the castles which the Pharaoh, their son, had built for them; and each successive monarch confirmed to the gods the possessions accorded by his ancestors (see Moret, La Royauté pharaonique, Paris, 1900). Similarly, the booty captured from foreign tribes was theoretically regarded as tribute which rebellious subjects had failed to render. In practice, this theory of property corresponded with the reality just in the degree in which the royal power was exercised on the surface of the land. Conquerors who (like Amenemnes I. and Amos 1.) reduced the land to order after a period of anarchy rewarded their subjects with grants of land pretty much as they chose. In periods of war, the result was a show of confirming (simite) already existing rights; or the latter might, as in the first half of the XIth dynasty, be actually under the control of feudal families, or, as in the XXIst dynasty, be usurped by a ruling priesthood. The official formula remained the same throughout Egyptian history, and might doubtless have been used to justify taxation, if, indeed, this question was ever raised. In any case, the function among a variety of proprietors, all tenancies of their proprietorship, which was attested by title-deeds and carried with it rights of testamentary disposition and alienation by sale. The elaborate care with which the land was surveyed and registered is only partly explained by the Egyptians' inerterate love of committing things to writing; documentary records were an absolute necessity in a land where the inundation was apt to sweep away all boundary marks. It was a primary duty for those in authority to protect proprietary rights, and the nobles frequently recorded the fact that they had been debarred from his property by one more powerful than he (Urak. iv. 972), and that they had 'never deprived a man of the estate of his father' (ib. 1. 125). A great portion of the land was in the hands of the priests, being theoretically considered the property of the gods. To such limits did the encroachments of the priesthood go, that in the XXTh dynasty, Amun of Thebes possessed no less than 654,188 stot of land, 492,362 head of cattle, 433 gardens and groves, and 86,486 serfs and slaves (see Breasted, Anc. Records, Chicago, 1906-7, iv. 97).

The crime of robbery is frequently mentioned:

'Never have I taken away the property of any man by robbery' (Urak. i. 79; and the subject of a well-known tale of the Middle Kingdom, wherein a peasant who has robbed his son-in-law, and its loot on a trumpery pretext, and who demands justice from the administrator of the province. Vogelsang-Gardiner, Die Eingen des Leibes, p. 141).

Robbery is distinguished from theft in Confession B; it is curious that A makes no reference to either sin. Many ostraca and papyri deal with cases of petty theft, but throw no light on the penalties imposed on account of it.

The decree of King Haremheb mentions some stringent reforms carried through by that Pharaoh; the official tax-gatherers had been committing the oppression of the poor and oppressing the peasants; these offences were thenceforth to be punished by banishment to the frontier fort of Zaru, after the
1. The rich equipment of furniture and jewels buried with the wealthy dead was an easy booty to unscrupulous men, and tomb-robbery was committed on a large scale.

2. In the XXth dynasty it was found that many royal tombs had been tampered with, and the legal investigations then instituted afford a graphic picture of some of the most interesting documents from Ancient Egypt (see Newberry-Spiegelberg, Ezzations in the Theban Necropolis, London, 1898).

3. 'A man who affirms that Truth—Truthfulness was highly esteemed and was barely distinguished from right, both concepts being denoted by the same word maat. In Confession B the deceased says: I have not spoken falsehood.'

4. In the court-law the ordinary oath was 'As Amon liveth, and as the Prince liveth,' but often there were added long and circumstantial self-curses specifying the penalty to be incurred if what is said proves to be untrue (see W. Spiegelberg, Rechtsvorsen, Hanover, 1892, and Gardiner, Inscription of Mes). Lying became a serious offence when it involved the interests of others:

5. 'I have not said lies concerning another,' an official maintains (Urk. iv. 120); and 'I have not betrayed the servant to his master.'

6. To render messages faithfully was thought a desirable habit (Prisse, 7. 3; Urk. iv. 120), and reliability and obedience towards one's masters are virtues everywhere praised. Honesty in commercial transactions is emphasized in those statements of Confession A which refer to the units of measurement and to the balance. The stemming or diverting of irrigation water (Abl. iv. 3) and what the Egyptians termed 'over irrigation played so important a part as in Egypt, was, of course, a common way of obtaining an unfair advantage over other persons. (Prisse, 11.)

7. 'The endeavour of the magistrate was not only to 'cause the two parties to go away satisfied' (Newberry, 4), but to administer the laws fairly and in accordance with the command of Pharaoh (ib. 10.). Great stress was laid on impartiality:

8. 'Regard him whom thou knowest like him whom thou knowest not.' Again it is said, 'To put upon the one side—the metaphor seems to be from overweighing one scale of the balance—'is the abhorrence of God' (ib.). The judge must, of course, be wholly incorruptible. 'I have not been dealt to the empty-handed, I have not received the bribe of any,' says the vizier Rekhmire (ib. 5. 54). In the case of which we have full details (XXth dynasty), a commissioner was sent out to make some investigations, and came back with a false report to the chief of the commission; it is clear that he had been bribed by one of the parties (Gardiner, Inscription of Moa).

9. The insistence with which the inscriptions refer to incorruptibility and impartiality suggests that these virtues were less common than was claimed; none the less the ideal of modern Egypt discoursed this supposition. The emblematic picture of the judge drawn in Tuthmosis III.'s charge to Rekhmire is up to a high standard of moral enlightenment. Besides the indispensable qualities of justice and incorruptibility, it demands uncomplaining patience, tact, and discretion; not to be over-lenient or over-stern, allowing the litigants to have their say, and making it quite clear on what grounds the verdict is given (Newberry, 10).

10. Menemnon in everyday life.—Good-temper was enjoined and admired. The chief hold (ib. in Tomb in Gurna, no. 110), takes credit to himself for having been of pleasant character, self-controlled, and free from passion: 'I have not been hot of mouth,' i.e. not in reply, is one of the few statements in this manner. Pharaoh, indeed, might allow himself to be enraged like a leopard of the South' (e.g. Urk. iv. 130), but his subjects had no licence. Con- tentiousness was considered a fault.

11. One moralist gives the precept, 'Do not persist in fighting with thy neighbour, Petrie Ostraca, and another advises, 'Enter not into the law-court, lest thy name stink' (Day, 2. 17).

12. Rancour was blamed, and men are bidden not to store up memories of small wrongs (Petrie Ostraca, 11); and the judge is frequently enjoined, 'Do not be quick to anger, the fear of evil' (B) may refer to the virtues of for-giveness. Among the fatalistic Egyptians of today, gratitude is said to be almost unknown. There is no exact phrase for gratitude in the old Egyptian language, for 'to praise God' (B) is for some one is rather to congratulate him than to thank him; in Coptic 'I am grateful' is rendered by oymesot wnt', 'a favour has been received.' The forgetfulness of benefits received, however, calls forth bitter comment in some of the texts:

13. 'Yesterday is not remembered, and to the door is not done again in these times' (Lebenenmite, 113). 'A man has no household on the day of the dead, he who seeks of his food conspired against me' (Millingen, 2. 5).

14. On the subject of friendship the ethical writers have much to say. The reflection contained in the words last quoted should teach the king to place confidence in anyone else (Millingen, 1. 2). If a proper means is condemned: 'Do not make straight what is crooked in order to win love' (Petrie Ostraca, 11).

15. 'Defiance to superiors was a duty imposed on all: 'How thy back to thy superior, thy overseer from the Palace' (Prisse, 15. 2). Distinctions of rank were jealously guarded, and etiquette prescribed a strict order of precedence. The pictures in the tomb-chambers show how the inscriptions declare that nobles were not expected to stand in deferential attitudes. Before Pharaoh all his subjects grovelled in the dust, touching the earth with their foreheads; and it was considered sufficiently lavish to be allowed to kiss the foot of the king's foot instead of the ground (Urk. i. 33).

16. Courtesy and tact were prescribed, especially in the company of men of position:

17. 'If thou art seated at the board of one greater than thee, take what he offers thee: 1... Look straight in front of thee; pierce him not with many glances... Speak when he addresses thee, and laugh when he teases; it will please him greatly' (Pap. Brit. Mus. 10500, 2. 18-19).

18. That obedience was exacted from inferiors goes without saying; but even so high an official as I{nemii affirms (Urk. iv. 172), 'I was one who means to do what the master said.' Pride is very often spoken of as a failing: 'Do not be proud, lest thou be humbled' (Prisse, 12. 1). Of intellectual pride it is said:

19. 'Do not vaunt thy heart on account of thy knowledge; take counsel with the ignorant as with the wise. For the limits of a craft is not to be reached; there is no perfect craftsman. A good saying lies hidden more than an emerald; it is to be found with slave-girls grunting at the mill' (Prisse, 5. 9-10).

20. The poor man is not to be treated harshly (Pap. Brit. Mus. 10509, 3. 6), for 'he possesses virtue possesses riches' (Prisse, 7. 5). Nor should contempt be shown to him who has no children, for 'there is many a father in misery, and many a mother, and one is no more a mother, and one is no more a father' (Prisse, 7. 6).

21. The Negative Confession has several references to pride and vanity: 'I have not been
puffed up,' 'I have not compared myself with others.' No quotations are required to illustrate the great love of ostentation characteristic of the Egyptians in their material and moral life, for it is apparent from the evidence of the excavations that ancient people were incurable braggers, never so contented as when airing their virtues and displaying their own cleverness. The characters of the greatest of the 18th and 19th dynasties has as its subject the rivalry of two scribes, each of whom tries to demonstrate his superiority over the other by boasting about himself, while emphasizing the records of his fellow (Guizot, Heriot Texts, Leipzig, 1811, p. 3).

Discretion was very highly valued; of many men we are told that they were 'deloused of mouth concerning what their eyes saw' (Benson-Gourlay, Temple of Mut, London, 1899, p. 326), or 'secretive in the business of the Palace' (Urk. iv. 47). The utility of silence was very well understood, and it was prescribed as the best mode of coping with many difficulties (Priisse, i. 1; 7; 5; 9). So, too, in B, 'I have not multiplied words in talking.'

(17) Qualities and defects of character.—Under the word 'character' we mean the esteem or regard in which a man is held with the various traits of character of which the ethical nature is more or less clearly defined. Drunkenness was the invariable ending of feasts, and it seems to have been looked upon as a good joke rather than as something culpable. In the tom- paintings, men are shown being carried home drunk on the shoulders of their companions; and not seldom we are allowed to see a fashionable lady with her attendants, while an attendant rushes to her assistance. Drunkenness is, however, sometimes deprecated as a bad habit, as in the following passage: 'Nicht zu trinken, geht es besser, Alkohol ist ein Gift.'

(18) Duties towards the dead.—In view of the care and thought which the Egyptians expended on the construction of their tombs and on the continuation of their funerary cult, it is strange that public opinion imposed no adequate obligation to fulfil the intentions of the departed. It is an undoubted fact, and one not untinged with tragedy, that magnificent tombs, ornamented with exquisite skill and equipped with the costliest furniture during the life-time of their owners, were within a few years suffered to fall into decay, and even to become the undisputed prey of tomb-plunderers. Filial piety, as we have seen, demanded that the son and heir should accomplish his parent's burial rites; but it may be assumed that none but a few shrirked this duty.

But this first perfunctory service by no means ensured the permanent welfare of the dead; offerings had to be made, and these were often not for a few years only, but in perpetuity. It seems certain that the attentions paid to the dead seldom extended beyond a single generation; and in this respect Ancient Egypt stands in sharp contrast to China, with its universally-recognized cult of ancestors. The Pharaohs, it is true, were more assiduous in their veneration of their forefathers than the bulk of the people; but, with a little qualification, it may fairly be said that in Egypt the cult of the dead existed only in demand, not in supply. See, further, ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Egyptian).

(19) Duties towards the gods.—In lands where, as in Ancient Egypt, an official cult of the gods has been established—wherever, in fact, religious observances are not dictated by mere individual desires—this cult and these observances become a duty. The only question is whether the obligation falls on the shoulders of the people at large or is vicariously discharged by a specially-appointed priesthood. The Egyptian priesthood was only in part professional; whence it follows that private persons, so far as their wealth and position prescribed, took part in the public worship of the gods. How far the populace at large attended to, or were supposed to attend to, the gods of the State will be discussed in such an approach to the moral life (Egyptian); here it will suffice to quote a precept which enjoins on all men generally the observance of the Divine feast days: 'Mako the feast of thy god, and repeat it in its season.'

He is neglected ' (Any, 2. 3-4). Various religious offences are mentioned in the Negative Confession, including fraudulent diminution of the temple offerings, the slaying of sacred animals, and blasphemy. There were also prohibitions as to food, rules of purity, and much else that cannot here be discussed. The fact that the gods regarded virtue (see above) proves that righteousness was regarded in a very high sense, as a duty towards them, and, owing to this religious side of ethics, the relations of a man with his deity might become very intimate. Certain votive steles of the New Kingdom exhibit the nearest approach to personage that is found in any Semitic inscription. (Thoth, 140) "A Thot (Thoth's) self described as a miracle of valour, and is compared with the lion for prowess and with the bull for strength. The purport of steles is the last words that will be mentioned under this heading; it falls within the province of ethics as being dependent on voluntary effort, and as being an object of general approval.

The man 'who knows things' (rakh idkhet) was held in high esteem by the Egyptians, and they often speak with pride of their intellectual attainments.

'Thus Rekheb, the son of Nebhepet, Theodore, having been made a 'high official,' the cult of the dead is said to be the noblest of the three high-Christ; and, ardent in inquiry, and a ready listener.' 'I was skilled,' he says, 'in the ways of the past, and the things of yesterday caused me to know them in her name.' ('Newberry, S. 25-30.)

Conclusion.—In conclusion, a rough moral estimate of the Egyptians may be attempted.
ETHICS AND MORALITY (Greek).—I. Homeric age.—The mental attitude of the society which Homer depicts was neither introspective nor agitated by moral doubts. It belonged to an age of physical strength, of bodily vigor, courage, and resolution more highly esteemed than unswerving rectitude or pre-eminent wisdom. The sagacity of Nestor was treated with formal respect, but he had lost in the fullness of age the position which he held and benefited from his experience. On the other hand, the counsel of Odysseus was the more readily welcomed in consequence of his practical resource and military skill. The authority wielded by the children of Odysseus over their feudal retainers depended on their power to enforce it: in the absence of Odysseus and Achilles, Laertes and Peleus were too old to watch effectively over their sons' interests, and Telemachus was a mere stripling was ignored. Similarly, the nominal over-lordship of Agamemnon failed to coerce Achilles, who was strong enough to assert his independence. Thus the exercise of the human virtues was restricted to the bounds of family or clan; but within these limits we find evidence of a highly developed morality. The sanctity attached to the marriage bond may be illustrated from the wonderful picture of Hector and Andromache and of Odysseus and Penelope, and the supreme happiness of a well-assorted union is recognized in the words of Odysseus to Nausicaa: "There is nothing greater or better than a husband and wife dwelling together with united minds." (Od. vi. 182 f.) The position of women recognized in the Homeric poems—but always within the limits indicated above—was characterized by greater freedom and influence than was customary at Athens in later times, as may be seen in the several cases of Penelope, Nausicaa, and Arcte the wife of Alcnoous (Od. vii. 66). Various causes have been assigned for the change, such as (1) the fact that the women described in Homer belonged to a privileged class, (2) the necessary secessions imposed by the conditions of town life, and (3) the contact with the Ionian civilization of Asia Minor (see Malan, Social and Religious Life in Greece, London, p. 147, and T. D. Seymour, Life in the Homeric Age, New York, 1867, p. 117 f.). Seymour, in suggesting (p. 123) that the society of Homer was Eolic rather than Ionian, refers to the abuse directed against the Eolii posteces by non-sympathetic Ionians.

There is similar evidence of sympathy with children (see esp. H. xv. 362, xxii. 499). The cases of Euryklea and Eumene show that slavery was compatible with relations of intimate affection. Odysseus, during his absences from his household. Beggar and suppliants were treated under the special protection of Zeus, and had an indefeasible claim to hospitality (Od. vi. 298, xii. 213). The same mild spirit was shown in the gentle treatment of the lower animals, such as horses and dogs; and the example of the old dog Argus (Od. xxv. 228 ff.), who recognized his master after twenty years' absence, is familiar to every one. The claims of morality as thus acknowledged imposed obligations which could not be broken without offending public opinion. The sense of honour (φιλοθυμία) corresponded to the feeling of resentment ( νιγρεια, as in H. xii. 122) with which a disregard of propriety was visited. Nevertheless, behind all these manifestations of refinement and generosity there was a dark background of hardness and cruelty.

In his wrath the Homeric hero was a savage. Patroclus slew the son of Amyntha in anger over a matter of reserve (H. xii. 86), and Achilles was afraid lest his passion should drive him to kill the defenseless Priam, who as assailant and guest could claim his special protection (H. xiv. 568, 569). Mutilation of an enemy is mentioned over and over again without reprobation (see H. xi. 145, xii. 292, xiv. 49, etc.). The punishment of the treacherous slave Melanthius is carried out with brutal and repulsive ferocity (Od. xii. 474 ff.). In fact, in dealing with those who were beyond the pale, the heroic warrior showed no pity for unprotected weakness; when a town was captured, the old men and children were slain, and the women were carried off as the property of the victors (see H. xii. 82; Od. vii. 502 ff.).

II. H. ii. Gardner.

2. Homer.—The poems of Hesiod, whether belonging to a time somewhat later than Homer or expressing the sentiments of a lower grade of society not articulate in the Iliad and the Odyssey, may be regarded as a bridge which crosses the gap dividing the heroic from the historical age. For in the Works and Days we find the earliest signs of a conviction that all is not well with the world, that the gods no longer dwell with men, and that even honour and respectability (τιμή and προσωπεία) have departed, abandoning mankind to the workings of harsh and malignant jealousies (200 f.).

"Poet is wroth against potter; carpenter against carpenter; even beggar is envious of beggar, and one man rules another" (22). "Money is a man's soul" (500). Morality is depressed from the heroic level to suit the work-a-day requirements of the struggling farmer. Life is a continual battle against poverty, and the simple virtues which it needs leave no room for the exercise of elevated sentiment. Industry and fair dealing, temperance and simplicity, are enjoined:

"Hard work is no shame; but ill deeds is a disgrace" (311). "Take a good neck-cloth and give as much or as little as return, so that in need you may afterwards find sufficiency" (390). Among the maxims of Hesiod's "Work" his rebuke of the unjust judges who robbed the poor: " Fool! they know not how much greater is the half than the whole, how mighty a blessing there is in mallow and asphodel" (40). There is plenty of shrewd and homely wisdom, breathing the spirit merely of commercial prudence; and we are hardly surprised to find a wise literature of the time a vein of melancholy may
be traced, to be seen in its fullest outcrop when Theognis writes:

'But the best of all things for the sons of earth not to be born, or to see the bright rays of the sun; or else after birth to pass as soon as possible the gate of death, and to lie deep down below the light of day.' (105 E.)

Debarred by stress of present anxiety from celebrating the glories of the past, the creative instinct found an outlet in recording the lessons of personal experience with more individual and passionate outbursts of the lyric poets are of less direct importance to a survey of morality. But the elegiac writers, and especially Mimnermus, Solon, Phocylides, and Theognis, contain a mass of proverbial wisdom to which after ages never ceased to appeal. Trite and commonplace as much of their writing seems to a modern reader, their immediate ances aud judged very differently.

To obtain consistent and true results a change in the ethics of society, politics, and education was to them a new and inestimable privilege. In the gnostic poets the morality which had been merely implicit in Homer and Hesiod received separate treatment and distinct expression. The wisdom which had been expressed in an allegoric way in the 'Divine' mind was tersely and readily condensed into a few pregnant sentences. These sentences formed the data for new synthesyes and higher generalizations, the topics for enlarged investigation, the 'middle axioms' between the scattered facts of life and the unity of the rational system (cf. A. Lyman's, Greek Poets, London, 1877, p. 109).

The poets were, in fact, the educators of Greece (cf. Isocrates, 314). Unfortunately we see K. J. Freytag, Schools of Hellen, London, 1907, p. 247); and to this age belongs the formation of all that was most characteristic in Greek popular morality. The dramatists were steeped in this literature, and their sententious passages are often to be adapted from some gnomic poet: thus Sophocles in Oed. Col. 1225 reproduced the above-quoted lines of Theognis, just as in fr. 320 he paraphrased the last line of Sol. 326 Th. 45.

Similar considerations apply to the traditional utterances of the Seven Wise Men. They belonged to the latter part of this era, the age of the tyrants; indeed, one of them, Periander, was himself tyrant of Corinth, and herer. Pittacus, was the ruler of Mytilene. They were happily described by Diodorus (fr. 28 [P.F.H. ii. 243]) as 'neither admirers nor students of philosophy, but men of intelligence endowed with legislative faculty.' Although Thales and Solon distinguished themselves independently, the others were merely convenient eponyms to whom could be attached such scraps of unappropriated wisdom as were handed down from their fathers, and for the same reason that Thales is said to have acquired the knowledge of medicine from Diels, Fragmenta der Vorschrücker, Berlin, 1907, p. 518). The famous 'Nothing too much,' attributed to Solon and repeated by Cleobulus as 'Measure is best,' comes from the innermost kernel of Greek sentiment. Phocylides (fr. 13) praised the middle rank as the happiest; Solon (fr. 2) rebuked the insolence (ἐφάρμοσι) of the popular faction, arising from the excess which they could not check; and Aristotle followed popular opinion when he defined Virtue as a mean. Closely akin is the saying of Pittacus, ἀρκεῖον ὑθυπό, which is inadequately rendered 'Know the right season,' since caution may be seen from the Latin, 'Est visum quodcumque, et nunc, quia meum pater in aeternum, 60, in quo potuit, et scire posse, quin aliquando, eam quae have not word corresponding to καλός is no less significant than the absence of Greek of terms capable of expressing adequately the ideas of 'duty' and 'sin.' The intellectual aspect of Greek morality appears still more strongly in Chilon's ἐγγύς εὐπρεπες, 'Know thyself,' which, together with ἰδοὺς ὑμῖν, was inscribed on the front of the temple of Apollo at Delphi. In fact, it was less obvious that the advice given by Pythagoras to his pupils, that they should always, on their return home, put to themselves these questions: 'Whither have I strayed? What have I done? Which of my duties was unfulfilled?' (Diog. Laert. viii. 22). But it was capable of a wider significance, and was interpreted by Plato in the Charmides (164 D) as a recommendation of ἑαυτῷ προσφέροντα, understanding thereby a proper examination of the observer of faults by capacity. In this sense it was adopted by the tragic poet Ion (fr. 55): 'Know thyself' is but a brief saying, and yet is a task so great that Zeus himself alone can master it. An increased recognition of the importance of justice is characteristic of an age which continued and developed the strain of wisdom introduced by Hesiod (Op. 320, etc.).

Solon declared (fr. 13) that unjust gains bring their own retribution; and Theognis (197) writes to the same effect, that riches righteously acquired are a sure possession, but dishonesty, though it seems to prevail for the time, issues finally in ruin. And Chion said (fr. 10 [Didier]): 'Choose less rather than shameful gain; for whither the one will lead, the other will never cease to be a curse.' Phocylides (fr. 5 of Theogn. 147) was to so far as to express the same hope for a future judgment; and this view afterwards exercised considerable influence on the ethical systems of Plato and Aristotle (see Aristotle, Nic. v. 1110). The greater the value attached by men to the observance of justice in their mutual dealings, the keener was the disappointment with which they viewed the apparent disregard of the gods in visiting with retribution the transgressions of the unjust. The poets were forced to conclude that, while the actual sinner escaped, his crime was 'repeated by the sufferings of his descendants' (Solon, fr. 4, 22-23). Yet no protest follows against the injustice of the gods: their ways are inscrutable and past finding out (fr. 9). Similarly Theognis, while praying that the purpose of the gods may yet be changed, mournfully acquiesced in the punishment of the innocent for the sins of the guilty (731-742). It must at the same time be remembered that the sense of justice was so limited, as to exclude any consideration for the rights of others. 'Beguile you not your neighbor with fair words,' says Theognis (306); 'but, when you have him within your grip, wreak your wrath on him, and let no one stand in your way. You may pour out your blood; I could drink their blood.' Is another of his utterances (348), when he is speaking of those who had robbed him. These are not isolated sentiments once totruities; they continue to exist in the writings of Diels, Fragm. der Vorschrücker, Berlin, 1907, p. 518). The famous 'Nothing too much,' attributed to Solon and repeated by Cleobulus as 'Measure is best,' comes from the innermost kernel of Greek sentiment. Phocylides (fr. 13) praised the middle rank as the happiest; Solon (fr. 2) rebuked the insolence (ἐφάρμοσι) of the popular faction, arising from the excess which they could not check; and Aristotle followed popular opinion when he defined Virtue as a mean. Closely akin is the saying of Pittacus, ἀρκεῖον ὑθυπό, which is inadequately rendered 'Know the right season,' since caution may be seen from the Latin, 'Est visum quodcumque, et nunc, quia meum pater in aeternum, 60, in quo potuit, et scire posse, quin aliquando, eam quae...
withhold his countenance from righteous deception,' and 'There are times when God honours a lie.' Flinders (Legg. [AD 127]) explicitly affirms that the many are too fond of saying that at proper times the practice of falsehood may be justified. Sophocles often follows closely the precepts of popular morality; and it may be concluded from the evidence he affords that falsehood was justified either in cases where it brought final success in a momentous issue (Phil. 109; fr. 326), or even where some definite advantage was perceived. 'This is the fruit of falsehood' (fr. 749). 'No speech is evil, if fraught with gain' (El. 61; cf. Athen. 122 C).

It has been suggested, on the strength of the Attic evidence, that in the period between Homer and the Persian wars, under the influence of the Delphic religion, a higher estimate of truthfulness was prevalent than in the subsequent period (L. Schmidt, ii. 413). This is a mistaken view, due partly to neglect of the fact which has already been emphasised, that the tragedians constantly echoed the sentiments of the genuine poets, adapting them to the conditions of their art, or ascribing them to their most conventional characters.

4. The era of the Persian wars.—It may be broadly affirmed as a general proposition that the conventional morality which can be gathered from the plays of the earlier tragedians, which may be fairly described as epoch-making, the time which elapsed before the establishment of the Macedonion empire was far too short for the new radicalism of the advanced thinkers to produce a direct effect in the theatre, or even in a community so sensitive to novelty as Athens. The conviction of Socrates is enough to show that the majority shared the sentiments of Strepiesades in the Clouds, and would willingly have lent him a hand in setting fire to the 'Reflector,' so soon as they perceived the danger of an inroad on their cherished prepossessions. Hence it would be a mistake to derive the bias of contemporary opinion from the sympathies which may be aroused by this or that play of Aeschylus or Euripides. Nor must this be understood as applying solely to subjects which excited the keenest controversy. For example, the Irregularities of Euripides is mainly devoted to a panegyric of Athens as the protector of the weak, and the advocate of generosity to a beaten foe (see Introduction to the edition by the present writer, p. xxvi, f.), not at the special time when this play was produced, the assembly was debating the Mytilenean decree; and the atrocities of Scione and Melos occurred not long after. It is dangerous to infer an advance in general morality because a few enlightened thinkers might condemn the execution of Peloponnesian envoys in retaliation for the similar treatment of traders in contraband (Thuc. ii. 67), or because the ruthless proceedings of a Spartan admiral evoked a general protest from Ionia (iii. 32). But to assign to literary evidence its necessary limitations is not to disparage the value of its feature. The true spirit of an age is to be gathered from the aspirations of its leading minds; but, when we finally leave the era of the tyrannies and encounter the first fresh breezes of democratic Athens, it behoves us to remember that the individual witnesses will be less likely to conform to a general pattern.

The effect of the Persian wars, following closely upon the democratic reforms of Cleisthenes and the expulsion of Hippias, was to deliver the Athenians from the danger of political slavery, and to open out an almost unlimited field for their practical and intellectual energies (see Gomperz, L. 392 ff.). Athens, at the head of her maritime league, was the leading member of a powerful confederacy, and was soon to aspire to an imperial role. On the other hand, it is often offered as a common danger had given birth to a new sense of pan-Hellenic unity. The best representative of pan-Hellenic sentiment is Pindar (q.v.) the Theban. He belonged to a State which had been reduced to a powerless condition, and had to have been heavily fined by his countrymen for his praise of Athens in the poem partly preserved in Ira. 76, 78, and 83. As a writer of odes in honour of victorious competitors, he was one of the great festivals from every quarter of the Greek world, he displayed an extraordinary sympathy with the local associations of his patrons' families, and testified to the unity of sentiment and tradition in the Greek race which Salamis and Plataea had made a living reality. He was so little a particularist that all Greece could feel proud of his genius. So in part he continued to expand the familiar axioms of the national ethics with a wider outlook, a more elaborate imagery, and a more varied application. No one perhaps so well illustrates the central Hellenic principle of σωφροσύνη, the need of self-control, the reduction of all excess to the normal, and the highest required by the interests of society (Gomperz, i. 301).

Even the highest ambition, the desire for the fame which song alone can give (Nem. vii. 27), must be controlled by the fear of going too far. A mortal must shape his aims with a sense of his own weakness; let him not seek to become Zeus (Iph. fr. 14). The pillars of Hercules are set as a limit to human enterprise (Ol. iii. 44). Strain not the eyes too far; the brazen heaven cannot be climbed (Pyth. x. 27). But there are those who, like Tantalus and Ixion, cannot bear the stress of great prosperity (Ol. i. 56; Pyth. ii. 25). Then surfice breeds insensibility, whose child is Ixion. The germ of this thought are to be found in Solon and Theognis, but Pindar and Aeschylus (Ap. Tep.) inverted it with a fuller meaning:

'Perhaps the most striking note in Pindar's poetry proceeds from his aristocratic pride. He will have no commerce with the vulgar, and cares nothing for the jealousy of lesser rivals. Birth is the supreme advantage, and natural powers are the gift of heaven, the want of which no training can replace (Ol. i. 100, ὅ δ' ἐστιν ἀριστουργημα)'

So he concludes from heroic examples:

'A man who hath the birth-right of nobility prevails greatly; but he who has knowledge in a lesson learned is a man in darkness, whose thought is as a veering gale, and who never cometh to port with unerring course, but with infernal mistaet and a thousand excellences' (Nem. iii. 40 ff., tr. Bury).

Great powers should be worthily exercised:

'Humble and happy to be sung in verse is he who, prevailing by might of arm or mind over his enemy, can bear the loss of his strength to win the highest prizes; and who lives to see his son in the like cause exalted and youth crowned with Pythonic wreaths as his due' (Pyth. x. 22 ff.).

While Pindar sang the glories of the great games, Aeschylus (q.v.) was making a more direct appeal to the national honour of Athens. Few poets have left with their readers so keen an impression as Aeschylus of their deep interest in the highest problems of morality. In his fervour for righteousness he has often been compared to a Hebrew prophet. With the issue of the dramatic conflict is involved the solution of an ethical or religious question which permeates the atmosphere of the play. Thus in the Prometheus the sufferings of the chief character and those of those bound up with the justification of the ways of Zeus. It was a leading motive of Aeschylus' poetic activity to find a moral lesson which could be traced among the horrors and cruelties of the old legends, and especially to discover how the interference of the gods in human affairs could be reconciled with the requirements of justice. It is a mistake to consider Aeschylus as a conservative thinker, though he came to be established at a later date. Probably to his contemporaries he appeared as a revolutionary. But, however this may be, he was undoubtedly a lofter moralist than any of the indefinite authenticity of the 'Comedy of the Birds' (Xen. Anab. v. 1. 4. 4 ff.).'
earlier poets. We cannot conceive of him as justifying a falsehood for the sake of obtaining a practical advantage: 'The mouth of Zeus knows not how to lie, and all his words he will fulfil' (Prom. 106). It is equally unpleasing to observe how Æschylus endeavors to give a new and higher meaning into the precepts of the old morality. That suffering was learning was an old saw which in Hesiod (Op. 218) took the form of: 'A child knows which is best when it is brought from its mother's teeth as set on edge ' as completely as the prophet Ezekiel (18%). Agamemnon was not punished for the sin of Atreus. He yielded to the fatal Temptation which was sent to him in the person of Iphigenia, as in the days of his triumph over Troy he forsook his nurse and gave way to Eumeneig (W. G. Headlam in Cambridge Prolegomena, 1906, p. 126). There is always a threat of sin breaking out afresh in the new generation—in consequence of the infant tillm in the blood. But how did the first sin come to be committed? Here Æschylus definitely rejected the traditional view which attributed it to the jealousy of the gods aroused by great prosperity:

But single in the world I hold
A doctrine different from the old:
Not wealth it is but sinful desire
More sinners after him doth breed
Formed in his image (Ap. 754 ff.).

The name of Æschylus was permanently connected with the 'good old days' of the Mapathowenágas; and old-fashioned citizens at the end of the century still held him to be the greatest of poets (Aristoph. Nub. 1380), and attributed to his teaching the virtues of the generation which grew up under the discipline described in the famous speech of the Just Reason (5. 961 ff., 986). When Æschylus and Euripides appear in the scene of Aristoph. Thesmophoria (the favor of Dionysus) they agree to base their claims upon their respective merits as teachers of morality (1008, 1055); and Dionysus in proceeding to his final decision proposes to examine them, in order to see which gives the best advice in the crises of life (1430). It is important to emphasize this old view of the poets as teachers, since we are now on the threshold of an age in which a class of professional educators arose styling themselves 'teachers of virtue.' In the eyes of the ordinary man, the chief of these Sophists, who claimed to supplant the poets, was Socrates (Rom. 1491); and, as the result of his and their labors, the teaching of morality was henceforth considered as the proper function of philosophy. (On the subject of this section, see the treatise of Buchholz, Die ästhetische Weltanschauung des Pindaros u. Äschylus, Leipzig, 1889.)

5 Influence of religion upon Greek morality.

In the summary description which has been given of the growth of Greek morality, hardly any portion has been taken of religious influences; and, before we close this chapter, we must briefly examine. At the present day morality is regularly regarded as an established code of precepts and obligations which has been framed to regulate human conduct and rest ultimately upon the authority of a religious sanction. But, inasmuch as their religion, so far at least as it related to the cult of the Olympian deities, did not comprise any such code, the Greeks, in the earlier period of their national development, scarcely recognized any relation between moral and religious life. It is true that there existed a vague and misty belief that wrong-doers were visited with retribution after death; but it was not a doctrine which prevailed among the ordinary man. Even in the popular mind the exceptional transgressors like Tantalus and Ixion, whose offences culminated in the arrogance of their attempts to share the blessings of the immortals. Each god had his appointed sphere (see Eur. Bacch. 302; Headlam on Eurh. Ag. 1067) within which he exercised control; and, though Zeus was supreme over all, even he was subject to the admittance decrees of destiny (Esch. Prom. 555 ff.). The gods were jealous to avenge any infringement of their privileges. But the sinner was punished not as a moral offender, but as a trespasser—and often as an ignoble trespasser—against a visible and actual power. Apart from special circumstances, the general attitude towards the conception of a future life, as may be gathered from the well-known utterance of Achilles, was one of contemptuous indifference: 'Sooner would I be a sea of time poor man who rules over all the sea of the lipless, than over all the spirits of the dead' (Od. xi. 489 ff.). So little concerned was the Greek to extend his vision to the farther side of the grave.

No less unsubstantial was the belief that wickedness is punished in this life. Such a conception is so notoriously contradicted by the facts of daily experience, that the believer in Divine justice is obliged, as we have already seen, to suppose that punishment is sometimes reserved for another generation, and the scoffer is convinced that the gods do not regard the affairs of man. The fact that the investment of the gods with moral attributes was an attempt to reconcile tradition with the needs of an awakening conscience. The primitive gods were not moral agents; they were vindictive and inscrutable potencies, to be conciliated and appeased, if need arose, but hardly to be severely venerated as the unwavering champions of righteousness. The natural result was not to stimulate a desire of improvement or a passion for righteousness, but to quell the promptings of Hope as a principle of hidden regions. This consideration will serve to explain the presence of Hope as one of the evils in Pandora's box (Hes. Op. 96), and the disparaging language applied to Hope in very many passages of Greek literature.

Thus Theogonis (257) puts Hope on a level with Danger, and calls them both ' cruel demons.' Euripides condemned the untrustworthiness of Hope (Suppl. 470), which excites the passions of rivalry and brings one State into conflict with another. And Pindar (Nem. xi. 40) speaks of the limbs of man as fettered by importunate Hope, while the streams of foresight are far distant. (Many other Illustrations are given by L. Schmidt, l. c. 78 ff.; see also Headlam, Cambridge Protections, p. 155.)

The power of hope depends upon the uncertainty of the future. It expresses the efforts of man to escape from his destiny, and points at once to his rashness and to his weakness. It is an invitation to man to step beyond his proper limits, to disregard the rule of temperance, and to seek to be a god. But true wisdom will recognize human impotence, and will counsel resignation to a lot which is inevitable. Hence, to acquiesce in destiny (προσφέρειν μορφαιον), as a mortal to aim at nothing (και το λογαριασμον γενομενον και τον χορφειν 'ακοικιαν ευθυχον) are inculcated again and again. The joyful aspect of Greek religion was embodied in its cults. But the recurring cycle of the city festivals and the greater splendor of the religious gatherings hardly touch the sphere of morality.
In relation to the individual, religious contemplation was pervaded by a spirit of melancholy which may be traced without difficulty from Homer to the latest period. (See S. A. Butcher, Some Aspects of the Greek Genius, London, 1893, pp. 142-176.)

If this was the general effect of religion upon the primitive mind, it is not difficult to find a plentiful crop of evils issuing from the superstitions of the vulgar. Here the old savage beliefs in magic and demons still flourished vigorously, and the superstitions were the victims not only of their own fears, but of all kinds of mendacity imposed upon them by others. The portrait of the superstitious man, as delineated by Theophrastus (Characters, 162, ed. Jebb, 1870), will furnish copious illustration. But in Greece, as elsewhere, superstition only ministered to fear; and, when Greek civilization awakened to a consciousness of its inner development, when the animistic conceptions of their forefathers ceased to satisfy the men of the historic era, and when the creative play of the imagination had hardened the outlines and determined the personalities of the anthropomorphic gods, the religious instinct—craving for something which would rescue man from the futility of life by the terror of an invisible, and assist him in his unceasing struggle towards the light—eagerly welcomed the professions of a purer creed which seemed to promise relief. Such, at least in certain of their aspects, were the tenets of Orphism. Orphism aimed at a purity of thought and act higher than the common standard, and, in order to stimulate the enthusiasm of its adherents, required of them a general asceticism of life, and, in particular, the wearing of white garments, the observance of certain tabus, and abstinence from a flesh diet. Curiously enough, this vegetableism was combined with an initiatory ceremony in honour of Dionysus Zagreus—intended to effect an identification with the Divine nature—at which raw flesh was consumed by the novice (Evfr. fr. 472, 9ff.). The leading notion of the Orphic creed, which cannot now be separated from that of the Pythagorean, was to cleanse the soul from the original sin contracted by its earthly imprisonment in the body. With their consciousness of sin and their systematic attempt to restore the soul to its former purity by the mortification of the body, the Orphics united a belief in metamorphosis and in the purgatorial office of the under world. (The best account of Orphism is in Comper, l. c., 223ff.)

We may say the claims of morality were recognized in the Mysteries (q.v.) of Eleusis. Although we are imperfectly informed as to the details of these ceremonies, there is ample evidence to attest their influence on the religious emotions, and especially the promise offered to their votaries of happiness in the world to come (Soph. fr. 753; Pind. fr. 137). Yet, when every allowance has been made for the influence exercised by mysticism upon Greek society, its diffusion was too partial to leave the character of the community. In the Hippolytus of Euripides, Thessalus appears to adopt the standpoint of the ordinary citizen who inveighs against the Orphics as satisfied and pretentious hypocrites who veiled a vicious disposition beneath a savour exterior (392 ff.). The Eleusins, doubtless, were much less the rallying point of a sect; initiation seems to have been the normal proceeding of an Athenian gentleman; and the privilege was so highly prized that .Hylas and Alectriades had to meet a storm of popular indigation to obtain admission as initiates. Nevertheless, an occasional festival, however venerable and soul-stirring, was necessarily lacking in sustained influence: the celebrants might, indeed, be moved by a transient enthusiasm, but were scarcely conscious of a new direction given to the current of their lives.

6. Beginnings of ethical inquiry. The appearance of ethics was due, not only to the Sophistic movement, and especially to the commanding personality of Socrates (q.v.), but also, to the philosopher's adoption by the Greeks of a moral code rather than custom. Even the moral teaching of Heraclitus (q.v.) and Democritus (q.v.), so far as our records go, consisted of statements and pronouncements, excelling perhaps in subtlety and penetration, but hardly differing in the form of their presentation from the dogmatic utterances of the Seven Sages.

There are several noteworthy sayings among the fragments of Heraclitus, such as "Character is a god to every man" (fr. 119), or "Insolence must be quenched sooner than a configuration" (fr. 43). When he affirms that opinion is "the failing sickness," and that the power of sight is deceitful (fr. 46), we may trace the working of his central doctrine concerning the supremacy of logos.

Much greater in bulk is the amount of sententious moralizing connected with the name of Democritus. We may select the following as the most conclusive specimens:

"Peace of soul (pityia) comes from moderation (mesoptraia) in pleasure and in pain, from the knowledge that righteousness is a mind content and unminded; but the end of unrighteousness is the fear of impending calamity" (fr. 215).

"The test of a man is a man; and similar is the determination of man, found in the results of physical speculations, but they do not profess to rest upon an assured basis of ethical science, and derive such additional weight as may accrue to their intrinsic importance from the personal authority of the teacher who was responsible for them.

The fact is that a moral system could not satisfactorily be constructed unless there had been some accumulated experience of the vagueness and inconsistency of the common moral opinions of mankind; and, when this was done, the moral counsels of every philosopher, however supreme his contempt for the common herd, inevitably shared these defects" (H. Sidgwick in Eths, viii. 579ff.)

Towards the middle of the 5th cent. B.C., the ontological inquiries of the early thinkers had issued in such conflict of opinion that further progress on the lines hitherto followed became impossible. The failure of repeated attempts to read the secret of the universe led to a fever of scepticism which left no shreds of tradition untouched. Nor was it surprising that the failure of the philosophers should spread to the region of morality, and undermine the established rules prescribed by authority. The struggle between the opposing forces was concentrated in the intellectual life of Greece, and in the region of Nature and Convention, where the ambiguity of the term 'Nature' helped to confuse the issue. The advocates of free thought rebelled against settled customs as artificial restraints imposed upon natural freedom.

"Convention," says Hippon in Plut. Prof. 337 D, "is the tyrant of mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are against nature," Archelaus, the pupil of Anaxagoras, declared that all moral distinctions were due to convention and not to nature (Degr. Lecst. ii. 10). Euripides, who was pre-eminently the poet of the new movement, is perhaps the best witness of the extent to which the revolt against customary bonds spread itself in cultivated circles. "The brute of bastardy is no name, for nature levels all" (fr. 165). We have traveled far from Pheidias in fr. 230: "I have but small praise for able birth: the good man be nature's nobleman, but the unrighteous, though his father be higher than Zeus, is naught but a churl." There is not a soul that dares assign a slave to the lord of all: in all else no honest slave is inferior to the free" (Iom, 884).

Sentiments like these appeal to the universal sympathy which is always ready to take the part of the weak. But Nature could be invoked to serve another turn. Callicles in the Gorgias argued that Nature is on the side of the strong, that Might is Right, that the strong man is the best ruler, and that the fetters of Convention and make himself supreme over the weak (452 E ff.). Laws which proclaim the equality of rights are framed in the interest of the weak, to protect them against the
encroachments of the strong. In a similar spirit Thrasymachus in the Republic (388 C E) says that Justice is the advantage of the stronger, and that only the fool willingly obeys the law, since the wise man knows that he may disregard it if he can. The prominence of the word Protagoras' in Plato's dialogue, and the prejudice attaching to Protagoras' profession of his ability to make the weaker cause appear the stronger (Arist. Rhet. ii. 24. 1428, 23), have earned for the Sophists as a class a name which they do not deserve, (see Grote's Hist. of Greece, 1869, ch. lvii.); and H. Sidgwick in JPh iv. (1872) 288). But, apart from this, they naturally attracted the unpopularity which is the usual portion of innovators. The effect of Sophistic teaching upon the average mind may be gauged by a quotation from the anonymous work known as Διαλεκτίς (ii. 18 [Diels, Vorschr. p. 639, 24]):

'Think that if one were to bid all men collect in a heap the several customs which they consider base, and then to withdraw from it those which they hold to be good, nothing would be left, but all would be completely distributed.'

7. Socrates.—It was in such a crisis that Socrates came forward as the founder of Greek ethics. Stung by the very thought, hiserry of men were due to a failure to comprehend the extent of their ignorance, and that his own claim to instruct others was founded not on any greater knowledge, but the belief on the part of himself of any pretensions to know anything at all (Plat. Apol. 23 A), he represented himself as eager to examine, in company with his fellow-learners, the possibility of arriving at knowledge which should have a practical result in conduct. But that, for the time at any rate, the opportunity of making further progress in physical science was excluded by the failure of previous investigators to agree upon a common result in conduct. Holding that, for the time at any rate, the opportunity of making further progress in physical science was excluded by the failure of previous investigators to agree upon a common result in conduct. Holding that, for the time at any rate, the opportunity of making further progress in physical science was excluded by the failure of previous investigators to agree upon a common result in conduct.

8. Knowledge and virtue.—Critics, both ancient and modern, have not failed to remark upon the extraordinary influence which attached to Protagoras' argument in accounting for the will in the Sophistic analysis of moral action; and it has been suggested that Socrates himself exercised so complete a control over his own impulses that he was led to ignore the important results which flowed from the failure of will-power in others. There may be some measure of truth in this, but it is far more important to observe that the Greeks never at any time succeeded in drawing a clear line between the intellectual and the moral qualities, and that the notion of morality was always rather a concern of the head than of the heart.

...Eucharis described insensate folly as causing the sin of Lais (Theb. 769); Hermes warned the Oecides not to be led by folly into disobedience to the will of Zeus (Prom. 1113); and Iphicles was the name cause of the bloodshed at Troy (Ag. 1456). So in Soph. Ant. 609, 'Wisdom, more than any other thing, has been destroyed by the folly of speech and freeness of the mind. These examples, taken almost at random, might be multiplied indefinitely; but the tendency is summarized in a fragment of Sophocles (859), 'Folly is most nearly akin to depravity.' It has left its mark on the vocabulary not merely in the moral connotation of such words as ἀθρός, σκαλις, and ἠλθέων, but in the more general use of ἀθρόφορος, ἀθρόμορφος, and the rest. It must also be remembered that ἀθρός itself was not entirely a moral quality like our 'virtue,' but included the other gifts and capacities which sustain and enrich life (see also Gomperz, ii. 65 E).

The subsequent development of moral philosophy in Greece was so far determined by the influence of Socrates that the various schools founded by his immediate pupils all professed to continue the teaching of the master. The school of the Cynics, which afterwards followed in the current. Until Christianity set up a new ideal, Socrates continued to be the pattern of moral perfection to the pagan world (M. Anton. i. 10).

9. The Cynicism.—The founder of this school was Antisthenes, who is said to have attached himself to Socrates, after a life of hardship, at a later age than was usual (Plat. Soph. 291 B). In the school which he established after the death of his master, he emphasized the Socratic principle of the supreme importance of knowledge, by a searching criticism of the ideals of the average citizen. Thus he denounced the false notions which are implicit in the popular estimation of riches, honour, and power. Antisthenes even went so far as to deprecate the patriotic ideals of his fellow-citizens, by declaring that the national victories in the Persian wars were of no great account, because known by the instability of the results obtained. But his severest condemnation was reserved for pleasure. 'May I be mad sooner than glad;' (Anl. Gell. ix. 5. 3). 'If I could lay hands on Aprodite, I would shoot her' (Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. 486). The real sentiment is an illusion (ὑποθέσεως), and the wise man must cultivate complete freedom from such illusions (εὐγνώμονα). In order to reach this security he must fix his regard entirely upon the requirements of Nature, and distrust everything which is sanctioned only by convention. For this purpose he must be self-sufficient (αὐτοψυχως), and must train himself to acquire the 'Socratic strength,' the complete self-control which springs from the wisdom of a master mind. The Cynic chose Heracles as his patron saint (Zeller, p. 306, n. 4), glorifying his labours as victories won against cruelty and lust: and loved to contrast him with his predecessors, who had brutalized mankind with the delusive promise of an injurious civilization (Gomperz, ii. 145, 161). It soon became evident that the requirements of a life 'according to Nature' were incompatible with the habits of ordinary society. The Cynic deliberately adopted the life of a beggar. He wore his beard long and unshorn, dressed himself in a rough coarse cloak, and carried a wallet and a staff.

The leader in this movement of practical asceticism was Diogenes of Sinope, who ultimately settled at Corinth, and to whose name a number of witty sayings were attached by later writers. Cynicism
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has been termed the philosophy of the Greek proletariat, and, by mixing with the masses and striving to instil their minds with saving knowledge, the Cynics passed on to us the teachings of early Middle Ages. The power of the movement is shown by the fact that it lasted until at least A.D. 400. Diogenes scornfully adopted as a title of honour the word 'Cynic', who had been applied to him in contempt. His life was directed especially to prove that the ordinary standards of value are based upon illusion. What the many esteem as goods are impediments to the attainment of happiness. Only when a man has learnt that sickness, death, and dishonour cannot impair his peace of mind is he able to grasp the absolute indifference (άδιάφορα) of external goods. But the Cynics were not content to be philosophical anarchists. Their writings advocated a new Utopia founded upon the abolition of all privileges, political and social, and of all distinctions between one nation and another, even of that which to the Greek was fundamental—the distinction between Greeks and barbarians. Diogenes proclaimed himself a citizen of the world. The extremes to which they were prepared to go in combating the prejudices of society—as they defended poverty, idleness, and cannibalism as natural—are responsible for the degradation of the word 'cynic' in modern usage. But the social communism which led Diogenes to advocate a community of wives and children was no more reprehensible in him than in Plato; and the spirit of the paradoxes by which he startled his hearers was no doubt often misunderstood and misrepresented.

An excellent estimate of the strength and weakness of Cynicism is given by Gomperz, ii. 100 ff.; see also art. CYNICS.

10. The Megarians (q.v.), a school founded by Eudemus, are chiefly important to the student of philosophy as the earliest of the Sceptics, who from this time forward, under various leaders, attacked the conclusions of the dogmatic schools; but as to their views in the department of Ethics we hardly any information. All that can be said is, that Eudemus, starting from the Socratic position that the good is the highest object of knowledge, proceeded to identify it with the Eleatic Being, and to declare that Good is a Unity, whereas of God, Mind, and Prudence are but different names. Further, since Good comprehends all existence, Evil, the opposite of good, is non-existent (Diog. Laert. ii. 106). In his attempt to unite Eleaticism with Socraticism, Eudemus reminds us of a modern writer who sought to blend his master's teaching elements derived from Heraclitus and Pythagoras.

11. The Cyrenaics.—Aristippus of Cyrene was the earliest apostle of hedonism. From the Socratic identification of the good with the useful, and his limitation of knowledge to the discovery of the proper end of action, Aristippus deduced that every virtuous action aims at pleasure. The analogy of the irrational impulses of children and animals, who continually strive after pleasure or seek to avoid pain, pointed to this process as a fundamental condition in the operation of Nature. Further, he held that all knowledge is relative to the subject, since we have no knowledge of things in themselves, but only so far as they affect our feelings. Consequently, we can only aim at producing what is gratifying to ourselves. He defined pleasure as a gentle movement, distinguishing it from pain on the one hand, and absence of pain on the other. The pleasure to be pursued is not to be aimed at, as most men say, but the sum of all pleasures, activities, although happiness might be the particular, but rather in the particular pleasure of the present moment (μυπήγωνον ἔννοιαν). The past and the future are alike indifferent; only the present is ours to enjoy. Since every pleasure, qua pleasure, is good, there is no difference between them; and there is no such thing as a disgraceful pleasure, pleasure being by definition an end approved by the will of man, and the consequence of the actions of man. Wisdom, in short, is required as a means to an end—the selection of the greatest good; for, though external circumstances press too hardly to permit the enjoyment of unbroken pleasure, he will live a life of pleasure, if he be fitted to the mean be passed in pleasure, that of the fool in pain (Diog. Laert. ii. 91).

The anecdotes which are related concerning the life of Aristippus, his alternate subservience and indifference to Dionysius the tyrant, his enjoyment of and contempt for wealth, and the importance which he ascribed to intellectual freedom and self-control (Zeller, 852 f.), illustrate the ideal of cautious cheerfulness and moderation to which he aspired. 'I endeavour,' says Horace, speaking in the person of Aristippus, 'to make things submit to my control, not to submit myself to them' (Epist. i. 32). No form of conduct, situation, or occupation, was so alien to his lofty aims, as yet equal to every present need (Epist. i. 17, 25; cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 66). The wealth of the Cynic was a means to an end, not an end in itself; and, as an end, was as much to be shunned as to be possessed (Diog. Laert. ii. 75), referred primarily to his connexion of the idea of a life that is fitted to the mean with the general attitude of Aristippus towards the emotions.

It is worth while to mention that one of the developments of Cyrenaic ethics took the direction of Pessimism. The impossibility for the great majority of mankind of attaining pleasure, and the consequent worthlessness of life, were most strongly asserted by Hegesias, who earned his title 'advocate of death' by his treatise on suicide (Diog. Laert. ii. 86). He argued that the best thing to which we can attain is freedom from pain, and that this is most fully realized by death (ib. 94; cf. also art. CYRENAICS).

12. Plato.—Of all the pupils of Socrates, Plato (q.v.) was the most fully endowed with his master's spirit, and must be accounted the true heir of the succession to his doctrine. By way of contrast with Plato, the philosophers previously discussed have been called the imperfect Socrates. The influence of Plato upon subsequent generations has been extraordinary (Gic. Tusc. i. 79; ad Att. iv. 16.3), but has been due at least as much to the charm of his surpassing literary genius as to the characteristic of his philosophical speculations. Plato's philosophical views were presented in a series of dialogues, in which the professed object of investigation often appears not to have been attained, and other ends, which his master had purposely introduced incidentally, only to be dismissed unsolved. The coherence and development of his system have in consequence given rise to protracted discussion. Fortunately, however, these difficulties are less urgent in the sphere of ethics than in that of ontology. Plato started from the Socratic position that virtue must be acquired through knowledge; but, in the investigation of the conditions upon which the acquisition of knowledge depends, he passed far beyond the Socratic limits. He derived from previous philosophers the conviction that sense-perception of the phenomenal world is thoroughly fallacious, and the apprehension of actual existence, Socrates, leaving all such difficulties on one side, had contented himself with affirming that whatever knowledge we have, the general conception underlying individual instances, which we do not wish to express by definition; but Plato made the general conception a Reality, something existing in and for itself, at once comprehending and transcending the particular instances we know our senses. Further, he was able to identify existence with good, on the ground that each thing exists only so far as it performs its par-
ticular good. True knowledge can proceed only from contact with the supreme entities (δεῖα; or "categorical" judgments) with the world of appearances comes into being or seems to be.

To bridge the gap between apparent and real existence is the lifelong task of the philosopher; and this in no small degree is the true virtue of the philosopher (Phaedo, 82 B; Meno, 100 A). The former may be accomplished by the successful statesman through habituation or by some Divine dispensation (δόξα), but the latter can be reached only by the arduous path of inquiry into the true nature of absolute virtue. The effect of this rejection of the sensible world as the field for knowledge was to drive the philosopher to the contemplation of the immaterial ideas. He must turn aside from the phenomenal and seek refuge in the Divine; his whole life must be a preparation for death, a purification of his soul from the delusions that are mingled with the body (Phaedo, 64f). This element of mysticism seems to have been derived from Pythagorean sources, just as the ascetic attitude towards phenomena was suggested by the conclusions of Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Xenophanes.

An important part of Plato's ethics can be understood only in connexion with his psychology. As the soul existed before, and will continue to exist after, its period of incarnation in the body, it must contain within it an element akin to the eternal essence of the ideas, at the head of which is placed the idea of the Good (Rep. 611 B, with Adam's discussion, i. 170). On the other hand, it is clearly accessible to earthly influences, and its deterioration must be attributed to the growth of those tendencies which depress its higher aspirations and strengthen its material bonds (Rep. 611). From these conditions Plato deduced his doctrine of the tripartite soul. The part which is akin to real existence is known as the ruling part, and as informed with reason (γνώμονας, λογιστικός); opposite to it are the two parts which are the seats of the emotions, the one of the nobler promptings of anger (θυμωνίας), and the other of the lower cravings of sensual desire (πεποθωμονίας). How Plato was able to reconcile this triple division without a question of a questionable division which need not be discussed here. The exposition of the character of virtue rests upon his psychology. Each part of the soul has its own appropriate excellence, or virtue, and, according to their various dispositions, men tend to excel in this or that direction. In this way Plato arrived at his doctrine of the four cardinal virtues. As Wisdom corresponds to the rational (λογιστικόν) part, so does Courage to the spiritual (θυμικόν), and Temperance to the appetitive (έπιθυμωνίας). But the exercise of the moderating power of reason over the other two parts, compelling them to subordinate themselves to its guidance, is assigned to the fourth virtue, Justice (δικαιοσύνη). It should be observed that Plato is here using Justice in the wider sense, which common opinion warranted (Adam on Rep. 331 E), of general righteousness in relation to which part of man to his neighbour, which was immediately limited by the requirements of particular values. But Plato would hardly have given to it such a prominent place in the analysis of the individual soul, if it were not with the same view that the welfare of the soul was conceived as analogous to the mutual relations of the three classes in the ideal community; and civic justice was the fulfilment by each separate class of its duty to observe the limits prescribed to its activities.

The Highest Good must be found in the complete development of the soul in its proper function of communion with objects of thought. He has already said that a soul is esteemed happy either in this phase of existence or after death. It is obvious that Plato had moved far from the simple utilitarianism of Socrates. But it is extremely difficult to define Plato's attitude towards the idea of happiness, which is variously expressed in different dialogues. Whereas in the Protagoras (351 A) he seems to identify Pleasure and Good, in the Gorgias (497 A) and the Republic (509 B) he declares that the two are entirely distinct. Finally, in the Philolaus, although he denies that Pleasure is the Chief Good, and asserts that in the scale of goods Intelligence and Reason stand far above Pleasure, nevertheless it is admitted that a life without pleasure (or pain) is not to be chosen (21 D, 63 E), and the pure and harmless pleasures of the senses are allowed to possess a certain degree of value (66 C).

15. Aristotle — The doctrine of Aristotle (q.c.) should be regarded as the complement of Platonic speculation. Their differences are less important than the particulars in which they agree, although the former are made the more prominent by the difference of method and style. Aristotle formulates and defines conclusions which are implicit in Plato's writings, and, by correcting the relative values to be assigned to certain views which occupy a part of the common field of investigation, he appears to be more in opposition than he really is. Thus, in his treatment of the Socratic ground-work, Aristotle definitely draws the distinction between speculative and practical wisdom (επιστήμη and σοφία) towards which Plato was working in contrasting civil with philosophic virtue. But, whereas Plato employed all the energy at his command in urging the paramount claims of philosophy, Aristotle admitted the supremacy of the theoretic life (Eth. Nic. x. 7) as an end in itself, and as an approximation to the Divine through the activity of reason, but concluded that the proper exercise of man is to be found in the moral virtues which belong to a practical life.

The Highest Good, or ultimate aim, of all action is to be found in Happiness (εὐτυχία), or to adopt a more accurate equivalent—in well-being. Neither pleasure nor external goods can be identified with Happiness, which can be attained only by rational activity. This activity properly performed is Virtue (Eth. Nic. i. 6). Happiness, however, is not to be predicated of single acts, but is commensurate with life taken as a whole, and requires a certain supply of external advantages. No one could call himself happy, if friendship, health, noble birth, and beauty are all elements which cannot be disregarded in making an estimate of complete happiness. In the same way Aristotle deals with the claims of Pleasure. While fully conscious that it cannot be weighed in the scale against virtue, and that, if it becomes necessary to make a choice between suffering and the abandonment of virtue, every hardship must be borne on behalf of the latter, he relates to natural pleasures as something indifferent or negligible. On the contrary, he maintains that it is the necessary concomitant of every activity (ib. x. 4), and that the purest and best pleasures are those arising from the use of the higher intellectual virtues. The pursuit of pleasure is natural and not to be condemned (ib. x. 2, vii. 13). Nevertheless, pleasure and external goods are valuable only
in relation to virtuous activities (§ 8, i. 8), whether intellectual (δυναμική) or moral (φύσιν).

Moral virtue is a permanent condition (§ 44) of the soul (§ 8, ii. 4), as distinguished from an emotion (πάθος) or a passion (τύμπανον). Virtue is not innate but acquired by practice, not involuntary but dependent on a definite exercise of the will. Again, a virtuous action implies a virtuous agent; unless it is preceded by a right motive, and is such that a virtuous man would perform, no action can properly be described as virtuous (§ 3, v 13).

Virtue requires the presence of certain natural qualities, i.e. we are born with a capacity for moral activity (§ 8, vi. 13). But these are not enough in themselves: otherwise children or animals might possess virtue. Virtue is impossible without insight (φιλοσοφία); but knowledge and virtue are not identical, as Socrates thought. Socrates ignored the irrational part of the soul, and the effect of emotion upon conduct. Virtue implies the free exercise of the will in controlling or yielding to impulses and is rooted in habit. The repeated performance of moral actions makes them a part of the agent—i.e. in the narrower sense as the virtue which aims at equality—is examined at length in Book v. Book vi. is devoted to the treatment of Insight (φιλοσοφία), the virtue of practical reason, which is carefully distinguished from ευγνωσία, σοφία, and the rest. This is not the place to enter into the details of the analysis, but it should be observed that Aristotle regards ethics as an abstract science than as an opportunity for recording the results of his own observation in the sphere of contemporary morality. The general principles reached by this method of induction cannot be so exactly systematized as to fit the varying circumstances of everyday life. Just as a lawyer will refuse to rely upon a broad generalization, by saying that each case must be judged on its own facts, so the philosopher should exercise the reciprocal relations of insight and moral virtue to be determined on the experienced judgment of the practical moralist.

14. The Hellenistic age. There can be no question that the period which closed with the death of Aristotle was one of marked decay in public virtue. After the disastrous issues of the Peloponnesian war, Athens was never again more than a shadow of her former self. She was still to produce eminent citizens, but the imperial spirit was broken. The venality of her politicians, and the failure of her citizens to make an adequate response to the calls of military and other public services, were continually on the increase. If we make allowance for the universal tendency to idealize the past, there was still sufficient reason for Isocrates to complain (vii. 48) of the increasing idleness and profligacy of the young men, of the workmen, and of the herdsmen. The usual tendency to esteem wit and cleverness more highly than the more solid civic virtues. Sparta, again, had failed conspicuously to realize the opportunities afforded by its political structure. Her whole system was marked by so much cruelty, stupidity, and avarice that she quickly aroused a general opposition to her ascendency, which never recovered from the shock given to her military power at Leuctra. If Thebes seemed for a season to have revived the ancient Hellenic fire, it proved to be only a temporary flash, quickly extinguished by the death of the hero Leonidas. In fact, the conditions under which the city communities had flourished were rapidly passing away. The time had come for the establishment of a wider dominion, and in the person of Philip of Macedon the destined conqueror appeared. His successor Alexander was not so much the establishment of a universal empire as the opening out of every part of the known world to the spread of Greek thought and Greek civilization. Thus, in the words of Plutarch (Mor. 329 A), he realized the dream of Zeno the Stoic, that all men should live as members of a single community, since Alexander, by mixing, as in a loving-cup, the lives and characters of all men, had required of them that they should consider the world as their native country. Henceforward the distinctive characteristics of the Greek communities were merged in a general uniformity of life; and the more practical custom at Athens was not widely different from that of Pergamum or Alexandria. The decay of civil interests led to the withdrawal of serious and intelligent attention to the more serious questions of philosophy, and so fostered the growth of the inner conscience, which is reflected in the teaching of the Stoics and Epicureans.

So far as the morality of the individual is concerned, it is difficult to make a comparison with the earlier era. But the pictures of ordinary life which are presented to us in the plays of the New Comedy—as known to us until quite recently only through the Latin adaptations of Plautus and Terence—are not of an attractive character. The society depicted is narrow and mean, and there is hardly a trace of elevated feeling or generous ambition. The tricks of a cunning slave, and the outwitting of a strait-laced father or a rashly pander were the common stock-in-trade of every dramatist. ‘Idleness, frivolity, luxury, self-indulgence, are the attributes of the society which went to see its own reflection upon the stage’ (Mahaffy, Greek Life and Thought, p. 137). The extent of the decay in public spirit which had set in since the great period of Athenian expansion may be gauged by contrasting—to take a trivial illustration—the caricature of Lamachus in the Acharnians with the military bragadocio of the New Comedy, or the speeches of Pericles in Thucydides with the servile compositions which bestowed Pindaric and Alexandrian Decorum on Demetrius Poliorcetes (Poetæ Lyrici Graeci, ed. Bergk, Leipzig, 1882, ii. 674). Even the chief ornament of Alexandrian literature, the development of the Theocritean idyll, has been referred, like the case of Boussan in the 18th cent., to a reactionary movement seeking to find relief in the freshness of Nature, from the depravity of contemporary society (see Ziegler, 142). But the importance of this evidence must not be exaggerated by omitting certain items on the other side of the account which deserve consideration. Thus, if the characteristic traits of the period showed less vigour, they had lost much of the earlier harshness. The increase of enlightenment brought with it a more widely diffused humanity. The most important sign of progress was the growing influence of philosophy upon daily life. The Sophists, who, which was sufficient for old-fashioned people at the end of the 6th cent., had ceased, after the lapse of a hundred years, to satisfy the needs of their descendants. To attend philosophical lectures, which was a fashionable passe-temps for ‘up-to-date’ people of the time of the Sophists, had become the established practice. Philosophers, instead of being prosecuted
for impiety, 1) were considered worthy of the highest honours by which the State could bestow. In the next generation we have the hononific decree in favour of Zeno the Stoic, the intimate friendship of Plato with Cleanthes, the political missions of Xenocrates to Antipater and of Crates to Demetrius.

Philosophy was no longer regarded merely as an eloquent instrument, or even as an amusement leading to knowledge. The schools of Plato and Aristotle became permanent institutions localized at the Academy and the Lyceum, and organized so as to encourage a spirit of corporate enthusiasm among their members. For the decadation of politics, as has already been mentioned, had driven those who were sufficiently serious to be dissatisfied with the frivolity of ordinary life, and were not preoccupied with mental industry or military service abroad, to take refuge in the disputations of the schools. But, in spite of the fame of their founders and the influence which they were destined to exercise over medieval and modern thought, neither the Platonists (ib. 4), reason, which originated exactly what the generation required. The lofty idealism of Plato and the minute and accurate science of Aristotle were alike unsuited to the need which existed amidst the sinster influences of a corrupt society. In other words, philosophy was expected to supply what religion was then incapable of affording. Herein lay the opportunity which the new schools of Zeno and Epicurus were not slow to seize. Both Stoics and Epicureans made practical ethics the ultimate end to which their physical and logical speculations were directed; they aspired to discover truth in order to throw open the way to happiness.

15. The Stoics.—Zeno, a native of Citium in Cyprus, who had studied under Xenocrates and Polemo the Academicians and Crates the Cynic, established a separate school at Athens in the closing years of the 4th century. Under his successors, Cleantus (q.v.) and Chrysippus (q.v.), the distinctive doctrines of the Stoics, so called from the Stoai Poikile, where Zeno had lectured, were developed and defined; and during the following centuries, through which it continued to flourish, the leaders of the school, without abandoning the dogmatic spirit, improved and secured for their rivals in accommodating their teaching to the needs and aspirations of the time. Although Zeno and his immediate successors devoted an immense amount of labour to the study of logic and physics, the supreme importance of ethics was recognized at an early date (Stoic. Vet. Frgmr., ed. von Arnim, iii. Leipzig, 1903, 68), and, as time went on, it tended more and more to be the sole subject of general interest. The ultimate end of moral action was, according to the Stoics, a life in agreement with Nature, whereby they understood a conformity with the workings of Reason as immanent both in the individual and in the universe (ib. 4). Reason, which is the Universal Law, is identified with Zeus, and happiness is attained when the individual reason is made to submit itself to the will of the Supreme Governor of the universe (ib. 18). Life in accordance with Nature is identical with a perfect life, and the perfection of anything is the same as its virtue (ib. 16). Thus virtue is the only thing which should be chosen for its own sake (ib. 39), and is by itself sufficient for happiness (ib. 54). The Good was interpreted, as by Socrates, as equivalent to advantage (ib. 75), and it was obvious that virtue alone would furnish true profit, and that vice alone could harm (ib. 75, 76). It follows that everything except virtue and vice—health, riches, fame, beauty, even life itself—is absolutely indifferent. So far Zeno is in accord with the Cynics; but he refused to draw the same inference from the premises. Things indifferent are capable of being used either well or ill, and are not all indifferent to the same extent. In other words, thing indifferent may have a certain value, positive or negative (διότι, ἀρετῶς), as contributing towards a life in accordance with Nature or as hindering its development (ib. 126). But there are certain things which have so much value that, in the absence of over-riding circums- stances, they will always be chosen in preference to their contraries. Such things are natural ability, life, riches, fame, and so forth, and they are consequently described as being preferred (προσωπεύονται), whereas their opposites are to be rejected (ἀποστροφοῦνται [ib. 31]). Such advantages, however, will weigh as nothing in the scale against virtue; and, if it becomes necessary to make a choice, we must face death sooner than be guilty of vice (ib. 168). All moral action arises from impulse (δύναμις), that is to say, the movement of the soul directed towards the acquisition of some external object. Right and wrong are determined by reason; but, where reason does not exist or is not fully developed, as in the case of children and animals, the natural impulses are primarily directed towards self-preservation, and not, as the Epicureans believed, towards pleasure (ib. 178). The objects thus sought after (τὰ πρὸς καλὸν φέουσα) serve as an introduction to the subsequent action of wisdom, which is exercised in the separation of the natural from the irrational and the rational selection of the former (ib. 186, 190).

The impulses given by Nature are directed to the right objects, but the reason may be distracted by the seductions of pleasure or the urgency of associates (ib. 228). Nevertheless, virtue can be taught, as experience proves (ib. 223). The Socratic view that Virtue is Knowledge is still maintained; but the Stoics, who held that nothing but body existed, were obliged to argue that the virtues also were corporeal, being, in fact, a particular disposition of the soul itself (ib. 305). Virtue is thus both one and many—one in so far as it is something; both for all and in relation to the sphere of its activities. Thus Insight is the knowledge of what to do and what not to do, Temperance the knowledge of what to choose and what to avoid, Justice is that knowledge which gives every man his due, and Courage that which can distinguish the proper objects of fear (ib. 292). The virtues are reciprocally connected with each other, and he who has one necessarily possesses all; nor can he act in the exercise of a single virtue without at the same time employing the others (ib. 299). Virtue, being based upon secure convictions, was so completely identified with a man's moral nature that some of the Stoics identified themselves with it (ib. 237). The ordinary man (φύσις), however, fails to exercise his reason properly. He is the slave of emotion (φρονησία), which may be desired more than anything else (ib. 379); or again as perverted judgment (ib. 456). The Stoics spent much labour in distinguishing the varieties of emotion, grouping them round the four chief classes of instrumental feeling: two of which, Pleasure and Pain, are concerned with the present, and the others, Desire and Fear, with the future (ib. 391). It will be seen that emotion is a disordered condition of the reason itself; we have no longer, as in Plato

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1) The last echoes of the older thunder were the decrees for the expulsion of persons of foreign birth from Athens of 316, which was re-
and Aristotle, to think of two rival powers striving for the mastery, but rather of a revolt against the rightful authority. It follows that emotion must be absolutely suppressed, since everything that is contrary to right reason is sinful (ib. 445, 446).

The Stoics drew up a classification of actions so as to correspond with the distinction between Virtue as the Absolute Good and things indiferent but yet valuable. Proceeding from this, the two kinds of virtue are Right Actions (καθόπωςdaemon), vicious actions are Sins (ἀμαρτίας). These classes comprise every act of the wise man on the one hand, and of the fool on the other. Hence the paradox that all sins are equal; for no difference in degree is conceivable (ib. 527, 528). But, if we look not at the agent, but at the act in relation to its object, we must distinguish between the fit and the unfit, capable (κάθεν) and its opposite. A perfectly fitting action (τρεῖον καθόπως), such as to act justly, may be identified with Right Action. Otherwise, fitting actions are such as may be justified on grounds of probability (διὰ προχρήσεως καθλοκοτίνακα). In ethics, we must take care of one's health (ib. 134 f.).

The actual embodiment of the Stoic conception of Virtue is to be seen in their picture of the Wise Man. The virtues of the wise man never make a mistake, never opinie, never changes his mind. He is an expert on every subject, being endowed with every excellence. His body may be in pain, but he never suffers; though he were as unfortunate as Priam, he would still be happy. None but the wise can lay claim to riches, beauty, or freedom; for no one has possessions so valuable, no one is so deserving of love as the wise. The wise man is the only true prophet, priest, and king. True friendship can exist only between the wise, for they alone can benefit each other: 'If a single wise man anywhere extends his finger with a wise purpose, all the wise men in the world are benefited' (ib. 627). The wise man bears no trace of softness; he is unmoved by passion; he never pardons, never pityes, and is never surprised. It is not to be wondered at that this doctrine involved the Stoics in controversial difficulties, or that Chrysippus was forced to admit that the wise man was a rarer portent than the phohnix (see E. D. u. E. Weisse Stoicorum, Cambridge, 1911, p. 298, and cf. art. STOICISM).

16. Epicurus.—The school of Epicurus (see art. EPICUREANS), first established at Mytilene and subsequently removed to Lampaeus, was transferred to Athens in 306. The system was in all essentials the work of the founder, and was faithfully guarded by his successors, remaining practically unchanged so long as the school continued to exist. Epicurus asserted emphatically that the object of all philosophical inquiry is the attainment of happiness by the individual, and that knowledge or virtue has any worth in itself. Thus, his exposition of the true nature of the good, as absolutely indifferent to human affairs, was intended to remove superstitious fears, which are among the most serious obstacles to human happiness. Similarly, by his inquiry into the essence of pain it is shown that it can neither be immortal, he hoped to destroy entirely the fear of death. He laid the groundwork of his ethics by a psychological examination of the whole mind. The highest grade of pleasure is attained when every painful need is removed, and every natural craving stilled. The condition thus attained is one of complete rest (καταστάσις ἐκ σκέψεως), and must be contrasted with the pleasure which consists in the satisfaction of a want (ἀποκορούν ἐν κινήτου). The latter is necessarily mingled with discomfort, unless it is merely connected with a variation (πατελομίδος) of the highest good. Wants were accordingly classified as (1) natural and necessary, (2) natural and not necessary, (3) neither natural nor necessary. The second class was not subject to the incalculable pleasure, passion, except when men are misled by a false opinion that the highest good is capable of increase. The third class are products of the imagination, and must be totally rejected (fr. 490-493 [Usener]).

Epicurus differed from the Cyrenaics in three respects: (1) he declared freedom from pain, which the Cyrenaics did not count as a pleasure at all, to be the greatest of all pleasures; (2) he declared that all pleasures of the mind are ultimately referable to and derived from bodily pleasures, whereas the Cyrenaics held that the pleasure of intercourse with friends or the gratification arising from honour is independent of sensation; (3) pleasures of the mind refer to the past and future as well as to the present, and, as being more durable, are greater than immediate bodily pleasures. Moreover, these principles are those of undiluted hedonism. Experience shows that pleasure and pain are the only motives which control our actions. The attainment of happiness is the object of our actions, and the natural criteria by which the value of our impulses and activities is measured. Reason is a later accession, which does not alter the ultimate aim, but points out the means of attaining it.

Reason teaches us to look not to immediate enjoyment, but to the remoter consequences of our actions. Every pleasure is a good in itself, as being suitable to our nature (αἰτιοῦτον), but it is not every pleasure that is an object of pursuit (ἀπολογεῖσθαι). Conversely, certain pains are comparatively so important that we must accept them, if on the balance of the account they appear to bring with them a larger amount of pleasure.

The value of the virtues is to be found in the fact that without them we cannot reach the highest good—absence of all pain and of every fear of future disturbance. Insight (προφησία) is the root of all the other virtues: it sets us free from false opinion, and puts before us the true goal of our endeavour. Self-control (ἐγκρατεία) imparts the necessary resolution to adhere to the decisions of the judge. Lastly, we reach peace by mastering the cause of pleasure and as little pain as are possible for us; and courage prevents our peace of mind from being destroyed; by fear of death, superstition, or pain. Lastly, the violation of justice is incompatible with an agreeable life. For the unjust man, even though his misdeeds are concealed, is continually anxious lest they should be discovered. On the other hand, upright conduct contributes to our enjoyment, by earning the good-will and affection of our fellow-men. On the value of friendship the Epicureans laid great stress: it was grounded ultimately upon mutual advantage, but the happiness of the individual was conceived to reach its highest pitch in the unsullied enjoyment of the wise and virtuous (fr. 544). In other respects, Epicurus assigned very little value to the conditions of civil society. Laws would not be needed, for human nature was such as to make every voluntary action sufficient to protect the wise from injustice (fr. 536). He recommended abstinence from politics on the ground that public life interferes with happiness (ὑπάρχου ἐπιστῆμα). Lastly, he deprecated arranged marriage as likely to lead to much trouble (fr. 525). The result of Epicurean hedonism is not far removed from the Stoic ideal: the happiness of the Epicurean wise man is no less founded on the secure possession of insight, and is so entirely independent of external circumstances that it
endures while its possessor is suffering physical torture. (Ir. 9.)

17. The Greco-Roman age.—In the sketch that has already been given of Stoic ethics, little or nothing has been said of the adaptation of Stoic principles to the needs of daily life. But the influence and vitality of the philosophy, as we have seen, was nothing more clearly than by their success in procuring the adhesion of the system of so large an element of Roman society (for the details, see E. V. Arnold, _Stoics_, 2 vols., 1889, p. 170), and were shown by the modifications made by Panaitius. Stoicism, as it was opened out to the practical Romans, became less a subject of study for the curious than a religious creed to which every serious man might look for support. Its success in this direction was undoubtedly promoted by the attitude which had been adopted towards the popular religion. By an elaborate series of allegorical explanations the Stoics sought to accommodate their pantheistical belief in the universal immanence of the Divine Reason to the existence of the separate personalities represented in popular theology. Hecules was fire, Rhea earth, Zeus father, and so forth. Thus, as a benevolent and all-powerful god, and to an advantage gained which neither the agnosticism of the New Academy nor the outspoken hostility of Epicurus to the orthodox religion was able to provoke. The history of the Stoas after Panaitius shows a continually diminishing sympathy in philosophy and an increasing strength in moral exhortation. Seneca (q.v.), for instance, laid much stress on the healing powers of philosophy for all who were mentally sick. He prescribed rules for those who were in various stages of progress (προςωπὴ) towards wisdom; for the removal of vicious habits; for the training of the impulses; for the mastery of the passions: and for the strengthening of the will. The restraint of civil liberty under the Empire imparted a gloomy tone to the discourse of the philosophic preacher. The doctrine of 'a reasonable departure' (εκφορος ξεγεργή) — by which the earlier Stoics had contemned suicide as an escape from intolerable evils, thereby emphasizing the moral indifference of life and death — was repeated by Seneca with morbid insistence. Musonius and Epictetus admit into their writings even less philosophical discussion than Seneca. Epictetus (q.v.) in particular was the preacher of a pure and gentle morality which often approximates to Christian doctrine. His famous maxim, 'Suffer and be saved,' shows the extent of his belief in the benevolent Providence; and he never fails to recommend the duty of submission to outward events which are not within our power. The same spirit of pious resignation appears in Marcus Aurelius (q.v.), the last of the Stoics; the proud independence of the sage had given way before the human sense of helplessness; the soul was hampered by the prison-house of the body, and found life to be a sojourn in a strange land. Thus in its last moments Stoicism came near to Platonism.

Of the four post-Aristotelian schools, neither the Epicurean nor the Poropatetic made any progress, of sufficient importance to be recorded here, beyond the views of their founders. But the Academy had a more chequered history, to which we must briefly refer. The New Academy under Aracitas and Carneades was preceded by its determined scepticism from admitting the possibility of scientific ethics; but on the basis of probability they gave a general adherence to Platonie teaching. Later, Antiochus of Ascalon, Cicero's teacher, endeavoured to effect a reconciliation of the doctrines of Epicurus and those of Stoicism, but his influence soon exhausted itself. In the 1st cent. B.C. there was a notable emergence of mystical asceticism, associated with a revival of Pythagoreanism. Its general tendency was to reduce the purity of soul attained by a special restriction of the bodily appetites to the only proper channel whereby the devotee could acquire a knowledge of the Divine mysteries (see Mahaffy, Greek World under Roman sway, London, 1890, p. 174). A revival of the doctrines of Pythagoras, Platonism, and the traces of its working may be found in the moral treatises of Plutarck (q.v.). According to him, the structure of morality is built upon the foundation of the religious. Virtue is identified with the assimilation to the latter and the Highest Good is the knowledge of God (Aristit. 6). Thus its attitude towards religion was conservative; he defended divination, maintained the doctrine of metempsychosis, and believed in the power of demons and spirits to control human action by their interference. To avoid the defilements of sense, and to cultivate the reason as the indwelling source of Divine inspiration, were the supreme duties of man (see de gen. Soc. 20, p. 388 E. E.). But the culmination of this mystical tendency was realized in Neo-Platonism (q.v.); and Plotinus, who was its chief representative, has been acclaimed justly regarding the last, last of the Antiquity. In conformity with Plato, who had denounced the untrustworthiness of sense-impression, Plotinus identified matter with evil, and made purification from the contaminations of sense, withdrawal from the body, and the retreat of the soul from its enslavement to the body, the fundamental requirements of his ethical teaching. The ordinary civil virtues are of no value, since they tend to blind the soul to the world of matter. The soul must approach God by re-absorption into the Intelligence (Sophos) from which it sprang. This process must be encouraged by contemplation and the love of the Beautiful (the Platonie Eros) helps to direct us from the impressions of sense to the ideal world. Constant association with the ideas may lead ultimately to the condition of supreme bliss, when the soul in a moment of ecstasy finds itself by contact with the Divine Unity identified with God Himself.

LITERATURE.—Several of the authorities have been mentioned incidentally, but the chief sources of information are the History of Greek Philosophy, and more particularly E. Zeller, _Phila. d. Griechen_ in ihrer geschichtl. Entwicklung, Leipzig, 1892 (the greater part has been translated into English by various writers in the 3rd German and 4th English editions, Griech. Denker, Leipzig, 1905-8 (three vols. of an Eng. tr. have appeared, London, 1905 E. R.)); W. Windelband, Gesch. der alten Griechen, 3 vols. (translated into French), Leipzig, 1892-97; J. Denkel, 'Die Ethik und die Überlieferungstheorie in der 1810 Jahre des griech. Alterthums,' Tübingen, 1857; Th. Ziegler, Ethik der Griechen und Römer, 2 vols., Bonn, 1886; cf. also L. R. Farnell, _Greece and Babylon_, Edinburgh, 1912.

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ETHICS AND MORALITY (Hindu).—Hindu ethics is deeply tinged with the belief in transmigration or rebirth according to the doctrine of karma ('action') under which every act, whether good or bad, finds its reward, not only in heaven or hell, but in innumerable other bodies, from a god to an insect or plant, or even a stone. The same gradation of rebirths which pervades the whole creation prevails in the more limited circle of human life, from the high-born Brahman to the low-grovelling Caste. The belief, therefore, that the body is an ephemeral form of ours rather than depend on the various shades of merit and demerit acquired in a previous existence. The hymns of the Vedas, it is true, contain no distinct allusion to metempsychosis; they abound in glowing descriptions of the delights of paradise and the torments of hell. The Upanisads, on the other hand, mention, for
instance, the rebirth of virtuous men as Brāhmans or other persons of high caste, of wicked men as dogs, hogs, or Chandālas, and of those who eat rice and meat (catuskata) as animals (panchaśūla catuskata).\(^\text{[10]}\) The idea of karma, or action, and karmāvakāpāh, or ripening of acts in future births, pervades the six systems of philosophy, and the earliest lawbooks of the Dharmasūtra class. This is the highest goal of Indian philosophy to get rid of the fetters of action and consequent rebirth by overcoming the inclination to be active. The question of will, whether bound or free, does not concern these philosophers; they regard the individual soul or volition by absorption into the supreme Being, the Dharmāstras state the special duties of men, as determined by their rebirth in a particular caste, notably the Brāhman caste; and they discuss the obligations of Brāhman ascetics who, by keeping the five vows of abstinence from injury to living beings, of truthfulness, of abstinence from theft, of continence, and of liberality, by the practice of various austerities, and by concentration of mind, wish to obtain full deliverance from the bonds of karma and to reach final emancipation.

The narrow-mindedness of Brāhman moralists was objected to by Buddha and his followers. Thus Buddha is said to have been consulted by two Brāhmans as to whether a man becomes a Brāhman who orpires that the station of a Brāhman is not due to birth, but to abhorrence of the world and its pleasures. The Buddhist Dharmasūtras, a beautiful collection of precepts and moral sentiments, contains an eloquent exposition of this doctrine in all refinement, patience, contentment, mildness, sympathy, which entitle a man to be rightly called a Brāhman. In other respects, there is no essential difference between Brāhmanical and Buddhist ethics. Karma in Buddhism is the cause of the aggregation of the five skandhas, which include all mental and physical phenomena, and therefore of birth and rebirth, of the universal passage through a succession of existences (sahānīret). The middle course, which destroys the working of karma and leads to the cessation of suffering and to Wisdom and Nirvāṇa, is the Eightfold Path, consisting of right views, right thoughts, right speech, right actions, right living, right exertion, right recollection, and right meditation. The five commandments (pañcakāśāsā) of Buddhism—Kill not, Steal not, Lie not, Adulterate, Drink not—closely resemble the above mentioned five special duties enjoined on Brāhmanical ascetics. Buddha made these rules obligatory on all his followers, and added five more severe commandments for his monks—not to eat at forbidden hours; not to attend worldly amusements, such as dancing or singing; not to use wreaths, unguents, or ornaments; not to use high mats or thrones; not to acquire or receive gold or silver. The five first rules of this Decalogue (dakṣaṭāsā), though binding on all men alike, were made more stringent in the case of Buddhist monks and nuns. Thus chastity means in the case of monks and nuns absolute abstinence from sexual intercourse; in the case of laymen it means refraining from adultery. There are also secondary precepts extending beyond the rules of the dakṣaṭāsā for those who have renounced the world. This superior morality corresponds in many particulars to the rule of life prescribed for a Brāhmanical yati (ascetic), which do not differ essentially from the moral code and the notions of right and wrong current among other nations of antiquity, except perhaps in the peculiar sanctity attributed to Brāhmans and all their belongings, and to the cow, the sacred animal of the Hindus. But every sin may be atoned for his anterior births, the Jātakas, that in former births he often gave himself up as a victim to satisfy the appetites of hawks and beasts of prey; and on one occasion the Brahma, a tigress, sacrificed his own body to supply the tigress and her cubs with food. This regard for animal life comes out very clearly in the rock and pillar edifices of the Buddhist King Asoka (c. 250 B.C.), which contain ample discourses on Buddhist morality, furnishing an early and authentic record of Buddhist teaching. Reversion to parents, elders, and preceptors, truth and charity and true ceremonial, tolerance of the belief of others, kind treatment of slaves and servants, liberality to ascetics and Brāhmans, truthfulness, purity, gentleness, and saintliness are other virtues extolled in the edicts of king Asoka.

Jainism, which, unlike Buddhism, continues to flourish in India at the present day, goes even beyond Buddhism in the regard paid to animal life. The oaths not to hurt animals is exacted from the Jaina ascetic on his entrance into the Order; it demands watchfulness over all functions of the body by which anything living might be hurt, and for this purpose the Jaina ascetic must carry with him a straw to wipe his mouth after drinking water, a broom, and a veil before his mouth, in order to avoid killing insects. In his four other oaths the Jaina monk promises, like the Brāhman, fornication, abstinence, and with the same words, not to speak untruth, to appropriate nothing to himself without permission, to preserve chastity, and to practise self-sacrifice. Asceticism, both inward and outward, is made especially prominent in this religion; it embraces repentance of sin, confession of the same to the teacher (as in Buddhism), penance done for it, the study and teaching of the holy faith, pious meditations, the renunciation of all worldly possessions, temperance, begging, different kinds of self-mortification, especially by fasts which may be continued to starvation, voluntary death by withdrawal of food being regarded as a sure entrance to Nirvāṇa. The rules of the 'right way' for the Jaina laity are less severe, the oath of chastity, e.g., being replaced by that of conjugal fidelity, just as the rules for Brāhman and Buddhist laymen are less strict than those destined for the clergy. In practical life Jainism may be said to make of its laity earnest men who excel in an exceptional willingness to sacrifice anything for their religion. Coexistence of the clergy and their dependents is united against humanity and its interests, and conversions of people of low caste to the Jaina creed are not uncommon even at the present day.

Later Bṛāhmaṇism, as represented in the Code of Manu, the 'Great Epic' (Mahābhārata), and many other productions of what is called classical Sanskrit literature, reiterates the old inquisitive law of caste, and tries to enforce the claims of the priestly castes to spiritual and social superiority.

'The Hindu code as a whole is savage and antique' (Hopkins). Thus in criminal law the jatśattra is carried to an extreme degree (see CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS [Hindu]). Witnesses in a court of justice are exhorted to speak truth, with many fine sentiments extolling veracity and denouncing falsehood, yet perjury is permitted when an accused of respectable castes may be saved from death by it (see LAW AND LAWBOOKS [Hindu]). Long lists of offences of various degrees are given, which do not differ essentially from the moral code and the notions of right and wrong current among other nations of antiquity, except perhaps in the peculiar sanctity attributed to Brāhmans and all their belongings, and to the cow, the sacred animal of the Hindus. But every sin may be atoned for

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by performing a penance (see EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Hindu)); and these penances were an important source of profit to the Brahmans. Though each class has its special duties assigned to it, there are also general obligations common to all classes, such as restraint, purity, liberality, self-control, regard for animal life, obedience towards elders, visiting places of pilgrimage, sympathy, straightforwardness, and punctuality. The doctrine of ahimsa (non-injury to living beings) is, however, not so much insisted on as in the Buddhist and Jainah creeds; for a sacrifice, cattle may be killed, and the meat of such cattle may be eaten, although the doctrine of karma and of the soul's passage through all kinds of animal bodies, according to its deeds in a previous life, is fully recognized in the Code of Manu. The merit of asceticism, combined with religious meditation, is highly extolled; and the entrance into the order of religious mendicants is supposed to form a regular stage in the life of a Brahman, preceded by the stage of a hermit in the woods (vibhushanaprasada). The sacramental element is very strong in the Mahabharata also, which, like the codes, is a vast thastusaurus of Hindu ethics. Thus there is an eightfold path of religious duty, as in Buddhism, but in it the asceticists insist on the principles of truth, penance, truth, mercy, self-control, and lack of greed. The upaniṣads contain many touching pictures of domestic and social happiness: children are dutiful to their parents and submissive to their superiors; parents are fondly attached to their children, and ready to sacrifice themselves for their welfare; wives are loyal and devoted to their husbands; husbands are affectionately disposed towards their wives; love and harmony reign through the family circle (M. Williams). The didactic and sententious note prevails in the whole range of Sanskrit literature (Madonell). It is particularly strong in the old collections of fairy tales and fables, which agree in putting instructive speeches and moral sentiments into the mouths of jackals, cats, elephants, parrots, monkeys, and other animals; and it also pervades Sanskrit lyric and dramatic works, among which the Priyodbhandhachandravanga furnishes an instance of an allegorical and philosophical play which may be fitly compared to some of our old Morals. The keynote in Sanskrit moral literature is the conception of fate, but fate is declared to be nothing else than the result of action done in a former birth, so that every man can by right conduct shape his future fate himself.

Passing to modern developments, we find a general tendency on the part of religious founders such as Basava, the founder of the Lingayats, in the 12th cent., Kabir, the founder of the Kabirpanth, in the 16th, Nanak, Dādā, and Chaitanya, in the 16th, and many others, to proclaim the social equality of all those who enrolled themselves in their Order. In practice, however, this levelling doctrine, such as forbids met with only partial and temporary success. As a way of salvation, the 'way of love and faith' (bhaktimarga) has been gaining ground, though the 'way of works' (karmamarga), i.e. the practice of religious rites, austerities, penances, and sacrifices, is held to be equal, and the 'way of true knowledge' (jñanamarga) is held to be superior to it. The pūṣṭindrā, or 'way of enjoyment,' is sometimes recognized as a third way. The Purāṇas, and the important Cenuse of 1806, contain some interesting attempts to establishing the actual standard of morality in India.

The code of morality of the ordinary Hindu is much the same as that discussed under moral maxims. There is nowhere attributed to a code. He knows that it is wrong to commit murder, adultery, theft, and perjury, or to covet, and he honours his parents, in the case of the father, at any rate, to a degree ex

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ETHICS AND MORALITY (Japanese).—1. Ancient Japanese.—The Japanese nation, although through its long history has cherished several peculiar forms of morality, which, of course, must be admitted to have undergone modifications to some extent, although their essential characteristic has remained unaltered, the characteristic feature of which is the similarity of the ancient Japanese are to be found in the morality of Japan at the present day. One of them is certainly nationalism. It is recognizable in the old mythology, which, unlike that of any other land, centres in the Imperial family and the State. In the course of the creation, the Divine pair, Izanagi and Izanami (see Cosmos and Cosmology (Japanese)), first produced the country (i.e. the earth) and, after a long interval, the Sun-goddess, the Moon-god, and one other son. The first of the three was made ruler of the heaven-world; she afterwards sent her grandson to Japan, gave him a mirror, a sword, and a bell, and bade him go down to their posterity as the royal insignia, and said:

'this country has to be ruled by my descendent; thou oughtest to go and reign over it. The sacred dynasty is to be so prosperous that it will last eternally, even as heaven and earth last.'

The Sun-goddess is sister to the country, and is regarded as the first ancestor of the Imperial family and of the people in general, which are to be, as her prediction indicates, eternally the ruler and the ruled. A throne occupied by a single dynasty.

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1 Nihongi, fasc. 2.
is the possession of no nation in the world except the Japanese. A great respect has always been paid by the people to such a sacred throne. At one time the Mikados, or the Leaden Gods, were living gods, and, even when they were deprived of ruling power, the people never ceased to pay the respect due to them. This does not mean that they stood in a slaveish relation to the Imperial family, which, on the contrary, is related to the people as the main house to branch houses. The Mikados are not their conquerors, as with the majority of other nations. The people are often addressed by the Mikados as children, but this accounts for the special relation between the two. Submission to the Mikados, therefore, is not merely loyalty but filial piety. In contrast with China, filial piety in Japan comes next to loyalty, though in most cases the two are mentioned side by side. In the Japanese family, parents are absolutely obeyed by their children, and superiors by inferiors, as the Mikados are obeyed by their subjects. Filial piety is not so highly valued as loyalty, which is absolutely and very often bids people sacrifice other virtues for its sake. Dutifulness to parents and obedience to superiors were the chief morals in the Japanese home life, and when children were modified by the laws needed to rule them, or minute moral doctrines to regulate their daily life, because they were simple, honest, and good, and committed neither illegal nor immoral acts. They were practical and optimistic to an extreme, thinking neither of the future nor of the past, but only of the present. Death was hateful, but not fearful, to them. They seem never to have thought of whether they would go after death—a state of things which was much modified after Buddhism was introduced. In ancient chronicles, we meet with the words nihon-ta (a gentle spirit) and aratama (a rough spirit); the former denotes the virtues of gentleness and generosity, the latter those of bravery and chivalry. The old Japanese were gentle and magnanimous on the one hand, and so were kind and indulgent to others, and lived in harmony with the world; but, on the other hand, they had strong wills and brave hearts, which, when duty called them, very often made them face dangers, and, if necessary, sacrifice their lives for the sake of the fatherland.

2. Shintoism.—The word shinto is not Japanese, but Chinese; it means the ‘Way of the Gods’ (Kami-no-michi). Some say it is a religion, some a moral system, and others a political way. It may be any or all of these three, for in ancient days no distinction was made between them. It presents no peculiar doctrines, and nothing like a code of ethics; but, as it is the great way of the Empire, all the Japanese, ancient and modern, in spite of different creeds, must be Shintoists. The Shinto scholars (e.g. Hirata) say that they are ancient and moving in accordance with the Shintistic teaching of the divine deities; when they venerate Mikados and parents, when they try to promote the national welfare and happiness, or when they lead an honest and godlike life. Shinto is a mixture of Ancestor-worship and Nature-worship, as may be seen from the nomenclature of the deities worshipped. The Japanese have combined their ancestors with nature in ancient days; then they still, and worshipped them. In dealing with them in such a manner, they mean that the ancestors are their progenitors, superiors, and benefactors; not only the creators of their bodies, but the furnishers of their life, professions, estates, and all other things. They held the same thing true of the deities which were their perpetual favourites. Esteem for their ancestors being common to all, the sentiments of loyalty, patriotism, and filial piety, the love of family and the feeling of honour are combined, and thus a phase of morality peculiar to the Japanese has been developed. In ancient times no distinction was made between worship and administration, between reverence for the gods and loyalty. Loyal people only composing the divinity of the deities, and the Empresses in taking the reins of government were appeasing and worshipping national deities. The very words matsuri (‘worship’) and misarigoto (‘worship-matter’ or ‘administration’) signify the identity of these two. Patriarchal monarchy was thus theocratical monarchy as well. Various ceremonies were performed to serve the national deities, of which the most important is the ceremony of purification or harai—important alike from the religious, the moral, and the legal point of view. Oharai, or grand purification, was performed at the Court twice a year. In this, it is a mere ceremony, to drive away the evils resulting from the sinful, immoral, or unlawful deeds of the whole nation during every half-year; and, when any serious offence was committed, a ceremony for the same purpose was performed. Misogi (body-washing) was another rite of purification which at first consisted in washing the body when one touched anything unclean, but afterwards became ritualistic, and was made between them. Defilement, mental or physical, was hateful to the Japanese; and, according to their simple ideas, any guilt, moral or legal, could be as easily removed by the performance of purifications as literal death could be removed by bathing. See, further, art. Shintoism.

3. Bushido.—Bushido, or simply Budo or Shido, is the Chinese term for the Jap. Mononofu-no-Michi, lit. ‘the Way of Fighting Knights or Samurai’ (attendants). It is a moral system intended for the military class. Though its full development belongs to later ages of the national history, say the feudal periods—the 12th and following centuries—it may be said to be as old as the race themselves; and Yamada Toshimichi (the soul of Japan), Yamato no Miya (a classical name for this country) is not only the soul of the military men, but that of the whole nation. Bushido is an indigenous religion of the nation, so Bushido is their national morality, or at least its essence. But here we have only to deal with the Bushido for the Bushi class, and not as national morality. The Bushi should be, in the first place, loyal to lord and filial to parents; these, along with reverence for gods and worship of Buddhás, were considered their chief duties. Indeed, loyalty and filial piety were the fundamental morality of the Bushi class, as is the case with the nation in general. Then they should be brave and fearless in fighting, and calm and never flinching in the face of any danger or destruction, national or personal. In session, and the like, were what they always specially cultivated; but they were not by any means foolhardy or brutal in fighting or in their daily life. Their courage was restrained and softened by the feeling of benevolence and the sense of rectitude and honour; they were not to do anything brutal or underhand, but what was right and valiant at any time. Benevolence is one of the chief virtues of the Bushi; and many pathetic stories are told of 'benevolence of warriors.' Kindness, magnanimity, sympathy, and the like, were praised as supreme virtues.  

1 Sawayaug, op. cit. infra. 2 Motooki, Nihon-shi, 1771. 3 Hagé, op. cit. infra. 4 Arihia, op. cit. infra. 5 Id. 6 Id.
virtues for the military men, who might otherwise be disposed to coldheartedness or even to cruelty. They should be polite to superiors as well as to inferiors in the fulfillment of their duties, and simple in their life. These, with a few others of a kindred nature, were the qualifications thought necessary to Samurai-spirit. The Emperor Meiji gave the five copious, who appeared to be five kinds of priests, in which pursuits, knowledge, and truth to these two; and the whole passed under the name of the five cardinal virtues, the sum-total of human virtue. In human society men are related to each other in five different ways, which impose upon them as many obligations. They are as follows: rectitude between lord and subject, familiarity between father and son, distinction between husband and wife, grade between elder and younger brother, and confidence between friend and friend. The most important of these are the first two, especially the second; hence filial piety is the root of all virtues, of all moral practices. Generosity, respect, gratefulness, humility, faithfulness, sincerity: these are some of the virtues commended in the Confucian teaching. For thirteen centuries the Japanese have lived under this moral teaching, and probably there is nothing in Japan that has not been influenced by it; but they have wisely adopted only the points suitable to their special culture and national development, neglecting the elements that might be injurious to public morals or fatal to the welfare of the State. Further, see Confucian Religion, Confucius.

5. Buddhism.—Buddhism was officially introduced into Japan in A.D. 522. Its introduction at the Court—a controversy which was not merely religious but also political and tribal, and which after a violent conflict resulted in victory for the pro-Buddhist party. Prince Shotoku (572-622), one of the wisest and greatest personages Japan had ever produced, did all in his power for the advancement of the newly introduced creed, and well deserves the high respect paid by the Buddhists to his memory. The doctrine of Divine incarnation, according to which some Shinto deities are the incarnations of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, or certain Indian Devas, was first taught by Prince Shotoku and then by Gyoki (670-749), a learned and virtuous high priest, and was further broadened and deepened by two great men who arose shortly after his death—Saicho and Kukai, who respectively founded the Tendai and the Shingon schools of Buddhism, and then either of the two. Strangely enough, the two somewhat antagonistic creeds coexisted in unity for nearly a thousand years, until their final separation in 1871. Prince Shotoku and other great personages who appeared early in the history of Buddhism in Japan seem to have striven to nationalize its teachings and to bring it into close contact with the nation as a whole. During those days all the work of the Buddhist was designed in the interests of the national welfare and peace. The Emperor Shomu (reigned 724-781), for instance, had a monastery and a nursery built in each province, and these, and the Japanese system, were as follows: Chinese ethics is founded on the worship of Heaven, whereas the Japanese worship ancestral spirits; the Chinese pay more respect to men of wisdom, and hence admit that unwise or tyrannical monarchs may be dethroned at the people's will, whereas the Japanese regard the Mikados as sacred and inviolable; and, lastly, the chief virtues of the former are benevolence, fidelity to the duty, and the latter attributes supreme value to loyalty and rectitude, loyalty and filial piety being, according to their national morality, identical.

1. Shigano and Kusaka, Bushido in Japan; Arima, loc. cit.
2. The official date of its introduction; but the verified one is about A.D. 492.
3. Endo, Confucianism (Enzio. of Philosophy, wt. in Eng.).
of unselfishness and freedom from desire being in harmony with the essential elements of Yamato-damashii, it has found a ready entrance into the Japanese thought. Its teaching, however, softened the otherwise harsh character of the national spirit. It introduced the idea of another world, which was entirely lacking in the ancient Shinto. This teaching, blended with the import of teaching may very well be understood as the In the change of the name, the word "Sawanagri," originally meaning "the village of the merchants of the cities and among the Bedawin. The Prophet opened his propaganda among them by denouncing their sins and threatening them with the Day of Judgment and the fire of Hell, but at first he encountered nothing but mockery; and it was only when he had in some measure accommodated his message to the present world that they gave heed to his words about the hereafter.

But, while the ancient Arabs were intent upon material advantage and enjoyment, they were not wholly unmindful of higher things. As we may see from the powerful impression produced among them by satirical poems—an impression due only in part to the dread of magic—they had a high sense of both personal and tribal honour. The moral ideal of the Bedawin found expression in the patient endurance of privation, in a loyalty accorded not so much to the chief of the tribe as to co-equal fellow-members; in a courage which, in open warfare and still more in marauding expeditions, was sparing only of the lives of enemies; and, finally, in hospitality—a virtue which, it is true, is ever a native of regions where there is little occasion for its exercise. As compared with the Bedawin, the people of the cities had, to say the least, a larger share of worldly wisdom. The Meccans, in particular, both before and after Muhammed’s day, were astute enough to put their market under the protection of a sanctuary, and to exploit the very piety of those who came to trade within the sacred precincts. The present inhabitants of the holy city quite frankly avow their adherence to the ethics of the happy mean, asserting that, while the people of Yiddah are very worldly, and those of Medina very devout, they themselves hold an even balance between heavenly and earthly interests.

In pre-Muhammadan poetry terms expressive of moral sentiments occur only sporadically. We find, indeed, warnings against arrogance and threatenings of Divine vengeance; but such exceptions, in which moral and religious concepts are distinguished from law or custom, are probably traceable to Jewish-Christian influence. It was under that influence, at all events, that Muhammed stood forth as the voice of the one God, and the words of tradition, ‘for the improvement of morals.’

Muhammed made the demand of personal belief and personal morality.

“No bidden soul shall bear the burden of another.”1 In the Day of Judgment every one shall be answerable for himself: ‘O ye people, fear your Lord, and dread the day when the father shall not alone for the son, nor the child alone for all for his parent.”2

Hence, too, the Qur’an urges—though less insistently than the NT—the necessity of repentance, conversion, and good heart, the child and parents—Good intentions are commended; unpremeditated lapses from virtue are leniently judged. In short, Allah makes it no onerous task for His faithful to serve Him a forgiving, merciful deity.

Nevertheless, as Muhammed’s earliest adherents were but a small company, it was no child’s play for them to respond to his demand of personal morality. Such a demand shattered the old family ties and can only result in conflict—at first somewhat harshly, though afterwards in a milder fashion—immortalizing usage and custom. In this way the moral fellowship of the true believers came to mean more than the tribal relations. In the light of the ideal thus introduced every believer

1 Snoeck Huygens, Mekka, ii. 23 f., 140.
2 Qur’an, iii. 39.
3 Io. xxxi. 32.
was henceforth the neighbour or brother of every other. Islam was to be a universal brotherhood, in which kindness and equity should count for more and love of mankind was to be additional, not less than that which is felt for the human race. Verily, thy Lord provideth plenty for whomsoever He will; and He too giveth with His grace to all who observe His servants. Kill not your children for fear of poverty; we will provide for them and for you a provision and a reward. If you kill a man to gain a reward, less thou be made to sit down in broil and beggary. Verily, thy Lord provideth plenty for whomsoever He will; and He too giveth with His grace to all who observe His servants. Kill not your children for fear of poverty; we will provide for them and for you a provision and a reward. If you kill a man to gain a reward, less thou be made to sit down in broil and beggary.

In principle, no doubt, private revenge was superfluous; but in practice the former was still permitted, though in a somewhat mitigated form. It had now to be kept within the bounds of moderation, and must involve none but the actual culprit. Nor did Muhammad help to foster a higher regard for human life by prohibiting the heathen custom of killing female infants; but, on the other hand, the practice of feticide has all along prevailed, without censure, in Muslim countries.

The ethics of the Qur’ān might be summed up in the trite formula: ‘Believe and do right.’ Belief, of course, is the primary obligation, since without belief all religious acts are vain—merely phantoms in the waste. But, as it does not come within the scope of the present article to deal with belief (see Faith [Muslim]), or with the duties of religion in the narrower sense, the question here is with the question, What is implied in ‘doing right’? Of human virtues the Qur’ān insists most frequently and most urgently on beneficence—the bestowing of benefits upon the poor, the needy, the orphans, the strangers, the slave, and the prisoner, especially in the form of alms (zakāt). By almsgiving a person not only helps others, but also manifests the true spirit of self-denial—in the expectation, it is true, of winning, not indeed the treasures of land or earth, but the reward of Heaven. This spirit was displayed by Muhammad himself, chiefly in the earlier years of his prophetic activity in Mecca, when he declared against the rich. Afterwards, when his followers had become a political organization in Medina, the antagonisms were somewhat less pronounced. A similar development appears in the practice of zakāt. Originally a voluntary expression of love, and, in the view of Oriental Jews and Christians, almost identical with piety or the fear of God, i.e., with virtue in general, it gradually became a tax upon property, and as such became one of the five pillars of Muslim law. Hence, the tax was usually assessed to be assessed for the public treasury. The collectors of the tax did not neglect their own interests, while the lawyers or priests (so far as we may judge from the traditions of Muhammad) claimed to rank pre-eminently among the poor and needy who had a right to share therein.

Besides almsgiving, many other virtues are spoken of in the Qur’ān as acceptable to God. A series of corresponding commandments which, while depending on the Mosaic Decalogue, is given in sura xxiii. 23–40:

A mercy god with Allah, lest thou sit down despised, forsoak. Thy Lord hath ordained that ye shall worship none but Him; and kindness to your parents, whether one or both of them attain to old age beside thee; and say not to them ‘Be silent!’ neither murmur against them, but speak to them in gracious words. And chair humbly to them out of compassion; and say, ‘Lord, have compassion on them, even as they were compassionate of me when I was little.’ Your Lord knoweth what is in your souls, whether ye be righteous: And verily, He is forgiving towards those who return to Him with repentance. And to thy kindred send thy due, and also to the poor and the wayfarer; yet waste not wastefully; for the worship of the House of Satan, and Satan is their unfaithful to His Lord. But if thou dost not, then turn away from them, and seeketh from thy Lord bounties for which thou hopest.

1 Qur’an, xviii. 105, xlv. 39.

2 See the third, being (1) the creed, (2) the ritual of prayer, (3) fasting, and (5) the pilgrimage. According to an ancient tradition, Muhammad enjoined as a sixth primary obligation the giving of one’s neighbor’s property to the need of others what one would wish done to oneself.

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In any wise speak to them with kindly words. And let not thy hand be fettered behind thy neck; nor yet quench the light which God hath given thee, lest thou be made to sit down in rotting and beggary. Verily, thy Lord provideth plenty for whomsoever He will; and He too giveth with His grace to all who observe His servants. Kill not your children for fear of poverty; we will provide for them and for you a provision and a reward. If you kill a man to gain a reward, less thou be made to sit down in rotting and beggary.

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thoughts of the heart, has ceased for ever; we judge people entirely by their outward actions; we protect him who appears to us as a near kinsman, and we know nothing that is within—Allah is the judge thereof—and we do not protect him who appears to do wrong, nor do we find faith in him even if he asserts that his motives are pure.

It is likely enough, indeed, that many who availed themselves of this pronouncement forgot the parenthetic clause regarding the judgment of Allah. It was easier, moreover, in conformity with the sunnah, to use a toothpick, to rub oneself with water or sand, and to submit to circumcision, than to cleanse the soul from sin, and with pure heart to serve Allah in spirit and in truth. Thus the great bulk of the moral precepts of Islam, as found even in the Qur'an, and more particularly in the tradition, bear a somewhat external and—ones may venture to say—commerical character. The believer has an account with Allah. One tradition has it that a convert to Islam has all his previous good deeds put to his credit. The sunnah agrees with the Qur'an in assigning the leading place among good works to almsgiving. If a man is unable to give alms, let him labour with his hands—in order, of course, to make himself fully free from the fruits of work presented by the tradition. Only by way of exception do the hadiths—the Qur'an is silent on the subject—ascribe an independent ethical value to work. Thus the following saying was put into the mouth of the Prophet: "No man can have a better means than that which he has earned by the labour of his hands. David, the prophet of God, ate what he had earned by the work of his hands. But perhaps this saying, and others like it, may simply imply that work is superior to begging, though not to almsgiving. The practice of almsgiving, as indeed the element of self-denial in general that was present in Islam from the outset, was strongly reinforced by the influence of Christianity, and, subsequently, of Indian religions, as appears from the fact that the sunnah is much less distinctly Arabian in character than the Qur'an. When Islam had overspread the Christian provinces of the Roman empire, it assimilated many elements of Christian asceticism.

The assertion that early Islam was absolutely destitute of ethical sanctions has been refuted, above, by God. The Qur'an undoubtedly contains ethical elements. It is true that Arabic has no single specific term for 'conscience,' but the thing itself is quite adequately commuted by such terms as 'heart of heart.' According to one highly esteemed hadith, 'virtue is [the sum of] good qualities, iniquity is what disturbs the soul, and what thou desirest others not to know concerning thee.' The last clause certainly savours of conventionalism, but there are other traditions in which the requirement of inward sincerity is more clearly expressed.

Thus, e.g., we read: 'Shall I tell you what work stands higher than all prayer, fasting, and almsgiving? It is to make peace between two enemies;' or, again: 'Of more avail (than ritual prayer) is the prayer which a man offers in his own house, where no one sees him but Allah, and which has no other more to do than to draw near to Allah.' Another tradition tells how a pious female devotee who was using insulting language towards her neighbour was counselled to honey the Prophet; whereas his judgment regarding another woman, who was negligent of prayer and fasting, but gave to the needy and needed, and her name was Mary, the mother of Jesus, was "(she was) destined for Paradise. The companions of Allah is frequently set forth as a pattern for the faithful, and they are urged to the performance of pious works. According to a favourite and frequently quoted hadith, the best works are: (1) honour towards parents; (2) not to take a niece in marriage;

2 Bkhârî, ii. 51.

4 Ib. i. 469.
5 Ib. ii. 11.
6 Verloeghen, p. 14 f.
7 Ib. 41 f.
the Persian maxim that religion and government are sisters, were not much better. In the most numerous Muslim sects, the merging of religion and government is often a source of contention. The doctrine of *tughrūya* ('prudence'), according to which it is the primary duty of the Shi'ite who sojourns in the land of the adversary—a very elastic term—to disavow his convictions by word and deed, for the sake of his personal safety, is one of the most dangerous arts known. Where within the bounds of Islam, and at all periods of its history, the discrepancy between ideal law and actual practice has, on the one hand, led to a policy of compromise on the part of the majority, and, on the other, given rise to scruples and conflicts of conscience, and also to numerous attempts, under the leadership of a Mahdi, to supersede a sinful and worldly régime by a better. In Islam, accordingly, aspirations after moral and religious reform are always involved with or accompanied by political action. The work of a man like General Booth, who, as leader of the Salvation Army, seeks to achieve moral and spiritual regeneration by methods which are incompatible in Islam, unless he or his officers tried at the same time to grasp the reins of political power.

The historico-legal development of Muslim jurisprudence cannot be dealt with in detail here, and it must suffice to refer the reader to the works of Goldziher, Snouck Hurgronje, and others (see the Literature at end, and cf. art. Law [Muhammadan]). We are, meanwhile, concerned with the *fiqh* only so far as it bears upon ethical conceptions and leaves room for the free expression of moral life. In this reference the most important point is the classification of actions according to their gradations of legal obligation, and here we find a number of such arrangements more or less in agreement with one another. The most widely accepted division has five legal categories, as follows: (1) absolute duty (*fard* or *wājib*), embracing actions of the performance of which is rewarded and their omission punished; (2) commendable or meritorious works (al-`amal al-mustabhāt), which are rewarded, but their omission not punished; (3) permitted actions (al-`amal al-muháb), which are legally indifferent; (4) reprehensible actions (al-`amal al-makrūh), which are disapproved of, but not punishable, by the law; (5) abominable actions (al-`amal al-kārim), the doing of which calls for punishment.

As regards the reference of each particular action to its proper category in this arrangement, there is, as might be expected, no unanimity among the learned in Islam. The more easy-going moralists, among the sages of the law endeavour to make out that certain forbidden actions are doubtful, i.e. permissible, and certain obligatory actions merely commendatory. In general, the great regulative principle is public opinion, which is based upon the thought and decision of the authoritative scholars of the day. This concept (al-*ijma*), is binding upon the conscience not merely in matters of faith, but also in the most trivial details of daily life. Yet, in spite of all, many Muslims, whether from want of knowledge or from want of will, order their lives by unauthorized *ābd*, or, when accounted still worse, exercise their discretion.

Further, the law is not uniformly binding upon every one. It distinguishes between duties incumbent upon all (fard *al-a`la* or *l-lain*); and obligations which affect certain individuals only (fard *al-kifāyan*). The duty of taking part in the holy war is an instance of the latter class.

Another distinction of importance is that between great and small sins—a distinction elaborated largely in connexion with the doctrine of evidence, which demanded that witnesses must be above reprobation. Since, however, among the great sins are murder, unchastity, misappropriation of property belonging to a ward, the taking of interest, the refusal of zakāt, and the like. To the class of small sins are assigned such offences as taking part in unlawful games or listening to hidden music.

As might be expected, the science of the law, in dealing with such distinctions, frequently degenerates into an arid casuistry, or becomes a sophistry which will elude. Every one can and defraud either God or man. The letter of the law kills the spirit of morality. An illustration of this will be found in the *Thousand and One Nights*, Night 296 ff. The manner in which legal luminaries tone down the prohibition of wine-drinking is set forth by Goldziher, *Vorlesungen über den Islam*, p. 63 ff.

4. The development of doctrine.——Islam found in the countries which it conquered not only legal and political institutions, but also systems of doctrine with more or less of an ethical element, as well as a popular didactic literature. With the latter we shall deal below (§6); of more immediate importance for the development of the Muslim doctrine of faith is the number of sects which were of Christian origin.

A factor of the utmost significance for later times was the ethic-religious system of the Mu'tazilites—descendants of the Qādārites. This sect was designated originally 'the people of justice' (of Allah), because they held that Allah is the Righteous One who rewards men according to their deserts. This was not a genuine Muslim conception in the early days. The original conception of Allah—and, somewhat spiritually, it still holds sway—was that, as the Almighty, He is a vengeance-breathing tyrant towards His enemies, and an indulgent God of mercy towards His friends. In His vengeance He is arbitrary; in His love and mercy, capricious. With many persons, no doubt, this idea was a cause or a consequence of unprincipled conduct. It was possible for a man to transgress the whole law and still remain a believer; confession to Allah in words, or even in thought—faith without works—was all that was required. Such was the teaching of the Murji'ites, who, though they discriminated between small offences and great sins, yet held that even the latter were forgiven to the Muslim who but uttered the creed.

This Murji'ite teaching was challenged by the originally powerful sect of the Khārijites, who have been called the puritans of Islam. They looked upon a great sinner as an unbeliever, and maintained that there is no true faith without works. This view approximates to the Mu'tazilite ethics, which might indeed be regarded as that of the Khārijites modified by the influence of Christi-anity, and, subsequently, of philosophy. It is certainly true that many of the early Mu'tazilites insisted emphatically on the importance of good works, and in this respect they might be compared with the Pelagians of ancient Christianity. They were neither liberals in theology, nor libertines in ethics.

Their speculations upon the Divine righteousness, moreover, were closely connected with the question of human freedom. No quite unequivocal teaching on this problem could be drawn from either the Qur'an or the hadith; nevertheless the devout of that age were always inclined to the doctrine of predestination. The idea that everything, not even excepting evil and sin, is ordained and brought to pass by Allah largely dominates the popular mind to this day. The Qādārites and Mu'tazilites, on the other hand, were probably the origin of the controversies of the Eastern Church, preached the
Doctrine of free will. In support of their position they could appeal to certain passages of the Qur'an, according to which Allah does not cause, but simply allows, the sinner to go astray. They held, accordingly, that man is the author of his own deeds, the arbiter of his own good or evil fortune, and that Paradise or Hell lies within his own choice. Evil and sin have their source in the human will; whatever comes from Allah is necessarily good. Subsequently, the school of asceticism taught that man can devise nothing but good, and must in all things work for the welfare of His creatures. Here, in effect, we have a theology, such as has frequently been propounded from Plato's day, and as frequently shunned by the monistic trend of thought or of reason. The theology of the Mu'tazilites was influenced even in its early stages by Neo-Platonic ideas. Their doctrinal system resolved itself in time into a rationalistic theology, with reason as its first principle—the source, not only of knowledge, but also of the laws of conduct. It is reason, they held, that distinguishes between good and evil.

The doctrine of free will became in this way a rational determinism. An action is good when reason finds it good or beautiful; an action is evil when reason finds it evil or repulsive; in short, moral distinctions do not depend upon the will of Allah. Man is given an authority to discernment, and obedience to reflection. Knowledge, discernment, reflection—it is these, accordingly, that reveal to us what is in itself good or evil. That which is in itself good is binding upon the will of God Himself, and thus involves a limitation of both His omnipotence and His freedom. In order to leave room in human life for a rational freedom and an absolutely free sphere of action, for self-determination and moral responsibility, Allah was represented as being conditioned by the law of His being.

While the Mu'tazilite doctrines maintained their position in Shi'ite literature, the orthodox party in Sunnite Islam adopted a mediating position. They would not cast the shadow of a doubt upon the doctrine of God's omnipotence and unlimited freedom. Human beings are absolutely dependent upon Him: their good purposes, their good works, the ability to carry these into effect—all flow from Him, from His mercy and grace towards mankind. Man, however, as was maintained by the orthodox Ash'arites, is an organism capable of appropriate God-like works, and it is this appropriation (bash or tiksidh) that constitutes the believer's sole merit. And even his great and heinous sins do not make him an alien to God, but he is being helped to higher ranks. But amongst them were also a number of brooding idlers, who began to speculate in Oriental fashion; and it was accordingly in Sufism that the practice of asceticism—from about the 8th cent. A.D. onwards—found a theoretical basis. Platonist-Bythagorean doctrines, gleaned from Hermetic and Gnostic writings, here joined hands with Indian speculation. Ascetic morality is always founded upon the conviction that the human body is of little value, if not indeed absolutely evil, or else a mere phantasm; while the soul, on the other hand, is regarded as the essential element in human nature, or at least as forming a stage of transition to the higher life, that of the soul of God. Thus the supreme object of human endeavour is to free oneself from the bondage of sense, to purge the soul of foul desire, and to become pure Spirit, or God—not merely God's monastic in the sense that the devout believe, when he commits them, that they are permitted.

5. Ascetic-mystical ethics. So long as the primitive community of Islam remained comparatively free from the Prophet's call to renunciation, the world was generally complied with. But this state of matters did not last; the Arabs, with their predatory instincts, soon learned to appropriate the world, and, in succeeding generations, to enjoy it. Caring little for imperial rewards, they were in reality a military aristocracy, an oligarchy, in the empire. In no long time, however, the peoples whom they exploited and laid under tribute began themselves to embrace Islam, thus creating a situation that demanded a new policy, even in moral and religious matters. Here and there, moreover, a feeling of social injustice, on the part of the higher and lower classes, was not altogether absent, as a result, and in the new centres of culture, and this in turn prepared the way for a system of an ascetic morality—which, it is true, had never been entirely absent from Islam. This ascetic

morality had special links of connexion with the ideas of Christian monasticism.

One characteristic feature of monasticism, viz. celibacy, was, however, alien to primitive Islam; nor has it ever at any time gained general recognition. There is no proof that the Prophet is recorded to have said; and in his later years he showed by his example that woman may be regarded merely as man's plaything. The ascetic and religious life was not, however, what ever its object was, actually served, however, as a species of training for the soldiers of the faith. It consisted in fasting and watching, and accorded admirably with the performance of the ritual of prayer. But, when at a later day the ascetic spirit became more widely diffused, the positive value of the practice as a means of discipline was more and more lost sight of in favour of a purely negative renunciation. To morbid the flesh became the cry. Absolute trust in God led to quietism: in God's hands man should be perinde ac cadaver. The mystic eventually becomes a mere will-less pauper, who is given a gift, the alma he will be ask or hold out his hand to take, and who fills his feeble life with pious ceremonies. Morality is hardly to be looked for in such conditions. The mendicant (fajir) lives only for the moment and for his God; he is filled with knowledge of posterity, he is as good as dead. Yet it was but the absolutely consistent application of his convictions that carried him to such extremes.

The ascetics, clothed in their coarse woollen frocks (gig), sought to vindicate their manner of life chiefly by appeal to passages in the NT. A sense of sin and a craving for penance were the ascetic motives which largely helped to found the ranks. But amongst them were also a number of brooding idlers, who began to speculate in Oriental fashion; and it was accordingly in Sufism that the practice of asceticism—from about the 8th cent. A.D. onwards—found a theoretical basis. Platonist-Bythagorean doctrines, gleaned from Hermetic and Gnostic writings, here joined hands with Indian speculation. Ascetic morality is always founded upon the conviction that the human body is of little value, if not indeed absolutely evil, or else a mere phantasm; while the soul, on the other hand, is regarded as the essential element in human nature, or at least as forming a stage of transition to the higher life, that of the soul of God. Thus the supreme object of human endeavour is to free oneself from the bondage of sense, to purge the soul of foul desire, and to become pure Spirit, or God—not merely God's monastic in the sense that the devout believe, when he commits them, that they are permitted.1

1 For the Maturashite theory, which is akin to that of the Ash'arites, cf. Macdonald, Development of Muslim Theology, p. 309.
wise politicians and merchants, and is thoroughly
typical of this class of literature.\footnote{1}

A much larger and more elaborately systematized
contribution comes, through Syrian channels,
from the philosophical literature of Greece.
Collections of biographies, with supplements of moral
aphorisms, treatises, letters, etc., were very
popular. Philosophers of the Neo-Platonic
and Hermetic type, were extensively circulated.
Works of Plato and Aristotle, as also compositions
falsely ascribed to them, found great favour among
philosophers. None of the cardinal virtues which appears in many Muslim
writers on ethics. To Plato also was ascribed a
treatise on the education of children \textit{Adab al-
}shiyam, and a testament \textit{waqiyah} addressed to
Aristotle. Of Aristotle's own writings, Arabic
authors refer to and quote from the \textit{Nicomachean
Ethics} (Kitab al-akhlaq), which is said to have
been translated by the afore-named \textit{Hunain} or by
his son \textit{Ishaq} ibn \textit{Hunain}. Extant quotations
from this work show traces of Neo-Platonic
redaction.

These and other translated works of the kind
helped to mould the development of \textit{mu\'tazilite
and \textit{Suffi}e ethics. But it was only in the
limited circles of sectaries of scholars and persons of
culture that ethical doctrine attained the more
independent status of a philosophical science \textit{al-
akhlaq}. Conformably to the scholastic Arista-
telian tradition current in the East, philosophy was
defined as 'a knowledge of the essence of things
and a doing of the good.'\footnote{2} The theoretical side
was invariably discussed more exhaustively than
the practical, but the latter also received attention
from those who dealt with morals and politics as
more or less independent of each other.

But it was the pseudopigraphic writings of a
spiritualistic and an ascetic and edifying character
that produced the most powerful effects in this
sphere. These writings were often supplemented
by astrological speculations, according to which the
natural temperament and even the moral constitu-
tion of human beings are conditioned by the in-
fluence of the stars. The folly of man was
believed to consist in his being delivered from
matter and exalted to the pure spirit-world of the
higher spheres. This type of ethics, pervaded by
metaphysico-psychological speculation, has left a
characteristic mark in the system of the 'Pure Ones' or 'Brethren of Purity' \textit{(Huwad as-Safa)}.

In the system of the Brethren of Purity, the
moral nature of man is determined by the following
four causal agencies. (1) The bodily structure:
the body is composed of the four elements, and
a person whose body contains, say, much earth will
be harsh and greedy, while another, with a large
proportion of air among its components, will be
gentle and gracious, and so on. (2) Climate: those who live
in a northern climate have more courage than
those of southern lands. (3) Education. (4) The
influence of the stars. Without this, indeed, is the
most powerful of all, since the other three are
dependent upon it. Even education, which super-
poses something upon the natural constitution, is
affected by the stars. Hence the following posi-
tions. All this holds good of the first stage of
human nature, the stage of natural morality, in
which conduct is instinctively good or bad. But
the soul can raise itself above nature, and in the
second or physical stage, where man has freedom

\footnote{1\text{ Cf. also the will of a merchant in the \textit{Thousand and One
Nights}, Night 306ff.}}

\footnote{2\text{ See \textit{Ma\'arif}, ed. van Vloten, Leyden, 1895, p. 122f.}}
of choice, his deeds are praised or blamed according to their quality. Should a man reach the third stage—that of rational deliberation—he acts either wisely or foolishly, nobly or basely. Finally, the fourth or highest stage is that of the Divine contemplation, wherein he indulges in by godly prophets and holy angels, and a man is rewarded or punished according as he does or does not associate himself with them in the endeavour to become, as far as in him lies, like God.

The path by which this last stage of the Christian, ascetic goal of life is to be reached, according to the Brethren of Purity, is the practice of asceticism. The supreme virtue, the yearning for things above, or the love that leads towards God, must manifest itself upon earth in a pious endurace of, and indulgence to, all creatures, even the animals. Man thereby wins freedom from sensual passion here, and hereafter the ascet to the eternal light. But if a man does not in this life purge himself of bodily desire, and persists in 'foolish slumber and careless sleep,' he remains after death hovering in the air, transmuted and drawn downward by his fleshly passions. Hell is simply the state of existence, whether on the earth or in the air; Paradise, on the other hand, is the eternal world of the celestial spheres to which pure souls ascend.

The ethics of the teaching of the Brethren are imperfect, though in different degrees. But the sum-total of good qualities is found in the absolutely perfect man, who has the characteristics of the Platonic Idea and the 'wise man' of the Stoics. The Sunnite mystics find the perfect man (insan a'ta'la) in Muhammad; the Shi'ites in Ali or Husain. The Pure Ones are less definite in their choice, and—apart perhaps from the 'Iman of the Sunnites—they greatly honour—it is rather Socrates and Christ who win their enthusiastic homage. In their estimation the ideal of reason was realized in Socrates, and the law of love in Christ; and it is these great ones, accordingly, whom they seek to emulate. In the interests of this imitatio they concede a relative value to the earthly life in the flesh; the body should be guarded and cared for, so that the soul may have time for its full development.

The moral theory of the Pure Ones is a mystical intellectualism. It is found—in a somewhat less fantastic form, no doubt—also in the so-called Aristotelian authors of the new type. The Sunnite mystics find the perfect man (insan a'ta'la) in Muhammad; the Shi'ites in Ali or Husain. In keeping with the character of their sources, these thinkers set— to use Aristotle's own words—the dianoetic virtues above the ethical. Thus, e.g., in the 'Apologia of Philosopher of Philosophy, Husain ibn Ishaq the highest good is identified with the sound understanding. Wit and shrewdness, talent and sagacity, are put on a higher level than goodness and rectitude. Such, too, is the spirit which pervades nearly all the adab writings ('the doctrine of good or elegant manners') of the Arabs—often, indeed, mere compilations of extracts, and having hardly the slightest concern with ethics and morality.

A counterpoise to the extravagances of mysticism was provided by the supreme Aristotelian principle of the mean—the doctrine of the merynta, which was introduced into Islam at an early period. The Mu'tazilite philosopher al-Ishaq († A.D. 869) has summarized the characteristic feature of the section is the endeavour to invest religious duties with moral significance. Thus the daily liturgical prayers of the Muslims, which were a part of the work routine of each ruler and the monks, were held in the silent cloister or the monk's cell; the meeting of dwellers to cities with the inhabitants of the surrounding districts at the two official festivals of the year; the asking of pilgrims—each one in his lifetime—from all countries to Mecca: these things, as enjoined by the Prophet, are approved by the Koran as the universal love of mankind.

The conclusion (section sometimes divided, as vi. and vii.) discusses the health and sickness of the soul. The diseases of the soul are the eight vices—the afflictions of the four cardinal virtues—and they are divided into two groups: (a) the excess and defect of courage—handled in detail, its
extreme being presumption or foolhardiness, and cowardice or want of spirit, with their sub-species. But the actual vices arising with less thoroughness than the infections from which they spring—anger and grief, and their varieties.

Thus far Ibn Maskawih and philosophical ethics of the Mu'tazilites, features of the theory, i.e., its dualistic psychology and its hyperphysical morality, found special favour among the mystics, while, on the other hand, the scholars of the 'Abdith and the Ash'ar, as well as the dialectical theologians (the Mutakallim) and the rationalistic writers, gave the preference to the Aristotelian elements.

7. The Ethics of Ghazali.—The ethical system of the great theologian Abu Ḥamid al-Ghazali (A.D. 1058-1111) merits separate treatment, more especially as he is the final authority for orthodox Islam. In his case life and doctrine are one—rooted in his own personality. He was delivered from the snare of vain learning and worldly ambition by becoming convinced of the truth and moral power of Islam. In Islam he holds single-handed a position to the standing of that held by Augustine and Aquinas in the Christian Church.

Ghazali's moral philosophy is the synthesis of the various doctrines which we have passed in review. He is also acquainted with philosophical ethics and the criticisms of the cardinal virtues and of the mean. These he expounds in his Mizān al-anwāl, probably one of his early works, and we find traces of them also in his later mystical writings. Thus the narrow bridge which leads to Paradise (ṣīrat), and the scales in which the deeds of men are weighed (mizān), he interprets esoterically, as the true mean of virtue, just as many Mu'tazilites and speculative Sāfis had done. Ignoring the actual sequences, he maintains that the philosophers borrowed their ethical theories from devout Sāfis. Such might certainly be said of his own system, as it is saturated with and held together by the spirit of Sufism, and is intelligible only in the light of the mystics' doctrine of stages (the corporeal earthly life; the sensuous psychical intermediate stage; the spiritual celestial life; the being of God). Ghazali's theory is, in point of fact, a mysticism that vitalizes the law and doctrine of Islam, as is indeed clearly indicated by the title of his greatest work, Iḥyā' uṣūm al-dīn, i.e. 'the revivification of the religious sciences,' dealing with living religion; with religious life. Faith without works was in his view a dead faith. Religion must be an experience of the soul, and must manifest itself in works. 'He who knows and acts accordingly shall be called great in the kingdom of Heaven.'

The relation between faith and works, knowledge and action ('ilm and 'amāl), had formed the theme of much speculation before Ghazali's time.1 The philosophic school, and even the mystics, were all more or less influenced by the intellectualism of Greek ethics. Correct thinking was preferred before good conduct. Action, moreover, was restated as sentiment. Life, i.e., it was deemed of value only as a preparation for a higher life; while perfection or salvation in the hereafter was thought of as a state of pure knowledge, not indeed without joy, but certainly without action. With Ghazali, however, with the fourth part, the relation in question is complicated by the introduction of a third factor. Between knowledge ('ilm) and action ('amāl) he places the state of the soul (ḥād), a condition akin to emotion, and having a propensity to good or evil conduct. We have thus a sequence of three causally connected elements: knowledge gives rise to an affective volition, and this to the conduct action.

In connexion with these explanations, the extreme intellectualism (gnosticism) of the philo-

sophers who assert that knowledge without consequence is better than action without knowl-

dge of the grounds of action is assailed by Ghazali as sheer folly. Nevertheless, we trace the influence of the philosophical-dogmatic tendency. He denies the propitiation of himself for action in the consideration of knowledge, even though he there-

by means knowledge of the religious sciences. For him, too, the perfection of the pure spirit consists in intuitive knowledge, i.e., the beatific vision of God. In the first book of the Iḥyā' he fully discusses knowledge—the religious knowl-
dge that is profitable for the life beyond, and is 'a work of the heart; and in the second book he deals with the knowledge of religious doctrine as man's primary obligation. Religious knowledge, or true doctrine, is in fact the tree whose branches are the various states of the soul (akhirāt), and whose fruits are good deeds.

Ghazali agrees with the Ash'arite school in teaching that the merit of man's action lies in his approbation or assimilation (khtisāb) of Divine action. This is the theme of the same book, with its final coda, and

1 Cf. Goldziher, Kitāb ma'ānī al-našī', p. 54 ff.

The reader should note this enumeration, as in mystical writings such numbers are never without significance.
always been urged in the higher, and in the light of this fact Ghazâlî combines the distinction made by the jâhâr between faryâd (admonition) and fârâm (punishment) with the doctrine of stages presented by Neo-Platonic Sûfism. Thus, e.g., in regard to fasting, the fourth of the religious duties; in the first stage, as obligatory upon the faithful, it means abstaining from food, drink, and other sensual pleasures; in the second stage, it means giving up the enjoyment of love; in the second, it signifies refraining from the sins of the mind, e.g., the members of the religious orders, from the计量 of human time; in the third stage, attained only by the few, fasting implies the heart’s abnegation of the world and of all that is not God.

The principles of Ghazâlî are very characteristic of the peculiar nature of Oriental civilization. Neither philosopher nor devout mystic has in this sphere ever been able to attain fully to the thought of the highest ethical truths, that lacks the realities of autonomy, and of a super-personal law which, written on men’s hearts, is binding upon all. Although in the East an all but immutable law has been in operation for centuries, yet the frequent changing of dynasties and rulers have ever and anon been attended with intervals of anarchy. An imperative law is thus always associated in the popular mind with a particular ruler and those who represent him in secular or sacred things. There has as yet been little scope for individual freedom or personal initiative in any sphere of life. The populace submit to the secular power, or to the shâikh of an Order, or to the Hidden Imâm, or to some one who claims to be the Mahdî; for neither in social and political affairs nor in the sphere of religion and ethics can they do without a leader.

8. The work of Ghazâlî. — For centuries the instability of Oriental life has been hedged round by a remarkable stability of doctrine. Since the 13th cent. A.D., Islam has been content to study and expound the teachings of the Prophet, and the writings of the earlier students are constantly being re-issued in lithographed or printed editions—not as mere scientific curiosities, but as real stepping-stones to learning; and this is true also in the sphere of ethics.

In Ghazâlî orthodox speculation reaches its culminating point, and in the sphere of religious learning his influence is immense. But other factors contributed to a peculiar devotion of the faithful to men who point the way to their “adâd, teachers of the jâhâr did not discard their casuistry, while many philosophers and speculative Sûfis ignored the law in its outward form (antinomianism).

Ethics (ilm al-khitâb) could make no further advance in Islam as an independent science. People found their moral doctrine in the compendiums of the legal schools, or in some guidebook to the Sûfîte life, or in the manuals of good breeding (adâd literature). Books of the last-named class found special favour in secular circles. In Persia there exists a marked predestination for the teachings of the Sûfis, and, in particular, for the didactic verses of Sa’dî. An illustration of the way in which ethics has been incorporated with the adâd literature is found in the Adâb al-dumayq seal-din of Abû l-’Qâsan al-Mâwûdî (î. A.D. 1055).

This work, which was written before Ghazâlî’s day, is still used in the higher classes of Sûfism, where it serves as a treasury of quotation for the young. After passing the time-honoured axioms upon reason and knowledge, it gives a panoply of aphorisms, uttered by devout scholars, poets, and sages regarding religion, the world, and the soul. The section that treats of the secular life bears the impress of Aristotelian ideas, while the closing section, dealing with the morals of the soul, shows an ascetic strain, and singles out for special commendation such virtues as humility, meekness, veracity, and contentment. Its counsels are regarded in the same light as in the 11th cent., when Mâwûdî compiled them, i.e., as so many fine byways.

This continuitv of doctrine is certainly a remarkable fact. Even those who have in modern times tried to introduce reforms into Islam appeal for support to the ancient teachings.

This is specially true of the Wahhâbî movement, which sprang up about the middle of the 18th century; it is none the less regarding Islam to its pristine state, and denounced in puritanical fashion all innovation, the use of tobacco and similar indulgences, the luxury of cities, and the worship of saints. Of greater significance than this Arabian attempt to restore the past is the Ahmadi movement (see Bâb, BâbÎs), which took its rise about the middle of the 19th century. It was in
its origin associated with ancient mystical ideas, and trafficked in all manner of magical trumpery, sapping and destroying the moral sentiments of mankind, etc. It has latterly assumed a more progressive aspect, and now advocates the emancipation of women and the brotherhood of all classes and religions. To the present writer, however, it seems highly questionable whether the Báb’s mystic utterances or the actual teachings of the Bábí prophets are capable of effecting anything—in the face of Oriental despotism—on behalf of a free and active morality. Some look more hopefully to the revival of Mysticism teaching, more especially in British India, where its best-known exponent is Syed Ameer ‘Ali. This movement, however, presents few but of the typical features of Islam, and is scarcely to be distinguished from a liberal form of Christianity.

Here, indeed, we have it upon the characteristic feature of present-day Islam. The culture of Europe and America, with Christian customs and moral ideas in its train, is forcing its way on every hand into Muslim countries, and by means of education and the press is asserting itself everywhere, with the possible exception of Afghanistan and Mongolia. The movement is meanwhile too heavily confined to scientific and technical learning, which is assimilated in a somewhat superficial fashion; but whether it will prove fruitful, not only in the economic, but also in the ethical and the social and political, remains to be seen.

9. Moral life.—We have now dealt with the foundations and the growth of moral conceptions in Islam; and, although much obscurity still rests upon the subject, we have found it possible, with the help of the extant literature, to trace the main lines of ethical development. A much more difficult question, and one, indeed, that must probably remain in great part unanswered, is that concerning the actual moral life of the people. What was its character, and how did it compare with moral doctrine? Law and doctrine may often act as incentives to good conduct, but they are often simply the unconscious reflex of actual morality, and sometimes but the drapery which hides the hypocrisy beneath. Our main concern is the people’s actual mode of life, and our knowledge of this is very defective.

It has already been remarked that the sacred law, alike in its original form and in its later expansion, has to a great extent the weight only of an ideal canon law; as a rule, the people regard it as a suggestion. It most religiously regards the duties and the provisions regarding family life. The sentiments and practices of daily life were largely conditioned by racial character, by circumstances, by occupation—in a word, by the stage of civilization that had been attained by society or the individual. A detailed history of the morality of Oriental society—could such a work be written at all, and as yet there is an almost complete lack of competent preliminary studies in this field—would have to depict a vast variety of phenomena, such as, for instance, the various gradations by which formalism passed into permanent habituation, and, in daily life, the practice of confining the inhabitants to certain quarters, streets, according to their creed, nationality, or trade.

The fact that differences in nationality and occupation involve differences in moral characteristics, has been the subject of attention from ancient times. Thus, according to an early Muslim tradition, ‘pride and haughtiness are among the people of horses and camels, the shepherds among the farmers and herders, and modesty (nakia) among keepers of cattle.’ It is a still greater contrast, and one that pervades the whole course of Muslim history, that is between the predatory semi-nomads and the owners and leaders of city caravans, whose great concern is security of travel, and the inhabitants of the larger towns, whose very livelihood is dependent on the proceeds of trade. The largely aristocratic customs of the former are very different from the more comfortable life of townspeople. This more luxurious mode of life was condemned by official Islam, which, however, was long unable to resist the march of the merchant, who succeeded in assimilating the national character of the Persians to their own, just as they failed afterwards with the Turks and the Mongols. In the polemical literature evoked by the struggle between Arabs and Persians in the 2nd and 3rd centuries A.H., neither side failed to pass judgment upon the qualities of the other, and, as we might expect, each judged with all the bias of mutual animosity. Such estimates must, of course, be utilized with the utmost caution. It will be well also to be somewhat sceptical regarding the morés emanating from teachers of the law, as the class to which they relate. It is probable that every age and among all peoples to proclaim the utter wickedness of a world that did not tally with their sacred ideals, or submit to their personal capacity. Our best course will be to avail ourselves of incidental evidence from narrative literature, in historical writings, and books of travel; while for recent times we may have recourse to ethnographical works.

We generally find ourselves in the spriritual and volupturnous society of princes and merchants—a society whose basis is largely sordid gain, and whose life revolves round ‘wine, woman, and song.’ These people know the moral code by heart. They are also imbued with the mysticism of the poets, and with the philosophical tendency, but only by way of rhetorical embellishment. At a very early date, even in the holy city of Mecca, then at the Umayyad court in Damascus, and subsequently in the Abbasid city of Baghdad—and Cordova, Cairo, and other less important centres of Muslim culture—we find, under the mask of religion, a most worldly mode of life among the higher classes of society. Their morality had always much in common with the popular ideas expressed in fables and proverbs—i.e., it was altogether mundane. We shall search the fables of Laugman in vain for any mention of God or the hereafter. Death, which in religious and mystical life is always hazy and uncertain, appears, conformably to the common sentiment, in The Thousand and One Nights, as the destroyer of all delights. The enjoyment of life is at once the ideal of popular literature, and the chief concern of educated society. To acquire wealth in the easiest possible way—often by means of magic—and to squander it in pleasure, to go in quest of adventures as a means of regaining capital, are the great concern in most cases, however, as a travelling merchant who is a favourite of fortune: such were the visions which, designed originally to captivate the imagination, many endeavoured to realise in practice. Here,
in fact, we find a society that fostered the virtues of worldly wisdom, polite intercourse, tolerance, and business initiative, and at the same time practised the old and prevalent vices in more refined forms. The city of Damascus, in Muslim times, was the one where the Turks and the Mongols. In the cultivation of science and art, in the refinement of manners, in the systematic provision for the treatment of illness and for other public services, it was, as far down as the 12th cent. A.D., and in part even later, in advance of Christendom and the West. In intelligence and outward culture the Muslim showed himself superior to the Crusader, but whether he stood higher also in an ethical respect it is not easy to decide. What was morally good in him was nurtured and cultivated in secret, and its good name was never exposed to the scorn and ironical art of a Saladin, it was perhaps no longer good at all. But, be this as it may, it is certain that in a moral aspect the Muslim world, even as it exists to-day, is rather to be compared—to leave absolute standards out of account altogether—with mediæval Europe than with the conditions of our modern civilization. In order to put the matter in a clearer light, and in view of the fact that the opinion of the present day is two or three in considerable numbers to assimilate Western culture, it will be well to add a few observations on the point.

Various are the ways in which the many systems of religion and philosophy set forth the essence and the religious sanction of morality, there is one feature common to all, viz. the requirement that the individual shall, on the one hand, permanently hold in control the moods and pleasures of the moment, and that, on the other, by a process of constant self-expansion towards the ideal of humanity, he shall adjust himself to, and play a useful part in, the larger to which he belongs. Every stage of civilization has its rightful measure of stability and its appropriate sphere of operation—these being conditioned by the sway of the forces of nature without, and of the impulses of nature within; and under this sway, while the West had been making progress, the East has stood still, yielding to its changing destinies with a species of fatalism.

When we go a little more deeply into the popular literature of Islam, we recognize the elementary stage of its underlying morality. In the following paragraph a number of particularities are combined in a sketch which, though its dependence upon romantic sources, such as The Thousand and One Nights, will be obvious to all, may nevertheless help us to form at least a relative estimate of Muslim morality.

1 From the same source that fills so large a place in this literature as the phraseology of fortune. Just as the peasant lies at the mercy of rain and sunshine, so does the citizen depend upon the interest and will of his superiors in life. But his life has no security; the beggar of to-day is a king to-morrow, and contemning one who to-day drinks deep at the wells of pleasure may to-morrow renounce the world. There is a corresponding lack of perseverance: people live for the day and do not lay by. Then the law against taking interest stands in the way of a profitable investment of capital. The idea that the hours of work which are indispensable to success, is in itself mereious work, is an encouragement to idleness. A man's living and prosperity are supposed to be dependent, not upon work or saving, but upon wealth. Many are often reduced to want, but there are occasional festivals at which everything is surrendered to merry-making, and the savings of a year are squandered in a day. The absence of steady self-centred lives, which itself fed every wish, is lightly forgotten, and secrets lightly betrayed. Men cannot curb their curiosity, and so bring disaster upon themselves; and it is curiouslylicer to see them make adventuring journeys. They make gifts freely, but give in order to receive again. They fall in love at first sight, and trust their affections easily and frequently. Passionate weeping and lamentation alternate with extravagant rejoicing or helpless dimay. It is to be feared that many have a decided aversion in their looks and bearing—or, rather, of hiding their feelings; but, when called upon they are usually found to be in a more favourable opportunity, the ethical character of their emotion or of the eventual deed of revenge is not sufficiently altered. But the tends not, or at least to save the power to strike never fails to induce the impulse of the moment; he multiplies and beholds without any serious inquiry as to the guilt or innocence of his victims; and repentance often comes too late, and when it can no longer avoid. Great is as the v nakedness of judges and officials, their credulity and capacs are a more great. Mere arbitrariness, finding expression now in extravagant kindness and now in atrocious cruelty, appears to be the sole rule of a society so constituted, while patient submission is its supreme virtue. A typical representative of a class far from uncommon in the musulm State of mediæval times has been limned by Ibn Bâjiya in a single sentence: "From the one side was never received an alms, nor the corpse of one who had been executed." The potente referred to was Muhammad Tughî, Sultan of Delhi (1215-92).

The wider psychological explanation of these various phenomena (which are without significance even for the present day) is that human history had an opportunity of asserting itself. The most telling instance of this is seen in the band-exhausted vitality of the various dynasties. A dynasty usually begins with the rise of its founder, who settle and maintain their kingdom; then its energies begin to flag, and the heritage of the fathers is consumed in an eternity of decay. A dynasty such as that of modern Mogul, which, though now apparently solution, has lasted since 1659—a era in the history of Islam. In Islam no rule ever been able to maintain its power the slaughter of relatives and even. And, while it is true that the statesmen, with all their significance for the state of moral, finding also in mediæval Christendom, yet it is in Islam that the whole art of life, including the promises of revenge, of the whole art of life, has been made an art. Men as moralists, who than the merest approximation to mixed city populations, with whom they have as little in common as with the hard-working, all-enduring Egyptian fellahin. In Western Asia the Arab brigand comes in contact with Turkish and Persian merchants, among others; the Islam, who are among the most loyal subjects of the British Crown, are very different from the Africans, a people proud of their independence. In the Dutch East Indies are found the scaffolding of a community, which as the predatory and warlike Achehese; and many more instances of diversity might be given. Notwithstanding the common faith of these peoples, they do not lay by. Then the law against taking interest stands in the way of a profitable investment of capital. The idea that the hours of work which are indispensable to success, is in itself mereious work, is an encouragement to idleness. A man's living and prosperity are supposed to be dependent, not upon work or saving, but upon wealth. Many are often reduced to want, but there are occasional festivals

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1 For the sake of brevity, the editor has not been able to include more extensive quotes from sources. However, the references provided for further reading include "Voyages, tr. de Decker, 9, Paris, 1747-49, ill. 216."
parities in Muslim countries. Slavery still exists, more particularly in the form of chumush and concubinage. The slaves, both male and female, are kept from motives of luxury and pleasure, they are relatively well treated. Such cruelties of capitalistic exploitation as we hear of in the annals of Great Britain or France, in the cases of the plantation system in the Indies and America, are seldom or never found in Islam. The Muslim owner frequently treats his slaves, and even his dumb animals, more cruelly than he does his fellow-men, and often with himself. Here, moreover, it is accounted a good and praiseworthy work to elevate slaves and then grant them their freedom.

The further division of Muslim society into classes is not everywhere the same. It strikes the Western mind as primitive, medival, or, at least, as pre-revolutionary. In India, for instance, Islam has not entirely abolished the system of caste. The inhabitants of cities in Western Asia were still segregated according to their various trade-gilds. An illustration is furnished by the membership of the first Persian Parliament, which by the constitution of the 5th of August, 1906, was to have the following denominations: (1) those of the princes and the ruling house (the only nobility in the proper sense); (2) those of learned men and students; (3) those of the merchant class; (4) those of manual laborers and peasants; and (5) those of the various industries—one member for each guild embracing from three to nine traders.

It is impossible in the space at our disposal, and especially in view of our dearth of knowledge of the morals of Islam, to deal exhaustively with the morals of all these peoples and their various social ranks. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to a few general observations regarding Muslim life as actually affected by the moral code.

Islam lays upon its followers the duty of propagating—of active effort in spreading the faith, either by the peaceful methods open to merchants and traders, or, where possible, by the holy war. This demand has pronounced moral effects. For the Muslims themselves the result is twofold: on the one hand, sinster—in so far as an impulse is given to fanaticism; and, on the other, favourable—in so far as active virtus is sustained by a sense of pride and by the consciousness of belonging to a vast and effectively expanding organization. With regard to the masses, the influence of Islam is more methodical and peaceful. Every time that there is a disturbance, a disturbance is the result of a reaction against religious rule, which is anything but propitious. There are in all some 225 millions of Muslims; but of these about 150 millions live under the British crown, 20 under Chinese, 20 under Russian, 20 under French, and so on; while the Turkish empire, the Persian empire, the Indian empire, the Egyptian empire, and the State in Europe, is now being harassed on every side. It is possible, however, that the diffusion of Islam among lower races, like those of Northern Africa, or Asia, may prove effective in raising their moral conditions to a higher level.

Throughout Islam the religious law has a powerful influence in family life. Christian writers have usually a good deal to say about the Muslim form of married life—polygamy. The law permits any man who has the requisite means to have four wives, and as many concubines as he wishes. But it should be borne in mind that this permission is circumscribed in practice by the fact that the number of women is not unlimited, as also by the economic conditions, which allow only the prosperous to maintain more than one wife. Monogamy is in all branches of the society, and is practiced by the majority of townsmen. As a matter of fact, the practice of marriage has nothing like such beneficial effects as the facility of divorce, also sanctioned by the law. It is not so much the practice of having more than one wife at a time as that of frequently changing the wife that works great moral harm in Muslim society. The husband can put away his wife at any time and for any reason, provided only he repays her dower or gives her a compensation. This extreme liberty of divorce, which is certainly incomparable with all higher cultures, is therefore a negative advantage, and the result is the derangement of domestic relations and the neglect of the family.

In most Muslim lands the position of women is an inferior one. The Qur’an explicitly declares the superiority of men. Women are treated with respect, but are, on the other hand, much more addicted to the magical arts and to the practice of visiting the graves of holy miracle-workers. The latter custom, however, has in many cases no deeper motive than visits to the hazard of the baths.

The Muslim reckons the preservation of his own life as one of his primary duties. Suicide is not even prohibited by the Qur’an, is as also the killing of one’s neighbour, though the latter prohibition is not so scrupulously observed in Islam, as elsewhere, more by circumstances than by religious law. The ordinary offences are not due to monetary rapacity or defective memory, rather than to evil will. In some respects the religious law, when it is not hypocritically evaded, tends to dlog the wheels of association and to break the spirit of the nation, and the last of the Madr—-the latter being in the main only observed—-mills against a settled and unalterable aim, much as giving, as was said above, encourages idleness. The theme of penitential interest is either enjoyment or the abstinence from, while a man daily work, or is regarded as having any ethical value. Praying, or begging, or even being insane is thought of by many as providing a more excellent career than working or trading. Study of the law is frequently prized more highly than obedience to it. In the greatest Muslim cities, like Cairo, and elsewhere, many continue to study the sacred sciences till old age—not, however, with a view to becoming useful members of society, but simply in order to win a higher place in Paradise.1 By way of instructing the faithful as to the right disposal of their wealth, the Cairo newspapers recently published the wills of a physician—a genealogist—and a shahik of the Azyar—who died in 1906.

He left one-third of his estate among the poor; a granddaughter received 3000 piastres; his books were bequeathed to his two sons, and his clothes to the poor students learned men of the Azyar.

An example of the false analogies to which the Muslim is led by his fatalistic tendencies. In God may be seen a phenomenon of the principle of insurance. A shahik of the Azyar says in a facetious manner, that life and fire insurance is to be regarded as gambling, and as contrary to the spirit of the law.

One great obstacle to the development of social morality in the East has been the time immemorial custom of the official life. Both in Persia and in Turkey, However, voices are now being raised in favour of a purer public service. Thus a celebrated punishment of 1906, the following words from his pulp: “We have, thank God, the best law in the world, which is the Qur’an, and we do not deny the law of the Europeans. But what we might well take from them is their method of appointing and superintending officials, and of collecting taxes. We have a much better way, one that needs no further explanation.”

The incapacity of governments and officials has often permitted greater freedom to prevail in the East than in the West. In various ways, and sometimes doubtless in the interests of justice and morality in a higher sense, the dead hand is compelled to move again. In the hands of devout teachers of the law these foods have been used as a weapon against the State, and the State accordingly encourages their secularization, though, as we might expect, the process is seldom carried out without fraud. Another consequence of the systematization of morality that prevails in Oriental life is that many people to conceal the fact of their wealth, as they would conceal heretical opinions. The majority, however, are either calm, the patronage of the rich, or the money-rabbi, and large retinues of servants.

The middle class, who devote themselves by preference to trading—indeed, who would regard nothing else—have generally a bad reputation for self-interest and avarice. This is probably an exaggeration. The people of the East, confined to Islam. It cannot be denied, indeed, that in the East the policy of fixed prices prevails still less in the Southern Empire, and that very many Orientals have been swayed by the spirit of avarice to falsehood. But to say that commercial honour is hereby unknown, or that the Muslim is not reckoned at all generally, is mere slander, though it may be admitted that the Muslim, like the majority of mankind, judges of truth and falsehood from the standpoint of immediate advantage rather than from that of morality.

The official moral code has less to say about the means by which a man earns his living than about the way in which he enjoys, or refrains from enjoying, his gains. But how does the matter stand in actual practice? One feature that forces itself upon the eye at once is that many morally indifferent com- munities are under a religious law that is the most severely, and are observed of all. The laws against luxury and intemperance are much less strictly adhered to. As regards luxury, indeed, some measure of disbelief is the only thing that is permitted, and it is that yet cannot commit sin; and to women, who are lost in any case; while the men are at least not allowed, in theory, to reside in brothels. Many Muslims produce a favorable impression by their unaffected manner and their temperate manners. The prohibition of the tambourine and the liquor-stores is in force, but it must be granted that with many Muslims hashish, opium, and other in- nocentakes are not only known that alcohol is consumed by many opium-smokers in Persia and Turkey, and there is also a considerable amount of wine-drinking. In India the habit of opium keeps many men from heaven, and frequently from the point of view, the Muslims of the Celestial Kingdom are said to be much more addicted to this vice than the Chinese masses.

1 CL Arminjon, in {Den of Paris, v. 1904) 592.
2 FB 279.
3 FB ii, 1903) 318.5.
With these insufficient references to the morals of contemporary life in Islam this article must draw to a close. The question as to the ethical significance of Islam for the future is one easier asked than answered. If the sacred law continues to remain a living force, and if the moral ideals thus embodied still prove helpful to peoples at a lower stage of civilization, it will in other circumstances act as an obstacle to moral development. Among more highly civilized peoples, Islam must either degenerate as an effective moral force, or adapt itself to new conditions. It must come to realize— as in many quarters, indeed, it has already realized—that the laws of Muhammad and the tradition were given in the view of the primitive conditions of an earlier age. Will the modern Muslim community, in ascertaining to this idea, be able to raise itself above the Qur'an and the sunna without surrendering Islam itself?


Another useful work is Procksch, Theologie des islamischen Handels, trad. avec notes et index, par O. Houdas et W. Marcias (Publ. de l'École des langues orientales, 2 to., Paris, 1919-20).


H. Henrici Triumegezicht, qui apud Arabes fertur de cactitutibus animae libidinis, ed. O. Harderken, Bonn, 1878; cf. also 'Muslim' sections of art. Avesta, Bishnoi, COMBINATION with DUTY.


A. Diehl, 'Akkal', in Encyclopedia (per. ed.), A.M. 1892; the same writer's O Kind! Arab. and Germ. by Hammer-Purgstall, Vienna, 1831.

D. A. de C. de Ordoñez de Palacios, Apuntes gramaticales varios: Moralia, (Colección de estudios árabes, vi.), Saragossa, 1861.


N. A. den Dûü, 'Abhik—or 'Abhîn (various ed.),


T. J. DE BOER.

ETHICS AND MORALITY (Parsi).—I. The place of ethics in religious system of the Avesta.—The religion of Zarathushtra, qualified by the Avesta and the Pahlavi books, is in the fullest sense the word a religion of morality. With the Parsis, Indian, we see the in a manner a moral interest in the take the place of the sacrificial and philosophical interests of the Brâhmans. This moral interest corresponds with the political aptitude of the Persians themselves; but the Zarathushtra ethics has it real foundation in the religious system of the Avesta. This system we know as a dualistic one (see DUALISM [Iranian]). Already in the theology of the Gâthas—the oldest part of the Avesta, originating perhaps in the time of the Prophet himself or in that of his nearest successors—we hear of the two opposing Spirits, the pure and good Spirit of Ahura Mazda and the evil and impure Angra Mainyu (Ahriman; q.v.).

'Of these two the wicked Spirit chose to do the most evil things, the holy Spirit chose Righteousness and those men who in performing acts of purity please Ahura Mazda (Gatha xiv. 22).'

'And, when the two Spirits met, they created as the first things Life and Death as the final end. What the wicked and the Good have done, the thighs of Death (Gatha iv. 2).

The conception of these principles of Life and Death is elaborated in the idea of two real empires, the one being the dominion of Zoroastrian, the other that of Ahriman. As these two empires are not divided according to the natural division of material and spiritual, they rule together in Nature, and in bodily phenomena as well as in spiritual, as do life and death, good and evil. The motto of Ormazd's empire is 'The furthering of life (fedat-gaitha), and the words are almost a war-cry in the combat; the angels of Ormazd, the Avesta Spenta (q.v.), 'Immortal Holy Angels,' are always said to 'further the living,' that they may not wither or decay; while, on the other hand, the chief of the Evil Spirits is called Pouramahkara, 'Full of Death.' From a formal and moral point of view, the two empires might be defined as Purity and Impurity—Purity containing all the vital forces of the world, Impurity all the forces of death. It is the sacred duty of mankind, and constitutes his moral righteousness, to uphold the forces of good; and so we see purity, holiness, righteousness appearing as identical conceptions, and all included under the one idea. This idea is the fundamental idea of the Zarathushtra religion. Personified, it is the angel Aes Vahitta, 'The Best Righteousness'; and, as the summum bonum, Aes Vahitta gives its name to Paradise (=New Pers. Badât). The final aim of religion, the regeneration of the world, corresponds with this idea of righteousness. It endeavours to make the world absolutely pure and righteous, free from every defilement of evil and death.

This dualistic idea, found already in the Gathas, is developed further in a mythological direction in the Pahlavi book Bûndehsh, where the Evil Spirit attempts to destroy what the Good created. He is here seen as conquered, but he is allowed to continue in the world for a time, in order that it may be perfectly manifest how bad the evil is, and that good deeds and a good life constitute the only right in the world. This tolerance of evil is to last for 6000 years, after which period the final processes leading to the victory of Ormazd begin. These 6000 years make up the period of the actual world, and so this world-period is naturally a time of struggle between the powers of Good and Evil (cf. AGES OF THE WORLD [Zoroastrian]).

The later Avesta (Vendidad, I) describes the beginning of that struggle as a twofold creation—Ahriman always creating evil, in imitation of each good thing created by Ormazd. So Nature itself becomes twofold—good things and pure creatures always mingling with the wicked inventions of the Evil One. The world of good is divided into good and evil, and so is it in the world of men: Ahriman is the chief not only of Evil Spirits, but of unbelieving men. The great Persian, Indian, we see in the former a moral interest take the place of the sacrificial and philosophical interests of the Brâhmans. This moral interest corresponds with the political aptitude of the Persians themselves; but the Zarathushtra ethics has it real foundation in the religious system of the Avesta. This system we know as a dualistic one

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Ornament is to struggle for his cause, to work out his ideas in the world, to realize the good and pure in Nature, as in the life of man. Thus the Good One and his followers struggle. Whether against the passions of their own hearts, or against the passions of the people, the final victory will depend on this collaboration of God and man. No other religion has made the work of man a condition of the ultimate success of the Divinity; and, because the system of Zarathushtra is based on the truth that a unique spirit idea enters into all, we must truly say that in a unique sense it is the religion of morality; duty being an inherent religious necessity, and moral actions the inevitable consequence of the religious spirit.

2. Morality as a struggle against the evil spirits. —This morality is, however, no morality in our modern sense of the word, the immediate struggle against the evil spirits forms a large part of the duties of man—especially of his sacrificial and ritual duties. For the priesthood the actions involved in the performance of the cult are the most important, but this cult has its meaning in the struggle against the evil spirits, and as a system of purifications to expel the evil spirits found in Nature and in human life. Against the evil spirits the priests are armed with a mighty weapon, consisting of the pure elements, and especially of the holy water, which is always kept burning as an ever active power of purification. In ordinary human life a great multitude of observances are needed for keeping the evil spirits at a distance; among these, cleanings are the most important, for evil is always considered as a form of impurity. At the same time the cleanings have the power of expelling the evil spirits; and many performances that would commend themselves to us as being practical and useful may, according to the Persian ideas, in reality effective because they expel the indwelling evil spirits. Water, for example, has a real anti-demonic efficacy, and not merely a hygienic or aesthetic value, as in our modern view. Again, after an illness all the bed-clothes must be cleansed with the utmost care, not so much to obtain clean bed-clothes as to free them from the indwelling evil spirits. Every sickness and the natural states of organic life, such as menstruation, are understood to pertain to the great realm of death and devils. Every dead thing belongs to Ahriman, is impure, and impurity must be removed. The ceremonies of cleansing are needful when one has touched a dead dog, a dead man, or any other dead body—only, however, if the creature, when living, belonged to the realm of purity.

Thus the customs of mourning imply at every step the expulsion of evil spirits, the purification of the house, the family, and the district where the evil spirit of Death has dwelt. The Parsees pray laying the dead bodies of men and of dogs to the 'Towers of Silence,' where they are exposed to the birds of heaven, in order that earth, fire, or water be not defiled by the burning or other destruction of the bodies. But, on the other hand, the corpses of evil men or of noxious animals convey no impurity, since by their death the demon has left them (Vend. v. 33-38; cf. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD [ Parsi], § 3).

3. Morality as an art of sacrifice. —Besides the actual deuce of living creatures, every state implying a poverty of life or a tendency opposed to life, in Nature and practice, is considered as a mere form of death, and as needful, naturally, of the action of evil spirits. Therefore, unfruitfulness, cold, destructive heat, withering, noxious substances, blight, weeds, harmful insects, etc., all belong to the empire of Ahriman, and are to be driven out. Thus religious duties go hand in hand with the work of civilization. In the time of Zarathushtra this civilization referred mainly to a nomadic and an agricultural community. The pious man ought to treat his cattle well, to nourish them, and not to beg for meat from sacrifices and this care for the cattle led in later Parsism to the classic symbol of pious morality. Besides these virtues of the nomad we hear much in the later Avesta of agricultural duties: the cultivation of the fields, cutting of canals, causing the roads and houses, of buildings of houses, and manufacture of agricultural implements are all important and necessary duties of the faithful. The weeding of the fields and the destruction of noxious insects and of meritorious deeds, tending to obliterate the boundaries of Ahriman's empire. The duties of an agricultural life provide the religious ideals of the Persians, and in the religious texts we continually meet with pictures drawn from agriculture which are used to illustrate the holy life.

To the question where the earth enjoys the best fortune, Ahura Mazda naturally answers: Here, "Where most sacrifices are made, the laws obeyed, and praise given to the Gods." Then follows the second answer: "There it is, where a builder builds a house and a priest and a king, who lives according to the natural life, where cattle and bohiness flourish, and food and dog, and wise and children, sufficient in abundance." And the third answer is: "This is it, where the believer grows most corn and grass and fruit; where he waters the dry soil and drains the damp" (Vendishist, ii. 1-4).

For the Parsees marriage is a holy vow, marrie, waiting for an husbandman, like a ripe maiden who goes childless, long years, as an husband, but which the soil with both arms will she bring riches, as a beloved spouse brings her child to her husband" (6b. 24:1).

With this desire for cultivation goes the representation of its religious meritoriousness and of its holy power. "Who sows corn sows holiness," is a saying of the Vendishist, which also declares: "When the barley is arranged (for threshing), the demons begin to sweat (for fear); when the mill is arranged (for grinding), the demons tremble; when the meal is arranged (for leavening), the demonic spell is removed; waiting for an husbandman, like a ripe maiden who goes childless, long years, as an husband, but which the soil with both arms will she bring riches, as a beloved spouse brings her child to her husband" (6b. 24:1).

4. Higher ideas of morality. —The norm of ethics is based upon the principle of utility contained in the Avesta. But that utility has in many cases an ideal character, and leads, at its height, to a real ethics even in our sense of the word. The productive activity of man is always highly esteemed. Nothing may be done that might curtail life in any sense. Therefore we never find any ascetic elements in the usual observances of cleanings. But every act that could diminish the fertility of man is strongly prohibited. Chastity is a necessary duty; and every form of unnatural sexual relation is forbidden and severely punished, as being under the power of evil spirits and leading not only to impurity but to the destruction of life. In the later contest with the Manicheans in Persia, the positive character of Zarathushrian ethics is always evident, and a chief point in the policy of the Zarathushtra or ethics was the resistance against the various forms of asceticism, such as celibacy, fasting, self-flagellation, and other forms of mortification of the flesh.

Besides the consideration of roads and buildings, the religious duties go hand in hand with the work of civilization.
only as pointing to social instincts necessary to the life of the community, but as being also personal qualities inherent in the highest type of Persian manhood, and giving to it its highest value. The truthfulness praised by Herodotus (i. 186) as one of the elements in Persian education includes, without doubt, the duty of speaking religious truths; so at least the art-nikāda vāzē ('true-speaking') of the Avesta is to be understood. In the name of God, might not directly the Avesta, at least in the ethics of the Pahlavi books; and here we note also how a city civilization in Persia leads to a higher moral state than that of an agricultural utilitarianism.

The inward qualities of man—the tender emotions, benevolence, thankfulness—are mentioned in the Table of Duties in the Dīn-dā Maināging-i Khrah, ch. 57. Of the thirty-three duties mentioned in that chapter we choose some characteristic ones: benevolence, truthfulness, thankfulness, contentedness, to further the welfare of the good and to be a friend of all men, to marry one's sister, to adopt children, to labour industriously, to preserve the capacities and goodwill of every one, to keep maliciousness and untruthfulness far from one's mind, not to show rancour, not to be libelous, not to be quarrelsome, not to touch the goods of travellers, and the unproven, not to give way to anger, to exercise self-control, to resist laziness, to be happy oneself and to further the happiness of others, to help the good and to protect against the evil, to be careful not to speak untruth, to be scrupulously careful in keeping one's word, to open one's house to the sick, the poor, and the traveller. This is, as we see, a composite scheme of ethics, where a very refined moral orthodoxy is combined with remnants of relatively primitive social customs—e.g., the marrying of a sister, which in the times of the Achemenians was regarded as a mark of the highest aristocracy.

5. Morality.—Parsiism being in this extreme sense of the word a religion of morality, the community naturally found a special task in upholding morality and educating the people in good works. The daily life of the priests was, of course, much taken up with ritual matters of cleansing and exorcism; but these rites included many moral and pedagogical elements—e.g., to insist that it is the duty of men to cleanse themselves from every defilement, as it is their duty to expel the devil by means of helpful works. It was the office of the priests directly to oversee and govern these multifarious exercises, and they had also to instruct husbands and wives in their duties and to punish those who were not fulfilled. The name of the priest who had the latter function, vrānas varē, 'he who works out obedience,' is very significant of the duty, and to 'work out obedience' he used a scourg called by the same name.

The system of penalties belonging to this sacred pedagogic is codified in the moral law of the Avesta, the Vendidad, whose name, 'given against the demons,' hints once more at the characteristic identification of demonology and morality in the Avesta. The idea of sin which usually meets us in this book is, therefore, essentially a juristic one. The pekā-tarn, as the sinner is called, is he who deserves corporal punishment. The conception of sin as an inward state of mind is hardly found in the Avesta.

The devout guilt is not conceived of as sin, but, from a religious point of view, as disbelief; or, in the extreme case, as worship of the evil spirits. The fulfilment of all duties is contained in the Two Good Works (Humēta, hobita, kuvresita).

Every pious man or woman may produce a great store of these three for gaining the bliss of heaven, and very holy persons, such as priests, may sometimes produce more than is needed for their own salvation. This overplus of good thoughts, words, and works is stored up in heaven as a thesaurus operum supererogatorum, to be distributed among the souls that are not sufficiently well provided for.

6. The Final Judgment.—It naturally follows from this system that the Final Judgment will turn upon the question of good works. The Zarathustritian eschatology is based on two stages of Judgment. The one corresponds to the judicium speciale of Christian theology, and is a scrutiny of individual souls; the other, the judicium generalis, is a trial of mankind as a whole.

The former is the trial before the tribunal of Mithra, on the mountain Chahāt-i Dāštī. There the souls will be weighed in the balance of the spirits, which renders no favour on any side, neither for the righteous nor yet the wicked, neither for the lords nor yet the monarchs. As much as a hair's breath it will not turn, and has no mercy, and bin who is a lost and a monarch it considers equally. In its decision, with him who is the least of mankind' (Dīn-dā Maināging-i Khrah, ii. 1200). (Tr. West, SBE xiv. 265.)

Even the soul that is acquitted is punished for its evil works by the angel Asha; then it may pass the Bridge of Judgment, Chinvet, which leads to heaven. The earth is divided from the极大 of the gulf of hell beneath (see, further, Bridge, ii. 2 (c)).

The Final Judgment is carried out on the Last Day, when the bodily resurrection takes place, and the souls, blessed and wicked together, rise again to join their bodily bodies. This judgment is an immense ordeal, in which resurrected mankind will be required to pass through the molten metal that will overwhelm the whole earth. Here the true character of existence and the remainder of life's task is fulfilled. The true fire will burn very fiercely, to the good it will appear like lukewarm milk; but in all cases was the same state of purity and holiness which was the original state before Ahriman introduced its defilements.

This Last Judgment, as we see, has much of the character of a natural process of cleansing; but in relation to the individual the formal element in the procedure appears; indeed, the idea is founded upon a principle of merciless retribution. The good Mithra, as the duty of superintending the procedure; the supreme God Ahura Mazda has no part to play at all, the idea of mercy being absolutely excluded from the accomplishment of human destiny.

Nevertheless, the religious community has the power of releasing men from the consequences of their guilt (1) by means of the Paetē, the confession of sin made at the moment of death (see Expiation and Atonement (Pars) ); and (2) by sacramental means, viz., putting the holy juice of haumīa into the ear of the dying. These dispensations are possible only in virtue of the overplus of good works at the command of the community.

Reviewing the whole field, we note the extremely formal and rather juristic character of the Zarathustrian ethic, while the Persian genius for utilitarianism and things practical always enters into the scheme of righteousness and justice. In the individual life, this ethic approves industry, self-control, and rectitude; in social life—righteousness, regularity, and social acceptability. This ethic is an abstract stiffness that will not accommodate itself to life, and whose irrational consequences are often inimical to life. The Zend-Avesta, monotonous and God-given, leaves no room for the intermediate stages of real life, for the individual and spontaneous states in the soul of man. The Persians cared little for
the emotions of disinterestedness; even in the religious feelings we feel too often the want of lyric elements; on the contrary, we always feel the heavy burden of the necessity. In accordance with this, 'religion' in the Avesta is called 'law' (deintu), and the Persians could not distinguish between the two ideas.

ETHICS AND MORALITY (Polynesian, Melanesian, and Malayan).—The character of the Polynesians has been painted both in the brightest and in the darkest colours. The truth seems to lie between the two extremes, and an explanation to be found in the fact that the Polynesian is a child of nature, and, like all children, under the sway of each passing emotion. It was the better side of the Polynesian character which led the early voyagers. Their lightheartedness, their ceremonious courtesy, and their abstinence from petty quarrels led their European discoverers to fancy that there was a golden spot in the future. Yet the same childish superficiality which filled them with unrestrained joy could fill them in an instant with melancholy which might not stop even at suicide. Nor was their lightheartedness always ingenuous; it often formed a cloak for falsehood and treachery. In many of these cases the Europeans were not free from blame, provoking, by their violence and licentiousness, such revenge as the weaker natives could fairly give. The more correct side of the Polynesians themselves, so that wars were conducted by ambush rather than by open attack. One of their leading characteristics was revenge, which was often conceived for years with deep secrecy until a fitting opportunity occurred for its gratification. This principle of revenge, which, it must be borne in mind, is reckoned a virtue rather than a vice among many peoples, frequently led to the vendetta. Thievory and robbery were considered commendable and skilful when practised against foreigners; yet among themselves or towards those who had been adopted into their midst as brothers, the Polynesians evidenced a high code of honour. In like manner, they possessed the primitive virtues of hospitality and generosity, though these qualities, like their honesty, suffered from the coming of the whites. Indolent and idle at work, the Polynesians were, nevertheless, devoted to war; yet flight was not regarded as a disgrace. The Tahitians regarded wounds in battle as marks of awkwardness and foolishness. Their wars were conducted with the utmost cruelty and with pitiless barbarity towards captives, though, on the other hand, there was in New Zealand and Tonga a noble recognition of a prisoner's valour. Closely allied with their bravery in war was their pride, even though this sometimes degenerated into vanity. In the use of spirituous liquors the Polynesians were originally extremely temperate, but their licentiousness, especially in Tahiti, was almost incredible. The police system was by no means lacking among the Polynesians. Noble deeds were admired, and the Tongans struck the keynote of hedonistic ethics when they said: 'After a good dinner a man should sleep, and if he were otherwise disposed, he should sleep his sleep or be content. Shame for theft or other unseemly deeds was by no means rare, and the ethical sense grew steadily higher with ascent in the social scale. The position of women throughout Polynesia was comparatively high, although they were not considered equal to men. Ill-treatment was rare, and women were often admitted to the councils, possessing an influence over the laws of their tribes. Pre-natal chastity was unknown, excepting in the higher classes, and the utmost indecency in conversation and jests prevailed throughout the islands, especially in Tahiti. After marriage, chastity was not strictly preserved, though occasional. The Tahitians were not averse to taking advantage of the weakness of their wives, and they married and fathered children more readily than was the case with the Polynesians. On the other hand, those who were unfaithful to a husband by the blood-covenant might regard his wife or wives as their own. From this must be distinguished a husband's possession of his wife, especially to Europeans. Unnatural and secret vices, as well as incest, were disgracefully common, all combining with the general licence to aid in the decay of the Polynesian race. Parents met with no want of esteem from their children, yet, despite the prevalence of infanticide and abortion, they were devoted to those who were allowed to survive. The status of slaves was toilsome, yet relatively merciful. Punishments consisted of fines, and the penalties being death and mutilation, while the lex talionis was common throughout the Polynesian Islands, and extended not only to the criminal but to the family, although pecuniary compensation was not unknown.

The character of the Melanesians was ethically inferior to that of the Polynesians. Thus theft was extremely common, especially in Fiji, where it was punished only when committed against compatriots. In like manner, the Melanesians were notorious for their falsehoods, except that one's own deeds were never denied. Proud and revengeful to the last degree, they forgot no injury, seeking retribution by murder and by black magic. They were cruel, but were cowardly rather than brave. On the other hand, the Melanesians were very susceptible to civilizing influences, and in their courtesy and hospitality were little inferior to the Polynesians.

The position of women was less elevated among them, however, since wives were obliged to do the heavier sorts of work and to surrender the greater part of the adornments to the men. Their condition was particularly deplorable in the Fiji Islands, where they were in the absolute power of their husbands, and were frequently maltreated. Melanesian women were far more jealous than Polynesian sisters, even the unmarried girls observing strict chastity. In the Fiji Islands sexual relations were unknown before the young men had reached the age of eighteen or twenty—a restraint which in its time checked the shameful procris which prevailed in Polynesia. In Melanesia strong affection prevailed, for the most part, between parents and children, and they were carefully educated, although they had no ethical training. The practice of infanticide was shockingly prevalent, two-thirds of the children in Fiji being killed as soon as they were born—often by people who made this their profession; girls were the chief victims, because they were more likely to be deserted. Abortion was also extremely common; yet, if an infant survived the first day, it was safe, and was treated with all tenderness. The immorality of infanticide and the murder of the un Petticoat is not the abstract. The belief that human beings lived in the future life in the age and the estate in which they were at death. The aged, or those afflicted with long and tedious illnesses, were either taken care of and in their lifetime or by abandonment. The sick and aged themselves desired to die thus, and it was accounted a tribute of love for sons to put them to death. Whether the practice of cannibalism may properly be considered
as appertaining to ethics is somewhat doubtful, but it is spreading under the prevalent idea that this characteristic is prevalent throughout both Polynesia and Melanesia. (See Cannibalism.)

The characteristics of the Polynesians and Melanesians are most clearly described in Tahiti and Fiji respectively. The one people was facile, mercurial, social, relatively cultured, kind, and chivalrous, but marred by an all-pervading and encraving sensuality; the other was cruel, treacherous, and inferior to the kind of virtue in almost every respect save that of sexual purity.

Literature.—Waltz—Gerland, Anthropologie des Naturvolker (Leipzig, 1873), vili. 106-115, 120-121, 133-145, 207, 223-227,


LOUIS H. GRAY.

ETHICS AND MORALITY (Roman).—

Sources.—In scarcely any field of Roman life are we so conscious of the paucity of our sources as in that of ethics and morality. For the earliest period we seem at first sight fairly well supplied, for we have, or seem to have, a multitude of anecdotes and figures from which to draw picture of the virtuous early Romans, but in the later and decadent period of antiquity took such retrospective satisfaction. But, once we have caught up with modern scientific progress in the matter of Roman history, these figures, and even the legends of the early Roman race, are reduced to the mere folk narrative and are unscientific. Modern theories of anthropology and primitive psychology take their place. With the beginning of Roman literature our situation improves; but this literature is to a high degree dependent upon Greek models; and, even where it reflects Roman feeling, the latter is merely that of the intellectual classes. Nor does the advent of Greek philosophy, with its formal teaching of ethics, succeed in any considerable sense in enlarging our vision. But, during the Empire at least, the multitude of inscriptions and our knowledge of Oriental cults diminish our darkness.

In spite of these obstacles, the following outline seems tolerably sure; in it an attempt has been made to sketch the evolution of the moral attitude of the Romans from the earliest times until the conquest of Christian ideas. It does not attempt to trace the development on Roman soil of ethics as a philosophical discipline. This is not possible, simply because no such development ever took place. Roman philosophy, to be sure, dealt profusely with the subject of ethics; but it took its origin from Greece, not merely at the beginning, but in every individual attempt, during all its history. It does not, therefore, represent so much a Roman development as the reflection, among Roman writers, of a development which took place in Greece and the Hell-speaking lands.

The ethical development of any people is a continuous process; but, though the process is continuous, it is, nevertheless, subject to change of speed, and may be accelerated or retarded by circumstances. The acceleration is usually due to the pressure of outside influence, while a lack of foreign impact often tends to quiescence and lethargy in the moral sphere. In Rome's history, between the foundation of the city and the accession of Constantine, there are three such accelerations: the first (in the 6th cent. B.C.), caused by the coming of the Etruscans; the second (in the 3rd cent. B.C.), caused by the victories of the Punic wars; and the third (in the Julian-Augustan age), caused by the influence of Greek philosophy and Oriental culture.

1. The period before the coming of the Etruscans.—In the phraseology of the orthodox history of Rome, this is the period of 'the Early Kingdom.' In it we are confronted with a series of pictures of heroic virtue. The chief reason why these stories have been discussed is, that the morality of the early Romans have used these stories as evidence, thus unwittingly spreading under the prevalent idea that this characteristic is prevalent throughout both Polynesia and Melanesia. (See Cannibalism.)

In the sphere of religion it is relatively easy to trace the effects of this patriotic instinct. But its effects were also perceived in the moral sphere. The chief example of this is the extension of the rights of Kin to those who have no kin.
The mass of accumulated power must be put to a purpose. The fulfilment of this purpose became a duty. Thus virtus adds to virility the idea of value, and the patria takes its place alongside the family as the object of patriotic ambition. But the new state of affairs continued until the end of the Second Punic War, or, in other words, until the beginning of the 2nd cent. B.C. It is scarcely an accident that at the opening of this 2nd cent. we have the remarkable words of the old Catu in the introduction to the treatise, de Agri Cultura—words which seem to sum up the whole ethical situation. Speaking of what their ancestors (maiores nostri) thought, he says:

And when they praised a man and called him good, they praised him in this fashion, that they called him a good farmer or a good tiller of the soil. And he who was thus praised, they considered to be praised indeed. For from farmers are begotten the strongest men and the bravest soldiers. The action which has added to it conquest; and the whole ethical system gradually adjusts itself to this new valuation. Henceforward, actions are good or bad, not simply as they assist or retard the progress of the State, but also as they further or retard the progress of the State.

3. The last two centuries of the Republic.—The Second Punic War and the wars of the 2nd cent. B.C. brought to Rome great material prosperity. Riches increased with astonishing rapidity, and large private fortunes became less and less uncommon. At first these riches were solemnly and frugally invested in lands, but such investments served only to increase the problem, by increasing the riches themselves. Thus began the spending of money for luxury, and, later, for mere extravagance. But, as the rich grew richer, the poor grew, if not correspondingly, at least considerably, poorer; and, in any case, the gulf between the two extremes of society grew open more widely. The effect of riches and of poverty was in so far similar that each alike begat in difference to ideis. The simple life of the fathers was impossible for either class: for the one, because they were choked with riches; for the other, because they were throttled by poverty. Thus the fashion in art was not about two decades after Cato’s death before a man was ‘good’ according to the extent of his riches—the essential bona—rather than because he was a good farmer or a good citizen. That was already true which Cicero says (de Rerum Fam., II. 31): ‘In their ignorance of virtue, they call those the “best men” who live in riches and plenty.’ Similar phrases are found a century and a half earlier in Plautus (Curculio, 479; Captivi, 385); and, though here they doubtless go back to Greek originals, they could count upon an answering echo in the Roman audience. The commercializing of ethics was the inevitable accompaniment of the general commercializing of human life. The greater maxims of severe frugality and patriotic zeal were not entirely forgotten, and they lived on with considerable power among the now despised farming classes; but gradually, at least, good manners and poverty were incommensurable; and the favourite phrase of Cicero, ‘all good men’ (omnes boni), referred in actual practice to respectable well-to-do citizens. Certainly, in Cicero’s informal moments, when he was not in the mood to express his real feelings, for example, in his correspondence, it is so used (ad Att., viii, 1, 3).

But, in spite of their apparent profligateness, the last two centuries of the Republic, by this very luxury and self-indulgence, were working out an ethical salvation. By a strange psychological antimoncy, through self-indulgence ethical individuality was born; and in the reaction from the depths of sensuous luxury we have the new and severe ethic of individual moral responsibility, which is one of the great epochs and lastperiod—the Empire to Constantine.

4. The Empire until Constantine.—The result of the general development of ideas which characterized the century since the beginning of the second Empire, was such a condition of scepticism in the realm of theory, and of sensuous materialism in the world of practice, that a moral revolution could not fail to follow. This new idea of morality was based upon the concept of the individual, and his responsibility. It was, doubtless, assisted in its development by the ethical theories of Greek philosophy, which now began to be popular in Rome; but it does not owe its rise entirely to these theories. The influence of Oriental cults was, at least among the masses, stronger than that of Greek philosophy. But both these influences worked side by side; and, although they were based on entirely contrary principles, they seem to have lived together without jealousy or interference. Thus we have the two great crusades for moral regeneration: that of the philosophers, especially the ascetic preachers, proclaiming the doctrine that moral regeneration comes from knowledge, that to know the truth is to do it, and, conversely, that sin is merely ignorance; and that of the priests of the various Oriental cults (of Magna Mater, Isis, Mithra), proclaiming that men are saved from sin and its consequences, not by knowledge, but by faith. It was the latter idea especially which affected almost all classes. The attempt to bring philosophy to the masses was destined to fail; but, where Stoicism failed, Mithra conquered. The world has seldom witnessed a more strenuous moral atmosphere than that which existed during the first two centuries of the Empire. Perhaps the most powerful proof of this statement is to be found in the fact that even the Oriental cults themselves were purified and spiritualized by their residence in Rome. See MITHRAISM.

Thus it came to pass that the Christian ethic, radically different as it was in many respects from that of the other Oriental religions which survived, not only was itself the best that could be associated with the accepted morality of the day; and its teachings, which would have been almost entirely unintelligible to society in the time of Sulla, were in many respects commensurable with the world of Trajan. There were, however, points of disagreement; and, by an unfortunate accentuation of certain Oriental interpretations of the Christian ethic, the old pagan ethic of patriotism engaged in conflict with the whole Christian system. The conflict raged for centuries, through Julian on to Gratian and to the altar of Victoria, and on to Alaric’s capture of Rome, until in Augustin’s City of God it reached at least a partial solution.


JESSE BENEDICT CARTER.

ETHICS AND MORALITY (Teutonic).—The term ‘ethics’ can be used in this connection only in its general sense of ‘ethical ideas’ or recognition of moral obligations, and by no certain that no idea of a system of ethics had ever suggested itself to the early Teutonic mind.

1. Sources of information.—No race has left so much literature behind it with so little of a merely didactic or theoretical nature. All the heathen Teutonic peoples, so far as we can judge, seem to...
have been intensely interested in conduct, but mainly as revealing character, not as illustrating abstract principles of right and wrong. In ancient Teutonic society there was no class set sufficiently apart from the ordinary business of life to survive it as a whole, like the poets of early Greece or the Druids of Celtic heathendom. The poets, lawgivers, and saga-tellers were fighters and farmers as much as everybody else, and even the priests were not a caste apart—except possibly in England—but only chiefs with priestly functions superadded. Perhaps it is significant that it is in early Anglo-Saxon poetry that we find those traces of expression on moral issues, as well as a facility in the expression of ethical ideas, which are so noticeably absent in all other early Teutonic literature; but it is most probable that these characteristics are the result of the early conversion of England to Christianity.

Most of the foreigners who had any opportunity of observing the manners and customs of the Teutonic races were missionaries, to whom the ethical ideas of the heathen made an appeal, so that we can depend very little on outside judgments. From an earlier date, however, the "Germania" of Tacitus gives an admirable outline of the social life of the early Teutonic people. A.D., and everything we know of these races in later times goes to show that Tacitus' observations on their code of morality were in the main correct. Still, in the absence of all open utterance on ethical ideals by the people themselves, we are driven back on the more or less unconscious self-revelation of the old hero cycles and sagas, in which the more choice of subject betrays where the moral interest of the writer lies. It is necessary for us to bear in mind that the period covered is a long one—ten centuries—and that our sources usually reflect the ideas of the ruling classes only.

2. Teutonic virtues—Such virtues as were vital to the continued existence of the society naturally ranked first in public opinion, and of these (1) the first and foremost was courage. Lack of courage is the one unpardonable sin.

Tacitus ("germ., vi) tells us that a German who abandons his shield in battle has committed the basest of crimes, and is subject to death. The sacred rites, and that the man who adds that many, after escaping from battle, have ended their lives with the saber. No less emphatic is the curse pronounced by the Teutonic poets, especially in the Songs of Beowulf the elder, "Hateson Beowulf," and it, too, ends significantly: 'Death is better for every well-beloved chief who has lived his life. (Beowulf, ed. Harrison and Sharp, 4th ed., Boston, 1901, line 2891 f.)'

Many a good man doomed himself to death at the hands of his superiors to escape the superior force of enemies because he could not bear the ignominy to the idea of seeking safety in flight. Even treachery to friends and kinmen can be condoned or understood, but no one will listen to a justification of an act of physical cowardice. Many tales reveal how far courage takes precedence of all the other virtues. The faithfulness with which Gunnar and Hognn lay their foster-brother Sigurd, in the Volsung story, is wiped out in the eyes of posterity by their heroic death at the court of Ath, and their still more heroic acceptance of defeat. The mind unshaken by adversity is the object of the Teuton's highest admiration. An almost American Indian stoicism underlies that grim humor and acceptance of death or wounds which strikes us so keenly in the Northern stories.

"Thormod, St. Olaf's scald, dragging a death-arrow from his breast after the battle of Skidkast, knew it as he dies and observes: 'Well hath the King led us, fat am I yet at the heart's root.' (Heilungsbringe, Morris-Magnusson's tr., 1902-5, ii, 442.)" When Thormod's descendant Gjaun hall in Iceland seeks to see if he is within, he returns mortally wounded to his companion, who asks Gjaun if he is there. 'You can learn that,' he says, 'what I found out is that his halberd was at home,' and falls dead ("Gerson-Sklanda, ed. F. Jónsson, 1905, ch. 77").

""The forbidding death of friends or kinmen is also admired, but the betraying of feeling under such circumstances is readily condoned, even in the aged, though we can feel the saga-writer's admiration in the tale of the old Viking Thorarin, who learns of the slaying of his son with apparent phlegm, with only a casual inquiry as to his defence, and all the while fumbles with the uncertain hand of age at a dagger with which he attempts to avenge his son. 'Enduring of toil, hunger, and cold, whenever fortune lays it on them,' says Geoffrey of Malatera of the Normans; and every expedition in the undecided Viking ships must have been a training ground of such qualities. Anglo-Saxons, in the poem on the battle of Maldon, supplies us with those two lines which are a very epitome of Teutonic ideals of courage and endurance:

'Our souls be steady, our hearts the higher,
Our mettle the more, the more our might be minimish.'

(3) But in modern eyes perhaps the noblest of the early Teutonic virtues is the supreme loyalty which inspired the followers of any chief or king. A man could choose whom he would follow, or whether he would attach himself to any one, but, once his choice was made and he had become the man of some great, he was bound by his allegiance. Loyalty transcends all other duties, and will lead men to arraign the gods, and defy Fate itself, as they fall in the last rally by their leader's side, like Bjarki in the story of Hrolf Kraki, as told by Saxo. Tacitus and the Beowulf concur in saying that it is a reproach for life to have survived the chief in battle. Even in the 12th cent., when the old Teutonic virtues were dying out, the young Icelandic Art. Tórunn, makes a shield of his body for his Norwegian lord, standing weaponless between him and his enemies. This is self-sacrifice born of courage, but the idea of loyalty fostered other virtues besides that of courage—virtues which otherwise would hardly have flourished on Teutonic soil. Tacitus tells us that the chief fights for victory, his vassals fight for their chief that to assuage one's own brave deeds to one's chief, to increase his renown, is the height of loyalty. The self-forgetfulness, the abnegation involved can be gauged only by those who realize that personal fame was the highest ideal of the Teutonic warrior. Loyalty was not confined, however, to the warriors by profession, but permeated the whole fabric of Teutonic society. Every little Icelandic farmer expects that his 'kindred men,' his friends, will cheerfully sacrifice their lives on his behalf, and the obligation even extends to the chance guest, so that many a Norwegian merchant in Iceland lost his life in a quarrel that was not his. The call of loyalty is yet stern in one case on record. Ingimund the Old has been slain by a base and unworthy hand; and, on receiving the news, one of his old shipmates declares: 'It is not fit for the friends of Ingimund to live,' and falls on his sword. His example is followed by another of Ingimund's old shipmates, who will cheerfully sacrifice their lives on his behalf, and the obligation even extends to the chance guest, so that many a Norwegian merchant in Iceland lost his life in a quarrel that was not his. The call of loyalty is yet stern in one case on record.

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in his house, at the bidding of his father, Harald Fairhair, because Egil had been addicted to drink and thence to breach of duty and ‘molestation of churchyard’, says Heimskringla (Morris-Magnússon’s tr. 1954).

(6) Truth was highly esteemed virtue among the Teutonic race. Tacitus ( Germ. xxii.), calls them ‘a race without natural or acquired cunning’—an estimate which may be partly inspired by the natural attribute of a sophisticated race towards a barbaric one: for, in the earliest Scandinavian chronicles already quoted calls the Normans ‘gens astutissima,’ and the somewhat cynical Edda poem Hávamál has no hesitation in advising its hearers to flatter a false slanderous friend and to conceal enemies (12, 45). But Saxo, the early historian of the Danes, says that ‘the illustrious men of old thought lying most dishonourable’; and it may be said that the sagas reveal a high ideal of straightforwardness in general. It is characteristic of the Northern trend of thought that there was no sin in a slaying openly confessed, but an indescribable busines in a secret or a midnight slaying, which was qualified as murder. To lie to a friend would certainly have been thought a business, and we meet with individuals who would rather risk their lives than impair their self-respect by lying. The accounts of the early Norwegian kings and their relatives reveal that flattery, at least, was not one of the best traits of the Teutonic character. Great sanctity attached to oaths and promises of every sort, and nothing was held to excuse breaches of faith, though instances, especially of truce-breaking, are found even when ordered down and the sagas oftener after than before the introduction of Christianity. To the recognition of an obligation to strict veracity in the recital of stories we owe much of our knowledge of ancient Teutonic customs.

(7) Modesty, strangely enough, entered into the ideal of the perfect warrior in Iceland, and boastfulness was regarded with more contempt than censure. In the epics of the heroic age, however, boasting is freely indulged in.

So far we have been dealing with qualities or obligations which are still recognized as virtues and duties in modern ethical systems. We catch glimpses of a time when it was an absolutely binding obligation, but in all Teutonic States the system of his principal compensation had been adopted before historical times, to mitigate the recognized evils of blood-feuds. But among a race which, from the time of Tacitus onwards (Germ. xiv.), rather than the idea of getting, it was hardly to be expected that every one should be willing to ‘put his (slain) kinsman in his pocket,’ as the saying went. The Icelandic sagas give us a vivid picture of the havoc wrought by blood-feuds that the custom of vengeance in the early history of that country is a matter of common knowledge, but its persistence in country districts in Germany is not so generally realized. In many parts vengeance was held to be obligatory, not only on nobles, down to the 16th century.

Thus our source tells us that in 1577 a Holstein peasant named Grannan, who had more or less accidentally slain another, was killed by the deceased brothers with 48 wounds. These brothers were proceeded against in a court of law, but were never condemned. They, as late as on the 28th of November, to have been customary for the relatives to hang up the corpse of their slain kinsman under their roof until they had acquitted themselves of the duty of vengeance. In England, so early Christianized, the current ideas concerning this duty are quarterly revealed in a verse made on King Edward’s death in 1067:

"Him would not avenge
A kinsman’s kinman
him has his heavenly father
greatly avenged." (Gest. Sæmundi, ed. Anna 976 [Gonne’s tr. 1909]).

The idea that vengeance alone can wipe out an insult was prevalent, and has persisted to this day in the Continental attitude towards duelling (q.v.)
(9) In the matter of sexual morality the heathen Germanic races have always had a high reputation since the time of Tacitus, and on this point Christian priests have added their testimony to his (see Sect. 167). This is not otherwise capricious: the marriage code, says Tacitus, is strict, and no part of their manner is more praiseworthy. Almost alone among the Teutonic peoples, a divorce by consent with one wife excites a very few among them, and these not from sensuality, but because their noble birth procures for them many offers of alliance ('Germ. xvi. 17).{25}

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Chandler's correspondence is equally unknown to men and to women (ib. xix.).

This description needs little modification to fit the customs of a much later age. It was the practice to King Harold Fairhair to have several wives, but it must be especially noted that this polygamy involved no harim, for it seems that for the most part each wife continued to live with her own family or in the part of the country where she was born. The Icelandic sagas indicate that divorce was easily obtainable—apparently on trifling grounds; but the fates of Brynhild and Sigurd, of Gudrun and Kjartan in the Lay of the Fate-Sagas, of Íjón the Hildate Champion, and Oddny, show that the persons wrongly nated make no attempt to throw off the marriage bond in order to be free to marry another—presumably because such action was impossible. It is not entirely out of jealousy that the Icelandic Gudrun brings about the death of the man she loves, but because only so can she rid herself of the degradation of preferring another man to her husband, and of the continual temptation of that other's presence. She prefers his death to dishonour.

Tacitus tells us of the punishment of a faithless wife; but later sources, Icelandic and Norweigan, mention the worry for the woman though they speak of a heavy fine to be exacted from her lover. The old Norwegian laws make the ecclesiastical fine for conjugal infidelity the same for either sex.

(10) Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the ethical ideas of the Teutons is that the ethical ideal was the same for both sexes. Women do not fight, but the wife, according to Tacitus, does not "stand apart from aspirations after noble deeds or from the perils of war, but is her husband's partner in toil and danger, destined to suffer and to dare with him alike in peace and in war (Germ. xvii.); and easier he tells us how the dauntless courage of the women has been known to rally warring forces in battle (ib. viii.). For Helen of Troy, for the Irish Deirdre, beauty and an unhappy love have been the stimuli to bitter and useless flight to fire the Germanic imagination women have needed these and more; the character that shapes destiny, the courage which does not blench before responsibility, the truth which seems to evade consequences. Such are Brynhild, Gudrun, Hervor, Svanhild, and the Anglo-Saxon Hildegryth of the Waldere-fragment (C. W. M. Grein, Angelsleben. Bibliothek, i. [1885] ff. It is perhaps significant that Germanic hero-legend exalts no woman who has yielded to a dishonourable love. The Icelandic sagas not only attribute these greater virtues to women, but expect them to urge the love of fair play and a high sense of honour on their men-folk, if these fail to realize their public responsibilities.

Grískelda is no Teutonic conception. In one minor detail a sharp line is drawn between the sexes: drinking to excess at feast is no reproach to men, but is unheard of in women.

3. Ethical motives and sanctions.—(1) If we regard the ethical ideas of the Teutonic races as a whole, the point that strikes us is that though the ideal of generosity has struck moderns as blameable, and it originated in an epoch when wealth was of little use save to attach warriors to one's cause. And if the Teutonic ideal of the community was strongly felt as a deterrent to crime, far more did its praise act as an incentive to virtue. From the time of their supremacy in Europe until their racial consciousness was merged in their citizenship of the Roman Church, the quest of glory called forth much that was best in the Teutonic race; and in judging it as a motive we must remember that there has barely lasted a renown—a fame that extended as far as the Teutonic race, so that the selfsame hero might be sung from the north of Africa to Greenland. We cannot
wonder that even the cynical Hävementi is inspired to the noble verse:

'Chattels die, kinmen die,
Von fame dies never.'

'But fame dies never.'

For if the formula has won it worthy 'Utea,' 79.

(4) But the deepest, most potent sanction of morality was an internal one: the sense of personal integrity, the sturdy self-respect, the fear of that sense of degradation which was probably as near as the heathen Teuton ever approached to the sense of sin.

Literature.—Tacitus, Germania; the Older Edda (B. Sjömen's text, Helge, 1859-1901; an English tr. by O. Bray, London, 1907; and in Vigfusson-Powell's Corpus Poeticae Boreale, Oxford, 1893; the Idothic Stages (some of which have been translated by Morris Magnussen, in the Saga Library, etc.; Norska Saga and Gida Saga have been translated by O. W. Daseet (Edinburg, X), the last ed. 1900; Gida, 1860); and Laxdale Saga, by A. G. Press (London 2nd ed. 1900). O. Jöse, Detente Heldnesjon, Strassburg, 1899 (Eng. tr. by M. Bentneck-Smith, London, 1902); the older epic. Little attention has been paid to the subject by modern scholars. A. Oirk's Nordisches Geisteleben, Heidelberg, 1898, is an able and sympathetic work by a man who has had so much occasion to know all known data bearing on the inter-relations of the several members of the human family, regarded not as independent groups, but as mutually related and interwoven unions, a result which anthropology has been able to ascertain by the close connexion between these divisions; and the most important problem which it has to solve is whether all races really constitute not distinct species, still less genera, but only varieties of a single genus and are ranging from about four to sixteen or even more—or certainly not yet extinct. But the tendency of modern thought is undoubtedly towards Mono-genesis, which postulates not only one such distinct group and a single division, but four major or relatively fundamental divisions separately evolved in four corresponding geographical areas reached by migration from a single cradle-land. A return to the old notion of the ‘ooman and his stress’ to the sober teachings of Linné, in whose Order of Anthropomorphe man appears as one genus with one species, ‘cujus specieis Europeas obius, Americanus refusenas, Asiaticus fames, Africicus ingenester’ (Syst. Nat.), ed. 1758, p. 3).

This scheme, forming the solid basis of all rightly directed ethnological studies, is frankly accepted by Sir William Flower, in whose Sub-Order of Anthropomorphe the (Linné's varietates) constitute the fifth and highest family, coming nearest to, but still independent of, the Similde, that is, the four groups of the so-called man-apes; Gibbon, Chimpanzees, Gorilla, Orang-utan.

These Homo, with their numerous diverging and converging sub-forms, are the proper study of Ethnology, which thus seeks to determine their origin, primal home, antiquity, and early migrations, their distinctive physical and mental character, social and cultural developments, and, especially for our purpose, their religious notions, not as separate units, but as interconnected members of the human family.

2. Specific unity of mankind.—(a) Perhaps the most convincing proof of common descent from one stock is afforded by what Broc calls their Eugenics, the complete and permanent fertility of unions between all races inter se. Such crossings between the highest and the lowest and all intervening grades have been places in which the physiological test has been so universally applied that there are no longer any pure races, except perhaps a few isolated groups, such as the Andamanese, the Negritos, and some of the New Oceanic negritos. Miscegenation is everywhere the rule, and all peoples are now essentially hybrids, representing both diverging and converging types of the original prototypes, which must now be regarded as mainly ideal. Accordingly in the Stone Ages we are intermingling of long-heads from North Africa with short-heads from Asia, resulting in the present Europeans. In recent times these Europeans migrating to the New World have formed fresh amalgams with the aborigines; and the Hispanic-American and Lusitano-American Mestizos now number little short of 50,000,000, and in many places (Mexico, Salvador, Colombia) the rather unexpected result that the fertility among half-breeds is considerably larger than among full-blood women (F. Boss). The Bovianers of British Guiana form a vigorous half-caste community, 'descendants of the old Dutch settlers by Indian squaws' (Henry Kirk), and most of the present South African Hotentots are also Dutch and native half-breeds. To realize the full force of this argument, we have only to consider how impossible such a result would be on the Polygenist assumption. Distinct human species originating in Pliocene or at least early Pleistocene times could not now be racially fertile, and their unions would serve only to illustrate the opposite law of konogenesis.

(b) Specific unity is further shown in the prevailing physical and mental uniformity of all peoples. As these points will again engage our attention, it will suffice here to remark with E. B. Tyler that 'all tribes of men, from the blackest to the whitest, the most savage to the most cultured, have such general likeness, in the structure of their bodies and the working of their minds, as is easiest and best accounted for by their being descended from a common ancestor, however distant' (Anthropology, p. 5).

But, it is urged on linguistic grounds, languages differ specifically and are so diverse, that four major or relatively fundamental divisions separately evolved in four corresponding geographical areas reached by migration from a single cradle-land. And, it is here that the argument runs into a fallacy, for it is at once become clear, when we reflect that the stocks in question are reckoned not by tens or scores, but literally by the hundred, so that quod minus probat nihil probat. In the United States and the Dominion of Canada alone such an enumeration of sixty stock languages; and as on this hypothesis, each of these represents a stock race, we should have in North America alone some sixty specifically distinct human groups, though de facto all are admixed very much alike, scarcely distinguishable physically or mentally one from the other. The facts relied upon merely show that race and speech are not convertible terms, that there is no arguing from one to the other. This may now be taken as axiomatic in Ethnology.

3. Origin: centre of dispersion: migratory routes.—Specific unity may thus be removed from
the sphere of speculation, and accepted as an established fact with all its far-reaching consequences. A first consequence is that man, being one, had but one cradle, whence he peopled the earth by migration. This cradle has been sought in all quarters of the globe—in the Arctic regions now covered with ice, in the Austral lands now flooded by the Indian Ocean, in the Eastern and Western hemispheres, in Asia the reputed officina gentium, in Africa, and recently Wijsenburg in Europe, and more particularly in Scandinavia (South Sweden). But none of these lands has made good its claim, and the tendency now is to look for the centre of origin and dispersion in South-East Asia, where it breaks away into the insular Malaysian world.

The latter view, which for the present at least may be said to hold the field, has acquired a certain consistency from the discovery made in 1892 by Eugène Dubois of some distinctly human remains embedded in the late Pliocene deposits of the Solo river in the Trinil district of East Java. These highly fossilized remains of Pithecanthropus erectus, as they have been named by the finder, include a femur, two molars, and portion of a skull, and are regarded by Manouvrier, Deniker, Hepburn, and most other competent judges, as undoubtedly those of a human creature. The capacity of the skull (950 to 1000 cubic centimetres) shows that it could not have belonged to any of the allied anthropoids, none of which even now exceeds 600 c.c., while the perfectly human femur makes it clear that this Javanese prototype could already walk erect. In the accompanying diagram he is seen to diverge, not from any of the living Simians, but from a common anthropoid stem having its roots far back in the Miocene; and that is the now commonly accepted view regarding the line of human ascent. The same diagram shows that, as regards its mental powers, as indicated by its cranial capacity, the Javan "man" (the expression covering a pre-glacial, two or more inter-glacial, and a post-glacial epoch)—thus coincides with the first migratory movements, which may be conceived as advancing and receding with the spread and retreat of the ice-cap, but were all completed, if not during the inter-glacial, certainly in the post-glacial (early Pleistocene), epoch. That is to say, the earth was first occupied by a generalized Pleistocene prototype, which northerly and southerly specialized into the four fundamental varieties in the four above-mentioned geographical areas. The main divisions of mankind may thus be regarded as respectively descended in their several zones from four undifferentiated Pleistocene ancestral groups.

This view of human origins at once removes some of the greatest difficulties that systematists have hitherto encountered, and at the same time accounting in a reasonable way for many phenomena which must otherwise remain inexplicable. Thus the four varieties, springing independently from four generalized Pleistocene ancestors, become each specialized in its own domain, and need no longer be derived one from the
other—black from white, yellow from black, and so on,—a theory which both on physiological and on physiographical grounds has always presented all the difficulty of any anthropologist. Indeed, no anthropologist has yet seriously grappled with the insoluble problem presented by conditions which, as we now see, have no existence. To suppose that the highly specialized group, as say, originally black, migrating from continent to continent, became white in one region or yellow in another is a violent assumption which can never be verified, and should on reflexion be rejected. However as a group, if placed in an environment quite different, it would probably have died out long before it had time to become acclimatized. The fundamental racial characters are the result of slow adaptation to their special surroundings. They are what climate, soil, diet, heredity, natural selection, and time have made them, and are of too long standing to be effaced or blurred except by miscegenation, a process rendered possible by primitive union.

5. Early works of man: Old and New Stone Ages. By descent from common Pleistocene ancestors is also more readily explained by the sura- 

unting resemblance, amounting to identity, which is everywhere presented both by the earliest skeletal remains of primitive man and by the first rude objects of primitive culture. Such are the skulls found in West and Central Europe, in Egypt, California, Brazil, and other parts of South America; the stone implements occurring in prodigious quantities in Britain, France, North and South Africa, Somaland, India, the United States, Argentina, Fuegia; the social and religious institutions of primitive man in Australia, Melanesia, Africa, North and South America. Certain Australian skulls seem cast in the same mould as the Neanderthal, the oldest yet found in Europe. Sir John Evans, the first judge on this subject, tells us that rude stone objects brought from the most distant lands are "so identical in form and character that they might have been manufactured by the same hands. On the banks of the Nile, many hundreds feet above its present level, implements of the European types have been discovered, while in Somaliland Mr. Seton-Kerr has collected a large number of implements which . . . might have been dug out of the drift deposits of the Somme and the Seine, the Thames or the ancient Solent" (Inaugural Address, Brit. Assoc., Toronto, 1883). If this be true, and it is found and are equally well illustrated in the religious notions of the Melanesians, the West African Negroes, and the natives of British Guiana (see below).

To the Pleistocene or Post-Pleistocene, answering roughly to the Quaternary of French writers and the Diluvium of the Germans, has been assigned a duration of from 200,000 to 300,000 years, and this may be taken as the measure of early man and all his works. It covers two distinct periods of cultural growth, the Paleolithic or Old Stone, and the Neolithic or New Stone Age, these being so named from the material, chiefly flint, employed by those in the manufacture of their weapons and implements of all kinds. As many are still in the primitive state, it is obvious that here Old and New do not imply time sequence absolutely, but only relatively to those regions, mainly Europe, North Africa, and America, where the subject has been most thoroughly investigated. Even in these regions Old and New do not always follow in chronological order, since the two stages still flourished side by side in some places, as, for instance, amongst the North American aborigines. The distinction between the two periods is based especially on the different treatment of the material, which during the immeasurably longer Old Stone Age was merely chipped, flaked, or otherwise roughly worked and polished. Hence experts assure us that they can always tell a paleolithic from a neolithic, although a warning note has recently been sounded, among others, by A. Thilenius, who, speaking from personal observation, declares that "toutes les formes, même les plus archaïques, ont été fabriquées simultanément avec les formes plus nouvelles, à l'époque de l'âge de jade, 'aux derniers jours de la pierre polie' (Hommage à Boucher de Perthes, Paris, 1904, p. 13). Nevertheless, Sir John Evans' great test of a paleolithic—the bulb of percussion— still holds good, while it is safe to say that no well finished and polished neoliths were produced in the early period.

Other distinguishing features of Palæolithic and Neolithic culture are here tabulated in parallel columns for more convenient comparative study:

**Old Stone Age.**

**Food:** at first mainly vegetable, then animal also; mostly if not eaten raw; obtained by hunting and fishing only.

**Cultivated plants:** none.

**Industries:** limited to the stone of stone and bone implements, the former never ground or polished, but of progressively improved types, and later embellished with artistic carvings, chiefly of the mammoth, horse, and other contemporary animals.

**Monuments:** none in the strict sense; no houses, graves, or burrows at first; habitation chiefly caves and rock-shelters; no permanent stations except for working stone implements.

**Speech:** at first perhaps inarticulate, later inarticulate, later oratory.

**Social groups:** the family, later the clan reckoning kinship through the female line.

**Religion:** generally supposed to be non-existent. But carvings in later Palæolithic times suggest funeral rites. The painted figures also late discovered by M. Rivière and Capitan in caves of the Mad- 

lenian epoch (see below) seem to afford evidence of religious notions at that time. M. Sal- 

mon Rendah is inclined to think that some, especially of the animal figures, may have served as tokens to the dead, in which case the use of torches, and the fact that such figures may have exercised a magic influence. If so, this would imply the existence of religious ideas in still earlier times.

**Letters:** none, unless certain pebble-markings found in the Museum of Anc. caves of M. d'Anzi, are regarded, with M. Pilet, as a kind of crude writing with ideographic, if not phonetic value.

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and that then, after a blank of unknown duration, a fresh start was made with the sudden appearance of a new and higher culture, as if dropped ready-made from the clouds. Evidence is now accumulating for a show that the Neolithic era was not arrested but continuous throughout the whole of the first cultural era, which thus tended to favourable localities (South France, the Riviera, North Africa) to its ultimate spread, by the second, Bay that it is not always possible to draw any hard and fast line between the Old and New Stone Ages.

The Old Stone Age is itself divided into a number of successively progressive eras, the most generally accepted of which, at least for Europe, are: (1) The Chellean, so called from Chelles on the Marne, where were first found some of the very oldest and rudest chipped flints, now often called coliths. (2) The Mousterian, named from the Cave of Mouster on the Vézère River, Dordogne, which has yielded some improved but still rude spear-heads, scrapers, and other flints of a simple type. (3) The Solutrian, from the cave at Solutré near Mâcon, whence come the famous " laurel-leaf " and some other patterns, showing an immense advance in finish and variety, still unexplained. The Chellean and Mousterian diverge thus, and the Solutrian and Mousterian diverge thus. (4) The Madeleian, from the rock-shelter of La Madeleine, above the Vézère, representing a very long inter-glacial or pre-glacial period of steady progress, during which was developed quite a Paleolithic "school of art." Here were first brought to light some of those remarkable stone, horn, and ivory scrapers, gravers, " harpoons," ornaments, and statuettes with carvings on the round, and skilful etchings of seals, fishes, reindeer, horses, mammoths, snakes, and man himself, considerable numbers of which occur also in many other stations in Dordogne and elsewhere. The remains found in the Placard Cave, the Charente basin, as well as in the Balsi Rossy caves at Mentone on the Riviera, together with the numerous rock carvings of the neighbouring Ventimiglia district, show distinct interminglings of Old and New Stone Age types, and thus the "hiatus" vanishes for ever.

The Palaeolithic Age gives the measure of the antiquity of man. The great division remains supply the proof of that antiquity. Many of the Chellean coliths (Gr. βοός, " dawn," sc. of culture) are found in situ under conditions and in associations which bespeak very great age. They occur, for instance, in the undisturbed glacial drift (sands, gravels, boulder-clays) of the Ouse, Thames, Somme, Seine, Nile, and other rivers which have since scoured their beds down to depths of 50, 100, and even 400 feet. In Tunisia many have been found under a thick bed of Pliocene limestone deposited by a river which has since disappeared. The now absolutely arid and lifeless Lileyan plateau is strewn with innumerable worked flints, showing that early man inhabited this formerly fertile and well-watered region before it was reined by the slowly changing climate to a waste of sands. Many objects of human industry have been recovered from Kent's Hole and other caves beneath great masses of stalagmite, while others again are found associated with the now extinct "Danaton." Post-Palaeolithic changes have taken place even in the comparatively recent New Stone Age, which acquired its greatest development in North Africa (pre-dynastic Egypt), in the Agamia lands (pre-Mycenaean culture), in Italy, Central and West Europe, the British Isles, Scandinavia, and South America (Tiwanakuco)!

In Scotland the Neolithic era lasted long enough to witness the formation of the Caernavon highlands, now stand 40 or 50 feet above sea-level, but then formed the bed of a sound or estuary flowing between North and South Britain. Hence Sir W. Turner's suggestion that after the separation of Britain from Europe in the second, Bay that it is not always possible to draw any hard and fast line between the Old and New Stone Ages.

6. Pre-Historic and Historic Ages.—The Neolithic era, to which a duration of from 50,000 to 100,000 years has been ascribed, merges in an ill-defined Pre-Historic period, when stone was gradually superseded by the metals—first copper, then bronze, loosely iron, as correctly stated by Lucretius (de rer. Nat. v. 1286-7):

a Posterioris fervi vis est arteque reperta,
Et prior seri erat quam fcere cognitum usum."

To these Pre-Historic times may perhaps be referred most of those popular myths, demi-gods, eponymous heroes and traditions which even to this day survive and have supplied the copious materials which were eagerly seized upon and worked up by the early rhapsodists, the founders of new religions, and later legislators (Homer, Hesiod, Zoroaster, Mani, Solon, Lycurgus).

7. Antiquity of the primary types.—With these names, shadowy though most of them be, are ushered in early historical times throughout the Aryan world, while in Hamitic and Akkado-Semitic lands more certain and far more ancient records are supplied by the dated monuments, the rock and mural inscriptions and clay tablets of the Nile Valley, South Arabia, and Mesopotamia. With the revelations made by archaeologists in these earlier seats of the higher cultures the Historic period itself is constantly receding farther into the background, and we are now assured that the Mesopotamian city of Nippur already possessed a history some 8000 years ago. Thus is approached the period of 10,000 years which may have to be assigned to the Historic Age before the archeological exploration of Egypt and Babylonia is exhausted. From the pictorial and plastic remains here brought to light, as well as from other early sources, it is now placed beyond doubt that the antiquity of the Egyptian race had long since then time already been fully specialized. Even in the Neolithic era the European type had already been established, as shown by the essential remains of the ' Cromagnon race,' so called from the cave of that name in Périgord where the first specimens were discovered. Professor Virchow has described a skull of the early Iron period from Wildenroth in Bavaria, which had a cranial capacity of no less than 1555 cubic centimetres, and was in every respect a superb specimen of the regular-fashioned, long-headed North European. In Egypt, where Oppert finds traces of a well-developed social and political organization dating back to over 13,000 years, Professor Petrie discovered in 1897 the portrait statue of Prince Nebkhetkaf of the 4th dynasty (3700 B.C.), a man also described as of "European features." Still older is the portrait of Eshangaga, who reigned over the Babylonian Akkad about 4050 B.C., and had quite regular features which might be 'either Semitic or eurasiatic, what changes have taken place.'

Thus we have documentary evidence that the Carcaoui, that is, the highest human type, had already been not only evolved, but spread over a wide area (Europe, North Africa, Mesopotamia).
some millennia before the new era. The other chief types (Mongol, Negro, and even Negro) are also clearly depicted on early maps, so that all the primary groups must have already been differentiated at least in the Neolithic times.

8. Nomenclature.—As these main divisions will hereafter be used freely as a basis for study, it will be well to give a summary statement of the more salient physical and mental characters (such as may be regarded as true racial criteria) by which they have been distinguished throughout the strictly Historic period. Very slight to which extent of what turns out to be purely conventional, it should be noted that the Ethnops, Negro, and Black are taken as practically synonymous, answering roughly to Linné’s Africains, but including also the allied Caucasian blacks commonly called Papiassins (Papuans and Melanesians), and Australasians, with the now extinct Tasmanians. The Ethnops division thus forms two distinct sections—the African or Western, and the Australasian or Eastern, now separated by the intervening waters of the Indian Ocean (see above). This remark applies also to the Negrit division, of which there are likewise formed (Athentic and Oceanic Negroes). Ethnops and Yellow are similarly equivalent terms, as are also American and Red, where ‘Yellow’ and ‘Red’ are to be taken in a somewhat elastic sense, as in Linné’s corresponding expression, the American and American races are said to be white and yellow. Lastly, Caucasian and White are the same, answering in a general way to Linné’s Europaeus albus. ‘European,’ however, can no longer be taken in this wide sense, since the division is now known to have also extended from Pre-Historic times to a large part of Asia, as well as to North Africa, where it most probably originated (Serge, Keane).

The terms African, Asiatic, and European have been proposed; but they have been introduced, so that nothing better has yet been suggested for Blumenbach’s somewhat equivocal Caucasian. As here used it does not mean a Caucasian, an inhabitant of the Caucasus (Georgians, Circassians) are or were assumed to be typical members. The three now nearly obsolete terms, Caucasian, Anthropoid, and Alfaro, are here discarded as useless, and leading to endless confusion.

As the four divisions have not remained stationary in their respective original homes, but have been diffused and mingled during Histrorical times, in the subjoined general Conspicuum are given their cradle-land, later expansion or retreat, and present domain, with approximate population.

19. Religions of primitive and later peoples; evolution of the religious sentiment.—In the treatment of religions, with which we are here more nearly concerned, it is assumed, with most unbiased observers (E. B. Tylor, E. Im Thurn, A. B. Ellis, F. S. Hatfield, E. Gsell, R. H. Codrington, T. Waiz, F. Ratzel, A. de Quatrefages, J. B. Ambrosetti, F. Bonn, P. Ehrenreich, J. W. Powell), that all later developments spring from the first vague notions formed by primitive man about his environment. The absolute starting-point, behind which it seems impossible to get, is everywhere the dream, which, as soon as the reasoning faculty is sufficiently awakened, enfolds the subtle and permanent relationship between human soul and body, spirit and matter. ‘The dreams which come in sleep to the Indian are to him . . . as real as any of the events of his waking life. To him dream-acts and waking-acts differ only in one respect—namely, that the former are done only by the spirit, the latter are done by the spirit in its body. Seeing other men asleep, and afterwards hearing from them the things which they suppose themselves to have done when asleep, the Indian has no difficulty in reconciling that which he hears with the fact that none belonged to himself. He excuses the fact that he did not see the spirit in his sight and motionless throughout the time of supposed action, because he never questions that the spirits, leaving the sleepers, played their part in dream-acts, and the sleepers themselves in their waking acts, at first sight strange fact that ‘a savage should be able to form for himself a conception of so immaterial a thing as a spirit.’ The quotations are from E. Im Thurn (Among the Indians of Guiana, Lond. 1853, p. 334). This is the earliest statement of the savage mind, and they have reference to the British Guiana natives (Caribs, Arawaks), whose religions system is perhaps the most primitive of which we have any clear record.

From this starting-point the development proceeds in two directions, which lead on the one hand to Psycholatry (Spirit-worship, Animism) in its simplest form, on the other to Ancestor- and Nature-worship, the two great factors in all primitive religions. For early man, after the conception of an independent soul is thoroughly realized in his own person, the next step is to extend the idea to his forefathers and to the plants, that is, to all living organisms, and, lastly, to the inorganic world, to such conscious and lifelike objects as the raging torrent, the rolling seas, snowy peaks, towering trees, steep rocky walls, glowing coals, electric arcs, laughing clouds, storms, lightning, torches, heavenly bodies, until all Nature becomes animated and everything personified and endowed with a living soul. But this soul emulates, so to say, from his own, and consequently resembles it in all respects, has the same passions, feelings, affections, and differs only in being, perhaps, a little more or a little less powerful; and this is essentially the universal principle of anthropomorphism (q.e.), which pervades all religions from the lowest to the highest. The mental qualities of the individual soul become the norm to which everything is referred, and, when in more advanced stages man likens himself to his deities, he is really fashioning his deities to his own likeness. Hence the intensely anthropomorphic character of the gods of the Babylonians (Ann, Ea, Mardik), the Semites (El, Baal, Jahweh), the Greeks (Zeus, Aphrodite, Apollo). So C. Hild Tent, speaking of the British Colonial Sociat tribe, tells us that ‘their anthropomorphic conceptions of the animal and vegetable world are of the same nature, thoughts. Even to-day . . . there is still a strong belief in the human or man-like side of animals, plants, and other objects and forces’ (JAI xxiv. [1904] 28). And so it is everywhere. Why any spirits, all being of a human nature, should be revered or worshipped at all is easily explained by the above remark that some may be more, some less, potent than man himself. The latter are, of course, treated with indifference, while the former are respected and even feared, and have often to be appeased, being for the most part ill-disposed towards mortals, whence the saying that time and he is a helpful friend, if even a human being was more powerful in life—a tribal chief, for instance, or any great warrior—he would also be more powerful in death, since death is only an extended sleep from which he may and does often return, as in explanation between human soul and body, spirit and matter. ‘The dreams which come in sleep to the Indian are to him . . . as real as any of the events of his waking life. To him dream-acts and waking-acts differ only in one respect—namely, that the former are done only by the spirit, the latter are done by the spirit in its body. Seeing other men asleep, and afterwards hearing from them the things which they suppose
pressed, of the Gold and Slave Coast Negroes; and the curious notions of the East African Wagiyrama people, who suppose that the departed spirits appear in their natural form and ask for food and drink. So, when it is a-brewing, some is poured out on the graves of the dead, who are asked to drink, and when drunk to fall asleep and cease to disturb the living with their brawls and bickering.

Thus also in Egypt, in whose sacred faith the god kal, or 'life,' and ra, or 'existence,' is endowed with various propensities; and thus, in the life, the dream, and believed in by the Egyptian scribe. In the after-life, as the Egyptians believed, the soul and the body are separate, so that man becomes disembodied and re-enter life, so that to live in a 'dead-land' they must die and be dismembered, and then rise again in the real human soul can do the same. Then, if evilly disposed, it will select the fiercest and most dreaded wild beast to effect its purpose—the wolf in Europe (whence 'wer-wolfs' and 'Werlachen' the devil in Germany); the tiger, leopard, hyena, shark in Africa; the jaguar in America; and so round the globe. Thus the principle extends even to the after-life; and Cummins (loc. cit.) tells us that the Nilotic Dinkas believe that the spirits of the dead sometimes take the forms of lions, leopards, hyenas, and such beasts. A transition is thus effected to the vampyre, a nocturnal demon, or the soul of a dead man who, the Slav think, leaves his buried corpse to suck the blood of the living (Tylor, *PC*, 1891, i. 192.)

From these animalistic notions, themselves the outcome of pure Animism (q.v., directly flow other religions, and the general attitude of spirit-worship. During the early phases of social life the safety of the tribe is supposed to be largely dependent on the dog-observing of the prescribed rites. Hence public worship becomes a matter of general concern. When a desire is entertained, as by the medicine-man, the witch, the shaman, the priest. These gradually assume of its nature as well as a sacred character; they are the means of the tribe, the people and their tutelary deities, and 'Church and State' are inseparably one. In the tribal council chamber—the Hellenic *prytaneum*, the Roman *capitol*, the American *kioet*, the Mungatta or *trinity-hall*—the super temporal and spiritual interests are transacted in common. Later, with the growth of general intercourse and increasing trade and wealth, a slow divergence takes place, and the agora and forum stand apart from, but still somewhat overshadowed by, the temple. Sacrifices and ceremonial rites of all kinds now acquire their full development, and are entirely controlled by the sacerdotal castes, which long continues to be an imperium in imperio, even exercising a direct influence on public opinion, as witness the death of Socrates. But, divorced from State affairs, religion becomes more introspective, concerned more with liturgies, outward forms, and dogmatic teachings than with personal conduct. In Arabia, the Babylonian Hades, the dead are judged by the goddess Beltis-Allat, and punished or rewarded, not according to the good or bad lives they may have lived, but according to the service they have neglected of the service of the temple, or taken part in sacrifices and offerings made at the shrines of the gods. Many religious systems certainly contain immoral elements, and place low ideals before their votaries. The faithful Musulim, for instance, is rewarded in the after-life with gross sensual pleasures, while in this life such a trivial thing as the use of knife and fork is regarded as sinful. But the general attitude of religion towards ethics is a wide question which cannot here be discussed. See the series of art. under ETHICS AND MORALITY.

Nor need we be detained with the higher forms of religion and their concomitants—polytheism and other forms of theism, Judaism, Brahmanism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Christianitv, metempsychosis (souls, immortality, nirvana, karma, as life, and the soul, all of which will be separately dealt with in detail.

10. CONJECTUS.

**ETHNIOIC, NEGRO, OR BLACK DIVISION.**

1. Western (African) Section.

Cradle-land: Africa south of the Sahara.

Later expansion: Madagascar, North Africa,
Southern United States, West Indies, Nicaragua, North-East Brazil, the Guianas.

Fan, (m. -mulun); Africa, 196,000,000; Madagascar, 3,000,000; America, 20,000,000.
total, 183,000,000.

Physical characters: head dolichocephalic, i.e. long from forehead to occiput cephalic index 72; taking length at 100; jaws prognathous; nose broad at base, short, flat; lips thick, everted, showing the red inner skin; cheekbones rather prominent; brow arched; eye large, round, black, with jaunty sclerotic; foot flat, with low instep and larskap heel; leg slender; calves undeveloped; arms disproportionally long; colour very dark brown and blackish, rarely quite black; hair short, black, woolly, flat in cross section, sparse or no beard; height above the average, 5 ft. 8 in. to 6 ft. and 6 ft. 4 in. (Turkana).

Mental characters: temperament and culture: sensual, unintellectual, fitful, passing readily from tragedy to comedy; mind arrested at puberty, hence unprogressive, this trait being attributed to the early closing of the cranial sutures or an earlier development of the cranial bones beyond the cranial sutures; no artificial arts beyond agriculture, stock-breeding, weaving, dyeing, pottery, woodwork, and metalurgy (iron, copper); in Benin artistic casting and carving in relief and on the round.

Spelling and pronunciation: with both prefixes and postfixes; stock languages numerous in Sudan, one only in Bantuland, besides Negrito, Hottentot, and Bushman tongues; in Madagascar; Malayo-Polynesian exclusively; in America, European patois exclusively.

Religion: generally at the stage of simple Animism, Ancestor-worship being on the whole more prevalent than Nature-worship; no one supreme god anywhere; chief deities Munktuntunka, with many variants, along the east coast, Nzambi, also with many variants, along the west coast, both intermingled in the interior; witchcraft and ordeals very prevalent; obeah and voodoo rites, with ceremonial cannibalism surviving in the West Indies, especially Haiti, and in the Guianas; human sacrifices and fetishism most marked among the Urani in Upper Guinea.

Chief Sub Groups: I. Sudanese (Negroes Proper): Wadof, Serer, Felup, Timmi, Kru, Nalu, Vei, West Sudan; Gurma, Mossi, Gurugu, with Bon, Bob, Tem, Top, Diola, Gold and Slave Coasts; Sonnay, Hauwa, Kaburi, Boghirmi, Mosgu, Yedina, Basa, Miki, Central Sudan; Igarro, Ibo, Nempt, Benin, Qua, Igbaro, Bogru, Lower Niger and Oil Rivers (Southern Nigeria); Mafo, Nube, Dinka, Golo, Shiluk, Buri, Fur, Nuer, Shuilu, Bongo, East Sudan and White Nile; Zendeh (Nama-Niam), Mangturtu, Monuf, A-Baromo, A-Bahu, Welle Basin.

II. Bantu (Neroioid Peoples South of Sudan): Waganda, Wanyoro, Lakes Victoria and Albert; Akkuyu, Akembo, Wapokono, Wanyu, Wamakari, Wagwara, British and German East Africa; Makua, Batonga, Banga, Basenga, Achavu, Mogwanga, Portuguese East Africa; Morotse, Malkauna (Mashona), Wayao, Zulu-Kafir, Basutos (Zulu and mixed): Africa; Ondjherero, Ovampo, Bundo, Eshi, Konga, Daceke, Mpongwe, Iwama, Duuta, Batanga, West Coast between Orange and Oil Rivers; Aduma, Bangala, Bala, Tusalbaqua, Buidalunga, Pungave, Mangemwe, Kanduna, Vuuranga, Vuvuoba, Balabhe, Boyans, Congo Free State.

III. Bafffand and Doubtfull Groups: Fula, West and Central Sudan; Fan, Ogowe and Gabun

Basis; Negrito (Akker, Wochua, Batuen, Obongo, Dume [1], Voto [1], Wandarorobo [2], Congo-Welle and Ogowe, Massa); South Africa; Hottentots (Namaqua, Griqua, Gonaqua, Koraqua, Hill Damara), Cape Colony, German South-West Africa; Vaalpens, Limpopo River.

2. Eastern (Oceanic) Section.

Cradle-land: Malaysia, Andamans, Philippines, New Guinea, Western Polynisia (Melanesia), Australia, and New Zealand.

Present domain: Malay Peninsula, Malaysia east of Flores, Andamans, New Guinea, Melanesia, parts of Philippines, and Australia.

Population: 2,000,000 (3), chiefly in New Guinea and Melanesia.

Physical characters: very variable, differing from the African section chiefly in the height, which is about or even below the average of 5 ft. 6 in.; the hair, though always black, is rather frizzly (' mop-headed') (Papuans) or shaggy (Australians); nose often large, straight, and even aquiline, with downward tip, and so-called 'Negrito nose'; few industrial arts; and magnesium; new and primitive, men and women, tend to be dark and thick, and sometimes more pronounced (Somans).

Mental characters: temperament and culture: Papuans boisterous, very cruel and treacherous, hunting and cannibalism common, generally more savage than the African; Australians better in all these respects, though at a much lower stage of culture (no tillage or navigation, and cruel puberty-rites); no science or letters anywhere; few industrial arts; elaborate wood-carving and good boat-building in Papuasia.

Speech: archaic forms of the Oceanic (Melayo-Polynesian) stock language everywhere in Melanesia: agglutinating tongues with postfixes in Australia and most of New Guinea; have no terms for the numerals beyond 2 or 3. In the Andamans the one stock language has developed agglutination to a surprising degree, numerous prefixes and postfixes being combined with the alliterative harmony of the Bantu tongues.

Religion: general, sometimes prevalent, with toto in Melanesia, and totemism in Australia; mana, a subtle essence or virtue like the Augustinian grace, is a distinctive feature of the Melanesian system, which is otherwise essentially animistic, distinguishing between pure spirits (supernatural beings that never were in a human body) and ghosts, i.e. men's disembodied spirits. There are prayer, sacrifice, divination, omen, death and burial rites, also a Hades (Loelombootogi), with trees and houses, and a ghostly ruler, but no Supreme Being. There is none of this in Australia and New Guinea, and in the Andamans they are little developed that many close observers have failed to detect it. The Australian Bunjji is too grossly anthropomorphic to be regarded as a spiritual being at all, much less a deity; and we are assured that those who credit these nations with a belief in gods have been imposed upon (Giles). But there are mythical heroes, such as Nurrungoni, who are already a kind of demi-gods, and may eventually tend to develop Ancestor-worship. Meanwhile, however, there is 'nothing of the nature of worship, prayer, or sacrifice'—a remark which may also be safely applied to the natives of New
Guinea, and to all the Oceanic Negritos. The Australian totemistic and panterny ceremonies must all be regarded as features of the social life, and in no sense religious institutions. 

Sub-Sections: Papuans, including the Papuans proper and the Melanesians. The Papuans, most typical of all the Oceanic negroes, occupy most of East Malaysia as far west as Flores inclusive, with nearly the whole of New Guinea. The term Melanesian gives (the 'Black Islanders') to the Melanesian world, most of which they occupy almost exclusively. The chief groups are New Britain, New Ireland, and the Duke of York, now by the Germans renamed the Bismarck, Archipelago; the Louisiades, Solomonas, New Hebrides, Banks, New Caledonia, and Loyalty, with the outlying western part of Fiji. The Australians, a highly specialized branch, with marked uniformity of type, speech, and usages, originally scattered thinly over the whole continent, now disappearing; Tasmanians of Tasmania, somewhat intermediate between the Australians and the Melanesians, all extinct since about 1876. Negritos, formerly wide-spread throughout Malaysia, now reduced to three detached groups; Andamanese of the Andaman Islands; Semangs and other tribes of the Malay Peninsula; and Aetas ('Blacks') of the Philippines, while they are extinct in several islands, but have left a distinct Negrito strain amongst all the other inhabitants (Malaysians, Japanese, Chinese, Spaniards).

MONGOLIC OR YELLOW DIVISION.

Cradle-land: probably the Tibetan plateau.

Early expansion: Indo-China, China, North and Central Asia, Mongolia, Macao.

Present domain: Japan, Formosa, China, Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, Siberia, Turkestan, Tibet, parts of Irania, Armenia, and Caucasia; most of Asia Minor; parts of European Russia, Scandinavia, the Balkan Peninsula, and Hungary; most of Malaysia and Madagascar, here intermingled with the African aborigines.

Population: China, 380,000,000; Japan and Korea, 57,000,000; Mongolia and Manchuria, 15,000,000; Tibet, 6,000,000; Turkestan and Siberia, 8,000,000; Indo-China, 35,000,000; Malaysia, 8,000,000; and East Europe, 15,000,000; total, 546,000,000.

Physical characters: head brachycephalic, i.e., short between glabella and occiput; cephalic index somewhat variable, but mean about 85; race is always mongoloid; height and weight vary; eyes fairly rogenous; nose very short and flat, or snub; lips thin, never everted; cheek-bones very high and prominent laterally; brow low and moderately arched; eye small, black, oblique, outer angle slightly elevated, vertical fold of skin over inner canthus (a highly characteristic trait); foot normal, artificially deformed in Chinese women; colour—dirty, yellowish and light-brown (Malays); hair uniformly black, lank, coarse, lustreless, rather long, round in transverse section, no beard, but moustache common; height about or slightly under the average of 5 ft. 6 in., but tall in North China and Manchuria (5 ft. 8 in. to 5 ft. 10 in.).

Note.—Many grouped as Mongols originally, and among them, with them, speaking Mongol tongues, are now largely and even completely assimilated to the Caucasian physical type (Finns, Turks, Bulgarians, Magyars). They speak the Aigil, Stickans and Tsemans of the early writers.

Mental characters and culture: temperament generally somewhat reserved, sullen, apathetic, outwardly very courteous, but supercilious; very thifty, frugal, and industrious in China and Japan, elsewhere mostly indolent (Malays, Siamese); nearly all reckless gamblers; science slack; art and literature undeveloped; porcelain, bronze work, ivory carving, and decorative painting scarcely surpassed (China, Japan, Korea formerly), but all plastic and pictorial art defective, lacking perspective, and the human figure mostly caricatured.

Speech: three great linguistic families:

1. Ural-Altaiic (Mongol-Turkic), ranging with great lexical and structural diversity from Lapland to Japan, from the Lena Basin through Turkestan and Asia Minor to Turkey in Europe and Hungary. Japanese and Korean stand quite apart; but all the rest are typical members of the agglutinating order of speech, with unchangeable roots and variable postfixes, cemented together by the principle of vowel harmony.

2. Tibet-Indo-Chinese, from the Himalayas to the Pacific, and from the Great Wall to the Indian Ocean; originally agglutinating, now in every transition of phonetic decay towards monosyllabic, which is itself a little path, but a very late condition of articulate speech. In the process of decay innumerable homophones are developed, which have to be distinguished by their tones; hence the members of this family may be called monosyllabic-toned languages. Structurally they are isolating, the sentence being made up of unchangeable isolated words, the inter-relations of which are determined not by inflexion or affixes, but by their position, as often in English (James hit John; John hit James).

3. Malay-Polynesian, the 'Oceanic' family in a pre-eminent sense, ranging from Madagascar across the Indian and Pacific Oceans to Easter Island, and from Hawaii to New Zealand (Maori); all more or less agglutinating at various stages of dissolution, but untoned; vocalism predominates, and the vowels are more stable than the consonants—a trait peculiar to this group.

Religion: Psycholyt or in its widest sense is the dominant force in the worship extending both to the disembodied human soul (Ancestor-worship, which is now perhaps the most prevalent form) and to the innumerable spirits, bad and good (fong-shu and fung-shu), which people earth, air, water, and all natural objects of the Mongol world (pure Animism).

The practical Chinese and Annamese combine both cults, and, while passing their lives in terror of the malevolent circumambient genii, keep the anniversary of 'roast pig day,' as they call their 'All Souls' day,' by littering the graves of the departed with pork, chicken, cakes, and other food. This Spirit-worship still persists elsewhere, and lies at the base of the later pre-historic and historic superimposed cults. Amongst uncultured peoples (Siberians, Yakagbirs, Kalmuckaides) it takes the form of undesignated Shamans, where the worshipper (wizard, medicine-man, not yet priest) is the 'paid medium' of communication between his dupes and the surrounding good and evil spirits. Spreading from him this primitive shamanistic Bonbo (Boo-ah) still survives beneath the official Lamaism. Nor have the Tibetans yet forgotten their red and black demons, the snake-deities, and especially the primitive father of all the secondary members of this truly 'diabolical pantheon.' In North-East Siberia the tiger is ousted by the bear, and
here the Gilyaks, Oronoche, and Ainans are all bear-worshippers. The historical religions are largely a question of race, all true Mongols of Mongolia, Manchus, Chinese, Indo-Chinese, and all Mongolo-Tatars being at least nominally Buddhist; the Turks, Tatars, and most Malays Muham-

mudans; the Finns, Lapps, and Magyars now Christians. Other so-called State religions—

the Confucianism of China and Annam, the Shintoism and Bushidoism of Japan — are rather ethical codes, fostered and upheld for political purposes. The "filial piety," ethos, imbibed for, the most part means devotion to the reigning dynasty, while the great weight attached to the purely civic as distinguished from the theological virtues—

self-mastery, courage (the Roman virtus, 'valor'), benevolence, and loyalty—shows that the sole aim of these systems is to nurture good citizens in this world without a thought for the hereafter. Here is no antagonism between: ligion and ideology, but a complete divorce of one from the other.

Chief Subdivisions: Mongolo-Turks, commonly called Mongolo-Tatars. MONGOL BRANCH: Khel-

kus or Kharsns, i.e., Eastern Mongols; Kalmucks, i.e., Western Mongols; Siberian Mongols;

Tunguses, Manchus, Lamsuts, Oronoche, Golds, Gilyaks, East Siberia and Amur Basin. TURKI-

BRANCH: Yakuts of Lena Basin; Koryghs, Uz-

beks, Kara-Kalpaks, Turkomans, West Siberia and

Turkestan; Nogais, Tats, Anatolians, Turks, Os-

menli, Canasaia, East Russia, Asia Minor, Rumelia.

UGRO-FINNISH BRANCH: Soyaets, Ostiaks, Yogyuls,

Permians, Savyrians, Scoyoga, Lapps, Finns, Livonians, Verets, Mordvins, Cheremis, Bulgars,

(now Slavonized in speech), Magyars, Althi Mts.,

West Siberia, North and East Russia, Lapland,

Bulgaria, Hungary. TIBETO-CHINESE BRANCH:

Tibetans, Burmeets, Shan or Laos (Siamese Ahoms,

Khaotsi), China, Nogis, Mielabns, Annames, Chinese, Tibet, Himalayas, most of Indo-China and

China. MALAYAN BRANCH: Malayas proper, Stu-

dinese, Javanese, Madrasese, Balinese, Sasaks, Bugis, Monksassars, Dayaks, Tagals, Banyans,

Formosans, Huavs, and others Malagasy, Malay-

sia, Philippines, Fornnass, Madagascar. KOREO-

JAPANESE BRANCH: Koreans, Japanese, Liu-Kiu

Islanders, SUB-ARCTIC BRANCH: Chukchi, Kar-

yaks, Yukoghoirs, Kamchadales.

AMERICAN OR RED DIVISION: Cradle-land: the whole of the New World.

Present restricted domain: the unsettled parts and some reservations in the Dominion of Canada; Alaska; numerous reservations and a few tracts in the Western parts of the United States; most of Mexico, Central and South America, partly intermingled with the white and black intruders, partly still independent or in the tribal state.

Population: 51,000,000; 20,000,000; 15,000,000; 10,000,000; Mixtecos, Mixtecs, 20,000,000; total, 30,000,000; chiefly in Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, Venenzuela, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil; 5,000,000 only in the United States, and 100,000 in Canada.

Physical characters: large, heavy, very variable, long and very short in many places, intermingled inexc-
tricably: highest known brachycephaly in South America (the extinct Calchaquis with cranial capacity of 1,220 c.c.), very large and square; check-bones moderately prominent; nose large, bridged or aquiline; eye small, round, straight, black, rarely with Mongoloid Mongolism but variable and yellowish in color, South American woodlands; hair uniform, very long, coarse, dark, black (horse-
Chinook; Siouan (Dakota, Assiniboine, Omaha, Poneca, Kansa, Osage, Quapaw, Iowa, Oto, Missouri, Winnebago, Mandan, Hidates, Crow, Tutelo, Calawa); Shoshone (Bannock, Comanche, Utah, Heirs, blacks, Miwok, Shoshone, Creek, Alibam, Seminole, Apalache); Natches; Pawnee; Kewa; Salish or Flathead; Pueblo (Zuñi, Tewa, Taos, Picurí, Tusayan).

II. Caribuna-Pine (Tarahumarun, Yuma, Cora, Papago, Topehuanu); Sere; Guayareun; Taracan; Otomi; Mexican or Nahuan (Aztec, Chichimec, Pipil, Niguan); Mayu-Quiché (Toltecs); Huaxte, Maya, Lacandon, Quiche, Mamé, Cachiquel, Sutugil, Pocoman, Zenial, Cho, Zetil, Pocone); Zoque; Mixe; Mixtec; Zoapotl; Chortegan; Lencan (Chontal, Wolwa, Rama, Paya, Guatusa); Briib; Talamanac; Cuna.

III. Southern: Chibcha; Choco; Chinchesuyun; Quichua (Inca, Chancu); Aymara (Cola, Calchaquí); Antisuyu; Jivar; Zapore; Pano; Ticuna; Pura; Mojó; Barre; Curiutu; Caripuna; Charuc; Chuncho; Cocona; Conibo; Carib (Muisca); Akawi, Rucuyene, Bakari, Arecuna); Araek (Atorali, Wapiana, Maypure, Parezli); Warrak; Chiquito; Bororo; Botocudo; Rhipuna; Tupi-Guarani (Chiriguan, Caribuna, Paraguay, Tupinamba); Mayura; Tupi (Can, Tamoana, Tupinambaza); Payagu; Mataco; Toba; Guaycuru; Gaucho; Araucan; Puelche; Pampas; Tehuelche (Patagonian); Fuegan.

CAUCASIAN OR WHITE DIVISION.


Early expansions: 1. Malayan lands; Central West and North Europe; Britain; Asia Minor, Syria and Palestine, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Iran, Eurasian steppe between Carpathians and Pamir, India, South-East Asia, Malaysia, Polynesia, North-East Asia.

Present domain: nearly the whole of North Africa and Europe; Abyssinia and Arabia; parts of Turkestan, Caucasus, and Armenia; Iran, India, and parts of Indo-China; Malaysia and Polynesia; New Zealand; Australia; South Africa; North and South America.

Population: Europe, 355,000,000; Asia, 300,000,000 (Chiefly India and including unclassified low-caste Hindus); America, 115,000,000; Africa, 15,000,000; Australasia, 5,000,000.

Physical characteristics: Three types: 1. Homo Europaeus: head rather long; cephalic index 74 to 79; jaws orthognathous; cheek-bones generally small, not prominent; nose large and straight; eyes blue or grey, white sclerotic, straight; colour florid; hair rather long, straight or wavy, fair, flaxen, very light brown or reddish (‘carrot’), full beard; height above the average, 5 ft. 8 in. to 6 ft. 2 in. 2. Homo Alpinus: head short; cephalic index 80 to 90 and even 95; eyes brown, hazel, or black; colour pale-white, in aboriginal groups (East Africa and India) very dark, and even blackish; hair brown or chestnut and black, rather short and straight, or wavy, small beard; height medium, 5 ft. 5 in. 4 in. 3. Homo Mediterraneus: head long; cephalic index 72 to 78; nose large, straight, or aquiline; eyes black and straight; colour pale-olive or swarthy; hair black, wavy or curly; height moderate, generally between 5 ft. 6 in., except in aboriginal groups, which are often tall (Gallas, Sonals, Sikhs).

Mental characters and culture: temperament of I. slow and somewhat stolid, cool, collected, resolute, tenacious, enterprising; of II. and III. fiery, fickle, bright, impulsive, quick, but unsteady, with more love of show than sense of duty; all three highly imaginative and intellectual; but below the Hebrews, the Greeks, the Romans, and the Celts, who were more developed to some extent even from early historic times; most civilizations (Egyptian, Babylonian, Sasanian, Assyrian, Persian, Indian, Mayan-Quiché, Hellenic, or Italic) have had their roots in Caucasian soil.

Speech: mainly influence (highest order, with complete fusion of root and formative elements), but also agglutinating (Caucasian, Deccanic, Polynesian); several stock languages in Caucasus; one (Basque) in Western Pyrenees; apart from these the whole Caucasian domain is covered by four great linguistic families: 1. Haussa-Semitic, North Africa, South-West Asia; 2. Aryan (Indo-Germanic, Indo-European), most of Europe, Armenia and Irania, Northern India, most of America, Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand, parts of North and South Africa; chief branches: Indo, Iranian, Hellenic, Italian, Slavic, Lettish, Tendent, Celtic; 3. Dravidian, Southern India (the Deccan); chief branches: Telengia (Telugia), Toda, Ooty, Mundaru, Quichia, Tami; 4. Mouros, or into the Arorians, formerly perhaps wide-spread throughout India, now reduced to the Vindhyan uplands between Aryan and Dravidian North and South.

Religion: from the first Nature-worship seems to have greatly predominated over ancestor-worship. The Egyptians did not worship the embalmed dead, who were supposed to remain human in the after-life. The chief gods of the Semites were the sun and moon, and those of the Aryan—Dyaus, India, Zeus, Apollo, Jupiter, Saturn, etc.—were the personified elements of the upper regions. The eponymous heroes, such as Heracles, who may be supposed to have had a human origin, always remained mere demi-gods, and were scarcely worshipped at all. Amongst the Aryans the gods were symbolized in stone, wood, or bronze; and this led to the worship of the image itself—true idolatry, which, despite iconoclastic zeal, still persists amongst the mediocrate classes in many parts of Christendom. The picture of St. Anthony is not clearly distinguished from the saint himself; and, when it fails to protect the Italian bifoto from avarice, it is cursed and thrown into fire. So the general polytheism various shades of monotheism were slowly evolved by a natural process of elimination. The process is now going on amongst some of the lower races, and it is a popular error to credit the Semites with the monotheistic concept from the first, as if it were a sort of racial character, a special privilege of those worshippers of Elu, Baal, Molech, and innumerable other repulsive deities. Out of the monotheism thus evolved arose the historic religions of the West (Judaism, Christianity, Muhammadanism), while even polytheism still dominates the East (Dravahmanism in India, a degraded Buddhism in Ceylon). Between monotheism and polytheism is the dualistic doctrine which had its home in Persia, where Ormuz and Ahirman, the good and evil principles, contend for supremacy in the universe. This Zoroastrian system, which refers light and all good things to Ormuz, the host of angels, darkness and all evil to Ahirman and his host of demons, was already denounced by Isaiah, whose Jehovah is the single source of every-thing, ‘formans luem, et eremus teneturs,
facades paeianu, et creans malum '(43?'). Nevertheless, it is found its way into the early Christian religious communities, and explains the demonology, with all its attendant horrors, which flourished in medieval times, and is not yet quite extinct.


A. H. KEANE.

ETRUSCAN RELIGION.—I. ANCIENT SOURCES.—I. Etruscan documents. Unfortunately we have no original document giving such valuable information on the Etruscan religion as the calendar of festivals (Monm-ian, CIL, 2. 205 ff.) supplies for the study of the ancient Roman religion. It is true that the Agrum linen-roll (I. lodal) supplies an eligibility of a right to this point of the theory, do not seem to serve as monthly dates. It must be forgotten, however, that the Roman calendar of festivals itself, with its arrangement of kalends, none, and ides (Etr. ides), and perhaps also the actual institution of the liturgical calendar of festivals in Italy, is analogous to the calendars of the Etruscans. Archives of families, temples, and cities, the sifting of which has proved so important for the study of the primitive Roman religion, must be presumed to have had their counterparts also in Etruria, but none of these survive in the original; and, in particular, among all the 8000 extant Etruscan inscriptions we do not find, or at least have so far failed to identify with certainty, the most important and the most important of the inscriptions as statutes, minutes, formulas of prayer, or rubrics of the priests' colleges or the religious fellowships of individual gentes: the one or the two gratifying results which from this letter roll must be expected will be discussed below. Meanwhile we possess definite and reliable evidence of the fact that such documentary records, together with oral traditions, were at an early period brought into an orderly form—probably in rhetorical language—in works ascribed to mythical authors (Etr. the books of Tarchon and Tarchon, the mysterious titles ('libri fatales', 'libri Acharterici', § 35), and that afterwards, for antiquarian and practical purposes, they were reduced to a learned and complicated system in the 'libri fulgurales', 'libri hermaicai', 'libri rituales' (§§ 30-34), as the Etruscan disciplina.

2. Latin adaptations.—These books were often reissued in Latin forms, or adapted to Roman conditions, and the history and contents of this derivative literature must now be laboriously gathered from sporadic and casual references in the works of Cicero, Livy, Seneea, and Pliny the Elder, as also of grammarians, antiques, commentators on Vergil, gromatici, and Church Fathers. More or less prominent among those who dealt with the subject are the following: Tarquinius Priscus (before Vergil's time) made poetical experiments in the field of the Etruscan discipline for himself with the study of ostenta 'unnatural phenomena') as the objects of harmopica (§ 32). A. Cuccia, whose family came originally from the Etruscan city of Volteria, and was used to the Etruscan discipline, wrote, among other works, books de Estis, de Divinacian, de Animuibus, in which he can hardly have ignored the Etruscan discipline. The writings of Labeo, de Dis Animuis (§ 20), are mentioned in Servius's commentary on the Xemdl, while Julius Aquila, Umbriarius, Melior, Vicellius, and Caesius are cited by Pliny, Lydus, and Arrianus as authorities in the literature of the Etruscan discipline.

3. The Agrum linen-roll. The Agrum linen-roll—by far the longest Etruscan text (some 1500 words in twelve columns) that we possess—has been regarded as an original fragment of the Etruscan disciplina. The remains of this liber litus are found in Egypt, carelessly torn into strips and wrapped about a female mummy. They are now preserved in the National Museum at Agrum (Croatia). The writing and spelling of the fragment, and the dressing of the mummy, point to the Greco-Roman period. Arguing from the few words and the complete absence of the Etruscan alphabet, scholars are variously inclined to see in this formulary a sacrificial ritual (Krall, Lattes), a ritual calendar of festivals (Torp), portions of the Etruscan doctrine of the lightning-flash (Thulin) or a relic of Etruscan religious poetry bearing some analogy to the Engubine Tables (Thulin). To the present writer the various items of external and internal evidence (the circumstances of its discovery, the manuscript rolls of Etruscan sepulchral monuments, the divine names, litanies, and certain definite appellatives in the text itself) seem to indicate a funeral text, and also to imply a more than merely local and accidental connexion between the roll and the mummy—in so far, namely, as the funeral liturgies and the ideas of the hereafter found in the libri Acharterici (§§ 20, 35) may have in this particular instance been used in the same manner as the Egyptian Book of the Dead.

4. Other sepulchral rolls and longer sepulchral inscriptions. With the Agrum roll we may fitly associate the manuscript rolls and diptychs held in the hands of figures on the lids of Etruscan sarcophagi and ash-chests, or in the hands of the persons or the gods of the under world skirnished on the sides of these memorials, or painted on Etruscan vases; and, above all, the so-called paludes, a sepulchral inscription of nine lines upon an
open roll which the figure on the lid (i.e. the dead person himself) holds up before the onlooker. Nor is this the least of the information, the sepulchral tablet of Capna—so far as we are able to interpret it—an inconsistent with the conjectural contents of these funerary book-rolls; while the third longest Etruscan inscription, which of course, is certainly its Etruscan, but that it is hard to disentangle the Greek and Italic strands in the history of Roman religion, the difficulty will naturally be greatly intensified in the case of a religion like the Etruscan, where the literary sources in particular are much more scanty and the linguistic memorials remain in great measure unexplained, while the ethnological, linguistic, and religious relationships of the people have not yet been conclusively made out. The old and the new, the exotic and the indigenous, intermingling in the nebulous tradition; and, even where foreign influence can be clearly traced, it is often impossible to distinguish between ideas fused together by later syncretism and those mutually related from the first.

9. The impossibility of a systematic or genetic delineation.—From the sources (the bibliography of which will be prefixed to this article) we gain some impression of the various deities and systems of deities, the worship, and certain phases of the religions and ethical ideas of the Etruscans, and this impression, after the fashion of the preceding paragraphs set forth. In view of the defective and fortuitous transmission of the records, and owing to the impossibility of interpreting them clearly and finally, it is out of the question to think of reducing the aggregate mass of data to a system, or of tracing the course of their historical development. Moreover, we lack as yet—apart from a few excellent but still unfinished compilations of occasional groups of objects (see list under 7)—a critical or relatively exhaustive collection of the materials furnished by the various monumental sources. Such a collection, again, would be of little service without an atlas of illustrations—not only because religious ideas are reflected in the artistic portrayal of the various types of deities, and in the conceptions of the Etruscan sepulchral monuments and their abundant furnishings, but even more because, by reason of the peculiar character of the Etruscan record, the pictorial and glyptic sources usually speak to us more distinctly than the linguistic sources, which—still remain largely inarticulate, and with a considerable admixture of non-Etruscan elements. We should add further, that the (in part) very imperfectly preserved readings of the all-important Etruscan mirrors—especially of these published some decades ago—require to be collated once more with the originals; while a persevering philological investigation, not indeed, of the roots—for such were at present a hopeless task—but of the suffixes of the Etruscan divine names, would even to-day be a most serviceable piece of preparatory work (see § 14).

II. NAMES OF THE DEITIES. — 10. Ancient Etruscan deities.—The etymology of the genuinely Etruscan divine names remains for the most part an unsolved problem; nor do the vast majority of these names occur in the literary tradition. Still, the pictorial representations enable us to identify—what certainty, or, at least, with some degree of confidence—to a number of them with the names of Roman and Greek deities. That the spheres of connotation in such secondary identifications only partially coincide, though they seldom bear inscriptions, are valuable sources of information regarding the characteristics and the various types of the gods.

5. The difficulty of isolating the purely Etruscan element.—One very serious difficulty in regard to both the monumental and the literary sources is that of clearly disengaging the specifically Etruscan from the Greek or Oriental origin, and the Etruscan deities are, though they often seem to furnish certain analogies to them. In comparison with these as yet very imperfectly interpreted literary remains, however, the furnishings and contents of excavated tombs, such as mural paintings, reliefs, vases, mural vases, and sarcophagi, and also the abundant accessories of vessels, utensils, clothes, and ornaments warrant much more definite conclusions regarding the cult of the dead and the hopes and fears of the hereafter (§§ 25, 26) that prevailed among the Etruscans.
and Mercury, Jupiter, and Venus; and the sun and moon.

12. Deities mentioned in the literary tradition.

Other Etruscan deities, bearing Latin or Latinized names, are known to us only from the literary tradition. *Virtumnus* is designated 'deus Etruriae princeps' by Varro. (De Ling. Lat. v. 46). *Vortumna* comes before us as the goddess of the federal temple of the Etruscan cities, as Virgil says: *'A consulium ad movendam bella... in Etruria ad amanum. Vortumnæ agitata. Ibi prolatæ in annum res, decretque caunctum, ne quod ante concilium fieret."
The temple of Virtumnus, the goddess of destiny, at Volsinii was noted for the device of registering the years by nails driven into the door (Livy, vii. 3. 7). The Etruscan city of Mantua took its name from *Mantus* (cf. §§ 10, 25), the Etruscan god of the underworld, (ancient authorities in Müller-Deecke, Die Etrusker, i. 2, note 6). A mythical monster called *Volto* is mentioned by Pliny (HN ii. 53, 140). The nymph of Bregus and the divine youth Tages will be referred to (§ 25).

13. Oriental deities. While we are on comparatively safe ground in recognizing certain Greek and Roman deities under their Etruscan disguise, we are quite at a loss with regard to other foreign deities. It is true that the only Etruscan inscription (1) that comes from Carthage contains the name of the Semitic melek, but of the identifications of Etruscan and Egyptian deities which the present writer has ventured to suggest on numerous dressings brought from Egypt (§ 3), has ventured to suggest, not a single instance is absolutely certain. The question whether pre-Hellenic (Pelasgian, Etruscan, *Saturnia*, "Carian", "Cretan", "Hittite", or the like) type deities were Etruscan deities—a question which as regards some of these deities, e.g. *Hestia*, *Hades*, and *Selene*, a number of scholars answer affirmatively—is not, in the present writer’s opinion, yet ripe for decision. Babylonian and Etruscan affinities will be dealt with below (§§ 30-32).

14. Suffixes of divine names. Perhaps the suffixes of the Etruscan divine names may yet prove to be the key to further progress in this field, though some of these terminations are so slightly characteristic that they might even be Indo-Germanic. The others may possibly indicate only the Etruscan modifications of Italic, Greek, or Oriental names. The forms noted below may serve at least as a starting-point for further discussion; meanwhile it is important to notice that in some cases the same suffix may occur in the names of both male and female deities.

**Suffix.**

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**III. SYSTEMS OF DEITIES.**—15. Triad, ennead, deoducid; *Dei involuti.* The various deities of the Etruscans (see Hesych. s.v. *aïou); Sueton, Aug. 97; Dio Cass. liv. 29) were grouped in distinct orders or systems. In every city that was founded *Etrusco ritu* special honours were accorded to the divine triad of Tinia, Uni, and Menrva, and a city which had not dedicated these three temples to the triad could not hold a consilium. In an ennead of gods, again, there belonged the power of lighting certain kinds of lightning (manubiae, *hand-weapons*, separate flashes); and, as Tinia grasped three such *manubia* in his hand, there were in all eleven distinct species of lightning (Plin. HN ii. 138) in this connexion the number eleven is probably derived from Bab. ideas (Serv. on Geor. i. 28). The *prima manubia* was held by Tinia en *consilii*; the *seconda* was sent with the advice of the *docend* of gods (*hos Consentes et Complices Etrusci aiunt*, quod una orientur et occident unam, *i.e.* the two directions of the world, Liv. ii. 25, 11). *Sancio* and *Vortumnus* are mentioned as deities of *misery and misdirection*; *sed eos summum Jovis consiliiarios ac participes existimabat* (Varro, in Arnob. ii. 40); the connexion of these six pairs of deities, who daily rise and set together in the sun, with the *Gr. Ekecheirêth, the Graeco-Oriental Et Eiletheria, the twelve months, and the Babylonian signs of the zodiac, is quite unmistakable). The *tertia manubia* however—the most destructive of all—was sent by Tinia only with theconnexion of the *dei superiores, involuti, or oportuini, whose names and number were unknown, and who, mysterious and inextricable, sat enthroned above all (Caelina, in Seneca, Nat. Quest. ii. 41; Varro, in Arnob. ii. 40).

16. Deities of lower rank. From these exalted gods we must distinguish the groups of spirits associated with persons and places. Here, however, it is more than usually difficult to detach the Etruscan from the Roman element. The *lores* (O. Lat. *lares*), the spirits who attach themselves to particular plots of land, and roam about at the same time (ii. 2, 6), are usually men who dwell hold way in the *penus*, i.e. the storeroom, beside the kitchen and the hearth; the *genni* of men and the *jumones* of women, who, as guardian spirits (Salienses), are accorded special honours on birthdays, just as the tutelary saint is honoured on the name-day, which
by its association with baptism became the true birthday of the Christian; the \*ainma hindu, or divina anima, the deified soul of the dead; the \*dei genii, this or that particular god; the gens; all these Roman divinities reappear—some quite evanescently, others more palpably, in the Etruscan tradition as well, though we cannot form a clear impression of the several groups, of their derivations from different sources or from other types (gods of the under world, ancestral spirits), or of the way in which they were fused together at a later stage.

17. Lacies.—But we are able at all events to distinguish the prenomen

Etr. \*Lar
Lat. \*Lar
Gr. \*Areus

with the long \*d attested by the spelling and accentuation of names like Lārinus, Laar, Lāronis, Areus, from the Lat. appellative lār (from \*lāre), gen. lāris, O. Lat. pl. lāres, with \*d short by nature. Lat. on the other hand, is not impossible that the Lāris, the gods of the other world (Ov. Fasti, ii. 599 sq.), whom scholars are unwilling to detach from the Lāres or Lases, may be akin, alike in name and in function, to the Lāsa (quantity of first a unknown), seen as a winged and attired god—possibly, under Latin, and standard between the seer hompere (Ἀμφατώς) and the vates (Afar), whose look is submissively bent to the ground (Gerhard, Etr. Spiegelt, iv. fig. 350). But there is a still unexplained incongruity between this particular Lāsa and the usual Lāsa-types of Etruscan mirrors (§ 23); and the \*Lāra 'used by Ovid instead of the ordinary \*Larunda' may perhaps be peculiar to that writer. The identication of the Etruscan deities lēxia and lāsa found on the Piacenza linter with the Lar militaris and the Lar coelestis mentioned by Martianus Capella is quite uncertain.

18. Penates.—Our authorities with regard to the Etruscan penates are Nigidius and Cessius, as quoted by Arnobius (adv. Gent. iii. 40). Both writers speak of a tetrad of deities. Nigidius distinguishes four genera, viz. the di penates Jovis, Neptunei, Inferorum, and mortali hominum; while Cessius specifies the four individual deities, Fortuna, Ceres, Genius jovialis, and Paies. In the four categories of Nigidius may be discerned the four elements—sky, sea, under world, earth; but whether, or in what manner, the four deities of Cessius are to be brought into relation with these, the present writer does not venture to decide.

19. Genii and junones.—Whether the term genius ('procreator') is the Lat. rendering of an Etr. word, as has been conjectured, and whether the Roman genii and junones had their counterparts in Etruria, it is likewise impossible to say. A genuine Jovisalia as one of the Etruscan penates was cited above (§ 18); in Festus, 359, Tages (§ 29) is designated genii illuxis, nepos Jovis. The serpent, the Roman symbol of the genus, is not infrequently depicted on Etruscan monuments.

20. 'Dei animales.'—The practice of defying the dead has left its impression in the sepulchral art of the Etruscans, and is directly attested by the literary tradition. According to Servius (on Aen. iii. 165), Laboe, in 'libris qui appellantur deis animallibus,' had written: 'esse quaedam sacra quibus animas humanae vertantur in deos, qui appellantur animales, quod de anima fant'; and Arnobius (adv. Gent. ii. 62) explicitly says: 'Etruria libris in Achenoricis pollicitur, certorum animallium sanguine numinibus certis dato, divinam animas fieri et ab legibus mortalitatis educt.' Such a deification is mentioned of the Lat. names by one of the Etr. names is indicated by the phrase \*ainma hindu (the deified soul of the dead)—is repeatedly referred to also in the text of the Agram roll.

21. 'Dei gentiles.'—We may safely assume, therefore, that ancestor-worship and the cult of the dead prevailed among the Etruscans. But to determine whether and in what manner this cult was transferred from the Etruscan to the Romans, which was not very fully developed, and which borrowed most of its materials in a rather superficial way from Gr. mythology (§ 11), was connected with the cult of the dead is certainly very difficult. We are able to distinguish more and more clearly a series of clan deities, though the relation between the deity and the gens—even in a chronological respect—is not always evident. In these cases the name of the gens is added in adjectival form to that of a well-known deity, or else the clan name and the divine name are simply identical. Thus in funerary text-rolls we can clearly trace the cultus lepini, i.e. a death-goddess of the gens \*lepini; and the uni versusnet, the junco of the gens Oreminii. The Etr. divine name sateris is related to the Etr. clan name saternas as the Lat.-Etr. clan name satrius to the Rom.-Etr. name Sacer. The Etr. divine name numisius, which the Rom. explain as the Numitoris was sometimes called Numitorinus and sometimes Mars; the gens Numisia worshipped Numisius Martius or Numisius Mars; and, similarly, we find in Etruscan inscriptions a maris hus- na-no, and assimilated to the Lat. gens Hune, and deities, that is to say, of a gens Fuxia (\*Huvia)—these names being fitted with characteristic Etruscan suffixes and accumulations of suffixes. Nor can it be disputed that the Etruscan or semi-Etruscan goddesses Anchoria of Fesule and Asculum, and Feronia of the Faliscan Soracte, are connected with the Anchori and the Heruli (=Ferruli; in the Latin dialectic gen. eruli), and that the name of the dictator Egerius Lovius explains that of the \*nympha Egeria; and, similarly, the name of the Etruscan \*nympha Bego, Vegoua, \*Vegonia (inferred from the adj. Vegenous) is quite identical with the regular feminine form of the clan name veci, i.e. with veci, *veciae, *vecinia; and, if we are unable to say with certainty whether the lāsa veci belongs to the same group, it is only because the spelling with -u instead of -ui (which would in this case make lāsa veci = lāsa veci = Lāsa Bego) has been but rarely found, and because the explanation breaks down when applied to other names with lāsa (§ 23). The Roman and Etruscan deities Vitanus, Vortumnus, and Volumnus, Volturnus (§ 12), as appears from the stems and the common suffix of their names, are connected with Etruscan gentilicia; while the names of the death-goddesses Tanaea, Manto-er-ana, (§ 25), and Laver-na, to judge from their structure and their stems, may really be pure Etruscan forms of clan names. 22. 'Ani' and 'uni'—clan deities?—Even the names of the well-known Etruscan deities ani (m. and uni (f) cannot be satisfactorily explained on any other hypothesis. The word Janus — the original Etruscan name was noted above (§ 11)—is in Latin an o or a stem family in the Etr. name, instead of being, as we should have expected, *œn or *anu, is ani, which would yield in Latin an otherwise unknown *Janunus, or would exactly correspond to an Amnisus (cf. *Amnis, the Etruscan king [Alex. Polyb. in Plut. Parali, min. 40]), and this would imply that an Etruscan clan (=gens) god had at a later stage come to be identified with the Lat.-Faliscan Janus, owing to the similarity of their names. The name Junius —the Etr. equivalent of the Faliscan prenomon inuno, the Faliscan patronymic iuno, the Roman gens Junia, and the month Junius (not *Jumonius) are all undoubtedly connected with the same root, a connexion which cannot be made out philologically; the name Juno, *iuno, not yet satisfactorily explained as to the final constituent of its stem, would
yield, in Etruscan, the form *unuui or *unuuiia; while the Etr. uni is the representative of an extinct Latin, or perhaps (in view of the Faliscan cult of Juno in Samnium) of a Semitic name-form *Jania, unless, indeed, it really represents the Indo-Germanic feminine form in -ne of which only fugitive traces survive in Latin itself (Skr. yuni cf. Etr. *yuni).

23. Etruscan *yuxa.*—We find numerous representations of the goddesses whose function it is to serve and adorn others. The majority of these belong to the group of *turas,* and may be most appropriately compared with the Horga and the *Charites.* They are depicted as winged, and generally as naked, but they wear trinkets and ornamental shoes, and handle vessels for anointing, hair-pins, and mirrors, or crown others with wreaths, fillets, or sprays. Two of them—*banx and esaukva—are seen assisting at the birth of Athena from the head of Zeus, just as the Greek Horkai likewise sometimes act as midwives. They are designated either by the Latin name (now an appellative name), or by this name joined to a personal name, or, again, by a personal name alone. Of such names, most of which remain unexplained, we may mention the following: *lasa rosea* (? *rosea?* (§ 21), *lasa sitica, lasa bonora (= *bonora?), lasa racuneta, alpan, axvirv, evan, iziapa, izipana, iziapa, izima, baiha, burun, mean (*meun), mabzux, mabzux, puriv, resvul, senapa, taivsa; while *nabixiv and *Anzvul (Psyché) also seem to belong to the group.

24. Date-remembering goddesses.—Whether the term *lasa* was broad enough to be applied in some cases (§ 17) to the goddesses who record or predict fate—such as *vani or melazuta—must remain an open question. It is quite possible that at a later stage the recording *Maja* and, above all, *Atropos,* took the place not only of the Roman *Paros,* but also of the Etruscan death-spirits, and, in particular, of *vanx.* Whether in any given case the goddesses who appear on Etruscan monuments holding a stylus and a roll or dipyx represent the ancient Etruscan *vuast or the Etruscanized Atropos (atrops), melazuta, or a lasa, cannot always be decided.

25. Hell.—The goddess *vanx* just referred to, together with her companions *calis* (§ 21) and *leuiz,* introduces us to the Etruscan views of Hell; the horrors of which might seem to be collected in the demons of Michelangelo and in Dante’s *Inferno.* Grausome figures (*xarun, txulgka), with distorted faces and animals’ ears, and with hammers held as if ready to strike down the circle of those who have loved their own. The sad necessity of parting is most touchingly portrayed on ash-chests and sarcophagi; on foot, on horseback, by waggon, or by ship, the dead set out on their long journey to the under world. In paintings on the walls of chambered tombs we see *aita (‘Alba) and gezipezi (Herapefôrbi) sitting enthroned, and in a bronze-mirror, *tarsa aita (‘Hades-Hermes’). It is only in the later art that *Maiesta, a speaker of *as, is spoken of as the Etruscan god of the under world, but he seems to be identical with the *muntrax of the monuments; while our sole evidence for the Etruscan origin of the death-goddess *Maiesta* (alongside of *munt-rax, Lar-e-ro, and Turpea) is the linguistic structure of their names (§ 21).

26. Paradise.—The ideas of the Etruscans regarding the hereafter, however, had also their peculiar, naive character. We must refer the reader to the practice of defying the souls of the dead—perhaps an Orphic-Pythagorean acerrion—which finds expression in the literary sources. It is true that, on the whole, the Etruscans did not have been in very susceptible to mystical views of the life beyond. The gorgeous displays seen in the cemeteries of Southern Etruria present, not the glorified
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28. Religious ceremonies.—The cultus consisted in prayers and imprecations, sacrifices and sacrificial meals. The worship of statues and theapedistu was a prominent feature in Etruria; while games, dances, music, statelily processions, horse-races, and prize-fights (often attended with bloodshed) all had a place in the service of the gods.

We cannot fail to recognize the presence of formal litanies in the Agrim roll—especially at the top of column 7; and Varro (De Re Rust. i. 2. 27) transmits in Latin form an Etruscan rhythmical charm for diseased feet which he had taken from the book of the Etruscan Sacerne. Mention was made above of imprecatory tablets and the Magliano lead (§ 35). The epigraphic ABC monuments seem to have been used for the same mystical and apotropaic purposes as their Greek and Roman counterparts.

Besides the ordinary votive gifts, which often take the form of bronze statues of the deities to be worshipped, we find in Etruria, as elsewhere in ancient Italian soil, other offerings of a peculiar character, such as clay models of heads, faces and parts of faces, arms and hands, legs and feet, engraved to illustrate the special emblems of generations or deities, which may have served as expressions of the worshipper’s gratitude for restoration to health or the blessing of children, or of his desire for such benefits.

Animal sacrifices were of two kinds, hostiae animales, and hostiae consultatoriae (Serv. on Aen. iv. 56). In the former the soul or life of the animal was sacrificed to the gods as a propitiation and a substitute for the soul and life of man; in the latter the offering solicited a revelation of the deity’s will or counsel in the entrails of the victim. But alike in the monumental and in the literary records we find evidence also of such barbarities as the massacre of prisoners and stoning to death.

29. Origin of the disciplina (Tages, Beego), and its divisions.—The Etrusca disciplina was traced to a mythical origin. The wondrous child Tages was cast out of a clod by the plough, and those who crowded round to hear wrote down what he revealed and sang (Cic. de Divin. ii. 50, and other writers). The ‘nymph’ Beego (§ 21) taught Arruns Volturnus (Etr. arni ultane) the sacred law of limitation (§ 33). The doctrine thus revealed falls into three parts—the libri fulguratores, libri haruspici, and libri rituales. The libri fatales and libri Acheronici, to judge from their contents, seem to belong to the second category of increased religious importance.

30. The libri fulgurales.—The libri fulgurales contained the Etruscan doctrine regarding the regions of the heavens and the gods of the lightning (§ 15). The fulguratores (§ 27) defined the various species of lightning according to their origin, force, and result; they interpreted the flashes according to the objects struck—places, trees, buildings, sanctuaries, statues, or human beings. They propitiated the lightning by removing the traces of its work (‘burying the lightning’); they knew how to mitigate or suspend its effects, but they had it also in their power to call it down by adumbrations and to summon the deity to appear in the flash as guest or counsellor, or to destroy an enemy. With such adjurations the rain-charm would doubtless often be combined.

That the object struck by lightning becomes taboo, sacred, or religiosum—a thing in face of which man vacillates between dread and worship—seems to be a universal human belief; but whether the divination of the Etruscan doctrine of the lightning by priestly speculations shows its details the influence of Roman, Greek, or Babylonian ideas, or whether—as was the case with haruspicy—it was the means of conveying Babylonian ideas to the Romans, and perhaps to the Greeks as well, is a problem that awaits further investigation.

31. The ‘libri haruspici.’—The libri haruspici comprised the treatise on the revealed allegories of entrails, and especially of the liver. The rocking entrails of the slaughtered animal were believed to be the media through which the gods spoke to men.

The bronze list of Piacenza (§ 58) contains the gods and divine names, that shows the Etruscans, like the Babylonians, assigned to their deities definite localities both upon the liver and in the sky, and that their doctrine of the lightning was inherently related to the stars. Thus Martianus Capella (de Nuptiis Mer. et Philol. i. 41-61) and the Piacenza model both represent the celestial temple of the Etruscans, but each in its own way, so that the regions and deities of the one cannot be summarily identified with those of the other.

In Etruscan, as in Babylonian haruspicy, the opus locinorium, the pars familiaris, and pars hostialis (right and left), the fossa (indentations and crevices often seen especially in the sheep’s liver), the fero (tips or edges of the liver), and the gall-bladder all had their special functions. We cannot say as yet whether the clay models of livers with Hittite connotations of general divination, which may have served as expressions of the worshipper’s gratitude for restoration to health or the blessing of children, or of his desire for such benefits, were ever used in the Etruscan model, or at all, or whether they have been connected with the celestial temple of the Etruscans. But we can even now make out a certain textual connexion between the Babylonian examples and the liver of Piacenza. Thus the two leading types of Babylonian haruspication were as follows: (1) ‘If the left side of the gall-bladder is thus or thus, the enemy will capture the sovereign’s country’; or (2) ‘If the left side of the gall-bladder is complete, the flattened middle of the gall-duet is the hand of Ishtar of Babylon’; and, when we compare with these the divine names in the several regions of the Etruscan model, we find that they are abbreviations of the second type. Both the Etruscan and the Greek practice of haruspicy seem to be directly related to the Babylonian; the Roman estrapiciem was no doubt strongly influenced by the Etruscan system, but its sole object was to decide whether the victim was acceptable to the deity or not, whereas the Etruscans read in the liver revelations of the future, even in minute details.

32. The ‘libri rituales (‘oscenta’).—The Etruscan doctrine of the lightning-flash and of haruspicy were in certain portions closely akin to the doctrine of ostenta, which formed a division of the libri rituales. One class of these ceremonies, that which the doctrine of ostenta is found in the responsa given by the Etruscan haruspices to the Romans who consulted them. With reference to any particular praedia, the following four points had to be determined: (1) From which deities did the sign proceed? (2) Why had they sent it? (3) What did it portend? and (4) How was it to be propitiated? Examples of such ostenta were earthquakes, tempests, showers of stones or blood (fire-balls) in the sky, and comets. Illomened trees with black fruits, and unlucky animals (beasts of prey and night-birds) struck terror into the beholder; white horses and rams with pure and bright spots or pellucid spots of luck; serpents might portend either good or evil. Monstrous births, especially hybrids, and grotesque animals stirred the imagination, and such creatures—chimeras, winged beasts, and crosses between lions and birds—appear also on the monuments, but have not as yet received special attention. These terrifying signs were usually propitiated by removing all traces of them. Statues which had been thrown down by tempest or lightning were set up more securely; injured temples were consecrated anew. Monsters and hybrid children were thrown into the sea or buried alive; adults who changed
their sex were banished to a desert island. A marriage disturbed by an earthquake or a celestial portent was postponed. Animals that spoke were supposed to be the mouthpieces of deities, and were made objects of sacrifice and of divination by observing the flight of birds was indigeneous to Etruria. Babylonian ideas make their influence strangely felt likewise throughout the Etruscan doctrine of ostenta, even in points of detail.

33. The 'libri riteules' (limitation, and ceremonies of consecration and foundation). — The libri riteules contained also directions regarding ceremonies on particular occasions. Plots of land, houses, temples, and cities had to be orientated and limited Etrusco ritu: pomerium and mundus seem originally to have been Etruscan terms. The arts of land-surveying and architecture enjoyed the sanction of religion. The books of the chronacitor contained an oracle of Vegois (§ 21, 29) regarding the surveying and allotment of land (agrimensoria, 330); the word gruma itself is most satisfactorily explained from Latin analogon agrimensorum —as a derivative of the Gr. ἀγρόμεσσα (acc. ἀγρόμεσσα). The Etruscan temple-design and the Etruscan ritus for the foundation of cities were adopted by the Romans. The excavation made, e.g., at Marzabotto confirms the literary tradition. The investigation of Italian place-names has yielded a surprisingly large number of Etruscan forms; and, as such names are nearly always attached to high places capable of being defended, they are in all likelihood to be explained on the theory that urban colonies of Etruscans, located above and amidst the Italic peasant farm-houses, were founded and named Etrusco ritu by the ruling families of Etruscan nationality; though it is not, of course, to be supposed that these settlers, who, being relatively few in numbers, would soon be granted the rights of conubium and commercium with the neighbouring peoples, were able to maintain the distinctively Etruscan character of their new localities.

34. The 'libri riteules'; law. — In Etruria, legal institutions likewise formed a branch of religion. The earliest code and general code: the juris civilis was merged in the jus suumrius of the religious books. The law of property seems to have been connected in the closest way with the sacred art of land-surveying. The saying of Vegois, found, as noted above, in the writings of the agrimensoria, finishes with words that suggest the phraseology of Oriental religions: `propeterea neque fallax neque bilunguis sis; disciplinam pone in corde tua.' The perjuror and his offering were doomed to become ingrates and outcasts. The frightful penalties wreaked upon hermaphrodites in Etruria (§ 32) are found attached to certain crimes also in Roman Law. By a fortunate accident of transmission, a representation of the solemn Etruscan rite of adoption has come down to us: a sketch on a mirror shows us the adult Herakles sucking the breast of Juno in the presence of the other Olympiads. The child and the adult respectively do the rite of adoption, the child being admitted into Olympus in virtue of the milk-tie—a relationship which is quite common in the Canaanites, and which, through the influence of Judaism, has become a universal law in the East. Cf. art. 36.

35. The 'libri fatales' and 'libri Acherontici.' — The libri fatales and libri Acherontici—the books of fate and of death—were also included among the libri riteules. We have already spoken of the definition of souls (§ 20); and in accordance there-where with the Acherontic books would appear to have contained certain elements of the Orphic-Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis, and, in the manner of the Orphics, they based the fact upon certain mysterious sacrifices. The books treated also of a certain respite of fate: a secondum aruspicis libri et sacra Acheruntia, quae Tages compensiase dictur, fata decem annis quadam ratione differi ... primo loco a Jove dicebatur (Serv. in Curi, viii. 393). Birthdays and other periods of life were accounted of great, and even critical, importance. The libri fatales assigned to human life a duration of twelve heldorns; but, when life had selected to ten heldorns, or seventy years, man could no longer delay the incidence of fate by propitiatory rites. From that stage onwards he must ask nothing more from the gods; and, even if he should survive for other two heldorns, yet his soul is really suffered from his body, and the gods vouchsafe him no further prodigia (Varr., in Censorinus, xiv. 6).

36. 'Secula'; cosmogony. — The doctrine of the periods of human life was adapted also to the life of the Etruscan city-State, appearing here as the doctrine of secula, which we meet with again in the sphere of Roman history. It was believed that man is released from the respite of fate by attaining the age of secundum a quo the Etruscan chronology was laid down as 307 b.C.—a date which is perhaps more without importance than regard to the appearance of the Etruscans in Italy.

The Etruscan cosmogony was of a very remarkable character. According to the account of it given by Suida (s.v. Topopoll.), the demigod appointed twelve millenniums for his acts of creation, and assigned them severally to the twelve signs of the zodiac. In the first chilid he created heaven and earth; in the second, the firmament; in the third, the sea, and the waters upon the land; in the fourth, the great lights of heaven—sun, moon, and stars; in the fifth, everything in air, earth, and water that creeps and flies and runs upon four feet; and in the sixth, man. Six thousand years had thus elapsed before the creation of man, and the human race should endure for six thousand years more. The similarity of this creation story to the Biblical account is unanswerable. Whether the source now by Suida, and very vaguely indicated by him, had been composed under the influence of the Biblical narrative, or whether his account really embodies an ancient Etruscan tradition—in the sense, let us say, that Western Asiatic conceptions underlie both the Biblical and the Etruscan doctrine of the origin and the secula of the world—is a problem which we are at present unable to solve.
Jahresber. über d. Fortschritte d. klass. Altertumswissensch., exl. (Leipzig) 1909) 76f. ('Religion,' nos. 48-51; previous years, 1907-1908, 1906-1907. A short summary of the literature will be found also in many treatises on Roman religion.


EUCHARIST (to end of Middle Ages).

The title "Eucharist," as applied to the central rite of the Christian Church, has its origin in the thanksgiving pronounced over the bread and cup by Christ at the Last Supper (Mk 14:22-25, Mt 26:26-29, Lk 22:19-20). This was followed by the Christian "thank-offering," with special reference to the bread and wine over which the thanksgiving was pronounced (Didache, 9; Ignatius, Philad. 4, Smyrn. 6; Justin, Apol. i. 69). On the use of the words ἐυχαριστία, ἔχος ὑλὴν, see note by Hort in TTHS iii. 594 ff.; and on the later history of the parallel word εὐχότια, based on the "blessing" (ἐὐχότια, Mk 14:26 [Mt 26:29]) pronounced at the institution, see Brightman, Liturgies Eastern and Western, Oxford, 1896, Index. There is no instance of these uses of the word εὐχάριστος in the NT, where the term employed to denote the common meal of the Christians with which the Words of Institution were associated, was the blessing of bread (τὸ κλασμα τοῦ ἱεροῦ, κλασμα ἱεροῦ, Ac 27:38, 28:11, 1 Co 10:16); in the last the "cups of blessing" is also referred to and "supper of the Lord" (ἐυχαρίστητα Λουδου, 1 Co 11:25; see below). From the presentation in the rite of bread and wine regarded as an offering of the fruits of the earth, along with the prayers and thanksgivings of the worshippers, the term "sacrifice" (θυσία, Did. 14) or "offering" (Iren. adl. Hier. iv. xviii. 1, eccl. hist. obit.; cf. Clement of Rome, ad Cor. 40, 44) came to be applied to the rite. Later expansions of this earlier language will be illustrated in the course of the present article. See, further, Drews, PRET, art. "Eucharistic.


1. Accounts of the Last Supper.—The four passages dealing with the Last Supper are Mt 26:17-29, Mk 14:22-25, Lk 22:19-20, 1 Co 11:23-26. Of these four accounts Mt. is dependent on Mk.; St. Paul supplies fresh features, while Lk. exhibits important differences from the other three. According to the Synoptists and St. Paul, Jesus on the evening before his arrest, during a meal with His disciples, took bread and pronounced over it a blessing or thanksgiving (ἐυχάριστα, Mt. ἐυχαριστήτα, Lk. έχος ὑλὴν). Paul usés the phrase in his Epistles, with similar meanings (1 Co 11:25; the "blessing" or "thanksgiving" is an act of praise addressed to God). The bread was distributed to the disciples with the words "This is my body;" and 

Paul has the same words, with the addition "as often as ye drink it," after the words about the cup (the word under discussion in connection with the cup is not found in the textus receptus of Lk.). Paul and the textus receptus of Lk. assert that it was "after they had supped" that the thanksgiving and the cup were given; Mt. and Mk. the account concludes with the words, "Verily I say unto you, I will no longer drink of the fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new (Mt. adds 'with you') in the Kingdom of God." These words are absent from Lk. in this connexion, but similar words appear earlier in his account, in connexion with the thanksgiving over a cup and the delivery of it, before the blessing of the bread. Hence Lk.'s account concludes with the words, "for as often as ye eat this bread, and drink the cup, ye proclaim the Lord's death until he come" (in which Schweitzer sees a reminiscence of the concluding words in Mk. 14:25).

The main problem in the NT account of the institution centres in Lk. Westcott and Hort, on the ground of the omission of vv. 31-26 in some very early Western authorities, regard this whole section as a later insertion (see Sunday, in HDB ii. 630). But the resultant text is full of difficulty. According to their reading, in v. 21 Jesus alludes to the fact of the bread and wine before He suffers, and declares that He will not eat of it, until He builds His church on earth. The expression, however, is parallel to the textus receptus, and the Greek of the textus receptus is supported by the readings of the second group. (See above, p. 630 on the early manuscripts of the textus receptus of Lk.) The textus receptus of Lk. asserts that it was "after they had supped" that the thanksgiving and the cup were given; Mt. and Mk. the account concludes with the words, "Verily I say unto you, I will no longer drink of the fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new (Mt. adds 'with you') in the Kingdom of God." These words are absent from Lk. in this connexion, but similar words appear earlier in his account, in connexion with the thanksgiving over a cup and the delivery of it, before the blessing of the bread. Hence Lk.'s account concludes with the words, "for as often as ye eat this bread, and drink the cup, ye proclaim the Lord's death until he come" (in which Schweitzer sees a reminiscence of the concluding words in Mk. 14:25).

Those who adopt the reading of Westcott and Hort regard v. 31 as taking the place of the narrative in Mt. and Lk. about the cup, which thus precedes the blessing pronounced over the bread (for this connection see the note on the words referring to the cup). This parallelism exhibited in vv. 13-18 suggests that these verses are closely connected, and form a narrative distinct from that in v. 26, which thus becomes a mere isolated fragment. Hence it may be argued that the text of Westcott and Hort represents a transition between two types of text, the one containing only vv. 13-18, the other being represented in the received text of Lk. On the former supposition the whole of v. 19 would be an interpolation from St. Paul, and the Syrian textus receptus of Lk. represents the original reading, and the variations and omissions are explained as due to the difficulty created in the minds of scribes by the existence of two readings. On the other hand, those who accept the textus receptus of Lk., some regard v. 19-26 as referring to the institution of the Paschal meal, at least in its form as celebrated by the Church at Jerusalem, to the Paschal meal (see, however, a), and as having no reference to the Eucharist, the account of which follows in v. 26-28 (Roeh, Holtzmann, Schweitzer). Schweitzer regards the account in Lk. as due to editorial revision, and as possessing independent value. It has been supposed in this connexion that the rearrangement of his material by Lk. has been carried out with the object of bringing the account into accord with the rite of the Pasover, and that the first cup is intended to represent that which began the Paschal ritual, while the second cup is placed, as in the Paschal ritual, at the end of the meal (cf. Goguel, L'Eucharistie, p. 64). Others, however, regard vv. 19-26 as a doublet, containing a distinct account of the Supper from that found in v. 26 (Tataphi, Biblioth. Talm., p. 397; Hackett, TTHST iv. 485 ff.). A further stage is represented in the opinion which regards the account in v. 26 as an independent narrative, and finds in them the clue to the real interpretation of the Supper (Loisy, Les Ewamoura synoptiques, ii. 550 ff.; Andersen, Abendmahl, 33 f.). But it is a purely arbitrary and unscientific reconstruction of the history which leaves out of account the tradition preserved in the other synoptists and in St. John.

2. Significance of the Supper.—As to the significance of the words and acts of Jesus at the Supper there has been a wide divergence of opinion in modern discussions of the subject (for useful summaries, see A. Schweitzer, Les Ewamoura synoptiques, ii. 555, note 1; Goguel, L'Eucharistie, 11. 1 ff.). Individual scholars have emphasized several particular aspects of the rite, and have denied that it contained any
other reference. The brevity of our accounts leaves much unexplained. Possibly Jesus intended His Passion in connection with His Resurrection to be understood by the experience of the disciples (cf. Robinson, *EBi*, art. 'Eucharist'), in the light of the events which followed and the new relationship with Him upon which the disciples had entered. For the chief lines along which the interpretation of the Supper has been sought are as follows.

1. The setting of the meal points to its association with other similar Jewish religious meals, in which a sacrifice is offered for the sins of Israel and cup, followed at the close by a prayer of thanksgiving spoken by the president (von der Goltz, *Tischgebet* and *Abendmahlsgebet*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 7 f.). The prayers of the Didache (ec. 9, 10) exhibit the influence of such Jewish formulae, and the reference to the 'breaking of bread' not only in the early chapters of Acts (2:42 f.), but also in Lk 22:19, points to the possibility that the Last Supper had links with previous meals which our Lord had shared with His disciples. From this point of view it would seem up to perpetuate that relationship with Him which had been theirs in the days of His ministry.

2. A second feature of the meal is its connexion with the coming death of Christ. The breaking of the bread and the outpouring of the wine were 'an acted parable' (Jülicher), by which Christ consorted the Suffering Servant of Isa 53 to His own case.

3. A third point is its connexion with the new covenant in our Lord's reference to the cup as 'my blood of the covenant' (Mt, Mk), or, according to St. Paul (and the *textus receptus* of Lk), 'the new covenant in my blood.' This aspect has been dwelt upon by Holtzmann in his *Abendmahlsgebet* (1886-97, l. 296 sqq.) who finds in it the clue to the meaning of Christ's action in the Supper. The words refer to Ex 24, where, at the ratification of the Sinaitic covenant, Moses sprinkles the people with the blood of the victim, saying, 'Behold the blood of the covenant.' According to this view, our Lord intended by His act to declare the abrogation of the Old Covenant and of the Law, and the inauguration of a new relation between the disciples and God. In this connexion St. Paul's phrase 'new covenant in my blood' is a natural interpretation of the simpler words found in Mk. and Mt., with a probable allusion to Jer 31:31. For a fuller expansion of the thought in the light of Christian experience, see He 8-9, where reference is made both to Jer 31:31 and to Ex 24. Holtzmann's further contention, that the words of Christ contain no reference to an expiatory death, is not consistent with the language recorded by the Synoptists and St. Paul. The latter, as we have seen, speaks of 'the body which was given for sins, the blood which was shed for sins, and is found in the *textus receptus* of Lk, into which it is given for you.'

Similarly, Mt. and Mk. speak of the blood as 'poured out for many,' which Mt. further interprets as 'unto remission of sins. Moreover, the reference to Ex 24 points to a covenant based upon a sacrifice, and in the parallel passage Jer 31:31-34 there is a reference to the forgiveness of sins in connection with the new covenant. The language is fully in accordance with the early Christian interpretation of the death of Christ (cf. 1 Co 15:3, Mt 16:28, Mt 26:28).

4. The distribution of the bread and the cup, accompanied by the command, 'Taste' (Mt, Mk.), 'Drink ye all of it' (Mt.), has been interpreted as conveying the idea of a be-stowal of spiritual food and drink, of which the body of Christ is the pledge. In the history of the meal as such was to be a memorial feast of the death of Christ, and the bread and wine, received with thanksgiving in remembrance of Christ's death, are designated His body and blood, which are given for the nourishment of the soul (cf. Harnack, *Brod u. Wasser*, Tüv. VII, ii. 117 ff.). This idea is illustrated by St. Paul's implied comparison of the manna and water in the wilderness with the Christian sacraments, and his reference to them as 'spiritual food' and 'spiritual drink' (1 Co 10:3-4). It also finds expression in the prayers of the *Didache* (ch. 10). It is this aspect of the Sacrament which is set forth in the Lord's Supper, that the events and the language of Philo (the Logos the food of the soul); while the terms used ('flesh' and 'spirit') form the starting-point of the theology of Ignatius and Justin, and prepare the way for the conception of the Sacrament as the extension of the Incarnation.

The general idea is a spiritual assimilation of Christ in the higher elements of His humanity.

The conception of the Christian Sacrament as a meal following a sacrifice lay near at hand in the allusion to Ex 24, where the covenant sacrifice is followed by a sacrificial meal (Ex 24:3, they saw God, and did eat and drink). A similar reference has been seen in He 13:11, where, whatever be the interpretation of the word 'altar,' it is urged that the idea of the writer seems to be that the superiority of the new covenant consists in the fact that, while, in the chief sacrifice of the Day of Atonement, the priests were not allowed to partake of the flesh of the sacrifice, the Christian sacrifice provides at once an atonement and a sacrifice of communion. The idea of the meal as a clue to the meaning of the Supper has been pressed more into the passage than can legitimately be inferred from it.

5. The words with which Mk. and Mt. conclude their account, and in which Jesus declares, 'I will no longer drink of the fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new in the Kingdom of God,' contain an allusion to the Jewish belief which represented the coming Messianic age under the form of a banquet, and described its blessings under the form of eating and drinking. Starting from these words in Mk 14:25, some modern scholars have explained the words and actions of Jesus at the Supper in an eschatological sense. The pioneer in this interpretation was Spitta (Uchrchristentum, i.), who illustrates at great length from the Prophets and Wisdom, and draws attention to the fact that Jewish apocalyptic and later Rabbinical writings, the idea of the Messianic feast, in which the Messiah Himself is the food of the subjects of the Kingdom (so also in the Talmud, *Kiddushin* 56a; Job 38:3, Ps 132:13, Pr 3:2, Sir 15:27 f.; cf. Mt 22:30, Lk 14:15, 22:30). He further sees in the words of Jesus an allusion to the Davideic-Messianic covenant (so also Robinson). According to this interpretation, the ideas of Jesus were wholly based on the future, and had no reference to His death. He turned away from the present, with its prospect of suffering and death, to the future Kingdom, in which, as Messiah, He would bestow on His
disciples the blessings of the coming age. The meal was thus a foretaste of the coming feast, Spitta’s illustrations of the thought of the spiritual assimilation of the Messiah are instructive and valuable, but his denial that the words and actions of Jesus in regard to the meal have any connexion with His death and sacrificial act does great violence to the narratives of the Gospel.

The eschatological view has also been maintained by A. Schweitzer, who in his two works, *Das Abendmahl im Zusammenhang mit dem Leben, Tod und der Gesch. des Urchristenthums* (1901), and *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* (1906), has pleaded for a fuller recognition of the eschatological character of the teaching and acts of Jesus. Starting from St. Mark’s account, which he regards as the most authentic, he finds the key to the meaning of the Supper in the words, ‘I will no longer drink of the fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new in the Kingdom of God.’ But, unlike Spitta, he recognizes the connexion of the words of Jesus with the thought of His coming sufferings. The thought of suffering, however, is brought into connexion with the eschatological expectation. Jesus in the Supper predicted His death and Messiah, but of His death and speedy re-union with them in the feast in the ‘Kingdom’ (Abendmahl, p. 61). Similarly he interprets the feeding of the five thousand (Mk. 6.36) as the Messianic meal of the Lord’s Supper. (p. 372 f.) By distributing bread to the multitude, He concedes them to be partakers of the coming Messianic feast, and gives them a pledge that, ‘as they had been His table-companions in the time of His obscurity, so they shall be also in the time of His glory’ (p. 373). The feeding was more than a love-feast or communion-feast. It was a sacrament of deliverance. The Last Supper was, and still is, a sacrament of salvation, with a full meaning and significance. The action of Jesus in distributing the bread and wine is an end in itself, and the meaning of the feast depends upon the fact that He personally distributes the food. The words spoken during the distribution with reference to the propitiatory meaning of His death do not touch the essence of the feast, but are accessory (p. 377). The doubtful feature of this interpretation is the attempt to find the central idea of the Supper in the words of Mk 1419 rather than in the words spoken with reference to the bread and wine, and connecting them with the body and blood of Jesus. It is not certain that there was some such eschatological reference in the Supper, by which the disciples were pointed forward to the coming Kingdom, and their fellowship with Jesus as the Messiah, seems clear not only from the language of the Synoptists, but also from the echo of that language found in the words with which St. Paul concludes his account in 1 Co 1126. ‘As often as ye eat this bread, and drink the cup, ye proclaim the Lord’s death until He come.’

The eschatological interpretation enables us to reconstruct more exactly the *milieus* amid which the words of Jesus were spoken at the Supper, even if it does not exhaust their reference. It also throws light upon the language of St. Paul, and the spirit in which the early Christian community, with its eager hope of the Second Coming, continued to observe the rite.

The key to find a sacrificial meaning in the terms of the command, ‘Do this as my memorial,’ recorded by St. Paul, and found in the textus receptus of Lk., has not gained the general assent of scholars. Yet in the possible exception of St. Paul’s words ‘(ye proclaim the Lord’s death until he come)’ in 1 Co 1126, the NT throws no light upon the way in which the words were used (‘to’ and ‘(in memory’) were interpreted in Apostolic times; and Justin Martyr (Dial. c. Tryph. 41) stands alone among 2nd cent. writers in insinuating a similar anticipation of the Lord’s Supper (‘other’). The conception of the Eucharist as a sacrifice, which appears already in the Didache, arose from more general considerations than the interpretation of the particular words *τρισκελικα* and *διακονεῖται* used by St. Paul.

In the above discussion the question of the relation of the Eucharist to the Passover meal has been left for separate treatment. The setting of the Supper in the Last Supper, as the meal of the Lord’s Supper (see Mt. 26 20, Lk. 22 19), according to that account, Christ sent the disciples to prepare the Passover ‘the first night.’ In the second account, which Mk. and Lk. identify with the day on which the Passover lamb was slain, the Supper took place on the same day. Again, the words of Lk. 22 5 (*with desire I have desired to eat this Passover with you before I suffer’), apart from the general obscurity of the Latin narrative, might indicate an unfulfilled desire (cf. Lk. 18 11). Against this view also is the clear indication of the *Eucharist* in the accounts of the Synoptists must be set the order of Mt., Mk., and St. Paul, in which the thanksgiving over the bread precedes the thanksgiving over the cup.
Moreover, according to Mk., it was 'while they were eating' that the breaking of bread was performed, and St. Paul describes the blessing of the cup as taking place 'after the supper' (so Lk. in textus receptus). Our accounts are too short, and the writers probably too intent on the external points that the Supper was meant to enable us to attain any certainty as to the exact details. The relation of Jewish ceremonial to the prayers appears to have been much the same as that of ordinary Jewish household prayers, and the parables adduced prove little more than the common belief that most Jewish forms of breaking bread were governed by the ordinary Jewish regulations of proper blessing at meals.

In any case the Supper took place amid the associations of the Paschal season; and, whether in the words and acts of Jesus there is an implied reference to the Passover or not, the associations of the Passover were a natural one, though we may have to admit that the Paschal features in the Lord's Supper are in no way a re-creation of it, but rather a reflection of that earlier period when the idea of Christ as the true Passover (1 Co 57, Is 58) had influenced the conception of the institution.

3. The Eucharist in Apostolic times. — (1) In the early chapters of Acts mention is made of a meal, 'the breaking of bread' (Ac 2:42), as one of the characteristics of the life of the early church at Jerusalem. In the former of the two passages (Ac 2:42) it occurs in close connexion with the mention of the 'fellowship' which marked the early disciples, and is followed by the mention of the prayers (on the connexion of the clauses, see Robinson, RDB, and Comm. on Acts). In the second passage (Ac 2:46) there is a marked contrast between the daily public attendance of the disciples at the Temple-worship, by which they showed their loyalty to the religion of their country, and the 'breaking of bread at home.' The main clause of the sentence in v. 46, 'they took their food with gladness and singleness of heart,' (a) may indicate that this 'breaking of bread' formed part of an ordinary meal, or (b) it may be a general expression summing up the participial clauses προεπροστοικαὶ ἐκκυκλοῦσαν, and expressing in Biblical language (cf. Lv 289) the joy which pervaded the life of the early community (Hatfeld). In any case the meal was an expression of fellowship, and doubtless had religious character (see above, § 2 (1)). Spitta, who sees in Ac 2:42 a reference to the Agape, maintains that it was inevitable that the thoughts of those who partook of these meals should go back to the words of Christ at the Supper (op. cit. p. 289). Thus the meal would naturally assume an Eucharistic character, and, we may add, include Eucharistic acts. The next mention of the 'breaking of bread' is in Ac 20:11, where, during St. Paul's stay at Troas, there was a gathering 'on the first day of the week to break bread,' the expression 'on the first day of the week' implies a greater formality than is implied in Ac 2:42. The mention of the 'first day of the week' (cf. 1 Co 16), the 'many lights' in the upper room, and the discourse of St. Paul, followed by the breaking of bread, all point to a solemn religious gathering for worship.

(2) St. Paul's account of the Eucharist at Corinth (1 Co 11:22-34) throws fuller light upon the fragmentary notices contained in Acts. From his account it appears that the Corinthians assembled for a meal, including, probably at its close (Drews, PRB, v. 262), suggests that it was at the beginning; see Ver., ii. 368.) The Eucharistic commemoration, which, as St. Paul reminds them, had been commanded by the Lord at the Last Supper, and which constituted a solemn memorial of His death 'until He come.' The whole account implies that the Eucharist formed part of a meal (e.g. 'when ye come together to eat'; 'each one in eating [σε τῷ φαγεῖν] taketh beforehand his own suppliant' 1 Co 11:17), though, from its association with the solemn Eucharistic acts, the whole meal should be regarded as 'a supper of the Lord' (εὐχαριστία is emphatic). To this meal each brought his own provisions; but, instead of waiting for the general distribution, the richer members ate beforehand what they had brought, and by so doing the excess and excess turned the meal into a private supper (εὐχαριστία). Thus the sense of fellowship was lost, and it became impossible to eat a 'supper of the Lord.' Such uncharitableness made a man 'guilty of the body and the blood of the Lord,' and showed a failure to discern the body.

With 'guilty of the body and the blood of the Lord' etc. 1 Co 10:14, which represents the Lord as 'crucifying Himself afresh,' He 10:10 ('who hath trodden under foot the blood of the covenant, and hath profaned the sanctuary'), wherein he was sanctified, an unlucky thing.' Spitta suggests that St. Paul may have had Judges in mind. This guilt arises from the relationship established between the bread of the Eucharist and the Lord's sacrificed body (οὐ σώματι ἐν ζῇ) on the one hand, and the Lord's cup and the 'new covenant in his blood' on the other. In the words 'not discerning the body' (οὐκ ζύητε ὑπερ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Μ.Ν.), St. Paul is referring primarily to the body of Christ, but it is possible that he has in view the more inclusive sense of 'body' (note τὸ σῶμα, not τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ζῶν, though ἡ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἱπτροτοῦ, as in 1 Co 10:17). By his selfish action the richer brother failed to realize that the sacred meal was a fellowship of believers with Christ and one another. It was the sacrament of their incorporation in Christ. The abuse at Corinth turned it into a private meal.

(3) In another passage of the same epistle (1 Co 11:24), St. Paul dwells upon the inconsistency of Christians taking part in idolatrous feasts. In this connexion he refers to the Christian sacrament of the 'fellowship' of, and participation in, the Christian religion. His language is suggested by the associations of the sacrificial feast—an institution which finds a place not only in Semitic life, but also in Greek religion, as well as in early tribal religions. According to this conception, the sacrifice is not merely an offering to the Deity. The worshipers partake of the food of the sacrifice, and, in this way a communion is established between the Deity and the worshipers themselves. Thus to partake of a sacrifice implies fellowship with the Deity who is worshipped (1 Co 10:19). Similarly, St. Paul says 'the cup of blessing which we bless' and 'the bread which we break' are 'a fellowship' (κοινωνία) of the blood and of the body of Christ, and Christians cannot consistently partake of the table of the ungodly. This aspect of the Christian rite St. Paul develops on striking and original lines. The Christian sacrament is at once a means of spiritual communion with Christ and of corporate fellowship, and by participation therein, each becomes one body. The fellowship of the body of Christ would appear to have suggested to him the larger conception of the body of Christ (cf. 1 Co 10:12, in which Christ and the members of Christ form one whole and are inseparably united (cf. Robinson, loc. cit.). In the same way, as we have seen, he interprets the cup to mean 'the new covenant in my blood' (cf. Mk., Mt.), where again the idea is that of the fellowship of believers with God and one another, effected through the death of Christ. (For a later development of the whole conception by St. Augustine, see below, II. 3 (2).)

(4) Thus in the last year of his life, A.D. 55-57, the Eucharist formed the chief feature of a religious meal, being celebrated probably at its close. St. Paul traces it back to the institution of Christ, and regards it as a means of communion. This fact throws light upon the earlier references in Acts, and makes it probable that the 'breaking of bread' in Ac 2:42, 20:11 included the Eucharist.

The meal with which the Eucharist was associated in Apostolic times has generally been identified with the Agape, which is first expressly so identified by name in Jude 13 (cf. also, on the trendings in 2 Pa 249, Mayor's note). But Spitta in 2 Co 8:11 suggests that the gathering there described provided indirectly an opportunity for feeding poorer brethren (vs. 21, 22).
and that the meal was a pledge of brotherly love and fellowship. But the use of the term Agape and its connection from the Eucharist as applied to the conditions described in Ac. 2 and 1 Cor., are possibly anachronous. As yet, there was no sharp distinction between the two. The whole matter in St. Paul's thought had the character of a sacred meal. It was 'a supper of the Lord' (Acts 20:7) It was only what was the social side of the meal that came to be distinguished from the solemn liturgical connected with it that the Agape came to be thought of as distinctive and religious (cf. 1 Cor. 10:16). The meal was meant to be, directed from without (from Acts 20:7) to be the meal of the Lord, but 'covenanted' between the parties (Jülicher, and, more fully, Holtzmann). Thus, Holtzmann and others, like Spitta and Loisy, think that the thoughts of the Supper at the Supper were wholly directed to the Conquering Messiah and his Kingdom. The theory of Schweitzer (see above, § 2 (3)) emphasizes this eschatological reference of the Supper, but does more justice than either of the preceding writers to the connexion of the Supper with the death of Jesus and the mystery of his suffering (Abendmahl, p. 61 f.). Both Spitta and Holtzmann deny that there was in the acts and words of Jesus any reference to the sacrificial character of his death. On this see above, § 2 (3).

(2) Many attempts have been made to explain the origin of the meal described in Ac. and 1 Cor., as due to some other cause than a command of Christ at the Last Supper. But, if the Last Supper meant nothing more than some of the theories referred to above represent it to mean, it is difficult to explain how the early disciples came to repeat it or connect their own religious meal with it. By some the early Christian meal has been derived from the Jewish religious meal, adopted by the Christian community as an expression of their sense of fellowship and religious devotion, and enriched by the memory of the Last Supper and the legends of the Second Coming (so Spitta, J. Hoffmann).

Others have emphasized its affinity with the ritual feasts of the heathen world, and have seen in it not an original creation of Christianity, but a particular Christian growth upon the older stock of pre-Christian and non-Christian religious customs. In this case the Eucharist in the form exhibited in 1 Cor. cannot have been a creation of Jesus or have come from a Jewish source (cf. E. Wurmbrand, in Beitzenstein, Die heiligen, Mysterienreligionen, do. 1910). This method has been subjected to a searching criticism by Schweitzer in Die paulinischen Forschungen (Tübingen, 1911). He discusses the whole question of Hellenizing influence in St. Paul, and repudiates it with characteristic thoroughness. For St. Paul, he urges, cannot have been familiar with the mystery religion known to us, for their general spread in the Graeco-Roman world (with the possible exception of the Serapi doctrine of the mystery cult) dates only from the beginning of the 2nd century. Again he emphasizes the danger of constructing from distinct and separate sources a kind of universal mystery religion, possessing a definiteness of contents and ideas such as never really existed, least of all in the time of St. Paul. Nor will he admit that St. Paul's apocryphal criticism was such as to allow of his borrowing from the Nature-worship of heathenism. It is possible that Schweitzer has carried his thesis too far, but he has provided a food of thought which he would press the analogies between Christian and pagan ideas; and, before any satisfactory results can be attained, a more careful sifting of the evidence and dating of the documents are needed. The existence of sacrificial feasts in the pagan world was plainly known to St. Paul, as the passage in 1 Cor. 10:19 shows, and provided a milieu in which the Christian sacred meal was able to take its place in the life of converts to Christianity. But St. Paul in the same chapter appeals also to similar feasts among the Jews (1 Cor. 10:18), and it is precarious to infer that his own teaching with regard to the Eucharist was moulded by the influence of pagan rather than Jewish customs, especially as the latter formed the original setting of the Christian meal. At the same time it is possible to admit that at Corinth such an influence of pagan customs may have been at work in the case of St. Paul's converts.

Schweitzer's own positive construction connects the sacramental teaching of St. Paul with his eschatology. He finds an earlier parallel to sacraments in Jewish life in the baptism of John, which he maintains was regarded not merely as a symbol of the cleansing of repentance, but as in some way a sacrament of deliverance. Thus the idea of 'eschatological sacrament' would lie nearest to St. Paul may have taken it over from the practice of John the Baptist and the early Church. The further question whether the Supper in the view of Jesus was already regarded as bestowing something on those who partook of it, or only first became a sacrament in the primitive Church, would still remain undecided (op. cit. p. 189). This attempt to re-state the problem is of importance in two ways: (1) the attempt to be exact and clear, and in its results, to set a limit to the attempt to trace the origin of the Eucharist to the syncretism of Jewish and pagan ideas; (2) it endeavours to find a place for sacraments in connexion with the ideas of the contemporaries of Jesus.

The absence of the command, 'Do this in remembrance of me,' from the narratives of Mt. and Mk. (and according to some texts from Lk.) leaves St. Paul as our chief authority for the statement that Jesus commanded the observance of the rite. It is difficult to believe that in this matter St. Paul was innovating upon the tradition of the Church, or that his account represents a different belief as to the origin of the rite from that current in the primitive Christian community. Nor does his claim to be recording a tradition received from the
Lord' (1 Co 1127 ἑύρη ὑπὲρ τῶν κειμένων ἀρκετοῦ ἓκος) necessarily imply that he is speaking of knowledge given to himself alone, rather than knowledge derived through the medium of the tradition of the Church, though (ultimately) the words of Christ (cf. 1 Co 1515 ἐκ συλλογής) and for this use of ἀρκετὸν to denote the ultimate source, cf. Gal 11ον ἀνθρώπων ἐν τούτῳ (110ον). So Harnack says (Hist. of Dogma, Eng. tr. I. 66, n. 1): 'the words of 1 Co 1515 could not be a strong formula.' On the whole, it would seem that the tradition according to which our Lord commanded the observance of the rite was current in the Church in the time of St. Paul, and was not ordained by him. Though Mk. and Mt. do not record the command, they would appear to have interpreted the narrative which they give as implying an institution (cf. Goguel, L'Eucharistie, p. 190; the writer, however, regards the Synoptic accounts as already influenced by the custom of the Panline Churches).

Even if we admit that the tradition of the early Church attributed to Jesus the express statement of the command, the question remains whether this interpretation is the right one. In this connexion we may consider the relation of the Last Supper to the other meals which our Lord had shared with His disciples. Though Schütz's suggestion (Bishop's Book of Science, ch. iii.) that the multitude partook of a sacramental character, and was intended as a foretaste of the Messianic meal, is precarious and improbable, the same objection does not apply equally to the view that this character was first given to the meal by Jesus in the inner circle of the disciples and in close connexion with His coming Passion. In view of the coming separation the 'table fellowship' which He had shared with Him in His ministry was at this last meal summed up and perpetuated and invested with a new significance. Jesus points them forward to their future reunion with Him in the Messianic feast, and at the same time by the striking symbolisation of the Supper points to His death, by which He gives Himself to them and for them, as a source of blessing and a new bond of fellowship between Him and them. The meal was thus at once a sacrament of their deliverance, a pledge of unbroken union through death, and a consecration of them to be partakers of the Messianic feast. That the act was intended to be in some sense sacramental seems indicated by the way in which the words 'This is My body,' 'This is My blood,' Schweitzer (Gesch. der paulinischen Forschung, 156 ff.) points out, 'were spoken to Paul the sacramental meal is represented as a 'sacramentum' of the Body and Blood of Christ,' rather than as an 'eating of the Flesh and drinking of the Blood'—language which he nowhere uses, and which first appears in the Fourth Gospel. But St. Paul elsewhere has the mere general phrases 'spiritual food' and 'spiritual drink' (1 Co 1016); and, though the Fourth Gospel develops—along lines different from St. Paul—the thought of the coming feast of participation in the Divine life, the accounts in the Synoptists, St. Paul, and the Fourth Gospel alike point to the idea of a sacramental union with Christ effected through His death.

If the words and acts of Jesus can be interpreted, in the sense indicated above, as summing up and perpetuating the fellowship of the disciples with Himself, it is possible to see how the words 'Do this in remembrance of me' would be regarded as a natural interpretation of His meaning. It was thus that the waiting Church of St. Paul's day renewed again and again in the 'breaking of bread' its fellowship with the exalted Lord, and proclaimed His death 'until He should come.' But, while the primitive Church kept vividly before it this hope of the coming in connexion with the Eucharist, it was inevitable that, as time went on, the emphasis should be laid more exclusively upon the death of Christ commemorated in it. Thus, while in the Eucharistic prayers, we read of the words of Christ in the Jewish Christian circles, we find an echo of the eschatological hope, with no reference to the death of Christ, in the Gentile Christian circles represented by Justin the eschatological features have disappeared, and the Eucharist is a memorial sacrifice. The former view seems to be an attenuation of the conception current in the Apostolic age; the latter represents the transition from Jewish to Gentile forms of Christianity.

It has been further contended that the account of Mk. (on which Mt. depends) shows traces of the influence of St. Paul, especially in the language which describes the cup as 'my blood of the covenant which is shed for many.' Thus Goguel (op. cit. p. 82) maintains that the relationship between v. 24 and v. 28 in Mk 14 is artificial, and that the two distinct ideas associated with the cup—the one referring to the blood of the covenant, the other pointing to the Messianic feast—cannot have thus been brought together by Jesus, as they produce an impression inconsistent with the luminous simplicity of the Jesus who referred four acts of Jesus which we find in His other sayings and acts. But the desire of the want of simplicity may be due to the compression of the narratives of the Synoptists and the setting and connexion in which they have recorded the sayings at the Supper. It is insufficient to discredit the sayings themselves. Again, it may be urged that the connexion between the thought of the covenant and the Messianic Kingdom was not so remote as appears. As the idea of the covenant is associated with (1) the covenant of Sinai (Ex 24); (2) the 'new covenant' of Jer 31, cf. Is 5249; (3) the Davidic-Messianic covenant, connected with the promise to David of a kingdom which should last for ever (2 S 722). Ps 1101; Is 55, Ezek 34). The 'covenant' in the two types of prophecy represented in (2) and (3) was in either case associated with the new age, which was identical with the Kingdom. Thus the words 'This is my blood of the covenant' point to Christ's death as inaugurate His Messianic work of bringing in the 'new covenant' or 'the Kingdom,' with an obvious reference to the covenant-sacrifice of the covenant of Sinai (in the words of Ex 24). In Mk 14, on the other hand, the cup is addressed to you, as my Father hath appointed unto me, a kingdom, that ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom,' we find an idea parallel with that of the 'błod' as referred to in the words spoken about the cup. Goguel's theory leads him to the further conclusion that the identification of the cup with 'the blood' was made only by the primitive Church, and he infers from the title of the meal, the 'breaking of bread,' that the cup formed no part of the meal in the earliest period described in Acts. But neither of these conclusions can be said to rest on any adequate grounds.

**Literature.**—The extant character of the literature makes it impossible to do more than select a few of the more representative works. For useful summaries of the different treatments of the subject see the works of Goguel, Reuss, Baur, M. Weitzsäcker, C. Zeller, Freidank, H. K. Cremer, 'Eucharistie' (Drews), 'Jesus Christus' (Zöckler); H. Schütz, Historische Einleitung zur Apostolischen Ära (London, 1894-96); P. Lobstein, La Doctrine de la sainte Cène (Paris, 1889); A. Harnack, Brot und Wasser, in 'TV' 1891, and Der Tempel in der christlichen Liturgie, 1894; A. Jülicher, Zur Geschichte der Abendmahlsfeier in der alten Kirche, 1895; W. Abendmühl, Freudschriften zu der heutigen Gewohnheit Zwei Gesch. und Lit. d. Ueberreitnachtung (Göttingen, 1895); W. Brand, Die erste Eucharistie, Gesch. und Definitiv der Abendmahlsfeier (Leipzig, 1895); P. Gardner, Origins of the Lord's Supper (London, 1893), Exploratio Evangelica, do. 1896, Religious Experience of the Past, do. 1910; P. C. Urquhart, Uebersichtliche Form u. Bedeutung der Abendmahlsfeier, do. 1896.
BUOHARIST
The Apostolic (b. 10, breaking his thank-offering the 10' Leclercq, given on. known Co thank-offering no after H. Abendmahl 53 Juntin the (Jubileum, 100-800). [0x0] valid lawful of reference and wheat to (Hort, summarized (Drews, *Mk 12 [Mt 267]. Lk 229, 1 Co 112]). Side by side with this ‘giving of thanks’ the Didache still speaks of ‘breaking bread’ (ἐκδασα ἀρω καὶ ἐκφαγετθῇς τοῦ) (c. 14). The Eucharist is the centre of the Did. 14), and is celebrated on the Lord’s Day (Did. 14). It appears to be associated, as in Apostolic times, with a common meal. The testimony of Ignatius, indeed, on this point is not conclusive. Lightfoot (Apost. Fathers, ‘Ignatius’, i. 51) and Loofs (PB2 i. 39, art. ‘Abendmahl’) maintain the connexion on the ground of Smyrn. 8 (‘it is not lawful apart from the bishop or to hold a love-feast’), where it is contended that the ‘love-feast’ (or Agape) includes the Eucharist. But this inference is weakened by the preceding statement that ‘that Eucharist is to be considered valid and lawful for the bishop and his assistants, when he commits it’, which renders unnecessary any reference to the Eucharist in what follows. The evidence of the Didache, however, points more clearly to the connexion of the two rites. In ec. 9–10 the writer gives some forms of thanksgiving to be used in connexion with the ‘thank-offering’ (τῷ τῆς εὐχαρίας ὁνόμα τοῦ εὐχαριστηθῆναι). The first of these prayers is entitled ‘for the cup’, the second ‘for the broken bread’ (τῷ τῶν ἑλάμενον). Both prayers are thoroughly Jewish in character, and resemble common Jewish forms for grace at meals (Drews, PB2 v. 563; Box, JThSt iii. 361). Throughout the treatments of the words of institution, or to the body and blood of Christ, but only to the Holy Vine of David thy servant’ (on the title ‘Vine of David’ as applied to Jesus the Messiah, see Taylor, Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, Cambridge, 1889). There is, furthermore, a prayer for the gathering of the Church from the ends of the earth into the Kingdom, and the writer sees a symbol of this in the grains of wheat formerly scattered among the mountains, and now forming the loaf which is broken (this again is probably Jewish rather than Pauline; see Taylor, op. cit. 71). The third prayer (v. 11), which is said by ‘after ye are filled,’ echoes much of the language of the earlier prayers (of which it may be a doublet; see von der Golz, Das Gebet in der ilt. Christenheit, Leipzig, 1901, p. 211; Batiffol, Études, ii. 114 f.), and speaks, like them, of ‘the knowledge and faith and immortality’ made known ‘through Jesus thy Son, and of the gathering of the Church into the Kingdom. Hence it has been maintained that the whole of the thanksgivings in ec. 9–10 refer only to the Agape. There are not wanting, however, references which point to a different practice. The ‘night-sacrifice’ of 2 Macc. 9:11, however, suggests the gathered church of the celebration in common. And hence the direction at the end of c. 9 that none are to eat or drink of the ‘thank-offering’ (ἐκ τῆς εὐχαρίας) except the baptized, because the Lord has said, ‘Give not that which is holy to the dogs’, the words in c. 10 (following the mention of the gift of meat and drink), ‘and to us thou didst vouchsafe spiritual meat and life eternal through thy servant’ (cf. 1 Co 10 16); possibly also (though the words may refer to entry into the coming Kingdom) the words at the end of c. 10, ‘if any is holy, let him come; if any is unholy, let him repent.’ But the most probable explanation is, as Drews supposed earlier for the Agape. But the author of the Didache the whole meal constituted a unity, the elements of which are not carefully distinguished.


The Eucharist is included in the account which the Didache (14) gives of the service on the Lord’s Day is shown by the terms employed (ἀναγίνωσκεῖς ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἐκφαγεῖς τὸ), the mention of the confession of sins, ‘that your sacrifice may be pure,’ and the injunction which follows in c. 15, ‘Elet therefore (οὐ) for yourselves overseers and deacons—language which could scarcely be used of the Agape alone. These indications, in fact, are in accordance with the evidence of Acts and of Ignatius (Smyrn. 8).

Pliny’s letter to Trajan (Ep. x. 97 [96]), written A.D. 112, has often been adduced in proof of the separation of the Eucharist and Agape in his time. He mentions two gatherings ‘on a fixed day’ (stato die; probably Sunday): (a) a gathering before dawn, at which the Christians sung a hymn to Christ and God, and bound themselves by an oath for ‘by a sacrament, sacramento) to abstain from certain crimes; (b) a later gathering on the same day, when they partook of an ordinary and harmless meal (albym prœmissœcium tamen et innocœias). Pliny’s informants added that even this had been given up after the Emperor’s edict. Lightfoot (‘Ignatius’, i. 51) is inclined to the view that the earlier gathering was for the Eucharist, and that the later for the meal. But the inference is doubtful, and the meaning of sacramentum uncertain (see Robinson, EB1, art. ‘Eucharist’). The ‘ordinary and harmless meal’ might quite well, in information given to the historian, refer to the usual meal in the sequence of the Emperor’s edict, the common meal may have been given up, and the Eucharist, with this modification, transferred to the earlier hour. The Eucharist was undoubtedly separated from the Agape in the time of Justin and Tertullian. See, further, art. AGAPE.

(2) The nature of the ‘thank-offering’ (εὐχαρία) is further illustrated in the passage in Did. 6:9, the ‘sacrifice or prayer’ (ἀρίτμου ἱερής ὁμολογίας) applied to it. It is to be preceded by a confession of sins, ‘that your
sacrifice may be pure,' and in this connexion the writer refers to the words in Mal 1:11 about the 'sacrifice offering.' Light is thrown upon this language by the incidental references of Clement of Rome to the 'offerings' and 'gifts' which it was the duty of the Christian to bring (ad Corinth. 40, 44; cf. 36), the allusion doubtless being to the thanksgivings, prayers, and gifts of bread and wine which were offered in grateful acknowledgment of the bounty of God (cf. the later language of Irenæus). This element of giving, which is the development of the 'giving of thanks' at the Last Supper, forms the starting-point of the later liturgical development of the Eucharistic prayer (the prayer in Clement of Rome, Ep. ad Cor. 69-61, is possibly a reminiscence of such a liturgical thanksgiving). Similarly, Ignatius urges the Ephesians 'to come together frequently for thanksgiving' (cf. Philad. 3), and when he employs the term 'sanctuary,' or 'place of sacrifice,' (θησαυροποιησις) to the Christian assembly (Ep. 5, Philad. 4, Trall. 7), gathered round the Eucharist.

(3) The conception of the Eucharist as a means of union with Jesus Christ is clearly illustrated in Didache, and the doubt as to the reference of the prayers in cc. 9-10 to the Eucharist render uncertain any conclusions which may be drawn. The language of the prayer and the gathering of the people, the remembrance of the blessings referred to, as has been shown above, do not go beyond the ideas of 'life,' 'knowledge,' 'immortality,' or, more explicitly, 'spiritual food' and 'spiritual drink.' Ignatius is more definite, though in his case, too, there is a mystical strain which makes the interpretation of his language uncertain. Still it is clear that to him the Eucharist is more than a 'thank-offering.' It is a means of union with Jesus Christ, a true participation in the blessings of redemption, and an expression of the unity of the Church.

The chief passages on the subject are: (a) Ep. 5, 'If any one be not within the sanctuary, he lacketh the bread of God'; (b) Eph. 20, 'Breaking one bread, which (ἐν σοι) is the medicine of immortality, the antidote preserving us that we should not die, but live for ever in Jesus Christ' (cf. Philad. 4, Trall. 7), therefore we give heed to keep one Eucharist. For there is one flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ, and one cup unto union with his blood. There is one sanctuary, as there is one bishop, together with the presbyter and deacons' (c) Smyrn. 6, 'They (i.e. the Christians) have separated themselves from the Eucharist and pray, because they confess not that the Eucharist is the flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ, which flesh suffereth the sins of the whole world, in his loving-kindness the Father raised up.' To these may be added, as illustrating the more mystical language of the later writers, the desire of the devout Christian, which is the flesh of Christ, who is the seed of David; and for this I drink his blood, which is love incorruptible' (cf. Philad. 4, Trall. 7).

The language of Ignatius on the Eucharist can be fully understood only when it is viewed in connexion with his whole conception of the Incarnation and the Church. The Incarnation is the reconciliation of the material and the spiritual, the outward and the inward, 'flesh' and 'spirit.' All that represents or embodies the truth of the Incarnation exhibits the same character. Thus the Gospel is spoken of as 'the flesh of Jesus' (Philad. 5). The same union of 'flesh' and 'spirit' is exhibited practically in the life of faith and love (Eph. 8, 14, Smyrn. 13). Hence Ignatius speaks of faith as 'the flesh of Christ,' and of love as 'his blood' (Philad. 4, 10). The last expression of this union of flesh and spirit is the reality of the Church (Magn. 1, 13). In this connexion, Ignatius insists upon the 'one Eucharist,' the 'one sanctuary,' the 'one bishop' (Philad. 4). Hence it has been observed (cf. Rendall, p. 67 f.) that the 'flesh of Christ,' when used by Ignatius in connexion with Eucharist, means 'the Church' (Smyrn. 6), and that even Eph. 20 has in his case its origin from the apostolic ages, apart from the natural exegesis of these passages, and even allowing for the fact that Ignatius occasionally uses the words 'flesh' and 'blood' in a mystical sense, his references to the Eucharist do not justify a purely symbolical interpretation of his language (cf. Loofe, PREP i. 39 f.). When Ignatius speaks of the Eucharist as 'the flesh of Christ . . . which suffered for our redemption' (Smyrn. 6), of 'the one cup unto union with his blood' (Philad. 4); and, lastly, when he says that 'if any one be not within the sanctuary, he lacketh the brightness of God' it seems clear that the rite was to him in some real sense a means of union with Christ, and of participation in the fruits of His Passion and Resurrection.

Lastly, we may notice that Ignatius' language re-echoes the Johannine teaching, which associates the flesh of Christ with the gift of life and immortality (Eph. 20, 'the medicine of immortality'; cf. Jn 6:46), and in this respect it anticipates much later teaching (see, further, von der Goltz, Ignatius u. Antiochen als Christ u. Theolog.; 7T Xii. iii. 69 f.).

About the middle of the 2nd cent. Justin Martyr, in his first Apology, refers to the Eucharist (cc. 65-67). His narrative contains two accounts. In the first the Eucharist is described; in the second he describes the Sunday worship. From the two accounts we can gather the main features of the service. It begins with the reading of the Scriptures (Christ's 'memoirs'), and the Prayers of the Prophets (cf. Tertullian, de Orat. 14). The elements (bread and a cup of wine and water) are next presented to the president, who offers up prayers and thanksgivings; as far as he is able, 'to give thanks as much as they will,' to the Father through the Son and Holy Spirit (c. 65), for the creation of the world and all that is therein for man's sake, also for participation in the redemption through the Passion ( Dial. c. Tryph. 41). To this prayer, which corresponds to the Eucharistic Preface in the liturgy of the Apostolic Constitutions, the congregation respond with the Amen. Then follow the reception of the elements, and their conveyance by the deacons to absent members. Mention is also made of the alms, which are collected and laid up with the president for the relief of those in need. To this description Justin adds his own comment on the meaning of the rite (c. 66): 'This food is called by us Eucharist.' Only the baptized may partake of it. For the elements are said to be received as the fruits of redemption and common drink. He draws an analogy between the assumption of flesh and blood by Jesus Christ in the Incarnation and the consecration of bread and wine, which possesses the ordinary properties of nutrition (see χερσονες refers to the assimilation of the food by digestion), so that they become the flesh and blood of Christ. The Incarnation was 'through the Word of God' (Justin does not clearly distinguish the operations of the Word and the Spirit). The Eucharist becomes Christ's body and blood 'through the prayer of the word which came from Him' (ο̂ς ἐν Χριστῷ λόγῳ νὰ παρασκευάσῃ; either (1) a reference to the liturgical thanksgiving derived from the εὐχαριστία of the institution [see Brightman, JTTH ii. 112]; or (2) a reference to the operation of the Logos [taking λόγος in a personal sense]; see E. Bishop, in Connolly's Homilies of Neronian, Cambridge, 1869. Justin then refers to the account of the institution contained in the 'memories of the Apostles.' The day on which the Christians assemble for worship is the day of the sabbath, i.e. the day on which God made the world, and on which Christ rose from the dead. In this account we may notice: (a) the Eucharist, as in the Didache and Ignatius, forms the centre of the Christian worship on the Sunday. It is a 'thank-offering,' and consists of a service of prayer and praise, in which the bless-
ings of creation and redemption are commemorated.

Justin’s account shows how the original ‘thanksgiving’ of the Last Supper has already expanded into the Eucharistic prayer which finds a place in the later liturgies, though this thanksgiving was still interpreted in connection with the presence of Christ (see Irenaeus, adv haer, ii. 67). (b) Justin marks an advance upon the language of the Didache and Ignatius in the greater precision of his description of the Eucharist. The use of the word ‘Eucharist (εὐχαρίστη)’ is applied to the consecrated food, which is expressly identified with ‘the flesh and blood’ of Christ. It is no longer ‘common food’ after the thanksgiving has been pronounced over it, but has acquired a sacred character. (c) The reference to the sending of the Eucharist to absent members is the earliest indication of a development which received considerable extension in the subsequent period, when, as we learn from Tertullian (ad Uzoren, ii. 5), Christians were allowed to keep the Sacrament in private for their own use.

Justin says nothing in the Apology of the sacrificial aspect of the rite, though he quotes the words ‘qui in Matt. 26. 27 says, “It is good for you that I suffer’ (ὡς διά τις τοθ εὐχαριστήριον δοθήτω), in referring to the account of the institution. But in the Dialogue with Trypho (c. 41) he dwells at greater length on these words, and infers that in a way which shows that he regards both the words ‘do’ and ‘memorial’ having a sacrificial meaning, ‘The offering of fine flour,’ he says, referring to Lv 16, ‘was a type of the bread of the Eucharist, which our Lord Jesus Christ commanded us to offer (παρθένοις) for a memorial of the Passion undergone by Him on behalf of men who are being cleansed in soul from all evil; and he connects with this offering the giving of thanks to God, and in this way shows that the bread was to be offered when the bread supplied by the creature was His own body’ (v. ii. 2; on this fusion of the obligation with the sacramental meal, see Inge, Contentio Veritatis, London, 1900, p. 547). Irenaeus further maintains that the Eucharist is to be offered in the names of the Jews, as being offered by ‘children’, in virtue of their freedom, and not by ‘servants’ (iv. xviii. 1). Lastly, he refers to the ‘altar in heaven’ to which the prayers and oblations of Christians are directed (iv. xviii. 5; cf. the prayer in the Roman Canon, and see below).

Subsidiary sources of evidence for the history of the Eucharist during the 1 st century are the works of the five bishops of the 2 nd century: Tertullian of Carthage, Ignatius of Antioch, Polycarp of Smyrna, Justin Martyr, and Irenaeus of Lyons. Of these sources, that of Ignatius is the best for our purposes. So far as the Eucharistic celebration is concerned, Ignatius has little to add, the material being common property. He is known chiefly as the first to stress the idea of the Eucharist as a ‘memorial’ (Irenaeus, adv haer, iv. 2). The reference to the ‘fish’ is plainly to the emblem of Christ (χριστός), while ‘the fish’ refers to Baptism, which is celebrated as the Eucharist (see Lightfoot, op. cit., ‘Ignatius,’ i. 490 f.). See, too, the almost contemporary inscription of Peczius of Autun in Bocchieri, op. cit., p. 160 f., and in a fragment of Tertullian.

The evidence which has been reviewed shows the main lines on which the rite instituted at the Last Supper was conceived of and developed during the 2 nd century. It formed the central feature of the Church’s worship, and constituted a great act of
thanksgiving—a sacrifice of prayer and praise for the gifts of creation, and a memorial of redemption. Though there was no fixed liturgy, and considerable freedom was allowed to the leaders of the Church in the way of extempore prayer (Didache, Justin), the main lines of later liturgical development may already be traced in Justin. The Eucharist was at the same time a means of spiritual refreshment, in which the faithful partook of ‘the flesh of Christ’ and of His ‘blood’. The bread and wine were united by the priest with His body and soul and body unto eternal life. Lastly, it was a pledge of the unity of the One Body. There was as yet no attempt to analyze the exact nature of the gift, or to discern the relation of the sign to the thing signified. The mystical language of the Didache speaks of ‘spiritual food and drink,’ and there is a strongly mystical strain in the language of Ignatius. But the majority of Christians probably accepted simply, without elaborating any conception of the matter, the words ‘This is my body.’ ‘This is my blood.’ See, further, Swete, JTTh iii. 170 f.

Developments in Eucharistic teaching and practice during the 3rd and 4th centuries. It was not till many centuries had passed that the Eucharist became a subject of controversy. But during the earlier period considerable developments took place, which affected the conceptions associated with the rite. During the 3rd and 4th centuries the simple faith of the early days was succeeded by a period of greater reflection and analysis, the results of which appear in the expressions used with reference to the Eucharist, and in the practices associated with it.

(1) As to the nature of the Eucharistic gift, we find that, while in popular belief and practice the elements were considered to be united with the sacred realities of which they were believed to be the vehicle, language was used by both Eastern and Western writers which distinguished between the elements and that which they signified. The former tendency may be illustrated by the use of such language as ‘to handle the Lord’s body’ or ‘to offer violence to’ it (Tertullian). It is shown again, in the growing reverence for the consecrated species, and the care bestowed to prevent even a drop or crumb from falling to the ground (Tert. de Cor. 3; Origem, hom. in Exod. xiii. 3; cf. Censena of Hippolytus, 389). Lastly, it is shown in the use of the Eucharist by Cyprian of Carthage, which attended the abuse of the Sacrament, as in the case of the defaulter who found the consecrated bread turned to a crumb in his hand (de Lapsit, 25 [28]). But as in this period, so in later ages, superstition, with which the consecrated elements were regarded, both Tertullian and Cyprian, when they set down their more deliberate conceptions of the nature of the Eucharistic gift, use language which seems far removed from such ideas. Thus Tertullian speaks of the bread as ‘the figure of His body’ (figura corporis; see adv. Marc. iii. 19) and as ‘representing His body’ (ponens quo ipsum representat); cf. ib. 10. Similarly, Cyprian speaks of ‘the blood of Christ’ as ‘shown forth in the wine’ (Ep. lxxii. 2, ‘Christi sanguis ostenditur’; cf. ib. 11, ‘quaqua sola Christi sanguinem non possit exprime’. Again, the language peculiar to the Latin Church of North Africa, or to the age of Tertullian and Cyprian. It forms the starting-point of the teaching of Augustine (see below), and it appears in the reference to the Eucharist made by a series of Eastern writers during the latter part of the 3rd and throughout the 4th century. Thus the Didascalia (second half of 3rd cent.), if the text be correct, speaks of ‘offering the acceptable Eucharist, which is a symbol (demon)’ of the royal body of Christ (vi. 30). In the Apostolic Constitution, written a century later, and based on the above, the mysteries are described as ‘symbols (demon)’ of His precious body and of His blood. The ‘unbloody sacrifice’ is celebrated to commemorate ‘the Lord’s body’ by virtue of the symbols (esotropia, xenoporia) of His body and blood. And in the liturgy thanksgivings are offered for the precious blood and for the body of which we celebrate these symbols (demon) and with which we consecrate at the same time the formula employed at Communion is ‘the body of Christ,’ ‘the blood of Christ.’ Eusebius of Cesarea, while speaking of Christians as ‘fed with the body of the Saviour’ (de Sacer. Pasch. 7), says that Christ delivered to His disciples the symbols (oios deistata) of His Divine Incarnation, charging them to make the ‘image (klipha)’ of His own body, and to use the bread, the ‘symbol (oio deistata) of his own body’ (Dem. Evang. viii. [PL xxii. 590]). Similarly, Eustathius of Antioch (PG xviii. 634 F.) speaks of the bread and wine as ‘symbol (demon)’ of the bodily members of Christ.

The liturgy of compulsion, bishop (361), while speaking of the elements as ‘the body and blood,’ also speaks of ‘offering the bread’ as ‘a likeness (katastos)’ of the bread, and ‘offering the cup’ as ‘a likeness (katastos)’ of the blood (Brightman, JTTh i. 125, note 5; Patifol, op. cit. p. 222; Loofs, PEFQ i. 59; on figura, see Turner, JTTh viii. 596); in many cases actual presence is intended (e.g. Tert. adv. Marc. iv. 22), though in others a representation to the mind seems to be implied. Again, as Harnack (Hist. of Dogma, Eng. tr. ii. 144) has said, ‘what we now-a-days understand by “symbol” is a thing which is not that which it represents; in that sense “symbol” is often, and not always, a word of contempt. It has indeed a meaning which, in some kind of way, really is what it signifies; but, on the other hand, according to the ideas of that period, the really primary elements lay even in or behind the visible form without being identical with it.’

In the case of Tertullian and Cyprian, moreover, such language is frequent, and even the expressions in which they speak of the elements as ‘the body and blood of the Lord’ (see, e.g., Tert. de Idololatr. i. 16, ad Uzor. ii. 5, de Ord. 19; Cyprian, Ep. xv. 1). Lastly, we may notice (Steitz, JDTA x. 402 f.; Loofs, PEFQ i. 58) that in many of the Eastern writers referred to above the sacramental conception of the rite is subordinated to the sacrificial, and it is to the elements as offered, not as received in the sense that the Eucharist in question is applied. The same statement is true of Cyprian. It was possibly owing to the emphasis laid upon the commemorative character of the Eucharistic offering that the use of this symbolic language came to be applied to the elements even when conceived of as the food of the faithful. But, as Loofs (loc. cit.) and Harnack (op. cit. iv. 289, note 2) have said, a purely symbolical representation, in our sense of the word, in the Eucharist is to be found practically nowhere in ancient times.

(2) In certain quarters this tendency to distinguish the elements as the sacrifices was carried to great lengths. This applied especially to the language of the two great Alexandrian
EUCHARIST (to end of Middle Ages)

teachers, Clement and Origen. While witnessing to the current teaching of their day, which adopted the more usual and literal interpretation (ρητονενθα \\
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κυριακης· εκ νυμφιον της \\
εστηκες της \\
οριον ορισμον; ης \\
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But, while the theory in itself is unhesitating, its connexion with another statement of Gregory, that, while Baptism is intended for the soul, the Eucharist is a means by which the body of man is brought into union with the Saviour (Or. Cat., loc. cit.), and so is made with a physical character of the Eucharistic food, and so prepared the way for a materialistic interpretation (Gregory, however, insists on the need of faith). There is a similar treatment to that of Gregory in Macarius Magnes, who also repudiates the teaching of those who maintain that the Eucharist is a figure (τοπος) of the body and blood (see Stone, History of Doct. of Holy Euch. i. 65, 731.).

None of the later fathers followed Gregory of Nyssa in his attempt to expand the rationale of the Eucharistic mystery, but from this time the language of conversion became common. It is found in Theodore of Mopsuestia († 429), who uses the word employed by Cyril of Jerusalem (μεταφασμα, in Mil. 290), though side by side with this presentation he speaks of the change as spiritual (in 1 Cor. 10), and, like other Eastern Fathers, calls the element of the Eucharist in the body and blood of Christ (in 1 Cor. 11). It appears again in Chrysostom († 407), who revels in the use of realistic phrases, and speaks of ‘eating the body,’ of ‘bathing the teeth in His blood,’ and of ‘wrestling with the Father, and of Him who is seated above with the Father being ‘held in the hands of all’ (de Sacerd. iii. 4). But the rhetorical and devotional character of such language prevents us from taking it too seriously, and elsewhere Chrysostom blunts its force by speaking of the gift of the Sacrament as being perceived only with the eyes of the mind, and not by the senses (in Matt. hom. 82. 4). Like Gregory, he speaks of the elements as re-fashioned and transformed (μετατροπης, μετασχηματισμος, in prolog. Jud. hom. 1. 6; in Matt. hom. 82. 5), but he does not analyze, like Gregory, the nature of this transformation. He adheres to the literal point of the popular conception of the rite, and the imaginative fervour and eloquence with which he sets forth explain the influence of his teaching on later Greek piety.

From the 5th to the 6th century the only way of conceiving the effects of the consecration of the Eucharistic elements passed into the West, finding its earliest exponent in Ambrose, bishop of Milan († 397), who in other respects acted in the interpretation of the text. In his treatise On Faith (iv. 10. 125), while using language suggestive of the symbolic sacrificial conception, which we have noted in other writers of the East and the West (‘the sacraments of the old Testament in the new’), he speaks of the elements as ‘transformed'
or 'transfiguradum' (transfigurandum); on this word see Batifol, op. cit. p. 259) by the mystery of the sacred prayer, into the flesh and blood (cf. de Inscript. iv. 23, 'offerre transfigurandum corpus'). In the Edessene, de Mysteriis, authenticities, of which, however, has been doubted (see Loofs, P.R.E. i. 61), the doctrine of conversion is expanded at length. The writer emphasizes the importance of the context of the elements, which he regards as a miraculous act of God, to which analogies may be found in the miracles of the Old and New Testaments (e.g. the miracles of Moses and Elijah, the Virgin Birth).

How much greater than the blessing of man is the power of the consecration pronounced by God Himself. For in the Eucharist it is Christ's own word, 'This is my body,' which changes the nature of the material elements on which it is pronounced (de Myst. ix. 52-54). Such language, with its repeated insistence on a change of nature in the elements (propter naturam, naturam naturae, species mutare elementorum), was not to the West; and even in the treatise in which it is found it is qualified by other expressions which weaken to some extent its force. Thus the writer still uses occasionally the older forms of expression, and speaks of the body as being 'given' (esse donatum), and of the wine as being 'called' the blood (vocare sanguinem). Again, he maintains that the food is spiritual, and that the body of Christ is the body of the Divine Spirit, because Christ is Spirit (66, 58).

In another treatise, the de Sacramentis—also bearing the name of Ambrose, though plainly not his work, but probably written about A.D. 400, somewhere in North Italy (Duchesne)—the influence of the teaching of the de Mysteriis is plainly shown, and the doctrine of conversion is expanded on similar lines. Though the writer does not state the spiritual character of the Eucharistic food, he is careful to guard against a physical conception of the Eucharistic gift, and in doing so speaks, like earlier writers in the East, of the sacrament as being received 'in a likeness' (in similitudinem accipere sacramentum), though this 'likeness' bestows the virtue of the reality (natura gratiam virtutemque consequitur, vi. 3; see Batifol, op. cit. p. 305).

His language, in fact, shows that he has not completely overcome the influence of the doctrine. Though in these works the de Mysteriis and the de Sacramentis, may be ascribed to Ambrose, they still remain authorities of great importance for the history of the Eucharist, as they were later on appealed to as containing the teaching of Ambrose, and they exercised an undoubted influence on Western conceptions.

But this new train of thought did not succeed as yet in imposing itself on the West. The language of Jerome (Ep. 98, 13), of Ambrosiaster (in 1 Cor. 11v. 20) and of the fragment of the Roman Canon of the Mass, quoted by the author of the de Sacramentis (iv. 6), still witness to the simpler view. The broad 'shows forth' the body of the Saviour (Jerome). The Eucharist is 'a memorial of redemption.' The eating of the flesh and drinking of the blood signify the new covenant. The 'bread' (in the original) is a figure of the blood of Christ (in typum [Ambrosiaster]). The Eucharistic oblation is 'a figure of the body and blood of Christ' (Roman Canon in de Sacramentis; see Batifol, p. 307).

(4) During this same period the conceptions of the benefits of communion underwent a corresponding development. The idea which has been that of Ignatius, 'the medicine of immortality,' and which was taken up by Irenaeus (in typum [Ambrosiaster]). The Eucharistic oblation is 'a figure of the body and blood of Christ.' The Eucharistic food helps the body and soul (ib. v. 9). But in Hilary of Poitiers and Gregory of Nyssa we meet with a more systematic attempt to exhibit the place of the Eucharist in the economy of the spiritual life. Both writers extend the idea that the Sacrament is the 'extension' of the Incarnation. Thus Hilary maintains (de Trin, viii. 131) that the union of the faithful with Christ is more than a union of will, because Christ abides in us naturaliter, in that He gives us His body and blood; and He draws a parallel between the union of the Word with flesh, and our union with the Word made flesh in the Sacrament. Gregory of Nyssa (Or. Cat. 37) says that Christ 'infused himself into our perishable nature, that by communion with him many-minded kind might at last be united.' As already indicated, Gregory lays special stress upon the value of the Eucharist for the body, and in his whole conception of the sacraments he emphasizes the being 'transformed' (mutare) and of the starting-point of this conception, which appears in a succession of Church writers, is thoroughly Christian, and is based upon the language of John but, in the more precise form in which it is presented, it exhibits points of contact with the ideas perpetuated in the Greek mysteries.

(5) The conception of the Eucharist as a sacrifice received considerable development during the period under discussion. Hilberto the Eucharist had been spoken of as a sacrifice only in connexion with the Christian interpretation of OT types, and by way of contrasting the spiritual service of Christians with Jewish and pagan ideas of sacrifice. Thus Athenagoras (Suppl. pro Chr. 13) speaks of 'the bloodless sacrifice and rational service of Christians' (ἀναθηματικὸν θυσίαν καὶ τοῦ λατρείου θυσίαν; cf. Io 12.), and Test. of xvi. Patr. (Levi 3), cited by Gore, Body of Christ, p. 120, note 2. As we have seen, Justin stands alone among 2nd cent. writers in associating sacrificial ideas with the words 'Do this as my memorial.' Origens appears to follow Justin (ib. exo. xxxii. 3 fl.), though a little further on he adopts the meaning 'remembrance' (ib. e. 5).

But in the Church of North Africa, and in the writings of Cyprian, we find the language of sacrifice freely adopted, and the Eucharist is spoken of as 'celebrating the Lord's sacrifice' (sacri- ficium dominicum; cf. also hostia dominica [de Unit. Eccl. 17]), of 'offering,' not only the cup, but 'the bread,' and once of 'sacra-mentals' (sacramentum; see Svet. Dom. cii. 166). Cyprian finds the justification of such language in the account of the institution and in the words 'Do this as my memorial.' Christ offered to God the Father bread and wine, 'that is, his body and blood;' to the price, and in Christ's stead (vico Christi fangitur), offers to God the Father in the Church a true and full sacrifice,' when he imitates what Christ did, and fully carries out His word in (by an act of using water only). In this sacrifice 'mention is made of his Passion; for the Passion is the Lord's sacrifice which we offer'' (Ep. lixiii. 4, 14, 17). This close association of the Eucharistic sacrifice with the sacrifice of the Cross Takus. There is no idea of a repetition of the sacrifice of the Cross. For, side by side with phrases which
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Speak of 'offering the blood of Christ,' Cyprian speaks of 'offering the cup in commemoration of His Passion' (loc. cit.). But the transformation of the sacrifice from the sacrifice as a whole to the consecrated elements (Harnack) marks the development of a more specific and clearly defined conception of the sacrifice. It is possible that this had already taken shape in popular thought before Cyprian's time. Another feature, which first appears in the North African Church, is the practice of offering the Eucharist for the departed (oblationes pro defunctis, de Sacerd. vi. 4; sacrificia pro defunctis, Cyprian, Ep. i. 2).

Traces of a corresponding development appear in the East. Origen already employs the terms 'priest' and 'altar' in a Christian sense (Swee, loc. cit.), and in his Homilies on Lamentus (vii. 3) he uses language which prepared the way for the association of propitiatory ideas with the Eucharist. He draws a parallel between the shewbread, which is a type of Christ, the true Propitiatio (Ro 30), and the permanent memorial ordained by Christ in the words 'Do this as my memorial.' The shewbread was set before God as a propitiatory memorial. The 'memorial' (commemoratio) instituted by Christ, according to the interpretations of St. Cyril which Steitz has observed (JDDH x. 93), it was the development of this conception which gave to the later doctrine of the sacrifice of the Eucharist its characteristic meaning. The memorial carried on the tradition of Enesbius of Cosarea (Dem. Evang. i. 10), who contrasts the OT sacrifices with the sacrifice of Christ and the 'memorial' (μνήμη, ἡμέρας) which Christ commanded to be offered to God in place of sacrifices. At the same time he brings this 'memorial' into close connexion with the forgiveness of sins which the sacrifice of Christ won for heathen and Jew alike. Another important feature in his representation is the way in which the conception of 'celebrating' or 'offering' a 'memorial' of the sacrifice of Christ passes over into the idea of an 'offering of his body' (τοῦ θρόνου τῆς μνήμης, τὴν ἑορτὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ παροιμίαν, καὶ τὴν κατασκευὴν αὐτοῦ σώματος προτέρους τῷ θεῷ δίκαιον, etc.). Similarly, in the Apostolic Church Order (c. A.D. 300) we find the phrase 'the offering (προσφορά) of the body and blood' (Harnack, Eng. tr. ii. 137).

But the fullest statement of the sacrificial idea is found in Cyril of Jerusalem. While repeating the language of the earlier period, and speaking of 'the spiritual sacrifice,' 'the bloodless service,' he definitely associates 'the holy and most awful sacrifice' (τὰ φύλακα καὶ φρεσκάδια ἡμῶν τῆς συναφείας τοῦ θυσιασμοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ) with the sacrifice of propitiation (τὰ θυσία τοῦ λαμβανόμενον) over which God is entreated for the common peace of the churches. It is Christ sacrificed for sins who is offered (Χειροποιημένοι τῶν λαμβανόμενων προσφέρομεν), while the loving God is propitiated (ἐξελευθερώντας τούς φαῦνοντας θέων) on behalf of the living and the dead. Cyril defends such prayers for the dead on the ground of the belief that 'the greatest benefit will accrue to them' and that, 'by the intercessions of the living after the consecration (the intercessions are found in the liturgy of Serapion) and in that of bk. viii. of the Apostolic Constitutions.'

Later on in the 4th cent. Chrysostom carries on the teaching of Cyril, and, like him, abounds in the use of sacrificial terms. He speaks of 'the most awful sacrifice,' 'the most holy sacrifice,' and the sacrifice 'for the peace of the Church.' Cyril is teaching the ideas of the sacrifice of the altar and sacrifice of prayer, and the priest (πρεσβύτερον) standing over the sacrifice and praying, and all redounded with that blood (de Sacerd. vi. 4), and of the silence and quiet attendant

ing the moment of consecration (de Comm. et de Crucis, 3). But in his exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews the reality and the spiritual element of this language receive their corrective. There is no repetition of the sacrifice of the Cross. There is one body of Christ, and, therefore, one sacrifice: 'We do not offer a different sacrifice . . . but always the same sacrifice (πάντας χορδήν τοῦ προμονήμου) of a sacrifice' (Ep. ad Heb. hom. xvii. 3). Christ 'offered sacrifice once for all, and thence-forward sat down' (ib. xili. 3). The whole action of the Eucharist is thus the memorial sacrifice, the spiritual region (6. xiv. 1, 2). And the same thought of the mystical nature of the Eucharistic sacrifice appears in the language of the Western Father, Ambrose, who contrasts the 'shadow' (umbra) of the Law with the 'image' (imago) of the (gospel on the other. The rites of the Church are an 'image' of heavenly realities. The priests on earth follow, as they can, the offering of their High Priest. Christ Himself is offered, when the body of Christ is offered. Indeed, He Himself is plainly shown (manifestatur) to offer in us, seeing that it is His word which sanctifies the sacrifice which is offered, and He Himself is the power near the Father. But in the Eucharist we have only the 'image.' The 'reality' is to be found 'where Christ intercedes for us as our Advocate with the Father' (in Christo, Rom. ix. 34, xvi. 238). Ambrose, in fact, views the whole action of the Eucharist from the standpoint of the abiding humanity and intercession of Christ in heaven, and the same thought is implicit, though not so clearly expressed, in the language of Chrysostom (see, further, below, § 3 (2)).

(9) The 4th cent. marks a period of considerable liturgical development in connexion with the Eucharist. The writings of Cyril of Jerusalem and Chrysostom enable us to reproduce with a considerable degree of certainty the liturgy current in their time. To this period also belongs a series of Church manuals, which contain liturgical forms for the celebration of the Eucharist.

Of these the oldest are the Ethiopia Church Order, and the Verona Latin Fragments (published by Hauler), both of which are based on the Greek original of the second half of the third century. For Egypt we have the liturgical prayers of Serapion, bishop of Thume (written before 300), and for Syria the liturgy of bk. viii. of the Apostolic Constitutions (c. 255). The Testament of Our Lord (published by Rahmann, Mainz, 1870), from Syrian Syria, contains the same century (Zahn, Berlin, or may be a century later. Lastly, in the de Sacramentis (c. 400) we have some Western prayers, which exhibit the earliest known form of the Roman Canon of the Mass.

Their evidence for the conceptions of the Eucharist may be briefly summarized. (a) The primitive character of the rite as a service of praise and thanksgiving for the gifts of creation and the blessings of redemption is emphasized in the long prayer which leads up to the central part of the liturgy. In this respect there is, amid many variations, a general unity in these liturgical forms. The following fixed points stand out: (a) the Sursum corda ('Lift up your hearts'), with the response 'We lift them up unto the Lord' (found in Cyril, and also in the Canons of Hippolytus; cf. 6th. Ch. Ord., and Apost. Const.), followed by the invitation 'Let us give thanks;' and the response 'It is meet and right'; (b) the consecration of God's cup, leading up to (c) the angelic hymn, the Sanctus (Serapion; Apost. Const.). This leads on to (d) the commemoration of the Incarnation, Passion, Resurrection, and Ascension, and the narrative of the institution of the Eucharist, (b. de Sacramentis). Then follows (e) the obliteration of the elements, and in the Eastern rites the invocation of the Holy Spirit to conserae them. Thus the structure of this part
of the rite sets forth the successive stages of God's revelation, culminating in the work of the Holy Spirit, whose intervention in the mystery is invoked.

(b) This invocation of the Holy Spirit upon the elements is found in most of our early sources (Ech. Cat. 2. 2; post. Cat. 2. 1; Cyril; Christosynn). In Serapion it is the Logos who is invoked; in the Testament of Our Lord it is the Trinity (cf. Cyril of Jerusalem, Cat. xix. 7). In the fragments of the Ixvi. Cat. the Cremnites we find in place of the invocation of the Holy Spirit (1) a prayer to God to make the oblation approved, ratified, reasonable, acceptable, because it is a figure of the body and blood of Christ; (2) a later prayer that the oblation may be received up 'on the altar on high by the hands of Thy angels.' Duchesne suggests (Chr. Worship, Eng. tr., London, 1894, p. 181 f.) that the latter prayer may be a symbolical way of expressing the same request for God's intervention in the mystery (others, however, see the equivalent of the invocation in the former of the two prayers (no. 1, above).

On the question of the precise moment of consecration, see W. H. C. Paul, History of dogma, vol. iii. 298 f.; Procter, History of the Eucharist, vol. ii. 240 f.; and D. C. L. Schramm, The Western idea, that the consecration is effected by the recital of the words of institution, appears to be accepted by the Cremnites in the Sacramentis (Ambrose, de Myst. ix. 52, 54; de Sacram. iv. 14-23).

(c) As to the effects of consecration, the earliest Eastern forms are explicit in identifying the elements with the body and blood of Christ. The words ἀναμνήσεως (i.e. Cyril, ἀγαθάνωμα (i.e. Serapion), ἀφορίσεως (i.e. 'Apost. Const.) probably a synonym of ἀναμνήσεως (cf. Serapion), ἀρισταρεία καὶ ἀναμνήσεως) used in the invocation to express the relation of the elements to the body and blood of Christ, are used in the earlier period of the Sacramentis (Ambrose, de Myst. ix. 52, 54; de Sacram. iv. 14-23).

In spite of the use of symbolic language by Eastern writers to denote the oblation, these liturgical forms adhere to the 'simple realism' of early times (cf. Justin, Irenæus). The prayers of the Western Canon in the de Sacramentis are less explicit. While using symbolic language of the oblation ('figure of the body of Christ'), the elements are spoken of as 'the bread and the cup of eternal life.' This accords with the Western tradition and the language of Jerome and Augustine. But in these prayers the sacramental idea is subordinated to the literal one. In the reference to the elements as body and blood, we find a reference to the gifts of Abel and the sacrifices of Abraham and Melchizedek.

(d) The conception of the sacrifice in these sources combines the idea of the oblation of the gifts (cf. Didache and Irenæus) with that of the memorial of the Passion (cf. Justin and Cyprian). Thus we find mention made of 'this living sacrifice,' 'this bloodless oblation,' and a reference, before the invocation, to the 'bread scattered upon the mountains' (Serapion; cf. Didache) ; also a prayer for those who have offered the offerings and thanksgivings, after the invocation (Serapion). Similarly the Apostolic Constitution of the Franks makes no reference to consecration, while the Eucharist has a conversion of the elements into the body and blood of Christ, while their opponents adhere to the 'diplysiaste' view, and maintain that the elements retain their own nature, and that the 'change' effected by consecration is in the region of grace (σερα χάριν). Such is the argument of Theodoret (+ 457) (Eranistes, i. 59 (PG 33xxiii. 87), l. 185 f. (ib. 207)). The same argument re-appears in the Epistles of Eusebius [Eusebius] (cf. Didache, p. 332), and in the East the doctrine of the conversion of the elements became more and more the accepted teaching, until in the 8th cent. John of Damascus (+ after 750), whose work de Fide Orthodoxa has, so to speak, established the tradition, at this time, sets it forth as the established dogma of the Church. Like Gregory of Nyssa, he illustrates the change in the elements by the transformation of food in our rite. The gifts of Abel and the sacrifices of Abraham and Melchizedek may be quoted as 'types' of the offering of Christ.

Serapion accords with the fuller development of the sacrificial idea, as found in Cyril of Jerusalem, in the prayer after the consecration: 'We beseech Thee, through this sacrifice, be reconciled to all of us and be merciful' (Iudicis). Lastly, in Serapion and the Apostolic Constitution the emphasis is on the departed and others are offered after the consecration (cf. Cyril Jer. Cat. xxi. 9, quoted above). This development is significant, and helps to explain how the 'High Mass' of later times passed into the 'High Mass' of later times.

3. The Eucharist in the later Patristic period (5th-8th centuries).—The two main developments in Eucharistic teaching which have been traced above may be summarized as follows: (1) the transition from a distinction between the elements and that which they signify (the 'diplysiaste' view, Harnack, Batiffol) to the conception of the body and blood of Christ (the 'conversion' doctrine, Batiffol); (2) the transformation of the idea of sacrifice, according to which the conceiving of the offering of the gifts and the memorial of the Passion becomes an offering of the body and blood as a propitiatory memorial sacrifice. In the period which followed, these two tendencies were accentuated, though they had to encounter the influence of an earlier tradition and the authority of Augustine's teaching long restored the former.

(1) The parallel which Gregory of Nyssa had drawn between the Eucharist and the Incarnation, and the idea that the latter is continued, as to its effects, in the former, concentrated attention on the rite as a living witness and attestation of the practical power of the Church's faith with regard to the Person of Christ. Thus Gregory of Nyssa complains that Eunomius and his followers held the view that the sacrifice and the sacramental tokens and customs from which the Christian profession draws its vigour, and that he had maintained that the sacramental tokens do not, as we have believed, secure spiritual blessings and avert from believers the assaults directed against them by the wiles of the evil one (c. Eunom. bk. xi. (PG xlv. 880)). Similarly, Cyril of Alexandria, in his Third Letter to Nestorius, appeals to the Eucharist as teaching that the flesh of Christ is 'life-giving' (ζωοοδότης). Thus it witnesses against Nestorius' teaching, which maintains that the flesh of Christ is not the flesh of the Word. In the transition to the Eastern Church in the subsequent period we find the same appeal to the Eucharist made by the orthodox and the Monophysites alike in support of their doctrine. On the other hand, the Monophysites contend that in the Eucharist there is a conversion of the elements into the body and blood of Christ, while their opponents adhere to the 'diplysiaste' view, and maintain that the elements retain their own nature, and that the 'change' effected by consecration is in the region of grace (σερα χάριν). Such is the argument of Theodoret (+ 457) (Eranistes, i. 59 (PG 33xxiii. 87), l. 185 f. (ib. 207)). The same argument re-appears in the Epistles of Eusebius (cf. Didache, p. 332), and in the East the doctrine of the conversion of the elements became more and more the accepted teaching, until in the 8th cent. John of Damascus (+ after 750), whose work de Fide Orthodoxa has, so to speak, established the tradition, at this time, sets it forth as the established dogma of the Church. Like Gregory of Nyssa, he illustrates the change in the elements by the transformation of food in our rite. The gifts of Abel and the sacrifices of Abraham and Melchizedek may be quoted as 'types' of the offering of Christ.
further maintains the identity of the Eucharistic and the historical body of Christ (though even he shows lingering traces of the earlier view when he speaks of the bread as 'not mere bread, but bread united to the Divinity'). For his whole treatment, see G. E. M. de Guignes, p. 321.

In the West the influence of the teaching associated with the name of Ambrose (see above, § 2 (3)) must be reckoned as one of the main factors in introducing the doctrine of conversion. But into this whole question was woven the weighty authority of Augustine's teaching, which delayed for some centuries the complete acceptance in the West of the Ambrosian view. Augustine starts from the earlier Western teaching, and is in the same line of tradition as Tertullian and Cyprian. But his importance also consists in the fact that he attempted an analysis of the idea of sacraments, which was epoch-making, and became authoritative for Western Christendom in later times. Thus his definition of sacraments as 'visible signs of divine things,' in which 'the invisible things themselves are honoured' (De Cat. Rudi. xxvi. 50), his statement that 'the word is the outward sign, another is understood' (Serm. cxdxivii. 8), and that what is seen has a bodily appearance, what is understood has spiritual profit (ib. 9), as also his distinction between the outward part (or external part) and the inward part; cf. Tract. in John. xvi. 10) on the one hand, and between the 'sacrament' and the 'virtue' (virtus) of the sacrament (in Joan. ib. 11; En. in Ps. lxxvii. 2) on the other, became classical for the later period, and form the starting-point of medieval discussions upon the subject.

Of importance, too, is his statement that 'the word is added to the element, and a sacrament is constituted, being made visible' (De Cat. Rudi. xxvi. 50). But, in accordance with the emphasis which his teaching laid on the spiritual side of things, and the importance which he attached to 'faith' and 'the word,' his language at times seems to pass almost into a figurative or symbolic view of the sacraments, and he has been claimed as teaching such by theological controversialists, as well as by many modern scholars (e.g. Harnack and Loofs). Thus he speaks, like Tertullian, of Christ delivering to the disciples 'the figure' (figurant) or 'sign' (signum) of His body and blood (En. in Ps. iii. 1; c. Adiutant. xii. 3). The become the body of Christ, because it has been sanctified by the word of God, it is His body; and it is His body (in Joan. xxxv. 3). Augustine uses the words consecrato, benedicito, and sanctificare to denote this consecration, and this sanctification has the effect of making the elements 'a sacrament of commemoration of Christ's sacrifice' (c. Faust. xx. 21). The sign, however, must be carefully distinguished from that which it signifies: 'it is not that which is seen that feeds, but that which is believed' (Serm. exii. 5). 'Believe, and thou hast eaten' (credere et manducari [in Joan. xxvii. 12]). The 'eating of the body' and 'drinking of the blood' in Jn 6th are expounded by him as meaning 'to dwell in Christ and to have Christ dwelling in us' (Cath. Tract. xiv. 1). It is well that we could not partake, but of this flesh we receive that which was its essence, the Spirit which quickens it (in Joan. xxvii. 5). The presence of Christ is, in fact, a spiritual presence (Augustine, however, nowhere uses this phrase of the Eucharist). Augustine does not identify the Eucharistic body with the historical body of Christ, but sees to conceive of the spiritual essence of Christ's humanity as receiving a new symbolical body (non hoc corpus quod visibile manducaturi est... sacramentum aliqud visibilis commendavit), and this spiritual essence also becomes the spiritual essence of the Church, which is sometimes spoken of as the body of Christ, and as the res sacramenti (see Serm. cxxxvii. in Joan. xxvii. 15; Ep. clxxxvi. 3 (ed Botte) and De Enarrationibus, p. 232, note 1). The latter presentation is in accord with the earlier language of Tertullian and Cyprian (cf. Tert. de Orat. 6; Cyprian, Ep. lxxxvi. 15). Again, he thought to teach a 'receptionist' view of the Sacrament, and some of his language certainly accords with such an idea. But his treatment is unsatisfactory, and his teaching on the subject of the reception by the wicked is not consistent. In some passages he seems to identify the eating of the flesh of Christ with believing on Him (see above), and maintains that those who 'abide in Christ' alone are the body and blood (in Joan. xxvii. 18; de Civ. Dei. xxvi. 55), though elsewhere he teaches that the 'inward part' (or res) is given to all (see Serm. cxxxiv. 7 ['infants partake of His table, that they may have life in themselves']), and for the reception by the wicked he quotes Cyprian (De Donat. v. 9; Serm. lxxiii. 17; in Joan. xxvii. 11). On the whole, Augustine must be ranked with those Eastern and Western writers upon the Eucharist who, in attempting to explain what he taught, what has been called the 'dyophysis' view. The characteristic of this teaching is, as we have seen (above, § 2), the sharp distinction which it draws between the sign and the thing signified. But, though Augustine emphasizes this point so strongly, and at the same time urges the importance of faith and the spirituality of the gift, there is no real justification for regarding him as teaching a purely spiritual gift (in Joan. xxxv. 3). But, though Augustine emphasizes this point so strongly, and at the same time urges the importance of faith and the spirituality of the gift, there is no real justification for regarding him as teaching a purely spiritual gift (in Joan. xxxv. 3).

For a fuller discussion of Augustine's teaching, see Harnack, Hist. of Dogma, Eng. tr. v. 1551; Loofs, RF v. 61-63; Bartollet, Edutes, 2nd ser., p. 3281. The last-named criticizes Loofs' symbolic interpretation, and also objects to his appeal to Augustine as teaching explicitly a belief in an objective presence in the elements (e.g. En. in Ps. xxvii. 9; Serm. cxxvii. i. 10; cxxxiv. 25).

These two currents of thought, the Ambrosian and the Augustinian, are exhibited in the writers of the 6th century. The Africans, Fulgentius and Faucundus, and the Spaniards, Isidore of Seville, re-echo the language of Augustine, while Cæsarius of Arles and Pope Gregory the Great repeat the teaching of Ambrose (Loofs, loc. cit.). The same is true of the language of the prayers in the Western liturgies between the 6th and the 8th century. On the one hand, there are found such phrases as 'the bread changed into the flesh... the cup changed into the blood,' 'unto the transformation of the body of Christ,' 'the Lord God Jesus Christ,' 'to eat the body,' 'to drink the blood'; on the other hand, there occur 'spiritual food,' 'spiritual cup,' 'the virtue of the heavenly food,' 'the image of the sacrament.' In the early Middle Ages the language of these prayers, as well as the authority of Augustine and Ambrose, was appealed to in the controversies on the Eucharist (Battiloria, op. cit. p. 348 f.).

(2) The transformation of the conception of the sacrifice in the Eucharist during the 3rd and 4th centuries, which has been indicated above, affected the course of the developments during the following period. In the East there was little development beyond the standpoint of Cyril of Jerusalem...
and Chrysostom. John of Damascus has only a passing reference to the subject, in which he recalls the type of Melchizedek and the prophecy of Mal 1:10, and speaks of the "pure and unbloody sacrifice of Christ" (v. 11). In the West we find, as in the treatment of the nature of the gift, two traditions, represented by Augustine on the one hand, and Ambrose on the other.

Augustine's conception of the sacrifice exhibits two characteristics, both of which may be paralleled from the earlier language current in the West. (a) The Eucharist is a "commemoration of the sacrifice of the Cross" (sacerfactum memoriae, sacramentum memorii [c. Faust. xx. 18. 21]). The sacrifice of the Cross was prefigured by the OT sacrifices. It was offered in reality on the Cross. It is celebrated by a "sacrament of commemoration" in the Eucharist (ib. 21). This language may be paralleled from Cyprian (collocam in commemorationem Domini et passionis ejus [Ep. xiii. 17]), and from the prayers of the Roman Canon in the de Sacramentis (the institution is figura corporis et sanguinis). Again, he speaks of the Eucharist as "the sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ" (de Au. et de Orat. i. 11 [13]), of "offering the body of Christ" (ib. 9), and of "the sacrifice of our ransom" (Confess. ix. 12 [32]). This also recalls Cyprian (see above, II. 2 (5)). (b) But the most distinctive feature of Augustine's teaching is his emphasis on the union of the faithful in the Eucharist with the sacrifice of Christ. The faithful themselves, by partaking of Christ's body and blood, are the sacrifice, and become "the body of Christ" (Serm. cxxvii. de Civ. Dei, x. 6. 29 [xxii. 10]). This conception, which is a development of Pauline teaching (1 Co 10; 1 Co), had been anticipated by Tertullian (de Orat. 6), who connects with the gift of 'daily bread' the idea of contumine in Christ and inseparability from His body (i.e. the mystical body), and by Cyprian (Ep. xiii. 18), who finds in the mixture of water with wine in the chalice a representation of the incorporation of the people in Christ.

On the other hand, the teaching of Ambrose (see above, II. § 2 (5)) is probably Gregory the Great in the 6th century (Dial. iv. 58). (a) The Eucharist is related to the sacrifice of the Cross, which "renews" (revivit) though this language is qualified by the words "in a mystery" and by the comment that it "imitates the Passion of the Only-begotten Son" (cf. Ambrose, in imagine). (b) Like Ambrose and Chrysostom, Gregory connects the heavenly life of Christ. He who is "immolated for us again in the mystery of the holy oblation" is the Son who died no more, but lives in Himself immortally and incorruptibly. In the mystery of the Eucharist things earthly are united with things heavenly (ib.). The whole action is, in fact, as in Ambrose, mystical and transcendental. Moreover, Gregory combines with this theme two conceptions which further qualify his language, and relate it to that of Augustine. (a) The sacrifice of the Eucharist is closely associated with the communion of the faithful. (b) The sacrifice is consecration, "the consecration of the worshippers" (ib. 59, For then will He be truly the victim [hostias] for us to God. the soul, we have made ourselves a victim [hostias]).

He speaks of the Eucharist and Gregory the Great in their teaching upon the sacrifice in the Eucharist exhibit certain common features, which re-appear in later Greek teaching and in some of the early mystics in the West. In both the language there lies the Pauline conception of the mystical body of Christ. "Through Christ, the Head of the body, and in union with Him (hence the emphasis of Gregory and Chrysostom on the communion and self-oblation of the faithful) we are united to the Godhead". The same time these Fathers appear to recognize that the scriptural application (e.g. in Hebrews) of the language of sacrifice and priesthood to the heavenly body of Christ is but the language of illustration, used to express the living truth of the sacrifice in the person of Christ to the throne of God: "His Incarnation is itself the offering of our purification" (Greg. Mag. Moral. i. 34; cf. Ep. 76). He has made a distinction, and sets forth that truth 'in an image' or 'in a mystery' (Ambrose, Greg.). The whole action of the rite is 'the sacrifice' (Ambrose). The same idea is suggested by the early language of Romans on the 'heavenly altar,' and in the de Sacramentis and Eastern liturgy. See Gore, Body of Christ, p. 158.

(3) The conception of the propitiatory value of the sacrifice in the Eucharist, which has been traced in the earlier Patristic period (Origen, Cyril of Jerusalem), received a considerable emphasis later on. The metaphorical language used by some of the Fathers suggested a renewal of the sacrifice of Christ in the Eucharist (e.g. Ambrose, de Off. i. 48 [quasi recipientis passionem]).

Mag. Dial. iv. 58 [mortem unigeniti reperit, eterum immolatur] hom. in Ec. ii. 37; 7 [iterum patitur]), and, though qualified by other expressions, it came to be taken in a literal sense. The liturgical custom of offering in Mass the bread and wine, and the gradually to the idea that each offering constituted a distinct sacrifice for sin. The transition was slow and almost imperceptible. In popular re-interpretation the propitiatory conception doubtless received a considerable impetus from the influx of pagan ideas into the Church. The language of Gregory the Great shows in this respect the advance made upon the earlier period. He dwells much upon the benefits resulting from the offering of the sacrifice of the Mass for souls in purgatory; in his Dialogues (iv. 55) he tells how a priest is visited by the apparition of a departed soul, who offers to him bread, and says, 'Offer this bread to Almighty God on my behalf, that thou mayst intercede for my sins.'

The transition from the Eucharistic to the propitiatory view of the Eucharist is reflected in the Western Sacramentaries, when compared with the earlier prayers (e.g. the de Sacramentis). Thus in the Leonine Sacramentary (6th cent.), side by side with the older language, which speaks of 'the sacrifice of praise, we find 'sacrifice of propitiation and praise' (sacrificium placationis et lauda). We may compare also the following prayers from the same source: (a) 'O Lord, we beseech Thee, mercifully sanctify these gifts, and, receiving them in the Eucharist, we beseech Thee to make us to be an eternal gift unto Thee'; (b) 'O Lord, mercifully look upon these gifts which we bring for the souls of Thy saints, and offer for our offences' (ed. Felton, Cambridge, 1896, pp. 24, 19).

The Western Sacramentaries, in fact, exhibit, in the multitude of their variable prayers, the gradations between the earlier Eucharistic and the later propitiatory view.


III. THE Eucharist in the MIDDLE AGES (A.D. 600-1500).—The Eucharistic Rite. With the Middle Ages we enter upon a period of enthusiasm and controversy upon the Eucharist, which before
the time of Paschasius had never received really systematic treatment at the hands of theologians. From the 9th cent. onwards, however, it continued to occupy a prominent place in theological discussion, which gradually formulated a theory of sacrament in the form of a mode of operation, effects, and place in religion. The period from the 9th to the 15th cent. marks the growth of a system of belief and practice, against which the Reformation of the 16th cent. was a protest. The history, however, is limited mainly to the West, where there was much greater movement of thought and much less uniformity upon the subject than in the East. The Greek Church, as a whole, held by the teaching of John of Damascus, in spite of occasional movements in the direction of a closer accord with later Western teaching (as at the Council of Lyons in 1274, when Greeks and Latins met to discuss reunion, and a statement was drawn up in which *meros adinit occurs as an equivalent for *transubstantiation). In the Western Church, on the other hand, the history of the doctrine exhibits a line of development different from that of the East. The conversion theory, taught by Ambrose, and established under Greek influence, gradually asserted itself, and was carried to its final development in the doctrine of transubstantiation. The two chief advocates who contributed most to the teaching upon the Eucharist were Ambrose and Augustine. The teaching of the former was appealed to by those who tended to the view of a miraculous conversion of the elements into the body and blood of Christ. The teaching of Augustine formed the starting-point of those who distinguished sharply the sign from the thing signified, and who inclined to the view of a spiritual presence which is a view which passes in its more extreme forms into a receptionist or commemorative view of the rite. Generally, however, an attempt was made by both parties to harmonize the teaching of the two Fathers and to interpret them in accordance with their own standpoint. There are three reasons why the conversion doctrine finally prevailed during the Middle Ages. (1) It gave to simple minds an easy and literal interpretation of the words, "This is my body," "This is my blood." (2) It fell in with the realism of popular thought, which viewed everything in the concrete, whereas the more vague language of the Church has resisted this tendency. (3) The attempts to materialize it, and it was only by a *tour de force that medieval writers made Augustine speak the language of transubstantiation. The language of conversion lent itself to the growing love of the miraculous.

2. The Eucharistic controversies of the early Middle Ages.—The medieval history of the Eucharist begins with the controversy excited by the appearance of the treatise of Paschasius Radbertus, *On the Body and Blood of the Lord*, in 844. The author was a monk, and afterwards abbot, of Corbray. His book, which was the most complete treatise on the Eucharist that had yet appeared, dealt with the whole subject of the Sacrament, and was inspired by a profoundly religious spirit. Paschasius exhibits clear traces of Greek influence (Cyril of Alexandria, John of Damascus), and no less evidence of the Cappadocian influence (cf. Jn. 6th), which was apparently the inspiration of the young Neoplatonists. He is no metaphysician, but starts from a direct intuition of God, the need of faith, and the words of Christ, "This is my body." His treatment follows that of Ambrose in the main. He adds the miracles of the OT and the NT to the belief that the substance of the bread and wine is changed into the flesh and blood of Christ. Yet the change is an inward one, and is not apparent to sight or taste. If the elements retain their outward appearance, the object is to call forth faith and to remind believers that the gift is spiritual. He adds, however, that the Apollinarian type of reaction is not impossible. The change of the outward appearance has occurred to convince doubters or reward faith. Yet no portents can enhance the value of that which the faithful receive in the Sacrament. He maintains the identity of the Eucharistic and historical body of Christ, and explains its presence in countless places at once by a creative act of God on each occasion. Paschasius' treatise fell in with popular tendencies and became in the subsequent period the authoritative exposition of the rite. But the influence of Augustine was still too strong to allow such teaching to pass unchallenged. Outside the circle of Paschasius' admirers the language of Augustine was still repeated (Ambrose, Florus, Rabanus Maurus), while John Scotus Eriugena appears to have taught a purely symbolical view of the Sacrament. But the form in which Paschasius' book was written is a book called forth was Ratramnus (also a monk of Corbray), who, in response to a request of Charles the Bald, wrote his *treatise, On the Body and Blood of the Lord*. The two questions submitted to him were: (1) Is there in medieval church doctrine the idea of something under a veil, as when Christ speaks of Himself as the Bread or the Vine? The word *veritas* denotes the showing of a thing unveiled in its natural character, as when we say that Christ was born of a virgin. The element which Paschasius adds is that the body and blood of Christ remains veiled and is only one thing outwardly to the senses, and proclaims another inwardly to the minds of the faithful. There is no material miracle in the Eucharist. Outwardly the elements are the same as before. Inwardly, to the minds of the faithful, they are in a figure (*figurate*) Christ's body and blood. The change is a spiritual one. There are not two different substances, body and spirit, but one thing under two aspects—one bread and wine signifying one body in another the body and blood of Christ. In their bodily nature they are bread and wine; in power and spiritual efficacy they are the mysteries of the body and blood of Christ. *Veritas* represents the older conservative tradition of the West (Tertullian, Jerome, the de Sacramentis). He quotes from Augustine the phrase *figura corporis Christi*, to prove that the sacraments are one thing, the thing of which they are the sacramental sign is another. As visible creatures the elements feed the body; according to their invisible substance (i.e. the power of the Divine word) they feed and sanctify the soul. (2) In dealing with the second question, Ratramnus appeals to a distinction drawn by Ambrose (de Myst. 53) between the sacrament of the flesh and the verity of the same, and to a further statement of Ambrose in the Sacrament of the body, which represents the body of a Divine Spirit. It is called the body of Christ because in it the Spirit of Christ (i.e. the power of the Divine word) feeds and cleanses the faithful soul. Finally, he appeals to the Mass to show that the elements are the "pledge" and the "image" of the verity of Christ's body and blood, but not the verity itself, which will be manifested in open victory. Thus in his *de Sacramentis* Ratramnus moves the emphasis of the object exhibits in an acute form the ambiguity attaching generally to the older Western tradition as represented most conspicuously in Augustine, and it is difficult to decide whether Ratramnus believed that the gift bestowed in the Eucharist was merely a mysterious
operation of the Divine power through the elements, effecting union with Christ, or a presence in the elements of the body and blood of Christ. His teaching, however, had a certain currency in the subtexts. Much of it appears in the Homilies of the English Aelfric (10th cent.). Ratramnus' book, which came to be attributed to John Scotus Eriigena (see below), also attracted considerable attention at the time of the Berengarian controversy, particularly in the matter of the body and blood of Christ and the eucharist (per generationem subject). He further illustrates the use of the negative in Scripture and the Fathers, in order to prove that it is often employed not to deny the continued existence of that to which it refers, but to emphasize something which it has become, or some aspect of it to which attention is directed. Thus, when it is said that after consecration the elements are not bread and wine, but the body and blood of Christ, it is not necessarily implied that the bread and wine cease to exist (ib. p. 177 ff.). He attacks Paschasius' idea that the body and blood of Christ exist in the eucharist (cf. this), but that which he received in the eucharist is the general figurative view. Every sacrament implies a res sacramenti, seeing that it is, in Augustine's phrase, 'a visible sign or form of an invisible grace.' Lastly, he has a valuable statement of the nature of the Divine working in its use of natural means. Everything which is consecrated is of necessity enhanced, but by no means destroyed. To Berengar's opponents such teaching seemed to deny any real presence of Christ in the sacrament. A purely 'spiritual' presence, such as Berengar taught, seemed scarcely distinguishable from a presence only in the intelligence or memory (Hugh of Langres; cf. Gore, op. cit. p. 256). Hence Berengar's language seems to have been simply figurative view of the sacrament. Others charged him with teaching a theory of impanation, i.e., that, as Christ took human nature into personal union with Himself and became immanent in the sacrament He takes bread and wine into the same kind of union, and may be said to be immanent and inivinable (see below, § 4). Both these views are attributed to the followers of Berengar by writers of the 11th and 12th centuries (Witmund, Alger of Liége, Gregory of Bergamo). The controversy produced a series of replies to Berengar (Lanfranc, Hugh of Langres, Witmund of Aversa, Daniel of Troyes), which express the current conceptions (physical manducation, reception by the wicked, incorruptibility of the consecrated species). But Berengar's protest had not been in vain. From this period the earlier views tend to disappear. The rising Scholasticism of the 12th cent. took up the task of formulating the doctrine of conversion. The term transubstantiation was not apprehended by Hugh Witmund's phrase substantialiter transmutatur is a close approximation to it. In the task of formulating the Church's belief, however, the Schoolmen learned from the controversy with Berengar to lay aside many of the unacceptable conceptions which had been current before. 4. The Schoolmen and the doctrine of transub-
stantiation.—During the 12th cent., the development of the doctrine of the Eucharist was affected by two factors in the general history of the period. The first of these was the religious revival which had resulted from the reformation of the Papacy and the reaction to the Catharistic heresies of the 12th cent. in the Catholic mystics, St. Bernard and the Victorines (Hugh and Richard). And this revival brought with it a revival of the influence of St. Augustine’s teaching.

The spirituality of conception shown by writers upon the Eucharist during the period, and in the recoil from the materialism of the preceding century (cf. e.g. Hildebert of Tours, de Sacramentum Altarum: the presence of Christ is real, yet spiritual; Christ is in heaven, yet He is in the Sacrament; His presence is a presence of power and efficacy, yet it is in the elements). The language of St. Bernard (de Coena Domini) echoes the Augustinian distinction between the invisible grace and the visible sign, while Hugh of St. Victor speaks of the Eucharist as “an image of the invisible and spiritual participation of Jesus which is accomplished inwardly by faith and love” (de Sacr. Christ. Fid. ii. 8. 7).

A second influence was the intellectual revival, of which Berengar and Roscellin had been pioneers. They developed the scholasticism of Abelard, and the questions raised by the Eucharistic controversy were transferred to the region of metaphysics. Attempts were made to state the nature of the Eucharistic mystery in metaphysical terms. At the same time the whole idea of sacrament was revised, and in this task the influence of Augustine played an important part.

(1) The great problem of the period, which divided Nominalists and Realist philosophers, was the nature of the “universal” or “general idea.” This question had come to the front through Roscellin’s Nominalist teaching on the Trinity. In refuting him Anselm and Abélard, starting from the standpoint of realism, and with the help of Aristotle, discussed the relation of “universals” to corporeal existence. In this way the terms substantia and accidentia came to be used by them. They are first definitely applied to the Eucharist in the 12th cent., though Berengar had anticipated their use when he employed the distinction between substantia and accidentia. By substantia was denoted “the impalpable universal which was held to inhere in every particular thing, under another name,” and by accidentia the “sensible properties which came into existence when the pure Form clothed itself in Matter” (Rashdall, Universities of Europe in Med. Ages, London, 1895, i. 461). From the 12th cent. onwards the application of this metaphysical language to the Eucharistic mystery dominated Western teaching.

(2) A second result of Scholasticism was the revision of the whole conception of sacraments. This was mainly the work of Hugh of St. Victor (+1141) and Peter Lombard (+1164; his Sentences became the manual of the Schools in the Middle Ages). They start from Augustine’s definition of a sacrament as “a visible form of an invisible grace,” and distinguish between the sacramentum and the res sacramenti (Peter Lombard further distinguished in the Eucharist the res concreta et signa, i.e. the body and blood, and the res significta et non concreta, i.e. the unity of the Church). They maintain that the sacraments “contain” grace (Hugh of St. Victor) and are “causes” of grace (Peter Lombard). Their purpose is not only to signify, but to sanctify. These statements became the accepted definitions, and were completed in the 13th cent. by Thomas Aquinas, who taught that the sacraments effect that which they signify, though they are instrumental causes, the principal cause being God.

Both the developments which we have indicated as due to Scholasticism mark it in some ways a considerable gain. The metaphysical distinction of substantia and accidentia, as apprehended by the Schoolmen, made it possible to hold a more refined view of the Established Church’s declaration of the presence. For the substantia of the Schoolmen was in the final resort real only to thought, and could be apprehended only by the faith of the believer (popular though it was largely held a far different conception and elug to the cruder notions of the earlier period). Again, the distinction between the outward sign and the inward grace, when clearly defined and held, tended to minimize the dangers of materialism. From this time onwards the language of the Schoolmen shows a growing emphasis upon the spiritual character of the hidden substantia of the Sacrament, and an increasing tendency to give more reality to the accidents. Thus, in their discussions upon the Eucharist, Hugh of St. Victor and Peter Lombard reject the materialistic views which in the previous century had been associated with the fraction and reception of the Eucharist. Whether the consecrated elements (see Hugh, Sacr. Christ. Fid. ii. 8. 13; Peter Lombard, Sent. lib. iv. dist. 13). In dealing with such questions the mysticism of Hugh comes to his rescue. Thus he says (op. cit. i. 132), “Christ exhibits His bodily presence for a season in order to give us His spiritual presence. Just as in the Incarnation He withdrew His bodily presence at the Ascension, though His spiritual presence remained, so is it in the Sacrament. The Sacrament is completed. The virtue remains. Christ passes from the mouth to the heart. That food belongs to the soul, not to the body. If, then, after this you seek the bodily presence of Christ, seek it in heaven.”

Both Hugh of St. Victor and Peter Lombard start from the language of the 12th cent. of ‘universal’ or ‘general idea’. This question had come to the front through Roscellin’s Nominalist teaching on the Trinity. In refuting him Anselm and Abelard, starting from the standpoint of realism, and with the help of Aristotle, discussed the relation of ‘universals’ to corporeal existence. In this way the terms substantia and accidentia came to be used by them. They are first definitely applied to the Eucharist in the 12th cent., though Berengar had anticipated their use when he employed the distinction between substantia and accidentia. By substantia was denoted ‘the impalpable universal which was held to inhere in every particular thing, under another name,’ and by accidentia the ‘sensible properties which came into existence when the pure Form clothed itself in Matter’ (Rashdall, Universities of Europe in Med. Ages, London, 1895, i. 461). From the 12th cent. onwards the application of this metaphysical language to the Eucharistic mystery dominated Western teaching.

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Neither Hugh of St. Victor nor Peter Lombard employs the term transsubstantiation, which is used, however, by Hildebert of Tours early in the 12th cent., while the verb transsubstantiare is found in Stephen of Antun in the first half of the same century. But they clearly hold the teaching expressed by it, that during the consecration, the substantia of the bread and wine pass into the substantia of the body and blood of Christ, the sensible properties (or ‘accidents’) of the bread and wine being all that remains of the original elements.

The doctrine thus expressed became the formally recognized teaching of the West. It fell in with the accepted philosophy of the day, and it gave shape and consistency to the conception of popular thought. It secured the belief in a miraculous conversion which was demanded by popular religion, and it minimized the crude materialism of the earlier period. On the whole it seems to have met with little opposition after the middle of the century.
Rupert of Deutz (1135) represents the standpoint of earlier Patriotic teaching (Theodoreof, Gesa) in drawing a parallel between the Bread and Wine in Christ and the Holy and Divine elements in the Sacrament. Like Berengar, he denies that the working of the Divine Spirit destroys the substances which are assimilated. The transubstantiation taught by Christ was not changed or destroyed by the union. So, too, the bread and wine become the Body and Blood of Christ, not by being changed into the sensuous realities of flesh and blood, but by assuming invisibly the realities of the immortal substance, which is in fact (de Trinitate operius ejus: in Ec. il. 10). Card. Bellarmine charges Rupert with acting as a Pelagian (op. cit., § 1), which was also attributed to Berengar. But in both cases the use of the familiar Patriotic analogy lays no support to the view that Christ and the Holy Spirit are co-equal with the substance or substance of the Host and Wine.

In both cases, however, the motive which inspired the use of such language was opposition to the papacy, and to the conception of the conversion of the elements. But such language as that of Rupert is an isolated phenomenon among the Schoolmen, and does not anticipate the errors of the Albigenses. It deals with the doctrine of God, the authority of the Old Testament, the Incarnation, and the sacraments. The statement upon the Eucharist runs as follows: "The body and blood of Christ, being mixed outside the church, must needs be in the altar, although no one is in a state of salvation. In this Church, Jesus Christ Himself is both Priest and Sacrifice: He and His body and blood are really contained in the Sacrament of the altar under the species of bread and wine, the bread being transubstantiated into the Body, and the wine into the Blood by the power of God, so that, to effect the mystery of unity, we ourselves receive here what He Himself received from His Father."

The reserve exhibited in the language of this decree has given rise to the question whether the Council intended to impose upon the Church any dogmatical definition of transubstantiation. For, though the term transubstantiatur is employed, the accompanying language was opposition to the papacy, and to the conception of the conversion of the elements. There is no explicit statement to the effect that the substance of the elements cease to exist, and that the accidents alone remain.

Hence it has been maintained that transubstantiatur is used in a more general sense, to denote a mysterious change (cf. Palmer, Treatise on the Church of Christ, I, 1001.; Pusey, Real Presence, p. 141; Raittlo, Etudes, II, 303). The language of Pope Innocent III. in his treaty, On the Mystery of the Mass (vr. 7-9), has been adduced to show that he speaks without condemnation of the view that the elements of bread and wine continue in their integrity after consecration. But such a conclusion may be doubted, and the treatise appears to contain a most careful and explicit statement of the doctrine of transubstantiation. More to the point is the Decretal (op. cit., de Ia. 271.) to the language used in the 15th century. By Peter d'Ally, who is the same as the author of the previous paragraph, is used against this isolated expression of opinion other language which shows that the Medieval Church from Thomas Aquinas onwards regarded as heretical any notion beyond transubstantiation. So, too, the Council of Trent explains it, maintaining the change of the whole substance of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, and denying the continuance of the substance of the bread and wine after consecration, though at the same time it speaks of the sacramental Presence as a "mode of existence which can scarcely be expressed in words." See, further, Stiern, History of the Doctrine of the Eucharist, I, 313.

Whatever ambiguity there is in the language of this decree, the scholastic doctrine of transubstantiation became the accepted teaching of the Western Church. It found its fullest expression in the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas (I, q. xlvii.-xxxvi. 6). In two respects he advanced upon previous teaching. (a) He defined more exactly the nature of the Presence. (b) He dealt more fully with the question of the accidents. But Aquinas maintained that the whole Christ (totus Christus) is present, being entire in each species and every fragment of each species, the body being present in the bread, and the blood being present by concomitance in the species of the bread. (This had already been affirmed by some opponents of the Berongarians. In its origin the phrase totus Christus maintained the important truth that the gift of the whole Christ is received in the Sacrament, and guarded against the idea of a partimula carnis, a part of Christ. In this sense Aquinas denies that the presence of Christ is a local presence (localiter, in loco). He is present only per modum substantiae (so also, still earlier, Odo of Cambrai). Hence, in the Sacrament, he is present in all respects, but only per accidents, in relation to the movement of that in which He is. He denies any fraction of the body, and maintains, like Peter Lombard, that the wicked receive sacramentally, but not spiritually. Lastly, the body remains until the species are corrupted. On all these points he gathers up preceding discussions, and attempts to evade the materialistic conclusions of earlier writers, by defining and spiritualizing the conception of the Presence.

(b) In treating of the accidents, Aquinas, like the later Schoolmen generally, allows them greater reality than had been conceded in the earlier period. This was the way how to reconcile the teaching that the elements preserve many of the ordinary effects of a substance with a literal acceptance of the belief that they become Christ's body and blood. Aquinas maintains that the accidents exist without a subject, yet they retain the power of affecting objects and can breed life, nourish, be broken and corrupted. Yet, according to the Schoolmen, the accidents have no independent being, but simply characterize the substance in which they inhere. The solution which Aquinas offers is that they inhere in quantity (quantitas dimensae), as in a subject. This was the great problem of distinction among later Schoolmen, and under the stress of it the metaphysical theory of transubstantiation tended to break down. In the following period the Schoolmen are inclined to allow still greater reality to the accidents. Duns Scotus denies that they require a subject in which to inhere, while Wyclif ridiculed the prevailing uncertainty on the question (de Eucharistia, c. 6).

The controversies upon the Eucharist tended to intensify the devotion of the faithful to the Sacrament, which came to be regarded as the mystery of religion per excellence. Around the miracle of transubstantiation there gathered a wealth of legend intended to augment devotion to it in honour to the Sacrament. Corresponding to this sense of the miraculous character of the Sacrament, we find a growing decrease of communion. Attention came to be concentrated upon the act of consecration. Peter Lombard had affirmed that the form of the Sacrament is to be found in the words of institution, while Aquinas maintained that the Eucharist is completed in the consecration, whereas all other sacraments are completed in the application of the matter to the sanctification of the individual (Summa, III. lxxxi. 12, where, however, he maintains the necessity of the communion of the priest; see also both kinds). Worship and adoration formed the central feature of the rite. This in turn led to some important additions to the ceremonial of the Mass, the chief of them being the introduction of the ceremony of the elevation of the consecrated gifts. This ceremony must be distinguished from the earlier ceremony found in the Eastern liturgies and connected with the invitation to communion addressed to the faithful, "the holy things for them that are holy." There is no rubric in the Eastern rites prescribing the lifting of the consecrated gifts, though later on in the 17th century, under Roman influence, the Council of Jerusalem (1672) assigned to the Sacramental Presence the same dignity as that attached to the Trinity. In the West, some time during the 12th century, the practice of elevating the Hosts and Species of the Eucharist, and before the close of the canon, came into use. It was intended, doubtless, partly as a protest against the views of the Berongarians, partly as a show of respect for the mystery of Christ's presence. In earlier days the altar had...
EUCHARIST (to end of Middle Ages)

been veiled with curtains, but the object of this new ceremony was to make a spectacle of the central portion of the rite. Henceforward, the 'gasing upon' the Sacrament plays a prominent part in the liturgy, and the instruction upon the Mass (e.g. the Latin Missal, of the Mass Book). The canons of various English Councils in the 12th century referred to the custom of elevation for the purpose of adoration, and in the same century Durandus, bishop of Mende, and author of the Nationale Declaratorum Officiorum, shows acquaintance with the ceremony in a form resembling the present Roman rubric. For the rubric in the use of Sarum, see C. R. Dodgson, The Eucharist, Cambridge, 1897.

This devotion connected with the Eucharistic mystery culminated in the institution of the festival of Corpus Christi in 1264 by Pope Urban IV. (confirmed and established in 1311). The occasion called for the noble hymns of Thomas Aquinas, in which the Eucharistic devotion of the Mediæval Church found its loftiest expression.

The doctrine of transubstantiation in the later Middle Ages. — The doctrine of transubstantiation remained throughout the later Middle Ages the standard of faith for Western Christendom, and the attempts to challenge it met with little success. In some cases it was violently opposed, but nowhere with more severe censures. At the beginning of the 14th cent. John of Paris and Durandus of Pronzain declared that it was impossible to believe in the Real Presence without believing transubstantiation. William of Occam, the Nominalist Schoolman of the same century, suggested that on the grounds of reason alone, apart from the decision of the Church, the permanence of the substances of bread and wine was not improvable. But the greatest of all mediæval opponents of the doctrine was Wyclif. Inspired by the practical abuses of the day, he exposed the inconsistencies of the Scholastic teaching, and the idea of the accidents existing without a subject, and charging the popular devotion with idolatry. He is also reported to have taught that the unworthiness of the priest invalidates the Sacrament. Such a theory was undoubtedly held by some of his followers; but Wyclif himself, while holding that the disposition of the priest affected to some extent the value of the Mass celebrated by him, regarded the sanctity which the Sacrament has from Christ's presence as the same in all Eucharists (de Eucharistia, c. 4 [Wyclif Society, London, 1892]). Some of Wyclif's language looks like an assertion of a merely symbolical presence. He rejects transubstantiation, identifying it with assimulation, and maintains that the words of institution are used in a tropical sense (op. cit. 9, p. 291). He attacks the popular idea of a sensible, visible presence of Christ (op. cit. c. 1, p. 201.), and maintains that the body of Christ is 'virtually in the Host as in a sign' (op. cit. c. 8, p. 271). The Sacrament is the form of bread and wine, and not Christ or part of Him (ib. c. 1, p. 29). But this language was directed against the materialistic conceptions of his time. Wyclif's positive teaching seems to indicate a belief in a real, though sacramental, virtual, spiritual presence. The Host is not itself the body of Christ, but the very body of Christ hidden (ib. p. 15; cf. Post. Zisc, London, 1858, pp. 115, 117). The bread is an 'effectual figure' of the body of Christ, and the Sacrament has a special efficacy beyond that of other signs of the OT and NT (de Eucharistia, c. 8, p. 81).

The bread is an effectual figure of the body of Christ, and the Sacrament has a special efficacy beyond that of other signs of the OT and NT (de Eucharistia, c. 8, p. 81). Wyclif's positive teaching on this subject was less than that of other parts of his teaching. In Bohemia his teaching on transubstantiation did not gain many followers, and John Hus, while protesting against practical abuses connected with the Sacrament (e.g. the denial of the cup to the laity), appears to have accepted the doctrine of the Church in its main features.

The great movement in the direction of spiritual religion, originated by the German mystics during the 14th and 15th centuries, did not at first affect the Eucharistic doctrine of the Church. Though some of the mystics, like Eckhardt, were accused of speculative errors in the direction of pantheism, they adopted the most part the semi-spiritual position, which is not indifferent to sacraments, but seeks to interpret them in a way which brings out their spiritual value, as emphasizing the union of the soul with Christ and its devotion to Him (so Huygens, the author of the 'Consolation of the Chrisi'). In John Wessel († 1489), however, there is a tendency to break loose from current teaching. Luther regarded Wessel as a precursor of his own teaching in several respects. While emphasizing, with earlier mystics, the spiritual character of the participation of the body of Christ, Wessel held that this spiritual presence was not restricted to particular moments, but extended over the whole life of the believer, and that there is no essential difference between spiritual and sacramental participation. The latter had value only in so far as it rested upon the former. As a sacrament, the Lord's Supper is the Eucharist of the Church. As a spiritual act of participation in Christ by faith, it is possible for all without a priest (de Sacr. Euch., passim).

Still earlier than the Mystics, the wide-spread sects of the 12th and 13th centuries promoted a spirit of revolt from the established doctrines. Some, like the Waldenses, appealed to Scripture alone. Others, like the Albigenses, were affected by Manichean views. From the Franciscans in the 13th cent. there proceeded a famous book, The Eternal Gospel (the work of a disciple of the Abbot Joachim of Floris), which preached the near advent of a purely mystical religion, in which the Church system, with its priesthood and sacraments, should find no place.

6. The Eucharistic sacrifice in the earlier Middle Ages. — In the Eastern Church there was little development in the doctrine of the Eucharistic sacrifice beyond the conceptions of the earlier Patriarchal period, as exhibited in Cyril of Jerusalem and Chrysostom, and in the West by Ambrose and Gregory the Great. The commemorative character of the rite as a memorial of Christ's sacrifice, and its relation to the sacrifice of the Cross on the one hand, and to the heavenly life of Christ on the other, were clearly affirmed. Later on in the Middle Ages, especially in the 11th and 12th centuries, there was an effort to connect the Eucharistic sacrifice with the ascension of the Lord, and the sacrifice of the Mass was regarded as a memorial of the ascension, and the mysteries of the church, the body of Christ. The whole Eucharistic action on earth is, in fact, conceived of as a mystical representation in time of the 'eternal redemption' won for man by Christ. It procures the remission of sin, and the sanctification of the believer, and it is celebrated by the Church in the name of the Lord for the living and the dead, and by communion benefits the faithful (Cabasillas). Lastly, like the mystical commentators of the West, Cabasillas sees in the Eucharistic sacrifice itself a drama of the life, death, and resurrection of Christ. See, further, D. Stone, op. cit. i. 150 ff.

The teaching of the West in the 19th and following centuries exhibits some of the main characteristics of Patriarchal teaching.
(1) The Eucharist is regarded as a commemoration and representation of the Passion. But this representation is found in the Mass rather than in its wider purposes. The prayers of the Mass are a tableau of the life and death of Christ (Amalarius). The mixture of the chalice represents the chalice of the blood which flowed from the side of Christ (Paschasius). Others find this representation in those acts of the priest which are based upon what Christ did at the Supper (e.g. the Supper of the Lord (William of Thury, 12th cent.), or the double consecration of bread and wine (Peter Lombard, Alexander Hales). On the influence of these ideas on later conceptions of the sacrifice of the Mass, see below, §7.

(2) Emphasis is laid upon the effects of the sacrifice. The sacrifice is, in fact, explained, by and identified with, the effects which it produces upon the celebrant (cf. Augustine). The Paschasius (op. cit. c. 9) teaches that the consecration of the gifts renews the Passion, because Christ reiterates daily that which He did upon the Cross, offering himself to the Father to deliver us from our sins. The whole offering is due to our need of daily cleansing. By communion we partake of the fruits of Christ's death. Lastly, he repeats Augustine's saying that by participation we become Christ's body and blood. In other words, the same identification of the sacrifice with its effects appears in Alger of Liège (12th cent.; see de Sacram. Corp. et Sang. Dom. ii. 21.).

(3) Paschasius and Alger of Liège connect the Eucharistic offering with the heavenly intercession of Christ. According to Paschasius, the true priest in every Eucharist is Christ Himself, now made a priest for ever. It is He who offers the gifts presented on the earthly altar, and it is from His offering of Himself that we receive them back as His body and blood. Thus he explains the prayer in the Roman Canon, Jube hanc perferr. The lifting up of the gifts is their consecration. The whole act of offering is sacramental, mystical, supra-local. The altar on high, at which the gifts are offered, is the body of Christ, through which and in which He offers to the Father the prayers of the faithful and the faithful themselves (op. cit. 8, 12; cf. Alger of Liège, op. cit. i. 14). This view combines the earlier Western view of the Eucharistic offering, contained in the Roman Canon, with the Eastern view of the Mass, and found also in Ambrose and Gregory the Great among the Western Fathers. The Eucharist is no repetition of the sacrifice of the Cross. It is offered, as Paschasius says, in commemoration of the Passion (op. cit. c. 9: this expression qualifies the words 'passionem illius reparsam' in the same chapter). But that which connects it with the sacrifice of the Cross is the heavenly priesthood of Christ, who has passed through death and is ever present with the Father, and presents to Him our prayers and intercessions. (Note the identification of the altar on high with the body of Christ. This shows the practical identity of Paschasius' teaching with that of Ambrose and Gregory the Great. See above, II. 3 (2.).)

7. The Eucharistic sacrifice in the Scholastic period.—The early Schoolmen paid little attention to discussions of the doctrine of the Eucharist, their thoughts being occupied with discussions as to the mode of the presence of Christ in the Sacrament. They content themselves mainly with denying that there is an identity of the sacrifice of the Cross and with the simple statement (following Augustine) that there is a representation, or commemoration, or likeness of the sacrifice of the Cross in the Mass. Thus Robert of Deutz declares that the whole Christ is present upon the altar, 'not that he may again suffer, but that to faith, to which all past things are present, His Passion may be united by its presence in the Mass as in Gen. vi.'). Similar language is used by Peter Lombard (Sent. iv. 12, 7).

The Schoolmen of the 13th cent. attempt a more analytical treatment of the question of the sacrifice. They are influenced by the development of the notion of the juridical and moral rationale of sacrifice. William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris (+1249), discusses the chief elements of the sacrifice. (a) Sacrifice is an act of homage to God with a view to the sanctification of the individual. (b) It is, in the theory of the sacrificial mass, a means of communion with God, and a source of spiritual refreshment. (c) It is an act by which the worshipper is associated with the family of God (de Legibus, c. 24). In what follows he maintains that the first and chief sacrifice is that of ourselves, without the offering of which nothing that we present to God is pleasing or acceptable to Him. The essence of the sacrifice of Christ lay in His sinless life of virtue (ib. c. 28). By his one oblation on the Cross, Christ has reconciled and sanctified the world. The sacrifice of the Mass is the application by the will of Christ of the benefits which accrue daily to the faithful from the sacrifice of the Cross. The sacrifice of the Eucharist propitiates God and averts His wrath. As a sacrament it sanctifies and supplies spiritual refreshment to those who receive it. Without the sacrifice of Christ and the Mass faith and devotion would die, and the faithful would be deprived of spiritual food. In it Christ is present as priest and victim, as advocate and healer (see the treatise de Sacramento Eucharistie, cc. 2, 3, 4). Similarly Albert the Great (+1280), the master of Thomas Aquinas, while combining in an original way the conceptions of earlier writers, and emphasizing the sanctifying effects of the sacrifice of the Cross which are imparted in the Eucharist, regards the Mass as an act of homage to God, and as representing the union of the Church with the self-oblation of Christ (de Sacram. Euch. dist. v. 4; Sent. iv. 13, 23). At the same time he prepared the way for future developments by discussing the question in what sense the Mass is distinct from the offering of the Cross (Sent. iv. 13, 23). See Vacant, Hist. de la conception du sacre du corps de notre Seigneur dans l'eglise latine, Paris, 1894, p. 39 f.

Nothing shows more clearly the undeveloped character of the doctrine of the Eucharistic sacrifice in the middle ages than the treatment which it receives in the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas. Like earlier Schoolmen, he emphasizes the effects of the sacrifice, and maintains that it is a 'representative image' of the Passion (III. lxxxiii. 1). Elsewhere he discusses the nature of sacrifice. It has its roots in the Laws of Nature. 'A sacrifice is something done for the honour properly due to God, to appease Him' (III. xvii. 5). But, he goes on, beyond previous Schoolmen in his further definition that sacrifice involves the production of a change in the object offered, 'as that animals were killed and burnt, that bread is broken and eaten, and likewise his flesh' (IV. 1 Pr. lixxv. 3 ad 3). The result of this definition was that the sacrifice was treated independently of the effects which it produced. This opened up a new era. In the later period the main question was, 'What is the doctrine of sacrifice, their thoughts being occupied with discussions as to the mode of the presence of Christ in the Sacrament. They content themselves mainly with denying that there is an identity of the sacrifice of the Cross and with the simple statement (following Augustine) that there is a representation, or commemoration, or likeness of the sacrifice of the Cross in the Mass. Thus Robert of Deutz declares that the whole Christ is present upon the altar, 'not that he may again suffer, but that to faith, to which all past things are present, His Passion may be united by its presence in the Mass as in Gen. vi.'). Similar language is used by Peter Lombard (Sent. iv. 12, 7).

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EUCHARIST (to end of Middle Ages)

In other respects the teaching of Aquinas associated the sacrifice of the Mass more closely with the consecration, and threw into greater prominence the character of the priest in the rite. In justifying communion in one kind, he argues that it is sufficient for the priest to receive in both kinds, because he receives in the person of all, and because 'the perfection of the sacrifice consists not in the use of the faithful but in the consecration of the matter' (III. lxxx. 12). This dictum, by isolating the act of the priest, encouraged the separation of the ideas of sacrifice and communion, which had already taken place in practice, and increased the tendency to view the Mass as an opus operatum completed in the act of consecration.

In connexion with the question of the relation of the priest's action in the Mass to that of Christ, the disciples of Aquinas followed their master in maintaining the idea of the Mass as a sacrifice, and the sacrifice of Christ, through the instrumentality of the priest. Duns Scotus (14th cent.), however, departs from this position in two respects. (a) He shows a greater anxiety to defend the unique character of the sacrifice of the Cross, and maintains that the sacrifice of the Mass has not the same value as the Passion of Christ, and that in it Christ does not offer immediately by an act of His own will, though He is present in the sacrifice (he quotes in support He 9:28). Still the Mass has a special worth, as being a special commemoration of the oblation of Christ upon the Cross, and as beseeching God for it (Quaest. Quaest. lib. 20, verr. 10). (2) He emphasizes the fact that the Eucharist is the act of the Church, rather than of the individual priest, and that it is accepted not by reason of the will of Christ acting immediately, but by the will of the Church (ibid.). This teaching was developed by the later Scotists (e.g. H一个是us and Biel).

In this later teaching upon the Eucharist the thought of the connexion between the worship of the Church and the heavenly intercession of the Mediator was back-ground of the early Christian conceptions of life and worship (cf. e.g. Clement of Alexandria, ad Cor. 36, 'the great priest of Christings'; see also Origen, de Ort. 10), and which characterizes the teaching of the later Greek Fathers, and in the West appears in Ambrose, Gregory the Great, and the early medieval writers, because obscure or even lost. Logically the later Scholastic teaching involved consequences which affected the value not only of the sacrifice of the Mass, but of the priesthood as well. Hence Vacant (op. cit. p. 49) says that it 'prepared the way for Protestantism' (cf. Kidd, op. cit. p. 104 f.).

(d) A second development of later medieval teaching was the idea that, while the sacrifice of the Cross availed for original sin, that of the Mass was an offering for daily sins both deadly and venial. This opinion was first mentioned and confirmed at the Council of Constance in 1538 (cf. the English Pr. Bk. art. xxxi.). The Roman theologians at first denied that such an opinion had been held. In reply the Reformers appealed to Aquinas. But the sermon appealed to, though ascribed to Thomas Aquinas, and also included in another form among the works of Albert the Great, undoubtedly belong to a later period. The same opinion was attributed to the Dominican Calendar, who was present at the Council of Trent, and it apparently gained a certain currency, largely because of its association with the two famous Schoolmen mentioned above. It was denounced by Latimer in 1540, when brought to light in the 16th cent., it was repudiated by the Roman theologians (for the history, see Vacant, op. cit. p. 41, note; Kidd, p. 73 f.).

9. The place of the Eucharist in medieval religion.—The historical development which has been traced above represents the growth of a doctrinal and practical system in which the influence of popular religion played a large part.

In the attempt to formulate a scientific statement of the mode of Christ's presence in the Eucharist the Schoolmen were hampered by the existence of an established belief which had taken shape in the later Patriotic and early medieval period, and which exhibited all the features of
crude and unreflective piety. They undoubtedly made a sincere attempt to free the doctrine from the materialistic expression which had been given to it before their time, but their influence in this respect, however, was in practice nil, for the expositions may have been, only very partially succeeded in affecting the general belief. The crude materialism of popular belief continually re-asserted itself (see, e.g., the statement of Archbishop Arundel in 1413, quoted by Stone, op. cit., p. 376 f.). Again, the absorption of the Schoolmen in the question of the mode of the Eucharistic presence only served the purpose of keeping the discussion on a lower plane, in which it was continually encumbered by the intrusion of purely physical questions, which withdrew attention from the purpose and significance of the Sacrament as a whole. We must except, however, from this criticism the treatment of the subject by such writers as William of Auvergne (see above, § 7).

(2) One effect of this excessive attention given to the question of the relation of the elements to the spiritual gift bestowed in the Sacrament was to concentrate the thought upon the moment of consecration, when by the miracle of transubstantiation the body and blood of Christ were present upon the altar. The elevation of the Sacrament upon the altar for the purpose above stated, § 4 gave point and precision to this aspect of the rite. Thus the Lay Folks’ Mass Book, which provides no devotions for communion, directs the worshipper after the consecration to do reverence to Jesus Christ’s own presence and to kneel, holding up both hands, and so to behold the elevation and meditate on Christ’s Passion. The manifestation of Christ in the Mass was regarded as supplying the greatest incentive to faith and devotion (see the language of William of Auvergne quoted above, § 7), and there is little doubt that in its higher forms this belief fostered a noble and beautiful piety (see, e.g., The Lay Folks’ Mass Book and the Ancren Riolte). But on its lower side this ‘gazing on’ the Sacrament tended to divert attention from the purpose of the Sacrament as a whole, and ministered to the craving for the miraculous and to a magical conception of religion.

(3) Corresponding to this emphasis on the moment of consecration we find a decline in frequency of communion. Amalarius in the 9th cent. still counselled the laity to fast on Fast-Friday (Langland, Pieters Plowman, Pass. xii. B. 358 1 f.) or even yearly communion (Chaucer, Parson’s Tale) was regarded as sufficient. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215), by prescribing a minimum of one communion a year, had contributed unintentionally to this growing infrequency, though local Councils from time to time sought to secure a higher standard. Among lay people frequent communion was exceptional (e.g., their mentions as a mark of exceptional piety that the Lady Margaret was ‘houselled’ well-nigh twelve times a year). Moreover, the custom had sprung up of giving communion outside the time of Mass (see Langland, Pieters Plowman, Pass. xxi. 4: ‘and dyhte me derly . . . and dide me to churche. To huyre holliche ye masse and be houseld after’). This dislocation of the rite, by severing the idea of communion from it, marks a wrenching departure in the liturgical order.

(4) Another medieval departure was the withdrawal of the cup from the laity. This practice began in the 12th cent., and was justified in the 13th by Aquinas on a comparison to the Lord’s Supper (Lancrenl, Dogmen-der, ii. 281; J. B. Franzelin, Tractatus de S.S. Euch. Sacram. et Sacrif., Boone, 1898; W. Palmer, A Treatise on the Church of Christ, London, 1855, ii. 161; E. P. Slicher, The Doctrine of the Real Presence as contained in the Fathers, Oxford, 1870, p. 177; P. Bailloud, La liturgie de l’eucharistie sacrifie, London, 1898; J. H. Shawley, Contribution de l’offrande du ver a la liturgie du XVe s., Freiburg, 1891), but as an actual fact, the rite was continued in the Church of England: de vererber de h. hostis ; de godsoordelen, Leyden, 1897.

(5) The Schoolmen, as we have seen, devoted comparatively little attention to the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist, though some writers of the 13th cent. have valuable discussions on the rationale of sacrifice in general (e.g., William of Auvergne and Albert the Great). Here again they were hampered by the external and mechanical conception which had been growing up since the time of Pope Gregory the Great. This popular system had encouraged, by the frequency of Masses, an external and mechanical conception which tended to the belief that each Mass had a distinct propitiatory value apart from the moral condition of the worshipper. The result was that an exaggerated importance came to be attached to the mere hearing of Mass.

(6) Lastly, the loss of the corporate aspect of the Eucharist as an expression of the unity of the faithful, which finds a place in the teaching of St. Paul and St. Augustine, was another consequence of the severance of the idea of communion from that of worship. The Schoolmen, indeed, in their treatises frequently refer to this aspect of the matter, and quote Augustine’s language upon the subject, but in popular religion and practice it seems to have found little place.

On the other hand, the mediaval doctrine and practice with regard to the Eucharist rendered important services to religion by the impressive witness which the mass had to the doctrine of the rite. (a) Worship and adoration found a striking and noble expression in the mediaval Mass, and in the prayers contained in some of the popular books of instruction. To the men of the Middle Ages the Mass was the mystery par excellence of the Church. Around it there gathered all the splendour which art and music could provide. The appeal that was made to eye and ear in the public worship of the Church was externalised in the sanctification and subdue the will. And there is little doubt that to multitudes the Mass provided a real incentive to devotion and to spiritual worship. (b) The mediavil Mass kept the memory of the Passion of Christ vividly before the minds of the worshippers. The popular books of devotion and the mystical commentators on the Mass alike emphasize the conception of the Mass as a sacred drama exhibiting and reenacting again and again the story of the Lord’s Passion ‘until He come.’ (c) The mystical aspect of the Eucharist as a means by which the union of the soul with Christ is effected finds clear expression in the mediaval Mass. The Mass alike in the teaching of St. Bernard, Hugh of St. Victor, William of Auvergne, in the hymns of Thomas Aquinas, and the devotions of the Imitatio Christi.


J. H. SHAWLEY.
BUCHARIST (Reformation and post-Reformation period)

EUCHARIST (Reformation and post-Reformation period)—1. GENERAL.—The first Reformation utterance concerning the nature of the Eucharist is found in Luther's sermon of 1518, *De digna praparatimone cordis pro suscipiendo Sacramentum Eucharisticum*. In order to avoid any unnecessary repetition, the believer must free his mind of all hatred and dissension. No other sins are so incompatible with both the name and the *res* of this sacrament, for its name is communion, and the *res* of the Eucharist is the body and blood of Christ. A picture of this, for the one bread is made up of many grains and the wine of many grapes.

Nouns are communi communi unum. Quod et figuratur in speciebus sacramento, in quibus multa granum, multae singulorum differentia, in unum panem. Item unae multae, amnis aus quoque differentia, in unum nummus redactae sunt.

It has often been remarked that, instead of union, this sacrament brought division into the ranks of the Reformers; in place of the *unitas cordium* there is a bitter sacramental controversy. But, while this is true, it ought not to blind us to the underlying unity of the Protestant doctrine. The Reformed Churches in all its various branches, is united in rejecting certain points of medieval theory and practice. Chief among these are: (1) the doctrine of Transubstantiation; (2) the idea of the *unam)* of the Host; (4) the *sacramentum propitiatorium* of the Mass; (5) the denial of the cup to the laity. If not so united on the positive side, it has been, and is, practically unanimous in making the following assertions: (1) that the Eucharist—whatever name for it may be in common use—is a sacrament instituted by Christ.

Here the Quakers dissent. They reject the idea of sacraments altogether. The Spirit of God is the only signatory and pledge of our Gospel inheritance. *'The communion of the body and blood of Christ is a mere symbolic and spiritual thing, breaking the bread of Christ and His disciples was a figure, which even they who have received the substance used in the church for a time, for the sake of the weak . . . yet seeing they are but shadows of better things, they cease in such as have obtained the inheritance* (Barclay, *Apology*, Prop. 13).

(2) That it is the central act of Christian worship.

(3) That it is a means of grace.

At this point a not inconceivable number part company with the general Protestant doctrine. Historically, they are represented by the Socinians. To them the Lord's Supper is not directly a means of grace. In their Confessional doxologies, they were even bold to speak of sacraments. They called the Eucharist the Lord's Supper *soma christi sacramento christi* (Christ's body as Christ's sacrament) which it was becoming to retain as a venerable and beautiful custom. It was instituted that believers might call to mind with thankfulness the work of the Cross and the things which this breaking of bread by Christ and His disciples was a figure, which even they who have received the substance used in the church for a time, for the sake of the weak . . . yet seeing they are but shadows of better things, they cease in such as have obtained the inheritance (Barclay, *Apology*, Prop. 13).

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The explanation of the sacramental unity, the co-existence of body and bread, he found in the metaphysics of Scholasticism.

His theory of the mode of presence of Christ's body goes back to certain distinctions made by William of Occam and adopted by H. J. and d'Anvers against a thesis first in his sermon Forma Sacrament demonstrationes (1526), and is developed in his other controversial writings against the Swiss reformers. Occam had taught (1) the esse repletivum (omnipresence) of God, (2) the unipresentsia of the body of Christ in heaven, and (3) the presence of the body of Christ in the Eucharist. The difficulty here lies in the esse differentiae. It is explained by Luther as that which is in space but does not fill any portion of it, and is not circumscribed by it. To Christ's resurrection-body belonged this kind of presence. 'Just as the sealed stone and the shut door remained unaltered, and yet His body was at the place where were mere stone and wood, in the same way is His in the Sacrament where the bread and wine are, and the bread and wine remain untransformed and unaltered' (Spec. de. x. 2841). The sacramento were not the mere symbols of the real presence, conceived in our local or circumscripted fashion. His body is present not after the mode of the esse circumscriptivum, but after that of the esse repletivum, not after the fact of the esse differentia. Luther holds that Christ's body is not broken, but remains complete in every part, even in the bread and wine. Scholasticism's repletion would have rested finally on the esse differentiae of Occam, had it not been that he was continually faced with the question, 'Christ is seated at the right hand of God, where is His body be in the Sacrament?' This he met by denying that the right hand of God is local. It is not a particular place 'like a golden chair, or the like.' God's right hand is everywhere. So he turns round to his opponents with this argument: 'Christ's body is at the right hand of God—that is omnipresent. But the right hand of God is everywhere—so assuredly it is in the bread!' (Weimar ed. vii. 149; cf. Hunzinger, PRF. xx. 186). The esse differentiae has thus been exalted to the esse repletivum, the multivoldispersitas to omnipresence.

To the same conclusion Luther came also from the side of Christology, in which he taught that the conjunction of the two natures in Christ implies a communicatio idiomatum—a transference of the attributes of the one to the other—and that, therefore, the body of Christ possessed the Divine attribute of omnipresence.

But all this proved too much, as his opponents were not slow in pointing out. If the body of Christ was everywhere, then it was received in every common meal, and not only in the Eucharist.

This difficulty was met by saying that there was a real presence in accordance with the promise. It is one thing for Christ to be present, and another thing for Him to be present for us. He is there for thee, when He says 'Himself by His word, and says,' 'Here art thou to find me.' (ib. xxii. 151). The solution is imperfect, as, indeed, must any attempt be to connect a theory of the ubiquity of Christ's body with a real presence in the Sacrament. For either (1) there is the mere presence everywhere as in the Sacrament, or (2) a specific sacramental presence must be added to the other, and is so far distinct from the other. Luther himself did not consider his theorizing to be binding or final. He had outlined an intelligible way in which the almighty power of God could secure the presence of the body and blood. What he did not do was to decide the formal fact of the real presence in, with, and under the bread and wine.

The characteristic Lutheran in, om, et sub panis is not Luther's own. It appears in the writings of Melanchthon and Krebs in Heidelberg after his death. Luther himself spoke of et sub panis, without the et, as far as we know.

In whatever way it might be explained, Luther's strong religious interest made him insist on the
real presence being conserved. Sometimes his vehemence led him into language which went beyond the instructions to Melanchthon in 1534; he uses language which might seem to imply that the body of Christ in the Eucharist is eaten after the manner of ordinary food:

"In brief this is our doctrine, that the body of Christ is truly eaten in and with the bread, so that what the bread does and suffers, the body of Christ does and suffers; it is distributed on our part, and our part is partaken with the bread."

But the qualifying phrase and the heat of controversy ought to keep us from pressing these words too far. And the Formula of Concord (Epitome, Art. 7, neg. 21) expressly rules out any such interpretation.

We also utterly reject and condemn the Capernalian manducatio of the body of Christ, as if, forswear, we taught that the body of Christ is torn by the teeth (with dein seriem). Luther regarded the manducatio ipiiorum as a decisive test of any supposed doctrine of the real presence. It was, in fact, that Luther, if the body of Christ were really present, in the sense that he understood the word, even the unbelieving who partook of the bread participated also in the body of Christ. This manducatio ipiiorum was so much an essential part of his doctrine that he used it from the beginning as an argument to overwhelm Carlstadt. The evangelical nature of the Sacrament he preserved by asserting that, though the unbeliever participated in the body and blood, they had no part in the grace of which body and blood were vehicles.

The main thoughts in Luther's reconstruction are these: (1) that the Eucharist was instituted for the commemoration of the events of Christ's passion; (2) that the true and complete meaning of the Eucharist consists in the reaffirmation of the assurance of the grace of God and communion with the Risen Lord; (3) that the objective guarantee of this assurance and the means of this communion is the real presence of the body and blood of Christ, in (with) and under the elements of bread and wine; (3) that the real presence itself is assured by the ubiquity of Christ's body, and made available by the words of institution; (4) that this real presence entails that the unbelieving participate in the body and blood of Christ, though they have no part in the grace of the Sacrament.

The doctrine of Zwingli—As already mentioned, the difference between Zwingli and Luther largely arose from the different points of departure—the Mass and the Eucharist respectively. To this must be added differences in training and religious experience. Luther's education was monastic, his theological studies originally and essentially Scholastic. Zwingli's education was Humanist, his theological studies originally Patristic. Luther's first Eucharistic controversy was with over-zealous Reformers, Zwingli's with upholders of the Mass. Luther's general idea of a sacrament received its evangelical shape in conflict with Rome over Indulgences and the sacrament of Penance, Zwingli's in controversy with the Anabaptists over Baptism. Against magical ideas of sacramental grace, Luther was led, therefore, to emphasize personal understanding and belief; against individualistic notions, Zwingli brought to prominence the social side of Christianity, the relation of the sacraments to the community.

In Zwingli's Von Tost und Widertost (1522), Baptism is a sign of election, but the Eucharist is primarily a memorial sacrifice. The expression he probably obtained from Melanchthon, who in his Letter (1521) had spoken of the sacraments as 'tesserae militae.' The Eucharist was the symbol of the communion of all believers in Christ. * Ergo hunc pacem editum, ut una pacis eorum commoditate, fit universae ecclesiae concordia in hoc, ut in actu cohaerendo in Christo sanctitate, in bene usu, in se sit, in aequitatis ordine, inter se et pacis eorum commoditate. * (1523) This is a historical reconstruction. It was Zwingli's main contention that the believer in the covenant of grace, and placed in the body of Christ in accordance with his profession. So, while Luther almost always thought of the individual in the communion, Zwingli gave prominence to the significance of the Supper for the Church community, and this especially when in conflict with Luther on the Eucharist. Zwingli's teaching is divided into three distinct periods. In the earliest and latest periods the main teaching is to be found in the middle period, during the controversy with Luther, the one essential point of his teaching at other times is obscured and even denied. In this article the former is taken to be the true Zwinglian doctrine.

Zwingli set out against the sacrificial aspect of medieval doctrine. Over against it he erected another, with its thought of the repetition of the Sacrifice of the Cross, he set the Supper as a memorial or remembrance, of the Sacrifice offered once for all. The thought of remembrance, therefore, is not supposed to any thought of present participation, but opposed simply to any thought of repetition. The bread and wine were signs of the broken body and the shed blood. The primary reference of the Eucharist, therefore, was to the death of Christ, and not to any union with the glorified Christ.

From the beginning of his teaching, Zwingli felt that the words *Hoc est corpus meum* must be understood in some figurative manner. 'But in 1522 he came to know of Gerhard Heyn's (Honius) *Vindicatio Christiana,*' and the body of Christ were really present, in the sense that he understood the word, even the unbelieving who partook of the bread participated also in the body of Christ. This manducatio ipiiorum was so much a part of his doctrine that he used it from the beginning as an argument to overwhelm Carlstadt. The evangelical nature of the Sacrament he preserved by asserting that, though the unbeliever participated in the body and blood, they had no part in the grace of which body and blood were vehicles.

The main elements of Zwingli's completed doctrine are these, and the obvious Scriptural derivation of all the points should be noted—e.g. (2) and (3) are founded on the words of institution, (4) on Jn 6, (5) on 1 Co 10—(1) the Eucharist is not a repetition of the Sacrifice of Christ, but the memorialization of the Sacrifice; (2) the bread and wine are signs or symbols of the broken body and shed blood of Christ; (3) the reference of the Eucharist is, therefore, rather to Christ crucified than to Christ glorified; (4) in the Eucharist, Christ is truly our food, and through Him our spiritual life is nourished, but He is appropriated by faith alone; (5) the Eucharist, as a true com-
munion of the body of Christ, is specially significant for the life of the Church community, being the sign and pledge of united allegiance to Christ and his Church. Therefore, he named it

3. The doctrine of Calvin.—Calvin’s teaching on the Eucharist is much easier to define—partly because he appeared on the scene later, when the problems had already been stated and discussed, and partly because he went on from them to seek for any change from the beginning to the end. The later Lutheran controversialists regarded Calvin as a cunning Zwinglian intent on making converts to his teaching by a partial use of Lutheran phrases, while many of the Swiss at first regarded him as a pure Lutheran, whose open and declared purpose it was to undermine the teaching of Zwingli. He stands in the middle, not merely of any need for a bold reform of the whole system of the Church’s teaching, but also of any need for a bold and unswerving adherence to the presence. His statement of the doctrine of Christ’s presence may be summarised thus: (1) that, though the body of Christ is in Heaven, there is a real presence of Christ in the Eucharist; (3) that, because Christ is at the right hand of God, He can be present both in the sacrament and in heaven; (4) that, through the Eucharist, Christ is a real means of grace, because He is in present in order to strengthen our real living union with Him.

In regard to doctrine, Calvin stands between Zwingli and Luther; but not so in regard to mode of administration. There is nothing to justify the wide-spread conception that, while Luther accepted all the old forms except such as were inseparably connected with the doctrine of transubstantiation, Zwingli removed all the ancient customs and, having made a clean slate, constructed therupon a new form which was meagre and sterile. The truth is that, in respect of the alteration in the celebration of the Eucharist, Zwingli was closer to Luther, as against Calvin. Calvin, and more completely, Zwingli, went behind medieval practices to primitive forms. Like Luther, Zwingli removed only the objectionable. He took over the old liturgy, doing away with some parts and altering others (cf. Ebrard, ii. 60 ff., for a description of the Zürich liturgy).

III. HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE EUCARIST AMONG THE REFORMERS.—The first controversies in Reformed circles concerning the Eucharist were Luther’s controversy with Carlsstadt, and Zwingli with the upholders of the Mass. But we begin at the point where the main bodies of Reformed teaching came into conflict with each other. Zwingli’s teaching, as above mentioned, arose independently of Luther’s and from another point of view. That teaching might have been tolerable to Luther but for three things. (1) He always associated Zwingli with Carlsstadt. As early as 1524 he wrote to Asmus: ‘Carlsstadt’s poison is spreading in Switzerland.’ (2) At first he knew Zwingli’s teaching only by inaccurate reports. (3) Zwingli represented a different political ideal. He breathed the free democratic air of Switzerland, which to Luther, with his experience of the French Revolution, was objectionable.

Passing over Zwingli’s letter to Alber—which, however, is noteworthy as containing his most radical views—the real controversy began with Bugenhagen’s attack on Zwingli, ‘Contra novum errores de Sacramentum,’ etc., which is mostly an echo of Luther’s against Carlsstadt, and seems to know no more of Zwingli’s teaching than that by est he understood significant. Zwingli in his answer meets his opponent on his own ground, and defends his interpretation.

*Which explanation of the words is the more violent—yours, by which you say, “Bread is bread, but in the bread is eaten the body of Christ”; or ours, when we say that the words are figurative, and then explain the figure “(oic est, nonne symphonia, figura, etiam verum est corpora mei, quod pro vobis traditur”’? (Responsa ad Bugenhagensis Epistolam.)

Almost simultaneously with the Responsio appeared a contribution from Oecolampadius, De genuina verboverum Doctrina, etc., expositionis. This work, unlike Zwingli, started from a theological conviction, and, also unlike him, set forth no complete theory, and no firm connexion with the death of Christ. To outsiders it therefore conveyed the impression that the whole innovation was a meagre product of a particular egesxis. This exposition, being dispatched to the Swabian preachers,
produced an answer, the Swabian Syngamma — the work of Brenz. Here the terminology was Lutheran, as it was to the theology of Calvin. It took a dynamical presence: the body is in the bread, just as the power of healing was in the Brazen Serpent, through the word (‘Jah, ut serpens versatus contemuit serpentem alias, cur non in sua coena verum corpus ad panem ferret’). Gecolampadius answered in his Antisyngamma, taking the Syngamma sentence by sentence, replying at length to criticisms of his exegesis, and flouting that the analogy of the Brazen Serpent proved no more than a presence in the Sacrament similar to that in the Word. In the meantime, Pirkheimer of Nuremberg had also replied to the expositio. This controversy is for two reasons worthy of mention. It was here that the Lutheran ubiquity theory first made its appearance; and it was from Pirkheimer that Luther got his knowledge concerning the doctrines and personalities of the Swiss Reformers; and Pirkheimer’s opinion had been coloured by Erasmus’ later view of the Swiss Reformers as fanatics and revolutionaries.

And now, Bucer and the other Strassburg Reformers, who had sought in vain to mediate between Luther and Carlstadt, tried to bring about an understanding between Luther and Zwingli. Their envoy, Chaselsius, brought back the answer from Luther that they had to wait for a time, to see whether either or both of them must be the servant of Satan. And in his preface to the Syngamma, Luther now openly joined in the conflict. The fanatics were wrong, he said, because they were so divided among themselves. To this Gecolampadius answered directly; Zwingli contented himself with his ‘Clear Instruction concerning the Lord’s Supper’ — the first of his sacramental writings in German — in which he developed his views in opposition to Luther, but without naming him. It was written to justify his position to the people. A little later he published his Amica Exaggesis, to justify his position to the learned. Sent to Luther, it crossed his sermon ‘On the Body and Blood of Christ against the Fanatics,’ which was answered by Zwingli, immediately on its reception, in his Fründich Verleugnung. In this he says that ‘Martin Luther stands in his poor judgment as high as any individual can, but yet God is higher.’

Every year the controversy grew more acute, with an exchange of tracts every few months, until in 1527, Luther issued his ‘That the Words of Christ, ‘This is my body,’ still stand firm.’ Zwingli replied in his ‘That the Words of Christ, ‘This is my body,’ would eternally keep their ancient and sole meaning; and Martin Luther with his last book has not made good his own and the Pope’s Interpretation,’ upon which Luther rejoined with his larger Bekennniss vom Abendmahl (1539).

What were the main points at issue in this controversy? The incorporation of the words of institution stands always in the foreground, but only a minor part of the real difference appeared there. In part it became a Christological controversy — Zwingli counselled Luther, with his communio idiomatum, of Docetism; Luther charging Zwingli with a Nestorian aloiosis. In regard to the Eucharist itself, the whole matter hinged on the thought that Christ himself said ‘This is my body’ and ‘This is my body,’ still stand firm. Zwingli it was expressly denied: (1) that the body were, if not corporeally eaten does or can confirm faith; (2) that the body of Christ corporeally or naturally eaten can or does forgive sin; (3) that the body of Christ is corporeally or naturally eaten can or does forgive sin; (4) that the body of Christ can be corporeally present in the elements, for He is seated at the right hand of God. By Luther it was asserted: (1) that in the One true Christ there is to be found the body, the heart, the soul, the blood of Christ; (2) that whoever accepts the miracle of the Incarnation has no ground for doubting the presence of Christ in and with the elements; (3) that Christ is not shut up in bread and wine; (4) that Christ himself taught; (5) that it is necessary for Christ’s body and blood to be in the Eucharist to assure the believer of the forgiveness of sins.

As the controversy grew more acute, the combatants became more isolated from each other, and as, all the time, the forces of reaction were gathering strength, Philip of Hesse resolved to bring the two sides together; and, after great difficulty, with the useful help of the usual middleman, Bucer of Strassburg, a conference was arranged for Marburg, and took place in the castle there in October 1529. After private conferences between Luther and Gecolampadius, and Zwingli and Melanchthon, came the public conference. Luther’s first action, as eye-witnesses on both sides assert, was to write with chalk upon the table ‘Hoc est corpus meum’ as a sign that he would not write a word. The arguments of the controversy were used over again, but with none of the old bitterness.

To Luther’s interpretation, Zwingli opposed John 6 as discrediting it, and the familiar ground of the sesio ad dexteram and the ‘ubiquity’ of the body, as possible. ‘If men cannot or do not wish to take these occasions did there seem likely to be an open quarrel. But no agreement as to the mode of presence was reached.

The Marburg conference, says Kolbe (PBR xii. 255), served more to the true understanding of the differences than to bridging them over. But it certainly was not fruitless. There was a mutual undertaking to cease from controversial writings. The two parties came to an understanding on every point save one — an agreement recorded in the fourteen Articles. In regard to the Eucharist, they came to see that one side had been misinterpreting the other — the Zwinglians in attributing to their opponents a Capernatic eating, and the Lutherans in regarding their opponents as holding to a mere memorial. After acknowledging in the Supper a spiritual enjoyment of the body and blood of Christ, the document concludes: ‘But, although we have not at this time come to an agreement as to whether the true body and blood of Christ are corporally in the bread and wine, and that we do not judge that Christian love towards the others, as far as the conscience of each will allow; and both parties ought diligently to beseech Almighty God to afford us the right understanding by His Holy Spirit.’

Within a few months of the Marburg Articles came the Augsburg Confession. Under what influence the tenth Article was drawn up is a matter of debate. The ‘under the form of wine and bread’ of the German version seems designed to conciliate the Roman Catholics, though it may be a mere protest against communion in one kind; and certainly the rest of the Article in German and the whole in Latin seems a drawing nearer to Zwingli: ‘De Cena Domini docent, quod corpus et sanguis Christi vere sano, et distributur venerabilibus in Cena Domini: et improbandum secum docentur’ (Schnell, Cracovia, New York, 1867, ill. 19). This Article, drawn up at the beginning of the altered edition of the Augsburg Confession, at the time no man questioned his right to do this, as he had drawn up the original. Now, in the Parris this article reads: ‘De Cena Domini docent, quod panem et vinum ex eis constituunt corpus et sanguis Christi, et distributur in Cena Domini: et improbandum secum docentur.’ The article is important historically. Under the influence of Calvin, as some maintain, or by reason of an independent approximation to Calvin’s teaching, Bucer and Melanchthon put forward this eleventh Article in the altered edition of the Augsburg Confession. At the time no man questioned his right to do this, as he had drawn up the original. Now, in the Parris this article reads: ‘De Cena Domini docent, quod panem et vinum ex eis constituunt corpus et sanguis Christi, et distributur in Cena Domini: et improbandum secum docentur.’
public controversy against it. In 1544, in his last Eucharistic writing before his death, he had rebuked the unscriptural innovations of a false character and reminded his readers that Christ’s body and blood have been given to us under the species of bread and wine in order that we might believe in his kingdom, to have our life changed, and to reign with him. These words of Calvin became a frequent theme in the discourse of the Reformed Church, and Loofs, using them, used them as the basis for his Discourse. Calvin’s answer to the question of the Supper is typically Reformed, and he maintains that the Supper is not a liturgical rite, but a sacrament. The Eucharist is not a meal, but a sacrifice, and the elements are not simply bread and wine, but the body and blood of Christ. Calvin wrote extensively on the subject of the Supper, and his ideas were widely influential in the Reformed Church.
which declares that by kneeling no adoration is intended to the actual corporeal and voluntary sacrifice, i.e., or any corporal (in 1552, "real and essential") presence of Christ's natural flesh and Blood, and Blood of our Saviour Christ are in Heaven, and not here; it being against the truth of Christ's natural body to be at one time both here and in Heaven. This rubric referred to as being offensive to Lutherans, and restored in the form quoted above was promulgated in 1586, by the Revision, as Drury (Elevation in the Eucharist, Cambridge, 1607, 181), "restored to our Church a complete representation of what our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ did, as a sacrifice in the sight of God, He was betrayed." We "take the bread" and "take the cup" as a memorial of Christ, and would further believe that He said, we took the bread and bless the cup as He did, and we perform these significant actions openly in the sight of the people and thus "proclaim the Lord's death till He come."

As the result of the composite nature of the Prayer Book as a whole, the Church of England, and a Low Church or Evangelical party in the Church of England. The former came into prominence with the Oxford movement.

In Tract 90, Newman attempted to show that the Articles, though the product of an un-Catholic age, were "patient of a Catholic interpretation." By the aid of a return to medieval ritual, attempts have been made to get behind Article 31, "Of the one Oblation of Christ finished upon the Cross." The question of ritual reached its most acute point in the Union Act (1558-59) and the MacCormack case (1597-98). High Churchmen speak of the Eucharist as a Sacrifice. Ridley had spoken of the "unbroken" and "uninterrupted" representation of the激情 sacrifice (Works (Parker Society, Cambridge, 1841, p. 256). The theory advanced by Hooker, and outspokenly and unreservedly condemned by Brightman (The Eucharistic Sacrifice, 1896), that the Eucharist is a sacrifice because "our Lord's sacrifice continues for ever and has a perpetual sacrifice, that is, the earthly counterpart of the sacrificial oblation which is being carried on in the heavenly tabernacle," for which a great weight of authority has been claimed, has been shown by Mortimer (The Eucharistic Sacrifice, London, 1901, p. 379 ff.) to have been derived through Mead from Chancellor. The controversy concerning the Eucharistic Sacrifice and its ritual development.

The teaching of the majority of the Nonconformist Churches in England and their sister-Churches in the United States and the Colonies, despite the ultra-Zwinglian Declaration of the Congregational Union of England and Wales in 1833 (Schaff, Creede, iii. 731 ff.), that the Lord's Supper is "to be celebrated by Christian Churches as a token of faith in the Saviour, and of brotherly love," is Calvinistic; and in most of administration they belong to the "Reformed" type.

V. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.—The Roman Catholic Church rests entirely on the development described in the preceding article. The Council of Chalcedon first gave Constantinople an embodiment to the distinction between the Eucharist and the Mass; and, though the decrees gave more space to the "sanctissimum sacramentum Ecclesiaæ", in theory and practice the sacrificial aspect (the Mass) completely overshadows the sacramental character (the Eucharist). The Tridentine decrees were a blend of conflicting medieval theories, one party wishing to exalt the Sacrifice of the Mass, the other unwilling to obscure the Sacrifice on the Cross.

It is a real propitiatory sacrifice: "Sic quis dixerit, Missæ sacrificium . . . neque pro vivis et defunctis pro peccatis, poenis, satisfactionibus et aliis necessitatis offerdi debet: absit semper" (Sess. x, c. iii. The Mass, unless performed by the priest, is no sacrifice. And yet the priest, not the other. Christ offered Himself once on the Cross, and He offers Himself daily on the altar. For the Mass is a sacrifice, and it is a sacrifice."

But the Catholic Church teaches that the sacrifice of Christ is immutably efficacious, and the thought of repetition, though present in the pre-Reformation time, is a heretical teaching, by a repugnance (mo33, 53 ff.). Post-Tridentine teaching went far beyond mediæval limits (Schreiber, La Dogmatique, Paris, 1832, iii. 310 ff.). Aquinas had taught that the Sacrifice of Christ is immutably efficacious, and the thought of repetition, though present in the pre-Reformation time, is a heretical teaching, by a repugnance (mo33, 53 ff.). Post-Tridentine teaching went far beyond mediæval limits (Schreiber, La Dogmatique, Paris, 1832, iii. 310 ff.). Aquinas had taught that the Sacrifice of Christ is immutably efficacious, and the thought of repetition, though current in pre-Reformation time, is a heretical teaching, by a repugnance (mo33, 53 ff.). Post-Tridentine teaching went far beyond mediæval limits (Schreiber, La Dogmatique, Paris, 1832, iii. 310 ff.). Aquinas had taught that the Sacrifice of Christ is immutably efficacious, and the thought of repetition, though current in pre-Reformation time, is a heretical teaching, by a repugnance (mo33, 53 ff.). Post-Tridentine teaching went far beyond mediæval limits (Schreiber, La Dogmatique, Paris, 1832, iii. 310 ff.). Aquinas had taught that the Sacrifice of Christ is immutably efficacious, and the thought of repetition, though current in pre-Reformation time, is a heretical teaching, by a repugnance (mo33, 53 ff.).

EUCHITES (Eûxîres or Eôxîres, from εὐχή, prayer).—A sect whose leading tenet was that sin could be subdued and perfection attained by the practice of perpetual prayer. This sect, which was an outgrowth of Syrian monachism, they propagated their ideas from the second half of the 4th cent. till the 6th, and traces of their influence are to be found at a much later date. They were otherwise named, after those who at various times were their leaders, Lampetians, Adelphians, Eustathians, and Marcianians; or, from some of their most striking peculiarities, Messalians (their commonest designation [Aram, ܐܘܛܝܝܐ, from ܫܡܐ, to pray], as in Du 6°, Ezz 6°]). Choreutes (χορεύται, from their mystic dances), and Enthusiasts (ἐνθυσταῖς, from their claim to possession of the Holy Spirit). It is somewhat difficult to determine their true character and teaching, because no information that has reached us regarding them comes from their opponents, the heretical literature having almost completely perished. The chief writers who have their opinions and practices are Epiphanius (Hr. 80), Theodoret (Hr. iv. 17), Hr. iv. 11), and Timotheus Presb. (in J. B. Cotelerius, Ecc. Gr. Mon., Paris, 1777-86, iii. 406). Their primary statement, written in a "Scripture before the ascetics," is often referred to, and it furnished John of Damascus with the heads of the impious doctrine of the Messalians taken from their own book" (Cotelarius, l. 302).
It is impossible to say whether their practice grew out of their theory, or their theory was squared with their practice. They taught that every crime was punished by a demon who incites him to sin. For the expulsion of the evil spirit baptism is ineffectual (δο άγιον βάπτισμα ϒύδι συμβάλλα τό [Timoth. loc. cit. 2]). It only "serves" to the soul who is the root of the evil untouchable. The true remedy is intense prayer, unremitted till the departure of the evil spirit is sensibly perceived. Sometimes the Holy Spirit is seen to enter in the appearance of an intense light or smoke, and to pass out of the mouth in the form of a saw with her litter (Augustine, Hist. 57). Then ensues the happy time when "the soul is as sensible of union with its heavenly bridalchamber as an earthly bride in the embraces of her husband" (Timoth. 4). The Enchite henceforth regards himself as a partaker of the Divine nature. Frequently he ends in a pantheistic self-deification (Neander, ii. 349). If an angel, a patriarch, a prophet, a royal or an apostle be named to him, he will reply in each case, "That am I myself" (Epiphanius, loc. cit.). As spiritual men, the Enchites alleged that they had visions such as were granted only to religious people. They danced in order to trample on the demons which appeared to them. They had also prophetic gifts, they knew the state of departed souls, and they had power to read the hearts of men. They regarded all the Church's ordinary means of grace, e.g. the Eucharist, as well as the discipline of the monastery, with indifference. Professing to give themselves entirely to prayer, they did no work, but lived as mendicants. Bands of Enchites of both sexes roamed about, as persons who had renounced the world and all its possessions. In summer they slept promiscuously in the streets of towns. They were suspected of believing that they could indulge in unbridled licentiousness without falling from their perfection. That may have been a calumny, but undoubtedly a nemesis often overtook the presumptuous self-confidence which ignores the radical weakness of human nature.

Edessa was one of the first centres of the Enchite heresy. Flavian, bishop of Antioch (c. 390), sent a body of monks thither to summon the false teachers before him. As he knew that they would, according to their custom, deny their doctrines and charge their accusers with slandering them, he resorted to a stratagem. Affecting to side with the accusers, he induced Adelphius, the aged leader, Adelphius, to disclose all the secrets of the order, and then rounded upon him with the stern words of Daniel, 'O thou that art waxen old in wickedness, now are thy sins come home to thee' (Susanna 2). Adelphius and his comrades were beaten, excommunicated, and condemned to exile, without the option of recanting. They went to Pamphylia, where they were again condemned in a Synod held at Side, and presided over by Amphilochius of Iconium. Proceedings were also taken against the sect in Armenia, and they gave trouble in Constantinople. Theodosius legislated against them (vi. Cod. 187), and Valerian and Amphilochius of Side had the book Accinctus condemned at the Council of Ephesus (431). Lampetus, the first of the sect to obtain the dignity of the priesthood, was summoned before his bishop, Alypius of Cesarea (Cappadocia), on a double charge of undue familiarity with women and of deriding the medical services of the Church as a mere bondage. He was found guilty, condemned, and degraded. He wrote a book called the 'Testament,' which is lost, but a fragment of Severus the Monophysite's answer to it is preserved (J. C. Wolf, Analecta Graecae, Hamburg, 1728-24, ii. 182). The Enchite leader in the 6th cent. was Marcellian, whom one of the Popes pronounced orthodox. Little more is heard of the sect till it reappeared in Armenia at the end of the 12th century. The Bogomils (g.v.) had their origin in Bulgaria, and were without doubt the connecting link between the so-called philosophical sects of the East and those of the West (EB 1 iv. 119). They were also known as the 'Paulicians' (from Paul of Samosata), whose doctrines survive in the great Russian sects. See, further, art. PAULICIANS.

Lemnians.—In addition to authorities cited in the text, see L. S. Tillemont, Memoires pour servir à l'histoire ecc., Paris, 1700, viii. 2057; C. W. F. Walch, Hist. der Ketzerleien, Leipzig, 1785, S. 74; R. J. A. Billerbeck, 'Lemnissen, ' in P.R.E.S., ed. London, 1854, iii. 283; G. Salmon, art. 'Enchites,' in Smith-Wace, DB; Bonetschick, 'Mosataner,' in PRESS.

JAMES STRAHAN.

EUDAMONISM.—Eudaimonism may be defined as the theory that the ethical end, the ultimate object to be achieved by action and conduct, the standard and the criteria of human well-being, is Welfare (eudaimonia). Welfare is not to be regarded as identical with happiness, although the latter term has been widely and even generally employed as its synonym. While 'welfare' (Wohlfahrt) more truly represents a happiness, of course, be so defined and understood by a moral philosopher as to become the technical equivalent of 'welfare' (Aristotle's eudaimonia); but this involves an unnatural divorce from the meaning which it bears in ordinary speech and literature, where 'happiness' undoubtedly connotes pleasure as an essential and predominant, if not as its sole, constituent, and signifies, in fact, 'a life full of pleasures, well selected and arranged' (Mezes, Ethics, London, 1901, p. 397). Now, although welfare may be held to consist of pleasure, that theory (Hedonism) imports so great a difference that, 'in whatever of its several forms it be maintained, it stands apart and calls for separate treatment (see art. Epicureans, Hedonism, Utilitarianism).

Eudaimonism finds its typical exponent in Aristotle, whose famous definition of welfare (eudaimonia), or man's ultimate good (ρο άνθρωπων άγαθον)—activity, or exercise of the powers, of soul according to virtue or goodness, and that the best and most fully developed—that has the high merit of elasticity, leaving room alike for individuality and for discovery in the conception both of psychical activity and of moral excellence. Only it is clear that well-being is founded and rooted in well-doing.

In modern philosophy Eudaimonism proper, as distinct from Hedonistic Utilitarianism, has few representatives. Perhaps Cumberland, who makes 'furtherance of the common welfare' the ethical end, and, after him, Huxley and Butler, have the best claim to be so regarded; and, in our own day, Paulsen, with whom 'acts are called good, when they tend to preserve and promote welfare; bad, when they tend to disturb and destroy it' (System of Ethics, Eng. tr., London, 1899, p. 222), welfare 'consisting in the perfect exercise of all human psychical powers' (ib. 224).

It is of the essence of Eudaimonism that it is teleological: it looks forward and makes for an end, and that end is not precisely, or mainly, 'rightness,' which implies a pre-existing rule or lawgiver. Herein it is contrasted from all that class of ethical theory which is retrospective and introspective, bidding us look back to a law once delivered, or inward to a perpetual and infallible monitor dictating duty with its consequences. Unlike every such 'intuitional' theory of morals, Eudaimonism does take account of con-

1 De Legibus Natura, London, 1672, ch. 72.
sequences, not only of those immediate consequences which even for the intuitionist commonly form part of the act intended to be done, but (which is the crucial matter) of manifold consequences that lie, foreshow, or pictured, in the far or middle distance.

Of Eudoxianism, which is likewise teleological, we may fairly say, with Wundt (Ethical Systems, Eng. tr., London, 1897, p. 187), that practically it 'coincides with Eudemonism,' though with the form of a restriction that the duty of moral self-development, as a means, however, not barely to self-perfection, but thereby to the welfare of our fellow-men. This identification will bring the school of Leibnitz into the ranks of the eudaemonists. At the same time it marks the difference between ancient (or Aristotelian) and modern Eudemonism. The former was primarily individualistic, notwithstanding that for Aristotle membership of a State is indispensable to human welfare. The latter is profoundly altruistic and universal. Now, individual perfection, excepting for Plato, is not manifestly the same as individual welfare, whereas universal perfection may reasonably be identified with universal welfare—the welfare of all human or, as some authorities would have it, of all sentient beings.

See, further, Ethics, and the Literature there cited.

EUDOXIANISM.—Eudoxianism denotes the opinions, especially on the Arian controversy, held by Eudoxius, who was born about A.D. 305, and became successively Bishop of Gerasanca in Comagene, of Antioch (A.D. 358), and of Constantinople (A.D. 369-370). The materials available for ascertaining his views are very scanty, consisting chiefly of his 'Confession,' a fragment of a work on the 'Incarnation,' which has been preserved in a collection made by the presbyter Anastasius. Inferences as to his opinions have also been drawn from his conduct at certain crises, and from one or two sayings he is reported to have uttered. One of these is a scurrilous sentence from a sermon delivered by the Bishop of Antioch and referred to at the Council of Sardica (Hil. Lit. Hist. of Dogma, iv. 1898. 75 ff., 147); F. Loofs, art. 'Eudoxius,' in DBE ii. (1898) 557; W. Harnack, art. 'Eudoxius,' in DICC ii. 1899. 355.

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EUGENICS.—See Marriage, Sociology.

EUHEMERISM.—The term 'Euherism' is often applied in a general though quite unwarranted sense to the rationalistic interpretation and disintegration of Greek mythology. As a matter of fact, the romantic tale compiled by Euhemerus of Messene marks but a single phase of religious-historical thought in the 3rd cent. B.C. and the period following, and it is only the influence exercised by this work on the Romans, and, through them, upon modern rationalism, that has given the term a significance by no means commensurate with the actual achievement of the man from whom the movement derives its usual name. For, when all is said, the teaching of Euhemerus has but little claim to be called original. Prior to his time reflection on religious things had undergone a fairly long process of development. The roots of Greek rationalism lie far in the past. The Greek historian Hecatoec had already dealt with ancient legends on rationalizing principles, and his example was followed by Herodotus and Herodorus, while the Cynics Antisthenes and Diogenes had sought to re-interpret the myths in a sense peculiar to themselves.

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Some knowledge of the work of Hecatoec seems to be presupposed in the Περὶ Αὐθεντικῆς of Euhemerus. In this book—written perhaps c. 280 B.C.—which purports to be the narrative of a journey, and is composed in the spirit of the numerous political Utopias of the 4th cent. B.C., Euhemerus gives a description of certain happy islands which he pretends to have discovered on a voyage from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. This romance of travel, the surviving portions of which are found in Diodorus (v. 41—46, vi. 1), as also in the fragments of Ennius preserved by Lactantius (Dito. Nat. xi. 1.
Varro perhaps being the intermediary—professes, in particular, to give a sketch of the fabled island of Panchaia, which is here depicted, however, not in Homer's wonder-land, but in a relatively sober and persuasive manner—artifice by which Euhemerus hoped to facilitate his readers' acceptance of his theology, for this was in reality his great undertaking. As a rule he proceeds to tell us that he had discovered on the island a temple of Zeus, and therein a pillar of gold on which Zeus had inscribed in sacred script his own deeds and those of Uranos and Kronos. Then, all that had ranked as divinity was brought down to the human level, precisely as in the work of Heracleus, whose views seemed in this way to gain some sort of documentary corroboration. In particular, Zeus himself was now no more than a ruler who had given a powerful impetus to civilization, who had completed the dissemination of his cult by erecting the sanctuary in Panchaia, and who ultimately died as a true king.

This narrative, of which we have given only the most essential particulars, was generally repudiated and pronounced a fabrication by the more earnest minds among the Greeks (cf. Callimachus, Hygm. i. 1. 86; Ptolemy, Ptolemaic History, xi. 13. 1; Polybius); Plutarch, De Is. et Osir. 23); but, as was noted above, it had a great influence upon the Romans, amongst whom it became naturalized in the later rendering of Ennius. It thereby became known to the Roman Christian writers (Minuc. Fel., Oct. 21; Lactantius, loc. cit.), who were as ignorant of Euhemerus in the original as of the Gr. apologists (Theophilus, ad Autolycum, iii. 7, furnishes no evidence on the point), and it was through their influence that Euhemerus and his work became immortal, and his theology passed into a proverb.

It is, accordingly, all the more necessary to insist upon the fact that in Euhemerus we have but a single—though, it may be, the most notable and competent—representative of the spirit of the age. Just as—unless all the evidence is fallacious—he had a forerunner in Heracleus, so he was followed by others who shared his views. Thus, while we cannot fix precisely the date of Leon of Pela, who fabricated a letter purporting to have been written by Alexander to Olympeion, the latter is often quoted by the apologists, and setting forth ideas akin to those of Heracleus—he unquestionably belongs to this period, and must be regarded as an exponent of Euhemerism (Eusebius, Geschicht der griech. Epochen, Leipzig, 1897, p. 223). Then, in the 2nd cent. n.c., Dionysios Skythobrachion, who is referred to by Diodorus (iii. 56; 57: 2: 60: 3 and 5; 70: 3, 7; 87: 11: 5; 72: 1: 4; 73: 1: 5, 5), followed on the lines of Euhemerus and his predecessor, maintaining that the gods were ancient kings who—as was specially exemplified in the case of Dionysus—had been promoted to divine honours for their services to civilization. Finally, at the end of the 1st cent. A.D., Herennius Philo of Byblus, in his Sanchuniathon, applied the same process of transmutation to the Phoenician deities (Enseh. Phys. Evang. i. 6, p. 20 ff.). The work of Palaios scholarchos (ed. J. de Vogli, Mythologi greeci, iii. 2, Leipzig, 1902) cannot now be regarded as directly relevant to the point before us. (Cf. with reference to the views developed in the foregoing, F. E. Wissowa, Die homer. Kultur, Berlin, 1896, p. 102 ff.; Jacoby, in Pauly-Wissowa, vi. 952; Wendland, Die hellenist.-röm. Kultur, Tübingen, 1912, p. 116 ff.)

Apart from a number of works in a dual character, generally rejected by Greek writers of the more earnest type, and especially, of course, by such as had engaged in research. It is, neverthe-
food for man, and, on the other, the gloomy depth of Hades. We find, accordingly, that in the Peloponnesian well-disposed deities of the earth were worshipped as Eumenides (Pausan. ii. 11. 4; cf. viii. 34. 1 ff.), and Preller-Robert, Griech. Mythol. (1864, i. 567). There they are also designated Πνεύματα or 'Αδόνιες, and in Athens, on the Areopagus and at the Demos Colonus, the Hesiod (Paus. i. 28. 6), while this name, as also the title οὐρανίας was likewise applied in a descriptive sense to Demeter and Kore (cf. Preller-Robert, i. 747). Such deities, in virtue of their chthonic character, were represented in the cultus as bearing not only flowers and fruits, but also the figure of the snake, which is found among many peoples as the symbolic animal of the dark and gloomy underworld. For in the earth underneath lie the souls of the dead, the haggard spirits whom those who still live on the earth must charm and propitiate; while, under a different name, these earth-deities are the avengers of murder, especially the murder of a blood-relation. It is true that even here the data remain somewhat obscure, for it seems as if the οὐρανίας was in general the angry soul of the murdered person himself rather than a deity who avenges the crime wreaked upon that soul. To all appearance Hesiod (Theog. 217; cf. Esch. frg. 928, 1. 47) identifies in the Erinyes the deities with the Κόραι, who must also be regarded as souls. And, since it is thus impossible, as has just been indicated, to attain to absolute certainty at this point, we must be content to verify some of the more outstanding features of the myth in its primitive form.

Now, it is so far an advantage to have ascertained that the avenging deities who punish the crime of matricide are here identical with the beneficent spirits of the underworld. The cause of a murdered man was in general taken up by his family group; but, when one individual in such a group killed another, the deed was accounted more atrocious than an ordinary homicide; and, as in this case the avenger could not fittingly be supplied by the family itself, the task of executing justice on behalf of the wailing soul of the slain was undertaken by the deities of the sombre depths. Thus the death-blow which Meleager had dealt the brother of his mother is, at her request, avenged upon him by the ἀρμοστὴς Ἐρήνης (II. ix. 571); and we are told in his xii. 280 that Clytemnestra, who was not directly guilty of her mother’s death, yet for him Εἰκιστὸς left pains behind, "all that the Erinyes (‘Avengers’ [Butcher and Lang]) of a mother bring to pass (Σῶσθν τε προτέρως Ἐρήνης ἐστιν, οὐς οὐδὲν):" Here, however, we can already trace the genesis of the finer and more spiritual idea that the Erinyes are the curse, or curses (ἀπολ.), of one who has suffered any kind of injury at the hands of a relative. Thus Telemaques is apprised of his mother’s curses (Od. ii. 135; cf. II. xxi. 412), while in Hesiod (Theog. 472), Rhea desires that Kronos shall propitiate the ἀρμοστής, i.e. in this case—the curses of his father; and, similarly, in Hygin. (Fab. 171) Heracles present themselves to Athene as the Ἁπατή (cf. Soph. Eidol. Col. 1375, 1391; Blass, Einleitung zu d. Eumeniden des Aischylos, Berlin, 1907, p. 21). In this way the Erinyes are lengthened to be protectresses of the constitutional family law in general; when a household was bereft of parents, their place was taken by the eldest brother, whose prerogative was now maintained by the Erinyes (II. xv. 294). Finally, when the hero is away from home, there comes the case of the much lamented Achilles (xix. 418), they seem to assume the function, if we may so express it, of maintaining the normal order of Nature. As they are thus the handmaidens of justice upon earth, they are also the guardians of oaths and the avengers of perjury (xix. 259; Hesiod, Op. 803 f.), and, accordingly, in the court of the Areopagus at Athens the judicial oath was taken in the name of the Τιμαίος (Dinarchus, i. 47). On all these details, see Rohde, Psyche, 1898, i. 134 ff.

The Erinyes thus came to be connected with all the power of artistic expression of which Hellenism was capable. The ἀρμοστής travels amid a dark cloud, is 'one that walks in darkness' (περίποτα, see above); the sound of the Erinyes, the ἐρυθρίας, and the ἐρυθρείς, are also figured as hunchresses; nothing escapes their eye; and, like a pack of savage hounds, they pursue the criminal—whose trail of blood they have speedily discovered—till they finally bring him to the ground. Hence Ἑρυθρείς, too, refers to them as the 'mother’s hounds' (Choepha. 924; cf. Eum. 131 f., 146 f).

It was, in fact, Greek poetry, and, above all, Greek tragedy, that gave these creations of popular belief their final form. We cannot fix precisely the period in which the repulsive stories of unnatural crime—paricide, matricide, and incest—first took their rise, and to which, therefore, the legends of Oedipus, Aeneas, and the Atrides are to be assigned. But in any case the Erinyes filled a great role in this particular phase of Greek mythology. This has already been shown in the case of Oedipus. The Erinyes, the Eumenides, the Erinyes of the house of Atreus, while, as regards the myth of the Atrides, we read in Stesichorus, who is our chief authority here, and is of importance also for the development of tragedy, that Orestes, who had killed his mother Clytemnestra, was pursued by the Erinyes, and received from Apollo a bow as a means of defence (frag. 40). The latter detail is one of great interest, as it indicates the early recognition of the symbolic character of the bow light and those of the under world which forms so significant a factor in the Eumenides of Aeschylus. For there the Erinyes are the primeval goddesses whose sole function it is to avenge the violation of kinship; the murder of a husband, which Apollo sets forth before the Erinyes in all its atrocity, is of no concern to them (Eum. 212). In Apollo and Athene, as a matter of fact, the Erinyes are confronted with a new ethical point of view—with the Delphic law of expiation—as also with the claim of the Athenian State to deal in its own right with such deeds as the crime of Orestes. And it is by no means certain that they are reconciled by Athene, and then, as beneficent spirits, pass into the under world beneath the Areopagus. The Erinyes have become the Eumenides. Thus did Aeschylus contrive to introduce ethical harmony into the primitive saga, which, as we saw above, recognized a dual aspect in the earth-deities. Another perpetrator of the crime of matricide was Aeneas, who was likewise pursued by the Erinyes, but was at length released from the consequences of his impiety (cf. Eurip. in Nauck, Fragm. trag., Leipzig, 1886, p. 379; Bethe, Thetis. Heldesm. Leipzig, 1893, i. 138 f.).

We have already noted the fact that the chthonic character of the Erinyes is symbolized by the snake, and on an Argive votive relief (Roscher, i. 1330) each of the three Eumenides carries a serpent in her hand. And, in like manner, the Terpsichore sometimes exhibits corresponding figures (Roscher, i. 1334). They are also provided with wings (cf. Eurip. Iph. Taur. 298), for which we have a further indication of their function as the swift pursuers of their prey. In their hands they hold scythes, and also torches (cf. the vase of Canossa, in Roscher, ii. 126) with which they torment the guilty in the under world.
EUNOMIANISM—The doctrine of Arias

The argument for the second premise, viz., that 'the Ungenerate' is God's name, the only definite proof he seems to offer is the somewhat curious one that long before the creation of man God had the naming of things, seeing that in the earliest of the sacred records, before the creation of man, the naming of fruit and seed is mentioned; and, if of things, how much more would He have the naming of Himself? Once he can establish ungeneracy as the Divine essence above, and he will have nothing to do by a constant misapplication of that which constitutes the Person or hypostasis of the Father to the whole essence [ōn] of Deity, the heavenly origin of the name follows as a matter of course in accordance with his theory of the sacredness of names.

But Eunomius' most elaborate proof, that 'Unenerate is God's name,' is a negative and indirect one. He attacks the mental history which Jesus and Gregory of Nyssa give of the term. He denies that it is due to a human conception, and boldly asserts instead that it is due to a perception as instinctive, spontaneous, and direct as any perception of the senses; the Deity presents it to the mind, and the mind at once grasped it. He pours contempt not only on the orthodox party for treating this and all other private names of the Deity as only privately invented, as a mere perception of the mind, but also upon the faculty of conception itself. It would be dangerous, he considers, to trust the naming of the Deity to a common operation of the mind. The faculty of conception may, and does, take upon itself; it can create monstrousities. Besides, if the names of the Father are conceptions, so also are the names of the Son, e.g. the Door, the Shepherd, the Axe, the 

It was this word 'ungenerate,' so familiar to Greek philosophy, so consecrated in its application to the First Person of the Trinity, that was seized upon to destroy the consubstantiality of Nicea. He saw in it the expression of a positive idea which enabled the mind to comprehend the Deity, and at which the same time, by virtue of the logical position between ungenerate and gener-}

_The Ungenerate_ as the name of God._—Eunomius asserts 'God is ungenerate, absolutely and independently of Himself, and as such shows at once what He is going to make of this by adding of the term 'ungenerate' itself: This name is His glory. It is grafted in our minds from above.' He then constructs the following syllogism: 'To term expressive merely of the absence of a quality can be God's name: the Ungenerate is God's name: therefore it does not express a privation.' But how does he prove his second premise, viz., that 'the Ungenerate' is God's name? The only definite proof he seems to offer is the somewhat curious one that long before the creation of man God had the naming of things, seeing that in the earliest of the sacred records, before the creation of man, the naming of fruit and seed is mentioned; and, if of things, how much more would He have the naming of Himself? Once he can establish ungeneracy as the Divine essence above, and he will have nothing to do by a constant misapplication of that which constitutes the Person or hypostasis of the Father to the whole essence [ōn] of Deity, the heavenly origin of the name follows as a matter of course in accordance with his theory of the sacredness of names.

But Eunomius' most elaborate proof, that 'Unenerate is God's name,' is a negative and indirect one. He attacks the mental history which Jesus and Gregory of Nyssa give of the term. He denies that it is due to a human conception, and boldly asserts instead that it is due to a perception as instinctive, spontaneous, and direct as any perception of the senses; the Deity presents it to the mind, and the mind at once grasped it. He pours contempt not only on the orthodox party for treating this and all other private names of the Deity as only privately invented, as a mere perception of the mind, but also upon the faculty of conception itself. It would be dangerous, he considers, to trust the naming of the Deity to a common operation of the mind. The faculty of conception may, and does, take upon itself; it can create monstrousities. Besides, if the names of the Father are conceptions, so also are the names of the Son, e.g. the Door, the Shepherd, the Axe, the

There is nothing to show that the name was used by the Church writers, whether before the 3rd cent. (which Bishop Bull has doubted) or after it (as has been conclusively shown by Lightfoot, Ignatius, vol. ii. p. 900).

Thus 'ungenerate' (υανερα) could be applied to the Son, but not to the Father. Ungenerate remains, then, as alone capable of representing the word which was put in the forefront of the Eunomian heresy, and from which all its conclusions flowed.

As a second argument also by the orthodox, Eunomius' use of it was all the more convincing and plausible.

In the English Term, the word 'ungenerate' there may be a little doubt. Though Gregory of Nyssa, in the opening of the letter, and after con-
This last statement must mean that the Third Person is inferior to the First, as having a cause at all; and to the Second, as proceeding only from the Second and not from the First. In this Eunomism marks his teaching throughout. He goes on:

There must, of course, be included in this account the energies which follow upon Beings of this class. These energies, as it is called, each Being is absolutely single, and is in fact and thought one, and its energies are bounded by its works and its powers; and the name is merely a summation of the name. Of course, the energies which follow these Beings are relatively greater and less, some being of a higher, some of a lower order; in a word, their difference amounts to that existing between their works.

We see that Eunomius holds this (and equally so in all that follows) has translated the terms of Scripture straight into those of Aristotle, and changed the ethical-physical of Christianity into the purely physical. Spirit throughout becomes Being (ēsia), a word which, saying that Eunomius still regards the substance as living, is best translated as above, 'Being'. Nothing else was to be expected after he had so effectually banished the spiritual and moral from his Unergreate that it becomes as physical as the 'Nameless First Manifestation'.

The contents of the above formula amount to nothing more or less than Gnosticism. In fact, the earlier and this, the later Arianism and Gnosticism are, the doctrine of emanations upon Christian theology. For, while Arianism held the Logos to be the highest Being after the Godhead, it regarded this Logos as only the mediator between God and man; just as, before the rise of Arianism, it had been the peculiar aim of Gnosticism to bridge over the gulf between Creator and created by means of intermediate beings (the emanations). It is also more evident the emanationism which Eunomius, like his master before him, adopted that system of Greek philosophy (the Aristotelian) which had always been the natural ally of Gnosticism. Aristotle is strong in divisions and differences, weak in 'identifications'; he had marked, with a clearness never attained before, the various stages upwards in the physical world; and this is just what Gnosticism, in its wish to exhibit all things according to their various distances from the ungenerate, required, and accordingly made use of. Gregory had reason when he spoke of the followers of Eunomius as 'these Gnostics'.

It is true that Eunomius uses also orthodox terms in dealing with the Trinity. We encounter such in the following creed of his, but the last words preclude any orthodox meaning:

We believe in the Son of God, the Only-begotten God, the first-born of all creation, very Son, not ungenerate, verily begotten before the worlds, named Son not without being begotten before He existed, coming into being before creation, not uncreate (quoted by Gregory of Nyssa, c. Eunom. i. 7).

The gulf had been dug when once ungenerateinity had been proclaimed to be the substance of the Father; and nothing more could pass it. Even the Godhead of the Son seems destroyed, notwithstanding the above articles from Eunomius' creed, in which the Son is presented as the Divine Wisdom, as the Word, as the Logos; but in this case the name is merely an identification, and above, 'First Cause,' 'longing,' 'First Cause,' 'uplifted.' This direct intuition on our part of the Unergnearate manifested a curious inconsistency in Eunomius' own system. We have to suppose that the creatures whom the Word, the Son, by Eunomius' own showing, created, unrelated as they are with the Unergnearate (since He has not made them), nevertheless conceive of and are, beyond their own Creator, all Being who cannot be anything to them: 2. Eunomius' treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity—It remains to consider the use, in detail, which Eunomius made of this primal dichotomy of 'Unergnearate' and 'Generate' as applied to the whole doctrine of the Trinity. His résumé of his re-arrangement of this, as quoted by Gregory, is in his Defence of my Defence, begins as follows:

There is the Supreme and Absolute Being; and another Being, existing by reason of the First, but after It, though before all things a third Being, and being with either of these, but inferior to the One as to cause, to the Other as to the energy which produced It.
he says, of no mean, just like that of 'rational' and 'irrational.' He contemplates, as existing in the 'generate' with reference to the 'un- generated', the same difference between 'rational' and 'irrational.' As the special attributes of the rational and irrational are essentially incompatible, so the nature of the generate is opposed to that of the ungenerate. He says, as far as the irrational has been created in subjection to the rational, so the generate is, by a necessity of its being, in a state of subjection to the ungenerate.

As to the mode and manner of the generation of the Son, Eunomius says the Father begat Him at that time which He chose, and quotes Philo: 'God, before all other things that are generated, had begotten over His own power.' This power was under dominion, and was restrained as to its activity, while the due time of the generation of Christ was still about to come, and to set this power in its natural work. With the cause of delay was, and what it was that intervened, Eunomius does not specify. Not time, not space, he says. 'Let there be no questioning among sensible men on this point, why He did not do so before. For the ungenerate and generate God (if he really could still give to Christ the name God), Eunomius shatters, as with a resistless wedge, the article of regeneration of the ungenerated Light Light, which compares the consubstantiality of Father and Son with the oneness of flame lit from flame. 'As great as is the difference between generate and ungenerate, so great is the divergence between Light and Light.' This is a striking instance how the avoidance of the Scripture terms 'Father' and 'Son,' implying real oneness of nature, made it possible to say almost anything in this controversy. He goes on:

'We know the true Light; we know Him who created the Light after the heavens and the earth: we have heard the Life and the Truth Himself, even Christ, saying to His disciples: 'Ye are the light of the world'; we have learned from the blessed Paul, when he gives the title of "Light unapproachable" to the God over all, and by the addition defines and teaches us the transcendent superiority of His Light; and now that we have learned that there is so great a difference between one Light and the other, we shall not patiently endure so much as the mere mention of the notion that the idea of light in either case is one and the same.

With Eunomius, that is to say, the 'true' is one thing, the 'unapproachable' another. The Incarnation was a still further divergence of the Light of the Son.

'This Light carried into effect the plan of mercy, while the other remaind inoperative with respect to that gracious action.' It was even a further degradation:

'If he (i.e. Basil) can show that the God over all, who is the Light unapproachable, was Incarnate,—or could be Incarnate,—then let him say that the Light is equal to the Light.'

As to the Incarnation itself, the true empyrean (aerous), which according to Scripture is involved in the abstract "in Eunomius' land; and if the Son is created and man is created, He was 'emptied' (Eunomius clings to this phrase) to become Himself, and changed His place, not from the transcendent to the lowly, but from similar (save with regard to the accidental difference of 'bodied' and 'unembodied') to similar both in kind and dignity. The difference between the uncreated and the created no longer constitutes the difference between the two natures in Christ; that difference is marked by dominion and slavery, for 'all things serve God,' while the 'whole creation' is by the former having disappeared, or rather having never existed between the Son and the world! He came to save, it could no longer be shown that the Master was mingled with the Servant, but only that a servant came to be amongst servants. In fact, in

Eunomius' scheme, the Incarnation was a fall rather than a condescension.

'The Ungenerated Light is unapproachable, and has not the power of speaking or expounding affections; but such a condition is germane to the generate.'

The 'coming in the flesh' was quite akin, with Eunomius, to the declension of a transmigrating soul into a lower body, and the transformation of persons, such as Pythagoras had taught. Eunomius represents the generate as intermediate between heaven and earth, the Divine and the human, so as not to preserve the living God, who has an essence mixed and compounded of contrary, which at once stretched out to partake of the good, and at the same time melted away into a condition subject to affections or emotions. So man need feel no gratitude to the Only-begotten God for what He suffers, since it was by the spontaneous action of His nature that He slipped down to the experience of such affections.

His essence, befurred with frail consubstantiality and affinity of nature and moved as men are, was thereby naturally dragged down; and such a transmigration or change does not demand human gratitude! Nothing could show more clearly than this parody the subtle trick of the Christian sect that is so wide the gulf is, and always must be, between Christianity and Eunomianism or any modern revival of it. It was in the very cradle of this last that the Christian 'theologian' per excellence had proclaimed, as the axiom of the new religion, that 'God is Love.'

We do not find the same fullness of statement by Eunomius as to the Spirit as we find in his treatment of the Son. This is little to be wondered at. The doctrine of the Spirit had not yet come to the front in controversy; with the exception of the heresy of Macedonius, who was forming his sect at the very time when Eunomius was teaching, no heresy was connected directly with this, and no Council dealt with it. That was reserved for the next century. The final clauses of the Nicene Creed, which affirm distinctly, amongst other truths, the Deity and personality of the Third Person, were, if we are to accept the entire silence of the leading historians as evidence, not added at the Council of Constantinople: they were entirely ignored even at the Council of Ephesians. The New appreciation of the Homounhousion of the Holy Spirit was little permeated as yet by the Christian consciousness of the unity of God. Still the faith in the Holy Spirit was in the Creed. The expansion of the Nicene Creed is found in a work written by Epiphanius seven years before the Council of Constantinople (A.D. 381), and it is probable that the old Creed of Jerusalem contained such clauses, and that Cyril produced them before the Council of Constantinople. But the times were not ripe for this controversy. Still, his system obliged Eunomius to say something about the Spirit; he had to draw his conclusions; and what he says savours of the purely Greek heresies of the next century: "After him (i.e. the Son), we believe on the Comforter, the Spirit of truth," says Eunomius. The omission of 'Holy' is to be noticed; doubtless it is because, being aware of the Scripture expressions, 'God is Spirit' (Jn 4th RVm), 'the Lord our God is Holy' (Lv 19), he may prepare the way, by the omission of one at least of these glorious titles, for the still further subjection of the Spirit. So he continues: 'Once for all made subject,' but does not specify what this subjection is. 'Who came into being by the only God through the Only-begotten.' The term 'the only God' prepares for what is coming, and shows what value to attach to the whole. The Father employs the Son as an instrument for the production of the Spirit. 'Neither on the same level with the Father,
nor conumerated with the Father; nor on an equality with the Son, for the Son is Only-begotten, having no brother begotten with Him. This is, of course, consistent with Eunomius' previous interpretation of the Scripture words πωτορότοκος τῷ κτιστῷ as actually meaning 'first-born amongst many brethren,' i.e. the whole creation, including not only the Spirit, but Humanity. Not yet ranked with any other, for he has gone above all the creatures that came into being by the instrumentality of the Son, in mode of being, and nature, and glory, and knowledge, as the first and noblest work of the Only-begotten, the greatest and most glorious.' Eunomius concedes much to the glory of the Spirit, but he is pledged by his emanationism to His subjectivity. We must discount the value of what follows. Eunomius does not read any text in Scripture about the Spirit in the light of other texts.

"He, too, being one, and first and alone and surpassing all the creations of the Son in essence and dignity of nature, accomplishing every operation and all teaching according to the good pleasure of the Son, this god by this, and deriving truth from Him, and declaring to those who are instructed, and guiding into truth." Again: "accomplishing every operation and all teaching of the saints," "conspiring with the Father, useful for the understanding and contemplation of things apposite to the knowledge of God, strengthening us in godliness, lightening souls with the light of knowledge," "emboldening the faint-hearted," "acting as a guide to the infirm," "approaching the mystic 'distributing every gift,'" "vanishing deaths," "healing the sick," "comforting the afflicted," "overcoming the distresses of mankind." Orthodoxy could not have a word to say against all this, for it is true scripturally, only Scripture attributes all these very operations to the Father and to the Son as well, or implies that they must be ascribed to both. But Eunomius, while bestowing his own doctrine upon Scripture, perforce ignored this. His principle once laid down at the first, that the energies and works are consaceous with the Beings which they follow, and are accordingly superior or inferior as the Beings are, prevents any of these operations of the Holy Spirit from being purely Divine in His eyes. The fatal separation and subordination of the Beings lead to a still more fatal separation and subordination of the works. As redemption itself by the incarnation, being the Son's work and not the Father's, was rather a symptom of weakness in Him than an evidence of the power of Divine mercy, so the work of the Holy Spirit, being not the Son's nor the Father's, is no more to Eunomius than what might be attributed to some human teacher, e.g., to be sent, to receive, to announce, to suggest the truth, to have God Himself whispering in the heart of man.

To this emanationism ingrained in his system we must, of course, attribute the curious insistence of Eunomius on the Father being the principal of the Son alone: the 'energy' of the Son produced the Spirit as the 'energy' of the Father produced the Son. Was it only reverence for the words in Jn 15, or was it also the spectacle of Eunomius and many of his co-emanationists, that restrained every Greek Council and every ancient Greek Father from mentioning the Son in conjunction with the Procession of the Holy Spirit? Already Gregory of Nazianzus speaks for them all: 'Standing on our definitions, we introduce the Ungenerate, the Generated, and that which proceeds from the Father (Orat de Filio, ii.).'

As to Baptism, the views of Eunomius can be simply put. He held only by a way of evading it in the following words (as quoted by Gregory of Nyssa, c. Eunom. xi. 5): 'But we affirm that the mystery of godliness does not consist in venerable names, nor in the distinctive character of customs and sacramental tokens, but in exactness of doctrine.' He goes on to say that baptism is not into the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but 'into an artificer and creator'-apparently excluding the Third Person altogether. Accuracy of doctrine and clearness of statement were to the Eunomians of vital salvation, but not so the claims of the Sacrament of Baptism must disappear altogether with the Divinity of the Spirit, as the claims of the other Sacrament disappear with the Divinity of Christ. Neither could place us, in this system, in communion with this ungenerate God, either in heart and spirit, as the Church could affirm with her living faith in a consubstantial Trinity, or in mind, which was all that the Eunomians would have valued. But for this communion of mind their teacher had provided a better way of his own.

If Eunomius has a title to originality, it must rest on the base he made of this term 'ungenerate,' and it is this peculiar use of it that makes his heresy strange and startling. For 'ungenerate' and 'generate' had been the very terms which the defenders of the Homoeousian had borrowed from the philosophers to set up a believing world that intimacy between the Father and the Son the mention of which was ever on the Saviour's lips, according to the Gospel records. They had compounded the very thing which was the mystery of the new religion. 'Generate,' which had previously connoted nothing but the opposite of 'ungenerate,' had now been brought into closest correlation and union with the Ungenerate; and expressed that which could not otherwise be expressed, in the current philosophical language. But Eunomius employs the terms in order to destroy that very thing which faith had adopted them to teach—the Oneness of the Only-begotten with the God who begat but who is Himself unbegotten. He found these terms within the Church, doing duty, as it were, to make clear that oneness; he employed them, by bringing them back to their former use, to destroy it? Then this dichotomy of his had to be met, e.g. by Gregory of Nyssa, with the counter dichotomy of 'created' and 'uncreated,' which, unlike the other, was founded on an essential difference, and left that which was within the inviolable circle of the Godhead free for ever from any more dichotomies, whatever other assaults might at any time be made upon it.

'Uncreate, intelligible nature is far removed from such distinctions' (i.e. as those of Eunomius, says Gregory (c. Eunom. i. 22). 'It does not possess the good by acquisition, or participate of the goodness of some good, judged above. It is... It is simple, uniform, in composite... But it has distinction within itself in keeping with the manner of its own, but not conceived of with regard to quantity, as Eunomius supposes.'

This was the impregnable position that Arianism also had taken up. To admit that the Son is less than the Father, and the Spirit less than the Son, is to admit, as we have seen, the law of emanation, that is, the gradual and successive degradation of God's substance. By this path Oriental heretics, as well as the Neo-Pagans, had been led to a sort of pantheistic polytheism. Arianism, indeed, tried to resist this tendency, but so far only as to bring back Divinity to the Son. But the Supreme Being of Arians speaks for the Divinity of the Son, who was with Arians as much a created intermediate between God and man as one of the Eons. Eunomius treated the Holy Spirit as his master had treated the Son; complete and decisive method, since his new weapon of ungeneracy created an actual unlikeness between the Persons. Arianism, whether earlier or the later, tended alike to Judaism, and, by making creatures admissible, to Greek polytheism. There was only one way of cutting short the phantasmas of Divinity emanations, without having recourse to the contra-
dietary hypothesis of Arian; and that was to reject altogether the law of emanations as hitherto accepted. Far from admitting that the Supreme Being is always weakening and degrading Himself in the course of emanations from Himself, Athanasius lays down the principle that He produces within Himself nothing but what is perfect, and just, and Divine; all that is not perfect is a work, but only a work, of the Divine will, which draws it out of nothing (i.e. creates it), and not out of the Divine substance.

With regard to the diffusion of Eunomianism, Sozomen says (H. S. 2, 10):

"The heresy of Eunomius was spread from Cilicia and the mountains of Taurus as far as the Hellespont and Constantiople. In a. d. 360 at Byzantium, near Constantinople, 'multitudes resorted to him; some also gathered from different quarters, a few with the design of testing his principles, and others merely from the desire of listening to his discourses. His reputation reached the ears of the emperor, who would gladly have held a conference with him. But the Emperor Flavius Constantius studiously prevented an interview from taking place between them; for she was the most faithful guard of the Nicene doctor." (O. H. G. v. 3, 5).

At the convention, however, of all the sects, at Theodosius' palace in A. D. 382, Eunomius was present (Sozomen, H. S. v. 10). His 'Eθενος η ψωτερας (to which he added learned notes) was laid before Theodosius in A. D. 383. In his answer, Eunomius says "The Empress Anna, Second Book, Gregory of Nyssa finds that Eunomius has still a flock, with whom the former thus expostulated: 'With what eyes will you now gaze? I speak to you, O Book of enduring souls!' This could not have been written earlier than A. D. 384. It was stated at the beginning of this article that he had been a martyr to his cause, and so he was destined still to be. But it was not till 391 that the Emperor condemned him to banishment to Mesia. The barbarians, however, drove him from them; and he was brought to Cesarea, much to the annoyance of the Christians there, who presented the residence amongst them of the enemy of their lost Basil. He died at his birth-place, Dacoara in Cappadocia; and his tomb was visited by all."

EUNOMUS.—The operations of castrating males and of spaying females were probably practised on animals earlier than on human beings; and castration has always been far more commonly performed on males than on females. Castration of horses was known in Vedice India, as is shown by the frequent occurrence of the proper name Vadhryadus ('He who has castrated horses'), and the repeated mention of the ox beside the bull (e.g. Rājveda, v. xxxii. 7, x. cii. 12; cf. further, Zimmer, Altd. Leben, Berlin, 1879, pp. 231, 226). Hомерic Greece was plainly acquainted with the operation of castration (Homer, Iliad, i. 171), and their custom of gelding horses is recorded for the Sceytians and Sarmatians by Strabo (p. 312).

1. Methods and purpose of castration.—The most primitive method of castration of children castrated has been by cutting the testicles, mentioned in Atharvedas, vi. cxxxvii. 2, and implied in a long series of words meaning 'castrated' and connected with base denoting 'crush' and the like.

2. Physical and mental effects of castration.—If castration is performed at an early age, certain准备工作 take place in the body. Certain precautionary measures are employed in the Oriental market. After puberty the operation becomes much more grave. In the case of boys, castration prevents the development of the secondary sex-characteristics—the growth of the beard.

Here belong Lat. capo, 'capon' (Gr. καπόν, 'strike'); Old Ir. mol, 'wether' (Old Church Slav. molot, 'hammer'); Swab. gudan, 'gelding' (Old High German, 'shatter'); Lat. trudo, 'thrust'; Gr. θεθοπη, θεθο, 'emunh' (θεθον, 'emunh'), 'crush'; Swab. etc., Gr. etc., etc., 'crush', 'shatter'; O. H. G. borg, 'castrated boar'; Old Church Slav. бура, 'wether' (L. Жеизо, 'strike'). It is also evident, from Atharvedas, vi. cxxxvii. 2, 4-9, that, besides crushing or splitting the testicles with stones, or with a peg, the penis might also be split.

Besides crushing, cutting was also employed, as shown by such words as Gr. τουλα, 'emunh' (τουλα, 'cut'); Lat. castrum, 'castrate' (Skr. क्रृत्य, 'cut'); Old Ir. mol, 'wether' (Old Church Slav. molot, 'hammer'); Skr. ниршина, 'castrated' (Skr. asti, 'edge,' 'knife'). The operation of dragging the testicles from the scrotum seems to be implied in Gr. σχιστος, 'emunh' ('σχίζω', 'slice'; cf. Skr. मुक्तिकर्ता, 'castrator' (lit. 'he who puts the testicles outside'), Atharveda, iii. i. 2), and, if O. H. G. urfèr, 'castrated,' Anglo-Saxon, æfetræm, 'castrate,' are connected with Gr. αφετρο, 'fire,' the application of hot iron to the testicles may likewise have been employed (on all these terms, see Schrader, Realelex, der indogerm. Altertumskunde, Strassburg, 1901, p. 919; Hirt, Indogermanen, do. 1903-07, pp. 291, 638).

A survey of the terms just given shows that castration of human beings was performed in Europe only where Oriental influences were present; and in this case linguistic evidence is not contradicted by any facts thus far known. The reasons for the castration of animals were doubtless the same in early times as they are to-day: greater docility (notably in horses and oxen) and increased savouriness of meat (as in esop's.)

Turning to the subject proper of the present art.—the castrated human male, or emunh—it may be noted that the terms for 'emunh' give, with perhaps a single exception, no clue as to the reason for the institution of castration. The sources of Skr. vaḍḍari and of Gr. ἀδημός, ἄραμ, τοῦκασ, and σχιστός have already been given. The best known term of all, ἀφετρό, is of uncertain significance.

The old etymology, found as early as the Etymologicon Magnum—αφετρό τοῦρκας ἰγνωκαὶ ἡμᾶς ἡμᾶς καὶ πατριάδος καὶ γεωργίας—and still advanced by Taylor (E. T., art. 'Emunh'), by which the word means 'bed-warder,' merits no consideration. Perhaps the best suggestion is that advanced by Jensen, Z. A. I. [1899] 35, who regards ἀφετρό as a loan from a Persian word, 'wether' comparing Heb. יָפָר, יָפָר, 'trained,' 'trained,' 'experienced' (cf. Syr. ṯφάλαγον, 'emunh' (lit. 'trustworthy,' 'trusted'), and see Lawy. Sem. Fragm., p. 29). The Hebrew term for 'emunh' is שור, which is probably to be regarded, with Jensen, Z. A. VII. [1892] 174, note 1, as borrowed from Assy. ἱσθαν, 'to stand,' who he who stood (Heb. יָפָר). This is what this would explain all the offices and duties performed by the ϊσσος in the OT (cf. Zimmern, ZDMG liii. [1899] 116, note 2).

EF is, therefore, correct in rendering 'ἵσσος' by 'officer' or 'chamberlain' in the majority of its occurrences, reserving 'emunh' for passages in which this is obviously the meaning (2 K. 20:1 29:25; 26:16, 18; some passages, as Jer 29:31, 34, are equally susceptible of either rendering; in any case it seems unnecessary to accept Cheyne's suggestion (EBI 1427) that two words originally distinct have been fused in שור. The precise nature of the operation performed on the ancient Sem. emunh is uncertain, but from the antithesis, in De 20:15, of פָּר יָפָר כָּרָם הַשָּׁבַע, it is evident that both crushing of the testicles and ablation of the penis must have been among the methods employed (cf. also the Vulg. rendering of the passage, 'emunh, istrii vel amputata testiculn et absidiso ventero').

2. Physical and mental effects of castration.—If castration is performed before an age of sexual maturity, certain precautions are taken, the operation is not, surgically speaking, a very serious one, although the mortality is enormous among the unfortunate boys of the native races in the ancient oriental market. After puberty the operation becomes much more grave. In the case of boys, castration prevents the development of the secondary sex-characteristics—the growth of the beard.
and of hair on the body, and the change of the larynx, the enunci voice thus approaching the female timbre. Males castrated in adult life naturally have the sex characteristics of other men. Data are lacking with regard to the castration of girls, though analogically there should be no public or auxiliary hair, and no characteristic development of the pelvis and area of the phallic region. The secondary sex characteristics remain - in a certain approximation to the male type, as in the case of the castrated rabbit, in growth of hair and increase of body. Castration of the male does not immediately result in loss of libido. On the contrary, the castrate can for some time - at least a year - have sexual intercourse and emit a quasi-semen (probably the secretion of the prostate gland). Accordingly, in the degenerate days of the Roman Empire, eunuchs were regularly made, soon after reaching puberty, for the unprinted gratification of the royal and imperial harems. In males it is also often done to relieve urinary weakness (retention of urine, etc.). Oophorectomy for ovarian disease of the female hastens the physical changes usually ascribed to amenorrhea, unless, as is often done, a small portion of ovarian tissue is left in situ, or is grafted upon the uterine body.

The operation of castration affects the body chemistry (metabolism) very strongly. The phosphates in the urine and the carbonic acid in the expired breath diminish, while the weight of the body increases. Many spayed women grow fat and dyspeptic. Congestion to the head and thorax and excessive perspiration appear and may continue for years. Melancholy is developed in a large percentage of cases, together with loss of memory, irritability, impairment of vision, nightmares, insomnia, and skin affections.

On mentality castration appears to produce no essential change. It is true that eunuchs are usually inclined to be malevolent and unscrupulous, that they are apt to be either extremely abused or inordinately haughty. Yet this is due not so much to the physical results of the operation as to the fact that by the hand of their fellow-men they have been put out of their path of national supremacy, and they feel a not unnatural resentment, accentuated by the aloofness usually felt by all who are marked off, by mental or physical peculiarity, from the ordinary mass of mankind. Now, perhaps, the unity of native ability and acquired malignancy has been more strikingly exemplified than in the case of Ághá Múhammad, who, castrated in early life by Adil Shah, was able to found the Zend dynasty and, as far as 1796, to found in blood the Qajar house (cf. Horn, GIPR ii. 594-596). But that cruelty is an accident, and that mental and spiritual powers are unabated, is attested by the famous instances of Origin and Alebdar (qq.v.).

Certain peoples are reported to have practised the excision of one testicle only, as is recorded of the Hottentots by Kolben (Beschreib. des Vorzüglicher der guten Hoffnung, Frankfurt, 1745, p. 147). Their motive was to prevent the birth of twins, an event of such ill omen to many peoples (see TWINS) and, according to Rolben, adapted characteristics sexual.

The general function of eunuchs was to serve as a superior sort of slave, particularly in view of their sterility - as guardians of the harem. It would appear that the castration of human beings was first suggested by analogy with that of animals (cf. Xenophon, Cyrop. vii. v. 60-65) - it was supposed to make a man more amorous and affectionate and so priving them of the distractions of family life, to render them more faithful to their masters. But, effective as this proves in the case of animals, it is far otherwise in the case of man; and the history of the eunuchs is full of the most terrible histories of cruelty and darkened by utter corruption.


Where castration started is an unsolved question, but the tradition recorded by Ambrosius Marcellinus (xiv. vi. 17), that it was instituted by the legendary Semiramis, would seem to point to the Mesopotamian region as its first home. Eunuchs were early known in Assyria, where they apparently acted as generals and governors (Jansen, op. cit., xiii. 468). In Ethiopia (Ar. 568) in India at an early date (Magaháhratá i. 36. cf. 46); they exercised an evil power at the courts of Gordianus III., Constantius, Honorius, and Arcadius (Gibbon, Decline and Fall, chs. vii., xix., xxii.), and they were introduced into China in the 5th cent. B.C. (cf. Stent, Chines. Eunuch, Leipzig, 1879).

4. The eunuch-priest.

None more important in the present connexion - and far more difficult - is the problem of the origin of the eunuch priest. The Ephesian Artemis was served not only by virgins, but by eunuchs, the name of the latter - Myr̄γa (lit. 'Beghna'), 'having salvation through the Deity' (Justi, ibram. Namensbuch, Marburg, 1895, p. 571) - betraying their Oriental origin (Strabo, p. 641); and the priests of Atargatis were also eunuchs (cf. Stent, ib.); and the name held to have been called Hecate probably an amalgamation of the great mother-goddess of Asia Minor - worshipped at Lagina (the modern Ileina, 2 hours north of Stratonicea, Caria), had among her servants eunuchs and hierophants (cf. Leibn. Miss. aegypt., p. 111). The name is a corruption from the Hellenic word, by virtue of which our word, 'roll,' is merely fantastic (cf. Group, i. 42, note 5).

It is in the cult of Cybele (q.v.) that the question of the origin of the eunuch priest must centre. That Attis (q.v.), her male partner, castrated him-
self was the subject of very divergent conjectures in ancient times (E.R.E. ii. 217; Gruppe, 1842). The castration of a god is familiar from the Gr. legends regarding Uranos and Kronos (Gruppe, 386, 1114, note 1); although they have not the same significance as the semi-castration of Attis. The foundation of the myth of the mutilation of Uranos and Kronos is, however, as a violent separation of the earth and sky, which some races, for example the Pazyrynskys, suppose to have originally clasped each other in a close embrace (Fraser, Attis, p. 94; J.G. Frazer, London, 1897, p. 28; Lamb. Custom and Myth, do. 1894, p. 45 ff.; Myth, Ritual, and Religion, do. 1905, p. 290 ff.; for a convenient summary of the Pazyrynsk legend, see E.R.E. iv. 176). Gruppe (1102) is inclined to explain the stories as borrowed from a Sem. source given by Philo Bouleus, as quoted by Roschius, Frapp. extra, 5. c. 12, but Gruppe's explanation, that the series—Tu'mesos (Aristoph.), Eli. Deipn., 5. 337—was used independently, seems less likely than the interpretation advanced by Lang and Frazer. But, if the myth of the castration of Uranos and Kronos is so originated, it seems equally evident that the origin of the legend of the self-castration of Attis was etiological, so that, as Frazer declares (p. 215), it was the self-castration of Attis that is nearly always the attempt to account for the self-mutilation of his priests, who regularly castrated themselves on entering the service of the goddess.

But why, granting Frazer's explanation of the myth of the castration of Attis, did the galli castrate themselves? First of all, the galli were priests of Cybele, a mother-goddess. The cult of this divinity, especially at Rome, is fairly well known (E.R.E. ii. 217 f.; and esp. Hepding, op. cit.). It is generally acknowledged that the original castration of the galli took place probably on 24th March—the third day of the annual festival in honour of the Great Mother—the dies aconiuinus, which is traditionally due to the death of Attis, and on which her devotees, headed by the archigallus, gashed their bodies with potsherds or slashed them with knives to bespatter the altar and the sacred tree with their blood (cf. Frazer, 222, with references, to which may be added the quotations from Ambrosiatus by Camm, RILLE viii. 1903) 322, note 1). We also learn much concerning the galli from the Latin accounts of their proceedings (e.g. Lucret. ii. 600 ff.; Ovid, Fasti, iv. 181 ff.).

Here one feature must be deemed peculiarly significant, even though little attention seems thus far to have been given by those who have studied the Attis-Cybele cycle—the galli wear female garb.

After his castration Attis wore female clothing (Lucian, de Dea Syr.). The Men, cxx. (ed. Buhl) describes the galli as partim venusta malicribi ornati stola; Arnoldus (Adv. Gentes, v. 17), as wearing "volucra medullum velamenta lanarum"; and the pseudo-Cyprian (ad Senatorum ex Christiana religione ad idolum servitutem conversam, 9), as clad "tuncia multibibios." Most important of all in this connexion is St. Augustine (de Civ. Dei, vii. 20), who expresses his scorn of the galli, who, in their processions, were to be seen "multidia capillii, facie dejecta, fungitibus membris, incestae feminae." Small wonder that satirists and Christian apologists even charged the galli with immorality (Narsar. Epigr., Aed. 3-5; Justin Martyr, Apol. i. 27)—a charge that was renewed by Rosenbaum (Gesch. der Insermuse des Allerheiligen, Halle, 1845, p. 129), though there seems to be no certain evidence for the accusation.

In like manner those castrists who castrated themselves in honour of the Syrian Astarte of Hierapolis also wore female dress. The mutilation upon themselves, they ran through the city, carrying in their hands the severed parts, which they cast into some house; and the inmates were to be dressed in female attire and female adornments, which were worn by the eunuchs for the remainder of their lives (Lucian, li). Among the Ba-sudari and Ba-bwende of the Congo many youths are castrated in order to more freely approach the phallic worship, which increasingly prevails as we advance from the north to the south. These eunuchs or in some way deformed are sometimes dedicated to a goddess named Agddepta. The practice might be mistaken for women. Also men who are, or believe themselves to be, impotent will vow to dress as women in the hope of recovering their original strength (Frazer, 331, 341). In Pegu, at a feast called the 'collock', some women were chosen who served the god of the Dance to the Gods of the Earth. Hermaphrodites, who are numerous in this Country, are generally chosen, if there are now present to make a Set for the Dance (Hamil. New Account of the East Indies, Edinburgh, 1727, ii. 671).

What, then, is the origin of the eunuch priest, dedicated to a goddess of fertility, and clothed in female garb? Leaving out of account the African negro, which is probably connected with religious sodomy—a custom also widely spread among the ancient Semites and the American aborigines—and likewise dismissing as fantastic the theory reported by Hippolytus (Refut. omnium harr. v. 17), on Naassennian authority, that by his castration Attis was raised to the celestial essence, where, they say, there is no male or female, but a new creation, a new man, who is androgynus, we may note the principal explanations that have been advanced.

The Notion of Astarte (1542-1546) supposes that the self-castration of the galli was to secure chastity (cf. Hepding, 162), in conformity with an ascetic desire to renounce the joys of the world, although the idea of the marriage of Cybele and Attis still existed in the practice of burying the severed parts in the earth or in subterranean chambers sacred to Cybele. Westermanck (MI ii. 414) suggests that the eunuchization may have been due to the custom of the chastity of his or her servants, his basis being a theory of Lactantius (Div. Instit. i. 17): 'Deum mater et amavit formosum adolescentem, et eundem cum pelle deprehensam eexectis virilius seminivum reddidit; et idee nunc sacra eis galla sacerdotibus celebrantur' (further references in Gruppe, 1842, note 3). To say, with Jeremias (in Churerque de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch der Religionsgesch., Tubingen, 1865, i. 361), that 'self-castration is the dedication to the goddess (Astarte). The castrates are dedicated to the divinity like the Vestals,' is an ambiguous platitud. Fraser (p. 223) conjectures that the self-wounding of the galli, like the castrating of the other devotees, was intended to strengthen the dead Attis for his resurrection.

Wrought up to the highest pitch of religious excitement, they [the galli] dashed the severed portions of themselves against the image of the cruel goddess. These broken instruments of fertility were afterwards reverently wrapped and buried in the earth or in subterranean chambers sacred to Cybele, where, like the offering of blood, they may have been deemed instrumental in recalling Attis to life and hastening the general resurrection of nature, which was then bursting into leaf and blossom in the vernal sunshine. Some confirmation of this conjecture is furnished by the savage story that the mother of Attis conceived by putting in her bosom a pomegranate sprout from the severed genitals of a man-monster named Aegeas, a sort of double of Attis. If there is any depth in this conjectural explanation of the custom, we can readily understand why other Astarte goddesses of fertility were served in like manner by eunuch priests. These feminine castrated order of more strictly for themselves ministers, who personated the divine lovers, the means of discharging their beneficent functions; they had themselves to be impregnated by the life-giving energy before they could transmit it to the world.

Hepding, who, like a number of other scholars, derives the self-mutilation of Attis from the Semites (pp. 128, 161 f., 178, 217), attributes it in part to the anæsthesia-producing frenzy of the general chariot races (pp. 129 f., 100 f.); but this is only a partial explanation, applicable, indeed, to the castrating with sherds and
knives, but hardly sufficient to account for the great act of self-castration. He is, however, probably correct in maintaining (p. 127 f.) that this description of the eunuch-priest as the "impotent," a name given to those who had undergone castration, is derived from the time of Herodotus, whose account of the Attic myth (iv. 76) contains no intimation of any orgiastic gallic rites.

Yet all the theories seem inadequate, especially as they do not account for the subsequent donning of female dress and for the general adoption of feminism. The only explanation which seems to fit (ib., p. 304 f.) is that, in the case of the eunuch-priest (v. 330 f.), the sexual ablation having been accompanied by a mutilation sometimes (in Egypt as well as in Babylonia) with the removal of the organs which rendered them not only incapable of sexual intercourse, but of reproduction, they removed the organs which had rendered them conversely not of her sex, and whose ablation made them approximately similar to her. Another common factor may perhaps have been that they were thus also assimilated to her virgin attendants of true female sex.

If the explanation here favoured is correct, there would be an interesting analogy in the present writer's suggestion regarding the origin of the Australian operation of arthila (E.R.E. ii. 608 f.). Moreover, just as in the case of female circumcision (ib. 609), there seems to have been a later, reverse tendency to make the female and male types of the devotees of the same deity, as is perhaps exemplified in the Athabasca, adae. Natwi, v. 137; cf. also Gruppe, 1546, note 5, whose explanation of the form seems scarcely tenable.

Even within the history of Christianity sporadic instances of self-mutilation have occurred. Of these the best known is that of Origen, who, after being the first to perform the operation for the sake of the virginity of the young girls, gave occasion to the Council of Nice to renew the ancient prohibition against such practices; so that, when the Arians afterward ordained him (E.R.E. ii. 26), Theodoret, ib. 247, tells us, the Catholics generally declared such a consecration as unconsecrated (Bingham, Antiquitates of the Chr. Church, ed. R. Blomfield, Jr., Oxford, 1836, ii. 471).

This form of mutilation is, as is well known, the characteristic which gives its name to the fanatical Russian sect of Skoptsy (or eunuchators)—the writer's rendering, 'circumcisers,' in E.R.E. iii. 667 (wrong), is, in fact, the only one which besides an eunuch to avoid suspicion in his converse with the virgin Eustolium: but he was deposed from the ecclesiastical office for the fact, and gave occasion to the Council of Nice to renew the ancient prohibition against such practices; so that, when the Arians afterward ordained him, the Catholics generally declared such a consecration as unconsecrated (Bingham, Antiquitates of the Chr. Church, ed. R. Blomfield, Jr., Oxford, 1836, ii. 471).

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The Skoptzy have not been the only ones who have donned woman's dress. According to Athenaeus (xii. 11 [p. 484]), the Egyptian so-called "Adrammeletes" who had once inhabited women in Lydia, 'using them instead of male eunuchs'; but the most interesting instance is that declared to exist among some Central Australian tribes.

On the authority of Purcell (Verh. der Berliner Gesellschaft für Anthrop. und Urgesch., 1883, iv. 97, and Orzechowski, loc. cit. 120) this is said to be the operation of eunutha, or spaying, is performed on certain selected girls from 10 to 12 years of age, the requisite organ being covered with emu feathers with a loop of hair at the end. This is thrust into the vagina and left there for some days, after which the old men pull it out, thus tearing away part of the womb. To three days later a small stone knife is inserted, and the neck of the womb is cut off, before uterine and vaginal discharges of grese or eagle-hawks being then introduced, and lumps of fat being used as salls. When the wound is healed, the sacred and consecrated circumcision (described in E.R.E. ii. 667 f.) is performed. The alleged purposes of this female castration is to prevent the women from being encumbered by children when going through dry and barren country; but, in view of the Australians do not know that procreation is connected with the sexual act (E.R.E. ii. 660 f.), this explanation must be accepted with reserves. Mitch-How (E.R.E. iv. 304 f.) describes a girl who had undergone this operation as having only slightly developed hips, breasts, and mons Veneris, and with some hairs growing on her chin. The purpose is said to be the furtherance of prostitution. The same authority was told by E. P. Ramsay, curator of the Sydney museum, that the well-known explorer MacGillivray has seen at Cape York a woman oophorectomized so as to prevent the birth of dumb children, herself having been born dumb. Similarly, Roberts cited by Bichoff in Müller's Archiv für Ästhet., Physiol. und wissensch. Medizin, 1848, p. clix f.) records having seen female eunuchs in India, who, under the name of "heralds," were kept for this purpose; and the women, whose age was about 25, approximately in lack of petric development, etc., very closely to the male type.

5. Castration as a punishment. Attention has already been drawn in the art. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (vol. iv. pp. 303 ff.; may also be seen in fr. 3304 f.; cf. also ETHICS AND MORALITY [Celtic], III. § 7), to castration as a punishment. Except in Frisian law, where this was inflicted on a rober of a temple, being preliminary to the penalty of death, emasculation was normally a punishment for rape and similar crimes; and occasionally, as in Welsh law, it was inflicted only when the crime did not pay the heavy fines required.

In Egypt, according to Plutarchus (De Castra, vii. 12), in their next incarnation by being born kites, (which may mean either 'eunuch, 'impotent,' or even 'hernephrodyte'). The laws of Alfred the Great (ii. 25) punished by emasculation a servant who raped a female servant (MT f. 231), and all male relatives of a Chinaman convicted for treason were doomed to death, excepting the young boys, who were castrated for service in the Imperial palace (ib. i. 45, with reference).
Already in the Roman Empire both Domitian and Nero had made castration (Sueton. Domit. vii.; Dio Cass. lxvii. 2, lxviii. 2), and this prohibition was repeated in the Digest (xlviii. 8. 4. 2—'nemo liberum servumque invitus simumentem castrate debet'). In the early Church, the only exception being the practice of castrating boys to preserve their voices, notably for the papal choir. The authorities cited by St. Alfonso Liguori (Tent. sacri vel. iv. iv. no. 374) make the custom dependent on the question whether the public welfare promoted by the sweet singing of the castrati was of sufficient magnitude to render licit a grave mutilation. St. Alfonso himself inclines to the negative, and the whole practice was indefinitely condemned by Benedict XIV. (de Syn. dioces. xi. vii. no. 4 f.). Since that time there have been no castrati in the service of the Church, although the usually indefatigable custom of having male sopranos on the Italian operatic stage lingered on until late in the 19th century. Marriage of a castrato was declared invalid by the Constitution Cum frequenter of Sixtus v. (28th June 1587).

Ethical problem of castration has recently come to the front in the question of the sterilization of certain classes of criminals and defectives. The operation, called vasectomy, consists in making an incision into the scrotum and severing the vas deferens, the womb being closed by the contraction of the cremaster muscle, and no further medical attention being required. (A similar surgical operation on the female is coohysterectomy by dividing the Fallopian tubes.) Result of vasectomy is sterility, although ibibo is not impaired, and the sexual act may be performed just as before the operation, except that there is no emission of semen. Besides preventing the procreation of offspring likely to inherit the defective or criminal traits of their parents, vasectomy is said to put an end to such vices as onanism, and it is declared to be absolutely without prejudice to the physical or mental health of the patient (cf. Joun. Amer. Med. Assoc., 4th Dec. 1909; Maryland Med. Journ., Sept. 1910; Med. Record, 11th Feb. 1911; Pearson’s Med. 1910; Nov. 1909). The operation is widely advocated in the United States, and laws providing for it have been adopted by many individual States. Of these an excellent type is one passed in New York in 1906, the law having been introduced to the date of writing (April 1912), no provision whatever having been made for its enforcement, 'to authorize and provide for the sterilization of feeble-minded (including idiots, imbeciles, and morons), epileptics, rapists, certain criminals, and other defectives.'

After stating that the Board of Examiners shall consist of a surgeon and neurologist, appointed by the Governor and with the advice of the Senate, and acting with the Commission of Charities and Corrections—the duties being to examine into the mental and physical condition of the feebleminded, epileptic, certain criminal and other defective inmates confined in the State institutions, or institutions operated by the State in the counties and State—the law proceeds as follows: 'The criminals who shall come within the operation of this law shall be those who have been convicted of rape, or of such succession of offences against the criminal law as in the opinion of the board of examiners to be sufficient evidence of confirmed criminal tendencies.'

Upon application of the superintendent or other adminis- trative officer of the institution in which an inmate may be confined, or upon his own motion, the said board of examiners may meet to take an examination into the mental and physical condition of such inmates confined as above; and if said board of examiners, in conjunction with the chief medical officer of the institution, should find that said inmate is not suffering from such procreation is inadvisable, and that there is no probability that the condition of such inmate so to such an extent as to render procreation by such inmate advisable, it shall be lawful to perform such operation for the
EUNUCH (Muslim).

In general every mutilation of men and beasts was forbidden by the Prophet (e.g. al-Bukhārī, al-Dhahabī shoal-qud, 25). Moreover, if we may trust Muslim tradition, Muhammad expressly enjoined his followers not to make themselves or others eunuchs. One day Uthmān ibn Māz'ān asked permission from the Prophet to castrate himself that he might not be tempted to commit fornication; he could, however, be again castrated if necessary.


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Eunuchs were employed by the Muslims either as guardians of their harems or as attendants of princes and in the houses of men of high rank and great wealth, or as guardians in sanctuaries. For the latter purpose they were sent as presents, especially to the sultans of Egypt, at the time of the marriages of princesses. In Cairo a holy relic, the so-called shirt of Muham- med, was guarded by a eunuch, who was sent for that purpose from Constantinople (see A. von Kremer, Ägypten, ii. 88).

Burckhardt, Kugler, and other travellers in Muslim countries have observed that eunuchs, on account of the important and con-
Euphemism

The religious aspect of the word, 'euphemism' may be defined as the use of names or words of good omen, instead of those of evil omen (though in practice it also includes the use of enigmatic words), the object being to avoid the dangers which are inherent in the use of the latter. The being thus named is flattered andconciliated and does not do harm, or he does not know that he is being referred to. Euphemism is not merely a substitute for the names of evil demons; it is an attempt to avoid the deleterious tendencies towards evil or demoniac beings in act.

In primitive thought, and surviving into much higher culture, a name is regarded as part of the personality of the being—god, spirit, or man—who bears it; or it is even identical with its owner's soul. Hence, according to the magical view of the universe so commonly entertained, knowledge and use of a name are bound to effect the owner of that name. It may be used in his presence to procure him power, or force him to do the bidding of him who utters it. But, on the other hand, when carelessly uttered, it may bring its owner unpleasantly near, or draw his attention to, or bring him into contact with or possession of, the utterer. Obedience by a spirit or demon to the pronouncing of his name was only on compulsion; and he was always watchful for any opportunity of falling upon him who spoke his name. Thus there was danger for the latter in using carelessly the names of dangerous beings. It brought them near, and they had an objection to their names being mentioned. In the Near East, there are many restrictions. Any taloned spirit, person, animal, or thing is apt to receive a circumscription or euphemistic name. Great precautions are taken by savages against disclosing their personal or secret names; hence many of them are known by nicknames or circumlocutions, and nothing is more common at certain times than a change of name, which may be used as a form of deceiving or even of making a person sick.

In many languages the same word stands for 'name' and 'soul.'
place of the Divine name in expletives, excalinations, etc., in popular speech—Eng. 'off' (Cow's bones); Germ. potz or kot (Gott, goddess), qvain, phlegm, and the like.

2. Supernatural beings.—Much more common is the use of euphemisms for the names of spirits, demons, fairies, etc. Thus in India the spirits of young men dying without becoming fathers are called 'fathers', 'fathers'; in India, the isis; Sikes, the spirits of substitutes. The euphemistic name, to leave the 243 sleep [1899] to some one.' (Crooke, P.E.R.i. ii, 523.) The Arabs and Syrians address the jinn, who are in all respects like our fairies (see Fairies), as 'sukhbrakan,' as 'blessed,' or 'blessed ones' (Lane-Poole, Arabian Society in the Middle Ages, 1883, p. 37; Hanauer, Folk-Lore of the Holy Land, 1907, p. 292). In modern Greece the Nereids, who also correspond to our fairies, are called generally in a euphemistic manner αράκσια, a name also applied to Lamos and other supernatural powers. Other names, corresponding to 'the Eumenides' and similar conciliatory, are γραναβρ, 'the Ladys of the Dark'; γκαλαναβρ, 'the kind-hearted ones' (αράκσια μας, 'our maidens'); γκαλαναβρατι, 'our good Queens'; γκαλαναβρατι, 'our good Ladys'—a name corresponding to αλ αν rage, in a way, all these names are 'others.'

As the women, (see Fairies), or the female personal name is generally avoided, and replaced by euphemisms. Death, being personified, or regarded as the work of spirits or evil-disposed beings, would, if mentioned directly, be apt to draw dangerous attention to him with evil consequences. The idea of the dread contagion of death (which forced all who handled the dead to be under taboo for a time), working even through the name (name and thing taboo), belongs to the idea of a dead man's name that would bring his spirit near the living. Among the Ainu figurative words are used for death, e.g. 'sleeping,' 'resting,' 'leaving the world behind' (Batachelor, Ainu of Japan, 1896, p. 212). Both in Melanesia and in Polynesia there is an unwillingness to speak directly of death, and the usual word for death, mate, is used only of the death of an animal or as a term of abuse.

Brown (Melanesiana and Polynesian, 1910, p. 404) gives the following euphemism for death: us morti, 'he has gone'; us morti fono (of an old one), 'he has gone to the council'; us gazodo (of a chief), 'the titles have passed away,' or us tappogoapogo, 'the titles are scattered about.'

In S. Africa, to die is 'to go home,' or 'not to look on the sun again,' or 'not to look on the women,' or 'to return to one's fathers' (Macdonald, JAR xx. [1891] 121; Casalis, Les Bassontos, Paris, 1836, p. 258). Among the Baganda, when a twin dies (an unlucky event), it is said that the child has 'died,' or 'passed away,' or 'gone to gather flowers,' and the death of a king is described as 'the fire is extinguished' (Rossoc, The Baganda, 1911, pp. 103, 125). When a sheep dies, lost its spirit should cause a woman to fall ill, she simply says, 'I am unable to unite with such a sheep' (ib. p. 290; cf. the saying in the Hebrides when a cow dies, 'it is lost').

In Burma, to die is 'to return' (i.e. to a state of bliss [Forbes, British Burma, 1878, p. 71]). Among the Chinese, dying is expressed by such phrases as 'to enter the measure' (i.e. the coffin), 'to leave the body,' 'to pass away,' while the coffin is euphemistically called 'boards of old age' (Friend, 'The Chinese,' 1896, p. 200; ib.); 'sleep,' 'a euphemism for death (Heb. כָּל, LXX θάνατος, 'in sleep,' and is constantly used: 2 S 17:2, 1 K 2:1, 2 Es 7:3; 1 Ki, xi. 241; Soph. Electra, 590; cf. Herkenrath, Stud. zu d. grch. Grabschriften, Feldkirch, 1898). St. Paul speaks of τον θανατον καὶ τον ψυχήν & θανατόν & θάνατον (1 Th 4:14); and these phrases passed readily into Christian thought, so that

Chinke, Wottkeren, Wouters (Grimm, 603.) The γνῆσις fuitusa regarded as a spire is also called familiarly 'Will o' the wisp,' 'Jorden's light,' etc.

In most European languages the devil is commonly spoken of by a variety of euphemisms and softened titles, which have a tendency to degenerate into slang, but which show the fear of using such a name of devil. In Scotland 'the good or good man' (cf. 'the good man's craft'—the part of a farmland left unencultivated because dedicated to the devil) probably expresses the devils tendency of hell ('the good man's lament'). Other names are 'Clootie,' 'Auld Iornie,' 'Sandy,' or 'the devil.' In the Hebrides such names as 'the brindled one,' 'the black one,' 'the great fellow,' (the nameless), are found (FL x. [1899] 265). English names are Old Nick,' 'the Old Gentleman.' In Germany we find Meister Peter, Meister Siech-fich-fur, Deichel, Gott sei beiseit, etc.; in France, dision, in Italy, ceterato (cf. Grimm, 987, 1904, 106; Hornemann, Slavische und its Analogien, 1890 ff. s.w.).

3. Death and the dead.—For similar reasons such ill-named names as death, the region of the dead, and also the personal name are generally avoided, and replaced by euphemisms. Death, being personified, or regarded as the work of spirits or evil-disposed beings, would, if mentioned directly, be apt to draw dangerous attention to him with evil consequences. The idea of the dread contagion of death (which forced all who handled the dead to be under taboo for a time), working even through the name (name and thing taboo), belongs to the idea of a dead man's name that would bring his spirit near the living. Among the Ainu figurative words are used for death, e.g. 'sleeping,' 'resting,' 'leaving the world behind' (Batchelor, Ainu of Japan, 1896, p. 212). Both in Melanesia and in Polynesia there is an unwillingness to speak directly of death, and the usual word for death, mate, is used only of the death of an animal or as a term of abuse.

Brown (Melanesiana and Polynesian, 1910, p. 404) gives the following euphemism for death: us morti, 'he has gone'; us morti fono (of an old one), 'he has gone to the council'; us gazodo (of a chief), 'the titles have passed away,' or us tappogoapogo, 'the titles are scattered about.'
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'sleep' became almost an equivalent for death rather than a euphemism. 'To sleep in peace,' to 'fall asleep in Jesus,' are common phrases in Christian epigraphy from early times, and recepta ad Deum, "of the dead," etc. 

In the everyday speech of ourselves 'to pass away,' 'he is gone,' and the like, are used for death (cf. 'to pass out' or 'over,' used by Spiritualists); and in the north-east of Scotland 'he was taken away' means 'he died.' In Germany, death is known as Freund Hein, and dying is expressed by a variety of euphemisms—departing in various forms; cf. Gr. ἀπεθανεν ἡ γοια, 'faring out,' etc. Our 'to join the majority' occurs in German, and is derived from the Gr. phrase ι τὸν λαὸν λέγεται (cf. the Heb. euphemisms, 'gathered to his fathers,' 'go to his fathers,' 'sleep with his fathers,' etc.).

The reluctance to mention the dead individually or collectively by name is universal among savages and survives in folk-custom (see DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD [Intro.], vol. iv. p. 441).

Among the aborigines of Victoria a dead man was 'the lost one,' 'the poor fellow that is no more' (Stranahan, TES i. [1861] 299); and among the Abipones he is 'the man who does not now exist' (Dohhrizoff, Abipones, 1822, ii. 273). S. African tribes say 'ye who are above' (Macdonald, JA1 xx. 121). The Roman De Mores, 'the good or kindly gods' (from onys, 'good'), applied to the gods of the world or the departed, is probably euphemistic; and perhaps the Gr. ἐν τῶν ἀκρωτηρίων, οἱ κράτες ἐν των ἀναγυμνοσ, 'those below,' or 'those who have gone below,' are of the same nature. cf. κληρον, Lat. majoris, Eng. 'the majority,' are all circumlocutions for the dead. In Scots folk-speech 'them that's awa' expresses a similar reluctance to refer directly to the dead as such. In Japan the old word mone applied to the dead means 'the beings,' and is euphemistic (see EEF iv. 611). Offended spirits in China are addressed by a euphemism, e.g. shing jin, 'sagely person.' Similarly the region of the dead or of the devil is subject of euphemistic expressions in stead of the word 'hell'—'the ill place,' 'the bad place,' or even, as in the Hebrides, 'the good place.'

Diseases. Among savages, diseases are frequently personified or controlled by spirits, and in either case they are sometimes referred to euphemistically, by way of avoiding such a direct reference as might cause them to afflict the speaker, and also in order to flatter them. In Fiji the word 'leprosy' must not be applied to any one in good society who is suffering from it; and many ingenious shifts are resorted to in order to express the meaning without using the word. (Thomson, The Fijians, 1908, p. 259). Among the Dayaks, smallpox is not referred to directly, but as 'jungle-leaves,' 'the chief,' 'fruit'; or they ask, 'Has he left you yet?' (St. John, Forests of the Far East, 1802, i. 62.)

In India the name of the smallpox-goddess, Sitala, is itself a euphemism, 'she that loves coolness'; but she is also called 'queen of the world,' 'the great mother,' etc. Similarly euphemisms are used for leprosy in the Oldβ Βα (Crooke, PI. i. 126; cf. EEF ii. 485).

In the Cyclades, plague is the pardoned disease, epilepsy is θηριστήριον or τό καλό, smallpox εἰθύμα; and in consequence euphemistic terms are introduced into their popular language. In the flux of the disease, a similar custom is observed while hunting, fishing, or pursuing certain occupations in particular places or at particular times. But here the custom is not confined to the hillmen but spreads to the whole island. (Bent, The Cyclades, 1883, p. 74; Crooke, i. 129.) Among the Slavs, the demon of fever is called 'aunt,' 'godmother,' by way of making her friendly. The Teutons call disease 'the good,' 'the blessed;' pestilence is 'gossip,' 'apoplexy,' the blessed, whilow the unnamed' (Grüm, 1154, 1157, 1650).

5. Animals. The same custom applies to using the names of animals whose ravages are feared, as well as to other more harmless animals—in the latter case perhaps a survival of some religious tabus in the cult of animals. In India, the tiger is spoken of as nagana, 'sir,' and would punish any one who did not so call him (Monteiro, Angola and the River Congo, 1875, ii. 116). In Algeria, the same animal is called Johanen-el-Johan (Certeux and Carmoy, L'Algérie trait., Paris and Algiers, 1884, p. 172); and the Bechuanas of S. Africa name it 'the boy with the beard' (Conder, JAI xvi. [1857] 54). Among various peoples of Malaysia, the tiger is called 'grandfather,' 'the wild animal,' 'lord,' or 'ancestor,' or, as in Sunda, 'the whiskered one,' 'the honourable one,' etc. In Sunda, the boar is 'the beautiful one.' The Malays also call the elephant 'grandfather,' and beg him not to destroy them, his grandchildren. When calling an alligator, they conodel with him and call him 'Raja,' 'Datu,' and 'grandfather'; and in Sarawak the Kenyahs call the crocodile 'the old grand- father' rather than 'grandfather.' In Japan, such cases calamity or illness would follow non-observance of these euphemisms (Marsden, Sumatra, 1811, p. 292; Monhot, Trav. in Indo-China, 1884, i. 283; Sckener, Malay Magic, 1900, p. 150, 152, 157; St. John, i. 19; Hose-Macdouall, JAI xxi. 186; Frazer, GIP i. 462). For similar reasons, and lost the dreaded animals should appear, snakes in India are called by various euphemisms—the cobra is 'the good snake' or 'good lord'; and 'worm,' 'insect,' 'rope,' 'creeping thing' are other reptile euphemisms. Similarly among the Cherokee, when a man is bitten by a snake, he is said to be 'scratched by a biter,' a respect for the animal should be hurt (Mooney, RBBEW [1900] pt. i. p. 295). Tigers are called 'the dog,' 'the beast,' 'the jackal,' etc., especially when they are being hunted. Other animals are also denoted euphemistically (Crooke, PI. i. 275, TC, 1896, i. 249; FL viii. 285; NIQ 1, 70, 104, v. 133). In Syria, the serpent is addressed as 'Thou blessed one' (Hanauer, 202). Similar respectful names are applied to the 'forest apple,' 'golden light foot,' 'old man,' etc., while the Lapps call it 'the old man with the fur coat' (see the Kalevala, passion: Tylor, Early Hist. of Mankind, 1865, p. 140). Similar forms are used by the Esthonians and Prussians for the bear; and by all these peoples and also generally in Germany the wolf, especially at certain seasons, is called 'grey-legs,' 'golden-tooth,' 'the vermin,' etc., while the fox is 'long-tail,' 'blue-foot,' etc., address the bear or (possibly water-monsters, 'water-person' or 'water person female' (II RBBEW, p. 439).

6. Euphemisms of occupation, etc. Some of the above examples have shown that animals while being hunted are spoken of euphemistically, the object being apparently to deceive them by a kind of make-believe, so as to render their capture easy, while at the same time it is sought to avoid falling one's fingers into their paws. In the flux of the disease, a similar custom is observed while hunting, fishing, or pursuing certain occupations in particular places or at particular times. But here the custom is not confined to the hillmen but spreads to the whole island. (Bent, The Cyclades, 1883, p. 74; Crooke, i. 129.)
or things which might be mentioned in conversation. They are either not spoken of for the time being, or they are referred to under some other name, circumlocution, or euphemism. By this class is usually meant the word using the thought to deceive the spirits or animals or any other being who might be listening, and who, recognizing them or their intentions, would attack them, or avoid and escape them. Thus, if, while hunting, men call their dog 'devil,' or they have slain, or their weapons, by other names, they reckon on deceiving the animal and so obtaining an easy prey. Or, again, if the animal is spoken of in a flattering euphemism, it may be so pleased that it will allow itself to be slain. In other cases, where names of objects or people, allowable at other times, are taboo at certain times or in certain places, there is obviously a fear of disturbing harmful agencies to which they might be obvious. Here, again, the words used are euphemisms of pretence. The beings and creatures swarming about men, whether spirits or animals, are credited with intelligence and understanding. Above all things, the English are at a certain point. They are weak enough to be open to flattering terms, or ignorant enough not to see through man's elaborate pretences.

Two examples may suffice. Martin (Dearer of the W. Islands, London, 1710) refers to the custom of the Lemains, when visiting the sacred Fijian Islands for towing, of avoiding certain words, in employing others in the same places—such, to call 'clearer,' 'shore,' 'crusty,' 'hard,' 'for,' 'rock,' 'pale,' 'sharp,' 'for,' 'soul,' etc., while the islands themselves must be spoken of only as 'the country.' Similarly, the camp-fathers of the Malay Peninsula, while engaged in the hunt or the chase, the true word 'kill' and the euphemistic language, because otherwise the spirit in the trees would not be propitious, and they would not find the object of their quest. Rice is called 'grass fruit,' gun is 'far-sounding,' etc. In Borneo, and for similar reasons, the same phenomenon is met with, and camp-fathers here speak of 'the thing that smelleth' (Great. St. 212 ff.); Furness, Folk-lore in Borneo, Wallingford, Penn., 1899, p. 41. The Yoruba, in Nigeria, do not express their own name while fishing, but as such, to hide his identity from the spirits (J.A. xxxiv. 1900, 459). For many other examples, see also Fraser, I. 451 ff. note A. 'Taboo on Common Words.'

7. Certain religious, customary, or unusual actions or things are also spoken of euphemistically, and for reasons similar to those already referred to. Thus, in Samoa, circumlocution of a peculiar kind had a recognized name, teuf, but in ordinary speech tafso was used as a euphemism (Brown, 382 f.). In Fiji, cannibalism, which had a religious aspect, was hedged about by many tabus and euphemistic names. The food, for example, was not called ko run, the house that persecutes; the feet, nduia runa, one-two; or such a desired portion of human flesh as the breast of a virgin was said more euphemistically as 'the body of my beautiful' (Brown, 104). Among the Yorubas, human sacrifice is euphemistically called 'basket-sacrifice,' because the victim is enclosed in a basket (Ellis, Yoruba-speaking Peoples, 1894, p. 105). In the Hebrides, the fire of a kiln is called angwall, not because, Leibauer, the latter is dangerous and 'ill will come if it is mentioned,' (F.L. x. 263) just as, in Scandinavia, fire was sometimes called heta, not ed or ell (Thorpe, ii. 647 f.). The twin's name was exceptionally used, born—an unusual but important event, because they were the gift of the god Minkas—the midwife, in announcing the birth to the father, did not use the name, 'twin,' but he gave the impression of using some such phrase (Roeser, Zykwarda, 1911, p. 63).

8. Euphemisms of etiquette. — Etiquette also demands that, in speaking to a superior, particular names or phrases should be used instead of those ordinarily applied. In Samoa, when a man wishes to take a place at an archery meeting and is unable to do so, he should decline on the ground of being ill, and say, 'I am suffering from carrying firearms,' which means himself, and it has been adopted from the manner in which a peasant would speak, as a term of mock humility. This is only one example out of many customary in China (SBE xxvii. [1885] 101). Similarly, in Samoa, words of an opposite meaning instead of those supposed to be objectionable were used in such cases (Brown, 380 f.). For the same reason ill-omened words are generally avoided in conversation; 'good omen words,' in the Cantonese phrase, being used, as many of the above examples have shown. Halleins says that the Athenians were careful not to use words of ill-omen; so they called the prison 'the chamber,' and the executioner 'the public man' (Phot. Bid., ed. Bekker, 1825, p. 535). The underlying idea is that by mentioning ill-omened words the action may be itself produced. Survivals of this—but now more than a shrinking from the use of words calling up disagreeable associations or unpleasant things—are common in civilized life among ourselves. But the old and primitive conception of the connexion between name and thing named, and of the power of the name to produce the effect or to cause the presence of spirit, animal, etc., when the name is spoken, is seen in certain proper verbs, the full meaning of which is not realized by those who use them: e.g. Talk of the devil and you will see his horns; 'Speak of the wolf and you will see his tail.'

9. Slang and euphemism.—Euphemistic language may become merely poetical, and, while it has a different origin from slang, it is also closely connected with it and easily degenerates into it both in English and in foreign languages. The euphemistic names of the devil have in many instances become merely slang expressions, though sometimes used by those who think them softer than such a 'wearing word' as 'devil'; or they have given rise to other slang names. 'The dicken's, 'the dence,' 'dence takes it,' 'the old boy,' etc., and some of the euphemisms already cited for 'devil,' are examples of such changes. Many people also use slang euphemisms for oaths—'dash,' 'blow,' 'confound,' etc.; while there are many slang expressions for death—'to kick the bucket,' 'to take an earth bath,' 'to go to Davy Jones' locker,' etc.—which in an earlier age would have been euphemisms pure and simple. See Farmer-Henley, Slang and Its Analogues, 8 vols., 1890 ff.; J. C. Hotten, Slang Dictionary, 1859; A. Barriere and C. G. Leland, Dict. of Slang, Jargon, and Cant, 5 vols., 1885.


J. A. MacCulloch.

EURIPIDES, the last of the great Greek tragedians, is a figure of high importance in the history of Western thought, as well as in that of literature. The present article will say nothing of his life (b. before 475, d. 406 B.C.), his artistic technique, or his influence on the stage (of which 18 genuine and one suspect are extant), except in so far as they directly illustrate his ethical and religious position.

The real strength of a dramatist, for instance, is shown far more by his choice of subjects, and the kind of character that he makes (to use the technical term) 'sympathetic' or 'unsympathetic,' than by the definite sentiments he puts in his characters. We shall therefore, notice that Euripides has whole plays upon such subjects as the immorality of the traditional gods (Ion, Auge, Melanippe, Danae, Alceste); the problem of the unjust government of the world (Iphigenia in Tauris, Troades); the wickedness or insanity of the 'sacred duty of revenge' (Electra, Orestes, Alcestes; cf. Medea,
Hecuba, etc.). He once treats the statesman sympathetically (Philoctetes); mostly he dwells on the crimes of statecraft (Iphigenia in Aulis, Hecuba, Troades, Phæo, etc.), which he associates with such the prophecies of the suppliants at an altar (Heraclides, Supplïc, Andromache), or, when backed by superstition, with human sacrifice (Heraclides, Hecuba, Iphigenia in Aulis, etc.). His virulence and his mordant sarcasm are brought to stand against this background of statecraft. He treats often of cruelty and injustice done to women, especially barbarian women (Medea, Hecuba, Andromache), and sometimes of the women's fanatic revenge (Medea, Hecuba; cf. Ion). He has plays on the wise woman (Melanippe), the strong and bold woman (Melanippe), the wise faithful to death (Protesilaus, Alcestis; cf. Supplïc); on the women in love, innocently (Andromeda, perhaps Iphigenia in Aulis), or with some guilt or trouble (Hippolytus, Phæo, Orestes; also Aulid and Medea, Andromache). He has a great play entirely on the evil of war (Troy); two on the beauty and the horror of ecstatic religion (Bacche, Orestes); one in which the hero is a slave, though he proves to be the savior of his birth; and one dealing largely with the contrast of practical and contemplative life (Antiope). This is clearly an unusual and characteristic list of subjects.

Euripides as an artist deserves a much fuller treatment than he can receive here. In general, his characteristic is the combination of a highly conventionalized style with an extraordinarily free and original intellect. His technique is as severe as his thought is unconventional. His adherence to the archaic traditional forms of the religious ritual from which drama probably arose—prologue, contest-scene, messenger, epiphany of god or hero—is as marked as that of Æschylus, and forms a strong contrast with the more 'natural' style of Sophocles. His extreme pursuit of σωφρευγία, 'clarity,' makes his speeches often too precise and self-conscious, his scenes too sharply separate and articulate, for modern taste. On the other hand, the persistent thoughtfulness and keenness of his criticism of life alienate those who like poetry to be conventionally poetical.

In his religious and philosophical ideas, though Euripides is not an adherent of any definite school, he can safely be called the poet of the Sophistic movement. A σωφρευγία is one who 'makes wise,' and in his Philosophy there is the strong effort towards knowledge and enlightenment which transformed the half-savage Greece of the 6th cent. B.c. into the Greece of Hippocrates, Thucydides, and Plato. Different sophists, of course, emphasized different sides of σωφρευγία; but in its negative aspect the movement was largely one and indivisible. In an age saturated with superstition the first condition of real enlightenment is a drastic rejection of spiritual and intellectual fetters. Criticism attacks first what is immoral or revolting in the accepted beliefs, next what is merely stupid or improbable.

Now, Greek religious belief was never, except in some special communities (Orphie, Pythagorean, etc.), organized into a definite orthodoxy. It rested on innumerable local rituals conforming to a few main types, and explained by traditional stories. Naturally, the minds of most of the sophists probably agreed with Hecateus that the traditions of the Greeks are many and absurd; there was no great body of positive doctrine which attempts to make the non-existent believable was being destroyed. The Sophistic movement was, on the whole, agnostic. It urged men to look for evidence, to use their understanding and their moral sense. But it must always be remembered that the rejection of traditional theology in Greece proceeded almost as much from the craving for a more satisfying faith as from purely critical or scientific motives. There is a strong supposition that of Orphism and the great growth of mystic religions in the Hellenistic 4th century. And Euripides, being by profession not a dogmatic philosopher, but a philologist, and a realist and student of character, sensitive to all the highest thought of his age, reflects its aspirations quite as much as its denials.

Attempts have been made to show a special connexion between Euripides and the doctrines of particular philosophers (Anaxagoras: the sun as a χαλκωμένη βίον [Phæaon], 771, 783; Or. 983); Protagoras: the άνθρωπος μέτρον [Alcias, 19, Phem. 499]; Diogenes of Apollonia: the worship of άθηνα [fr. 941, 877; Ar. Ran., 492], the soul as air [Hel. 1013 ff.; Tro. 884-86, γι' άληθείας από τον πρώτον]; Heracleitus, Hippocrates, Proclus, and, in his political theories, Antiphon; cf. Dünzl., Proleg. zu Platon's Staat, 1801, pp. 101, 201 ff.; the Sophists: fr. 912, 475, and 638, 583; but the affiliation of each doctrine is often doubtful, their use is almost always dramatic, and the doctrines of no one school can be said to be professed with any great degree of assent. In the existence of the gods, the moral government of the world, the survival of the soul after death, Euripides is full of questions and contradictions, but pronounces no personal judgment.

A question that vexed the age was whether the world is governed by Intelligence (ζέων), or, more crudely, whether the gods were φαντάσματα, i.e. were they like reasonable parents knowing what is in man's heart, or, as the traditions would have it, innumerable incalculable creatures ready to punish savagely all who broke their irrational tabus? The question between monotheism and polytheism gives as little trouble to Euripides as to most Greeks; he uses the singular and the plural indifferently: θεός, in any case, was one. Euripides at times (Hep. 1103) 'has in his secret hope the belief in some great Understanding' (ζέων τοῦ θεοῦ). He is represented as actually praying to ζέων in Ar. R. 492. But he sometimes finds the facts against him (Hep. 18, cf. Iph. in Aulis, 3944; Her. 655).

Hecuba's often quoted lines (Troy. 884 ff.),

βασιλεία τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἡ ζέων ἡμῶν ἡμῶν, ἡμῶν ἡμῶν,

"I base of the world in the world on the world. Whose thou art, unknown and hard of sunrise, Cause-chain of things (ἀρχές φαντάσματα) or man's own reason, God, I give thee worship, who by noiseless paths Of justice lead the ignorance that is the movement is the only express a belief, frequently repeated and denied elsewhere, in the rule of the world by Justice, but in the play the belief is quickly falsified by the event. Cf. the Letterphon, where the righteous hero questions Zeus on this point, and for answer is blasted by a thunderbolt.

If one is to try to conjecture Euripides' own view, it would perhaps be that unknown forces and influences do exist, which shape or destroy man's life, and which may perhaps be conceived as in some sense personal (διάπεκτον θεόν, μέν τις ποιεῖ ἐν τοῖς [Or. 415]), but that morally they are less good than man, who at least pities and tries to understand. At times, indeed, he deliberately quotes 'marvel- able tales of the poets: 'if the gods do shame, they are no gods' (Bell. 292); 'God, if he be indeed God, hath need of mght' (Her. 1349). Yet, not only the myths mete out the punishment, but Heracles, Electra) represented as very poor characters, but even the gods of the Hippolytus and Iphoche, who clearly represent real forces, if not quite real persons, by human standards evil. In the magnificent closing scene of the Trojan War we can see Euripides' enactment of the worship of the dead who may
still love us, then beyond to that a great refusal of all false comfort, an acceptance of the darkness that is God and more than God.

About immortality, Euripides often brings in scorn, pride, and, as we have shown, correct the life to be verily death, and our death life to those that are gone?; cf. Phæniz, fr. 816, Hip. 191), and thoughts of an impersonal immortality (Helen, 487-490) (esp. 488). He avails, hath consciousness (φρονεῖν) immortal, and being plunged into the immortal ether; cf. the 'other shapes of life in Ion, 1068, Med. 1039).

Next to the supernatural, sexual morality is the great field for talus and unreasoning judgments. Euripides' treatment of all such questions is by modern standards high and austere, but shows both sophist and romantic bias. He treats with sympathy, though with condemnation, the love of married women for men not their husbands (Phaedra, Stenebra; cf. Med. 635 ff.), but shows no tenderness for men in the same situation. He treats of love within the forbidden degrees (Canace and their emotions, and turn quickly to of heaven-sent madness, of that between Pasiphae and the Bull-god. He often treats legends of the children born of a god and a mortal woman (Creusa, Med. 635, 801, 606, as a case of a woman sympathetic and the god hateful, or, at least, suspect and imperfectly justified. Unlike Sophocles and Æschylus, he appears to have no tolerance of pedestrians, which he attributes only to the bestial Cyclops and, as a primeval sin, to Laius. (Gany- medes is mentioned in lyrics.)

Two social institutions of the 5th cent. especially provoked the criticism of sophists—slavery, and the subjugation of women. Both had been made to the rapid expansion of city life and commerce. Slavery is never expressly condemned as 'contrary to nature' in our remains of Euripides, though he probably shared this view; but his interest in the question is shown by the innumerable references to it. The influence of slavery is very bad, and most slaves are cowardly and untrustworthy (El. 633; fr. 86, etc.). Yet 'many slaves are better men than their masters' (fr. 511). 'Many so-called free men are slaves at heart.' 'A man without fear cannot be a slave.' More important than these abstract statements, which are naturally put as a rule into the mouths of slaves, is the presentation of the empathic 'sympathetic' slaves (esp. Alexandros, see above). The blind devotion of a slave is shown in the Iph. Asul., and the Ion (cf. Helen, 720 ff.). The women of Euripides are famous; they are more prominent in his plays than the men, more closely studied, and treated with more sympathy. Yet, magnificent as his heroines are, they suggest strange conclusions about the real Athenian woman of the 5th century. They are apt to be loving, courageous, clever, and often intellectual; but very ignorant and untrained, dis- contented, and instinctively ready to unite against the man who injures one of them. They are the slaves of their husbands, and turn quickly to treachery and crime (Creusa, Phædra, Electra, as well as the barbarians Medea and Hecuba). Even Iphigenia (Taurica) and Alcestis have their weakness and weakness are the 'bond, Hecuba in the Troades is extraordinarily noble, and so are the various virgin-martyrs. It is one of Euripides' chief glories as a dramatist that he so cleverly indiges in an ideally 'sympathetic' stage character any interest more than in stage villains. His strong symp- pathy with women made him understand them too well to draw them in the conventional man-attract- ing poses. This enables Aristophanes to represent him as a master of the art of the sex, who has dis- covered its secrets and betrayed them to the world (Themosphoriazusæ).

Two other questions which vitally interested Euripides were: (1) Is virtue teachable or purely innate? and (2) Is the current conception of a happy life, with its insistence on the possession of fame and glory, correct? He speculates several times, on the whole laying much stress on 'noble birth' (εὐγενεία), if only it is of the true inward sort (fr. 32, 617; El. 551, etc.). He generally inclines to the idea that only a wise man, means wisdom or 'culture,' but covers such qualities as 'gentleness' or 'mercy' (El. 294; Or. 491, etc.; Alc., 606, etc.); while ἀμδεῖα denotes brutality and cruelly (passim; cf. the uses of ἀρκεῖον, συμμορία, etc.). Yet he believes greatly in the virtue of 'those in the mean,' especially the free peasants who keep no slaves (ἀναστυφωτος; cf. El., first half; Suppl. 244; Or. 929). At times (Bac. 363, 428 ff., 1065 ff. (?); Suppl. 218; Hec. 1192) his characters even denounce the inadequacy or falseness of conventional σοφία. About children, and the intense happiness and more intense sorrow which they are apt to bring, he writes with peculiar interest (Med. 1195 ff.; fr. 608), as a case of a child. All the world (fr. 394 ff.; Andr., first half; Med., passim, esp. 1270 ff.; above all, Tro. 700-900).

We must not forget that Euripides was in the first place a dramatist and poet, only in the second a philosopher. His habitual subject-matter was the heroic saga, which uses supernatural machinery as a matter of course; and, though he cannot keep his mind from criticism, both moral and intellectual, of this subject-matter, his main business was not criticism: it was the writing of tragedy. Further, we must not suppose that a 5th cent. Greek, who rejected superstition and tried to follow σοφία, already possessed at once a scientific view of the world. He was only one of the pioneers who eventually made such a view possible. Euripides' habits of often opening with a prologue spoken by a supernatural being, and closing with the appearance of some god or hero in the air, who founds the ritual on which the play is based and explains its αἴρεσις (or legendary origin), belong rather to his technique than to his religion. In the development of Greek stage-craft they have their natural place (see note in J. E. Harrison, Themis, 1915, pp. 341-362), and theories which explain them away should be rejected. There are real difficulties, and each case requires separate treatment, but in general we ought probably to realize (1) that an epiphany was an integral part of the old saccer ludus from which tragedy is derived, and was usual in Ἀθηναία (This can be proved from the fragments.) Euripides only stiffened the convention and introduced improved machinery. (2) The epiphany is often beautiful and effective even by our standards; in other cases we must try to imagine what the effect may have been when the mechanical device was new and impressive, and the figure in the Divine mask corresponded with the ordinary man's instinctive expectations, and was not in the least degree inherently ridiculous. The thought of Euripides is in many ways so extraordinarily advanced, not only for his own age but for any succeeding age, that it is of the greatest importance to the pedagogi (gr.) and the present day, that it requires an effort to realize that in other respects he was probably, to our ideas, quite primitive and simple-minded. He was mystic as well as rationalist; his work, and, while recognising the Olympian mythology and the pretensions of the Delphian priests, it is surprising how often he falls back on some approach to the more primitive strata of religious thought. Apart from this, as a poet, as a playwright, Euripides' distinction as a poet lies partly in a sincerity which often makes him
spoil the harmony of his work rather than be content with mere make-believe, and partly in a lyrical gift which can transmute into beauty his most grisly representations of human suffering; but most of all in his unequalled emotional power. It is doubted if any later dramatist has been born to dispute his right to the tremendous title awarded him by Aristotle, who calls him, in spite of various faults, 'clearly the most tragic of the poets' (Poet. 1455c, 30).


**G. Norwood, The Riddle of the Bacchae, London, 1908; G. Murray, Introduct. essays to his *Europäische*, London, 1902 (= vol. iii. of Athenian Drama, ed. G. C. W. Warr.); and his tr. of the *Troyan Women*, Elektra, etc., London, 1902-10; and the articles in the *Antiquités de Greece*. (Berges, Jevons, Murray; also in Gompers, Greek Thinkers, Eng. tr. 1903.**

**GILBERT MURRAY.**

**EUROPE.—We have seen (artt. Africa, Asia, and Ethnology, §§ 8 and 10) that the Caucasian discrimination of culture and race evolved and probably is in North Africa, whence it ranged in remote times eastwards into Asia and northwards into Europe. The latter continent was first reached by now vanished land connexions, in company with the large Pliocene or early Pleistocene fauna whose remains—elephant, hyena, rhinoceros, hippopotamus, cave-bear, sabre-tooth lion or tiger—are found in association with those of early man in many parts of South and West Europe. We thus get a vast antiquity (estimated by some authorities at three or four hundred millennia) for the first arrivals, the men of the *Palaeolithique, or Old Stone*, Age, which nearly coincided with the Ice Age, that is, with pre-, inter-, and post-glacial times. All were apparently of somewhat uniform long-headed type, but showed steady progressive developments, both in physical and in mental respects, from the rude *Chellean and Mousterian* to the more advanced *Solatrium and Madelenien* epochs.

The Old Stone Age was followed without any clear intermission of certain men who marked breakings of the faunal record (now rejected by all leading paleontologists), by the *Neolithic, or New Stone*, Age, which had also a very long duration, estimated by Sir W. Turner for Scotland alone at perhaps a hundred million years. For a long time Neolithic man was also of the same long-headed type, which in the Cro-Magnon race of Dordogne reveals physical characters that may be called 'European' in the modern sense of the term. Moreover, Quatre-fages, who connects all the human remains, both of the Old and of the New Stone Age, with 'the white type,' identifies the Cro-Magnon with the tall, long-headed, fair-skinned, and blue-eyed Berbers (Himites) who still survive in various parts of Mauretania. These Neo-Lithic African peoples are also credited the megalithic monuments—dolmens, menhirs, cycloiths, triliths, barrows, galeries de passage—found in the Iberia, Gaul, Britain, Denmark, and Sweden, and which in North Africa range from the Atlantic seaboard to Tripolitana. It follows that the men of these regions long ago were related to the present inhabitants of South and West Europe, and that they are, for the most part, of North African origin.

But before the close of the New Stone Age the uniformity of the long-headed type was disturbed by the advent of numerous short-headed peoples, both in the North-west (Furuz, Belgium) and in the South (Lozère, Lower Rhone Valley). These everywhere intermingled with the earlier long-headed type, and later became continually more numerous, until, 'towards the close of the Neolithic Age in France, the round and medium types became eight or ten times more numerous than the long in certain parts' (*P. Salmon, Races humaines préhistoriques*, p. 39). In Britain the earlier long barsrows are occupied exclusively by long-heads, the later round barsrows chiefly by round-heads, whence Thurnam's dictum: 'Long barrow, long skull; round barrow, round skull.' In France Paul Raymond, who separates the northern short-heads from the southern long-heads by a diagonal drawn from Cohentin to the Maritime Alps, has recently discovered several short-heads commingled with long-heads in the sepulchral cave of Lirac (Départ. Gard), and infers that 'vers la fin de la période néolithique vivaient dans la sudest de la France des populations dolchoscopihes qui présentaient les caractères de la race des Baumans-Auréliens (Cro-Magnon type), avec les variations que leur avaient imprégnées le croisement de brachycephaliques immigrés' (*Revue préhistorique*, Jan. 1906, p. 56).

As these Southern short-heads appear to have penetrated inland by the Rhone Valley from the south coast, they too may have come from North Africa, where a very ancient short-headed type, representing the Libyans proper and ranging into the Canary Islands, still forms the substratum in Tunisia and Kabylia, and is declared by Collignon to be remarkably like the short-headed brown French type:

'Si Ton habitait ces hommes de vêtements européens, vous ne les distinguerez pas de payans ou de soldats français' (*L'Anthrop.*, 1907, p. 474). It is generally admitted that the more numerous Northern short-heads of Europe, coming by the Danube route, in the Bronze Age some four or five thousand years ago. These ranged over a vast area in East and Central Europe, and many passed westwards through Britain into Britain, where they had been preceded by the Afro-European of both Stone Ages. Other Asiaties of a long-headed type arrived, also in the Bronze Age, or perhaps even earlier, by a northern route, and occupied the Baltic lands and Scandinavia, where they are now represented by the North Germans and Norsemen, of tall stature, fair or florid complexion, and blue eyes—Linne's typical *Homo Europaeus*. Lastly, another race of Orientation, following a southern route through Asia Minor, made its way into the Balkan region, and thence into the peninsulas of Greece and Italy, where they had been preceded by the men of the Stone Ages from North Africa.

We thus see that Europe was first settled in the south and west by North African Hamites, who came later to be known as *Pelagians* in Greece, *Ligurians* in Italy, and *Iberians* in Spain; in the east and north by Asiaties, who may now be called *Eurasians*, since their original domain comprised the whole of the Stephn-lands between the Carpathians in Europe and the Pamirs in Central Asia (Schrader). They are also commonly called *Aryans*, because all the Eurasians spoke various diverging dialects of the long extinct *Aryan* stock language. But it is obvious that, strictly speaking, 'Aryan' can be only a linguistic and not an ethnical expression, since it was seen above that the Eurasians were not of one but of two distinct physical types—short-heads and long-heads. Hence, when we speak of the Aryans, we usually mean very mixed populations of a roughly uniform Caucasian type, and of uniform Aryan speech.

It is more important to note that these Eurasians, coming in the Bronze Age, and consequently more highly cultured and equipped with better weapons for warfare, everywhere conquered the ruder Afro-European Hamites, imposed their Aryan languages
On them, and in the process merged with them into various mixed ethnic groups, which differed from each other in accordance with their different constituent elements. Thus was brought about in remote pre-historic times the Aryanization of Europe. This was considerably assisted, excluding the much later intrusion of the Finno-Ugric languages, the only non-Aryan form of speech still surviving in Europe is Basque (q.v.), which is spoken by a scattered population of the Western Pyrenees region. Basque, which represents all that remains of the old Iberian language, and is distantly related to the Berber (Hamitic) still current nearly everywhere in North Africa (G. von der Gabelen, M. Géze, Morris Jones, and others). Other survivals may have been the Pictish of Britain, since Prof. J. Rhys thinks that 'Picts and Iberians belonged to one and the same family which I have ventured to call Ibero-Pictish' (Academy, 26th Sept. 1891); and the Pelasgians of Greece, whom W. Wachsmuth calls 'ante-Hellenic,' and of whom Herodotus writes that, according to some evidence, they were the Pelasgi or Pamphylios (Homo Magnus) (l. c. 57). For Homer these Pelasgians were Eeio (H. ii. 4. 429; Od. xii. 177); for Herodotus 'barbarians' (loc. cit.), and for Dionysius Hal. (18 f.) 'Greeks' (tqj wv Pelas- gow evpEivov). Such apparently contradictory descriptions only mean that during the course of ages, the pre-Aryan inhabitants of Europe were gradually absorbed and assimilated by the Asiatic intruders of Aryan speech.

This rapid outline explains and agrees with the three great ethnical divisions proposed by Ripley, Sergi, and other leading ethnologists for the historical European populations. These are (1) the tall, fair, long-headed northern type, for which de Lacoste has written 'Homo Alpinus,' and to which Ripley applies the term 'Teutonic,' because the whole combination of physical characteristics 'accords exactly with the descriptions handed down to us by the ancients.' Thus Tacitus: 'omnibus truces et caerulei oculi, rutilae coma, magna corpora, et tantum ad imputem valid'a (Germania, iv.).—(2) The central zone of medium-sized roundheads with light brown or chestnut hair, brownish skin, and grey or hazel eyes, the Celts or Celto-Slavs of Broca, the Ligurians or Arvernians of Beddeoe, and whom, for want of a better name, Ripley calls Homo Alpinus, though also comprising the Slavs of the eastern plains. These are the short-headed, dark-skinned people from Asia, which may be supposed to have joined hands in the central European uplands, where are met the most pronounced round skulls (hypertrochicephalie in Tirol and Switzerland).—(3) The southern zone of undersized, pale, black-eyed, and black-haired long-headers, who are the primitive Afro-European element in Greece, Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Iberia, West France, and Britain, and are now generally identified with the above-mentioned Pelasgians, Ligurians, and Iberians, who were afterwards modified by Aryan intermingleings, but are grouped together by Sergi, Keane, and Ripley as 'Mediterrenean.'

All the present Aryanized inhabitants of Europe, that is, the vast majority, may now be conveniently tabulated in accordance with these three anthropological divisions as follows:

2. Homo Alpinus (Celt-Slav): most French, Bretons, and Alsacians, South Germans, Swiss, Tiroles, Austrians, Russians, Lithuanians, Poles, Czechs (Bohemians), Croats, Servians, Danes, Montenegrins, some Albanians, Bulgarians, and Roumanians.
3. Homo Mediterraneus (Ibero-Liguro-Pelagian): most Iberians, Corsicans, Sardinians, Sicilians, Epiretos (South Albanians), and Greeks.

On the linguistic basis the groupings naturally vary with the different views taken by philologists regarding the order in which the various members of the Aryan family branched off from the extinct mother-tongue. On this point there is still little accord, although it is generally allowed that, of the six recognized branches, Hellenic, Slavic, and Litho-Lettic are more closely related to one another than they are to the Italic, Teutonic, and Conic branches. The Western Pyrenean—those living in the Netherlands and a western branch, which, with their numerous sub-groups, may here be tabulated:

**AYRAN LANGUAGES FAMILY: EUROPEAN SECTION.**

**Eastern Division**

**Slavic branch:** Old Slavic, Russian, Little Russian, Bulgarian, Slovenian, Servo-Croatian, Czech (Bohemian), Polish, Polishish, Lithuanian, Latvian.

**Lithuanian branch:** Lithuanian, Latvian, Prussian (Old Prussian).

**German branch:** Old German Group: Dutch, Old Norse, Icelandic, Danish, Swedish, High, Low, Platt-Dutch, Dutch, Anglo-Saxon, English.

**Danish branch:** Danish, High German Group: Low Saxon, Frisic, Platt-Deutsch, English.

**Western Division**

**Slavic branch:** Old Slavic, Russian, Little Russian, Bulgarian, Slovenian, Servo-Croatian, Czech (Bohemian), Polish, Polishish, Lithuanian, Latvian.

**Teutonic branch:** Low German Group: Gothic, Old Norse, Icelandic, Danish, Swedish, High, Low, Platt-Dutch, Dutch, Anglo-Saxon, English.

**Italian branch:** Italian, Latin, Ocean, Umbrian, Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Romancsh, Walloon, Roumanian.

**Bulgarian branch:** Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian, Hungarian, Thuringian, Swabian, Swiss, Tirolean, Austrian.

**Celtic branch:** Old Irish, Irish, Gaelic (Gael), Manx.

**Welsh branch:** Welsh, Cornish (extinct), Low Breton.

Besides the already mentioned Basques, the only non-Aryans now in Europe are the Baltic and other Finns the Lapps, Samoyed, and Magyars of Hungary, now assimilated to the normal European type but still speaking a Ugro-Finnic language, the Osmani Turks, also largely Europeanized but not Aryansized, and lastly a few Kirghiz (Turkish) and Kalmuk (Mongol) nomads in Astrakhan. All these arrived from Asia in relatively late historic times, and can in no sense be regarded as European aborigines. The distinction of the others there is no question—it is important to note that the views formerly held regarding a western extension of the Finnic race over the whole of Europe and the British Isles are now exploded.

1. Despite the fact that all the Finns are distinctly round-headed, they were identified first with the long-headed cave-dwellers, who retreated northwards, and latterly with the Ugros tribe of the north, for whose sake the Finnic tongue, which has nothing in common and half the myths, folklore, and legendary heroes of the western nations were traced to Finno-ugrian sources (Keane, Men Past and Present, p. 364).

2. In fact, recent research has shown that the advent of the Finns in Finland itself dates only from about the new era, and the men of the Bronze Age in this region were not Finns but Teutons (A. Hackmann, Die Bronzezeit Finnlands, 1897, passim). Tacitus (Germ. xvi.) does not know whether his Fenni (Ptolemies's Fvvo) were Germans or Sarmatians (Slavs); but the reference to the children's cradles suspended from the branches of trees shows that they were the Σπελαηφοροι of Procopius (de Bell. Goth. II. 15), and the Sciride-Finnns of King Alfred (Orosius, l. 12), that is, the Lapps, who are still always called Finns by the Norwegians.

During the slow process of fusion between the Afro-European indigenes and the European intruders, their religious faiths all became early intermingled, so that the pre-Christian forms of belief were all of a mixed character like those described in art. *Aborigines*. Even after the fusion, further intermingleings took place through
infiltrations from Egypt and Persia, and, more especially, from the Semitic world. Nor were these later influences confined to the contiguous Hellenic and Aryan lands, but were carried by the Phoenician seafarers westwards to Iberia and the British Isles, when they are reflected in the national legends and even in the very language of the Celtic-speaking natives of Ireland, e.g. Bal Dhia dhuil, ‘God Baal to you’; and there is a district in Ireland which is called Béal-ochtú, ‘Field of the worship of Baal.’ Elsewhere this Baal-cult was associated with phallic rites, as in Phoenicia.

To discriminate between all these heterogeneous elements is no longer possible, though it seems safe to say that the higher forms—the Olympian deities and personifications of the natural forces—came in with the more cultured Eurasians, and were by them superimposed on the rude animism and the chthonic gods of the Euro-Africans, while the mysteries and degrading rites of the Cabiri, of Dionysus, Astarte, and the worshippers of Mithra and Isis (these twice expelled from Rome), were introduced by Oriental origin. Thus the compound forms Δυσαζίας, Ζεῦ-ταρε, Δίς-πιτερ (Jupiter), show at once that Jove was already dominant before the Aryan dispersion, and subsequently assimilated by other Euro-Africans, by whom his supremacy was spread north, through Lithuania (Dacieza) to Scandinavia (Týr), Germany (Ziu), and west to Britain (A.S. Tuesedeg, Eng. Tuesday = ‘day of Týr’) and Ireland, where das retains all the associated meanings—sky, or ‘heaven’, ‘day’, and ‘god.’ On the other hand, Jove’s counterpart, the goddess Ertha (Herthas, Earth), was clearly an Aryan-European divinity, since she was worshipped by the whole Celtic-speaking region as human sacrifice in some customary wood, with the Veđic and other proto-Aryans, and has been identified with Rhea, Ops, Demeter, Cybele, and other distinctly chthonic divinities. But she was early added by the Eurasians to their pantheon, for Tacitus tells us (Germ. xl) that the Angli (Continental English) ‘Herthum (variant Erthum), id est, Terram matrem, colonum.’ He adds that the rites observed in her honour on an island in the ocean (Kiügen) concluded with the sacrifice of the attendant slaves, whom the lake in her hallowed grove (castum nemus) ‘swallowed up.’ With this should be compared the orgies practised by the Celts in honour of Cuile, daughter of Terra, or Terra herself, in Phrygia and Thrace, whose worship passed into Greece (Elesinian mysteries), and thence into Italy, where her shrine was annually cleansed by the waters of the river Almo, just as Ertha’s chariot and raiment were cleansed in the above-mentioned lake at the foot of a high cliff which to this day is called ‘Ertha’s rock.’ The Italic ‘Ertha’ was called Bona Dea, and her non-Aryan origin is admitted, as is also that of the Irish chthonic goddess Morrigan, the ‘Great Queen,’ who has been identified with Cybele.

That human sacrifices, apparently unknown in the Aryan cradle-land, were everywhere practised by the Eurasians in their new western homes, that is, were adopted from their Euro-African predecessors, is evident from Cesar’s account (de Bell. Gall. vi. 16) of the frightful holocausts in Gaul, and from many other less familiar indications. From Tacitus we learn (Germ. ix.) that ‘deorum maxime Mercarium solunt, cui certa diebus humanis quoque sacrificia spectant’ (Tacitus, Histories of the Germans and Scandinavians (as seen in the English Wednesday-day), and the Greek Ἐγκυρία, who, Herodetus tells us, was sacrificed by the Thracians to their gods (v. 7). In Rome, sexagenarians were called semes deportantes, ‘old bridge-castaways’; because old people, when a bridge was finished, were thrown into the water as a sort of bridge-toll to appease the offended river-god for this intrusion on his domain. The tribute had to be paid not once only, but every year, and it was a function of the Vestal Virgins to throw the deportantes into the river. Later, for the living victims the so-called arges—rush or straw figures—were substituted as the piscorum virorum simulacra. The statement that the sexagenarii deorum were the same which dejicibus’ occur in Festus, and in Tacitus, who referring to the Emperor’s attempts at general assembly in The Evolution of the Jews, 356. An echo of the practice, which appears to have been wide-spread, survives in the Wendland district of Hanover on the Elbe, formerly inhabited by Slavs (Wedos), but now by Low Germans, who declare that their exhortation, kruus unwor, kruus unwor, de Welt is de gräns (‘creep under, creep under, to thee the world is [now] grim’), was once used as a prayer [encouragement] when the old people were thrown from the bridge into the water (ib.). Bridge-building was a matter of such importance to the community that a priest called a pontifex, or ‘bridge-maker,’ was appointed to superintend the works, and to be a guide and, graduate of the priestly order, the Pontifex Maximus—a title which still survives as that of the Roman Pontiff, whence Long fellow’s

We are told by Tacitus (Germ. xxix.) that the Semones, who occupied a vast domain between the Elbe and the Oder, opened their national assemblies with horrible barbaric rites at which a human victim was immolated publice, that is, on behalf of the people. Even sati, or widow-burning, which was practised in India and unknown to the Greeks, Romans, and Celts, was practised both by the Slavs and by the Germans. After her husband’s death the wife mounted the pyre—not, however, as an act of heroic devotion and a voluntary immolation, as amongst the Later Hindus, but because she had, nonets volens, ‘to share the fate of all the other possessions which were sent into the graves of a deceased man, perhaps under the impression that he could make use of them in the other world; perhaps because the idea that they should fall into other hands was repugnant to him. Besides his weapon, his horse, his attendants, and his boudoir, his wife also was sent after him’ (Herber, op. cit. p. 31). In Greece we hear little of human offerings, which seem almost excluded by Herodotus, who asks (ii. 45): ‘If even animals, except bulls, swine, calves, and geese were unlawful, facet obsa (the Hellespont) perhaps the bodies of the dead were thrown into the Egean sea, and were wounded together with the ships. I myself have seen the heads of the Slavs, then the head of the German and the head of the Irish person, the head of the Christian, who were burnt in Nar-land, where the custom was universal till the introduction of Christianity, and was even observed, or at least threatened, by way of retaliation, by the first converts in Iceland. In the year 1000, the champions of the old faith having offered up two men to the gods, calling upon them not to let Christianity overrun the land, the Christians retorted that they too would make an offering of two men.

‘The heathens,’ they said, ‘sacrifice the worst men, and cast them over the bridge or cliffs; but we cast the best men, and call it a gift for victory to our Lord Jesus Christ’” (Crangie, The Religion of Ancient Scandinavia, p. 88 l)

In the same spirit, on the opposite side, the Norwegian king Olaf Tryggvason (968) threatened a great immolation, saying:

‘I will not choose thralls or criminals, but will select the most distinguished men to give to the gods’ (ib. 461).

So in Denmark, at the great national gathering held every nine years, a holocaust was made of ninety men, with as many horses and dogs. In the Swedish annals it is recorded under the Thorsmen kings (v. 7). In Rome, sexagenarians were called semes deportantes, ‘old bridge-castaways’; because old people, when a...
the early kings was made a ‘burnt-offering’ to Odin in order to end a famine caused by his slackness in keeping up the sacrifices, while another king immolated nine of his sons in succession to Odin, to obtain long life for himself. Lastly, it is related in the Guta Seige that the people of the island of Gotland ‘sacrificed their sons and daughters and their cattle. All the land was hallowed with sacrifices with fresh human beings; he also bad each third (of the country) by itself’ (ib. p. 571).

For the western Celtic world reference has already been made in the account of the Irish Druids. But the early Slavs were also a people steeped in the rites and beliefs of the nature-goddess and her followers. Finally, we have the Hellenistic colonists who brought to Europe the Greek idea of the persistence of the human soul after death, and also the idea of the immortality of the soul.

For the rest, there is no hard and fast line to be drawn between the religious beliefs and practices of the early Aryans and the later European peoples. The transition was gradual and often incomplete.

But such details made little difference; and, when we find monogamy the rule amongst the early Europeans and later universal, we recognize in the fact the same moral conception of the marriage laws

which placed them so far higher than all contemporary nations of antiquity. In this respect the Aryans are proved to have been a civilized nation of the first rank’ (Ihering, op. cit. p. 29).

No less beneficial was the patriarchy, with descent through the male line, which everywhere superseded the universal tabu of the incipient Celtic, the presence or absence of which is the main feature of the primitive marriage system. For the Aryans had developed or adopted the system of patri-matrimony, where the mother of the children belonged to the husband of the mother, and the father of the children was the father of the children. This is a matter of some importance, for the Aryans entered Europe, where, consequently, the trace of the system is still preserved to-day in the form of family, where the slave or servent, the wife, and the children were all under the head of the husband, and the woman was the steward of her husband.

But the Aryan system was not the only system of marriage that was adopted by the Aryans. The Romans, for example, had a mixed system of marriage, where the husband was the head of the family, and the woman was the steward of her husband. The Romans also had a system of polygamy, where a man could have more than one wife.

Thus in the Dianachus it is stated that to Crom Cruch, the chief Irish deity, his votaries offered ‘the first-born of all offspring, and the first-born of the female children’—probably a Phenician god, as the story goes. In Greece, too, the gods were worshipped in pairs, and the worship of the gods was an important part of the religious life of the people.

It matters little whether this actually occurred or not, since the mere mention of it as a possibility shows that the early Christian writers were aware of the pagan customs, for which there is in any case a vast abundance of collateral evidence.

Thus in the Dianachus it is stated that to Crom Cruch, the chief Irish deity, his votaries offered ‘the first-born of all offspring, and the first-born of the female children’—probably a Phenician god, as the story goes. In Greece, too, the gods were worshipped in pairs, and the worship of the gods was an important part of the religious life of the people.

If the proto-Aryans adopted these revolting practices from the Afro-European aborigines, which seems scarcely open to doubt, they did so not because their own practices were good, but because they could not afford the luxury of many wives. Moreover, the marriage relation received religious sanction, which was even compulsory in certain cases, and was thus a prehistoric time the whole of Aryanized Europe was ordered to have been monogamous. The business part of the transaction varied considerably; in Rome the bride brought the dowry to her husband, while the Germans and Slavs brought the dowry to the bride, that is, bought her, as we see in the case of Vladimir the Great (898), who forcibly abducted an unwedded Byzantine princess, and then paid her relations for her; cf. Tacitus: "dedit non uxori marito, sed uxori maritus offert" (Germ. xviii.).
Catawbas of North America, and still is by the Bulgarians, the Japanese, the Hindus, the Tahitians, and the Fijians of the central Pacific Ocean. Small-fire-myths are met with from the Prometheus in Hellas to that of the extinct Tasmanians, who had no fire at all until two natives, standing on a hill, threw it about like sticks.

'After this no more was fire lost in our land. The two blackfellows are in the clouds; in the clear night you see them staking around the hill above it and through, and put the fire to roast and melt at the fire. . . . Lady — says the Princess Indian — is the consummation whenever the fire is not strangers at table; and she thinks her Royal Highness really has a superstition that destroying this efficacy of her husband will bring the more the life of his Domestication of his Royal Highness (G. Clerici, a Queen of Indiscretion, J. Chapman's English ed. 1667).

So in Ross-shire the rudely shaped image of the person aimed at is 'stuck all over with pins and thorns and placed in a running stream. As the image is worn away by the action of the water the victim is carried away with some mortal disease. The more pins that are stuck in from time to time the more excruciating agony the victim suffers. Should, however, any watcher discover the corp (effigy) in the stream, the spell is broken and the victim duly recovers' (Haddon; Magic and Fetiche, p. 59).

In the Isle of Wight the plan is to put a slug under a flower-pot, fix it there with a pin or a needle, and leave it to die, when the victim also is sure to die.

"Our early Teuton forefathers," remarks F. York Powell (in Religions Systems of the World, London, 1891, p. 570), "were influenced by anthropomorphism and animism, and thought that inanimate objects, as stones, stars, and the elements, and organisms such as trees, fishes, birds and beasts, were possessed of spirits akin to their own.

From this root-idea, which belongs to all primitive systems (see art. ETHNOLOGY, § 9), sprung these countless hosts of invisible beings, some good, some evil, some harmless, some who have throughout the ages filled the upper, the terrestrial, and the lower regions, and whose numbers were greatly increased by the ancestor-worship which was highly characteristic of the pre-Aryanans. As these immigrants failed to sweep away the lower forms of animism (as above), so the Christian system not only left the spirit-world untouched, but enlarged it with Lucifer and his fallen angels, and with those δαίμων πόλλα and πηγαινα έκδο- αγών whose name was 'Legion' (Mk 5). Satan and Beelzebub were also recognized, and, demonology having thus received a new lease of existence, it is not surprising that it should continue to flourish throughout Christendom down to the present day. Its name is still 'Legion,' as we read in the Life and Works of Robert Burns (ed. R. Chambers, 1831, p. 10), where Betty Davidson, who lived in the family,

'had the largest collection in the country of tales and songs concerning devils, ghosts, fairies, brownies, witches, warlocks, spookies, kelpies, elf-candles, dead-light's, wraiths, apparitions, caradoces, giants, enchanted towers, dragons, and other tripe.'

Nor does this exhaust the list, which further includes leprechauns, leprechauns, churlions, good people, fairies (imagined), the Law Family, the Fair Family, the Ithoehod, the Cynoerach, the morrigan, phoebes, pixies, spooks, spectres, sprites, nixers or water-kelpies, bogles or boggs, bug-bears, bug-a-boys, goblins, holm-goblins, fays, ogres, daces, dwarfs, liab-

friends, pucks, trolls, nissens, damhests, damavoi, rotri, korkis, korigans, nadals, nymps, dryads, syphes, wer-warch, and every more local and personal Gespenister and 'familiar spirits' (cf. Socrates), so that some parts of Europe are said to be more thickly peopled with these invisible spirits than with human beings. And Sir Conan Doyle writes (Sir Nigel, 1898) that 'in those simple times (14th. cent.) the Devil raged openly upon the earth; he stalked behind the hedge-rows in the gloaming; he laughed loudly at the laughing time the night-time. His 'brothers' (through Smyth, Abor. of Vict., Melbourne, 1878, ii. 461).

A closer parallel is the wax effigy of a person, by means of which he was done to death at a distance—a practice found almost everywhere in Europe. The process as described by Ovid (Ep. vi. 91)—

"Devente absentes, simulacra cecis fict,"

Et miracum tenues in juere urget acous"—

is exactly the same as that adopted by the hapless Princess Caroline to encompass the death of the Prince of Legist.

'She made a wax figure as usual, and gave it an amiable addition of large horns; then took three pins out of her gar- ment and stuck them through and through, and put the figure to roast and melt at the fire. . . . Lady — says the Princess Indian — is the consummation whenever the fire is not strangers at table; and she thinks her Royal Highness really has a superstition that destroying this efficacy of her husband will bring the more the life of his Domestication of his Royal Highness (G. Clerici, a Queen of Indiscretion, J. Chapman's English ed. 1667).

Then, as the majority of these spirits were dangerous or ill-disposed, all kinds of devices were naturally invented or developed to thwart their designs and the machinations of those supposed to be in league with them (see art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS). Thus arose those otherwise unaccountable charms (formule), spells, incantations, preparations, reading of horoscopes, fortune-telling, ordeals, duels, and especially that sinister belief in witchcraft (g.v.) which broke out again and again through the medieval times and which is perpetuated of unaccountable horrors by religious and other fanatics. It is scarcely three centuries since James i., the author of a special work on Demonology, put two hundred wretched victims of the craze, along with a noble and learned physician, to a horrible death on the charge of having 'raised the wind' against the coming of his Norwegian bride. Whoever wants to understand the full essence of his frightful blasphemy and ferocity should read Cantic's official revelations of the witchcraft mania, which did not receive its death-blow till the judges of the ecclesiastical courts were themselves struck at by their victims under torture (see Manzoni, I Promessi Sposi, Turin, 1827).

'Fear in high places thus removed one great evil, but left others which still persist, and all of which have a religious basis. Such is the ordeal, which is the last surviving form of the ordeal in Europe. Its great antiquity is shown by its archaic Latin form duellum, of which belium is a much later modification (cf. Hor. Od. iii, v. 29, 'paccum duello miscuit'). The ordeal itself, that is, the A.S. ordeal, the Germ. Urteil, and Lat. judicium Dei, persisted under various forms from the earliest times far into modern times, as will be clearly seen in Shakespeare's Richard III. 1. 2, where allusion is made to the test of touch to which suspected murderers were subjected. At their contact the wound of their victims were supposed to bleed afresh. The close association of these oracles with early religious beliefs, as pointed out in art. AUSTRALASIA, is clearly illustrated in the pagan Anglo-Saxon coronet, under which an accused person was required to swallow a piece of bread or cheese exorcised by the priest. If he did so easily, he was innocent; if with an effort, guilty: and it may easily be supposed that, in persons of weak nerves, the awe of the surroundings might produce the effect, even in the case of guiltless persons. In Christian times the coronet, like the fire, water, and so many other unpleasant ordeals, was still continued, the consecrated wafer being now substituted for the exorcised bread (see, further, artt. DUELING, ORDEAL).

A still more striking instance of the fusion of the old and the new systems is afforded by the mixed rite of his manifestation among the European gypsies, more especially those of Hungary and Austria, who have for some generations been nominal Christians, mostly Roman Catholics, but also Orthodox Greeks in some dis-

...
tricks. But none of them is quite clear about the presiding deity, though the prevalent idea is that the dethroned ruler, the Bero puro ducel, ‘great old god,’ has long been dead, and that the world is now governed by his son and successor, the dino tarmo ducel, the ‘small young god,’ i.e., Jesus Christ. Another theory is that the first still lives, and has only abdicated in favour of the second. Others, again, hold that the old god is really dead, but that he is not the son, but the son of a carpenter, having, like Jupiter, usurped the throne on which he is now seated. He controls the elements, and is not a beneficent deity, since, like Saturn, he ‘devours his children,’ i.e., allows them to die. He also has fire, lightning, and thunder, when he sends down thunder and lightning, snow, rain, and hail, which destroy their crops, burn their villages, and cause many other disasters. These gypsies can ascertain the nature properly so called. They do not worship the old or the new god, they have no kind of rites or ceremonies, and their heng, or devil, is borrowed from the Christians.

They believe in omens and prophecies; they give credit to the existence of ghosts and spectres, are afraid of the pernicious touch of the evil eye, and suspect to have the portrait taken lest they might be bewitched” (Featherman, Dirveut, p. 64).

In these respects the eastern gypsies differ in no way from their western kindred, or from the great bulk of the uneducated classes in every part of Europe. The Irish peasantry have endless magic cures for rheumatism, jaundice, whooping-cough, toothache, and other ailments.

Edith Wheeler tells (O值守ia Review, iv. [Nov. 1903] that the jaundiced are managed by having taken three times over water running south. The whooping-cough is stopped by taking the patient to a child that has never seen its father, and letting the ‘sacred hair’ of the sufferer and ‘the curse with work.’ On a headland in Co. Clare there is an old altar, and near it a pool of fresh water, and a ‘bed of stones’ — the saint’s bed—to which the pilgrims come and walk round three times, and, if a child of stunted growth be carried round in the same way and then dipped in the pool, it will grow up properly, if the little fishes come to the top of the water.

So in Co. Mayo there is a well from which no woman, though perishing with thirst, would dare to draw water, until certain rites are performed with a new-born babe, else it would turn to worms and blood. In the same district another well is visited by women who come to pray for the sick. ‘They go round the well and kiss the water, praying and weeping, till they obtain satisfaction. At the conclusion of their devotions, a strange thing is seen in the well; their prayer is answered. I have seen a poor woman know the answer, and look in the well with the eyes half closed, and gaining with agonised anxiety into the clear water’ (Sir H. Blake, in Mac. 1903, no. 11).

Here is an Irish charm for the toothache: “May the thumb of chosen Thomas in the side of guileless Christian heal my teeth and make me whole, and cast away from me worms and maggot’ again showing the blend of old pagan and Christian traditions. The strong, the harmless, and the personal concerns at funerals are also very ancient, and certainly pre-Christian, if not pre-Aryan.

Certain observances, which later acquired a religious character or became associated with magical agencies, were originally of a purely practical nature. See, e.g., art. AUSTRALASIA; so also the inspection of the entrails of birds and cattle for divination purposes in Greece, Rome, and Etruria had a similar utilitarian object. But many, or perhaps all, of the divinatory operations recognized by Democratia, who thought that not the pleasure of the gods, but the healthiness of the climate and the richness or poverty of the soil, were indicated by the condition of the intestines of the animals living in the district:

‘palmi genus, et sarmum remus, quas terra processat, vel ulceratur, geit noxum terrae exumia, nullam temetum etiam, aut pestilentiam extis esticendi sita’ (Cicero, Nat. D. 2. 4. 9). This view is rejected by Cicero but adopted and revived by Ihering (loc. cit.), who concludes generally that the ancients associated with the study of the extra, the flight and song of birds, i.e., the ‘avium voces volutusque,’ as in Tacitus, Germ. x., the feeding of poultry (tripudia), and so on—

‘sui pratticae, quaeque peccatae, quaeque sanctae quodammodo ut sunt, and has been added, as was the case with so many other primitive institutions, after they had lost their original and practical meaning.”

Those who reject this explanation can take refuge only in the notion that in remote antiquity the people believed that the deity revealed himself in the belly of an ox (‘interesse deum singulis pecorum flius’) (Héring, p. 570). This is, in fact, the natural solution of such practices, since primitive man must at some time have been concerned with the quest of food and other material considerations than with costly and elaborate religious ceremonies (see, further, art. DIVINATION). Some of the methods of divination are of great age, and may well have been brought by the proto-Aryans from their Asiatic homes. Such is that of the old Germans which is described by Tacitus, Germ. x., and is exactly like one practised by the Seythians, as in Herodotus, iv. 67. The ancient oracles have long been silent, but their voices, the messages from above, seem still to linger in the thunder-cloud, in the lightning-flash, in the soughing of the wind, and especially in the sound of bells, which, like the holy water, are potent, when blessed, to dissipate foul weather and to scare the evil spirits riding in the gale.

It is the custom, the consecration, which endows the bell, the Agnus Dei, the scapular, and other such talismans with their mana, their supernatural virtue (see art. MELANIES and AUSTRALASIA), and has caused Haddan to declare that ‘all religion is saturated with magic.’ Certainly the belief in magic influences is still universal in Europe, and Haddan does not hesitate to declare that ‘four-fifths of mankind, probably, believe in sympathetic magic’ (ops. cit. p. 2). By sympathetic is meant what Frazer calls a compound magic, which requires, if not actual contact, at least some material connexion between the person and the object operated upon. A few hairs, nail-parings, a drop of blood, clothes, personal ornaments, anything will suffice, not only to cause death, but also to produce any other desired effect. Thus in England:

‘a girl forsaken by her lover is advised to get a lock of his hair and bell it; whilst it is simmering in the pot he will have no rest. In certain parts of Germany and Transylvania the clipping of the hagels-pohonius is magic, which, if performed, is said to bring the dead into the garden, and if buried beneath the elder tree which grows in the courtyard are not burnt, or carefully hidden, for fear of witches” (ib. p. 5).

To this, perhaps, may be due the strange object some people have to being overshadowed by an eider-tree, one of which the present writer had to remove from his garden to oblige a superstitious neighbour.

All kinds of magic processes are adopted as counter-charms against the baneful effects of the evil eye, &c., the dread of which is universal in Italy. Any reputed jettatore—and Pope Pius the Ninth himself was one—causes a general stampede should he appear in a crowded street, and, ‘ever since the establishment of the religious orders, monks have had the special reputation in the church of wearing the fatal influence’ (ib. p. 34). It is perhaps the very oldest superstition of which there is distinct record. It was known not only to the Greeks and Romans (Julius Tertullus), but even to the early Egyptians, one of whose most common amulets was the so-called ‘Eye of Osiris.’

‘These mystical eyes were worn equally by the living and the dead as amulets. If the eye were natural, they were supposed to have the power of having the power of the homopathic magic, that representations of the eye itself should have been considered potent amulets against its malign influence’ (ib. p. 31). See also ERF. Much more common was the practice of cutting off any one falling under its baneful influence.

And of the ‘Hundred Battles,’ a legendary Irish hero, it is related that he always kept his right eye closed, because its glance was found to be fatal to any one falling under its baneful influence.
As a rule, any one might practise magie if only he or she knew how. But there were specialists—medicine-men, shamans, Druids, magicians, sorcerers, wizards, witches, wise women, and others—who professed the science, and who had to undergo a severe probation, in which long fasting and vows proved that their sins had been forgiven. Amongst the Finns and Lapps they were also constituted the tribe or college of witches, which, like those of the Roman and Etruscan augurs and haruspices, exercised considerable influence even in political matters. But after the suppression of the order of Druids (q. e.) by the Emperor Claudius, such societies were never reconstituted in Aryan Europe, and their place was later taken by the Christian hierarchy. Nevertheless, C. G. Leland refers to some such association that still persisted in Tuscany, which, however, is shrouded in much mystery. Its professors, mostly women, are said to meet in secret and, like the Anatolian Yezidis, to observe some old-time rites, and to dispense charms and spells to their followers (Etruscan Roman Remains in Popular Tradition).

It may be mentioned in this connexion that the term saecratores occurs more than once in Tacitus (Get. 148, 150), although references from other sources that the Germans had no distinct order of priests like the Celtic Druids. Thus Cæsar states positively (de Bell. Gall. vi. 21) that the Germans 'neque Druides habebant, neque sacrificium student.' Yet Tacitus calls his saecratores 'ministros deorum,' and adds that they kept order and controlled the proceedings in the public assemblies. On the other hand, we know from the sagas that amongst the pagan Scandinavians there was no distinct priestly caste, but that the priestly and civil functions were vested in the same person—the king, earl, or district chief, spoken of as 'ruler of the sanctuaries,' or godi, from goði, 'god,' like the English 'divines' from root divus, deus. It appears, also, that women, to some extent, acted as priestesses, although their precise relation to the priestly chiefs is not clear. The office was hereditary, and, as the godi was both a chief and a priest, the name did not disappear with the adoption of Christianity, though it naturally lost its religious associations and thereupon was denoted only the recognized leader in the various districts' (Craigie, op. cit. p. 65).

About the Celtic Druids, their status and functions, much diversity of opinion still prevails, the reason being that the term itself covers three different orders, as it was used in Gaul and in Britain. By Cæsar these are all merged in one, the Druidic as opposed to the military order; but they are carefully distinguished by Diodorus, Pliny, and especially Strabo (after Ptolemy), who speak, as we still do, of the Druids proper, the vates (seers), and the poets (bardis). The Druids were rather philosophers and theologians than priests, though they had to be present at the sacrifices. They taught Pythagorean doctrines, and the immortality of the soul through transmigration, to their disciples gathered in caves and secluded groves where trees might have still survived, and where, in any case, high honour was paid to the cow, and to its parasite the mistletoe, the emblem of love, which still plays a part in our Yule-tide festivities. Cæsar (de Bell. Gall. vi.) says that these arcaea were known not only in Gaul, but under the Continental Druids resorted to complete their education. So in later times the first dawning of the new learning came also from Britain and Ireland (p. 23). And if the term 'ascetic' be extended to include the Stoical, Christian, or Scholastic philosophy. The true priests were the vates, who performed the sacrifices which, till suppressed by the Roman Emperors, were marked by features of a peculiarly atrocious character. They practised divination by the slaughter of a human victim, and the observation of the aëreous emanation which from it might issue forth, the spitting of the blood, and the like, this being 'an ancient and established practice among their disciples. And lastly, the barda (v. e.) were minstrels and poets, often retainers of powerful chiefs, whose heroic deeds they sang, thus stirring up fierce rivalries between neighbouring clansmen in society, and acting as pacemakers. They would at times step in between hostile tribes, and, like the Sabine women, induce them to stop the fight. A volume would scarcely suffice to state the contradictory views held regarding the Irish Druids, barda, brenons (legislators), ollamhs (teachers), and others, all of whom, according to the bias or ignorance of the writers, receive indiscriminate praise or vilification as priests, philosophers, astronomers, minstrels, poets, learned doctors, law-givers, or physicians, or else as charlatans, impostors, astrologers, sorcerers, necromancers, magicians, and so on. Eugene O'Curry, who knew them best, declares that 'there is no ground whatever for believing the Druids to have been the priests of any special positive worship'; while E. Ledwich tells us confidently that 'the Druids possessed no internal or external doctrine, either verified by symbols, or clouted in enigma, or any religious tenets which did not, but the charismatical elements, the mental and physical powers of ecstasy or religious illusion' ('Antiquities of Ireland, quoted by Bonwick, Irish Druids, p. 36'). Cæsar also notes, Rel. of Anu, Celta, 1911, passim.

Hence Bonwick (p. 23) shrewdly remarks that 'it is as easy to call a Druid a deceiver as a politician a traitor, or a scientist a sorcerer, and a saint a phoney.'

One thing is clear, that Druidism was not removed by Patrick, who rather exaggerated Christianity on the pagan superstition with so much skill that he won the people over to the Christian religion before they understood the difference; there was no distinct priestly caste, but that the priestly and civil functions were vested in the same person—the king, earl, or district chief, spoken of as 'ruler of the sanctuaries,' or godi, from goði, 'god,' like the English 'divines' from root divus, deus. It appears, also, that women, to some extent, acted as priestesses, although their precise relation to the priestly chiefs is not clear. The office was hereditary, and, as the godi was both a chief and a priest, the name did not disappear with the adoption of Christianity, though it naturally lost its religious associations and thereupon was denoted only the recognized leader in the various districts' (Craigie, op. cit. p. 65).


EUSTATHIUS.—Eustathius, bishop of Sebaste in Armenia, was regarded as the apostle of monotheism in the northern part of Asia Minor. Probably he was the compiler of the so-called "Life of the Ascetic Life attributed to St. Basil." (Constitutions Asceticæ, see Garnier's Intro. to the Benedict. ed. of St. Basil's works). For these reasons he
deserves more generous treatment than he has generally received at the hands of ecclesiastical historians.

Euthanasia appears to have been the son of a bishop, Eulalus (Soz. iv. 24, 9; Soc. ii. 43, 1), and was born about A.D. 300. He was the pupil of the heresiarch Arian in Alexandria (Basil, Ep. 223, 224). He does not appear to have been prepared in advance for his duties of dogmatic teaching. He acquired, while in Egypt, a great admiration for the lives of the early hermit ascetics. On his return to Asia Minor he commenced to practice asceticism in a manner which brought him into conflict with his father, Bishop Eulalus (Soc. ii. 43, 1), and earned him a reputation as a dangerous man (Basil, Ep. 223). He gathered around him a considerable band of disciples, known as Eustathians, who perhaps exaggerated his ascetic practices and teaching. They, though apparently not Eustathius himself, came under the censure of the Council of Gangra (341). There is no suggestion that they were idolized as dogmatically unsound; what was objected to was the severity and unchristian nature of some of their forms of asceticism, and the extreme, puritanical narrowness of their efforts to make the clergy in general conform to these ascetic practices. We must either have been opposed to this exaggeration of his teaching or must have disassociated himself from his followers, for, in or about A.D. 345, he became bishop of Sebaste. A few years later his intimate friendship with St. Basil began (Basil, Ep. 223).

He was at this time noted as an able preacher, a man of exemplary life (Soz. iii. 14, 30), and a leader of 'very excellent monks' (vii. 27, 4). He founded his ἱστολογος, a great house for strangers and hospital for the sick, in Sebaste (Epiph. Hier. lxxv. 1), and placed it under the charge of monks. This was the model of St. Basil's more famous institution in Caesarea. Although he lived through the stormy period of the Arian and semi-Arian controversies, his interest in dogmatic questions appears to have been small. He probably believed that some satisfactory middle way could be discovered, and wished to be left in peace to perform his practical work. He signed, without apparently realizing his inconsistency, the creeds of Ancyrn (A.D. 350), Constantine (359), and Lampsacon (364) (see ARIANISM). It was this indifference to the dogmatic issues at stake that was the cause of his quarrel with Basil. Perhaps the main reason was not the man to spare an opponent, and Eustathius had suffered in the estimation of ecclesiastical historians by the account which is given of him by his former friend, after the rupture. We last hear of Eustathius, then an old man, in Basil's Ep. 269, written A.D. 377, and we may suppose that his death took place shortly after this date.


JAMES O. HANWAY.

EUTANASIA.—Euthanasia may be defined as the doctrine of the life-saving, in certain circumstances, when, owing to disease, senility, or the like, a person's life has permanently ceased to be either agreeable or useful, the sufferer should be painlessly killed, either by himself or by another.

The discussion of the subject, especially from the standpoint of Applied Ethics, is exceedingly difficult for several reasons. In the first place, it may easily be misconstrued as a mere recommendation of suicide or of the wholesale murder of aged or infirm people. Secondly, the effect of such a doctrine on weak or unbalanced minds, incapable of weighing aright the conditions which may be held to render death more desirable than life, is very apt to be pernicious. Thirdly—and this is the greatest difficulty of all—the question must be considered whether there are any grave and important obstacles in the way of any practical application in a modern civilized community. In order to make euthanasia in any sense a legal proceeding, one would be obliged to encumber, not merely prejudices or even time-honoured religious beliefs, but the healthy and moral feeling that human life is too sacred and valuable to be taken except under a few very definite conditions.

In other words, euthanasia would constitute a new form of justifiable homicide, and, unless most strictly regulated, would lead to an appalling increase in sordid forms of crime already far too common. It would be particularly objectionable in the case of an infant afflicted with an incurable hereditary disease, or with idiocy, might be put to death, a new excuse for infanticide—terribly prevalent, as is well known, in the case of illegitimate children—would at once come into existence. The most part a mere act of insensateness, rashness, or cowardice—would be likely to become more common than it now is if, for instance, persons suffering from a disease known or supposed to be incurable were rather encouraged to take their life than discouraged from such a procedure.

On the other hand, we can hardly refuse to recognize that an application of the doctrine of euthanasia could provide a solution to many grave problems which the modern State is obliged to face. Take a single example, already incidentally mentioned. In all communities a great number of children are born seriously defective in body, or mind, or both. Although a certain proportion of these can be cured by proper medical attention, many cannot, by all the resources of modern surgery and medicine, be made normal; and this applies especially to those who are more or less completely idiotic. Many of these unfortunate are not so obviously abnormal as to make their condition plain to a casual observer, and, especially among the poorer classes, they are frequently treated almost as fully rational beings and allowed to mingle with the community at large and even to propagate their kind. The only substitute for euthanasia is segregation; but the argument for which was put forward some years ago by an eminent worker in that field, M. W. Barr, of the Pennsylvania School for Feeble-minded Children. This writer draws attention to the excellent results produced, within his own experience, in a large number of cases, by industrial training in properly-conducted institutions. His claim is that the feeble-minded can be made actually useful, as many of them, we consider that the physical skill, and that their lives are far from unhappy under such conditions. But he freely admits that it is only by careful segregation and training that such results can be accomplished; and this obviously involves heavy expense of all sorts, including the diverting of the abilities and energies of a number of physicians, etc., from other fields of activity. Whether, even in the most favourable cases, the result would be justified by the labour and this leaves out of account many individuals whose mental disabilities afford little or no hope of any considerable improvement. A carefully controlled system of euthanasia, on the contrary, would eliminate the more hopeless, but in the very necessity of control lies the
great, if not the fatal, difficulty. Supposing all objection removed to the taking of life otherwise than in battle, self-defence, or capital punishment, there would still remain the fact that, as a valuable asset, and the question as to where, in any conceivable community, an authority could be found competent to decide whether a given individual was to live or not, and to carry out the decision in practice. Apart from all purely moral considerations, if we treat the matter as one of mere calculation, it is obviously most difficult, if not impossible, to judge whether a helpless, known to possess considerable intellectual powers, or is not more of a burden to the community by reason of the constant attendance he will require than of benefit to it because of his possibilities of brain-work. And, even were this difficulty overcome, we should still have to deal with the vexed question of the limits of the State's functions; for by no means all thinkers, even of those farthest from extreme Individualism, are disposed to allow to any State such wide authority in matters of life and death. Thus Sidney Ball, a writer of rather decided Socialist tendencies, holds that 'the real danger of Collectivism is ... that it would be easier, or at least as easy, as Plato his old direction of "social surgery."' When to these theoretical difficulties are added the certainty of most emphatic opposition from all religious bodies, the problem remains too little to be reckoned with of the more squeamish kind of humanitarianism, and the great likelihood, already referred to, of abuse in practice, it is obvious that any extended application of this doctrine is, at present at least, out of the question. This goes a long way to account for the extreme paucity of literature on the subject in recent times. So far as the present writer is aware, no important work by any modern author deals at any length with the topic. And, as a matter of historical fact, euthanasia has never been put into practice. We intend in the remainder of this article to give a brief account of certain approximations to it which have existed or still exist, and of the views of those writers—mainly ancient—who have upheld some form of it.

1. Non-civilized communities. — One of the most noteworthy features of savage and barbarian, as opposed to civilized, society is the relative unimportance of the individual as compared with the community. This is seen, for example, in the frequency of various forms of human sacrifice, which appears to have been so generally accepted and quite calmly by the victim himself; in the absolute obedience of most, if not all, savages to the elaborate and often irksome tabus affecting marriage, the obtaining, preparation, and consumption of food, and other essential acts of life; and, most clearly of all, in the practice of a sort of crude euthanasia. This is generally the result of economic forces. When the available food-supply is limited, the numbers of the community must also be kept within bounds; and, if the population becomes too large, the least necessary members are simply got rid of. These are generally young children or very old people (cf. art. ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE, vol. i. p. 3). Perhaps the most striking example of this primitive application of economic laws, regardless of individual feelings, comes from the South Seas, where infanticide—usually a matter for the individual or the family—was actually enforced by law under the native chiefs.

'The Polynesians,' says R. L. Stevenson, 'a competent and sympathetic observer though not a professed anthropologist, met this emergent danger (of famine) with various expedients of activity and prevention ... Over all the island world, abortion and infanticide are to speak of a valuable asset, and the question as to where, in any conceivable community, an authority could be found competent to decide whether a given individual was to live or not, and to carry out the decision in practice. Apart from all purely moral considerations, if we treat the matter as one of mere calculation, it is obviously most difficult, if not impossible, to judge whether a helpless, known to possess considerable intellectual powers, or is not more of a burden to the community by reason of the constant attendance he will require than of benefit to it because of his possibilities of brain-work. And, even were this difficulty overcome, we should still have to deal with the vexed question of the limits of the State's functions; for by no means all thinkers, even of those farthest from extreme Individualism, are disposed to allow to any State such wide authority in matters of life and death. Thus Sidney Ball, a writer of rather decided Socialist tendencies, holds that 'the real danger of Collectivism is ... that it would be easier, or at least as easy, as Plato his old direction of "social surgery."' When to these theoretical difficulties are added the certainty of most emphatic opposition from all religious bodies, the problem remains too little to be reckoned with of the more squeamish kind of humanitarianism, and the great likelihood, already referred to, of abuse in practice, it is obvious that any extended application of this doctrine is, at present at least, out of the question. This goes a long way to account for the extreme paucity of literature on the subject in recent times. So far as the present writer is aware, no important work by any modern author deals at any length with the topic. And, as a matter of historical fact, euthanasia has never been put into practice. We intend in the remainder of this article to give a brief account of certain approximations to it which have existed or still exist, and of the views of those writers—mainly ancient—who have upheld some form of it.

EUTHANASIA

2. Greece. — Passing now to ancient civilization, we have to note in the case of the Greeks a twofold exemplification of principles which may be roughly identified with euthanasia: first, in the practice of certain States; second, in the precepts, often actually followed, of a not a few philosophers. On cornt stoels, where the horror of shedding the blood of a member of the tribe goes far to explain the seeming inhumanity of leaving a helpless person to starve, rather than killing him quickly.

'Such 'social surgery' we may call the public application of euthanasia. With regard to its private application, it should be noted that suicide is rare among civilized people. Some races, as the Andamanese and Central Australians, seem never to have heard of it; others believe it will be punished in the next world (Dakotas, Kayans), or treat it as an offence against the chief or king (Dalhomme); while others regard it as an indifferent, or at most a foolish, action (Accad). There is always something of the nature of responsibility, even as conducive to future happiness (Estokins of Dav's Strait). Some cases may be classed as genuine euthanasia. Thus, among the Karens of Burma, 'if a man has some incurable or painful disease, he says in a matter-of-fact way that he will hang himself, and he does as he says.' But, on the whole, the natural love of life is strong in savages, although, as we have seen, the vague sense of the importance of the community may at times overpower it.

1 'Moral Aspects of Socialism,' JIE vi. 313. For Plato's views, see below, p. 606.
2 The two we have used the word 'euthanasia' to mean simply 'dying well,' i.e. in such a manner as to conduct to happiness hereafter. This, of course, nothing to do with the present sense. See, e.g., among the Wa-Orians of Brit. E. Africa, 'women will sometimes, after deserting their husbands, kill their children

3 See, further, Post, Grundzüge der etikologie. Jurisprudenz, Oldenburg, 1894-95, l. 174, l. 11, 43.
4 See, further, Westermarck, MI II 229; Post, op. cit. II, 344 ff.

5 Westermarck, MI II 331. Many other examples are given in the same chapter.
EUTHANASIA

to death. There is, however, a curious story 1 that, in Kos, 'very old men come together garlanded as if to a banquet, and drink hemlock (Barson) (the famous narcotic poison) • Contum maculatum), when they realize that they are incapable of doing anything useful to their family or fatherland.'

Passing over this case of voluntary euthanasia, which may or may not be genuine —for Ariadne clearly thinks more of edification than of historical verity, and such a beautiful story is—perhaps, we must next consider that State which, more than any other, claimed and exercised absolute power over the lives of its citizens—Sparta. Plutarch 2 gives us the following information:

The authority to rear his child, when born, but brought it to a place called the Leech; here the elders of his tribe sat and examined the infant. If it were well-made and strong, they made him rear it, and appurtenances to it one to the 900 allotments of land; but, if it was feeble and ill-shaped, they sent it to the so-called Place of Casting-out (Koepke) —a chain near Mt. Titytos,—considering that for a child ill-suited from birth for health and vigour to live was disadvantageous alike for itself and for the State.

By this rigid elimination of weaklings, combined with a rough kind of enege, 3 Sparta endeavoured, and for several generations successfully, to maintain a high standard of physical efficiency. Other States, however, scientificly, generally speaking, the parents of a child could choose whether or not they would rear it; if for any reason it was not thought desirable to let it live, it was simply exposed, with certain provisions, one guilder, to keep its ghost from being troublesome. Examples of this are wearisomely frequent in New Comedy, and are often found in earlier drama. 4 But this is not euthanasia; it is a mere shirking of parental responsibility. Also, it did not necessarily result in the death of the infant, which might be found still alive, and in such a case became, it would seem, the absolute property of the finder. 5

The same is not to be the case of an accident in accordance with popular feeling when he mentions as justifiable causes intolerable pain or disgrace. We hear very little of it among the Greeks, from Homer down to the end of the Hellenistic Age. In a sense, what doubtful passage of the Odyssey (xli. 271 ff.), Epikaste (= Jocastra) hangs herself on learning of her unconscious incest; but the suicide of Ajax seems to belong to the non-Homerico tradition. One curious instance, which reminds us of Hindu sati, is the self-slaughter of Euandre on the pyre of her husband Kapanæus,; 6 while, among historical examples, we may cite the suicide of Pantites, one of the two Spartiates who survived Thermopylae, as a mark of dishonour; and of Themistocles, to avoid fighting against his fellow-countrymen. 9 But in Athens at least, although the regular form of capital punishment was enforced suicide, self-destruction in general was looked upon with disfavour, perhaps from fear of the dead man's ghost; at any rate, the right hand of the corpse was severed before burial, 10 with which custom we may compare the mutilation (μακροχερωύς) of a murdered man by his slayers. 11

(2) The philosophers, and especially the later schools (Stoic, Epicurean, etc.), were interested chiefly in the question of suicide; of euthanasia in their little. Plato, however, whose State is to a great extent an idealized form of the constitution of Sparta, is in favour of a some-

what ruthless application of the principles under discussion to weak children and also to invalids. 12 The children of inferior parents, and any malformed offspring of the others, they require to be, for the (euthanasia) purpose of cutting off. 13 But the subject is also naturally more of interest to a writer on the well-being. Not dissimilar views were held by Aristotle, 4 in whose ideal State maimed children are not to be reared, and abortion may occasionally be practised. Later, however, the popular prevalence of extended protestations against the custom from Munsonius 5 (1st cent. A.D.). With regard to other applications of euthanasia, Plato considers that invalids ought not to be kept alive by an elaborate regimen, but allowed to die, as they are quite unable to attain to the higher developments of either mind or body. 6 Cf. art. Suicide.

3. Rome.—With regard to the Romans, there is almost nothing to add. Their philosophy was borrowed entirely from Greece and was for the most part either Stoic or Epicurean. The former school inspired most of the famous suicides, such as Cato of Utica; hence Shakespeare's reference is, for us: 'Shall we be mere shadows to the world?... But that the rather I will so live, that when I shall die, men will say, This was a man.' Self-immolation and abortion are also mentioned occasionally late date. Neglecting myths, mostly of palatable Greek origin, one hears of the former as early as the comedies of Plautus and Terence in these are Greek; and it is under the Empire chiefly that we hear of wholesale avoidance of maternal responsibility. The potestas of the father, however, was supreme, and with his formal recognition of a child it was not reared.

5. Judaism.—It is to the credit of the Jews that we hear nothing of such practices among them, owing partly to their strong desire for offspring,—causing them to rear even a child blind or otherwise helpless from birth,—partly to their regard for human life, and partly to the fact that the patria potestas did not, at least in the times of the later kings, extend to life and death. 7 Suicide, though not formally prohibited, 8 seems to have been rare; (2) an offence against the community; (3) a usurpation of God's power to kill and make alive—arguments of which the second is Aristotelian, 9 and the first derived, it would appear, ultimately from Plato (Laws, loc. cit.). 10 Other forms of euthanasia are equally opposed to orthodox Christianity, at least as heretofore stated, owing to its enormous emphasis on the value of the individual. It is

2 Polit. ii. 1325 A, 10 ff.
3 Stob. Flor. ixxv. 16 and ixxiv. 21.
4 Rep. iii. 479 C, 479 D.
5 Cf. Ant. and Cleop. iv, xv. 87; Macbeth, v. viii. 1.
6 E.g. the end of the Argo.
7 iexvi. 694 E, and many other passages.
8 See, e.g., De finbus.
9 Apparent, however, was not regarded as an offence; e.g. Althophus is 'buried in the sepulchre of his father' exactly as he had died a natural death (2.1740).
10 For Por. Dis, i. 177.
12 See, further, on the Jewish and Christian attitude towards suicide, Kirk, FREE will (1908) 10ff.
EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE

perhaps from this source that Islam borrows its prohibition of suicide.

The misconception of modern civilized States is for the part in accordance with this doctrine, even where not actually dictated by it. Thus, the medical profession traditionally keeps a patient alive as long as possible, although an exception has sometimes been made in cases of hydrophobia, where, as readers of George Macdonald will remember, smothering used formerly to be resorted to. 1 The law of murder, again, does not take any account of the physical condition of the victim; and suicide is a legal felony. Theological writers are less uncompromising. Thus Sir Thomas More represents suicide as occasionally practised in Utopia — indeed he may be regarded as an enthusiast.

But if the disease be not only incurable, but also full of continual pain and anguish; then the priests and the magistrates exhort the man, saying he is not able to do any good as a soldier of the laws. and to him to do any injury to others, and to himself, for if he determine with himself no longer to cherish that pestilential [sic] malady, he determined with himself no longer to cherish that pestilential [sic] malady.

Among the morbidities of the inferior type of pessimist we may note a tendency to glorify voluntary death, as in the well-known lines of Thomson (City of Dreadful Night, xiv.)

This little life is all we must endure; The grave's most holy peace is ever sure; and the following lines. But that greatest member of that school, Schopenhauer, regards it as defeating its own ends, 4 since it is not a denial but an assertion of the will to live, the great obstacle to moral freedom. Home's famous Essay was directed against the growing objection to it, and declared it to be no dereliction of duty, human or Divine. Despite the classical argument of Kant, 5 most writers on Ethics would probably agree in substance with Pascal 6 that to refrain from it in great bodily or mental anguish may be heroic, but is no definite duty; 'Heidemant ist nicht Pflicht, But, as has been already remarked, euthanasia in general has received little if any discussion. See, further, art. SUICIDE.


H. J. ROSE.

EUTYCHIANISM.—See Monophyism.

EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE.—This is an association of Evangelical Christians of different countries and speaking different tongues, united for the swiftness and promotion of Christian union and the advancement of religious liberty. It owed its origin to a wide-spread and growing desire in Protestant Christendom for closer fellowship among true believers holding to the same essentials of faith, and desirous of bearing faithful witnesses to their obedience to the Lord's prayer, 'that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee' (Jn 17:21). The union of Christians of different denominations in the formation of some of the great Foreign Mission Societies and the American Board of Commissioners


W. Tytler, pt. II. vii. 'Of Wooden, nese persons, etc. (p. 127, Cambridge ed.)


Kant regards self-preservation as 'the first, if not the highest, of the moral virtues' (in the sense of suicide; 'The destruction of the moral subject in oneself is tantamount to a driving out of the world, as far as can be in ones, of Morality itself') He adds that it involves the expelling of man in general (Assen non-sans) as represented in one's own person.

Euth, II. 103 ff.
3. Modes of operation.—The Alliance has sought to accomplish its work mainly in three ways: through the Week of Prayer, General Conferences, and efforts to put a stop to religious persecution.

(a) Annual Week of Prayer.—This institution was first proposed at a meeting of the Alliance at New York, 1846, in the resolution urging the friends of the Alliance throughout the world to observe the first week of January as a season for concert in prayer on behalf of the objects contemplated by the Alliance. The Alliance then outlined its programmes in answer to an appeal from English and American missionaries in India. The British branch issues this year (1912) its 65th programme of topics. These topics have included Union with Christ, thanking for various benefits, and Prayer for Home, City, and Foreign Missions, for nations and their Rulers, for the Y.M.C.A. and Schools, for the Family, the Observance of the Lord's Day, and other subjects. The Week of Prayer, observed in cities and hamlets in all parts of the Christian world and in missionary territory, has, without a question, exercised a profound influence in promoting the spread of the Gospel and cordial co-operation among ministers and laymen of the different Protestant communions.

(b) Conferences.—National or Local Conferences have been held by the British branch and biennially by the American branch, 1875–1893 (with several intermissions). The international or General Conferences, ten in number, have been held in London, 1831; Paris, 1833; Berlin, 1837; Geneva, 1847; Amsterdam, 1867; New York, 1873; Basel, 1879; Copenhagen, 1884; Florence, 1891; London, 1896. The meetings have been called by agreement of the branches, and the arrangement and the carrying out of the programme have been left to the branch within whose bounds the Conference met. The topics discussed have included reports of the religious condition of the nations; the conflict of Christianity with infidelity, Romanism, and superstition; the practical and humanitarian enterprises of the Church; Christian education and revivals. The London Conference in 1831 probably included representatives of more Protestant denominations than had ever sat together since the Reformation. The Conference in New York was the most largely attended and widely influential religious gathering held up to that time in the Western World. This result was largely due to the efforts of Dr. Philip Schaff, who made four journeys to Europe to present invitations to attend the meeting and to arouse interest in it. The Alliance has received the recognition of crowned heads and of the President of the United States. Frederick William iv. of Prussia authorized the invitation to meet in Berlin, was present at one of the sessions, and accorded a reception to the members at his palace. The King and Queen of Denmark, the Crown Prince and Princess, and the King and Queen of Greece attended some of the meetings of the Copenhagen Conference. The President of the United States, Mr. Grant, and the Vice-President, Mr. Colfax, signed the signatures, endorsed the objects of the Alliance and the invitation to the meeting in New York; and President Grant, surrounded by the members of his Cabinet, gave the delegates to the New York Conference a reception at the White House. The then king of Italy sent a cordial letter of greeting to the Conference in Florence.

(c) Opposition to persecution.—In its earliest period an eloquent appeal was made by Merle Aubigné in behalf of the General Confederation of Russia, and at the same time an appeal was made for the oppressed Armenians. Early cases of successful intervention were the release, through an appeal to the Grand Duke, of the Medial family of Thesarny (1822), from imprisonment and holding religious meetings; and the release (in 1863) of Matamors, Carrasco, and their friends in Spain, who were thrown into prison and condemned to the galleys on the reign of Isabella. The Alliance interceded for the Methodists and Baptists in Sweden (1838), and through a delegation (in 1871) to the Czar, then supporning at Friedrichshafen on the Lake of Constance, for the persecution of Lutherans, and with relief, relief for the Russian and Finnish Allies of the Baltic Provinces. Again in 1874 it sought the Czar's good offices for the Baptists of Southern Russia, and in 1879 it sent a deputation to the Emperor of China to make known their sympathy in Bohemia, and the request was granted. It helped to secure from the Sultan (1856) rights for the missionaries in Turkey, and has made efforts to secure relief for the Nestorians in Persia, the Stundists in Russia, and other persecuted Christians.

The influence of the Alliance can be traced in the formation of the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance, the Pan-Anglican Synod, and the Pan-Methodist Conference, and in the Federation of the Churches of Christ in the United States, which held its first meeting in New York in November 1902, representing 18,000,000 communicants belonging to 35 denominations, as well as of Baptists and other bodies. It is the purpose of the next section to give a brief account of the proceedings of the Federation of the Churches of Christ in the United States, which was formed at New York in 1905, and the constitution and structure of this federation.

LITERATURE.—Conference on Christian Union. Narrative of Proceedings of the Meetings held at Liverpool, Oct. 5th, 1857; London, 1847; Annual Reports of the British Branch, London, 1846 ff., and of the American Branch, New York, 1857 ff. The Proceedings of the General Conferences have been issued in the tongues spoken at the places of meeting, and for the most part in English reproduction, viz. those of London, Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, New York (ed. of P. Schaff and S. Irenaeus Prine), Basel (Ger., ed. by J. H. Riggenbach; Eng., ed. by J. Murray Mitchell), Copenhagen (only in Danish, ed. by Yahl, 1880), Florence (Eng. ed. by R. A. Bedford), London (the Jubilee vol., ed. by J. A. Arnold). Brief but notable satisfactory histories of the Alliance may be found in the Alliances of the World, 1857, by James Davis, secretary of the British branch, and in the Jubilee Proceedings of the Alliances, ed. by Rev. H. G. Carrasco, The Life of Philip Schaff, New York, 1897, pp. 252–274, 323 ff., 520 ff. Special documents have been issued from the offices of the British and American branches. The more notable of the latter are The Narrative of the State of Rel. in the U.S., by Henry B. Smith, presented at the Amsterdam Conference in 1875; The Proceedings on the Alliance Deputation to the Czar of Russia, 1871, and The Reception of Christians in Persia, 1870. The latter was a result of a work, which was presented to the council of the Alliance held in conjunction with the Columbian World's Exposition in Chicago, 1893. The 'Alliance, Evangelische' in PRS I p. 376, by E. C. Achelis, pronounces an unfavourable judgment on the Alliance as having departed from its original aims, and carrying on a hostile separatist propaganda. It declares that the Alliance reached the height of its history at the Berlin Conference in 1857, and that, as a religious organization, it has no longer any significance in Germany. This is not the place to enter upon a consideration of the conditions which call forth a judgment so partial and unjust. The British branch issued a monthly, under the title Evangelical Christendom, 1847–1899, The Evangelical Alliance Quarterly, 1850–1898, and annually, Evangelical Christendom, 1900 ff.

DAVID S. SCHACHT.

EVANGELICALISM.—The name given, in English-speaking lands, to a movement of revival which has borne other names in other parts of Christendom. This movement is usually traced to Holland, where it began under the name of Federalism, being so named from its foremost representative, Cocceius († 1669), professor at Leyden, whose theology was called 'Federal' on account of the prominence given in it to the conception of religious union (see GENEVAN THEOLOGY). The next phase was Pietism (q.v.), the principal representatives of which were Spener († 1705), who operated chiefly by prayer-meetings,
known as collegia pietatis; A. H. Francke (1663-
1727), professor at Halle, where he founded the
orthodox Pietist school, still fond of the academic
centre; and J. A. Bengel (1687-1752), the Pietist
of South Germany, and author of the well-known
Gnomon, which may be taken as an index of the
devotion to Biblical studies characteristic of the
movement. Out of these Pietists, one at least, as
sociated with the name of Count Zinzendorf
(1700-1760), the passionate lover of Christ and
inaugurator of those foreign-mission efforts for the
extermination of which the name of Halle has so
distinguished a name (see MORAVIANS),
Methodism, the next phase, was evolved from
Moravianism as obviously as the latter was from
Pietism. In many respects it is the most remark-
able phase of all; and it would be a pleasure to
follow the course of its development, first in Great
Britain and then in America, where it has achieved
phenomenal success; with its great leaders, the two
Wesleys and Whitefield, and their many notable
successors; with its divisions and reunions; its
open-air preachings and camp-meetings; its class-
meetings and local preachers; its hymnody and its
doctrine; but all these topics will be dealt with in
art. METHODISM.

1. In the Church of England.—The Anglican
Church might have retained Methodism within
itself, for the original leaders were most unwilling
to give it an official character. But, at one
time, however, there arose within the State
Church a number of clergymen who imitated the
zeal and efficiency of the Methodists, and earned
the name of 'Evangelicals.'

Among these, in the latter part of the 18th cent.,
the most conspicuous figure was the Rev. John
Newton (1725-1807). After a wild youth, spent at
sea, he underwent as thorough a conversion as any
Methodist, and no Methodist could have had less
scruple in making his religious experiences public.
Though over forty before being settled in a parish
of his own, at Olney in Buckinghamshire, he im-
mediately unfolded an earnestness and force of
character which could not fail to make him a centre
of influence; and from the time when he was trans-
lated to the Church of St. Mary Woolnoth, in
Lombard Street, London, in 1778, he exercised
without the name of bishop, a more than episco-
pal sway over those within the State Church who were
coming under the influence of the revival. Before
leaving the country, he had won as a convert the
incalculable number of a community. Among these,
the Rev. Thomas Scott (1747-1821), who was shaken out
of Socinian views and out of the habits of a careless
life by hearing Newton preach. At first this ad-
herent fought against his convictions; but, Newton
wisely refraining from being drawn into contro-
versy with him, he at last shut himself up with his
Bible for three years, determined to discover what
was the religion taught in this oracle and to hold
to it alone. From these studies he emerged with
the conviction that the Evangelical system was the
only true gospel; and so convinced was he that a
 creed obtained as his had been must be the correct
one, that he wrote an account of his experiences
under the title of The Force of Truth (1779)—a
book which gained an enormous circulation, and
of which John Henry Newman said that he almost
owed to it his soul. If Scott was able to prove
the new tenets to be Scriptural, another adherent
of the school, Joseph Milner (1744-97), undertook
to prove, in his History of the Church of Christ,
that they were the doctrines of the Apostolic Age
of the Church, and of the theologians of the Church of
England. The Evan-

But the Evangelical doctrines had the good for-
tune to secure a means of propagation far more
more rare and effective, in those other years, than
the Bible, as an expositor or an ecclesiastical historian. While
living at Olney, Newton had for a neighbour the
poet Cowper (1731-1800); and to the gentle bard
this strong man of God became a hero and Great-
heart. The literary tastes of Cowper have persistent
represented Newton, indeed, as a tyrant, who drove
the poet distracted; but Cowper's insanity was in
the blood; he had been in confinement before Newton
ever saw him. But, if a friend would not come to
him, the poet could not finally rescue him from his fate,
he redeemed him from himself and furnished him with
employment, by which he was made, in the intervals of his
disease, a useful and a happy man. Besides enjoying his collaboration in the writing of
the Olney Hymns, Newton suggested other themes for his muse, which drew from him not a
few of his happiest efforts; and thus, for the
peculiar beliefs and sentiments of Evangelicalism,
there was a secured the benefit of musical and im-
perishable expression; for there is no more com-
plete or accurate representation of them than is to be found in Cowper's verse.

In prose, also, the new way of looking at Chris-
tianity was to receive brilliant expression from a
layman. This was at the hands of William Wil-
berforce (1759-1830), who, having been turned from
a life of frivolity;摇了: a fortunate
Isaac Milner, brother of the ecclesiastical historian,
carried his newborn enthusiasm into the business
of Parliament, of which he was a member, and into
the upper ranks of English society, of which he
was an acknowledged leader. To this society
his statement of the Evangelical position was ad-
dressed, as was shown by its full title, A Practical
View of the prevailing System of professed Chris-
tians in the higher and middle Classes of this
Country contrasted with real Christianity; and
the grace, the frankness, and the humour of its
style made it acceptable in circles into which reli-
gious literature seldom penetrated.

But Wilberforce rendered to Evangelicalism a
still more important service by leading its accumu-
1

lating numbers in a crusade against the Slave
Trade. In this he enjoyed the support of a large
portion of the community in which the new views had
made remarkable progress—the members of the
upper middle class, engaged in banking and similar
occupations. Of these there happened to be such
a number as to make them the dominant force in
the whole Evangelical party was sometimes styled 'the
Clapham Sect.' Taking this nickname and con-
verting it into a title of honour, the genial
historian of Evangelicalism, Sir James Stephen, has
under this caption, in his Essays in Ecclesiastical
Biography (London, 1907, vol. ii.), penned capti-
vating sketches of such men as Henry Thornton,
Granville Sharp, Lord Teignmouth, and Zachary
Macanlay, who not only stood by Wilberforce in
his prolonged and laborious campaign against
slavery, but were distinguished in many other
walks of philanthropy. For Evangelicalism had
reached and tapped the springs of active benefi-
cence. To whatever it may have been due—
whether to the Calvinistic doctrines, believed by
Evangelicals, or, as they might rather themselves
have said, to the work on their spirits of the Spirit
of God—the adherents of the new views not only
believed, but turned their beliefs into practice.
It was a maxim with them that every one to whom
the good news had come was bound, according to
his powers and station, to do good. Their first
actions, accordingly, were to propagate
the gospel both by personal testimony and by cor-
porate action. They visited the poor, they tended
the sick and dying, they instructed the ignorant,
they founded schools and colleges, they not only sought out candidates for the ministry, but bought and removed in order that parishes might be manned with clergymen of the right sentiments, the force operating behind these efforts being the solemn sense of their own responsibility as well as of the danger and the duty to those whose belief they were exerting themselves. The Church Missionary Society and the Religious Tract Society came into existence in 1779, the British and Foreign Bible Society in 1804. Far, however, from the extinguishment of the Evangelical party, these men, who were the sons, they were directed from the first to the body also; and soon philanthropies were devised for prisoners, for children and women working in mines, for the blind, the deaf and dumb, the paralytic, and, in short, for every form of human misery. Wilberforce was succeeded in the next generation by Lord Shaftesbury (1801-85), who, in Parliament, was the unfailing advocate of the poor and needy, and, after a life of unwearying philanthropy, exclaimed, on his deathbed, that he was sorry to quit a world in which so much misery still existed. Through his influence with Lord Lansdowne, the Prince of Wales secured for the Evangelicals a fair share of the influential offices in the Church. In one of the universities, Evangelicalism fought its way to power through the advocacy of the dean of Chester, Charles Simeon (1759-1836); and the first heads of the Evangelical divinity halls, founded at Cambridge and Oxford, both rose to be bishops. In the latter half of the 19th cent., the party profited by throwing itself into the revivals which passed over the entire kingdom, coming from American sources; and a centre for the quickening of the spiritual life was provided in conferences, held annually from 1878 at Keswick.

Though, for more than a hundred years, a large and influential party in the Anglican Church, Evangelicalism has never succeeded in permeating that communion completely. W. E. Gladstone, while crediting it with the high merit of pervading the Church as a whole with the preaching of Christ crucified, showed, in an article published in 1879 and republished in Gleanings of Past Years (1893-97), that it had manifested a singular incapacity for retaining its own more gifted children, these going off to the left or the right, when they reached maturity. The rise of the Broad Church party in the early half of the 19th cent., furnishes, in other persuasion, a parallel to the same process which Evangelicalism was not satisfying; and the same was still more manifestly by the phenomenal development of the High Church and Ritualistic party, which has not yet suffered any check, and has in recent decades eclipsed all rivals. Those who have themselves passed from Evangelicalism to Ritualism are wont to regard the one movement as a preparation for the other, which is, they say, its natural completion. But this is a sanguine view, in which Evangelicals will by no means concur; and a historian will be more likely to recognize in Ritualism a reincarnation of the Anglicanism of King Henry VIII of Elizabeth, while in Evangelicalism he sees a revival of the Puritanism which long struggled inside the Anglican communion, before it was driven forth into dissent. At the present time the strength of this party is estimated by G. R. Balleine at fully a fourth of the entire Church; and the proportion might be reckoned higher if the Anglican Church in the United States and the Colonies were included.

2. In English Nonconformity.—By the Dissenting communities of England it might be contended that, in its essence, Evangelicalism was among them not only before it appeared in the State Church, but even before it was seen in the form of Methodism. Long before the conversion of John Wesley might be manifested with clergymen with whose belief they were exerting themselves. The Church Missionary Society and the Religious Tract Society came into existence in 1779, the British and Foreign Bible Society in 1804. Far, however, from the extinguishment of the Evangelical party, these men, who were the sons, they were directed from the first to the body also; and soon philanthropies were devised for prisoners, for children and women working in mines, for the blind, the deaf and dumb, the paralytic, and, in short, for every form of human misery. Wilberforce was succeeded in the next generation by Lord Shaftesbury (1801-85), who, in Parliament, was the unfailing advocate of the poor and needy, and, after a life of unwearying philanthropy, exclaimed, on his deathbed, that he was sorry to quit a world in which so much misery still existed. Through his influence with Lord Lansdowne, the Prince of Wales secured for the Evangelicals a fair share of the influential offices in the Church. In one of the universities, Evangelicalism fought its way to power through the advocacy of the dean of Chester, Charles Simeon (1759-1836); and the first heads of the Evangelical divinity halls, founded at Cambridge and Oxford, both rose to be bishops. In the latter half of the 19th cent., the party profited by throwing itself into the revivals which passed over the entire kingdom, coming from American sources; and a centre for the quickening of the spiritual life was provided in conferences, held annually from 1878 at Keswick.

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2. In English Nonconformity.—By the Dissenting communities of England it might be contended that, in its essence, Evangelicalism was among them not only before it appeared in the
the expectation of conversions; and, it is believed, he was not disappointed. Though he had not enjoyed the advantages of academic training, he was a man of a broad and liberal mind, and the subjects likely to help him in preaching, Greek included; and he founded a theological college, of which he was president, delivering lectures on patristics, which are esteemed among the best ever produced on the subject. His capacity for business and the warmth of his heart enabled him to carry on a large orphanage; and he maintained, besides, an extensive library of Evangelical literature, and especially his own sermons, which were published every week and sold in thousands. The tabernacle built for him, in South London, held 5000, and was always full, serving, indeed, for a whole generation as a rallying-point for Evangelicals from all corners of the globe. In it was upheld the banner of Evangelicalism, the doctrine of which were preached with clearness, fullness, and spiritual power. In later life, Spurgeon came to believe that the younger ministers of his denomination were forsaking these truths; and, in consequence, he alienated himself from the Broad Union. But the officials of that body denied his accusations, or at least refused to endorse them.

The other leader of Evangelical Nonconformity, R. H. Hutton (1781-1865), was more open to new light and more inclined to learn from others. He used to speak with earnest conviction of the need for a reconstruction of Protestant theology. At some points he was in sympathy with the Broad Church, especially with Mauroy. With him he believed in the creation of humanity in Christ; like him he held strongly by the sacredness of secular life; and, with him, he believed that the wicked would live for ever in torment. Yet he gloried in the peculiar doctrines of Evangelicalism, such as the death of Christ as the ground of divine forgiveness, justification by faith, and the supernatural work of the Holy Spirit in redemption; and equally did he value the Evangelical ethos, as he called it—its passion for Christ and for the souls of men.

3. In Scotland.—It was fortunate for Evangelicalism that it was mediated for Scotland through the big brain and big heart of Thomas Chalmers (1780-1847). In England it has sometimes exhibited a somewhat petticoat aspect. It is impossible, for example, to find of the developments at Cheltenham by which Frederick William Robertson was driven away from his early associations into the Broad Church without recognizing that Evangelicalism could be narrow and unlovely, deservedly bringing down on itself the nick-name of 'the hard church' given to it by R. H. Hutton. But Chalmers (q.v.) could not have been the founder of a hard Church. His humanity was broad; he had passed through an intellectual before experiencing a spiritual awakening; he had a distinctly philosophical mind, which delighted in tracing facts to their causes; and his position as an academic teacher could not but intensify this natural bent. Still he was profoundly practical. Among the documents of Evangelicalism there is not one more important than the address he sent to his parishioners at Kilmany when quitting that rural parish, in 1816, for the city of Glasgow. Reviewing the years he had spent among them, first as an opponent and then as an apostle of Evangelicalism, he fixed on this as the essential point: 'The object of all preaching is to realize the righteousness and holiness which his early preaching had utterly failed to produce. Afterwards he was always speculating on the reason for this, and he found it in 'the expulsive power of a new affection.' He did for theology, in his academic prelections, exactly what Schleiermacher was doing for it at the same time in Germany, though from a very different point of view. He believed that to be a true theologian is to be a man of the world, and that is to say, instead of beginning with the mysteries of revelation and coming down from these to human experience, he took his stand on experience and worked his way up to the mysteries without which such experience could not have been enjoyed. His dogmatic consisted of two parts—first, the disease; then, the remedy.

There had, indeed, been an Evangelical party in the Church of Scotland before, but its influence had not been felt upon the scene; and, outside of the State Church, the doctrines of the gospel had been preached to growing numbers by the ministers of the Secession and the Relief denominations; but it was by the mighty voice of Chalmers that the new views secured the attention of his countrymen as a whole. In the courts of the Church his influence grew space, till the 'Moderates,' on the opposite side, saw the preponderance vanishing. In their straits they sought and obtained the assistance of the civil courts, by which the reforming party was so limited and thwarted that, in 1845, it quitted the Church and formed itself outside as the Free Church of Scotland.

The virtue of the Evangelical principles by which the Free Church was inspired was made visible by its success (1843-1850). In 1845, two erected churches, manses, and schools all over the land for its own necessities, but threw itself into mission work of every kind, both at home and abroad. All the foreign missionaries had joined the outgoing movement; and not only were they provided for, but the Church was ready to rise to opportunities, as these presented themselves, to extend its operations. Similarly, the home mission problem was attacked with such vigour that even in Glasgow, where the growth of the city has been phenomenal, the increase of the means of grace has kept pace with that of the population; and at the present moment measures are being organized for meeting the wider needs disclosed by the recent developments of labour. For these missionary and philanthropic exertions the Church was strengthened by widespread revivals of religion in 1859-60, 1874, 1881, and 1890, with which the ministers and members associated themselves sympathetically.

This also enabled the Church, under the leadership of Principal Rainy (1836-1900), to meet and survive not a few科的 by example, to which the development of the Church was contributed by Professor Robertson Smith (1846-94). As this scholar recognized the Bible to be the word of God, the only rule of faith and duty, and appealed with full personal conviction to the text: *monimentum Spiritus Sancti internum*, his views met with a tolerant and patient hearing from his fellow-countrymen, and were, to a large extent, accepted without injury to Evangelical faith.

Meantime the two denominations mentioned above outside the State Church, after uniting in 1847 to form the United Presbyterian Church, had been pursuing a similar course, growing in the same convictions and being educated by similar providences. They outran the Free Church in the development of worship, by adopting earlier the use of hymns and the assistance of organs; and they were earlier in the adoption of a Declaration Act (1879; the Free Church Act was passed in 1894), by which the Confession of Faith was modified in the direction of a more cordial acknowledgment of the Scriptures. It is the view of the party that there is no gloomy view of human nature and its destiny. But this branch of the Church excelled particularly in enthusiasm for foreign missions; and, when it and the Free Church united in 1900, there was an
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expansion within the united Church of this species of Evangelical sentiment.

At the Disruption of 1843 those who remained in connexion with the State were the so-called "Moderates," who had stood in opposition to the Evangelicals in the same way as, on the Continent of Europe, the Rationalists had faced the Pietists. But from the first there had been left in the State Church a considerable amount of Evangelical sentiment with this history of which it is now, being favoured by such spirits as Norman Macleod (1812-72) and Robert Flint (1838-1911); and a sign that it is strongly represented among the younger men of light and leading may be seen in the cordiality with which these are now seeking union with those from whom they were separated in 1843. There are few men of mark at the present day in any of the ecclesiastical bodies in Scotland who would be averse to being designated "Evangelicals."

4. In America.—An additional proof of the suggestion made above, that the true source of Pietism, as it is to be sought in English Puritanism rather than in the Continental movements to which it is usually traced, is supplied by the fact that in America it arose earlier than it did in England. The date of John Wesley's conversion is 1738, but as early as 1726 there occurred the first of those awakenings which took place at Northampton, in New England, through the preaching of Jonathan Edwards (1703-58), which spread astonishment and awe far and near, and was heard of even in England. In fact, it is known that John Wesley had himself read an account, penned by Edwards, of the experiences in America before anything of the kind had occurred under his preaching in London. While the German Pietism, from Moravianism, and from English Methodism entered into the religious life of the United States: yet in the revivals which have, from the time of Jonathan Edwards, formed an outstanding and frequently recurring feature of American Christianity, the impulse has always been a native one; and America has, in this particular, been in a position to give to Europe rather than to receive from it. Very remarkable awakenings were experienced in Kentucky and the neighbouring States from 1796 onwards; and in 1837 the whole country was pervaded by a similar movement. During this time and the earlier, from Ireland and Great Britain. Not infrequently have such movements had their origin in schools and colleges, and so marked has been their influence upon the young that some psychological observers in America are declaring conversion itself to be a manifestation of puberty. In the early revivals there were physical accompaniments, sometimes of a singular and alarming character; but these have tended to disappear with the progress of time. In the same way, at first, the experiences were looked upon as altogether divine; but, as they became commoner, it was recognized that human agency also had a part to play in the setting apart of time for prolonged religious exercises, and the mind could be interested in spiritual things, and, by the bringing together of large numbers for a common purpose, social influences could be generated. Certain persons, it was discerned, had the power of awakening parents or of bringing the hesitating to decision. It was found, in short, that revivals could, to a certain extent, be manufactured; and thus a new danger had to be guarded against; namely, mechanical excitement passing itself off as religion, or even of revivalism becoming a trade and falling into unworthy hands.

The Puritan religion of New England had originally a very particular character. The township and the congregation were identical, all the inhabitants being communicants. But, as population multiplied, it became apparent that there was a growing discrepancy between these two magnitudes; and Edwards became the proponent of the surprising view that only those should be admitted to the Lord's table who had undergone a religious change, of which evidence was supplied by a consistent life. Indeed, he became the victim of this contention; for so much antagonism was provoked by his severity that he was driven from his pastorate at Northampton and had to betake himself to a mission to Indians; though he did not continue under a cloud, being appointed in 1758 president of Princeton College (see art. EDWARDS). But the demand for a distinct personal experience, of which an account could be given, became more and more general, and the frequent occurrence of revivals, by which this was promoted, fostered a general dependence on this mode of acquiring religious experience, to the disparagement of the regular work of the ministry and the influence of the family. Against this a protest was raised by Horace Bushnell (1822-76), one of the most outstanding American thinkers, who, in 1846, in a little work entitled Christian Nurture, recalled attention, with marked success, to the slower and less exciting processes by which many are brought into the kingdom of God.

Still, in spite of drawbacks, the revivals were gifts of infinite value to the Church in America. One of them is said to have added to the Church more than a million members; and devout observers have noted that they seemed to be granted when the country stood on the verge of any particularly trying period, in which new tasks had to be faced or new hardships borne. It was by means of the enthusiasm and influences thus thrown out special grace that the Church in America rose to the efforts rendered necessary by the developments of the country's history and the course of Providence; and the Evangelicalism of the United States was not behind that of England or Scotland in the variety or extent of the forms of sin and misery with which it was able to cope. America has all the philanthropies of Europe; and in some spheres, such as the Sunday School and the Young Men's Christian Association, it has specially excelled. But the great task of the Christianity of the country has been the provision of ordinances for the everyday life of those who at this point would have been fatal. But the Church has nobly risen to the occasion, the Methodist and Baptist denominations distinguishing themselves by the zeal and heroism with which they have accompanied the pioneer and settler into the wilds of the West and the South, and helped to lay the foundations of Christian civilization. In spite of the phenomenal growth of the population, the provision of ordinances compares favourably with that of Europe.

Jonathan Edwards was a profound metaphysician and theologian as well as a revivalist; and in his works the seed was sown of that most original and philosophical activity which has accompanied the more practical efforts of American Christianity, not a few of those who succeeded him in developing the New England Theology, as it is called, either to his left or right, the development of metaphysical theologian and powerful evangelist. Edwards' speculations were all directed towards the practical end of reconstituting Calvinism on a wider basis than that which he described as the "muchness" of the doctrine in the writings he was the mouthpiece; and the abest of his successors moved in the same sphere. It must, however, be confessed that, in some of the speculations indulged in, any practical aim was difficult to discern; but at least the attempt to widen the truth to the best element in Edwards' theology—that dealt
with his great work, A Treatise concerning Religious Affections (1746).

5. On the Continent.—While these phases of the problem were disclosing themselves in the English-speaking countries—and for a complete view the Colonies of Australia, South Africa, and Canada would also require to be taken into account—other phases of what was substantially the same movement were manifesting themselves on the Continent of Europe. These were in part derived from Great Britain or America. Thus, a visit paid by one of the brothers Haldane, consisting in descent from a common mother. An ancient interpretation adopted by Wellhausen and some other modern scholars gives Hawwah the meaning ‘serpent,’ and finds in Genesis a trace of the primitive belief that earthly life originated in a serpent, as in some forms of the Babylonian cosmology, all things spring from Tiamat, the primeval dragon. Zimmermann (KAT, p. 438) suggests that the Eve narrative has been influenced by the Babylonian goddess Ishtar. Skinner (p. 85 f.) writes, with regard to the connexion between the name Hawwah and Semitic words for ‘serpent’:

1. Quite recently the philological equation has acquired fresh significance from the discovery of the name on a lead, Punic tabella ecosterea ... of which the first line reads: ‘... Lady HVIY, goddess Hawwah, in ...’ This was a Punic mythological personage a goddess of the under-world, and as such a serpent-deity, and identified with the biblical Hawwah. Hawwah would thus be a ‘depotentialised’ deity, whose prototype was a Phoenician goddess of the under-world, worshipped in the form of a serpent, and also as the ‘Mother of all living.’ Cf. also the OT niva. Probably the references to Eve in Gn 3 and 4 do not belong to the most ancient form of the creation story, but to a later stratum of J (so C. J. Ball, ‘Genesis, in SBOT). In the older story (Gn 2) the man names the first woman ‘ishshath (the ordinary Heb. word for woman,’ because she was taken from a man, ’ish; or, better, as the LXX and Sam., from her husband, ’ishah). But this derivation is not accepted by modern scholars, who derive ’ishshah from ’ash, ‘to be soft or delicate,’ and ’ash from ’ash, ‘to be strong,’ unless, indeed, ’ish is a primitive form, independent of any verbal root (cf. Oxf. Heb. Lex., pp. 35, 61).

P (Gn 16? 5?) states that mankind was created in two sexes, and tells us that each of the antediluvian patriarchs had daughters (P. 1), but says nothing about their wives. In J, however, P refers to the wives of Noah and of his three sons. The first woman mentioned by name in P (11?) is Sarai (Sarah), as she had already been given to Abram as his wife, Adah and Zillah, and his daughter Naamah (41? 2). A characteristic feature of the Eve narrative is the sentence (4) referring to the birth of Cain, ἐγερθεὶς αὐτοῦ—Unfortunately these words are very obscure, and the text may be corrupt. The RV tr. is ‘I have gotten a man with the help of the Lord’ (similarly LXX, Vulg., Symm.). Another tr. is ‘I have gotten a man, even Jehovah’ (Gr. tr. in Hexapla; Lather), understood as expressing Eve’s belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of express Eves’ belief that the Messiah supposed to be promised in Gn 3:16 had now been born—a mere exaggeration of expres...
EVIL EYE

serpent is used as an illustration of the possible seducing of the Church, the bride of Christ, from her Divine Spouse, probably by the devil. On 1 Cor. 5:1-13, of a passage of the narratives of Jewish, Christian, and Muhammadan legends, see ADAM.

The Book of Adam and Eve,' also called 'The Conflict of Adam and Eve,' an extant in an Ethiopian version (Eng. tr., S. C. Malan, London, 1882), was written in Arabic or Syriac by an orthodox Christian of the 5th or 6th cent. A.D. Starting after the Fall, it expands the narrative of Adam and Eve in a less ahratic to the account of the patriarchs down to Abraham, and summarizes the history down to the Advent.

EVIL.—See GOOD AND EVIL.

EVIL EYE.—I. The supposed influence.—'Evil eye' is the common English term for an influence the belief in which may justly be described as both primitive and universal, and which is in many countries as current to-day as it was in prehistoric times. Its equivalent may be said to exist in every written language, living or dead: Gr. θέρατος, Lat. fascinum, hence modern English, French, Spanish, Portuguese—fascinacion; German—böscher Blick; Neapolitan—jettatura, murriana, and fascino. Fascino applies to the act as well as to the effect, and consequently, by development, to one of the best known protective against it. An idea so widespread cannot but have its more common descriptive and colloquial alternatives, such as malocchio in Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese, marronis in French. By Shakespeare and in English dialects the act implied is forcibly expressed by the verb 'over-look'—'over-looking' used in a well-understood sense, wholly distinct from the literal form meaning 'surveillance' (see OED). The word 'evil' is still a household word among English pensanians, though, except in theology, becoming obsolete in literature (HDB, s.v. 'Evil'). Many diseases of man and beast are called, e.g., 'king's evil,' 'breast evil,' 'udder evil,' 'quarter evil,' and others. In some dialects the word is habitually contracted into 'ill,' and this household word for sickness keeps alive one of its original meanings, viz. sickness or misfortune caused by a worldly evil eye (Essay ix. 'Of Envy') says there is a belief in a power of working evil which is ejaculated upon any object it beholds, that has existed in all times and in all countries. Notwithstanding modern science and education, this belief is as strong as ever it was, and, if this were the case, endless authentic stories might be adduced to prove it.

The root conception of the very earliest ages, and still everywhere held by superstitious people, is that certain individuals have the power, by some considered demoniac, whether voluntary or not, of casting a spell or producing some malignant effect upon every object, animate or inanimate, upon which their eye may be exercised, with the consequence of exercising upon the victims of their displeasure. There does not appear, however, at present, or, so far as is regarded, in the past, to be any sort of belief in the power of the eye to produce any good or desirable influence upon the person or thing upon which it may rest, except that doubtful one known as 'love. From the earliest times the eye per se had been supposed to work only a wholly maleficient effect. In Ps. 33:19, 'Of the eye is the whole body, and to understand to be the product of a distinctly voluntary and beneficent power, the word 'eye' in these cases being used to denote a personal surveillance. On the 'lifting up the eyes' (Ps. 25:5, Dan. 4:15, Eccles. Bibel, 1905, p. 353) says this is the opposite of the evil eye, the same in meaning as 'make His face to shine upon.' Its supposed manifestations have undergone a process of change in the expression of more or less descriptive definitions; and these in their turn have further branched out and acquired conventional meanings, which at first sight seem to have no connexion with the original idea of the 'evil eye.' Summing for example, is our Eng. word 'envy,' meaning malig-nant or hostile feeling that may be said to arise from natural jealousy—as in 1 Sam. 16, where Saul 'eyed David.' It is obvious how close is the connexion here between the definition and the fact denoted. The classic invideo describes most accurately what we mean to-day by 'over-look'—'to gaze with evil intent' (see French, Syn. of NT, 1865, pp. 83-106). The Lat. invideo denotes the feelings connected with 'envy,' but is to-day an alternative word for the modern Italian malocchio.

The Hebrew word (епg) expressing 'envy' signifies also evil eye, that is, the natural selfishness, the inbred tendency of humanity, the covetous irritation of unattainable desire. In Scripture, envy and the evil eye are synonymous. One of the characteristics of envy is 'to desire the attainment of . . . equality or superiority by the particular means of others being brought down to our own level, or below it' (Butler's Sermon on 'Human Nature,' 1-12, note). So rooted was the belief in this fell influence of the malignant look that in the earliest times every human mischance, all sickness, and whatever was undesirable in the world, was looked upon as the certain result of the fatal glance of some person or animal, not necessarily inimical by intention, as will appear later. This conviction remains to the present day among many people, even in England, as strong as ever, while in more backward countries and among so-called savages it is universal and undoubted. In Italy and Southern Europe generally the belief is more prevalent than in more northern countries, and consequently more in evidence. In the last moment, in many parts of England, there are always one or more persons who believe themselves, and are commonly believed to be, slowly dying from being 'over-looked.' This is particularly true of the Welsh, and, as F. C. Ryle says (Life and Letters of F. R. Hawker, London, 1905, p. 490), the evidence to be adduced to later, found upon the earliest settlers of Babylonia, the cradle of civilization, as well as upon those of Egypt, proves conclusively the importance of the belief, and not only that the dread influence was all-powerful, but that, and to have a malevolent, and to guard their bodies against it. Pith, the father of the gods, brought forth all the other gods from
his eye, and men from his mouth—a practical rendering of the ancient belief that, of all bodily emanations, those from the eye were most potent. The passages in Scripture referring to the evil eye, such as Deut. 23, Lk 11, Ps 29, etc., prove how prevalent the belief was in the ancient East. Among Jews, Muhammadans, Hindus, and all Orientals at the present day it is as firm as ever (see Westermarck, ‘The Origin of Marriage,’ pp. 277, 278, 282). The so-called ‘ornaments’ of Jg 8, (AVm ‘like the moon’) were none other than the protective charms, some crescent-shaped brasses, some blue glass beads or disks, such as may be seen to-day upon the camels’ necks. Young animals of all kinds are now, as ever, thought to be specially liable to injury. Virgil’s shepherd (Ec. iii. 108) says, ‘Nescio quis teneros oculos mihi fascinat agnos,’ Plutarch (Symp. v. 7) says that certain men’s eyes are destructive to infants and young animals. Cows and horses everywhere are to-day subject to the malignant eye, as, indeed, are all kinds of domesticated animals. In the time of Elizabeth, eye-biting witches were executed in Ireland for causing diseases among cattle. One effect of the evil eye on cows to-day is to cause them to lose their milk; this is believed to be due to an antidote for the eye. Even the mention of the word fascino or jettatura is enough to cause some to decamp (for a curious instance of this, see Elworthy, The Evil Eye, 17).

The antiquity of the belief in the power of the evil eye, as well as its constant persistence, is proved by abundant evidence. In the times of ancient Greece, and in all the subsequent ages, the earliest, the latest, the most familiar, the most constantly portrayed in need of all the possessed are the Medusa, whose fatal glance turned to stone all who beheld her awful face. She was at first depicted in a more or less conventional manner, with staring eyes, wide, grimacing mouth, showing wolf-like fangs, and a protruded tongue split down the centre. This was the typical archaic form, and to her fearful ugliness was attributed her baneful influence. The story once started evidently developed rapidly, for at a very early period a parallel version seems to have taken root, and henceforward until comparatively recent times the two stories were distinct. First story: She lost her extreme hideousness, and by degrees, easily traced in ancient art, it became at last in Roman days just as lovely as it had been frightful, while the story was more or less descriptive. So much she was said to have been beautiful at first, and then to have been punished by being changed into a hideousness so terrible that whoever looked upon her was turned to stone (see ‘Solution of the Gorgon Myth’ in Folklore, xiv. (1903) 212 ff.). The belief that her baneful influence arose from her fearful hideousness continued to hold its full force, while, at the same time, the story had developed in the opposite direction to such an extent that her power of fascinating, bewitching, or entrancing was held to be the result of her matchless beauty; yet with all this development the belief has ever remained that the spell was on the eyes alone. Thus we see the process by which these terms applied to women in our day derive their meaning. Many Greco-Roman and Etruscan Medusæ are beautiful, but have a sort of horrid-struck, exquisite expression (see Elworthy, Horns of Honour, 61 ff.).

Many theorems have been put forward respecting the Medusa and the legend of Perseus—all more or less mythical and speculative. The other famous exploit of Perseus, the rescue of Andromeda, is doubtless still more mythical; by some it is said to be the classic form of the fight between the sun-god of Babylon and the dragon (cf. Jb 9, 13). Horses slaying the dragon is several forms on Egyptian paintings is but another version; the myth also appears in the fight between Michael and the dragon, and again is perpetuated by St. George on modern coinage. The representations of Perseus and St. George in art are almost identical, except that the former rides the winged Pegasus, while in some instances St. George rides the dragon. It is the ancient armour. The panic-stricken lady on the rock, instead of being in the classic nudity of the figure where Perseus is the hero, is dressed in the hoop and farthingale of the Renaissance, in sculptured marbiles at the Louvre and Paternoster Museums.

Domestic animals of all kinds have ever been specially suspected of being possessed of the Medusa. Some animals of all countries have been killed on account of the ‘ominous’ (Jb 8) (AVm ‘like the moon’) were none other than the protective charms, some crescent-shaped brasses, some blue glass beads or disks, such as may be seen to-day upon the camels’ necks. Young animals of all kinds are now, as ever, thought to be specially liable to injury. Virgil’s shepherd (Ec. iii. 108) says, ‘Nescio quis teneros oculos mihi fascinat agnos,’ Plutarch (Symp. v. 7) says that certain men’s eyes are destructive to infants and young animals. Cows and horses everywhere are to-day subject to the malignant eye, as, indeed, are all kinds of domesticated animals. In the time of Elizabeth, eye-biting witches were executed in Ireland for causing diseases among cattle. One effect of the evil eye on cows to-day is to cause them to lose their milk; this is believed to be due to an antidote for the eye. Even the mention of the word fascino or jettatura is enough to cause some to decamp (for a curious instance of this, see Elworthy, The Evil Eye, 17).

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He says that envy exerts an evil influence through the eyes, and that this most directly and perilously are the products of evil, which pierce like poisoned arrows. Moors of Morocco still hold the same beliefs (Westermark, loc. cit.).

It is the influence of the evil eye in all the world is ascribed to children, and that it is necessary for the mother to keep one breast tied up for 40 days, feeding the child with the other only, by which means the spirit is starved to death. If the child is fed from both breasts it will grow up with the evil eye. Muhammadans have more fear of the evil eye than of any other evil. The Hindus; and texts from the Qur'an, as in all other countries of India, are used as arguments against the evil eye (Heliodorus).

The speculator in the native H. of India, is the outcome of this belief. San, the Hindu Saturn, had been left out of the invitation to the gods to rejoice at the birth of a boy. One of the saints, Parvati; he appeared on the soil, in a rage, and with the first glance of his eye he caused the child's head to drop off. The other gods instantly cut off the head of a young elephant and stuck it upon the infant's body; hence Gopala is frequently thus represented.

Plautus has said that a portion of fruit bought in the market should be thrown into the fire to avert mazar (the native term). It is usual in some parts for a mother to blacken her child's face with a burnt stick to preserve it during the day from the evil influence. Natives of India put kalai (lamp-black) on their eyebrows, believing that they are thereby protected against, as well as incapable of casting, the evil eye. This blackening of the eyebrows, usual all the world over, is not merely a piece of female vanity, but a veritable protective.

The Targum give a wider reading to gen, explaining that all the sons of Israel went out one door, lest the evil eye should have sway over them as they went out to buy. Again, Ezek. xxi. 26. (malevolent) eye after Moses. Much is said on the subject by A. Goodrich Freer (Upper Isles, 73. Marion Crawford (Pietro Ghisleri, 1583. li. 50. I. 42. and Anton Josef, 1596. p. 21.) (Sym.) while the whole subject is dealt with very exhaustively by Frohmann, de Fascinat.ion.

2. The possessors.—A power so baneful and so stumbling would obviously lead to much speculation and contention as to the personality of those possessing it; hence arose a multiplicity of canons by which they might be known.

There are physical peculiarities, whether of beauty or of ugliness, that have been rare evidence of the dread power in all ages associated with the supernatural, with the demons and the powers of darkness. Even the gods were believed to possess it, and to use it when wishing to injure. Juno was particularly so credited; and for this reason Mercury the messenger was provided with a safeguard in his codiscus, lest he might be hindered in his flights by the envious eye when on errands for rival deities. Fear of anything uncommon seems to be part and parcel of the nature of all living creatures. All those among the ancients who in any way surpassed conspicuously the common-condition, for instance, in athletic or physical strength or size, were dreaded as possessors; and so on, the other hand, any one specially defective, particularly a dwarf; the latter, if hungrily, was the most feared still more. Squinting or differently coloured eyes were always certain marks of what is now a jettatore. In India and in Italy a squintor (guercio) is ipso facto considered a jettatore.

We English unconsciously preserve the same idea, for we say 'So-and-so has a "cast" in his eye'—a word purely technical in this sense, and implying the same meaning as the It. jettore, 'to cast or throw.' In Armenia very blue or green eyes are evil.

Many animals, particularly those with remarkable eyes, e.g. the serpent and the fox, were undoubted possessors of the evil eye. The peacock, with its tail full of eyes, is very much envious and ill-natured of the deities, has always been, and still is held to be, a potent mischief-maker. Many well-educated people in England, go on the supposition that there are shocked if peacocks' feathers are put up as ornaments, or even if they are brought into a house; death or at least some evil is believed to be the consequence. The grasshopper's prominent eyes gave it in classic days so a reputation as to lead to a certain proverb: "Nulli nescit it was the exact counterpart of our English, 'Thou art over-looked.' Tycho Brahe

would not proceed on his way if a hare crossed his path. The hare is on the Greek-Italian Vase, 1879, Naples Museum, as an emblem of ill-luck. Very much superstition still attaches to the hare; doubtless its properties stem from the belief that its eyes are so powerful that they could drive the sun from the skies. They have been thought to cast the evil eye on their cattle; therefore they believed hares to be witches, and consequently there used to be a general slaughter of them on May Day. The hare is still believed in some parts of Italy, particularly in Naples and the Isle of Man, to be the favourite animal into which the witches change themselves (see lycanthropy). Kaluks regard the rabbit with fear and reverence. Even to-day in Devonshire, fishermen will not pronounce the word 'rabbits,' but describe the animal by some roundabout method (Deacon Assoc. Trans., 1896). Pregnant Chinese women must not look on a hare lest its eye falling on them should cause the child to be born with a hare-lip. Fishermen almost everywhere avoid mentioning by name not only the hare and rabbit, but also the pig, salmon, trout, and dog, and go out of their way to have a bad reputation. Old gamekeepers do not speak of a fox to each other; it is always a 'thing.'

Pliny (HN. xvi. 107.) says that the rear of the Nile is found a wild beast called the otocolipus, an animal of moderate size . . . sluggish in the movement of its limbs, and its head is remarkably heavy. Pliny says it not for a moment to believe that it proves the destruction of the human race; for all who behold its eyes fall dead at the spot.

In Brazil there is a tradition that there is a bird of evil eye which kills with a look. A hunter once killed one of these birds and cut off its head without the eye being carried on him. He was instantly struck with a paralysis, and within a few years again lived a reputed witch. Whenever she wished to injure a neighbour she placed a toad at his door, so that when he opened it he might find the toad looking at him, and so receive its first glance.

Snakes have always had a reputation for having the power to fascinate, and there are many marvellous stories of the way in which they hypnotize frogs, birds, and other animals until they seem unconsciously to submit to being swallowed. One kind in particular, Bucephalus capensis, is so noted.

At the time of the Black Death in England it was currently believed that a glance from the death's eyes was very much more effective than the usual glance. This was sufficient to infect those on whom it fell. To this Shakespere refers in Macbeth to his wife: 'Write, "Lord have mercy on us," on those three; They are infected; in their hearts it lies; They have their plague, and caught every eye.' (Love's Labour's Lost, V. il. 141. 2.)

Stalin Dasa describes the Khali's eyes: 'A Syrian blind of one eye was not allowed near him a second time. He declared 'nothing can resist it'; illness and misfortune are all caused by the evil eye.' Saul was probably believed to possess it (I S. 189). Heliolodius implies that most, if not all, individuals have it; he says: 'When any one looks at what is excellent with an envious eye, he fills the surrounding atmosphere with a pernicious quality and transmits his own envenomed exhalations into whatever is nearest to him' (Theop. and Char., ii. 7.) Pinctarb says that the Thebans had this faculty so powerfully that they could destroy not only infants, but strong men. Cretans and Cypriots have had this reputation from ancient times, and retain it even at the present day. So also in Moslem the whole families of sinners was held on account of their eyes. People with deep-set eyes, and those whose eyebrows are united over the bridge of the nose, are particularly dangerous' (Westermark, loc. cit.).

Pliny says that the Thibii and others possessing the fatal power have a double pupil in each eye; others have neither, while some have two pupils in each eye; and that in Africa there are families who can cause cattle to perish trees to wither, and indite to die. Especially the Triballi and Illirii have such a power of fascination with the eye that they can kill those on whom they fix it (Xen. Hell.). Cicero (De Div. ii. 35) says that 'fumus ingenios ubique vici norecque duplicitis pupulis habet.' However, there are those who maintain that the 'ocularis oblivic.' Bacon (loc. cit.) and Frohmann (de Fascinatione, p. 11) repeat the same thing. Ovid mentions the double pupils, and Pliny explains that 'incuriosus omnis' (vii. 365). The Greek islanders still in heart worship a certain proverb:

Some persons are reputed to have the dread power over special persons or objects. In Italy
there are many stories of those known as *jettatori di bambini*, who are of all the most dreaded by mothers, and so are carefully shunned. Another class are supposed to have the faculty of obstruction—such are said to have a *jettatura sospensiva*. If any such person is met on the way to an enterprise, or on setting out on a journey, nothing will succeed, the business will fail, there will be an accident, one must return and give it up for the day.

Pope Pius IX. was confidently affirmed to have the evil eye, and his successor Leo XIII. was said to have it still more; it will probably become part of the reputation of the present Pontiff. It is, moreover, a well-known fact that all ecclesiastics are more or less suspected, especially monks. The murder of King Humbert was confidently ascribed to the *jettatura* of Leo XIII. The Russian peasant is convinced that his or her priest has the evil eye (Norman, *All the Russians*, 1902, p. 44).

In Abyssinia the reputed possessors are called *budus*; they are also magicians, who can work evil at will on any one whose name is known, by taking a certain reed, which the practitioner bends into a circle and places under a stone. At that moment the victim is taken ill; if the reed snaps in bending, only the person who made it will suffer. It is looked upon as *budus* (Bent, *Sacred City of the Ethiopians*, 1893, pp. 63, 212); cf. our legend of Wayland Smith. These moderns are most likely the descendants in name and reputation of the *Buduni* of Herodotus, who refers to them (iv. 109) as evil-minded enchanters; he says that one day in every year they changed themselves into wolves— but he himself did not believe it (see Lycanthropia).

Some circumstances referred to in wer-wolves (see his de *Dei, xviii., 18; see also Pliny, *HN* viii. 30).

Not only have the evil-disposed the fatal power, but it is possessed by some involuntarily and much to their own sorrow. Woyciki (Polish Folklore, translated by Lowenstein, p. 52) mentions an unhappy Slav who, with the most loving heart, was afflicted with the evil eye, and in sheer desperation blinded himself that he might not be the cause of injury to his dears ones. Cases of involuntary fatal power are related as existing still in England and elsewhere (Mabel Peacock, *Daily News*, Aug. 13, 1895), so that mothers will not venture to expose their infants to the touch of a stranger. Thus a father who was several years ago than 1901 a farmer of Somerset was said to ‘have the evil eye so bad’ that if he looked on his own cattle they died. De *Sp* is held by Fro- manner the most wide writer on the subject, to be a distinct communicable possession acting upon this terrible influence acting against the will of the possessor. Among the Bhiyia and Bhiyuvar of India, children born on Saturday have the evil eye, and there are special spells to obviate it (Crooke, *TC* ii. 84, 97).

Perhaps no phase of this superstition is more generally wide-spread than that relating to the danger arising from praise or admiration to the object of it. ‘*Landet qui invicit*’ was believed devoutly by the Romans; it is held and acted on, if unconsciously, among the English to-day, and still more commonly among the belonging to other nations. The conventional or national words uttered instinctively on receiving compliments seem to reflect the notion that danger exists, and that protection must be sought by appeal to a higher power, *mens sana in corpore sano*.

One is inclined to see the beginning of this in the old Roman baneful influences, who in their forms resemble the ancient ‘Black Art.’ These have been met by analogous acts, so that both baneful and antidote fail more properly under the subject of MAGIC; but, inasmuch

should say. ’In Italy the custom in a like ease is to say, *Si mal ochio non ci fosse*, ‘No evil eye take effect.’ In England it has always been recognized as a rule of good manners not to over-praise; but few reflect that it springs from the old danger (rather than from politeness) lest the speaker should himself fascinate the object of his admiration; for those who were highly praised by others, or even by themselves, were liable to be blasted (Elworthy, *Evil Eye*, 121). In the Hebrews this belief is very strong. Miss Goodrich-Freer writes of horses falling down as if dead (soon after being admired)—the work of the eye (Outer *Iles*, 293). A Highland minister’s wife, whose child had been much admired, said, ‘Oh, dear, something is sure to happen to that child; I hope she has not given it the Evil Eye!’ (Murray-Aynsley, *Synb.*, 140). Narcissus was thought to have fascinated himself, hence his untimely fate; so also Eutelidus, who wasted away in consequence of his own admiration of himself. From these old legends we learn why to-day it is not so much ill- mannered as directly impious and dangerous to boast of one’s belongings, or to praise oneself. Lane (*Mod. Egyyp*, ed. 1895, p. 258) says a modern Egyptian is thereby alarmed, and will reprove one who is over-praising or asking him, ‘*O God, what does the Prophet*.’ If, then, the envier says, ‘O God, favour him,’ no ill effects will be feared. In England, ‘bad luck,’ it is thought, is certain to follow undue praise or boasting: this is well within the experience of all who have known the experience of all who have known

‘Only yesterday I was saying I had not broken anything for years, and now I have let fall this old glass that belonged to my grandmother. As I was letting loose a fine piece of silver I said to a friend, ‘Of all the dogs I ever had, this is the most intelligent, and he will grow up to be a treasure.’ Half an hour later he picked up a poisoned rat in the garden, and said it about ten yards, ran half a mile farther, and died!’ (1895).

Just as the hunchback is believed to have the evil eye, so, when his influence has been counteracted, he is thought to be a defender against the malignant influence of others; hence, it is said, a notable one gets his living at Monte Carlo by waiting outside the Casino that players may touch him for a consideration, in the belief that so doing will bring luck, i.e., prevent evil influence. Luck or good luck is but a negative result depending on the absence of evil or malevolent opposing influence. A very ancient beliefs is that a bonnet of pearl, silver, lava, or other materials, is a gobbe, or hunchback, to be found everywhere, even in Moscow, dressed in Russian clothes. An Italian who was wearing one under his waistcoat, having actually received a wound, said he was bear to part with it; and at last declared that all his good fortune was gone. He died shortly afterwards.

2. Protective.—A fear so wide-spread ‘and so deeply rooted could not but lead to the invention of innumerable means by which the dreadful influence could be counteracted. The direct emanations from the eye are the most to be avoided, and the first glance falling upon the susceptible object is the most injurious: if that can be averted or met by some antidote, no harm will be done. It has been shown (Elworthy, *Evil Eye*, 170 ff.) that the devices upon the heads and shields of warriors were originally intended to attract, and so to counteract, the first glance of the adversary in battle. Thus has arisen all that is now understood under the word *helmets* as heraldic blazon. I say ‘Glory be to God!’ ‘Lord be wi’ us!’ Little gratitude is expressed, and certainly no Christianity, but simply a desire to avert the evil expected. This was so strongly felt by the Romans that it became customary for the speaker of praise or compliment to accompany his speech with the words, *praeclare dixerim,* freely translated, ‘Fend evil eye...’
as many of these acts are confined exclusively to the central group of the front gable, it is needful to refer to them here at some length. All authori-
ties and all experience agree that to neutralize the look it is essential to attract it towards some-
time, through the cabs of the diversified group. Without this the object is liable to injury. Hence arose the use of bright, shining ornaments of all kinds—of glitter-
ing helmets and fantastic head-dresses. Some have even held that this was the origin of the wearing of such appurtenances. The point is maintained (Boettiger, Kleine Schriften, 1837-8, iii. 402; Lobeck, Agath., 1829, ii. 973), were first adopted to prevent injury to the persons of those who were necessarily much exposed to the gaze of possible enemies. ‘Everything that was ridiculous and obscene was supposed to be iminical to the malignant influence of fascination by the oddness of the sight’ (Dodwell, Class. Text, 1819, ii. 54); hence we find that the amulets that were most poten-
t were of this character. Nothing attracts curiosity like obscurity, so amulets of a phallic character have been in all ages the most common, all the worst over. Indeed, some writers consider that this is the basis of all protective amulets (J. G. R. Forlong, Rivers of Life, 1883). Foremost in this class must be placed that known by classæ writers as the phallic roes (Etruschi form., Ling., Litt. vol. v. 99). For a full description, see Payne Knight’s Worship of Priapus, 1866, pt. ii. p. 152; Jahn, ‘Uebcr den Abergel.’; Frohmann, p. 5. Specimens of this amulet, both to be worn on the person and for household suspension, are to be seen in the British and many other Museums.

Amulets against the evil eye are of three classes (for distinction between amulets and talismans see Eden’s Evil Eye, 1921). Those intended to attract upon themselves the malignant glance, such as were worn on the outside of the dress, or such as were sculptured, painted, or otherwise exposed in or upon houses or public buildings, etc.; (2) all those endless objects worn on or concealed beneath the dress for the purpose of averting evil; (3) written texts from the Scriptures, Qur’an, or other sacred writings; cabalistic figures and magico-
formula, either in appropriate covering, or carved, painted, or otherwise displayed on houses.

The turpentina roes was so much in use amongst the Romans that it is only known by the name of Jesus, as in Hor. Epod. viii. 18. On this Frohmann (ib. Fase, p. 5) remarks at length in unquotable language. In fact, fascinae became the Roman name for mistrustful, and especially, as fascino in modern Italian. Where our present day conven-
tions perceive nothing but obscurity, our ancients saw only the sumam of everything indispensable to combat successful-
ly the most terrible danger. With them ‘fascination was destruction, death—the phallic was life’ (Tischmann, München, ii. [1896] 10). The survivor and clearest remaining part of the fascinum is still to be seen in the ordinary silver charm worn by Roman infants, and known as mano in fea (see El-
worthy, Evil Eye, 192, 250). Its analogue among ourselves survives in the coral and bells of our childhood. Most of the objects worn by the ancients as amulets were generally emblems or symbols (defined in Evil Eye, p. 117) of a god, to whom the wearer tacitly appealed by the display of his or her attri-
t. The amulet denoting one of the four lascivious gods were by far the most common. Of these Priapus, called also Fascinum, according to Lucian, was the special patron of lustful women. Jesus was his special social emblem. Infinite in number and in variety of obscurity are the emblems of Priapus, for in all ages and countries his cult seems to have held a prominent position. In Babylonia, Egypt, India, Greece, Rome—among the ancients everywhere—he was in striking evidence. His emblem was displayed on the pediment and in the house. The phallus was consecrated to Osiris, the protector of Egypt.

To-day his cult is prominently visible among all savages and so-called Nature-worshippers, while in sculptures and cryptic forms it is represented by more civilized people, even by the English. In most museums of antiquities it is to be seen spec-
imen of the grosser kind of phallic amulets. That of Naples, containing the remains of Pompeii, gives the greatest number; and few are without specimens of the turpentina roes before al-
uded to (on this see Knight, op. cit.; Jahn, op. cit.; Montelius, Etrusci, 1880, p. 200). A singular example of obscurum Graecae Fabae is to be seen in a small terrac-
cotta (W. 75, Read) at the Brit. Mus., obviously intended as a protective. It consists of two phalli personified, in the act of saving an eye. Pompeii presents numerous specimens still in situ. From medieval times many are to be found in monastic curios, even monastic as gags in legends, etc., and elsewhere. Publicly exhibited obscurum carvings of the Middle Ages were mostly intended as a protection against the evil eye. Cl. Mt. Chamis and Amulets (Greek), in vol. iii. p. 435 f.

Next to phallic subjects and their developments, perhaps the commonest was a representation of the eye itself, either alone or in combination with other well-known protective symbols. The best known ancient example is the uzu, or Eye of Osiris, on most Egyptian coffins or sarcophagi. A good example is one on a large wooden sarcophagus in the middle of the Egyptian room at the British Museum. A great eye was carried in Egyptian funeral processions, and, along with the winged serekh, a blue uzu was placed over the incision made at the embalming of the body as a protector of the dead. Blue and red are everywhere protective colours in Europe, Palestine, India, and throughout the East; in Eng-
land and all over the world they are the favourite colours for horse ornaments.

The eye as a defence against the evil eye is a good instance of sympathetic magic (on this see HDB, e. v. ‘Magic’). As a protective amulet it figured among several races, Greeks, Romans, and is used to-day by Turks, Arabs, Nubians, Italians, Russians, and many others. Inghirami (Pitt. di Vasi Etruschi, 1852, ii. 164) gives a shield having an eye proper in the centre, as the only device; also (ib. 400) Hercules nude has a large eye on each breast and on each thigh, to protect him from the malignant glance of the enemy. A striking shield on a Greek vase in the British Museum has the club of Hercules in the centre, with a large eye upon the appendage beneath (see pl. xiv. in Millingen, Painted Gr. Vases).

In modern Italy any glass bead or stone having a marking at all like an eye is carefully preserved as an amulet. Bellucci of Pergia has a great number of such, many set in silver and much worn. Ancient Egyptians ornamented their pottery with a similar eye as a special feature, often in combination with surrounding accessories. Maspero (Egypt. Arch., 1902, p. 245) gives a notable example: three fish having one eye common to all, alternating with three lotus flowers. A remarkable sculptured scene with the eye as the central object is the famous Woburn-relief, first published by Millingen in Archaeologia, xix. 70, and here reproduced. In this the evident meaning is the same as that referred to above (Brit. Mus. Read.). Here the eye is being attacked by several hostile animals and by a gladiator, while above it is a man in
Phrygian cap in a well-known indecorous attitude of mocking contempt. This attitude is still practised literally and habitually by Italian sailors against adversity; and it is not unlikely that the writer's knowledge in England both in act and in words to match. Other curious instances of the eye being attacked by a ring of enemies are found on many ancient gems (ib. Elworthy, *Evil Eye*, 130), but perhaps the most curious is that (ib. 131) where the eye is surrounded by seven symbolic figures, representing the seven powerful and beneficent deities who in turn preside over the days of the week.

This amulet, therefore, provides a protection for every day. Several compound gem amulets having the eye as the centre surrounded by inimical protectors are shown and fully described in ib. 130. The accumulation or piling up of protective amulets is an old-world custom (see Lanciani, *Atheneum*, April 25, 1891). Examples of its prevalence exist in the numerous *dies sacrif* of Graeco-Roman times, 350 B.C., discovered chiefly at Taranto. One notable specimen is to be seen at the British Museum, and one other at Naples, while two are in the Ashmolean. These have been fully dealt with in the *Soc. Antiq. Tras.*, 1898, and more particularly in the present writer's *Horns of Honour*.

The same accumulation, and unwillingness to ignore, protective amulets are still in evidence in the dedications of abbeys and churches, e.g. to St. Michael and All Angels, to certain Apostles conjointly, to two or more Saints, and, lastly, to All Saints, that none be omitted.

The Gorgon's head already described not only preserves the earliest evidence of the dread of the Evil Eye, but has also been in all ages one of the most favoured amulets against it. Especially has it survived as one of the commonest devices upon the door-knockers, not only of Pompeii, but of modern Naples and all the cities of Europe; thus becoming, even to-day, a potent protector of the horse against every new-comer. Birmingham little dreams how persistently she aids in maintaining an ancient myth. One of the most potent of protective is the *horn* in its various shapes and developments. In modern Italy, especially in Naples, it is so much in use that the word 'horn' has become generic; every kind and description of protective charm against *jettatura* is 'un corno.' The phrase 'non vale un corno' is equivalent to our 'not worth a fig.' On close analysis both phrases are found to bear an identical phallic signification (see Horax). Pintarch (Symp. v. 7) declares that objects fixed up to ward off fascination derive their efficacy from the strangeness or ridiunculousness of their forms, which attract the mischievous working eye upon themselves. The same effect is aimed at in the numerous grotesque devices found upon ancient gems. *Grifli*, a quasi-technical term, though included in 'corni,' is the name of all amulets of this comic description. In modern Italian, *grillo* is not only a cricket or grasshopper (a potent protector, because *per contà* a possessor of the evil eye), but also a caprice of fancy, said to be a classic survival. *Idem* (Antiquities) gives the writer's knowledge in England both in act and in words to match. Other curious instances of the eye being attacked by a ring of enemies are found on many ancient gems (ib. Elworthy, *Evil Eye*, 130), but perhaps the most curious is that (ib. 131) where the eye is surrounded by seven symbolic figures, representing the seven powerful and beneficent deities who in turn preside over the days of the week.

The Scripture *tēphēlium*, called 'phylacteries' in the NT, are combinations of an object to be worn conspicuously and a hidden writing enclosed within it. Their Greek name promises their purpose as protective, while the Hebrew *tēphēlium* ('prayers') indicates more clearly their contents (HDB, s.v. 'Phylacteries'). The Jews are still devout believers in the evil eye, and hence preserve many objects in their ceremonies of a prophylactic nature; among these is the *mezuzah*, awesomely a literal fulfilment of Dt 6'. Strict Jews' doorposts still exhibit this valued safeguard. Persians as well as Jews use tassels, or *tallith*, which have a mystic prophylactic meaning (see HDB, s.v. 'Fringes').

Luck if analyzed is really the absence of misfortune, i.e. of evil wishing, whereby desires and natural expectations are frustrated. Damocles who, according to Theocritus (*Idyll* vi. 39), admired his own beauty reflected in the water, knew of the probable consequence, and used the well-known remedy against fascination, spitting three times on his breast. Spitting is a protection against many misfortunes. In Bulgaria it is believed that spitting protects against fascination and also against perjury at a trial.

Many objects besides those already noted, believed to be potent against the evil eye generally, are in some parts held to be specific against certain effects of it. The crescent—symbol of the moon, Ishtar, Hathor, Artemis, Diana, and the Virgin Mary—is everywhere a potent amulet. Along with the sun, it is to be seen on great seals and coats of arms, even episcopal. As a separate amulet, it specially appeals to all who are powerful deities in the Graeco-Roman world, but in Sicily the horned shell called *coquzes di luna* is worn by children and others against toothache, always considered as the result of malice on our part. There also the *operculum*, everywhere a protective amulet from the natural eye upon it, is a certain specific against sore throat (male di gola); so also a little wooden cross tied to a piece of crystal is good against sore throat. Small gold earrings are worn by *carboneari* and others, accustomed to ward off the *malocchio*; and our own navvies and showmen wear them for the like purpose, not merely for ornament. A double triangle of silver, a viper's skin in a bag, a silver ring called 'di S. Biagio,' and many other objects are specific against various maladies. Many special Sicilian amulets *contro la jettatura* were exhibited by Pitrè at the Palermo Exhibition, 1905:

1. A piece of red cloth. Red everywhere is inarticulate to witchcraft of all kinds, and is constantly used, from the most orthodox, to the most heretical, both alone and as a strengtheners of other amulets against the evil eye. Our phallic horses and our notorious red and white ribbons, and the King's ornament their horses with bright colours to keep off their enemies. Of red wood or horse is always woolen or worsted. Charms in Italian and Sicilian shops are always tied with red woolen braid or painted red; horses on butchers' shops are always painted red and white.

2. *Viritoceia* (Sicilian), *Funzolo* (Italian), the perforated wheel used in spinning. This is but one example of perforated amulets.
of which also the holed stones used everywhere as protective amulets are another (see Elworthy, Evil Eye, p. 55). Amulets known as 'Zabara' (on protector embossed speciality. A prophylactic string 112 Chlave 256) Tola any, Smyrna. Tigers' teeth have been used in Italian, Napo-My-Anna, etc. Amongst showmen, protective amulets are all specially avowed to protect them from the evil eye at his trial. On a child in Corsa was a small silk bag, containing salt, charcoal, a nail, and a clove of garlic.

Evil of carallo, tied with red cord. The horsehoe to us is perhaps the most familiar of all amulets against the evil eye. It is explained as being merely the conventionalized form of the horseshoe, and that the horseshoe was not, as is commonly supposed, an importation from the Far East by the early Christians. Britain, is always shaped like the Byzantine crescent. Power is cumulative; so iron, the base of witchcraft, is further strengthened by association with the horsehoe (cf. Elworthy, Evil Eye, 215).}

5. Callo di chiodo di ferra. All rings are amulets, but silver ones, Diana's own metal, above all. In Italy the rings sold speciality. A prophylactic string 112 Chlave 256) Tola any, Smyrna. Tigers' teeth have been used in Italian, Napo-My-Anna, etc. Amongst showmen, protective amulets are all specially avowed to protect them from the evil eye at his trial. On a child in Corsa was a small silk bag, containing salt, charcoal, a nail, and a clove of garlic.

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tective value, and have it still, particularly red. Their form, the slit ball, was so established that the Fatcino Iron, made by L. Frommond (Frommon), of Deux-Familles, Nuremburg, 1785; V. Alarios, of Fichi and Frommon Felonum (Felonum, Paris), of Theaumus (Guillai), of Nuremburg, 1808. The Fatcino Iron, always a protective amulet, has been used in ages—always as protective. On farm teams in the West of England, the devil was supposed to have a so-called amulet, a row of five or six long-jangling bells, ornamented de regueur with red woofed fringes, was carried above the collar of the leaner. The noise was often diminished: the purpose was to drive away evil spirits, while the red colour attracted and so absorbed the first glance of the devil. Many of these amulets are not originally intended as calls to prayer, but rather as a preparation for it, by driving away evil spirits, to whom the noise is a terror. The better to be effective, the best advice given by eighteenth-century present writer, are sung specially on their respective Saints' Days to 'drive the devil over to the other parish.'

'The sea-horse occurs on many early crosses in the east of Scotland, notably at Aberlemno and Meigle' (Reliquary, Oct. 1856, p. 251). Miss Goodrich Freer says: 'In the Hebrides coal-breachan, water ragwort, called armpit flower of St. Columba, is placed in byres, etc., to protect cattle from the same. The cock is sacred to keep off evil spirits' (on this see Elworthy, Horns of Honour, 93). In India the excrescences of the Bombax, or cotton tree, are considered protective; and in the same tree has the like reputation in Mexico, where it is common. The usual shop amulet of butchers in Naples is a pair of cow's horns, painted red and white, over the door; but, in addition, very many of the better class have a stag's head with bucking horns affixed to the inner wall. Many have other objects suspended, such as a horsehoe with a single pendant horn tied with red (see Horns). Macaroni and provision dealers frequently have several curiously combined amulets hung up inside their shops. Laundresses usually have a glove filled with sand, the thumb and two middle fingers sewn in, so as to make the mano carvino. These are worn and often a common finial for the silver spada worn by women in their hair; some have a flower, bird, or piece of coral. Written texts, cabalistic signs (such as the well-known Solomon's seal) of many descriptions are also potent protectors against the dreaded influence. Many are of a double character, i.e., possessing power as visible amulets, but with special virtue from the nature of their contents. Magic squares, still worn in modern Italy in brooches, and even well-known to the ancient Romans, many in terracotta having been found, with numbers arranged precisely as they are to-day. In Scotland, written charms against various ills were very common (Folklore, iv. [1904] 359). In Tenerife it is the custom to scatter mustard-seed through the house after a birth to keep off witches and the evil eye. The Dangi of India, in similar fashion, burn mustard and pepper, the fam cariteit and pepper on a Tuesday or a Saturday, and the Khairwa salt and pepper (Crocke, TC ii. 251, 329, iii. 224). Iron, as being a well-known seer of demons, is employed to avert the evil eye among the Tharu (ib. iv. 369); and the Armenians spit on a stone and turn it under, or make cakes of dough, wet them with water, and throw them into a fire, the evil eye being broken as the cakes crack assunder (Abeghian, Armenischer Volksglauhe, p. 124 f.). Elsewhere an effort is made to ward off the evil eye by giving a deprecatory name to a child, as among the Indian Raja (Crocke, op. cit. iv. 214), though among the Golapahar this is resorted to only when the first child of a marriage has died (ib. iii. 427).

Besides all this multiplicity of concrete objects, there is an endless multitude of incantations, of which the mass of knowledge has for the like purpose, too numerous to be more than referred to. Sayce (Rel. of Anc. Bab., App. iii.) gives a long list of magical texts. Abra-Melin also gives a vast number of magical squares, formed of letters, for warding off or producing all sorts of evil.


EVIL-SPEAKING.—See SLANDER.

EVOLUTION (Biological).—In the history of biological thought the term 'evolution' has had more than one meaning. It has, however, been more especially used to denote those views on the interrelation of living things which imply the conception of the mutability of species, now so closely associated with the name of Charles Darwin (1809-82).

1. The idea of the transformation of species, of the origin of new forms from existing ones, is very old; it is to be found in the teachings of many of the Greek philosophers. Aristotle devotes some attention to it, and his writings doubtless express in large measure the opinions generally prevalent in learned circles during the time in which he lived. He taught that there had been a continuous succession of animal forms, during which the older and less perfect had gradually given rise to the younger and more perfect, in a process of giving rise to yet more perfect forms. Life itself arose through the direct metamorphosis of inorganic matter. Plants came early in the succession; after them appeared the animals, powers of nourishment and reproduction, they have neither feeling nor sensibility. Later came the plant animals or zoophytes; and still later the animals proper, gifted with sensibility and even, to some extent, with powers of thought. Highest of all is man, the one form capable of abstract thought. The process of Nature is a struggle towards perfection, the expression of a perfecting principle inherent in the universe. The result is a gradual evolution from the lower to the higher, owing to the resistance offered by matter to any change of form from that which the perfecting principle seeks to impose upon it. At the back of the perfecting principle is the Efficient Cause; though, whether this Efficient Cause gave the original impulse and the consequent movement remained outside the operations of Nature, or whether it is all the time constantly at work, is a question on which Aristotle raises without being able to resolve.

In his conception of the processes of Nature, Aristotle had advanced as far as the existing state of knowledge went. In more detail, the idea of progressive change in the organic world stands out clearly enough. But he was unable to point to any natural agency through which change might be brought about. Curiously enough, he considers in one passage
a crude form of the survival of the fittest which was advanced by Empedocles, though only to reject it. It was tacitly assumed and argued by the feeling of design in Nature to sift out the argument for natural selection dimly foreshadowed in the writings of the earlier philosopher. Moreover, the facts at his disposal were far from forcing him to pay attention to the great amount of variation normally found among living things or to realize its significance. In the teaching of Aristotle are summed up the contributions of the Greeks to the problems of evolution, and, as Osborn has said, they 'left the later world face to face with the problem of causation in three forms: first, whether Intelligent Design is constantly operating in Nature; second, whether Nature is under the operation of natural causes originally implanted by Intelligent Design; and, third, whether Nature is under the operation of natural laws due from the beginning to the laws of chance, and containing no evidences of design, even in their origin' (From the Greeks to Darwin, ch. iv.).

2. The acute and speculative minds of Greece had in large measure formulated the problem of evolution, and for many centuries it rested much where they had left it. The learning of Europe passed through a definite stage in the mental work where it became a means of extolling the glory of God rather than a pursuit to be followed for its own sake. It was in the order of things that a firm belief in another and better world should dominate the imagination only so long as the sinful and transitory life, and the touch thus exerted upon natural curiosity produced its inevitable result in the stagnation of natural knowledge. It is true that some of the more liberal minds in the Church, notably Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, endeavoured to reconcile the teaching of the Greeks with the Mosaic cosmogony, but eventually the precision of the first chapter of Genesis conspired with the inclination of the faithful to behold in the manifold variety of Nature incontrovertible evidence of the manifold power of the Creator. It was only after the lapse of many years that the weakening of the authority wielded by the Church, helped largely by the renaissance of Greek learning, lent a fresh stimulus to curiosity, and enabled men to put aside the temptations of a future life and to devote themselves to the discovery of the world in which their lot was cast. But it was long before definite progress was made with the idea of evolution. In the early revival of science, men were more attracted to the study of the phenomena of nature in their stable aspect, where the phenomena encountered were less likely to suggest the derivation of one form of matter from another in orderly sequence. In the provinces of zoology and botany, where these problems are more likely to arise, the naturalists were for too long too busy with absorbing into their classifications the facts continuously streaming in to devote much attention to the philosophy of their subject.

3. Starting with the great miscellaneous compilations of Aldrovandus and Gesner in the 16th cent., the process of arrangement gradually took shape through the labours of Ray and others till it reached the status of a system of Linnaeus (1707-78). The problem of species had been discussed before Linnaeus, but it was the Systema Naturae which by its comprehensive and logical arrangement insisted upon the question of the way in which species were related to one another. Linnaeus himself, though a man of science, was a good Christian, and held to the Church’s teaching of the separate creation of each species and animal. Linnaeus allowed himself a little more latitude, and admitted that in certain cases new forms might have come into being through crosses between the original species. But the change so brought about was held to be a degenerative one, tending to obscure the perfection of the original type as it had been issued from the creative hand of God. It was the classification of species that interested Linnaeus—the demonstration of criteria by which the vast variety of animal and plant forms could be definitely separated out and arranged. Howard’s conclusions that differences might have come about was a question in which he was not greatly interested. Nevertheless, his attempt to fix the limits of natural species inevitably forced the botanist and the zoologist to inquire more closely into the nature of species itself.

4. Contemporary with Linnaeus lived another great naturalist, who, perhaps more than any one, should be regarded as the father of modern evolutionary thought. In most respects the mind of Buffon (1707-88) contrasted sharply with that of Linnaeus. Though no less insistent upon exact description as a first necessity in science, he held that the mere accumulation of facts was not an end in itself, but that the scientific mind was fulfilling a proper function in combining and generalizing upon the facts which it had brought to light. For this reason at service to the progress of thought, and were full of suggestion for many who came after him. To determine precisely the credit due to Buffon in the development of the conception of evolution is a matter of extreme difficulty, for his own standpoint was only set on the stage of changes during different periods of his life. Like Linnaeus, he started with a belief in the fixity of species, each enjoying the attributes with which it was invested at its creation. But with the riper knowledge that came from his studies in comparative anatomy, he found himself questioning the perfection of the plan upon which an animal is built. In his famous dissertation upon the pig he points out that this animal cannot be regarded as formed upon an originally perfect plan, but that it evidently has parts which, though well formed, are of little or no service to it. In fact, it may be regarded as a compound of other animals. From this position it was not a great step to a belief in the frequent mutability of species, and to the conception that the members of a group of species should be capable of being mankind from a common ancestor, some by becoming more perfect, others by degeneration. So might the horse and the ass, so even man and the ape, be related to one another. Yet, after forcibly advancing the theory of evolution, Buffon will suddenly remember the susceptibilities of his neighbours, and protest that, after all, it cannot be so, since there has been vouchsafed to us a direct revelation that all animals have issued in pairs, completely formed, from the hands of the Creator. How far this attitude was irrational is difficult to say, nor need it greatly concern us here. There is little doubt that in his inmost mind he believed in the mutability of species, and held that changes in animal and plant form could be directly brought about by changes in their environment, and that these changes could become hereditarily fixed. Buffon’s great mental work lay in his suggestiveness. He questioned the orthodox notions as to the relation of species to one another, and from the width of his learning, the acuteness of his intellect, and the charm of his style he raised his questions in such a way that no man henceforward could afford to ignore them.

5. The seed so sown by Buffon soon began to bear fruit, and within a few years Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) in England and Lamarck (1744-1829) in France each put forward a theory of evolution. Each accepted the doctrine of the mutability of species, and each adopted almost the same hypo-
thesis to explain how the transformation of species might be brought about. Buffon had expressed the opinion that the natural surroundings in which animals lived might directly influence their form. Both to Erasmus Darwin and to Lamarck a changed environment was at the bottom of the natural phenomena, as an indirect one. The changed circumstances of its life led to an alteration in the habits of an animal; and the altered habits, by causing increased use of some organs, together with decreased use of others, eventually brought about a change in form. Sources of alteration of form brought about by increased use or disuse of organs—'acquired characters,' as they are now generally called—were assumed by Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck to be inherited. The net result of a permanent change in the environment was a permanent alteration in form, though this was reached only indirectly through a change in the animal's habits. Unless the animal reacted to the altered environment by an alteration in its habits, a change in form could not take place. Evolution was effected only through the co-operation of the animal's nervous system.

In addition to this, the views of Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck failed to secure a firm hold on men's minds. At the English Universities, scientific studies were at a low ebb; and although, including the acute and gifted Paley, was directly hostile and sufficiently powerful to prevent the new doctrines from percolating far. In France the great weight of the learning of Cuvier (1769-1832) was cast into the scale against Lamarck, and the younger generation probably grew up to regard him as little better than a madman. The doctrine of the transformation of species implied a unity of plan running throughout the kingdom. In this idea Cuvier, who stoutly upheld the orthodox view of the separate creation of species, was vigorously opposed. He contended that there were several perfectly distinct plans or types upon which different groups of animals were built, and that these different types could not be related to one another. There were instances in which animals built upon one plan might show apparent resemblances to those which were built upon another, but careful analytical examination showed that in reality the resemblance was one of analogy only. His great knowledge of comparative anatomy enabled him to doubt until the rise of modern embryology that the fundamental unity of plan common to the great animal groups came to be clearly perceived.

7. Comparative anatomy, as it then existed, was ranged on the side of special creation as opposed to the gradual evolution of species. But another study was already coming into greater prominence. The year (1830) that witnessed the victory of Cuvier over the Lamarckians in the Academy of Sciences at Paris witnessed also the publication of the first volume of Lyell's Principles of Geology. In that work was set forth what came to be known as the uniformitarian doctrine in geology—the principle that the past must be explained by the present unless good cause can be shown to the contrary. Lyell pointed out clearly and forcibly that the formation of the rocks in past ages could be referred to the operation of causes similar to those now at work, and that there was no valid reason for assuming the interpolation of a series of cataclysmal changes such as Cuvier had advocated. But Cuvier's followers, however incompetent to account for the non-living part of the globe, Lyell strengthened the hands of those who were trying to show that it could also account for the living. Moreover, the uniformitarian doctrine in geology provided another strong argument for the evolutionist. Paleontology had arisen as a serious study, and in the hands of Cuvier and his pupils it had already gained ground in an environment in which animals lived might directly influence their form. It had been perceived that, on the whole, the different strata of the earth's crust contained different and distinctive collections of fossil forms, and that the animal life of the globe had undergone a cataclysmal changes, which involved the extinction of world catastrophes which blotted out animal life, followed by a series of separate creations which re-peopled the earth with new and distinctive fauna. By abolishing the catastrophe the geologist brought the naturalistic face to face with the problem of explaining the connexion between the fossil forms of life and those still living, and, as the science of paleontology developed and fresh discoveries were made, it came to be more clearly seen that the distribution of these various fossil forms in time accorded well enough with the idea that there existed a genetic continuity between them, but that it was not easily to be reconciled with any other hypothesis.

8. The development of the natural sciences during the earlier half of the 19th cent. was rapid, and by the middle of it the evolutionist was able to set forth a good array of arguments in support of the idea. In Germany, theories of the transformation of species had excited considerable interest. Through the works of Oken, Treviranus, von Baer, and others, science was brought to be said to have been not only familiar with the idea, but also in large measure sympathetically disposed towards it. In England, on the other hand, isolated as she had been from the solvent action of the Napoleonic wars, scientific opinion was largely represented by men of sincere and orthodox religion, to whom the idea of the mutability of species, and all that it implied, was unwelcome and even repugnant. The existing arguments for evolution were actually brought together by Robert Chambers, whose work on the Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation ran through many editions and excited very considerable discussion and controversy. A brief presentation of these will show that the case for evolution was forcibly stated before 1830, and it is not easy to understand why scientific men in England were not more early sensible of their weight.

(1) Argument from the general presumption of science against 'supernatural' explanations of phenomena.—The first argument for the discovery is to eliminate the miraculous as an element in the causation of natural phenomena, and to regard this causation as having from the earliest times been operative in the same way as we see it now. With the accumulation of facts in the physical sciences the principle of the continuity of natural causation had become so firmly established, through the discoveries of Newton and other great natural philosophers, that it was accepted as axiomatic by those who worked at these branches of knowledge. In deciding, therefore, between two rival theories to account for the causation of the organic world, it was obvious that the presumption was in favour of the one which permitted a continuous and orderly process of natural change, as against that which explained the phenomena by the sporadic intervention of an alien and incalculable force.

(2) Argument from uniformitarianism in geology. —The influence of the rise of modern geology, with its doctrine that the past is to be explained by the present, has been perhaps the most important bearing upon the question of organic evolution as opposed to a series of special creations is sufficiently obvious without further remark.

(3) Argument from homologies in vertebrates. —The studies of the comparative anatomists, began
in the 18th cent. and so brilliantly developed by Goethe, St. Ray, Buffon, and Cuvier, and demonstrated that the parts of the skeleton of vertebrates could all be reduced to a common plan. Widely different in appearance as were the wing of a bird, the fin of a whale, and the hand of a man, they all still stood in the same structural relation that there was an intimate correspondence between them, so that the separate parts of the one could be clearly recognized, though greatly modified, in the other. This was the homology confined to the vertebrates; for even at this time cases had been worked out among such groups as the insects and molluscs. Such homologies were obviously in harmony with a theory which implied community of descent through a process of gradual evolution.

(4) Argument from the variability of existing species.—Though the study of variation had not yet made much headway, there was one group of facts which pointed clearly to the possibility of species being capable of permanent modification. The various domesticated races of animals offered evidence that certain species were capable of modification, and that such modification could be transmitted. Whatever the origin of the variability, its existence at any rate was positive proof that species could undergo transformation.

(5) The sequence of types in paleontology.—As the fossiliferous strata of the Earth came to be more fully explored, it was seen that a rough order was apparent in the succession of the new forms brought to light. The more recent the strata, the higher the types; and the more nearly approximating to living species; while, conversely, the older strata were characterized by a simpler fauna and by the absence of the higher and more specialized types. Though the general import of the sequence of types was unmistakable, the evidence, as it existed in the middle of last century, was for special cases imperfect and often apparently inconsistent. Whole groups of animals might suddenly disappear at the close of a geologic period, and be suddenly replaced by other distinct groups of closely related species, without the appearance of intermediate forms. Such facts were naturally insisted upon by the opponents of the evolutionary doctrine, and its supporters could make little retort beyond alleging the imperfection of the geological record. It was clear that the embryological gave partial general support to the idea of evolution, the records existing in the earlier half of last century were too scanty to afford that detailed evidence without which it could hardly be admitted as a cogent witness for the evolutionist. More recently, of course, the position is greatly changed; and the paleontological discoveries of the latter part of the 19th cent. have not only gone some way towards filling up existing gaps in the record, but in certain cases, notably those of the horse and the elephant, have brought to light very beautiful and complete series in which the evolution of an existing animal can be clearly traced back to a geologically remote and widely different ancestor.

(6) Argument from persistent types in geology.—Though the paleontological record exhibits on the whole a progressive series of animal forms through time, there are cases in which a species has remained constant over vast lapses of time. Crocodiles indistinguishable from those now living occur early in Mesozoic times, and the shrew-dog is an almost primitive mollusc and brachichopi still existing in the seas as far back as the Silurian. Though clearly not a positive argument for evolution, such facts as these are evidently not what would be expected on the rival theory of successive cataclysms and special creations; and, as such, they have carried weight in favour of the former alternative, had they been demonstrated.

(7) Argument from the Recapitulation Theory.—The study of comparative embryology was founded by von Baer in the earlier part of the 19th cent., and it was clearly pointed out by him that the forms of early embryonic development do to some extent remind us of the early stages of allied groups are far more alike than are the adults. Thus the early embryos of a bird and of a fish are to the human eye very much alike, and during the course of development the embryo of a bird exhibits such piscine characters as gill-slits. With the course of development the fish-like characters eventually disappear, until the unmistakable avian form is established. But the fact that the animal higher in the scale tends during its embryological development to recapitulate, as it were, the ancestral history of the race to which it belongs appears more natural on the theory of evolution than on that of special creation. Through the work of F. M. Balfour and others in the latter part of the 19th cent., the study of comparative embryology was largely developed, and many striking instances of recapitulation were added to those previously known. At the same time it must be stated that fuller knowledge has shown that embryological development is no sure guide to ancestral history. Nothing is more certain than this, on the evolutionist, that the ancestors of birds were toothed creatures. Yet in no case hitherto investigated in birds is there an embryonic stage in which tooth-gums are present; and numerous other examples could be given in which, during the development of the individual, no traces occur of structures which its ancestors, according to the theory of evolution, must at some time have possessed.

(8) Argument from rudimentary organs.—The researches of the comparative anatomists had revealed in many forms the presence, in an undeveloped state, of organs which in allied forms were obviously of use to their possessors. Small teeth had been found in the fetus of the whalebone whale, traces of hind limbs in certain snakes, small and imperfect additional toes in the split bones of the horse—all obvious imperfections in the general plan of the animal in which they were found. Chambers made use of these imperfect structures as an argument against the hypothesis of special creation. Their existence alone condemned the idea of a special creation, and in seeing that they, 'on such a supposition, could be regarded in no other light than as blemishes or blunders' (Vestiges, p. 262). Yet, though discordant with the idea of special creation, they became intelligible and instructive on the hypothesis of a genetic connexion between the different forms of animal life. For, on that hypothesis, horses must be descended from ancestors with more than one toe, baleen whales from whales with teeth, and snakes from reptilian forms with limbs. Not only was the rudimentary organ explicable on these lines, but it might even give a clue to the past history of the forms in which it occurred.

9. From all this it is clear that the idea of evolution had been fully and critically discussed during the earlier half of the 19th cent., and that the arguments for and against it were fairly set forth before 1850. Yet it had failed to take root. Nor was this altogether due to religious prejudice. A great obstacle in the way of accepting the evolutionary idea was the difficulty of conceiving a natural process by which it could come about. The suggestions of Buffon and the theories of Erasmus Darwin and of Lamarck all lacked compulsion, nor did the ascription of the process to an innate perfecting principle, as
with Aristotle, succeeded in investing it with more than a mere biological status. It was not until Darwin and Wallace jointly formulated their views in 1858 that a working factor was felt to have been found. In the following year appeared The Origin of Species, a work which has influenced human thought more profoundly than any other book of modern times. In that work, Darwin summed up the existing arguments for evolution, and at the same time clearly and convincingly demonstrated a working principle by which Charles would have been led to suggest. This factor was 'Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life.' The idea was not entirely new. It had been formulated by Wells in 1813 and by Matthew in 1831, but in both cases it had been thrown out rather as a suggestion in connexion with a small class of facts than as a principle of the first importance and of general application. The greatness of Darwin lay in his appreciation of the profound importance of the principle he advocates, in his patient accumulation of facts, and in his masterly handling of them when brought together.

To Darwin, as later to Wallace, the first hint of natural selection had come from the reading of Malthus's Essay on the Principle of Population (London, 1798). The main theme of Malthus was that stagnation in population would result from an unbalanced food supply, and stress was laid upon the inevitable struggle for existence that arose unless this tendency was somewhat checked. Malthus concerned himself solely with his own species. For him the struggle was an unpleasant fact, a source of human misery of which some mitigation was much to be desired. What was to Malthus a fact of mainly economic significance became to the wider vision of Darwin a phenomenon of deep philosophical import. For, with a struggle for existence once granted, the logical outcome was the working factor in evolution for which naturalists had long been searching in vain. But to complete the argument two further co-operative factors are needed, and these were demonstrated by Darwin in the Principle of Variation and the Principle of Heredity. According to the former, no two animals or plants are quite alike; but even the offspring of the same parent or parents tend to vary, in greater or less degree, both from them and from one another. According to the latter, the peculiarities exhibited by the parents tend to be repeated in their offspring, to some in greater, to others in less intensity. In other words, offspring are never exactly like their parents, but nevertheless tend to resemble them in greater or less degree the members of the same species or variety. If such is the normal condition of a population of living things, and if upon them is imposed a struggle for existence induced by over-multiplication, it follows necessarily that a progressive change will take place in that population. For, since its members are not all alike, some will possess variations through which they will be better equipped than others for survival in the competitive struggle for existence; and these will, therefore, tend to leave more offspring than their less advantaged brethren. These offspring will tend to resemble their parents in exhibiting the favoured variation in greater intensity than their parents; moreover, they will be still more greatly favoured in the struggle, and will tend to leave offspring of whom some will possess the advantageous variation in even greater intensity. The process is cumulative. Automatically, the struggle for existence leads to the more favoured variations surviving to become the parents of the next generation. And, as through the principle of selection offspring will show the advantageous variation more marked than the parents, it follows that this variation must become gradually built up by small degrees in each generation, until a definite change of type has been brought about. To this automatic process, by which those showing the more favourable variations were picked out for parentage, Darwin applied the term 'natural selection.'

In The Origin of Species Darwin's performance was twofold. First, he brought together once more the various arguments for evolution, supplementing them by great stores of knowledge, and making use of a new argument in the geographical distribution of animals. Secondly, he endeavoured to show how, through this newly discovered factor of natural selection, evolution might be brought about. That he succeeded in his endeavour, in spite of the most strenuous opposition, is now well known. A few years had to elapse after the publication of The Origin of Species before the new doctrine of evolution through natural selection was generally accepted by scientific men, and much vigorous controversy was at first engendered in the clash between the adherents of Lamarck and the new doctrine. But after a while the new doctrine rapidly won its way in spite of the prejudices it was bound to arouse; and the fact that it has already been accepted for some years in all schools of thought is not a little due to the pens of Ernst Haeckel, Germany, and of T. H. Huxley in Great Britain.

To Though Darwin himself regarded natural selection as the main factor in evolutionary change, he did not consider it to be the only one. He attributed some influence to the effects of use and disuse which he considered to be inherited, thus following the teaching of Erasmus Darwin and of Lamarck (cf. art. Evolution). Moreover, he was struck by a class of facts which seemed to present great difficulties in the way of explanation in terms of natural selection. For, to be affected by natural selection, variation must have a utility value, whereas this can hardly be supposed to be the case for a large proportion of those highly ornamental characters which are confined to the male sex, and are generally intensified during the breeding season. It is difficult to ascribe any value, in the struggle for existence, to the tail of a peacock or the plumes of a bird of paradise. Indeed, it might be fairly argued that the reverse is the case, and that such characters as these are actually an impediment to the animal's chance of survival. The difficulty was appreciated by Darwin, who eventually accounted for them on the hypothesis that the more brilliant and attractive males would be preferred by the females; and it was Darwin himself who said that some of the latter would gradually bring about changes in the males through a process of sexual selection (cf. Darwin's Descent of Man). This theory has not met with such general acceptance as that of natural selection, and has been definitely rejected by some authorities. Among these is A. R. Wallace, who regards the brilliant ornamentation found in certain males simply as an indication of temperamental vitality. He attributes the virtue of this extra vitality that such males would be more likely than others to mate successfully and leave numerous offspring. By associating this apparently useless beauty with the militaristic property of vigour, Wallace seeks to explain it upon grounds of natural selection alone.

11. The influence of The Origin of Species resulted in the production of vast quantities of literature on evolution during the remainder of the 19th century. In certain branches of biology, notably in those concerned with morphology, embryology, mimicry, geographical distribution, and palaeontology, great numbers of new facts were added; and, on the whole, they may be said to
have resulted in a strengthening of Darwin's position without contributing much of novelty to his argument. Perhaps the most interesting additions in this connection have been the views of Romanes and Gulick on the importance of isolation, whether geographical or physiological, in the formation of incipient species; and Pearson's suggestion of reproductive isolation. Darwin, however, had already pointed out that if any particular character was definitely associated with greater fertility, that character would tend to establish itself in a population without the help of, and perhaps even in spite of, natural selection. Darwin's work brought prominently forward, none attracted keener interest than that dealing with the transmission of the effects of use and disuse. Darwin always believed that such effects could be transmitted, and in this matter he was supported by Spencer, Haeckel, Copé, and many others. There were some, however, to whom Lamarckianism made no appeal, but who considered that natural selection and natural selection; for here was an almost transformation of species. Of this school, sometimes termed the Neo-Darwinian, Weismann has been the chief exponent, and he rendered considerable service to the struggle against the hotly disputed science of challenging the evidence upon which the alleged transmission of 'acquired characters' rested, and in showing that it generally broke down under critical examination (cf. art. Pangenesis).

13. Brief mention may here be made of a theory of evolution which regards inheritance as a form of memory; it was independently developed by the physiologist Hering and by Samuel Butler. Darwin clearly perceived that a true theory of evolution must be based upon an accurate knowledge of the facts of heredity and variation, nor did he less clearly perceive that such knowledge was in his time practically non-existent. In the 6th edition of The Origin of Species, the last published in his lifetime, we find him writing that the laws governing inheritance are for the most part unknown; and, again, that our ignorance of the laws of variation is profound. He himself never ceased to accumulate facts and to make experiments bearing upon these matters, and it was largely due to his intimate acquaintance with the great body of facts so patiently brought together that he owed his remarkable sanity of judgment on doubtful questions where direct proof was for the time impossible. But in this work he had few followers, owing largely to the very barbarous and objectionable suggestions by which he endeavored to make natural selection an acceptable factor through which the transformation of the species might be brought about. He had placed the idea of evolution in a firm basis. It was no longer an unsetting speculation but a definite theory which none in future could afford to neglect. And it was the doctrine of evolution that primarily seized upon men's minds, rather to the momentary extinction of natural selection; for here was an almost promise of a clue to that orderly arrangement of the vegetable kingdom which the students of natural history had long been searching for. It was a true story; it ought to be possible to build up a classification of animals and plants in such a way as to establish the genetic connexions among them. All living things, however aberrant they might seem, should find a place in this scheme of things. Darwin's book, and, whether anatomist, embryologist, or palaeontologist, this was the central thought in the mind of each. In the countless speculations that ensued as to the past history of living things, it was tacitly assumed that the necessary variations could have occurred and could have been transmitted; but, as different as the views of Romanes and Gulick were upon the origin of species, it was not unnatural that widely discrepant views were forthcoming as to the pedigrees of the various groups. The origin of the vertebrates, for example, was treated as though the polycheate worms, to the arthropods, and to the enteropneusts; and, as each author usually supported his views with much ingenuity and some little warmth of feeling, the time and labour occupied by these engaging controversies. As time went on, however, and facts accumulated, the doctrine of evolution became firmly established in spite of differences of opinion as to the exact course which it had taken. As the glamour of pedigree-making wore off, the minds of naturalists gradually turned to other problems.

Though the majority of naturalists at this time were testing the true theory of evolution, the facts of embryology and comparative anatomy, there were, nevertheless, some who attempted to test the theory of natural selection. In this case the attempt was by a study of the particular characters that animals have arisen through the operation of natural selection, it is evident that the theory demands that they should be of value to their possessors in the struggle for existence. If, on the other hand, it was found impossible to ascribe to them any utilitarian importance, the case for their formation through the operation of natural selection was obviously weakened. Through the observation of animals in their natural surroundings, supplemented, where necessary, by carefully devised experiments, it was hoped that light would be thrown upon this problem. In many cases these hopes were abundantly fulfilled. Numbers of creatures, more especially insects, which at one time looked so closely with some feature of their external surroundings as to become practically invisible—an obvious advantage, whether for avoiding over-crowding or for fulfilling some protective role in a fancied sense of security. The form and color of the leaf insects, of the twig-like 'looper' caterpillars, of the spiders which resemble bird droppings, and of a host of other creatures, it would be difficult to deny a utilitarian value, and, in suggesting that the natural selection an acceptable factor through which the transformation of the species might be brought about, he had placed the idea of evolution in a firm basis. It was no longer an unsetting speculation but a definite theory which none in future could afford to neglect. And it was the doctrine of evolution that primarily seized upon men's minds, rather to the momentary extinction of natural selection; for here was an almost promise of a clue to that orderly arrangement of the vegetable kingdom which the students of natural history had long been searching for. It was a true story; it ought to be possible to build up a classification of animals and plants in such a way as to establish the genetic connexions among them. All living things, however aberrant they might seem, should find a place in this scheme of things. Darwin's book, and, whether anatomist, embryologist, or palaeontologist, this was the central thought in the mind of each. In the countless speculations that ensued as to the past history of living things, it was tacitly assumed that the necessary variations could have occurred and could have been transmitted; but, as different as the views of Romanes and Gulick were upon the origin of species, it was not unnatural that widely discrepant views were forthcoming as to the pedigrees of the various groups. The origin of the vertebrates, for example, was treated as though the polycheate worms, to the arthropods, and to the enteropneusts; and, as each author usually supported his views with much ingenuity and some little warmth of feeling, the time and labour occupied by these engaging controversies. As time went on, however, and facts accumulated, the doctrine of evolution became firmly established in spite of differences of opinion as to the exact course which it had taken. As the glamour of pedigree-making wore off, the minds of naturalists gradually turned to other problems.

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idea was subsequently extended by Fritz Müller to include the many instances in which several nauseous species tend to resemble one another. Müller suggested that in such cases the toll taken by natural selection, if unrelieved by the advent of new varieties, by being distributed over several species, would fall more lightly on each separate one, and in this manner all would profit by exhibiting a common warning coloration.

With the ideas then current as to the nature of variation, natural selection offered the most plausible explanation of these remarkable cases of resemblance. A new note was struck by Bateson in 1894, when he pointed out that, while the results attained by the study of embryology and of adaptation could be brought into harmony with the doctrine of evolution and the theory of natural selection, they nevertheless offered no explanation of the origin of specific differences. Each assumed a vague capacity for indefinite variation on the part of living things—a plasticity through which natural selection was able to mould them in this direction or in that, according as what was best suited to the course of the author's argument. Bateson insisted on the importance of the study of variation, if further progress was to be made with the problem, of knowing beforehand the extent to which they might have themselves unlimited credit in dealing with variation, whereas they ought first to have inquired what variations actually did and what did not occur. By the systematic collection of facts Bateson was able to show that in many cases variation is certainly of a discontinuous nature. Definite variations are constantly found as part of a population living and presumably breeding together, in the absence of any intermediate forms. As examples may be mentioned the normal orange and the paler yellow form of clodded yellow butterfly (Colias edusa), the red and blue of the red underwing moth (Catocala supata), the blue and the scarlet varieties of the common pine-miller (Anagallis), or the ordinary brown and the violet-green valesina form of the silver-washed fritillary (Aglaia paphia)—examples which might be almost indefinitely multiplied.

The existence of such cases is difficult to explain on the view of evolution usually current. In the first place, it is not easy to account for the existence of both or of any intermediate forms. As examples may be mentioned the normal orange and the paler yellow form of clodded yellow butterfly (Colias edusa), the red and blue of the red underwing moth (Catocala supata), the blue and the scarlet varieties of the common pine-miller (Anagallis), or the ordinary brown and the violet-green valesina form of the silver-washed fritillary (Aglaia paphia)—examples which might be almost indefinitely multiplied.

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of certain plants introduced into culture from distant habitats. Neither of the Chinese primulas (*Primula sinensis* and *P. obconica*) is known to show in its native wild state the profusion of form and colour that characterizes the cultivated forms. The historical evidence points to the different varieties having arisen as 'sports' from the wild forms when placed under cultivation in contrasting environments or habitats. This is the case with the sweet pea, which offers another instance of the same story. The original purple form first reached England from Sicily at the end of the 17th century. Not long after its introduction, a red and a white variety are recorded in addition to the purple, and by the middle of the 19th century, several other shades of purple and red were in existence. But the enormous number of varied forms, both in colour and shape, now to be seen are of recent origin, and in some cases, e.g. that of the dwarf 'Cupid,' it is certain that they originated in California, from seed sent out there to be grown on. Such examples as these are typical of the experience of the horticulturist. The new forms are produced by natural selection, and, having been suddenly and for no apparent definite reason. Once it has appeared, it is a matter of a few years only to fix it so that thenceforward it breeds true to type. Natural selection is now understood. The purple variety is evidently increased by a sharp change in the environment, such as is to be obtained by transferring it from one country and climate to another. Precisely why this should be is not at present known, but there is reason to suppose that the environmental change leads to abnormal divisions in the ripening germ-cells, and that these abnormal divisions are the starting-point of the new variety.

In a true breeding this process of cell-division by which the germ-cells ripen are symmetrical, and the germ-cells themselves are all alike, in that the factors contained by each are the same, both in point of number and of quality. Should, however, certain of the cell-divisions be abnormal, they must result in an asymmetrical distribution of the factors to different germ-cells, so that some contain one or more factors in excess of the normal, and others one or more factors less than the normal. If two germ-cells are each with a factor less than the normal come together, the resulting individual will be completely lacking in a factor possessed by the original form and will hence be true to type. And, indeed, the evidence from experimental breeding points to the majority of domestic races of animals and plants having arisen in this way (cf. art. HEREDITY). The new form comes into being by the loss of this or that character from the original wild, and this loss must be supposed to be dependent upon the elimination of the appropriate factor or factors somewhere in the cell-divisions which give rise to the germ-cells. Less commonly the new form must be regarded as possessing one or more factors in addition to those present in the form from which it sprang, and it is possible that this is due to the formation, through cell-division, of an asymmetrical division, of certain germ-cells with more factors than the normal, and to their subsequest union to produce an individual of a new type.

When once the new variety has arisen, natural selection decides whether it is to persist with or to replace the form from which it sprang. Since the difference between it and the normal depends upon a definite and clear-cut distinction, and since that distinction is respected throughout the hereditary process, the variety, having once arisen, cannot, as Darwin once thought, be swamped by continual crossing with the normal form. On the contrary, as G. H. Hardy has shown, a population mating at random with a variety that has been superimposed upon the original, would, after the first generation, be no different from the original. In the absence of natural selection, retain its constitution. Provided that it is equally fertile, the new form will hold its own even though present in very small numbers, and the population will remain in a position of stability. Positions of stability can be reached in two ways, or with two values of the equation $q^2 + qr + r^2 = 1$, where $p$ and $r$ are the numbers of the pure-breeding individuals of the type and variety respectively, while $q$ is their hybrid type. If, however, the variety be favoured by natural selection, though only in a slight degree, it will gradually supplant the original form until the latter is eliminated. Moreover, the process must be a rapid one. If a population contains 99 per cent of a new variety, and if that variety has even a 5 per cent selection advantage over the original form, the latter will almost completely disappear in less than 100 generations. Cases of this sort are not unknown to actual experience. Sixty years ago the dark double *dianthus* form of the common peppered moth (*Amphipysis betularia*) was known only as a rare variety. To-day it has almost entirely ousted the original form in many parts of England and of the Continent.

17. Considerations of this nature have a bearing upon a class of facts which at first sight are not easy to explain, and they may determine the fate of a species. Any species is distinguished by its homogeneity. Colour varieties are numerous in the domestic rabbit; in the wild rabbit they are rare. On a scheme of evolution based upon the mutational nature of variation, it is this homogeneity that offers difficulties in interpretation. But, if the wild form be supposed to possess even a slight selection advantage over the various other colour forms, the rarity of the latter becomes more comprehensible. They may arise, and, with the conditions adverse, though ever so little, they must tend to disappear.

18. There is another aspect of species which is not so generally taken into account. Most species—using the word in the Linnean sense—are seen, when examined closely, to consist not of a single form, but of a number of slightly different, though perfectly distinct, forms. This was clearly brought out in the middle of the 19th century by the French botanist Jordan and others. Jordan showed, for example, that the Linnean species *Draba verna*, the common whitlow grass, can be analyzed into a great number of forms, each more or less marked off from any other by habit, shape of leaves, etc., and can be bred true from seed. Such is also the case, though generally to a less extent, with many other species. Moreover, it has been shown by experimental breeding that in some cases these varieties—or 'elementary species,' as they have been termed—differ from one another in the same way that domestic varieties differ. They follow in heredity the Mendelian law of segregation, and the differences between them must be supposed to depend upon the presence or absence in their constitution of specific factors for the characters in which they differ from one another. When, as so often happens, many of these elementary species are found together, it must be supposed that no one of them has any selection advantage over the rest. Were the conditions of life to alter so that one form was favoured above the others, even to a slight extent, that form would tend rapidly to supplant all the others; and it is conceivable that this may already have happened in many cases of species which exhibit relatively few varieties.

19. The problem of what constitutes a species is one that has vexed the minds of many naturalists and philosophers; but, in spite of much that has been written upon the question, it is yet unsolved. The classification of species at present in vogue is an
extension of the Linnean system, and is mainly based upon external features either of structure or of color. In most cases these external differences are accompanied by the phenomenon of sterility between even closely allied species, though this is not necessarily so. There are cases, such as those of the horse x ass cross and the horse x zebra cross, in which the offspring is fertile, but in which the latter are themselves sterile. In some groups of animals, again, hybrids between acknowledged species have been shown to be fertile when intercrossed with any of the parent species. This is the case with various forms of oxen and buffalo, and especially with the duck and pheasant tribes, where crosses between birds classified as belonging to different genera have been proved to produce fertile offspring. For the systematist, however, whether botanist or zoologist, it is the external features that matter, for upon them he has to base his classifications. But instances are becoming more numerous in which it has been shown that two species founded in this way are fertile together. Whether they are to be regarded as one species or two depends upon the external features of the offspring or whether it is sterile. On the whole, it may be said that there is a general consensus of opinion in favour of the latter. If, then, the phenomenon of sterility lies at the root of the species problem, it becomes of the first importance to form a clear conception of the causes to which sterility is due. There is no doubt that in some cases it is due to mechanical causes, as, for example, where there is great disparity in size, or for some other reason. But the sterility that is associated with species is of a different nature. The germ-cells may come into intimate contact, fusion may occur, and development may even proceed for some way; yet the process stops short of the production of offspring. There would appear to be some incompatibility, probably of a chemical nature, preventing two healthy germ-cells from giving rise to a new individual. Everything seems to point to the problem of species resolving itself into a problem in chemistry, but the present state of knowledge does not permit of more definite statement. Darwin clearly recognized that the phenomena of sterility could not be explained in terms of natural selection. For the gradual acquisition of sterility on the part of certain individuals cannot be regarded as advantageous; rather is it likely to lead to the decline of those individuals or to the rest of the species. The most natural view of the origin of sterility is to regard it as having arisen through some abrupt physiological change in the organism—a change which at bottom must probably be conceived of as chemical. Sterility is of the nature of mutation; and, if we look upon it as the essential characteristic of species, we must also regard mutation as the bridge between one species and another. The mutational change upon which the sterility depends may become associated with other characters either before or after it first arises. Such associations of characters are not infrequently met with as the facts of heredity are coming to be more carefully studied. External features would then become transformed into not only characteristic but even essential features of the species. Without a species is defined as not out of which it had arisen, but its origin must be sought in the origin of the fundamental sterility which it shows towards the parent species. Beyond the fact that it is a process initiated in the germ-cells, almost any additional definition of the conditions under which a mutation arises. Until such knowledge is forthcoming, that most important link in any theory of evolution—the proof of the nature of species—must remain unsolved.


EVOLUTION (Ethical).—As its title implies, this article is concerned with ethics as explicable only by the principle of evolution. The application of the science of biology, psychologists, in seeking to explain the constitution of the human mind, assumed it to be different in kind from animal mind, and postulated certain innate ends and faculties which analysis would furnish a clue to character and to all mental operations. A history of the various theories of the nature and foundation of morals lies outside our province, but, as briefly indicating points of difference between them and the theory summarized in this article, it may be stated that they are mainly resolvable into what are known as the Utilitarian and the Intuitionist. Utilitarianism was first among the 18th cent. philosophers to formulate (the doctrine itself is as old as Socrates), and of which Bentham and the Mills are the chief modern exponents—defines virtue as that which is approved, and vice as that which is condemned, the sole standard of morality being utility, whose aim and end is 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number.' Spencer incorporated Utilitarianism into his Principles of Ethics, but held that it tends to become wholly altruistic, and modified it by giving play to the egoistic also. The Intuitional, of which Butler is the most famous exponent, and James Martineau is the modern upholder (see his Types of Ethical Theory, Oxford, 1866), assumes that there is in each individual a faculty of innate or immediate cognition and perception of what is good or evil, true or false, this intuitive faculty acting without the intervention of reason or the guidance of experience.

A death-blow was dealt to methods of introspective interpretation by the publication of Herbert Spencer's Principles of Psychology (London, 1855) and Principles of Ethics (loc. 1879-1892), and of Darwin's Descent of Man (loc. 1871), notably in its chapters on 'Comparison of the Mental Powers of Man and the Lower Animals. Extending the comparative method, which had justified its application in other directions, to the psychical. Biology has demonstrated fundamental relations between the mental apparatus of the lowest and highest organisms, and has shown, to quote Field- win's cogent words, that 'the development of mind in its early stages, and in certain directions of its progress, is determined at preschool in the conditions under which a mutation arises. Until such knowledge is forthcoming, that most important link in any theory of evolution—the proof of the nature of species—must remain unsolved.'
within, involving adaptation to needs, lies the explanation of processes linking man, animal, and plant. The higher the degree to which the activities are of fundamental and permanent instinctive impulses (inherited tendencies of which the nervous apparatus is the vehicle) which supply the driving power to the jealousy all the more the struggle is sustained. From these impulses the complex faculties of the most highly developed minds have their source.

They are the mental forces that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies, and in their interaction their central nucleus the life and mind and will' (W. McDougall, *Intro. to Social Psychology*, London, 1908, p. 44).

In the behaviour of the lower organisms there is manifest the potentially psychical 'faint copy of all we know as consciousness in ourselves' (Francis Darwin, *Presidential Address*, Brit. Assoc. 1908).

The glaukonic leaves of the *Drosera* or sundew, and the bladders of *Utricularia*, or bladderwort, entrap the luckless insect which alights on them, and assimilate it for their nourishment. The ameba withdraws its pseudopods when touched, and selectively seizes the thing it feeds upon. And thus the instinctive impulses might be traced along the entire line of psychical evolution, the instinctive yielding to the rational in such degree that, in Ray Lankester's phrase, the animal becomes more 'educable' (*Kingdom of Man*, London, 1907, p. 23).

They are the fundamental impulses of nutrition and sex, which, Wundt contends, men and animals alike possess 'to form the inalienable foundation of human society as well as of animal association' (*Ethics*, 'The Facts of the Moral Life', p. 129).

The classification of instincts lies outside the province of this article, and it suffices to refer only to the gregarious or social instinct as the essential factor in ethical development. Man, as a solitary animal, is unlike any other; 'It is not good that the man should be alone' (Gn 2:18), and Aristotle follows the writer of the Book of Genesis when he says that 'he who is unable to live in society must be regarded as not existing at all' (*Politics*, pp. 893 and 834). 'A man not dependent upon a race is as meaningless a phrase as an apple that does not grow upon a tree' (Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, London, 1882, p. 81); and individual and racial obligation and morality are as interdependent as the personal and the social are inseparable and correlate. The unending struggle for life—and there is no discharge in that war ('Ec 8:1')—is a dominant factor in bringing about, on the one hand, individual dependence at maturity in the case of solitary animals, as, e.g., the eagle, cat, and lion; and, on the other hand, collective dependence among social animals, as, among invertebrates, the ant and bee, and, among vertebrates, e.g. non-raptorial birds, sheep, horse, dog and man. Turning to the ant, as corresponding in position among insects to the position of man among mammals, there is, says McDougall, 'no trait in emin. character more interesting than the entire devotion of every individual, even unto death, to the welfare of the community' (*Ant Communities*, London, 1905, p. 81).

Animal morality thus begins with the maxim *salus populi suprema est lex* governs alike ants and men.

Speculating on the social habits of our earliest-known ancestor, *Pithecanthropus erectus* (see art. *Anthropology* in vol. i. p. 563 f.), who, in expert opinion, represents the stage immediately antecedent to the human, the author of *Evolution* has proceeded in advance of the simian,' we have only analogy to guide us concerning primitive human unions. Arguing from the strength of 'the feelings of jealousy all large social communities are governed', as from the analogy of the lower animals, more particularly of the anthropoid apes,' Darwin formulated the theory that aboriginal man 'lived in small communities, each with a single wife or, if powerful, with a harem'. The Bible 'calls them guarded against all other men' (*Descent of Man*, ch. xx. p. 901). Without question, in one form or another, the family is the social unit, impetus to personal and permanent association being given by the longer period of infancy in the human as compared with that period among the higher mammals. It may be remarked that the larve of the ant pass through a prolonged babyhood involving incessant parental care, because the condition of helplessness and dependence strengthens the self-sacrificing instinct of the parent, supremely that of the mother, who, in nourishing her offspring, feeds upon its excretions. John Fiske, who in this matter was preceded by Anaximander two thousand years ago, treats this fully in his *Century of Science*, London, 1899, pp. 100—122.) Hence, in the satisfaction of the physical needs of the child the child binds together solicitude, love, self-denial, courage, and—greatest of all—the sympathy out of which the morals of family life are woven, strands multiplying in number and strength until they bind together gentes or groups of the same blood-brotherhood, clan, or totem, these aggregating into tribes which are the foundation of the nation, the patriotism engendered by which is the family bond 'writ large.' One and all are the outcome of social heredity. 'Society is the school in which men learn to distinguish between right and wrong' (*Westermarck, MT* i. 9), and in this lies the key to the nature and origin of the judgments which make up the ethical codes of every age and race. These judgments are wholly subjective, being the outcome of emotions whose beginning and impulses are social. For Nature supplies no standard by which to govern conduct: from obedience or disobedience to her laws invariable consequences follow, but these have no element of the ethical; they are neither rewards nor punishments. The earth may be said to have 'dark places' may be 'full of the habitations of cruelty' (*Ps 73*), but 'seedtime and harvest, and cold and heat, summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease' (*Gen 8*).

Moral concepts have their basis in feeling, not in reason; moral emotions, as Westermarck argues, fall into the two classes of disapproval or indignation, and approval, each belonging to a wider class of emotions which he calls 'retributive,' disapproval being manifested in anger and revenge, and approval in 'retributive kindly emotion,' including gratitude (op. cit. i. 21). This assumes organization within which is turn demands an altruistic, rather than an egoistic, individual.

It is the extension of the application of natural selection to groups rather than to direct application to individuals that has given birth to morals. Morality has arisen because it is socially useful; says McDougall: 'the survival of the fittest' (*Baldwin, and the Humane Life*, London, 1910, p. 64).

As J. A. Thomson says, 'progress depends on much more than a squabble around the platter' (*Darwinism and the Human Life*, London, 1909, p. 92); and Darwinism recognizes that mutual aid has modified the rigour of the struggle in both the animal and the human. Stripped of a certain coat of exaggeration, the numerous stories of help
rendered by one animal to another are not to be dismissed as 'travellers' tales. For example, in his account of the hawk, the American ornithologist Hudson says that, when one of the barrows is destroyed and the viscachas are buried alive, other viscachas will come from a distance to dig them out ('Naturalist in La Plata, London, 1892, p. 190).

The degree in which the social and sympathetic impulses have been developed is the measure of the relative place in intelligence reached by man speaking. The unfettered and undirected strength of the community is made effective by restraint and subjugation of self-assertion to the interests of the community. An ethical code has warrant and permanence only in the degree in which it secures the healthy interplay of regard for self and for others, and, wherever this is defied in wilfulness or weakness, natural selection, extending its operation from individuals to groups, secures the survival of the fittest, who possess an ethical value in maintaining the health of the social organisms. The weak and wilful, those who detach themselves from the communal life, go under. The solitary animal fights for its own life; the social animal must be strong enough to maintain its tendacies towards self-regardfulness are restrained by communal action whose one end is the common weal. 'That which is not good for the worm is not good for the angel,' (V. 51).

Morality is the sum of the preservative instincts of a society, and presumably of those which imply a desire for the good of the society itself' (Leslie Stephen, "op. cit. 288). Society being possible only by the compliance of each member with what the community sanctions as necessary to its welfare, or abstinence from what it forbid's as inimical thereto, it follows that, in the prohibition or permission of certain acts, we have a fundamental constant, a moral quality in acts which, however much they vary in character, cumulative experience pronounces to be harmful or helpful to the community—in plain language, right or wrong. The means vary, but the end to be achieved is the same, and the achievement is by co-operation. Social acts have a quantitative, not a qualitative value, because man everywhere is psychically, as well as physically, fundamentally the same. His monogenetic origin, with good evidence, is assumed; so is his enormous antiquity, which supplies the explanations into varieties and for the different degrees of civilization to which these, be they white, yellow, red, or black, have attained. Man being, at the core, the same everywhere, observation of what, at first sight, seem his vagaries brings home how superficial are the changes which time has wrought since he came to express his philosophy—for such it was in the making—of things. He remains, in the main, as his intermittent outbursts of fury and savagery everywhere evidence, a creature of instinctive impulses inherited from his animal ancestry; as an emotional being, his antiquity is deathless, and a reasonableness he is a late and somewhat rare product. But whatever he has evolved in thought and put into action has justified its existence, because it has responded to some need. It has had, little as might be discerned, some 'soul of goodness' imputing the strength of the time being, seemed to secure the common weal.

Since both religion and ethics are social in origin and, therefore, institutions subject to the law of development, there is no state in man's history on which we can put our finger and say: Here he became a religious and a moral being. It is, therefore, necessary to recognize, as main factors, the impulses to social order which communal life postulates as the primal sources of moral codes. If 'society is the great agent of the human spirit,' (Ames, Psychology of Religious Experience, London, 1910, p. 131), 'custom is the earliest shape in which duty presents itself to the consciousness of the savage' (F. B. Jevons, Intro. to Hist. of Rel., London, 1898, p. 190). 'Little by little and, as it were, by stealth, custom creeps into our authority as the origin of her authority in us' (Montaigne, Essays, I. 335, Dent's Temple ed.). In their preference both 'ethics' and 'morals' witness to their origin. The one is from φυσική, a modification of φυσική, custom, usage, manners; the other from φοίτησις, morals, pertaining to manners, therefore to conduct.

Be man savage or civilized, the reluctance to defy or to depart from the usual, the fear of being called 'eccentric,' i.e. 'out of the circle,' is in his bones. Conservatism, or because, after all, we do think it is, with possible to overrate either the authority or the value of custom as a factor in conduct. Identity of belief and practice makes for unity and stability, and this is the source of tradition. To what particular and local causes the great body of customs, infinite in variety, and, not seldom, irrational or inconsequential, is due remains an insoluble problem, because of the multitude of good followings, which it was possible that they arose. We have only to observe how, among intelligent persons, some chance occurrence will excite or paralyze action, to see, a fortiori, how, among unintelligent people, some casual event, followed by fortune or the reverse, will cause this or that line of conduct to be made a rule of life, and obedience thereto to become a rule of conduct, a part of the customary law, of the community.

Imitation—this phenomenon of 'ethical and moral social life' (McDougall, p. 336)—whether in creeds, codes, or clothes, has been a powerful element in the conservation of the decrees of custom. To both savage and civilized are applicable the lines which Henry Sidgwick composed in his sleep:

'We think so because all other people think so ;
Or because—oh, because—after all, we do think it is,
Or because we were told and think we must think so ;
Or because we once thought so and think we still think so ;
Or because, having thought so, we think we still think so.'

Closely linked with imitation is the influence of suggestion in swaying judgment and conduct, sometimes for good, but, perhaps, as often for evil. The imitations he follows in a crowd, in seen what each member of it, detached from his fellow, would reject as a fable. Hence, frequently, the worthlessness of collective evidence and judgment; hence, too, often, the valuelessness of concurrent testimony even from men of scientific training as to the validity, say, of so-called spiritual phenomena when, expecting to witness the same, they meet in seances. Hence the aberrations when some dominant idea takes possession of the unphilosophical, with mischievous results akin to the epidemic delusions of the Middle Ages, or the corybantic displays of hysterical revivalists, or the terrorism of the Apaches of Paris and the hooligans of London and other crowded centres.

Travelling along the line of least resistance, the general attitude of civilized communities, in which the primitive is persistent, towards innovations explains the conservatism of the savages. At the death of the weight of the dead hand of custom that the nameless reformer who ventured to resist it must have been stamped in no common mould. For St. Augustine to insert the point of the wedge of disruption; it was to assume that he who defied was wiser than his fathers, or, committing rank blasphemy, wiser than the defiled ancestors, the traditional framers of the tribal
EVOLUTION

What long pro-rational ages of stereotyped acquiescence prevailed is well shown by the fact of the main reason still plays in content; the emotions as, primarily, the outcome of the instinctive impulses which are the bases of mental activities show themselves dominant and persistently, the same state as a "rare and an occasional exception"; and, where the wisest are not supreme, there stagnation rules (see Bagehot's "Physics and Politics", London, 1857, pp. 41, 211).

But an ounce of example is worth a ton of exposition.

Herodotus (II. 83) narrates how "Darius asked certain Hel- lenes for what price they would eat their fathers when they died, and they answered that they would do so.

After this he summoned those Indians who are called Callidians, who eat their parents, and asked them, in the presence of the Hellenes, for what payment they would burn the bodies of their fathers when they died; when they cried aloud and bade him keep silence from such words. Then those three were established by usage, and I think Pindar spoke rightly in his verse when he said, "Custom is the King of all."

Fifteen centuries later, a traveller in High Albania tells us:

For all their habits, laws, and customs, the people, as a rule, have not one explanation: "It is the custom of Lek," the law that is said to have been laid down by the chieftain Lek Dakub- ghi. Lek is said to have legislated minutely on all subjects. Of himself little is known. He has left no mark on European history—"is a purely local celebrity—"but that "Lek said so."" Old Custom is a great law. The teaching of Islam and Christianity, the Sheriff and Church law, all have to yield their place to "Lek's orders."" (A. W. H. Dukart, "A如的 Albania," London, 1909, p. 53). There is an Albanian proverb which says: "It is better that a village should fall than a custom (ib. p. 580); and another: "He who does not fear God, nor God's laws, nor the church, is no better than a dog.

A murderer, adulterer, or sodomite will obtain easy absolution from the Church, and even find favour with society; but a man who does not fear God, nor God's laws, nor the church, is avoided and abhorred as a monster of repulsion. How all the ages used in their assumption of moral qualities for use in acts which have no bearing on character—the confusion of mature in se with meritum proibitum—is further seen in comparing a passage which Atius Gellius (Notee, x. 28) quotes from Cicero, that it is for the husband to condemn and punish his wife if she has been guilty of any shameful act, such as drinking wine or committing adultery, with W. G. Palgrave's account of the Washaki moral code, in which the great sins are paying divorce honours, desertion, bigamy, murder, robbery, and murder, adultery, and false witness are 'merely little sins' ('Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia', London and Cambridge, 1886, ii. 370)

The literature of the subject of the tabu is en- ormous, and here it must suffice briefly to refer to the widespread institution as a continuous and effective factor, even among the civilized, often in unsuspected form, in human conduct. In "Psyche's Task" (London, 1899), Frazer has shown, in a series of cogent examples, how 'by virtue of his tabu-abilities' man secured stability for use in the fundamental bases of society, government, private property, marriage, and regard for human life. The belief that dire results will follow breach of rules as to things forbidden is the most powerful deterrent that superstition has begotten. Curses and charms, and all other appurtenance of the sorcerer, are more effective than the prosaic bogy. 'Trespasser will be prosecuted,' and the would-be evildoer is by the fear of some horror or disease will follow the stealing of his neighbour's yams; or that he may go mad-ridden for the rest of his life, if he stealthily removes his neighbour's branch of the banyan. The belief that irregular sexual relations will disastrously affect the fertility of the crops is a check on incontinence, and therefore an encouragement to the formation of orderly con- nexion. The belief that the ghost of a slaughtered man will wreak vengeance on the tribute to which the murderer belongs creates a feeling that shapes codes embodying ideas of the sanctity of human life. Orocues was driven from one land to another, not so much because he had killed his mother, as because of the peril to others brought by him who was pursued by the Erinyes.

In their later analysis the codes of every age and people are found to deal with human relations.

'Tis pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction; not as 'a rare and an occasional exception'; and, where the wisest are not supreme, there stagnation rules (see Bagehot's "Physics and Politics", London, 1857, pp. 41, 211).

Society is looked upon by the Kaffir as the essential virtue.

The children play in great bands. To loaf about alone would be regarded as a highly penal offense, and every child regards eating in according to age and sex, as a natural appetite and there is no law that "thou shalt not steal." In the case of Teachers of the Ten Commandments, seven are concerned with such duties. In the first centuries older than the Hebrew code, the Instruction of Pitho Hotep, the author 'devotes his work entirely to the principles of charity and duty to one's neighbour' (tr. W. G. Mann, 1896, p. 33); and the essence of the teaching of Confucius, 'the purest of any in the world,' is—'Act socially' ('Confucian Analects' tr. Giles, 1897, p. 27).

In early social stages, acts of mutual help are restricted to the community. Among existing savage peoples, as the Comanches, Kalimbas, and others, the social code is held in reverence, their admission to higher rank. Speaking of the ancient Germans, Cesar says that 'robberies beyond the bounds of each community have no infamy, but are condoned as a means of exercising youth and lessening sloth' (de Bell Galli. vi. 23). 'Ought' was originally the preterite of 'to owe,' but moral obligations long remained intra-tribal, and the life-struggle which at the outset compelled this, among even the highest civilized communities, is yielded but partially and tardily to a wider sympathy and benevolence which are the fruits of a closer inter-course between, and therefore enlarged knowledge of, peoples—socially and materially. Hence the racial differences appear to be too deeply engraved to warrant hope that white, yellow, and black will ever be linked in a world-embracing sympathy.

For numerous examples of the distinction between intra-tribal and extra-tribal misdeeds, see Westermarck, H. K. 20-25).

There never has been, probably there never will be, a uniform, unalterable standard of right and wrong, applicable through all times for all men.

'The moral world is as little exempt as the physical world from the law of ceaseless change, of perpetual flux. ... We can as little ascribe to the march of nature the loss of population, and the still greater "sweep of the tides or the courses of the stars" (GB, London, 1901, vi. 20) the instinct of the fecund and the perishing.

Since the migration of primitive man from a common cradleland, the different environment has been operative in dividing the race into permanent varieties. Sociological differences have resulted, and, since each branch of society, there inevitably arise the contradictions, varieties, and, often, repellent elements whose presence would otherwise perplex the student of the astoundingly complex official customs of the world.

'The study of moral advancement is not tracing out of a single straight line, but rather the following of a very winding curve' (C. J. Robinson, "Moral in Evolution", London, 1906, i. 57).

In ethics, as in biology, there is not continuous progress, but adaptation, which sometimes involves retrogression, and adjustment on a lower level.
The sea-squirts, lancelets, and rotifers have their correspondences in degenerate races, in the decline and fall of civilizations whose types of manliness we cannot hope to excel, whose codes embody precepts which are sufficient rules of life, and whose art of living is the envy of the world, not because it surpasses, but because it gives hope to survivals. The moral standard is the measure of civilization in the highest; and that not a commercial, sense which a community has reached, and that standard advances with the growth of the race; and who was ever in the course of a few years, changes so momentously that what is approved or tacitly condoned at in one generation is condemned and punished in a later. For the code does not create the ethic; it can only embody what, after ages of sore testing, man has felt to be best for man—a result attainable only when acts have their foundation in sympathy disciplined by judgment. We must not travel out of the history of our own criminal code for examples of the relativity of morals, and of their advance along the lines of social evolution.

In the later part of the 16th cent. Sir John Hawkins, captain of a slave ship named the Jesus (1), gave some of his profits to the founding of Chelsea Hospital. He was made a larger gift, but he explained that 'so many of these wretched creatures are sold in Europe for spurious gold that it is only for God's sake that we are enabled to barter them.' It was not till 1807 that the importation abolished slave trade, and another twenty-six years passed before slavery was abolished in Britain. The punishment for the offense of piracy was by the 19th century 200 lashes and compensation. The collective conscience has passively acquiesced in what has gone on unquestioned for centuries; only as the moral tone has fallen has been a change made by a generation of lesser gods who were 'angry with the wicked every day' (Ps 7th AV) arrested the course of many an evil-doer. And to this day, wherever the moral tone is lower, and social conditions worse, the belief that it is a necessary and often, effective check. In the slow evolution of man from the ape and tiger stage, it seems probable that many ages will pass before the protective mechanisms will redress the wrongs of others, so that no one life shall be worse than the acts through the acts of another, will be the ruling motive of conduct. 'Evil is wrought' not only by 'want of thought, as well as want of heart,' but by the accompanying lack of imagination. It is the absence of this which prevents a man from putting himself in the place of those whose actions he may, without warrant, condemn, and deceives him of that sympathy which is the social cement. On the other hand, it is by this faculty of imagination that man has devised instruments of cruelty and torture, and methods of crime which have made him lower than the brute.

Viewed from the standpoint of evolution, the assumed dependence of morals on theology (which, as a body of dogma, is a different thing from religion) is injurious thereto, because the authority of an ethical code is weakened in the degree in which it is bound up with creeds whose truth is questioned, and which, as knowledge advances, become obsolete. Examples of this mischievous connexion are supplied by witchcraft, to give up belief in which, John Wesley contended, was to surrender belief in an infallible Bible, wherein is commanded, 'Thou shall not suffer a witch to live' (Ex 22:18, cf. De 18:10); and by the justification of the custom of determining guilt or innocence by ordeal given in Nu 5th. Moreover, the codes of both savage and civilized peoples show that the quality of actions which are held to be sins and punishments are determined by the conceptions entertained regarding those beings. On the lower plane of these sinful acts are omissions of ritual, withholding of offerings, and other omissions which have no relation to conduct. 'The gods of the Gold Coast are jealous gods, . . . jealous of the adulation and offerings perpetually due to them. They demand so much as to make the writer feel they respond so much as to make, whether intentional or accidental, which may be offered them' (Ellis, Tribes-speaking Peoples against his fellow believers, p. 1087, p. 1087. In Australian legend, the god Ankaus expelled man from heaven to
earth for neglect of his ceremonies. He made no moral law, but his ritual law as to circumcision and whirling the bull-roarer must be obeyed. In the Hitod (xxxiv. 66), Zeus says to Hera that he had sworn to him all moly, 'because he nowise failed in the gifts I loved. Never did my altar lack meanly feasts of animals, and the list of sacrifices; even the honours that faileth to our due.' Speaking of the modern Greek, J. C. Lawson says: 'In the mental attitude of the worshipper, there is little or no idea of reward or punishment. The words, 'sacrifices written, 'gifts win the gods' (Mod. Gr. Doul. and Anc. Gr. Ric., C.), in which the god gives, cost us nothing for nothing. Each blessing has its price. Health is to be had, say, for a calf; wealth, for a couple of yoke of oxen; a kingdom, for a horse. He is to be appeased.' General crimes against superstition being that of mentioning his name, or, per contra, as in the light of the sun or moon, without its blessing: it was innumerable importance to know the correct name (Warre Fowler, Religion of the Roman People, London, 1911, p. 119). How the nature of the offering available to the gods is ruled by the conception of the offerer is seen in the advance from sacrifices of 'thousands of rams' to the social acts of justly and loving mercy (Mie G5). For the highest moral law is 'expressed in the form, 'Do this,' not in the form, 'Do this' (Leslie Stephen, op. cit. ed. 188). The comparative method, to which reference was made at the outset of this article, has justified its application to inquiry into the evolution of the moral sense. It has imported order into a realm of speculation and inquiry, where hitherto confusion and chaos ruled. It has made clear the fundamental uniformity of human nature, showing by what motives the most unlike acts are prompted. It has thrown light on the darkling mysteries which invested what seemed the inescapable problem of the origin of evil and of the unending tale of human wrong, bloodshed, and tyranny. It explains what part, for the time being, institutions and customs which to the higher moral consciousness are repellent and arresting forces, such as slavery, infanticide, the exposure of infants, blood-feuds, polygamy, polyandry, duelling, torture, the killing of the aged and sick, and cannibalism, have played in social evolution, as subservient what the community believed essential to the welfare of the whole world. It has proved that our moral codes, like our theological creeds, are conditioned by the accident of birth, of heredity, and of surroundings. To the fundamental doctrines of Evolution—unity and continuity—it has brought its 'cloud of witnesses.' A survey of the codes and customs of all ages and peoples shows that they are man-made social products; that they are before all creeds and dogmas; that they derive their power solely from the proved utility, and that they have their origin as the outcome of social needs, increasing their force and securing their permanence because of their adjustment to altered social and requirements. Conscience has followed the trend of moral development, and the theory of a definite, rigid, and absolute ethic is a fiction. Montaigne puts the matter with his usual shrillness: 'The laws of conscience, which we say to proceed from nature, rise and proceed of custom' (Essays, i. 112). It follows that, except in the sense that sin is rebellion against, and attempt to thwart, the universal order, the term is inapplicable. Sin, in essence, is therefore the anti-social.

EXECUTION OF ANIMALS.


EXCOMMUNICATION.—See CURSING AND BLESSING, DISCIPLINE.

EXECUTION OF ANIMALS.—Belief in kinship between man and animals is universal amongst the lower savages. Their daily, close association with the untamed creatures of hill and jungle impinges upon them all multitudes pointing to community of origin and character. Animals move and breathe; they 'certainly seem even to talk' (Im Thurn, Among the Indians of Guiana, 1885, p. 301); they are moved by the same passions, secured by law, and controlled by strength and violence; they manifest the phenomena from which man derives his conception of spirit; they cast shadows and reflections; they are in the light of the sun and moon, and are merely 'true while they last,' but actual happenings affecting his waking life. Did space permit, a large number of examples of this primitive psychology should be cited, but the few that follow have the greater weight in evidence being drawn from races above the lowest plane.

One of the sects or sub-tribes of the Rachâris of Assam show traces of their belief that in animal descent he who was praised in the fastings, and performing certain funeral rites when a tiger dies (Kachris, Kachris, 1911, 232). The Rachâris call objects, animate and inanimate, seem exactly of the same nature except that they differ in the accident of bodily form, and have spirits which differ not at all in kind from those of men' (Im Thurn, 330). To the Blackfoot Indians the question 'whether animals have mind and the reasoning faculty admits of no doubt,' for they believe that all animals receive their endowment of power from the Sun, differing in degree, but the same in kind as that received by man and all things animate and inanimate' (McClintock, Old North Trail, 1919, p. 167).

Hence logically follows belief in the responsibility of the animal for its actions, and punishment for its misdeeds. The Bogos kill a bull or cow which has caused the death of a man; the Maoris killed the pig that strayed into one of their sacred enclosures, as 'in Mohammedan E. Africa, a dog was publicly murdered for having entered the sacred area' (Westerner, M.F. i. 253). Among the Malagascans the buffalo that kills a man is put to death, as under the Hebrew code: 'If an ox gore a man or a woman, then the owner of the ox shall stone, and his flesh shall not be eaten' (Ex 21:2). And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand of man.' The animal, being regarded as a moral agent, is thus made subject to penal laws whose basis rests on the same motive as that determining all laws of the kind, namely, the resentment of society to acts inimical to its welfare and protection. In his Thurg and moral Sentiments (1857 ed.), Adam Smith remarks that the dog that bites, the ox that gores, are both of them punished. If they have been the cause of the death of any person, neither the public nor the relations of the slain can be satisfied unless they are put to death in their turn; nor is this merely for the security of the living, but, in some measure, to revenge the injury of the dead' (p. 137).

This explanation, which Westerner accepts in MI (ch. x.), largely accounts for the persistence of dealing with animals as criminals throughout medieval times, and even down to the present century. Sufficient warrant for the punishment of animals as criminals would be found in the belief that man, in his reverence for the sacred animal, sought to protect it from injury or mischief. 1

1The Echo de Paris of 4th May 1906 reported the condemnation of a dog to death for complicity in a murder committed at Delémont, in Switzerland.
EXPEDIENCY. See Being.

EXORCISM. — See Demons and Spirits, Magic.

EXPEDIENCY. — That character of an action which, in its positive aspect, combines practicability with effectiveness for the end sought, and, in its negative aspect, implies indifference to other characters, especially moral characters. Generalized, it denotes regard for the expedient as determining conduct or as a principle of action.

Expediency bears a threefold relationship to moral values: it may be indifferent to them; it may oppose them; it may be identical with them. The first relationship obtains only where there is a range of conduct recognized as neither moral nor immoral, as in the case of the lawyer or the business executive. The second relationship obtains when there is a range of conduct which is moral as well as expedient, e.g., the relationship between truth and utility. The third relationship obtains when the conduct is likewise expedient and immoral. In such cases expediency is the only rational governing principle; it becomes, in fact, identical with reason or sound sense. Where the moral value of a given range of conduct is unknown there often opened a similar opportunity for
resort to expediency. Indeed, the principle of probabilism is, in effect, nothing more than this. Even tutelaries upon a kind of expediency, though in this case, since the moral and not the \textit{apprise} or personal end is sought, it is a moral expediency—that is to say, the judgment as to moral safety amounts to a judgment that the conduct indicated is practicable and effective for the moral standard in the long run.

The antagonistic relation of expediency to morality can occur only in systems which distinguish the ethical connotation from the ethical good—that is, where the 'right' and the 'good' are not necessarily identical. For expediency in conduct only means adopting the most direct means for the end in view. Presumably that end is always (subjectively at least) the good. But, if no other obligation than the realization of this good be recognized, then the expedient means must necessarily be the right means. Intuitional ethics, however, recognizing a moral independence of invariable benefit, and a moral value in action apart from the end of the action, naturally distinguishes actions governed by the sense of right dictated by expediency practically.

The latter may (though they need not) conflict with the former; and the fact that there are many ends of human desire the attainment of which is not, \textit{per se}, immoral, yet which lend themselves readily to a through action, that is, the castration of righteousness, has given a derogatory connotation to the term 'expediency' as designating these means.

It is doubtless the failure on the part of the intuitionists to recognize the twofold regulation of conduct involved in their double reference to a moral sense and an objective good that has led to their reproach of single-principled systems, such as the utilitarian, as endeavours to moralize mere expediency. It is, of course, a fact that systems based only upon a recognition of the objective good as the governance of conduct do determine the righteousness of an action by its expediency to this end; but it is sufficiently evident that, recognizing no conflict between the sense of duty and the realization of the good, right conduct must always be expedient conduct. If the only moral value be the end in view, any means to its attainment is justified. Even Machiavellianism would be beyond criticism if there were no lurking incongruity in the difference of code assigned to purpose being.

It is but fair to note, however, that the utilitarian is forced in practice to resort to a kind of expediency differing from moral certainty as much as does the general rule of tutelaries. Such an end as the happiness of the greatest number can only be an object of approximative judgments. Every specific action must be gauged by a kind of calculus of chances of benefit, and in adopting any given estimate a problematical course is being pursued. Granted that the course chosen be the morally plausible one, still the lack of certainty makes its adoption a matter of expediency—moral, to be sure, in motive, but not necessarily so in result. It is, in other words, expedient for the individual to pursue a course which shall justify his moral sense even if it defeat the true moral good as a result of his ignorance. This is a kind of converse to the position in this intuitional ethics that the expedient course to the attainment of benefit is to be condemned if it run counter to the moral sense. Of course, in effect intuitionalism merely sets up an indirect likeness of the integrity of moral feeling—which is made paramount over its ostensibly end—the attainment of objective good.

\textbf{Experience (Religious)}

1. \textbf{Spiritual experience and subjectivism.}—It must not be assumed that this method involves a lapse into subjectivism. Experience is not the mere reflex of psychical states, whether intellectual, emotional, or volitional. It is grounded in reality, which attack of subjectivism that recognizes no action of the mind is unmade when a 'life-process' is examined, it is found that it is not merely subjective, but clothed with a trans-subjective character, inasmuch as the psychical states of the individual are unified and brought into relation with those of others (so that he realizes himself to be a member of a spiritual commonwealth), by the operation of a transcendent spiritual life which is immanent within him. The question has often been asked, Do we, when we speak of spiritual experience, mean that of the individual or that of society? It is possible to press the antithesis as to give rise to a false alternative. The individual cannot be separated from society, and treated as though he lived in \textit{vacuo}. On the one hand, one can interpret the spiritual experience of others except in the light of his own. On the other hand, the spiritual experience of the individual is closely linked up with that of others. That which seems to us to be our own peculiar possession has in great part come to us among many channels, e.g., heredity, environment, and education. Individual experience cannot, therefore, be one, or part of the influence of others as to become no more than the individual's own concern.

2. \textbf{Reality and independence of the spiritual life.}—Is the spiritual life truly the Divine life in man, or is it simply the fruit of ordinary psychological processes, extended, it may be, to loftier heights and deeper depths, but still self-originated, and wholly independent of any Power that is not ours? We shall endeavour to show that, while it manifests itself through, and utilizes, all the resources of the personality, yet its source is outside of us. For (1) it is a transmuting and unifying power. It is continually working the materials of our human nature into higher forms, creating a new reality out of the old, and resolving the inner antagonism of flesh and spirit. It holds forth new ends for our endeavour, and 'holds before us a regenerate view of the light of which it passes upon judgment on things as they are,' so that human nature is continually striving to rise above its own level, and to become a 'new creation' (Eucken, \textit{op. cit.} 7). It is differed in its operation—there is in man himself for the production of this result, the achievement of which 'demands from


\textbf{H. B. Alexander.}
us so much toil and sacrifice, such a complete revolution of our being, such a shifting of our life-centre, that it is impossible to think that any natural impulse towards happiness would have led us to it. To the higher nature by the lower we can attain, but that is the mutilation, not the redemption, of the personality. But to remodel all our impulses and passions—not merely to subdue or change their antagonism, but to bring them into the service of the life of the spirit—is a vastly different task, and one for which the natural man is unequipped. (2) History, properly interpreted, is a struggle for the supremacy of the spiritual life. Underlying all the external events and movements of history are spiritual forces which have provided men with their deepest motives and most potent energies, and linked them together in the fellowship of a hidden life. That inner antagonism which is found in the life of the individual is manifest also in history, and is being resolved by the gradual fulfilment of spiritual purpose. No merely naturalistic hypothesis is sufficient to explain this phenomenon. The evolution of natural forces will not yield the teleological unity of the spiritual life. If an immanent teleology can be traced in history, it is because of the interplay of spiritual forces, which brings reality and independence of its own. Thus, from the standpoint of the individual and of history, we are led to the conclusion that spiritual experience is not only the outcome of such psychological states, but has objective reality in fellowship with the Divine life. It is important to notice that the presence of the Divine life in man, as a controlling power, is not destructive of moral freedom, but rather enhances and enlarges it. The precondition of moral growth is voluntary self-surrender, which brings us increasingly under the liberating influence of the spiritual life. But self-surrender involves conflict and choice. Man is a personality, not an automaton, and has to win his way through to the freedom which chooses the good alone (Aug. de Civ. Dei, xxii. 30). Only by struggle and discipline can we attain to willing conformity with the Divine will, and a conscious and ever-increasing participation in the fullness of Divine life.

3. Personality and the spiritual life.—The conception of a transcendent spiritual life, immanent in man, raises very important questions affecting both Divine and human personality. Two dangers must be guarded against. On the one hand, the Divine must not be identified with the human as such, or all objectivity destroyed. On the other hand, the action of the Divine upon man must not be so conceived as to impair his moral freedom. Each of these antagonistic modes of thought ends in the obliteration of the line of demarcation between the Divine personality and the human. The transition from the idea of the Divine immanence to that of Pantheism is made with fatal facility. There can be no doubt that the Hegelian philosophy, in the hands of some of its exponents, tended in this direction, despite the safeguards which they have endeavored to set up. These tendencies have been specially characteristic of Mysticism, which is defined by Inge as 'the realisation in the human mind and feeling of the immanence of the temporal in the eternal, and of the eternal in the temporal.' Properly apprehended, it is neither irrational nor destructive of the will, but is the growth of our being, pushed to extremes, and has made for the destruction of the self by the absorption of the human personality into the Divine. Mysticism has indicated three phases in which, if man is to be what he is, he must attain, or at least come near to it: (1) Transubstantiation, (2) Transmutation, (3) Transformation. The Divine enters into us in ever-increasing fullness, as we are fitted to receive it, and union between God and man is not so much a consummated act as a transforming process. At the same time it is well to remember that, as Inge points out, all three views represent aspects of the truth:

‘If we believe that we were made in the image of God, then in becoming like Him we are realizing our true idea, and entering upon the heritage which is ours already by the will of God. On the other hand, we believe that we are constituted from original righteousness, and have no power of ourselves to help ourselves, but need, outside, an acquisition of a righteousness not our own, which is neither imparted nor bestowed on us. And, thirdly, if we are to hope for a real change in our relations to God, there must be a real change in our personality,—a progressive transmutation, which, without the continuity, will bring us to be something different from what we were’ (p. 365).

What is the authority of mystical states? For the mystic himself they have absolute authority, and he demands no further confirmation. For those who have not experienced them, they overthrow the pretension of non-mystical states to be the sole and ultimate dictators of what we may believe’ (W. James, Varieties of Religious Experience, 1902, p. 427).

4. Psychology of religious experience.—The attempt to connect religious experience with some particular faculty of the mental life has broken down. Faith, which is regarded as the organ of religious experience, is not a separate faculty, but the surrender of our nature to that in which it discerns the promise of the satisfaction of our deepest needs. To discuss adequately the process whereby this surrender is brought about would carry us far afield. It must suffice to insist that personality has the unity of an organism, not that of a bundle of sticks, and that, if faith is to be justified, it must be a unity of the whole personality. To ground faith only in the speculative reason is to impoverish the spiritual life, and to degrade religious belief into a mere form of intellectual knowledge. This leads to an attempt to explain away the phenomena of religious experience which cannot be rationally interpreted. At the same time there are elements of knowledge in faith. The school of which Schleiermacher is the chief representative, who makes faith the product of feeling, fails to solve the problem, because, as J. Caird says, ‘to place the essence of religion in feeling is self-contradictory, for a religion of mere feeling would not even know itself to be religion’ (Introductory to the Philosophy of Religion, 1880, p. 170). That feeling is a vital element in spiritual experience is undeniable, for the religious life finds its highest manifestation in the emotion of love. But, however blind love may be in its lowest forms, in its highest it must discover a moral ground for the selection of its object, and this cannot be done without the aid of reason.

There is a moment when God may seize the place of the will in religious belief, usually associating the will with feeling. This is the view of W. James, who contends that our beliefs
are the product of our 'willing nature,' including not only acts of will, but 'such factors of belief as fear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship, the circumpressure of our caste and sect' (The Will to Believe, 1897, p. 9). We must have faith in the world and the good, trust the great adventure of faith by deliberately willing to accept the validity of those religious impulses and feelings which work.' From James's standpoint, it is no objection to this theory that it leaves unexplained, and thus' does not even explain, the 'subliminal' interpretation of the universe. But an objection of another character is not so easily evaded. We are entitled to ask, What is the standard whereby we determine the 'workability' of our beliefs? To say that a belief 'works' is to presuppose a standard of 'workability'—which cannot be arrived at without the aid of reason.

The problem of faith can be solved only when the unity of personality is kept steadily in mind. The reason must gather its materials and sift them, deriving them from no narrow sphere, but from the whole range of knowledge, thought, and personal and spiritual instincts and intuitions. The judgment thus arrived at can be made effective only through the emotions and the will. Knowledge does not pass into belief without a decisive act of will, in which emotion is a powerful factor. The act of faith is one of religious adoration, fear, or love. Thus the whole personality is called into activity before the transition can be made from knowledge to belief. Even yet we have not fully traced the process whereby religious faith is reached. The belief which is the mere outcome of rational, emotional, and volitional processes falls short of faith. And here we are driven back once more upon the reality of that Spiritual Life which underlies all, and is not within, but immanent within him. To use the language of religion rather than that of philosophy, the Spirit of God entering into us illuminates our reason, purifies and quickens our emotions and intuitions, and strengthens our will, so that we are enabled to make a whole-hearted and whole-minded surrender to our beliefs, and all the consequences which come in their train. Faith is, therefore, of ourselves, yet not ourselves. It is not a person in so far as it is the product of the quickening activity of the Spirit of God; it is of ourselves in so far as it is the rational, willing, and loving response of our whole self to the presence of God. [62]

Religious experience and the subliminal self. Modern psychologists lay great stress on the subliminal self and, by some it is regarded as the organ of religious experience. James holds that the discovery of the subliminal self marks the greatest advance which psychology has made. Myers uses the term to cover all that takes place beneath the ordinary threshold... of consciousness— not only those faint stimulations whose very faintness keeps them submerged, but much else which psychology as yet scarcely recognizes— sensations, thoughts, emotions, which may be strong, definite, and independent, but which, by the original constitution of our being, seldom emerge into the domain of consciousness to which we habitually reside with ourselves... I conceive also that no Self of which we can here have cognizance is in reality more than a fragment of a larger Self, revealed in fashion at once shifting and limited through an organism not so framed as to afford it full manifestation (Humus Personality, 1917, ed., pp. 13-16).

James has proposed as a hypothesis that whatever it may be on its farther side, the 'more' with which in religious experience we work, our constructed is on its nearer side the subconscius continuation of our conscious life (Varieties, p. 62).

(a) Following up the line thus opened, Sanjay has laid it dawn: 'that the proper seat or locus of all divine indwelling, or divine action upon the human soul, is the subliminal consciousness' (Christianity, 1910, p. 109).

For criticism of James's and Sanjay's views, see REV iv. 60.

II. CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE. In the NT we find ourselves in a very different atmosphere from that of philosophy. Its dominant note is not speculation but certainty, and its emphasis is not on the abstract but on the concrete. Spiritual religion is focused in a historic revelation. God has spoken to the world through His Incarnate Son, Jesus Christ, whose teaching, life, death, resurrection, and ascension, and the consequent outpouring of the Holy Spirit, are all shown to stand in a vital relationship to spiritual experience.

This connexion is not elaborated in the Synopsis of the Gospels as in the other NT writings. This is what might be expected, since the Synoptists set out to give a simple record of the earthly ministry of Jesus, and rarely yield to the temptation of reflection upon it. Nevertheless, even they afford sufficient material to establish the distinctive features of Christian experience. Jesus Christ is set forth as the Mediator of a new revelation and a new relationship to the whole of humanity as Father, and calls on men so to live that they may be the sons of their Father in heaven, and thus receive the Holy Spirit. Israel had already apprehended the Divine Fatherhood, in relation to the nation, and even to the individual Israelite through the mediation of the nation; but in the Gospels it is declared to be universal, and is represented as being actually manifested in Jesus Christ, in whom the filial relationship was perfectly realized and exemplified. The purpose of Christ is to reveal to and restore to men their sonship, and to initiate them into a higher spiritual order—the Kingdom of God. In this Kingdom He is the supreme Mediator. He bids men come to Him, take His yoke upon them, and learn of Him, if they would find rest for their souls (Mt. 11:29); He is 'the resurrection and the life' (John 11:25); and, though crucified and buried, He is risen from the dead, and is with His people even unto the consummation of the age (28); and will be the final Judge of all. It is not possible to trace here the development of this teaching in the other NT writings. It must suffice to indicate its main content and implications.

1. The Incarnation and Christian experience. The Incarnation is a concrete revelation of that which lies at the basis of spiritual experience,
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union between God and man. It is the revelation of an eternal harmony between Being and Nature, between God and man. Some Unitarians, no less than Trinitarians, prefer the doctrine of Athanasius to that of Arius, on the ground that the former conserves the truth of a union of God with humanity. The NT, however, does not regard the Incarnation as a mere illustration of union between God and man, but as the ground of its realization. It is not simply the revelation of the affinity between the two, but the initiation of a new spiritual process, whereby that affinity is consciously realized by man—a process based not on imitation, but on fellowship in a hidden life, mediated to us by Jesus Christ. ‘The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus’ liberates us from ‘the law of sin and death,’ endues us with a moral dynamic, begets in us ‘the mind of the spirit’ which in ‘life and peace,’ and leads us into the realization of an affinity with God, which is so close that we are called His sons (Ro 8:17).

2. Christian experience and the death, burial, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ.—The death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus are related to the history of guilt, and guilt, and the birth of the new life in the soul. The sense of sin has always been a characteristic mark of Christian experience. Theories of the Atonement have been developed in the NT by theologians, and the NT sets forth the Cross as the ground of reconciliation, and as that which brings deliverance from the power of sin and the paralysis of guilt—short, that which makes fellowship with God possible. The Resurrection is regarded as the pledge of the perpetual presence of Christ in the world as the Mediator of the Divine life. It might, however, be contended that an ascended Christ is transcendent, but the Resurrection and Ascension are interpreted in the NT in the light of Pentecost. The Spirit is the ‘Spirit of his Son’ (Gal 4:4). ‘The Lord is the Spirit’ (2 Co 3:18). The ‘Living Christ’ is not a mere symbol for the posthumous influence of Jesus. He is present by His Spirit in the hearts of those who love Him, and the Christian hope of immortality is grounded not in speculation, but in participation in His inner life. The death, the Resurrection, and Resurrection are also taken by St. Paul as typifying certain inner experiences of the Christian.

‘We have crucified Christ; yet I live; and yet no longer, but Christ liveth in me’ (Gal 2:20). ‘We were buried therefore with him through baptism into death: that, like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life. For if we have become united with him by the likeness of his death, we shall be also by the likeness of his resurrection’ (Ro 6:4).

This is not a mere description of a mystical doctrine of resurrection. The spiritual experience has its basis in historic facts, by the aid of which it is initiated. The crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus, and the resurrection to newness of life are achieved only by means of the spiritual energies liberated in the death and resurrection of Jesus.

3. The naiš consciousness, fellowship with Christ, and the indwelling of the Spirit.—The content of Christian experience may be variously described in these three ways, each of which emphasizes a different aspect of the truth. The change that is wrought in the old self and the resurrection to newness of life are achieved only by means of the spiritual energies liberated in the death and resurrection of Jesus.

4. The witness of the Spirit and the inner light.—The Methodist doctrine of the witness of the Spirit has been expounded in art. CERTAINTY (Religious), vol. ii. pp. 325-331. It may be well here to distinguish between it and the Quaker doctrine of the inner light. The witness of the Spirit is conceived of as operating ab extra, the inner light ab intra. The former is a development of Christian experience, the latter is its presupposition. The inner light has been compared with the Stoic σηπεμενη λογος and anima mundi.

‘By this seed, Grace, and Word of God, and Light wherein we say everything is enlightened, and hath a measure of it, which strives with him in order to save him... we understand not the proper Essence and Nature of God, precisely taken... but we understand a Spiritual, and Invisible Principle, in which God is Father, Son, and Spirit dwells: a measure of which Divine and Glorious Life is in all men, as a seed which of its own nature draws, invites, and inclines to God; and this some call Vehiculum Dei’ (Barclay, Apology, 1736, p. 127).

It is from this substance that the inward birth arises (Barclay, op. cit. 130). It is not to be inferred from this that Christ dwells in all men by way of union and habituation; ‘outward seed, and inward life; if ever it is nor can be separate from that holy, pure Seed and Light, which is in all men; therefore it may be said in a larger sense that He is in All’ (cb. 143).

Further, this light is not to be identified with any natural faculty such as reason or conscience. Neither is it subject to man’s control.

‘He must wait for it; which comes upon all at certain times and seasons, wherein it works powerfully upon the soul, mightily tends it and breaks it; at which time, if man resists, but closes with it, he comes to know salvation by it’ (cb. 141).

Barclay strongly denies that this doctrine is in any way dependent on the old self for its principal character, which they know nothing of Christ’s coming to the flesh, through whose obedience it is purchased unto them... The history then is profitable, but not comfortable with the spirit without it; but the Mystery is and may be profitable without the explicit and particular knowledge of the history’ (cb. 141).

5. Individual and collective truth.—The spiritual truth which is the relation of the spiritual experience of the
individual to that of the whole society of Christian disciples! The two extremes to be guarded against are, of course, both of which form part of the organic character of Christian experience, and the authority which eliminates individuality and variety by demanding conformity to a fixed type. Ritschl holds to the idea that the gift of the Spirit to the individual, but is mediated to him through his membership in the kingdom of believers. It seems to be more true to the NT to and to the facts of experience to represent the new birth as immediate fellowship with God in Jesus Christ, and as verifying or correcting his deductions, not merely by reference to the authoritative diet of the Church, but by spiritual fellowship with those who are partakers of a like experience.

'The basis principle of individual experience' is 'saved from excess by the correction given through the experience of others.'

6. Christian experience and philosophy.—The Ritschilians distinguish between theoretical judgments and judgments of value. The validity of Christian truth is no longer based on natural reason, but by test. Ritschl and Hermann deny that theology needs the sanction of metaphysics. They hold that religious knowledge has no need to be justified with the aid of theological knowledge. Kaftan, however, writes:

The sphere of thought peculiar to the Christian faith, and the corresponding world of the Church, must be identified with the religious knowledge of things, cannot be wholly apart from one another: it must be possible to combine them so as to make a whole' (The Truth of the Christian Religion, p. 11, quoted by Mosley, Ritschlianism, 1909, p. 27).

What Ritschl means by value-judgments may be stated in a statement that 'we know the nature of God and Christ only in their worth for us' (Justification and Reconciliation, Eng. tr., 1900, p. 212). There can be no ultimate divorce between theoretical and religious knowledge. Truth, though many-sided, must be one, and the spiritual and rational universes must finally coincide. But it is not to be assumed that Ritschl conceived of two kinds of knowledge, mutually exclusive and irreconcilable. His emphasis on value-judgments was due to the fact that his interest was practical rather than metaphysical. It seemed to him that they offer the one method of approach to religious truth. And as much as such method may be able to advance the Church in its work, it may be necessary for the Church to make sure that the use of this method is directed by an enlarged and deepening of our vision and deepening our sense of certainty. But it is necessary to go further than Ritschl, and to recognize that their authority is greatly increased if they are viewed in the light of all our knowledge, and verified or corrected thereby. The theory of value-judgments embodies, at any rate, two important truths. (1) Experience is a vital factor in the solution of the truth problem. The higher we ascend in the scale of truth, the more scanty does theoretical evidence become, and the more dependent are we on practical motives. (2) Speculation cannot yield an intimate knowledge of the nature of God. Such can be won only by experience—the realization of God's worth for us. The inner meaning of the Christian revelation can be apprehended only by those who have experienced its work in their own lives (cf. 1 Co 2:10-11).

To sum up, value-judgments stand for 'the recognition that proof cannot mean in theology exactly what it means in natural science, but that in theology knowledge must be a matter of personal experience arising from individual experience.' They are the 'assertion of the presence of a religious element in all knowledge, and protest against excessive intellectualism, the understanding that truth is perfectible and fallible, and as in our conceptions we have been inclined to represent it' (Mosley, op. cit. 110).

7. Christian doctrine and experience.—Christian doctrine is the outcome of the interpretation of the historical facts of the gospel in the light of Christian experience. The facts of the historic revelation are illumined and established in the light of experience, which of itself cannot prove their reality, but, once they are given, confirms and interprets them. Doctrine cannot be evolved out of experience alone. The birth, life, teaching, death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus were dependent upon the attestation of history, but no adequate doctrines of the Incarnation, the Person of Christ, the Atonement, the mediatorial work of Christ, and indeed as some might consider all the facts are approached and interpreted by Christian experience. The doctrine of the Trinity is an outstanding instance of a dogma springing out of the necessities of the experience which is grounded in the facts of the Christian revelation. The eschatological doctrines of Christianity are in a different category. They are based not on historic facts but on revelation, and can be neither deduced from nor confirmed by experience, except in so far as the final principles of judgment are seen to be operating here and now. It is in the development of the doctrines which relate to the new birth in the experience of the individual and the church that the utmost potent influence. Conversion, regeneration, justification by faith, sanctification, assurance, are phenomena of the inner life, and, however fundamental their relation to the historical facts of the Christian experience, are also the development of the doctrine. Both the hope and the justification of theological progress lie in the advance which Christian experience is gradually achieving. Doctrines are not only a product of the Church but are the outcome of the Church's experience of Christian life. And it is in the light of this experience that the Church must judge the world, for it is the Church's life which is the standard of all life.

8. Christian experience and history.—As has been shown, Christian experience is based by the NT writers on the historical revelation of God in Jesus Christ. The Ritschilians distrust the mystical side of the religious life, and hold that the Christian knows God and communes with Him through the apprehension of the inner life of the historical Jesus. This view, while it places a necessary emphasis on the historical side of the revelation, does less than justice to the mystical side of NT teaching. The experience initiated by the apprehension of the historical Jesus is finally realized in fellowship with the living Christ, without any sacrifice of objective reality, or subservience to merely subjective processes. At the other extreme are those who separate the Christ of faith from the Jesus of history. In some instances the historicity of Jesus is denied, and it is held that the Gospel is but a representation of a wide-spread 'Christ-myth' which reflects humanity's struggle for God. The attack on the historicity of Jesus cannot be said to have met with any success, and many of the parallels, so confidently advanced, between the details of the Gospel narrative and mythology, break down on analysis (see Carter, The Historical Jesus and the Theological Christ, 1911, ch. i., and St. Clair Tisdall, Mystic Christs and the True, 1909). In other quarters the conception of the heavenly Christ is regarded as the outcome of the process of gnostic development, and certain of his sayings and acts have been taken place round the form of Jesus of Nazareth, who, as some think, was the embodiment of a Divine humanity, or, as others believe, merely a well-intentioned, but mere pious Jewish apologist. But such theories are not only impossible of justification, but are beset with difficulties that are insuperable. (1) They do not explain how the gnosticizing process came to centre in the crucified Jesus of Nazareth, nor do they help us to understand why from earliest
days Christian faith has sought its nourishment not in a mystic gnosia, but in the knowledge of the historical Jesus, whom it identifies with the heavenly Christ. (2) Facts of consciousness which are the product of speculation and reflection, however, are significant. H. P. S. Smith, of course, claims that the authority and certainty of a revelation which centres in a great historic fact. (3) Whenever the Church has treated the historic record with indifference, it has invariably fallen either into scholasticism or mysticism. . . Christianity, when scholastic, lacks inspiration; when mystical, it lacks reality and balance.' (Forrest, The Christ of History and of Experience, 1897, p. 335).

EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT

EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Introductory and Primitive).—The entire subject of expiation and atonement is inextricably involved with that of sin (q.v.), and with the propitiation (q.v.) of the Divine being or beings angered by such sin, whether the propitiation be by sacrifice, fasting, penance (q.v.), or any other means. The concepts of expiation and atonement are, however, neither synonymous nor even necessarily connected; the latter involves a far higher type of religious development than does the former. Even on the human plane, the desire to placate an offended fellow-man by no means implies of necessity a wish to be at one with him; the averting of wrath is not inherently prompted by love either for or in the offended. It is true that—from motives of fear as well as of love—there may be a desire not merely to appease, but also to win the favour of the one who appears to be such desire is accidental, not necessary, to the concept of expiation, whereas it forms the innmost kernel of the concept of atonement.

The broad principles motivating expiation may be summed up in the phrase 'fear of Divine anger' (cf. Anger [WRATH] of GOD) at sin, which, in the words of the Westminster Shorter Catechism (q. xiv.), is 'any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God—a definition which, mutatis mutandis, will apply to the lowest as well as to the highest systems of religion. In the lower stages of religion, what we may conveniently call sin' does not necessarily imply infringement of a moral law; it may be merely a violation of an un moral custom (q.v.) or of a non-moral tabu (q.v.); it may be one of omission as well as of commission; it may be voluntary, involuntary, or unwitting; it may be grave, or venial, or of any intermediate grade; it may offend various classes of worshipful beings—ghosts, godlings, deities, and the like; it may be entirely physical or ritual. In all such cases of innocence, some sort of expiation becomes necessary—some penance must be undergone to placate superhuman beings, just as some surrender of self is needful to appease others in human life.

It seems safe to conclude that, at its lowest level, expiation is non-ethical, and that non-ethical ideas remain connected with expiation, to a greater or lesser degree, in relatively advanced religious systems, while in some—notably in Buddhism (see 'Buddhist' section, below)—the concept is non-existent; while in others—as in Muhammadanism (see 'Muslim' section, below)—expiation degenerates into a crass question of guilt and credit. The non-ethical aspect seems to characterize the entire Polynesian and Melanesian area, where expiation appears to be simply an endeavor to placate offended ghosts and deities. Yet it must be remembered that, with the exception of the Australians, few of these peoples have as yet been studied with a view to ascertaining their ethical-religions principles—a failure particularly lamentable, since with so many of them the old system of beliefs has practically vanished for ever. Yet it is at least significant that even so competent an observer as Codrington makes no mention of any ethical feelings underlying such sacrificial acts as are made in Melanesia for the purpose of propitiation (Melanesians, Oxford, 1891, p. 127), though it is perfectly evident that the Melanesians and Polynesians had many ethical principles of a high order (see above).

In Africa, also, the non-ethical form of expiation is the more usual. As a type may be taken the Shilluk of the Egyptian Sudan. When a Shilluk is seized with a disease as a result of some offence that he has committed, a propitiatory sacrifice is offered, with an appropriately sad and humble frame of mind, to appease the angered worshipful being; and, should the sick man recover, his restoration to health is attributed to the intercession of Nykand (the apotheosized first king of the Shilluk) with Cuok, the 'Great Spirit' (Hotmayt, Anthropos, vi. 1911: 121).

In like manner, among the Bantu Walanga, a sick man inquires of his sorcerer as to the origin of his illness; and, if it be from an offended ghost, this is appeased, according to the sorcerer's directions, either with the sacrifice of a sheep, etc., or with a libation of honey, meal, milk, and the like (Pasemann, Anthropos, 1900, 189).

A distinct form of expiation is the rite of confession. Outside Christianity (see Penance), confession has been most commonly known from the Assyro-Babylonian, Egyptian, Hebrew; see these sections of Confession; and for a divergent rendering of the Egyptian confession—more accurately 'repudiation'—of sins, see above, p. 478;
EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (American)

Parsi (see 'Parsi' section, below) religions. Yet it occurs elsewhere, as among the Eskimos (q.v.), the Atecs and Peruvians (see 'American' section, below; cf. also Vitel, Anthropophy der Naturvolker, Leipzig, 1880–77, iv. 129 f., 462 f.), the Denes (q.v.), and the Iroquois (q.v.). Here only the Hebrew and the Parsi, together with the Aztec and Peruvian confessions, are represented by real ethical considerations, from their earliest known history; but the Parsi patite are of very late date, while, in the case of the Aztec and Peruvian confessions, there is a possibility (though merely a possibility) that they have been formulated in too ethical a setting. The Assyro-Bab. confession is, at least originally, largely devoted to ritual offences; and the Egyptian 'repudiation' has no indication of any real sense of sin and repentance—at the most, only attrition is indicated by it (see also 'Egyptian' section, below).

Afri can also knows confession. Among the Kikuyu, east of Lake Victoria Nyamunit, sin is the violation of the moral law, custom, rite, or taboo, and consists of three parts: mography; noki; violation; and sanhu, punishment. Of this, Fr. Cayzac says (Anthropos, v. (1910) 211): 'Sin is essentially remissible; it is enough to confess it. Ordinarily, this is done to the 'sorcerer,' who expels the sin by a special prayer. The principal rite is a somnolent vomiting (kobokho, derived from t'okha, 'vomit').

There is also a private, non-sorcery confession; a man has just committed adultery; he is not connected to speak of it. If he has said nothing, the man would not have sinned; but, since he has voiced his thoughts, he is responsible; in this case, then makes a private confession of his act to some friend, and this confession renders him immune against death.'

Confession is also practised by the Mkalwulo (German East Africa), but only the raidds, who must perform the rite publicly, fully, and sincerely. Confession is made by all assembled in case of severe illness, or difficult delivery, or before crossing a dangerous stream; individual confession, when the father of the household is starting on a journey.

The confession for severe illness begins: 'The illness is grave. Let us see; perhaps there are sins among the kin. Let him who has sins confess them; let us confess well; let us not confess with double heart. Forgive me, gracious God! I have no other sins than that. (Adultery, breaking of vows, falsehood, theft, etc., as the case may be.) I have no other sins at all. I am poor; protect me, gracious God! All my sins are gone from me. I have no sin left in me. With this he says words of somnolent confessing: casts towards the west splinters of wood and bits of straw, that he has done wrong, and has sworn, and that he has dammed the sinks in the west, never to return. If the sick man mends, it is attributed to the perfection of the confession; otherwise, it becomes necessary to get a second confession, in order to discover who is concealing some of his sins, and thus rendering the recovery of the patient (Hamberger, Anthropos, iv. (1909) 303–312).

And yet, non-etrical as these African forms of expiation appear to be, it has been declared that the African possesses a real concept of conscience.

Thus Schenkel (Jottt. der afrikan, Naturk., Münster, 1891, p. 192) writes: 'The negro is guided at every step by religious consciousness (religiöse Gewissensfähigkeit), though, unfortunately, he is very often not guided by truth and morality; his morality is not based upon self-made, secular, and human principles, but upon religious, especially sin-consciousness, which may often be quite artificial. What bonds and binds him is not 'the categorical imperative of self-willed reason,' but another, higher will, which proclaims to him his religious duty.' With this, he knows that the sin-consciousness casts itself towards the west splinters of wood and bits of straw, that he has done wrong, and has sworn, and that he has dammed the sinks in the west, never to return. If the sick man mends, it is attributed to the perfection of the confession; otherwise, it becomes necessary to get a second confession, in order to discover who is concealing some of his sins, and thus rendering the recovery of the patient (Hamberger, Anthropos, iv. (1909) 303–312).

And yet, non-etrical as these African forms of expiation appear to be, it has been declared that the African possesses a real concept of conscience.

Literature.—In addition to the authorities cited in the text, see the lists appended to the following articles:

LOUIS H. GRAY.

EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (American).—The conception of expiation is already fundamentally present in the primitive effort to placate the anger of gods and of propitiate the departed spirits. It may become unfriendly. Sacrificial rites of all sorts are designed to such ends, the notion being that the worshipper can purchase favour by his sacrifices. Where the sacrifices, in place of a mere offering of goods, involves physical suffering on the part of the donor, we may fairly regard the rite as expiatory—as an effort to make good the punishment which the propitiated power is wont to inflict.

Rites of this type are common among the American Indians. One of the most interesting examples is that given by F. F. Im Thurn (Indians of Guiana, London, 1893, p. 308). 'Before attempting to shoot a cataract for the first time, on first sight of any new place, and every time a sculptured rock or striking mountain or stone is seen, a man in the spirit of the gods of such places by rubbing red-peppers (Eupatorium) each in his or her own eyes... The extreme pain of this operation when performed thoroughly by the Indians I can faintly realize from own feelings when I have occasionally rubbed my eyes with tamarind leaves which had been ground with red-peppers; and from the fact that, though the older practitioners inflict this self-torture with the utmost stoicism, I have again and again seen the otherwise rarely petrified individuals, children and even young men, sobbing under the infliction.'

The same propitiatory notion underlies the severe tortures which the Plains Indians inflicted upon those who were accustomed to undergo on the eve of going to war, though doubtless here the ethical motive of putting to test the warrior's fortitude also bears a part. A typical description is given by de Smet (Life, Letters, and Travels, New York, 1805, p. 253 f.).

Among the Sioux, as among the Arois, warriors preparing for an expedition were subjected to a very rigorous system of severities. They have for this purpose a "medicine" lodge, where they spread a buffalo robe and plant a red-painted post: at the top of the lodge is tied a cage containing all sorts of devices. There, to obtain the aid of the Great Spirit, they pierce their breasts, pass leather cords through, attach themselves to the post, and dance several times around the lodge to the sound of the drums, singing their war-lie and flourishing their war-clothes over their heads. Others make deep cuts under their shoulder-blades, run corde through the gashes, and draw two great buffalo heads to an immense alent a mile away from the village, where they dance until they drop senseless. A last offering before setting out consists in cutting off little pieces of flesh from the ears, and throwing them to the wind; and, to offer to the sun, the earth, and the four cardinal points, to render the blazing, or tutulose, or tutulose spirity, of the different elements favourable.

From rites such as these, designed to compound the offence for which a sacrifice is made, and to render compensation for an offence already given is but the step of reason. Possibly an intermediate case is the acceptance of punishment not with a sense of having offended, but merely as a means of averting a calamity already falling—such as the case of Black Coyote who, after several of his family had died, in obedience to a dream sacrificed seventy pieces of skin from his body to save the remainder (4 RREW'T, p. 2 (1890), p. 119). In this instance, as with no apparent sense of fault; yet expiation readily develops into penance, with the penitential conviction of sin accompanying it, and sometimes into penance viewed as a sacrifice viewed as atonement. An excellent instance of this complex sort is the penalty for murder among the Huros as described by Father Brébeuf (Jottt. Relig. Infid.,更有199, p. 81). Not only must the murderer and his family give compensation, in the form of presents (as definitely determined as the Anglo-Saxon sergild), but he must also give satisfaction—probably conceived as a placation of the angry dead. Brébeuf thus describes it: 'The dead body was stretched upon a scaffold, and the murderer was compelled to remain lying upon it and to remain upon himself all the mitad which existed from the
corps; they put beside him a dish of food, which was soon finished, and then the corpse, to which little by little fell into it; and merely to get the dish pushed back ever so little would cost him a present of seven hundred porcelain beads. This was a custom restricted to the highest classes, as long as the relatives of the deceased pleased, and, even after the formal ceremony, the relatives had to make sacrifices.

War among the Indians was but an expansion of the primitive blood-feud, of which the above ceremony represents a sort of commutation, as is proved by the fact, noted by Brebeuf, that, 'if the relatives of a dead man should lay their own bodies into this injury by the death of him who gave the blow, all the punishment fell on them.' Much of the difficulty in maintaining an Indian peace lay with the relatives of the war-slain whose manus had not yet been appeased by the death of a foe. Thus the Assiniboins explained to Father de Smet (p. 1128) their horrible cruelty in slaughtering a whole encampment of unprotected women and children of their Blackfoot enemies, declaring that 'they satiated themselves with cruelty to satisfy the manus of their deceased parents and kindred.' Certainly, if captives were spared or adopted, it was usually because the losses of the captors had been negligible in the conflict.

The conception of pollution or uncleanness, with the corresponding need for ceremonial purification, obtains far and wide in the Indian world; but the framework of rules and ceremonies which marked the purifying are hardly to be regarded as in a strict sense expiatory; they are of the nature of a cure rather than of a penance. We find, however, that the Indian was more than receptive when the notion of penance, as expiation of sin, was once laid before him. At all events, there is a general unanimity of the Jesuit teachers to the effect that their aboriginal converts were singularly ready to confess their sins and to be absolved for them. It is often observed that the Fathers required of them the statement, 'they accused and condemned themselves, and pronounced their own sentence, which they carried out' (Thwaites, xxxii. 35), represents not a particular case but a common attitude.

Le Jeune in the Relation of 1640 (ib. xlvii. 173-177) describes at length one of the rather numerous instances in which a convert had exposed a pagan, and had later come repentant to the Fathers. 'We assembled the principal Christians to ascertain what their plan of things is,' he writes. 'They summarily decided that he should be driven away and forbidden ever to live again with the Christians.' To this severity the Fathers of the young man made a preliminary protest, publicly to confess his sins. 'This he did; but more than this, he came in front of the whole congregation, and, saying: 'My fathers, I have so deeply regretted my fault that I have not dared to approach any Christian since my return; I would not dare even to look at them. I wish you to tell me whether you would do the same if I returned to Catholicism, wealthy and a married man; but I have come, nevertheless, to see you. I assure you that, since I left this house, I have tasted every day —eating only one day and not more, —so much have I grieved for offending God. I have not dared to take shelter in the abode of the Christians; I pass before them in silence, with bowed head; I shall go and see them when I have confessed.' Le Jeune adds: 'I carefully examined his behaviour: I found him so little guilty before God that he shuddered within myself for some time with a holy horror. It is true that he had taken this young girl, having already given his word to another; it is true that he lived with her if they were married, and that was the offence. But it is also true that he was afraid of offending God and his respect for his baptism had prevented him from touching her, although he was urgently solicited to do so —desperation would have become Christian before showing her the evidences of his affection. This, in my opinion, is what passed wonder —to be in the fire, and not be burned; to do an act almost innocent before God, and patientiy to bear the punishment for it before men.'

Thus the Indians did not confess and do penance as is recorded by the Spanish friars in Mexico. There, moreover, the idea had developed independently before the advent of Christians, as is illustrated by the explicit account given by Sahagun (Hist. gen., Paris, 1882, ii.; cf. art. COMMUNION WITH DEITY [American], in vol. iii. p. 741). And, indeed, the whole temper of the Aztec religion is that of a deep and unescapable sense of sin —with which a reader of Mexican annals can hardly fail to synapo-
thize. Something very similar among the Peruvians is indicated by Garcilasso (Royal Commentaries, ed. Paris, 1830, xii. iii.) in the spirit in which the Inca laws regarded as Divine, the laws of the empire were viewed as Divine ordinances, the violation of which was sacrilege.

'Heck,' he says, 'often enough, those who knew themselves culpable, condemned by conscience, went voluntarily to proclaim to the judge their secret faults; for their belief that the soul condemned to a sacrilege could not be appeased by the cause of all the ills which befell the state—maladies, deaths; unrepentant sins; disorders, disgrace, general confusion. Therefore, the law itself ordained that they should send their lord to send other ills into the world, they wished to expiate their sin by death.'

There was, in fact, no distinction between crime and sin; every offence was an offence against the Inca, who was himself immune from faint simply by his Divine origin and sanction (cf. id. xii. xxv.).

Garcilasso (vi. xi.) records that in certain tribes the priests were accustomed to fast for the welfare of the community. This is a wide-spread custom among the Indians, being intimately associated with the mystical notion that dream-revelations of importance to the people were to be obtained by such means (see 14 REV, pt. 2, passim). The idea of vicarious atonement is so far beneath the surface in a society whose morals are still on the group basis, distributing responsibility to all the relatives of the offender. A quaint development of this notion is detailed in the Jesuit Relations (ed. Thwaites, xxxii. 395) by Père Lalemant:

'After the fathers and mothers have confessed, they make such of their children as are fit to receive the sacrament go to confession. But, as regards those who have not sufficient discretion, their elders bring them to the fast, where they fast and often detain them in their presence their petty acts of naughtiness, and make them ask for a penance, which they themselves perform for their little ones.'

For the final development of this idea of vicarious sacrifice, in its native form, we must turn to the mythologies of the Indians. There we find—among the Iroquois, the Algonquins, the Sioux, the Pawnees, and many others—various developments of the conception of a demigurge being modelling this world as a habitat for man after the plan of the world which is in the confinement and which was before the earth was. This being is at times (as with the Iroquois) a cosmic titan, slain in the making of the earth, so that its body becomes the source of the life of the vegetable and the animal realms, and thus of man, whose life is a reverence of the nourisher of life. At times (as in the legends of Hiawatha) an historical or legendary chieftain, conceived as a benefactor who has won for his people such some gift as the knowledge of agriculture, is identified with the cosmic sacrificial demigurge—thus giving a vicarious turn to the heroic life. Possibly the dominance of the theanthropic conception throughout Mexican religion is but a continuation of the same fundamental conception—of a god dying for mankind (see esp. J. N. B. Hewitt, 'Iroquoian Cosmology,' 21 REV [1902], p. 135; D. G. Brinton, Myths of the New World, Philadelphia, 1905; cf. art. INCARNATION [American]).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the authorities cited in the article, see list appended to COMMISSION WITH DEITY (American).

H. B. ALEXANDER.

EXPATRIATION AND ATONEMENT (Babylonian).—1. Personal gods and demons.—To understand the intricate system of purification from sin in Babylonian religion, it is necessary to start from the unique conceptions of the Sumerian 1 religion regarding the relation of the individual to the gods. The Sumer.-Bab. religion possesses a 27The cotyledon structure of fish, religion is essentially non-
pantheon extraordinary in its ability to represent every element of Nature in its hierarchy, and many abstract ideas as well. The earliest religious literature of the Sumerians represents the social aspect of religion as distinguished from the individualistic.

The public worship, in which the entire community joined to sing liturgies in the temples, in praise of the great gods, is apparently older than those forms of worship which touch more closely the individual, who is regarded as a sort of subsidiary of the realm of nature and were excluded from the temple-worship from first to last. But the individual who, by the socialist nature of early worship, felt himself lost in the sight of the gods in the great public liturgies expressed his need of a more personal religion by adopting a personal god, his protecting genius. Each man lived under the protection of his personal god, a good spirit which dwelt in his body, or whose Divine presence permeated his being. Proper names in both languages often refer to this idea.

The deity whose name figures in the proper name of any individual is not always his protecting genius. He felt free to choose some other. Usually each individual accepted a god adapted to his personal gods, so that the Babylonians spoke more often of 'my god and goddess.' So long as the personal god dwelt in a man, he felt himself in complete possession by divinity, but the evil demon (originally a ghost) often overpowered the protecting spirits and drove them from the body. His god is departed from his body, his thoughtful godhead stands afar,' says the priest of one who has fallen to the powers of evil. Ordinarily sickness or any trouble physical or spiritual is regarded as a sign of possession by the demons (see DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Assyr. Bab.]). It is likely that in the first stages of this religion the demons were regarded as taking the initiative without any cause whatsoever. Thus in the earliest known text of this kind we have the following:

'To his hand he has beaded,
To his foot he has extended,
This man is the son of my hand, son of my foot is he.'

2. Conceptions of sin.—But only the primitive stages of the religious attribute the flight of the protecting spirits solely to the hostile attacks of the demons, and himself becomes a factor, and begins to reflect upon his own conduct as a possible cause for the flight of his gods. The first notion of sin is here ritualistic, grossly materialistic.

'These streets, has he trodden upon a libation poured out? Has he set his foot upon improper water? The water of unclear hands has he seen? A woman of impure hands has he met? A maiden of impure hands has he seen? A woman of poisonous witchcraft has his hand touched?1

1 Ban by drinking from undercup cup (Gilgamesh Epic).
2 Ban by having touched a man accursed (Marduk) dissolve.
3 Food (unclean) I have eaten, waters incanted (I) I have drunk, refuse of my god, whether I have vowed, rash of my goddess unwittingly I have offended.

The ethical conception of sin and the moral element in religion begin to develop at an early period, if we may judge from the religious aspect in which injustice and violation of civil laws were regarded. Yet it may be safely asserted that ethics and religion were originally independent of each other in Babylonia. There is no moral transcendence about estrangement between man and his gods are mentioned at great length in the Surpu series:

3. Condition of the sinner.—Corresponding with the advance made in the conception of sin, there are distinctly different conceptions of the condition of the sinner in the various stages of the cults of expiation. The reader will have inferred from the preceding paragraphs that the earliest state of sin was regarded as one of demonic possession.

Whether diseases of sorrow, and the father's cure of the attacks of the demons, the machinations of witchcraft, the evil eye, or what not, the actual state of man was described as one of demonic possession. Thus in a ritual against a disease we have the curse:

'Evil ghost, evil spirit, evil demon, evil man, evil eye, evil mouth, evil tongue from the body of the man, son of his god, may they depart.'

The technical term for a man in demonic possession is paphalta = nuna(italik)u, lit. 'one losing to and fro.' Also what is often employed to denote the misery of a sinner. The fundamental idea of this root is 'unclean,' worthless. Sumerian, therefore, in each case employs a term based on the religious aspect of the case. A sinner is one cursed by the demons, made unclean by the evil spirits so that his gods can no longer dwell in his body. The sinner is often described as one who has a curse, for which the technical word is malama in Semitic. The root of this word, enu, Heb. מָכָה means 'to speak with a rumbling voice,' probably referring to the ventrilo-
quip. A demon or a witch casts the *mamit* upon a man, or the *mamit* falls upon him as the result of any kind of sin. The individual sometimes represents his condition in more ethical terms in the later stages of the religion. May the sickness of my body be removed, may the weariness of my flesh be driven away. Calling and no answer has encompassed me. From the days of my youth much have I been bound with torment. Food I eat not, weeping is my nourishment. Often the gods (both personal gods and others) are said to be with him, to have turned away from him. His god and goddess are enraged with him; the goddess has turned away from me.

### 4. Methods of expiation.

Since the fundamental concept of sin is essentially one of demonical possession or of a ban and curse, which enfold man like a great net, the method of overcoming the demons or the curse must be magic. It would be not inadmissible to say that no religion ever existed in which the entire scheme of atonement is so thoroughly based upon magic. No analysis of the ritual of atonement could possibly convey to the reader the true and comprehensive nature of the fundamental notion. It is essentially enfolded in the entire scheme of the atonement. It follows, then, that he will be restored to favour with all the gods. To free man from the demons, to loosen the ban cast upon him by the powers of evil, is the problem in the ritual of atonement.

Power to overcome the demons and the ban is obtained through the curse given to the priests by Marduk, the highest of the gods or the curse of the water of fresh water. Inherently there is no difference between the curse hurled upon man by the demons and wizards and the curse of salvation uttered by the priests in the name of the water-god. The superiority of the latter lies in the superior mystic power of the god himself.

### 5. The curse.

The technical term for the curse of expiation is *bīstum* in Semitic, a word borrowed from the Sum. root *kāb*. Ordinarily the rituals employ the term nam-sum-sub, lit. the casting, throwing. We do not possess material from the primitive period to give us an insight into the nature of the spell that is introduced by the mystic spell revealed by the water-god, but the act of casting a spell of Divine power probably consisted in uttering words attended by conventional movements of the hands.

This supreme magical formula was known as the curse of Eridu, and had power not only to overcome the bans of the demons, but also to consecrate any object whatever. As in the Christian Church the consecrating formula employed for the elements of the mass is preceded by the sacred history of its institution, so in the Babylonian ritual the curse of Eridu is employed only after the account of its legendary origin.

Still another technical term is arānu, curse; the verb is arānu Hebr. ënma. The Sum. for arānu is akī. Ilī-will; and the verb akī-ba, hurl the ill-will. Note the idea of hurling, casting, the curse of the water element in cursing in Sumerian. It is obscure (see Landson, *Sum. Gram.*, 1911, pp. 121, 250).

### 6. Curse without ritual.

Only in the later period do we find the priests of incantation depending wholly upon the curse to banish the powers of evil and bring about reconciliation with the gods. The process here may be described as purely intellectual magic. The priest proclaims himself as commissioned by Ea; and, after describing the demons at great length (it was necessary to obtain a clear idea of the nature of the ban before it could be cursed), finally utters the curse of Eridu, following it by an oath that the demon is cursed. This secondary curse, 'Verily, thou art named,' may be sworn to in the name of any number of gods or sacred objects, and serves not as an assertion that the priest has really discovered the name of the demon to be cursed.

### 7. The ritual elements.

In the ordinary ritual of atonement water, bread, grain, plants, and animal sacrifices are introduced. The terms used are described in the passages cited above. The reader will note the passage cited above in § 5, where bread and water are placed at the head and feet. In the primitive ritual, water was undeniably employed as a means of purification, and applied in one way or another before the curse of Eridu was uttered. The priest seeks to drive the demons into the water, the bread, the grain, or whatsoever element may be employed. When he utters the curse the evil passes into the water, which is then taken away into a 'clean place' or thrown in the highways. Such water, bread, etc., were regarded as unclean.

### 8. The institution of Ea.

Ea, the water-god, is said to commission his son Marduk with his own power over the demons. Marduk is represented in the person of the magician (yupu), whose words are, therefore, really those of the water-god.

The following passage is the earliest known source for the ritual of expiation, and is employed against hazzel, the demons.

Go, my son Marduk, this man the son of his god pacity. Bread at his head place, rain-water at his foot place. Sin the head of hazzel.
The words of the curse of Eridu utter.

Of his limbs, to have turned away from him. May the head face ascend to heaven like smoke.

Into the beneficent hand of his god restore the man.

The words of the curse of Eridu have not been recorded on tablets. It may well be that they constituted a sacred formula revealed only by oral instruction in the schools. The word *mamit* (Sum. *say-ba* and *nam-erim*), which, as we have seen above, often denotes the curse of the demons, may also be used for the curse of the gods. With the curse of the earth-spirits I curse thee, says the priest of incantation to the demon. A quasi-philosophical conception of the course of Eridu is found among the Sumerians. It essentially one of the twin concepts not to be transgressed. The consecrating, delivering curse belongs to the water-god only, or to the gods connected with fresh water, as Marduk, son of Ea, son of Enki, and Shukdut, Shukdut, the son of the curse was then personalized, and a hymn (King, *Bab. Magic*, 61) refers to the curse as created with the gods.
EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Buddhist)

EXPIATION. Faithfully look upon me, hear my supplication,' says the penitent in a prayer to the moon-god.\(^1\) 'May my sin be undone, my frivolity forgotten. May the good genius, the good spirit walk beside me. May evil mouth and tongue stand aside. Better be found not clear and sing thy praise.' So run the closing lines of a prayer to the god of the new moon.\(^2\) It is probable that sinners read a tablet of their sins before the gods, and that the ritual was broken in sign that their sins were forgiven. This form of the ritual finally freed itself from magic, and the sinner depended entirely upon confession and prayer in the so-called penitential psalms.

The significant act of atonement in this form is the appeal of the sinner to various gods to intercede for him with the god whose anger he wishes to appease. Forgiveness is here expressed by the phrase 'remove my sin,' or 'turn thy face unto me,' or 'may thine anger return to its place.'

It will be seen that Bab. religion identifies sin and disease in all its stages, and that atonement and reconciliation depend largely upon magic. The atoning power of sacrifice is a negligeable factor, and in any case is not original. The ritual tended to the production of a beautiful literature, and in many cases to symbolic acts of great spiritual meaning. The power of a magical prayer, in which appeal is made directly to the god.


S. H. LANGDON.

EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Buddhist).—In the sense in which these terms are used in Christian theologies, the ideas of expiation and atonement are scarcely, if at all, existent in Indian religions. This holds true especially of Buddhism, constructed without dependence on a deity, and profoundly influenced by the Indian theory of karma (\(\text{g.v.}\)). According to the theory of karma, as current, it is generally agreed, just before the birth of Buddha, the fate of each sinner in the next birth, was determined by the man's karma (lit. 'doing') in this birth. The soul was supposed, in this stage of the theory, to be a very minute creature residing in the cavity of the heart, and resembling in every respect (except in size and in the absence of a soul within it) the visible man. Like a man's, its outward form was material, consisting of the four elements and heart; like a man, it had anger, desire, quality, and other mental traits.\(^3\) This hypothesis of a soul was rejected by Buddhists; but in other respects it adopted and systematized the karma theory, and made it one of the foundation-stones of its ethical theory.

Karma becomes for it an inexorable law, working by its own efficacy, subject to no Divine or human interference, and resulting in an effect following without fail upon every deed, word, and thought. As to what effect followed on what deed opinions differed (see KARMA). But on the main fact of karma all Buddhist schools are agreed. They held that the karma and its vipaka (the act and its result) were inextricably interconnected by the law of either of expiation or of atonement was either possible or desirable; and that the contrary doctrine, an explaining away or denial of karma, was pernicious, immoral, a bar to religious progress.\(^4\)

\(^1\) King, Bab. Magic, no. 6, 60-62.
\(^2\) Jb. 51-34.

\(^4\) King, Bab. Magic, no. 6, 60-62.
EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Christian)

The passages in the canonical books in support of the above doctrine are so numerous that only a small selection can be given.

In Sutta Nipata, 606, the Buddha is reported as saying: 'Karma is the man does, be it lovely, be it evil, that is his inheritance, whatsoever it may have been done, that he must abide in it.' At Anguttara, 306, it is said: 'Of all woven garments, brethren, a hair shirt is known as the sword-hair shirt, but it is clumsy, in colour rather dirty; it is ugly, evil-smelling, grievous to the touch. Just so brethren, of all the doctrines commonly known among those of the religious, the doctrine of the Cittasamvara is the worst; for that foolish one is of opinion that there is no karma, no action, no energy.'

Yet, notwithstanding this uncompromising attitude as to the result of any act done, there are two cases in early Buddhism in which, at first sight, there seems to be some mitigation possible. The first is where a bhikkhu is forgiven for a breach of a by-law of the community; the second is in the matter of a patti-dāna, or transfer of merit.

The rules as to the first case are translated in Vinaya Texts, ii. 339 ff. and iii. 61-53. Stated quite clearly, they amount to this: if a breach of the rules had been reported to the local chapter, the chapter could, under certain conditions, suspend the offender from certain privileges. On his subsequent repentance, he could be brought forward, at least to a subsequent meeting of the chapter, for rehabilitation. By leave of the chapter the offender was brought in, and, on his acknowledging his offence, the chapter, through the mouth of the mover of the motion, 'took back' the offence (as the standing expression is). Sometimes the Buddha himself, without the matter being laid before a chapter, 'took back' an offence (see, for instance, Śanguttaya, i. 128). But in all such cases the offence, it should be noted, is purged only as regards the Order. The law of karma is not broken. The karma of the offence will work out its inevitable result independently of the fact that the offence, so far as the Order is concerned, has been expiated.

The other apparent exception, the patti-dāna, or transfer of merit, is interesting as showing development in doctrine. The belief is not found in the Nikayas themselves, only in the commentaries upon them. In the latter, however, it is taken so completely for granted that it must have grown up some considerable time before they were written in their present forms. In note, there is the idea (though not the technical phrase for it) must be as old as the Milinda, that is, probably, as old as the 2nd cent. A.D., 'attainment,' 'accomplishment.' To have done a good deed was to have attained the good result that would inevitably follow. By the law of karma that result would accrue to the benefactor (to him who has done the good act) either in this or in some future birth. The doctrine of patti-dana (lit. 'gift of the patti') was that the benefactor could so direct the karma that it would accrue not to his own benefit, but to that of some one else whom he specified. That this amounts to an interference by human will in the action of karma cannot, we think, be disputed. And, if the merit of a good action cannot be transferred, it would seem to follow logically that the result of an evil deed could also be transferred. All this brings us very nearly, if not quite, to the Christian doctrine of atonement, of the imputation of righteousness. The Buddhists might deny this; and would point out, quite fairly, that such transfer of merit was supposed possible only in the case of certain good actions of a minor sort. In fact, the patti-dāna is most frequently found in the colophons to the MSS, the copyist giving expression to the pious hope that the merit of his having completed the copy may redound to the advantage of all beings. And in other cases, the stories told in the commentaries, the act of which the merit is transferred is usually the gift of a meal to a bhikkhu, the placing of a white flower at the foot of the monument to a departed arahant, kindness to animals, or something similar and pious.

It is noteworthy that the transfer of merit is usually from a good Buddhist to a non-Buddhist, and that the latter is usually a friend or relation of the benefactor. There is no instance of a good Buddhist desiring or accepting any transfer of merit to himself.

EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Christian).—t. Scope of the article.—It is the purpose of this article to review briefly the development of the Atonement on Christian soil, to distinguish and classify its most important forms, to show their historical antecedents and relations, and to estimate their significance.

The word 'atonement' may be used in two senses: either as a synonym of reconciliation (at-one-ment), or to denote the 'satisfaction or reparation made for wrong or injury, either by removing some condition or by doing or suffering something which is received in lieu of an equivalent' (Cent. Dict.). It is in the latter sense that the term has been commonly employed in theology. By the Atonement is meant the satisfaction made by Christ for the sins of humanity, however that satisfaction may be conceived in detail. Since the purpose of Christ's atoning work is to reconcile sinners to God, it is not unnatural that some modern theologians should have returned to the original meaning of the word, and maintained that in theology also the true meaning of atonement is reconciliation rather than satisfaction. Such an identification, it is true, has been a departure from the historical usage; and in what follows we shall understand the word in its more technical sense as signifying the action taken by Christ to bring about reconciliation between God and man, rather than the reconciliation itself.

In the sense in which the Atonement has been commonly understood in later theology, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, namely, as an objective satisfaction made by Christ to the Father to secure the forgiveness of man, the doctrine was first clearly formulated by Anselm in the 12th cent. In his famous Cur Deus Homo. Long before this time, however, the death of Christ had been made the subject of explicit reflection by Christian theologians; and the answers which they gave to the question why Christ died on Calvary form the necessary introduction to the history of the doctrine of the Atonement. These answers begin within the NT itself, and the rich material which is there contained has proved the point of departure for later speculation.

2. The Biblical basis.—The conceptions which the NT writers bring to the interpretation of the death of Christ fall into five main groups.

(1) The simplest answer finds a sufficient reason for Christ's death in the fact that he took place in fulfillment of OT prophecy. This is the explanation given by St. Peter in Ac 3, where no attempt
is made to explain why the suffering was necessary. It is enough to know that it is in the sacred book in which the Divine will for man is revealed (cf. Lk 24:17—27).

(2) A more speculative interpretation is suggested by Jesus' own words in Mt 26:28. Here the mark of His acceptance to a covenant-sacrifice is sealing the relation between the disciples and God under the new dispensation, as the Paschal lamb marked the union between the Israelites and God under the old. This most fully developed in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where the death of Christ is regarded as at once the fulfilment and the abrogation of the OT sacrificial system. As the High Priest of the New Covenant, Jesus enters the Holy of Holies (i.e. the immediate presence of God), not with the blood of bulls and of goats, but with the perfect sacrifice of His own life-blood (He 9:20-21), and hence exhibits a type of the true spiritual sacrifice with which alone God is well pleased (13:15). This sacrificial conception underlies the Anselmic doctrine of the Atonement, though in association with other ideas drawn from a different source.

(3) A different interpretation, also suggested by Jesus' own words (Mk 10:45), sees in the death of Christ a ransom or purchase price by which His disciples are delivered from the bondage into which they have been brought by sin. The comparison is suggested by the provision made in the Law for the enthranishment of slaves upon the payment of certain specified sums of money, or by the familiar custom of the ransom of prisoners taken in war. What these money payments accomplished in delivering those in bondage from temporal captivity, that the death of Christ is conceived to effect in securing the deliverance of transgressors from the deadlier bondage of sin (cf. 1 Co 6:19, 20; 1 Pt 1:18, Tit 2:4, Eph 2:10). This idea re-appears in the later history, in the Patristic interpretation of the death of Christ as a ransom paid by God to Satan.

(4) A different explanation again is that which interprets Christ's death after the analogy of the bloody expiation exacted by justice from those who have been guilty of wilful sin (e.g. 1 K 21:1). The idea of expiation through suffering is a very ancient one. Where a wrong has been done for which the ceremonial system affords no remedy, atonement must be made by the death of the offender; this is the conception found in a striking expression in 2 S 24 (cf. 1 Ch 21), where David's sin in numbering the people is atoned for by a pestilence in which seventy thousand of the people perish. It is the pre-supposition of the well-known passage in Is 53, in which the stripes of the righteous servant are the means by which the wicked are healed. In the NT it has its most signal illustration in the Pauline conception of the Crucifixion as the voluntary acceptance on Christ's part, as a result of His self-identification with humanity, of the consequences in suffering, shame, and death to which their own sin had made them liable. This conception re-appears in the later history, in the various forms of the so-called Penal Theory of the Atonement.

(5) In the theology of St. Paul, however, this interpretation of the death of Christ is only one side of it. It is not the death conceived by itself alone which has redemptive significance to St. Paul, but the death as a part of the entire process of the Divine self-identification with humanity, which makes it possible for believers here and now to become partakers of the Divine life of the Christ, and so sharers in His triumph and resurrection. It is not simply the passive Sufferer; He is the conquering Lord, and the benefits both of His suffering and of His conquest are mediated to His disciples by the mystic union with Him which is brought about by faith.

The connexion between the death and the incarnation of Christ is made even closer in the Fourth Gospel. To St. John the suffering of Christ is but an incident in that self-identification of the Divine Word with humanity which constitutes His true redemptive work. It is not the death so much as the life of Christ that has saving power, and Calvary is important not so much for the specific function which it fulfils of itself, as because it is the supreme proof of the completeness of our Lord's subjection to all the conditions of human life.

The contrast just suggested is of importance for the later history. As we follow the interpretation of Christ's death through the centuries, we find two main types of thought predominating. According to the first, the death of Christ is an incident in His infinite love and infinite sacrifice, and forms a part. To the Greek, unlike the Latin, the supreme evil from which man needs to be delivered is not guilt, but corruption. Through sin, humanity becomes subject to the law of death. The mind is darkened through ignorance, and the entire nature, as mortal, is destined to destruction. What is needed for the salvation of man, therefore, is not simply forgiveness, but a new transforming power which shall enlighten the mind by the revelation of truth, and transform that which is corrupt and mortal into incorruption. Such a Divine and transforming power entered humanity through the Person of Christ, who was conceived of the Holy Ghost, 'He became what we are, that He might make us what He is' (Rom. 8:3, Preface [Ante-Nicene Fathers, iv. 55]).

This conception of redemption finds its classical expression in Athanasius' tract on the Incarnation of the Word (Eng. tr. in 'Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers', 2nd ser., iv. 30 ff.). Discussing the problem of redemption, Athanasius says why it was necessary for man's salvation that God should become man, and answers that it was because 'He, that only could man receive the new life which was the indispensable condition of his salvation. If it were simply a question of guilt, forgiveness might suffice if there were adequate penitence, but forgiveness alone could not deal with the radical corruption of nature which had been produced by sin (cf. S. 4-5). For this the Incarnation alone was the remedy (xiii. 7). In the Incarnation, Christ became the partaker of a complete human experience. He shared our sufferings and limitations; He died the death which we due, and so opened the way for us to a share in His Divine and glorified life (viii. 3); A well-known king had his abode in a lowly village, all the houses share the honour which is conferred by his presence, so all humanity shares the benefit of the Incarnation, and for all a way of salvation and hope is opened (ix. 4). This way of hope in provided through the Resurrection service, in which the power of Christ's death is made manifest, and the promise of a like immortality assured to all who put their trust in Him (xxii.—xxvii.). The convincing proof of this is found in the fact that it is the weakest of them—no longer fear death, but 'leap to meet it,' preferring it to life on earth (xxviii. 1).

It is clear from this brief review that the death of Christ holds a very different place in this theology from that which it does in the later teaching of the Western world. To Athanasius, as to St. Jerome, the Incarnation is a conception that had its roots deep in the saving work. It is the Incarnation as such that is redemptive. The death takes place because it is a part of the common lot of humanity, which the Redeemer must have endured. In Biblical language, as the payment of a debt (xx. 2), but no theory of its efficacy is given in detail, nor is any of the analogies suggested in the Scripture pressed to its literal conclusion.

So far as we find explicit reflection upon the death of Christ in the Greek Church, it follows the line of the third figure above referred to. In the writings of Origen and of Gregory of Nyssa, as of Ireneus before them, the death of Christ is interpreted as a ransom paid by God to Satan in order to secure the redemption of humanity, which has been brought under his dominion by sin. The theory is differently developed by recent writers. Sometimes the right of Satan to the possession of his captives is admitted, and the death is interpreted as a ransom due to the devil on grounds of justice. This interpretation was abandoned, and the method actually followed is explanation of grounds of fitness, or of God’s graciousness in being unwilling to take by force that which was rightfully His.

Gregory of Nyssa regards the deliverance of man as having been secured by the redemption of God’s part, Satan being deceived by the humble appearance of the Redeemer into supposing that he had obtained a new to Christ, a man of too late date, for the Devil whose presence he had not perceived escaped his clutches through the Resurrection. This deception he justifies on the ground that it was only paying the devil his due, since he “effected his redemption for the ruin of our natures”; but God, “in love, he [Christ] took upon him a burden fit and good, and wise one, used His device, in which there was deception, for the salvation of him who had perished, and thus not only conferred benefit on the lost one, but on him, too, who had wrought our ruin” (Great Catechism, ch. 26, Eng. tr. ‘Nice and Post-Nicene Fathers,’ 2nd ser. v. 469).

Fanciful as this theory appears to us to-day, it exercised a great influence, and continued for many centuries to be the prevailing interpretation of the death of Christ. From the Greeks it passed to the Latins, numbering among its adherents such men as Augustine, Gregory the Great, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Peter Lombard. Often the present theories are a mere device to explain a fanciful conception. In the works of Gregory we see the Lord’s humanity to the bait placed upon the hook of His divinity (Moralia, xxiiii. 7, Eng. tr., Library of Fathers, Oxford, iii., 569), or what is the same thing, the Gospel is the monose in the soul of man, baptized by our Lord’s blood (Liber Sententiarum, iii. Dist. xiv. 1). Yet, it would be a mistake to regard this theory as a mere idle speculation. To the man who held it, it expressed a genuine conviction, and the fact is that it secured the endorsement of such teachers as Origen and Augustine shows that it had its roots deep in experience. It is the most signal illustration of the dualistic conception of the world which played so great a role in the early history of Christianity—a conception that had its roots deep in the realm of speculation, and appealed to the various mediating theories of a Demiurge or Logos, and in the world of practice to monasticism and the ascetic life. To the early Christian theologians, Satan was the source of all corruption, existence, and a redemption which delivered mankind from the power of the devil was the supreme need of man.

Yet, it is important as the place held in history by the theory of a ransom to Satan, it would not be true to say that it is the only point of view represented in the Greek Church. The Greek theology, like that of the later Church, had its different schools of thought, and no single formula can express the point of view completely. If there had been no other influence at work, the study of Scripture, with its varying interpretations of our Lord’s death, it would have invented uniformity of statement. So we find different theologians using different figures, and even the same theologian varying his language at different times. The gospels of the first centuries are found in Ireneus (ad. Hier. v. 1), and of the Incarnation Theory in Origen (in Num. hom. xxiv. 1; cf. hom. in Joann. xxxviii. 20). Tymanis finds in Gregory of Nazianzus anticipations of the Governmental Theory later developed by Grotius; while Origen, in his profound teaching, regards even the Incarnation itself as but a sort of picture-teaching, through which the Divine Logos prepared the way for that higher insight into truth which constitutes man’s true redemption. Thus all the points of view which reappear in the later history are found in germ in the Greek theology.

4. The Atonement in Latin theology—Latin theology took over from the Greeks the conception of salvation through incarnation; but, in contrast to the Greeks, the Latins found the evil from which man needed deliverance not so much in corruption as in punishment. Where the Greeks thought of God as the Ultimate Reality, the Latins regarded Him as the Supreme Lawgiver or Judge. Hence the death of Christ acquired in Roman theology an independent significance which it did not possess in that of the Greek Church. It was the Divinely appointed atonement for the guilt of man’s sin, and incarnation took place primarily in order that this atonement might be wrought. While this theory which first finds explicit expression in Anselm’s De Deus Homo, it has its antecedents in the earlier history. Among these may be mentioned Augustine’s development of the concept of original sin in his anti-Pelagian writings, and the application of the concept of satisfaction to the problem of forgiveness by Tertullian and Cyprian.

Augustine agrees with Athanasius in his concept of sin as inherited corruption. It differs from the Greek theologian in the emphasis which he places upon the guilt of this sin. It is not mortality, as such, from which man needs to be
delivered so much as the separation from God, which, while it is justly punished in his sin, is also rectified by his expiation.

Through the fall of Adam all mankind has become guilty in God's sight, and is justly exposed to his wrath and curse. So great was the guilt of this sin that it has involved all its descendants in a condition of condemnation. While Christ's redemption, even infants dying in infancy are justly condemned to eternal punishment.

A further preparation for Anselm is found in the development of the theory of satisfaction by the earlier Latin theologians, notably Tertullian and Cyprian. According to their teaching, it is possible for man by good works to make satisfaction to God for the sins which he has committed. Tertullian (de Baptismo, xx.: cf. de Oratone, xxiii.) holds that such satisfaction should precede baptism, while Cyprian contends that it is a remedy for sins committed after baptism (de Lapsis, 36). While they did not apply the concept of satisfaction to the death of Christ, their teaching undoubtedly prepared the way for Anselm's theory by making men familiar with the word. 

Anselm's theory, as is well known, is set forth in his treatise, DeUs Homo. The title explains the purpose of the book. The words "Deus Homo" should be translated, 'Why a God-man? not, as they are often rendered, 'Why did God become man?' It is the problem of Christ's Person that engages Anselm's thought. He wishes to know not simply why incarnation took place, but why God, who is infinite, should enter into a finite personal relationship. This is the question of the godhead and humanity, of God and man. Why could not God or man alone have answered the purpose just as well? Why was it necessary that there should be a God-man? The answer, in a word, is that it was necessary in order to make possible the Atone-ment. Only thus could a person be constituted who could render to God the satisfaction necessary for man's sin, and so make possible the redemption which he desired.

The work, which takes the form of a dialogue between the writer and his disciple Boso, begins with an examination of objections to the doctrine of the Atone-ment, as well as of earlier theories which Anselm rejects as inadequate. Among these is the theory of a ransom to Satan. Anselm finds no reason to believe in such a justification to Satan. In the case of man, which prevented him from redeeming him by his own power, he is necessary (bk. i. vii.). In contrast to this, Anselm maintains that Christ's Atone-ment concerns both God and not the devil. Man by his sin has violated the honour of God and defiled his handiwork. It is not consistent with the Divine self-respect that He should permit His purpose to be thwarted. Yet this purpose requires the fulfilment by man of the perfect law of God, by which his sin man has transgressed. For this transgression, repentance is no remedy, since penitence, however sincere, cannot atone for the guilt of past sin (bk. i. ch. xx.); nor can any finite substitute, whether man or angel, make this atone-ment. Sin, being against the infinite God, is infinitely guilty, and can be stoned for only by an infinite satisfaction. But this no finite creature can pay (bk. i. l. xxxii.).

Here, then, is the situation: either man must be punished and God's purpose fall, or else man must make an infinite satisfaction, which is impossible. There is only one way of escape, and that is that some one should be found who can answer to the two conditions, both of humanity and of infinity. This consummation is brought about by the

incarnation of Christ. In Christ we have one who is very man, and can answer to the satisfaction of his sins, and who is at the same time very God, and whose person by infinite goodness and will gives infinite worth to the satisfaction which He makes (bk. ii. ch. vii.). But why, it may be asked, the necessity for the death of Christ? Why did not the life of Christ suffice? Why then do we reach the most original part of Anselm's theory. The life of Christ, according to Anselm, however perfect, is not available for the purpose of satisfaction, because, as man, Jesus' duty is to do right, and, when He has done all, there is no merit to spare. So not with His death. This, which is the case of other men, is the judicial consequence of sin, in the case of Christ, the divine. The satisfaction of Christ is a supererogation—a voluntary offering or sacrifices not due to God, which He freely gives in exchange for the forgiveness of man. This death voluntarily borne when it was not due is the infinite satisfaction which secures the salvation of man (bk. ii. chs. x. and xi.).

The analogy between this theory and that of a ransom to Satan is obvious. In each case man's deliverance is secured by the acceptance, on the part of the one whose rights need to be conserved, of a substitute which he considers an equivalent in value. But, in the former case, it is the devil whose rights need to be protected; in the latter, it is God. In the former case, again, the satisfaction which is offered, while great in value, is not necessarily infinite, since Satan, as creature, is himself a limited being, whereas in the latter case it is the essence of the theory that the satisfaction rendered should be of infinite value. So far as the infinity of Christ enters into the former theory, it is as an element in the conception which is practised upon Satan. Had he perceived our Lord's Divinity, he would never have consented to the substitution.

Anselm's theory, on the other hand, it is Divinity which gives the atoning sacrifice of Christ the priceless worth in God's eyes, though which alone man's redemption is made possible.

There is so much in Anselm's theory which, from our modern point of view, is fanciful and unreal that it is easy to overlook its true significance in the history of doctrine. This is to be found in its clear perception of the fact that that which gives value to the death of Christ is not its penal quality as suffering, but its moral quality as obedience. Christ is not punished for our sins, as in the later Penal Theory; His death is rather a precious gift brought to God, having its value in the spirit of self-sacrifice by which it is inspired. Thus, in the history of the later connexion between Anselm's theory and the theories of the Reformers, this subject is divided into distinct types. Anselm's theory, as Ménegoz1 has rightly shown, is a development of the sacrificial theory of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and has close points of contact with the later ethical satisfaction theories. The Reformers, on the other hand, reject the alternative, which is the major premise of Anselm's argument, and deny that satisfaction can ever be admitted as a substitute for penalty. This fundamental difference has been obscured by the familiar usage which classes Anselm's and the Reformations together as theories of satisfaction.

Few treatises of equal length have exercised so great an influence on the history of thought as the DeUs Homo. Apart from its influence in Protestantism, of which we shall speak presently, it provided the theological basis for the prac-tices of indulgences, which in Anselm's time had already begun to assume substantial proportions. Through the death of Christ, there is laid up a store of supererogatory merit which is available for the remission of the penalties incurred for sins committed after baptism. The doctrine of indulgences is thus entrusted to the Church, and is exercised by her through the penitential exercises of the Church. The whole conception of supererogation, which fills so great a role in the theology of the later Roman Catholicism, has in its most significant illustration in the death of Christ. What Christ did in death was a death which was not His due, gives an example which the Church has used, and which, as the works increase the store of merit which the Master has begun.

In the later Roman Catholic theology the theory

of Anselm is modified at two points. In the first place, the conception of supernumerary merit is extended beyond Christ's death to take in His life of service. In the second place, the principle of strict justice which belonged to Anselm, is abandoned in favour of a theory which makes the efficacy of the Atone ment dependent upon the gracious acceptance of God rather than upon its own inherent dignity. The first of these changes means is us in the theology of Thomas Aquinas; 1 the second is characteristic of the Scotist theology, and gives rise to the so-called Aceptiation Theory of the Atone ment. Both changes have their parallels in the theology of Protestantism.

Contrasting the theology of the Roman with that of the Greek Church, we are struck by the greater prominence of the legalistic element in the former. The older realistic conception of salvation is not denied; it is, indeed, the assumption of the later development, but its significance is altered. Baptism and the Eucharist lose their central position as the sacraments of the Church, and of a complicated system in which penance and indulgence are the controlling elements. The Eucharist is no longer, as in the Greek Church, a mystic rite through which we become partakers of the incorruptible body of Christ; it is the repetition of the sacrifice of Christ upon the cross, and a means of increasing the store of merit which is available for the remission of sins.

Yet here, again, we must beware of too hasty generalizations. In the Roman Church, as in the Greek, many points of view were represented, and no single type of thought adequately expresses the wealth of teaching which its theologians present. In the theory of Soteriology, as in the historic teaching of Gregory of Nazianzus, we have a recognition of principles which reach their full development in the Governmental Theory of the Atone ment. Abelard, in his commentary on Romans, 8 antici pates, with a clearness which is remarkable, the later Moral Influence Theories; while in the writings of the mystics, as in Origen's teaching of old, all external media fall away, and salvation is sought and found in the immediate vision of God. 9

5. The Atone ment in the older Protestant theology. — Great is as the importance of the doctrine of the Atone ment in Catholic theology, its impor tance in Protestantism is even greater. To the Catholic theologian the Atone ment forms the basis of the whole system of ecclesiastical machinery upon which man's salvation is supposed to depend. To the Protestant theologian it is his warrant for rejecting this machinery as superfluous. Through the atone ment of Jesus Christ the price of man's redemption has been paid once for all, and henceforth nothing remains but to appropriate the benefits of this accomplished salvation through faith.

The central principle thus given to the doctrine appears in the language by which it is described. In Protestantism the Atone ment and regeneration are treated as identical. Thus the Westminster Confession (iii. 6) speaks of the elect who have 'fallen in Adam' as being 'redeemed by Christ,' whereas the context makes it plain that the reference is to the Atone ment. 1

1 Quot. xlvii. art. 1. 'From the beginning of his conception Christ merited eternal salvation for us.'— Cf. the following context. 'Thus the merit of the life is contrasted with the merit of the death.'

2 I.e. the theory that Christ's death owed its efficacy, not to any particular virtue which was inherent in it, but to its being an exact equivalent for the punishment due from man, but to the good pleasure of God, whereof he (Christ) was pleased to make a substitute. According to the Atomeut, cf. Seeberg, Die Theo. des Johannean. Denkwerke, Leipzig, 1869, p. 244 f.

3 Abelard. Der Cross is the supreme revelation of the love of God, and the means through which a corresponding love for God is to be fostered.


G. B. Stevens' work, entitled The Christian Doctrine of Salvation, is really, as an analysis of its contents shows, a treatise on the doctrine of the Atone ment; and James Denney, in The Atone ment and the Modern Mind (London, 1900), says of the Atone ment that 'for those who recognise its importance at all it is Christianity in brief; it concentrates the whole Christian gospel, as a gem of immortal beauty, in the wisdom, love, and power, and love of God mean in relation to sinful men' (p. 2). So much is this the case that, 'when we speak of the Atone ment we are speaking of the modern mind, we are speaking of the modern mind and the Christian religion ' (ibid.).

No doubt it is true that not all Protestants carry their egotism so far. But the mystic conception of Christ's humanity is made prominent, the older Greek thought, in which incarnation is the central reality, lives on. Thus, to Luther, as to Athanasius and to St. John, the death of Christ is only the culmination of that self-identification with humanity which through which we are freed from our bondage into the glorious liberty of the children of God. In Christ we see the revelation of the gracious Father, and are contrasted to become partakers of a complicated system in which penance and indulgence are the controlling elements. The Eucharist is no longer, as in the Greek Church, a mystic rite through which we become partakers of the incorruptible body of Christ; it is the repetition of the sacrifice of Christ upon the cross, and a means of increasing the store of merit which is available for the remission of sins.

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We may illustrate this changed point of view in the case of Calvin. Calvin, like Luther, takes over many of the presuppositions of the Catholic view about the necessity on God's part for the death of Christ, he holds with Anselm that, if man is to be redeemed, it must be through the incarnation of the Church, and therefore the death of Christ became the central point upon which the thought of Protestantism was fixed, and in which the redemption love of God was seen supremely manifested. This central position was due to the fact that it was interpreted not only as satisfaction, but as punishment, and hence given a substitutional significance even greater than that attributed to it in the Anselmic theory.

This recognition of the wider aspect of Christ's redeeming work has never been altogether absent from Protestant theology. If there were no other cause, the Bible itself would have compelled a wider outlook. But a further cause was the recognition that in the death of Christ became the central point upon which the thought of Protestantism was fixed, and in which the redemption love of God was seen supremely manifested. This central position was due to the fact that it was interpreted not only as satisfaction, but as punishment, and hence given a substitutional significance even greater than that attributed to it in the Anselmic theory.

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take the place of guilty men, and so make possible a forgiveness which is at the same time consistent with justice.

It would be unjust to Calvin's views to ignore the ethical aspects of his teaching. Like Anselm, he refers more than once to the part which Christ's obedience had in bringing about mankind's salvation; but in his descending to death itself, he is following the teaching of St. Paul: in Ro 5:8 St. Paul teaches that the ground of pardon which excepts from the curse of the Law extends to the whole life of Christ. From the moment when, as a man, He assumed the form of a servant, He began, in order to redeem us, to pay the price of our sins. Thus, the more the doctrine of substitution is emphasised, the more the conception which看到了 death and its effects the whole life of Christ is already anticipated in the Institutes.

In the later Calvinistic theory the close connexion between the death and the life of Christ is no longer maintained. The obedience of Christ is separated from His suffering as having a distinct significance. It is the means through which Christ fulfils our righteousness, and so merits for us the reward which we are ourselves unable to earn; even as His death is the payment of our penalty, and so the means of securing our forgiveness (cf. Westm. Conf. viii. 5; A. A. Hodge, The Atonement, p. 144).

But it is in its view of the means by which the connexion is made between the atoning work of Christ and those for whose benefit it was accomplished that Protestantism differs most singularly from Catholicism. In Calvinistic theory this connexion is brought about by the Divine decree. God who, from all eternity, foreordained the atonement of Christ, determined also those who should receive its benefits; and in due course, through His Holy Spirit, created in them the new life which Christ has merited by His obedience. Infinite as is the value of Christ's atoning work, it is to it that we should look; and for those only, for whom, in the Divine plan, it was determined from the first (see, further, art. ELECTION).

With the rise of Arminianism (q.v.) this doctrine of limited atonement became a subject of increasing protest. Men who had no difficulty in accepting the Calvinistic doctrine of atonement as substitutionary punishment shrank back appalled from the conception of an arbitrary limitation of its scope. In order to reconcile their view of the limited effects of the Atonement with a belief in the universal love of God, they took refuge in a theory of the will which gave man himself the power to accept or to reject the mercy offered in Christ, and so by his refusal to accept it of his own destiny. This conception of a universal atonement, limited in its results by man's freedom, has become characteristic of Arminian theology, and has been without its influence in Calvinistic circles as well.

But the Penal Theory was subjected to even severer criticism by the Socinians. They attacked the entire conception of substitutionary punishment which was the premiss of the traditional theory. According to the Racovian Catechism (§ v. ch. 8), punishment and forgiveness are inconsistent ideas. If a man is punished, he cannot be forgiven, and vice versa. Under the theory of distributive justice, punishment, being a matter of the relation between individual guilt and its consequences, is strictly intransferrable. But if, for argument's sake, it be granted that this is not the case, then it is clearly unjust if, having received an infinite atonement, He does not forgive all. What kind of a God must He be, it is asked, who, when one drop of Christ's blood would have sufficiently atoned for a sin, yet suffered His own Son to endure such needless torture?

1 The Socinian view is most fully set forth in the writings of Paucaus and Ludius Socinus, collected in the Bibliotheca Pra- teosiana, (Amsterdam, 1629). Its official statement is found in the Racovian Catechism (1605, Eng. tr. by Rev. L. Beza, London, 1649).

2 It is interesting to note that a similar objection was made by William Pickton, a New England Puritan, in his Meritorious Price of Our Redemption (London, 1650)—a book which so far as their positive teaching was concerned, the Socinians held a form of the Moral Influence Theory. Christ's death being regarded as a declaration of God's love and an incentive to lead men to seek salvation through Him; but their great importance is more empirical rather than constructive. It was as a result of their criticisms that Hugo Grotius wrote his well-known work on the Satisfaction of Christ, in which for the first time the so-called Governmental Theory of the Atonement found sound expression. The work was exercised so extended an influence that it needs careful consideration.

Grotius himself is apparently unconsistent in any departure from the traditional view. As the title of his book indicates, he proposes to write a defence of the orthodox view of the satisfaction against Socinian objections; yet he introduces only a superficial survey of his work to show how profoundly he has been influenced by the arguments which he opposes. He begins by denying, with Socinus, the applicability of the category of distributive justice to the atoning work of Christ. But he differs from Socinus in substituting for the theory of public justice. God does not, indeed, deal with men as a judge, who administers strict justice in the individual case. It may be that with them as a governor who is obliged to circumscribe the interests of the common welfare. In the course of his rectoral sermons he may relax this rule; but for any case, provided it can be done without danger to the interests of public justice (ch. ii. Eng. tr. p. 271). This is what actually happens in Calvinistic theory. Christ may be substituted for punishment, a suffering inflicted by God and voluntarily undergone by Christ, which has been transferred by moral influence (cf. pp. 107-109) in order to secure the ends of righteousness. Such suffering on Christ's part is necessary, since forgiveness on the basis of repentance alone might be interpreted by men and lead to grave carelessness (ch. v. p. 182). It is more inconsistent with God's justice than any other suffering on the part of the innocent for the guilty. The Socinians themselves admit that such suffering is a part and a consequence of our common relation to one another (ch. iv. pp. 82, 85). The Governmental Theory simply draws the conclusion which naturally follows from this premise.

We have already pointed out the fact that certain features of the Governmental Theory were anticipated in the teaching of Gregory of Nazianus. In the Latin Church it has its analogues both in the Scotist theory of the Aceptatio and in the Moral Theory of Abelard. It agrees with the Scotist view in its denial that punishment is necessary to satisfy an inherent need of God's nature. It differs from it, however, in that it conceives God as governor, and as being under a constraint, as real as, if different in kind from, that of the one who is the governor of distributive justice. The governor, unlike the judge, may temper justice with mercy, but the motives which lead him so to temper it are never arbitrary, but are found in the state of society itself, in God's purpose and the rule of government. The Governmental Theory agrees with the Moral Theory in that it conceives the nature of the Atonement as determined by the moral effects which it is designed to promote; but it differs from the latter in the fact that the motive to which the Atonement appeals is conceived as fear rather than as love. In Christ's death, men see what will be their fate if they do not repent, and so are moved to repentance and faith.

In the extent and permanence of its influence upon Protestant thought the Governmental Theory is comparable with the Penal Theory alone. Among the most thoughtful Arminians it has practically supplanted the older Penal Theory, and is declared by Professor Miley 2 to be the only theory of the Atonement described as the first outbreak of the independent spirit of Congregationalism, and afterwards roused by order of the General Court, and Mr. Pynchon found it so unsatisfactory that he wrote: "See to it that you are not turned from the good word of God (Eccles. 1:18); and was reprinted in Andover in 1889.

2 Systematic Theology, New York, 1898, ii. 109.
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ment logically consistent with Arminian principles. But its influence is by no means confined to Arminianism. It maintains that God's voluntarily weakening his character, and his successors has passed over into Calvinism and has been widely held, not only by New England Congregationalists, but also by the New School Presbyterian, though they have been closely affiliated. Albert Barnes has left on record, in the introduction to his well-known treatise on the Atonement (Philadelphia, 1859, p. 4), the difficulty which he felt with the older form of the doctrine, and the relief which was afforded to his mind by the Governmental Theory. Those Calvinists, trained in the older orthodoxy, who have shared Barnes' sense of difficulty with the legal categories of the older theories have commonly found their relief where he did.1

6. The Atonement in modern Protestantism.—With the growing acceptance of modern critical methods we find an increasing disposition to emphasize the moral and spiritual elements in the atonement of Christ and, in particular, to relate His death more closely to the life-work of which it forms a part. While the older theories still live on in the schools, and are also the presuppositions both of the Penal and of the Governmental Theories have been written within the last half-century, the pre-suppositions upon which they rest in their older form have gradually under
dined. The conception of God as a being with whom justice is necessary and mercy optional, so characteristic of the older Calvinism, has been largely abandoned. The notion of atonement as satisfying some mysterious necessity in God, apart from the realization of the redemptive purpose which Christ has revealed as His supreme aim, appears increasingly unsatisfactory. Even where the interpretation of the Atonement is still heartily accepted and the death of Christ made central in Christian teaching, we find the effort to get a conception of it which shall relate it more closely to the principles and ideals that have made themselves controlling in other departments of Christian theology.

A potent influence in bringing about this change has been the new view of the Bible. It was characteristic of the older discussions of the Atonement that, whatever might be the particular view advocated, whether Legal or Governmental or Moral, it was identified without question with the teaching of the Divine word. With the breaking down of the old traditional theories of inspiration, such an easy identification is no longer possible. It is clear that what we have in the Bible is a series of parallel and, in part, differing interpretations, rather than a single consistent dogmatic theory: and no one of the later interpre
tations can claim exclusive Biblical authority for itself.

The recognition of this diversity of view-point has sometimes been made an excuse for abandoning altogether the attempt to frame a consistent doctrine. A distinction is drawn between the fact of the Atonement, faith in which is essential, and the theory, as to which men may differ without loss: and even theologians who along other lines would be the first to repudiate the Roman doctrine of an implicit faith have, in the case of this particular doctrine, declared themselves frankly agnostic.2 But such an attitude, however convenient as a temporary resting-place, is difficult to maintain for the minds of those for whom the Atonement is permanently to retain in Protestantism the strong hold which it has hitherto had upon the faith of Christians, it must be related to the world of thought in which modern men are living, and shown to be as capable of explanation and defence in the moral and spiritual terms which have become controlling for our modern thought of God as in the legal and judicial categories so familiar to the older theologians. It is characteristic of recent works on the Atonement that they attempt such a re-translation. This attempt is not confined to the members of any particular party or school of thought. It is as noticeable in the case of those who still hold the substance of the older theories as in those who reject them. An example in point is R. W. Dale's well-known treatise on The Atonement.3

Dale's book is interesting as the most serious effort which has been made in recent times to retain a penal significance in the death of Christ, while avoiding the artificiality and legalism of the older form.4 In his preface he gives a brief account of the author's discussion, but the essence of it consists in the fact that he conceives the death of Christ as the suffering justly inflicted upon Christ, as the representative of the head of the race, in order to satisfy the eternal law of righteousness which is one in essence with the will of God.

"The only conception of punishment," he writes (p. 333), "which satisfies me most, and seems most consistent, and which corresponds to the place it occupies both in the organisation of society and in the moral order of the universe, is that which represents it as pain and loss inflicted for the violation of a law."5

If the older theologians were at fault in their treatment of the Atonement, it was not, says Dale, in their insistence upon the penal element in Christ's sufferings, but in their arbitrary limitation of its effects, and, above all, in their failure to give adequate expression to the moral and spiritual side of the relationship which constitutes Him, not only the substitute, but the head and representative of the race (p. 433).

Even more striking, as an example of the effort to translate an older theory into modern terms, is Scott Lidgett's suggestive book, The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement, as a Satisfaction made to God for Sins of the World.6 Lidgett agrees with Dale in his conception of the headship of Christ, but he differs from him in finding the necessity for penal satisfaction in the very nature of fatherhood itself.

"Of course," writes Lidgett (p. 285), "the magnanimity of fatherly love raises it above the treasuring up and the exact vindication of merely personal wrongs. But, in the case of true fatherhood, what is personal stands for something that is more than personal. In dealing with a disobedient and rebellious child, the father has to do justice to his own character and will as an authority over the child—an authority representing the ideal of what the child should become, and guiding him on the way to its realisation. It has to assert the sanctity of the law which has been broken, and to secure its recognition. He has to bring home to the child the consciousness of wrongdoing. All this is the work of punishment, and it is most truly in the interests of the child himself. . . . The punishment which has been inflicted by the father is made the very means of uttering the conversion of the child."

Both Lidgett and Dale, in common with the older Protestant writers on the Atonement, agree that that which gives the death of Christ its saving power is His suffering, and what the sufferer's power is His suffering. But Dale, while he allows that suffering which Christ endured as our substitute or representative. This principle is, however, 1 So Horton, in Faith and Criticism, New York, 1955, p. 187 f.; cf. Dale, op. cit., pp. 273 f.; Scott Lidgett, op. cit., pp. 20 ff.
2The Congregational Union Lecture for 1875, 14th ed., London, 1892.
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to be repentance pure and simple, and in this contention he has been followed by not a few of the older writers on the doctrine who differ from him at other points. 2

To the question how the penitence of Christ avail for others, Campbell has a very simple answer. It is by the moral influence which the Atonement is in every one of us the conviction that we ought to repent if only we knew how. In Christ we have presented to us the ideal penitent. As He identifies Himself with our sin, so truly and truly we identify ourselves with His repentance, and through this self-identification there is gradually wrought in us that moral transformation which enables us in our turn to repeat Christ's supreme condemnation of sin, and so to enjoy that full forgiveness which God is ever ready to grant to genuine repentance (p. 153).

This conception of the death of Christ, as primarily efficacious through the moral influence which it exerts upon those who witness it, finds classic expression in the second of the books referred to, Bushnell's Vicarious Sacrifice. The problem which Bushnell sets himself is that of the possibility and the nature of substitution in religion; and the conclusion to which he comes is that in the case of a moral and spiritual religion, like Christianity, this is possible only in the sphere of the manifestations which is universal of the family rather than the law-court or the civil government gives us the most helpful example. In love, Bushnell discovers a vicarious principle, involving, on the one hand, the self-identification of the lover with the beloved, and, on the other, a corresponding transformation of the one loved through the response of his spirit to the new moral influences of which he is thus made the subject. This idea lays the difficulty in the way of God's forgiving sin is not that there is any barrier on His part to be cleared away which justice cannot remove, but that, as a matter of fact, men do not truly repent; and this, in turn, is due to the fact that no motive has yet been brought to bear upon them strong enough to overcome their existing sinful habits and desires. In this condition of things Campbell finds the key to the true nature of the Atonement. What is necessary, if man is to be saved, is that some man shall be found who shall estimate at its full heinousness the significance of human sin, shall accept in filial reverence and submission the moral consequences in subjection to which this sin has inevitably brought in its train, and so shall set in motion those moral influences by which other men, following his example, shall be drawn to a like repentance. This is, what happened in the atonement of Christ. In the spirit in which He met His suffering and death we have the supreme revelation of the true attitude which man should take toward sin. Christ on the cross identifies Himself by sympathy with suffering humanity. He utters in reverent submission His Amen to God's judgment of sin, and so, for the first time, exhibits in the most impressive way the condition upon whose fulfillment alone forgiveness depends (p. 117).

Campbell's critics have objected that in substituting for the older doctrine of vicarious punishment his newer teaching con-ceiving vicarious repentance, he has hopelessly replaced one difficulty by another. They argue that the conception of vicarious repentance is no easier to hold than that of vicarious punishment. Indeed, it is less easy, since repentance as a personal act of the individual is strictly untransferrable, whereas punishment, being inflicted on the individual, can be transferred to others, a substitute. Such a criticism, however, does not touch Campbell's main contention. He is not concerned primarily with the vexation how the benefit of Christ's repentance can be transferred to others, but rather with the question what condition must be fulfilled if man is to be forgiven at all. This he main-

1 The Nature of the Atonement in Relation to Remission of Sin, by American Tract Society, New York, 1849.
2 The Vicarious Sacrifice grounded in Principles interpreted by Human Analogies, 5 vols., New York, 1861.

1 E.g., C. H. Wesberry and W. L. Walker.
2 The Godward Aspect of the Atonement is more fully developed in vol. ii. of the Vicarious Sacrifice. Here Bushnell promises a study of the Divine nature, suffering in which the analog of human experience is used to illustrate the nature of God's attitude towards sin. The volume,
Both Bushnell and Campbell are concerned particularly with the Atonement as it affects the relation between God and the individual; but, from the first, it has been recognized that the work of Christ has a larger meaning. It was designed not simply to save individuals, but to redeem humanity as a whole, and to once and for all establish the Kingdom of God among men. One of the most striking features of modern thought regarding the Atonement is its emphasis on this wider scope. A proper appreciation of the doctrine of the Trinity, to which we have already alluded, this emphasis takes two forms. The first, which is more prominently represented among Anglican theologians, regards the Church as an institution, as the continuation of the Incarnation, and emphasizes the connection between the Atonement and the Sacraments. The second, more ethical in its conception of salvation, takes its departure from the social nature of personality, and finds the primary object of Christ's death in the creation of a community in which the bond of union is the acceptance of his principle of self-sacrificing love. We may refer to Moerberly's suggestive book *Atonement and Personality* (1886) as an example of the first type, and Ritschl's *Justification and Reconciliation* (1887) as an example of the second.

So far as his conception of the Atonement itself is concerned, Campbell—like Campbell in *Finding its essence in penitence* (pp. 110). Like Campbell, he maintains that a perfect repentance, if it could be found, would constitute an adequate atonement. Like Campbell, again, he denies that such repentance is possible to man alone. But what is not possible for man alone is possible for the God-man. In the sinless Christ we have one in whom God's ideal for humanity has been for the first time realized, and in His perfect obedience and penitence an adequate atonement for the sin of humanity has at last been made.

But how are the benefits of the Atonement to be imparted to others? It is at this point that Moerberly finds Campbell's view inadequate. The moral influence on which Campbell relies he finds not enough. There must be a real identity, if the atonement which Christ makes is to be really ours (p. 450). The identity Moerberly finds throughout his doctrine of the Holy Spirit. In the Spirit, Christ Himself enters humanity and becomes the basis of its higher life. *Spirit is the mediate Christ, [it is] made, through the Incarnation, the Spirit of Man* ('p. 203). *He is the subjective representative of ourselves with Christ, who was first manifested objectively and externally, for our contemplation and love, in Galilee and on the Cross. He is more and more, as the Christian consummation is approached, the Spirit within ourselves of Righteousness and Truth, of Life and of Love. He is more, indeed, than within us. He is the ultimate consummation of ourselves* ('p. 904). Only through this indwelling Spirit who is 'Christ in the man' ('p. 227) is it possible to realize, what true personality means.

But where and how do we actually find this mysterious union realized among men? Moerberly answers—in the Church. In organized Christianity with its sacramental system we find the sphere and instrument of the Spirit's influence, nay, more, the Spirit Himself become incarnate in the lives of living men.

One, the Church. Yes, in fact, the Spirit of Christ, communicative to the spirits of those who recognize, and believe in, His Person and work; it is in the disciples of Christ, made Christian in very deed by participation in the Spirit of Christ* ('p. 369).

Like Moerberly, Ritschl emphasizes the social significance of the Atonement; but, in place of the mystic bond of union mediated which was composed eight years after the first, was originally designed to take the place of its third and fourth sections, but this does not affect the salient point of the plan, and the two versions stand side by side as books 1. and lii.
7. Summary and conclusion.—As we look back over the history which we have briefly passed in review, we are struck by the great variety of opinion represented in our survey. Whether we consider the Atonement from the point of view of its nature, its object, its necessity, or the means by which it is made practically effective in men’s lives, we find differences of view so striking as to make any attempt at harmony seem hopeless. The atoning character of Christ’s death is now found to be a real quality of suffering, now in its ethical character as obedience. It is represented now as a ransom to redeem men from Satan, now as a satisfaction due to the honour of God, now as a penalty demanded by His justice. Its necessity is grounded now in the nature of things, and, again, is explained as the result of an arrangement due to God’s mere good pleasure or answering His sense of fitness. The means by which its benefits are mediated to men are sometimes mystically conceived, as in the Greek theology of the Sacrament; sometimes legally, as in the Protestant formula of imputation; and, still again, morally and spiritually, as in the more personal theories of recent years. In surveying differences so extreme, one might well be tempted to ask, with some recent critics, whether, indeed, we have here to do with an essential element in Christian doctrine, or simply to carry over our personal ideas whose presence in the Christian system constitutes a perplexity rather than an aid to faith. Yet, such an opinion, however natural, would be misleading. The differences which we have discussed are not greater than may be paralleled in the case of every other Christian doctrine. When we isolate any doctrine from its environment, it is easy to represent it as a record of inconsistencies and contradictions; but, when we look below the surface and consider the underlying causes of the changes in question, we find it necessary to revise so superficial a judgment. These causes have to do with the conception of God and of His relations in the world. Where God is conceived, as in the old Greek theology, in physical or metaphysical terms, as the absolute Spirit, immutable and incorruptible, who says man by making him par-taker of his own immortal life, the Atonement necessarily becomes a mere incident in the life of the Incarnate One, and the type of thought represented by Athanasius is the result. Where, as in the Nicene formulae and the earliest Protestantism, God is conceived primarily as Governor or Judge, dealing with men in terms of justice, either private or public, legal phraseology becomes the natural expression of religious faith, and the various substitutionary theories, whether, in the form of satisfaction or of penalty, are the result. Where, on the other hand, as in modern times, the ethical and spiritual categories are controlling, the Atonement will in like manner be given an ethical and spiritual interpretation; and the various questions as to its nature, its necessity, and its effects will be answered along the lines followed by the later Protestant writers whom we have been reviewing. We have noticed one way of conceiving Christ, and it is, on the whole, most adequate to express the Christian view.


W. ADAMS BROWN.

EXPiation AND ATONEMENT (Egyptian).—No certain trace of any rite or ceremony analogous to the Sem. atonement-sacrifice (kippa, "sin") is known in Egypt. At least two resurrection ceremonies can be found in Egypt, religion so long as it was influenced by Sem. observances. The close connexion with Palestine, which began in the time of the XVIIIth and reached its climax in the earlier dynasties, resulted in the temporary introduction of many Sem. deities into the Egypt. pantheon; and with them, no doubt, came many Sem. religious observances, among them that of the atonement-sacrifice. But the anti-Semitic feeling, which was brought about by the national resistance to the Assyrians in the 8th and 7th cent. B.C., resulted in the expulsion of the Sem. deities, at any rate from the official pantheon; and with them went their cult-observances. Any trace which may be found of the kippurim-rite in Egypt is probably to be regarded as of this Sem. origin (as was certainly the case with the rite of burnt offering), and would not have been allowed of Sem. religious influence. The main rite of atonement-sacrifice was probably rather that of wajib than of sin. The Egyptian conception of sacrifice does not even seem to have included any idea of expiation for sin. The Egyptian placed fruit, cakes, and cooked meat on a mat, before the sun, and rote, and poured out wine and libations. Sacrifice, sin, and burnt incense before it, in order to feed him, please him, and ward off his wrath in case the offerer had offended him by doing something wrong. In this rite we probably get something which is probably rather that of crine than of sin. The Egyptian does not seem to have had the same idea of sin as the Semite, and the sin-offering was, therefore, probably unknown to him originally. When he sacrificed from fear of the Divine wrath, it was
because he had committed a crime against the king's peace or that of the god, not because he had 'sinned' in the Rab. and Jewish sense, or even in the less emphasized Greek sense. Wickedness and the concept of sin are thus anathema to the ancient Greeks, like other primitive peoples, undoubtedly practised rites to drive away evil spirits, and that from these rites arose many later practices, the object of which was to remove some point of evil. In so far as the evil was the cause of the Divine anger and separated men from communion with the gods, it may perhaps be called 'sin,' and its removal the expiation of sin. The idea that evil itself is a substance which can be absorbed in a specially prepared decoe (dios kathos), or removed by some potent cleansing material like blood or clay, or instilled into a person who can bear it out of the city, is perhaps nearer to the facts than is our thought of evil spirits. In a period much later than the one under consideration, the Thargelias, a festival of Apollo at Athens, included a peculiar rite in which one or two men (sapaes) were first fed at the public expense, then when threatened by the Divine anger, though doubtless more stress was laid on a ceremony in time of famine or pestilence, when men felt that their gods were angry with them. It was primarily a means of removing any taint of evil which might bring danger to men or destruction to their ripening crops. Because rites of purification originated from the moral conceptions of the early Greeks, it is not surprising that purification took a very early period. In themselves they shed little light on the present question, except as they indicate that men feared the possible anger of their gods, and possessed means to remove the cause of such anger, if not to allay the anger itself. Still these rites of pardon (aporia) must be taken into account as the source of later purificatory rites, and perhaps as the starting-point of propitiatory sacrifices.

2. In the Homeric poems.—In contrast with the earlier ages, for which the evidence is largely based on inference, the picture of religion in the Homeric poems is that of a religion whose purity, safety, and moral purity, and it is necessary to consider the expiation of sin by rites of this character. Again, any disregard of what is due to the gods is an exhibition of man's neglect or self-assertion, which may be considered as sin against the gods. Such acts are a foie-majesté demanding purifying punishment, though sometimes the latter may at least be lessened by expiatory rites. It will be noted that this conception of sin goes with the belief that the gods have a moral code.
The concept of sin as an affront to Divine rulers which provokes their anger is illustrated by Ajax's boast that he had saved himself from the sea against the will of the gods (Od. iv. 504), whereupon Poseidon threatened the man who had found safety; or by the recklessness of Odysseus' followers in eating the cattle of Helios (Od. i. 7-9, xii. 379); or by the affront to Athene when the city of Troy was sacked. In this last instance Agamemnon thought to allay the anger of the goddess by sacrifices, for he did not recognize that the purposes of the gods are not lightly changed (Od. iii. 143 ff.). The omission of sacrifices that were due to the gods brought down their wrath on Calydon (II. ix. 533 ff.), and prevented the departure of Menelaus from Egypt (Od. iv. 489 ff.). In such cases it was necessary to make good the omission by highly-penalized sacrifices. Menelaus must go back and offer the sacrifices; Agamemnon must restore Chryseis to her father, the priest of Apollo (II. i. 89 f.). Often, however, it was impossible to undo the evil, in which case men might seek to propitiate the anger by giving the gods what little goods they had no hope of securing. So the companions of Odysseus foolishly thought to set right the slaughter of Helios' cattle by vowing to build him a splendid temple, and to dedicate many valuable votive offerings (Od. xii. 345 ff.). The sacrifices offered to the gods under these circumstances did not differ from the ordinary ones; but, inasmuch as sacrifice always expressed man's desire to gratify the gods by paying them remunerative propitiation, there was danger to his fellow-passengers; and, when sacrifices were offered to the gods, his presence made the worship unacceptable (Antiphon, Herod. 81-89). Purifications were performed before every religious festival, for any impurity would provoke Divine anger. The more dreadful the cause of the impurity, the greater the Divine curse, so that, for example, the murder of Cylon and his companions by Cylon's father demanded more severe purifications. Moreover, the rites themselves came under the worship of Zeus Mellichlos, whose statue, erected after great bloodshed at Argos, was distinctly an expiation for that sin (Pausan. ii. xx. 1). The ordinary practice of purification, however, was the removal of a possible cause of Divine anger, rather than the expiation of any sin.

It is clear that most of the rites of purification have nothing to do with any real sin. Contact with death, sickness, and birth demands a purification which has no moral significance. Probably the same is true of purification for manslaughter, though that, too, was considered a justifiable homicide. At the same time, all shedding of human blood must have been regarded as a kind of wrong, for which some expiation was welcome. The restoration of the murderer to his place in society involved two elements, viz., an adjustment with the family of the murdered man (often a money recompense), and a religious purification; both these demands would be regarded as expiation just in so far as the murder was truly to be a sin. Herodotus (vi. 139) tells how the Lemnian Pelasgians cruelly murdered their Athenian wives and children; and, when a plague came upon them, they were informed by the Delphic oracle that they must pay whatever sacrificial duty the Athenians might demand. A similar answer was made to the inhabitants of Apollonia when they sought relief from a plague which followed the blinding of Ennius (Herod. ix. 30 f.; also Pausan. i. 167, Herod. iii. 207 f.). From the standpoint of the Homeric poems, sin, whether moral transgression or direct affront to the gods, received its due punishment. It was not the sin alone that was to allay the anger of the gods, but there were two sanctions specifically for this purpose, and men had no assurance that their efforts in this direction would meet with any success. The only expiation for sin, strictly speaking, lay in the effort to set right the wrong that had been done. 3. In later Greek history.—While all three conceptions of sin and expiation are found in the later and better known periods of Greek history, the first to develop seems to have been the thought of sin as a pollution which demanded purification. In connexion with the spread of the worship of Dionysus early in the 6th cent. B.C., a new emphasis was laid on purification. Undoubtedly rites of this character originated in the effort to free men from the taint of evil—in other words, from the dangerous influence of infecting evil spirits. It seems that the Dionysian religion, like the more organized Orphic religion, developed these rites to secure release from those gods which seemed to stand between man and the divinity. In the 5th cent., some of the rites had been adopted by the State religion, while others were branded as superstition. The question with which we are now concerned is whether the evil banished by purificatory rites ever gained a moral content, which certainly it did not have at first, or whether impurity in itself provoked the anger of the greater gods, so that its removal could in any sense be called expiation. The second point is more easily answered than the first. Although rites of purification originated quite independently of the greater gods, a connexion was established before the 5th cent. B.C., so that these rites became a part of the State religion. The murderer was banished because he was hated by the gods (Sophocles, Ed. Tyr. 95 ff., 236 ff., 1519; cf. Antiphon, Tetraf. i. 3 and 10; Thucyd. iii. 50 ff.). The same might have been the case with danger to his fellow-passengers; and, when sacrifices were offered to the gods, his presence made the worship unacceptable (Antiphon, Herod. 81-89). Purifications were performed before every religious festival, for any impurity would provoke Divine anger. The more dreadful the cause of the impurity, the greater the Divine curse, so that, for example, the murder of Cylon and his companions by Cylon's father demanded more severe purifications. Moreover, the rites themselves came under the worship of Zeus Mellichlos, whose statue, erected after great bloodshed at Argos, was distinctly an expiation for that sin (Pausan. ii. xx. 1). The ordinary practice of purification, however, was the removal of a possible cause of Divine anger, rather than the expiation of any sin.

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was at times carried over into the ethical field. Most of the evidence for this view may be questioned, since it comes through Christian writers (e.g. Tert. de Passient. 40: 'diabolus lpsa ... expiationem a deo demonstravit'; cf. Cyprian, Ep. 5): yet it is probable that men did come to the mysteries with a feeling of guilt from which they sought relief (Diod. Sic. v. xlix. 6; Schol. ad Hier. Eclog. ii. 227; cf. Schol. ad Locr. 6. άξιόκεισθαι ... 62c.). Although rites of purification commonly had no element of expiation, sometimes the pollution involved a feeling of guilt for which these rites provided relief by expiation.

That it was a sin to neglect the gods or to offer them any direct atonement was recognized in later times as clearly as in the Homeric poems. And in later practice, as in the epic picture of society, the expiation of such sin consisted, first, in setting right the one's attitude toward the gods; secondly, in appeasing the Divine anger. A mythical example is found in the legend of the Trojan war: Agamemnon pursued a hind within the precincts of the Delphian oracle; in this case rich gifts were sufficient to appease Apollo's anger (Xenophon, Cyrop. v. ii. 19). A plague fell on the inhabitants of Phigaleia; the Delphian oracle explained it as the result of the neglected worship of Demeter, and it ceased when that ancient cult was restored (Pausan. viii. xii. 5). To kill Cylon and his companions at the altar of Athene was an atonement to the goddess for which it was necessary to seek an unusually potent means of atonement (cf. also Herod. vi. 91 f.).

Ordinarily, anything like an atonement to the gods was the act of some individual, while the anger of the gods was visited on the State; it was, therefore, the business of the State to deal with the matter, first by punishing the individual, and, secondly, by appeasing the Divine anger. Such acts were the mutilation of the herma at Athens, and the profanation of the mysteries. Regular courts existed to punish individuals who were responsible for the profanation of religious objects. And to appease the gods the State had recourse to special rites of propitiation [which will be discussed in the article under that heading]. Here it should be noted that the punishment of the individual and the expiation by the State were, as in the case of propitiation, distinct from each other.

The third point of view from which the Greek conception of sin may be regarded is found in the Divine government of the world. The Homeric conception that murder was the sanction of the gods is found in later literature from Hesiod (Erga, 333 f.) onwards. 'That old saying, "The doer suffers":' (Esch. Choep. 366) expresses the Greek view of the inevitableness of punishment (cf. Sophocles, Ed. Tyr. 863 ff.; Electra, 209 ff.; Euripides, Electra, 1165). For any expiation which should do away with inevitable punishment, Greek thought found no place. On the other hand, the punishment of murder was sometimes regarded as an expiation of the guilt. So the death of Laius' murderer was to 'loose', i.e. undo, the effect of the original deed (Sophocles, Ed. Tyr. 100 f.; the emphasis on the power in Delphic tragedies). Orestes may have 'loose' the blood of long past murders (Mes. Choep. 863 f.; c. Eurip. Her. Fur. 40). It is not difficult to see how this principle works out in the cases of Orestes and Agamemnon. In Sophocles the king is self-willed, quick to anger, relying on his own great powers; after years of suffering the same man appears in the Electus Colones, his temper chastened and brought into harmony with the will of the gods, for in the results of his unwitting sin he has made his expiation for it. More commonly, however, the penalty for a grave sin was death; but an excommunication was made, but at the expense of the man's life.

The idea of penance finds no place in Greek religion, nor are there any practices by which someone could take upon himself the moral consequences of sin. The word 'expiation' naturally refers to some process by which the sinner may free himself either from some of the results of sin, or from the sin itself, or from both. We have seen that the idea of sin was never clearly developed and unified in Greece. Along with other forms of pollution to be removed by purification there was included the pollution due to some evil deed; at times purification came to be a sort of expiation. An atonement to the gods was sin costly gifts might expiate such sin, though here it is simpler to speak of Divine anger and its propitiation. Finally, sin as morally wrong than atonement other than full punishment, since the sinning of was regarded as something unchanging and absolute.


AHRUR FAIRBANKS.

EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Hebrew).

1. In AV 'expiation' occurs only once, Nu 35* marg. ('and there can be no expiation for the land after a murder except by the blood of him that shed it'; see further below), and 'expiate' in Is 47* marg.: in this text of Nu 35* is brought into the text; to make expiation for occurs also in RV in Dt 21* and 'expiated' in the margin of 1 S 3* Is 6* 22* 27*. In all three passages the Heb. word used is kipper. 'Atonement' occurs in the priestly laws of the OT for kipperátm, an abster from sinning, to reconcile with the Divine, and 'to make atonement' regularly in the same laws for kipper. In AV of the NT 'atonement' occurs once only (Ro 5*), for karaLag; in RV it does not occur at all, 'reconcilation' being substituted for in Ro 5* on account of other compounds of ἀξιόκεισθαι being, even in AV, rendered by 'reconcile' and 'reconciliation' in both AV and RV, it should further be pronounced, 'atonement' means always, a remission or restoration, which is the sense the word has acquired in modern English, but at 'one-ment,' or reconciliation, which is the sense in both 'aton' and 'atonement' are regularly used by Shakespeare, and other writers of the same kind such as Othello, iv. i. 234; 'I would do much to atone', i.e. to reconcile them; and 2 Hen. iv. iv. i. 221, 'If we do now make our atonement (reconciliation) well done, our ained limb united, Grow stronger for the breaking'; Rich. III., t. iii. 36 (see further examples in Aldis Wright's Bible Word-Book, London, 1896, s. v.).

It will be noticed that the Pauline theory of reconciliation by which Zippah is the Heb. word corresponding to both 'make expiation' and 'make atonement' our first step, therefore, must be to examine this word,
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with its cognates, and try to ascertain what ideas are associated with it.

The precise meaning of kipper is uncertain, and, with our present knowledge, cannot be made the starting point of an investigation. In Arabic the corresponding word, kafar, means to cover, being used especially in the instance (Lai. 2929), of clouds covering the sky, or of the wind covering a trace or mark with dust; and formerly it was customary to derive the senses of kipper from this, as it would have been impossible to derive similarly (so, though with reserve, and allowing it to be uncertain, the present writer in 1902, in *HDB*, art. 'Propitiation'). In Syriac kēpār, and esp. the Pael conjag. kappăr, means to wipe, or wipe away (as to wipe the mouth, to wipe away tears, the stain of sin, etc.) and W. R. Smith (*OTJC* [1881], 438 f., more briefly *OTJC* [1892], 380 f.) explained the senses of kipper from this, supposing it to denote properly the wiping away of sin. Recent progress in Assyriology has, however, thrown new light upon the word. In its Assyrian form, koppurü (with a derivative, topkirtü), it is now known to occur repeatedly in a ritual connexion in Assyrian, and the word in Assyrian is usually shown to be a derivative of the term is still disputed among experts, it seems clear that in actual usage it expresses the idea of ritual purification: by certain specified ceremonial acts, the person who is affected, for instance, to 'purify' a king (tūra takopparr), a sick person, or a house. The ceremonies prescribed are largely, it should be noted, of a magical nature, and their supposed effect is to remove diseases, and especially to expel the demons who were regarded as the cause of both these and other troubles in those whom they possessed (see above, p. 638). The word is used in a much deeper sense in Heb. than in Assyr., and the applications in the two languages are sufficiently kindred to leave no doubt that there must be some ultimate connexion between them. Whether, in the remote age in which the Hebrews and the Assyrians separated from each other, the word had already acquired a ritual signification, which was afterwards developed along different lines in the two languages, or whether (Zimmern) the word was borrowed by the Hebrews from the Assyrians at a later date, or whether the ritual sense then attaching to it was afterwards modified independently by the Hebrews, it is hardly possible at present [1912] to determine; but, in one case at least, the Heb. and Assy. applications of the word must have sprung from a common origin.

It will be convenient in the sequel to indicate the action denoted by the verb either by the inf. kappär, or by the post-Biblical stem, kappārāth. 3. The following are the general ideas expressed by kappārāth. Either the guilt of sin or the stain of some ritual (non-moral) 'uncleanness' rests upon a man: the appropriate kappārāth expiates the guilt, or ritual stain, clears the offender, and at the same time appeases the Divine anger, which the sin has aroused, and effects the 'at-one-ment,' or reconciliation, between God and man. The means by which kappārāth expiates sin is usually named, 1

1 Zimmern (*Beiträge zur Kennniss der bab. Relig.*, 1896, p. 92; *KAT*, 601 f.) supposes its primary meaning to be to wipe away 'superstition' (not sanctity) and the notion is certainly present in the sense of 'wiping away' a fear in *KTB* vi. 75, 266; 186. If Langdon (*EBTP* xxi. [1011] 328 f.) contends that its primary meaning is to remove, C. P. Bury (ib. p. 325 f.) and C. J. Ball (ib. p. 475 f.) argue, largely from the evidence afforded by a syllable 'a,' that the word is properly to be bright, or, in the case of the kippârāth, to make bright, the 'theological' idea of the word, as used in the OT, is, however, unaffected by the question of the primary, physical meaning. In some cases it is doubly difficult if this was at present the Hebrews when they used it in a ritual or theoretical sense. 2

2 See the collection of passages given by Langdon, *EBTP* xxi. 328 f. and 290 f.; and the translations by Zimmern, *op. cit.* (see Index, s. v. 'Kippurü').
the surviving kinmen of the murdered man might decide which they would accept. The Gibonites choose the latter.

4. A murdered; i.e. a murderer cannot be traced; and the guilt of his blood rests upon land and people.

5. The elders of the city nearest the spot on which the murdered man was killed are to perform the symbolic ceremony, saying a cow (representing the murderer) cannot expiate by bleeding; they are to wash their hands, to symbolize their own innocence. The ceremony having been duly performed, they are to pray to God in these words: "Our hands have spilt this blood, neither our eyes seen [Expiate] (or Declare expiated), O Jehovah, thy people Israel, when thou hast slain an innocent blood in the midst of thy people," after which it is added, "And the blood-guilt shall be expiated for them." Jehovah does not say this is to be said by a priestly ceremony, but satisfied with the ceremony which the elders have performed, He regards it as 'expiated,' and no longer refers to His people, (De 23:2). (end of the Song attributed to Moses).

6. We now come to passages from the prophets. It is 67. In his vision, Isaiah's 'iniquity is taken away,' and his 'soul is restored like a sword, and the mouth of the serpent touched him with the hot stone from the altar.'

7. It is then their unimpaired in presence of the law, the prophet pronounces sentence against the people of Jerusalem in these words: 'Surely this iniquity shall not be expiated by you, day by day, saith Jehovah of hosts.' Cl. 1 S 31:4 above.

8. (addressing Israel). 'Therefore shall evil come upon thee, which thou shalt not know how to charm away; but accost probably נוח, to bribe off, for ינשע; and mischief shall fall upon thee, which thou shalt not be able to expiate (fig., for an expiation or expiation-price) (Cf. Jer 15:23).

9. In a prayer against his foes, 'Expiate not their iniquity, neither blot out their sin from before thee: but let them be made to stumble before thee; deal thou with them in the time of thine anger.'

10. (a promise of restoration of favour). 'When I expiate thee (clear thee from guilt), in regard to all that thou hast done.' The figure is suggested by the priestly terminology: Jehovah produces directly, and by His own free grace, an effect which the priest produces by means of a sacrifice.

11. (addressing his people). 'As for our transgressions do thou (emph., expiate) them.'

12. The messenger who is compassionate, he expiates his iniquity, and destroyeth not. Ps 79:4, 'And deliver us, and expiate for our iniquities, for thy name's sake.'

13. In the next two passages the term is used figuratively.

Ps 109:8, 'The wrath of a king is (as) messengers of death (i.e. it threatens death); but a wise man will propitiate it,' viz. by prudent and conciliatory behaviour.

2 Ch 30:18, 'The good Jehovah expiate (clear from guilt) everyone that setteth his heart to seek God, though he be not cleansed by purification of his soul.'

In 2 Ch 30:8, 'Seventy weeks are determined upon thy people and upon thy holy city, to finish transgression, to make an end of sins, and to expiate iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness,' etc., i.e. to bring in an age free from all sin.

14. It is to expiate for the soul. کپر (L. and V. kipper, Kipper (L. except Am 5:23, always rasson) is the expiation-price for a life, the money offered for the life of a murdered man to appease his kinsmen's wrath, the ו-olds, or 'wergild,' no money being paid. The first of the semi-civilized nations (see BLOOD-FEUD, vol. ii. p. 720 ff.). As the allusions to it show, the kipper must have been an institution familiar to the Hebrews: but in Hebrew he is 'expiation of a life'; but, for the sake of preserving the connection, it is used here (and sometimes in the sequel) in its old sense, which it shares with the Lat. kipper, of paying a person from guilt or pollution—properly by religious ceremonies.

law, from the earliest period in which we know it, the principle, in the case of murder, was life for life (Ex 21:23). 'He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be put to death'; and in P the acceptance of a murderer's life in lieu of his own was regarded as an act of grace (Nu 35:21-23, no kipper to be accepted for the life of a murderer; v. 33, 'murder can be expiated only by the death of the murderer'); it was admitted only in the case of a man being killed by a vicious ox, in which case the owner of the ox was held responsible, but the owner might pay such a rvah as they might fix (Ex 21:30). 'If there be laid on him a kipper, he shall give for the redemption of his life whatsoever is laid upon him.' The kipper is also mentioned in the following passages:

1 S 13:8. "If a man's soul (life) is his riches." Ps 88:11. "He is a kipper for his soul, and his life is in the hands of the executioner, and the treacherous (cometh) instead of the upright." Is 43:2. "And I will give Egypt for thy price." Ps 49:8. "No man can redeem (notice, 'redemption' in Ex 21:30, above) a brother's life, or give God a kipper for it, (i.e. a price sufficient to save his life)." Ps 68:18. (said of the high priestly office, and our sacrifice); and he who will not accept its price will lose his life to the slayer (from their right)." Is 43:9. "As such kipper thou art, as such price; and for the estimation of thy life take account of thy sin." (v. 15, the kipper is said to be given to expiate kipper for their lives, and in v. 16 it is called expiation-money. Cf. the two other usages of κληρονομε, in which, though the word kipper is not used, the idea is present, and the verb kipper is used exactly as in Ex 20, just referred to."

Na 9:9. The Levites are 'given as a gift to Aaron and to his sons (i.e. to the priests) from among the children of Israel,' to perform for them menial duties about the sanctuary, and to make expiation for the children of Israel: that there be no iniquity among the children of Israel, through the children of Israel coming nigh unto the sanctuary. The Levites, in approaching the holy vessels, etc., would do so, according to a prescriptive law. The kipper, at the risk of the life of their children (Nu 18:33, v. 34, wvĩ). This, in the literal sense, is the 'kipper,' doing it in their stead, prevent Jehovah's wrath from manifesting itself in a plague (cf. Ex 34:11), and are therefore said to 'make expiation on their behalf.' Na 3:10. The army which had returned from the war against Midian without killing a man bring a man of the tribe of Levi before the jewels which they had obtained from the spoil, 'to make expiation for them.' But before Jehovah had pronounced the expiation is expiated; and by the fear of Jehovah men depart from evil.' Cl. the teaching of Ben Sir. Sir 22, v. 11, παντοι ἀποφασίζει εἰς τὴν καταφέρειν ἀνοσίαν, καὶ καὶ τὴν ἐνλευθεροποίησιν. Sir 32, v. 20, εἰς καταφέρειν ἀνοσίαν, καὶ καὶ τὴν ἐνλευθεροποίησιν τής πόλεως, ἀποστείλω ἡγεμόνιον ἄνδρα ἀνοσίας. Also 31:14 (Vista, 31 (40) 25, εἰς καταφέρειν ἀνοσίαν ἀναστήσω ἑαυτοῦ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐνλευθεροποίησιν τής πόλεως)

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We 8. Lastly, to consider the use of kipper in the priestly passages of the OT, i.e. in Ezk 45:11, and in 1 Ch 6:9, 2 Ch 29:20, Neh 10:19. In those the idea is always of a price paid to an individual (Lv 1:1711, and, in passages already considered, Ex 30:29, Na 31:20 25) offering of some kind;
The object is never the guilt (as in many of the passages cited above), and indeed, as a rule, is unexpressed, the usual expression being to make expiation for (or on behalf of) a person or (of) the soul (life), i.e., the means is a sacrifice, except in the few cases in which some other act, or offering, is regarded as having an expiatory force.

(2) Of the blood of the sacrificial animal containing the 'soul,' or life, Dt 12:20; Lv 17:11 (in the 'Law of Holiness,' I have given to you the altar to make expiation for your souls). Of the blood of the burnt-offering, Gen 22:18; Ex 29:12—20, the means is by the shedding of the soul of the life, which is in it.

(3) In the case of the burnt-offering: Lv 1 (generally): 'And it shall be accepted for him to make expiation for him'; 11:4—17 (on the Day of Atonement, after the principal ceremonies are over, when Aaron comes out of the tent of meeting, and offers a burnt-offering 'to make expiation' for himself and his people), also sometimes been sung in conjunction with a sin-offering (see § 6(d)).

(c) Most frequently of the sin-offering: Ex 30:16—20 (to make expiation for the altar of burnt-offering at its consecration) ; see Lk 5:26; Lk 7:50 (for the altar of incense, on the annual Day of Atonement); 30:17—21 (on a point of ritual; so 102f); 34 (for Aaron and his sons at their consecration); the sin-offering not expressly mentioned in Lk 17:1f (see verses 26—30 solemnly upon his duties, for himself and the people); 11:5* for (the 'un-sin' or un-leavened bread of the Levitical law); 26:2—8 (after purification for leprosy); 15:1—30 (after the cessation of unclean issues in man or woman); 16:18ff. 16:18—26f. (on the Day of Atonement, for the house of Israel, for the guilt-offering Azazel, for the Holy of Holies); 29:1* because of the uncleanness of the children of Israel, for the other priests, and for the whole people) ; 23:1f (on the Day of Atonement); Nu 10:1 (after the sin-offering of the sin-bearer, when rendered unclean by a person dying suddenly beside him); 18:1—19f. (on the day of atonement); 19:9—22f. (Materials); Lk 4:19 (on the first day of the first, and [LXX] of the 7th month—the two days of annual purification and atonement, prescribed by Ezekiel); 2 Ch 29ff (for all Israel, at the purification of the temple by Hezekiah, as described by the Chronicler). Neh 10:17—19f. (the people agree to make atonement, among other things, for the sin-offerings to make expiation for Israel); cf. 1 Ch 22ff.

(c) Of the 'ram of Installation' (2 Ch 29)?—a species of peace-offering, offered at the consecration of the priests (Ex 29:20—22, 23—24), a blood which was sprinkled upon the priests and their garments and seemingly, also, of the cakes of bread eaten by the priests with it (Ex 29:25). Cf. Driver, Exodus, Camb. 1911, ad loc.

(r) Of the 'boiled-offering' (Ex 26:28) to be sprinkled upon a house infected with leprosy, after it has been pronounced clean by the priest, to 'purify' it (Lv 14:36; see § 6(c) for expiation, for it (2). (g) Kipper is also predicated generally of the meat and peace-offerings, of the burnt and sin-offerings in Ex 29:20—27.

(1) Of Aaron, when, by kindling incense from the fire on the altar, and carrying it rapidly among the people, he approached Jahweh, and arrested the plague (Nu 16:25—33).

(c) Of Phinehas, when he slew with the sword two conspirators, and their 'ploy' 'turned away' Jahweh's wrath from Israel, and stayed the plague (Nu 25:7).

See also Ex 23:16; Nu 33:1 (cited in § 7), and Nu 35:12 (on the altar, and carrying it rapidly among the people, he approached Jahweh, and arrested the plague (Nu 16:25—33).

(9) The following facts respecting the use of kipper in Ezk and P ought to be noticed:

(a) Though the object of kipper is usually an individual or sacrificial community, or, in general, a material object, or an animal—perhaps in particular, the altar of burnt-offering (Ezk 43:25—28, Ex 29:22, Lv 8:16—20, 26, 27), the altar of incense (Ex 30:1—4), and the sacrament (Ezk 45:2; Lv 16:10, 20, 24), associated with leprosy and the occasion of its purification (Ltv 14:13), the goat sent to Azazel (Ltv 16:10).—(b) The verb is a denominative, meaning to perform an expiatory ceremony for (or on behalf of) a person or thing: the object follows in the accusative, only in Ltv 15:8—6; Ezk 45:24—65 (each time of a material object).—(c) It is followed by it and shall be for given him (them), in the case of the sin-offering, Ltv 4:28, 29, 30, 32, 33, Nu 15:26, 28, 29 (cf. v. 28); and in the case of the guilt-offering, Ltv 5:1, 2, 6f. 16—19ff.—(d) It is closely associated (but only when predicated of the sin-offering) with 'to be clean' (TV, or to cleanse') (Ezk 45:24, Ltv 15:26, 28, 29; Nu 8:7, 8, 17; 28:1; De 17:17).—(e) It signifies 'to be purified' (Lv 14:23, 27, 31, Nu 8:7, 8, 17; De 17:17).—(f) It is a verb frequently used in the Levitical system; but the term may have been applied to the 'mercy-seat,' as being the means of bringing the blood as near as possible to Jahweh on the Day of Atonement. Even if kapporeth did originally signify ltid, it is difficult not to think that the associations of kipper must have been felt to attach to it (King: Sukedekel). The word occurs in Ex 25:22, Lv 8:10, and elsewhere (but, except c. 24), as a proper name.

11. From all that is stated, or may be inferred, it is probable that the primitive ideas of expiation and propitiation among the Hebrews were very similar to those of other primitive nations (p. 255ff.), but that, as was the case with other primitive ideas and customs, they were developed by the Hebrews along their own lines, made the vehicle of important religious truths, and more and more spiritualized. Early passages implying the idea of appeasement are Is 52:10 (where David says, 'if it be Jahweh who hath in question, let him accept [Heb. smell] an offering' [v. 12]).—2 S 24:21, 22 (the burnt offerings offered to appease Jahweh's anger [v. 1] for David's census, and to stay the plague).—Gn 8:31 (where Jahweh 'smells with satisfaction the soothing odour' of Noah's offering, and promises no more to curse the ground for man's sake) but neither in these passages nor in Is 3:14:15 (v. 1. 'expiate forum.' (Cf. Phil. 1:30; p. Rob. 111.))

But whether it is literally true, the burnt offerings (see above) of the house, and rites, incantations to execute it; after this he carried as away the body, and cast it into the river Nidah (cf. Ltv 15:29—30).
EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Hebrew)

(Ex 29:22). Among primitive and semi-primitive peoples the human being, as member of the community and in absolute trust in God, possesses a mysterious potency, was, and still is, widely diffused; it may form a sacramental bond uniting men between themselves or with their God. It (Ezk. 312-20; 33:20-40) it is powerful, especially when shed in sacrifice, to protect against disease, misfortune, and death (Curts, Primitive Semitic Religion Today, Lond. 1922, p. 138 f.; cf. Driver, Exeg. CJ., 1911, p. 603). The whole idea of the sin and stain of the sin, and to restore to 'holiness' (see Blood, vol. ii. pp. 715-719, especially 719; Moore, in EBS, art. 'Sacrifice'), col. 421-7). Blood, as the seat of life, was too sacred to be used as food (Dt 12:16-23). But it was so much the more potent as a sacramental agency— as in the cases contemplated in Lv 17— by being sacrificed upon the altar, and especially when it was that of the sacrifice of atonement (symbolically) nearer to Jehovah than that of other offerings. No doubt, also, later the idea would arise that the 'soul,' or life, of an innocent animal involved in the blood was the more acceptable as an offering to God, as being the purest and most immortal gift that could be offered to Him.

13. The effect of the kippurah is a purification, usually from sin, but sometimes (Lv 12, 14, 15, Nu 6) from merely ceremonial defilement—ritual and moral defilement being not clearly distinguished by the Hebrews (cf. the use of 'kek' to 'un-sin') of the altar, a leprosy, or other material object (§ 9), and of a person after the purely physical 'uncleanness,' occasioned by contact with a corpse [Nu 19:15-22]. The aim of the priestly legislation is to maintain, by a detailed and comprehensive ceremonial, the ideal holiness of the theocratic community, and the kippurah is the primary means by which this is effected. Sometimes cleansing (moral or ceremonial) is expressly mentioned as the effect of the rite (see 16* and note esp. Lv 16*). On this day shall expiation be made for you to cleanse you; from all your sins ye shall become clean before Jehovah'). As prescribed in Lv 4* and 16* ritual, sacrifice for the Levites (Nu 8:2-29), before entering upon their sacred duties, it is a readily intelligible rite of preliminary expiation. Enjoined for a material object, the altar or the sanctuary (§§ 8, 9), its aim is to secure, or to preserve, its holiness; the altar prior to its consecration, as the work of human hands, is regarded as affected by a natural uncleanness, which has to be removed; the sanctuary, frequented by a sinful and unclean people, is contaminated by them, and requires periodical purification; the leprosy house is conceived as tainted by sin; and the 'scape-goat,' offered by the sinful people, must be purified before it can discharge the solemn functions assigned to it.

On the part of God, the effect of the kippurah is more particularly specified— at least in the sin- and guilt-offering— as forgiveness (Lv 4:14-21, Nu 15:23-31, Lv 16:10-22, and, after greater offences, 6:19*). In view of the constant teaching of the prophets that there was no merit or value in sacrifices as such, and that repentance and amendment of life was the primary effect of bloodshed by the death of the 'ram of installation' also

In the Amor. ritual, it may be noticed, blood is rarely mentioned in connexion with kippurah, and no stress is laid upon it (above, p. 604).
15. A few words must, in conclusion, be said with regard to the famous prophecy, Is 53:9-10, in which, though the term *kipper* is not used, the idea of expiation is nevertheless expressed. The prophet here draws a picture of Jehovah's Servant, ideal Israel, describing his exaltation after an antecedent period of humiliation and persecution ending in death; the heathen, who were astonished at his suffering, will be less bemused by his new and unexpected greatness (33:13) (see *startle for sprinkle*). As the Book of Job shows, suffering was to the Hebrews evidence of sin; and for a while those who witnessed the Servant's sufferings thought that he was suffering for his own sins (53:10); but at last the truth was borne in upon them that he was, in fact, suffering for their sins, and relieving them of the penal consequences which were their dues (53:6, v. 8). Ideal Israel's voluntary sufferings thus bring home to others the sense of their own guilt, and restore them to spiritual health (53:10); they show the truth of the sinfulness 'guilt-offering' ('âshâm, 53:10), he will rise again, see God's 'pleasure' (i.e. his religious mission to the world, 41:1-9) prospering in his hand, and, as a final reward for his voluntary submission to death, be honoured with accessions, of a very great and good nature (23:9). The use of the word 'âshâm shows (see § 8 (d)) that sin is here regarded as a *sacrifice*, an invasion of God's honour; the 'âshâm is the expiation made for it, viz. the innocent life of the ideal Righteous Servant. The voluntary sufferings of the Righteous Servant are accepted on behalf of the wicked; and so the prophecy preaches at the same time the doctrine of vicarious suffering, or the idea that the righteous suffer in the place of others.

16. The theological importance of the ideas which thus had their centre in the *kappârâh* will now be apparent. The dim and at first confused ideas of the nature of sin, of its antagonism to the holiness of God, of its effect in arousing His punitive wrath, and of the need of allaying this, first gave rise to expiatory rites. Gradually, the ideas connected with them became clearer; ‘sin’ and ‘holiness,’ which were both at first intermingled and confused with non-moral elements,1 were seen to be exclusively ethical; and so in Israel, where, in the ancient world, spiritual illumination was greatest, expiatory and atoning customs of a ceremonial kind came to be connected with the holiness of God, and to the need of means for annulling the penal consequences of sin, and effecting ‘at-one-ment,’ or reconciliation, with God. As the *kappârâh* is a ceremonial side of religion, there was danger that its moral and spiritual side might be overlooked or forgotten; but the prophets guarded against this, by insisting strongly and repeatedly on the sufficiency and adequacy of the *zîr quân* of the forgiveness and favour of God. The ritual thus served as a great educational agency inculcating in the hearts and minds of participants and spectators the right conceptions of the nature of man, and the holiness and mercy of the just God’ (J. M. P. Smith, *BW*, 1908, p. 217). And so the way was prepared for the use made in the NT of the ideas, and terminology, and symbolism of the *kappârâh*. It is the first and highest and most perfect of atoning sacrifices, the death of Christ. See EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Christian).

1 The word ‘atonement’ is derived from the Greek *metatetos* and *metatetos* in the LXX, and from the Hebrew *shâbâqârâh* and *shâbâqârâh* in the OT. The word ‘atonement’ is used in the NT to designate the act of God in providing a sacrifice to meet the requirements of righteousness, and to signify that the sacrifice has been accepted and the penalty of sin has been paid. The word ‘atone’ is derived from the Hebrew *hâshâm* and *hâshâm* in the OT, and from the Greek *metatetos* in the LXX. The word ‘atone’ is used in the NT to signify the act of God in meeting the requirements of righteousness and paying the penalty of sin through the sacrifice of Christ. The word ‘atonement’ is used in the NT to signify the act of God in meeting the requirements of righteousness and paying the penalty of sin through the sacrifice of Christ. The word ‘atone’ is used in the NT to signify the act of God in meeting the requirements of righteousness and paying the penalty of sin through the sacrifice of Christ.
EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Hindu).

—Atonement or expiation (prajñasūtra) forms one of the three principal parts of the sacred law (dharma) of India, judicial procedure (vyanuhrata) and religious custom (dharma) being the other two. It is the third of the seven divisions of the Brahmans; for an offence was not originally devised by the Brahmans, as it goes back to the Indo-Iranian epoch, the penances ordained in the book Vendiddh, of the Avesta being closely analogous to the penances of the Sanskrit law-books. On Indian soil, the Śāmavādāhārā-brāhmaṇā of the Śāmaśeṇa seems to be the earliest work in which a somewhat detailed exposition of the system of penances is given, but it is to the law-books that we have to turn for a full description of the various modes of atonement prevalent in ancient India. The penances for deadly sins are very heavy, and extended. The culprit who has committed the mortal sin of drinking intoxicating liquor is to drink the same liquor when boiling hot; when his body has been completely scalded by the previous process is freed from guilt (Mann, xi. 91). The killer of a Brāhman will become in battle the target of archers who know his purpose; or he may thrice throw himself headlong into a blazing fire. A Brāhman who has stolen gold belonging to another Brāhman shall go to the king and, confessing his deed, say ‘Lord, punish me! The king himself shall strike him once; by his death the thief becomes pure (Mann, xi. 100 f.). In other cases, a penance is prescribed of astonishing extent. Thus the ‘lunar penance’ (chāḍayāya) consists in eating no more than fifteen mouthfuls on the day of the full moon, and diminishing this quantity of food by one mouthful every day for the ensuing half of the lunar month, until the quantity is reduced to nothing at the new moon, and then increasing it in the same way during the fortnight of the moon’s increase. This penance is required to be performed, for stealing men and women, and for wrongfully appropriating a field, a house, or the water of wells and cisterns (Mann, xi. 164). The cow being the sacred animal of the Hindus, no thing coming from a cow nor any cow-contaminated with, is supposed to be a means of purification. The five products of a cow (pañcagavya), viz., milk, sour milk, butter, urine, and cow-dung, have to be swallowed, as a part of various penances, e.g., of the penance called gopāraṇa, which consists in following and serving a herd of cows for a whole month, washing oneself with cow-urine, and abstaining on the five products of the cow during that time. Drops of water falling from the horns of a cow are declared to expiate all the sins of those who bathe in them, and even scratching the back of a cow is said to destroy all guilt (Vyaśñū \[50 f.]. 

The commentator of the Bṛhūṇ (c. A.D. 1030) mentions, as an expiation performed by Hindu slaves on their return from captivity in a foreign country, that they were buried in the dung, stale, and milk of cows for a certain number of days, till they went into a state of fermentation, and were given similar dirt to eat afterwards. The muttering of prayers, and the chanting of songs from the Śāmaśeṇa, consisting of the words of the gods. Some of these prayers and songs have special names indicating their purificatory effect. Religious gifts to the Brāhmans are also greatly recommended. A rich man would give his own weight in gold or silver to the Brāhmans; this is called ‘maṇiṣeṣṭha, ‘a man of great weight,’ and of this practice several instances are recorded in Indian history. Visiting one of the sacred places of pilgrimage (tirtha) in which India abounds is another favourite mode of atonement. Such pilgrimages, as an atonement for heinous sins committed, are very common even at the present day; nor have the older forms of expiation disappeared, though fines or dimers given to the caste are now by far the most common sort of punishment. Thus, e.g., when a man has been accustomed for travelling into Europe, crossing the sea in a vessel belonging to regia and violating the law, he may be admitted into his caste again if he gives a dinner to the entire caste. An offender, having been tried and found guilty by his caste, is still occasionally addressed with the old Sanskrit formula: Aṣṭāṅgīṣya labhasya priyāsūtra samāchara, ‘Take a spiritual adviser and perform a penance.’ In cases of difficulty, some learned Brāhmans are invited to send in a written declaration (vyatikā) in which their opinion of the case and of the particular penance to be inflicted is stated. The offender is re-admitted on performing the penance enjoined by the Brāhmans. This was done even in ancient times and is common in the times before British rule than it is now, and the spiritual power thus exercised by Brāhmans acquainted with the sacred law must have been considered of especial value, especially as they were consulted by the courts of Justice in cases of civil and criminal law. There never was in India a strict line of demarcation between religious and secular law. Offenders, after being duly punished, might be compelled to do a penance in order to obtain readmission into their caste. The kings did not inflict worldly punishments only; they dictated also the penances by which religious offenders were subject to in the Hindu kingdom of Kashmir the Mahārāja, as late as 1875, was in the habit of looking after the dence performance of the prajñasūtras ordained by the five learned jurists (dharmaśāstra) of the country. The readiness of the people to submit to the prescribed course of atonement for their sins was enhanced by a superstition proud of the tortures of hell and of the pains to be suffered by future births. Many diseases and natural misfortunes were viewed as the consequence of sins committed in a previous existence, lepers, for instance, being required to do penance in order to expiate the crime in which they had polluted the body, which was considered to be due, and to avoid being afflicted with the same illness in a future birth. Secret penances (vratasya-prajñasūtra) are also mentioned; they were, and are still occasionally, performed for offences not publicly known.


J. JOLLY.

EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Jewish).

—r. It is necessary, though somewhat difficult, to draw a distinction between penance, or repentance, and expiation, or atonement. This differentiation cannot be entirely rigid, for, in dealing with atonement, it is impossible to exclude all references to penitence, and vice versa. It may be laid down as a convenient axiom that penitence is the consciousness of sin; atonement, the desire or effort to be free from sin. Penitence must precede atonement, for penitence is an attitude of the mind, while atonement is a subsequent action. Atonement, however, is directed towards the realization of that attitude, although it may sometimes, as will be seen, penitence was nothing but an atonement. The question then resolves itself into an examination of the process which a Jew, guided by rabbinic ideas and direction, would adopt in order to free his soul from the
stain of sin, it being more or less taken for granted that the redemption of his sinfulness has already been accomplished in him.

The regular word for repentance is נַשֵּׂא, 'returning' (as opposed to נַשָּׁא, 'backsliding' [Hos 14]). This latter word denotes the act of coming back, which was probably 'to wipe out' rather than 'to cover up' (but see König, in Ezq T xxii. [1911] 332, 375), the ה, 'ransom,' 'bribe,' being the instrument. The ransom, to wipe out sin, and purify and atone for the sins of the blood of sacrifices, gradually gave way to a more spiritual idea. It would not be correct to regard this absolutely as progressive development. Sacrifice was but the outward form of the atonement, a concomitant of the ideal. In course of time it was found possible to maintain the inward process independently of the outward form, but this must not be taken to mean that the idea of physical sacrifice was condemned. In many cases sacrifices were brought without the intervention of penitence on the part of the sinner; this abuse was sternly reproved by the prophets (Am 5:24, Mal 1:6c; cf. JE xix. 610 and following). The commandment (xxi. 16), given, col., ed. Warsaw, 1868; see also Toshefta Babo Qamma, x. 18, cited by Abrahams in Camb. Bib. Essays, London, 1909, p. 189; Qimh on Jer. 52:20; cf. the commentaries. Nevertheless it is impossible not to see in the practice an attempt to purify the sinner. Nevertheless it is impossible not to see in the practice an attempt to purify the sinner.

On the other hand, the same doubt may be traced in Rabbinic writings and in the Liturgy. It is true that the Prayer-book of all the Land of Israel contains numerous expressions of repentance and prayer for restoration as a means of atonement for sin (Singer, pp. 255, 234, but contrast p. 267; see also JE xix. 639), and that the daily and festival services correspond to the Temple Office; nevertheless it must be remembered that most of these prayers were composed at a time when the overwhelming calamity was still fresh in the mind of every Jew, and that very often the return to Zion and the rebuilding of the Temple are but other expressions denoting the Messianic age. The thirteenth articles of the Creed, composed by Maimonides (1265), contain no reference to sacrifice, neither does the tenth and eleventh articles, which deal with God's cognizance of sin and with reward and punishment, naturally imply the doctrine of atonement, and the twelfth makes obligatory the belief in the Messiah. The substitution of prayer and penitence for sacrifice as a means of atonement, as taught by Iosea, Micah, Nahum, and Isaiah, was the keynote of the Rabbinic penitential theory; but this did not in any way condemn the sacrificial system of the Temple.

The Day of Atonement itself is, of course, the outstanding feature in the Rabbinic scheme of repentance, and its effects on the religious life of the Jew are magnified in the importance and cause many associations to gather round it. The Synagogue liturgy contains many an echo from the Temple ritual. The service of a Russian Ghetto confesses his sins in the identical formula used by kings and high priests. Penitence and atonement occupy so prominent a position in the life of a Jew, as conceived by the Rabbis, that their writings are full everywhere of the necessity of confession of individual sins to the great sins. In particular, the end of Mishna Yoma should be studied, but on the whole it will be convenient to examine the treatise on Atonement and Penitence of Maimonides (Tad., ccxxv 370) and to incorporate, where necessary, references from Talmud and Midrash, and finally to consider the Liturgy and Synagogue practices.

2. The Mishnaic atonement consists in a complete repentance, coupled with affliction of the flesh according to the prescribed requirements of the Day of Atonement. The sins brought against man, restitution must precede everything else. Atonement is also necessary. Death can atone in certain cases. Death-bed repentance is effective, but it is not the highest form of atonement. Fasting, on the other hand, is not a substitute for an act of submission to stripes—all these can atone; but all forms of atonement depend for their success on the grant of Divine grace.

The Mishna and Genara Yoma deal, in the main, with the ceremonies of the Day, but the concluding sections may here be cited, as referring more particularly to the abstract idea (Yoma viii. 8-9). The sin-offering (נַשֵּׂא) and the offering brought for sin (אָסָא) are similar to the first and second instances of the sacrifices of the Day of Atonement. The sin-offering is itself a means of atonement, the confessor of these sins, and also the sinner. Nevertheless, there is in the Day of Atonement a more adequate, if there is one, means of atonement; the sacrifice of the Day of Atonement is adequate, if there is any, for the sins of the people. It will be brought to those who are able to be benefited by it. Atonement is a means of atonement.

R. Abba (1 A.D. 135) said: 'Happy are ye, Israel; before whom are ye purified and who is it that purifies you? It is your Father in heaven, as it is said in Ezekiel 19:5: 'And I will sprinkle upon you clean water and ye shall be clean, from all your impurities and from all your abominations will I purify you'; and the verse (Lev 17:9) saith, 'O thou Mosech of Israel, O Lord []' (miṣpaḥ having the double meaning of 'hope' and of 'ritual bath'; the latter occurring in the latter sense in Gn 30:4 'Let the waters be gathered together'), Just as the miṣpaḥ purifies the unclean, so the Holy One be blessed be He, purifies Israel. See also Yoma 50, quoted in full in art. 1 'Atonement' in JE ii. 280 (this art. is very important).

In the treatise on Penitence, mentioned above, Maimonides summarizes all that is essential in connection with the subject. The tenth and eleventh articles, which deal with God's cognizance of sin and with reward and punishment, naturally imply the doctrine of atonement, and the twelfth makes obligatory the belief in the Messiah. The substitution of prayer and penitence for sacrifice as a means of atonement, as taught by Iosea, Micah, Nahum, and Isaiah, was the keynote of the Rabbinic penitential theory; but this did not in any way condemn the sacrificial system of the Temple.

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Verily I have repented and am ashamed of my deeds, and I will never renew such an act. (H.T. i. 2.) The last sentence is, according to Maimonides, the integral factor of the whole confession; and every one who is profuse in confession (see also the footnote to this point) is accounted worthy of praise. The Divine name is, of course, omitted; סע just as in the Temple formula, representing the Tetragrammaton, which was uttered only by the high priest. No sin, occurring without repentance and confession, nor could the infliction of capital punishment suffice to wipe away guilt without these two adjuncts. Moreover, theft, even if restitution had already been made, could be forgiven only if the thief had made public confession and resolved to abandon theft for all time (H.T. i. 3). Confession is just as vital in the case of the community; hence the high priest, in sending away the scapegoat, made a public avowal, laying his hand on the head of the goat, because it was to be an atonement for all Israel. But, although the scapegoat was a general national atonement for the whole community and grievous unpunished sins, with or without avowal,—yet this was the case only if the sinner repented; without due repentance on the part of the individual the public atonement of the scapegoat was of no avail except for light sins. According to the legal definition, the difference between light and grievous (פסיו) transgressions lay in the penalty; in the latter category were all sins for which the penalty was capital punishment at the hands of the Beth Din, and exorsion (see CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS [Jewish]); but vain swearing and perjury, although not subject to this condition, are included under Transgression of the Law (גרא). The destruction of the Temple has made repentance itself the means of atonement. So powerful is repentance that even on the death-bed of a lifelong sinner it is effective. Further, to those who repent, the Day of Atonement is itself the means of pardon. There are some sins which are forgiven as soon as repentance is exercised, while in the case of others pardon is deferred.

Four main distinctions may be traced (H.T. i. 7; Yoma 86a) (Gold. 1021, Roldk. 134). Thus, if a man repents of a ‘light’ sin of omission, his pardon is immediate. In the case of a man who repents of a ‘light’ sin of commission, his repentance suspends the penalty. For, if a man commits, say, theft, and the Day of Atonement brings his pardon. If a man has committed ‘grievous’ sins of commission, penitence and the Day of Atonement will suspend his condemnation and punishment, and the chastisement which will be inflicted on him will complete his pardon. In no case can complete pardon be obtained without penance or chastisement (טבש; see conclusion of art. DISEASE AND MEDICINE [Jewish]). The only exception is in the case of blasphemy. By blasphemy (lit. the profanation of the Name) more is understood than the English equivalent implies. It almost includes deliberate atheism (cf. the word מחלל foyer ‘suffer martyrdom’), and is the only sin to which the distinction of presumption (=ax) and ignorance (ןי) does not apply (סנה לֹא נָכוּ וְנוֹכֵּא הָאָדָם יִהְיֶה יִהְיֶה דֹּּדְיָּהָאָדָם דַּעֲקָדוּ: Abodaiv. 4; Singer, p. 196). In the case of a man who has ‘profaned the Name,’ repented and remained constant in his repentance, passed a Day of Atonement, and suffered the chastisements, his absolute pardon is deferred until his death; but by the effects of repentance, Day of Atonement, and chastisement, his punishment is suspended (H.T. i. 6-9).

The principles underlying these differentiations are clear. It is far easier to repair a sin of omission than a sin of commission (see also the footnote in Singer, p. 202); the reality of repentance in the case of a sinner who is guilty of evil practices is tested by time, for he must prove that he has had the power and opportunity to relapse and has not yielded. The greater the sin, the longer is the period necessary to attest repentance. Repentance in itself is also not a sufficient proof of the crime to have been effaced. If the element of chastisement did not enter into the question of pardon, it might lead to a false repentance to avoid punishment.

The question of the reality of penitence is discussed by R. Yehuda in Genara Yoma 86b (Gold. 1024, Roldk. 136), and repeated by Maimonides in H.T. i. 11. He concludes that he who repent the sin and complete opportunity to repeat the offence. With this is also connected the question of validity of death-bed repentance. Maimonides is very decisive. Even if a man has been a sinner all his days and repents in his old age, when all opportunity for sin is gone, in spite of the fact that this is not the highest form of penitence, nevertheless his penitence is a valid atonement. Even if he has sinned all his life and repented only on his deathbed, his sins are all pardoned, in accordance with Ex 12: (H.T. ii. 2). On the other hand, see Abodaiv. 15 (Singer, p. 199) ‘Repent one day before thy death’ (i.e. at once, since thy death may be to-morrow). The difficulty, of course, which the Rabbis felt was how to keep the gates of repentance open to the dyer-sinner, without, at the same time, making it any easier for a man to sin all his life, relying on his last hour to make his peace.

It has already been pointed out that penitence is itself held by the Rabbis to have been a means of atonement; consequently a warning is uttered against the doctrine of hypothetical atonement. Since the act of repentance had taken the place of sacrifices as the agency by which pardon could be gained, there must be no danger of the means once more being mistaken for the end. Any man who confesses his sins without the firm intention of abandoning them, is like one who bathes while holding in his hand an unclean insect (גח). His bathing will be useless until he abandons the contaminating insect. Repentance must be a real p SendMessage to: change of mind, and must involve a deep recognition of the heinousness of sin. A penitent should be continually praying and giving charity, according to his means. He should flee from temptation, he should even change his name, as much as to say: ‘I am now another person, I am not he who did so and so.’ He must change all his actions for good; he should exile himself, because exile is in itself an atonement and will involve him in humiliation and affliction which will cause him to become humble and meek in spirit (H.T. ii. 5).

It is also palsyworthy to make public confession; for, if a man is proud to reveal his transgressions, his penitence is imperfect. Here, however, a distinction is drawn. A man should confess publicly sins against his neighbour, but not those against God (H.T. ii. 7; Yoma 86b (Gold. 1024, Roldk. 137)). Penitence and confession, although acceptable at all times, are especially desirable at the period of atonement, that is to say, from the beginning of the New Year (אשורי) until the Day of Atonement. (For an investigation of the time and manner of confession, the formula of confession, the manner in which a man must reconcile himself with his neighbour, and the lengths to which he may go, see the last sections of H.T. ii. and iii. 5 ff.)

The question of punishment can scarcely be considered here, but eternal damnation requires treatment in so far as the idea of everlasting doom was utterly repugnant to the Rabbis; and, when it was limited to a very small number, great pains were taken to prove that almost every individual or class for whom there seemed to be no hope was, in fact, saved. There was always some mitigating circumstance which had been overlooked, some Scriptural authority to be found. In the end, there were but few, indeed, for whom there was no hope. Maimo-"
EXPLANATION AND ATONEMENT (Jewish)

gives much attention to the question, and also in H.T. iii. 11 ff.; it is in the latter passage that the famous words occur: יִשְׂרָאֵלָה יִשְׂרָאֵלָה וַעֲשֵׂה יְשִׂיאָתָה וַעֲשֵׂה יְשִׂיאָתָה וַעֲשֵׂה יְשִׂיאָתָה וַעֲשֵׂה יְשִׂיאָתָה וַעֲשֵׂה יְשִׂיאָתָה וַעֲשֵׂה יְשִׂיאָתָה. These words are, however, without the common stress of expression. The most natural interpretation of them is to give the sense 'Do not only repeat the Shemoneh Esreh, and the Selihah, but also the Amidah, and the Kaddish, and every form of prayer and charity.' The moment we relinquish this interpretation of the passage in which we had the key to the entire subject, and look on Shemoneh Esreh and Selihah as a part of the Amidah and the Kaddish, we leave the door wide open to the strange and inadmissible statement that these prayers are the 'repetition of the first, or the universal Creator: who has a star, in order to have an intermediary between himself and the Lord.'

The Epicurean among the Jews is he who repudiates prophecy and inspiration in its widest terms ('he says that there is no knowledge from the Creator that reaches man's heart'); he who denies the prophecy of Moses and the Divine knowledge of human actions. The Jew who denies the Torah is he who says that it is not from God (even one verse or one word); or he who says that Moses wrote it on his own authority; so also he who denies the oral Law; who denies its exponents, as, for example, Zadoq and Balaam; who says that the Creator changes one demand for another, or that the present Law, though originally Divine, is now superseded.

All these sinners, as well as the others enumerated by Maimonides (H.T. iii. 16-23), but who cannot, through lack of space, be included here, are denounced from the very first by the Prophets. The plain and simple statement is at once mitigated by Maimonides: 'Under what conditions are the above-mentioned sinners precluded from doing penance? If only he has died in sin. But, if a man turns from his wickedness and dies (in repentance), then he is not a sinner, he is one of those who shall have a part in the coming world (and may even die without sin), and who will be saved from repentance. Even a man who has denied the cardinal principle (יִשְׂרָאֵלָה יִשְׂרָאֵלָה וַעֲשֵׂה יְשִׂיאָתָה וַעֲשֵׂה יְשִׂיאָתָה וַעֲשֵׂה יְשִׂיאָתָה וַעֲשֵׂה יְשִׂיאָתָה וַעֲשֵׂה יְשִׂיאָתָה וַעֲשֵׂה יְשִׂיאָתָה וַעֲשֵׂה יְשִׂיאָתָה), and repented at the end, has a share, as it is said (Psalms 77:19). Peace, peace to the far and near, saith the Lord, and I will heal him. So too, all the wicked, the sinners and transgressors, when they return, be it openly or secretly, they are accepted, as it is said, 'Return ye backsliding children' (Jer 31:18); although such a man be still a backslider, since he has returned in secret without making amends, yet he is received by reason of his repentance' (H.T. iii. 24-25).

The obstacles to repentance are dealt with in H.T. iv., but in this connexion penitence is not the means of atonement itself, but a necessary preliminary to it; consequently the fourth and subsequent clauses are inadmissible, which deal with different subjects also, may be neglected here. It is important, however, to study carefully the Gemara at the end of Yoma 85a (Gold, 1019-1033, Rodt, 132-142) and ch. xi. of Sanhedrin, 113a, with the commentary of Maimonides (see Lit. at end), and also the other Rabbinic references given in J.E., art. 'Atonement.'

A number of Midrashic extracts are given by Rapaport in Tales and Maxims from the Midrash, London, 1907, p. 261.

1 It remains to consider the question of atonement from the liturgical and ceremonial point of view, apart, of course, from the Day of Atonement itself, to which special treatment is accorded (see FESTIVALS AND FASTS [ Heb.]). The keynote of the Liturgy is the theme of repentance, and that of the Selihah is the 'atonement of all nations have a share in the world to come.' It is noteworthy that, when Maimonides proceeds to particularize those who are eternally damned, he is careful to begin each section of Maimonides: 'because these beliefs which he stigmatizes are frequently held by other religions. Having stated that those of other creeds, holding these beliefs, who live a righteous life have a share in the world to come, he does not warn them again. After they have been warned the same time, there must be no excuse for any Israelite holding these beliefs. In such a case, a Jew may not rely on justification by good works. There is no atonement for the following classes, if they die impotent: the Epicureans; those who deny the Torah, the resurrection, the coming of the Messiah; those who cause the multitude to sin; those who separate themselves from the ways of the Congregation; those who sin publicly and with a high hand, like Jehoiakim; the betrayers; those who put the Congregation in terror, not for the sake of heaven; those who shed blood; the slanders of the Congregation in the presence of those who draw the' wars. Six kinds of Israelites are said to be repented: he who denies the existence of a God; he who says that the world has no guiding power; he who says that the world has two or more guiding powers; he who admits that there is a Lord, but affirms that it is a star or some being endowed with a likeness; he who denies that the Eternal was the first, or the universal Creator; he who worships a star, in order to have an intermediary between himself and the Lord.'

2 For it is on Thy mighty mercies that we rely, or some similar phrase, in order to lead up to the next Selihah, which is never varied and which begins, 'For it is on Thy mighty mercies that we rely, on Thy charitie, as we trust ' [Davis, pp. 252, 82, 189]. A similar prayer, or poetic decalogue, is the mention of the thirteen midrash, or Divine attributes (Ex 34:6), as means of atonement. As instances may be cited the two prayers יִשְׂרָאֵלָה יִשְׂרָאֵלָה וַעֲשֵׂה יְשִׂיאָתָה יִשְׂרָאֵלָה יִשְׂרָאֵלָה וַעֲשֵׂה יְשִׂיאָתָה יִשְׂרָאֵלָה יִשְׂרָאֵלָה יִשְׂרָאֵלָה יִשְׂרָאֵלָה יִשְׂרָאֵלָה יִשְׂרָאֵלָה יִשְׂרָאֵלָה], what is the name of God stoning 'for his Name's sake' (cf. Singer, pp. 57 and 160, near foot).
this idea is old; ‘God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob’ occurs in the ‘Amidah (Singer, p. 44, and Mt 22:32), and in the Pentateuch (Gen 24:31[32]). In the end great stress is laid on the merits of the Patriarchs, for they are a private fast in the name of grace and in imitation of salvation and atonement. If children are not to suffer for the sins of the fathers, it would seem that they may not benefit by their virtues. But in the Selihoth the refrain, ‘but we and our fathers’ (cf. Ps 106:43), subdues this mercy, stating a fact, not recording a feeling of helplessness at an accumulation of sin. In any case it is held very strongly that, by the Divine grace, the merits of the ancestors may be accounted to their descend- ants as atonement for sin (e.g. the Selihah מַעֲנַי יִשְׂרָאֵל [Proops, fol. 68b, no. 129]; cf. the Selihah beginning with almost the same words, in the Sephardic rite (Gaster, i. 99 or ii. 80)); the prayer occurs in the Ashamnu (Singer, p. 258), and is elaborated at the conclusion of every Selihah Service: שְׂאֶלֶת וְשָׁם לְךָ נַפְלָת (Proops, fol. 69), or Gaster, iii. 37). The second is the ‘al-Het (Singer, p. 230). This is not recited alone in its entirety. The third formula cannot be quoted so readily; it is the one intended for private use and silent meditation. Several examples of this kind of Widdadi exist. There is the beautiful composition of H. Isaac b. Israel in the Chagigah Mihev Service of the Kippur (Gaster, iii. 225). See also the Widdadi for Musaph by R. Shem Tov b. Ardentiel (Gaster, iii. 181), and the great Widdadi by R. Nissim of Babylon (ib. 125). For a confession for the reader alone, cf. ib. 125. In the long prayer (תִּפְרִיחַ) which concludes the Selihoth for ‘Erev Rosh hash-Shanah, a Widdadi has been interwoven (fol. 24 of Proops’s ed., Amsterdam, 1711). The former of the public con- fessions is repeated at all the five services of the Day of Atonement, the ‘al-Het, however, only at the first four; at Nefilah there is substituted for it a very beautiful prayer, מַעֲנַי יִשְׂרָאֵל (Singer, p. 130). Other fasts for atonement may be briefly noticed: the ‘Second and Fifth’ after the three festivals:

the private fast of the bride and bridegroom on the wedding day, because they begin a new life purged of sin (Jer. 31:34; fol. b, cols. c, d (ed. prince. =vol. ii. p. 386 of Schwab’s tr., Paris, 1875-79)); the fast of Yom Kippur, in order to atone for a sin; finally, on the historical fasts Selihoth are said, because the calamities which are commemorated were due to sin, and penitence may bring pardon and restoration. On the ninth of Av, although the fast is not mentioned, yet the recognition of sin and the prayer for atonement is implied in many of the Qiddush. The doctrine of vicarious atonement in the Christian sense finds no footing in Rabbinic Judaism, because the Rabbis denied original sin. Man had his two yeers, but there was no necessity or room for a Messiah suffering for the sins of his people. ‘Happy are you, Israel, God is he who purifies you,’ said Agiba (loc. cit.). Although passages could be produced which might seem to point to the vicarious idea, such a sense proves, on examination, to be un- tenable. Other means of atonement—study of the Torah, etc.—may be found in JE ii. 290, outer column.

Reference may also be made to punishment and death as means of atonement. Thus poverty (cf. Erubin 41a, fol. 135, Babylon, 1811, p. 370, suffering (Ber. 50c), can be cured if (see DISEASE AND MEDICINE (Jewish)). The death-bed confession (Singer, p. 317, based on Ber. 60b) is that ‘my death may be accepted as an atonement for my sins.’ In the Selihah we say (Iov. 159a, ed. cit. no. 131, fol. 68b; Davis, p. 224) by Moredeci b. Sabbattai, the poet prays:

‘May the words of my mouth be a sweet savour before Thee, Rock of Ages, accept my fat and my blood, diminished by fasting, instead of the fat and blood of the sacrifices; may the meditation of my heart that I have laid before Thee be lasting, a sweet offering, the trespass-offering, and the Minhash’ (Rab. i. 61).

Baptism can scarcely be said to have been a means of atonement in Judaism. On the eve of Kippur, after receiving ligation (see J. Caro, Shulhan ‘Arukh, ch. 607, §6) it became the custom to bathe; but ritual bathing was associated with rather than a means of atonement, though another water-ceremony has been introduced. On the New Year, after service in the place of worship, the congregation repairs to running water, and prays that God may cast our sins into the depths of the sea. The last two words of these prayers are, with other passages from Scripture, there recited; and it is from Micah that the cer- mony takes its name of Tashhı̂‘, ‘Mayest Thou cast’ (Abrahams, Festivals, London, 1906, p. 91; and JE xii. 66).

On the eve of the Day of Atonement the ceremony of Kapporet took place (see Oesterley and Box, Religion and Worship of the Synagogue, p. 445). It consisted in swinging a fowl, afterwards given to the poor as a symbolic atonement. (The origin of this custom, and also the objections raised against it, may be studied inJE ii. 282, and viii. 43). For the Selihoth see also Shulhan ‘Arukh, ch. 605.) Probably the original aim was charity—to provide poor Jews with a meal before the fast began.

EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Muslim).

—The formula whereby duties and rights are designated in Islam are identical with those used for debts and credits. Hence the acts prescribed by the Qur'an are regarded as debts due from man to God, incurred by acceptance of Islam; other duties may be incurred by undertaking obligations voluntarily or by violating prohibitions. In the third case expiation is necessary; in the second it may be permissible; in the first it has no place.

Man's debts to God are the five daily prayers, fasting in Ramadan, payment of alms, and pilgrimage. If he omit to pray at the right time, all he need do is to say an extra prayer at a later time; no 'expiation' (kaffārāth) is required. There is some question whether one who has temporarily apostatized and been re-converted to Islam ought to make up for all the prayers which he has missed in the interval, and whether the same obligation is incumbent on one who has ignorantly brought up, so to speak, all the prayers during the interval. The majority hold that this obligation is incumbent (Faddāl-i-Qādī, 1306, ii. 293). 'Payment' of prayer, i.e. saying it at the proper time (ada'), is distinguished from 'repayment' of this sort (qadd). Similarly, one who has for any reason omitted to fast should make up for the omission by fasting the requisite number of days out of season. Unpaid alms can also be given when the year in which they should have been paid has elapsed; or they may be taken out of the first month. An omitted pilgrimage can be made good by deputy, i.e. by paying some one to perform it in a dead man's stead. What distinguishes all these cases from those which follow is that there is no substitution of one performance for another; the identical act is performed, through out of the time, or by another person.

'Expiation' in the case of obligations voluntarily undertaken means the substitution of a different act for the act originally promised. This is not permissible in the case of a vow, but is so in the case of an oath (Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah, Works, A.H. 1325, ii. 240). The Qur'an emphasizes the principle that an oath set down is valid until the interval between it may be broken on condition of some act pleasing to God being performed, such act being the maimmisation of a slave, the feeding of the poor, or, if these be beyond the means of the perjurer, fasting (Qur. vii. 21); the substituted act is called kaffārāh (a word borrowed from the Hebrew, and the proceeding itself is called 'profaning of the oath' (thahlib al-qayn (Qur. xlv. 2), otherwise interpreted as 'losing of the bond'). The theory is that it removes the guilt incurred is rejected by some jurists, on the ground that in many cases such perjury is approved. It does not appear that any oath or contract is ipso facto voided from this principle; and the discussions of the interval and the question of the form of the act which constitute 'oaths' and the amount of compensation to be paid by the perjurer. The Prophet is supposed to have said: 'Be mindful of something and afterwards find a better course, let him do what is better and make kaffārāh for the oath' (Yāsīt, Dictionary of Learned Men, vi. 116).

Although the case of expiation contemplated by the Muslim code are thus strictly limited, certain practices, involving the idea of expiation, survived from pagan times, and certain others are to be found in the Jewish code. In the case of various sorts can be cancelled by acts of supererogation. To the former class belong the sacrifices which the law permits rather than enjoins—such as the offering of two ewes for the birth of a male and one for the birth of a female child, where the number corresponds with the rule in the Law of Inheritance that the male counts as two females. The practice doubtless originally signifies that the life of the animal is to serve as a substitute for that of the child which the god may claim; but the jurists seem unwilling to formulate this theory. The sacrifice which forms part of the pilgrimage ceremony is regarded as winning favour rather than as expiating sin; but, according to a tradition, the weight of the animal is to be put into the scale of the sacrificer's good deeds on the Day of Judgment, and so will serve as an offset against evil deeds which have been done in the interval of another scale.

LITERATURE.—This has been given in the article.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTTI.

EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Pars).

—In the sacred and in later times, there were such religious acts as pahāt and āpārēt, 'expiation,' occur in the Vendād (ii. 21, vii. 52 [gloss in the Palavār tr.], iii. 38 f., vii. 107, xvii. 68) in connexion with the penalties prescribed for various crimes. Neither the Gāthas nor the extant Avestan texts have
of hell (ib. xlii. 8; Sad Dar, xlv. 10), and is given a place in Hamseshagahn, a place specially reserved for the souls whose good and evil deeds are equal (Riyûyat-i Dârîb Hormuzdâyâd, pp. 497, 498, Navsari, 1896).

1. In one of his communings with Ahura Mazda, Zarathushtra sees the soul of king Jamsked in the torments of hell. Jamsked becomes penitent before the prophet, and craves forgiveness. Zarathushtra then shows Ahura Mazda to show mercy to the fallen soul. The soul is then removed from hell and sent to Hamseshagahn, a place reserved of the thousand years, and, after further penance and expiation, is forgiven all sins and sent to Garomoun (ib. 498-500).

2. If a follower of Mazda who has sinned apostatizes to another religion and dies without expiation, his soul goes to hell, and remains there till the final Renovation (Dâtestân-i Dinik, xli. 5, 6).

3. The nature of expiation.—True repentance must bring about a change of will. The penitent must resolve to abstain from ever repeating the sinful act (Dinkart, tr. Sanjana, Bombay, 1874 f., bk. vi. ch. 50). Lord confession with the lips and bathing the face with a torrent of tears are of no avail, if the heart is not turned against Ahura Mazda, the Angâmî Spentas, or their respective creations; against parents or children, kinsmen or countrymen, friends or neighbours—in short, all sins that is possible for human beings ever to do.

2. Expiation absolves sins.—Fasting from food is prohibited; the only fast inculcated in the Mazdayasni religion is from sin (Sad Dar, ixxii. 3-5). The faithful should not commit sins voluntarily (Mainôgî Khorot, li. 16). Not to sin is better than to expiate sin (Dâtestân-i Dinik, xli. 11). But, if one has sinned through thoughtlessness or otherwise, he should take the first opportunity to expiate his sin. A quarter of the year in every dimension, whereas by atonement its growth is stunted, and it withers like a tree (Sad Dar, xlv. 5). Owing to a man's sins, he incurs the condemnation of Ahura Mazda; but sincere penance restores him again to the right relation to his heavenly father, and he is forgiven. The efficacy of expiation is such that, whereas the recital of every sacred Gândha ronts one demon, the expiation of one's sins routes every Índ (Shâyâyat ti Shâyâyat, xx. 11). The best time for making atonement for one's sins is during one's life (Dâtestân-i Dinik, xli. 10). It is said that men should make it a custom to expiate their sins every night before going to bed (Sad Dar, ixxiv. 1). For who knows but the Demon of Death may capture him while asleep, and he may not rise to atone for his sins in the right of the day? If an individual dies without expiating his sins, his way to heaven is blocked, for it is ordained in the religion of Ahura Mazda that the only means of entering heaven or to escape hell is the making of expiation while living (Dâtestân-i Dinik, xlii. 10). The religion of Mazda extinguishes all kinds of sins by means of atonement (Vendidad, ili. 41, 42, viii. 29, 30). As the sins already atoned for in this life stand cancelled in the book of life upon conviction or upon expiation, the soul approaches the seat of judgment on the dawn of the fourth day after death (Dâtestân-i Dinik, xiii. 2, 3). We are told in another place that such a soul does receive punishment at the tribunal of justice in the body's grave (Dâtestân-i Dinik, xxii. 33, 34), and translated by Spiegel. Acsacts übersetzt, Leipzig, 1858-63, iii. 293, that the soul is fit to chant the hymn of Zârâkshî Shâyâyat (Manuel du peuple, Paris, 1880, pp. 140-151), and in Pâzand by Antâî and translated by Antâî (pp. 212-232). Mention should also be made of the two other Pâzand expiatory prayers: the Pâzand Êrînîyag, edited by Antâî (pp. 131-140), and translated by Antâî (pp. 212-232) and translated by baron de barson (Zend-Avesta, Paris, 1862-63, iii. 107-189); and the Pâzand-Fêrûrûyag, or 'Shôra to the Dead,' edited by Antâî (pp. 125-134), and as yet untranslated.

3. Retributive expiation.—The penitent sinner has to perform other duties besides the recital of the Pâzonti, the confession of his sins before the high priest, and the sincere atonement wrought within his own spirit. When he sincerely desires
EXPIATION AND Atonement (Roman)

If a man during his lifetime is unable, for any reason, to recite Patët for the expiation of his sins, he should bequeath one of the priests to do so for him on payment. But in this case he should himself recite at least the shortest expiatory formula three times a day (Risivšt, p. 501). If he fails to do so, he is guilty of neglecting his sacred duty towards the dead, and should atone (Patët i Pashimíth, 11).

If a man dies, he must be prepared to undergo any corporeal punishment, or to pay any amount as penalty, or to perform any other deeds of righteousness that the Dostur may prescribe (Sad Dar, xlv. 6; Dâšt-i Dinik, lxv. 3). Bodily punishment in such a case would save the sinner from intramortis punishment. But if he does not submit to the penalty in this world, his soul goes to the abode of the Druj (Vend. viii. 107). The penitent is generally ordered either to arrange a certain number of marriages between the faithful and the poor, or to offer zerchur libations, or to carry certain loads of sweet-scented wood to the fire, or to consecrate barœsan twigs, or to throw bridges over canals, or to kill noxious creatures such as snakes, frogs, and ants, or to practise other good works as compensation for the wrong he has done (Vend. xiv. 1-18, xvii. 67-74; Dâšt-i Dinik, lviii. 17, 19, lxx. 10, 12; Mainuy-i Khî, i. 9). The pulling down of the dakhrou, wherein lie interred the dead bodies of men, or the killing of the noxious creature Zairim-yangura, which kills the creatures of the good spirit by thousands, is also a means of the expiation. The sin of having thought, word, and deed, and is equivalent to the recital of a Patët (Vend. vili. 51, xii. 5-7).

7. Inexpiable sins.—The sins of burning or burning corpses, eating dead matter, and solitude are of a kind which could not be expiated (Vend. i. 11, 12, vi. 27). The man who knowingly lets a corpse remain interred in the earth for a period of two years becomes guilty of anapórëta (ib. iii. 36-39). A barrier has seduced men into the cooking of corpses—an inexpiable sin, the penalty for which is death (ib. i. 16, viii. 73 f.; Strabo, p. 732).

8. Reciting Patët for the expiation of the sins of others. It is customary among the modern Persians to give his death a Patët before the dead body as long as it remains in the house. The recital of this expiatory prayer forms an important part of the ceremonials performed in honour of the dead, even after the removal of the corpse to its final resting-place. The relatives and friends of the deceased join in reciting the same prayers for the expiation of the soul which is now embarking on its journey to the next world. They generally keep up this observance daily for at least a month, or in many cases throughout the first year.

If one man has been requested by another to offer penitential prayers for him after he dies, and if the man who has this duty to do hastens to perform his obligation so soon as he hears of the death of the said person, or, at the latest, on the dawn of the fourth day after death, at the moment once period when the soul approaches the threshold of the celestial world. If the man sincerely recites the Patët as he has consented to do, the benefit of it reaches the soul of the deceased at the Bridge (Risivšt, p. 501). If he fails to do so, he is guilty of neglecting his sacred duty towards the dead, and should atone (Patët i Pashimíth, 11).

At the feriae Latinae, for instance, if in the distribution of the sacrificial meat to the priests another one of the participants, should omit the prayer (Livy. xxvii. 1. 9, xxxvii. 3, 4), or if in the prayer the name of one of the interested communities was omitted (Livy vii. 16. 11), it was enough to ordain that the whole community should partake of the meat which regarded the games, Cicero (ad Hirm. Resp. 23; cf. Anth. iv. 31) gives quite a list of the irregularities—manifestly of frequent occurrence—which necessarily entailed a fantáuturion of the proceedings. Thus, if a dancer suddenly stopped dancing, if the fistal, called bôîî, or Karâthu, the servant of the Caeli, refused to give the chariot of the gods let go the reins, if the preceding aedile made the speech of the games while praying, or if the priest of the bee libation—in all such eventualities, Cicero expressly tells us, not only had the games to be repeated from the beginning, but, in addition, a penalty was required: 'nuncque errata expiatur et nentes deorum immortalium ludorum instauratur placenta.'

Similarly, every breach of the rigorous injunctions against doing work during the feriae publicae
In order to form a proper estimate of the Roman practice of expiation, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that there were laws and regulations concerning the case. Thus, if a priest gave judgment on a case de noua statu (Varro, de ling. Lat. vii. 30), if a general issued an order calling out the efficient troops on one of the days of the religious laws, or if a priest declared that public property was desecrated (Cato, de agri cult. 2. 4, Verg. Georg. i. 268 ff., Colum. ii. 22, xi. i. 20)—such actions had to be atoned for by a piaculum. There were also numerous possibilities of incurring guilt in the sphere of the insanium—the law relating to the dead and their tombs.

The provisions of this law were violated by such acts as the following: burying the dead within the city (Lex Col. Jul. vet. [Gell. xii. 4. 25; cf. Colum. ii. 24]; removing a corpse from its tomb (Paul. Sent. i. 3. 4; ed. Chim. 1884, x. 825), omitting to make the requisite purification of the funera permanent after a death in their house, or not performing the rites in the prescribed manner (Civ. ii. 4. 5), failing to perform the Alexioi by casting earth (ina quae placet) upon a corpse found unburied, or desecrating the deus of a stockbreeder (cf. Varro, ap. Nonius), or becoming responsible for disposing of the dead in a manner forbidden by the law (Liv. ii. 57: ‘in ede saepe necne, die deinde in mare nuncuti destine...porcum heredi esse contracta et habetibus istudern ferias et porco homina placentum pati; si in mari mortuus est, cadem praetor placetum et ferta’ i. 4766). If a Roman magistrate or a company of Roman soldiers desecrated the property of a temple, even the temple of a foreign deity, then not only did the actual perpetrators become liable to Divine punishment, but the State likewise had to purify itself, by numerous acts of expiation, of all complicity in the misdeeds of its officials or its soldiery. Thus, a contribution on the State’s behalf after the sacking of Proserpina’s temple at Locri by the legate Q. Pleminius in 294 B.C. (Liv. xxxix. 19. 9, 21. 4), after a theft committed by Roman troops at the same sanctuary in 200 B.C. (xxxii. 12. 4), and after the violation of sanctuaries perpetrated by the Censor, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, in carrying away the marble roofing of the temple of Juno Lucina in 173 B.C. (Liv. xili. 3. 10). But an expiation was no less necessary even when the proprietary rights of the gods were infringed without any evil intent. Thus, the pardon of a criminal who was under sentence of ‘consecratio capitis et hominem’ demanded a piaculum, because such an act of pardon deprived the deity of something that was legally his (as when absolution was granted to the Horatius who murdered his sister; cf. Liv. i. 39. 13, also Mommsen, Rom. Strafrecht. Lecit. 39, 294). A tree for the soldier who had been devoted to the gods but had survived the battle, as also for the loss of the lance on which the general had stood while promenading under the formula of devotion (Liv. viii. 12. 14, 14), is to be explained in the same way.

Of the numerous other contingencies in which satisfaction had to be made by acts of expiation, the following examples may be cited: if a man was caught again before the first day of the regular ten-months’ period of mourning (Plut. Xenod. 12); if a slave who, while being conveyed to the place of punishment, met the Flamen Dialis and threw himself at his feet, was nevertheless punished the same day (Gell. x. 15. 10); if a concubine (procurat) caught in a foul offence (C. c. dom. ii. 3. 31); if a person suffered the name of the goddesses Salus, Seminia, Selia, Sogstia, and Tulliusa (Macrobi. i. 16. 8, etc.).

Thus Cato the Elder (op. cit. 190) records the prayer which the farmer coupled with the expiatory offering called for by the operation of clearing a grove (symbol conburum), and we find here an interesting regulation to the effect that, if the work was interrupted, or if feast-days intervened while it was in progress, the sacrifice must be repeated (op. cit. p. 128). If the Arval Brothers invariably performed piaculum when they removed trees that had fallen from age or had been overthrown
Expiation and Atonement (Roman)

by a tempest (Hoenen, 136 ff.), though the great sacrificial rite of the bustrun maniuon, which they performed twice in special circumstances, and which Hoenen (p. 149 ff.) discusses under the term piaen, does occur under the head, not of expiation at all, but of lustration. The piaen was performed by the Arval Brotherhood in an open space, with trees of their growing season (\textit{hibi equoquinti et operis fidelum}), and corresponding to the sacrifice of the piaen, a sacrifice was offered annually on the second day of their annual festival, immediately before the principal oblation to Pros Dia (Hoenen, 136 ff.). But, as the season of the year in which the festival occurred—the month of May—seems the least suitable for the pruning of trees, there is much to be said for the theory that, as in the season of the annual festival, all operations of the kind required to be done during the year were enounced for by a single piaen (p. 23). Such precaution might find a parallel in the piaen of the piaentia, which was originally required of publicit 40 gratia (Coll. iv. 6. 8) only from one man (qui minister insta non fecisset) (Paul. p. 228; cf. Mar. Velt. p. 20 (Kell): qui hinc deposito non fercerant in faciendo pocorum lat. i., had in such way vio-

lating the decrees of the \
\textit{s}uovizara\textit{t}it (Liv. viii. 10. 14), Juno a she-lamb (Paul. p. 222; Gell. iv. 3. 3), the Muses a black sheep (Ulf. x. 8250); the cow in calf offered as a piaen by a widow whose husband in the recognized period of mourning (Plut. Numa, 12) would seem to have been assigned to Tellus, to whom fordoe box were sacrificed at the \
\textit{Forcideia} (Varro, de Ling. Lat. vi. 15; Ovid, Fasti, iv. 826 f.); while the rustic practice of offering a dog as an

atonement for breaking the law enjoining rest on feast-days (Colum. ii. 22. 4) finds a parallel in the immolation of a dog at the agrarian festivals of the \
\textit{Rigilaginis} (Ovid, iv. 908, 925 ff.; Colum. x. 34. 3) and the \ 
\textit{Aurignum Canarium} (Pest. p. 285; Philarg. on \
\textit{Verg. Georg. iv. 425}). But the animal most fre-

quently made use of in expiatory sacrifices—at once

the most ancient and the least ostentations victim

was the \
\textit{forca parenius.} Not only was it the \
\textit{poreo parenius} that was, as Cicero (de leg. ii. 22) puts it: \
\textit{si sacrum comminus, quod neque expiat poterit, impie comminus est.} But the words with which 
\textit{Cicero continues}, \
\textit{quod expiat poterit, publico sacerdotes expiato,\textit{ do not on a strict interpret-

ation harmonize with the religious practice of the Romans; for here expiation was not effected by the priest at all, but simply came about on the ground of the expiatory sacrifice presented by the offender in the name of the State and the magis-

trates. The sole function of the priests in this regard was, when consulted by the individual or by the community, to pronounce on the judgment as to the possibility of expiating a given offence (ib. 37: \textit{publici autem sacerdos imprum-
dentium consilio expiatam metu liberet, anesseim \ldots damnet et impiam indicet}), and as to the

kind of atonement required—and it is possible to see this sense in the \textit{expiantio} of Cicero (ib. 22) is to be understood. But they had no part whatever in the performance of the expiatory sacrifice offered in name of the community—the earliest excep-
tion to this took place in the reign of the Emperor \
\textit{Clundius,} who (according to Tac. Ann. xii. 8) in 49 a.c. directed \textit{sacra ex legibus Tituli regis piae-

unque spudd lineae Dansae per pontifices danda}\text{—} nor did it ever become the duty of the church to give

public judgment on any religious offences (cf. Mommsen, 36 f.). Nor could either priest or magistrate exercise any penal procedure against an individual who offended, or inflict punishment in connexion with religious offences (cf. Mommsen, 36 f.). Nor could either

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priest or magistrate exercise any penal procedure against an individual who offended, or inflict punishment in connexion with religious

offences (cf. Mommsen, 36 f.).
In course of time, however, the sphere of ritual transgression came to be encroached upon by the secular element, the ceremonial penalty ('piaclum') being conjoined with, or in part superseded by, the legal penalty of the fine ('multa'). Every offence committed willfully, and against the 'ius sacrum' (in a strict sense, accounted inexorable; thus, e.g., the praetor who had knowingly administered justice on a dies nefastus [godless day], longed, and even incurred by the Pontifex Maximus, Q. Mucius Scævola (Varro, vi. 30; cf. Macrobi. i. 16. 10); but in the law of the grove of Spoleto (CIL xi. 7766: 'benece locum non quasi violato ... si quis violat, love bovid, piaclum datate, sei quis seies violat dolo malo, love bovid piaclum datate et a(s)ses CCC moktai santo. eius picili multaque dictator[ei] exactio est(odd)') unconscious and conscious, or intentional, injuries are differentiated by the circumstance that, in addition to the piaclum incurred in all cases, the voluntary offence demanded also a multa, and to this extent the latter found its way even into the sphere of religious law, while the legally actionable character of the multa came to demand attention likewise to the piaclum. The juxtaposition of multa and piaclum, as found in Macrobi. i. 16. 9f. in connexion with the violation of the feast-day, reposes, is to be explained both by the municipal law of the Colonia Julia Genetiva (CIL ii. Suppl. 5439), cyp. 73, not only were those who interfered a body within the city obliged to pay a fine of 5000 sesterces—for which any citizen might take legal action—and threatened with the removal of the grave, but it was also ordained that, 'si adversus ea mortuus inlatus posset everti, expianto uti orportet,' i.e. a piaclum was required. On the other hand, the law of the Colonia Praetensis (CIL i. 3543) enjoined that one who had polluted the grove ('in hoc loco sacrum nec quis fundatid nee cadaver proiectus nee parentatis') should be punished either by a fine (which was recoverable at law by any citizen) or by a multa of the magistrates ('seis quis arvoris hæ facit, civi[um] quis velet pro iudicato[n] s[ensus] L manum inicet[is] estod. seivc mag[i]ster[ias] velet multare, [I[cetot]'], while by the ordinances of the temple of Poros (CIL ix. 3513) one who rifled the sanctuary was liable only to the multa of the aedile ('sei qui hic sacrum surrupuerit, aedilis multitio esto, quod velet'), nothing whatever being said of an expiation.

Since the Romans, as has been shown in the foregoing, regarded guilt in relation to the gods, and its remission by expiation, from the standpoint of mere legality, it is obvious that penitence in the sense of a repentant and contrite spirit, and of a course of conduct directed by such a spirit, did not come into consideration at all. This is seen unmistakably in the prayer accompanying the expiatory sacrifice for the 'lucum conticere' (Cato, 130), inasmuch as it contains no expression of regret or apology for the offence against the sacred laws or claims decrees: 'uti tibi ius est poreo piculo facere.'


G. Wissowa.

EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Teutonic).—Among the ancient Teutons expiation was the act by which peace was restored between the community and the wrongdoer, or his kindred on the other. An act of expiation prevented the outbreak of a feud, or put an end to one already going on. It was either a purely public act, as proclaimed inexpiably guilty by the co-operation of the legislative community, or in virtue of a legal judgment. In the latter case it falls within the sphere of criminal jurisprudence. That which was rendered by the wrong-doer for the purpose of expiating his violation of the peace was the 'boot' (O.N. and A.S. bêt, O.H.G. bôza, Germ. Bôse), 'redress,' 'indemnity,' 'atonement.'

1. Intervention of the Teutonic State. As hitherto times expiation and atonement must have been the concern exclusively of the families to which the doer and the sufferer of the wrong belonged. The period was till fine cases in which the families were reconciled without any intervention on the part of the larger community. Thus the Icelandic sagas tell repeatedly how the murderer made unconditional surrender to the slain man's next of kin, put his freedom and his life unreservedly into the latter's hands, and so made atonement for his crime. If, however, the man-slayer did not take this course, there ensued the family feud, which formed so important a feature of ancient Teutonic life. But, in general, even in the early historical period, the entire legislative community had a share in the business of reconciliation. For the rupture of a blood-feud between whom two families were affected not the injured family only, but also the community at large. It was the community, accordingly, which proscribed the wrong-doer, and thus made him incapable of the perpetration of further violence. Yet, that, when the outlawry was revoked and reconciliation effected, the community could claim a share in the indemnity, and even had the right to fix what the latter should be. In this way arose the practice of exacting fines, systematic regulations regarding which are found in the codes of all the Teutonic peoples. In the earlier period fines were paid in cattle (Tac. Germ. 12: 'equorum pecorumque usque ad imaginem sese') or in food, or other materials of general utility (corn, linen, etc.). This form was longest retained in Scandinavia, but was subsequently superseded—first of all in Southern Germany—by metals or monetary equivalents. Of such payments the injured party received the largest share, usually two-thirds, while the smaller portion was assigned to the public authority—in particular, to the ruler—or to the common good. The latter portion was the price of peace, the compositio, the recompense paid to the community for its share in the re-establishment of peaceful relations.

2. Feud and Outlawry.—Expiation presupposes a wrongful act. The party injured by such might be either an individual or a community (sacrilige, treason, desertion). In the former case the culprit was either the patrilineage with one of his fellows or with the kindred of the injured person; in the latter, with the community at large. The wronged individual and his kindred had the right of revenge. If the offender was caught in the act 'red-handed,' summary vengeance could be executed upon him; if not, the family of the person injured had the right of feud against the wrong-doer. The feud (O.H.G. fikida; A.S. feah) was a state of hostility between two patrilineages (see 16,000-blood feud [Teutonic), vol. ii. p. 337]. The earliest documents recognize the feud only in connexion with homicide; in later sources it extends also to such offences as the abduction of women, adultery, and gross violation of the laws of honour. The right lay entirely in the hands of the injured person and his relatives, and to them belonged also the right of fixing the expiation and indemnity. The usual method of this was the erection of an expiation-warrant, a 'wolf in the league,' who was at everybody's
mercy, and whose property any one might seize. This was also done when the cause of the wronged individual was espoused by the legislativo community—a practice found among most of the Teutons, particularly in the Frisian history of the period. Even then, however, the prosecution of the culprit—i.e. the proclamation of outlawry against him—was solely the affair of the injured party, and was considered as an adequate redress for the case of wilful injury. In cases of unintentional injury, the doer, according to the Scandinavian codes, had voluntarily and without delay to make satisfaction to the injured party, or, by the laws of the German tribes, to maintain an oath, and with the aid of a compurgator, that his act was really unintentional. But even outlawry was not usually permanent; it was circumscribed both as to time and as to locality, and could always be reversed by indemnity and expiation; while offences not involving feud and outlawry could also be absolved by the payment of compensation.

3. Conditions of reconciliation. The act of expiation involved certain formal conditions. To begin with, it had to take place within a given period, the length of which varied among the different codes. Thus in the Frisian code it had to be paid on the day that the wrong had been committed, or the act of the wrongdoer was considered as a suppliant before the person whom he had wronged, or his legal representative; and, finally, it had to be accepted on oath that, had he been the injured party, he would have been satisfied with the indemnity which he now offered. The two parties then took the oath of peace, i.e. declared the feud at an end, and sealed their reconciliation by a mutual embrace and the kiss of peace.

4. Compensation and fine. While the right of private vengeance and feud, together with the right to fix the indemnity, remained in force among the northern Teutons till far on in the Middle Ages, among the other Teutonic peoples proscription gave place at an early date to a system of fines. Outlawry was, in fact, resorted to only when such fines were not paid, and even then in a greatly mitigated form. In the earlier period it lay with the wronged individual to decide whether he would adopt the policy of vengeance and outlawry, or accept compensation; subsequently he was compelled to take the latter course. Thus the system of compensation was introduced in successive periods, but in all cases the extent and character of the injury, and the standing or family of the injured, were important considerations in its assessment. The indemnity for injury to any part of the person was estimated according to the utility of that part in earning a living. The legal tender of such compensation originally consisted of cattle. In this connexion, as was noted above, Tacitus mentions horses and small cattle; according to the Scandinavian codes, the standard of value in fixing compensation was the cow (kýgill, kjýgill). But we often find reference likewise to cloth (O.N. rísval, Fris. riswet), and also to corn, butter, and wax. It was only in a later age that animals and produce were superceded by the precious metals, and, among the southern Teutons, by coin. In North Scandinavia the pieces of metal were uniface, and were simply by weight in the form of rings (býggill, býggild). The nature and amount of the indemnity were not of course, matters of public concern in every case, but were sometimes arranged between the injured and the injured. The Frankish codes, in particular, made frequent mention of such private negotiations. Thus Gunni, having stunned the slave of a peasant with a blow, offered a mark as compensation to the master, who, though at first he thought the sum inadequate, finally accepted it (Lit. Siger, Fr. Fritse, the sixty histories of the period). Even then, however, the prosecution of the culprit—i.e. the proclamation of outlawry against him—was solely the affair of the injured party, and was considered as an adequate redress for the case of wilful injury. In cases of unintentional injury, the doer, according to the Scandinavian codes, had voluntarily and without delay to make satisfaction to the injured party, or, by the laws of the German tribes, to maintain an oath, and with the aid of a compurgator, that his act was really unintentional. But even outlawry was not usually permanent; it was circumscribed both as to time and as to locality, and could always be reversed by indemnity and expiation; while offences not involving feud and outlawry could also be absolved by the payment of compensation.

5. 'Wergeld.' A peculiar form of expiation is found in the wergild (O.H.G. werigold; Germ. Wergeld; O.N. manngild, mannbæotr), the sum of money which had to be paid for killing a man, and which came to be substituted for outlawry. The wergild, which was recognized by nearly all the Teutonic codes, might be doubled, or even trebled, in certain cases; it was, however, held in such esteem. The family of the slayer and that of the slain had each a part in the transaction. The former was required to produce the legal amount—a practice which was confined to this form of indemnity—while the compensation was likewise received by the relatives of the slain man in a body. Nor was this rule departed from when the man-slayer had fled or was dead. This fact suffices to show that the wergild was regarded not as a penalty but as an indemnification. The share which the individual relatives of the person slain had in the compensation was also regulated by law, but the mode of allotment was not everywhere the same. The custom of excluding women from participation was almost universal. The share of the male relatives was computed according to the principle that it must be directly in proportion to the nearness of kin to the slain man. According to the Icelandic sagas, which in this as in many other respects reflect older conditions, the amount of the wergild was arranged privately between the families of the individuals involved. When the money which carried the day, as we find it in the Leges barbarorum, and the Frisian, Anglo-Saxon, and Scandinavian codes. In the various nationalities the measure of the compensation was fixed in successive periods, but in all cases the extent and character of the injury, and the standing or family of the injured, were important considerations in its assessment. The indemnity for injury to any part of the person was estimated according to the utility of that part in earning a living. The legal tender of such compensation originally consisted of cattle. In this connexion, as was noted above, Tacitus mentions horses and small cattle; according to the Scandinavian codes, the standard of value in fixing compensation was the cow (kýgill, kjýgill). But we often find reference likewise to cloth (O.N. rísval, Fris. riswet), and also to corn, butter, and wax. It was only in a later age that animals and produce were superceded by the precious metals, and, among the southern Teutons, by coin. In North Scandinavia the pieces of metal were uniface, and were simply by weight in the form of rings (býggill, býggild). The nature and amount of the indemnity were not of course, matters of public concern in every case, but were sometimes arranged between the injured and the injured. The Frankish codes, in particular, make frequent mention of such private negotiations. Thus Gunni, having stunned the slave of a peasant with a blow, offered a mark as compensation to the master, who, though at first he thought the sum inadequate, finally accepted it (Lit. Siger, Fr. Fritse, the sixty histories of the period). Even then, however, the prosecution of the culprit—i.e. the proclamation of outlawry against him—was solely the affair of the injured party, and was considered as an adequate redress for the case of wilful injury. In cases of unintentional injury, the doer, according to the Scandinavian codes, had voluntarily and without delay to make satisfaction to the injured party, or, by the laws of the German tribes, to maintain an oath, and with the aid of a compurgator, that his act was really unintentional. But even outlawry was not usually permanent; it was circumscribed both as to time and as to locality, and could always be reversed by indemnity and expiation; while offences not involving feud and outlawry could also be absolved by the payment of compensation.

6. Indemnity and punishment. In cases other than the wergild, the compensation was graduated according to the damage entailed by the offence. Loss of property had to be made up by a reparation of equal amount, or by an equivalent in money; an imputation or a personal honour had to be made, and amends for a solemn withdrawal, etc. A peculiar form of reparation is found among the Franks from the 6th cent. A.D., viz. the 'banforfett,' or the 'king's ban.' This originated with the Merovingian kings, and forms a contrast to the other provisions of the Frankish tribal codes. Here the 'ban' was the sum of money paid to the king by those who did not comply with his decrees (670). Thus the 'king's ban' partakes of the nature of penalty rather than of indemnity. The latter, we must remember, was not originally a penalty, but simply a payment made in order to recover the protection of the law, and to indemnify the injured person. Thus, when the wrong-doer was no longer liable to
proscription, and the wronged was forbidden to avenge himself, that compensation was superseded by punishment and the right to demand punishment, including not only legal penalties but also the private vengeance of the community acted as the medium. Thereafter the injured party had merely the right to prefer an accusation, and the intervention of his family was disallowed. The penalty was thus a longer matter for the injured person to decide, but was regulated by law. Thus corporal and capital penalties were added to those which consisted of monetary fines.

7. Human sacrifice.—In the sphere of religion, expiation took a peculiarm form. When a man committed an offence against the gods, he was held guilty of a crime against the community as well, since the vengeance of the offended deity fell upon the community as a whole, so that— even in certain circumstances, as e.g. famine and storm, even many—of its members were put in peril of their lives. In such cases the deity could be propitiated only by the gift of a human life, and the practice thereupon to impute the crime to himself. Again, however, such a sacrifice was not a penalty, but an expiatory act. The criminal was first of all declared an outlaw, and thus excluded from the legal community, or, in Iceland, before the introduction of Christianity, we have the case of a man who was proscribed for sacrifice (Jal. Sognur. 11): he was thereby numbered among those who were unprotected by law, and could be dealt with as a sacrificial victim whenever such was required. But the sentence of outlawry by the community does not seem to have been pronounced in every case. One who had committed sacrilege was excluded from the legal community without any act of proscription or process of law, and was then treated as a slave or outlaw, by the offering of whose life alone the deity could be propitiated.

It is recorded, for instance, that King Olaf Trötelga of Sweden was offered up by his own people during a time of famine, because he had acted perfidiously as a sacrificial victim, and was thus a scourge of the gods. (Heimskringla. p. 37.) A crime against the gods, especially when their retribution manifested itself in storm or failure of crops, could be expiated by nothing less than a human sacrifice. If the anger of the gods broke forth at a time when the community had brought prisoners full of ease within its pale, or did not know of any, attempts were then made to assuage the divine wrath by an oblation of slaves or prisoners of war. Wherever such victims were not to be had, the person to be sacrificed was discovered by casting lots. It then appears that among the ancient Tenents of human sacrifice (q.v.) was not a punishment, but an expiation. Cf. art. Crimes and Punishments (Teut. and Slav.), vol. iv. p. 304, et passim a whole, so that same.


extreme unction.—i. Purpose and efficacy.—By the official teaching both of the Roman and of the Orthodox Greek Church the anointing of the sick and dying is recognized as one of the seven Sacraments. The Council of Trent (1545-1563) in its 14th Session deals with the subject at some length. It declares that the Redeemer of mankind, having provided all spiritual aids for the different emergencies of human life, wished also to guard the close of life by the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, as with a most firm defence. It urges the need of such help, on the ground that at the hour of death the assaults of the tempter are redoubled. Hence Christ, it is stated, instituted this sacrament as ‘truly and properly a Sacrament of the New Law.’ The rite, we are told, was foreshadowed in the anointing of the sick by the Apostles, spoken of in Mk 6:11, but it was ‘promulgated’ in Jn 19:30: ‘Is any among you sick? let him call for the elders of the church [i.e., the (Gr. πρεσβυτεροι; Vulg. presbyteros, AV and RV ’leaders’ of the church) and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord; and the prayer of faith shall save him that is sick, and the Lord shall raise him up; and if he have committed sins, it shall be forgiven him.’ In these words are indicated not only the matter, the form, and the proper minister of this sacrament, but also the effect.

‘For the “thing signified” here is the grace of the Holy Ghost, whose anointing cleanses away sins if there be any still to be expiated, and stays the remains of sins, and raises up and strengthens the soul of the sick person by exciting in him a great confidence in the Divine mercy, whereby the sick man being supported bears more easily the inconveniences and pains of his sickness, and more easily resists the temptation of the devil who lies in wait for his soul, and at times obtains bodily health when expedient for the welfare of his soul.

In the Eastern Church the principal stress is laid upon bodily healing. Thus the Shorter Russian Catechism simply states that the Church maintains ‘consists in this, that the sick man is anointed with oil, while grace is prayed for him. But the Longer Russian Catechism and the Canon of the Orthodox Church of Mosul, emphasizes also the spiritual effects, the last-named declaring (cap. 110) that, though health is not always obtained, nevertheless the forgiveness of sins is always most assuredly received.

To the Tridentine decree four anathemas are appended. The first condemns those who deny the Divine institution of the Sacrament and declare it to be only of Patriotic origin or a human signment. The third and fourth anathematizes those who maintain that the ritual of the Roman Church does not fully accord with the text of St. James, as well as those who would allow others than priests to administer the Sacrament. The second runs as follows:

‘If any one saith that the sacred anointing of the sick does not confer grace, or render sin, or comfort (either) the sick, but that it has now lost its efficacy, or that (though it were) a grace of working cures in bygone days, let him be anathema.

The view that St. James was not speaking of any truly sacramental anointing (cf. Loisy, Autour d’un petit livre, Paris, 1903, p. 251) was condemned in 1897 with other ‘Modernist errors’ in the decrees Lamentabili and Excommunication, Freiburg, 1898, no. 2948.

Speaking generally, it may be said that this account of the purpose and effects of the Sacrament is in close accordance with the teaching of Aquinas and the medieval scholastics. See, thus, the opinion there was between the Thomists and the
Scottish regarding the primary object (effectus principalis) for which it was instituted, the former maintaining that it was the comforting of the soul, the latter that it was rather the final remission of venial sins (see Kern, De Sac. Extr. Unctionis, pp. 219-221). It was a spiritual and metaphysical one and was without much practical bearing upon the popular conception of the Sacrament and its effects.

2. Ritual.—In the Church of Rome at the present day the rite of administration is brief and simple. Apart from one or two short and unessential prayers which preceede and conclude the ceremony, the rite consists in the anointing of the eyes, ears, nostrils, lips, hands, and feet of the sick person, the following formula being repeated at eachunction: 'Through this holy unction and His own most tender mercy, may the Lord pardon thee whatever offences thou hast committed quidquid deliquisti by right (by bearing, smelt, etc.).'

Formerly, in the case of men, the loins were also anointed, and the Ritual still retains the formula provided, but in practice this is now always omitted. Only a properly ordained priest can confer the Sacrament validly, and the oil used must be the unctionem infirmorum consecrated for this special purpose by the bishop on Maundy Thursday. If by some mistake a mineral oil should be used, or the oil of an other holy unction, or the unctionem infirmorum, should be substituted for the unctionem infirmorum, the validity of the Sacrament would be doubtful. Further, the proposition that in case of necessity, when episcopally blessed oil cannot be procured, a priest may validly use oil blessed by himself has been censured so far as concerns the Western Church. On the other hand, permission has long been accorded by the Holy See to the United Greeks to administer the ancient tradition of Eastern Christendom, according to which any simple priest who administers the Sacrament blesses the oil himself. That this was also, at least in some localities, the earlier practice in the West seems highly probable.

According to both the present and the former practice of the Western Church, the Sacrament is administered only to those who are suffering from serious illness, and thus at least remotely the danger of death. It may be reiterated, but not in the same illness, or at any rate not unless some new crisis has supervened. Among the Greeks and Syrians the latter proposition (it is not recognized by the Nestorians) the Sacrament of the Prayer-Oil (el Chiasm), as they call it, though a much more elaborate ceremony, requiring when possible the assistance of seven priests, is often administered in maladies of no gravity, and it is received on certain days of the year by persons in normal health as a preparation for Holy Communion. It is consequently very commonly administered in the church, and the forehead, nostrils, cheeks, chin, breast, and both sides of the hands are anointed with a brush or twig, the ceremony being repeated by each priest in turn. The form used begins as follows: 'Holy Father, physician of souls and of bodies, who did send Thy well-beloved Son our Lord Jesus Christ as the healer of every disease and our deliverer from death, heal also Thy servant X. from the spiritual and bodily infirmity that he may have life forever, through the grace of Christ, etc. After this, a number of saints are named, and amongst the rest the 'holy and moneyless physicians Cosmas and Damian' (see Malzow, Schranken, 492 ff). The oil used is commonly mixed with wine, and it is blessed by the principal priest present. In practice the Sacrament among the Greeks, as in the West, is often deferred until the sick man is in extremis, but the hope of a cure is always entertained. See, for example, Pataio, vol. Annae Karaman, bk. v. chs. 19-20. In both the Eastern and the Western Church an abbreviated form is sanctioned for cases when the danger of death is imminent.

3. Historic Remarks.—The unctionem infirmorum, of which oil was a primitive form of medical treatment (see Is 1:6; Jos. Bk. x. xxxiii. 5; Jk 10:9), and, like all other remedial measures, was peculiarly apt to be associated with religious observances (see Anointing, vol. i. p. 549 ff.), it is not altogether surprising that the early history of sacramental unction should be somewhat obscure. It was an observance which would not have provoked controversy by arousing the hostile criticism of pagans, and the faithful had no special reason to draw attention to it, since it was only the Christianized counterpart of customs, medicinal or magical, which every one recognized. Further, the existence of a non-sacramental use of consecrated oil is clearly deducible from the epistle of Innocent i. (ad Decentium, 8 [PL xx. 559]), from Cæcarius of Arles (PL xxxix. 2238), and from the Vita S. Genesii (ed. Kirschner, v. 2), the chrestian of the Holy Ointment, the unctionem infirmorum, to the sick by themselves or by a woman. Moreover, in other cases oil seems to have been employed in charismatical healing (Mk 6:8), under which we may include the instance mentioned by Tertullian (ad Scop. iv.), when Septimius Severus was cured by the Christian Proculus. Nor can we leave out of account the use of oil from the lamps in the basilicas, or oil sanctified by relics, etc. (see e.g. Chrysostom, hom. 38, to the Holy Ointment, III. 584); Cassian, Coll. vii. 26 (PL xiii. 706); Greg. Tur. Hist. Franc. iv. 36 (PL ixi. 299). But, just as the healing of Gorgonia after anointing herself with the sacred species of the Eucharist (Greg. Naz. Orat. vili. 18, and cf. JThSt xi. [1910] 275-279), a Western example of the same outward application of the Eucharistic species seems to be found in Cæcarius of Arles (PL xxxix. 2238) could not be cited as an argument against the sacramental character of the Eucharist at the same period, so this domestic use of consecrated oil does not seem to militate against the existence of an authorized and official sacramental use of the oil when recognized by the episcopal authority. In this light the letter of Innocent i. to Decentius, A.D. 416 (Denzinger-Bannwart, no. 99) seems quite intelligible. Decentius had doubted whether he, a bishop, was free to anoint the sick, seeing that only priests were mentioned by St. James.

Most certainly you are, the Pope replies in substance: 'even the simple faithful are allowed to use the blessed oil, and with much greater reason the bishop, who has power to consecrate it, has power to anoint with it and to bless the sick. But such anointing ought not to be administered to penitents (i.e. those undergoing penitential discipline), for it is an sacred rite quia genus est sacramentorum, and, if the other sacred rites are denied to penitents, why should this particular rite be conceded? (Quia quippe genus sacramentorum est, quandoque umnum genus patetet nostri).'

No doubt, this answer implies that the anointing was not then regarded as specially belonging to those in extremis, for penitents at the point of death would have been excluded by grace of reconciliation and the Eucharist. On the other hand, the formula for blessing the oil which we find in 'Serapion's Prayer-Book' (A.D. 556) is associated with a position in the liturgy of the rites of interment, though its terms clearly specify the restoration of health to both soul and body.

'Send the healing power of the only begetten upon this oil.' God is asked 'for his work which he has done in you by the grace and remission of sins, for a medicine of life and salvation, for health and soundness of soul, body, spirit, for perfect strengthening.'
The Vita S. Genoveca clearly shows that even then (c. A.D. 550) it was believed in Gaul that only a bishop had power to consecrate the oil (forte acedit ut Genoveca aevum non habert nec addeset in tempore pontifici qui ad praesens deo gratiam sanctificatoris infundere [c. 40]). Similarly the Vita S. Hypatius (AS, 17 June, p. 251) tells us how Hypatius, who was long inferior of his monastery, used, when any illness grew serious, to send for the abbot, ‘since he was a priest’ and Hypatius himself was not, in order that the sick man might be guarded against this Life. This Life was assigned by Bardenhewer to about the year 450. With the 8th cent. the evidence regarding the nature and rite of Extreme Unction grows more abundant. Bede, speaking in some detail in his commentary on St. James (P.L. xliii. 39), and St. Boniface (about 745) in his Canons orders priests to have the oil for the sick constantly at hand, and to instruct the faithful, when they feel ill, to apply for the Unction. Similarly in the 9th cent. many Councils, beginning with those of Chalons (813), Aachen (836), and Mainz (847), issue various injunctions on the subject, generally making allusion to the Epistle of St. James. Of all the Canons mentioned some seem to occur for the first time in the 15th of the Canons ascribed to Bishop Sonnatius: ’Extrema unctio deferator laboranti et petenti’ (Mansi, x. 599). These Canons may be as early as the 7th cent., but we have no certainty on this point. The name ‘Extreme Unction’ became common only at a considerably later epoch. It was in all probability suggested by its being the last in order of the sacraments, a man was prepared for, but no doubt the association of the Unction with the Pastourea and approaching death made the term seem specially appropriate.


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without the House of Commons, and its emphasis is still upon persuasion.

For the first time, in a sharp encounter and the policy of indirect and detailed activity an analogy was found in the tactics of Fabius Maximus (surnamed Cunctator, on account of his seeming dilatoriness), and the groupings of the Society. The plan of campaign was indicated by the following motto, the latter part of which will not bear exact historical scrutiny:

"For the right moment you must wait, as Fabius did most patiently. Henceforward nothing may check your delay; but, when the time comes, you must strike hard, as Fabius did, or your waiting will be in vain and fruitless."

The policy of delay did not, however, mean inactivity, but preparation of plans, training of forces, and seizing of small opportunities. Having no belief in the efficacy of separatist communities apart from the ordinary economic and political life (cf. COMMUNIST SOCIETIES OF AMERICA), the Fabians turned their back on Utopianism, and declared that Socialism must be not a withdrawal from existing conditions, but a transformation of them. Rejecting also the naive faith of the revolutionists—that, after a sudden outbreak in which the proletariat seized possession of the坊, a scheme would somehow settle down into an ordered Collectivism—they undertook the more arduous task of educating themselves and others regarding the means by which that social transformation might be achieved.

The standpoint of the Society was explicitly stated in the following "Basis":

"The Fabian Society consists of Socialists.

It is the mission of the Fabian Society by the emancipation of Land and Industrial Capital from individual and class ownership, and the vesting of them in the community for the general benefit, in this way only can the natural and acquired advantages of the country be equitably shared by the whole people.

The Society accordingly works for the extinction of private property in Land and of the consequent individual appropriation, in the form of Rent, of the price paid for permission to use the earth, as well as for the advantages of superior soils and sites.

The Society, further, works for the transfer to the community of the administration of such Industrial Capital as can conveniently be managed socially. For, owing to the monopoly of the means of production in the past, industrial inventions and the transformation of surplus income into Capital have mainly enriched the proprietary class, the worker being now dependent on that class for leave to earn a living.

If these measures be carried out, without compensation (though not without some relief to expropriated individuals as may seem best for the community), a real and earnest interest will be added to the reward of labour, the idle class now living on the labourers' savings will be disfranchised, and practical equality of opportunity will be maintained by the spontaneous action of economic forces, with much less interference with personal liberty than the present system entails.

For the attainment of these ends the Fabian Society looks to the spread of Socialist opinions, and the social and political changes consequent thereto, including the establishment of equal citizenship for men and women. It seeks to achieve these ends by the general dissemination of knowledge as to the relation between the individual and Society is its economic, ethical, and political aspect."

This basis, to which every member is required to subscribe, sufficiently indicates the main objects of Fabian Socialism; but it is upon the detailed application of these generalizations to concrete problems on the day that the actual work of the Society has been concentrated. Unlike some other groups of Socialists, it has refused to take sides on subjects which it views as outside its special province, such as religion and marriage. It wastes no time on discussions as to the precise form of currency to be used in the future State. But, whenever a political or social problem is being discussed or seems ripe for treatment, it devotes itself to careful study, propounds the Socialist solution, and opposes any measure which it cannot be brought into harmony with the Socialist principles. Thus, it has rejected peasant proprietorship as a solution of agrarian problems, and co-operative production by self-governing groups of workmen as an alternative to capitalism, the former being simply an extension of landlordism, and the private appropriation of rent, while the latter is merely a form of joint-stock individualism.

Both perpetuate the conditions which the Fabian Society desires to extirpate, and, while granting that there are very many questions of Socialist organization that are as yet unsettled, it strives to set the current of reform in a definite direction. Opportunists in the sense of seizing the favourable moment for propaganda, and mathematicians of materials, he is not opportunist in the sense of accepting any kind of solution which comes first to hand. He acts on principle, by advocating measures that appear to be consistent with the Socialist consummation.

2. Forms of activity. — In carrying out this method of social transformation the Society has done an unusual amount of educational work of a very practical nature. It has, in the main, worked to bring about a closer relation of present-day problems and institutions than has any other group. Fortnightly meetings for discussion of the subjects held in London, where the majority of Societies, of which each branch or a group of members devotes prolonged study to some single social question, and presents the results to the Society, by which they are again discussed; and, when conclusions have been reached that meet with the general approval of the members, they are printed and widely circulated in the form of pamphlets. About 160 of these "Tracts" have now been published, and, being generally well-informed and severely practical in tone, they, along with Fabian Essays, may be taken as the text-books of Fabian Socialism. The educational work has also taken the forms of circulating libraries supplied to trade unions, workmen's clubs, co-operative societies, and similar bodies; of the publication of select bibliographies on social subjects; and of supplying lecturers to various societies and classes; while a small monthly News is sent to the members. In this department of its work the Society had no small influence in the foundation of the London School of Economics, now a constituent college of the University of London.

3. Influence. — As might naturally be expected, the Society has appealed mainly to the more educated Socialists, and its members are usually of the middle class; its demand for its own purposes, except by the encouragement of branches in the Universities; but since 1906, when there were about 1000 members, there has been a relatively rapid increase, until now (1912) there are over 2000, besides many associates who are not committed to the basis, but are interested in the work and subscribe to its funds. Yet its power has been quite out of proportion to its numbers, chiefly because of the high-mindedness, and pre-eminence of its leaders; and, besides spreading Socialist opinions among the educated middle classes who stood aloof from other Socialist bodies, it has had no small share in influencing the tone of the English Labour movement and has also occasionally had a marked effect upon political programmes and measures.

4. Demands. — The more immediate demands of Fabianism are summed up in the following: (1) nationalization or municipalization of the larger public services, such as tramways, railways, lighting, electric-power, liquor traffic, and land, with the gradual extension of the principle to other industries; (2) the re-occupation of all land that is not being used to its full capacity; (3) a reduction of the number of hours of labour, to a maximum of eight per day for men and seven for women; (4) the nationalization of the banks, and the liquidation of the foreign and joint-stock banks. These are by no means constitutive of the programme of the Society, but rather an indication of the true character and tendency of its demand.
than may be necessary to make the livelihood of the people and their access to the sources of production completely independent of both. Subject to this condition, the Government, through individuals, test the social value of new inventions; to initiate improved methods of production; to anticipate and lead public enterprise in catering for new social wants; to promote all arts, crafts, and professions independently; in short, to complete the social organization by adding to the efficiency of private activity. Adjustment to the market of public routine, is as highly valued by the Fabian Society as any other article in the charter of popular liberties' (Tract No. 47, p. 9).

(2) The organization and development of a trained Civil Service, capable of managing the industries and functions taken over by the State, including the co-ordination of the medical and sanitary services, poor-law and other hospitals, under an enlarged public health authority which shall replace much of the private practice by a State service. (3) The imposition of public burdens on the wealthy by such means as death duties and super-tax. (4) The expansion of public education, raising the age for leaving school, increasing the facilities for poorer children to obtain higher education and to enter the universities. (5) Enlarged opportunities for recreation, by means of public parks, playgrounds, and baths. (6) Extension of factory and mine legislation in such a way that it will provide not only a national minimum of sanitation and safety, but also a national minimum wage below which the standard of life shall not be permitted to fall.

On the negative side, as against some schools of Socialists, Fabianism repudiates the doctrine of the individual's 'right to the whole produce of his labour,' insisting that wealth is social in its origin and must be social in its distribution, since it is impossible to distinguish the particular contribution that each person makes to the common product. It also rejects doctrines of equal wages, equal hours of labour, equal official status, and equal authority for every one. Such conditions it declares to be not only impracticable, but incompatible with the equality of subordination to the common interest which is fundamental in modern Socialism. While most of the Tracts deal almost exclusively with economic questions, this ethical note frequently recurs; and the Society has issued a few publications on moral aspects of Socialism, besides insisting elsewhere upon the duty of the Fabian service to the common welfare. But it does not advocate Socialism as a panacea for the ills of human society, but only for those produced by defective organization of industry and by a radically bad distribution of wealth' (Report on Fabian Policy, 1896, p. 8).

5. Criticisms.—The Fabian Society has been subjected to much criticism by both Socialists and others. Objection has been taken to its indirect, insidious, and underground methods of permutation, which, indeed, were at one time more questionable than they now are. Mr. Shaw boasted in 1892 of the solid advantages they had gained by undermining Liberal and Conservative associations and adroitly pulling all the wires they could lay their hands on. This is denounced both by friends and by opponents of Socialism as sailing under a false flag; but latterly the artfulness has taken the more legitimate form of obtaining support for Socialist measures by attempting to convince people that the new reform is only an extension of long-recognized principles. So long as every one knows that the Fabian aim is Socialism, there can be little objection to enlisting even conservative instincts in the cause of a particular change. Indeed, there is much in the Fabian conception of utilizing existing institutions; and some of its leaders have such a dread of any form of destruction that they are censured by the more revolutionary Socialists. These not only condemn Fabian opportunism, but sneer at the Society as the cult of the Civil Service, composed of middle-class men, who may naturally be expected to decry the class-war and to work for a bureaucracy staffed from its own ranks.

Other criticism comes from moderate Socialists, who are much more sympathetic towards its aims, but are not satisfied with its methods. Granting that the waiting policy was defensible in the early years of the movement, these critics consider that the Society has retained it even when the time has come to 'strike hard,' and that now it should employ all its resources in furthering an open Socialist campaign in politics. Socialism, it is urged, will be more effectively achieved by making people Socialists than by insidiously attempting to get Socialist measures adopted without the electorate knowing that they are such. Indeed, it is pertinent to ask if there can be much real benefit in securing a few socialized industries, if the majority of the advocates of Socialist ideals. More nationalization or municipalization is not an end in itself; and, if it is to be of much social service, it must be accompanied by an expansion of the Socialist spirit, which is being balked by the wheel of one at a time. It seems at present to be no little difference of opinion within the Society itself in this respect. Some urge it to give whole-hearted support to the Labour party, and to exclude from its membership all who will not do so. Others desire the establishment of a Socialist party quite independent of the Labour party. But the dominant opinion remains favorable to complete liberty of the members to act as they please in party politics, and to the traditional policy of permutation, since it is a delusion that all reform must be effected through a single party.

It is also alleged that the habit of limited action has had an enervating effect, while hostility to revolution and the policy of utilizing existing machinery for new functions have tended to an excessive reverence for the present institutions. In particular, it has been complained by H. G. Wells, who was once a member of the Fabian Society, that its insistence upon continuity 'developed into something like a mania for achieving the old Socialist ideals with the aid of that ruling body' (New Worlds for Old, p. 298). This led to the advocacy of public operation of industries, even in small and unsuitable areas, under incompetent boards and councils, with effects which have sometimes tended to discredit Socialism. Hence it is urged that the socialization of industries cannot proceed much further without a reconstruction of administrative areas, and the typical Fabian policy of building Socialism is the foundation of the existing machinery of Government has almost reached its limit. The areas of local government were not created for the operation of industrial enterprises, and are not ill-adapted to many of them. Recently, however, the Society has devoted some attention to this phase of the Socialist reconstruction, and has issued a number of Tracts under the New Horizon Series, advocating changes in administrative areas to render them more suitable to the requirements of public trading.

LITERATURE.—The best known literary product of the Society is the volume of Fabian Essays on Socialism, London, 1890. Most of the Fabian Tracts may still be obtained from the secretary, 3 Chatsworth Inn, London, some of them have been grouped together and reprinted in the volumes of The Fabian Socialist Series. G. Bernard Shaw, The Common Sense of Municipal Reform, London, 1899, and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, do. 100, and Problems of Modern Industry, do. 108, 1899, show the influence of Fabian works. The following contain expositions or criticisms

**FABLE.**—Fable originally meant 'a thing said,' and thus a story or narration (as in Horace's 'Mutato nomine, de te fabula narratur' [Sat. I. 1. 70]); and Dryden wrote 'Fables' of men and women present in modern English usage the word is mainly restricted to Beast-Fables, or short narratives about animals, having a moral application which is generally expressed in an explicit 'moral' at the end. The fable in this more restricted sense has to be distinguished from the Beast-Ancedote, and especially from the Beast-Satire, in which beasts, by their antics and wiles, parody and satirize the worst qualities of men, as in 'Reynard the Fox' (see MacCulloch, CP, poem). There is one further quality inherent in the fable which should be emphasized at the outset for reasons shortly to be given; they appeal largely to the sense of the fun; the first thing George Eliot remembered laughing at was one of Asop's Fables (Life, by Cross, 1885, i. 20). A German might, accordingly, on the analogy of Tendenzroman, define the fable as a 'Moral-Tendenz Beast-Droll.'

In this strict sense, its independent and original production is practically restricted to two countries—Greece and India. Sporadic instances occur elsewhere, as in Jotham's (Jg 9-11) and Jehovah's (2 K 14) fables in the OT, or in the fable of 'The Belly and Members' given in Livy (ii. 32), and repeated by Shakespeare in Coriolanus, though even here the 'moral' is not explicitly given; but for any large body of fables we have to look to China and to India. If we associate them with the name of Aesop; in the latter they can, in many instances, be connected with the Jatakas, or birth-stories of the Buddha. The main problem suggested by the fable is the connexion between the two. This, again, is mainly a literary problem, though there can be no doubt that originally fables both in Greece and in India were current among the folk.

The fables known as Aesop's Fables, which have spread throughout Europe, can be traced back to a collection in Latin and German published soon after the invention of printing by Heinrich Stahnhaum and Anthonius Leister, about the year 1479. In some years, translated into Italian, French, Dutch, English (by Caxton), and Spanish. This consists of a Life of Aesop (connected with the legend of Abiqsar [g.v.]), four books derived from a medieval collection of fables known as Romulus, a selection of the fables of Avian, some from a previous selection made by Ramutio, others called 'extravagant,' and two collections of rather coarse anecdotes from Lucian and Peter Alphonse. The Romulus has turned out to be entirely medieval prose renderings of Phaedrus, a Greek freedman of Augustus, who flourished in the early years of the 1st cent. A.D. He gives survivals of Phaedrine fables which are no longer extant in verse form, such as 'The Town and the Country Mouse,' 'The Ass and the Lap-Dog,' and 'The Lion and the Mouse.' It may accordingly be said that our Aesop is Phaedrus with a mixture of English, in verse form, such as 'The Town and the Country Mouse,' 'The Ass and the Lap-Dog,' and 'The Lion and the Mouse.'

Besides these prose renderings of Phaedrus, which form the bulk of the modern European Aesop, there exist a number of Greek prose renderings which were composed after the original Aesop, but have been proved by Bentley and others to have been derived from a metrical collection in choriambics by one Valerius Babrius, tutor to the son of the Emperor Severus, who flourished about A.D. 255, and whose fragments were discovered on Mt. Athos by Minioles Menas in 1849. Babrius, in his preface, refers to two sources—Aesop for Hellenic fable, and Kylibes for 'Libyan' fable; and Jacobs has suggested that the latter collection ran to about one hundred in number, and was derived directly or indirectly from a Sinhalese emnassy which came to Rome about 1479. Probably Phaedrus refers (iii., Proteg. 52) not only to Aesop but to Anacharsis the Scythian, as his sources; and some of the Indian elements which he disregards may have come from this source; but there were such Indian elements in Phaedrus and Babrius as well as in Avian (who flourished c. A.D. 375) can scarcely be doubted after a glance at Indian fables.

In India, fables in the strict sense, i.e. humorous Beast-Stories with 'moralis,' are found not only in the Bipalit literature, but, much earlier, in the Jatakas. These were brought over to Ceylon in the 3rd cent. B.C., and are probably a couple of centuries earlier. They consist of a 'Story of the Present,' in which some adventure of Buddha is told, which reminds the Master of a 'Story of the Past,' which he proceeds to relate, summing up his moral in a Gatha, in verse, and with the connexion of the 'Story of the Past' with that of the 'Present' by pointing out that one of the characters was a previous incarnation of either a disciple or a king. In the Indian fables, there is a previous incarnation of himself. Now, several of these 'Stories of the Past' are fables in the strict sense of the word, and several are actually identical with some of the most familiar of Aesop's Fables. Jacobs in his History of the Aesopic Fables has pointed out thirteen of these, including 'The Wolf and the Crane,' 'The Ass in the Lion's Skin,' 'The Wolf and the Lamb,' 'The Fox and the Crow,' 'The Bald Man and the Fly,' and 'The Goose that lays the Golden Eggs.' Other parallels are given by the same writer between Greek fables and Indian ones that occur in the Mahabharata and in the earlier strata of the Bipalit literature. These include 'The Oak and the Reed,' 'The Belly and Members,' 'The Lion and the Mouse,' 'The Farmer and the Serpent,' 'The Two Pots,' and 'The Cat turned into a Maiden.'

The critical problem of the fable is to determine whether the Indian form is derived from the Greek or vise versa.

The solution to this problem is given by the thirty fables in the Aesopic form which he calls 'Moralistic literature. Except in three or four cases, all these can be paralleled either in Indian or in Greek fable or in both. In the last instance the Talmudic form invariably follows the Indian wherever it differs from the Greek. Thus in 'The Two Pots' the Talmudic proverb (Esther Rabbba 2a), 'If a stone falls upon the pot, woe to the pot; if the pot fall upon the stone, woe to the pot,' resembles the story of the Biped, 'I like a stone that breaks a pot, the mighty remain unhurt,' rather than the fable familiar to us. So too, in the fable of 'The Wolf and the Crane,' both Talmud and Jatakas have the lion as the animal with the sore throat, and the Jewish form of 'The Belly and Members' is closer to the Indian than to the Aesopic form. The Talmud itself mentions (Sukka 28a) that Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai (c. A.D. 90) knew both the 'Fables of Kosis' and the 'Fables of Kohsm,' and it has been suggested by Jacobs that the latter is a misreading for 'Kubis,' and thus identical with the Kylibes mentioned by Babrius as one of his sources. It is possible that some Greek fables should have been translated into Hebrew and changed by the Rabbis and then taken to India. The process must have been in the reverse order, especially as the Jatakas are earlier than the first collection of Aesopic fables made by Demetrius of Phaleron, who founded the
Library of Alexandria about 300 B.C. and there collected Greek proverbs and the sayings of the Seven Wise Men, as well as Aesop's Fables—all from the mouths of the people (Diog. Laert. v. 89).

Quite apart, however, from the Talmudic evidence, the probabilities are in favour of India on general grounds. India is the home of incarnations and therefore, in the mythologies of the Hindus, to imagine animals acting as men, whose predecessors they were, whereas in Greece such a belief was at best a 'survival,' and was no longer living in the thoughts of the people. The existence of the 'moral' in the fable properly so called may be traced back to the Gáthás, which formed the nucleus of the Játakas, the two 'Stories of the Present and Past' being given as explanations of these metrical morals. In earlier Greek literature only eight complete fables are known, with a dozen others only referred to, the latter, however, including 'The Ass's Heart,' 'The Countryman and the Snake,' 'The Dog and the Shadow,' 'The Cat turned into a Maiden,' all of which can be traced to India, though the occurrence of these fables is in most instances earlier than Alexander's invasion.

The possibility of the same fable having arisen independently in the two countries may be at once dismissed. Two minds in different countries may hit upon the same story to illustrate a simple wile of woman or a natural set of revenge, but it is in the highest degree improbable that two moral teachers, trying to inculcate the dangers of the lowly with the proud, should express it by the imagery of two pots floating down a stream. In one case, however, there exists absolutely evidence of the direct derivation of classical fables from India. There is a fable of 'The Farmer and the Serpent,' in which the farmer receives benefits from the serpent, but he or his son strikes it, which brings the friendship to an end. This occurs both in Latin (Romæus ii. 10), derived from Phædrus, and in Greek (Halm, 1852, p. 96), derived from Babrius. Both forms, however, are imperfect, whereas the Indian, given in the Panchatantra (iii. 5), assigns the motive for every incident, and practically combines the Greek in the Latin forms, which are thus shown by Benfey (Pantchatantra, Leipzig, 1883) to have been derived from it. But, while the presumption is in favour of India, where both collections of fables contain the same stories with the same morals, it would be hazardous to assume that all the Greek fables came from India. Of those extant in Latin—running to about 290—56, or about one quarter, have been traced with more or less plausibility to India; the remainder, till evidence is shown to the contrary, may be regarded as originating in Greece and connected with the name of Aesop. Very little is known of the putative father of Greek fable. Herodotus (ii. 134) reports that he was, together with Rhodopis, a slave in Samos, which would fix his date at about 550 B.C.; he also reports that Aesop was murdered and that his master's grandson received wergild for him by direction of the Delphic oracle. As all this occurred within a century of Herodotus' period, there can be no doubt of its substantial accuracy. But it does not follow that Aesop was necessarily the author of the Greek fables passing under his name and referred to by the Jatakas, the latter of whom occupied some of his days in prison, while waiting for his end, in putting a few Aesopic fables into verse. The casual way in which references are made to fables in classical Greek literature would seem to imply that they were not a part of the moral month to month among the folk, and the problem connected with them in Greece is to account for their being associated with the name of a special person. This was probably due to their humorous colouring, since it is usual for folk-drolls to be associated with special names of persons, as in the case of Pasquill, John Bull, Punch, and Jack; the folk mind seemingly requires a jest to be associated with a name which has previously elicited guffaws. As Aesop's period was that of the Tyrants, hisconnexion with them is so evident as to prevent any direct derivation of the fable from political purposes. The only fable directly connected with his name by Aristotle (Hæt. ii. 20) was of this kind. The association of the name of Aesop with what was practically a branch of Greek (or partly Indian) folklore was thus due to its humorous character in the first place, and then to its political application. Wherever we can trace the introduction of the fable, it is almost invariably associated with political applications. Both the Biblical fables and that in Livy are applied politically. Rabbi Joshua ben Hananiah applied the fable of 'The Wolf and the Crane' to prevent a revolution of the Jews against the Romans (Gen. Rabb. xiv.), Kritoph and his followers made use of the fable in Russia to reflect upon the bureaucracy; and, when Aesop was first translated into Chinese, the officials soon suppressed the edition because they considered the fables to be directed against them.

Throughout the history of the Greek fable a distinction was made between the Aesopic and the 'Lybian' fable; Aristotle makes this distinction, as well as Habrius and the Emperor Julian. Hence it would appear that the Greeks themselves recognized that a certain section of fables had an exotic origin which, with our later knowledge, may be assumed as the percolation of these very fables into India, which has been already mentioned, the Aesopic fables current among Greeks were collected and written down by Demetrius Phalerus, and it was from this collection that Phædrus derived his fables, since he included among them an anecdote about Demetrius himself. His collection contains several that can be traced back to India, so that these must have percolated thence in the wake of Alexander's army, or even at an earlier stage, since 'The Cat Maiden' fable, ultimately derived from India, occurs in Greece, being quoted by the dramatist Strattis about 400 B.C. Whether the Indian forms started the practice of attaching a 'moral' to a fable corresponding to the Gáthás cannot be determined. The earlier history of the fable in India, before it was taken up into the birth-stories of the Buddha, cannot be definitely traced, though it is remarkable that almost all the Játakas containing fables begin with the formula 'Once on a time, when Brahmaddatta was reigning in Benares,' and the previous incarnation of the Buddha was in the person of Kásyapa, the son of this Brahmaddatta. It is possible, therefore, that a separate collection of Beast-Fables existed connected with this Kásyapa, which was incorporated in the Játakas by assuming him to be a pre-incarnation of the Buddha. It was thus easy for the Buddhist authorities to assume that these fables represented the experiences of the Master in his previous lives. Thus the lamb in the Játakas is no sooner the subject of the verse than the prattle of a young Brahmin, and the crane in the fable of 'The Wolf and the Crane,' are both incarnations of the Buddha. The stories, however, probably existed as Beast-Tales among the Jatakas before they were incorporated into the Buddhist canon.

Thus, both in Greece and in India the fable existed first as a piece of folklore in oral tradition, and was applied to moral purposes by the Buddhists, and to political purposes by the Romans. In India they were written down in order to form part of the Buddhist canon, while in Greece they
were collected by Demetrius in his search for the wisdom current among the folk, whether in the form of proverbs, sayings of wise men, or fables. Fables are thus an interesting and early example of the transformation of oral into written literature.

Very few additions were made to the original stock of fables current in the classical world—in Latin by Phaedrus and Avian, and in Greek by Babrius; the former being translated into poor Latin prose (Romulus), the latter into equally ineffectual Greek prose (collected by Neveletus, 1617). But towards the end of the 12th cent. a couple of sets of new fables made their appearance. Marie de France translated from the Middle English a set of 103 fables, a third of which are unknown to classical antiquity. Many of these also occur in a set of 107 fables with the Talmudic title Mille Shabb'atim ('Fox Fables'), written by one Berachjah ha-Nadgen, who has been identified with an English Jew known in the contemporary records as Benedict le Puncteur, mentioned as living in Oxford in 1294. Both these collections contain Oriental elements found in Arabic literature, but their exact provenance has not yet been traced. Stainshole inserted a dozen or so of them in the fifth section of his Esopo; other additions to the fable world are made by Fontaine, mostly from Oriental sources. These include the story of Perrette, who counted her chickens before they were hatched, which Benfey, and after him Max Muller, traced all the way from India to France. Gellert in Germany, Gay in England, and Krillof in Russia have imitated the Asopical fable, but their additions have not been accepted by the people, and the European Esopo to this day is practically identical with the collection of classical antiquity.

Fable with its explicit 'moral' is thus a highly differentiated form of the Beast-Tale, and it must not be considered remarkable that it occurs in full force only in one or two countries. Aesop's fables, and tales about beasts are found everywhere—in South Africa (Block) and among the American negroes ('Uncle Rennus'). An attempt has been made by Sir Richard Burton to trace the fable, properly so called, to Africa, and to suggest that it recalls reminiscences by man of his animal ancestors. The sole basis of this bizarre theory, however, is an Egyptian paraphrase of the fable of 'The Mouse and the Lion', followed in a late Egyptian papyrus, which also contains Copite versions of the 'Ritual of the Dead'; and it must, therefore, be summarily rejected. Wherever we find the fable with its distinctive moral, it can be traced either by derivation or imitation to Greece or India.

Yet the conceptions at the root of the fable are primitive enough; they contain almost the first moral abstractions, or at least personifications of the cruder virtues and vices; in them courage is personified by the lion, greed by the wolf, cunning by the fox, innocence by the lamb, etc. Early man may in this way have learnt his first lessons in moral abstraction; to him cunning was foxiness, moral acumen was lion-sense, and cruelty wolf-hood. Even to the present day we have no other way of referring to one of the ruling motives in a capitalistic society than by speaking of the 'Dog in the Manger,' the 'Cat and the Canard,' the 'Fox in the Hen's Nest.' The so-called 'primitive races' do dwell in the primitive mind of children, which is the more direct owing to the absence of any reference in them to the sex-motive. The touch of fun, which follows and often element of fables, is another attraction for children. The love, and cruelty, too, in other children, the morals they incite are not very lofty, since they are necessarily confined to animal qualities. The higher elements of culture—knowledge, love, beauty, consideration for others—are altogether beyond their parvus.

But the appeal of a fable to the mind of the child remains to-day as strong as ever, and the Asopical fable is probably, outside of the Bible, the only literature known to practically all Europeans. Cf. also art., Fiction, Folklore and Keynrdard the Fable.

LITERATURE.—The above account summarizes a somewhat elaborate History of the Asopical Fable, which forms the first volume of the edition of Caxton's 'Fables' (now in 1912. 3 vols.) by J. Jacobs, London, 1888. This contains a full account of the previous literature and critical investigations by Cruous on Babrius, Hervieux on French, Grose on English, and of the numerous collections of other nations, of which many have been translated by scholars; see, for example, S. Arthur Strong, Collected Fables, London, 1912. A more popular account will be found in Jacobs, Fables of Egypt, London, 1894. The following works may also be consulted: A. MacNeile, Folk and Fable-Tales from an Eastern Forest, London, 1891; J. Jacobs, in J.R. i. 2111, v. 234. Cf. The Bibliography in MacNeile, op. cit.

FA-HIAN.—The first Chinese traveller in India. As to his Book of the Buddhist Kingdom, see YUAN CHWANG.

FAIRY.—Fairies or elves may be described at this stage as a non-human race, the belief in whom is mainly known as it exists among the Egyptians, Greeks, and Teutons. There is little difference in attributes, characteristics, and actions between Celtic fairies and Tontonic or Scandinavian elves, dwarfs, and trolls; and much the same cycle of history and beliefs is common to both. But among other European folk, Slavic or Latin, there are similar stories told of fairy-like beings, while Arabs, Hindus, Chinese, and savages of all regions believe in more or less supernatural beings. Many things are told which offer a curious parallel to the Celtic and Tontonic fairy superstition. Thus, though the popular idea of fairies is that of a supernatural race existing in the fairy world of the Eastern and West Europe, a scientific explanation of the belief must take a wider sweep. And, while the popular idea mainly regards the fairies whose occupation it is to dance in the moonlight, our investigation must also include house fairies and fairies of wood, stream, or other parts of wild Nature.

From the abstract Lat. nauta fata, 'fate,' was derived a late Lat. or Italian personal noun Fata, equivalent to Fairee. Antiquus uses the word in this sense, speaking of Alar Fata; and Procopius (De Stat. Goth., 1. 25) mentions a Fata, which was assigned to the planets, and was said to have the name of the Roman equivalent of the Mopsa; hence in Romance languages the words for 'fairy,' Fal., Faute, Span. Sana, Portuguese Fata, etc., were derived, for constellations. From fata came in med. Lat. fatare, 'to enchant,' which became in Fr. fatare, with a p. fem. fatares, the common people's word for the 'fairy damsels, enchanted ladies'; and a 14th cent. passage, les fées ce septens doutez qui disent que les gens estes et en fées ses leus a bice, laissent a cor'. The same sense is found in Scots 'fay.' From fata was formed a noun faerie, faeria, 'enchanted,' Illusion, which was adopted into English, but with different senses—(1) the region of the fées, (2) the people of fairyland, (3) an individual fairy, with pl. 'fairies.' pl. 'elves.' El' comes from N. fyr, A.S. e; cf. M.H.G. elf, genius, pl. elben. It is generally connected with Skr. yuh, 'artistic spire.' The German word 'elf' was borrowed in the 13th cent. from the same English word.

1. Varieties of fairies.—In the Edda the Lioselfar ('light elves') dwell in Alheim, and are divided from the Dökkelfar ('dark elves') dwelling underground, who, again, are separated from the Dvergar ('dwarfs'), perhaps named Svartalfar, who originated as maggola from Ymir's flesh, and now, in later works, are the sons of the Dvergar. But the latter can hardly be distinguished from Dökkalfar, and are sometimes identified with them, or in their proper names the word elfar occurs. In folk-belief the distinction between light and dark elves is not clear, and elves are both light and dark by turns, while the widest class is an earth- or under-earth-dwelling race, though there are elves of air or sky. Other kinds are associated with the house, with the forest, with the mine (scarcely to be distinguished from...
dwarfs). Such a division generally holds good for all Teutonic, Scandinavian, or Anglo-Saxon lands, and it corresponds, on the whole, to the Celtic groups of fairies, though the chief class of the latter, the beanán, are not always a dwarf-like folk. The Celts have also their dwarflike fairies, as well as house, water, and (to a less extent) woodland fairies. But these divisions hold good in folk-belief all over Europe, both in ancient and modern times. Though it is also evident that the dwarfs strictly so called—vægor, vrege, drows, bhinn, nais, cluricauns—are metal-workers, but this is also true of elves in the Edda.

2. Characteristics.—Fairies are generally regarded as of a nature between spirits and men, or as spirit beings with the semblance of a body which, to quote Kirk (Secret Commonwealth of Elves, Fairies, and Fae) e, ed. Lang, 1893), is 'spurious, thin, and defective.' In many aspects they are like mankind. They have their occupations, amusements, fightings. They marry and bear children. But they have powers beyond those of ordinary mortals, yet like those attributed to mediciners, sorcerers, and witches. They are regarded as a separate race of superior beings, as many of their titles suggest—for still folk, 'the race of the fey.' O'Farrell states while in the Edda the Ælfar are a distinct class of beings. They have a king or queen, usually the latter, and the names of some of these are known—Fionnabh, Aine, Aoibhinn, Clodna, Midna, Gwien, Huldra, Oberon (=Alberon). There are also single fairies—the Irish leprechaun, the Brownie, etc.—not living in communities. In their dwellings, as seen occasionally by mortals, they have great splendour and luxury. But often all this proves to be mere glamour when the mortal comes to himself (perhaps one source of the fairy glamour conception is to be found in the rude awakening to the grim realities of life after a happy dream experience).

Separate fairy bands are sometimes at enmity; this is already found in old Celtic tales of the sid folk (RCD xvi. (1805) 275). Frequently fairies are regarded as a diminutive folk, but there is much contradiction on this subject, and many fairies (the feé of S. Europe, the Slavic sides, and the sid folk of Ireland) are hardly to be distinguished in size from men. Though the size of fairies may be tall, others pygmy, but the varying size is sometimes due to their power of changing their form. Once fairies were regarded as small, their smallness would tend to be exaggerated. Usually great beauty is ascribed to female fairies, but certain groups of fairies—dwarfs, kobolds, etc.—are ugly and misshapen. Their clothing is often of a green or red colour, though the Teutonic dwarfs are dressed in grey (cf. the 'elfin grey' in Tanlame). They are all intensely fond of music, singing, and dancing (as also are witches), as well as of feasting, and are often represented as spending the whole night in revelry, which has an inevitable attraction for mortals, who are lured into the dance to their own eventual discomfort or worse. No picture is more charming than that drawn by folk-belief of the nightly fairy revels on the greensward. The marks of these form the fairy-rings in which it is dangerous to tread or sleep, and which are also attributed to the witches' Sabbat. This feature may connect fairies with actual rites of an orgiastic character among the folk, performed for purposes of agricultural magic, or with folk-festivals in which music and dancing figure. In part the Sabbat is also

connected with these (see Grimm, Teut. Myth. 187, 470; Scott, Minstrelsy, 213; Delrio, Diso. Mag., 1599-1600, p. 179). The fairies disappear from their revels at dawn, or their power ceases then—a trait shared by many other beings by witches (MacCulloch, OF, 1905, p. 105). They dislike being seen by mortals, and he who looks upon them or their doings is usually brought within their power. They punish with blindness those who possess some knowledge of them when they are invisible to others, and again their look is of itself sufficient to bewitch. It is also dangerous to enter their domain without due precautions (see § 11).

But it is in their magical powers that the special characteristics of fairies appear. They have the power of invisibility, e.g. by wearing a magic cloak or hat, or by means of some herb, e.g. fern-seed (see 1 Hen. IV. Act ii. Sc. 1). This power they could also confer on mortals. Immortality is sometimes ascribed to them, especially in poetry (Ariosto, Orlando Fur. x. 47; Beaumont and Fletcher, Faithful Shepherd, etc.). The fairy glamour has already been referred to, and it corresponds with their power of making time appear long or short to those mortals who are lured into their company. They have also the power of making invisible or hidden things, or of divining where they are. Thus it is easy to see why powers of this kind (divination, second-sight) should be regarded sometimes as fairy gifts to mortals.

Yet, in spite of all their powers, fairies are curiously dependent on men. They seek to reinforce their own race by stealing human children; or they steal women who in child-bed, in order to unite with them or that they may nurse their children. In such cases the place of the stolen child or woman is often taken by a fairy (see CHANGELING). They compel women to come and assist at child-birth their females or those whom they have stolen. Or they may steal the infant of other mortals, or they steal men, usually by luring them into the fairy dance (cf. the luring of men into the Sabbat), or by taking them by fascination or force to fairyland (see an early instance in O'Grady, Tales Gaelilic, 1892, ii. 204 ff.). The purpose of these kidnappings and unions is to improve the fairy race, to obtain human strength or beauty, or perhaps to share in the spiritual benefits of the religion from which fairies are supposed to be excluded (cf. de la Motte Fouqué's Undine, Eng. tr., 1875). On the other hand, men often steal fairy brides. Cattle are also stolen by fairies, an illusory appearance being sometimes left in their place, which has an evident attraction for mortals, who are lured into the dance to their own eventual discomfort or worse. No picture is more charming than that drawn by folk-belief of the nightly fairy revels on the greensward. The marks of these form the fairy-rings in which it is dangerous to tread or sleep, and which are also attributed to the witch's Sabbat. This feature may connect fairies with actual rites of an orgiastic character among the folk, performed for purposes of agricultural magic, or with folk-festivals in which music and dancing figure. In part the Sabbat is also

1 Some folk-songs and lullabies are said to have been learned from fairies (see, e.g. Journ. of Folk-Song Soc. 3 (1891) 174, and passim).
them off by night and make them travel long distances, sometimes using them as steeds; the men when they awake in the morning are more or less conscious of this. The trick is also alleged sometimes as an explanation of paralytic stiffness. It is obviously connected with the phenomena of senes-

cambulism and nightmare, though the belief itself might sometimes be exploited by unscrupulous mortals to explain any mysterious absences of the young people. They say that they took men (cf. the Poltegeist and the house-fairy when insulted).

A favourite trick is to give men gold which turns into worthless articles (but worthless things offered as a reward for human services often turn to gold [Hartland, 48 f., 184; Simrock, Handbuch der deutschen Mythologie]; Bonn, 1897, p. 427]). They are easily irritated, capricious in their character, and given to resentment. More than this, they are dangerous and even cruel, especially when despised or ill-treated, causing injury, illness, madness, or death, usually by a 'fairy stroke' (§ 6). Hence the folk seek to placate them or to enlist their assistance by the gift of magic words, etc. But these objects are often stolen by mortals from fairyland. Supernatural and magic powers are also given by them to mortals (cf. the gift of prophecy—the tongue that could not lie—to Thomas à Becket; Lan, Demonology, 1898, Letter 5, Minstrelsy, p. 212). They also preside at birth, and confer talents on the child.

Thus the relation between men and fairies is a reciprocal one. Each seeks help from the other. Each harms the other. Men are now contemptuous, now afraid of fairies. Fairies are now friendly, now hostile to men. We may see here the survival of older religious ideas—of gods now kind, now evil, and of benefits rendered by them to men out of all proportion to the attention paid to them. This is an old aspect of sacrifice—du ut des.

Fairies in Christian lands are generally regarded as devils, demons, signs, and things kept at a distance, and they fear sacred days (see an early instance in Adamnan, Vita S. Columb., cap. 9), while a demoniac character is attributed to those beings whom the literature says are good people, 'guid neighbours,' 'gute Holden,' 'gentry,' etc. (see EUPHEMISM, § 2).

On the other hand, fairies often assist mortals, especially for local services (articles borrowed, advice given, etc.), and are very generous. This is especially true of the house-fairy, who is sufficiently rewarded with a little milk or food. They give gifts of great value (cf. stories of magic swords, etc.). But these objects are often stolen by mortals from fairyland. Supernatural and magic powers are also given by them to mortals (cf. the gift of prophecy—the tongue that could not lie—to Thomas à Becket; Lan, Demonology, 1898, Letter 5, Minstrelsy, p. 212). They also preside at birth, and confer talents on the child.

This was already hinted at by J. Crerie, Scottish Songery, 1808, by Sir W. Scott, following Dr. Leyden (see Minstrelsy, 189), Demonology, 1892), and by Grimm (p. 460), as a partial explanation of the fairy belief. Its main exponent in later times is D. MacRitchie, with his theory of an earlier pygmy race dwelling in what are now regarded as sepulchral mounds (see his Testimony of Tradition, 1890, Flans, Fairies, and Ficts, 1895, etc. and A. H. Heselton, FC, Feb. 1895).

But no one case can be alleged for the origin of the fairy superstition; and, taking into account the precisely similar characteristics ascribed also to spirits, ghosts, demons, witches, etc., in all parts of the world, we may trace it back to animistic beliefs modified and altered in different localities, but undoubtedly influenced also in various ways by traditions about older races, by beliefs in ghosts, and by the débris of older myths and religious ideas. We may find dreams, trance experiences, and psychic phenomena as formative and moulding influences. W. Y. Evans Wentz has recently sought to prove that 'fairies

memory, and the like, in which the person, when he comes to himself, takes up the thread of his life where it was left off, the intervening period being thus short to him. Exaggeration of such experiences—especially after sickness—has often led people to believe they had been in fairyland, the other world, etc.—would result in the incident of the supernatural lapse of time (see Hartland, 1883). The fairies of some fairy stories the opposite experience is found—the consciousness of having spent a lifetime during a moment as a result of a fairy spell. This, combined with the fact of similar trance or dream experiences, points to these as its true source.

3. The origin of fairies. The folk-explanations of the origin of fairies are various. Sometimes they are regarded as descendants of rebellions angels, cast out of heaven, and doomed to remain in sea-

land, air, or underground; or they are supposed to have stopped on the way to hell and remained in these places. This is a Celtic and Slavic belief (Curtin, Tales of the Fairies, p. 42; Sikes, British Folklore, 1880, p. 184; Ballinston, Songs of the Russian People, 1872, p. 106), and it may be compared with the Arabic belief that the jinn are a pre-Adamite race who rebelled against God and were driven to the earth (see Keightley, Fairy Mythology, 1890, pp. 295, 412; Wentz, The Fairies, Springfield, Ill., Oxford, 1911, pp. 147, 176). Or they are people who refused to accept Christianity and were cursed (Keightley, 432; Wentz, 169). The learned have seen many explanations. Many (Fées du moyen âge) found the fées in old Celtic and Teutonic Nature-goddesses, Matrona, Matronæ, akin to the Fates, Junes, Nymphs, etc., and in a folk-memory of 'druidesses' with magic power, who had been their priestesses. To these the people then gave the names fata, fées, 'enchanted ones,' etc. There is no evidence that such 'druidesses' were priestesses of these goddesses (see MacCulloch, Rel. of the Anc. Celts, Edin., 1911, p. 316). Others have seen in them the ghosts of a small and swarthy pre-historic race transformed in popular fancy into an actual supernatural people dwelling underground (G. C. MacClenan. Who Were the Fairies? London, 1891). Another theory is that which regards them as a folk-memory of a pre-historic small race, dwelling underground, with weapons of stone, and generally hostile to their Celtic conquerors.

This is rather clearly indicated by Dr. Layden, following J. Cririe, Scottish Songery, 1808, Minstrelsy, 1892, and D. MacRitchie, in his theory of an earlier pygmy race dwelling in what are now regarded as sepulchral mounds (see his Testimony of Tradition, 1890, Flans, Fairies, and Ficts, 1895; and A. H. Heselton, FC, Feb. 1895).

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1 The witches' aerial flight to the Sabbath and the aerial transport of their victims resemble this. But cf. also the alleged flight of medims (see MacCulloch, CP, 222).

2 In Ireland a trance is recognized as the presence of the entranced person in fairyland.

3 This resembles the myth in the Edna of elves of air, and of underground.

4 Cf. also J. Shaw, Province of Moray, 1775, p. 257.
exist, because in all essentials they appear to be the same as the intelligent forces now recognized by science (pp. 239-40), whether these are phantasmal of the dead or other orders of beings, acting on men, seen by them, or producing the alleged phenomena which the folk ascribe to fairies. But he attaches too much importance to the evidence that modern Celtic seers, and too little to the phenomena of hallucination. Similar evidence, if rashly accepted, would equally prove the existence of many other mythical beings. Fairies, whether seers, or mythical beings, creations of fancy utilizing existing beliefs, traditions, experiences, and customs. In the following sections the connexion of fairies with earlier divinities, ghosts, or actual races will be discussed.

4. Fairies as earlier divinities.—Fairies, as a race of supernatural beings, have many of the traits of earlier divinities; in some instances they may have been originally Nature-spirits or Nature-divinities. In Ireland this is especially true of the Daoine sidhe, still associated in popular belief with the Tuatha Dé Danann, the ancient gods of the Irish Celts. Dispossessed by the Milesians—in other instances possibly by Christian missionaries—of their land in Ireland—they retired to the sid, or mounds. This is the constant tradition of Irish story, and one class of fairies in Ireland are tall, handsome beings, much more divine than any other class of fairy folk (see n. 2). Specific earlier divinities—Fionnghar, Aine, Clodna, Aibell, etc.—are kings and queens of the fairy hosts of different regions. The pagan Celts or the pre-Celtic folk of Ireland may have believed in a race of sid-folk other than the Tuatha Dé Danann, with whom the latter were assimilated or became their kings and leaders (MacCulloch, Rel. of Anc. Celts, 65 f.). What is certain is that earlier gods, connected with agriculture and growth, have for centuries been regarded as fairies, while yet preserving some of their divine traits. Other Irish fairies are unconnected with the gods, and others again are lineal descendants of rivers, wells, or tree-spirits (MacCulloch, op. cit. 43, 173). The Celts of Gaul worshipped nisius and peisgi (groups of water-divinities), some of whom have personal names, and these are the nixes and perhaps the picnies of later belief (ib. 185). Sirens, mermaids, and other fairy beings haunting the waters, the Welsh fairy-brides who emerge from lakes, often accompanied by a venerable old man, and to whom offerings are made—are all alike精灵like beings haunting the sid, or sid-folk. Fairy diversities appear in later legend as fairy-like beings or fairy kings. So also in Italy, some of the older divinities are still remembered, and fairy-like characteristics are ascribed to them (Leland, Etruscan Roman Remains, 1892, passim), while the domestic Roman gods resemble the Brownie, as already noted by Reginald Scot; the Romans had also their misuti dei (Plant. Cist. ii. 45) and their divinities.

Offerings of food or milk are made to Celtic fairies to appease them; when this has not been done, vengeance is said to have followed. As with similar beings, it is the invisible essence of the food which is supposed to be taken by them—"the toradh—the outward appearance being left" (Campbell, Superstitions of the Highlands and Islands of Scotland, Glasgow, 1899, p. 32). The northern elf are coupled in the Edda with the Divine einur (cf. the A.S. connexion of es and eafa); the dark elves are allied with gods against their enemies, and work for them (Simrock, 424). They are divinities, and of great magical powers. The general impression which one receives from the older sources is that of the divine character of the

1 This is also true of fairy thistles of cows or corn; the substance is talon and the empty ensemble is left.
goddesses, e.g. the Roman Nymphae as worshipped in C giả the Roman Nymphae as worshipped in C. In popular Italian belief the Roman Orcus has become a wood-fairy or ogro (Grimm, 486; Leland, 78). All these were generally helpful, but occasionally hostile, to men. (Gayer, 12) The fairies may be said to be the love of fairies for music and dancing connects them with divinities in whose cult these were common, while the fairy moonlight dances may be a reminiscence of the cult itself, like the witches’ Sabhais in another direction. The powers of fairies—shape-shifting, invisibility, magic, etc. —also link them on to the world of the gods.

5. Fairies and the dead.—While the fairy belief cannot be derived merely from a belief in ghosts, since the two exist side by side, the latter forms one of the strands from which the former has been woven. It should also be observed how much is common to the two beliefs. Both fairies and ghosts can benefit or harm the living. Both steal children (see CHANGELING), while both fairy changelings and ancestral ghosts are always hungry. Both can cause death—usually by a ‘phantom draft’ (cf. ogro), or by means of sudden death. To see them often means death to the seer (see ERE iv. 739). Both can be avoided or repulsed by the same means (broom and iron tablet, running water, etc.). Both are associated by fairy and mortal, and both have offerings made to them. Both love the night for their revels (dancing on meadows, etc.; cf. Grimm, 890), but both must vanish at cockcrow (as must the witch and vampire [MacCulloch, Cf, 195]). Both possess enchanted objects of which daring mortals try to rob them. Both dislike untidiness and uncleanliness (cf. Curtin, 178). In fairyland and the world of the dead the time passes like a dream (see F. 454). The same holds true of the whole tabu with regard to eating fairy food or the food of the dead —in both cases dangerous to mortals—exists (see ERE ili. 501 f.; iv. 653, and add to roff. there Brown, Melanies and Polygenies, 1910, p. 194; Seligmann, Melan. of Br. N. Guinea, 1910, pp. 656 f., 734). The warning not to eat the food usually comes from a mortal imprisoned in fairyland or from the dead person whose rescue from Hades is sought. It may also be noted that in Ireland there is the whole superstitious regarding the dead is exactly like that regarding fairies, both there and elsewhere.

Fairy belief and Mährchen, fairies are associated with tumuli or burial-mounds. These are sometimes called ‘Fairy-hills,’ ‘Elf-hoves,’ ‘Albenbergen,’ etc.; but they are also believed to be haunted by the ghosts of those buried in them, or at least are associated with these. In certain cases fairies have succeeded the ghostly tenants of the tumulus forgotten by the folk—a natural result, since any mysterious structure tends to be associated with mysterious beings. In other cases they are merged with them, and it is hardly possible to discriminate rigidly between them, while both are regarded with awe. The Tontoncwi are unterirdische (cf. cognate names in other Northern languages [Grimm, 454, 1415]), as are the dead, the άνεμοθηον, οι κτώνερες or οντωριστά of Greek belief (see EARTH, § 8). The Haunui, who haunted the tumuli and was feared by the Scandinavians as a breaker of houses, is at once a ghost and a kobin, like the forest-bird or Pons Elyria near Mold, the hill of the kobin or fairy (Windle, Life in Early Britain, 1807, p. 113; J. Anderson, Scotland in Pagan Times, Edinburgh, 1886, p. 278). Such a being as this has been found in Madagascar, where the graves of the votozime (at once the aboriginal folk and a species of spirits) are re-
carded with awe (Ellis, Hist. of Madagascar, 1838, i. 424).

In many cases fairies and ghosts are one and the same in popular belief. This is true of much of the fairy belief in Ireland (see Wentz, 46, 58, etc.). The Welsh washer-women regarded as souls of the Druids (Keightley, 412; the Teutonic Dhvergar are closely associated with the nádir, or ghosts, and the afgar are probably in part souls of the dead (Grimm, 445 f., 1415; Simrock, 425, 570 f.; Visionus volk, Corpus Post., 2D, 118). In Brittany the fairy washer at the ford (kannezed noz) is now a revenant, and, like the Irish and Highland fairy washer (also associated with a woodland, used on the approach of death (Le Braz, La Légende de la mort, Paris, 1902, i. p. xili). It is interesting to note that Kirr (p. 10 f.) associates the ‘co-walker,’ or double, seen by second-sighted persons, with the fairies. The speech of fairies, like that of ghosts, civilized and savage, is said to be a kind of twitting (Kirk, 14; cf. Tylor, PCl. 457).

The dead house-fairies, CP’s associated with fairies in fairyland, and are seen there by those who visit it, and are warned by them not to eat or drink. According to Scottish superstition in the 16th-17th cent., witches were in league not only with Satan but with the water-fairies of fairyland, and they saw there many persons known to be dead (Scott, Minstrelsy, 207 f., Demonology, 106, 124 f.; Dalvay, Darker Superstitions of Scotland, Glasgow, 1835, pp. 536 f.). The same idea is found in the Romance writers and in Chaucer, who make Hades into fairyland and change Pluto and Persephone into the king and queen of Faery. Fairyland is also in close association with the Christian Other-world. So, already in early mediaeval Welsh belief, Gwyn is king of Faery, and is associated with Annwn (Elysium) in its later aspect as hell, and hunts the souls of the wicked (MacCulloch, Cf, 212). Similarly the water-fairy keeps souls of the drowned in his under-water-world (Simrock, 445 f.; Grimm, 490).

The demoniac spirits, with uncertain temper, in whom the West Africans believe, and whom they localize in the air or in natural objects, are ghosts of the dead (Nansen, Feticisms in W. Africa, 1894, p. 58), and the Arabic ‘qura, evil jinn, is a name applied also to ghosts (Lane, Modern Egyptians, 1846, ii. 40).

In Mährchen of the ‘Dead Wife’ cycle, in which a dead mother is recovered from Hades, there is the same incident as in tales of women carried off to fairyland. In both the mother re-appears to suckle her child, and in both she is recovered by her husband, who avoids certain tasks. In the latter case the wife apparently dies, but the ‘corpse’ is an adult fairy changing or an illusory appearance. Or, again, the changing is in effect a double or ‘co-walker’ (Curtin, 188; see also CHANGELING, 5 f.; Discovery to Heaves [Eidehick], 8). In Ireland the idea is widespread that people who are taken by fairies and there is also the belief that the soul is taken, leaving the body dead.

There is one species of fairy which is closely connected with if not in all cases actually derived from, ancestral or other household spirits—the house-fairy or Brownie, already mentioned as the Parnobe by Gervase of Tilbury in the 13th cent.

1 Dawkins, Early Men in Britain, 1880, p. 432; FJL v. [1887] 122; Hartland, 221; Kirk, 22.
2 For the various names and characteristics of the house-fairy in Germany and Scandinavia, Britain, etc., see Biirger-Fraud, i. 36 f.; Simrock, 450 f.; Keightley, 493.

He is the ‘house-friend’ of Milton.
who dwells in house or stable, and loves to do the work of either. He dislikes disorder or laziness; and, where either is shown or the usual offering is not made to him, he is disagreeable to the person rendering it, and milk and meal are turned out for him, and he usually receives an annual gift of a new hat or coat, though in some instances this causes him to leave the house. He is particularly associated with the hearth, and to some extent corresponds with the medieval and later familiar spirit who worked for his master and advised him (Calmet, Traité sur les apparitions, Paris, 1751, i. 249 f., 260).

His analogues are the Roman household Lar (see Plaut. Aulularia, prologue), whose worship culminated at the hearth; the Greek ϝ��φορος; the Italian lauto and attilio (Leland, 80 ff., 141 f.); the Slavic dedushka domoven, 'Grandfather of the house,' who haunts the stove; and the Tengticle and Celtic ancestral and household spirits. The close connexion of the ancestral spirit with the house is perhaps partly to be accounted for by the wide-spread practice of house-burial, found among many savage tribes, as well as among the ancient Semites (I S 25, 1 K 24); Jastrow, Rel. of Babylonia and Assyrca, Boston, 1898, p. 599), among the early Mycenean folk, and among the Celts and Teutonic tribes (Reinach, L'Anthrop. vii. 327; Plato, Minos, 315; Scruvin, on Ιν. vi. 151), among the Celts, and possibly the Slavs (Ralston, 326), and among the Hindus (see DOR). The practice may have arisen in the Stone Age, when men lived in rock-shelters and caves, and buried their dead there. In any case, the house-burial resulted in, and also guaranteed, the presence of the ancestral spirit in the dwelling. In modern times and in many ancient religions and belief systems there are certain religious and magical conceptions that the house-spirit has taken a more or less demoniac form. In some cases the Brownie appears as a small animal, snake, etc.—a trait common to ancestral spirits elsewhere. The main ideas of the house-fairy superstition and of the household-ghost belief, whether savage or more civilized, are the same—the house-haunting, the offering of food, the assistance rendered to the inmates. The relation of house-spirit and house-fairy is well marked in the case of the Slavic domoven, the shaggy, stove-haunting being, kindly when respected, dangerous when neglected. He is not only with the older and more primitive cult, regarded often as ghosts, who act and are treated exactly as the Brownie, may also be compared (Thorpe, Northern Mythology, 1832, ii. 93). Sometimes, in fact, the Brownie is regarded as the spirit of a former servant.1

The house-fairy becomes a malicious, noisy, tormenting sprite, when neglected or insulted, and is thus most often connected with phenomena which in the line between ghost and fairy is seen—those of the Poltergeist, in which furniture, etc., is moved or thrown about, and in which hands or hair, the touches of a tiny hand is felt, etc. Some of these are extreme forms of poltergeist—the movement of objects without apparent cause, in presence of a person, or of noise, or of frights upwards, in connection with coincident phantasmal appearances. These were early known to the Pagan, and were, like timeless and modern times, and they still occur among savages and civilized men.2 The phenomena, as yet unexplained, rest

1 Besides the house-haunting Brownie, fairies in general are often (very properly) used as doing household work for those whom they like.

2 See Burton, Anot. of Melancholy 99, 1636, p. 134.; Calmet, l. cit. 254; Scott, 'Tales of the Highlands,' ii. 277; St. John, Forests of Far East, 1862, i. 91; H. J. Bell, Goben Witchcraft in...
Such a pygmy race in Europe might well be connected in tradition with fairies. But this is not to say that in all respects they are identical with to the fairy belief. In any case, some characteristics are ascribed to pygmy races which resemble those ascribed to fairies.

The pygmies are often feared and pitied, and they are supposed to have magical powers—a trait shared by all aboriginal peoples. They barter with the taller folk (cf. Grim, 464, note), giving porridge, meat, or boiled fruit in exchange for cultivated food-stuffs (Lang Red, JAF xxiv [1906-07] 296; J. A. R. 259). They are shy of being seen, or of their dwellings being discovered or entered. Invisibility is ascribed to them—probably on the authority ofTESTAMENT (1588, p. 516). Their dwellings are unusual in shape, spirit-like in appearance, and of great strength (Rowland, p. 1582). They dwell in caves or concealed structures, suggesting underground residence. The dwarf people believed in by the Ainu are said to have hidden under large burrows—a habit recalling that of fairies hiding under mushrooms. Johnston says of the Congo dwarfs: 'Any one who has seen as much of the Central African Pygmies as I have, and has noted their merry, mischievous ways;—unseen, spirituous vengeance; quick gratitude;—and prompt return for kindness, cannot but be struck by their singular resemblance to character to the elves and gnomes and sprites of our nursery stories' (p. 516f.). At the same time he warns against reckless theorizing.

It is denied that many stories about fairies suggest an actual people (cf., e.g., the stories cited in Grim, 451, 469). The frequent reference to fairies as earth- or mound-dwelling may be the result of the fact in another case, especially when it is known that the Bushmen (dwellers not only in the bush but in subterranean caves) are also called 'Earth-men' (FABAS xvii. p. 1.). In many stories, fairies resent mortals building over their subterranean dwellings or mounds—probably a trait derived from actual experience of innocents being plagued by aborigines lurking in subterranean places over which they had built. On the other hand, they may be derived from the fear of aborigines haunting the mounds. In some cases, as in 'Childie Roundway,' the fairyland is surrounded by terraced circles—the markings of an earlier form of terrace agriculture still seen on hills (Jacobs, English Fairy Tales, 1889, pp. 117, 242; Gomme, Village Community, 1890, p. 75 ff.). In many tales it is obvious that fairies dislike the civilization of mortals, and flee from it (while those who are accused of much sordid care, though they sometimes take advantage of it. These facts suggest the dislike of an aboriginal race to the ways of their conquerors, yet their occasional desire to benefit by them. Similarly the incident in which fairies receive articles left out for them, which they replace by gifts of their own, points to actual methods of barter. Their thefts of produce, animals, etc., and more particularly their kidnapping of women and children, reflect incidents in the contact of conquered and conquering races. The occasional cannibalism attributed to fairies is obviously derived from primitive custom, while their shyness, their retiring before the approach of mortals, easily suggesting invisibility, give the impression of a conquered race avoiding its conquerors. Finally, the dislike of fairies to metal, especially iron, by which they are kept out of harm, they cannot pass, is significant, though this dislike is also shared by gnomes and other spirits, witches, jinn, etc. The dislike is primarily a human one; and, though the taboo concerns iron, it must first have concerned beings.

The mystery with which the working of metal was surrounded, and the suspicion which attached to it first came, as well as the superstition as to the spell- or magic-making power in the use, must have contributed to the curious feeling with which it is regarded. As iron is regarded as a protective element, Continental sagas prohibit its use in ritual; hence it easily came to be regarded as ominous.

Fairy traditions, as described above, might have existed between Paleolithic and Neolithic folk, these forming the basis of traditions which may have been handed on to metal-using races (to whom the Neolithic folk were probably hand-made by them, and then adopted by them with the necessary changes.

Some support is given to the theory of fairies as an actual race by the belief that in Polynesia, where there is a belief in fairies, the traditions concerning them are probably connected with the religions existing between as an ancient race, especially when it is known that the Bushmen (dwellers not only in the bush but in subterranean caves) are also called 'Earth-men' (FABAS xvii. p. 1.). In many stories, fairies resent mortals building over their subterranean dwellings or mounds—probably a trait derived from actual experience of innocents being plagued by aborigines lurking in subterranean places over which they had built. On the other hand, they may be derived from the fear of aborigines haunting the mounds. In some cases, as in 'Childie Roundway,' the fairyland is surrounded by terraced circles—the markings of an earlier form of terrace agriculture still seen on hills (Jacobs, English Fairy Tales, 1889, pp. 117, 242; Gomme, Village Community, 1890, p. 75 ff.). In many tales it is obvious that fairies dislike the civilization of mortals, and flee from it (while those who are accused of much sordid care, though they sometimes take advantage of it. These facts suggest the dislike of an aboriginal race to the ways of their conquerors, yet their occasional desire to benefit by them. Similarly the incident in which fairies receive articles left out for them, which they replace by gifts of their own, points to actual methods of barter. Their thefts of produce, animals, etc., and more particularly their kidnapping of women and children, reflect incidents in the contact of conquered and conquering races. The occasional cannibalism attributed to fairies is obviously derived from primitive custom, while their shyness, their retiring before the approach of mortals, easily suggesting invisibility, give the impression of a conquered race avoiding its conquerors. Finally, the dislike of fairies to metal, especially iron, by which they are kept out of harm, they cannot pass, is significant, though this dislike is also shared by gnomes and other spirits, witches, jinn, etc. The dislike is primarily a human one; and, though the taboo concerns iron, it must first have concerned beings.

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7. FAIRIES AS NATURE-SPIRITS. — There is little doubt that, in some aspects, fairies are derived from older Nature-spirits, or from the animistic beliefs which led to the creation of the latter in popular fancy. Thus, the ancient and widespread belief that the dead are not interred in the grave, but are carried off in the form of fairies (the idea is not without its basis in the old idea that the soul is invisible, as in the belief in the mountain spirit, or in the belief in the dead as spirits of the earth), has led to the idea of the fairies being the spirits of the earth. Thus, in many parts of Europe, the fairies are believed to be the spirits of the earth, and are often identified with the spirits of the dead. The idea of the fairies being the spirits of the earth is also found in the idea of the fairies being the spirits of the water, and is often connected with the belief in the fairies being the spirits of the sea. The idea of the fairies being the spirits of the water is also found in the idea of the fairies being the spirits of the earth, and is often connected with the belief in the fairies being the spirits of the sea. The idea of the fairies being the spirits of the water is also found in the idea of the fairies being the spirits of the earth, and is often connected with the belief in the fairies being the spirits of the sea.
have been experienced in hypnotic states, or in drunkenness. Here probably we have another of the roots of the fairy belief. On the other hand, all such states are fruitful of visions of beings already believed in by the percipient. Preconceived notions colour dreams, just as preconceived notions of hell or heaven have caused visions of these regions. Again, any belief in abnormal creatures which is strongly held is certain to produce the ideal images of them which are confused with reality.

The changeling belief, as far as it concerns adults, may have been partly shaped by the phenomenon of alternating personality. The person stolen by fairies is replaced by a fairy, who resembles, but acts differently from, that person. In one Irish instance, the father said of an afflicted daughter whom he believed to be a changeling that she had the ‘tongue of an attorney,’ the daughter herself being a ‘quiet, honest girl’ (Curtin, 157). Actual adult changeling stories often read like a transcript of this.

The one who can set fairies on his back has seen one (Rhyd, Celtic Folklore, passim), just as in Russian folklore, a dead man will place a sod cut out of the churchyard on the head of a living person, who then lives as one under the world (Rahlston, Russian Folk Tales, 1873, p. 900). The feeling is directed to the enjoyment of the kinship with the percipient with whom the精灵 together share the view of the world; this is also true of clairvoyance (Gurney, i. 189). Modern experience has shown that this increases the possibilities of communication, and cases are on record where the percipient of a phantom could cause another to see it by touching him (Parish, Hallucinations, 1897, p. 94). Thus, what is perhaps an actual psychic fact, experienced by the Folk, has been applied to fairies, and other beings.

9. Fairy-like beings outside Europe.—That no single cause peculiar to European lands has operated in the formation of the belief in fairies may be seen from the fact that in every part of the world there are to be found beliefs in a variety of beings, all more or less like the fairies of Europe, with similar qualities, characteristics, and powers.

The Battaks of Sumatra believe in mountain-dwars or changelings, who carry off men or women, or have amours with handsome mortals (L’Anthrop. iv. 851). In Formosa, tales are told of a mysterious little people to be seen in the forests, with houses which change into boulders, and in which gooblins live in caves, and causing famine, sickness, and death (FLJ. i. 143, 149). The Siamese phi are spirits dwelling in forests, etc., with many fairy traits (Hardinon, Rev. creul. pop. (1898) 297 f.; for Annam, see EEE i. 538, 539).

Turning to Africa, we find the Baganda believing in elves or sprites called ngegwe; and the W. African Bantu in asiiki seen at night wearing a comb, which, if a mortal can snatch it, will bring him riches (Johnston, 677; Nassau, 299). Callaway compared the Zulu belief in ghosts (amantongo) with the Irish fairy creed. They call the living to join them or produce disease or pain in men. They live underground, where the living may visit them and see their dead friends, as the dead are seen among fairies. There is also a belief in a ‘Little Chiefness’ with a troop of children, to see whom is fatal (op. cit. 226 f., 253). The Malagasy believe in dwarfs who come to houses to get milk, and who have a small voice like birds. Another dwarf, Kotel, resembles the Brownie. They also enter houses at night and eat rice; but it is dangerous to prevent their leaving before dawn (Ferrand, Contes pop. malagasy, Paris, 1860, p. 82 ff.).

Among American Indians, the belief in tiny sprites of rocks, streams, etc., resembling fairies, is wide-spread. They dance in moonlight; and, when seen, vanish at once. They assist or trouble men; e.g., among the Shoshones they steal infants, leaving a fox in its place. The Algonquins say the Ojibwas they attack poultry and cattle, which die, or throw stones into the Indian dwellings; among the Algonkis they cause sleep by striking men with their small clubs; among the Micmacs they tie people when asleep. The belief is that of tiny men. The Masquaque Indians believe in sprites produced by Mechee Manito-ah, who cause melancholy, quarrels, ill-health (Owen, Folk-Lore q. v.). The persistent belief is that of tiny men. The Eskimos believe in inngersuia, an underground fairy-like folk (Rink, 460).

In Polynesia the ‘Peerless Ones,’ daughters of Mirn, queen of Hades, come to the dances of mortals and leave at dawn. There are also fairies of sky and fountain, the latter sometimes meeting with men. Other fairies, ponatuus, dwell in the sea, appearing only by night, for the sun is fatal to them. Others carry off mortals, and are much dreaded (Gifford, 187; Clarke, 90). The Melanesian vu, a race of spirits, have many fairy characteristics, and many of them are ‘a lesser folk of dwarfs and trolls,’ with magic powers, yet easily deceived. In some tales they assist mortals, like our fairies (Coedington, Melanesians, Oxford, 1891, p. 152). In Torres Straits a mischievous female bogey called Dorgo seduces men, steals children, etc., but she can be outwitted and destroyed (Haddon, JAI xix. 121). The Fijians have a race of little gods of the sea, a timid race to whom a secret cult is paid, and who sometimes come ashore. They give immunity from wounds, and are fond of singing. Their songs, like those of some of our fairies, have been recorded (Williams, Fiji, 1978, i. 237, 240; Thomson, Fijians, 1998, p. 189). In New Britain an order of lebaran is called ingii, mischievous and annoying sprites. Others are friendly and live around men. They are a belief in a changeling, iv. 1379 among some mortals, or enter their bodies to teach them charms, dances, etc., by which they make a profit. There is also a belief in mermaids, and in their unions with mortals (Brown, JAI xii. 290, 292). The Atauros believe there is a belief in an underground folk, not the dead who may unite with mortals, and from whom men steal valuable things; as well as in other beings in the forest or swarm, shy of being seen, and with other fairy habits (Seligmann, 386 f., 646 f.).

The Arunta believe in irurtarintin, spirits of the Alcheringa (q.v.) age, living in winter in underground caves where there is sunshine, and wandering on earth in summer. They have each a double, the arumburuma, which, when the spirit is reincarnated, follows it or dwells with the others. These are not visible to all. The trurtarintin are very real to the native, and are dreaded for their power of placing pointing sticks in his body. They are visible only to medicine-men and children born with eyes open, and are like men, but thin and shadowy. They steal from men, and carry off women and use them in magic to those who can communicate with them they impart sacred ceremonies (Spencer-Gillen, 515-521).

The beings which most resemble fairies, however, are the Arab jinn or jin. They live underground, but also haunt doorways, and are usually invisible though they also appear 1See 1900 (1900), p. 1. 475; JR Ill. 497; Dorman, Orientalism, Super. Philos., 1897, p. 379. 2See Gurney, i. 119; County Folk-Lore, Suffolk, 1892, p. 189; Scott, W讲故事; Campbell, 90. 3Evelyn, 290; Campbell, Superstitions of the Scottish Highlands, 1900, p. 192.
in various forms. They travel about in sand- 
stones or rocks, and are found in the graves of 
their species, and are subject to laws like mortals. 
Many are evil and cause sickness, madness, etc., 
act like the Poltergeist, carry off beautiful women 
for wives or others as midiwives, or their females 
forced to remain in certain places. Some are 
friendly to men and even marry them, or by 
means of talismans men can obtain power over 
them. Iron, Divine names, etc., are all powerful 
against them, but for this reason, they are 
euphemistically called mukarakin, 'blessed ones.' 1 
Indeed, there is scarcely an article of the fairy 
creed which does not equally apply to them. 1

Faries and feés of all kinds—Celtic and Ten-
tonie, Slavic rites, Greek nereids, Arabian jinn and 
peris, Hindu apsarasas, and other supernatural 
males, like the dorgai of Torres Straits, or the 
awiri wife of W. Africa (MacCulloch, CE, 330), or 
the omangs of the Batuaks (L’Anthrop. iv. 80), or 
the swan-maidens and mermaids of universal folk-
belief—carry on amours with men, or marry 
and bear children, either on earth or by boring 
into them their abodes, as the Queen of Faery 
does in Yeats’ The Green Bough. Yet the 
most characteristic traits of female fairies 
are their seductive power over men, and the 
fatal results which follow from amours with them— 
’t he who loves, he’s undone.’ (Kirk, 258.)

This, however, is a feature found even in the case 
of fairy wives, whether captured by men or not, 
when the mortal husband breaks a taboo, and was 
already noted by Guyrave of Tilbury (Offa Imper. 
ch. 13; see MacCulloch’s CE, ch. xii.).

But what is important is illustrating the likeness 
of various ethnic supernatural beings to our fairies 
is the fact that precisely similar dangers await him 
who is caught by the naiads in modern Greece (Bent, Cycloades, 1883, p. 19; 
Lawson, Modern Greek Folklore, Cambridge, 1910, 
p. 142), as it is the case with him who is lured by the 
Hindu válikés or chured (Crooke, PSE, 1856, i. 
222; 1860, i. 486); or by the nenek by the 
monk, who takes the form of a 
lovely girl (Joly, Legend in Jap. Art, 1908, p. 45).

The Arabs have transformed the ka which haunts 
the pyramids into a beautiful nude woman, whose 
lovers become restless lunatics (Maupas, Études de myth. et arch. égypt., Paris, 1893, i. 79).

Similar beliefs are found in Melanesia regarding 
sea-snakes which take female form, or the tarakawak which appears as young or old to entice 
mortals of the opposite sex. In either case death 
or madness is the result. Another species of 
spirits, called in New Britain toltaf, inflict serious 
wounds on the sexual organs of their male 
or female lovers (Codrington, 172, 188 f.; Brown, 
197; Lang, in Kirk, p. xxxi; cf. Williams, Fiji, 
1870, i. 229).

The same ideas are found among the American 
Indians; e.g., the Ynroks believe in a seductive 
being who lures men into the forest, changes to a 
panther, and kills them (FUL v. 1882 90 f.); and 
the Mayas have stories of the xtabi and the xtab 
chak, who appear in the form of a thorn-bush when 
the pursuing mortal claps them. He then 
speedily succumbs to fever and delirium (FUL i. 
1883 355). These are the beliefs in the 
intercourse of women with nayagals, see Birton, 

Risks were also run by women who had inter- 
course with Hissis, Panisci, Satyrs, Fauns, Silvanis 
and in the incubus and succubus of medieval 
thought, the demons who had amours with women or men. 
They correspond to the Celtic dweti, shaggy demons 
who sought the couches of women to gratify their 
desires, and procuresses, they are 
epithetically called bhadaitis, ‘blessed ones.’ 1

1 See Westermack, JAI xxix. [1900] 252 f.; Laps. Arab. Soc. 
297 f.; Sykes, FL xi. [1901] 209; Banville, Folklore of the Holy 
Land, 1907, p. 168 f.; W. R. Smith, 111 f.


1 The Jewish idea of the fall of the angels through their 
hunt for mortal women.

1 Simrock, 437; see Tykoc, PCG ii. 1041 f.; Berlin, La Démocro-
mont des soûm, 1983, p. 109; O’Malley, The Irish Alp; sehr Wester und seine Heilung, 1853; J. Franck, Frazoso 
Medico Universtas Francop, Leipzig, 1822, ch. 1. ‘de incubis.'
something to reminiscences of earlier sex-festivals with music and dancing (see MacCulloch, CP, 223).

The wayfarer attracted to both, and often pays dear for it. He is forced to pipe or dance, and finds himself in the morning worn out, while all that so attracted him has vanished. Both revels and Subahyast marsh-towns and down-town cock-crow (see Reuss, La Sorcellerie, Paris, 1871, pp. 39, 43, 54, 56, and ref. there). Similarly the beliefs in bodily or spirit transportation through the air in invocations by women or witches—already the objective aspect of a trance or drugged condition (see MacCulloch, CF, 223; Wood-Martin, Elder Faiths of Ireland, 1902, ii, 8; 21; Nassau, 223 [W. Africa]; Seligmann, 401 [New Guinea])—in child-stealing (see Channing), in cannibalism (CF, 223; François, L'Eglise et la Sorcellerie, Paris, 1910, pp. 68, 119, 145; Sébillot, i, 229; Wentz, 128), in gifts of money which turns to rubbish, in shape-shifting and invisibility, in taking the substance of milk, nuk, or of an animal (cf. a similar belief in W. Africa [JAI xxix. 23], in E. Africa [Macdonald, Africana, 1852, i, 212]; and see Scott, Demon., 92, 228), in the power of killing cattle by nym of a forest-godd (Elias, 70); by having them forthwith at night, in the force of similar tabus against both—all apply equally to fairies and witches. Both the medieval Church and 17th cent. Presbyterian plagues and witchcraft under the same ban; and, in their trials, witches were accused of appealing or repairing to fairies and their queen (Dallyell, 536 f.; Scott, Demon., 129, 135, 260, Minst., 267). Witches used for their nefarious deeds elf-arrows, which were manufactured by fairies and the devil, and applied to them (Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, Edinburgh, 1833, i, 191 ff.; Scott, Demon., 135, 235). In popular Scots tradition the elf-queen or mother-witch, or Gym Carteine, are identical. The three Fées who are present at births are sometimes three witches, and both groups are associated with the earlier ‘wise woman.’ Finally, fairies and witches were supposed to ride through the air incited by a Hecate called Nic Neen (Scott, Demon., 111).

Beliefs similar to those associated with fairies are also elsewhere connected with the dead (5), or with other beings—in Japan, foxes; or, among savages, spirits of all kinds; in our own and other lands, the devil or demons, or vampires. But the best example is found in the belief in the ‘fairy eddy’—a sudden puff of wind or whirl of dust, leaves, &c., which fairies are supposed to be (Rhys, ii, 596; Rakstol, Songs, 382; Frazer, GB, i, 127). Among the Arabs the jinns (in India shaitan) cause, or travel in, such whirlwinds or sand-storms. In ancient Persia a demon caused the whirlwind (Bundakhi, xxviii. 24). In Brittany, the damned, who tried to carry off the wayfarer as fairies carried off men, were seen in snakelikes (Le Ira, ii, 20); among the Ainme, whirlwinds are embodiments of evil spirits (ER, i, 244); among the Baganda, a dust eddy is believed to be caused by ghosts at play (Roscoe, 282); among the Yoruba, an eddy of wind is a manifestation of a spirit (Mabogunje, 291). It is thought that Brewin travels in a whirlwind (Howitt, JAI xiii. 194); or, as in Fiji and among the Pawnees, the whirlwind is caused by ghosts (Fuller, 128). With all these peoples much the same methods of availing of the eddy or of overcoming the beings in it are found; while, comparing these customs with that of attacking a storm with weapons, we see that both eddy and storm were first personified and then believed to contain hostile beings.

Thus, considering the similarity of what is attributed equally to fairies, witches, ghosts, demons, and spirits of all kinds, it is obvious that certain primitive ideas easily attached themselves to all these objects; and that the original fairies must be sought in no one recent source, but ultimately in very ancient beliefs of man regarding the beings of his imagination. At the same time, we must not omit that which his poetic fancies have lent to the whole fairy belief, for to do so would be to omit what has always been a most vital element in all folk-lore.

The fairies who figure in the earlier romances and in the Renaissance and later poets are in part the creatures of folk-tradition, in part the creations of the poetic imagination, and concern us but little here.

II. Situation of fairyland. — Fairyland as a separate region is variously situated. Most generally it is a subterranean region, sometimes directly below men's dwellings, or within hills and mountains; and to the latter corresponds the medieval tradition regarding fairies. These are tabus to which ‘Venusberg,’ of which there were several (Venus here—a fay; see Grimm, 935). We may compare also the Irish tradition regarding the Tuatha Dé Danann and their relation to other women—this dwelling was through a cavern (or fairyland was in a cavern), crevice, pit, or wells on tops of hills: the oldest recorded example of this is found in Gervase of Tilbury's story of the Welsh Elidurns, who was taken by two small men through a subterranean passage to fairyland (Utan., Camb., i, 8).

In this aspect fairyland corresponds to Hades, as well as to Hell or Purgatory, the entrance to which is also often through a cave or cliff. Both in Tentonic and in Celtic regions, fairies are also associated with tmuli, or with old raths or forts, which are often seen lit up at night (for an early instance, see William of Newburgh, Historia, Oxford, 1718, i, 28). Fairyland is also within the waters, and accessible through wells or by diving beneath river or lake or sea (in this corresponding to one aspect of the Celtic Elysium; see Bliss, Anone of the Celts). This dwelling is both that of water-fairies and of other water-beings (7). It is also on islands in lake or sea, which sometimes are seen by the gifted seer (Wentz, 147; Davies, Mythol. and Rites of Brt. Druids, 1905, p. 150). Hill-spirits are associated with the island Elysium of the Celts (see ERE art. cited). Fairyland may also be all around, a kind of fourth dimensional region interpenetrating ours; 2 or it may suddenly be entered in a mist; or, again, it may be in the air. These various conceptions are connected with the original character of fairies, whether as Nature-spirits or ghosts; and in some instances the abode of older gods has become fairyland.

It is usually dangerous to violate any sacred fairy spot—tree, dwelling, etc.—as it is dangerous to enter the charmed fairy circle, or to cross the line of a night ride with fairies. These are tabus to which many parallels from lower and higher cultures, with respect to sacred places, abodes or haunts of spirits, gods, or ghosts, might be added (see Codrington, 177, 218 f.; Seligmann, 194; MacCulloch, CF, 64 xi.

LITERATURE.—There is no work covering the whole ground of the fairy belief, but T. Keightley's Fairy Mythology, new

1 See Nuit, Fairy Myth. of Shakespeare, 100; Goyau, La Vie et les morts, Paris, 1910; Delatour, English Fairy Poetry, Oxford, 1912.

2 Cf. the New Britain saying regarding matunas nics, the place of the dead: ‘The head was turned so that what is inside the head were now outside, we would see that matunas nics was very near to us and not far away at all’ (Brown, 192).

Hindu.—See BHAKTI-MARGA.
Greek (I. F. BURNS), p. 694.

F A I T H.

Buddhist.—See BHAKTI-MARGA.
Hindu.—See BHAKTI-MARGA.
Muslim (E. SELL), p. 695.

F A I T H.

FAITH (Christian).—Every act of religious faith shows two sides or aspects—a cognitive and a volitional. It is at once an affirmation of truth and a surrender to the truth affirmed. Apart from the first, it would be blindly; apart from the second, without practical significance. The fact that the emphasis is sometimes placed on the one and sometimes on the other leads to two relatively distinct notions of faith. When the volitional aspect is emphasized, we have the notion commonly denoted by the word ' trust' (q.v.); when the cognitive, that denoted by the word ' belief' (q.v.). It is with faith as belief that we are concerned in the present article. The notion of trust is, indeed, vital for religion, but it has played no part in theological controversy.

1. Scripture doctrine of Faith.—(1) In Jewish canonical and extra-canonical writings.—Although there are only two OT passages (Dt 32:28, Hab 2:4) in which the RV admits the substantive ' faith,' the idea is far from being infrequent. Every word of God contains a claim to be received as true; to believe it is an act of obedience to God, as unbelief is rebellion and a mark of hardness of heart (Ex 14:12, Dt 1:33, Ps 78:34, Is 7:18). At the same time, faith is not among the cardinal conceptions of OT religion. What God requires of men is less that they believe His word than that they fear, love, serve, obey, and trust Him. God's word is thought of rather as a commandment to be obeyed than as a message to be believed.

What first brought the notion of faith into the foreground was the loosening of the bond between religion and nationality, and the rise of a propa ganda. When Hebrew religion entered, with a claim to universal acceptance, into competition with other religions and became a matter of personal choice, the question whether a man believed in the God of Israel and received His laws and promises as true inevitably advanced into a position of cardinal importance. The initial religious act became one of belief; and persistence in belief, the presupposition of fidelity. We can thus understand the change from an act of trust to a notion of faith should be considerably more prominent than it is in the OT (En 46:58, Aproc. Bar. 54:12 16; Philo, de Abrah. 208; 2 Es 5:7 9). (2) In the teaching of Jesus.—Evidence for the increasing importance that was being attached to faith will hardly, however, be discovered in the teaching of Jesus. Often as He uses the word, it is nearly always with the meaning of trust in the prophecies of God (Mt 16:20; Mk 8:11). This is the meaning even when He speaks of faith in Himself. What He has in view is not belief in HisMessiahship or in any doctrine, but trust in the Divine power that works through Him (Mt 8:26 15). Though He is conscious of bringing a new message, He lays the stress not on the acceptance of His word, but on the doing of it. ' This do, and thou shalt live ' (Lk 10:17). The message is so simple and self-evidencing that the question of believing it hardly comes into view.

(3) In the writings of Paul.—It was with the Christian proclamation that the idea of faith really entered on its great career. From the first the gospel was preached, not primarily as a law to be obeyed, but as a message to be believed (Ac 2:44 45); and the cardinal article of belief, that which includes all others of doctrine, is ' faith in Christ. The doctrine of salvation through believing was, therefore, not introduced by Paul; in his controversy with Peter at Antioch he could assume it as common Christian ground. None the less, he marks a decisive stage in its development. He was the first to establish it on a reasoned basis, and to bring the Church to a clear consciousness of the new significance which faith had acquired. This he accomplished by demonstrating the congruence of faith with the nature of the Christian gospel. Since the gospel comes as a revelation of Divine grace and of a righteousness freely offered to guilty man, the fitting response on man's part can only be that of humble and thankful acceptance of the gift. Putting away the proud thought that he can stand on his own merits, he must believe in Him who justifies the ungodly (Gal 3:4, Ro 4). It is evident that faith as here conceived is a thing of the heart rather than of the intellect. It implies moral earnestness, the sense of sin and need, submissive ness and openness towards God, and is indistinguishable from the trust of which Jesus speaks. Doubtless the Apostle included in his notion of faith the acceptance of what we should describe as doctrine (Ro 10:9). The grace of God had no meaning for him apart from the redemption drama in which it presented itself to his imagination and thought. Nevertheless, Wrede's assertion (Paulus, Tüb. 1904, p. 67), that what Paul means by faith is nothing more than the obedient affirmation of the preaching of redemption, is wide of the mark. In his doctrinal constructions, Paul has no other object than to set forth the sin-forgiving, salvation-bring ing grace of God; and at bottom it is this grace he asks men to trust and believe in.

In vindicating the title of faith to be regarded as the sole and sufficient condition of salvation, Paul considers it exclusively in its relation to justification. What he establishes is justification by faith. Does he think of faith as also the inner spring of the new life? In two or three passages he approaches this idea. He speaks of faith as working by love, and declares that what is not of faith is sin (Gal 5:6, Ro 13). His activities of the new life are traced not to faith, but to the transcendent working of the Holy Spirit. The Christian virtues and graces are fruits of the Spirit (Gal 5:2, Ro 8). Our modern method of psychological derivation is foreign to his thought.

Much more important is the question whether faith, as defined in Ro 4, is an adequate description of the religious relation as Paul habitually con-
receives it. Is the bond that unites the believer with Christ nothing else than trust in the Divine grace manifested in His Gospel? The truth is that it is only in connection with justification that the Apostle thinks of it in this way. In general, the union with Christ appears as something more intimate and close than can be described in ethical terms. He is, for him, the object of spiritual union, and risen with Him; He is in Christ, and Christ lives in him. While this has for Paul a strongly ethical meaning, to interpret it in purely ethical terms, as signifying the relation of faith to sin and resurrection to righteousness, a reproduction of Christ's mind or spirit in the believer, is to miss its secret. The union he has in view is a mystical union. Like all mystics, he finds the idea of faith inadequate to express the religious relation. Whether he regards this mystical union as onely a deeper interpretation of faith, or as something that follows on it, is not easy to decide (Gal 2:20, Eph. 2:15).

(4) In the Fourth Gospel.—As compared with that of Paul, the conception of faith found in the Fourth Gospel is distinctly more intellectual in character. The writer shows unmistakable allusions to the higher forms of faith ascribed to the Greek thinkers, as a result of the impression made on the enquirers, not so much by the grace and truth manifested in Christ's words and deeds, as by His miracles. His whole earthly career is presented in the light of a series of Divine attestations of His claim to be the Son of God (Jn 10:25). Knowing and knowing are brought into the closest connection with each other, are, indeed, treated as identical. Like the Grecians and Philo, the Evangelist attributes a saving significance to knowledge. At the same time, it is far from his intention to exhibit faith as a mere intellectual assent to the proposition, 'Jesus is the Son of God.' Everywhere the ethical factor, perhaps in conscious opposition to Gnostic tendencies, is strongly emphasized. Knowledge is not understood as a predominantly intellectual function; it includes sympathy and kinship with its object, a personal relation to Christ, and is morally conditioned (Jn 6:44 51 8:37).

Like Paul, the writer of the Fourth Gospel knows of a deeper relation of the soul to Christ than that of faith or knowledge. Everywhere the mystical union is in the foreground: 'I in them, and they in me, that they may be perfecled into one' (Jn 17:11) — that is the profoundest secret of his piety. It is in view of this mystical union that the statesman and Divine Hs which belong to Christ as His native possession is imparted to the believer, 'He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit' (Jn 15:5). The mystical vein of piety, which passed into Christianity from the Oriental religions, runs side by side with the Hebrew vein, and is suffused with the ethical spirit of the latter.

(5) In the Epistle to the Hebrews.—In the Epistle to the Hebrews we find a conception of faith which is modelled on that of Philo. Faith is the vision of the eternal realities of the unseen world—God, His righteousness, His salvation, the better country— the vision of these realities and the conviction that they are more enduring than the things we see and touch (He 11). As such it is the spring of all heroic action. Christ is related to it as its author and perfecter. He is the great example of faith, and through Him the saints of old time could only gain from afar has been a realized fact (vv. 32-36). Of all NT conceptions of faith, that of Hebrews is perhaps the broadest.

2. Catholic doctrine of Faith.—We have seen that, from the outset of the Church, and even of Christ's Person and work, always implied belief in His power and dignity as Messiah and Lord, and in the reality of His redemption. If, notwithstanding this, the NT cannot be said to show, except in the most feeble forms, any reflection of the intellectualizing of the notion of faith, the explanation is to be found in the fact that doctrine was still sufficiently simple, ethical, and elastic to serve as a vehicle of the Gospel. It still made its appeal less to the intellect than to the heart and conscience. But a time speedily arrived when this in large measure ceased to be true. The passing of the great constructive thinkers, and the Church's experience of Gnosticism of the dangers incident to unfettered speculation, led to the fixing of doctrine as an authoritative norm, the fitting attitude to which was intellectual submission. Nor was this all. More and more, doctrine was elaborated in a direction that removed it from the domain of the heart and conscience into that of the speculative reason. In determining the inner relations of the Trinity and the constitution of Christ's Person, the Church doctrine was sought to define and safeguard what seemed to it vital religious interests. At the same time, such determinations were far removed from the simple truths of the Gospel, and the importance attached to them had the result of throwing the latter into the background. Faith was superseded by speculation. It was made a condition of salvation, it was inevitable that faith should come to be understood as fundamentally an act of the intellect. By Augustine it is defined as 'cume seacione cogitari' (De Pract. Sanctor, 5), and by Aquinas (Summa, II. 2, qu. 2, art. 2) as an act of the intellect which is moved to assent through the will. Three elements were distinguished in it—notitia, assentio, and fides; the first two being purely intellectual, and the third having but the slenderest claim to be regarded as ethical. Not only was faith intellectualized; it was conceived in the main as an act, not of insight and independent conviction, but of intellectual submission. The highest mysteries of the faith, being inaccessible to reason, could be received only on the ground of an external authority. Early Scholasticism, it is true, proceeded on the assumption that the doctrines of the Church were capable of being demonstrated to the reason; still the doctrines were first, and reason second. Moreover, the attempt to justify this assumption was in the end abandoned. Faith, in the Catholic conception of it, is authority-faith. And the authority that guarantees the truth of the doctrines is, in the last resort, the Church: 'Evangelio non ereterem, nisi me estatitur de Fide et Ratioe' (Aug. contra Ep. Manich. 6). The Church, therefore, is the real object to which fides implicita, the practical element in faith, is referred. The notion was still further eviсerated when the Church came to recognize that an intelligent assent to its doctrines more than could be expected from unlettered people, and to accept a fides implicita, or readiness to affirm these doctrines, though not precisely known, as sufficient for saving graces which the Church dispensed to her children.

It is not to be denied that there were
currents of thought in the Catholic Church. It would be easy to quote from Augustine and Aquinas passages in which faith is based not on authority, but on inner apprehension of Divine truth. Divine things, Augustine asserts, cannot be understood except by the pure in heart, and Aquinas, against the idea that faith is an arbitrary choice. It presupposes a certain amount of natural trust and natural grace. Still the main drift was as described.

2. Luther. — Luther restored faith to the place it occupied in the theology of Paul. Against the Roman doctrine of justification by works he set the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith only. In the act of believing, the sinner has full assurance of salvation; his assurance is not contingent on the good works he has done or may do, much less on any ceremonial observance. For salvation is a Divine promise; and, as 'without a promise we have nothing to believe, without faith the promise is useless, since it is through faith that it is established and fulfilled' (de Captiv. BabyL. Evol.), Luther defines it as a 'certain fiducia cordis et firmus assensus quo Christus apprehenditur' (Commentary on Gal. i.). It is nothing else than personal trust in the sin-forgiving grace of God; and it is the product not of reason, but of the impression which the Divine word makes on the heart and conscience.

This conception of faith sets up a new standard for doctrine. If doctrine is to be the object of faith, it must embody the gospel, must exhibit Christ in the characters that render Him our Saviour and awaken our trust. Of this Luther was dimly conscious. He saw that we apprehend Christ only in our experience of His merciful will: 'Christus certe non est Deus aliis qui non posseant misereri, eum sint misereri;igitur qui miseretur et bonus est, Deus est.' But, though in these words Luther criticized the metaphysical formulae of the Greek creeds, he did not seriously raise the question whether they fulfilled the requirement he had proposed. They imposed themselves upon him as something sacred; and he was content to leave them unaltered, and to read into them as much evangelical meaning as they could carry.

2. The Reformed Church after Luther. — Far from working out Luther's epoch-making ideas about faith, the Protestant Church after the Reformation reverted in large measure to the Roman view. The traditional dogmas, supplemented by that of justification by faith, were elevated to their old position. In the object of faith the sum of the articulis fidei was included. As a consequence, the existence of a purely intellectual element in faith was again emphasized. We are to regard faith merely as a decisive for salvation, notitia and assensus were described as necessary preliminary steps. More and more the ground of assent was again sought in authority, with this difference that for the authority of an individual there was substituted that of an infallible Bible.

4. Modern discussions. — In the modern period of theology, which may be dated from the Illumination, discussions regarding faith have turned mainly on two points — its cognitive character; and its relation to the historical facts, above all to the fact of Christ. (1) Every act of faith involves a judgment, an affirmation of truth or of what is regarded as truth. Faith is thus in one aspect a cognitive process. What is the nature of this process? On what ground are the affirmations of faith justified? Are the grounds on which we affirm the justice or the goodness of God the same in kind as those on which the affirmations of science are based? The question is one which has far-reaching significance for theology; it is, one may assert, the only epistemological question with which theology has any deep concern.

For its theory of religious knowledge, Protestant orthodoxy was indebted to the theologies of the Catholic Church, above all to Aquinas. It distinguished between the knowledge of God which comes to us through the exercise of our natural reason, and our knowledge of supernatural things communicated by the Church, or the Bible. Eighteenth-century Rationalism, while it allowed the first, rejected the second. For Rationalism, all religious truths were truths of reason. But neither Protestant nor Catholic theology dreamed of subjecting what it called reason to critical analysis.

(a) It was Kant who first undertook this task, and his account of reason forms one of the great landmarks in epistemological investigation. As the result of his analysis, Kant distinguished a twofold process in knowledge — that of the theoretical, and that of the practical reason. As theoretical, reason is for its domain the world of sense-experience, and for its instrument the categories — above all, the great category of causality. Within this domain it moves with logical certainty, rising from effect to cause and connecting fact with fact as parts of a single, ordered system. But there its competency ends. When the theoretical reason attempts to transcend the phenomenal world of sense-experience, and to explore, by means of its categories, the ultimate reality which lies behind that world, its incompetence is at once demonstrated by the paradoxes in which it finds itself involved. The transcendent objects with which religion is concerned exist in a non-theoretical way. To reason as theoretical they are inaccessible. Only through reason as practical, i.e. as imposing itself upon us as the law of our conduct, do we attain to any knowledge of the unconditioned. Our religious knowledge comes to us as postulates of our moral consciousness, and the certainty with which we hold it is not a logical but a moral certainty. If our consciousness of being under obligation to obey the categorical imperative of our reason is not to be stultified, we must assume that our will is free, that beyond death there lies an opportunity for approximation to the moral ideal, and that the ultimate power in the universe is on the side of the good.

The Kantian account of knowledge has the great merit of bringing out the fact that our religious affirmations, unless those of science, are morally conditioned. In other respects, however, it is open to grave objections. It leaves room for no knowledge of God unless as a postulate. Communication with God is possible only in the form that as we fulfill our moral duties as God's commands, the divine theory which so limits the range of religious experience cannot be regarded as adequate.

(b) Fruitful as the Hegelian movement proved in many ways in theology, on the side of epistemology it represented a reaction in the direction.
of Rationalism. For Hegel, religion was but the
founder of philosophy, and religious apprehension
but an undeveloped form of philosophical. Firm
ground is reached only when the highest truth is
logically developed from the idea and recognized as
a necessary conclusion. The distinction drawn
by Kant between the theoretical and the practical
reason completely disappears.
(c) Meanwhile the problem of knowledge was
being attacked from another side. Herbert
drew attention to himself as a new factor.
De Wette showed that in such judgments
what we predicate of an object is not existence
but worth. We arrange the objects of our experi-
ence in a scale of values, rising from hedonistic
values to spiritual, the morally good forming the
climax of the series. The idea of 'value-judgments'
was taken up by Lotze, and still further developed.
More definitely than De Wette he established
their basis in feeling and connected them with
religion. He held that feeling is the most
appreciative of values (Microcosmus, Eng. tr. 2
241 f.). Through our feeling for values we reach
a knowledge of things as authentie as that given us
in science. Nay, it is precisely such faith-knowledge
that the highest good in the heart of reason; for it is not
in the world of forms with which science deals, but
in the world of values, that the inner nature of
things comes to expression.
(d) It belongs to the epoch-making significance
of Albert Ritschl that he was the first to intro-
duce the 'value-judgment' into theology, and to
explain by it the character of faith-knowledge and
faith-certainty. According to the Ritschlian view,
all our judgments of value, or value-judgments,
rest on such. They have their ground not, as in
the case of theoretical judgments, in the compulsion
of perception and thought, but in our feeling for
values. Our belief in the personality of God, for
example, rests on the fact that we rank ourselves
above Nature and claim dominion over it—rank
the personal above the impersonal. We proceed
on the principle that the highest in rank must be the
ultimate in being. The impulse to set the good
on the throne of the universe has behind it a
feeling for the claim which the good makes on our
will. In proportion as we seek the good, we are
compelled to set our will in accordance with that
it is the fundamental law of things, and must
assert its right against all resistance. It is the
same feeling for values that lies at the basis of the
affirmations which faith makes about Christ. The
assertion that in Christ God meets us has no other
ground than a valuation of the ends for which He
lived and of the spirit that breathes through His
every word and deed. His holy love authentifies
itself to us as the love of the Father for this single
reason, that it is the Divinest thing that has come
within our experience. Always faith is concerned,
not with causal explanation, but with values.
(2) The doctrine of value-judgments is put forward
as an analysis of the actual process of faith-
knowing. It rests on the assumption that the cer-
tainty of faith is different in kind from the
certainty with which we hold a scientific hypothesis.
In this assumption justified, certainly the objects
of faith—God, the Divinity of Christ, the immor-
tality of the soul—do not present themselves to
the religious mind as hypotheses, the validity of
which has to be tested by fallible, arbitrary
scientific canons. The assurance with which we affirm
them is not measured by our ability to fit them into a
causal or logical scheme of things. On all hands
it is admitted that a complete theoretical demon-
stration of their reality is out of the question.

From the conservative side we have, indeed, ever
renewed attempts to establish Christ's Divinity in
a theoretical way, by an appeal to such facts as
His miracles, His sinlessness, His superhuman
consciousness, and His bodily resurrection. But such
demonstrations have always been vain. They rest
on the fact that faith is not a logical certainty,
but a moral certainty. It is rooted not in the
intellect, but in the heart and conscience, and is
morally conditioned. Its measure is the force of
our affirmation of the Good, the Fair, and the True.
Faith is the soul's everlasting yea to the Divine
realities that appeal to it. If it sets these realities
on the throne of the universe, it is because a
universe in which they were not central and supreme
would be morally intolerable. In the value-judge-
ment theory of religious apprehension the radically
moral character of faith-certainty is brought, for
the first time, to clear scientific expression.
That justification of faith, which is so closely
linked with among our cognitive processes is now widely
recognized—even by logicians like Sigwart as well as
by theologians. Where the Ritschlian episte-
nomology encounters the strongest opposition is
in its scepticism about the speculative reason, and in its demand that the knowledge
of faith be kept free from all admixture of specu-
native elements—in its demand, that is to say, for
the exclusion of speculative metaphysics from
theology. To many this has seemed equivalent
to setting up a double truth, and to a denial of
the unity of truth. W. R. Inge, for example,
while recognizing the significance of value-judg-
ments for the development of our concept of
value, can never prove that our valuations are anything more than
subjective, maintains that there must be a unifying
principle in which the different activities of our
nature are harmonized as activities of one person,
directed towards one satisfying end, and that it is
in this unifying experience that faith for the first
time comes fully into its own. In other words,
faith is securely established not in the 'proof
sacrifice', but in our value-judgments, with
all our other knowledge, into a single, coherent
system. That the human mind will never cease
from the attempt thus to synthesize its knowledge
may be regretted, in vain, but that will not
assist to the assertion that the syntheses which philosophy offers
are without significance for faith. It cannot, how-
ever, be admitted that faith is dependent on
the constructions of any philosophy. In our
Christian religion it is precisely those elements which have
been imported from philosophy that have proved
themselves the least stable. Christian faith, as
distinct from speculative theology, really moves
among a few grand, simple, and relatively constant
truths; and these truths owe little or nothing to
the speculative reason, but are the affirmations
of the heart and conscience. While philosophy can
render to religion, particularly in the domain of
apologetics, a service that is real and indispensable,
the idea that it will some day succeed, as Edward
Caird hoped, in transforming the moral certainty
of faith into logical certainty is purely fantastic.
(2) To seek in faith定了factos historicos a historical
facts, particularly on the fact of Christ? To state
the question in a more general way—What is the
medium through which God reveals Himself to the
soul? How is the object of faith given?
Traditional theology has always distinguished
between a general revelation and a special. The
former it regards as given in Nature and in the
moral order visible in the life of man.
Nature we can rise, by the exercise of our natural powers, to the idea of an almighty and intelligent Creator; from the moral order in human life to that of a righteous Lawgiver and Judge. To general human thought this is as an idea which has been reached through a process of thought. Special revelation, on the other hand, is regarded as consisting in certain 'saving facts' of history and facts into our world of one who was the Son of God, the Second Person in the Trinity, and the atonement for sin He accomplished on the cross. In this specifically Christian faith has its object. While, however, the Incarnation and the Atonement are thought of as facts of history, it is evident that they are not of a kind that can be established by purely historical evidence. They come to us as a speculative construction or interpretation of the Person and work of the historical Jesus, the truth of which is guaranteed in the last resort by inspired Scripture. The immediate object of specifity of Christian faith is thus, for traditional theology, not the historical facts of Jesus' life, but a doctrine or series of doctrines; and only when the doctrines have been accepted — whether on authority or as speculatively established — does the historical method of historical revelation be given in the form of doctrine.

(a) It was against a historical revelation so conceived that the Rationalism of the eighteenth century directed its attack. Rejecting the traditional doctrines of Christianity, it put in their place the simple and self-evident ideas of reason as the one valid content of religious faith. These ideas, the chief of which are God, freedom, and immortality, are independent of Christian history, indeed, of all history; they are in their nature timeless, the same for every age and every race. For the significance of history, whether in religion or in any other department of human life, Rationalism had little feeling. In this respect the Kantian philosophy of religion marked no advance. For Kant, too, the content of religious faith is given in ideas that are timeless and necessary. The conception of a revelation — whether in Nature or in history — was barred for him by his doctrine of phenomenalism. The world of our inner and outer sense-experience, being merely phenomenal, can yield us no knowledge of the hidden power behind it.

(b) In the Hegelian philosophy the significance of history seems, at first sight, fully recognized. The entire bulk of patristic speculation or of the contingency of historical facts. History is exhibited as controlled by the immanent law of reason, and as the medium of a self-revelation of the Absolute. Of this self-revelation, the historical religions constitute a particular mode. Nature, art, and philosophy forming kindred modes. Christianity — which has as its characteristic that Christ is contemplated as the God-man, the human — is established as the culmination of the series and the sole absolute religion. But what Hegel gives to history with one hand he takes away with the other. The religious way of envisaging the oneness of the human spirit with the Divine, the finite with the Infinite — as realized, that is to say, in the Person of Christ — is for him but a step on the road to the philosophical. Firm ground is reached on the side of the world, the higher and the highest truth is developed from the idea itself and recognized as a necessity of thought. Ultimately we are left with a rational idea as the sole content of the Christian religion. To make this clear was one of the motives that led Strauss to write his Leben Jesu. He believed that in resolving the Gospel-narrative into a tissue of myth he was doing Christianity a real service, by compelling it to advance from the history-faith of popular religion to the higher faith which receives its object from thought alone. In this epoch-making book he took himself as an example of a man who, basing his work on what has been learned from human testimony, and human testimony is fallible. How can we build our faith on a foundation that criticism may stir to destroy, if it has not already destroyed it? This objection bears with particular force against the traditional conception of a historical revelation, since it is precisely the miraculous facts on which it relies to prove the significance of Christ that are most open to critical attack.

(c) Orthodoxy, Rationalism, and Idealistic Philosophy, widely as they differed in many respects, were all agreed in one fundamental assumption, that it is the nature of a doctrine or of doctrine that religion arises. Faith was made dependent for its object on a process of thought. Schleiermacher's importance for theology consists in no small degree in this, that he was the first to break with the method of psychological analysis, he sought to demonstrate religion as a function of the Spirit, independent alike of philosophy, ethics, and dogmatics. Religion, he taught, is the immediate response of the Soul in feeling to the Divine reality which besets it behind and before. This reality is not, however, found in Christ or in any historical fact; it is not even anything moral as such. It is the Infinite, the Eternal, the Whole of things. Religion is the inscrutable sense of the Infinite in the finite, of the Eternal in the temporal, our feeling that our time-life is a manifestation and organ of the eternal Whole and absolutely dependent on it. Significance is attributed to Christ only as a prototype of a new mode of such 'God-consciousness.' That Schleiermacher gives an adequate account of the content of Christian faith, few would now contend. None the less his demonstration of religion as an immediate experience of Divine reality, and as independent of the constructions of theology and philosophy, stands for all time.

(d) Ritschl learned from Schleiermacher that faith springs up as the result of contact with Divine reality, and that its object, therefore, is not to be sought in any idea or doctrine. But, holding a definitely ethical theory of religion, he could not regard the Whole of things as the field where the soul finds Him. Not in Nature, but only in the historical life of man, can God reveal Himself in His moral working and as the God of our salvation. And, among the facts of history in which He approaches us, Jesus Christ possesses a significance that is not only supreme but absolutely unique. What gives to Christ such significance is not the miraculous facts on which rationalist theology relies to prove His Divinity, but the moral and religious traits of His character as they manifest themselves in word and deed. In contact with His moral life and holy love, we feel the hand of God laid upon us, and know that He has drawn near to us to forgive and overcome our sin and to call us into His fellowship and service.

The historical Jesus, and not any doctrine of His Person and work, has been brought into the faith. What then is doctrine? It is a product of faith, and intelligible only as an expression of what the soul has found in Christ. This need not be taken as denying to the doctrine of the Church any religious value. We know that for countless thousands the doctrine of the Atonement has been the one great medium through which they have
Faith

1897); Can Is 83 Christian Psychology, 694 ITiat and mankind, denies such be community when certain but one living the of Divine, its experience. It is ideal of Christian life and charity and progressiveness of revelation and at the same time to escape the menace of historical criticism, Loisy and Inge, among others, have sought the ground of of Jesus. He was alive in the living Church. He manifested Himself in the Church and the individual soul, rather than in the Jesus of history. The significance of the latter they find in this, that He introduced the movement which in its entirety will constitute a theology in the life of humanity. It has to be said, however, that the problem which such writers attempt in this way to solve is not that which Ritschl had before him. About the progress of faith in the early church, Ritschl was not concerned. His one concern was with what he regarded as the fundamental Christian experience, the assurance, namely, that we have a gracious, sin-forgiving God. How can such an experience be reached? In attaching it exclusively to the person of Jesus, Ritschi does certainly give ground for the charge that he denies any other channel of revelation. It would be difficult to deny the fact that many have reached the living experience he has in view in other ways through contact with the historical Jesus. The love of Jesus meets us not only in the written Gospels and in the preaching of the Church, but also in men filled with His Spirit; and, wherever we find this, a kind of spiritual life of faith, which, before it, it points to us as something Divine, and has power to produce within us the assurance that the God of our life is a God of grace. But, while this must be admitted, the history of the Church has made it abundantly clear that Christianity loses its vitality when the Person of its founder is forgotten or obscured. The men and women who have been the driving forces in the Christian community have drawn their inspiration from no secondary source, but from Christ Himself. That in a Christian community there is a power at work which with a certain fitness can be described as 'the living Christ'—as 'the living Church'—as 'the living God,' and that it has shaped itself in the modern mind—is not to be denied. And such a power cannot but possess immense significance for religion, for this among others is what in this very word means to us in the language of to-day. But can it be accepted as a substitute for the Christ of history? One may assert that the Christ of history, while a child of His time with respect to the forms of His thought, in its essence was a child of His centuries and this stands above time. A wealth of significance belongs to Him far transcending that of our richest ideals, and a power to awaken and sustain faith in the living God of salvation such as meets us in no other fact of our experience.

FAITH (Greek).

In this article we propose (1) to give some account of religious experience, and (2) to indicate the relation between faith and knowledge in Greek philosophy.

1. Faith as a religious force. (1) Its nature.

By religious faith we understand belief coupled with trust in a Divine power. Both these elements enter into the words πίστις and πιστολογία, although the moral rather than the intellectual notion is prominent in each, especially in the verb (W. R. Inge, Faith and其 Psychology, London, 1909, p. 3 f.). But, to see the distinctive character of Greek faith, we must turn to its objective aspect. The Greek faith was polytheistic. Its deities were beautiful, and often sublime, conceptions. At the same time— we speak of the national religion rather than of local cults—they were but glorified types of humanity, beings who inspired confidence rather than awe, to whom the artistic imagination freely played.

(2) Its history. —The faith thus described was a living force in Greece till about the middle of the 5th cent. B.C. It is true that of the 8th and 7th centuries 'the figure of Zeus dwarfs and obscures all the other divine personalities' (J. Adam, Relig. Teachers of Greece, Edinburgh, 1908, p. 83; cf. F. P. Mahaffy, Social Life in Greece, London, 1892, p. 451); but in the heart of Greece there is no revolt against the old national faith. The lyric poets 'never advanced even to the most distant hint of atheism, or to a denial that the gods could and did interfere in human affairs'.

Polytheism, gradually purged, indeed, of its grosser elements, was the accepted creed of the Greek poets from Homer to Sophocles. It inspired the masterpieces of the greatest period of Greek sculpture. It was at the heart of every great movement in the formative period of Greek history. Of this, two illustrations may be given. The first is the Apolline cult. The worship of Apollo was, directly or indirectly, involved in the intellectual, social, and political development of the Greeks (for details, cf. L. R. Farnell, in HDB v. 145 f.). To take but one instance—the Apolline cult was largely instrumental in introducing and in gradually deepening the vital ethical conception of purification from sin. Our second illustration is from the Persian war. Plato (Laws, ii. 609) expressly mentions trust in the gods as one of the great causes of the Greek victory. And the truth of his statement must come home powerfully to every reader of Herodotus. It was faith in the gods that kept Leonidas at Thermopylae, and the fleet at Salamis (vii. 220, 145). It was this that moved the Athenians to reject the overtures of Mardonius (viii. 143). And accordingly, when the Athenians appealed to Sparta for aid, they referred to this faith as their own supreme advantage—'evening Zeus Hellenics, and fearing to betray Hellas, have not accepted the offer of the king' (ix. 7). Finally, Themistocles, addressing his captains after the battle of Salamis, emphatically declared to them that we do not owe this to ourselves, but to the gods (viii. 109), which he would certainly not have done unless he had been sure that he was expressing the uppermost thought of all (E. E. Muller, Hellenica, London, 1893, p. 539). For the above view to as}

the power of the traditional faith, cf. also Mahaffy, p. 358.

As Greek faith rested on polytheism, it flourished as long as the latter remained credible. But, about the middle of the 5th cent., rationalism, which had arisen in the Greek colonies of Asia Minor, began to play havoc with traditional belief, and the age of faith was succeeded by the so-called age of illumination (J. Adam, 270 f.; L. Campbell, Retig. in Greek Liter., London, 1898, pp. 208, 209). This corresponds, roughly speaking, to the latter half of the 5th century. On the other hand, the rapid spread of Christianity made the most notable incident of which was the condemnation and death of Socrates (399 B.C.). Did the national religion ever regain its old vitality? Malan argues (p. 355 f.) that Grose and others have greatly exaggerated the scepticism of the last period of Greek history. But even he does not maintain that the old polytheistic creed ever again expressed the prevailing religious attitude of thoughtful minds. There was, indeed, much earnest religious life in the following centuries. This is especially true of the Stoic and the Mystic. But their belief does concern us here, both because it was not profoundly religious, and also because, being polytheistic, it could hardly be said to embrace the element of trust which belongs to a genuine religious faith.

4. Knowledge. — According to our definition, faith is an act at once intellectual and moral. But such a mode of conceiving man's knowledge of God is foreign to Greek thought. Reason alone, according to Greek philosophy, is adequate to the knowledge of God. This view forms an essential part of Aristotle's teaching, but it is in the Republic of Plato (511, etc.) that the superiority of knowledge to faith is most distinctly laid down. According to Plato, πίστις is but a stage in the pathway to knowledge, a stage in which the visible and oplicable is regarded as true. 'With Plato, Knowledge and not Faith is 'the assurance of things hoped for, the test of things not seen' (J. Adam, 407).

On the other hand, the opposition between knowledge and faith in Greek philosophy is not so absolute as may at first appear. For knowledge, while ascribed to reason alone, is often brought into closest relation with the moral nature. Thus, Pythagoras viewed the pursuit of knowledge as a means to spiritual emancipation (J. Adam, 193 f.); Socrates, again, viewed knowledge as 'a certain overmastering wish' that lays hold primarily, indeed, of the intellect, but through the intellect of the entire personality (ib. 329). And, similarly, Plato taught that in the conversion wrought by knowledge the character also is involved. It is a revolution in which the whole nature shares (τον δαχτυλικον τον ναον, ib. 412; Plato, Rep., 518 C). Lastly, the figure by which, in the Symposium, Plato sets forth the knowledge of God is that of the soul's marriage with her ideal. It is still knowledge, an amor intellectus, with which he professes to deal. But it is obvious how near the conception brings us to the standpoint of Christianity.

Lit.
that, as all believers, even the most perfect, have committed some sin or other, they must enter hell for such shorter or longer time as each case may require, and be finally burned for no Muslim, even the most wicked, can suffer eternal punishment, or be annihilated. Paradise is the final goal of all believers. Thus, speaking generally, the most important element in faith is the intellectual foundation on which the religious edifice of the protagonist of a believer, whether the moral results of his belief be good, bad, or indifferent.

There are other definitions of the term imān, framed with reference to the grounds on which it is based, or the means by which it is formed. Traditional faith (imān fi taqdis) is based on the authority of a teacher (taqdis), without any attempt being made to prove its correctness. This is the faith of the unlearned, who have not the ability to search out things for themselves. Those who have the leisure and the necessary intelligence to investigate religious matters, and who then believe, are said to have imān fi 'ilm. Faith which rests on the inner vision (imān fi a'yan), or intuition of the mystic, is progressive in its nature. The last stage is attaining to a fixed devotion to which is so absolute that the soul is absorbed in God, the great Reality.

Another point round which many controversies have raged is whether imān and Islam are the same. The orthodox view is that they are synonymous, and that a Muslim is a mu'min, a believer. By others, Islam is looked upon as a larger term than imān. It is said that Islam signifies belief with the heart, confession with the tongue, and good works done by various parts of the body. Imān refers to the first of these, and, is, therefore, only a component part of Islam. The believer who confesses his belief and practices what he believes unites Islam and imān; he who does not so confess and practise possesses imān only. On the other hand, he who confesses and acts, without having any real belief, is not a true believer. Those who hold that confession and action are both essential would not consider assent to the teaching of Muhammad made on a death-bed to be of much value, as the opportunity for confession of belief and action on it would be gone. The term Islam, however, lays great stress on such action. The Muslim is a man who is resigned to the will of God as regards the performance of the five practical duties. It is not so much resignation to the providential dealings of God with a man as such, that Islam implies, but confidence in, and order to fulfill certain duties. So far, this seems to support the views of those theologians who teach that Islam and imān must be kept quite distinct. They say, for instance, that works cannot be a part of faith, for a man who believes and confesses and dies before he does good deeds is a believer and enters Paradise, even if he die before he makes open confession of his faith.

Another question in dispute is whether faith can decrease and increase. Some say that it does not change, and is not affected by sin, or by the omission of religious duties, though such shortcomings will be avenged. Others admit that, in the case of the Companions of the Prophet, faith did increase, for new revelations brought fresh truths to them; but, now that the dogmas of Islam are fixed and there is no further development, faith cannot increase. Abu Shafi'i, the philosopher, held the latter view. He maintained that, if religious duties were neglected, faith would decrease; to this the reply is made that, at certain times, women do not say the stated prayers, or give alms, yet their faith is not thereby decreased.

The view of Ash-Shafi'i is not supported by a verse of the Qur'an, revealed to encourage the Muslims when an attack on them was imminent: 'Who, when men said to them, 'Now are the Meccans mustering against you; therefore, fear them' —it only increased their faith' (ii. 167). The following further distinctions are made by those who agree with Ash-Shafi'i: the faith of men and of the jinn increases and decreases; the faith of prophets increases only; the faith of angels neither increases nor decreases. It is usual to assign a position in the middle between those who believe in the teaching of Muhammad, and so have faith and are mu'mins, or believers; those who do not so believe, and are, therefore, kāfars, or infidels, who class all non-Muslims not as unbelievers. These, if they reject the truth after investigation, are not so blameworthy as if they had declined to accept it through sheer obstinacy. Muslims may have defective faith, but can never be called infidels, though they may be called heretics. In this category the orthodox place all those who have tried to bring reason to bear on religion and have striven to put away the incumbrance of traditions, or knowledge of an intuition of the mystic, (imān fi a'yan), or intuition of the mystic, is progressive in its nature. The last stage is attaining to a fixed devotion to which is so absolute that the soul is absorbed in God, the great Reality.

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FATH (Roman) — FAITH-HEALING

The reflected eye of the Roman people, which by virtue of its power, was able to influence the decisions of the state, was the object of much study by historians and philosophers. The concept of faith was closely tied to the Roman state, and was seen as a crucial element in the maintenance of social order.

Faith is a concept that has been central to human civilization for millennia. The Romans, like many other cultures, had a complex and multifaceted understanding of faith. In this essay, I will explore the role of faith in Roman society, and how it has shaped the development of Western thought.

In the 2nd C. B.C., eagerly studied by many Romans, we can see the effects produced by these and other causes. In the last age of the Republic, while many sought religious satisfaction in new ways—in Pythagorean mysticism, for example, or in oracular foreign worship, and in many forms of asceticism and superstition—there was no Roman religion worthy of the name. The ancient forms no longer expressed a genuine belief either among the people or among their rulers. The state was toward the close of the war in a fast decaying. Old cults and old deities fell into partial or complete neglect. Old priestesses fell into abeyance, or became mere steps in the ladder of political ambition, while on every side the temples were crumbling into ruins (Hor. Od. iii. vi.; Propert. ii. 6. 53 f., etc.). And, lastly, the age was as conspicuous for immorality as for unbelief (cf., e.g., Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, tr. W. P. Dickson, new ed., 1894, bk. v. ch. xi.). But the national conscience was not dead. We in writings of the age a profound sense of national ill-being—here the sense of national guilt, there of misery entailed by neglected duty to the gods (Livy, iv. 35, 42 f., Hor. Od. iii. vi. 35, Exper. iv.; Virg. Ec. iv.; etc.). The superstitions extravagances above described were themselves a symptom of spiritual unrest. No, it was to such feelings that this god-like man appealed, wherein he reminded the Roman people of their high destiny, and of the way to its attainment—through a pietas like that of his hero, the service of the State with the help of the State's deities. And it was to this task that Augustus, the original of Virgil's hero, devoted himself. His revival of the State religion is described by Fowler as 'the most remarkable event in the history of the Roman religion, and one almost unique in religious history' (op. cit. p. 429 f.). He did all in his power to reinstate the old religion in the faith and affections of the people, chiefly by the revival of ancient cults, and by a vast work of temple restoration (Mon. Ancyr. iv. 7; Livy, iv. 20, 7; Ovid, Fast. ii. 50, etc.), while he sought to strengthen his own dynasty by linking it at many points with the restored religious order (cf. esp. Hor. Carm. ii. 5). Finally, the religious policy of Augustus was continued by his successors. If, now, we seek to estimate the general importance of the old Roman religion in the early Empire, we may point, among other evidences, to the curious fact that gradually incorporated into the philosophy of the Oriental worship of their time that the Christian Fathers directed their keenest ridicule. If we ask, on the other hand, whether as a spiritual force the Roman faith had any real renascence, the question is not so easy to answer. Here it must suffice to add that both in Rome and in the provinces 'the old religion continued to exist for at least three centuries in outward form, and to some extent in popular belief' (Fowler, 429).

See, further, art. ROMAN RELIGION.

Literature.—An ample bibliography will be found in the works of W. Warde Fowler above referred to, and especially in its introductory chapter.

FAITH-HEALING.—A term used to express a belief that in the curing of disease the faith of the sufferer (or of others) is a contributory factor. This faith puts its trust in the immediate action of a super-normal being, acting with or without means. In the strictest sense, therefore, faith-healing may be said to exclude the most valuable means of healing; but, in the wider sense—in the sense, that is to say, in which 'faith-healing' occurs as a historical phenomenon—it admits such means as one factor in the process of healing. The prin-
cical species are named mental healing, magnetic healing, spiritualistic healing, and spiritual healing. In all, suggestion plays a healing part. The most widely spread and widely used method of spiritual healing is that known as Christian Science (q.v.), and the strongest form of suggestion is called hypnotism (q.v.).

1. History. - Faith-healing is the oldest form of healing in the world, for as early as 1503 B.C., in the early days of the Hebrews, faith was practiced as a means of healing, as is shown in the Bible. The first instance of faith-healing was recorded in the Old Testament when the prophet Elisha healed a leper, as recorded in 2 Kings 5:22-25. In the New Testament, faith-healing is a common theme, with numerous instances of Jesus Christ performing miracles through faith. For example, in Mark 9:14-29, Jesus heals a boy possessed by a demon, and in Mark 8:10-13, Jesus heals a blind man.

2. In the earliest documents of the Christian Church, faith-healing is frequently referred to, and is a dominant factor in the acts of healing wrought by Jesus Christ. The centurion's servant was healed because of the faith of his master (Mt 8:5); a paralyzed man was healed on account of the faith of his friends (9); the woman with an issue was made whole by her faith (9:20); and so were the two blind men (9); and so was the daughter of the Canaan-Itish woman (15). On the other hand, the lunatic boy's cure was delayed through want of faith (17:18); and it is significant that the sins of the woman who was a sinner were forgiven because of her faith (Lk 7:38). Moreover, it is expressly recorded that on one occasion Jesus did not (Mt 19:11), and could not (Mk 6:5), put forth His power because of the want of faith of the people. The inference is necessary that what He did by His power was done by Jesus was of the same general character as that practiced by the priests of Asklepios, that is to say, it depended partly on a power put forth by the healer, and partly on the active faith of the sufferer. This, again, corroborates the definition given above of faith-healing, viz. that it consists, as a matter of historical fact, not so much in the power of faith (or of auto-suggestion) as in the power of faith acting in conjunction with some external agency, visible or invisible.

In the Apostolic age the passage 1 Co 12 is classical for its conception of faith-healing. According to it, the power to heal was a gift of the Spirit (v. 9); it was one among other gifts (v. 11); it was given not to all (v. 30); it was one of the greater gifts, and as such was to be sought for (v. 28); its chief object was the common good (v. 7), and the royal road to its attainment was love (v. 7). An instructive comment on this passage is supplied by Ac 3, where Peter and John are said to have healed a lame man by calling on the name of Jesus Christ. The healing of Zaania by Peter (Ac 9) and the raising of Tabitha (v. 40) both imply the same process, while it is expressly said of the cripple of Lystra that Paul healed him because he saw that he had faith to be healed (14). In Ja 5, to the invocation for faith for the recovery of the sick, is added: 'The prayers of the righteous are mighty in their effect.' (v. 15). In all cases the implication is that, as cases of faith-healing, they are the joint product of the work of an invisible agent, Jesus Christ, and of the faith of the sufferer. (On the form and power attributed to the invocation 'in the name of Jesus,' see Heitmillar, 'Im Namen Jesu,' in Forschungen zur Rel. u. Lit. des a. u. N. Test. i. [1905] 2.)

As illustrating the nature of faith-healing as practised in the early Church, the ceremony of exorcism is instructive. It is constantly the third with prophecy and healing, as in the case when the activities of the pagan sancta are described (Bolde, Psyché 4, 337). The name of exorcism is but another name for the driving away of disease, wherever the diagnosis in general starts from the postulate that all disease is the work of malignant spirits. For example, Israël Eikes (ed. Del. et ali. 4) says of his own times and of his own fellows:

'Some do certainly and truly drive out devils, so that those who have thus been cleansed from evil spirits frequently both
believe, and join themselves to the Church. Others have fore-
knowledge of things to come: they see visions, and utter pro-
phetic expressions from others, again, heal sick, by laying their
hands upon them, and they are made whole."

He goes on to say (§ 5) that Christians work their miracles merely by calling on the name of Jesus Christ, and by faith, and by virtue of the Spirit, or, in other words, by faith (cf. Just. Mart. II Apol. 6, I Apol. 30, Trypho, 39, 76; Tert. Apol. 25, 37, 43, de Idol. 11, de Pud. 21; Origen, c. Celsus, i. 11, ii. 21, 24).

Perhaps the most vivid description of the faith-healing of the Patriarchal Church is that given by Augustine in his De Civitate Dei (xxi. 14). There, among many stories, the story of a man at Carthage who had been operated on for fistula with partial success only, but who was cured by prayer, and so saved from the necessity of a further threatened operation; and also of a leading Carthaginian lady, named Innocentia, who was healed of an incurable cancer in the breast through the sign of the cross being made over her. The union of divination and faith is here again exemplified by the fact that Innocentia was told in a dream how her curse could be effectuated. Another man, a doctor, was, at his baptism and after a dream, cured of gout; and of the eyes and paralysis: a paralysis youth was cured when brought into contact with some earth from Jeru-
salem. The most graphic story of all is that of a brother and sister being healed of St. Vitus' dance at the tomb of the martyrs in the church where St. Augustine was ministering—the sister, indeed, while he was preaching. He adds many other examples of cures wrought by faith-healing and the agency of the martyrs, and records the case of a man who gives it as sure and sample of miracles that cures wrought within the two years preceding the writing of this volume—he knows, he says, seventy such cases.

(1) The history of faith-healing is full of instances of no artificial divisions, but runs on unchanged, so that what is true of one age is found true of another.

The phenomena of pre-Christian days recur under Christianity, whether in its earlier or in its later forms. The Middle Ages brought a rich collection of instances of faith-healing, or miracles of healing, as these were then considered. A few typical examples must suffice, it being understood that these cases are quoted more as an argument to the belief in faith-healing than as in every case beyond suspicion.

St. Bridget cured a blind girl named Daria (Les Petits Ecol. ill. 1584); and two lepers were cured in the sign of the cross (Lanzenus, Martyr. Rom., Antwerp, 1550). The works of healing power of St. Francis of Assisi are numerous, and were recited in the hymn of his cantillation. Another St. Francis (of Paulia), three cen-
turies later, was a still greater wonder-worker: "He gave eyes to the blind, hearing to the deaf, speech to the dumb; he made the halt to walk, the cripple to have the use of his limbs, and recalled six dead persons to life again" (see Les Petits Ecol. iv. 1554). Similar instances are told of Sts. Germaine of Pontoise (S. 1. 100), of St. Germanus, 'the father, physician, pastor, and love of his people'; of St. Adrian, a wonder-worker (Les Petits Ecol. iv. 227); of St. Carlo Borromeo, of St. Cuthbert, St. Pat-
rick, of all great saints indeed, and of numberless lesser saints.

The religious movements of the 16th cent., able to crush out faith-healing. The saints, it is true, fell out of favour where the Reformers' spirit prevailed; but the witches remained, and Satan remained as an ever-active power of evil. In one striking case, at all events, faith-healing was able to hold its own. English kings since the days of Edward the Confessor, and French kings apparently from Clovis onwards, had touched for scrofula, or 'the king's evil.'

Queen Elizabeth touched, but omitted the sign of the cross; Charles I., lingering by proclamation had to come to him to be touched; Charles II., touched 92, 107 persons; William IV., touched without success; Queen Anne touched 290 persons, including Dr. Johnson when thirteen months old; George I., discontinued the practice.

A case of cure by faith-healing which seems well authenti-
cated is that of the "holy water bottle" of Fort Royal, in 1685, who was cured of a persistent lachrymal fistula by the application of a small drop of water from the Savoy, written down of Thomas (see E. H. Hutton, Essays Theol. and Lit., 1877, vol. i. pp. xxiii-
xxvii)."

But, though faith-healing fell into disrepute in proportion as the spirit of rationalism prevailed, the belief underlying it found defenders contin-
ously. Paracelsus, Gianvill, Valentine Great-
rin, van Helmont, Robert Fludd, Magnetici magi-
orum curantium (1621), the Cambridge Platonists, and John Wesley all set forth that philosophy of life on which faith-healing depends. Moreover, Martin Luther, the Moravians, the Waldenses, the German Pietists, the English Baptists and Quakers, the famous healer of the last century, Prince Hohenlohe-Waldenburg-Schillingsfurst, Father John Wesley, and his famous Pious Society, are recorded to have heale all sorts of diseases by "faith and word," and the "wonderful work of faith" has been practised the art. Our own days, moreover, are witnessing its revival, under the in-
fluence of the renaissance of Theosophy and Animistic, Orphic, and Hermetic modes of thought.

2. The means employed.—(1) Foremost among these, though the least important, we must place some of the ordinary articles of the pharmacopoeia. The majority of these, it is true, such as iron and arsenic for the blood corpuscles, strychnine for the nerves, and pepсин and bismuth for the alimentary canal, call for little or no faith as a co-operant. But, in many cases where the mind reacts on the body through a depressed nervous system, through fancy, in epilepsy, or in some cases of hysteria, the medical man will use drugs, or other media, not for their own efficacy, but as a means of calming the nerves, or of making the via medicatrix naturae may be stimulated into action. Nor can the therapeutic value of confidence in the medical man be easily overrated as affording that restfulness of the soul which is one necessary condition for faith-healing.

(2) In Roman, Greek, and Christian times alike, great use has been made of the hand, and especially the right hand, as an instrument of healing. Blindness, child-birth, lameness, abdominal troubles, snake-bites, and strokes of any sort which were attributed to Divine or demonic influence were all treated as curable by the magic power of the Divine or human hand; to these must be added the touch of the foot, or of the dress as healing agencies, and also kissing any-
thing which was thought to possess healing power (Weinreich, Antike Heilungswunder, 14 ff.). But, to make such magic power effective, there was ob-
viously needed a co-operant as well as a prevenient faith.

(3) The so-called 'temple-sleep' of the pagan temple was used as a species of faith-healing. The patient was put to sleep, and in the state of hypnosis he was either operated on or received suggestions that he was healed, which (if the inscrip-
tions may be trusted) were found, when the patient awoke, to have effect ed their purpose. Modern hypnotism is aware of the part that faith plays in its activities, and is agreed that patients of low intelligence make bad cases, through their in-
ability to make any continuous or sustained imagination, i.e. through their lack of a living faith. The ancient temple-phenomena repeat themselves in many of the miraculous healings performed by Christian saints.

(4) Miscellaneous objects used in faith-healing are: blood, oil (St. Cuthbert), spittle (St. Hilarian), hair, the sign of the cross, baptism, holy water (St. Willibrord), or water in which a saint has washed (St. Amaund), the hand on which a saint has died (as in the case of St. Vincent Ferrier), the medal of a saint (St. Francis Xavier), a tooth (St. Matrin), a shroud, relics, indeed anything which has in any way come into contact with a saint. In fact, nothing is a stronger argument for the validity of faith-healing in some sense and to some extent than the predominant place it took in the first 1500 years of our era. When all deduction has been made for charlatanism, imposture, and the desire to edify, there still remain a large number of healings which must be regarded as genuine, and must be accounted for either by the faith or by the power of the saints, or by a union of both. The last probability is in favour of the last solution. That such wonder-
works began to die out from the 16th cent. is
hardly to be accounted for by a supposed cessation of activity on the part of the saints, but rather by the want of inner and potent subconscious belief in the Divine essence of the faith-healing. Whether in the narrower or in the wider sense, characterized the West for 1500 years; it became sporadic for the next 400 years, and is now once more raising its head. The inference is that, were an unquestioned faith and, as is the Divine man in man; that the human mind in its finiteness is too weak a power for the work thus demanded of it; and that such results as mental healing seems to be better assigned to spiritual healing. In this form of possession or hallucination (la contagion mentale) (cf. W. von Bechterew, Die Bedeutung der Suggestion im sozialen Leben, Wiesbaden, 1905).

3. The species of faith-healing.—For the sake of clearness, the principal species of faith-healing may be described as magnetic, mental, spiritualistic, and spiritual.

(1) Magnetic.—This is described by its supporters as a special case of the use of a primordial and universal force which displays itself in a balance between pairs of allied opposites, e.g. magnetism and anti-magnetism. Its therapeutic use was familiar to antiquity and is seen in the use of the hand (Weinreich, I-66). It appears in the miracles of Jesus (Mk 2:5, 5). The power was practised by His followers (Ac 5:15-18), and was used in the methods of Paracelsus, van Helmont, and Robert Fludd. It is long before Mesmer in 1775 gave it wide currency. Afterwards the theory of a 'fluid' was discarded by the researches of Puységur and Farin, and Frère-Jean. The result has been undeservedly to neglect the unquestionable actuality of a force of some kind known as animal-magnetism, in favour of another known as hypnotism. The mental power has ousted the physical. In both the appeal is made to the nervous system, whether by way of establishing or disturbing its equilibrium; and it is claimed for magnetism that it effects its therapeutic results by the natural use of a force radiating from the operator, which is cognate to a universal force in which the nervous system of all living beings is bathed at its periphery. The chief method of magnetic healing is by passes, by touch, especially at neural centres, and by the application of objects which have been in contact with the operator. But, through the favour shown to hypnotism, magnetic healing has fallen comparatively into the background, though there is a little doubt that it masks a real force of some kind.

(2) Mental.—Mental healing is both active and passive. As active, it consists in the reception and assimilation of such suggestion. The healing proper, however, is sought in the consequent mental activity of the patient himself. He has been enjoined, for example, to fix his thoughts by an effort of attention, continuous or repeated—on such virtues as joy, peace, contentment, or love; and, by implication, to exclude their opposites. The soul, it is assumed, will be put by this means in a more favourable condition for the activity of its inherent capacity for health. By some, indeed, faith-healing is identified with this auto-suggestion, on the ground that thought in man is distinguished by its presence in the mind and required for the maintenance or restoration of health is the free play of this inherent Divinity. The phenomena of telepathy, moreover, have been invoked to support the contention that 'absent treatment' by faith is as effective as that given in the presence of the patient. The difficulties in the way of accepting this whole theory of mental healing lie in the facts that suggestion has less to do with the conscious mind than with the subconscious; that there is no ground for regarding faith as a power propelling the Divine man in man; that the human mind in its finiteness is too weak a power for the work thus demanded of it; and that such results as mental healing seems to be better assigned to spiritual healing. In this form of possession or hallucination (la contagion mentale) (cf. W. von Bechterew, Die Bedeutung der Suggestion im sozialen Leben, Wiesbaden, 1905).

4. Suggestion.—It is necessary to say a word on the part suggestion plays in the many theories of faith-healing. The word is used frequently as if it were coterminous with the influence exercised on us by our whole environment, or with any influence exercised by any person on another. Or (Lefrère) is applied to all ideas which impinge on the mind without apparent motive and are unconsciously assimilated; or (Ponsot) to alteration, by word or gesture, of another's nervous system by which entrance is afforded to the desired idea; or (Wundt) as a psychical act which blocks up all association-tracks of the nervous system other than the one suitable for the presented idea; or (Binet) as a moral impression which one person exerts on another; or (Sidis) as the invasion of consciousness by an idea without criticism or opposition. It is the latter, however, that Bechterew (p. 10), to distinguish between perception-activity in which the will takes an active part, and that in which the will is passive. The will is passive in a twofold manner: (a) with regard to all objects which lie beyond the circle of the field of consciousness (attention being concentrated exclusively on the one object at the centre); and (b) when the nervous system is depressed and, therefore, the power of attention is lost, that is, the latter condition of twofold passivity, suggestion proper belongs, and its proper place in our classification would be under the head of mental healing. Closely connected with suggestion in general is hypnotism, being described as effectual which ensures an enhanced power to suggestion in a state known as hypnosis. In hypnosis two factors work
jointly—one physical and one psychical. The physical consists in a partial dissociation of the neural dispositions or systems, in such a way that, while some are depressed, others (or one alone) work with increased vigour. In a state of concentration or depression the full flow of nerve currents (ideas) in the patient is arrested, so that the one current which the hypnotizer desires to keep open works with unusual force. The psychical factor is that of a co-consciousness, or secondary stream of consciousness, which is to the waking consciousness as the stars are to the sun.

When one sets, the other rises (see Carl du Prel, Philos. of Mysticism). Mental dissociation of tracts of ideas and physical dissociation of groups of nerve processes seem to be the two poles between which all the phenomena of hypnotism swing.

5. Another question must be touched on. Faith-healing, as we have seen, obeys the same law in its activity as thought does when it depends on subject and object. It is the product of two factors, not of one only. The power which actually heals may be latent and native in the sufferer himself, but it is not called forth except through some stimulus. No account, therefore, of faith-healing can be adequate which omits either the one or the other of its two components.

In faith-healing the suggestion is that cure will be worked by spiritual or Divine power, especially if this power be appealed to in a religious setting, a church, a place of worship, the feet of an idol, a fountain, or pool of water, the resting-place of some sacred relics, such as the bones of a saint, or it may be in presence of the Eucharistic procession, or during High Mass, or the administration of the Holy Sacrament. This Divine power is supposed to be neutralizing or over-coming sickness, disease, and the ill consequences of accident. The faith-healer does not doubt the reality of matter or of diseases, but believes that he can draw upon a spiritual force to subdue or annihilate an existing evil (Henry Morris, in Brit. Med. Jour., 15th June, 1910, p. 1453).

**FALASHAS.**—See Abyssinia, Aga.

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**BIBLICAL (J. DENNEY), p. 701.**

**ETHNIC (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 705.**

**FALASCHAS.**—1. The narrative of Gn 3—

By 'the Fall' is meant that first act of disobedience to God which is narrated, with its consequences, in Gn 3. If this chapter were in the proper sense history, its interpretation would be easy: it would mean just what it says. But the beginning of human life lies beyond the reach of history; there neither is nor can be anything akin to tradition or recollection in a story which deals with the origins either of knowledge or of conscience. Such stories are the fruit of reflection and imagination, which may be more naive or more philosophical, more childish or more spiritual, more gross or more refined, according to the minds in which they originate, but they are never his- torical. This is the case with Gn 3. It is a mythical explanation—charged with moral and religious lessons of the highest importance—of some phenomena in human life which especially impressed the writer. In his eyes life was an un- certain term of penal servitude, under the shadow of capital punishment. Both for men and for women it was under a curse. It could not always have been so. God could not have destined man to this misery from the first. There must be some expla- nation of how man came to be in this condition, and the explanation is given in the story of the Fall.

This view is adopted with practical unanimity by modern scholars, but agreement as to the char- acter and purpose of the narrative does not neces- sarily result in agreement as to what it means.

The further question whether the theory of faith-healing is that man's organ is self-contained, like a perfecta societas, or that it is like an Aeolian harp played on by outside forces—in other words, whether as a discrete mass it contains within it all that is necessary for health and wealth, or whether other agents, such as animism and the doctrine of angels postulate, supply its needs—may remain here undetermined for want of a volume. The complex psychical factor is that of a co-consciousness, or secondary stream of consciousness, which is to the waking consciousness as the stars are to the sun. When one sets, the other rises (see Carl du Prel, Philos. of Mysticism). Mental dissociation of tracts of ideas and physical dissociation of groups of nerve processes seem to be the two poles between which all the phenomena of hypnotism swing.

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When we say that the writer gives his explanation in the form of a myth, the question immediately arises how far he was conscious of what he was doing—that is, how far the writer, who certainly did not make the myth out of nothing, was literally bound by its very terms, so that his work is simply one of stating the results of a rationalizing or spiritualizing the myth, or feeling that it had significance in the rational and moral world, even if he could not use much liberty with what was probably a more or less sacred form. The various answers which have been given to these questions have issued in different readings of the whole story. Broadly, these may be illus- trated as follows:—

(1) Gunkel tries to keep strictly within the limits of the myth. The one false path is that of modernizing. Eden is a garden which is the abode of God. Adam and Eve live in it on the fruit of the trees. They are in a state of childlike innocence, knowing no more than children know. That is the state in which God intends to keep them, and so they are forbidden to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. This has no- thing to do with conscience. To know good from evil, or good from bad, means in Hebrew to know one thing from another; it is to have risen from the age of childhood to that of responsible experience (Dt 17 v., 2 S 19 v., Is 7 v.). The tree is quite accurately described when it is called the tree of knowledge, and the aim of God in forbidding it to man is to keep man in his place. He is not to
become like God—to enter into His secrets and to share His sovereignty. The cunning serpent (who in a more primitive form of the myth must have been an evil god or demon) reveals God’s purpose, and God punishes with His curse all who have had part in the presumptuous action—the serpent, the woman, and the man. But there is no connexion, rational or moral, between the act and the miseries which God inflicts. They are the revenge of a jealous God on an impious invasion of what He had reserved to Himself; and this invasion and revenge are the mythical explanation of the miseries. Such an interpretation may do justice to the myth used in Gn 3, but it does not do justice to that use of it. The author of the chapter was himself a modernist, compared with the original myth-maker, and it is not modernism that prevails in which the chapter was written if we lift the whole to a higher level both of reason and of morality.

(2) It is a higher level which is reached in Wellhausen (Prolegomenen, 1886 seq.). He reads the story in connexion with Gn 4 and 11, which tell of the invention of the arts, the progress of civilization, and the building of the Tower of Babel. This whole process is a mistake from the beginning: man was fatally misled when he first tasted of the tree of knowledge. Civilization with all its triumphs is labour and sorrow; we build Babylon only at the cost of losing Eden. Gn 3 is thus an early anticipation of modern moods in which men speak of the bankruptcy of science, the strain of civilization, the happiness of the simple life. But the tragic fact is that the mistake is irreparable. Eden is closed against us with cherubin and a flaming sword, and we can never get back to the idyllic world again.

(3) It will hardly be questioned that thoughts like these were present to the mind of the author, but not to the extent that he is here thought to mean. While the knowledge of good and evil is undoubtedly in Hebrew the same thing as knowledge or intelligence simpliciter, its moral reference is not to be denied. It is not identical with conscience, or the knowledge of right and wrong, but it includes conscience. The Hebrew would not say that a person who could not tell right from wrong had the knowledge of good and evil. And, when we take the story as a whole, and particularly the account of the temptation of the woman by the serpent, and the judicial examination of the man and the woman by God, marked as both are by extraordinary psychological fineness in the derivation of conscience, it is very difficult to deny that the centre of the author’s interest lay here. Whatever may have been the original motive of the myth, the main concern of the writer who used Gn 3, it has not the light of science on the beginnings of civilization, but the beginnings of sin. Of all human origins the origin of the bad conscience is for him the most fateful. It is sin which has robbed man of his primal felicity. All that is necessary is to say that the trunk of the tree has been cut off, and with creeping poisonous thoughts within, till he returns to the dust from which he was taken. There is no indication in the text that the victory will come at last to man’s side. Nothing is said but that, as long as there are men and serpents in existence, they will be at war with one another. But even for the writer of the chapter (it is suggested) this literal truth did not exhaust the meaning.

With many variations in detail, this is the line of interpretation followed by most students—not from a vicious habit of modernizing, but from a conviction that it is what the writer of Gn 3 had in his mind. It has the corroboration of conscience, not, of course, in the sense that conscience turns the myth into history, but in the sense that conscience is directly appealed to in the main matter which interests the writer, and can only assent to his teaching that disobedience to God is that which brings life and works death. The chapter does not contain history or dogma, but ethical experience expressed in a mythical narrative. It is not the story of the first man, but of every man; and, if the key to its form is to be sought in comparative mythology, the key to its contents can be found only in the soul.

It is hardly necessary to inquire into the antecedents of the myth. While we find in other moderns references and reminiscences of Eden (see FALL (Ethnic)), to the tree of life, and to the streams which water the garden, nothing has been discovered analogous to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. This is not parallel in Babylonian mythology to the story of the Fall as there is to the stories of Creation and the Flood; the Chaldean Genesis, so far as known, is quite defective here. Nor can it be doubted that, if such a parallel were found, it would be as much inferior as those others, in religious and moral respects, to its counterpart in the Hebrew Scriptures. Neither need we inquire how the writer would have conceived the moral history of man to take shape had Adam resisted the temptation and refused to eat of the forbidden fruit. What he has to do is to explain the actual world, with its suffering, toil, and death; but whether or how he imagined an alternative world without sin and its curse we cannot tell. Probably a mistake is made when we try to deduce from the narrative a conception of man’s original state or nature and not describe it to us. In any case, in his story, we must not make the author responsible for more than he says. The eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge was forbidden under pain of death; but it is vain to argue from this as to what man’s relations to evil were. If we try to deduce from the story as it were science; and it is not doubtful that, when Gn 3 was written, such a view was no longer possible, even if it had once been so.

2. Apocryphal and apocalyptic literature. Apart from the reference in some passages to the Fall in the OT. The garden of Eden is mentioned in Jl 2’., Ezk 36’; Eden the garden of God in Ezk 28’; and the tree of Eden in Ezk 31’., 16. 18; but, though Ezk 29 has various mythological features (including the cherub) which recall Gn 3, there is no allusion to the events of this
chapter. The margin of the RV is to be preferred to the text in the two passages (Hos 6, Job 31) in which the sin of Adam is directly recalled. But, at a later period, the story of the Fall conceptually goes back to the beginning of human history, and we are not entitled to ignore this earlier account.

In Sirach and Wisdom, and still more in the later apocalypses known as 2 Esdras and Baruch, it is a focus of theological speculation. The poetry of Gn 3, 1 its position in the worthless

It is connected with Adam certainly, but there is no longer either a serpent or a devil in the case.

A grain of evil seed was sown in the beginning, and how much wickedness has it brought forth unto this time! and how much shall it yet bring forth till the time of redemption come!'

Who sowed the grain of evil seed in the heart of Adam ab initio he does not tell; but it originated apparently one continuous self-propagating life of sin in its world. It has been said before that it is, before he is tempted, and to be, if not the source, the ally of temptation and the cause of the Fall.

For the first Adam, bearing a wicked heart, transgressed and was overcome by the greatest temptation, which was born of him. Thus disease was made permanent; and the law was in the heart of the people along with the wickedness of root; so the good departed away, and that which was wicked abode still (25:18).

Man, as he is, has two things in him—the wicked heart, which he has inherited from Adam; and the law, which God has given him as a guide to Himself. This does not solve the problems of theodicy; it only raises them. How can man be responsible for his wicked heart if he has inherited it—that is, if it belongs to the natural, not to the moral, world? And how are we to understand the cor maligetnum, the 277 77, in Adam, before he had transgressed at all? What does this theology say? The story of the Fall is part of 'the sinfulness of that estate wherein man fell,' but the cor maligetnum or malignitas radiea is inherent in Adam before he falls. It is part, apparently, of the constitution of his nature as he came from the hand of God (ab initio, 2 Es 48:1, 2).

It is not, however, the ultimate origin of evil or the idea—which a Jew would not seriously have contemplated—of ascribing it to God that really disturbs the author; it is the fact that all men are involved somehow in the sin and doom of the first:

'This is my first and last saying that it had been better that the earth had not been made; that it had not been made, nor does He delight in the destruction of the living. He did not make man for death, but for immortality; this is included in 'His own proper nature,' in the likeness of which man was made. This is an idea, if of Greek origin, peculiarly congenial to the Greek mind, even when Christianized. The serpent has disappeared, and is replaced by the devil: the idea of a close connexion between the two, whether it be that the devil makes use of the reptile, or that the reptile is regarded as an incarnation of the devil, first emerging here, became common (cf. Rev 12:2, 3).

This, as Gunkel observes, may be one of the points at which in the last stage of the myth a return is made to the beginning, the serpent having been originally a demon or evil god. The author of Wisdom does not explain what he means by the envy of the serpent: the idea was variously expanded in later haggadic treatment of the Fall, sometimes man, with his Paradise and immortal prospect, being the object of envy, sometimes God (Bonnet, Relig. des Judenmens, 2, 469). The main point is that the author finds in Gn 3 an explanation of how a being constituted for immortality lost that high destiny, and became what we see man to be.

A deeper and more despairing kind of reflection is found in 2 Esdras. The writer of this apocalypse, who lived through the terrible events of A.D. 70, is a pessimist in a profounder sense than the author of Gn 3; but he finds in the Fall of Adam there recorded the explanation of all the sin and misery of the world in his own age. These are universal.

'It is true there is no man among them that he born but he has death wickedly: and among them that have lived there is not which hath not done amiss (24:21).

But the purely mythological element disappears from his speculations on the origin of all this evil.
in the Book of Jubilees (3176) and the Apoc. Mosis (11), but in ways that have no new interest for thought (Bousset, 411; Conard, Die religiösen u. sittl. Anschauungen der altestl. Apokryphen u. Pseudepigraphen, 113) cf. also Enoch 68.

As we say in the apocryphal books just examined were, no doubt, familiar to many Jewish minds in NT times; but, apart from St. Paul, there is little trace of their influence in the NT literature, save for the Synopspic Gospels Jesus nowhere alludes to Gn 3; and in Jn 8:7, we find the devils alluded to Gn 3, but rather to its scenerv than to its incidents; the end of history returns to the beginning, and Paradise is restored (7:5-12, 13-19) with the tree of life. The old serpent, who is the devil or Satan, is cast down from heaven and chained (12:20).

There is no speculation or reflection on the Fall. The same may be said of some of the allusions which we are led to expect, and which we are probably borrow from a recollection of Gn 3. In 2 Co 11 there may be a reference not only to Gn 3, but to an idea current in certain Jewish circles, that the second coming of Jesus, was a second marriage, the resumption of a previous connexion with the circle of ideas in which the authors of Sirach, Wisdom, 2 Esdras, and Baruch move. The interest of both is that St. Paul draws them in a parallel, which is in other respects a contrast, between Adam and Christ.

(1) In the earlier passage (1 Co 15), as in Wis 2:25, death is in view rather than sin. 'As by man came death, by man also shall all be made alive.' Adam is the head of the old humanity, which (whatever its original constitution or destiny may have been) is, in point of fact, mortal; this is what it is, and it is so in virtue of a connexion with the first man. Adam is the head of the new humanity, which (in spite of the mortality due to Adam) is destined at last to triumph over death; it is really immortal in virtue of its connexion with Him. The fact that in the two cases the connexion is quite different in nature is disregarded by the Apostle. The connexion with Adam, which involves us in death, is an affair of heredity; we are descended from him in the ordinary course of nature, and stand where we do, liable to death, apart from any choice of our own. But the connexion with Christ is not a matter of heredity, but of faith; it is only those who believe in the Apostle's word who will share His triumph over death. There is nothing in the fuller reference in v. 40-47 which enables us to say more. In particular, there is no reference in them to sin. What to us is Paul's mind is that the creature made of the dust of the ground, the ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἐγενότος, cannot as such be immortal. Flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God, not because they are sinful, though that is true, but because they are essentially corruptible, and the Kingdom is incorruptible. There can be no such thing as immorality in nature; if there is to be immortality at all, it must be in another mode of being—not that mode of being with which we are familiar from our connexion with Adam, but that which has been revealed to us in the resurrection of Christ. Immortality, in other words, is strictly supernatural. A connexion with the kind of body that is needed to ensure our participation in immortality, just as our mortality is ensured in virtue of a connexion with Adam. It is needed to ensure it; and it does. 'As we have worn the image of the man of clay, so shall we wear the image of the heavenly man.' An analogy, which is an evolution in which our being rose to a higher level, rather than the reversal of a doom, might seem to justify the terms here employed; but, congenial as this might be to a modern mind, it is improbable that it represents St. Paul's thought. Even if we set aside v. 46 as a marginal comment which interrupts an inspired text, it is shrewdly to the purpose, and thoroughly in keeping with the other passage in which the Apostle treats of the same subject.

(2) The other passage is Ro 5:12-19. St. Paul is not dealing here, in the first instance, with immortality, but with resurrection (the ζωήν τοῦ θεοῦ); it is this which is referred to in 15:19, when he again draws a parallel between the first and the second Adam, the emphasis falls not on death and life, but on sin and righteousness. Death comes, no doubt, through sin (4:25); but Adam reigns through righteousness unto eternal life, but sin and righteousness are here the primary interests. 'As through one man sin entered into the world and through sin death, and so death extended to all men, for that all sinned;' so, we might suppose the Apostle continuing, by one man righteousness entered into the world, and through righteousness life; but we should find it difficult to provide a connexion between the two. There is scarcely any connexion here. These last words themselves (ἐν δύναμιν ἡμῶν, ἐγενναρον ἄνθρωπον) have been taken very variously. (a) Some have ventured to identify Adam and his posterity in such a way that his responsibility became immediately theirs—that is, theirs without any action on their part which meditated it from him to them. As Bengel puts it, 'Omnis peccatorum Adamo peccante.' This seems to agree with the fact that the individual is involved in the moral responsibilities of the race, awful as these are, without his consent being first asked and obtained; he is born participant in the guilt and doom of mankind. Whether St. Paul would have shrunk from this or not, it raises more serious difficulties than it solves. (b) Others would make the ἡμῶν apply to voluntary individual sins. Every man is his own Adam, and the author of his own fate. Within whatever limits this may be true, to say that it is true absolutely is to ignore the solidarity of the race in sin and its consequences, with which the Apostle is specially concerned at this point. (c) The interpretation which appeals for relief to the doctrine of heredity, and assumes that man inherits from Adam that which, when it is morally appropriated, reveals itself in consciousness as sin, is perhaps not unfair to the passage, but cannot directly appeal to anything in it for Christ and St. Paul is concerned that men are somehow one in sin; but, though he knows that only the faith of the individual unites him to Christ and makes him a partaker in the righteousness and life, he never raises the question whether there is anything analogous to faith—an individual and voluntary appropriation of the inherited cor malitium, gravis num malum minium, malitigatus radice, χεὶς γάρ, or however it is to be called—in virtue of which he is mostly involved in the responsibilities of the first man.

While the solidarity of the race in sin and death is an immediate datum of experience for him, which he connects (without defining how) with the entrance of sin and death into the world through
Adam's disobedience, he gives us no means of constructing a doctrine of man's original state, or of the origin of evil. Adam, as the head of the old humanity, and as a foil to Christ the Head of the new, is just what we are before we are united to Christ. The superman, the demi-god, or of those holy, of their place, or of those more sinful, weak, mortal; an Adam before the Fall, in a state of original righteousness, may seem to be logically implied in what St. Paul says of 'the disobedience of the one,' but is a conception of which he makes no use.

It is quite futile to think that a Pauline doctrine of the origin of evil can be deduced from Ro 7:15. There are undoubtedly allusions here to Gn 3, so far as the expressions are concerned, but no historical doctrine can be based on this piece of generalized and ideal autobiography. If we say that in 1 Co 15:24-26, the mortality of man is made to depend on his inheritance of Adam's nature, and that in Ro 5:12-21 the condemnation of man, with all its fatal consequences, is conceived as dependent upon his being involved somehow in the transgression by Adam of God's express command, we are far from the truth. This does not transcend theoretically the problems presented by 2 Esdras. He makes no use of the serpent or the devil in explaining the origin of evil. He speaks of sinners, sin given in the stock and has been from the beginning; it is deep, virulent, constitutional, no hurt to be healed slightly. But St. Paul's theodicy is not in a doctrine of its origin, in the act of Adam or otherwise; it is his doctrine of redemption. Such in its unity and universality may be taken for granted, and it may also be overcome; but not even on the basis of the Bible—OT or NT—will its origin ever be overcome.


FALL (Ethnic).—1. ORIGIN OF THE BELIEF.—1. Man's curiosity regarding the things around him, itself the source of numerous Nature-myths, must necessarily be increased by the condition in which he found himself. His speculative faculty had caused him to ask questions regarding the origin of the world and of mankind, and to these questions his cosmogenic and creation myths supplied answers. Hence it is not surprising that he should have sought an explanation of such things as appeared to him evils in his lot—hunger, his battle with the forces of Nature, the difficulty of obtaining food, the existence of disease and death, and, so far as his moral faculty had been awakened, the opposition of good and evil in himself, the struggle he had to follow the law he felt to be right, perhaps the testamentary laws of his tribe. These questions gave rise to innumerable myths, found among many races and at all levels of civilization, which suggest as the answer that in the distant past something had occurred which reduced man to the sordid condition in which he now found himself, or that some disaster, perhaps anterior to his appearance on earth, had affected his destiny, or that some being, hostile to man, had moulded him physically and morally, or that man had gradually deteriorated from some earlier existing state of happiness. Such occurrences may be comprehensively included under the title of Fall, as used in Christian theology, while the stories which embody them are called Fall-myths. As a rule, the form and contents of such myths have been moulded by man's experience of the things which have happened to him, or of descent from a sinful, weak, mortal; an Adam before the Fall, in a state of original righteousness, may seem to be logically implied in what St. Paul says of 'the disobedience of the one,' but is a conception of which he makes no use.

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The existence of death was one of the clearest indications of a serious disorder in human life. Ethnological evidence from all parts of the world proves that man's thoughts about death had everywhere taken much the same form. To man, with his intense love of living, death appeared unnatural; hence his firm belief in a life beyond the grave, or in the possibility of the renewal of life on this earth. The unnaturalness of death from the savage point of view is shown by the universality of the idea that disease and death are due to demonic and magical influences, and that if men were only wise, or in all mythologies, they would always live on. Death from any natural cause is inconceivable. But, if death is unnatural, the question arises, How was it first introduced into the world? Answers were always given, all tending to show that a time had been when death did not exist, and in some of these we see distinct traces of the idea that its coming was due to man's disobedience or folly. Other causes are alleged, e.g., the wrong delivery of a divine message, or a compact between an evil being (e.g., Death personified) and the divinities, or the misuse of an evil being, or the first man's death establish precedents. Traces of such myths may be found in some of the higher mythologies, but they are most common among lower races. We are here concerned only with those in which the origin of death and other evils is due to man's own fault, as in the Hebrew account of the Fall.

(1) In some cases the fault is man's stupidity or carelessness, as the following myths will show. The Dog-rib Indians say that after the Thunder-bird had made all things, he gave the Indians a large arrow which they were to keep with great care. But it was lost through the stupidity of the Chipewas, and the creator was so angry that he left the earth for ever, and now men die (Bakeroff, Nat. Res. p. 166). Similarly it is said that there was a time when men could walk on the ocean or restore life to the dead (here death already exists, but is vanquished), but they lost the privilege through carelessness (Schoedlack, Ind. Tribes, 1857, iv. 255). In Jap, mythology, death is introduced because, when the deity Great-Mountain-Possessor sent his ugly elder daughter as wife to the savior for his younger daughter's hand, he sent her away. Had he not done so, their offspring would have been immortal; as it is, they are as frail as the flowers (Kojiki, xxxviii. 115). Where the performance of religious rites according to ancient custom is all-important, myths regarding any breach of ritual are sure to arise. Among the Maoris such a breach is the cause of the entrance of death into the world. When the culture-hero Mani was baptized, his father committed part of the korakias, or prayers to the gods. For this reason men became mortal. As yet there was no death, nor would there ever have been if Maia had been able to pass through the body of Himinut-epe; but because of this omission he failed and died, and now all men must die (Grey, Polynesian Myth., 1857, p. 16). In the Admiralty Island version, death is due to the fact that a certain child could not recognize that his spirit, and not his body, which had fallen from a tree, was the real man, so that he makes his spirit return to the dead body, and thus perish (Anthropos, iii. [1908] 194 f.).

(2) In other cases, death results from a quarrel (cf. the death of Abel), or from man's wickedness. An Eskimo myth (cf. Story 1, p. 5) relates: "One day, the wife of a chief in a far distant land quarrelled regarding human immortality. The one who advocated men's dying gained the victory; hence arose death (Nansen, Eskimo Myth., 1893, p. 278). Among the Hare-skin Indians death is said to have come from a quarrel between the session of a screech-owl. An old man fell with it, but was pursued and killed; a relative of his killed the chieft murderer; he was in turn slain, and thus death and war arose (Petitot, Trad. nat., 1886, p. 186). The Aleutians say that formerly men, as they grew old, plunged into a lake and renewed their youth. But a woman who had a divine lover made him angry by her peevish complaints. He killed her brother, and so made all men subject to death (Farrer, Primitive Manners and Customs, 1878, p. 13). In Blackfoot Indian legend also the folly of woman introduced death (Grinnell, Blackfoot Lodge Tales, ii. 5). An old man's wife died and wept. Her daughter promised to make her send her. As a consequence of this evil wish, agitated by her, the old woman re-dons her skin, and has been the death has been in the world (Anthropos, i. 1908) 193).

(3) In others, that death is attributed to man's disobedience, e.g., eating some forbidden food; and myths of this nature have very naturally arisen among people who believe that breach of tabu, or eating a totem animal or plant, is inevitably followed by punishment, especially by the death of the tabu-breaker. Wherever such a custom or belief existed, it would be easy to found a myth upon it as the following myth relates: The origin of death and other evils. Some of these myths may have been influenced by the account of the Fall as told by missionaries; on the other hand, they are so comprehensive with savage mythology and methods of thought that they bear marks of originality. A Dog-rib Indian myth relates that the first man, Tesapawih, gave his children two kinds of fruit, black and white, forbidding them to eat the former. They were obedient for a while but he was absent to fetch the sun, but disobeyed him when he went away a second time to obtain the moon. He was angry with them, and, 187, that the death of the earth would produce only bad fruit, and men should be subject to sickness and death. His family bewailed their lot, and they then relented so far as to say that those who dream of the dons should have all the power of curing sickness (Klehn, Culturgeesch., 1845-52, ii. 155). The tabu is often connected with the idea that eating the fruit of any strange country or people makes one belong to it; hence arise myths that mortal men are immortal beings who were condemned to earth because they ate of its fruits. A Tonga version of such a myth makes certain immortal gods journey from Boloito (Hades) and land on earth only to recognize that his secret spirit, and not his body, which had fallen from a tree, was the real man, so that he makes his spirit
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Hence arose the race of men, subject to decay and death (Mariner, Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands., 1818, ii. 115). The same idea occurs in Semitic cosmology: the immortal beings of the fifth period of creative energy were of a certain plant and so became subject to mortality and lost the power of returning to the heavenly mansions. At the same time arose the division of the sexes (Beardmore, Eth. of Bengal, 1872). But make tabu! Slie a view the and Some such foods, they became subject to death (Dalloul, Eth. of Bengal, 1872). There is an Australian myth to the effect that the first pair were forbidden to go near a tree on which lived a bat, which was not to be disturbed. Gathering firewood, the woman approached the tree; the bat flew away, and death arrived (Brong Smyth, Abor. of Vict., 1878, i. 429). Elsewhere the disobedience is not connected with a tabu. Another Australian myth makes death result from men refusing to fear to carry the fierce dogs of Buhllo (the Moon) across a creek. 'If you had done what I had asked you,' said he, 'you could have died as often as I die, and have eaten as much as life' (K. L. Parker, Aust. Legent. Tales, 1896, p. 8). In Uganda it is thought that death was introduced because when Kinta, the first man, was sent down from heaven, he was told that if he forgot anything he was not to return for it, since Venereal disease (death) would assuredly go with him to earth. He forgot miltlet, and, contrary to his wife's advice, returned for it, with the result predicted (Johnston, Uganda Produceante, 1905, ii. 704). The Basutos say that Matomeo, the first man, came out of the earth with his sign Matoomya, who had a life-preserving medicine and told him to lead their cattle in one direct descendobeyed her and she, in a rage, went 1. be earth with her medicine. Thus death freques came into the world (Campbell, Travesses de Afir., 1822, i. 306). The following myth was told by a native of Tumelat (Cent. Africa). 'Til made men deathless, and forbade them to kill the beasts; they broke his command, and were all destroyed save one. Til now changed a gazelle into a woman, who bore the survivor four children, two white and two black. These were also deathless; but the frog complained to Til that it was unfair to make harmless animals subject to death, and guilty man immunity. He suggests that Til banish all men subject to old age, sickness, and death (Ausl. land, Nov. 4, 1847). In Togo, death is due to the petition of a frog, who reached the Supreme Being before the dog, who sought that man might live again after death (Anthropos, B. [1907] 226; cf. ill. [1908] 277); and in an Admiralty Island version, death comes from the ingratitude of a man who sought to deceive the tree which had saved him from a demon (ib. ill. 194). The Melanesians account for death by various myths, one of which turns on an act of disobedience on the part of a woman made by the divine hero Qat. She was stolen by Marawa; Qat urged her to return, but she refused; therefore, while the pair were sleeping, he pulled their teeth, shaved their hair, and covered their eyes with spiders' webs so that their sight became dim. Thus old age and death became the lot of men (Coffington, Melanesians, 1881, p. 256). In New Guinea (Mowat), death came upon all men because the mother and grandmother of the first man who died, instead of obeying his injunction to remain until returned to them as before, went in search of him (Beardmore, JAI xix. (1890) 465). An American Indian myth reported by the Jesuit missionaries in 1634, and apparently quite original, has a curious resemblance to the Greek Pandora myth (see below, 2 (3)). After the world had been recovered from the Deluge, the divinity Messon gave a Montagnais Indian the gift of immortality enclosed in a nest of box, subject to the condition that he should not open it; for, so long as the box remained closed, he would be immortal. His curious and incredulous wife opened the box to see its contents. And thus all Indians became subject to death. This myth is the only one of its kind in the parts of Canada (Relazione de la Nouvelle France, 1836)—among the Ojibwas in 1857 (Hind, Labrador, 1863, i. 61).

These myths of the origin of death and kindred evils through a 'Fall' form the most concrete answer to man's questionings about his evil plight—death being taken as typical of evil generally—while they approach the series of the more complete Fall-myths current among many peoples, which must now be considered.

2. Myths of a Fall.—(1) Some myths of this class bear a striking resemblance to the story of Genesis, and may have arisen as a result of missionaries' teaching, or through the gradual diffusion of the Hebrew story in the same way as Mørchen have been diffused over a wide area. In others, the idea of immortality seems to be derived from the original myth with pigments borrowed from outside sources. Each myth of this kind must be judged on its merits, and with a full appreciation of the possibility of similar stories arising through similar circumstances, and psychic conditions, in more places than one. Many others are undoubtedly original—even a few which might seem at first sight to be borrowed. Especially is this the case where, in many of the myths which follow, as in some already referred to, the Fall is due to the eating of a forbidden food. This need not necessarily have been borrowed from Genesis, but shows how emphatically the system of tabus, especially with regard to foods, was connected with punishments meted out automatically to the taboo-breaker, and how naturally all this was reflected in myths of the origin of evil. Man accounted for the latter by that which appealed most easily to his imagination, and of the danger of which he had seen many evidences. His Fall was a punishment visited on him for breaking a divine taboo. Such a view might easily become current among the lowest races, since it is found that the creative beings of, e.g., the Andamanese, Australians, and Bushmen are also moral governors, pass judgment, and give commands. The Batutsi say that the Fall was due to Nyinakigwa's breaking of the divine prohibition to tell how, being steril, she had three children, the gifts of the deity Imana (Anthropos, ill. [1908] 2 ff). Where it had become customary not to eat of certain foods at certain seasons, it would be easy to form a myth suggesting that men had been told by a higher Being not to do so, and that, when they had done so, much evil had resulted. Thus the Andamanese, whose remarkable theology, according to the best authorities, is independent of Christian influence, believe that Puluga, the creator, gave the first man, Tono, various injunctions, especially concerning certain trees which grew only at one place (Paradise) in the jungle, and which he was not to touch at certain seasons—during the rains, when Puluga himself visits them and partakes. Later, some of Tono's descendants disobeyed and were severely punished. Others, disregarding Puluga's commands about murder, adultery, theft, etc., and becoming more and more wicked, were driven out of the jungle. Two men and two women survived, and, in revenge, wished to kill Puluga, who, telling them that their friends had been justly punished, disappeared from the earth. But even now these trees are strictly
tabu during the rainy season when Puluga visits the island; and it is firmly held that, if any one dares to trespass with them, a new deluge will result (Man, JAI xii. [1882] 164, 166 ff., 154). Here, a native system of tabus has given rise accidentally to a series of myths resembling those to the Genesis story, and this may, quite conceivably, have happened elsewhere. An Australian myth, which might easily have become a Fall-myth, points to this conclusion. When the divine Baiame sought earth, the flood wavered and died. Three trees alone were left which none dared touch, because Baiame had put his mark upon them. When he saw that no one touched them, he sent a kind of maize upon the earth (K. L. Parker, More Aust. Legend. Tales, 1890, p. 84). A Fall through breaking a divine tabu regarding food or some other divine orders will be found in several of the myths which follow. Such myths, involving a catastrophe to many, should be compared with Morehen, in which an individual comes to grief through disobedience, i.e. breaking a taboo. Here, too, the incident reflects actual customs.

A myth, current among the Maidu Indians, may possibly owe some of its details to missionary teaching. The good-world-maker, Ko-do-yam-peh, sends animals to all the earth, but the animals were tame and the soil fruitful. He bade them take all things freely, but always to bring his food home and cook it, never to kindle a fire in the woods. But the evil Hel-lo-kri-eh told man to cook his game in the woods. He did so, with the result that the smoke made the animals wild, as they now are; the ground was changed, and man had only roots and worms to eat; frost, rain, and tempests arose, and such introduced evil into the world (FLTR v. [1882] 118 ff.; cf. the 'Bushman myth,' §3). In Pentecost Island (New Hebrides) a woman, become the wife of the sun-god, is violated by the moon-god, who enters the tabued precipices of the happy land; she is accordingly driven away, and bears two children, one black (the son of the sun-god) and the other white (the son of the moon-god); they engage in conflict, and the black son, the ancestor of the natives, expels his half-brother, the ancestor of all white men (Anthropos, vi. [1911] 902-905). A kind of dualism runs through all American Indian mythology (see DUALISM [American]). Evil here, like evil being acts the part of the tempter, but the myth, like many others, can no truths be borrowed, is in the main original. Similarly in a Blackfoot Indian myth, when Napi the creator makes the first pair out of clay, death is introduced through the folly of the woman, and all later misfortunes arise through disobedience to the creator's laws (Lang, Making of Religion, 1889, p. 250). Another myth which, according to Leland, 'gives the fall of man from a purely Indian standpoint' traces all human evils to that idle loquacity which is, above all other things, most contemptible in Indian eyes. A child was born of an Indian girl by a spirit of the mountain. She was hidden never to tell her people of his origin. The child fed them miraculously, and would have made them of a mighty nation, but they never ceased to ask his mother whence he came, and she told them. 'It shall be to you exceeding sorrow that ye ever inquired.' She and the child disappeared, and thus the Indians, who should have been great, became a little people (Leland, Algonguin Legends, p. 217). The dualistic idea of the origin of evil reappears in a myth current among the Khonds of Orissa. Boora Pennu, the god of light, had a consort, the Earth-goddess, the source of evil. In jealousy of her husband's love for his creature man caused her to introduce physical and moral evil into the world. Such men as rejected her influence were defiled; all others were condemned to suffering, moral degeneration, and death (MacPherson, Mem. of Service in India, 1863, p. 273). Compare with this the old Mexican belief that the Golden Age of Anahau came to an end through the sin in resemblance to the Genesis story, and this may, quite conceivably, have happened elsewhere. An Australian myth, which might easily have become a Fall-myth, points to this conclusion. When the divine Baiame sought earth, the flood wavered and died. Three trees alone were left which none dared touch, because Baiame had put his mark upon them. When he saw that no one touched them, he sent a kind of maize upon the earth (K. L. Parker, More Aust. Legend. Tales, 1890, p. 84). A Fall through breaking a divine tabu regarding food or some other divine orders will be found in several of the myths which follow. Such myths, involving a catastrophe to many, should be compared with Morehen, in which an individual comes to grief through disobedience, i.e. breaking a taboo. Here, too, the incident reflects actual customs.

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through to the remotest parts of Africa (see the Egyptian Golden Age myth, § 3 (v)).

The Madagascar myth of the Fall producing a different sex may be compared with the Sinhalese myth, above, i. s (v).

(2) The idea of a Fall occurs in various forms in the mythologies of several higher races. Among the Hindus, who more than any other people have brooded over the problem of evil, various reasons were alleged to account for man's evil plight. A Fall or Captivity was a favourite method of accounting for it; in other cases it was regarded as the inevitable consequence of the association of the soul with a material existence; again, the doctrine of emanation, as in the Gnostic view, suggested a gradual deterioration, keeping pace with the increasing distance of souls from the divine; while, as in Greek mythology, a series of successive world-ages, each growing worse than its predecessor, was also postulated.

In the earliest writings (the Vedas) there is no Fall-myth; the story of the incest of Yama and Yami (Rigveda) affords no real parallel to the Genesis story, as is sometimes supposed, but is a crude explanation of origins. In later times the more philosophical views occasionally give place to a conception of a God or nature, treated of by the first man Mann Sväyambhuma, and Sara-tāpā, Manu's wife, the equivalent of the creative principle. Siva dropped from heaven a blossom of the sacred rose, or Indian fig—the bhūdhīkrana, or tree of knowledge of Brahman and Buddha alike. Ensured by its beauty, Brahmā gathered it, thinking it would make him immortal and divine. While still existing in this thought, he was punished by being consigned to an abyss of degradation, whence he could be freed only after a long term of suffering. His wife, adds the myth, had urged him to take the blossom, and on their descendants was the curse entailed.

This myth, which has very frequently been cited as a parallel to Gn 30, owes nothing to the latter, is of late origin, and possibly is derived from a Buddhist myth with several variants. One form, cited by Hardy (Man. of Bud., 1864, p. 66), tells how the Brahmans who were born into this world were happy, and peace reigned everywhere. A peculiar form occurs on the surface of the earth; one of them tasted it, found it palatable, and devoured it greedily. The others followed his example, with the result that the glory of their person was faded and necessitated making the sun and moon. Their skins grew coarse; they deteriorated morally and physically; and the world became filled with passion and evil. The Tibetan form of the myth is similar. Men lived to 60,000 years, and were invincibly nourished and able to rise at will to the heavens. But, through covetousness and the consequent eating of a honey-sweet substance or herb) produced by the earth, they lost these gifts, became victims, and were forced to practise agriculture for the sake of food (Pallas, Reise, 1771-76, i. 334). In the Nepāl version, earth is uninhabited, but visited occasionally by the dweller in the heavenly mansions (Abhāvāra), who were innocent, and androgynous. But desire to eat arose in their minds; they tasted the earth, lost the power of return to Abhāvāra, and were cut off from the fruit of the earth for ever (Hodgson, Buddhism, p. 63). The Sinhalese version resembles this, but after eating earth for 60,000 years these visitors became covetous. Earth lost its sweet taste, and brought forth a kind of mushroom of which they ate in excess. Thus they proceeded from food to food, till their spirits nature was lost, and they became men, filled with wicked ideas (Uplahm, Sacred Books of Ceylon, 1833, iii. 156).

(3) However lightly the Greeks may have estimated moral evil or veiled it under aesthetic forms, they were by no means blind to it, and myth and philosophy alike tried to explain its existence. The early legend of Prometheus and the theft of fire shows that the Greeks were at least aware of the evils of human life by the fact that the hero, in stealing fire from the gods, was trespassing the limits set to human knowledge and power by them. Hence their resentment. It thus exhibits that respect for moral law. Mythology, as the Hebrew, of the gods' jealousy of men, of men becoming their equals, while the idea of man's enroaching on something forbidden is paralleled with the Semitic Tree of Knowledge and other forbidden things. Hesiod (Works, and Days, 52 f.) brings the story into connexion with that of Pandora, fashioned by the gods to bring evil to Prometheus and the whole race of man. Within her breast were infused falsehood and guile by Hermes, following the counsel of Zeus. She was received by Epimetheus, in spite of the warning given him by his brother Prometheus. And now evils came into the world, because Pandora removed the lid from a vessel in which they were contained, and so dispersed them among men. In a story mentioned by Pseudo-Aelian, Prometheus himself had deposited this vessel, called the ship of the soul, with the gods, with Epimetheus. Contrary to warning, Pandora opened it, thus showing her nature. But according to Philodemus, Epimetheus himself opened it, bringing evil and death upon his fellows. Hesiod's intention is to teach that woman is the intermediate cause of human ills (cf. Gn 3). Better had it been for man to have remained alone than to have joined himself to this god. For, in the later creation of the gods. A similar duplication of the idea of human ills being brought about by rash desire for illicit knowledge as well as by woman occurs in the myth of the Sirens, who say they will send men who listen to them on their way the wiser. For they 'know all things,' 'all that will hereafter be upon the fruitful earth' (Odyssey, xii. 191). The close approach of these leading ideas of the Greek myth to those of the Semitic story is remarkable; but, in spite of possible points of contact between early Greeks and Phoenicians on the one hand, and Phoenicians and Hebrews on the other, we need not suppose that the two are interdependent or have any common source except in the similarity of man's psychic conditions and environments leading him to formulate his conception of the world on more or less necessary to make the sun and moon. Their skins grew coarse; they deteriorated morally and physically; and the world became filled with passion and evil. The Tibetan form of the myth is similar. Men lived to 60,000 years, and were invincibly nourished and able to rise at will to the heavens. But, through covetousness and the consequent eating of a honey-sweet substance or herb) produced by the earth, they lost these gifts, became victims, and were forced to practise agriculture for the sake of food (Pallas, Reise, 1771-76, i. 334). In the Nepāl version, earth is uninhabited, but visited occasionally by the dweller in the heavenly mansions (Abhāvāra), who were innocent, and androgynous. But desire to eat arose in their minds; they tasted the earth, lost the power of return to Abhāvāra, and were cut off from the fruit of the earth for ever (Hodgson, Buddhism, p. 63). The Sinhalese version resembles this, but after eating earth for 60,000 years these visitors became covetous. Earth lost its sweet taste, and brought forth a kind of mushroom of which they ate in excess. Thus they proceeded from food to food, till their spirits nature was lost, and they became men, filled with wicked ideas (Uplahm, Sacred Books of Ceylon, 1833, iii. 156).

In the story of Pandora later theological animos may be detected. In mythical ideas, they seem to have been a great Earth-goddess, mother of all things. The triumphed over may have been supplanted by the grave-pithecus from which primitive Greek belief inferred the keres of death (see above, 110, 111, 112). See J. E. Harrison, Prolegomena to Greek Religion, 1903, p. 284. For a comparison of the Semitic and Greek stories, see Symonds, Greek Poets, 2d ed., 1879, p. 115.

(4) In the Persian sacred writings a myth occurs which some think have been borrowed from Jewish sources, while others suggest its influence on the Hebrew story. A careful examination of
the myth (which, possibly through earlier faulty tradition, had supposed to have taken a resemblance to Gn 3 than it really possesses) shows that it may have been quite independent in origin, while it need not have exerted any exterior influence. It occurs in the Bundahish, a Persian work, in its present form from the 9th cent., but doubtless enshrines material of a vastly older date. There is no reason to suppose that the myth is not archaic, and its contents suggest an exceedingly primitive view of things. Thus the Bundahish describes the covenant made between Ahura Mazda and Ahriman (after the discovery of the former by the latter, towards the end of the first three thousand years) that Ahriman's power should last only nine thousand years. In the first three thousand Ahriman is caused to remain in confusion; in the second, he is triumphant; in the third and last, he is gradually overcome (see Ages of the World [Zoroas- trian], vol. 3, p. 205). At the beginning of his triumphant career Ahriman is said to have made a rush at the creatures, 'springing like a snake, out of the sky down to the earth.' He first destroyed the primeval forest, and seed various plants and animals proceeded. Next followed the destruction of Gâyomârt, the archetypal man, but from his seed sprang a human pair, Mâshya and Mâshyôti, who existed first, apparently, as plants, and out of the earth they were distinctly changed into human form. To them Ahura Mazda said: 'You are men, you are the ancestry of the world, and you are created perfect in devotion by me; perform devoutly the duty of the law, think good thoughts, speak good words, do good deeds, and worship no demons!' After having washed themselves they acknowledged the power of Ahura Mazda, but now 'antagonism rushed into their minds, and declared the evil spirit to be the creator. That false speech was spoken through the will of the demons... through it they both became wicked, and their souls are in hell until the future existence.' At first they drank only water and were clad in herbage; but after thirty days they drank the milk of a goat, expressing their delight in it, and by this second false speech enhancing the power of the demons. Thirty days later, they slaughtered and ate a sheep, roasting it with fire 'extracted by them out of the wood of the lote- plum and box-tree, through the guidance of the beastly spirit, and probably by friction.' The skin of the animal served them for clothes; later, they wore woven garments. They dug iron out of the earth, hammering it with a stone, cut down wood, and made a shelter from the sun. Their gracelessness increased; the demons became more oppressive; and they fell to fighting with each other. At the end of fifty years they were moved to desire of each other. A pair of offspring were born to them, but, 'owing to tenderness for off- spring,' they devoured them. This 'tenderness' was taken from them by Ahura Mazda, so that their succeeding children remained alive. Here, as in the Hebrew and other Near Eastern, advance in culture is associated with a lapse from righteousness, but temptation is merely hinted at, and we learn only by inference that the drinking of milk and eating of flesh were forbidden. On the whole, the differences are greater than the resemblances, and we may have here an original and ancient myth, which at a later date may have received some colouring from Hebrew sources, but obviously is entirely Persian in its teaching (Bundahish, chs. i. xvi., in West's Pahlavi Textes, pt. 1. SBE v. [1880]). In other parts of the Bundahish it is clear that Ahriman seduces human creatures to evil, rather than that evil comes from within themselves. So he announces his intention to the creator: 'I

will force all thy creatures to dissatisfaction and a love and affection for myself' (Bund. i. 14) and Ahura Mazda says he cannot rest at ease, for he must provide protection for his people against the seductions of Ahriman, who 'casts into this the thoughts of every one of them. All is said to be a lie; it is sought, and it is not necessary to be steadfast in it' (xxviii. 3-5). It is not clear that a taint of evil is inherited. At all events, king Yima, sixth in descent from Mâshya, appears to have lived in righteousness, for reason (Bund. xxxiv. 4): when this happened he took a she-demon for wife through fear of the demons, and gave his sister Yimak to a demon as wife. 'From them have originated the tailed ape and bear and other species of degeneracy' (xxiii. 1). Yima is the Yama of the Vedas, who committed incest with his sister Yami, just as, in a later Pahlavi text, Yimak pretended to be Yima's demon- wife, and lay with him (SBE xviii. [1882] 419). Yima appears in the earlier Iranian writings (Vendâdîd, ii.), as a righteous king whose reign was a time of innocence, without cold, heat, age, disease, death, and seed; the power and prosperity (Yâsna, ix.; Yast xv.). Here, too, it is said his 'glory' departed through his lie, when he began to delight in falsehood (Yast xix. 34). First, in the 10th cent., says Yima, the gods were made to be a god. Yima is not here the first man, though he may in an earlier myth have had that position; this, however, is rendered unlikely by the fact that he is through all the sacred writings placed in a later generation. Disease and death, too, were in the world before his time. He may, therefore, have simply been the ideal righteous king, who at last fell, like all other men, through the seductions of the beastly character. Yima, the first and only, he also bears this righteous character, but is taken as an example of apostasy, apparently because he sinned through flesh-eating after having lived on vegetable food. The interpretation of the passage Yâsna, xxxii. 8 is much disputed, and Tiele and others do not accept this rendering. There is no doubt, however, that the Iranians believed the earliest state of men to have been one of innocence and prosperity, when they lived on imperishable food and were free from the ills of life, and that all this came to an end through the envy of the dàvèna, who corrupted men (Yâsna, ix., xxxii. 5).

(6) The idea of man's hapless plight as a punishment is also suggested in myths which refer it to a wrong choice (like the choice of Plato's pre-existing souls, see § 5) made in the beginning of things. The Ashantis trace all their woes to the folly of their ancestors. In the beginning there were three white and three black men and women, who were told by a divinity to choose either a box or a piece of sealed-up paper. The blacks chose the box and found in it gold, iron, etc.; while the whites chose the paper, which contained wisdom. After their choice the blacks worshipped 'fetishes' instead of their high god (Huston, fabric. in the T'ou-nan, chs. 293, 299). The Navahos assert that their ancestors chose a richly decorated jar which contained rubbish, and hence they are now poor and miserable; the Pueblos chose a coarse jar full of flecks and herbs, and now enjoy plenty of children, reason (Kroeber, 1890). The Ashanti myth probably existed before the appearance of the whites, and would then have referred to some other race, to judge by the analogy of the Tongan and Fijian myth, alleged to be archaic, and also to have received its present application after contact with Europeans, to the effect that the first-born of mankind was disobe- dent to the Creator and grew black, while the second-
born, by virtue of a higher obedience, remained fair, and was the ancestor of the white race (Hale, Exploring Expot., Philadelphia, 1846, p. 177).

The choice of a worse object and the obtaining of many benefactors, such as the齐的 prize, and the choice of a better object which produces nothing but evil to the race, is a favourite theme of Marduk, in countless forms and in all parts of the world, civilized and savage (cf. § 3).

3. Myths of a Golden Age.—Combined in some cases with the myth of a Fall, and always predicated on the earlier man, innocence, and happiness, is the legend of a Golden Age, or the more philosophic idea of a series of recurring world ages.

(1) Even among the lowest races, especially after contact with a higher civilization, such a conception is not wanting. The Bushmen tell how once they could 'make stone things that flew over rivers' (Lang, Myth., Kit., and Rel., 1899, i. 169), while their myth of origins relates that once men and animals (who could speak) lived together till men made fire, which they had been forbidden to do, and so startled the animals that they lost the power of speech and fled ever afterwards from man. Cf. the Amer. Indian myth, ii. (1), and the idea (as in the Prometheus legends) that fire is illicit. In Samoa, as elsewhere, we hear of a primitive Golden Age when all things could talk. The idea of a Golden Age in the past, lost through man's fault, took shape in various ways, but it was more immediately suggested by the almost instinctive conviction (common to old races as to old individuals) that things must once have been better than they are, just as men generally hope that things will be better in the future. In some cases a people dwelling in comparative comfort and plenty in some part of their native country, and driven out to a less pleasant region by a stronger race, would easily shape to themselves a legend of a happier state of things long ago, and with each generation the mythic happiness of that state would be increased. All migrations would tend to do the same, just as in some cases the dim memory of rivers and mountains crossed, joined with the desire to be buried in one's native place, suggested the idea of the journey of the soul over a perilous way to the land of the departed. Occasionally the memory of such migrations appears to be mixed up with myths of human origins; men came from heaven or descended from the skies (see § 4). In the latter case the myth usually took root in the form that men and gods then lived together, or that there was intercourse between heaven and earth; this ceased through some act of human folly (cf. the Tongan myth, ii. r (3)). Finally, the idea of the Golden Age may have been suggested to men by observing the happiness of the child, and by thinking that all men were thus happy in the childhood of the race.

(2) The most typical form of the Golden Age myth is the Greek one given by Hesiod in his Works and Days (following upon, but distinct from, his myth of Pandora), where we learn that a new race was formed in each of the series of successive ages, gradually deteriorating. The first age was that of the golden race of men, who were prosperous and happy, and passed from life as in a sleep. The second was the silver age, in which began sorrow; men could not refrain from injustice, and refused worship to the gods. The third was that of the race of bronze—a race of warriors who fought away life with their own hands. Then came the fourth age, that of the men who fought at Thebes and Troy, now in the Isles of the Blest, where Kronos reigns; and, lastly, the iron age, that of the present, full of toil, wretchedness, and corruption. The Attic Cronus, like the Sатур-
virtuous and happy reigns of such kings as Wan; while, according to the *Shu King* (pt. v. bk. 27, 2), Kuo Ch'ing first to avert any ill-starred order, which spread among the people. But, as this rebel is held to have lived about 2700 n.c., the Chinese Golden Age is thus brought within historic times. A verse sometimes quoted from the *Shi King* (iii. 448), while adumbrating the fall of the gods, as proving that the fall was due to a woman who overthrew her husband's wall of virtue, does not refer to a primitive fall, but only describes in general terms the fall and overthrow of the best of men.

(5) Some trace of a myth of the Golden Age appears in ancient Egyptian religion. Maspero says:

'Certain expressions used by Egyptian writers are in themselves sufficient to show that the first generations of men were supposed to have lived in a state of happiness and perfection' (*Dawn of Civ.*, 1896, p. 158). They recalled the earthly reign of Ra in the beginning as a Golden Age long ago passed, perhaps from the time of Adam and Eve, the cause of its ending, and of Ra's leaving the earth and causing the death of its people at the hands of a goddess. But with the survivors a compact was made that they would not make the land desolate. Men looked back to that happy time with longing, and expressed it by the phrase 'the times of Ra,' while of anything which was superior of its kind they said that its like had not been seen since the days of Ra (cf. *op. cit.;* Lenormant, *Les Origines*, 1889–91, i. 448).

Connected with the legend of a Golden Age is the myth of a Paradise, not always, however, inhabited by the first human pair, as in Genesis, but by gods, or supraindividual beings, or deathless men. Among the Greeks there is the conception of Elysion and the Islands of the Blest, as well as that of the Garden of the Hesperides, a home of the gods, in which Hera's golden apples grew on a tree guarded by a dragon which Hercules alone of mortals could slay. Some have seen in the last an echo of Genesis (Lenormant, *Origines*, i. 94). But beyond the seductive beauty of both gardens and the mythis tree there is no real parallel: the dragon acts differently from the serpent, and Hera's apple is not even in Genesis, while there is no temptation or 'fall.' The Hindu sacred Mount Meru, with its gardens and four rivers, unapproachable by sinful man and guarded by a dragon, has its counterpart in the Iranian Alborz (Hara-berezaiti), the seat of Mithra, where there is no night, darkness, cold, putrefaction, or uncleanness (Feist x. 50). A similar garden mountain, moistened by water flowing from the fountain of immortality and forming four rivers, and guarded by an animal called Kaiming, appears in Chinese mythology, and possibly was suggested by Buddhist influence. The fabled earthly Paradise is the counterpart in space of what the Garden of Eden is in time. Both are equable, paradise and nether inaccessible. Possibly the idea that Paradise with its Golden Age had been lost to men in the last leading to the idea that it still existed, was developed by adventurous or favouring mortals. The idea that gods dwelt with men in the past suggested that an ascension of an earthly house of gods, while it doubtless helped to form myths of a Golden Age. That divine earthly home perhaps became also the inaccessible Paradise.

(6) World-ages.—Among various races cosmogonic speculation, in the attempt to conceive in beginning of things, has imagined a series of world-ages, in which some mythologies end each in a catastrophe, and are occasionally connected (as in Hesiod) with the Golden-Age myth. The Hind world-ages are also connected with the theory of a Golden Age and of the gradual deterioration of mankind. In the Kta age all was perfect, men were innocent and happy, they had found their place in the world. In the next age, Kali, age, doubt and atheism flourished; while in the present, or Kali, age, evil of all kinds predominates in human life. These four ages are but divisions of the life of the human people, with the Bhagavadgita, and their division may correspond to the seven cycles of the modern world. In this, the Bhagavadgita, and their division may correspond to the seven cycles of the modern world. The Bhagavadgita, and their division may correspond to the seven cycles of the modern world. The various races of men were created and then destroyed as being unfit for survival, and inadequate to their surroundings. The existing race is thus a survival of the fittest. We find this in Brahmanic myths, in the Quiche Popol Vuh (with the further idea that some of the earlier peoples degenerated into apes), and among lower races (Lang, *op. cit.* i. 202). This view also resembles a widespread mythological conception of the ancestor of the race being ignorant of the arts and given up to various evil practices, e.g. cannibalism, until they were taught better by a god or a divine culture-hero. The race thus improved instead of deteriorating, as with the ancient Greeks in the *Iliad* (in line with the teaching of modern science) instead of a descent from better things. The idea of Aristotle (Pol. ii. 8) was that men were at first on a level of ignorance and darkness; and that of Zosimus, that men lived in caves and were wretched till enlightened by Prometheus. The latter may point to a Greek myth differing from that of the Golden Age, just as in Egypt a myth, contrary to that already noticed above (5), told how Osiris weaned the first people from a condition of bestial savagery. In Babylonia, according to Berossus, Uanna taught men, who till then had lived as beasts, while the Babylonian epic of Gilgames makes Enlil live with beasts as a beast till the sacred prostitute, Ukh, shows him a higher life (cf. Jastrow, *Relig. of Bab. and Assyr.*, Boston, 1888, p. 476 fl.). The story was thus an attempt to focus in the most diverse myths—producents, in certain cases, of different tribes or races which have amalgamated—without any thought of their incongruity. Yet even in such cases of fusion, so long the hero remains among the people whom he has taught, there is for them a kind of Golden Age. Then he takes his departure, promising to return; but till that time men must live in toil and pain.
This was a frequent myth among all branches of the American Indian race.

The Greek myth of Saturn's reign and the Egyptian of Ra's booth postulate the presence of a divine being with men during the state of infantility.

4. Myths of a lost intercourse between gods and men.—Analogous to the idea of the divine culture-hero dwelling with men for a time in a kind of Golden Age is the belief (related to that of a Golden Age), found among many races, that at the earliest period of human existence there was free intercourse between gods and men, heaven and earth, either by some method of reaching the sky or by men having actually dwelt with the gods. This is usually part of a myth explaining the origin of man, who, as sometimes thought, came from that glad upper world. Various reasons are assigned for that intercourse having ceased; occasionally it is human curiosity, weakness, or error which caused this happy state of things to end; but it may also arise through ancestor-worship, especially where the ancestors worshipped have become gods, from whom the people or their rulers trace their descent. In Andanian mythology, the high god Pulma lived with men till they tried to kill him. He answered that he lived with them as they were, if they persisted in disobeying him he would destroy them and the world with them. This is the last occasion on which he made himself visible (Man, JAI xii. 167). Among the Kurnai of S. Australia it is held that a great being, Mangan-mana, once lived on earth and taught them all the arts they know. He instituted the Jeraell (mysteries), but some traitor once revealed the secrets of these mysteries to the women. Mungan went fire between heaven and earth so that men went mad with fear; then the sea rushed over the earth, drowning all save a few, who become ancestors of the Kurnai. Some of these were changed into animals. Mungan then left the earth and now remains in the sky (Howitt, Nat. Tribes of S. E. Aust., 1894, p. 630). Among the Negroes of Fernando Pó it is held that once there was a ladder from heaven to earth by which the divine beings descended to men, until a cripple started to ascend. His mother chased him, and the gods, horrified at the sight, and at the possible intrusion on their domain, threw down the ladder (De Bary, G. Histoire de l'Antiquité, ii. i. 159). The Fantis have a myth which tells how the first men lived in a lofty and desirable land, but were driven out of it in order to learn humility (Smith, Nouveau Voyage du Guihne, 1744, ii. 176). The people of Guiana hold that their forefathers once lived happily above the sky, but curiosity tempted them to descend to earth by means of a rope-ladder and to taste its food. One of their number (in one of the variants, a woman) stuck in the hole in the sky, thus preventing all possibility of return. There are several variants of this myth, some of which tell of men longing to return to heaven, and their condemnation to remain below in spite of their pleading (Brett, Legends of B. Guiana, 1880, p. 103 f.). A myth of the same kind, found among the Kirghiz, is also connected with the earlier Golden Age. On the top of Mt. Mustagh-at a is an ancient city built in the days of universal happiness. Since that time ceased there has been no intercourse between its inhabitants and the people below. A happy, and the fallen race of men (Sven Hedin, Through Asia, 1895, i. 221). Instances of divine beings descending to earth and thus losing their immortality have therefore been borrowed from the Hindu, Tibetan, and exemplify this conception, which is also met with in the myths of various tribes of the Algonquin stock. A divine woman, for some reason which varies in different myths, but which is occasionally said to have been disobedience or immorality, is banished from heaven to earth, and falls on the back of the turtle, who then sends another animal to earth (Brinton, American Hero-Myth, 1882, p. 54).

5. Myths of the Fall in a former existence.—This latter notion of a fault committed in a higher state leading to banishment to the earth is the basis of those myths and beliefs which trace man's Fall and his present misery to his wrong-doing in a previous state. Metempsychosis, wherever it is held in an ethical form, presupposes the idea of a Fall. In Hindu belief, the souls which departed from the primal essence were condemned to existence in the body within a purgatorial world, and each life is now conditioned by its conduct in the former. The misery of life is thus a direct penalty for the primal Fall as well as for the sins of all succeeding existences (Manu, vi. 77, 78). This idea of human life as a purgatory, whether borrowed from Egypt or not, appears sporadically in Greek religious and philosophical thought. Pythagoras and his school postulated the guilt of the soul in a higher state as the reason why it was placed in the body, and its divine and its imprisonment in the body, through one or several existences (Zeller, Pre-Soc. Phil., 1881, I. 48), and Empedocles taught that mundane existence was the doom of souls hurled earthwards from the heaven of which they had proved unworthy. This, too, according to Plato, was the Orphic doctrine—the soul expiated in the prison of the body the sins it had committed in a previous existence. Plato himself, while sometimes teaching the belief in a Golden Age, lays stress on pre-existence and a Fall in that earlier state, due either to indolence, weakness, and perverseness, or to a wrong choice of the destinies of life (cf. the Ashanti myth above, 2 (5) ; Phaedr. 246 ; Repub. x. 2. 614). A similar doctrine of the Fall appears in Philo and in Origen, and has been upheld by later Christian philosophers, e.g. Müller in his Christian Doctrine of Sin, Eng. tr., 1883 (see PRE-EXISTENCE).

6. Myths of a divine Fall.—A more profound thought is reached in the occasional myths which tell of the Fall of a god. In most of these myths there is a concern to show the sin is conceived as almost more than human—the first man is sometimes a creator, or, when he dies, he becomes king of the dead. It has been seen, too, how immortal man in order to become the first of men through descending to earth and eating its fruits (see ii. i (3), 2 (2)). Wherever dualism prevails (and it runs like a coloured thread through the stuff of most mythologies), the divinities are usually subject to the attack of evil beings—titans, giants, wicked divinities, serpents, etc. —and are frequently defeated by them. Though this defeat is not, strictly speaking, a Fall, yet it shows a strain of weakness in the gods, such as is also adumbrated in the thought of an immutable fate to which the gods must be subject, e.g. the divinities of Scandinavia could not avert the death of Balder. Again, that strain of weakness is seen in the idea, a prominent in Zoroastrianism, and which occurs even in savage mythologies, that the works of the good creator, and especially man, are subject to, and frequently overcome by, the attacks of the evil divinities. Though not a Fall of a divine Fall exist, they occasionally show how it affected for the worse the lot of man. In a Hindu example, Brahmā was seized with a guilty passion for his daughter (2 (2), Tougou, Hindu, Tibetan), and exemplify this conception, which is also met with in the myths of various tribes of the Algonquin stock. A divine woman, being
proud of his works and wishing to make himself equal with the supreme Being, he was sunk by him in matter, followed by all his creatures (B. Con-
stant, De la Religion, iv. 116, 117). A genuine example of the myth exists in the Tezcatlipoca, and their brethren were gods in heaven and passed their time in a rose-garden until they began plucking roses from the great rose tree which grew therein. Therefore Tenoch-tecutli, in his anger at their action, hurled them to earth, where they lived as mortals (Brint-
on, Amer. Hero-Mysfs, p. 95). Two curious Scandinavian myths in the Edda, both ancient, and the first of them certainly dating from heathen times, suggest a fall of the gods. In the Völuspá we read, 'The Æsir met on Ida's plain: They altar-steads and temples high constructed. Their strength they proved. All things tried, Furnaces established. Precious things forged; Formed tongues, and fabricated tools; At tables played at home; Joyous they were; To them was naught the want of gold. Until there came Thurs-maidens three, All in one case it is a separate event. Finally here is suggested weakening of the gods and an end of their happy state on Ida's plain, through the seduc-
tions of these female giants, just as the seductive Paimon (or a serpent) caused the fall of man. (Dasent's Seemund, 1866, 3’ Völuspá,’ stanza 7 and 8). The other myth, which occurs in ‘Bragi’s telling, relates that Loki was seized by a eagle (a giant in that shape) who would not let him go till he took oath to bring to him Þunor, guardian of the gods' apples of immortality, out of Asgard. Loki agreed, and hurred Þunor into a wood under pretence of comparing her apples with others which he had found. There he was seized by the giant, who fled with her. Loki would have been punished by the sorrowful gods had he not agreed to go and seek her in Jötunheim. Thence he brought her, pursued by the giant, who was slain by the gods (Dasent’s translation of Edda, p. 86). The seduction of the goddess is involuntary on her part, but the story resembles Loki’s final revolt against the gods, of whom he was one, as a result of the giant nature which was in part his.

A war between two classes of supernatural beings, and the utter ruin and banishment of one of them to a lower state, is the subject of various myths in the gods and Titans. Scandinavian myths of gods and giants: Hindu, gods and demons, etc. (for other examples, see Baring-Gould, Legends of OT Chor., p. 51). Some such idea, connected with that of a fall of higher powers, underlies the various versions in the Bible, where the fall of the angels, so much developed in Rabbinical and Muhammadan lore (cf. Book of Enoch), while it forms a central doctrine in various Gnostic systems and in Mithraism.

The Fall and the Flood. In some cases peoples who have a myth of the Fall have also a Deluge-myth. Sometimes this is directly brought into connexion with the Fall as its punishment; in other cases it is a separate event, thereby resulting as the punishment of further human wickedness. Or, again, it is merely a catastrophe ending one or more of the successive world-ages. In some myths all three stages are supposed, and a new race of men is formed; in others, a few survivors who re-populate the earth. Andamanese myths are examples of a flood as a direct punishment of a Fall (see ii. 2). The idea that men at first lived in happiness and to a great age, until they became wicked and a flood came and swept them away (de la Borde, Reise zu den Corasien, 1864, p. 390).

See DELUGE: Baring-Gould, Legends of OT Chor., i. 116–153; Lenormant, Les Origines, p. 382 f. iii. COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FALL-MYTHS.

1. With few exceptions, the surveys of Fall-

myths have been uncritical. Anxiety to prove the truth of the Biblical story of the Fall has led several writers to find echoes of it in myths and legends from all parts of the world. It was enough for them to show that Quetzalcóatl, the Tezcatlipoca, and their brethren were gods in heaven and passed their time in a rose-garden until they began plucking roses from the great rose tree which grew therein. Therefore Tenoch-tecutli, in his anger at their action, hurled them to earth, where they lived as mortals (Brinton, Amer. Hero-Myth, p. 95). Two curious Scandinavian myths in the Edda, both ancient, and the first of them certainly dating from heathen times, suggest a fall of the gods. In the Völuspá we read, 'The Æsir met on Ida’s plain: They altar-steads and temples high constructed. Their strength they proved. All things tried, Furnaces established. Precious things forged; Formed tongues, and fabricated tools; At tables played at home; Joyous they were; To them was naught the want of gold. Until there came Thurs-maidens three, All in one case it is a separate event. Finally here is suggested weakening of the gods and an end of their happy state on Ida’s plain, through the seductions of these female giants, just as the seductive Paimon (or a serpent) caused the fall of man. (Dasent’s Seemund, 1866, Völuspá,’ stanza 7 and 8). The other myth, which occurs in ‘Bragi’s telling, relates that Loki was seized by a eagle (a giant in that shape) who would not let him go till he took oath to bring to him Þunor, guardian of the gods’ apples of immortality, out of Asgard. Loki agreed, and hurred Þunor into a wood under pretence of comparing her apples with others which he had found. There he was seized by the giant, who fled with her. Loki would have been punished by the sorrowful gods had he not agreed to go and seek her in Jötunheim. Thence he brought her, pursued by the giant, who was slain by the gods (Dasent’s translation of Edda, p. 86). The seduction of the goddess is involuntary on her part, but the story resembles Loki’s final revolt against the gods, of whom he was one, as a result of the giant nature which was in part his.

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1. With few exceptions, the surveys of Fall-
serpent or dragon became the symbol of darkness or evil (as in the myths referred to above), or elsewhere remained the enemy of man, keeping back the most valuable treasure, water, from him. The mythical, animal, and human nature of the serpent would easily make it the vehicle of man's mythic fancies, sometimes his fabled enemy, but also possessor of a higher wisdom and occasionally maker of his happiness. Genesis may have had in the earlier forms of the story (see Barton, Sem. Origins, 1902, p. 93). On the other hand, the myths which speak of woman overcoming the serpent by being confused with the Biblical story in its present form—a woman tempted by a serpent to evil. The latter, however, may have some connexion with a whole series of myths and Mārechen in which the serpent has a mystical relation to woman—her lover, seducer, or husband. These stories arose from the general animistic and totemistic idea that men and beasts had much in common, and that the qualities of the one were reflected in the other. But the persistent appearance of the serpent rather than other animals in such stories may have some other significance besides, and, taken in connexion with a series of myths showing that the serpent or the fish is sometimes having been bitten by a snake, that significance is possibly phallic.

Ch. Schoebel, in Le Mythe de la fémme et du serpent, 1878, seeks to show that the story of Genesis and its supposed correlative true friends, have a phallic significance. As soon as man, until then bi-sexual, became two, male and female, the serpent was thus having been forbidden. It is man thought to himself on a level with the creator and to equal his creative power by the force of the flesh. This fall: hence his shame and also his punishment.

LITERATURE.—Most writers on the subject have written either from the apologetic or from the destructive standpoint—to prove or disprove the truth of Genesis. Their studies are useless and forced. In the best commentaries on Genesis some parallels are usually cited, but frequently these are exaggerated, especially that from the Bundahish, where it is doubtful whether the demon had the form of a serpent, as is asserted. The reader may refer to Kalisch's, Dillmann's, and Driver's Comm. on Genesis. C. Geikie, Hours with the Bible, London, 1851, vol. 1, ch. 2; S. Baring-Gould, Legends of OT Characters, London, 1871, vol. 1, ch. 4; P. Lenormant, Les Origines du Livre de Genèse, Paris, 1868, vol. 1, ch. 2; B. Constant, De la Religion, Paris, 1882, p. 46; E. Cowell, Christ and Other Moderns, Cambridge, 1882-1888; F. R. Tennant, Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin, London, 1903, ch. 2; and also other authorities cited in the article.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

FALL (Muslim).—The Fall (hubbit) of Adam and his wife from Paradise is repeatedly epitomized in the Meccan and Medinan narratives, with slight variations. The temptation is ascribed to Iblis (Djibablos, the D being mistaken for the Syriac sign of the genitive), determined to injure Adam, before whom he had declared to proscribe himself when commanded to do so. Adam, intended by God to be His deputy on earth, is told that he and his wife are to dwell in the Garden, and eat thereof where they will, only not to approach the tree, "as a time when their quality was identical. But the persistent appearance of the serpent rather than other animals in such stories may have some other significance besides, and, taken in connexion with a series of myths showing that the serpent or the fish is sometimes having been bitten by a snake, that significance is possibly phallic.

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FAMILY (Primitive).

Primitive (E. N. Fallaize), p. 716.
Celtic (E. Anwyl), p. 728.
Egyptian (H. R. Hall), p. 783.
Greek (A. Fairbairns), p. 735.

FAMILY (Primitive).—1. Rudimentary forms of family life among lower animals.—Traces of the generally recognized permanent, of parents and offspring usually understood by the term 'family' are found among the lower animals: among birds, companionship of male and female after pairing, the sharing of labour in building the nest, of incubation, and of the care of the young while they are unable to look after themselves, present close analogies to the essential functions of the human family. On the other hand, among some mammals, especially the non-hunters, a protection which the family organization would demand from the young is lacking, and the offspring sometimes become, or would become but for the protection of the mother, the prey of the male. The quadrupeds, especially the anthropoids, in the relation of the parents to one another and to their young, seem to approach more nearly to the human type. It is recorded of the gorillas that they move about in bands consisting of females and one male, while the male builds a nest for the female and sleeps at the foot of the tree to protect her and the young at night. The chimpanzee is said to act in the same manner, and the evidence (Wallace, Malay Archipelago, London, 1869, ii. 283) points in the same direction in the case of the orang-utan.

The essential features which make it possible to speak of family life among the lower animals are the provision for the needs of the female and of the young, and a protection of both the female and the young, by which the family becomes an organization directed towards the preservation of the species. The human family is organized upon the same basis, the chief difference being the greater permanence, due in the first instance to the longer period during which the children require the care and protection of their parents.

2. Functions of man and woman as members of family group.—(a) Man.—Subject to certain qualifications, it may be said that among primitive races the functions of the senior members of the family are defined. The duties of the male are to protect the female, to supply her with a habitation, and to provide food, sometimes by agricultural labour, more often by the chase. Instances may be quoted of the views of primitive peoples on these points.

The Patwin of California held strongly that it was the duty of the father to support his family (Powell, 'Tribes of California,' Contributions to A. Amer. Ethnology, Washington, 1877, iii. 222). Among the Iroquois, during the first year of marriage, the husband, the wife, and the child were subjected to the care of his wife's mother, and subsequently were shared equally with her (Herries, Travels through the Canadian, London, 1857, p. 230). Admiral Fitzroy (Voyages of the Adventure and Beagle, London, 1839, ii. 152) records that among the Fuegians a youth who desired to marry must show that he was capable of supporting a wife by hunting and fishing. Among the Botocudos, girls were married at a very early age, but after marriage remained with their father until middle life; but, according to Cabot, when required to support his wife (J. von Tschudi, Reisen durch Südamerika, Leipzig, 1866-69, ii. 283). Among the Kurnal, a man was required to support his family with the assistance of his wife (Howitz, Festa, Raininari, et culti, Leipzig, 1869-70). In some cases it was considered the duty of a man to support and protect his wife, and the absence of the wife to obey her husband and to wait upon him and upon any visitors (Brown, Polynesians and Melanesians, London, 1910, p. 43). In Thurn records that among the Indians of British Otago a bridegroom could do a day's work and support a family before he was allowed to marry (Indians of Otago, London, 1886, p. 175). Prowess in fighting as well as in hunting was also required. The head-hunting Babos of Borneo, as well as the Nagas, make marriage depend upon the number of heads taken by the aspirant (Bock, Headhunters of Borneo, London, 1881, p. 216; Dalton, Deserip, Ethnol. and Ethnol. Sav., London, 1876, p. 49). Among the Kafirs and Bechuana of S. Africa, the bridegroom must have killed a nilgossor (Livingstone, Miss. Travels and Researches in S. and E. Africa, London, 1857, ii. 147). In Burma, failure to support constituted a ground for divorce (Fytche, Burma Past and Present, London, 1878, ii. 72). The obligation to contribute to the support of a wife was even continued after the marriage had been dissolved; and, when the husband died, the duty of supporting her devolved on the husband's relatives.

(b) Woman.—The provision towards the support of his wife and family made by the male parent naturally varied according to the character of the community. Where the staple of life was obtained by hunting and fishing, the provision of food fell largely to the father; and among pastoral peoples the care of the flocks and herds was also his duty. Agriculture originally fell to the lot of the woman, as is still the case among the majority of the Bantu peoples of Africa. In Melanesia, where both men and women work in the plantations, the duties of women are not strictly defined. The woman was also responsible for such domestic duties as the collecting of fuel, the cooking, the making of pots, weaving, and the care of the children. The position of the woman was not safeguarded by the complete subjection to her husband of the Australian gin to the supreme authority of the woman in the long house of the Senecas. The customs attendant on exogamy and the tracing of descent through the mothers tended to place restrictions upon the power of the husband, while vesting in it the woman's male relatives: but even in the exogamous and matrilinial societies of Melanesia the husband and father was supreme in authority in his own kinship group, and the wife's authority, so far as dependent on status, did not exist. In Africa, among the Bantu races, even where, as is still largely the case, matrilinial descent prevailed, the authority of the husband and father was paramount except in certain matters, in which traces of the authority of the kin remained. Among the Baganda, for instance, the wife's kin hold the husband responsible for negligence, and in the event of the wife's death, the care of the boys was under the care of their father; but in a matrilinial society of primitive type the claims of the kin cause them to pass to the care of their

Hindu (J. Jolly), p. 737.
Muslim (Carra de Vaux), p. 742.
Persian (L. H. Gray), p. 744.
Roman (J. B. Carter), p. 746.
Slavic.—See 'Teutonic.'

Teutonic and Balto-Slavic (O. Schrader), p. 749.

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maternal uncle, who is also sometimes responsible for their preparation for initiation. In the Torres Straits this claim is also to some extent recognized in the maintenance of the house; where the child arrives for their initiation, they are handed over to their maternal aunts for instruction and preparation (Haddon, *Head-Hunters*, London, 1901, p. 135). As a rule, however, husbands and children live with their parents until their marriage; or, in the case of boys and where the institution of a man's house is recognized, until their initiation, or attainment to the age of puberty.

3. The dwelling-place and the family.—One of the urgent needs of human existence is some form of shelter against the inclemency of the weather. The dwelling-place, as the centre which, through early habit and by custom, has come to be recognized as the gathering place for those who are closely connected by birth, has played an important part in the development of the family and of the acknowledgment of the common obligations and privileges it entails. In the early stages of human society, a camp-fire, with at most a screen of boughs or some natural hollows in the lee of the rock as a shelter against the wind, served to give warmth and comfort to a mother, her children, and their common protector. As the group increased in numbers by the birth of children and the accession of husbands for the daughters, owing to the desire for a change of scene and the prospect of contiguity, the tendency would at first be to enlarge the shelter rather than for the group to split into a number of smaller groups, each with a shelter of its own.

The Rock Veddas of Ceylon, who live in caves and rock-sheltered haunts, are descended to the Palaearctic, and the inhabitants of the Magdalenian epoch of Europe, are an example of a community stage in the development of the communal house inhabited by the members of one family or kin. The Veddas reckon descent through the mother, and the husband on marriage joins his wife's family group, of which the head is his maternal uncle, his wife being his cousin. Each group, consisting of husband, wife, daughters, and daughters' husbands, is recognized as the owner of a cave. Within the cave, however, each of the smaller groups within the kin group, i.e. the families, has a fire of its own, around which the members sit at night. No family ever usurps the place of another (Seifmann, *The Veddas*, Camb., 1911, p. 235 ff.). This represents the beginnings of the large communal houses which have been found in various parts of the world, the best known examples, perhaps, being the long houses of the New American Indians, which sheltered never more than a few kin. Among the Orang Manu of Sumatra, the head of the clan is the owner of the house of the community (Wilken, quoted by Hartland, *Primitiae Paternitatis*, London, 1910, p. 294). The communal house has reached its most elaborate form in Borneo in the Lahad too, where as many as 35 families may live under one roof, each in separate apartments, with doors opening on to a common pavement (p. 311). The largest of the communal houses of the clan found in Kioal Island in the Torres Straits resembles the Vedda cave-dwelling in internal arrangement, each family having its own entrance (Haddon, 1907).

The men's house or club house of Melanesia—found wherever Melanesian influence has penetrated, as, for example, in Fiji—in which all unmarried men live between the time when they leave their own family on attaining puberty and their marriage, is a relic of the communal house. The separate hearth for each member is a record of the distribution of the occupants in families in the earlier stages. A reminiscence of the communal house also exists among the Bontoc Igorot of the Philippines, but in this case the club house belongs to the gifted of the village. When it is realized that the secret society to which the club house belongs has in Melanesia taken the place of the social group, the tribe of which young men were introduced by initiation ceremonies which conferred upon them the status of men, and then went (with their tribe, their relation to the communal house and their position in relation to the development of the family and family life become clear. The custom in Fiji is, if a man leaves his tribe and family and returns to the club house for a lengthy period after the birth of a child, it is not his mother's choice but a ceremonial reunion to a earlier stage.

The extension of the dwelling, if local circumstances are favourable, is an obvious method of accommodating an increase in numbers, as well as the necessity for imprinting upon the children the importance of the kin. The Pueblo value daughters more than sons, for the reason that they add to the power and importance of their family by the introduction of their husbands into the group; instead of the newly married pair seeking a home of their own, more apartments are added to the already elaborate cliff-dwellings characteristic of the case. As this happens, the communal house, the communal house, however, is not the only one, indeed, the more usual result of the expansion of the family or the kin. Its construction presents no material difficulties for the parents until their marriage; or, in the case of boys and where the institution of a man's house is recognized, until their initiation, or attainment to the age of puberty.

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FAMILY (Primitive)

Africa, the free wife stayed in her own village; her husband did not necessarily remain with her, as the men, especially the Angoni, spent much time in hunting, in which may also be unusually on traditional occupations. He had more than one free wife, he divided his time between their different villages. The men also had slave wives, who either followed the husband in his village, or, in the sense of a group, took up residence permanently with his chief wife in her village, his slave wives followed him, lived in his wife's hut, and acted as her servants (Werner, Eiknol.

5. Early form of the family.—Widely divergent views have been held as to the origin of the family. One school of anthropologists, of whom Morgan, McCleland, and Bachelot may be taken as the representatives, have maintained that in the earliest stages of the development of human society the family as such did not exist. They hold that within the group individual marriage was non-existent, and that the widely used custom of tracing descent through the mother, the close connection existing between the mother's brother and her children, and the nomenclature of primitive relationship point to a state of society in which primitive uncertainty of paternity was a rule, and the children were regarded as belonging to the group and not to a particular family. The family, it is maintained, is a comparatively late development, which has spread within the larger group. On the other hand, it has been held (Atkinson-Lang, The Primal Law, London, 1903) that the primitive horde was a single family, from which the young males were driven by the jealousy of the elders, and as such it had attained to maturity. Westmarck (Hist. of Hum. Marriage, London, 1891, p. 40 ff.), arguing that man was not originally gregarious, largely on the ground of the difficulty of obtaining an adequate food supply, quotes a number of instances in support of his view that the family and not the group is the original basis of society, and that, even where a group of a few families are found in association, they tend to separate in times of stress.

The Wild Veddas of Ceylon, one of the lowest races in the scale of social organization ever described, were said by Frohlich (Amm. Anthropol., London, 1848, p. 146) to live in single pairs, building their huts in trees, while the Wild, or Nilugas, Veddas in Ceylon live in 4 to 5, new ser. (1863), 2 pairs in pairs or families in caves. Seligmann (p. 62) says that the social group among these Veddas usually consists of the father, mother, children of both the sexes, and sometimes of the father's daughter and daughter's husband. The Fuegians recognized no relationship outside the family (Stir- B JM, 1881, p. 193). The Tasmanians, (H. B. von Temichl. ii. (256), the Botocudos of Brazil recognized the family as the only tie, while the same thing is stated of other Indian tribes of Brazil. Among the Bushmen, for instance, each family is said to dwell in its own solitary hut (H. W. Bates, The Naturalist on the River Amazon, London, 1868, ii. 370). Petrow records of the Esquimaux of Alaska that they live in families or groups of families without cohesion, and that a young man will wander away from his family on a hunting expedition, marry, and settle, without regard to his native place of origin, or his original group (Population, Industries, and Resources of Alaska, Washington, 1884, p. 135). The Australian tribes of Victoria used, in times of scarcity, to break up into their different families, the head of each betaking himself to the last, which had been carried by his father (Brough Smyth, Tribes of Victoria, London, 1878, i. 146). Schoolcraft, in his account of the Indians of North America, speaks of families becoming widely separated in times of scarcity.

It would be possible to extend the number of quotations from the observations of travellers to show that the family is widely recognized among primitive peoples as the social unit, whether the group consists of one or more families. When, however, the position of the individual and its relation to its social environment are examined, it must be conceded that the evidence, even if it does not go to uphold the group theory of primitive society in its entirety, does demonstrate in many cases a transition from one fundamental basis of social organization to another. The group, in the earlier form of social organization, has undergone a change of composition. It is only in the later stages that the family, in the strict sense of a group, has become the social unit. But the importance of the kin in the early stages does not involve a negation of the existence of a rudimentary family in the strict sense. At this stage, however, certain privileges and duties connected with the disposal of property and the right to control the lives of its members, which later are recognized as essential features in the organization of the family, are vested in the blood relatives or kin. The substitution of patrilineal for matrilineal descent, which would seem at one time to be another to have existed among almost every people, has been accompanied or preceded by a re-adjust-ment of the organization of the social unit; and from this re-adjustment has evolved the family of civilized type, of parents and offspring, with full recognition of relationship on both sides of the family.

6. Relative importance of father and mother, in the early stages of development.—The prevalence of mother-right and the organization of society on a basis of female kin, is best illustrated in the kin through the mother, while ignoring the father and his connexion with his children, whether it existed in its logical entirety, as has been inferred from the evidence, or not, necessarily renders the origin of the family obscure. The marriage customs and social organization which accompany matrilineal descent, as well as the use of primitive terms of relationship, have led some writers to deny that the father in the earliest stages of primitive civilization had any place in the family group at all. There is ground for maintaining that the physiological facts of paternity were not fully recognized, even if in the earliest stages of human progress they were recognized at all. The beliefs as to conception and pregnancy current among the Arunta of Australia, as reported by Spencer-Gillen, appear incompatible with any such recognition. A part from this, the importance of the mother's brother, upon whom devolved the duties which at a later stage fell upon the father, shows that it was he, and not the father, who was regarded as head of the group. But the position of the father does not begin to be recognized at a very early stage, although he does not attain his full share of family authority, rights, and duties until the patrilineal stage of social development is reached. At the same time, in the stage prior to paternal authority, the existence of a small group of persons, closely related, living more or less in close association, and recognized as forming a unit within the kin to which the term 'family' might be applied loosely, is not only highly probable, but is clearly indicated by the fact that the functions which at first fall to the kin are gradually assigned to the mother's brother, and not to the kin as a whole. Upon this and the mother's brother fall all the rights and duties which under fully recognized father-right fall upon the father. He is the nearest relative of his sister's children, he is responsible for their well-being, he provides for them, and is most important of all in a primitive society—they inherit his property.

The preponderating importance of the mother in primitive social organization is shown by the fact that in the earliest stages the children belong to the mother's kin and not to that of the father. In a society in which mother-right is the rule, status depends upon the mother; the status of the father...
7. Position of the husband and father as a relation to the wife's kin or family. Any further stage in the development of the family is reached when the father, instead of being a temporary visitor, lives with his wife's kin.

The Orang Maman of Sumatra are organized into a subu, or clan. Each family of the subu lives together, and, as no members of the same subu can marry, husbands and wives are kept from the same subu, but, when they do, the man goes to the woman's clan. His position, however, as regards authority is not affected; the children of the marriage are called the wife's children, the husband's son.

The women of Jhililay had the right to dismiss their husbands at will. In reference to Saracen marriages he also quotes Amissan Marcellus (iv. 4), who says that the wife gives her husband a tent and some food. Robertson Smith interprets this as meaning that she provided her husband with a home, and that he was under an obligation to fight for her kin (Kinship and Marriage, Lond., 1903, p. 79 f.).

Among the Syntegen of Assam, although the husband only stays with his wife and his mother's house and himself lives with his own mother, yet, if he dies, his widow keeps his bones after his death, on condition that she does not remarry. If she marries again, the man's children have no claim to his estate, but may build a house in the village where he may never enter, and among the neighbouring Khasis, however, the husband goes to live with his wife in her mother's house, and may after the birth of one or two children remove her (Gurdon, The Khantis, London, 1907, p. 82). A similar juxtaposition is found in Sumatra among the Menangkaben Malays: the husband is only a visitor, and each party lives in his or her birthplace; but among the Tag Logweeng the husband goes to live with the wife, or may build her a house in the settlement of her clan (Wilken, quoted by Hartland, ii. 108 f.). Here the children belong to the mother's clan. A further development is also found. Lower down the river, among the mother's clan, residence is the stronger, whether he is the clan of father or of mother; and descent follows residence.

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is of no consequence. In the Congo, even legitimacy is of no consequence; the fact of birth gives the child status as a member of his mother's family (Darinskii, op. cit., i. 218). Among the Fantis of the Gold Coast, it is stated, the father is hardly known or is disregarded. Although it is not probable that among many peoples at the present day the father is absolutely unknown to his children, numerous instances are recorded where he does not live regularly with the mother. In the Torres Straits Islands men of one island frequently marry women of another; these women stay in the island, and the husband returns periodically to his village to cultivate his own land (Haddon, 100 f.). In early forms of polygamous union a man may have wives in several villages, the custom being that the wife should not dwell in the husband's village. At this stage the family, as an association of both parents and their offspring, can hardly be said to exist, and, as already suggested, its place is taken by the unit consisting of mother and offspring more closely associated with a male head—the mother's brother—within the kin.

8. The blood-feud. The blood-feud (g.v.) throws much light upon the early stages of the evolution of the family, particularly at the point at which it passes from an organization based upon kinship to one founded upon the marriage tie.

The supreme influence of the relationship traced through the female line is shown in many customs and practices. In the Caucasus, whereby, if a man murdered a brother by a different mother, the blood-feud arose between himself and the surviving brothers born of the same mother as the murdered man. In Daghestan the murderer of a wife paid blood-money to his own wife's brother. In some cases, however, the children as well as to his wife's relatives (Darinskii, quoted by Hartland, i. 372). A number of customs among various tribes of Africa are peculiarly significant in this connexion. A husband among the Kushe, and did not avenge his wife's death, departs with the daughter of the man who murdered in his presence; this duty fell primarily on his wife's brothers or her eldest son. Nor was the murderer necessarily responsible in case of his own violent death, while the duty of avenging his children's death should beThis is a question that has been discussed from the earliest times; and those whose connexion has been brought into existence by marriage.

9. The power to pledge the members of the family. A similar conception of family ties and the right of the husband to his wife's brother, or uncle, the mother, not the father, is responsible for the children's debts.

10. The bride price. The institution of a family independent of the bride's parents is not infrequently made to depend upon payment of the bride price, and in these cases the line of descent of the children is changed when the conditions of the marriage bargain have been fulfilled. 'In the Laung Sermata group of the Moluccas, the payment of the bride price gives the right to reside with the wife, but does not entitle the husband to carry her off. Bat on the islands of the Ambon and Uliase, on the payment of the bride price, the bride is handed over to the bridegroom, and she is conducted to his dwelling. Side by side with this custom there exists another form of union. Proposals of marriage having been made by the man's relatives, if he is accepted, he establishes himself in the bride's dwelling, and becomes proprietor of the messing of his wife's parents, acting the part of the secret lover. All children belong to the mother's family. In Wetar, in the same group, although the married pair live at the wife's home until they get a separate dwelling, payment of a bride price secures his children to the husband. On the island of Serang, when the wife enters her husband's family, payment of the bride price is followed by constant gifts to
the wife's parents, to keep alive his right in his wife and children (Riedel, quoted by Hartland, ii. 27). Torres Straits Indians, as the birth of the first child of each successive child involves payment to the wife's parents. On the other hand, in the islands of Mab- ning and Badu, although the husband took up his residence with his wife, he paid, and the bride price was to be paid, to her father or her family, except that in the case of the re-marriage of a divorced woman part of the compensation given to him was handed over to him in cash (Haddon, 159, 161). Thus we see how different systems exist side by side on the Walli-bela Islands. Here, in the case of the man who lives with his mother's family, payment of the bride price gives him the right to marry her as children. If his mother had formally been handed over to him in the first instance. Marsden (Hist. of Sumatra, London, 1811, p. 225 ff.) states that, in Rejung in Sumatra, on payment of the bride price, the woman became the slave of her husband; but, except in case of a quarrel, a small part of the bride price was never paid, in order to keep up the relationship and the family interest. The eldest child of the husband becoming a member of the bride family was also found. In this case he and his wife might emancipate themselves by payment, but this was made difficult if there were daughters, as their value belonged to the family. Thus the practice, according to Titford (ib. xxxv. 225), is quite interesting, if we may say so, custom by which, for every twenty-five dollars in the bride price, the parents have to support the bride for one year, the husband giving her only a small monthly present (Hargrave, The Achehnes, Leyden, 1906, i. 295). A right would here seem to have been transformed into a duty. The Belugene of Timor have a double system; the home and the children follow the marriage price, but this is payable by either the man or the woman, the descent being determined accordingly (Wilken, quoted by Hartland, ii. 57).

11. Residence. Throughout Africa, among various tribes, residence with the wife's family is common, whether for a shorter or a longer period, among the Dinkas the period of residence ended with the birth of the first child (JAI xxiv. 1904, 151). Among the Bambala a man will be required to fight for his father-in-law's village against his own (Titford, ib. xxxv. 1905, 399, 410). Both Bushmen and Hottentots required the husband to reside with the wife's parents; among the former it only applied to those who go into trade. When among the S. Americans, among the Bakairi (Fritsch, 445), the husband worked in the father's clearing, and on the death of his wife he was bound to marry his wife's sister. This custom was common elsewhere. The Luaga of the Paraguay Chaco sometimes compromised in the matter of residence, the man and wife spending half their time in the homes of the parents of each (Grubh, Indians of the Para-gayan Chaco, London, 1904, p. 61). The husband among the Aravak worked for his wife's brother (In Thurn, 186, 221); when the family became too large to be accommodated in the husband's hut, the wife was asked to build a hut for herself near by. When the head dies, the several fathers separate, and build houses for themselves, thus each forming the nucleus of a new settlement. Settlements of the same kind are found in Melanesia.

In Oceania the father's kin is, for the sake of the reference has already been made to the absence of influence of the father in the primitive family, and the vesting of parental rights over children in the mother's kin, and especially among the Australian tribes the mother's. The gradual recognition of the father as the person responsible for the well-being of his children, and as the holder of the rights to dispose of them and to exact obedience from them, has only very slowly ousted the older conception—by stages which are fairly clear.

The customs of the people of the Lower Congo may be taken as typical of an early, if not of the earliest, stage. There the uncle, who is addressed by the children as 'father,' exercises paternal authority over the children of his brother, the father is without voice over her of her child. If the husband and wife are separate, the children go with her as belonging to her brother. The children, as they grow up, go to live with their uncle (Benity, Pioneering on the Congo, who, 1900, ii. 389, and H. Kingfisher's Travels in W. Africa, London, 1897, p. 224). Among the Bambala in the family is beginning to develop its form; there are two types of marriage. In the case of child-marriage, or, more properly, child-bridal, the boy lives with his chosen bride's parents until he is of marriageable age, and any children of the marriage belong to the maternal uncle. In the case of marriage of the first child, the bride price is paid to the father or maternal uncle, and any children then belong to the father. But a father has little authority, and any property he himself has is inherited by his eldest son (Haddon, i. 189), if he has no son, then any property he has over no power over his children, the case is different when the mother is a slave; among the Kunbunda they are reckoned his children, and can inherit from him. The customs of some negro tribes exhibit instructive peculiarities. Among the Ewe of Anglo in Upper Guinea, the nephew accompanies the uncle on trading journeys and acts for him, accounts to his uncle for all that he takes, and receives a share of the profits. But it is the uncle and the father together who negotiate for his marriage; and the father is also consulted as to the marriage of his daughter, and receives a share of the price (Ellis, Eve-speaking Peoples, London, 1890, p. 207 ff.).

Among the Fanti a further step in the organization of the family has been taken. The Fanti are patrilinial; the head of the family is usually the eldest male in the line of descent, and he is compoun dwell not only the younger members of his line of descent, but also his own wives and children. His power is limited, however, by the fact that he is not a despot, and the consent of any members who have left to live with their maternal uncle are out of his power (Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, London, 1897, passim). Among the Kukana of Abyssinia the right of the father has been extended to cover the son's earnings, but not his life and liberty, which remain in the power of the maternal uncle (Munzing, 477 ff.).

The position of the mother's brother and his relation to his nephew are of great importance in Melanesia, and especially in Fiji. But even in this region has it begun to give way to a recognition of the father's head of his family. On the island of Muralug, Torres Straits, patrilinial descent is recognized, but the bride's brother still arranges the details of a girl's marriage, although the father receives the bride price, and his consent to the marriage is not required. But the father exchanges a daughter for his promised wife; and, if he has no sister, he gives a daughter of his maternal uncle (Rep. Camb. Exposed. Torres Straits, v. 145, Camb. 1910).

Among the Polynesians the position of the children is very slight, but it rests with the father, so far as boys are concerned, until the time of initiation, when it is vested vaguely in the elders of the tribe. In the case of girls, the
authority is concerned chiefly with the right of betrothal, while after marriage the power of the husband, who usually also has control of what exists is vested mainly in the girl's or her mother's brother. Among the Dieri (Howitt, *Native Tribes of S.E. Australia*, London, 1904, pp. 177, 167, 195, 215, etc.), the mother, after the death of the mother, who acts with the concurrence of her brothers. The Wallaroi exchange their sisters without the intervention of their mother.

13. The inheritance of power and property.—The gradual growth of the feeling of solidarity in the family as opposed to the kin, i.e. in the unit in which the relation of father to offspring is more potent than the connexion which is traced through sister or mother, can be seen in the customs connected with the disposal of power or property. Where the feeling of kinship is predominant, at a man's death his property would be divided among the members of his kin, with whom he was connected through his mother. The "potlatch" of the Haida of Charlotte Island in N. America, to which the whole kin contributed or in which they shared, is an instance of an analogous character, which shows the originality of the connexion to personal property. A parallel instance may be quoted from Samoa, where all the relatives contribute to the dower of the *tapuau*, or village maid. As the connection of wives with the kin increases, it becomes generally recognized that the direct heir is the sister's son rather than the kin as a whole. At this stage of development it is usual for the chieftainship to be elective, and the tendency is for the honour to fall on the wealthiest or to the one who is possessed of the greatest amount of traditional knowledge. A further stage is reached when a man's affection for his own children is not sufficient for him to endeavour to break through this restriction. The evidence from Melanesia is of importance in connexion with the evolution of the family, as it offers numerous examples of a transition from one set of customs to another. The peoples in the various islands are divided into exogamous clans, and for the most part trace descent through the mother; husband and wife belong to different sides of the house, and neither at marriage passes over to the side of the other. It is clear that at one time the heir in all cases was the nephew. In Bogotó the chief is the head of the predominant *kema* or clan. But, it is seen, a change is becoming predominant, because a chief, in order to secure the chieftainship to his children, transfers what he can of his own property to his sons, who are not of his own kin (Cochrington, 32ff.). Property is frequently transferred to the son, or used to secure the son's advancement in the club house during the father's lifetime. In the New Hebrides, the chieftainship tended to become hereditary, as the chief handed on his traditional knowledge to his son. At Motu the headship had become hereditary. In the case of land a distinction was recognized. Land in long occupation, which, it would be assumed, had originally been cleared by the kin, would descend to the sister's son, but land cleared by a man himself—a task in which the sons would assist—would descend to the children. Further, this land would continue to descend from father to son; but, should the fact of its clearing by an individual, and not by the kin, be forgotten or overlooked, it would descend to the nephew. Trees, in which property was recognized as apart from the land, naturally passing to the planter or on that of another, also descended to the sons. Strictly speaking, personal property was inherited by the nephew, but might be secured to the children. Another stage would be, when the children were hidden in the owner's lifetime for the benefit of the children; in Florida a canoe might be given to the son by the father's direction; or the direct heir in a tribe. If the child, however, was regarded as a vessel, his interest in the land and personal property might be inherited by this method.

14. Conclusion.—A general review of the evidence relating to the inheritance of the family—considered around which in its various aspects much controversy has arisen—would suggest that many of the theories which have been put forward have been based upon superficial observations and imperfect evidence. Early travellers, and even the men who have seen much that belonged to the civilized conditions with which they were familiar, while by the use of ill-defined terms of relationship, which did not correspond with the native connotations, they have misled those who relied upon their evidence. If the precise meaning of a group consisting of father, mother, and offspring is to be attached to the term 'family,' it must be recognized that in the early stages of civilization the family as a group, though not necessarily non-existent, as has been maintained, is not so closely knit an organization as it becomes at a later stage. The economic and social factor in the production of material comforts and utilities, as a source of the accession of strength from outside, and as the mother of future members of the tribe, was recognized at an early stage; and this accounts largely for the fact that many of the functions of the family of which the father was recognized as the head in a later development were vested in those related to the woman by blood—at first the kin as a whole, later the smaller group within the kin consisting of her immediate male relatives, or, using 'family' in a looser sense, the family connected by blood ties. It is only by gradual stages—through the bride price, the compensation, whether it be the husband's service for his life or a term of years, the exchange of another woman (a sister) for the bride, the loss of all or some of his children, or a payment in goods or money, or through forcible abduction—that the husband has been able gradually to secure independence of the unit of which he becomes the head, in location, in the disposal of property, and in the ordering of the lives of its members.

 Cf. also artt. CHILDREN, INHERITANCE, KINSHIP, MARRIAGE.

LITERATURE.—This is given in the article.

FAMILY (Assyro-Babylonian).—The three meanings usually given to this word were also present in Assyro-Bab.: (1) the head of the household, with his wife, children, and other relatives; (2) a group of people connected by blood or by marriage; (3) the same, including the tribe or clan. The commonest word for 'family' is, perhaps, *qinnu*, from *qinnū*, 'to build a nest,' though this may not have been its original meaning. The word occurs in the Assy. historical inscriptions; 'his brothers, his family (qinnu-su), the seed of his father's house' (Assur. ii. 10); 'his wife, his sons, and all his family' (*qinnatu-gabti*; Assur. K. 13, 1. 8); '300 families (qinnātē) of the criminals (implicated in the rebellion)' (Tiq. vi. 31). A synonym of this word is *kimtu*, which explains (WAI ii. 29, 72-74,9) the cognate forms *kīmu*, *kimatu*, and also *kimu*, all meaning, probably, something collected—a group, or the like. *Kimtu* is the Bab. rendering of *hammu* in the name *Hammu-rābi*, which the Babylonians translated as *Kimta-rēpatum*, 'my family is wide-spread,' or the like; and of *ammu* in *Aminī-qqadu* (*qqadu*), rendered as *Kimtu-w-kēttē*, 'the righteous family'—to all appearance they did not recognize in *hammu* or *ammu* the Assyro-Bab. *kimtu*. These examples show that *kimtu* was regarded as the equivalent
of the Arab, *hamm*, or *hāmnat*, and, though it could be used in the restricted sense of *ginū*, a wider meaning was sometimes present: *kintu ṭur.qa.Pl, sainta lāqīhār, pitʿī laquntāl*, 'may I speak of my father, may I mention my relatives, may I extend my offspring' (Meissner and Rost, *Belt. z. Assyr.*, Leipzig, 1893, pp. 254, 255). *Bitu*, 'house', also became a synonym of the *abū, bābī, bābīt*, with the addition of servants and dependents (*Cun. Texts*, xviii. p. 16, 26).

All these expressions naturally belong to the period following that of the early nomadic times of the Sem. tent-dwellers. The word *abū* probably denotes the Heb. *āḇê, *āḇī, 'father', the Heb. *āḇi, *āḇîh, 'family,' with transferred meaning, implying that the inhabitants of the early centuries of population were as one large family. The character expressing *āḇîh, however, seems to be rather a large house than a tent.1

The members of a *Bab* family were the husband (*muṭa, ṣaḥārm*), the wife (*ṭāʾalātu, ḍātītu*) or wives, and their children.2 More than two wives seem to have been unusual, and, in the case of a double family of this kind, both were expected to interest themselves in their common offspring. A wife might give her maid-servant to her husband (*Code of Hammurābi, § 146; Gu 161*), but in that case he could not himself take a concubine. The maidservant thus honoured was not equal with her master, and every part might result in her being relegated to her old position, even though she had borne children. If the wife were childless, the husband might take a concubine (*§ 145*); and, if a malady had stricken the wife, the husband might marry again, but the sick wife could not be divorced (*§ 148*). That there may have been transgressions of these laws is not improbable, but they seem to indicate the composition of the families of the well-to-do. A second wife appears to have been taken sometimes to provide a servant for the first (Pinc hes, *OT in the Light*, p. 175). An ill-treated wife could claim her freedom (*Cod. Ham.* § 142).

Descent was always traced through the father, and the Sumerian, custom of mentioning the female sex first in certain cases may have had merely a mythological origin, due to the teaching which made Tiamat, or 'Mother Hubur,' the first creator. Her offspring, who overcame her, however, were all gods, not goddesses. Even in the purely Sumerian pantheon, it is nearly always the divine husband who is the more prominent, and in many cases the wife's part might result in her being relegated to her old position, even though she had borne children. If the wife were childless, the husband might take a concubine (*§ 145*); and, if a malady had stricken the wife, the husband might marry again, but the sick wife could not be divorced (*§ 148*). That there may have been transgressions of these laws is not improbable, but they seem to indicate the composition of the families of the well-to-do. A second wife appears to have been taken sometimes to provide a servant for the first (Pinc hes, *OT in the Light*, p. 175). An ill-treated wife could claim her freedom (*Cod. Ham.* § 142).

The descendants of a man were called his 'seed' (Sumer. *ühûnum, Assyr.-Bab. šarru*) or 'progeny' (Assyr.-Bab. *nummab*). To indicate his parentage, and thus identify him legally, his father's name was given, and generally, in later times, the founder of his tribe, e.g., *Marduk-naṣir-ibī*, son of *kudītu ša*; *Itti-Nabû-balātu*, the first creator. Her offspring, who overcame her, however, were all gods, not goddesses. Even in the purely Sumerian pantheon, it is nearly always the divine husband who is the more prominent, and in many cases the wife's part might result in her being relegated to her old position, even though she had borne children. If the wife were childless, the husband might take a concubine (*§ 145*); and, if a malady had stricken the wife, the husband might marry again, but the sick wife could not be divorced (*§ 148*). That there may have been transgressions of these laws is not improbable, but they seem to indicate the composition of the families of the well-to-do. A second wife appears to have been taken sometimes to provide a servant for the first (Pinc hes, *OT in the Light*, p. 175). An ill-treated wife could claim her freedom (*Cod. Ham.* § 142).

The father was supreme in his house. It was he who gave his daughters in marriage, whether

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1 This, however, would merely imply that the Sumerians were at this time when they came into contact with the Semitic Babylonians.

2 Synonym of *šarru* are *šarrus, ṣālī, šalitn*, those of *mūṣā* or *mūṣāt* being *mūṣāt*, and *mūṣā*. Other forms are *mūṣāru*, 'husband,' and *ḥarrat*, 'wife,' (*WA* II, 30, 39-40c). The *mūṣā* itself is called *mūṣišu* in the *čarrātu* of *Tammuz;* the wife of *ū-năšši* the Babylonian Noah, is called *nāššu*, 'woman,' and *mārtašu*, 'wife.' There was apparently a distinction between a divorce and a divine and earthly spouse.

3 This is naturally a remnant of the old days of wife-purchase. For details provided by selling the consented maidens by auction, see Herod. I. 190.
the husband could divorce the wife, upon paying her divorce-money. She retained her dowry.

Whether women were looked upon with more respect in earlier (Sumerian) times than in later is uncertain, but the ideogram for 'mother,' ama (also, probably, age), is written with the sign for 'divinity' within that used for 'house' or 'dwelling-place.' This has led to the suggestion that the Sumerians thought of her as the divinity within the house, and the more likely, however, that a mother was herself regarded as the dwelling-place of some divinity—probably one of the manifestations of Zerganiitu.\(^1\) who, as Aruru, created the seed of mankind with Merodach, and was possibly conceived as acting within her (see Birth [Assyr.-Bab.], vol. ii. p. 643).\(^2\)

The mother occupied a high place with regard to the children in the family. If she said to her son (or foster-son), 'Thou art not my son,' he had to forsake the house and the furniture; and if, on the other hand, he denied his (adoptive) mother, he was first marked by having his temple shaved, and then, having been led around the town, was expelled from the house.

Wives were at liberty (no doubt with the consent of their husbands) to carry on business, and also to appear as witnesses to contracts.

In the case of the last (i.e. eldest) son, if old enough, took his place, and administered his property. Otherwise the mother became head of the family, and administered the property for her son, as is shown (Cod. Hamm. §§ 29, 25). In the death of the father, his children divided the property according to the usual custom, and engaged not to bring actions at law against each other with regard to the sharing (Pinches, 178 ff.).

To parents a son was apparently willingly given by their children. In a letter from Elmesis\(^3\) to his father, of about the time of Hammurabi, he prays that Sama'a and Merodach may grant his father enduring days, that he may have health and life, and that his father's protecting god may preserve him. He hopes that his father will have lasting well-being. In the body of the letter, he seems to have regarded the direct pronouns 'thou' and 'thee' as too stiff, so he substitutes the words 'my father' wherever he can, sometimes along with the pronoun required.

The nature of later dates, given in the history of Bumunnû and her lawsuit with her dead husband's relatives. She had married Abil-Addu-nahaans, bringing with her a daughter. The latter had an elder pair of twin daughters. They traded with the money of her dowry, and borrowed a large sum of money, with groundсолving a sum of money to complete the purchase. In the 4th year of Nabonidus she made an arrangement with her husband, and he willied all the money to the eldest daughter and the dowry and the fact that they had always acted together. The next year they adopted a son, Abil-Addu-alakına, and made known that their daughter's dowry was two murrus of silver and the furniture of a house. After her husband's death, her brother-in-law laid claim to all her property, including a slave whom they had bought. The judges decided in her favour, and decreed that, according to their tables, Bumunnû and Abil-Addu-alakına, her adopted son, were the rightful heirs.\(^4\) The lender was to receive the money which he had advanced, Bumunnû was to have her dowry back, and her share of the property be increased.

The daughter was to receive the slave (Pinches, 469 ff., 469 ff.).

The private letters belonging to the period of the latter Babylonia show the same courteous spirit between members of the same family as of old.

Anything is the letter of a father to his apparently more successful son, in which he tells him that there is no grain in the house, and asks him to send some. He prays to Bel and Sin for the preservation of his son's life. The letter tells him that his mother greeds him (ib. 450). Affectionate letters between father and son are not often found, as well as others showing that brothers were not always on good terms. Among the last may be mentioned the letter of Maraduk-nir-biš to Sultu his brother, protesting against the later's capacity to sign documents (ib. 451). A noteworthy fact is that of Nabû-nir-biš to his four brothers, protesting against the plundering of their brother Bel-špānu (ib. 452). Of the few of the later dates, that of certain of these slaves may be quoted to show in what manner the enumerations in such cases were made:

1. Uha, Nabû-nir-biš, his brother, 1 suckling (ib. 'child of milk'), 2 women—total 5; Papil-ak-hina, his brother, 1 child (4 years), 2 women—total 5; Zastu, 1 child of 1, 2 women, 3 daughters—total 5; Harrāru, the Haranite, Aman-bēl-humur, a child of 6, 3 women—total 5? (A. Smith, Keilschriften aus Assur, Leipzig, 1887-89, pl. iii. p. 63.2 and (pl. 3)).

For the family of the slave Uha (Hubašu, see Johns, Assyrian Deeds and Documents, Cambridge, 1898-1909, iii. 41).

It is to be noted that the word 'wife' (āšābītu) is not used in these cases, but simply 'woman' (sinnititu), implying either that slaves were not regarded, at least sometimes, as regularly married, or that their wives were not held worthy of the more honourable term.

From life-long association and intercourse, slaves or vassals were probably only occasionally regarded as members of a man's family; and, when the women of that class were favoured with the attention of the master of the house, this quasi-membership became a reality. The children of a free man and a slave, however, were regarded as the natural children unless he acknowledged them during his lifetime (Cod. Hamm. §§ 170, 171). The best way to ensure their freedom and inheritance of his property was apparently by emancipating the mother.


T. G. PINCHES.

FAMILY (Biblical and Christian).—Here is a social group which, in its present form, is by no means an original and outright gift to the human race, but is the product of a vast world-process of social evolution, through which various types of domestic unity have been in turn selected and, as it were, tested, until at last the fittest has survived (Peabody, Jesus Christ and the Social Question, New York, 1901, p. 134).

1. IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.—There are not wanting indications that the Hebrews, like all the other Semites, passed through the stages of exogamy, totemism, and reckoning descent in the female line. But in the earliest historical times the patriarchate was a superseded and un questioned possession. The family is constituted under the headship of the father; the woman passes over to the clan and tribe of her husband; kinship, tribal connexion, and inheritance are all determined by the man. The Hebrew historians assume that throughout the expansion of the family all the wider groups are evolved, and the attempt to derive the tribes of Israel, and ultimately all the races of mankind, by male descent from a common ancestor. The Hebrews were always remarkable for the intensity of their family feeling; the strength of their nation lay in the depth, variety, and richness of the characters which were created in their homes; and their moral and spiritual progress is largely the evolution of their domestic life. In their Scriptures the imperfect relations of husband and wife, parent and child, brother and sister, master and servant, host and stranger, were displayed with a fine healthy reality; but, we may hold permissively, slowly but surely developed an ethical ideal which is the preparation for the perfect Christian type of the family.
1. The father.—The reverence paid to the head of the family was due not so much to his superior wisdom and strength as to his position as priest of the household. His unlimited authority rested on a spiritual basis. The family was a society bound together by a number of religious observances. Even those who were among the sons of the old covenant, and who were born into it, were used to various acts of reverence, as a matter of course, its social cult, in which the worship of ancestors seems to have been originally the distinctive feature. The two forms of sacrifice (Gen 33:19, 18:21, 1 Kings 1:51, etc.) are usually understood to have been images or symbols of ancestors. The family lying-place was holy ground, and many of the famous old sanctuaries probably owed their sacredness to their being regarded as the graves of heroes. Ancestor-worship was, of course, family worship. The father was the guardian of the traditional cult, which he passed on to his eldest son, thus securing the continued prosperity of the family. According to the earliest documents, the patriarchs erected altars and offered sacrifices (e.g. Gen 12:7, 13:3, 22:2 [Abram; Gen 26:25 [Isaac] 35:7 [Jacob]). The father presided at the passover, which was a family rite, observed in the name of Jacob (Ex 12). In the days of Saul, when the tribes had long been united in the worship of Jehovah, each family, or clan (mishpōthākh), still had its saica gentilica, and every member was beholden to the tribal observances (1 Sam 25:21-28). Any one who cut himself loose from the authority of the father debarred himself from the protection and favour of the ancestral aumena. As the strength of the family was thus rooted in spiritual causes, it became a matter of sacred duty to secure its continuance. The cult must be handed down from father to son, from generation to generation. Cibility was at once an impiety and a misfortune, for it involved the exclusion of the recipient from the society of worship. When a family became extinct, it was a cult that died.

2. Husband and wife.—The position of woman is the touchstone of civilized society. In ancient Israel the husband had a proprietary right over his wife. He was the owner or master (b'atāh), she the owned or mastered (b'ēdēhā). In the Deuteron law she is mentioned as part of his wealth, along with his house, slave, ox, and ass (Ex 21:10). To betroth a woman was simply to acquire possession of her by paying the māhar, or purchase-money. A 'betrothed' was a girl for whom the māhar had been paid, while the transaction was unnecessary, all the arrangements as to the marriage, and especially as to the purchase-price, being carried through by her father or guardian. So long as this commercial idea of marriage prevailed, certain blessings marred the beauty of family life. (a) Polygyny was common. If a husband regarded his wife simply as a valuable asset, his power of multiplying wives was limited merely by his purse. It was the ambition of most men of rank and wealth to possess a large harton. In addition, any of the female slaves of the family was at his disposal as a concubine. Sometimes the legal wife took the initiative in suggesting this arrangement, as in the cases of Sarah (Gen 16:2), Rachel (Gen 30), and Leah (Gen 30). Of course, the approximately equal number of the two sexes placed limits to polygyny. In the middle classes placed inferiorly in the social scale, the probability of the practice was slightly increased (1 Sam 1), it was probably the ordinary course to have two wives. (b) A rival (1:71) was the technical term for one of the two (1 Kings 14:2), and in the OT a wife with whom the rival was not beloved and the other hated. In the nature of things, a large proportion of the poorer classes must have been monogamous. (b) The woman being an asset, he had the right to divorce her at his pleasure (Dt 24:1). He could at any time send her back to her own kin, provided he was willing to return the māhar with her. No moral stigma of any kind attached to her from the mere fact that she had been divorced. (c) While the husband was allowed a wide sexual liberty, law and custom dealt very strictly with the wife. Adultery was not only punishable by stoning (Dt 22:21), and the same sentence might be passed on the wife who at her marriage was found not to have been a virgin (22:22). (d) Being herself a part of her husband's estate, the wife was treated as of inheriting property. Her right of ownership was confined to presents. She was the mistress of the servants whom she received as personal attendants on leaving her home. But even these were ultimately the property of her husband and his heir, since they could not revert to her own kindred. (e) The husband's authority over the wife easily degenerated into tyranny, and in the lower ranks of society her lot was, doubtless, often hard, since she had not only to fulfil the arduous menial tasks of the household, but might be required to engage in field labour or tend the flocks and herds.

Various causes, however, conspired to improve the position of women, and so to elevate family life. (1) Marriage was not always an affair of the market. Sometimes the heart obtained its rights. In some places, all ranks of society, even the kings (e.g. Solomon), legislated for intercourse between the sexes, and the spirit of romance was not to be quenched. In a simple pastoral society, men and maidens naturally met at wells, and love-matches were sometimes the result (Gn 29:25-29). The Song of Songs celebrates a rustic love that is strong as death; and in kings' courts, marriages were not always conventional (1 Sam 18:18). (2) The māhar tended to lose its original meaning of purchase-money, and thus the position of the wife devolved on the husband's sister. Laban's daughters complained that he had sold them as slaves and wasted their māhar (Gen 31:25). (3) While an injured wife could not divorce her husband, she was not without redress. She always had claims on the protection and aid of her blood-relations, who were ready to defend her if she had any just cause of complaint. The women of the family were its most sacred trust, and any insult offered to them was sure to be avenged. The aim of legislation was also to restrict the man's freedom of divorce. By requiring him to give his wife a bill of divorce, it enabled her to resist and delay the transaction, and so the right of divorce was in principle taken from him, and in some cases was limited or altogether abrogated (Dt 24). If a man falsely charged his wife with unchastity before marriage (22:21-24), or if he had seduced her and been consequently obliged to marry her (vv. 25-27), he was deprived of the right of divorce. (4) The typical 'mother in Israel' was far from being the morally and intellectually stunted creature who is often met with in Eastern lands. If she was a person of rank, she was too powerful and independent to be treated as a mere chattel. If she was a woman of character and ability (Pr 31:2), she knew how to increase her husband's affection and to improve her own condition. Once again in the interest of Hebrew history centre in the action of some brave and noble woman. (5) The whole prophetic movement was towards monogamy. Gn 20:24 makes woman the helpmeet of man, and the love of one man for one woman the normal relation of the sexes. As the prophets regard marriage as the symbol of Jehovah's covenant with Israel, and adultery as that of idolatry, they think of monogamy as the ideal. Hosea was one wife to his one wife, and when he tells the story of a love which does not lose its lustre and rekindles a prodigal wife, but cherishes and seeks to redeem her. Malachi (2:10-16) proclaims the Divine detestation of divorce. The Hebrew Wisdom makes marriage problems in the family life of the nation, and there is
abundant evidence that Israel ultimately began to realize the folly and sinfulness of sexual licence on man's part as well as on woman's. Yet the law of monogamy was never placed on the Jewish statute-book; and Justin Martyr (Dial. c. Tryph. 134) states that, even in his time, the Talmudists allowed every common man to have four or five wives, while kings might still have as many as eighteen. But by that time humanity had heard the voice of the final Lawgiver. See, further, MARRIAGE AND WIFE.

3. Parents and children.—(a) To have a numerous progeny was the universal desire in ancient Israel. Children were a heritage of Jehovah, and happy was the man who had his quiver full of them (Pr 12:7). The honour paid to the wife was dependent on her having a son. If she was childless, she endured a reproach; for barrenness was regarded not only as a misfortune, but as a Divine judgment. 'Give me children, or else I die,' was Rachel's heart-cry (Gen 30:1; cf. 1 S 11). The husband who had no son dreaded the extinction of his house. His fear was probably rooted in ancestor-worship: and children would have been the only one to pay the needful dues to his manes. Therefore, if his first wife had no son, he was his sacred duty to take a second or concubine; and, if, after her, another child was born, it would be an heir of piety on his brother's part to marry his widow and raise up children in his stead (Dt 21:5).—(b) The first desire of parents was for sons, the defenders of the hearth and the main support of the home. It was the first-born son who was dedicated to Jehovah (Ex 22:27). But daughters were also welcome, and that not merely because they were required for the labour of the household, or because a mother could be assured of an heir and a successor to her throne. The sons were desired and their chastity honoured alike in kings' courts and shepherds' tents (Ps 45, Canticles, passim). There was none of that contempt for girls which has always marked many Eastern races. Female infanticide, which was practised among the Arabs, was apparently unknown among the Hebrews. —(c) The patria potestas was, however, almost absolute. Abraham's readiness to sacrifice Isaac (Gen 22), Jethro's sacrifice of his daughter (Jg 11:31-32), and the practice of offering children to molech (2 K 23:10, Jer 32:35) rest upon this authority. The father had power to cast out a bond-woman with her child or a concubine if she bore him no son (Ex 21:11), and he could sell his daughter into bond-service (with concubinage), though not to foreigners (Ex 21:11). He could not, on any account, sell her into prostitution (Lv 19:29). He might cast away a prodigal son to be stoned to death (Dt 21:15-16), or a prodigal daughter to be burned alive (Gen 38:34). Children were required to render the utmost respect and obedience to both their parents (Ex 20:12, Lv 19). Any one cursing his father or his mother was put to death (Lv 20:9).—(d) The early education of the children was mostly in the hands of the mother. The sayings of Lemuil were taught him by his mother (Pr 31). Proverbs contains many references to the instruction (ma‘asir) of the father and the teaching (torah) of the mother. Schools are never mentioned in the OT. —(e) The solidarity of the Hebrew family was so complete that grave injustice was often done to the children. The sin of Achan was expiated by the destruction of his whole household (Jos 7:21-22). It was the task of the prophets to preach the doctrine of individual responsibility. The self-sacrifice of the son 'from the soul of the father' (Ezk 18:13).—(f) The stress which the OT lays upon the family is indicated by its closing words, which contain a promise to turn the heart of the fathers to the children, and the heart of the children to their fathers. A strong and pure domestic life is to save the earth from a curse (Mal 4:4). See, further, ARTS. CHILDREN AND EDUCATION.

4. Brothers and sisters.—(a) Polygyny divided a man's family into sub-families, each presided over by a mother, whose personal jealousies were apt to be shared by the children. Talmudists regarded the full brother as the natural guardian of his sister. Laban takes precedence of Bethuel in the arrangements for Rebekah's betrothal (Gen 24:2). The sub-families were so distinct that in early times brothers were permitted to marry their half-sisters (1 Co 7:12). Tamar, Absalom's daughter, thinks that David will certainly allow her to marry her half-brother Amnon (2 S 13). Ultimately, however, such unions were forbidden by law (Lv 18:21).—(b) There was no difference of legitimacy, in the Greco-Roman sense, between the sons of wives and those of concubines. Even Jephthah, though a prostitute's son, is brought up in his father's house, and rightly complains of his expulsion as an act of violence (Jg 11:7). The claim not unnaturally made by the wife, that the son of the bond-woman should not share the inheritance with her son (Gen 21:10), was never sustained by law. The children of Israel were descended from the sons of Jacob's concubines. A man's acknowledged children were all legitimate, irrespective of the status of their mother. The bastard (mamzer) was excluded from the Jewish community, but the offspring of an incestuous union (Dt 23:1).—(c) The domestic word 'brother' had a wider application to the clan, the tribe, and the nation. Israel and Judah (2 S 19), Israel and Ishmael (Gen 16:12-13, 25), Israel and Edom (Nu 20), were brethren. But those who were not kin were not always kind. The Prophets have to ethicize the ideal of 'a covenant of brethren' (Am 1), the Psalmists to denounce the pitying of their beauty which was desired and their chastity honoured alike in kings' courts and shepherds' tents (Pr 45, Canticles, passim).

5. Master and servant.—The Hebrew slave was a true member of the family. He was part of his master's wealth, but he was not regarded as an inferior being. He was circumcised, and kept the passover. He was admitted to the family cult. He prayed to the God of his master (Gen 24:32). In the Deuteronomistic law his humane treatment is rooted in his master's remembrance that the Hebrews themselves were once slaves in Egypt (Dt 15:11-12 etc.). It was a still higher consideration that the same master who could sell his daughter into bond-service (with concubinage), though not to foreigners (Ex 21:11), could not, on any account, sell her into prostitution (Lv 19:29). He might cast away a prodigal son to be stoned to death (Dt 21:15-16), or a prodigal daughter to be burned alive (Gen 38:34). Children were required to render the utmost respect and obedience to both their parents (Ex 20:12, Lv 19). Any one cursing his father or his mother was put to death (Lv 20:9).—(d) The early education of the children was mostly in the hands of the mother. The sayings of Lemuel were taught him by his mother (Pr 31). Proverbs contains many references to the instruction (ma‘asir) of the father and the teaching (torah) of the mother. Schools are never mentioned in the OT. —(e) The solidarity of the Hebrew family was so complete that grave injustice was often done to the children. The sin of Achan was expiated by the destruction of his whole household (Jos 7:21-22). It was the task of the prophets to preach the doctrine of individual responsibility. The self-sacrifice of the son 'from the soul of the father' (Ezk 18:13).—(f) The stress which the OT lays upon the family is indicated by its closing words, which contain a promise to turn the heart of the fathers to the children, and the heart of the children to their fathers. A strong and pure domestic life is to save the earth from a curse (Mal 4:4). See, further, ARTS. CHILDREN AND EDUCATION.

6. Host and guest.—The Hebrew family was scarcely complete without the 'stranger' or guest (ger, p’son~), who, segregated for some reason from his own kindred, put himself under Israeli protection, and then was included in the sacred bloodbond. As Jehovah was 'the protector of strangers' (Ps 146; cf. Zens Xemnos), hospitality rested on religious sanctions. There are many exhortations to deal justly and generously with the ger (Ex 22:21 etc.), who worshipped the God of the land in which he sojourned, shared the privilege of the sabbath, and was perhaps admitted to the show of his patron. This family tie between host and guest was also to be perfected in Christianity.

'The Christians looked upon themselves as a body of men scattered throughout the world, living as aliens amongst strange people, and regarded the kinsfolk of one another as the members of a body, as the brethren of one family. The practical realization of this idea was the demand that wherever a Christian moved from one place to another he should find a home among the Christians in each town he visited' (Sandy-Headlam, Roman, Edinburgh, 1902).

II. THE CHRISTIAN FAMILY.—Jesus had personal experience of the privilege and obligation of

FAMILY (Biblical and Christian)
home life. He spent many quiet years in the Holy Family at Nazareth, which was to His a shrine of moral culture, a temple of Divine communion. His whole thinking was influenced and inspired by the experience. He came to regard the sacred relation of the family as the upwards and devout will of God and man. He had an intuition of the essential oneness of these relations. He saw that of all the immense forms of love none is so beautiful, so pure, as the love of husband and wife, parent and child, brother and sister. He grasped this force as the key of all future moral and spiritual progress. By consecrating marriage, by emancipating womanhood, by sanctifying childhood, by expanding brotherhood, and making the domestic group the type of the Divine social order which is to be, He created what may distinctively be called the Christian family.

1. The consecration of marriage.—Both in the lower and in the higher aspect, the union of two personalities is the beginning of family life. Jesus recognizes its physical aspect (Mk 10), which He never regards as an impurity, a fording of one flesh (10:8). It is scarcely possible to overestimate the importance of the change which He effected by His law of marriage. On many of the burning questions of His age He positively contended for Himself, but in regard to the institution of the family He repeatedly expressed His mind with the utmost emphasis. To the last of the time He opposed an austere purity, which startled even His own disciples, and probably seemed to the ordinary intelligence fanatical. It is true that, in spite of the technical lawfulness of polygamy, the Jews had become to a great extent monogamists. But divorce was scandalously common, and the discussions on the subject had fallen to an extremely low level. Between the two great Rabbinical schools of the period there was a standing dispute (based on Dt24), not whether divorce was permissible, but for what reasons. The school of Shammai wished to restrict them to acts of unchastity, but the school of Hillel inferred that a divorce was warranted when a woman burned her husband's food in cooking, while Rabbi Akiba thought that a man might lawfully dismiss his wife if he found another more attractive (Mishna, Gittin, ix. 10). In opposition to these licentious trifling, Jesus categorically denies the righteousness of divorce (Mt 19, Mk 10, Lk 16:18). In His teaching He does not uphold the law, which can merely recognize and protect it, but an institution based on a Divine creative act. Its true significance is to be sought, not in human customs, but in the law and teaching of Christ, who, indeed, allowed divorce (Mk 10), but only as an expedient, as the lesser of two evils, regulating what He could not prevent, reducing anarchy to law, while by a legislative compromise He violated human nature. From temporary ethics Jesus passes to absolute morality. He sees that marriage in its true nature is not a legal status, a social contract, a licensed partnership for mutual help and support, but a real union of consubstantial, unchangeable, loving one flesh (10:6). In His view the question is not, May a man divorce his wife? but, Can he? and the emphatic answer is, He cannot. The sacred bond is essentially indissoluble. It is not to be violated even by a look or a thought (Mt 5:32), and, except as a formal recognition of an already broken union, divorce is impossible. Jesus discerned the Divine ideal of the institution, and made that the law of His Church. He directed His legislation to the perfecting of the home in the interest of the Kingdom. It was not so much that He changed the family (which till then had only a civil importance, no spiritual significance), as He brought to the essential nature of both the man and the woman. It was, therefore, not in the spirit of a purist or a fanatic that Jesus thus put a final seal upon divorce, but in that of the ethical and social philosopher (Shaler Mathews, The Social Teaching of Jesus, New York, 1910, p. 90).

2. The elevation of womanhood.—Jesus' lofty conception of the family involves the emancipation of woman. Astonishingly free from Eastern prejudices, He ascribes the idea of equality to the standing of women rights in his wife, and liberates her spirit from the last trace of servility and abjection. He never commands her to be in subjection to her husband (contrast Eph 5), and never traces the concession of mankind to the womanhood (1 Ti 2). He simply teaches woman as an equal—equal in the matter of marriage and divorce, equal as a companion (Shaler Mathews, op. cit. 97). St. Paul's teaching on this head is not quite self-consistent, but he clearly has the mind of Christ when he enumerates the principles that in Him there can be no male and female (Gal 3:28); and Augustine, while he gives celibacy and virginity the exaggerated importance of a more perfect virtue, teaches that the natures of man and woman are equally honourable, and that the Saviour gives abundant proof of this in His being born of a woman (Sermo 190, § 2). In a recent work the Fathers teach that the wife must equally honour the sanctity of the home. Errors which are condemned in the one cannot be condoned in the other.

In consequence of Christian respect for reinstated woman, it is no longer she alone who is thought capable of committing adultery. The doctors of the Church vigorously attacked the pagan pride which held that the husband alone could be free. Henceforth the unfaithful husband was held to be as guilty as the wife who violated her duty (Schmidt, op. cit. 200).

3. The dignity of childhood.—The family exists especially for the child. Jesus was Himself the Holy Child, reared in the shelter of an earthly home, meeting parental authority with filial submission, growing in favour with God and man. His profoundest teaching was coloured by thoughts of family life, and He has left words which have for ever hallowed childhood. He made the spirit of a little child the type of Christian character (Mk 9:3), and gave children a share in His kingdom (10:14). He used to describe in details for the conduct of parents and children. In general it was His part not to legislate but to inspire. He entrusted to others the task of inculcating His principles in the midst of imperfect human conditions. Under the influence of His spirit paternal authority ceases to be an arbitrary tyranny, and the scrivile dependence of children is replaced by the truer and gentler dependence of love and gratitude (cf. Eph 6, Col 3:20). Christianity vitalizes the fine Roman saying, 'Maxima debeta puero reverentia' (Juv. xiv. 47), and gives it the sanction of a far higher faith.

4. The expansion of brotherhood.—In the original condition of mankind, blood was the single tie which bound men together, the family was the sole basis of rights and duties. Everyone who was not a brother was counted an enemy. Only the life and property of a kinman were safe. We have seen how the idea of brotherhood was gradually extended to the tribe and the nation. It was reserved for Jesus to place all men in the relation of brethren to each other. In Han's St. Paul exhorts Philemon to receive Onesimus 'no longer as a servant, but as a brother beloved' (Philem 10). The thought of 'the brother . . . for whom Christ died' (1 Co 8) has been the inspiration of the noblest society of the human race. The Saviour's hope for the world is to be fulfilled through the expansion of those affections which...
are naturally born and nurtured in the sanctuary of the home. The family is His microcosmic kingdom. He makes the first social unit also the last. His entire theology may be described as a transfiguration of the family' (Peabody, op. cit. 147).

'Domestic selfishness is as disastrous as any other form of selfishness. Just because the devotion of kindred is so intense, it is apt to be exclusive. When Jesus entered on the work of His vocation, and, again, when He began to call men to be disciples, He came into collision with the claims of the family.

Then and only then did He seem to deprecate it. He 'that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me' (Mt 10:37). Whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother' (Mk 3:35). The family exists for the sake of ends beyond itself; it is the preparation and equipment of personalities for the service of God and man. It is the very tragedy of Jesus' life that He was not understood by His own brethren, and that He had to assert, in unequivocal language, His independence of the interests and obligations of His former home. The pain of separation from His kindred, and especially from His mother, was proportionate to the tenderness of His love. By example as well as by precept He taught the rule of duties into conflict with the claims of affection, the former must prevail. It was not that He loved the family less, but that He loved the Kingdom more. As Bengali notes on Mt 12:5, non spernit matrem, sed apontit Patrem.'

6. The ultimate social aggregate. — Though the best institutions may easily become the most mischievous when they are perverted and mismanaged, that does not affect their intrinsic value. The character of the teaching of Jesus on the family has never been so adequately appreciated as to-day, when science and politics are concentrating the attention of the educated world on the crucial problems of the domestic group. Many anti-Christian attacks are being directed against the domestic group, but 'it is clear that monogamy has long been growing innate in civilized man, and this relationship is manifestly the ultimate form' (Spencer, Principles of Sociology, London, 1876-96, i. 673, 753). The Christian family is the germ of the yet higher civilization of the future. It enforces in itself the promise and potency of all social progress and pure human happiness.

'It is the mature opinion of every one who has thought upon the history of the world, that the thing of highest importance for all times and to all nations is Family Life. ... Not for centuries but for millennia the Family has survived. Time has set its stamp upon it; it has imprinted upon it; nor discerns discovered anything more lovely; nor religion anything more edifying. (H. Drummond, The Assent of Man, London, 1904, pp. 378, 407.)

FAMILY (Buddhist).—In the 6th cent. B.C., when Buddhism arose in the valley of the Ganges, the family had already been long constituted, and its every detail settled, in accordance with the tribal customs of the Aryan, Dravidian, Kolarian, and other inhabitants. Spiritual in the beginning, when the precepts put into the mouth of the Buddha in our earliest documents, was any attempt made to interfere in any way with those customs; nor afterwards, of course. The bond of moral teaching, so do we find any decree of a Buddhist Council, or any ordinance of a Buddhist king, prescribing a change there in family relations. When Buddhism was subsequently introduced and more or less widely or completely adopted in other countries, the Buddhists evinced no desire, and probably had no power, to reconstitute the family according to any views of their own on the subject. It is possible, therefore, to speak of the family as Bud-

This is here addressed to the bhikkhus. Afterwards the same story was included in the popular collection of Jatakas (Faussbill, Lond. 1877-97, l. 217-220); and it was well known to the Chinese pilgrim, Yiian Chwang (Watters, On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India, do. 1905, l. 54). A similar sentiment is found in the Nandasutta, the Dhammapada (verse 109, a celebrated verse found also in other Buddhist anthologies, and repeated, in almost identical words, by later Sanskritic authors).

In the Sigaevada Suttanta the Buddha sees a young man worshipping the six quarters, North, South, East, West, the nadir, and the zenith, and shows him a more excellent way of guarding the six quarters by right conduct towards parents and wife and children, and teachers and friends and dependents.

'In five ways the son should minister to his mother and father, who are the head quarters; in five ways show their affection to their son. They restrain him from evil, and train him to follow that which is seemly, they have taught him a craft, they have educated him in letters, in a season they give him his portion of the inheritance....

In five ways they command the elder brother, who is the West quarter. He should treat her with reverence; not belittle her; never be false to her; acknowledge her authority; and provide her with a wheel and a seat in the house. The wife should in five ways show her affection for her husband.

1 Vinaya, II. 161, tr. in Vinaya Texts, iii. 104 (BBE xx.).
2 Manus, ii. 121; Makkhāṭāra, v. 1521.
FAMILY (Celtic)

She should manage her household well; carry out all due courtesies to relatives on both sides; never be false to him; take care of his property; and be able and active in all she has to do.

Passages of similar tendency are found in other parts of the Nitiyâs addressed to beginners or householders. The principles set forth in them may certainly be said to be Buddhist, since they have been adopted in the Dhamma. But it is probable that they are a selection from the views as to family and sexual relations already current among the Aryan clans to which the Buddha himself and most of his disciples belonged. What is Buddhist about it is the selection. For instance, we know from the later law-books that the pre-Buddhist Aryans performed, at a marriage, magical and religious ceremonies which bore a striking resemblance in important details to ceremonies enacted at a similar date by other Aryan races in Europe. Other religious ceremonies were performed at the name-giving, the inauguration, and the marriage of the children of the family. All these are, of course, ignored and omitted in the exhortation. Buddhist could not countenance practices which they held to be contrary to religion. And they put nothing in their place. There are no Buddhist ceremonies of marriage, initiation, baptism, or the like. Marriage is regarded as a purely civil rite, and the Buddhist clergy, as such, take no part in it. This is probably the reason why Asoka, in his edicts on religion, does not mention it. He considers marriage, and the observance of family customs, a civil affair.1

In pre-Buddhist times, divorce, but without any formal decree, was allowed. So Isidâs, for instance, explains how she had had to return twice to her father's house, having been sent back by successive husbands owing to incompatibility of temper (the result of her evil deeds in a former birth).2 No instance is recorded of similar action taken against the husband. In countries under the influence of the Thera-vâda (the older Buddhism) there is divorce on equal terms for husband or wife on the ground of inidelity, desertion, or incompatibility of temper. This is, however, infrequent. Fielding estimates it, for village communities in Burma, at two to five per cent of the marriages; and the present writer, while not able to estimate any percentage, for which there are no statistics available, is able to testify to the very low number of divorces in Ceylon.

The marriage, retains her own name, and the full control of all her property, whether it be dowar or inheritance. Property acquired by the partnership (of husband and wife) is joint property. There is no niririm system; marriage is monogamous (that is, among the people; kings often follow the Hindustani custom); women go about, engaged in business, can sign deeds, give evidence, join in social intercourse, and have just such liberty and importance as their menfolk think expedient. Fielding, who has given the facts for Burma in considerable detail (chs. 13-17), does not discuss the question how far this state of things is due to the influence of Buddhism and how far to the inherited customs and good sense of the people. But, when we call to mind that the same or closely related races have, under other influences, much less advanced customs, and that in early Buddhism a remarkably high position was allotted to women, it is shaming for a boy to be present before the face of his father in public, until he was of age to bear arms. He also tells us (v. 14. 4) that in

we may conjecture that the influence of early Buddhist teaching was not without weight.

LITERATURE.—The authorities are given in the article.

FAMILY (Celtic).—1. The evolution of the Celtic family is wrapped in considerable obscurity, and it is by no means easy, from the evidence that has come down to us, from both Christian and pre-Christian sources, to conjecture what changes it had passed before the dawn of history. In the case of Celtic countries, too, it has always been remembered that the Celtic-speaking inhabitants were comparatively late-comers, and that the previous inhabitants had for ages their own social institutions, which may or may not have undergone a similar evolution to those of the invaders of Indo-European speech. Nor can it be supposed that the institutions of the invaders would necessarily supplant those of the earlier inhabitants, especially in the remote districts, where the indigenous population would be most likely to hold its own. But while, therefore, some cases, the institution which survived was neither that of the invaders nor that of the previous inhabitants in its entirety, but a working compromise consisting of elements from both sources, the development is almost by no means easy to follow. It may well be, for example, that the curious system of fosterage, which played so large a part in Celtic family life (see art no CHILDREN [Celtic] and FOSTERAGE), was long after, its origin to some such fusion of Celtic and pre-Celtic institutions, but it is now, at this distance of time, a fruitless task to speculate upon the matter. Further, it must be borne in mind that, in the documents which describe the social life of the Celts, our information relates almost entirely to the higher circles of the population—that is, to the free members of tribes (doubtless in the main sprung from men of Indo-European speech) who at the earliest did not reach the British Isles before about 1800 B.C. and the West of Europe some centuries before. What the institutions of the "unfree" tenants of Celtic countries may have been, involved in great uncertainty, and their social organization may well have developed on lines distinctively different from those that were characteristic of the Indo-European conquerors of Gaul and the British Isles, through the influence of the kinship of these conquerors in other countries of cognate speech.

2. A study of the various treatises which embody the ancient law of Ireland, together with the documents which describe the social and religious organization of the Scottish Highlands, make it abundantly clear that the family basis was patriarchal, and, at any rate in Christian times, essentially monogamous. In Gaul, too, as Cesar (de Bell. Gall. vi. 15) tells us, the family structure was of the same type, and the family groups had attached to them groups of ambacti ('clients')—a word of Celtic origin, which is the exact phonetic equivalent of the Welsh amact ('farmer'). Nor is this development of Celtic institutions to be wondered at, because the type of family in question is the natural correlative of the kind of military and semi-nomadic life which ultimately brought the Celts into a dominant position (until Rome conquered them) in Celtic lands. At the same time, there are indications that there were, at any rate in some of the Welsh lands, certain unusual features of family life, which impressed some of the observers of the ancient world. For example, Cesar (vi. 18) acquaints us with the curious fact that, in Gaul, it was considered to be a shameful thing for a boy to be present before the face of his father in public, until he was of age to bear arms. He also tells us (v. 14. 4) that in

1 Tr. from Dhâra, i. 189 ff.; also tr. by S. Gogerly, Ceylon Buddhists (ed. Bishop, Colombo, 1905), p. 382 ff., and by R. C. Childers, Ch. 187.

2 There is a conference to doctilly towards parents in the 3rd Rock Edict. See T. W. Rhys Davids, Buddhist India, London, 1899, p. 160.

Britain ten or a dozen men had wives common to the group, and that in this matter brothers mostly joined with brothers. Strabo (iv. 5. 4), following Posidonius, speaks of a rumour that the Irish had no definite system of matrimony, but he could not verify for the truth of it with Din Cestín (lxxvi. 12. 2) says that the Caledonii had wives in common (τας γυναίκας τεκνοὶς χρίσοντο).) and, in his description of Thule (derived from Pytheas), Strabo, Polybius, ch. (Polybius), ed. (Polybius) of the king-system, which island had no wife of his own. These statements regarding the inhabitants of Britain appear to have gained a wide currency in antiquity, and we find Bardesanes in Eusebius (Præpar. Evang. vi. 10) repeating the story that several persons jointly had one wife in Britain; while Jerome (adv. Jovin. ii. 7, p. 333) says of the Scotti:

Sæctorum natio uxorum propria non habet: et quod Platonis politiam legerit et Catonis sectaer quam exemplum, voluit apud eum coniunxi propria est, sed, ut cuique libitum fuerit, pecunia more lasciviunt (see, further, above, pp. 456 f., 460 f., 462 f. 463).

It has been thought that the absence in Welsh of any word for 'son' as distinguished from 'boy' (nadd), or for 'daughter' as distinguished from 'girl' (merch), points to an analogous situation in remote times in that country; but this absence of separate terms may easily be one of the accidents of an early period. 

The system, whereby the Pictish crown descended from the reigning king to his sister's son, has been thought to have had its roots in a remote matriarchal system; but the criticism of this view by d'Arbois de Jubainville, in La Famille celtique (p. 88) makes it hazardous to accept it. Nor would it be safe to attach undue importance to certain cases of illegitimacy, such as Conchobar mac Nessó (Conchobar, son of Ness) and Cwydion fab Don (Gwydion, son of Don), where the hero is called after his mother's name. The prominence given also to the grouped goddesses called 'Mátras' and 'Matronae' (on whom see EEE iii. 290) in certain regions cannot, in view of the scantiness of the general evidence, be regarded as of any significance in this connexion.

3. Still, notwithstanding the rumour of antiquity, which it would be rash to say were entirely devoid of foundation, at any rate in the more backward districts,—the evidence of Cæsar as to Gaul, and the abundant testimony of the Irish and Welsh laws shows that there is in the matter, in the whole of the countries where the male head of each social group is in unmistakable prominence. Of the patria potestas enjoyed by the husbands in Gaul, Cæsar says (iv. 18): 'Vir in uxore, sicuti in liberos, vitae necisque habent potestatem,' and both the Irish and the Welsh laws show us that women could not be members of the recognized tribes. The organization of the Celts was everywhere based on the tie of blood; in Gaul the tribe, in Ireland the clan under its chief, and in Wales the ceneddi (kindreds) under its penceneddi ('head of the kindred'), were all governed by the idea of a common ancestry. The family proper was the smallest subdivision of the social organization, and was founded on the principle of monogamic marriage. The organization of the family had at one time a very important practical significance, since it was closely connected with the tenure of land and the occupation of the dwelling-houses built upon the land—in other words, with succession, and also with responsibility for the land. This may often have been so strongly connected with the tenure of land and the occupation of the dwelling-houses built upon the land—in other words, with succession, and also with responsibility for the land. This may often have been so strongly connected

4. The Irish legal documents, such as the Senchas Mór, with its commentary, the Book of Aídal, and other treatises, unfortunately do not present us with a very clear account of the structure of the Irish family, and the descriptions therein contained have given rise to much discussion; see d'Arbois de Jubainville, op. cit.; also the 'Introduction to the Book of Aídal,' in Ancient Laws of Ireland, vol. iii. p. exxxix, and especially the Introduction (by Alexander George Richey) to the Brehon Law Tracts, 6th. ed. vol. iv. p. xlix. The latter introduction, which cannot be said to have been written most thoroughly, may be supplemented with advantage by a study of R. Atkinson's Glossary to the Ancient Laws of Ireland (vol. vi. in the Rolls Series). Both the Introduction in question and the Glossary show how little can be gleaned with certainty from the Irish laws as to the precise significance of their fourfold classification of the Irish family into the gelfine, the dorhine, the tarféine, and the tarfree. Of these family-groups it is evident, from the account given by Atkinson in his Glossary, that the gelfine was the most living and vigorous form of the family in the times to which the Irish Law Treatises belonged, though this form may, even then, owing to the settlement of a large part of the land of Ireland, have lost something of its earlier raison d'être in the occupation of new territory. According to Atkinson, it can be stated that the following class of family can be distinguished by his three varieties: (1) the gelfine tar melbicic ('frontwards'), and (2) the gelfine tar culath ('backwards'), the former denoting five men of the direct line—father, son, grandson, great-grandson, and great-great-grandson; the latter denoting the similar descendants in the direct line from the father's brother. Of these two varieties it would appear that the former was the more important, and the gelfine, and Richey in his Introduction has ingeniously suggested that it began with the occupation of new lands, when the father would hold the original dwelling, and, if he had five sons, four of them would during their father's lifetime occupy each a homestead on the land, while the fifth son would in time succeed to his father's homestead. The view held by Whitley Stokes and d'Arbois de Jubainville, that goî in gelfine means 'a hand,' and that it is cognate with the Greek χιός, is improbable; and, consequently, there appears no warrant for the view that the gelfine was essentially a 'familia in man.' Of the other names for family-divisions in community ('tribes'), Richey suggests that it may have denoted what was for a time a rival classification with some of the other divisions, and the present writer is inclined to hazard the opinion that these terms, which have given rise to so much ingenious discussion, are in reality surviving traces of different family arrangements, which prevailed at different periods, and that the Irish, instead of discarding the old classifications completely when the gelfine came into favour, allowed them to remain as names, and regarded them as being forms of family arrangements which were in reserve in case of need. The process of evolution has doubtless occurred here, and has left some of its traces, as in the case of other social institutions.

5. The Scots who carried with them the Gaelic tongue into Scotland brought also their own organization, but, as Skene (Celtic Scotland, iii. 320) points out, the original clan-organization of the Gaelic-speaking invaders from Ireland appears to have been of a very strong character, and it came to appear as a distinct and prominent feature in the organization of the Gaelic population. The basis of the clan-system was, however, essentially the same as in Ireland; and, just as there were in Ireland certain settlements that there were, side by side with the clans of kinsmen corresponding to the Irish 'free' tenants, other
FAMILY

In Wales, the family organization within the tradition of fostering ( pageable), namely, that corresponding in the main to the gelfine of Ireland. It consisted of the ancestor, his sons, his grandsons, and great-grandsons. So far as the occupation of land was concerned, the corresponding territorial division was the geudy, upon which a body of members of the same family were settled, occupying the supplementary tydlynod ('homesteads') which were built upon the land to accommodate the sons as they married. This family organization among the Welsh was responsible for the payment of the gaelnas ('blood fee') in the case of the commission of homicide by a member of the family (see Crimes and Punishments [Celtic]). It will thus be seen that in Wales, as in Ireland, it was the practical questions of land-tenure and responsibility for the actions of kinmen that made the family as such so important a factor in social life, with the result that pedigrees were kept with remarkable care. With the introduction, however, of the English manorial system and English law, the pressure of practical considerations, which stand in the way of less urgent; but, nevertheless, the sense of kinship, even to the recognition of distant relatives, has remained far stronger in Wales than in corresponding circles in England at the present day; and this recognition of kinship shows itself in a marked way in the sense of obligation which most Welshmen feel to attend the funerals even of distant kinsmen—a feature of Welsh life which generally appears strange to Englishmen who come to reside in Wales.

7. The various terms which express family relationship, in spite of their common Indo-European origin, are somewhat different in the two great branches (the Goidelic and the Brythonic) of the Celtic tongue. For example, the term for 'father' in Irish is atbair, the phonetic equivalent (with the regular loss of Indo-European 'p') of the Latin pater, while, in the Brythonic group, the corresponding Indo-European term of endearment, tata, has entirely supplanted the more formal Celtic term for 'father,' giving the Welsh and Breton form for the term, tada, while in Welsh, Breton, and Cornish, the place of poed (the equivalent of Lat. mater, Irish maithair) has been taken by the analogous term of endearment maen from maime. Likewise in Brythonic (cf. Welsh taill, 'grandfather,' rain, 'grandmother') we have survivals of Indo-European terms of endearment. In Ireland, too, the terms for 'father'—uaidh and 'foster-father'—uaidh and 'foster-mother'—muain are, in origin, both survivals of terms of endearment.

The Irish word mac, like the Welsh nab, can mean both 'boy' and 'son'; and the Irish term ingen ('daughter')—a word meaning literally 'one born into the family' (for uis-gena)—has the same dual meaning as the Latin virgo. In the Celtic speech, too, the words which originally meant 'grandson' and 'granddaughter' have come to mean 'nephew' and 'niece.'

8. In modern Welsh the term in regular use for 'family' is teulu, but the reader should be on his guard against assuming that in Welsh medieval documents this word had the same meaning as it now has. It is true that, in the general use of the word (from try, 'house,' and llw, 'host'), was the retinue or bodyguard of the head of the household; and, in the case of the king, this retinue had a special head, the pen teulu, and a special bard, bard teulu, who sang of the deeds of their lords. The social meaning of the word now survives only in a South Welsh term for a 'phantom funeral procession' (pronounced tolw-i teulu).

9. The treatment of children among the Celts, as well as the interesting practice of fostering, is discussed in the artt. Children (Celtic) and Fosterage, the place of the foster-mother and the foster-father in the family, together with the conditions of marriage (including the question of marriage gifts) will be considered in connexion with the subject of Marriage (Celtic).


FAMILY (Chinese).—Introductory. The analysis of a Chinese character is not always a reliable guide to its primitive meaning. The usual form of the character for 'family,' i.e. those under the roof of one paterfamilias, is a pig under a roof; and the Shuo Wen (c. A.D. 100) says that, as that, originally meaning a pig-sty, it was afterwards metaphorically used for a human home. It is just as likely, however, that originally the part of the character which stands for pig was of less value; and in any case the Liu Shu Ku (between A.D. 1250 and 1319) sets aside this derivation, and analyzes another form of the character into three persons under one roof, and day.

The institution of the family is ascribed to Fuh-si (2832-2736 B.C.). Before this time the people were like beasts, knowing their mothers but not their fathers, and pairing without decency. Fuh-si established the laws of marriage, organized clans, and introduced family surnames.

Society in China is predominantly patriarchal. The family is the social unit and the norm of social organization (Williams, Middle Kingdom, New York, 1876, i. 296). A mandarin is the parent of his children people. 'The Empire is one family.' 'To the Son of Heaven there is no stranger; he regards the empire as his family.' In accordance with this idea, he sets up, the duty of a child, and the duty of a younger brother, are the fundamental social virtues. 'Esteem most highly filial piety and brotherly submission, in order to give due prominence to the social relations' (Suser, Secul. Edict [A.D. 1670], 1). A typical Chinese family might consist of father, mother, sons, daughters-in-law, and grandchildren.

To have four generations alive in one household is marked felicity; if five are alive at the same time, many are the congratulations, and special announcement of the fact is made in the temple of the City-Guardian.

1. Husband and wife. Marriages are arranged by the parents of the bridegroom and bride through the agency of a 'go-between.' 'In taking a wife, how do you proceed? Without a go-between, it cannot be done' (Shi-King, xv, 6). Betrothal is considered binding, and often takes place at a very early age. In some cases the future daughter-in-law is brought as an infant into her future husband's family, and grows up as a member of it. The custom, however, is not of high repute, and is particularly objectionable where, as in at least one district, the future husband and wife cohabit from their earliest years, and there is no formal marriage. For convenience with its derivation (from ty, 'house,' and llu, 'host'), was the retinue or bodyguard of the head of the household; and, in the case of the king, this retinue had a special head, the pen teulu, and a special bard, bard teulu, who sang of the deeds of their lords. The social meaning of the word now survives only in a South
man may marry his cousin but not his aunt. Otherwise there is no restriction. In practice, of course, regard is paid to equality of social status; in China, to one's own 'animal' weight for half a pound'; and the horoscopes of the parties are often taken into consideration. The bride brings her trousseau; but the husband's family have to pay a dowry for her, although among the wealthy this is somewhat of a formality. Marriage arranged in this way is not of affection, and in many cases, at least in the humbler ranks of life, is as much providing a help for the mother-in-law as a wife. But it is evident from popular tales that romance is not unknown in Chinese life, through love stirred by favourable report or accidental glimpse. Doubtless, too, in many cases, however affection may be lacking to begin with, it springs up in the course of years. The virtue of a husband is to be 'a just person,' and of a wife to be obedient. Conjugal harmony is recognized as the foundation of successful family life, and finds its emblem in mandarin ducks—types of conjugal modesty and fidelity (cf. Shi-King, i. 1).

Owing to the low status of women and the excessive desire for offspring, the wife is too often regarded as not supporting the birth of son. The lower ranks of life, where it is her function to 'boil rice' as well as to 'bear children,' it is desired also that she be a capable housewife. Theoretically she is to keep at home; her husband refers to her as the 'person within,' with the addition of various depreciatory epithets. Whatever the origin of foot-binding, it is popularly regarded as a salutary check on women's productivity to gadding about and to worse evils. Foot-binding, however, is by no means universal; and among the lower classes, especially in certain districts, women are allowed great freedom, and take even too large a share in heavy outdoor work. Owing to the lack of female education, a wife can seldom be a companion to her husband. Nor is this looked for; and a household is apt to fall into two sections, male and female, the women and girls taking their meals apart from and after the men-folk.

Besides the normal form of marriage, in which the bride goes to live in the home of her husband's parents, there are other forms, in which the husband joins his wife's family. This may happen when the wife's parents have no sons, and, instead of marrying their daughter out, bring in a son-in-law to marry her. In this case the husband does not take a wife but some arrangement is come to, such as that the first son of the marriage shall take the surname of his mother's parents, and carry on the succession for them. A second class of such marriages is where a husband is called in to marry a widowed daughter-in-law. In such cases the wife retains the surname and even the name of her deceased husband, and the children of her second marriage carry on his succession and not that of their own father. In this case the second husband leaves his own clan and is merged in that of his wife, and is regarded with a certain measure of contempt.

Re-marriage of a widow is usual; and re-marriage of a widow is not infrequent, though to remain faithful to the memory of her husband is considered most estimable, and a second marriage is celebrated with 'maimed rites.' The arrangements for the re-marriage of a widow are made by her parents-in-law; but more regard is paid to her will in the matter than would be paid to the wishes of the first husband. To this end, in regard to the disposal of a widow's children; but it may be taken for granted that not all her sons at least would be allowed to accompany their mother to her new home.

**Concubinage.**—Chinese law recognizes only one wife, but concubinage is legal. The practice dates from ancient times. Of Yao (2556 B.C.) it is recorded that he took 80 concubines, and each was worth for him half a pound. Concubinage is common among the wealthy classes. Among the poorer it is less common, and usually only for the purpose of securing a male succession. There is no legal limit to the number of concubines that may be taken.

**Divorce.**—According to law there are seven reasons for which a husband may divorce his wife; but the law recognizes no right of the wife to divorce her husband. The seven legal reasons for divorce are unfaithful conduct (towards the husband's parents), adultery, jealousy, loquacity, theft, grievances concerning the wife or her family, e.g., barrenness, are not recognized by custom. To these legal reasons must be added poverty, which is the commonest cause of all. It is difficult to estimate the percentage of divorces, but divorce is said to be not uncommon. This is more so in the case of the repudiated woman as a precaution. The repudiated wife is married by the aid of a 'go-between.' This is not so difficult as it might seem; for the desire for children is strong, and concubinage is largely a mercantile transaction, in which a woman whose reputation is damaged may be had at a cheaper rate. The husband's somewhat despotic power over his wife is limited in practice, not so much by legal restraints as by public opinion, and in particular by the fear of his wife's relatives, especially if they are of a powerful clan. Short of divorce a man may, if his wife offends, send her back to her parents, as a hint that their family discipline has been defective. This is regarded as a disgrace to them; and it is for them, if the wife has been in the wrong, to place her husband and persuade him to take her back. In practice, though not in law, a concubine has little protection against her husband, and can be sold at his pleasure.

2. Parents and children.—In the family the father is the head of the family; but rules with many qualifications according to the ability and force of character of other members of the family group. A woman is not supposed to rule; as a girl she should obey her father, as a wife her husband, as a widow her grown-up son. But, while it is true that the status of women is low, it would be a great mistake to infer that they can have no influence. Of the twenty-four examples of filial piety, more than half are instances of piety towards mother or stepmother; an aged mother is usually treated with much deference. The duty of a son to his parents takes precedence of his duty to wife or children. The eleventh of the examples of filial piety is a man who, being in his means, was insufficient to maintain his mother and his child, says to his wife: 'One may get another child, but it is impossible to get another mother,' and proposes to economize by burying his child alive. As he is digging the grave, he is rewarded by finding a pot of gold. According to the same principle, to put away a wife because she is displacing his mother or sister is disloyal, and to the right to subordinate the wife's interests to the mother's. The object of having children is broadly stated to be that parents may in old age enjoy their ministrations; and 父母 has been defined
as to serve parents with propriety, to bury them with propriety, and to sacrifice to them with propriety (Analects, bk. ii. ch. v.). A parent's birthdays are times of congratulation, particularly from the younger members, whether on their sixty-first birthday or their fifty-first, sixty-first birthday, and so on, when women observe their fiftieth, sixtieth, etc. A coffin is considered to be an appropriate gift for a parent on his principle date, and to provide a sepulchral structure is a ceremonial act of the utmost importance. The importance of the practice of ancestor worship is a matter of natural and adopted reason, and is known to be carried on at all times and places, without exception. The question is one of constancy, of the order of duty, and of the maintenance of the relationship between the living and the dead. The question is one of duty, of the order of duty, and of the maintenance of the relationship between the living and the dead. The question is one of duty, of the order of duty, and of the maintenance of the relationship between the living and the dead. The question is one of duty, of the order of duty, and of the maintenance of the relationship between the living and the dead. The question is one of duty, of the order of duty, and of the maintenance of the relationship between the living and the dead. The question is one of duty, of the order of duty, and of the maintenance of the relationship between the living and the dead. The question is one of duty, of the order of duty, and of the maintenance of the relationship between the living and the dead. The question is one of duty, of the order of duty, and of the maintenance of the relationship between the living and the dead. The question is one of duty, of the order of duty, and of the maintenance of the relationship between the living and the dead. The question is one of duty, of the order of duty, and of the maintenance of the relationship between the living and the dead. The question is one of duty, of the order of duty, and of the maintenance of the relationship between the living and the dead.
Sisters are appropriate to a certain generation, and form part of the name of all the males belonging thereto. Mutual responsibility is a marked feature of Chinese life; senior relatives for their juniors, and the oldest a cin in its members.

4. Servants and slaves.—In the lower ranks, servants or hired workers are treated very much as being of the family, and take their meals with it. According to the higher classes, this is not so. There, on the one hand, servants show to their masters a ceremonious deference; on the other, they often exercise a freedom of intervention in their master's affairs, both civil and spiritual. Indeed, in Western manners, servility is by no means a prominent feature of Chinese life; though, even where it is unknown as such, there may be those who through stress of poverty have been sold, or have sold themselves, into service. A much more usual type of slavery is seen in the slave girls of well-to-do families. They are the property of their owners, and dependent for their happiness on the goodwill of their mistresses. They are distinguished from daughters of the house by not having their feet bound, and by some differences of attire. When they have grown to womanhood, they may remain in the family as female attendants, though this is rare, and considered as a dishonorable position, to be disposed of in marriage, or as concubines to others. Eunuchs employed as slaves are unknown outside court circles.

5. Social changes.—China is in a state of transition, and the family also is sure to undergo change. Among the influences which may modify her social system are education, increased knowledge of other social systems, female education, changes in industrial conditions with the rise of manufacturing, and, of course, greater facilities for travel, the general shock of the current revolution, and last, though not least, the spread of Christianity.


FAMILY (Egyptian).—The Egyptian family presents many points of contrast both with the Semitic and with the Greek. Its most interesting characteristics are a distinct preservation of matriarchy, the prominent position of the woman, and a comparative prominence of sexual relations.

We may, therefore, regard it as in some ways more primitive than the family in other countries of the ancient world. The peculiar position of the women in the family led generally to a prominence of women in Egypt much greater than that allowed to them either among the Semites or in later Greece, and analogous to that apparently enjoyed in a greater degree by the women in early (Myce- nem) Greece. There also, among a people probably racially connected with the Egyptians, a matriarchal idea of the family may be assumed to have been held as furnishing prominence even more pronounced than in Egypt. It was no idea of the equal intelligence of women and men that in Egypt placed the two sexes almost on the same level, and in Myce- nem Greece, the women made the women quite as important as the men. This equality arose simply from the matriarchal idea that descent is absolutely certain through the mother, but not through the father, so that the family centres in the house-mother rather than in the house-father; and the woman, instead of being the man's slave, as among the Semites, is in many respects his equal or even superior. But this view of family life makes at the same time for that we should regard as sexual immorality. Thus, at any rate in the royal family, the Egyptians, in order to secure the succession of the mothers in the same family, often married their own sisters. In Roman times we find this practice common among ordinary people.

The most important person in the family was the father. The mother was the house-ruler, the nebt-per, the focus of the family. Nevertheless, she was the inferior of the man, her husband, in that he was known by his name, whereas she was always spoken of. He was the head of the family, and the wife (hemet) of the man, he is never the husband (zat) of the woman. After all, she could not become nebt-per unless she were first hemet, and that, when all was said and done, depended on the pleasure of the man. So far the man dominated, but never as the Semitic man did, who was the ba'al, 'lord' of his wife, his b'r't'ah, 'chattel,' or as did the Greek man, who, like Hesiod (Works and Days, 408), regarded a wife simply as a necessary possession on a level with his ox and his plough; at Athens only the hetairai had any freedom or influence. But, on the other hand, the Semite distinguished from his master's slave women their part in the family, and the wife, with the result to the Pharaohs, but the indefiniteness of the relations of the women to the family is shown in the fact that the word hemet, 'sister,' was used not only for the real sisters of a man, but also for his concubines, and even for his hemet, or wife. Similarly 'brother' might mean 'husband.' The woman who sits at the side of a man in some funerary sculptured groups may be described as 'his sister, whom his heart loveth,' or as 'his beloved wife.' He might have many of these 'sisters' together with one wife (rarely two), or no wife at all; in that case there was no properly constituted nebt-per; for this only a wife could be. If there were two wives, one was the nebt-per; if two nebt-per are mentioned on a man's tombstone, it means either that the one succeeded the other in the dignity of house-mother, or that the man had maintained two separate establishments, which had no link save the fact that the same man maintained and fathered both. This a noble might do, and besides the regular 'houses' of his 'wives' he might also possess a harim of concubines. But these had nothing to do with his family or families proper, however much he might favour his natural children. The man's son is his heir, but this was somewhat opposed to usual custom, which, in accordance with the matriarchal theory, preferred that property should descend in the female line. Thus, ordinarily, it was to the eldest son of the man's eldest daughter that his goods went, and a man's maternal grandfather was considered more closely related to him than his own father. Naturally this elaboration of primitive custom was as far as a general parental affection, and so the men constantly broke through it; those in high station, and, above all, the kings, consistently did so. It was rarely that a dead monarch was not succeeded by his own son.

The maternal line of descent had the effect of confusing families, so that the Egyptians had little idea of family history, of genealogies and pedigrees, and never developed the surname or 'patronymic.' Even tribal names were unknown. The ordinary man was the son born of his mother So-and-so. Only the man of better class is such-and-such a man's son, the son of him who legitimated what we should regard as sexual immorality. Thus, at any rate in the royal family, the Egyptians, in order to secure the succession of the mothers in the same family, was con-
FAMILY (Egyptian)

seions of her great age, that she became interested in her past, and her children reckoned back the generations.

Marriage was effected by means of a properly drawn up legal contract, but of these we have none till the Greek period. There may have been, as in later times, a stipulation year, after which, by certain payment, the marriage might be annulled. The concubine, if free, no doubt was taken by force or came of her own accord; if a slave, she had no voice in the matter, and therefore her son by her master might legally be made a full wife we do not know. The king was subject to the same laws and customs in this regard as his subjects. In contract to Assyria, where only one queen appears on the monuments, and only two or three are even mentioned during the whole course of the empire's history, the queen of Egypt is always mentioned, and always appears with her consort, who not infrequently derived his sole right to the crown from her, as in the case of Thutmose I. She is called the 'king's wife' simply, or the 'great king's wife,' to distinguish her from other and inferior wives; often she is bored 'the king's wife,' 'the king's mother,' (hemet-nsw useret, and met-nsi). The 'king's son' (si-nsi) might, were he the son of an inferior wife, conceivably have in his veins not a drop of the blood of his father's predecessor on the throne. In this case, his succession could only be assured by force if necessary. Thutmose III. was related to Amonhatpe (Amenhetep) I. only through the female line, and was actually the son of an inferior wife, if not of a concubine. This last fact rendered his right to the crown so weak that, in order to give him a good claim, it was necessary to marry him to his aunt Hatshepsut, who was wholly of the blood of his eldest daughter of a 'great king's wife' (but whose father, Thutmose I., was not of royal blood at all). She kept her nephew in the background, herself assuming the royal dignity, not as queen merely but as actual 'king.' In spite of the pre-eminence of the nebd-her in the family, there was no precedent for Egypt being directly ruled by a woman; so, as Hatshepsut would have no lord and master in the kingdom, she was obliged to assume, officially, the dress and state of a man. The husband-nephew considered himself wrongly entirely from his rights, for, though the son of a concubine or inferior queen, his marriage with his aunt had at once legitimized his claim to the throne. The custom of the ancient world with regard to deceased saved Hatshepsut undoubtedly became in law and custom an usurper, and Thutmose was legally justified in the punishment which he meted out to her adherents after her death.

Difficulties of a similar kind must have repeated themselves indefinitely in the homes of subjects, and yet Egyptian family life was very close and very affectionate. On his tombstone a man's immediate relatives, whether gone before him or surviving him, are all represented bearing the offerings to him and praying that the gods of the dead will give him the kingly funeral meats. The words 'love' and 'beloved' recur more frequently in Egyptian months than in those of any other ancient nation, for none, whether father, mother, brother, sister, son, or daughter, seems to have been unbeloved by the rest of his family, judging from the inscriptions of the tomestones. This must at times have been an artificial convention, of course (we may be sure that Thutmose III. did not love his aunt Hatshepsut), but at the same time the convention would not have grown up had not the reality been there, and we obtain the impression in old Egypt of a very close and very loving family life. It is so still: the modern Egyptian is usually a fond father, though Islam has turned his relation to his wife into a tyranny (albeit often a kind one) which his forefathers did not know. In ancient Egypt the woman was the legal object in marriage than the possession of children by both man and wife in common; children came normally to all, whether prince or peasant, as one of the best of gifts. It was only on a very high plane, though not necessary to his soul's health after death, it was at least desirable that a man should have sons to make the funerary offerings and pray for the safety of their father's spirit in the under world. We have not, even in the preceeding of ancient Greece, such constant insistence on family solidarity and affection as we see in the Egyptian gravestones, especially those of the Middle Kingdom; and in later times the same spirit is revealed in the repeated bas-reliefs in the tombs of el-Amarna, which show the heretical king, Akhenaten, with his sister-queen Nefertiti and their little daughters, always together and represented as exhibiting the closest mutual affection.

From Babylonia and Assyria we have nothing of the same kind; king Assurbanipal is shown once feasting with his queen (with the head of his enemy, and an elephant at his feet), but no sign of marital affection appears, and the king's children are never represented. The greater harshness of the Semitic nature and the more 'human' character of the Egyptians are very apparent when we compare them. The reason of this difference is the absence of a body of princely parasites for centuries; reasons of policy would forbid such reckless conduct on the part of later monarchs. As in all societies in a similar stage of development (e.g. India and China to-day), pesty- lience and war served as the natural checks on a too prolific increase of the race.

Death took early toll then, as it does now, of the Egyptians; and, though we have many instances of very aged persons, yet the funerary stels show how enormous a proportion of the ancient Egyptians after death, never to be seen again, no longer go with them. The usual equivalents of our 'deceased,' after its name. These representations of children, one often a head taller than the next, and so on, remind us of the rows of sons and daughters shown on the brasses of the 16th to 17th centuries in our churches. Of course, as in these modern brasses, all the children or other persons shown on an Egyptian stele are not dead; the whole family is shown, dead and living together, bringing offerings to the tomb of the owner of the stele.

The large number of children often caused confusion in family consanguinity. After the death of a child bearing a certain name, another might be born to whom the same name might be given, and both appear on the same stele of their parents. But very often two, sometimes many more, children living at the same time might bear the same appellation—a fact which makes the ancient genealogies often very difficult to unravel.

Children in ancient Egypt were differentiated
from their elders by a special mark—the manner of dressing their hair. Whereas, with the exception of the soldiers and often the peasants, the Egyptians always shaved their heads. Women wore wigs, the boys either shaved or close-cropped, only part of it, leaving on one side a long lock, which was always carefully plaited in a pigtail hanging down to the waist. Sometimes the whole hair seems to have been worn gathered into this single thick pigtail over the ear. Rarely, and only under the Old and Middle Kingdoms, does the tail appear to have been worn at the back of the head. Aspasia—she was often so named—sometimes we find portrait-figures of young men who wore both the natural pigtail and a wig, the former coming out of a hole in the latter! In later times the princes seem all their lives to have worn this lock, which marked their position as 'royal children' (in their case it seems sometimes to have been a representation of the lock rather than natural hair). The girls wore the same lock, but often in a worse form, sometimes in small braids or not plaited at all, whereas that of the boy was always a single plaits. And very often the girls did not shave the rest of the head, but wore the rest of their hair hanging down, the 'lock of youth' being simply tied separately at the side. On reaching womanhood a great wig was often worn on the top of the natural hair, though sometimes the women seem to have worn both their hair and hat, or their hat shaped like the men, always, of course, wearing their long wig over it.

Children of both sexes usually wore nothing but a slight girdle. The mother was assisted in their care by the nurse (mena't), who was an important person in the family, and is commonly represented on the tombstones as a member of it. The ideograph of her name shows that she was primarily a wet-nurse or foster-mother. The name was transferred to male nurses (like our 'nurse'), and we find the great nobles who acted as tutors or governors of royal princes bearing it as their official title ('royal nurse').

We thus see that the love of the Egyptians for their children, the important position of their women, and their interest in their families and dependants enable us to give a very full idea of the ancient Egyptian family and its life.

See also CHILDREN (Egyptian) and MARRIAGE (Egyptian).

LITERATURE.—Good general account in A. Erman, Life in Ancient Egypt, London, 1912, 6-200. The present writer has in this article used his general knowledge of the stele in the British Museum. For the relics of Akhenaten and his family, see N. de G. Davies, Locke Tumbl of El Amarna, London, 1903. For the funerary stele, see Lange and Schäfer, Grab- und Denkbatte des Alten und Neuen Reiches, Berlin, 1907; and Hall and Scott: Mnooppeps, Hieroglyphic Texts from Egyptian Stele in the British Museum, pt. 2, London, 1912. The present writer has in this article used his general knowledge of the stele in the British Museum. For the relics of Akhenaten and his family, see N. de G. Davies, Locke Tumbl of El Amarna, London, 1903. For the funerary stele, see Lange and Schäfer, Grab- und Denkbatte des Alten und Neuen Reiches, Berlin, 1907; and Hall and Scott: Mnooppeps, Hieroglyphic Texts from Egyptian Stele in the British Museum, pt. 2, London, 1912. The present writer has in this article used his general knowledge of the stele in the British Museum. For the relics of Akhenaten and his family, see N. de G. Davies, Locke Tumbl of El Amarna, London, 1903. For the funerary stele, see Lange and Schäfer, Grab- und Denkbatte des Alten und Neuen Reiches, Berlin, 1907; and Hall and Scott: Mnooppeps, Hieroglyphic Texts from Egyptian Stele in the British Museum, pt. 2, London, 1912.
for citizenship was limited to men of legitimate birth; and the preservation of the reputation of the family in the State was a very strong incentive to good citizenship. In Sparta the fines for men who did not marry (Stob. Flor. lxxvii. 16), in Athens the wedding ban, and in Spartan and gener- 
ally marriage (Dein. in Dem. § 7), and the disgrace of 
dughter who did not find a husband (Soph. 
Ed. Tyr. 1500), illustrate the importance attached to 
this duty, which was naturally emphasized in 170, the body of the State. Religion also 
demanded that a man marry and raise up sons to 
continue his line. The worship of the State-gods 
was carried on by legitimate citizens, and on this 
ground also Plato restates the duty of marriage (Leg. vi. 
773 E). Further, certain forms of religious 
were the duty and privilege of particular families, 
which must be kept up in order that this service 
may be performed. Finally, the wellbeing of the 
deal (of a man's ancestors, and his own well-
being after death) depended on offerings by his 
descendants (Isoc. xiv. 60; Plato, Hipp. Maj. 
291 E), so that actual or adopted sons (Isaeus, vii. 30) 
were necessary to perform this important service.

3. The choice of a wife depends on this conception 
of marriage as a duty to the State, to the gods, 
and to one's self. A man's wife is ordinarily chosen 
by himself and his father-in-law, his best friend or 
the father of the proposed bride, and there is little or no opportunity 
for romance or individual choice, since ordinarily the 
girl has had no opportunity of seeing her future 
husband before betrothal, and hardly any opportu-
tunity before marriage. Even the consent of the 
parties themselves need not be asked, for the girl 
has no occasion to object, and the youth can have 
his income cut off if he does not agree. The 
picture of the Hymen and Antiope in Sophocles' 
Antigone is evidently an exception to the rule, 
even in literature. That marriage was conceived as 
a duty and arranged by the parents does not, of 
course, mean that in ancient Athens (any more 
than in modern countries where marriage is 
arranged by parents) the husband did not often 
come to have real regard and love for his wife. 
The woman chosen for a wife must, of course, be 
the daughter of an Athenian citizen, for only the 
children of such a marriage would be legitimate. 
She might be, and often was, a near relative of 
his future husband. Usually the bride would be 
a girl between fifteen and twenty, unless, indeed, 
she was older, and her husband would be thirty 
years of age. Her beauty would count for something, her skill in 
the feminine arts, such as spinning and weaving, for marriage 
was certainly not the most important thing; rather than 
her social position and her dowry should be com-
parable with the position and wealth of her future 
husband. The reason for this is simple, in that a 
woman with small dowry would often fail to win 
his husband's respect, while a wife with a very 
large dowry might make her husband very uncom-
fortable by interfering with his financial manage-
ment of the property, if not with other sides of his life (cf. Plato, Leg. vi. 774 D. Plut. de Educa. 

5. The relation of members of the family. — The 
 effort to ascertain from Greek literature the 
 meaning of the family as an ethical institution is 
 complicated by various difficulties. Pictures of 
 private life, such as that of Diogenes (Plut. de Educa. 
See further, Marriage (Greek).

4. The family a religious institution. — While 
 marriage and the family were definitely legal 
institutions, the religious side must be clearly re-
ognized. Like every other human institution, 
the family needed the divine blessing, and religious 
rites to obtain this blessing were not neglected even 
in times when belief in the gods became vague or 
insincere. Indeed, they could not well be neglected, 
for, in so far as the family was recognized by the 
State, it was a duty to the State to follow the 
customary rites in invoking the blessing of the 
gods. So far as the marriage ceremony was con-
cerned, the religious rites attending it resembled 
in principle the religious rites attending an im-
portant undertaking. They consisted in sacrifices 
to the patron gods of marriage on the day before 
the wedding, and again in connexion with the 
marriage, if the gods were pleased. The gods whom 
these sacrifices were offered, rather than the charac-
ter of the sacrifices, was significant. Zeus and 
Hera, who, with local deities, were honoured in 
the preliminary sacrifices, were not only the patrons 
of marriage as a human institution, but also the 
gods whose relations represented the type of the 
family human in the Olympian circle. Similarly, 
the gods of the household and Aphrodite, who 
were honoured at the marriage feast itself, were 
the gods who watched over the relations of the 
new family. Just as the religious character of any 
Greek institution finds expression in the gods with 
whom it is associated, so the religious character of 
the family is seen in the nature of the gods invoked 
in the marriage ceremony.

Further, Greek religion was a matter of social 
groups like the family or the tribe or the State, 
before it passed to the idea of a personal 
relationship with the gods. The recognition of the 
worship of the family centre in Hestia (Vesta), 
the personified earth-flame. At her round altar, 
hung with fillets, in the main room of the house, 
libations were made at each meal, and she was 
recognized in connexion with every sacrificial 
act that took place in the home. Other gods also were 
worshiped—Apollo the Guardian, whose symbol 
or altar stood outside the door; the patron gods 
of their race, whose shrine might be in a room on 
the main hall; Zeus Herkoios, whose altar stood in the 
court; and the gods of property like Zeus 
Ktoios; even gods from different shrines in the 
city might be represented still images in the 
home. At all the events of family life, such as 
the birth of a child, the coming of age of a son, or 
in cases of sickness or death, the gods of the home 
were worshiped. On home anniversaries such as 
birthdays, and often on the occasion of public 
worship in the city, sacrifices were offered in the 
home. In a word, the Greek family was a religious 
institution, because every social institution in 
Greece was essentially religious.

If we go back to the Homeric poems, we find 
charming pictures of the intimate relations of 
husband and wife, in particular of Hector and 
Andromache (II. vi.), of Alcinoos and Arete (Od. vi. — 
Hesiod, Erg. 702), *There is nothing mightier and nobler 
than when man and woman are of one heart and mind 
in a house, a grief to their foes, and to their friends 
great joy, life in their own hearts it best * (tr. 
Butler and Lang).

In later literature the references to this subject 
are few but striking. It is Euripides who describes 
the chaste wife who makes the home life happy, so 
that the husband rejoices when he enters, and calls 
himself fortunate as he goes out (Iph. Ant. 1158 ff.). 
Euripides also speaks of the sweet deceit of a wife 
who softens the trouble and cheers the illness 
of her husband (Iph. 819). In her husband's absence
it is her lot to suffer (Aesch. Agam. 581 f.); in his presence there is such complete trust and understanding that burdens are lifted off their shoulders (Soph. Eid., Tyr. 760 f., and passim). By the time of Aristotle the entire community of life between husband and wife is emphasized (Arist. Eth. Nic. vii. 14, p. 1162z, B. 19-20; cf. Protag. 65 f.) and the name P. (names 59 f) names her to the wife as one of the essential families.

While these references in literature can hardly be considered as the inspiration for philosophical theories of philosophers, we must not fail to recognize the conditions which limited the development of such relations. In general it is clear that the possibilities of intellectual companionship were limited by the very restricted opportunities of the wife for any intellectual development. Where books hardly existed in the home, and where women never came in contact with any one but slaves, even if the latter were sometimes educated persons, they could not be expected to meet their husbands on common ground intellectually. Certain pleasures belonged to husband and wife in common—pleasure in the comfortable, well-regulated home and in the family, and the sound and pleasure of music. Common purposes and ideals they certainly shared so far as the sons and daughters were concerned. Of affection between husband and wife one cannot write. It seems hardly possible, however, that the pictures of affectionate husbands and wives in Greek tragedy could have been appreciated by the Athenian audience, or even conceived at all, if they had no counterpart in the actual life of the day.

The relation of parents to children is frequently referred to in literature. Three similes in the Iliad (iv. 130, xv. 302, xvi. 7) express the tender sympathy of the poet for his mother and for his children. The joint of Jason in his son Jason and of Telamon in his son Ajax is described by Findar (Pyth. iv. 120 f., Isthm. v.) the love of Creon for Haimon, temporarily blinded by passion, in Sophocles' Antigone, the mother's joy in Cleobis and Biton (Herod. i. 31), and the pain Medea inflicted on Jason by killing their children (Iur. Medea), are examples that might be multiplied indefinitely. The reverse of the same thought is found in the pain which children turn out badly (Isoon. v. 39; Theog. 271 f.); and, when this feeling of tenderness to children seems to be lacking, as in the case of Diogenes who regarded the insolvency of the State above his personal loss in his daughter's death, it is a typical subject for public reproach (Aesch. in Ctes. 77).

The visible record of parental affection is preserved to us in the representations of mother and child on Attic vases, and in various representations of the family on Attic grave-reliefs. The duty of parents to bring up their children in right ways, and in particular to develop honour to the State and respect for parents, is ordinarily presupposed rather than stated explicitly (cf. Demost. Koron. 22-25; Eurip. Antiope, fr. 219). This training in earlier years was supervised by the mother; and, as girls never passed out of the mother's immediate care till they were married, the relation developed between mother and daughter must have been an intimate one. The son early passed from his mother's care to the school of the training slave (paidagogos), and, in lesser degree, to the father. As to any intimate relation of father and son, we know little except from the evidence of tradition. It is clear, however, that both sons and daughters were trained strictly in the feeling for the unity of the family, with the duties and privileges which this imposed.

The relation between brothers, and between a brother and a sister, is not infrequently mentioned from the Homerics onwards. The account of Agamemnon and Menelaus in the Iliad (iv. 148 f., vii. 107) only gives particular importance to the brother (Od. viii. 546). The affection of a brother and sister is best illustrated by the story of Electra and Orestes as it was developed in literature and in art.

The duty of children toward their parents is first a material one, namely, to care for them in their old age (Lyseus, xiii. 45; Isaeus, vii. 30). More broadly it is described as honour towards parents (Lyseus, Lond. p. 89; cf. I. 223 f.). Plato goes so far as to say that pious towards parents is the best worship of the gods (Leg. x. 930 E.); and the absence of such pious was at Athens a legal bar from public office (Dein. ii. 17). For the Athenians the most repulsive phase of the Sophistic attack on moral ideals concerned this point (Aristoph. Clouds, 394 f.; Xen. Mon. iii. 5, 15), and the problems which arose for sons, when one parent was turned against another, as in the story of Eripyle or of Clytemnestra, proved extremely interesting to the Greeks.

Judged by the only data at our disposal—those of myth and in the later laws and customs—there was a fundamental conception of Greek society and Greek morals. When the hold of other social and political institutions had begun to weaken, the family still retained its solidarity, and duties to the family were observed with care.

Cf. also the 'Greek' section of artt. CHILDREN, EDUCATION, MARRIAGE.


FAMILY (Hindu).—1. The family in India is of the joint-family type, and it is chiefly for this reason that the Indian family law differs so much from that of Europe. Its main principles were early reduced to writing in the well-known legal Sanskrit treatises called Dharmasastras or Smritis, all the more important of which have been published in English. This so-called Hindu law is still applied, throughout British India, in all questions relating to the inheritance, succession, and marriage of Hindus, to caste, and to Hindu religious usages and customs. All these questions are considered in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908; the Code of Civil Procedure, and the Indian Evidence Act of 1872.

2. The state of a family living in union implies a common habitation as well as community of property, of meals, and of customs. It may be described, with H. Maine, as 'a group of natural or adoptive descendants held together by subscription to the eldest living ascendant, father, grandfather, or great-grandfather. The head of such a group is always in practice despotic' (Early History of Institutions, London, 1875, p. 116; cf. Ancient Law 19, do. 1907, p. 123). It should be added that, if the family chose to continue united after the father's death, the eldest son would generally become its head, as stated in the lawbook of Nārada: 'Let the eldest brother, by consent, support the rest like a father.' The position of such an eldest son managing the family estate is also a very influential one, though not equal in dignity to that of a father, whose power resembles the potestas potestatis of the paterfamilias in ancient Roman law.

Thus 'a wife, a son, and a slave, these three are declared to have no property, and whatsoever wealth which they possess is required for him to whom they belong' (Manu, vii. 416). 'That is declared a valid transaction which is done by the senior or head of a family. That is declared a valid which has been contracted by one who does not enjoy independence' (Nārada, l. 46).

Even nowadays the manager (karta) does not confine himself to the financial part of the household; there is not a single domestic affair of any
importance which may be undertaken without his consent or knowledge; and he is even expected to watch over the spiritual needs of all the members, and to check irregularities of all kinds by his sound discipline. The evidence in the facts that married sons in India, with their wives and children, generally choose to remain under the paternal roof, as they marry very early, and avoid the responsibility and expense of a separate establishment; that adopted and of illegitimate sons may have to be added to the legitimate sons; that polygamy and concubinage are not forbidden, whereas the re-marriage of widows is objected to; and that a respectable Hindu is often obliged to support indigent relatives together with their families, as well as a hereditary family-priest and other hangers-on. It should be remarked, however, that the general body of an undivided family extends further than the consanguineous, which consists of the three generations next to the owner of certain property in unbroken male descent, and possesses a right of survivorship to under the descent also advanced in it.

3. The eldest son is not infrequently allowed by the father to manage the affairs of the family under his direction, and he may even himself become the karta during the lifetime of the father, if the other sons or male members are unwilling or unable to continue to concern himself with matters of a secular nature. After the father's death, the eldest son, as mentioned before, will generally succeed him, though this is no invariable rule. The precept of Narada is still occasionally followed, that even the youngest brother may govern the family if specially capable, because the prosperity of the whole family depends on ability. It is seldom, if ever, that a minor or female member of a family takes part in the management, though there is nothing to prevent such democratic methods of family government. The karta is, however, liable to render an account; it has been so held by a full bench of the Calcutta High Court.

4. The wife of the manager, called ghimni, also occupies a responsible position, as she has to look after the inner department of the household, to exercise a mild and prudent sway over her daughters and daughters-in-law and over the domestic servants. She has her daughter married at an early age, and have their nuptials properly celebrated. As for the task of educating her children, it would be a mistake to expect too much from a mother whose main interest in most cases is unconnected with the barest elements of knowledge, entirely governed by religious notions of the crudest kind, and given to superstitious practices.

5. The daughters and daughters-in-law, whose attitude towards another is not always that of strict harmony and peace, are not only subject to the control of the female head of the house, shut up as they are in the family zenana; they also have the charge of the household and hardships incidental to the difficult position of females in an Eastern country. Thus a young daughter-in-law in a gented family is regarded as modest and unmannerly, if she should happen accidentally to enter into a room or uninvited in the presence of her husband's relatives. For fear of being offended, men take their meals with the others, and the choicest part of the food is first offered to the males, and the residue kept for the females.

6. Most women in India are strictly religions; the ghimni in particular, as the representative of the household, to go through her morning service in the domestic place of worship, at the close of which she invokes the blessing of her guardian deity. All the inmates of the house, both male and female, are expected to present at the daily puja performed by the header of the family, and of which her obedience is binding on the stone or metal image of the tutelary god of the house. In rich families, a sufficient endowment in inalienable landed property is set apart for the permanent support of the idol.

7. From a legal point of view, the subject of maintenance is important, especially as this includes defraying the expense incurred for the nuptials and other religious ceremonies, or sanahars, of the younger male members of the family. Those who, owing to some bodily or mental defect, are disqualified from inheriting under the Hindu law have a claim to maintenance against the head of the house. Illegitimate sons and conubines are also entitled to be maintained.

8. Partition is another important subject. According to the 11th cent. Mitakshara (a well-known authoritative Sanskrit commentary), partition is the adjustment taken by the family to stipulate the property of the several members of a joint-family, i.e. the ascertaining of individual rights which during the joint condition—where the members share in food, worship, and estate—are not enough. Partition, according to the same authority, may take place at the desire of a single male member, who is therefore at liberty, as far as he is concerned, to terminate the joint-tenancy, the other copartners having to submit to it whether they like it or not. In Bengal, however, real partition may take place only after the father's death, when any co-sharer is at liberty to demand it. Such is the law as laid down in the 15th cent. Bāyānadhya, an authority, which is supposed, in the Maharastra, to have deprived the latter of the right of enforcing partition against the father's wish. It appears probable that throughout India partition against the father's will was, down to very recent times, considered very much contra bonos mores, even where it was not forbidden.

9. The early Sanskrit lawbooks contain long lists of secondary sons who may be used to supply the place of a legitimate son, if the latter should happen to be wanting. This topic of the secondary sons (gurupaputra) is also treated in the learned Sanskrit commentaries of later times, though all the various suggestions and theories as to adoption and illegitimacy which have become obsolete except the device of adoption, which has remained a highly important and vigorous institution down to the present day (see ADOPTION (Hindu)). Of the other auxiliary sons, the swetra, or son of the wife, was the son begotten of one man's wife by another, after express authorization, the legitimate husband being childless and impotent, disordered in mind, incurably diseased, or dead.

Thus, in the Sanskrit Epics, King Sandian is reported to have induced the sage Vasiṣṭha to beget for him a son by his queen; and the two brothers Bharata and Prayū, the ancestors of the chief hero of the Mahābhārata, are said to have been begotten by the sage Vyāsa for King Vichitravirya. This custom corresponds in part to the tretāra of the Jātakas, and has been found to prevail among many nations of antiquity and recent times in all parts of the globe.

A son secretly born (sahaja) from adulterous intercourse, is not entitled to become the son of his mother's husband: if a pregnant woman marries, her son belongs to the husband, and is called a son received with the bride (akṣotkha) and the son of a girl (samāja); if she marries after her husband's son; whereas, should she remain unmarried, he is reckoned as the son of her father. The latter principle is equally applicable in the case of the purikaputra, or son of an appointed daughter, who is married or married, if the latter had no male issue. Somewhat peculiar
is the case of the pausharbhava, or son of a woman twice married in succession, the second and younger sons, because women, under the Brahman law of marriage, are not permitted to marry more than once—a prohibition which has only been removed by the English legislation of the last century.

On the other hand, the social exigencies, as evidenced by the recognition of these various substitutes for a real legitimate son, seems to have originated in the exigencies of a primitive state of society when marriage by a widower was the property of a family used to depend on the number of hands able to cultivate the family property; and the very existence of a tribe surrounded by enemies depended on the number of its male members capable of bearing arms. The happiness of a man even in the next world was connected with the existence of a continuous line of male descendants capable of making the customary offerings to deities, and the chastity of women was valued very highly.

11. It is not necessary, on the other hand, to extend this to the early family law of the Brahmanas from a supposed universal practice of polyandry in ancient India, and to connect them with the polyandrous practices which are no doubt widely extended among the primitive races in India. The well-known tale of Draupadi in the Mahabharata, who became the joint-wife of all the five Pandava brothers, is the only instance of an Aryan woman said to have been the legal wife of several men, and the Mahabharata itself records the match of Draupadi as unusual and shocking. As for polyandry among non-Aryans, it exists, according to Risley and Gait's Census Report, but in no way, as a woman forms alliances with a plurality of men not necessarily related to each other, and succession is therefore traced through the female, and in the fraternal, where she becomes the wife of several brothers.

Thus, among the Kambayas of Madura, a woman may legally marry any number of men in succession, and may bestow favours on paramours without hindrance. Among the carpenters and blacksmiths in Malabar, the four or five chosen husbands are said to be in the habit of celebrating their polyandrous marriage openly with much pomp. In the Malabar and Canarese tongues generally, a woman may freely associate with as many men as she pleases to each other, so that the only family group is that of the mother with her children. The family is perpetuated by the female members only, and the person occupying the position of the mother is called the sister. This is the mahasarvagandharaka law, lit. descent in the line of a nephew of the oldest son, who is nowadays confounded with the Nayams and other castes on the Malabar coast, and in Travancore, but even there is falling into disrepute, and gradually passing into the fraternal form of polyandry or monandry. The great facilities for divorce which exist in some parts of the Madras Presidency may also be viewed perhaps as a relic of, or akin to, matriarchal polyandry. The fraternal system is still widely spread along the whole of the Himalayan range, including Kashmir, as well as in some parts of S. India, e.g. among the Todas in the Nilgiris. In Kashmir the woman is regarded as the wife of all the brothers, as in the case of Draupadi, and the children call them all father.

12. In the Aryan marriage system of India, what strikes a European observer most is the well-nigh universal prevalence of the married state, which is brought about by the custom of infant marriage (see Child Marriage [in India]). This custom, the gradual growth of which may be traced in the Sanskrit law-books, has gone on spreading from the Hindu to the Mohammedan, to the degree that in almost universal. There is no greater opprobrium, at least in a gentle family, than to have a daughter unmarried at the age of puberty; hence no father dares assert the right of deferring his daughter's marriage till she is grown up. It may be supposed that the patriarchal power of the kasthā was adverse, from the outset, to the female members of the family retaining the right of choosing their husbands for themselves; it may be hoped that

the movement against infant marriage will gradually gain ground in India, though hitherto it has made but little progress.

13. The prohibition of widow re-marriage, which is said to be the social complement of infant marriage, is also a custom of ancient standing which has been spread over the higher castes by the lower. Among the latter, however, it often meets with strenuous resistance, women being more of a power than in the higher castes, and naturally prone to set their interest above the prosperity of the family. The upper classes, also, social reformers have been constantly advocating the propriety and necessity of widow marriage.

14. Polygamy, though permitted in the Sanskrit law-books, is rarely practised nowadays, the excess of wives over husbands not amounting to more than 8 and 7 in the thousand respectively among Hindus and Buddhists. It is quite unusual to take a second wife, unless the first wife should be barren or afflicted with some incurable disease; and, even then, a man has often to obtain the consent of his first wife, or of his caste panchayat, or of both.

15. The Sinhalese contain many rules regarding prohibited degrees in marriage, the principal rule being that bride and bridegroom should never belong to the same gotra, or clan (see Castes, §§ 12 and 14). These are founded on the endogamous principle, under which intermarriage between persons differing in caste is strictly forbidden (see Marriage [Hindu]). In practice, any marriage may be said to be valid which has been celebrated in the presence, and with the presumed assent, of the relatives and leading members of the caste.

16. It should be observed, perhaps, that the otherwise strict rule against intermarriage between different castes is relaxed in the case of what has been called hypergamy, or 'marrying up,' i.e. the custom forbidding a woman to marry a man of a lower group than her own, and compelling her to marry into a group equal or superior in rank. This custom is both wide-spread and ancient, the Code of Manu styling marriages between men of a higher class and women of a lower class as according to the order of nature, while marriages of the converse type are unnatural. Social reformers have endeavoured to check the operation of the general rule against intercastes by a proposed fusion of the existing sub-castes.

17. The universally prevailing custom of celebrating the nuphals with great pomp, and often lavish expense, may be cited as a proof of the importance and sanctity of marriage in the eyes of the people. Some of the ceremonies customary at a wedding are extremely ancient, and seem to have come down from Aryan times. It is true that concubinage is tolerated, both the concubine or female slave and the illegitimate son being mentioned in the Sanskrit Commentaries as members of a joint-family. Since the abolition of slavery, however, public opinion on this head has greatly changed; and it is only in the case of holders of riyās, or large estates, or among very low-caste peoples, that concubines living as members of the family of the man keeping them may now sometimes be found. See Concubinage, Male, and Female.

FAMILY (Japanese).—The earliest family system in Japan was that known as uji. This word is of the same origin as the English "society," "commune," or "household"; but from the earliest times it had been used exclusively in the sense of "name," especially the name of a clan. Uji existed from the remotest times and constituted the first units of Japanese society.

The organization of the uji was quite complex. It was not a matter of blood relationship alone, but of social, economic, and political interests as well. Originally but a few noble families possessed names and received recognition as uji. These uji included all the members of the given family, and were named after the favour of the Royal uji, the occupation of the family members, or the place of residence. As the numbers within the family increased, the branches were made subdivisions, called ko uji, or lesser families, under the authority of the central uji, o-ujii, while the uji were governed by its kawoi, or superiors. Each central uji, with its various branches, formed a social body, for the most part sufficient unto itself; and its chief interest became that of preserving and self-perpetuation, along clear and distinct lines.

As early as the reign of Suzihime (29 B.C.), there were laws governing the names of uji; and the court carefully looked after their preservation, not allowing names once fixed to be changed except by special arrangement; and, later, establishing such historic uji as the Fujiwara, the Minamoto, and the Taira. As the offshoots of the various uji still further multiplied, they took various family names, often from the locality, such as Higas, Ashikaga, Tokugawa, etc. These names were known as miyaji (the name of a descendant), as distinct from uji; but the use of even the miyaji was not allowed to the common people until after the opening of the Meiji era in 1868.

As economic groups the uji were important. Occupations, trades, and professions were considered hereditary; and, while each caste system in the strict sense never existed in Japan, very real bonds held a man to the calling of his father, whether that was the making of swords or the teaching of mathematics at the Government University of the time.

As political factors, the uji constituted the very material and machinery of government. Theoretically, the people of Japan were all included in the various branch uji of the central uji, of which the Emperor was the head; and the national administration, such as it was in those early days, was carried on for the most part through the uji. In course of time the large uji became very powerful, holding many in a kind of serfdom, and defying the central authority of the Court. Such a state of affairs led to the Taikwa reformation in A.D. 645, which sought to strengthen the Imperial authority, and to the overthrow of so-called uji, and the organization of provinces and prefectures as political units in their place. This system, copied from China, was not adapted to conditions in Japan at the time, and soon gave way before the influence of Buddhism. But during those years the uji underwent modification, which led, by the latter part of the 12th cent., to a more complete development of what may be termed the uji archal system.

In the uji the family, as including the members of one household merely, was merged to a great extent in the larger body of the clan, and possessed no real social influence; but in the patri-
the most essentially Japanese of the faiths, developed at a time when the worship of ancestors was strong and vital. The deified spirits of ancestors, uji-gami, protected the home and made it a holy place dedicated to the maintenance of harmony.

Loyalty to the family of the past required that the family of the present should take thought for the family of the future. This perpetuity of the family was attained through the perpetuity of the family head. The eldest son and his eldest son preserved the family name, and so preserved the family. Thus the heir to the family headship was obliged to marry; and for him to die without a male descendant to continue the family and pay due respect to the spirits of the departed was a grave offence against the most sacred law of filial piety. Divorce of the barren and the taking of concubines were honourable if intended for this purpose.

Heirship in the family was not so much a matter of property as of birthright to the position of family head. From this fact grew the system of adoption, when no son was born to succeed to the family name. The adoption was preferably of a relative; but, if circumstances required, it might be of a stranger. The obligation which rested upon the head of the family, in representing the deceased past, and as respectable for the present and the future, was great; and hence it was most important that he should be a man of real character and ability. From this consideration arose the custom of retirement, eijyo, by which one resigned his position as the head of a family to his son or another who should succeed him. This was very common, for various family reasons; and, in the case of individuals or families, to take place, for political reasons, at the age of fifty, or even much earlier.

With the entrance of Western influence at the dawn of the Meiji era (1868) great changes began in the social and family, as well as business and political, life of Japan. Social changes, to be made safely, have to be made slowly; and many elements of the old patriarchal system are strongly operative to-day; but gradually the principle of individualism is gaining ground. The present Civil Code was compiled, after years of careful study in comparative legislation, by scholars and lawyers. It is modelled in many particulars on the German law, but is of greater due consideration. It became operative on 16th July 1898. In the section concerning the family the old calculation of relationship is abolished; and relatives by blood to the sixth degree, husband and wife, and relatives by affinity to the third degree are recognized as forming a family. An adopted son is recognized as related to the other members of the family as a natural son would be. A 'house' is declared to be the sphere of its headship without regard to personality; and, with a view to putting an end to the objectionable custom of early retirement from active life, it is provided that the headship of a family shall not be resigned before the age of sixty. Furthermore, marriage is recognized as an act requiring formality, and is legalized upon report to the proper Government registrar. Mutual consent and judicial decision are recognized as conditions, one of which must obtain, in securing divorce. A legal agreement may be made concerning the property of husband and wife; but the legal heir of a family may manage the property of a wife—or of a husband if the head be a woman—unless a special arrangement be made. The wife is regarded as the representative of her husband in the ordinary domestic affairs of the home.

In spite of the spirit of the new laws and the changes which are taking place, it must be said that the country people and farmers still follow, in large measure, the old system in all matters of personal family influence, the young being fettered by the family authority of generations living and dead. Among the educated and the cream of the young generation, there is a growing ambition to express individualism; but beneath the apparent calm a bitter struggle is going on. Two principles are contending for supremacy: the principle of communism within the family—personal absorption in its interests; and the principle of personal freedom—the right of personal initiative and realization. The young men and women who have received a modern education are at present the greatest sufferers from the strife if, as often happens, they are forced by old customs into an uncongenial marriage, or, on the other hand, if they break too thoughtlessly into rebellion. Nevertheless, the old order changeth, yielding place to new.

See also 'Jewish' sections of Birth, Education, Marriage.
off their garb of shame and resumed the royal attire of freemen. The home was the place where the children began to learn the world; she grew up in the place he was perhaps hard and sometimes ignoble; in the world he helped his judges to misunderstand him; in the home he was himself' (I. Abrahams, Jewish Life in the Middle Ages, London, 1890, p. 68). See also Ch. VII.)

I. ABRAMS.

FAMILY (Muslim).—The constitution of the Muslim family is very different from that of the Christian family; it is more indefinite, involved, and complicated. Marriage has not the same binding force; the ceremony is far less solemn—in fact, it is scarcely a public ceremony at all. A first marriage does not depend upon the consent of the parents. Polygamy being quite legal; and, outside the married state, the husband is allowed to cohabit with an unlimited number of slaves. The status of the children is regulated by the consent of the husband and without the consent of the parents. Thus even marriage does not precisely decide the question as to the legitimacy of a child. Furthermore, a Muslim marriage is precarious: divorce is more easily obtained than in any Christian sect. Properly speaking, it is not really divorce that is admitted by Islam—it is the husband's right of repudiation, which he may exercise almost as he pleases. Muslim custom does not give the same social importance to marriage as we do; the wife, always secluded in her apartments, or veiled, does not appear in society at all. A guest or a host must never speak to a Muslim about his wife, or ask any news of them. The education of the children, which is the great family duty in Christianity, is reduced almost to vanishing-point in Islam, and is hardly a subject of interest at all to the parents. Finally, the family makes no effort, such as is made among Christian races, to perpetuate or increase its prosperity and glory from generation to generation; it is, especially in despotic countries, at the mercy of the prince's whims, and may pass in a day from wealth to poverty.

The rules controlling the constitution of the Muslim family are supposed to be laid down by the Qur'an; but they are not found explicitly stated them. The motive is a remote and abstract custom. Muhammad formally sanctioned polygamy—for himself in particular, since he had several wives (nine, according to some traditions; fourteen, according to others), all of whom he regarded as legitimate; and he always had a revelation to justify these various marriages. But he did not approve of this large number of wives for the general mass of his followers. It is generally said that he forbade them to have more than four legitimate wives; the verse containing this rule, however, is not quite precise: 'If ye fear, says the Prophet (Qur'an, iv. 3), 'that ye cannot do justice between your wives, then marry two of them, or three, or four.' that is, do not marry too many wives if you are not sure of being able to bring up the children. Tradition has set this limit of four wives for ordinary believers, and has authorized the Khulifas and Sultans, as successors of the Prophet, to have nine. Muslims are also allowed, according to the most generally accepted tradition, to have as many slaves as they choose, to use as concubines at a moderate fee. Lower slaves are often among the women in the service of their legal wives, and hence arises a situation somewhat painful for the latter. This custom of unlimited concubinage does not appear...
to be formally sanctioned anywhere in the Qur'ān: certain Muslims, indeed, do not think it conformable to the pure teaching of their religion. It is, nevertheless, a custom that has always had wide vogue in Islam, and is, I think, mostly a survival of the ancient Persian origin. A large number of wives is one of the luxuries almost forced upon a personage of high estate by his position.

By legitimate wives are meant women of free or certain barbarous origin—e.g., among the Turks, the daughter or wife of a Turk. Slaves would include the Circassians, Georgians, and at one time even the Hungarians, Poles, and Muscovites, bought as a rule through the Jews; and also prisoners of war. The husband has the right to free a slave and take her as his legitimate wife.

Marriage with a woman of free status, which is marriage properly so-called, takes place by means of intermediaries; the husband and wife do not see each other until their union is consummated. Friends of the two families meet together, a matron visits the girl and gives the young man as exact a description of her as possible, and, if the description pleases, the dowry is fixed. The latter is paid by the man; this is not only a custom, but a Qur'ānic law. The Qur'ān says: 'Give women their doweries freely;' says the Qur'ān (iv. 2), and, 'if and when they are good enough to remit any of it to you of yourselves, then enjoy it at your ease.'

A dowry really represents a purchase: it is the price paid by the man for his wife, and is handed over to the parents of the girl, who give her up. The wife has full control of the dowry—at least after the necessary furniture has been bought. Certain parts of the marriage contract legally constitutes the marriage; as may be seen, it is scarcely more than a simple declaration. After the contract, the parties go to the mosque, with the bride (velled, of course) and a few relatives and friends, and the imām blesses the marriage. The woman is then taken to her husband's house; the wedding is celebrated by two feasts—one for the parents in the husband's apartment, and, at the end of the feast, the husband enters the nuptial chamber and sees his bride for the first time.

Muslim girls are married very early—usually at the age of from twelve to fourteen; sometimes they are betrothed when they are only three or four years old. Their parents are very anxious to have them married, and also remarried as soon as possible after being widowed or divorced. The state of celibacy, either for men or for women, is scarcely a possibility in the Muslim world.

The Qur'ān (iv. 29 f.) indicates what classes of women it is unlawful to marry:

1. Unlawful for you are your mothers, and your daughters, and your sisters, and your paternal aunts and maternal aunts, and your brother's daughters and your sister's daughters, and your foster mothers, and your foster sisters, and your wives' mothers, and your step-daughters who are your wards, born of your wives to whom ye have given in marriage, and that ye form a connexion between two sisters... and do not marry women your sisters-in-law.

It will be noticed here that foster mothers are regarded as real mothers; as to the prohibition against marrying mothers, daughters, and sisters, it must have been necessary in consideration of the teaching of the Jewish religion. Adultery, fornication, and the customary upon his words says that he must cohabit with them at least once a week.

Polygamy is a very costly luxury. The four legitimate wives cannot be for a long time united to one another; each one has her house, or at least her apartment, table, and domestics. Economical reasons are a check upon polygamy, and it is only the rich who can practise it. Men of moderate means and peasants usually only one wife; there are even men who prefer not to marry at all, and are content with the commerce of their slaves, the latter being
regarded as legitimate wives once they have borne a son. This method of procedure is in agreement with the spirit of Qur'an, iv: 3:

'It ye fear that ye cannot be equitable (i.e., that you will not be able to do your duty to the children), then marry only one wife.'

The Muslim woman's life appears to us as a very pitiable condition. She takes no part in the society of men; she seldom goes out, and is always veiled when she does go out. The same amount of seclusion is forced upon her by the Qur'an. The custom of veiling is also found in ancient Greece; it existed likewise among various Arabian tribes before the time of Muhammad; it was meant to protect the dignity of free-born women, and scarcely applied to any others. It was only the women of high social rank that Muhammad had in view when he imposed the rule of covering the face with a veil; his words did not apply to slaves or women of low station. The precept, however, has been put in practice by all Muslims, and peasants and even nomads wear veils; the latter, it is true, do not have them so well cut or so often washed; they hang loosely around their necks and are lowered only when passing a stranger. In Constantinople, after the revolution (A.D. 1909) which dethroned the Sultan Abdul Hamid, women have gone out un- veiled; and the shah of- al-sultan had to make a fated commanding them, on pain of imprisonment, to return to the observance of the law.

Women of high position go out very little; they pay visits to each other, and sometimes visit the shops, but rarely the mosque. Their chief amusement is going to the baths; but in the larger harims there are very elegantly built bathrooms, and so the women are not deprived of this motive for going out. The Turkish lady passes her day on a sofa, smoking, singing, spinning, embroidering, or sleeping. Many of them have had keen intellects in their youth, and have received instruction and even learned a little foreign literature; but their intelligence is apt to become dull in their seclusion, and their occupations are of necessity childish. Their chief concern is to please their husband; and they become expert in the arts of dressing and toilette.

In the larger harims the musical and dancing slaves have to give festivals from time to time.

Neither the Turks nor the Arabs are a prolific race; and the multiplicity of wives does not increase the numbers of children. The seduded life must be unfavourable to fecundity, and the desire for luxury gets the better of that of producing children. Many young women, slighted by their lord, pass the latter part of their lives in a kind of forced sterility in the women's workshop; and the keeping of these, besides, entails the sacrifice of a certain amount of virile force, for it is necessary to make a great number of enemics to keep in the paths of chastity a multitude of pretty slaves who are tormented by their sensual appetites and the ennui of the harim.

Children are brought up, to the age of seven, by the women, in the father's house; they are swaddled for eight or ten months, and are exclusively nursed by the mother, who suckles them for twelve or fourteen months (the Qur'an [xli. 14] says thirty months). If a nurse has to be requisitioned, she is treated with the greatest respect; she is called 'the foster mother,' and is generally a young slave who becomes free and is then regarded as a member of the family. The child is laid in a fine cradle and, in rich families, rocked by slaves. A fête is held to celebrate the day when it is put into short clothes, or has its hair cut for the first time, and another when it begins to walk. At about seven years of age, boys are circumcised and pass out of the women's care. This ceremony, which they like to perform for a fairly large number of children at a time, is the occasion of great rejoicings. The boys after circumcision may be seen walking in the streets of Muslim towns, dressed in rich clothes, and wearing turbans embroidered in gold and silver and surmounted by plumes, and their families also give gifts to the people at the door. See, further, CIRCUMCISION (Muhammadan), vol. iii. p. 677. Among the Arabs, this is also the occasion for giving the boys horses. Boys from the age of seven upwards go to school, where they learn reading, arithmetic, and a little of the Qur'an. In towns where there are Christian missionary schools the young Muslims sometimes attend them; even the little Muslim girls go to the schools managed by Christian priests. Sometimes the richer parents employ governesses to come to their houses, and they may be Europeans. All the girls learn to sew and embroider; they do not take the veil until puberty. See, further, EDUCATION (Muslim).

Muslim children have the greatest respect for their father and mother. This veneration is joined in several verses of the Qur'an (xlvii. 16–18, xvii. 241). A Tatar boy never sits down in presence of his father; and a Turkish boy always comes for his father's blessing at the festivals and chief events in his life. In important Arab families the father is a veritable king. The chief of a rich family is able to maintain a housekeeper and a servant, and to keep no less than twenty; he gives them houses of their own and finds them wives; this first marriage is arranged by the parents, whom the young man cannot but obey.

The Qur'an lays down some regulations as to wills; but they are not quite clear. The disposable portion is not stated in figures. It is said that 'men should have a portion of what their parents and kindred leave, and women should have a portion of the same, and kindred leave, whether it be little or much, a determined portion' (iv. 5); but it is not stated what portion. A son has a right to twice the portion of a daughter. A husband gets one-half of what his wife leaves if there are no children, a quarter if there are children. A widow gets a quarter of her husband's possessions if there are no children, an eighth if there are children. Thus we see that testamentary legislation is ruled by the idea of the woman's inferiority—an idea which dominates the whole system of Muslim family life. See, further, LAW (Muhammadan).

LITERATURE.—It is impossible to select a bibliography on this subject. All books on Muslim religion and all accounts of travels in Muslim countries contain information on the subject. Besides the Qur'an itself, it may be useful to consult d'Ossas's Tableau général de l'empire othoman, Paris, 1757–1803, which gives an account of Turkish customs at the end of the 18th century—"that is, at a time when the Turks had not yet been influenced by European thought;" the general works and memoirs recently published on Muhammadanism, e.g., by O. Houdas (Unislamisme, Paris, 1908) or M. Hartmann (Der islam, Orient, Berlin, 1899 ff.), and the present writer's La Doctrine de l'islam, Paris, 1909. There are numerous interesting details regarding life in the Seljuk harem in J. A. Guer, Histoire et mœurs des Turcs, Paris, 1745 (a very fine work); and a charming description of family life in the castle of an Arab nobleman is found in Emily Fages's Mémorial d'une princesse arabe, Paris, 1905.

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FAMILY (Persian).—Pride in an honoured lineage has always been as characteristic of the Iranians as of other peoples. Thus Darins i. traces his descent to Achaemenes (Bakht. i. 4–6), and from his father, Hormozd, he derives the Persian Iranian term for 'family,' tanumā (ib. i. 8, 28, 45, etc.), lit. 'seed.' There are, however, only meagre data on the various degrees of relationship, except the case of those between kinsmen and between father and son (ibid. and ibid. by zēr, 'seed, family' (cf. Heb. yṣ, 'seed, offspring'); and the plural of Av. asman, in the sense of 'kindred,' in Vend. xii. 21).
FAMILY (Persian)

child, and for this reason we must especially regret the loss of those portions of the Avesta Hāspāram Nāsk which treated of it. This is well illustrated by the variety of it, and the fitness of a man for it. About one's own family, and whatever is on the same subject. About the income of wife and children, however, we have a variety of it, and fitness for it; the violation of adoption, the sin of the son who is the next of kin for levirate.

The next of kin for levirate. A (heer) may be his wife, if she has no children by her first husband, who in any case has her in the future world; she is also a sister wife. A child orphan is not considered to be without the consent of her parents, from whom she inherits no property 

Apple apparently an orphan girl without uncles on either side was unmarried as (Dīnk. viii. 13). Polygamy was common, at least among the rich, among the Persians (Herod. i. 135; Strabo, p. 738; Ammian. Marcell. xxi. 76; Agathias, ii. 30) and Medians (Strabo, p. 526); and it also appears to have flourished among the Zoroastrian Iranians. As Geiger points out (Ostirān. Kultur, pp. 244, 247), there are Avesta passages, such as V. 22.7 (in the house of the righteous, women and children are present in rich abundance—frāpitvāu nārīkās frāportvȋ o aperenāqā), which imply this, while in Yasna xxviii. 1 there is plainly a reference to the women (doubtless the wives) of Ahura Mazda himself (yāsā tā ganahā māzād), and Zoroaster is represented by tradition as having three wives, two of whom were 'privileged' and the third a 'serving' wife (Bun. xvi. 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187; Tahkīn, xvi. 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187). In the later period, when the Mātigāz-t-Haḍar Dīštāt in was written, polygamy was expressly recognized (West, GT-P i. 17), but in India it was permitted only when the first wife had a husband. An example of this is given (Axonu Perrett, i. 501).

In regard to concubinage, it would seem that there was a sharp distinction between Zoroastrian and non-Zoroastrian Iranians. The Avesta contains no allusion to the concubine, and the chief references in Pahlavi literature seem to be Sāyāst tā-Sāyāst x. 21, xii. 14, the latter passage reading: 'It is well if any one of those who have their hands (tāwar) in cohabitation (zānī), and offspring is born of her, she shall accept all those who are male as sons; but those who are female are no advantage, because an adopted son is requisite, and there are many who do not appoint an adopted son with this idea, that: "The child of a handmaid may be accepted by us as a son."'

Among the non-Zoroastrians, on the contrary, concubinage was very common, at least among the wealthier class (EBC ii. 85; see also the evidence for the sasanian period, where there is to-day, a strong disapproval of marriage outside the Zoroastrian community (Dīnk. iii. 50, tr. Sanjana, pp. 90-102; the particular consideration is the marriage of a Zoroastrian to a Jewess, the marriage being largely those of lack of racial and religious sympathy. On the other hand, the marriage of princes from foreign lands was very frequent throughout Persian history, even in the sasanian period (Spiegel, Erdn. Alterthumskunde, iii. 679 f.).

When Zoroastrianism was still a proselytizing religion, a non-Zoroastian might be wedded after having embraced the Zoroastrian faith; but the modern Parsis have not merely abandoned proselytizing, but object strenuously to receiving converts, so that the problem of intermarriage has become more difficult than it was centuries ago.

The dowry of a widow who marries a second time is less than that of a virgin bride (Dīnk. v. 17, tr. Sanjana, p. 857), and, as already noted, half of her children by her second husband really belong to her first husband, as does she herself in the future world.

There was, besides the forms of marriage already mentioned, a quasi-levirate. According to al-Bīrūnī (India, tr. Sachau, London, 1885, i. 109), quoting Tansu:

'If a man dies without leaving male offspring, people are to examine the case. If he leaves a wife, they marry her to his nearest relative. If he does not leave a wife, they marry his daughter or the nearest related woman to the nearest related
male of the family. If there is no woman of his family left, they
wo, by means of the money of the deceased, a woman from some
marriage is considered as the offspring of the deceased. Who-
erness, if woman or girl is willing to stay and reared there,
sons, since he cuts off the progeny and the name of the deceased
to all eternity.'

The desire of the Iranians for children and their
their education have been considered elsewhere (ERE iii. 544, v. 207 f.). As
mentary to CHILDREN (Iranian), it may be noted that
childlessness is a curse (Yast xvii. 57), but special respect was paid to mothers

The principle of filial obedience was implanted by
and (Yasna xvi. 7), and the
Yast. xxxv. 6; cf. iv. 5.) that

'some teacher to a son reverence unto his father has also
appropriated the reward for reverence unto the creator for
teachers; hence, for this reason, because of reverence unto parents and service to them are connected
reverence unto the Creator and service to him.

The death of one's parents and other relatives, one is to celebrate the sacred feast (myazd), the consecration of the sacred caked (dhrin), and the benefactions (ofringin) for the
child's beneficiaries. There is a doctrine from the living (Sad Dar, xiii.; cf. vi. 2, xiv. 9).

Naturally, the father had certain duties toward his child (Dink. viii. xxxii. 21, xxxiv. 41); but, if
the principle of filial obedience was not shown, those
the man's suffering, his wife and mother, and asked no absolution and forgiveness
from their father and mother in the world,' had, in hell, 'their chests plunged in mud and stench,
and a sharp sickle ever went among their legs and other limbs, and they ever called for a father and
mother' (Artk-Vinr Namaq, ivx.)

In the Pahlavi Dastatán-i Dink, elaborate rules are given for inheritance, adoption, and guardianship.

The regulations for inheritance are as follows (ibid., 6):

'When there is nothing otherwise in the will and private
property of the deceased, who is a privileged, or if one gives
her anything by will, then she does not obtain the share pertaining
radical and in the order of descent; this share is not provided by this
every one has so much, and the wife may be a privileged
one has twice as much; and the share of that one of the sons,
or half-woman, or who is blind or is not capable of giving
in both feet, or raimed in both his hands, is twice as much as
the son of one who is sound; if there is no son of that man,
and if there be a daughter or wife of his, and if some of the
affairs of the man are such as render a woman not suitable for the

As a guardian to a family guardian; if there be, moreover, no wife or daughter of his, it is necessary to appoint
an adopted son.' The adopted-sonship and guardianship
ability to a family of the deceased, and is called
the adopted-sonship; and he is to be appointed to it who is
the nearest of the same lineage, who can manage and keep
the property united in its entirety. The guardianship is of
that when a guardian has to be appointed in that manner over
the property, if it is in the hands of those who are old, or infant, son
not fit for their own guardianship, so it is necessary to ap-
potent one.' Those who are suitable for such adoption
are a 'grown-up man of the good religion who is intelligent, a
complete ruler of a numerous household, expert in managing,
and the man being eligible,

'even when he has accepted either one adoption, or many adop-
tions.' Any woman, or even a child, is suitable for
one adoption, but when adopted in one family she is not suitable for
another adoption. A woman requiring a husband—though
a commoner, she cannot be adopted, but if infed, or one
having a sister worthy of death, is unfit for adoption; so also
those who are chosen by the neighbors, she who is untrustworthy (khosn
mتن) or courteuse, and she who is menstruous are unfit.
by its extensiveness, and the very superficiality of the matter. Thus the gods were interested in the fulfillment of the duties which attached to each of these four above-mentioned relationships. The divine duties of a man as a citizen of the State formed a part of the whole 'private,' or sacra familia; the duties connected with the worship of the Deities, those which he owed to the State, were called 'private,' or sacra publica; the divine duties connected with the other three relationships were included under the term 'private worship,' or sacra privata. Of these three relationships, the worship of the Gods, or gens sank so soon into insignificance that our knowledge of the sacra gentilicia is extremely scanty, and the subject need not trouble us here. The divine duties of the family form the theme of this article, but the individual was so involved with the family that we cannot eliminate him from our discussion. As a matter of fact, those elements which later assumed the characteristics of individualism were in their original state merely phases of family worship, expressing the relations of each individual to the family.

Our sources for a knowledge of the history of the family and of family worship in Rome are relatively scanty. The history of the State and of the State religion. Official documents, calendars, etc., which are so valuable for the history of the State religion, are of almost no service in the study of family worship, as they are exceedingly numerous, but they are almost all fragmental, and are therefore valuable only for our study of the cult of the dead. The very homeliness and familiarity of the subject from the standpoint of contemporaries is the cause of our ignorance; very few people take the trouble to speak about what everybody knows; hence our sources are largely incidental, e.g., among the poets, especially Plautus, Horace (Satires), Tibullus, Horace (Satires), Tibullus, besides a few late antiquarian writers, and the scholiasts and commentators on the poets. We might well despair of ever obtaining an adequate picture, were it not for one psychological fact, namely, that, though all religion tends to conservatism, there is no part of it which is more conservative and less subject to change than the religion of the family. Hence, though our sources are fragmentary and widely separated chronologically, they can be placed side by side to form a mosaic picture.

The deities worshipped by the family may be divided for convenience of treatment into two classes. One class consists of those deities whose cults have been more or less completely absorbed by the State, and for which we have only scattered references. The other consists of those deities which have remained intact; and the two groups of deities, the Dei Manes and the Di Penates, are the only ones with which we shall deal.

1. Deities regularly connected with the family.

The deities regularly connected with the family were either not included in the State cult at all, or, if included, were worshipped there as an imitation of the cult of the family, a symbolic representation of the State as merely an enlarged family. Chief among these deities are the Genius (and the Lares), the Lar, the goddess Vesta, and two groups of deities, the Di Manes and the Di Penates.

(1) The most important element in the worship of the family and the supreme duty of the individual was the worship of the deified ancestors, or Di Manes (literally, 'good gods'). At death each individual was conceived of as losing his individuality and becoming immortal merely as a part of his family, i.e., as one of the deities, or genii, of the family. Thus the prime duty of the head of the family was the regular and scrupulous fulfillment of the ancestral sacrifices; and it was also his paramount duty to provide for the welfare of the adopted son who could take up the burden of the sacrifices after he had laid it down at death. For further particulars, see DEIFIED ANCESTORS AND CULT OF THE DEAD, Roman.

(2) Quite distinct from this worship of the deified dead en natae was the cult of the protecting deity of the living; the guardian of each member of the family. This deity was called a genius, or 'priest of a man the Genius, in the case of a woman the Juno. The connexion of the individual with the family is shown very clearly in the original meaning of the name Juno: the deities who were thought of in a purely materialistic way, as the physical force employed in the maintenance of the family, the Genius (cf. genitors, and Censorinus, ii. 1) as the procreative power, and the Juno as the protective power. By degrees these ideas became more and more spiritual, until during the empire the Genius and the Juno stood for a sort of guardian angel. The Genius (we use the word here and onwards to express both Genius and Juno) was thought of as co-existent with the individual, born with him, passing through life with him, and finally dying with him. Hence the birthday of the individual was the chief festival of his Genius. On this day he worshipped his Genius (Latin natalis, or merely natalis or simply 'Natalis' (cf. Tibullus, ii. 2, iv. 5; Censorinus, ii. 1; similarly 'Juno natalis,' Tibullus, iv. 6. 1); and sacrifice of wine and milk and cake was made. The feasts connected with these birthday celebrations was naturally that of the master of the house, the paterfamilias. Slaves and freedmen often erected dedicatory inscriptions in honour of this event (cf. CIL vi. 297-299, 1919, v. 1868, x. 800, 801, ii. 356; and, for the Juno, i. 1324). From the time of Augustus the Genius received an additional emphasis from the fact that the Genius of the living household was no longer a god, but the first for the State at large, and afterwards for each family. The use of the Genius as a protecting deity of corporations, cities, buildings, etc., lies outside of our present discussion.

(3) But the religion of the family did not content itself with the cult of the deified dead and the worship of the Genius of the living; it paid homage, in addition, to the deities who protected those material things with which the family had to do—the house itself, the store-closet, and the hearth—viz., the Lar Familiaris, the Di Penates, and Vesta.

(a) The origin of the Lar Familiaris, or protecting deity of the family, is lost in the obscurity of the early phases of Roman religion; but the most likely view is that the cult of the household Lar (in the singular) is merely a branch of the general cult of the Lares (in the plural) at the cross-roads, the so-called 'Lares Compitales' (for a different view, cf. Samter, Familiengesetze der Gr. und Röm., Berlin, 1901; cf. also ERE iv. 336). The Lar Familiaris was thus the protector of the house and its inhabitants, especially the slaves (the familiae in the technical sense). The venerable farm-almanac of Cato directs that the husband's wife, the villicia, should place a wreath on the hearth on the Kalends, Ides, and Nones and set out on those same days a sacrifice to the Lar Familiaris for plenty (de Agric. 143). The Lar Familiaris formed the sentimental centre for all phases of family life, and offerings of wreaths, incense, and wine were made to him on all family anniversaries, and the Lar represented the primitive concept of home, and was the ideal figure about which the associations of the household clung. Before undertaking a journey, before entering the Roman house, the Lar represented the primitive concept of home, and was the ideal figure about which the associations of the household clung. Before undertaking a journey, before entering the Roman house, the Lar represented the primitive concept of home, and was the ideal figure about which the associations of the household clung. Before undertaking a journey, before entering the Roman house, the Lar represented the primitive concept of home, and was the ideal figure about which the associations of the household clung.
wreath was put on the Lar; and, when a member of the household died, the ceremony of purification which followed included the sacrifice of sheep to the Lar (Cic. de Leg. ii. 53). When a son put on the toga praetexta, the Lar Familiaris, and the amulet, the bulba, which the boy had worn up to that time, was hung about the neck of the Lar (cf. Pers. v. 31; Petron. 60; Prop. iv. 1, 15). At the birth of a child, the house of his husband, she placed one copper coin on the hearth as an offering to the Lar Familiaris, gave a second to her husband, and placed a third on the altar at the nearest cross-roads in honour of the Lares Compitales (Varro, in Nom. p. 331). Finally, various votive offerings were hung on the wall near the hearth in honour of the Lar, e.g. the weapons of the veteran soldier (cf. Ovid, Trist. iv. 8. 22; Prop. iii. 30. 21 f.; Hor. Sat. i. 5. 63 ff.).

(b) One of the most important rooms in the old Roman house was the cella penaria, or store-closet, corresponding to the room which in modern Italian houses is called the dispensa, containing the reserve surpluses and interests of the household, carefully distinguished from the pantry, where the day’s supply of food was kept after it had been taken out of the store-closet. It is characteristic at once of the independent practical nature of an early Roman religion that a group of gods who were supposed to be in charge of this store-room, and who received their names from it, formed one of the most important elements in the cult of the family. These gods were known as the Di Penates (penusae’, store-closet’), where Penates is not a proper name like Lar, Lares, but merely an adjective in agreement with Di; hence it was frequently a theme of discussion among the antiquarians of Rome to whom the Di Penates were, and whether any particular deity, e.g. Vesta, belonged to them or not. The real state of affairs seems to have been as follows.

The Di Penates originally were a group of otherwise nameless gods, and Vesta was not included in their number, though she was very closely associated with them, since the hearth, Vesta’s altar, was the place where sacrifice was made to them also. When Vesta was worshipped by the State in the forum, this relationship was recognized, and the Penates of the State, the ‘Di Penates P.R.Q.,’ were worshipped at the same altar. Later the Penates received their own State temple, and Homer and other poets record that Vesta and Penates entered the temple of Vesta, so that both they and Vesta preserved their independence. In private worship the reverse process took place, and the original association of Vesta and the Penates was never broken, but, instead, Vesta gradually lost her independent position, and was included under the title of the Penates. This explains the apparent neglect of Vesta in private worship. But, apart from Vesta, there was a constant tendency to abandon the group of nameless deities, and to include certain well-known gods among the Di Penates. The choice in such cases was governed by the particular circumstances and interests of the individual; hence we have many varying combinations, as may be seen in the frescoes on the kitchen walls of many of the houses of Pompeii (cf. Helbig, Kleine Abhandlungen über Vesta’s Tempelkomplexe, Leipzig, 1869, p. 19 ff.; de Marchi, II Culto privato, 1896, i. 79 ff.).

2. Deities occasionally interested in the family.

—Apart from those deities whom we have already mentioned, and who were constantly protecting the individual himself and his permanent surroundings, his house, his hearth, his store-closet, etc., many others of the gods of Rome were occasionally concerned in family life, so that it literally true that human life was hedged about by them from the cradle to the grave. Practically every one of the gods of the State came into contact with the family at some time during the life of the individual, and we shall speak here only of the more important of these temporary associations.

(1) The family was crowned with an aureole and the amulet, the bulba, which the boy had worn up to that time, was hung about the neck of the Lar (Cic. de Leg. ii. 53). From his standpoint a fair enough expression of the part which a host of minor deities was thought to take in the life of each household seemed to be that of a human being. The exact names of these deities, however, and the part which each took, are by no means certain (for further details, cf. the article Indigimenta’, by Peter, in Roscher’s Lexikon; and de Marchi, II Culto privato, i. 185, note 3); but the chief of these deities was Juno, who, under the cult name of Lucina, was invoked as the goddess of childbirth (cf. ll. 649). Another long list of deities cared for the child in its cradle, taught him to walk, protected him from the evil eye, and developed him to young manhood (for these deities, who also are uncertain, cf. Peter, i. 1, and de Marchi, i. 186 f. and notes). Certainty attaches, however, to the notion that a child was brought up in the cradle on the ninth day after birth in the case of a boy, and on the eighth day in the case of a girl (cf. Marquardt, Privatleben der Römer, Leipzig, 1888, p. 83), when the child was brought from the cradle to the cradle and the god of a sacrifice, and probably a banquet. One of the greatest proofs of the essential difference between Roman religion and Christianity, and of the absolute foreignness of Roman religion to our habits of thought, is found in the matter of the training of the child. We miss any act resembling in meaning either baptism or confirmation; religion and the State are so identical that the child as a citizen was necessarily partakes of the religious life of the State without any formal act of inclusion. Further, since religion consists so entirely in ritual acts and is so barren of theology, no formal religious instruction is necessary, but the child grows up learning by imitation when and how the ritualistic acts should be performed. The myths he learns partly from his nurse, partly in the schools, but principally by being surrounded by them in wall-decora- tion, literature, etc. The transition from boyhood to manhood was marked by the putting on of the toga virilis, and the offering of a sacrifice. The youth, accompanied by his family, ascended the Capitol, sacrificed to Jupiter, and was enrolled in the money-box of the goddess Juventas. The usual day for the performance of this rite was the Liberalia (March 17), the festival of Liber.

(2) From the standpoint of the preservation of the family, the most important act in the life of the individual is marriage; hence it is not surprising that it, too, was under the protection of the gods. But, while we see traces of religious observances surrounding all forms of Roman marriage, it is difficult to state exactly in what these ceremonies consisted. Of the three forms of marriage in Rome—conforrario, usus, and coeptio—only the first was attended by any special religious act, while the last two were affected by religion only as much as were all the acts of life. Common to both conforrario and coeptio was the avoidance, on religious grounds, of certain days for marriage. (Usus, being the condition of the Statia, or the day at the end of a year, did not permit of the choice of a special day.) The days thus avoided were: the Parentalia, or the feast of the dead, Feb. 15–21; the month of March, because of the festivals of the Salii and Mars; the month of May, because of the Lenanias—May 9, 11, 13—and because of the procession of the Argei on the 15th; June 7–15, because the temple of Vesta was being cleansed; the three days in the year when the lower world was thought to be open (mundus patet)—Aug. 24, Oct. 5, Nov. 8; in general the
FAMILY (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic).—When the Aryan peoples, including, of course, the progenitors of the Teutons and Balts, spread over Europe in pre-historic times, the connexion among many of the aboriginal tribes of our continent, certain forms of family life quite different from their own. Of these the most notable was the so-called patriarchal, i.e. that family organization—still surviving, as ethnologists tell us, in certain parts of the world—which, while it recognizes a marital relationship of longer or shorter duration, does not recognize the paternal relationship, as the children belong, not to the father, but to the mother, and inherit property, not from the father or paternal uncle, but from the mother, and especially the maternal uncle or grand-uncle. In connexion with the patriarchal family we frequently find, on the one hand, that women are held in high honour and even possess supreme power, and, on the other, that sexual life is marked by an astounding laxity and polyandry, of the marriage of blood-relations, and even of complete sexual promiscuity. A signal contrast to such conditions of family life is presented by what we know of the Aryan or Indo-Germanic stock, in which the existence of the so-called patriarchal or agnatic family is attested by the fact that the words express of family relationships are essentially the same in the various cognate languages.

Thus, for example, Goth. fadar corresponds to Lat. pater, Gr. πατήρ, Skr. पितृ, O.H.G. waster, O. Slav. mati, to Lat. mater, Gr. μητέρ, Skr. मातृ, Goth. éazna, Lith. tētā, to Gr. πατρίς, Skr. पत्रि, Goth. zemnis, O.H.G. waster, 'uncle,' to Lat. patruus, Gr. πατρος, Skr. पत्रो, Goth. sôter, 'grandmother,' to Lat. anna, A.S. ðēgna, 'grandchild,' Lith. nepeto, to Lat. nepos, Skr. नेपत, O.H.G. waster, 'daughter-in-law,' O. Slav. edelka, to Lat. nura, Gr. νύμφη, Skr. सुती, O.H.G. wehr, 'father-in-law,' Lith. æstari, O. Slav. výstar, to Lat. soror, Gr. ἥρων, Skr. jñātī; Goth. svistar, 'mother-in-law,' to Lat. sover, Gr. ἥρων, Skr. jñātī; O.H.G. fahēzen, 'husband's brother,' to Lat. leucri, Gr. ἱδρωτ, Skr. žūkr; O. Slav. struk, 'sister,' to Lat. gēla, Gr. γυναῖ, O. Slav. jetry, 'husband's sister's wife,' Lith. bate, to Lat. jœdicula, Gr. ἐδριακές, Skr. jñātī, etc.

These examples of the terms applied to family relationships show incontrovertibly that the foundations of the modern family were already laid in primitive Aryan times, and it is the object of the present article to treat of this institution in fuller detail, more especially as found among the Teutons and Balto-Slavs. We do not propose to deal separately with these two ethnological groups, as it will be seen that in many cases the bearing of the subject in one group becomes fully intelligible only by reference to the other. The subject-matter will be arranged according to the three headings of (1) marriage, (2) husband and wife, and (3) the other inmates of the household.

1. Marriage.—From the earliest times we find in either group two forms of marriage, viz., marriage by purchase and marriage by capture. As regards the ancient Lithuanians, we have the following item of information in Michalonia Lituan i de moribus Tartarorum Lituanorum et Moscorum (Part I: 171-173; Part II: 489-490), by Ch. Kasus (Basel, 1615): "The Lithuanian women arranged men in a modum et in nostra olim gente solvahab paterni- bus pro sponsis pretium, quod krieno (purchasemoney': Skr. kriēṇā, 'I buy') a Samagiits vocatur." The ancient Prussians, Peter of Dulsburg (in Script. Maguncia, Hortus Eboracensis, Leide, 1608) writes: "Secundum antiquam consuetudinem loco
habent Prutheni adhibe in usu, quod uxorres suas emunt pro certa summa pecuniae. With reference to the ancient Slavs, see below. In Old Russian a man whose name was called a "marten," from *arme* (<Arminius) "marten," because her parents might exchange her for marten-skins, the usual medium of payment in ancient Russia, just as Homer speaks of a maiden and their "scutum," a marten-skin, saying that she brought her parents a bride-price in the form of cattle. To this day among the Russian peasantry, the first act of the nuptials is the suit or proposal (vsetiane), which is a purely commercial transaction. The father of the suitor, the suitor usually accompanied by a relative, visits the girl's parents and says, 'We have a purchaser; you a commodity: will you sell your ware?' Then follows the bargaining, which is, in our informants state, differs in no respect from a negotiation about the sale of a cow.

The well-known reference of Tacitus to the marriage customs of the ancient Germans (German. hist. 3: 18, non uxor maritii non uxor maritus offerat. Intersunt parentes et propinqui ac numerus probant [i.e., marriage was an affair of the whole family-group], non ad delicacies multihabes quasitas nec quibus, non patria conatus, sed boves [cf. *darta*, *darta*] de fringibus et scutum commissum gladique. In hae munera uxor recipit) can hardly refer to anything else than a commercial transaction of similar character. For the fact that marriage by purchase is commonly practiced among the Teutons till a much later period is shown by numerous passages in the vernacular records.

Cf. e.g. *te thena gilhas giboth lit te brudil* (O. Sax.); *die lordel ehalt cae dawe e gift, baimo and baumg* (A.S.). The Teutonic term for the bride-price appears in Old English as *wifgeat* and in Old Saxon as weston, words in which in some cases to some extent changed their meaning (cf. N. H. O. wittum, "widow's estate"), but which, alike in form and signification, were originally equivalent to the Homeric *fiev (cf. *flevon*, "gift to the bride's parents." If we assign to this word a root with a double termination (e.g., *feb*), we can trace the A.S. *wifgeat* and Gr. *heson* to the oldest term for marriage in the Aryan tongues: Lith. *vedai*, O. Russ. *vedeti*, lit. "to lead" (sewedai, "wife"), Skr. *veda*, "wife," Avest. *wedas*, "woman," *vedaryga*, "marriageable"; so that A.S. *wifgeat* and Gr. *heson* mean literally "the price for taking home the bride." 

Side by side with marriage by purchase is found marriage by capture. The co-existence of the two forms is seen most clearly in eastern Europe. Thus, according to the Chronicle of Nestor (ed. Mikielievs, Vienna, 1600), cap. 10: "they (the ancient Slavs) had their customs and the law of their marriage, and their marriage, and their marriage customs, and for their fathers, were said to be, before their daughters-in-law and their sisters, their mothers and parents, and showed great respect for their mothers-in-law and sisters-in-law. They had a marriage (bridegroom) system... but the Devil's (forest) folk lived in bravish fashion; they lived like wild beasts; they killed one another, ate unclean things, and had no marriage (bridegroom), but abducted (inmyshksti meshes) the young woman. And the Radimici (sons of Radim, on the Ori, the Vistula (sons of Vistula), on the Oka, and the Seres (people of the North), had all identical customs: they lived in the woods like wild beasts, and ate all manner of unclean things; they carried on levirate conversations before their parents and daughters-in-law. They had no marriages (bridegroom), but captured the women between the woods, in these games, dances, and all kinds of devilish sportings, and these women were carried off the woman with whom he had come to terms. Each man, moreover, had at least three wives."

Among the Baltic tribes likewise—the Lithuanian, Livonians, and Curétes—as also among the Muscovite and Ruthenian, as we learn from the *Historia de gestis agricultarum Rusinorum* (Rome, 1555) of Archbishop Boleslaus Magnus, marriage by purchase or by capture was quite common. Of the Lithuanians in particular, Lasciuinus (de Dileta Sanguisgerum, cap. 56) writes as follows: "Nece ducuntur (puellae), sed rapuntur in matrimonio nocturno et uterque a Lycegro instituto. Rapianur autem non ab ipsio sponso, sed duxus ejus cognatis." Cf. also M. Protectorius, *Deliciae Prusacae*, ed. W. Pierson (Berlin, 1871), p. 69: "Eranus Franchini, in his *Mirror of Mirth*, lib. 5, c. 3, p. 508, speaks thus of the Prussians: "In many localities their marriageable daughters were little hells or cymbals, which were offered to the bridegroom by a ribbon and little bit of the marriageable, so as to give a sign to suitors that the fruit was ripe. Nevertheless, they did not offer themselves directly, but allowed themselves to be courted and mated by the suitors. They were carried off, however, not by the bridegroom himself, but by his two syni (birds)."

Among the Russian peasantry the two forms of marriage referred to, viz. marriage in the recognized sense (bridegroom)—which, as we saw, was simply marriage by purchase—and "predatory marriage" (vsetiane), marriage by capture (magykande), or whatever else it may be called, still exist side by side, though the latter has receded farther and farther into the wooded country to the east of the Volga. For a fuller discussion of predatory marriage in Russia, see Schrader, *Sprachwgrl. u. Urgesch*, ii. 326 ff.

In the Teutonic area, marriage by purchase was much less in vogue than marriage by capture, but that it prevailed there not merely in isolated cases but as a general practice is rendered probable by its existence among related peoples, such as Indians, Greeks, and Romans (Schrader, p. 321).

Further, with reference to the Teutonic peoples, times, we have the witness of Tacitus (Ann. i. 45) to the predatory marriage of Arminius and the daughter of Segestaes, who had been betrothed to another—a proceeding that led to a deadly warfare between the two family groups, and was finally concluded by Olaus Magnus (see above), family feuds were rife among the peoples of the North-east, 'prepiter rapsitas virgines et arripiendas.'

2. Husband and wife. Marriage by purchase or by capture, then, the young woman passed under her husband's authority—a state which the Roman-Teutonic legal documents speak of as *munidion* (O. H. O. munt, 'hand'); in other words, the woman became the man's property. The idea that in the married state the man and the woman enjoyed equal rights in relation to each other, as regards the Teutonic and Slav peoples in primitive times, absolutely baseless. A specific confirmation of this is found in the fact that originally the man's act of marriage had quite a different terminology from the woman's. This phenomenon has been preserved most faithfully in the Slavic dialects. Thus have we, e.g., O. Russ. *zentaja, zentaja* (with a wife), as predicated of the husband (Lit. *in matrimonium ducere*), and ystizum ("to walk behind the man," i.e., when the woman is taken in marriage). Further, terms like Fr. *mariage" and Ger. *heiraten* (O. H. O. *kwerti*, marriage, Lit. *choosing*), as used of either the man or the woman, are of relatively late origin.

In the original Aryan language the man to whom authority the woman was thus subject was styled *poti* (Skr. *pati*, "poti", domestic sway," i.e., 'married life," 'lord and master.' This term may still be traced in the Goth. *beidja*, bridegroom, Lit. *maiden's lord,* and appears also in the Slavic compound *vost-poti*, Russ. *gospodi*, lit. *master of the strangers who come into the family* (O. Slav. *gost*). At a still earlier stage of Aryan speech the word *poti* was not simply "himself" (cf. Lith. *pati*, and Avest. *vasti-poti, himself," but it is a singular fact that over wide tracts of the Slavic and Teutonic area the master of the house is to this day habitually referred to as "himself." Thus, among the Russian commercial class, which maintains the old built Russian marriages with remarkable fidelity, "himself* (in relation to the woman and the household generally), and *st*, "herself* (in relation to the children and the home), are the usual designations of husband and wife respectively. Os- trovskij, the brilliant delineator of this old Russian commercial class, has in his stage given numerous instances of the "poti" ("some authority," 'self-loving,' cf. Russ. *sam, sent,* durak, "fool") of the ancient Moscow merchant, whose wife and children were treated as mere *poti*. Thus, among the Muscovite, Lithuanian, Czech, and Poles, as also throughout the Scandinavian Peninsula, corresponding designations are popular; the husband of a peasant and his wife (Norweg. *han, stje*, *hjord), while in many parts of Britain ('hiself' and 'herself' are popularly used in the same way.

We proceed to a more detailed account of the relations between husband and wife in the earliest
times. It is beyond question that as regards the Teutons and Balto-Slavic we must start from the stage of polygamy. It was not until A.D. 1249 that the ancient Prussians formally bound themselves to abandon the custom of having three or four women as wives, and to marry only with one (cf. Hartknoeh, Das alte u. neue Preussen, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1854, p. 117). Polygamy, according to the Chronicle of Nestor, was practised also by the ancient Slavs. We must likewise assume that polygamy was originally prevail'd in the case of the Teutons, among whom, and especially among the Norsemen, a wide-spread practice of polygamy was long maintained (cf. Adam of Bremen, iv. 21); here, indeed, we find that a man might have as many as nine wives. Among the Germans, however, as referred to by Tacitus in Germ. 15 ("man proprie soli barbororum singulis uxoribus contenti sunt, exceptis adnominand. parcii, qui non libidinem, sed ob nobilitatem plurimis nuptis ambitur"), there seems to have been a marked leaning towards monogamy. But the concurrent existence of an extensive system of concubinage is proved by the fact that the term kobies ("concubine") is found in all the Teutonic dialects.

The strongest possible contrast to this sexual freedom on the husband's part is seen in the position of the wif. Theateful penalties wreaked upon the unfaithful wife among Teutons and Slavs are indicated in art. CHASTITY (Teut. and Balto-Slav.), vol. iii. p. 490ff. That article emphasizes the fact that the erring wife was punished not so much for unchastity in the proper sense as for yielding her person to another without the knowledge and consent of her husband and owner. This may be safely inferred from the two institutions discussed in the article referred to, viz. various promiscuous prostitution and lending a wife to a guest, both of which are found in the Teutonic, and the former also in the Slavic domain. And in another respect the patriarchal family system was everywhere associated with the depreciation and servitude of women. The idea that a woman is in some way a creature of inferior rank prevails to the present day in rural portions of Eastern and South-eastern Europe. The wife of the Russian peasant could not well conceive of a mode of life without the uelit ("discipline"), i.e. flogging by the husband. If, when she did wrong, her husband did not have her scourged she would think that he no longer loved her. Nor, except by reference to similar practices, or at least, to the vestiges of such practices, among the Teutons, is it possible to explain what, according to the writer of the German Nibelungenlied, Queen Kriemhild, after her wrathful insults to Brunnhild, says of her husband (xx. 904):

"Das hat mich getreneue — sprech das edel wip—
Souch hat er mi zeltenowen dar umwe mien hlp;
Das ich le bewerte ir mit rede den men.
Das hat vil wol erdenchen der helt kleine nade gut."

Of no less significance for the position of women was the universal custom which forbade them to eat with the men, and compelled them to take their meals by themselves. Thus, when the Nibelungs came to Beochelaren, they were met by the Margrave Ruediger and his wife, and then, as we are told (xxii. 1671):

"Nach gewonheit dà schleder si sich dà —
In many districts, as, e.g., in the island of Spjalland, the men sat, while the women stood at table, the wife taking her position next to her husband, and then the daughters and maids to her left. In Sorbo, as recently as the reign of Milosh Obis it is admitted that the somewhat sombre picture of women's position among

FAMILY (Teutonic and Balto-Slavic)
the Teutons and Slavs of archaic times is here and there relieved by brighter touches. Women were regarded as prophetesses (Tac. Germ. 8: 'misce quin etiam sanctum aliquid et providum putant, nec aut occulti aut responsa negligunt'; for their horrible modes of divination, see art. Aryan Religion, vol. i. p. 54); and Divination [Tent., vol. iv. p. 527], as physicians (Tac. ib. 7: 'ad matres, ad coniuges vulnera ferunt; no illis coniuges aut exergae plebes parentis'), and as helpers in war (Tent. loc. cit.: 'elbossa et hortamina pugnantibus gestant'). These various traits are found also among the Slavs, and especially the sons of a sort called 'master of the house', the specific term for the Teutonic house community (cf. O. Kauffmann, Worter und Sachen, Heidelberg, 1911, ii. 26 ff.).

The epoch in the system by which a son left his father's house at his marriage and founded a home of his own, superseded the house-community on Teutonic soil (where the change occurred earlier than among the Slavs) to that which awaits further investigation. But it is beyond question that at some time the same conditions existed among the Teutons as we saw above to have prevailed among the Slavs.

We must now turn to speak of the persons who thus lived in separate families, and indeed, which is the earliest traceable form of the family among the Aryans and, derivatively, the Teutonic and Slavic peoples.

(a) Parents and children.—Possibly the term that comes nearest the primitive conception associated with the former word is the Gothic, faðrain, lit. 'fatherhood,' which Ulfilas uses for 'parents,' and which, in its derivation from the word for 'father,' is but a late form of a root *h₂₃r₃₃, 'father.' The absolute authority of the father over his children began from the moment of birth, as it lay within his option either to recognize the newly-born infant by the symbolic rite of 'lifting' it, or to doom it to exposure. With the former act was associated a kind of baptismal initiation, the child being immersed, immediately after its birth, in the waters of the Rhine, a practice that seems to have been adopted from the Aryan. It is worthy of note that an abulutionary ceremony of similar import is found also among the Babylonians (cf. ZERV xxii. 1900 434 ff). The right of exposing infants, which, notwithstanding the averments of Tacitus (Germ. 19: 'numerum liberorum finire flagitium habetur'), was frequently exercised among the Teutons, doubtless bore most heavily upon females, the birth of whom was in ancient times so frequently regarded as a calamity. Even to-day, indeed, if a Lithuanian, whose family numbers five, three sons and two daughters, is asked how many children he has, he will answer 'Three,' as he looks upon the males as adults and the females as children. What Caesar (de Bell. Gall. vi. 10) says of the Gauls ("Viri in uxoribus, sicuti in liberis, vitae necisque habent potestatem") holds good without qualification also of the Teutons, Letts, and Slavs. Of the Fririans, Tacitus (Ann. iv. 72) writes: 'Ac primo boves ipso, max agros, postremo corpora coniugum aut liberorum servitio tradebant'; while the Russian peasant, as depicted in folk-song and village tale, could exercise, even down to modern times, the same unlimited authority (patria potestas) over his family as was enjoyed by the paterfamilies of ancient Rome.

(b) The aged.—The family circle of the house-community would, of course, in like manner, include grandparents.
and grandmothers, grand-uncles and grand-aunts, and even great-grandparents, living in the 'old people's quarters.' Their lot would scarcely be a happy one, for the temperament of primitive peoples, especially of the Teutonic tribes, was hard and unsentimental. In point of fact, we know that among the Teutonic and Baltic tribes, as in Europe and Asia generally, it was a common practice to abandon the aged, with the consent of their kinsmen, cf. with reference to the Teutonic Heruil, Procop. de Bell. Goth. ii. 14: ἑνδικα ταῖν ἡγὼ ἡνόγ ὁλη ἐπινάκει ὁ εἴγεντος τοῖς συγγενεῖς αἰτείςδα δηγάτα ἐν ἄνθρωπον οὐν ἀφιέται; and, with reference to the present Prussians, Harknoch, op. cit. p. 181: 'At the order of the wiedelevanti (i.e. priest) they smothered their own parents when they became old or fell into a severe illness, so that they should incur no unnecessary expense in their regard.'

(c) Brother and sister.—Of the relationships among the younger members of the house-community, that of brother and sister merits special notice. Among Teutonic and Baltic tribes, as among the Aryan peoples, the brother might be designated the moral sponsor of his sister, and, after their father's death, her guardian in general. It was the custom among the Slavonic peoples to find on the marriage night not to be a maid, to hang a halter around the neck of her brother, and to compel him to wear it throughout the marriage feast. In Russian folk-song the brother is represented as taking a prominent part also in the transactions regarding the bride-price. We find an indication of the Teutonic practice in a verse of the Nibelungenlied (i. 4):


Among the Letto-Lithuanians the strong bond of affection between brother and sister forms at once a special feature of common life and a favourable theme of popular poetry.

(d) Uncle and nephew.—It was noted above that the Aryan term for 'father's brother' can be traced in the O.H.G. futruo, Lat. patrus, Gr. πάτρος, Skr. patrena. We find no corresponding Aryan term for 'mother's brother,' who, of course, was not a member of the agnatically constituted house-community; but it is worthy of note that the Teutonic term chorda (cf. chorda Slavonic, Old Prussian (awiso), and Slavie (awio)) forms for 'uncle' are all derived, though in quite different ways, from the Aryan root for 'grandfather' and 'grandmother' (grandu and granda). The Latin 'uncle' has not as yet been satisfactorily explained. It is beyond question, however, that in several of the Teutonic dialects, as in the Celtic group throughout, the Aryan word for 'grandchild' (Skr. nayot, Lat. nepos, etc.) has by a corresponding linguistic process come to mean 'nephew' in the sense of sister's son. Now, these two more recently formed correlates, uncle and nephew (i.e. mother's brother and sister's son), acquired great importance among the Teutonic peoples, as appears not only from the remarks of Tacitus (Germ. 29): 'Sororum filies idem apud avunculum qui apud patrem honor. Quidam sanctiores adiremone bene nuxam sanguinis arbitrantur,' but also from the fact that in Old English and Old Danish poetry uncle and nephew on the female side are represented as being most intimately associated alike in peace and in war. This is not to be explained by the matriarchal system among the primitive Teutons, as the ancient law of succession there was of the agnatic form (Germ. 20). But it is a possible conclusion that the Teutons were influenced in this respect by non-Aryan peoples who reckoned by female descent, and that among the former the mother's brother thus came to enjoy what was rather a position of honour than a strictly legal status.

(e) Mother-in-law and daughter-in-law.—As we have seen, the son brought his bride (O.H.G. bried, briedes, as's bride) to his father's house, and he lived with her in the circle of his own kindred. The converse case, i.e. where the bridegroom joined the wife's household and became an 'adopted one,' or 'incomer' (Russ. статский сын, Stepson, or a 're-heater' (Lith. for one who marries a widow), is also, as these terms indicate, to be met with in all parts, but was certainly of sporadic occurrence, and must not be postulated as a characteristic feature of the earliest times. The young wife's residence with her husband's parents was at first no pleasant experience for her. As the Russian folk-songs indite, with abundance of concrete detail, she was an object of mockery, and the hardest drudgery was laid upon her. She suffered most, however, at the hands of her mother-in-law, who often resorted to the knot; and, indeed, as the house-community was the nursery of patrie potestates, and of the tutelage of women, so was it the source of the old popular notion of the 'wicked mother-in-law.' That expression applied in ancient times to the husband's mother only, not to the wife's mother; for the bride was found on the marriage night not to be a maid, to hang a halter around the neck of her brother, and to compel him to wear it throughout the marriage feast. In Russian folk-song the brother is represented as taking a prominent part also in the transactions regarding the bride-price. We find an indication of the Teutonic practice in a verse of the Nibelungenlied (i. 4):


In ancient times, the husband's mother only was regarded as the woman to whom the eldest son was to be married; the younger sons were to marry women of lesser rank. Thus, Rovinskij, vol. iii, p. 501)

(f) The widow.—The melancholy fate of the average Teutonic widow in the days of pagan times has not as yet been satisfactorily explained. It is beyond question, however, that in several of the Teutonic dialects, as in the Celtic group throughout, the Aryan word for 'grandchild' (Skr. nayot, Lat. nepos, etc.) has by a corresponding linguistic process come to mean 'nephew' in the sense of sister's son. Now, these two more recently formed correlates, uncle and nephew (i.e. mother's brother and sister's son), acquired great importance among the Teutonic peoples, as appears not only from the remarks of Tacitus (Germ. 29): 'Sororum filies idem apud avunculum qui apud patrem honor. Quidam sanctiores adiremone bene nuxam sanguinis arbitrantur,' but also from the fact that in Old English and Old Danish poetry uncle and nephew on the female side are represented as being most intimately associated alike in peace and in war. This is not to be explained by the matriarchal system among the primitive Teutons, as the ancient law of succession there was of the agnatic form (Germ. 20). But it is a possible conclusion that the Teutons were influenced in this respect by non-Aryan peoples who reckoned by female descent, and that among the former the mother's brother thus came to enjoy what was rather a position of honour than a strictly legal status.

(g) The bachelor.—The house-community was characterized by the rarity rather than by the frequency of bachelorhood. It cannot be doubted that the primitive Aryan race regarded marriage as an obligation from which there was no discharge (for the grounds of this idea, see art. Aryan Religion, vol. iii, p. 515). Hence, even when she was not forced to follow her husband in death she would doubtless be prevented from marrying again (cf. Tac. Germ. 19: 'melius quidem adhaesce civitates in quibus tantum virgines nubunt et eumque vocant uxorius semel transigatur'). It seems to have been the ancient practice that the son, after his father's death, should take possession of his stepmother or stepgrandmother; cf. Prus. de Bell. Goth. iv. 20:


Thus, F. A. Rovinkski, an eminent authority on the social life of these regions, writes as follows of the Russian and Lithuanian customs: 'The idea of marriage is insisted upon still more emphatically: a man

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can be designated as a human being (ζωή only) when he is married, for by this he will always be spoken of as but "youth," lit. "child" (δίπετον). In Servia and Bulgaria likewise marriage is held to be a duty absolutely binding upon all.

Similar views prevail in certain rural districts of Germany. A man who had died unmarried was still an object of the survivors' solicitude. The Arabic tradition has been that the Phoenicians, two visitors to Asia in his commercial journeys, writes thus of the people as he saw them:

They cremate their dead, laying their weapons, their bearts of the dead upon the same pyre. When a man dies, his wife is burned alive with him; but when the enclosure-owner, and was originally the technical term for the peasant who had no allotment in the communal land of the Teutonic settlements, but was restricted to a small fenced-in portion of the soil, quite insufficient for the support of a family. The Sanskrit word for 'bachelor,' 

(h) Slaves.—In the lower stages of civilization there is never any marked outward distinction between bond and free. What Tacitus records of the Germans in this regard (Germ. 20: 'Dominum ac servum nullus educationis deliciis dignocebat: inter cadem pecora, in cadem humo degunt, dune actas separat ingeniosus; virtus agnoscet) is proved by the evidence of language to have been true of the Slavs no less than of the Teutons, as the Teutonic and Slavic designations of male and female slaves (e. g. A.S. Aiwon [pl.] 'domestica'; O. Slav. semipf. 'mancipia'; Lthic. sewinyena, 're-tainers') are in many cases derived from the already noted terms for 'house-community,' *hieva and simiefu, thus showing that the slaves likewise were reckoned among the inmates of the house.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the literature given throughout the art., cf. O. Schrader, Ueber die indogermanische Hl. Blgg., 1901 (2nd ed. in preparation), Die Schoneggermutter u. d. Hagestolz, Brunsvik, 1904, Tonenhöchst, Jenia, 1904, Brunsvik, Q. Cognates, S. Jena, 1907 (esp. ii. 300 ff.), and Die Indogermanen, Leipzig, 1911 (esp. p. 74 ff.).

O. SCHRAEDER.

FAN (Anglo-Sax. 'fann,' from Lat. vanus 'wet-nosed')—A instrument for purifying grain by throwing it into the air. Cognates of vanus are ventus, 'wind,' 'winnow' (see Walde, Lat. etymol. Worterbuch, Heidelberg, 1910, s. v. 'Vanus'). For variant English forms of the word and historical steps in meaning, see OED and the English Dialect Dictionary (s. v.). The Gr. equivalent of vanus, λισσόν, and its by-form, ϵέλλο, go back to a root *noloi, 'to clean' (cf. sīs, 'to wash'); the L anglicized in German as- into the sense of cleaning 'grain' (see J. Schmidt, Kritik der Sonantentheorie, Winnaar, 1895, p. 107 f.). The Gr. word for the fork or shovel form of fan, πτέω, is related from an onomatopoeic root ρέω, meaning 'to spit out.' The Gr. and Lat. words for 'sieve,' λισσόν and crinitum, mean simply 'separator.' Normally they are used for perforated instruments, but Pilato's λισσόν τερπέων (Gorgias, 403 B) may point to a time when the sieve, like the fan, was not perforated.

1. Shapes of fan and methods of use.—Two principal forms obtain. (1) A long-handled instrument, which may be a fork, a toothed spade, or a shovel. It is used like the modern hayfork. After the grain is threshed, the mixture of broken straw, chaff, and corn is turned full circle, so that the wind may blow away the lighter material. The 'fan' and shovel of Is 30:24 are instruments of this kind, such as are still in use in modern Palestine (see infra). In the latter, the fan is designated by the Hebrew word, 'shovel,' where specimens are figured), and, indeed, all over the world. Such instruments lent their symbolism to religion, e. g. Lk 3:3 'whose fan is in his hand,' and he will thoroughly purge his floor'; but, so far as we know, they were not employed in Palestine in actual ritual. But on the steatite vase of Hagia Triada in Crete (JHS xxiv. [1904] 249, fig. 7; see Literature, infra) pronged forks are carried in what seems to be a ritual harpoon procession. On an Egyptian sculptured slab of the XVIIIth dynasty, now in Bologna, a winnowing-spade is seen erected on a heap of corn offered to the serpent-goddess of the granary, RWN! About it are grouped two pairs of handle scoops, a pair of sweepers, and a three-pronged fork (JHS, loc. cit., fig. 1). The custom still prevails in Teneiree of erecting the winnowing-spade when the work is over. But it seems to have no ritual association. Among the Greeks the winnowing-spade (πτέων) was set up in honour of Demeter. Theocritus at the end of his Harvest Idyll (vii. 155) prays:

'O once again may it be mine to plant
The great fan on her corn heap, while she stands
Kneeling with sheaves and poplars in her hand.'

(2) It is the second form of winnower, the winnowing-basket, that is of cardinal importance in ancient ritual and mysticism, and this for a reason offered to the serpent-goddess of the granary, RWN! About it are grouped two pairs of handle scoops, a pair of sweepers, and a three-pronged fork (JHS, loc. cit., fig. 1). The custom still prevails in Teneiree of erecting the winnowing-spade when the work is over. But it seems to have no ritual association. Among the Greeks the winnowing-spade (πτέων) was set up in honour of Demeter. Theocritus at the end of his Harvest Idyll (vii. 155) prays:

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FAN. Its shape is seen in fig. 1, a modern winnowing-basket (or fan) from France, now in the Ethnographic Museum, Cambridge. The method of its use, now rapidly becoming a lost art, is seen in fig. 2; the essential feature in the winnowing-corb, as for cleanliness and brevity we shall call it, is its shovel shape, one side being left open. The distinguishing point in its use is that, in the winnowing by the corb, as contrasted with the fork, though the mixture of grain and chaff

FIG. 1. Fan from France.
is in a sense ventilated, the wind plays no part in the process. By a particular knack of jerking and working the basket—a knack difficult to acquire and almost impossible to describe—the chaff is gradually propelled forward and out of the basket and the grain left clean. Columella (1st cent. B.C.) knew that the wind played no part in the use of the *vannus*. He says (ii. 21): 'If the wind be low in all quarters, let the grain be cleaned by fans ( *vannus expurgentor*). Broadly speaking, the fork or spade was used for rough preliminary work, the basket for finishing cleaning. Some further confusion in terminology was caused by the fact that not only were winnowing-fork and winnowing-basket confused, but winnowing-basket was later writers identified with winnowing-sieve ( *ovibrum*, *klwava*). All had, of course, in common this factor only, that they were grain-cleaners: identity in function led to confusion as to form. That the winnowing-basket was called a *fan* or *van* in England, and was of substantially the same shape and use as that in fig. 2, is happily certain from a 14th cent. brass in the Church of Chartham (C. Bontell, *Monumental Brasses of England*, London, 1849, p. 35). On the sarcophagi, shields, and of Sir Robert de Setvars are embellished the family arms, the seven *fans* or baskets.

2. Ritual use and mysticism of the winnow-corb ( *vannus*, *liknon*) among the Greeks and Romans.—The *lucus classicus* as to the sanctity of the winnow-corb is, of course, the passage in the *Georgics* of Vergil (i. 165):

> *Virens praeterea Celos vitignem sulpelac,
Arbutae crateo, et mystica *vannus* lacchi.*

It is clear that to Vergil the *vannus* is a light agricultural implement made of wicker-work. He assumes its mysticism as known; but Servius in his commentary, though very confused as to forms, (1) makes clear that the *vannus* is our winnow-corb, and (2) gives some cause for the epithet *mysticus*. A portion of this long note must be quoted:

> 'The mystic fan of Iacchus, that is, the sieve of the threshing-floor. He calls it the mystic *vannus* of Iacchus because the rites of Father Liber had reference to the purification of the soul, and men are purified in his mysteries as grain is purified by fans. . . . Some add that Father Liber was called by the Greeks *Lakites*. Moreover, the *vannus* is called by them *liknon*, in which he is currently said to have been placed after he was born from his mother's womb. Others explain it being called "mystic" by saying that the *vannus* is a large wicker vessel, in which peasants, because it was of large size, used to heap their firstfruits and consecrate it to Liber and Libera. Hence it is called "mystic".'

The Latin *vannus* being the same as the Greek *liknon*, we can elucidate *vannus* from Greek usage. Harpocrater (c.e. *liknon*) has left us this remarkable statement:

> 'The *liknon* is serviceable for every rite of initiation, and every sacrifice.'

We begin with sacrifice. The *liknon* was serviceable for sacrifice, simply because it was a convenient basket in which to pile up firstfruits. It was not made to be a carrier—that is clear from the open end, which could only serve the purpose of winnowing—but it could and did serve to hold fruit or grain.

In a fragment of Sophocles (760 [Nauck]) the Athenians are addressed as 'Ye who pray

To Erasae, your bright-eyed child of Zeus,

With service of your winnow-corbs set up.'

In a Hellenistic relief (fig. 3), now in Munich ( Glyptothek, no. 601; T. Schreiber, *Hellen. Reliefbilder*, Leipzig, 1899, Taf. 50c), we see such a service: a little circular shrine, past which a peasant is going to market; in the middle of the shrine an ornamental pillar surmounted by the shovelf-shaped wicker-basket from which hang bells to scare away evil influences; in the basket are fruits, leaves, and the phallos, the sign of fertility. Servius is confirmed by this and many other monuments.

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**Fig. 2. Fan in use.**

**Fig. 3. Hellenistic relief: liknon holding firstfruits.**

The *liknon*, Servius tells us, was used as a cradle. For this the shoe-shaped basket was obviously convenient; the cradles of to-day are of similar shape. Diomysus as a child was called *Liknites*, 'He of the Cradle.' On the Pashley sarcophagus, now in the Fitzwilliam Museum at Cambridge (fig. 4), we see 'Him of the Cradle' carried by two men bearing torches. The *liknon* as cradle is closed in at the end, lest the child fall out. About this simple and convenient use of the *liknon* as cradle, a primitive mysticism of the 'sympathetic magic' kind speedily grew up.

The scholiast on Callimachus ( *Hymn.* i. 45), in telling of the *liknon*-cradle of Zeus, says:

> 'In old times they used to put babies to sleep in winnow-corbs as an omen for wealth and fruit.'

The child was put in the winnow-corb for what we should call 'luck.' Another scholiast (op. Aratus, *Phen.* 268) says that this was done immediately after birth (τὰ γὰρ βρέφη τα πρῶτα γενόμενα, κτλ.).

The same magical intent, dwindling gradually into mere symbolism, explains the use of the *liknon* in marriage rites. The pseudo-Plutarch ( *Prog.* Alex. xvi.) says:

> 'It was the custom in Athens at weddings that a boy, both of whose parents were alive (τῶν ἐνπάθων πατέρων), should carry a *liknon* full of loaves, and thereon pronounce the words, "If have I feed, better have I found (ἀνοιχτὸν καρδίν, εἴρην διδώνω)." The loaves of bread (ἄργυρον, fermented bread) have
FAN

The winnowing-fan in India. — The Indian equivalent of the fan, the winnowing-basket (śārpa), also merits attention in this connexion. It is one of the concomitants of the wedding ceremony in the period of the ēkāraṇa, and on that occasion the śārpa, containing four handfuls of roasted grain mixed with āgni leaves, is placed before the wedding fire (Hillebrandt, Ritualistik. [=GIAP iii. 2], Strassburg, 1897, p. 65 f.). Among the modern Baiswar, after the clothes of the newly-wedded pair have been knotted together, they do the usual five revolutions round the cotton tree, while the bridegroom holds a winnowing-fan (fanam) into which the bride's brother pours a little parched rice each time as they go round. The bride sprinkles the grain from the ground out of the fan, and both retire into the retiring room (Crooke, TOI. 129).

The winnowing-fan is also used among the Kols and Oraons in selecting a new village priest, since by its magical power it drags the person who

briefly to resume: in the mysticism of the 'fan' two elements are distinguishable: (1) purification, and (2) magical promotion of fertility. Any form of winnower, be it fork or basket, might have served as the symbol and vehicle of purification; but, as a matter of actual fact, mysticism gathered only round the basket, not the fork. Hence it is probable that the main element of the symbolism focused in the notion of fertility, and that the idea of purification was at first subsidiary. Later, when the idea of sin and release from it became prominent, the fan as purifier was more and more emphasized; and its symbolism was still further developed in relation to its perforated successor, the sieve. It must, however, always be remembered that, alien though it is to modern thinking, to the primitive mind purification and fertility charms are never far asunder. Fertility is largely induced by purification, i.e. by the purging away of all evil influences hostile to birth and growth. The other element in its induction is the bringing of things into contact with the source of growth or other living things, plants, fruits, running water, or whatever is supposed to be charged with life and grace, or, as the Polynesians call it, mana. The liknon was the vehicle of both procedures, and its use shows very clearly how the highest spiritual mysticism of New Birth and Regeneration may have its source in a rudimentary magic. You lay a child in a winnow-corb, you put a corb of fruits on a boy's head at a puberty rite, you carry a corb of grain and fruits in a marriage procession, and the winnow-corb becomes at once the symbol and the sacrament of the whole physical, moral, and spiritual field covered by the formulary (būrgos kākē, ēkāraṇa).
holds it towards the individual on whom the sacred mantle has fallen (Crooke, PL II. 189).

But, if the winnowing-baskct, through its association with grain, is often associated with ritual, a political function that has been so essentially employed to separate the evil from the good, so that Matangi Sakti, a form of Duraga (q.e.), 'carries a broom and winnowing-fan with which she sifts mankind (PL I. 133); and the essential difference between the two cases is that the sifting is not only a Sakti ('philosopher') that Greek philosophy was a unity, he laboured to reconcile Plato and Aristotle, and with this idea wrote treatises on The Aim of Plato and Aristotle, and The Agreement between Plato and Aristotle: the former title is that of his book. He also discussed certain interpretations of Aristotle proposed by Galen and John Philoponus, and composed an Intervention between Aristotle and Galen.

In the sphere of science, Farabi wrote commentaries on Aristotle's Physics, Meteorology, The Heavens, and The Universe, besides commenting on the Almagest of Ptolemy. To him also is due an essay explaining some difficult propositions from the Elements of Euclid. The occult sciences interested him, and he left writings on Alchemy, Geomancy, Genii, and Dreams.

This great philosopher was also a talented musician—a fact which accounts for the most explicit work on the theory of Oriental music. His musical talent excited the admiration of Saif ad-Daulah.

Farabi's style is somewhat peculiar. It generally takes the form of aphorisms which always appear condensed and profound, but sometimes become obscure by failing to maintain a methodical sequence. Farabi is indeed a difficult author, and it is to be a great study to be able to intelligently attempt to interpret the details of his system.

In the main body of his teaching he belongs to the so-called 'school of Philosophers,' i.e. to the school which represented the Neo-Platonic tradition in his time; his position in this school is between al-Kindi (older than Farabi, though not so well known) and Avicenna (a younger philosopher, who is very lucid and easy to study). Following Kindi, he prepares the way for the theory that we find explicitly formulated in Avicenna. His system, or at least his style of thought, is, however, more mystical than that of Avicenna. Mystical ideas and terms appear nearly all through his writings, and seem to be woven into the fabric of his system. Avicenna treats mysticism as a sort of supplementary chapter or a climax, quite distinct and separate from the rest of his system. The Orientals called Farabi the 'second master,' Aristotle being the 'first.' In giving this title to the Muslim thinker, it was especially his importance as a logician that they had in view.

2. Doctrines.—It is possible, by making a methodical arrangement of his sentences, to disentangle the principal theses of Farabi's doctrine and present them in a coherent form. This has been done by M. H. de Boor in an important work (see Lit. below) devoted to this philosopher and his writings. Isma'il al-Farabi (pp. 496-491). It is easier to recognize, under his arrangement, the teaching of Oriental scholasticism. The chief subjects of discussion are as follows. (a) In Logic: cognition, conceived as a resemblance of objects; perception, a means of cognition; representation, the first stage of cognition; the concept, assimilation and union with the object; the qualities of the objects; substance; and being; the qualities of bodies and the accidents; causality and the relations in the physical world. (b) In Psychology: the principle of life, breath; the faculties and their objects; vegetable, animal, and intellectual faculties; the soul, capable of desire, fear, anger; the external senses; the internal senses; common sense (in the
scholastic meaning of the term) and memory; imagination, cogitation, instinct; human intelligence, with its logical faculties; and the active intellect which receives illumination from God. (c) In Metaphysics: being, the source of being, non-being; the proofs of God's existence; the necessary and the possible; potentiality and action; species and individual; substance and accident, causality, God, the origin of causes; the chain of causes; the principle of causality—that every effect produced upon an object is produced by causes than by its nature comes from the cause exterior to it. (d) In Theology: God existing by His very nature, proved by the causal series, and by the consideration of multiplicity and unity; comprising all creatures; being at the same time unity, truth, love, and light (as in Plotinus), pure being and the source of being, endowed with an interior activity and a personal life; knowing Himself and knowing the world, but always maintaining His unity; the causes by which man can understand free actions in man; both visible and invisible; knowable by man as cause, and through ecstasy or revelation. (e) In Cosmology: the first being sprung from God, Divine knowledge and power; the World of Ideas and the act of creation, the second being sprung from God, the 'Commandment' or Word (Κόσμος, Arab. amr) the celestial spheres and the sublunary world. (f) In Ethics: happiness, the end of life; the soul attained by union with God, the return of all things to God.

The following passages are taken from the treatise Gems of Wisdom, and will give an idea of the philosopher's style. The work, consisting of 59 articles in a very brief form, was much admired and extensively used in the schools; it has been edited by Dieterici and translated by Horton.

There are two worlds: the world of created things—our world—and the world of unseen, invisible things, which is the celestial kingdom and the region of Ideas. The latter is also called the world of the 'Commandment'; the 'Commandment' is the eternal will in relation to created things with their perfection. Farabi further distinguishes the 'Commandment' (amr) from the Spirit (pirit); we may take amr as corresponding to the Logos, or Word, of the Neo-Platonists, while the Spirit corresponds to the Logos.

How does the multiplicity that is in evidence in the world arise from a God who is Unity? By a sort of intermediary hyposissis between the absolute One and the world: 'You regard Unity, and it is Power; you regard Power, and it becomes second knowledge, which includes within itself multiplicity; for the first knowledge of God can know nothing but the One. 'There is the horizon of the world of Sovereignty—the purely Divine world—which is followed by the world of the Commandment where the reed-pan runs along the table.' This refers to the tablet on which, according to Qur'ân eschatology, the deeds of men are inscribed. 'Unity becomes multiplicity at the point where the shadow of the heavenly Lotes falls, the Lotes which shades the Muslim Paradise, and where the Word and Power are one; the eternal Word of God inspired by the Spirit and preserved in the Qur'ân. 'There is the horizon of the world of the Commandment, followed by the Tabernacle and the Throne, the seat of God and envelope of the world, then the heavens and all that they contain. Every creature sings the praises of God; the heavens revolve according to the principle,' according to the imprisoned soul, the dominator, and there is the world of the Creation, whence one comes back to the world of the Commandment, by which all once more become one. 'You regard the world of the Creation, you perceive the nature of what is created; when you regard the world of your Father, you know that there must be something existing by his essence. 'If you know truth first, you also know its opposite; but if you regard error first, i.e. the contingent world, you regard the creator, and there is the world of the Creation, whence one comes back to the world of the Commandment, by which all once more become one.'

God, conceived as supreme Unity, is also thought of as necessary Being, existing by itself.

'Necessary Being has neither form nor kind nor difference . . . it is the principle whence all else proceeds, and by the same time interior and exterior, manifest and hidden; this manner of speaking is that of which it is said that its essence, and in virtue of being exterior it is interior'; i.e. the brightness when He appears is so great that it blinds, and the Divine unity can only be seen externally by means of His, i.e. everything is visible in Him, as objects in the light of a lamp are visible.

God has a two-fold manifestation: first, the manifestation of unity; He shows Himself as unity either to the human intelligence, which seeks after the absolute, or to the heart by means of mystical illuminations and manifestations taken by means of signs, which are the wonderful creations scattered throughout the world. 'This second manifestation is connected with multiplicity, and proceeds from the first manifestation, which is that of unity.'

Does God know the world? According to Aristotle, God can have only an abstract knowledge of things. Farabi does not agree with this view. According to him, God knows things in their causes, and this kind of knowledge does not lead to any change in His being, because the causes, viz. Ideas, are eternal. Moreover, His knowledge is active, and becomes confused with His power to create; it does not, as a result in the impression made upon Him by the objects: 'We cannot say that the First Truth comprehends the things that spring from the first decree of God; He comprehends them, because things of sense are perceived by the fact of their presence and comprehension they manifest things by its essence; for, when it regards its essence, it sees the lofty power therein, and in the power it sees what is decreed; it sees all, then, and the knowledge it has of its essence is the cause of the knowledge it has of all other things.'

This theory is dangerous for free will; for, if God knows all the details of the world's life as consequences of His power and His decree, there is not much room left for liberty.

The creation is not conceived as an action analogous to human actions, which would be accompanied by desire and effort; it is merely the immediate expression of the Divine thought. As soon as God imagines a thing to Himself, the existence of that thing follows. According to this conception of the act of creation, it seems absolutely necessary to admit that creation is eternal; for God's thought of the world must have been eternal, and He did not require to wait until a need or a desire brought it to realization; the world must then have been formed from His thought eternally.

This conclusion, however, is not so inevitable as one might think: the Oriental scholastics, like all the ancients, did not have quite the same conception of time as we have. For time began when the world was set in motion, and was measured by the number of revolutions performed by the heavenly spheres. Before the movement of the spheres there was no time, but only a sort of fixed duration not susceptible of measurement.

The Creator is therefore placed outside of time; and produces it all at once along with the world. Similarly, according to the Oriental conception of the Middle Ages, measurable space did not extend beyond the limited sphere of the world.

On the idea of substance, Farabi expresses interesting but contradictory views. He applies the term to both individuals and species. Species and genera, though real substance, require individuals to actualize them. They become actualized and individualized gradually with the passage from the general to the particular. Material substance is the cause of bodies; bodies are the cause of plants; plants, of earth, matter; earth, matter, of the heavens, and so on you will perceive the stars which suffer eclipse; this is an allusion to a passage of the Qur'ân (vi, 76), and that turn your eyes towards the face of Him whose throne, and now on earth, is eternal.

God, conceived as supreme Unity, is also thought of as necessary Being, existing by itself. 'How it is asked, are we to conceive the order of substances which are supported by one another? The first substances are
the individuals; nothing else is necessary to their existence.

The second substances are species and genera, which in order to exist, have not individuals. In this sense, are therefore anterior in sublimity, and have more right to the name of substance than species. But, from another point of view, universals, as being fixed, permanent, subsisting, have more right to the name substance than perishable, accidental, individual, things. Again, "the notion of existence in action; they exist only by individuals, and their existence is then accidental—which does not mean that universals are not individuals, but that their existence in action can take place only by accident.

Munk, in his art. on Fārābī in the Dict. des acad., in the article Fasting, says that the philosopher Tim Tufail tried to accuse Fārābī of denying the immortality of the soul. But this accusation lacks support. Fārābī's doctrine on this point is the same as the Bahāshī's. For, while in the Bahāshī the soul, on accomplishing the end of its destiny, must enter into communication with the intellect at work (the philosophical form of the doctrine); or it returns to God (the mystic form). But the fact that the soul is destined to become united with God does not necessitate, according to Fārābī, the annihilation of its personality; nor does it follow, from the fact that the human intellect must receive illumination from outside in the world of Ideas, that the human person must lose all idea of particular things. Fārābī's conception of happiness and the other world is similar to that found in the mystic part of Avicenna's works.

There is a curious passage in which Fārābī speaks of bliss in the other world; it is in The Ideal City, the work in which he explains that the end of government on earth ought to be to make souls happy in the other world. The souls of the inhabitants of the city assemble, generation after generation, and their happiness increases as they become more numerous:

'The joy of those long dead increases at the arrival of the newly dead, for each soul then comprehends its essence and the essence of the other souls similar to itself; thus the intensity of its feeling, and the satisfaction in which the soul is washed by the number of times it practises writing. The addition of souls to scale corresponds, as regards the progress of each soul's happiness, to the scribal's repetition of his work, by means of which he progresses in facility and skill.'

This passage assumes that each soul is endowed with individual feeling and perception in the other world.


Fasting (Introductory and non-Christian).

1. Purposes and origin.—The purposes of fasting as a religious, magical, or social custom are various. It may be an act of penitence or of propitiation; a preparatory rite before some act of sacramental casting or an initiation; a mourning ceremony; or a series of purificatory rites; a means of inducing dreams and visions; a method of adding force to magical rites. Its origin has been sought in the act of the most holy sacrifice, and it is not improbable that, as a rite, it may have originated differently in different quarters. But behind all there was first man's frequent periods of enforced fasting through scarcity of food or difficulty in obtaining food. His experience of this as well as of his bodily, whether on body or on mind, would come in course of time to be used as suggesting the value of voluntary fasting.

Thus, when men wished to obtain vivid dreams, the recollection of the fact that enforced abstinence from food was conuced with such dream experiences would suggest recourse to fasting in the hope of obtaining them. Again, when men began to believe in the presence and activity of supernatural beings, or would propitiate, higher powers, the unpleasant experience of enforced fasting would also point to it as a satisfactory form of suffering. Over and above, a rite might originate both from man's incapacity for eating food when he was seriously distressed—this is leading to become a conventional sign of mourning—and from a real desire to suffer pain on occasions of bereavement. The custom of avoiding certain foods, sometimes for a whole day, at certain times might readily be extended into a disciplinary practice; or might resort to fasts to gain the impress upon the body, and this might then come to be regarded as a magical way of increasing the latter, the fasting being now more strictly observed (see ASTURIES, § 6). In the lower stages of culture all these various origins and methods may be taken for granted, but it is mainly at higher stages that fasting becomes a part of the religious practice of self-mortification and discipline or of propitiation.

Fasting may be complete or partial, and in either case for a longer or shorter period. Sometimes, generally upon magical grounds, though often upon grounds of health, only certain foods are abstained from on particular occasions, but these foods occasionally cover many which are liked by necessity to the savage at other times. Again, in many instances certain foods are not eaten by tabu to women, or to youths and children; but, while this may be invested with some supernatural sanction, it is probably due to selfish causes.

Among the Ba-Taek, almost every form of flesh as well as fish is tabu to women and all children below the age of eighteen and yet, if visited by supernatural punishment (Jaf xxvii, 1900) (61). Among the Wagogo of Uganda, the persons suffering from diseases of the kidneys, heart, etc., are prohibited in childhood (Cole, Jaf xxv. 1932) (27). In New Guinea, young people may not eat certain foods, under pain of certain undesirable fast's happening to them (Seligmann, Melanesians of Brit. N.G., Cambridge, 1910, pp. 130, 336).

Generally speaking, this is true among most savage tribes with respect to women and to youths before initiation; and, though it does not necessarily amount to fasting, it points to abstinence from certain desirable foods, this abstinence being generally enforced by tribal customary law or by the power of fear. Thus, fasting or abstinence, more or less complete, may be regarded as a well-nigh universal practice among lower races at certain times of the year, and the Boardmore asserts that the natives of Mowat, New Guinea, that they never fast (Jaf xix. 1889-90) (402), but these exceptions are very occasional. The attitude of the Church to such practices and religions to fasting will be considered later.

Probably no single cause can be alleged as the origin of the practice of fasting.

W. R. Smith explains it as: 'primarily nothing more than a preparation for the sacramental eating of holy flesh,' (Rel. Surv., 1884, p. 443); Tyler, as a 'means of producing ecstasy and other moral exaltation for religious ends' (Sp. xxv. 410; and Wundt, Volkspsychol., Leipzig, 1904, II, 5, 351). Herbert Spencer suggests that the sacrificial food to the dead causes a lack of food and so produces hunger, and that fasting arises as a necessary result of such sacrifices (Principles of Sociology, 1876, i, 283).

The complex nature of its origin is amply vindicated when the various occasions of fasting, among both savage and higher races, are considered. But in no case should it be thought that fasting is a strictly religious or spiritual discipline, or that fasting occurs as a necessary result of such sacrifices. It is used for a multitude of purposes, and to very different ends, and it is not improbable that, as a rite, it may have originated differently in different quarters. But behind all there was first man's frequent periods of enforced fasting through scarcity of food or difficulty in obtaining food. His experience of this as well as of his bodily, whether on body or on mind, would come in course of time to be used as suggesting the value of voluntary fasting.

Thus, when men wished to obtain vivid dreams, the recollection of the fact that enforced abstinence from food was con
Fasting is a purely magical one, and was probably not of early or immediate origin, as in the history of mankind, it has been so common that it is of importance in any discussion of the principle of fasting. It helps to show, how, for certain definite purposes, man is willing to renounce the enjoyment of the foods which are so essential and agreeable to him at all ordinary times, in order that he may prevent certain contingent results following upon his indulgence in them.

Among the Melanesians, this method of abstinence is of general occurrence. Thus, among the Koita of New Guinea, a woman during pregnancy must not eat bush-cod, eel, certain kinds of fish, and sago; and the husband must observe the same food tabus. Among the southern Massim, the mother must abstain and, show tabum (Tylor, JAI xii. 189). Similarly, Codrington says of the Arapesh, that both father and mother refrain from certain foods before and after a birth (Melanesians, Oxford, 1891, p. 289). Fasting is expected of the Andamanese. The parents must abstain from pork, turtle, honey, iguna, and paradoxurus; while the husband abstains from the two last (Tylor, JAI xii. 189). Among the Arawaks, among most Australian tribes, a numerous list of forbidden foods applies to the expectant mother, fewer to the child born, and those of danger to the unborn child, or occasionally to the parents (Spencer-Phillips, 614). The husband and wife among the Coroados of Brazil fast every Saturday for a birth (Spix-Martius, Travels in Brazil, 1834, p. 247). The father, among the Xinga and other tribes, must avoid fish, flesh, and fruit; and among the Bororo both parents eat for two days after the birth, while among the Paraesst and other tribes, for five days (von den Steinen, Unter den Naturkauern Central-Braziliens, Berlin, 1894, pp. 341, 342). The father must fast for five days after a birth, and at the end of that time has to undergo other austerities (Tylor, Early Hist. of Mankind, 1866, p. 284).

Among the Andamanese a special restriction is observed in fasting to prevent the occurrence of contagious diseases, and some of the customs and results of fasting have been described by Codrington (see also Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, p. 253). If a woman shows herself to be pregnant, she is required to fast upon entering the town. She is further forbidden to eat or drink while within it; and if she is discovered to be in the act of breaking this law, she is cast out, and her nurse is severely punished. This prostration, which is necessary to induce a certain spirit to enter into her and to prevent her from injuring the child, is observed in all parts of the world, and is known under different names.

2. Fasting as an act of mourning.—The origin of this rite has been explained on various grounds—as a prohibition of the foods eaten by the dead, in accordance with ordinary practices and actions, and the results of the action of the dead, which differ from those of this earth (see AEW xii. 1909), as a prevention of the ghost of the dead man from entering the body with which it was identified (Frazer, JAI xiii. 204), and as a conventional practice arising out of the actual starvation consequent upon the destruction or sacrifice of food-stuffs at a death (H. Spencer, i. 285). Western European customs that the ox may be found in the fear of swallowing food polluted with the contagion of death—the custom of not preparing or eating food in a house where there is a dead body pointing to this (FL xviii. 405). But, while this or the other causes of fasting may have been being assigned to it, the time during which the fast endures varies considerably, and in some places the fast is absolute, while elsewhere only certain foods are abstained from.

In the Andaman Islands, fasting is made from pork, turtle, and luxuries (Man, 142). Among the tribes of New Guinea, various foods are abstained from, and in some instances a man voluntarily gives up entire classes of food, which he would eat at other times (Spencer-Phillips, 70). Among the southern Massim, the widow may not eat the kinds of food eaten by her husband in his last illness until after the funeral feast— with the result that she is often reduced to a state of starvation (Seligmann, 617, and passim). In Fiji, fasting is observed during the day when the family is mourning for a member (Paisley, 169); and, in Aurora, many foods are abstained from, and what is eaten is usually non-prodigious in the bed (Codrington, 253), just as in the Solomon Islands the mourners live on cocoanuts and a few bananas (JAI xvi. 96). In Samos, mourners abstain from fish only on the night before the funeral, and for a period long after a death (Watts, Anthro., Leipzig, 1872, ii. 199). Among South African tribes, fasting is observed after the death of a relative or of a chief, in the latter case by the whole tribe for a day or longer (Macdonell, JAI xix. 1898-99). The Andamanese and other high Tibetan families fast for a girl must fast for four days; and also throughout the whole lengthy period of her seclusion she must abstain from fresh meat, because this would harm her sex, and she would remain barren if she took offence (Hill Tout, JAI xxxv. 1905 160). Among the southern Massim, girls were secluded at this period and had to abstain from all flesh food (Seligmann, 498). For fasting before marriage, see ASTERTITIES, vol. ii. p. 290. The same custom was ordained in ancient China in the Li Xi, along with various purifications (SBE xxvii. 1885 78). Food-tabus are also observed during sickness, as among the Waggo of E. Africa, with whom the medicine man forbids certain foods (Cole, JAI xxxii. 1902 317), and among the Ten's of Alaska, where, after a cure, certain forms of abstinence—from hot food and drink, or from certain kinds of food—are imposed temporarily or for life (Jetté, JAI xxxvii. 1907 172).

In many cases, tabus are placed upon certain foods for a shorter or longer time, generally for practical purposes, so that having really the intention of a 'close season.' This may be done by the chief, or by some society, or by general consent (see Brown, 126; Seligmann, 290). But sometimes a religious use is given to this taboo, as among the Andaman Islanders, who also forbid certain fruits, edible roots, etc., at certain seasons, because the god Pulunga then requires them, and would send a deluge if the taboo were broken (Man, JAI xli. 154, 326). These prohibitions correspond to the magical food-tabus which are observed by various peoples, to prevent the piercings of the animal eaten from entering into the eater.
In connexion with fasting after a death, it is interesting to notice—as showing that the fear of death or of incurring a revengeful ghost has influenced the practice—that in many instances those who have slain a man must fast, besides undergoing other rites of a purificatory order.

In New Guinea (southern Massim), the killer or captor of a man who was to be eaten would go at once to his house and remain there, living on roots and betel nut; he did not join in the cannibal feast because he was afraid of the news of the dead man. Among the Moeke tribes the warriors are sealed and must eat but little. Among the Roro-speaking tribes, homicide during their purification must always fast, and that must not handle the food (Seligmann, 287, 333, 557; cf. also, for the Fijian practice, Thomson, Fijiinus, 1886, p. 90). In the Peler Islands, young warriors after returning from a fight must eat only cocoa-nuts and syrup, other food being taboo (Kohary, Die sozialen Erscheinungen der Feiern, 1867). Hence, a rite of mourning.

4. Fasting as a rite of preparation.—As food may convey evil influences into the body, according to savage belief, and as fasting would, in any case, be useful in connexion with the body void of impurities, it is often resorted to as a ritual preparation and as a purificatory act.

Thus, before slaying the eagle, a sacred bird, the professional eagle-killer and the Chepke hunters had to undergo a long vigil of prayer and fasting (Mooney, 19 RBW, pt. i., 190, p. 298). Among the Pima the men at the festival of the sun fasted in the recollection, after a death a girl fasted for eight days, unless she was married, when half as many sufficed. In the former case the fast was for four days, rest for three days, and then for the remaining four, as a preparation for the spiritual incarnation which was brought about by fasting (Mooney, 19 RBW, p. 439). For similar reasons the Egyptian fasted and performed abulations before entering a temple (Wiedemann, Rel. of Ancient Egypt, 1897, p. 206) and, for the purpose of purity, fasting was resorted to before sacrifice in the cult of Isis (Herod. ii. 49), just as the sorcerer among the Laagu prepare himself by fasting for the offering of a sacrifice (G. von Gosen, Über Laylapland och Lappl. jäm, Stockholm, 1873, p. 256). Hence, before eating food, the firstfruits of the harvest, etc., fasting is commonly practised, the food possessing a kind of sacramental virtue. Before the year, feast in New Guinea the chief was kept without food for several days (Brown, 433). Among the Cherokees, at the dances at which the new corn was eaten, only those could eat who had prepared for it by fasting, prayer, and purifications (Mooney, 424 R.; and among the Creeks, at the festival of the breastplate, the young men fasted before the breastplates were put on) (Frazer, G.E. ii. 380). Similarly among the Natchez, at the festival of the sun (a festival preparatory to the new year), the people fasted for three days and took an emetic, after which the festival began (Chateaubriand, Voyage en Amérique, Paris, 1827, p. 356). Hence, receiving food which is to all intents and purposes sacred, the body must be purified—this being also seen in the use of spirit in connexion with fasting, found among the Masai (Thomson, Through Masai Land, 5, 1887, p. 430). Among the Iggada the person who drank milk fasted for several hours before eating certain foods tabooed in connexion with it, and vis versa (Bosse, 418). The Mexicans, before eating the sacrament at the Reformation, ate no food for a day, just as modern Jews fast from 8 a.m. before eating the Passover. Among the Western Chippew, before the festival known as Bagwa Feast, certain members of the community who are set apart as holy must fast from boiled food, mango fruit, etc., and a number of women are employed to prepare cakes of corn meal which are given. In these cases there is clearly seen the aspect of fasting as 'a preparation for the sacramental eating of holy flesh,' whether we regard this as its origin (Cumont, Le sacrement de Mithra, 1893, p. 141, 160). In other instances fasting is a preparation for festival rejoicing. The third day of the Thesmophoria, called πορήσια, was observed by fasting amongst the Athenians. It was the sick, seated on the ground ("l'Init. de Is. et Oisr. 69.")

This also was explained as an imitation of Demeter's mourning. In the Roman cult of Ceres, the ritual of which was very largely Greek, there was introduced in 486 B.C. the festival of Eleusis, which corresponds to the Attic πορήσια. Similarly in the ritual of the Mater Magna, the 24th of March, Dies Sanguinis, was a day of fasting and mourning, recalling the history of the Mother for Attis, and was succeeded next day by the Hilaria, a great day of festival rejoicing. The taurbolium sometimes took place on the Dies Sanguinis. Though these fastings are connected with mythic events, they are in origin preparatory, purificatory, and festive in character.

5. Fasting at initiation.—This, along with the whole complex ritual of initiation to manhood and its privileges, may also be regarded as a preparation for the latter and for the reception either of foods hitherto prohibited, or of the best reaf the olden days and at the same time inculcating upon the youths the habit of strict obedience. Such food restrictions are also found in the Andaman Islands, where, as a test of self-denial, until the tabus are removed at initiations (or, in the case of girls, at marriage), young people must not touch certain favourite articles of food for months or years—turtle, pork, fish, honey, etc. (Man, 94, 129). In the Beka Island, as a fitness to the secret societies or clubs, a period of fasting has to be undergone. In the New Hebrides the novices at initiation are kept in an enclosure for 29 days, and are fed on a restricted diet of copra, vegetables, etc. (Frazier, G.E. ii. 380). Similarly in the Natchez, at the festival of the sun (a festival preparatory to the new year), the people fasted for three days and took an emetic, after which the festival began (Chateaubriand, Voyage en Amérique, Paris, 1827, p. 356). Hence, receiving food which is to all intents and purposes sacred, the body must be purified—this being also seen in the use of spirit in connexion with fasting, found among the Masai (Thomson, Through Masai Land, 5, 1887, p. 430). Among the Iggada the person who drank milk fasted for several hours before eating certain foods tabooed in connexion with it, and vice versa (Bosse, 418). The Mexicans, before eating the sacrament at the Reformation, ate no food for a day, just as modern Jews fast from 8 a.m. before eating the Passover. Among the Western Chippew, before the festival known as Bagwa Feast, certain members of the community who are set apart as holy must fast from boiled food, mango fruit, etc., and a number of women are employed to prepare cakes of corn meal which are given. In these cases there is clearly seen the aspect of fasting as 'a preparation for the sacramental eating of holy flesh,' whether we regard this as its origin (Cumont, Le sacrement de Mithra, 1893, p. 141, 160). In other instances fasting is a preparation for festival rejoicing. The third day of the Thesmophoria, called πορήσια, was observed by fasting amongst the Athenians. It was the sick, seated on the ground ('l'Init. de Is. et Oisr. 69.")

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Corresponding to these initiatory forms of fasting are the prolonged fastings and other austerities which the American Indian youth undergoes in seclusion at puberty, in order that by means of a vision he may see the guardian spirit which will be his for the remainder of his life. This form of fasting is a preparatory act, and is generally combined with the purificatory use of strong emetics, and of ablations, although there is a physiological connexion between the fasting and the visions which are induced in the brain of the youth weakened by hunger and worked up to a pitch of excitement. This connexion has probably been discovered for himself by the savage. This form of fasting is found among all the American Indian tribes, or of higher or of inferior and, in many of the instances recorded, the discipline, whether self-imposed or not, is of most rigorous kind. A few examples will show this. Boys among the Tuskequah Indians go through a "ears training," which becomes steadily more severe. "The facts that at first were deprivation from one meal lengthen, till they
Fasting (Introductory and non-Christian)

stretch over days and nights of abstinence from both food and water. Finally comes the nine days' fast, during which the lad wanders in the forests and has severest fastings, in one of which he learns at what his 'medicine' is to be (Owen, Folk-lore of the Mwagwage Indians, 1901, p. 67). Charlevoix (vol. 67) describes the same process among the Algonquins and others: 'They begin by blackening the boy's face, then the rest of his face and body, without giving him e'to eat.' This induces dreams which are carefully interpreted into. 'Nevertheless the fast often ends before the proper period is elapsed,' says Jones; and Djlawa Indian, describes his own experience of fasting: 'I well remember the fifth day when I fasted my face and fast, in order to obtain the favour of several familiar gods, that one day, being thirsty, I took a sip of water. The moisture which thus seeped into my face, I thought, and supposed acted filled me with sorrow, and I wept the greater part of the night. I was never afterwards in a vision, and hence never obtained a manton (Hist. of the Ojibway Indians, 1901, p. 87 f.). The fasting, sometimes for a fortnight, would ordain and fast for some time in order to make him keep alive by the tamanous or manton (Kolla, B. R., pi. 1, 880, p. 514). For many other Leda, see the works of Brescett, Schoolcraft, etc., and those cited by Frazier, Tidemans and Espouzay, 1916, iii. 377 f.; also art. COMMUNICATION WITH DEAD.

In certain mystery cults of the ancient world, fasting was one of the conditions of initiation. Apuleius describes the three-repeated ten days' abstinence from all kind of animals and of wine—'reverential abstention'—which the candidates had to observe before being fully initiated into the mysteries of Isis (Metam. xi. 23, 25, 30). See also § 4 above.

Similar with the use of long ommites, narcotics, hallucinations, etc., are undergone in many regions by those who wish to become medicine-men. Here too the act is preparatory to the reception of higher knowledge, but it also leads to induce dreams, which are regarded as a necessary part of the medicine-man's means of obtaining revelations. The Ekkono youth who wishes to become an angakot must retire and fast for some time, during which the spirits are supposed to visit him (Crauz, Hist. of Greenland, 1832, i. 210). The young Zulu had to fast strictly (Kienem, Culturgesch. Leipzig, 1836–38, ii. 85). In Brazil, the youth who desires to be a paei dwells alone and fasts for some time in order to receive the visions, in which the spirits are supposed to visit him (Martin, Von dem Reichtumswande unter der Bru, Munich, 1838, p. 125). Among the Abipones, the postulant for the position of kobol had to sit on a tree overhanging a lake for some days, fasting, until he began to see into futurity (Debrisch, Abipones, 1832, i. 66). Similar methods obtained among the N. American tribes for becoming a medicine-man. These included very severe and prolonged fastings, followed by vivid dreams. So also among the Zulus, diviners became qualified for their work and for intercourse with spirits by a severe discipline of fasting and economy of food and libations, forming a very rigorous fasting. Thus the youth becomes 'a house of dreams' (Callaway, Rel. System of the Amorites, 1884, p. 257).

In the case of the divinatory function of fasting, it is clearly a natural power, which becomes larger and other discipline methods, and dreams, visions, or revelations, is well established everywhere. Hence also, in order to induce such dreams or to receive communications from supernatural spirits or for becoming a medicine-man occupied so important a place, it is very commonly resorted to as an ordinary means of acquiring hidden knowledge or messages from the spirits ininal or higher powers.

The hunting fasts have been very commonly resorted to both among savages and among more advanced peoples, as well as in higher forms of religion. Among the American Indians, with whom fasting as a preparation for the acquiring of a guardian spirit and for becoming a medicine-man occupied so important a place, it is very commonly resorted to as an ordinary means of acquiring hidden knowledge or messages from the spirits ininal or higher powers. The hunting fasts are resorted to until the hunter, whether his hunt will be successful or not; the husband fasts until he dreams whether his hopes of becoming a parent will or will not be gratified. The greater the power of fasting, and the more wild and numerous the consequent dreams, the more was the sieer held in reverence and the greater power did he acquire. Even the Great Spirit might appear as a handsome youth to him who has the almost supernatural fasting—vision believed to be of peculiar efficacy. And as a preparation for the state of ecstasy in which the spirits speak through the medicine-man, he fasts much and often and undergoes other austerities (see Schoolcraft, Indian Tribes, Philadelphia, 1852, passion; Relation des Jésuites, 1672, p. 38; Matthews, Ethnog, and Philol. of Hadada Ind., Washington, 1877, p. 51; Warren, Hist. of the Ojibway Nation, St. Paul, Minn. 1885, p. 202; Dunn, Hist. of the Ojibway Tribe, 1895, p. 225 f.).

The Zulu diviners also make use of fastings fasting over several days, in order to have visions. For, 'as their proverb runs, 'The continuous fast is a sufficient body and that which agrees with Galen's saying that dreams produced by fasting are better and clearer than others (Callaway, 1883, p. 125). The Sanatal priest also fasts for several days; the result is a wild ecstatic state in which he utters oracles by the power of the god possessing him (Jones, 1814, p. 155). The Chinese custom of fasting before a sacrifice to the ancestral spirits may have been originated from the Zulus, through their visions, as the person had at the same time to fill his mind with thoughts of them (SBE iii. 304, xxviii. 290).

In one of the texts of Tholom a method is described for fasting in order to become of concentrated mind, and after several days a man has forgotten all other words, he is now fit for Divine revelations (SBE xi. 191 (290). Such fastings were not unknown in the mystic aspects of Greek religion. At the grotto of Acharna, the vapours of which had a medicinal virtue, and which was therefore the seat of an oracle, the sick received baths and fasts, and which was subsequently the seat of an oracle, the sick received baths and fasts, and it was during the fasts that the revelations were given. Hence also the Hebrews, to judge by certain references to it in connexion with revelations, or visions, or communications from God. For these there was preparation by fasting as well as by keeping the Law. Thus, while Mosas was with Jehovah on the Mount and received the Law, he fasted forty days and forty nights (Ex 34:36, cf. Dt 9:4). Daniel, also, before his communion with God and the visions which he experienced, fasted only one case entire day, and part of another, 'bread, flesh, or wine for three months' (Dan 9:16). It is also noticeable that Elijah's revelation on Mt. Horeb comes after he has gone in the strength of the food provided by the angel of the Lord over many nights (1 K 19:8). Latter Jewish writers define a neermomaker as one who fasts and lodges among tombs in order that the evil spirit may come upon him (H. Spencer, i. 281). This purpose of fasting also passed over to Christian custom (see Fasting [Christian], and cf. Tertullian's opinion that fasting gives rise to dreams [de Anima, 38], and Chrysostom's saying that it makes the soul brighter and provides it with wings to mount and soar in [cf. 1. Gen., xix. 2]).

6. Fasting in magical ritual. —Here also the power of fasting as a preparation for sacred or ritual actions may be seen. The man who fasts makes his magical act more likely to succeed by his being in a purer state of body for it.

In Banks Island, fasting adds power to the charms used for causing the death of an enemy, and would a man fast that, when the day arrived on which he was to use the charm, he was too weak to walk (Coddington, 250 f.). Among the Korrup-speaking tribes of New Guineas, a sorcerer who wishes to obtain a magical snake-stone fasts for two weeks, eating merely a few roasted bananas. Then he dreams of the locality of the snake and sets off in pursuit. Before a hunt, the hunt is ritually initiated, and this is itself preceded by abstinence from many customary foods (Chapman, 265, 290). Among the Zulu tribe, those who remain at home must abstain from eating certain foods, else a devil would be sent to punish them (Jones, 1814) 330). Maori sorcerers, using magic with a victim's hair to cause his death, remained fasting for three days. During all those at home had to fast strictly while the warriors were in the field, the magical effects acting through the sympathetic connection of the two. Before the expedition no food was cooked on the previous day until the priest had gone through his divinatory rites (Old Jena, a plains, by B. K. 314). In Java, the rain-doctor observes a fast as part of the ritual for the prevention of drought (Batien, Old Joi, Singapore, 1894, p. 69 f.). Among the Sandites, on the other hand, those who visit a sacred hill to beseech the god found go there fasting (Talise, 945; True, 1858, 35). Among the Natchez, also, wizards fasted and danced, and those of white in their most sacred (Lettres et traductions, Paris, 1780–87, vii. 294 f.). Similarly the body of a priest-priest among the Zulus had the special duty of fasting and praying for rain (Stevenson, 25).
1904, p. 390). The Halda Indian fasts in order to obtain a fair wind; indeed, of these and other tribes it is true that, 'whether a man is sick or not, he could not suppress his physical powers, or obtain property, success in hunting, fishing, war, etc., by rigid abstinence from food and drink, by remaining away from his wife, bathing in the sea, fasting, or sleeping in the sun. He would drink warmed salt water often, and take fresh water afterwards, when all the contents of his stomach were ejected, leaving him so much the "cleaner"' (Swanton, *Contrib. to the Ethnol. of the Haldas*, 1906, p. 40). In Alaska the wife must remain fasting for a week, and while her husband was fishing, in order that he may have a good catch (Holmberg, *Jcta Soc. Scientiarum Fenniae*, 1904, p. 157). The Tsimshians (Boas, *Coming to B.C.,* pp. 427, 435) believed that he is a hand of God. They were gathered with a due ritual and after fasting (Pliny, *HN* xxiv, 1). For the Cetios custom of "fasting against a person," see *E.J* vi, 411.

Fasting as an act of penitence.—While some of the methods of fasting discussed above may have had a penitential aspect, especially those connected with initiation to mysteries, they were not said to be a penitential act. Rather does fasting as an act of penitence form a development from them. The person who fasts suffers inconvenience or pain, and he may well have come to think that by so suffering he would humiliate himself before higher powers who would be moved to forgive him, and would thus gain their pity. At the same time, his suffering was a self-inflicted punishment for sin, which might have the effect of warding off other or further punishments inflicted as extra. As regards the origin of this aspect of fasting, it is admitted that it was variably combined with prayer. The relation between fasting as a penitential act and fasting as a more or less magical method of forcing the hand of the gods is perhaps to be seen at lower levels of culture.

The Tsimshians think they can force the deity to perform their wishes by strict fasting. Hence they lie in bed for seven days without food, observing also continence (Boas, in *Frazer, Totemism*, ii, 172). In the Aztecs of Mexico they fasted in order to obtain the help of their deities, they fasted and observed continence for several days (Ternaux-Compan, *Essai sur l'anc. Cunimacharco*, Paris, 1842, p. 44 f.). Here there is no penitence, but it is easy to see how such fastings might become penitential if it were the forgiveness of the deity that was sought. Among the ancient Mexicans, fasting as a penitential act existed, and it tended to assist in purifying the conscience. These fasts varied much in extent,—from one day to several years,—and they were observed either by individuals or by the whole nation on particular occasions, arising by the priests after due confession of sins or for special offences.

The high priest fasted and prayed, practising also severe austerities in seclusion, for months at a time, on occasions of public calamity (Claviger, *Hist. of Mexico*, i, 397 f.; Torquemada, *Monarckia Indiana*, Madrid, 1723, ii, 212 f.). In Egypt, fasting as a method of expiation for sin, either occasional or at fixed times, was recognized. All luxuries had to be abstained from, as well as every form of gratification of the passions. It is thought that fasting is alluded to in the 'negative confession' (Wilkinson, ii, 398).

As many of the Babylonian psalms show, fasting had become a regular ritual act of penance, accompanying these mournful expressions of wrongdoing: The penitent describes how he has neither eaten food nor drunk clear water. But there were also days of fasting appointed in periods of distress and calamity when the people gave themselves up to sternest fasting and other acts of penitence (Zimmern, *Bab. Dispsalsmen*, Leipzig, 1881, p. 172). As many of the psalms show, fasting was regarded as necessary to the welfare of both the soul and the animals. They were covered with sackcloth, wept and fasted, and prayed to God for forgiveness (38:4).

Among the Hebrews, fasting as a form of penitence was well known from comparatively early times. Originating as a means of exciting the Divine compassion, it came to have a more ethical colouring, and was the outward expression of a real inward penitence. At that time there was a contrary tendency for the practice to be resorted to in a conventional manner whenever calamity threatened, and as a mere means of keeping it off (a view against the Copts, maniacs, and heretics). Individuals fasted on account of their sins or for some special object (1 K 21:7, Ezr 10). On various occasions a general fast was proclaimed as a recognition of sin—the occasion of any public calamity being a proof that the people had sinned (1 S 14:2, 2 Ch 29:2, 1 K 21:7, Jer 36:2, 1 Jl 152). Or it may have been resorted to spontaneously (Jg 20:6, Neh 9). Fasting, if the accompaniment of a due penitential state of heart and the token of humility, was certainly approved by the prophets and regarded as agreeable to God, the reverse being abhorrent to Him and them (Jl 2:19, Is 58; 33:12). The act of public fasting might take place on the occasion of any calamity on which the case, the lack of autumn rains; but fixed times of fasting are also found. Of these the most significant is that of the Day of Atonement (Lev 16:27), which is a penitential act, but also a religious rite. On the 10th day of the 7th month the people were to 'afflict their souls.' This may be the fast referred to in Neh 9 as taking place on the 4th day of the month. Four yearly fasts, in the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th months, are mentioned in Zoc 30 (cf. 79). These had reference to events in the Chaldaean conquest of Jerusalem. Another fast-day of later origin was that of the 13th of Adar, supposed to be commemorated for the fast of the Jews at Est 4:16, when the food and the fasts of the people commanded by her (Est 4:16). It immediately preceded the Feast of Purim, and may have been of Bab. origin (see *Frazer, Gt* ii, 176; Zimmern, *ZATW* x. [1901] 187 f.). Private fasting was also much multiplied during and after the Exile, strict Jews fasting on the 2nd and 5th days of each week in the year (cf. Lk 18:23; *Matt., 8; Tz'amah, 126*). These were also days adopted for special public fastings. Such fasting was done as openly as possible,—a sign of its non-spiritual nature,—and this was rebuked by our Lord (Mt 6:6). At such times it varied from inactivity to eating only bread and water for a period of 12 or 24 hours, and according to the omission of various usual actions. Private persons no doubt added to these occasions of fasting, taking no wine or flesh or pleasant food for many days or even over a period of years, as a sign of mourning for sin or as a help to living chastely. This is reflected in the Apocryphal and other writings (Jth 9*; Test. xii, Patr. [Heb. 9]; Sim. 9*; Jud. 10*; Isaach. 7, Jos. 9*; 9f). Indeed, so characteristic did fasting as a Jewish custom become that Augustus boasted that he had fasted more earnestly than a Jew (Tac. *Hist.* v. 4). In Muhammadan ritual the principle of penitential fasting is recognized and highly commanded by Muhammad himself. The Qur'an recommends fasting as a penance, for three days on a pilgrimage, and for seven on returning (ii, 185). The believer who kills another believer and cannot find the blood-money must fast for two months as a penance (lv, 94), and the oath-breaker who cannot as a penance feed ten poor men must fast for three days (v. 91). Fasting may be performed from before sunrise to sunset, and it is one of the recognized duties of the Muslim. Hence there are many stated times of fasting, some of which are obligatory, and others may be regarded as optional. There are also days of fasting taken by the devout. Chief amongst the latter classes is the fast of the 30 days of Ramadán, rigorous and
strictly observed, in which no water is allowed between dawn and sunset, and from which only the sick and infirm, travellers, idiots, and young children are exempt (ii. 189 ff.). Devout Muslims seclude themselves in the mosques, and those who observe this fast receive pardon of all past venial sins (Michæli, vii. 7, p. 217). It is a great festival of rejoicing, to which it may be regarded as in some sense preparatory. The 13th, 14th, and 15th days of each month are also generally observed as fasting days, also the day As hârâr, the 10th, and further Monday, which Muhammad said he hoped it would cover the sins of the coming year. Strict Muslims fast also on the Monday and Thursday of each week. While Muhammadanism is a religious principle, it may be viewed as a dualism between body and soul—the former evil, the latter pure— is not recognized, although, in some of the religions referred to, this dualistic view came to prevail amongst individuals or sects. But, wherever asceticism is based on this view, fasting is a more or less recognized ascetic practice, since by observing it the evil body is not pampered by excess in food or drink. Fasting as a penitential practice would make no sense between body and soul—the former evil, the latter pure—fasting is it true, that even where the strictly dualistic view does not prevail, fasting may be practiced in order to combat the grosser desires of the body, or by way of preparing it for some sacred occasion. This view has already been found in considering fasting as a preparatory act, and in certain instances it very closely approaches strictly ascetic fasting. This is also true of cases where excess is regarded as too luxurious—a conception perhaps originally based upon earlier food tabus.

Thus Plutarch says that the Egyptian priests (of Isis) committed the sin of eating fish on fish, the priests abstained from it, one reason being that it was an 'unnecessary and over-luxurious article of diet.' For a similar reason they abstained from garlic (de Dea et Ostre, § 8). Abstinence from luxurious food, flesh, and wine was necessary for him who was initiated into the mysteries of Isis (Apuleius, Metam. xii). The Orphic prohibition of animal food was based on the fact that it was used in sacrifice to the dead, though it became an ascetic practice (on this aspect of abstinence generally, see Porphyry, de Abst. ab Epicureis Animantibus). In Greece, the native religion was opposed to the idea of the acceptableness to the gods of a maceration of the body, this dualistic view leading to a true asceticism is found in Orphism, and here, accordingly, fasting had its place (Ib. vii. Ein orphischer Demeterchymus,' in Festschr. für Th. Gomperz, Vienna, 1902, p. 61). Pythagoras also recommended frugality in diet, and commended fasting. These, however, are the temples to pray for some days should not take food all that time—perhaps an example of preparation for Divine revelations rather than of ascetic fasting (Porph. Vita Pyth. 34; Iamb. Vita Pyth. 27; Diog. Laert. viii. 19). The gods are too holy to be sated with the realization of bodily desires, gluttony, drunkenness, etc., is also continued by Plato (Phædo, 69-71).

Reference has already been made to the abstemiousness of the Egyptian priests. In the Maxims of Any (XIXth dynasty) the same principle is recognized—'Be not greedy to fill thy stomach, for one knows no reason why he should do so' (Petrie, Rel. and Conscience in Anc. Egypt., 1898, p. 113). This, however, is not ascetic fasting, but self-control, and followed by a great festival of rejoicing, to which it may be regarded in some sense preparatory. The 13th, 14th, and 15th days of each month are also generally observed as fasting days, also the day Ashihrâ, the 10th, and perhaps Monday, which Muhammad said he hoped it would cover the sins of the coming year. Strict Muslims fast also on the Monday and Thursday of each week. While Muhammadanism is a religious principle, it may be viewed as a dualism between body and soul—the former evil, the latter pure—fasting is it true, that even where the strictly dualistic view does not prevail, fasting may be practiced in order to combat the grosser desires of the body, or by way of preparing it for some sacred occasion. This view has already been found in considering fasting as a preparatory act, and in certain instances it very closely approaches strictly ascetic fasting. This is also true of cases where excess is regarded as too luxurious—a conception perhaps originally based upon earlier food tabus.

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also been seen that Buddha taught moderation rather than asceticism, that the Dharmapada the fasts of the Brāhmans are accredited as discordant with the moderate Buddhist discipline (SBE x. [1881] 21, note), and in another passage fasting and other ascetic practices are said to have no effect in purifying a mortal who has not overcome desire. Of themselves they cannot purify the passions (SBE x. 38). The ancient Parthi religion, although fasting occurred sporadically (cf. § 3), despised it. In its 410 the station of Barnabas see Pacta servanda. When and in its 742, Chionites, 10 (1890) 42) it is said that 'he who fills himself with meat is filled with the good spirit more than he who does not do so.' And the Sad Dar (83, SBE xxiv. [1885] 348) says:

'It is requisite to abstain from the keeping of fasts. For, in our religion, it is not proper that they should not eat every day or anything, because it would be a sin not to do. With us the keeping of fast is this, that we keep fast from committing sin with our eyes and tongue and ears and hands and feet. 'That which, in other religions, is fasting owing to not eating is, in our religion, fasting owing to not committing sin.'

While this expresses a valuable truth of spiritual religion, it is perhaps aimed at the excessive fasts of the Manichaeans. So, too, in one of the writings of the Taoist Kwang-tse, the question is asked:

'How have we drunk in proceeding water and eaten none of the prescribed foods, be regarded as a fast?' and the reply runs: 'It is the fasting appropriate to sacrificing, but fasting as a means of the purification of the soul, explained as a purely spiritual process (SBE xxxix. [1901] 201.f.).

10. It should be observed that fasting is usually associated with other acts of asceticism, e.g. continence, by numerous austere sects, and generally, in the higher religions, by prayer. Cf. the common Jewish phrase 'prayer and fasting.'

A reference is referred to throughout the article. See also E. B. Taylor, FOD, London, 1909, ii. 410; E. Westermarck, 'The Principles of Fasting,' II. xvii. [1907] 293 f.

FASTING (Christian).—I. THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES.—1. New Testament.—Two sayings of our Lord moulded the ideas of early Christianity about fasting: (a) that, though His disciples did not fast as the Baptist's disciples did (often,' Lk 5 33), because the Bridegroom was with them, yet the days would come when the Bridegroom would be taken away, and then they should fast 'in that day and in the solemnity of the Holy Ghost' (Lk 9 58), which was interpreted literally and led to a particular rule as to the duration of the Paschal fast; and (b) that fasting must be unostentations (Mt 6 17). Although He Himself fasted forty days before beginning His ministry, and probably, as a devout Jew, kept the one fast-day that was obligatory at the time,—the Day of Atonement,—He left no regulations for fasting; He gave the principles, and left His Church to make rules for carrying them out. This explains why the Church was so slow in developing a system of fasts and festivals. No rules on the subject could claim to come directly from the Master Himself. It is hardly probable that the first disciples initiated the stricter Jews in voluntarily adding to the Day of Atonement the two weekly fasts (cf. Lk 18 12) of Monday and Thursday (days which were chosen because Moses was believed to have gone up to the Mount on the latter and to have come down on the former), for there is no trace of these as Christian fasts in NT. But many Jews increased these fasts voluntarily, as did Anna (Lk 20), and even the heathen Cornelians, according to some MSS. (Ac 10 9); and so we read of St. Paul fasting (2 Co 6 12: 'fastings often' the mark of the Christian minister), and of the first Christians fasting before and after important events (Ac 14 25; 28). The Jewish Christians, doubtless, continued to keep the Day of Atonement, and St. Luke mentions it as an event (Ac 27 7: 'the fast'), but the Gentiles were almost certainly not pressed to observe it.

2. Second century.—We may now proceed to trace the growth of fasting in the Christian Church, and, in doing so, we must bear in mind the caution that customs varied much, and therefore we must be careful to pay attention to the particular age and country of which our authorities speak, without assuming too much, because we cannot mention in one of the older Fathers, it must have been characteristic of the whole Church from the beginning. A broad generalization of Hooker may, however, in the main be accepted. He says that fasts which were introduced by the church have as their object 'to temper the mind, lest contrary affections coming in place should make it too profane and dissolve' (Rheias. Pol. v. 72, last par.); and the former dictum is true of all but the weekly fasts (below (e)). When we review the century and a half that followed the death of St. Paul, we are at once struck by the want of regulations as to fasting; as far as we can gather from the scanty literature before the age of Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian (end of 2nd cent.), and from the writings of those Fathers, much was left to individual piety. The following facts, however, emerge from the study of this period.

(a) There was a general sense of the duty of fasting, and frequent warnings against making it a merely external act. Barnabas (§ 5; c. A.D. 100) and Justin Martyr (Dial. 15; c. A.D. 100) quote Is 58 in this sense; the same warning is given by Clement of Alexandria (Fest. iii. 12, Strom. vi. 12). Clement also wrote a separate treatise on fasting (Jerome, de Vitr. Illustr. 38). Earlier in the century, Polycarp, (§ 7; c. A.D. 110) urges fasting and prayer as a means of meeting temptation. Hermas (Sim. v. 1; written before A.D. 140) [3] says that he was fasting and praying 'a fasting and prayer' (weekly) fast) when he met the Shepherd, who spoke to him of fasting, warning him against the mere external observance: 'to do no evil in your life and to serve the Lord with a pure heart' is the true fast; fasting is very good if the commandments of the Lord be observed.

(b) Paschal fast.—We hear of this first from Irenaeus. He mentions it in his letter to Pope Victor on the Paschal controversy (written c. A.D. 195, and quoted by Eusebius, H I v. 24), and says that there was great variety in its observance, some fasting for one day, others for two or for several days, others for forty hours of night and day, and that this variety was not long standing: it existed 'long before, in the time of our ancestors.' This shows that the Paschal fast was known early in the 2nd century. The fast of the one day and that of forty hours would doubtless be absolute; the latter period would correspond to the time during which our Lord lay in the grave. Tertullian (de Orit. 18) says that the 'day of Pascha' (by which he means Good Friday, though the term Pascha has other meanings) [1] was a general and, as it were, public fast, on which the kiss of peace was not given. See also below (e).

(c) Weekly fasts.—It was a common custom in the 2nd cent. at least in some countries, to fast on Wednesdays and Fridays; see FESTIVALS AND FASTS [Christian]. 1 (b).

(d) Pre-baptismal fast.—This is mentioned in the Didache (§ 71); it was for a day or two days, and was observed by the candidate, the baptizer, and others. It is also mentioned in Justin (Apol. I. 61) and in Tertullian (de Bapt. 20, and perhaps de Imag. 8). Paschasius, bishop of Amasea, ordinarily administered at Pascha (Tertull. de Bapt. 19, and later writers passim), though it might be deferred to 'Pente-

1 In Christian literature, Pascha means Easter Day, or Good Friday, or Maundy Thursday, or Holy Week, or even the forty days before Easter; and similarly Pentecost means either the festival itself or the fifty days before it.
cost, i.e. the 50 days after Easter (ib. : "latiusinum spatum"), there was a very close connection between this fast and that before Pascha, and the authority may assume that the former is the real rationale of the latter.

d. The feeling of the non-Montanist Christians in the 2nd cent. with regard to fasting is clearly exhibited by Tertullian's Apol. treatise, de jejunii ratione, written c. A.D. 210, after he had become a disciple of Montanus; and it is curious that the great development in fasting which took place later was largely due to the way in which the Montanists kept two weeks of 'xerophagy,' i.e. partial fasts, in the year; but of these weeks the Saturdays and Sundays were excepted (de jejun. 15). It is not said at what time of the year they were kept. Both the name and the thing were opposed by the 'Psychics' (the ordinary Christians) as a novelty (§ 2). Xerophagies consisted in not eating flesh or anything juicy, not even succulent fruit, or anything with the flavour of wine, and in abstaining from the bath (§ 1). The 'Psychics' objected to the definite enjoining of 'stations,' as these should be voluntary (§ 10); yet (Tertullian says) they were inconstant, as sometimes they lived on bread and water, and in most cases in the fast. The name 'xerophagy,' i.e. 'when the Bridgework was taken away' (the Paschal fast, see above, I. 1), and Wednesday and Friday up to the ninth hour, or 3 p.m. (§§ 2, 10); they often fasted from sunset till noon. Tertullian says nothing that we should never be observed as a fast-day except at Pascha (§ 14); their bishops ordained fasts for their own dioceses, and there were fasts before Councils were held (§ 13). The Montanists kept on the bi-weekly fasts to a later hour (§ 10). With this we may compare Hippolytus' accusation against the Montanists, of 'novelties of fasts, and feasts, and meals of parched food and repasts of radishes' (fltr. viii. 12 [c. A.D. 220]; cf. x. 21, 'novel and strange [read παραβάσεις] fasts'). Thus the difference between the Montanists and the Orthodox seems to have been that the latter were less strict in the custom of fasting, and left more to voluntary observance, while the former made a settled practice of compulsory xerophagies and half-fasts in addition to the complete fast of the Paraskeue (Good Friday), or of Paschae and the following Sabbath. Tertullian's treatise shows how bitter was the feeling excited by a mere difference of observance.

II. PERIOD OF DEVELOPMENT (A.D. 200-500).—

1. Development after Tertullian.—From the 3rd cent. onwards the fasts were called Church Orders, became common, busying their injunctions in most cases on Supposed Apostolic Authority. What before was a matter of voluntary or customary observance now came under rule. Fasting accordingly was more exactly regulated, and the Orthodox became stricter than the Montanists, who retained the fasting customs mentioned by Tertullian till the 5th cent. (Sozomen, II. vii. 19). The term 'fasting' as in fact, and even well on in the 4th cent., we find only the two days before Easter named as fasts in some authorities (Egyp. Ch. Order, 55; Ethiopic Ch. Order, 41; Verona Fragments, ed. Häuser, Leipzig, 1900, p. 25); in the 4th cent. (so Apol. Constant. v. 18 [c. A.D. 357], probably to be dated A.D. 300-350]) the fasts end at midnight (Test. ii. 12). No other Paschal fast is mentioned in these works, and sick people who cannot fast on both days are allowed to fast on the Saturday only (so also Apos. Constant. v. 18 [c. A.D. 357], for which see below). In the above-named Church Orders, or at least in their sources, the Crucifixion and Resurrection were commemorated on the same day. Epiphanius says that the Quattuordecimana (c. A.D. 180, [§ 1. 1-3; Exp. Fid. 22]) But a greater development is found in the older Didascalia (v. 14. 18 [probably 3rd cent.]): a partial fast with bread, salt, and water is enjoined from Monday to Thursday of Holy Week, and an absolute fast on Friday and Saturday. Dionysius of Alexandria (Ep. ad Basiliam, can. 1 [early 3rd cent.]) mentions a Holy Week fast, during the six days of which some even ate nothing at all; but he limits them to the Montanist usage of some, fasting three, some two, some for four days, others not even one day. There was also a diversity (he says) as to the time of ending the fast before Pascha (cf. 'Pentecost,' which this seems to be an error); in Rome they ended it at cockcrow, elsewhere at nightfall. He mentions the Friday and Sabbath (Saturday) as rigorous fasts.

A forty-days’ fast is not found till the 4th cent., and made its way only gradually; a supposed reference in Origen (hom. in Juxta, x. 5) is due to Rufinus' 'translation.' In some countries the 'forty days' were observed as a solemn season for prayer, without being a fast, as Advent was observed in modern times. All the fasts are now to be regarded as voluntary, and are often mentioned as a well-known space of time, before which Synods were held (can. 5); and in the Test. of our Lord (c. A.D. 350) the people are told to fast 'in vigilia' to pray in the church; but there is no word of fasting (ii. 18). The name of the season instead was ἔφεσανε τῷ Πασχάδι, 'Quadragesima,' at first means the 'fortieth day' before Easter, on which the competentes, or selected candidates for baptism, were enrolled (Cyr. Jerus. Cat. Lect. Introd. 4); but soon the name was given to the whole season. An exact parallel is to be seen in the name 'Pentecost' (see above, I. 2 (b)). The next stage was that the partial fast before Pascha, of varying duration, was called ἔφεσανε τῷ Πασχάδι, irrespective of its exact length. Some moderns suppose that the name first arose from the forty hours' fast; others think that it has nothing to do with the fast, but only with the period of probation of the competentes, though it is not quite clear why this was forty days. For less probable reasons, see below.

The 'Fastis Lavorum' of Athanasius show that the 'forty-days' fast did not develop so soon in Egypt as in Rome (cf. also Egypt. Ch. Order above). In the first (A.D. 339) he speaks of the fast beginning on Monday of Holy Week, and extends it to Easter; the Fastis of Moses, Eliah, and Daniel were longer than those of Christians. So in the letters for A.D. 352, 353, Holy Week only is mentioned. In the intervening years there are fasts (and worst?) but only tentatively; Holy Week is the fast, and so in the letter for A.D. 314. In the year 340 (Ep. vii.), writing to Straton of Thmuis from Rome instead of sending a fasting letter, he persuades the people to fast all the forty days, as they did in Rome. In 317 (Ep. xiv.) he says that any one who neglects to observe the fast of forty days cannot celebrate Easter. Two points appear from these Letters: (a) Saturday and Sunday were not fast-days (v. 13; so A.D. 350 at Milan (Ambrose, de Ritu et Jejunnio, 18) and Antioch (Chrysostom, hom. x. in Gen. 25); (b) the Holy Week fast ended in Egypt late on the evening of Saturday, as in the days of Dionysius (see above). Like so many earlier and later writers, Athanasius warns his people against making the fast an external matter only (iv. 47). The forty-days' fast is also mentioned by Eusebius (de Pasch. 5), and in the Canons of Hippolytus (c. A.D. 235) as the 'fast during the forty days.' The latter prescribe bread and salt and water in Holy Week (can. xxii. 186-89); sick persons and those who neglect the fast by ignorance of the time should fast after Pentecost. The Edessæ Canones (c. A.D. 350 [v. 18, 255]) mention the forty days, but do not prescribe the reason for the 'forty-days' fast that our Lord and Moses and Eliah fasted for that period; at Edessa the 'forty days' included all or most of Holy Week (so Test. of Constance, which does not make the forty days a fast), and the Passion and Resurrection were apparently commemorated on the same day (see above). Another development is the
The prefixing of the forty-days' fast to Holy Week, as in the Apost. Const. (v. 13, 18, ed. Funk, Didascalia et Apost. Auctor., Paderborn, 1905); in Holy Week, before the Palm Sunday, and after. But in the two last days are an absolute fast if possible, or, at any rate, the Saturday (see above; the saving clause is an adaptation of the parallel Didascalia phrase 'in the week of the fast' (v. 20). 

Pseudo-Ignatius (Philipp. 13), who is perhaps the author of Apost. Const., likewise makes Holy Week separate from the ἄνθρωπον, as in the Eusebius (E. xxvi, 23; Ed. and Casdano, Gen. i. The Apostolic Canon, which at any rate are from the same school, do not mention this point, but make the forty days a fast for all, under penalties (can. 69 [c. A.D. 400]). The 'Pilgrimage of Silvia' (or 'Ethiopia') describes an eight-weeks' Lent at Jerusalem, with forty-one actual days of fasting (c. A.D. 385 [3]).

In the 5th cent. Socrates (HE v. 22) says that the Paschal fast varied greatly. At Rome three successive weeks before Easter were kept, except Saturdays and Sundays; but the accuracy of his statement that Saturdays were excepted has been doubted. In Ilyria and Greece and Alexandria they in the 4th cent. were called ἡ ἔναρξις. Others began the fast in the 7th week before Pascha, and fasted only for three periods of five days, and that at intervals, and yet called it τό ἀνατύπωμα, which somewhat surprised the historian. The mode of fasting also varied; some abstained from things that had life, others ate fish only, others both fish and fowl; some did not eat eggs and fruit; some ate dry bread only, some not even bread till the last week, then took any kind of food (this applies to the weekly fasts; see below, 3); there was no written command on the subject.

Sozomen (HE vii. 89) gives like evidence. In some Churches the fast was 6 weeks, as in Ilyria, the West, Libya, Egypt, and yet 7 weeks in Constantinople and the neighbourhood as far as Phocis. In some Churches people fasted 3 alternate weeks during the space of 6 or 7 weeks; in others they fasted continuously for 3 weeks just before Pascha; Montanists fasted only for 2 weeks. Earlier in the 5th cent. John Chrysostom remarks on the variety of custom with regard to the Lent fast (COMMENTARIVS. xxii, 34-29, written c. A.D. 419); he says that, though some kept it for 6 weeks and others for 7 weeks, both made only 59 days of fasting (this would depend on whether the Saturdays were fast-days or not); and the number 69 was one of the year. The 36-days' fasts for all, but some devout persons exceeded the number; the observance of Quadragesima was not primitive, and was not originally extended to the laity by the canonical legislation, but was a matter of gradual growth. The name was adopted because our Lord, Moses, and Elijah fasted for 40 days and nights (Exod. iv. 11, Mark vii. 24, and the observation of these reasons. The reference of the name to our Lord's fast is also given by Augustine (de Doct. Christ. r. 16 [257], Ambrose (Coment. 25), Gregory of Nazianzus (Orat. vii, 99), and Jerome (in Is. xvi, 28; in Jon. 2); Socrates (HE ii. 43) says that, in Constantinople, the bishop's office of Ambrose, who was condemned by the Synod of Gangra (c. A.D. 390), allowed the prescribed fasts to be neglected, and recommended fasting on Sunday (see also the Synodal letter of Gangra, summarised by Hefele, Concil. ii. 567, Eng. tr., Edinb. 1571-96).

During Lent, entertainments, horse-racing, and similar shows were forbidden (see DCA ii. 975). The Council of Laodicea (can. 51 [c. A.D. 360]) prohibited the keeping of the festivals of martyrs in Lent except on Saturday and Sunday; so (A.D. 699) the fourth of August, 7th of November, and 14th of Funk: 'omni tempere' seems to mean 'all the year round'), which hints at the reason for the fasts on these days, which is explicitly given at the beginning of the 4th cent. by Peter I. of Alexandria (Ep. xxvi, 15), which tells us that the fast on this day was the day of the conspiracy of the Jews, and Friday of the Crucifixion. Augustine (Ep. xxxvi, Benedictine ed. [alter lxxvi], 30 says the fast gives the same reason (for another explanation, see Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. 22). Eusebius (Vit. Constant. i. 18) tells us that Constantine enjoined on all his subjects the observance of Sunday and Friday; he does not mention Wednesday. But these 50 days were not universal. In the Test. of our Lord no fixed days are prescribed in the week, though the possibility of a fast-day falling in the week is allowed, for, in which case the Eucharist is to be celebrated then (i. 22); for in some countries a fast-day was chosen for the Eucharist (Tert. de Ora. 19—Wednesday and Friday). The Edessene Canons prescribe service on Wednesday and Friday, which may be a remnant of the 4th cent. speaks of the observance of these days as fasts, and seems to say that the Eucharist was celebrated on them at 3 p.m., except in Lent. The Hippolytian Canons mention them as fasts, and say that the more devout added other fast-days as well (can. xx. 164). These fasts are strictly enjoined in Cyprus towards the end of the 4th cent. (Epiphan. tib. 6; Exp. Fid. 22), who says that they were universal, and that the fasts of the 'stations' ended at the hour of the Lord's death, the 9th hour; also by the Apost. Const. (v. 14. 20 incorporating the Didascalia, and v. 23 incorporating the Diatases), with the same reason for the choice of the days as we find in Peter of Alexandria; and by Pseudo-Ignatius (Philipp. 13) and the Apost. Canons (can. 69).

In some cases the fast was prolonged to Saturday; the phrase was 'superponere' (ἐπεριστρεφεῖν), or, in Tertullian, 'continuare jejunium.' The Council of Elvira in Spain (c. A.D. 305) ordered these superpositions one month, except in July and August, and not every week (can. 26); though Saturday is not mentioned, that day is probably meant, but Hefele (Concil. i. 146) takes the phrase to mean an extension of the fast till evening on the Saturday (v. 40); and the custom in the West, especially at Rome (so expressly Augustine, loc. cit., though his words do not involve every Saturday in the year). But, in the East, Saturday was regarded from the 4th cent. as a festival commemorating Creation; and fasting on it, except on Easter Even, was strongly condemned (cf. Tertullian above, i. 2 e); so Apol. Const. v. 14, 20, vii. 23, viii. 33; Apost. Canons, 84; and, in fact, the second Trullan, which forbids fasting, as was practised at Rome, on Saturdays in Lent, can. 56). For this reason Saturday as well as Sunday was thenceforward regarded as specially suitable for a synaxis, with a Eucharist, as in the Test. of our Lord (i. 22, corrected text), the Arabic Didascalia (§ 38), the Apost. Const. (i. 59) by implication, and that the Council of Laodicea (can. 40, 51 [in Lent]); and in Socrates' time this custom was universal, except at Alexandria and Rome (HE v. 22; cf. Sozomen, HE vii. 19, who says that it obtained at Constantinople; see art. Agape in vol. i. p. 172). That the Saturday fast, however, was known much earlier as the beginning of the 3rd cent. appears from a remark of Jerome (Ep. lixi. 6 ad Lucinum),

1 But in the derived Arabic Didascalia (§ 35 [c. A.D. 400]) Wednesday and Friday are fast-days.
who says that Hippolytus discussed the question of the Saturday fast and of a daily reception of the Eucharist.

4. Prebaptismal fasts.—These are twice prescribed in the Canon of Hippolytus for the candidates for ordination. In one place (c. 104, 418*) it is laid down in the Canon of Hippolytus (can. xix. 150–2), xxviii. (305), in the Test of our Lord (c. 20, 25), in the Verona Fragments (Hanser, 1898, in the Eth. Ch. Ord. 44). In some of these passages, but not in all, the rule is insisted on: the faithful are enjoined to eat other food. The Can. of Hippolytus say that no one is to taste anything before receiving the mysteries, especially on the days of the sacred fasts: the last words show that the rule was not absolutely rigorous.

Though these passages are (probably of the 4th cent., their wording shows that they are derived from the common source of those rules, and therefore the rule goes back to the 3rd cent. Of writers of the 4th cent. who insist on the rule may be mentioned Basil (hom. de Jejun. i.), Chrysostom (hom. 27 in 1 Cor. etc.) and Greg. Naz. (Orat. xi. 30). The last treats the custom as universal, though (he remarks) Jesus gave the sacrament of the Passover after supper. Augustine makes it a Divinely established rule (it seemed good to the Lord and the Gentile Fastings, vii. 22) that it should be observed for a time, and says that 'for the honour of so great a sacrament the body of the Lord should enter into the nostrils of no one except at one time for canonical legislation, from 16 (16th).

The fact that this custom kept through the world, even although the disciples at the Last Supper did not receive fasting (Ep. liv. 8, Bed. ad Janu. [alter xvili. 6]). It is clear that in this matter an additional reason for fasting besides the observation of Lent before the ordination of the bishop, was added, and that (as is well shown that at the time when that manual was compiled the Pentecostal fast was not an ordinary observance. Athanasius alludes to a short fast (of a day or two [2]) before Pentecost in Apol. de fuga 6, c. a. 395. It probably began only in the 4th century.

6. Special and voluntary fasts.—Corresponding to the fast before ordination in NT is a special fast for bishops after their consecration in the Test of our Lord (i. 22) and the Arabic Didascalia (23, 38). In several of the Church Orders voluntary fasts are recommended to widows and, indeed, to all Christians (Test. i. 42; Egyp. Ch. Ord. 47; Eth. Ch. Ord. 57; Orat. Hipp. xx. 150). The bishop, however, according to the second of these, ought not to fast except when all the people fast. In some places Jan. 1 was in the 4th cent. observed as a fast with a view to counteracting the influence of heathen New Year's orgies (Ambrose, Serm. ii. 'de Cal. Jan.': Aug. Serm. xcviii. 2, Bedeine dicet, 'de Cal. Jan.'; but Augustine says that, if people cannot fast on that day, at least they should dine with sobriety. As monastic communities grew, from the middle of the 4th cent. onwards, special fasts became common in them. For monasticism and its discipline, see artt. ASCETICISM—MONASTICISM.

7. Fasting before and after Communion.—The fast before Communion corresponds in some measure to that before Baptism, but is not mentioned at so early a date. It is clear that, if the Agape was connected with and preceded the Eucharist (see the various views given in art. AGAPE), the latter could not have been received fasting; yet the feeling of reverence which dictated fasting before Communion would not be offended by the previous partaking of a sacred meal like the Agape in the same way as it would be offended by the partaking of ordinary food. But there is no evidence of the custom at the time when the Agape and the Eucharist were united.

The first writer who alludes to the custom is Tertullian (ad Uzor. ii. 6: 'quod secreto ante altum gustis'; the reference is to private reservation of the Eucharist by the Christian wife of a heathen husband: cf. also de Retr. iv. 2); but there is no hint that it was a novelty in his day. The next certain reference to the custom is in the 4th cent. It is laid down in the Canon of Hippolytus (can. xix. 150–2), xxviii. (305), in the Test of our Lord (c. 20, 25), in the Verona Fragments (Hanser, 1898, in the Eth. Ch. Ord. 44). In some of these passages, but not in all, the rule is insisted on: the faithful are enjoined to eat other food. The Can. of Hippolytus say that no one is to taste anything before receiving the mysteries, especially on the days of the sacred fasts: the last words show that the rule was not absolutely rigorous.
cluded among the canons of Agde or Agatha in South Gaul (A.D. 506; Hefele, Concil., iv. 76, 83). Thereafter the practice was common.

9. When fasting was forbidden.—On Sundays and in the season of ‘Pentecost’ (i.e. Easter tide, 50 days after Easter) fasting and kneeling were not allowed, both being considered unsuitable to a time of joy. The prohibition is found first in a fragment of Irenaeus quoted by pseudo-Justin, Quest. et R. ad Orth. 115 (kneeling); then in Terratullian, de Cor. 3 (fasting and kneeling) and de Orat. 23 (kneeling); in the latter passage Terratullian says that those some abstained from kneeling on Saturdays, and that on fast-days prayer should always be offered kneeling. We find the same prohibition in Peter I. of Alexandria (Ep. can. 15, kneeling), in the canons of Nicaea (can. 20, kneeling), in the Test. of our Lord (ii. 12, fasting and kneeling in Pentecost), in the Apost. Constit. v. 20 (fasting); the prohibition is not in the parallel Dioecesian, and in the canons of Saragossa (can. 2, Sunday fasting). Pseudo-Ignatius (Philipp. 13) says that one who fasts on these days is a ‘Christian spirit in a Christian time:’ and those who fast on Sunday from pretended asceticism (can. 18). Augustine is equally strong on not fasting on Sundays and in Pentecost (Ep. xxxvi. 18, or Peter lxvi. ad Caesalan). See also DC. i. 754ff.

III. MEDIEVAL AND MODERN PERIODS.—(A) THE WEST.—1. Lent.—Sundays in Lent were expressly ordered to be kept as fast-days at the beginning of the 6th cent. in South Gaul, by the Council of Agde (can. 12). Yet, even so, ‘Quadragasima’ consisted of only 36 fasting days, since Sunday was not a fast. At Rome, Gregory the Great (590-604) added a fast from Ash Wednesday to Good Friday, i.e. 36 fasting days (hom. 16 in Evang.). So in 853 the 8th Council of Toledo in Spain repeats Cassian’s language (above, II. 2) about Lent being a tithe of the year (can. 9). But in the 7th cent., before the Gelasian Sacramentary was drawn up, four days were prefixed to Lent, which thus began on Ash Wednesday, and consisted of 40 fasting days. At Milan the older custom survived; and, according to the Ambrosian rite, the Lenten fast still begins on the 6th Monday before Easter. In Scotland the four extra days were introduced by St. Margaret in the 11th cent. (Vita S. Marg. ii. 18); the Mozarabic Calendar 1570 (in Fullwood, Hist. of Eng. Lit. 1587; Dawden, Ch. Year and Calendar, p. 83). Gregory the Great recognizes sickness as a reason for not fasting (Epp. xxxii. xi.).

2. Advent.—This season, instituted in preparation for Christmas, is not heard of as a fast till just before the 6th century. Hence, from the fact of its once lasting six weeks no argument can be drawn as to the original date of the Western Christmas, as has lately been done by Kirkopp Lake (Guardian, 29 Dec. 1911). But the Council of Cesaragnosta (Saragossa) in Spain (c. A.D. 580; can. 4) appointed the days from Dec. 17 to Jan. 6 as a solemn season for prayer and daily church-going, i.e. when ‘no one may go with bare feet.’ It was not, however, a fast. This may indicate that Jan. 6 was then observed in Spain, as in the East at that time, as the Nativity (estival). The fast of Advent is first found in the Calendar of Perpetua, bishop of Rome, 491 (PL xxxvi. 566). It lasted from Nov. II (Martinsmas) to Dec. 25, and was for three days a week. The Council of Milan (A.D. 581; can. 9) appointed for Dec. 17 a fast lasting 12 days, i.e. when ‘no one may go with bare feet.’ This is, however, not a fast. For this reason Advent came to be known as ‘St. Martin’s Quadragesima.’ The Council of Tours (A.D. 567) appointed a daily fast for these three weeks for monks (can. 17). At Rome, Advent never lasted for more than five Sundays (so even in the Gelasian Sacramentary [7th cent.]; and usually only for four (so Gregory the Great). Advent fasting soon died out in the West, and the season became merely a solemn time for prayer, as it is at present. Bede, however, mentions a 40-days’ fast before Christmas and after Pentecost as being observed by some devout persons in the 7th and 8th centuries.

3. Pentecost.—The Council of Tours, A.D. 567, mentions a week’s fast after Pentecost for monks (can. 17). In the 8th, 9th, and 10th centuries we find a 40-days’ fast after Pentecost, sometimes called ‘the Quadragesima before St. John the Baptist.’ This is said by Theodore, Abp. of Canterbury (+590), in his Pientudentia, to be for all men. We find the same in Ireland c. A.D. 700, in Charlemagne’s Capitula, and in the canons collected by Burchard, bishop of Worms, A.D. 1006 (Dowden, 85). For Bede, see above, III. 2. But this fast soon disappeared in the West.

4. Rogation Days are a Western institution only. They are the three days before Ascension Day (Holy Thursday), and the Friday and Saturday before that festival. They are thought to have been instituted by Mamertus, bishop of Vienne on the Rhone, c. A.D. 470, at a time of earthquakes in Avignon. He introduced the ‘remonstrations’ or ‘protestations’ for supplication. The Rogation fast was enjoined by the first Council of Orleans, A.D. 511, indirectly by that of Tours, (can. 17), and perhaps by that of Mainz, A.D. 813 (can. 331; the fast not explicitly mentioned); in England by the Council of Clovesho, A.D. 747. It was enjoined by Leo III. at Rome, c. A.D. 800, as an intercession for the fruits of the earth. It is found in the Missale Gothicum (perhaps six weeks or 49 days); the procession still survives, especially in the form of beating parochial bounds; hence the names ‘gang days,’ ‘gang week,’ found in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle and in the laws of Athelstan (Dowden, 87).

5. Ember Days are also found only in the West. They are the fasts of the four seasons (‘quattor tempora,’ Germ. Quattnerm, whence perhaps the English name, though it is more probably derived from A.S. ymbren, ‘recurring’), being (since the 11th cent.) the Wednesday, Friday, and Saturday after the First Sunday in Lent, Pentecost, Holy Cross, and Christmas. They are particularly interesting as being the relics of the full weekly fasts of the West (above, II. 3), which thus have survived in only four weeks of the year; otherwise, the Friday fast is the sole survival of the weekly observance, though, in and after the Middle Ages, Wednesday and Saturday were sometimes observed as fast-days (see Froeter-FreRe, Hist. of Bk. of Com. Pr., London, 1801, p. 583; and below, 3). Leo the Great (c. A.D. 440) refers to these fasts of the four seasons at Rome, held in Lent (Serm. 39-50), Pentecost (Serm. 78-80), the 7th (Serm. 86-94), and 10th (Serm. 12-20) months, i.e. Sept. and Dec.; and from Rome they spread over the West. But at one time they were held in some places only at three seasons, the sowing, reaping, and vintage; afterwards the Winter Ember fast was fixed. The exact weeks, however, have varied. The Gelasian Sacramentary mentions the 1st, 4th, 7th, and 10th month. At the Council of Mainz (A.D. 813, can. 34) they fall in the first week of March, the second week of June, the third week of Sept., and the third week of Dec., and Friday as the last. In the Leofric Missal they are in the first week of Lent, the week of Pentecost, and in the full weeks before the autumn equinox and Christmas. Pseudo-Callistus (Ep. 17), part of the rule of pseudo-Isidorus (Ante-Nic. Chr. Lib. ix. B. p. 292) advocates their being held quarterly, with reference
to the four seasons and the fruits of the earth. The Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) enjoins the fasting of the 40th and 10th months but does not mention that of the spring, probably because it was absorbed in the great Lenten fast.

The original Ember Days had no reference to fasting, but in the 7th century, Gelasian Sacramentary and in later authorities (though the custom may be earlier (Duchesne, Chr. Wor. p. 353)), it became the rule for bishops to ordain at these seasons, thus taking the form of a pre-ordination exercise; and this is the present aspect of the Ember Days. Minor orders, however, were conferred at any time. The present rule in the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches is for ordination to the presbyterate and deaconate to be normally confined to these seasons, though the bishop has a discretion (see, e.g., the preface to the English Ordinal in the Bk. of Com. Pr. and the English Canon 31).

6. Vigils.—These are single fasting days before certain saints' days and other festivals; but as fasts they are purely Western. Originally a ''Vigil'' was a night spent in prayer, as often in the 4th century. The Anglican Rubric of Fasting and Absolution (pt. II., Pontius, Life of Cyprian, p. 15; Chrystos., hom. de Mart., ii. 608 D.; Socrates, HE vi. 9). The substitution of a fast-day for this ''penitentiao'' probably dates only from the 8th century. As Sunday cannot be a fast-day, if the day before a festival which has a Vigil be the Lord's day, the fast is kept on the Saturday.

7. Fasting and abstinence.—The Roman Catholics at the present day make a distinction between these. On a day of abstinence, meat is forbidden, but there is no restriction on the quantity of food taken; on a fast-day the quantity is also restricted. The distinction was originally in England modern; in the Anglican Bk. of Com. Pr. the two terms are used synonymously. The distinction was introduced among the English Roman Catholics in 1761, Fridays and Rogation Days being days of abstinence.

8. Fasts at the present day in the West.—The Church of England and the Church of Rome enumerate as fasts the 40 days of Lent, Ember Days, Rogation Days, all Fridays except Christmas Day if it fall on that day of the week, and Vigils before certain festivals. Roman Catholics in some countries relax the Vigils in favour of a stricter observance of Wednesdays and Fridays in Lent, and keep the Ember Days. In the Church of England, while fixing the fasting days, has made no rule as to how they are to be observed, leaving this to the individual conscience; but Acts of Parliament of Edward VI. and James I. and Proclamations of Elizabeth, vigorously enforced, ordered abstinence from flesh-meal on fast-days, and gave the curious reason for the injunction that the fish and shipping trades might be benefited; also, curiously enough, Saturdays are therein mentioned as fast-days (see remarkable instances of the enforcement of these injunctions in Hieroglyph Anglicana, London, 1902-4, II. 106 ff., cf. li. 2). The Anglican Rubric of Fasting and Absolution defines fasting as a 'withholding of meat, drink, and all natural food from the body,' and (pt. ii.) a 'restraint from some kinds of meats and drink'; it permits a fast on a fast-day (Hier. Ang. II. 106). A relic of the pre-baptismal fast is seen in the service for the baptism of such as are of riper years in the Bk. of Com. Pr., where the candidates are to be exhorted to prepare themselves with prayer and fasting (1st rubric). Fasting was also retained by the Protestant Reformers in Continental Europe; and the Fast Day (generally Thursday) before the Communion is a well-known feature of Scottish Presbyterian custom, observed with much rigour by the devout up to recent times. See also art. 'Fasting (Christian)' in vol. III. p. 79. In Roman Catholic countries the days before Ash Wednesday, called 'Carnival' (from Lat. carnem levere, 'to put away meat,' or carne levamen, 'solace in the flesh') are given to relaxation and enjoyment of food. Ash Wednesday is also permitted in Mid-Lent; the fourth Sunday in Lent, when the Gospel for the day narrates the Feeding of the Five Thousand, has long been called 'Dominica Defectus' or 'Refreshment Sunday' (but in French Mardi Gras).

(B) The East.—i. The Orthodox Eastern Church.—(a) Lent, the 'Fast of the holy and great Thursday before the Sunday of Pascha, is called the 'Carnival' (in Greek, έορτάζεται), autumn fast in popular language. In the Eastern Church, it is called the 'Sunday of cheese fare' (ετοιμάζεται τα τηρήματα έφερον). During this week cheese and eggs are permitted on Wednesday and Friday as well as on other days. The Sunday corresponding to the Western Sexagesima (that preceding the above mentioned 'fast of Easter') is called the 'Weekend of cheese fare' (ετοιμάζεται τα τηρήματα έφερον) and lasts one week. The Orthodox Church observes a week of fasting and abstinence (see, e.g., the Preface to the Orthodox Confession) before the Masses of the Lord's Last Supper, and these fasts are observed in the Eastern Churches, but not in the Western. The 'Carnival' is observed even in the Western Church in its separate Eastern rites, e.g., the Greek rite. (b) Advent and Christmas.—Advent begins on the Saturday after Quinquagesima, which in the Eastern Church is called the 'Fasting of the Apostles' (Peter and Paul) and lasts 40 days up to Christmas. Shem (408). This date from not before the 9th century. (DCA i. 926), and even then was only for monks. Theodore of Balsamon (A.D. 1200) says that there was in his time only one fast, the 'Fast of the Apostles' that before Pascha; the other fasts were of 7 days only (ib.). But now Advent is a fast of 40 days for all. The Greeks sometimes call it the 'Fast of St. Philip,' because St. Philip's Day falls on Nov. 14. The rule is applied to the Repose of the Virgin (Ang. 15); it perhaps once lasted for 40 days (DCA i. 622). The 'Fasting of the Nativity of our Lord' (Advent) begins on Nov. 15, and lasts for 40 days up to Christmas (Shem, 408). This date from not before the 9th century. (DCA i. 926).
2. The Armenians.—See Festivals and Fasts (Armenian).

3. The Monophysites. — (a) The customs of the Western Monophysites or Jacobites are less known to us than those of any other Eastern Church. Their Adorations, or Săbăo (Săbăo = ëasy-qa'alul), lasts for six weeks, as compared with 24 days of the Nestorians. — (b) The Christians of the Abyssinian Church.

The fasts as enjoined in Filothoas' Catechism of the Coptic Church (Eng. tr. ed. Bromage, London, 1892, p. 421.) are: 'The holy 40 days followed by the week of Easter' (they thus exclude Holy Week; see above, II. 2). Wednesday and Friday, the fast of Christmas, the fast following the day of Pentecost, the 'days relating specially to our Lady,' and the three-days' Ninféh fast. [For the three-days' fast (sic) of the Ninevites in OT, see Apost. Const. v. 20; but it is not there mentioned as a Christian fast.] In the fast, meat and butter are forbidden. Fasts are binding on all except 'infants, invalids, women in child-bearing, those worn out by captivity or exile, and the like.' We also learn that ordination among the Copts is followed by a 40-days' fast, and that between a death and burial all the near relatives fast (Fowler, Church Life, Eng. tr., London, 1897, p. 298, 212). The Abyssinian fests are still stricter.

4. The Nestorians (known also as East Syrians, Assyrians, or Chaldeans) are remarkable as fasting more strictly than their own Book of Canon Law, or Sănădăhă, requires. They abstain on Sundays in the fasting season, though the Sănădăhă forbids it because of the Manicheans. In some copies a savior law (it says) that a man may fast on Sunday if it is not from an evil and Manichean intention. The fasts observed by all are: (a) Adorations, called Săbăo, also 'The Little Fast,' Dec. 1-24 incl., though the Sănădăhă makes this a voluntary fast except for monks. (b) Lent, called 'The Fast' or 'The Great Fast,' lasting 50 days, including Sundays. The Sănădăhă mentions 40 days, but the Service-book called Kăthārā, or 'Cycle,' allows for 50 days (with the Sundays included). Mid-Lent is often marked by some entertainment, but the fast is not broken. (c) The 'Rogation' (bē'sīthā, or 'supplication') of the Ninevites, the three days following the 5th Sunday after Epiphany. (d) Every Wednesday and Friday, not excluding Christmas Day.

Other fests, not now universal, are the 15 days before 'Mart. Mariam' (St. Mary, Aug. 15), observed by many, the two 'Rogations' of Mar Zain and about the 4th of the year; three days following the 2nd Sunday after Christmas and the 1st Sunday after Epiphany; the shādawā' (or period of seven weeks) of the Apostles (beginning Whit Monday; this is the Pentecostal fast, ending with the festival of the Twelve Apostles, or Nawarudd, 50 days after Pentecost—thus the Nestorians, by 'the Apostles' in this connexion, do not mean St. Peter and St. Paul); the shādawā' of Elijah (beginning 99 days after Pentecost). These two are mentioned by the Sănădăhă as voluntary fasts, but are now almost, if not quite, obsolete, and the Rogations of Mar Zain and of the Virgin are nearly so. In the fast, meat, butter, milk, fish, eggs, etc., are prohibited; and the strictest Nestorians, especially those in the Kurdish mountains, will not eat, drink, or smoke in Lent till mid-day, except on Sundays. If the fasting seasons they may eat when they please, as long as they do not partake of the forbidden foods. In practice, the Wednesday and Friday fasts in most parts of the E. Syrian country begin in the morning, and are usually from Easter to Pentecost, butter, milk, and eggs may be taken on these days. The usual food in the fast consists of bread, beans, rice cooked with walnut or other vegetable oil; vine leaves stuffed with rice and raisins and cooked in vinegar; treacle, fruit, raisins, and walnuts. A curious rule about the end of the fast reflects the difference of custom in the 4th cent. (see above, II. 2). The Advent and Lenten fasts end at evensong on Christmas Eve or on Easter Even, if one has communicated at the Eucharist of the Even; otherwise it does not end till the Eucharist of the festival (the rule is not of universal application). On fast-days the Eucharist is celebrated before 11 a.m. or 12 m.—that all may remain fasting till then (see above, II. 7). Another rule (perhaps now obsolete) is that, if a person does not communicate at or about Easter, he is not to eat meat for a month; if he has communicated on Maundy Thursday, but not on Easter Even or Easter Day, then for a fortnight. (For the information in this section, see Maclean-Browne, The Catholics of the East, London, 1892, p. 340 f.) In this Church, as now among the Greeks (see above, III. (B) 1), there is no difficulty about a festival and a fast falling on the same day; as a matter of fact, most of the holy days fall on a Friday, but that day is, nevertheless, a fasting day.

All the Eastern Churches are strict about the fast before Communion. In some cases (e.g. the East Syrian Sănădăhă) Maclean-Browne, (p. 343), the clergy who take any part in the Eucharist or baptism or ordination must be fasting.

Cf. art. Festivals and Fasts (Christian).


FATALISM.—See Fate, Neccessitarianism.

FATE. — I. DEFINITION. — The idea of Fate is found only in conditions where some attempt has been made to trace all phenomena, and more particularly the phenomena of human life, to an ultimate unity. Fate, indeed, is precisely this unity apprehended as an inevitable necessity controlling all things; it is the absolutely inescapable power to which all men are subject, and may be either personified or represented as impersonal. It is a conception which prevails wherever the mind of
man is unable to frame the idea of rational necessity or of a supreme purposive will, and it survives so long as either of these, though within the field of consciousness, is imperfectly realized. Further, men tend to fall back on the idea of Fate when their more elevated level of interest fails, they begin to doubt of a rational order, or a rational end, in the universe. If any distinction is to be drawn between Fate and Destiny, it is simply that the former is the former regarded as operative in particular cases. The idea of Destiny, however, does not necessarily preclude the rationality of the thing destined; it merely implies that this rationality is not perceived. Destiny, in fact, being a somewhat indefinite conception, may even denote an ethical vocation, and may in that case be applied to the end which a higher will sets before a moral personality as an ideal to be realized in moral endeavour.

II. HISTORICAL SURVEY. — 1. Non-Christian religions. — In the course of history, Fate has assumed various forms. (1) In polytheistic or religious thought is as yet too incoherent to give definite Egyptian or Nir}er, anticipate a lot, as, e.g., in the 'Life-Dream' of the American Indians, amongst whom, however, the prevailing idea is of a chatelast, but not of a world-soul, in whose being these not being supposed to form a unity. An important place is certainly assigned to the Death god, the All-Father, or Great Spirit, but he is not figured as Fate, for the simple reason that the conception of necessity, or even of the necessary order of Fate, has not yet dawned upon the mind.

(2) A closer approximation to the idea of Fate is found in religions which recognize the uniformity of Nature. This is especially seen in the conception of the heavenly bodies, and which develop an astrology. This stage was reached by the Quichuas and the Aztecs, who, having various astrological beliefs, began to entertain surmises regarding the operation of Fate in human life, and, interpreting this as the will of the gods, sought to get into right relations therewith, and with its actual decrees, by means of magic, omens, dreams, and haruspications. Among the Aztecs, in fact, there was a special school of astrology, while full credence was given to the manifold evil omens which pointed to the downfall of their kingdom.

(3) We meet with the idea of Fate also in religions which regard the process of Nature as the dominant factor, such as the Egyptian, in which the leading motive is the antithesis of life and death; or the Babylonian, which is permeated by the thought of the uniformity of Nature, more particularly as exemplified in the movement of the stars. Yet we must not forget that these religions likewise show a high ethical development, however incongruous with their naturalistic tendencies this may appear.

(a) In the religion of Egypt, magic papyri are regarded as equally effective with good works in obviating the penalties of the final judgment. The Egyptians speak of Fate; they personify law in the goddess Ma'et, who in reality stands for natural order, but has also moral attributes; they find a place for Destiny in the authors, Shai, and Hemmnetet; and, in fact, as the system in its entirety, notwithstanding its ethical aspects, is dominated by the process of Nature, it exemplifies a stage of development in which Fate takes the form of natural necessity, as may be inferred likewise from the magical arts by which souls are to be delivered at the day of judgment. See, further, FATE (Egyptian) and ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian).

(b) The Babylonians, on the other hand, have a profound sense of the anguish of the gods, as that which maintained not only the order of Nature but also the ordinances of the State, and in their penitential psalms the devout make sorrowful confession of their offences against both. Yet we find among them so much in the way of exorcism, magic, and astrology as to make it develop perhaps that, so far as their view the order of Nature was simply an all-controlling Destiny: the stars decide the lot of men. The Chaldean astrology, we should note, was still a power in Rome. See, further, FATE (Chaldean) and ASTROLOGY (Chaldean).

(c) Similar conditions meet us in China. The worship of spirits is there associated with reverence for natural law, of which, again, civil law is simply a particular phase. In the religion of ancient China, systematic knowledge of the order of Nature—an order believed to emanate from Heaven, from the Sovereign Deity—was obstructed by the belief in spirits, as appears from the respect accorded to soothsaying and astrology. Here morality really consisted in the due observance of class-precedence, i.e. in the recognition of that domestic and civil order which is at the same time the order of Nature. To this impersonal Fate, which Confinus was so far ethical that he laid the supreme emphasis upon practical obedience to the law, and supported his demands by examples culled from the history of particular spirits, he is convinced that obedience to the moral law is attended with the happiness which is organic to the order of Nature, he does not develop this view to its logical issues. The man who does right should have no anxiety regarding the result: 'If the wise man achieve something, it is well; if he achieve nothing, it is also well: he recognizeth Destiny.' The perfect man sees dangers, and yet hopes to Destiny.

Although Confinus sought to limit the sphere of sorcery and the belief in spirits, he did not identify Destiny with Providence; and, while he yields a certain recognition to Providence, he is, nevertheless, content to ascertain what the order of Nature prescribes; for him Destiny still remains the necessity to which he adjusts himself, though he does not directly assert that it possesses moral attributes. The natural order was recognized still more distinctly by Lao-tse, who actually idealized it as the metaphysical force that he calls Tao. Tao is the source of that economy which is manifested both in Nature and in the State. It shows no partiality. It is just; it is impartial; it is without desire, and in it, renouncing all passion, he must find peace. Lao-tse takes his stand upon the necessity of this self-adjustment. But Tao, notwithstanding all its ethical accretions, still remains a merely natural power, like Heaven itself. As a matter of fact, the ever-growing practice of soothsaying—the feng-shui, or geomancy—shows how firmly-rooted was the belief in Fate, in a country where men had an inking, but no concrete knowledge, of the order of Nature, and tried to fathom its mysteries by fantastic expedients of all sorts. In reality China is at that stage of development where order is felt to be morally determined; but, as this is the case with a natural order, it is neither more nor less than Fate. See, further, FATE (Chinese) and FENG-SHIU.

(d) The conception of Fate is found also in the Teutonic religions. Though the process of Nature is here combined with the ethical process which terminates in the Gotterdtummenung, the 'twilight of the gods,' yet guilt and impermanence—to which the gods themselves are subject—operate as tragic elements. The destructive elements, viz. the Fenris Wolf, the goddess Hela, and the Midgard Serpent, at length gain the upper hand, while Odin himself falls swooning from the world-tree. The cosmic process of its consummation as something destined. From
the beginning the winds are graving at the tree Yggdrasil. In the watery Life dwell the three Norns, daughters of Hela, goddesses of time—past, present, and future—who spin the threads of fortune; goddesses of Destiny, who are older than Odin. Thus the idea of Fate, especially in its tragic form, plays a part in this religion also. The moral element is certainly not absent, but the moral process is mainly one of dissolution. It is a moot point whether the anticipation of a new world under the influence of Vishnu and Siva, the original divinities of the so-called Vedic and Tentonic tradition. In any case this religion looks upon the transitoriness of Nature and human life as the decree of Fate. See DOOM, DOOM MYTHS (Tentonic).

(c) The Indo-Germanic peoples of India combined Fate and ethics in a somewhat different way. Brahmanism and Buddhism are both dominated by the doctrine of re-birth—the evil cycle from which no one can extricate himself. The Eta of the Vedas may be regarded as an analogue of the Greek Μοῖρα, since the ordered process it denotes is by no means thought of as purely ethical. In Brahmanism, the final deliverance is envisaged. Fate, as the true ascetics, seems to be something more than Fate. But, on the other hand, later Brahmanism possesses an eonianatal doctrine, representing in the Trimūrti the cycle of generation and dissolution in Nature; where, again, it shows itself fixed, the belief that the individual having been fixed by his birth, the system of caste is fostered also by the doctrine of re-birth. It is true that this doctrine contains the idea of a divine analogue of the endless cycle of worlds and the interminable suffering of life which it involves are, after all, a necessity of Nature, a decree of Fate. To wrench oneself free from the chain of re-birth is possible only for those who become absorbed in mystic contemplation and live as ascetics, i.e. those who belong to the two higher castes. In other words, the conception of Fate forms the substructure of Brahmism in its exoteric form. See, further, FATE (Hindu).

The same holds good of Buddhism, the basis of which is the doctrine of universal suffering in an infinite cycle of rebirths. In this religion, too, the idea, the idea of the infinity of Nature is represented as moral retribution; nevertheless it is predomi-

nantly regarded as an inherent Fate, in which man finds himself enmeshed against his will. Deliverance is, indeed, possible for those who renounce all life, all desire, all infatude, in order that they may enter Nirvāṇa; and the way is open to all. But Buddhism in its original form is so closely identified with a fatalistic view of the continuity of Nature that the deliverance which it profers involves the destruction of personality, the conception of Spirit as something which transcends Nature not having as yet been attained. The latter feature is reflected also in the various magical expediency by which popular Buddhism seeks to dominate Nature, as also by the mechanical formality of the popular worship. Exoteric Buddhism, in short, is destitute of any positive spiritual content. See, further, for a somewhat different view, FATE (Buddhist).

(f) Fate plays a considerably less important part in the dualistic religion of Persia, but it has not been without influence. Though in this religion the development of personality, the conception of Fate as something which transcends Nature not having as yet been attained. The latter feature is reflected also in the various magical expedients by which popular Buddhism seeks to dominate Nature, as also by the mechanical formality of the popular worship. Exoteric Buddhism, in short, is destitute of any positive spiritual content. See, further, for a somewhat different view, FATE (Buddhist).

The Indian system of religious thought is that which we have called the theory of rebirth. In it the idea of Fate is developed in a true fatalistic way. It is believed, indeed, that the conflict between the two powers will eventually eliminate the evil, and that man's part in the campaign is to obey the laws of Zartushtra; meanwhile, however, man is entangled in an evil world, beset upon every side by demons, from whose wiles he must guard himself; and become Deity himself, though sure of ultimate victory, is not as yet wholly free, but physically and spiritually circumscribed by the evil spirit. Now, as this evil spirit acts without reflection, and under the influence of a lower Fate, the original idea is supported by a whole host of demons, who shed abroad darkness and sorrow, temp to robbery and tyranny, stir up hatred and revenge, and disseminate evils of all kinds, including even the unsavouriness of food—men are clearly subject to an alien necessity, from which they may, indeed, with the help of the law gradually free themselves by a struggle, but by which their earthly existence is heavily trammeled. We shall hardly err, therefore, in saying that in Parsism the conception of Fate has not been fully transcended, though it has certainly fallen into the background. The dependence of the Norns, the Avestan (q.v.) Dāhūra, upon Fate, as represented in the later Avesta—even though that dependence be but temporary—bears an ominous resemblance to the idea that the gods themselves are subject to Fate. That Angra Mainyu appears as the great demon, who, if the fact that he and his demonic hosts alike are under the control of a blind will, thus resembling a natural force which acts in opposition to the highest god and compels him to struggle. The naturalistic limitations of Parsism are also shown in its fire-worship, and the partial worship accorded to natural deities. Furthermore, Asha, the Persian concept of Fate, though it represents a purely ethical order. The potent influence of the conception of Fate—an all-controlling factor in human life—in this system of dualism may probably be traced in the later theological idea of Zoroastrianism, or Infinite Time, which forms the apex of the system, and furnishes the starting-point of the dualistic process. Again, in the fraenschi (q.v.), the guardian angel of the good man, we recognize the belief that human beings are surrounded by friendly and beneficent spirits, as well as by assnants of evil intent; while the belief that the latter can be effectively counteracted by the frequent practice of good and magic—this is the mechanical debasement of religion, in fact, which corresponds to a naturalism not yet transcended.

Finally, the various systems of Neo-Gnosticism influenced by this religion, as also Manichaicism, are largely pervaded by the conception of Fate: thus, they regard mankind as divided by nature into pneumatic, psychic, and lylic groups, the lot of the individual being determined by the extent to which the evil principle intermingles with his being. See, further, FATE (Iranian).

(g) Nor had the religions of Greece and Rome quite outgrown the belief in Fate. As regards Greece, it is true that Homer places Zeus on the throne of Olympus; but, as the gods are still to some extent liable to envy and caprice, they are shadowed by Μοῖρα, or Necessity; and, although Destiny is spoken of as the 'decree of Zeus' (Δεσμὴ, etc.), yet it is Μοῖρα who, acting independently of Zeus, assigns the term of human life. In the tragic poems the idea of Fate was superseded by that of a just and final end; and the personified Fate was controlled by Zeus: Μοῖρα gives place to Δεσμὴ. They warn men against Ῥήδα, the temper which transgresses the limits of human power. The jealousy of the gods was repudiated by Pindar in favour of the idea of retribution. In the hands of the tragedians, Fate acquires an ethical significance: the Μοῖρα
combines with the Erinyes, who punish 695ps. While in Sophocles the distinction between Fate and guilt is frequently obscured, and guilt may sometimes fasten upon the innocent, yet he also envisages the opinions which will be visited with stern retribution, and that hardship and sorrow may lead to glory. In Greek philosophy likewise, the trend of which was towards materialism, the Supranatural Deity is subordinated to the supreme idea of the Good, as the supreme Reason, as Providence, though we still hear of 'Arrêges (Necessity) and Eubouleus (Fate). In point of fact, natural necessity and Providence are not as yet sharply distinguished, and, accordingly, the moral personality has not attained to complete emancipation from Nature. Nature, indeed, save where it was interpreted by reason from the aesthetic standpoint, was always a mystery; and, though the Stoics regarded the gods themselves as organs of Providence (not altogether free from natural necessity), we need hardly wonder that even amongst them the occult arts had a place. Nor was the necessity of Fate to the wise, the natural dualism in their view of matter; and, consequently, they too fell back upon magic and the After-life. Fate did not succeed in fully harmonizing moral reason and natural necessity; it either identified the two, or admitted a residuum of dualism, and, while the conception of cosmic unity became more and more clearly formulated, all the more persistently did some element of fatalism maintain its ground, asserting itself alike in ritual and in moral life. See, further, Eumenides.

The belief in Fate survived also in Rome, where it assumed a largely practical form, being associated with the Fata, or destinies of individuals, and with the practice of augury connected therewith and developed mainly from Etruscan sources. The Fata were primarily concerned with birth and death. The later period of Roman history was remarkable for its syncretistic tendencies, the city becoming a rendezvous for sorcery of all kinds, Chaldean astrology, Greek oracles, etc. Fortuna (rōs) was worshipped as the goddess of Destiny, as were also the Parce. The fatum, or lot, of the individual or the State was doubtless traced back to the gods, but taken with this the ascending belief in Fate as an independent power, manifesting itself in various prognostica, the interpretation of which was a craft by itself. Thus there was ever the Diva Necessitas hovering above the life of man. See, further, Fate (Greek and Roman). Fortuna (rōs) was worshipped as the goddess of Destiny, as were also the Parce. The fatum, or lot, of the individual or the State was doubtless traced back to the gods, but taken with this the ascending belief in Fate as an independent power, manifesting itself in various prognostica, the interpretation of which was a craft by itself. Thus there was ever the Diva Necessitas hovering above the life of man. See, further, Fate (Greek and Roman). Lord, or of the supernatural theism, such, e.g., as the leading faiths of the Semitic world. This, however, is by no means the case. We must not forget that in those religions the Divine will, being regarded as absolute sovereignty, really takes the form of inevitable necessity. In the last resort chance and necessity signify the sanctifying their irrepératos (super-existential Being), quite free from a natural dualism in their view of matter; and, consequently, they too fell back upon magic and the After-life. Fate did not succeed in fully harmonizing moral reason and natural necessity; it either identified the two, or admitted a residuum of dualism, and, while the conception of cosmic unity became more and more clearly formulated, all the more persistently did some element of fatalism maintain its ground, asserting itself alike in ritual and in moral life. See, further, Eumenides.

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rational, and likewise identical with the all-wise Will, which the Will, being, as a most sublime stimulus to the freedom of man. Only when freedom and necessity are recognized as being one in the Deity is it possible for Destiny to give place to Providence; only when man realizes his freedom as that which carries with him the obligation of self-determination in the sphere of conduct does he cease to resort to the occult arts; and only as he knows that all things can be utilized for the highest good, the Foundation of Fate. These beliefs, however, constitute in essence the Christian point of view.

Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Christianity is even yet entirely free from the belief in Fate. For one thing, vestiges of the idea have worked their way into Christian doctrine; and, again, traces of it are actually found in Christian practice; while, finally, the Christian world shows a reincarnation of certain theories of the universe which, avowedly opposed to the Christian view, have rehabilitated the belief in Fate in one or other of its forms.

As exemplifying the first of these tendencies we shall speak of Origen and Augustine, the two greatest thinkers of the Patristic period; from the Medieval period we shall cite Aquinas and Duns Scotus; and from Protestantism, Calvin and Socinus.

1. Fate in Christian doctrine.—(1) Patristic.—(a) In so far as Origen regards the world as originating in a condition where all spiritual beings were of the same sort, and believes that, when the fall of spirits has reached its term, the world will be restored to its primal state, his doctrine is still capable of a Christian interpretation, since, in fact, mankind is being raised, under Divine tuition, from its present sinful condition towards perfection. But, as Origen also conceives of this world-process as eternally recurrent, he does not get beyond the idea of an endless cycle, and thus still retains something of the ancient conception of Fate. Again, while he holds that man may become one with the Divine Logos in virtue of his freedom and his rational nature, thus making Christianity the rational and ethical religion, yet his view of the Father, as supremely exalted above the Logos, and of man's incapacity for perfect oneness with the Father, practically makes God a super-ethical and metaphysical Being. Nor is Origen able to efface the distinction between the Logos and the Father, the Logos being sometimes spoken of as a natural and necessary efflux from God, and sometimes as a product of the Divine will; and, similarly, God is now the rational Will which reveals itself in the Logos as Love, and now a simple metaphysical Monad, which creates the Logos by natural necessity. This inconsistency repeats itself in Origen's view of the world: now he accepts providence, man's final unity with God, while, again, this unity is ceaselessly ruptured by finite free will—the irrational factor in the world. Finally, in Origen's theory, it is mere metaphysical caprice which excludes the creature from perfect unity with God and casts him again into the endless cycle of fall and restoration—a process which holds him in its grasp like inevitable Fate itself. The relapse into sacramental magic with which the early Greek Church is sometimes charged is, so far as the charge is valid, attributable to the fact that God is now not yet fully attained to an ethical conception of God.

(b) A similar inconsistency appears in Augustine. He interprets God, on the one hand, as a Trinity of conscious loving Will, manifesting itself in the gratuitous grace of love, and giving out of His own being some out of His mere grace and rejects others. Moreover, God works irresistibly in the elect as an impersonal gratia; and, just as these can do nothing to procure their election, so the prodigal likewise are under an absolute grace, shadowed as if by a necessity of Fate, and even children who die unbaptized are consigned to perdition. Such views present us with unmistakable vestiges of the belief in Fate, with the idea of Fate. These beliefs, however, constitute in essence the Christian point of view.

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It also follows from this that man can apprehend the will of God only by revelation through the Church, and must, accordingly, obey the Church's behests, because that will is not only beyond the power to comprehend in the same way as one more residual idea of Fate, for the Divine decree, while emanating from the free sovereignty of God, is, so far as the world is concerned, simply a re-creation of the world as it is, and thus that which for Aquinas is supernatural necessity and negation is for Duns Scotus the arbitrary determination of God, and, consequently, the idea of Fate is not fully surmounted by either.

(a) The same thing may be said in regard to Calvin; nor, indeed, does either Luther or Zwingle differ from him in the matter under discussion. It was Calvin, however, who most consistently developed the fundamental idea, and we may therefore take him as representative, more especially as his view is shared by some theologians at the present day, of whom we may instance Kuyper. It is true that, if we fix our attention apart, it seems that the world is not only the elect-namely, that God has chosen them in order that they may do His will, that He assures them by His Holy Spirit of their election, that the general grace of God which is given to all men, and that accordingly, secular callings have their rightful place in the Kingdom of God, while the State, as also science and art, may likewise subservire His glory—it may well seem that everything in the nature of Chance or Fate is excluded. But if, on the other hand, we bear in mind that, according to Calvin, everything is subject to the omnipotent will, and that a certain number of the human race are rejected from the outset, simply because God willed that they should be sinful and should persist in their sin, it is plain that the ethical purpose of God is subordinate to His arbitrary decree. God's horribile decreatum is thus, so far as the reprobate are concerned, neither more nor less than a Fate from which there is no escape. As, in fact, the Divine decree, once fixed, is carried out with absolute necessity, and as no man can do aught to procure his own salvation unless he is empowered thereto by it, it is clear that Calvin has so far failed to free himself from fatalism.

(b) Schleiermacher attempts to make good this defect in the doctrine of election by limiting the Divine decree exclusively to the particular time at which an individual shall come to participate in the Christian salvation. He seeks to show that the Divine plan of the world is a unity, and that the conception of it which is associated with the natural man is so realized in Christianity as to become the spring of moral conduct. From this it would appear that his belief in Providence embraces the whole world, and that the entire world-order is illumined by the Divine reason. On the other hand, Schleiermacher's idea of God as the absolute undifferentiated unity of all opposites, and of the world as the sphere in which these opposites fall apart, implies that the world is not only different from God, but permanently imperfect as well. As Schleiermacher has given no definite expression to his view of the world's final purpose, we may fail to see anything which is thought, but, in part of fact, his philosophy is still burdened with the ancient theory that the world is the realm of negation. The more perfect the world becomes, the more completely must its opposites disappear, and this may merely be that which is appropriate to the undifferentiated unity of God, i.e., cease to be a world at all. Further, the order of Nature, as a product of Divine omnipotence, stands at the centre of Schleiermacher's system, and it is in this way whether, on his view, the moral order takes precedence over the natural order and assimilates it, or, on the other hand, the ethical life is not seem to natural law as Nature itself. In short, neither the metaphysical conception of God as an absolutely simple Being, and of a natural uniformity to which the world adjusts, nor the idea that the world's imperfections rest upon its opposites, is calculated to dispel the suspicion of a fatalistic ingredient. Since good and evil, alike in a physical and moral sense, find their place in the world, on account of its difference from God, is doomed to permanent imperfection by God Himself, its absolute sovereignty, the lingering trace of the conception of Fate in Schleiermacher's theory is quite unmistakable.

ii. Fate in common life. It is also obvious that vestiges of fatalism are present in the everyday life of mankind, as, e.g., (1) in the manifold superstitions handed down from earlier stages of religion—observation of days, exorcism, astrology, oracles, drawing lots, etc.—as also in the use of amulets, escopolas, images, and miraculous preventive of the divine fate, which are to be met with in every country and in every age and in every epoch. Such notions are frequently associated with a pleasure-seeking and immoral spirit, as in those who look for success not to their own efforts but to extraneous influences, and are disposed to take what comes with resignation. Similarly, many extend the moral task of deciding questions for themselves, and have recourse to something of the nature of an oracle, which will give a decision by mere chance and without any rational connection with the matter in hand; or, again, they help themselves out of a practical dilemma by referring to some contingent natural phenomenon which is believed to exert a magical influence, but which has no ethical import at all. The power thus supposed to help or hinder is represented as working, not by rational or moral means, but through the blind mechanism of Nature; while, again, the belief in Providence as applied to ordinary life and practice frequently exhibits traits that really belong to fatalism.

(2) As another instance of the still surviving influence of the belief in Fate we may refer to poetry, and in particular to the drama, though it is by no means only the dramas of Fate strictly so called which exhibit the feature in question. The dramatist who would portray the tangled skein of life is at no loss for a thing which with the natural man is called destinatio necessis, seems to rule. He sees a human being held in bondage by ignorance, and that through no fault of his own; or immured from childhood in a narrow or uncongenial sphere, so that the wing of spiritual aspiration is lamed from the outset. In the drama, again, decisions of the gravest import are often brought about by events that seem purely accidental, so that the individual comes to feel that his virtues are a plaything of an inexorable power. His very ignorance of the larger concatenation of things prompts the thought that he is in the grasp of a blind destiny. But, even when he is somewhat enlightened, he may still feel compelled to bow before an all-ruling necessity, as something actually experienced, and it is this iron sway which the dramatic poet often makes it his task to bring to light. Such an immense and irresistible necessity, whose causal relations we may so far recognize, though their deeper significance remains inscrutable, must likewise fall under the conception of Fate.

(3) A recurrence of the conception shows itself also in certain recent philosophical ideas. Thus, those who find the sole regulative principle of things in the mechanism of Nature do not seem
very far away from the ancient belief. Herbert Spencer, for instance, if we regard him from the standpoint of the Unknowable everywhere in operation, and, while he recognizes a progressive movement in the world as it now is, yet he looks for an eventual disintegration, that is, he regards the inherent destiny of the universe in the merely mechanical cycle of becoming and dissolution. Mention may be also made of the Darwinian theory, in which he regards every phenomenon—progress as well as degeneration—to merely mechanical causes, though the actual progress ought to be something more than blind necessity. We may also instance J. S. Mill, who discards the idea of a God at once almighty and morally good, and regards it as most probable that there exists a Superior Being whose purposes of good are constantly thwarted by a hostile necessity—a theory analogous to that of Pantheism, though Mill's representation of the antagonistic power remains quite indefinite. Parallels to these views likewise appear in Germany, e.g. in the 'Evangelium der armen Seele.' Among a result of the diverse kind of philosophies towards psychology, with its consequent repudiation of the Ego and the Ego's independent action, and its tendency to explain everything by a psychical mechanism, this mechanism itself has become a new factor in Fates, the most important one.

Finally, if we take as our starting-point the manifold misery of the world, and survey, from the eudemonistic standpoint, the various forms of evil—the transitoriness of all things and the suffering associated therewith—we can hardly wonder at the rise of a philosophy which emphasizes the irrationality of existence, traces it to the impulse of a blind Will, and regards the extinction of this Will as the final task of the race. True as it may be that there is, as von Hartmann admits, a relative rationality and purpose in the world, yet, according to the general theory, the world over its existence to the persistent action of an unconscious volition, i.e., Chance, or to blind necessary impulse, the limits of whose action have not been clearly defined by von Hartmann, as there is nothing to show that the extinguished Will may not re-assert itself. In any case it is obvious that this Unconscious Will, as the source of all things, is simply a Fate, a Destiny which cannot be evaded till the Will is brought to extinction. Such is the latest presentation of the idea of Fate.

III. ANALYSIS, INVESTIGATION, AND CONCLUSION. From the above outline we see the wide diffusion of the belief in Fate among mankind, and the manifold forms it assumes; it is likewise that vestiges of the belief persist even where a radically different view of the universe prevails, and, further, that the idea is again in various shapes gaining a footing as a kind of reaction to the Christian view. Our survey, however, also indicates that fatalism takes root wherever men regard themselves as subject to an irresistible power thought of as incapable of rational or purposive action. When an all-controlling force is figured as immanent or as transcendent, whether it is regarded as a mechanical, physical, unconscious necessity, or is credited with a volition which, though unconscious, is absolute and arbitrary in its working—in every case it is to be recognized as inevitable Fate. Fatalism cannot be overcome by the assumption of an omnipotent arbitrary Will representing more than by his own physical pantheism or pan-cosmism; nor is an at-

dote to it found in the ability to grasp the law of Causality or the order of Nature, so long, at all events, as these are reduced to a mere mechanical necessity emancipating all intellectual super-
fore, no millstone, no incubus of Fate, weighing down the mind; on the contrary, in the very act of its being overcome it proves a powerful motive for re-consideration and further progress. Of all religions it is Christianity alone which, when rightly interpreted, rings the knell of the belief in Fate.


FATE (Babylonian).—By the Babylonians and Assyrians the abstract conception of Fate or Destiny was never personified as a separate deity, whose attributes might be elicited as evidence in this connexion. But they possessed a special word for 'Fate' (šimāt), and it is desirable to establish as accurately as possible the senses in which the word was used. Apart from such direct evidence it is clear that in Bab. thought a conception of Fate or Destiny may have existed which was not peculiarly associated with the word šimāt, or at any rate may not have left its traces on the passages or fragments in which the word happens to occur. Our inquiry thus falls into two main sections. In the first we shall examine the use and precise meaning of the word šimāt 'fate'; in the second we will be necessary to inquire whether at any time there may have existed a trace of a fatalistic conception in Bab. popular beliefs or philosophical speculation. The latter inquiry will be the longer of the two, as it touches some points around which a considerable amount of controversy has gathered during recent years.

1. The word šimāt, pl. šimātu, derived from the verb šimātu, 'to establish'; 'to determine,' is the feminine of the participle šimātum. It properly has a passive meaning, 'established,' 'determined,' but in a few passages referring to the šimātum of some of the greater gods it is clearly used with an active meaning, in the sense of 'the act of determining the fate. From the context of the passage in its passive sense the word is sometimes used as a synonym for 'death'; it might seem at first sight that death, and consequently, the length of life were events which were decided from the beginning. That care should be taken before drawing such a conclusion is suggested by a very interesting passage in the Cylinder-Inscription of Sennacherib, in which the premature death of Assur-Namahi, king of Elam, is said to have taken place by the command of Ashur on a day which was not his šimātu, or pre-ordained fate. From this passage it is clear that šimātu was not an irrevocable destiny, since, at any rate, in certain cases, it may be overridden by the special decretal of Assur, the national god of Assyria. By whom then was the šimātu, or 'fate,' determined, which could apparently be altered when the head of the pantheon? A study of the Bab. mythology enables us to answer the question with some degree of confidence.

In the legends the power of controlling the fates or destinies of all the gods, in other words, the various departments and parts of the universe, was symbolized by the possession of certain magical tablets, known as the dupšišmi, or 'Tablets of Fate.' In the Bab. Creation-legend, when the monster Tiamat, after the defeat of her consort Apsû, appointed Kingu the leader of her host, she gave them the Tablets of Fate and laid them on his breast; the Tablets were not merely the symbol of authority, but in themselves conferred the power to rule. So, too, in the 7th act of the conquest of Tiamat and her host, was taken from Kingu the Fate-Tablets, seal them, and place them on his own breast. 2 It is clear that he did this in order to acquire the power inherent in the Tablets which Kingu had hitherto enjoyed. The magical character of the Tablets and the manner in which their mere possession conferred supreme power upon the holder are well illustrated in the legend of the storm-god Zû, which recounts how he stole them from their rightful owner, Enil, the god of Nippur.3 The privileges their possession conferred may be gathered from Zû's soliloquy when contemplating the theft:

'1 will take the Fate-Tablets of the gods, and the oracles of all the gods will I direct; I will establish my throne and dispense commandments upon every one of the gods. 2 The legend relates how Zû waited for the dawn at the entrance of the hall where Enil dwelt. And, while Enil was pouring out the clear water for his morning ablution, Zû swooped down and seized the Fate-Tablets which Enil had laid aside with his diadem and other insignia on the throne beside him. Zû made off with the Tablets to his inaccessible mountain, where he enjoyed the power they conferred until the Sun-god caught him in his net and recovered them. 4

From these passages in the mythology it is clear that the ultimate arbiter of the fates of gods and men was the chief of the gods, and that he enjoyed his power by virtue of the Fate-Tablets which he possessed. But it is not to be inferred that the Fate-Tablets had any independent existence or any power apart from their possessor. It is also clear that they did not in any sense resemble a Book of Fate, for the whole or part was not recorded unchangeably upon them: nor have we any evidence that the Divine holder of the Tablets recorded his decrees upon them from time to time. They appear to have been merely magical insinuations, which enabled the god who possessed them actively to control and mould the course of events. The legends which have been recovered concerning them arose at a period when the Bab. pantheon was already in existence, and it appears that, before the rise of Babylon to power, the ultimate arbiter of Fate, was the head of the pantheon. Originally this god was Enil of Nippur, who retains his early privilege in the legend of Zû; with the rise of Babylon to power, and since the ultimate arbiter of Fate, was the head of the pantheon.
the attributes of Enlil, and in the Creation-series in its present form we are told how he became possessed of the Fate-Tablets. In Assyria, on the other hand, Ashur, the national god, inherited in turn the attributes of the supreme Bab. deity—usually the most important being the power to decree fate.

2. From an examination of the uses of the word limtu, and of the legends which refer to the Fate-Tablets, it can be seen that the Bab. belief, the fates, both of the universe and of individual gods and men, were not believed to have been fixed from the beginning, but were pictured as in hourly process of development under the influence of a dualistic or one-sided conception of deity. Thus it remains to inquire whether, apart from these legends and beliefs, we may trace evidence that the Babylonians of any period conceived of Fate and its implications in a considerable following in that country. For upholders of the theory claim that belief in a fixed Fate or Destiny, both of the universe and of the individual, did enter largely into Bab. thought of all periods, including the historical.

Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the theory is that, according to the Bab. conception of the universe, everything on earth was the result of a heavenly predestination. It is well established that the Babylonians, like the Hebrews, conceived the universe as consisting of three parts: the heaven above, the earth beneath, and the waters under the earth. Winckler, the chief exponent of the astral theory, and his followers elaborate this conception of the universe, and work it out in the threefold division of the heavens a parallel to the earth. Thus they would divide the universe, according to their view of Bab. belief, into a heavenly and an earthly world, the latter’s three divisions (the heaven being confined to the air or atmosphere immediately above the earth) corresponding to the northern heaven, the zodiac, and the southern heaven. The important point to note is that in these threefold divisions the zodiac and the earth occupy the second place and correspond to one another. Thus the movements of the sun, the moon, and the five great planets (which are visible to the naked eye) through the ecliptic constellations were held to have a peculiar connection with events on earth. It is a fact that in the later Bab. period the greater gods were identified with the planets and the lesser gods with the fixed stars, each god having his special house or star in heaven in addition to his temple on earth; thus the heavenly was reflected in the earthly. Their movements were the cause of events on earth; but the movements of the planets were not necessarily acts of independent deities. They took place in accordance with a cosmic law of harmony, inherent in the universe, and ordained from the beginning. In the case of the terrestrial planet earth, its movements are controlled by the signs of the zodiac fixed in the course of time. For a further description of the theory, we refer to the history of astronomy in the Bab. country.

Fate-Tablets. From the reasoning of the Bab. gods is the theory of the sun and its motions derived. The sun’s path throughout the year is attributed to the movement of the earth in its orbit around the sun; its movements are repeated every 12 months, and the same signs of the zodiac and the same constellations are occupied by the same stars. The various phenomena of the universe are thus viewed in a general picture of fate.

The purpose of placing the present article to do more than indicate briefly the false assumptions on which this theory rests. Most theories of interpretation have some historical basis to rest upon, and in making generalizations of this magnitude it is necessary to make statements which are not always true. But the necessary support for their thesis, they plant the roots of their theory in a purely imaginary age where evidence for or against it is ex hypothesis lacking. Thus the oldest monuments that have been recovered upon Bab. sites are not regarded by them as relics of the early stages of Bab. culture. It is assumed that in the periods behind them there existed a more elaborate and highly developed civilization, described as pre-historic and lying back in the darkness beyond the earliest existing records. In the total absence of material evidence it is not difficult to see how this assumption is made, and which is shared by no other early or primitive race in the world’s history. It is assumed that war and violence had no existence in this pre-historic time. Intellect dominated and controlled the passions of this primeval but highly gifted people, and, in particular, one form of intellectual conception, based on a scientific knowledge of astronomy. It is postulated that a purely astronomical theory or conception of the universe lay at the root of their civilization and governed their whole thought and conduct; and this was no secret teaching of a priesthood, but a universally held belief which permeated every phase of the nation’s life. These doctrines were the ineradicable part of their religious belief, the political ideas being the result of their work, and which is a fundamental element in the future of the universe. In this way the astral mythologist attempts to explain the unsatisfactory character of his evidence, from which he claims to be able to reconstruct the original beliefs in their entirety. So involved are they in the conception of an inexorable Fate or Destiny of the universe that, according to the upholders of the astral theory, the earliest Babylonians endeavored to be in a state of the future in its broader aspects. For it is asserted that they believed themselves able, by a mystical application of a remarkably accurate knowledge of astronomy, not only to disclose the origin of the world from its birth, but also to foretell its renewal in future ages.

To find evidence for their theory the astral mythologists are naturally obliged to rely on texts which have come down to us from the historic period. Assuming the close correspondence between the signs of the zodiac and the earth in early Bab. thought (an assumption to which reference has already been made), the Bab. mythologists, who believed the Babylonians divided the course of the world’s history into Ages according to the signs of the zodiac in which the sun stood each year at the vernal equinox. This is a most vital point of the theory, and it postulates on the part of the early Babylonians a highly accurate knowledge of astronomy; it assumes a knowledge on their part of the precession of the equinox, which could be based only on a very rigid system of astronomical observation and record. The course of Bab. history, from the pre-historic period onwards, was thus divided, according to the theory, into three Ages—those of the earth, the sun, and the moon. According to the signs of the zodiac in which the sun stood at the vernal equinox. Certain myths are supposed to have characterized each of these Ages, not only affecting religious beliefs, but so incorporating Bab. thought that they even influenced historical writings. As the sun at the vernal equinox gradually progressed through the great elliptic constellations, so, according to the theory, the history of the world—its story—is told in a series of events which harmonize with the theory. The sign of the zodiac in which the sun stood at the vernal equinox was the sign fixed in the skies by the Bab. mythologists as the beginning of a new period.

It would be of great benefit if the present article were to do more than indicate briefly the false assumptions on which this theory rests. Most theories of interpretation have some historical basis to rest upon, and in making generalizations of this magnitude it is necessary to make statements which are not always true. But the necessary support for their thesis, they plant the roots of their theory in a purely imaginary age where evidence for or against it is ex hypothesis lacking. Thus the oldest monuments that have been recovered upon Bab. sites are not regarded by them as relics of the early stages of Bab. culture. It is assumed that in the periods behind them there existed a more elaborate and highly developed civilization, described as pre-historic and lying back in the darkness beyond the earliest existing records. In the total absence of material evidence it is not difficult to see how this assumption is made, and which is shared by no other early or primitive race in the world’s history. It is assumed that war and violence had no existence in this pre-historic time. Intellect dominated and controlled the passions of this primeval but highly gifted people, and, in particular, one form of intellectual conception, based on a scientific knowledge of astronomy. It is postulated that a purely astronomical theory or conception of the universe lay at the root of their civilization and governed their whole thought and conduct; and this was no secret teaching of a priesthood, but a universally held belief which permeated every phase of the nation’s life. These doctrines were the ineradicable part of their religious belief, the political ideas being the result of their work, and which is a fundamental element in the future of the universe. In this way the astral mythologist attempts to explain the unsatisfactory character of his evidence, from which he claims to be able to reconstruct the original beliefs in their entirety. So involved are they in the conception of an inexorable Fate or Destiny of the universe that, according to the upholders of the astral theory, the earliest Babylonians endeavored to be in a state of the future in its broader aspects. For it is asserted that they believed themselves able, by a mystical application of a remarkably accurate knowledge of astronomy, not only to disclose the origin of the world from its birth, but also to foretell its renewal in future ages.

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will suffice to summarize the damaging criticism which the theory has sustained at the hands of an astronomer,¹ for which its supposed astronomical basis had been completely demolished. In the first place, it may be noted that there is no evidence that even the later Babylonians had a sufficiently accurate system of measuring the heavens to enable them to arrive at a knowledge of the precession of the equinoxes. But in complete independence of this fact, and assuming such a knowledge on the part of the Babylonians of all ages, Kugler has shown that the zodiac which is supposed to have been divided from the constant assumption by Winckler and his school do not follow. It is well known that the different ecliptic constellations which make up the signs of the zodiac do not each occupy thirty degrees of the ecliptic, but that some are longer and some shorter.

Also the constellations of the Bab. astronomers during the late periods do not completely coincide with ours. For instance, the most eastern star of our constellation Virgo was counted by the Babylonians of the Asaricad era as belonging to the next ecliptic constellation, Leo, since it was known as 'the hind foot of the lion.' But, fortunately for our purpose, not much doubt can be cast as to the eastern limit of Taurus and the western limit of the Ram, which mark the beginning and end of the three World-Ages of the astrological mythologists; for the two bright stars, Castor and Pollux, from which the Ram is reckoned from under the arched heavens, were undoubtedly reckoned in that constellation by the Babylonians, and the easternmost star of our constellation of the Fishes (a Piscium) was probably well beyond the Bab. constellation of the Ram. Working on this assumption, and assigning thirty degrees to each of the three intervening constellations, Kugler has calculated the years in which the sun entered these signs of the zodiac at the vernal equinox. He is consequently able to state accurately the years in which Winckler's World-Ages would have begun and ended, and his figures entirely dispose of all Winckler's claims to an astronomical basis for his system. The Age of the Twins, instead of ending, as Winckler and his followers hold, about 2800 B.C., really ended in the year 4383 B.C. Thus the Age of the Bull began fifteen hundred years before the birth of Sargon I, who is supposed to have inaugurated its beginning, and it ended considerably before the birth of Hammurabi, under whom we are told, the Bull-Age motifs were principally developed. Moreover, from the time of the 1st dynasty of Babylon, a.d. 3000 B.C., that is to say, during the whole course of her history, Babylon was really living in the Age of the Ram, not in that of the Bull. In short, all the motifs and myths which have been so confidently and with such ingenuity connected by the astral mythologists with the Bull sign of the zodiac, ought really to have been connected with the Ram. But even the astral mythologists admit that there is not a trace of a Ram motif in the Bab. mythology.²

¹ See F. X. Kugler, Im Rumkreis Babylons, Münster, 1919. Cf. also O. Bezold, 'Astronomie Himmelsachene und Astraltheorie bei den Babylonern' (Göttinger Beiträge zur Geschichte der eigenen und der Geschichte der Geschichtswissenschaften, 11, 1911, 19). For a scientific survey of the astronomical knowledge of the Babylonians, see especially Kugler's Sternkunde und Astronomie im babylonischen Weltalter, Münster, 1905-1912; and cf. also his Die babylonische Mondrechnung, Frankfurt, 1910, and Ernst Weidner, Die Astronomie und Astronomie der babylonischen Astrologie (A Beiträge zur Assyriologie, iv, Leipzig, 1911). Justrow's Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens, ii, 401-428 (1922), and his detailed description of the zodiacal representation, is most of the astrological material.

² According to Winckler's system, the Age of the Ram did not start till about the 8th cent. B.C., being inaugurated by a fresh revision of the calendar under Naram-Sin. But no account is taken of the time when the Babylonians first began to have any idea of astralism as such. It is therefore most extraordinary that Winckler should have been so far from the true idea of the nature of the mind. The nearest approach to one is found in the Libyan descent of the gods, which is represented by a head of a man and a falcon, and he is assumed to have been identical in his nature with Marduk. Thus the new reckoning is supposed to have passed Winckler's assumptions with regard to the astrological knowledge of the Babylonians, the theory is found not to support what is now considered Babylonian astronomy. It is at fault, and his three astrological World-Ages do not really correspond with his periods of history. It follows that the Babylonians did not divide the history of the heavens into five periods, no sufficient grounds for the further assumption as to their conception at an early period of a world-cycle, evolved through a succession of aeons, in accordance with an inexorable Fate or Destiny, are thus removed.

It remains to decide whether any part of the later Babylonian history we may not recognize a fatalistic conception in priestly, as opposed to popular, belief. The evidence of Diodorus, Philo of Alexandria, and other writers may certainly be cited in favour of ascertaining to the later Chaldaean priesthood the teaching of a religious and cosmic system closely associated with the idea of an impersonal Fate or Destiny. But their evidence is certainly not applicable to any period earlier than the Seleucid era, where it is impossible to separate the nucleus of native tradition from the essentially different form it assumed under Hellenic influence. It is certain that the Babylonian knowledge of astronomy from the 8th cent. B.C. onwards prepared the way, in the Achemenian period, for the recognition of law in the heavens as opposed to the earlier conception of a universe governed by the intervention of a personal God, governed by human passions. But it is doubtful whether the Babylonian astrologers themselves ever evolved a conception of Destiny, as existing apart from the gods, except under the direct influence of Greek speculations.

To sum up the results of our inquiry: it is probable that at no period much earlier than the Seleucid era had the Babylonians any conception of Fate or Destiny as a blind, impersonal, and inexorable law, whether as applied to the universe or to the individual. In their belief the fate, whether of a man or of a country (which was usually the limit of their speculations), was not irrevocably fixed, but was in continual process of development, under the supervision of the most powerful deity known to them at the time. In the earliest period the city-god was for his worshippers the Unchallenged Lord of Fate; he was the nucleus around which the growth of a federation of cities and the accompanying development of a pantheon, whose place was naturally taken by the head of the pantheon—at least as far Elil took the place of the chief god of Babylon; and as Assyra, Ashur, the national god. Before the Hellenistic period, Fate was never dissociated in Babylonian belief from the personal direction of the gods, and, when once it had been decreed, it was still capable, in extreme and exceptional cases, of modification.

LITERATURE.—For collections of passages from the inscriptions in which the Bab. word for 'Fate' occurs, see the references cited on p. 789, n. 1; and for passages bearing on the subject in the Bab. mythology, see p. 789, notes 2 and 3. The best and most detailed criticism of the so-called 'astral theory' of the Babylonian religion is Kugler's Im Rumkreis Babylons; and for scientific information on Bab. knowledge of astronomy, see the other works cited on p. 789, n. 1.

LEONARD W. KING.

FATE (Buddhist).—To Oriental thought in general, and more especially to a mind trained in Buddhist doctrine and possessed by the teaching and preconceptions of Buddhist ethics, the idea of Destiny or Fate presents itself in an entirely different aspect. In the first place, the concept of destiny or philosophy or history has given currency in the West to Egypt, while Babylon remained unaffected and continued to enjoy 'Bull motifs.' The only explanation put forward is that the idea of the fate of an individual was the core of the power of Babylon was on the decline. This example of constructive theory is quite typical of the case with which the astral mythologist is capable of clearing the most stupendous obstacles.
'Fate,' in the sense of an external compelling power, with universal sway and irresistible decree, is a conception entirely alien to the fundamental principles of either of the great schools of Buddhist thought, and is opposed to the exhortations to personal effort and striving in order to win salvation, which in the sacred books the Master is constantly represented as uttering. The disciple of the Hinayana works out his own deliverance by his own unaided self-striving and self-help, so none who help, so none can hinder in the great task. The kindlier and more liberal creed of the Mahayana puts at the disposal of the seeker after truth and rest, supernatural and effective aid, whereby his feeble endeavours may be seconded and supported, and brought to certain fruition. In either case the issue of life depends ultimately upon the individual, the determining factor being his own will and moral purpose, and neither is the result foreordained nor is he himself the plaything or helpless victim of an omnipotent force which he can neither influence nor resist.

The place which Fate or Destiny occupies in the systems of Greek and European philosophy and theology is in the East taken by karmic [q.e.] Karma, however, implies action with all its results or 'fruits,' so far from being an extraneous and independent cause. In the course of human life an irresistible control cannot be gainsaid or resisted, is the self-caused and internal constraint of the deeds of the individual in his transient existence upon earth. He is himself his own fate, in that he receives now the due and deserved recompense for what he has himself done, be it good or evil. And his life proceeds, not on lines determined for him from above or from without, but on lines he himself marked out and continues to mark out with irrevocable certainty and exactness, as long as a life of fruitful activity is prolonged. Only when his actions cease to bear 'fruit' is the control broken, the power of karma rendered ineffective, and he himself set free. Between the conception of 'Fate,' therefore, as defined in the teaching of Greece and the West, and its Buddhist and Eastern counterpart, there is a profound difference as well as a substantial likeness. In both the power is absolute, dominant, and irresistible; its movement can neither be stayed nor turned aside; the sphere of human action is limited, and leave only to say to it; he can only bow his head and submit. Fate regulates the course and issue of all, and man can only make the best of his own hard case. According to the scheme of thought of the East, man orders his own destiny. Once determined, it is in each part and at each moment as rigorous and unbending as the most absolute pronouncement of the Fates. What is done cannot be undone; the effect remains, and must be realized in the form of reward or suffering in his own personal experience and life. He may, however, or rather must, by his own actions and conduct determine what his future shall be. Its course and conditions are entirely laid down by himself. When these have been, as it were, prescribed, they have passed beyond his control and are unalterable and irreversable. But the future is in his own hands. At each moment by his deeds he is shaping his own destiny. The moulding thereof for good or for evil rests entirely with himself. He ordains and directs his own fate, which is then inexorable and self-operative. All his life long, it is under the dominion of karma, and cannot escape from its effects.

In a wider cosmic sense it may be said that the conception of Fate prevailed in Buddhism as much as Buddhist doctrine took over from Hinduism the conception of world-cycles, succeeding one another as the acts of an indefinitely prolonged drama of birth, florescence, decay, and death (cf. Ages of the World [Buddhist]). From the Buddhist point of view, each cycle was characterized by the renewed preaching of the true doctrine, which for more or less widely accepted amongst men, ran its course, and then fell into neglect with the increasing prevalence of unbelief and wickedness, and finally disappeared. In each cycle a Buddha would appear, as none who help, so none can hinder in the great task. The kindlier and more liberal creed of the Mahayana works out his own deliverance by his own unaided self-striving and self-help, as none who help, so none can hinder in the great task. The series of world-cycles, therefore, is independent of human will and endearour, and so far correspondent with the unalterable and almost mechanical, with supreme and absolute control of the destinies of all, moving forward resistlessly to a predetermined end. The doctrine, however, is purely cosmical, and does not concern itself with the career or fate of the individual, except in so far as the latter may chance to have been born at an age propitious or otherwise for attending to the preaching of a Buddha. This last event, of course, in which he landed place of his birth within the cycle, like all the other circumstances and conditions of his life, is controlled by karma. His existence is comprised, as it were, within the world-scheme, as an item or element in its progress. But it contributes nothing to its determination, and cannot affect its course. The revolution of the ages, the rise and fall of the true teaching, the destruction and resurrection of the universe, repeat themselves within assigned and unalterable limits, without cessation, and apparently without conceived or conceivable beginning or end.

It would appear, therefore, that from the Buddhist point of view, human life afforded the individual, is practically equivalent to a theory of strict and determinate causation, the merit or demerit of his own actions resulting in a proportionate increase of freedom and happiness, or involving him in renewed tribulation and punishment. Moreover, both of the great schools, the Mahayana and the Hinayana, taught the possibility of deliverance or redemption from the power of karma, in the attainment of nirvana, the state in which actions are performed without desire or clinging, and therefore do not entail any resultant consequences which must be worked out in a renewed existence. In reality, especially in the Mahayana, nirvana came to be equivalent to paradise or heaven; but it was originally attainable and attained here upon earth during the mundane life. And the broad difference between the doctrines of the two schools consisted in this, that in the endeavour to reach the goal, and to secure final release, the adherent of the Hinayana found himself dependent upon his own unaided exertions; while that of the first, as, for example, are enumerated in the Sukhavati-ayana, beginning with Utpalakara at the end of the past, in an innumerable and more than innumerable, enormous, immeasurable, and incomprehensible number before now! Elsewhere the predeceases of Utpalakara and Gautama are said to have 'received recognition' from twenty-four of these.

1 See art. Buddhas, vol. ii. p. 855

2 See see art. Buddhas, vol. ii. p. 855

3 See art. Buddhas, vol. ii. p. 855
no external aid was either available or possible, and in the most absolute sense of the term he must work out his own salvation. The Mahâyâna, on the contrary, conceived man to be the object of the affection, or of human existence, thus regulated in each individual instance by karmika, was carried out and completed within the larger cosmical cycle, in which karma laid down the place. The life proceeded in a fixed and determined order, through scenes upon scenes of time. It represented, upon the broadest possible scale, the Buddhist or rather Indian conception of a mechanical and all-controlling Destiny, to which the entire universe was subject, alike in its origin, its progress, and its dissolution.


A. S. GEDEN.

FATE (Celtic).—As among all imaginative and superstition-ridden peoples, the belief in Destiny was strong among the Gaels. The whole of life was regarded by them as encompassed and ruled by an over-mastering Fate, from which there was no possibility of escape. In the older literature we find no expression given to this belief.

'If He be here that I am fated to die, I have no power to shun it,' says Diarmuid in the tale of the 'Pursuit of Diarmuid and Grainne.' It is probable to fly from death; and, though I should avoid the battle, flight never yet saved a wretch, exclaims Cormac, and through Rath (cf. O'Donovan, Irish Arch. Soc., Dublin, 1843). 'There are three periods of time that cannot be avoided—the hour of birth, the hour of death, and the hour of conception.' (p. 6.) In an old poem attributed to St. Columba we get the same idea of the reality of Fate.

'When once the fixed period of death arrives, there is no fortress which can resist it; . . . But the fortunate in life are protected; even in the front of a battle . . . Whatever God has destined for a man, he leaves not the world until he meet it.' (ed. O'Donovan, Misc. Celt. Soc., Dublin, 1840.)

In like manner the Teutonic or Scandinavian poet, when reduced to extremity by Cesar, thought that what was happening was not by the act of man, but by the will of the gods (cf. Bell. Gall. viii. 43, 5.)

Though this sense of falsity is as old as pagan times, it is probable that it had rather developed than been changed by Christian teaching. The passivity of mind and the inertia which mark the life of the Gaelic and Breton peasant arise largely out of this feeling that both the good and ill of life lie entirely outside of his control; his stoic acceptance of evil and death rests upon the same idea. The legends and folk-tales both of Britain and of the Gaelic-speaking peoples are filled with the same overpowering sense of falsity. Connected with this are the omens of death or ill-luck which we find penetrating all Celtic literature, and which are universally believed in at the present day; and, again, the belief in lucky and unlucky days and hours. In the old medical treatises, the cross or unlucky days are set down in order, and in Christian times Biblical events were made to coincide with the days or hours of pagan observance. It was customary to consult a Druid or druidess in the lucky or unlucky moments for beginning a journey, battle, or other undertaking.

King Domnach requires his Druid to 'let him know his destiny and that of his country,' for a twelvemonth from that day (O'Curry, MS. Met., Dublin, 1861, p. 254). Before the campaign of Domnach against Mag-nach, who laid a riddle on the life of the child, if not born before a certain day foretold by the Druids, would become a great king (S. H. O'Grady, Silene Galatia, London, 1892, ii. 382), the Druids were supposed to have given them to the Coligny Calendar (J. Rhys, 'Celts and Gauls,' in Proc. of the British Academy, London, 1905).

Regular horoscopes were drawn at critical moments in Irish tales, such as the battle of Mag-nach, and are mentioned in both Brughnáth and Cormac's Glossary (ed. W. Stokes, London, 1882, p. 94). Sometimes this knowledge seems to have been obtained by looking into a crystal. The prophetess Fedelm, who declares that she has knowledge of this art, is asked by Queen Medb to 'look for her' what will be the fate of her expedition. Then the maiden 'looked for it,' apparently into a ball or crystal (LU 555, 561). Another heathen method of divination was known as teimn thraghtha, which enabled an inquirer to discover such matters as to whom the body of a headless Cúchulainn belonged (Cormac's Glossary, p. 130). Both these methods of divination are said to have been suppressed by St. Patrick, on account of the idol observances with which they were accompanied (ib. p. 94 f.; Senesch Mór, vol. i. [Dublin, 1864] pp. 24, 44). But he permitted the use of a means of foresight known as diectaí dochenannah, which was gained from some incantations made with the finger-tips, and was not accompanied by offerings to idols. Instruction in these arts formed part of the regular course of the fully-equipped friar, or Druid of the higher ranks (cf. art. COMMUNICATION WITH DEITY [Celtic]). At times the decision as to who was to be elected king was reached by Druidical revelation gained in sleep, after a 'bull-feast' (Brughnáth Æfh Derga, ed. Stokes, 1862, pp. 14, 15). The stone on which the kings of Ireland were crowned at Tara was called the Lia Fál, or 'Stone of Destiny,' because it was believed to cry aloud when the rightful heir stepped upon it. In the before-mentioned poem, or 'Lóirea,' attributed to St. Columba, several means of divination are mentioned as practised by Druids:

'Our destiny is not with the sroéd, nor with the bird in the top of the tuig, nor with the pine, nor with the gnarled tree, nor with a sron, hand on hand. . . . I adore not the voice of birds, nor a sroéd, nor a destiny, nor this earthly world, nor a son, nor chance, nor woman. My Druid is Christ, the Son of God.'

In an old historical poem relating to the settlements of the Cuitheine, or Irish Picts, in Alba (Scotland), among the kinds of divination taught by evil Druids and necromancers were:

'The honouring of sroedhe and omens, choice of weather, lucky times, the watching the voices of birds, they practised without disguise.' (Irish Nunnin, ed. J. D. Todd, Irish Arch. Soc., 1845, p. 145.)

The exact signification of some of these terms of divination is not known, but the word sroéd is connected with són or són, 'good one' or 'luck,' in various passages; and in MS. Land, 615, p. 7, we read: ni h-a-g sroéd atá mo chuid, 'not for me is the luck of the sroéd.' Stóna-stóonna means 'augury,' or 'sorcery'; and in LL 101a we read of the 'power of the són and of the solad, next don t- stón agus don soid—evidently omens of good-fortune. A lucky moment called són in LL 555, and in MS. 648, it is possible that the sroéd or sroéd may be connected with sron or srocht, 'sneezing'—a form of augury known in early times, and frequently condemned by

The sense of Destiny surrounding each person of importance is expressed in the old tales by means of tabus (called in Irish *gessa* or *gesna*), usually laid in his birth, and which, when his doom is about to overtake him, are broken through by him, one by one, against his own will, fore- shadowing evil. Many of the Irish *gessa* were, no doubt, real tabus actually imposed upon kings and chiefs. We possess a complete tract giving the restrictions which had to be observed by the provincial kings of ancient Ireland (Leabhar na g-Ceart, ed. O'Donovan for the Celtic Soc., Dublin, 1847, pp. 1-23); but they are used in the old romantic tales, with the definite poetic purpose of representing the unescapable decrees of Destiny. They have all the Greek sense of over-mastering Fate. They are usually, especially the birth- tabus, laid on the hero at birth; but any one seems to have had the power of inflicting them, and they appear to have been equally binding, however they were imposed.

In the story of "The Tragic Fate of the Sons of Usnach," the tabu of Pergusus to refuse a feast resulted in the death of the three brothers; in the "Persuit of Diarmaid and Groleid", the death of the hero was due to his neglect of his tabu "never to hunt a boar"; the breaking of the *gessa* laid upon the hero Conchulainn resulted in the slaying of the sea by his own father.

Elaborate *gessa* were laid on each of the chief heroes of the older, or Cuchulainn, cycle of tales (see CUCHULAINN CYCLE), and it is in the gradual and inevitable breaking down of these *gessa* that the tragedy of their doom consists. The approaching end of each, and especially of the central figure of Cuchulainn himself, is surrounded by omens (cf. and compare the fate of the three brothers, p. 306 of § 62). The Ossianic tales, especially the more recent of them, stress less is laid upon the breaking of tabus, but great prominence is given to the omens of sickness or death, such as the howling of dogs, clouds red like blood, and foreboding dreams (Trans. of the Ossianic Soc.). These signs are still regarded as sure forewarnings of a fatal catastrophe.

Another remnant of a very ancient superstition is the belief that 'banishes,' or female fairies (see DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Celtic]), foretold by their wailings near a house the death of an inmate. The baniese is usually the early pagan goddess of the district of which she appears, but she appears as a weeping woman, mournfully bewailing the expected death. Many families have their own special baniese who always appear before a death in the family. Sometimes, instead of the presiding genius of the country, some woman who has met an accidental death acts the part of the baniese, and is heard crying and moaning. There are examples of the appearances of banisches in the old historical literature.

Queen Aschiball of Craig Liath, the presiding goddess of Clare and baniese of the Dalcaism race, appears to King Brian Boru before the battle of Clontarf to forewarn him of his death (War of the Gaedhil with the Goilti, ed. J. H. Todd, London, 1867, p. 201). The same goddess has been seen in recent times attended by twenty-five other banisches of Clare before an impending disaster.

In many of the ancient tales this forerunner of death takes the form either of a beautiful but weeping maiden or of a gruesome and monstrous hag, who is found in the path of a host going to battle, or of a chief who is doomed to death, stooping sideways like a miserly man, or sometimes in the form of a black mare; or a hedgehog; or a broom sadly wringing out bloody garments and weapons. She is called the 'washer of the Ford,' and she informs the doomed man or host that it is their own bloody garments that she is wringing out.

As late as 1318, Richard de Clare and his Norman troops met this hideous figure, 'washing armour and rich robes till the red-gold gleam was changed through her fingers' when they were on their way to plunder the O'Deas of Dyserg. She tells Richard that she is come to invite him to join her among the tribes of Hell. Next day Richard and his son and host lay dead upon the field near the fort of Dyserg.

A similar superstition is that of the 'death's coach,' with headless driver and black or headless horses which, if it passes by a house or through a village, must not be stopped on its way. If it meets with any impediment it will go on; if it is driven out of door, some one is sure to die next day within the house. These beliefs are firmly held in all parts of Ireland, and many apparently authenticated cases of recent years are recorded in the following within recent times (PL iv. [1895] 352. X. [1899] 119, 122; T. C. Croker, Fairy Legends, London, 1870, p. 250). In Brittany the same superstition exists; the 'Coach of the Ankon' is driven by a figure who is the forerunner of death, imagined as tall and lean with long white hair, or as a skeleton whose head turns about every way inspecting the country. His loch resembles a funeral cart with lamenting horses, and he is escorted by two companions walking beside the cart, who open the gates of fields or the doors of houses and pile the dead upon the vehicle. The 'Ankon' is the last person who has died in each parish during the year, and is replaced at the end of twelve months by a successor (A. le Braz, La Légende de la mort, new ed., Paris, 1902, i. 95-99).

LITERATURE.—What has been given in the article, Cf. also the literature appended to art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Celtic].

**FATE (Chinese).—I. Definition of the term.**—The Chinese equivalent for 'fate,' viz. *ming*, like the original of our English word, means primarily "something spoken or decreed." It is composed of the radical for 'mouth' and the symbol for 'law' or 'command.' Or, it may be understood as supplying the place of phonetic as well as supplementing the force of the radical. As *fatum* in philosophical language represents the eternal, immutable law of the gods, so *ming* is interpreted as the appointment of Heaven, the unalterable decree which determines man's lot; it is often used as synonymous with 'life'—regarded as the span of existence, whose limits are irrevocably fixed, so that a longfellow one's fortune. Owing to the fact that the *ming* is sometimes applied in connexions which seem to admit of a variety of interpretations, some of the circumstances under which the Chinese should be described as fatalists, but it may be said without hesitation that the weight of evidence is in favour of such a description. It may be sufficient to note, with regard to the contrary view, that there are circumstances under which it may be possible, according to Chinese theories, to escape one's destiny, which might seem to imply that *ming* was not considered as invariable; but it will be found, on investigation, that in such cases apparent failure of the decree was of the nature of a deprivation of the gifts which Heaven had in store, in consequence of the unwillingness or unworthiness of the intended recipient to receive or retain them, rather than merefence on the part of Heaven. From this point of view it might seem that man is regarded as the potential master of his destiny, but, on the other hand, it must be borne in mind, though he may fail to realize, or deliberately reject, the high position marked out for him by fate, he may by no means attain to a higher station than that which is destined for him.

2. Classical references.—In the Confucian classics the term *ming* frequently occurs, though, as we are informed, it was one of the subjects on which the Master was characteristically reticent. The word is sometimes qualified by the addition of 'Heaven,' i.e. 'Heaven's decree'; and sometimes 'Heaven'
alone stands for the decree of Heaven. The two terms are often found in apposition, as in the statement, 'Death and life have their determined appointment (ming), riches and honour depend upon Heaven.'

When a disciple named Po Niu was visited by Confucius, and found to be hopelessly ill, the Master said: 'It is the appointment (ming) of Heaven, also!' The expression is frequently used with regard to the ancient rulers: 'Heaven decreed him the throne.' We may call the head of the 'ancestor man,' the Confucian ideal, as 'walking, quietly and calmly, for the appointment of Heaven.' Is his destiny, in contrast with the 'interior man' who 'walks in dangerous paths looking for luck.' In another passage Confucius says: 'Without recognizing the decree of Heaven, I dare not to be a superior man.' He frequently refers to destiny as influencing his own life, e.g.: 'Heaven produced the virtue that is in me.' 'I think that I am the person of Heaven.' 'While Heaven does not let the cause of truth perish, what can the people of Kwang do to me?' 'If my principles are to advance, it is so ordered; if they are to fall to the ground, it is so ordered (ming).'; 'Heaven is destroying me.'

From statements such as these it may be argued, that to the mind of the Sage, ming meant very much what we mean by destiny or fate: something which he recognized as actively operating in the determination of man's lot, but which he refused to discuss or analyze, regarding it, in common with spiritual beings and the other extra- mundane phenomena, as the acts of the power of destiny.

3. Mencius.—The philosopher Mencius agrees with Confucius in regarding ming as Heaven's decree, in his references to the ancient 'Empires.' Yet ming is applied by him to the evolution from the Old to the new dynasty of Chow. When the prospect of obtaining preferment was suggested to him, he replied, in the words of Confucius: 'That shall be as Heaven directs.' He speaks of Heaven's gift of the kingdom to Shun, though he does not describe it as resulting from destiny, but rather as the duty to execrate, to which Heaven had appointed him. His pronouncements on the subject are much looser than those of Confucius, since he speaks in one place of calamity and happiness as being in all cases of man's own seeking, and endeavours to illustrate his theory by a quotation from the Odes: 'Study always to be in harmony with the ordinances (ming), so you will certainly get for yourself much happiness,' and again, in a passage from the Canon of History: 'When Heaven sends down calamities, it is still possible to escape from them; when we occasion the calamities ourselves, it is not possible any longer.'

He uses a phrase of his: 'That which is done without man's doing is from Heaven, that which happens without man's causing it to happen is from the ordinance (ming). There is, therefore, a destiny decreed for every man, there is an appointment (ming) for everything, and it is possible for each man to establish his destiny, or fail to realize the favours which Heaven wills to bestow on him. An early and apparently antiquity death may be ascribed to destiny, as encountered in the honourable discharge of one's duty; but a disgraceful death cannot be so attributed. Men should calmly await a fate which is decreed for them; but, should the 'situation' place them in needless danger, they may entail upon themselves a 'fate' which is not of Heaven's appointment.

Destiny and Nature are closely associated in the mind of Mencius, and seem to reflect what is said in ch. i. of the Doctrine of the Means: 'What Heaven has conferred (ming) is called Nature, the idea being that Heaven has decreed and Nature has decreed his death or success in realizing that destiny represents the extent to which his nature is in harmony with the ideal. He may attain to the highest honours, if such are indicated to him by the understood will of Heaven, as in the case of the ancient rulers; or he may, like some of them, be condemned, by his own moral delinquency, to undergo a decreed and determined punishment and suffering to which, humanly speaking, his former virtues entitled him. His ideal destiny may assign him a potential longevity, which he may reject by voluntary suicide. His idea is, that Heaven is so determined as to correspond with the ideal that he can fulfill his ideal destiny. He discovers his destiny by performance of the eternal law of Right, and thus Mencius, when asked 'Did Heaven confer its appointment on Shun with such intuitions?' replied 'No, Heaven does not speak, it simply showed its will by his personal actions and conduct of affairs.' By this means Shun was declared to be 'the man after God's own heart,' by the conferring of the Imperial Mandate upon him.

The ideal destiny is limited or determined, in the sense that none can reach a higher standard than that appointed for him. In the case of some, that appointed limit may not permit him to rise above the lowest levels of human attainment; in other cases it may allow the happy recipient to secure the proper appreciation of the limitations of his power. A recent pronouncement by a Confucian writer states that 'Confucius emphatically denies that all men may be made good' (Lim Boon Keng, in China, Jan. 1912, p. 515). Man may represent an early stage in the evolutionary process which, in course of time, may produce a sage; but, in his own person, he can have no hope of reaching that prud stage, though he may rejoice in the privilege of advancing the process by strict attention to the limited sphere of his own responsibilities. He may, on the other hand, inherit a noble destiny, and not only fail to attain it, but by his failure retard the evolutionary process, and bring about a condition of atavism.

4. The Chucuan school.—The reiteration of Confucic with reference to ming gave his later expositors the opportunity of elaborating theories of their own; and their materializing tendencies are reflected in the Doctrine of the Mean, attributed to Tsz-sze, a grandson of Confucius, who was also, to a great extent, the inspirer of Mencius. A further development is observable in the writings of Chu-lai (Chu-tai) A.D. 1130-1200), who deprives Destiny by explaining it as meaning simply Nature, and Nature as equivalent to Principle, whether existing in the natures of men or beasts. In other words, men and other creatures are different natures, which constitute each of them a law unto himself; but, since Nature, or Principle, may become deflected, an outside standard is necessary for correction of morals, viz. Tao, or the 'Way'; and X'eo, or 'instruction,' which is furnished by sages and teachers. It should be borne in mind that Chucuus was largely influenced by Buddhist opinions, and that the doctrine of karma, no doubt, affected his treatment of the subject; and, since Chucuus is admitted to be the most popular exponent of the Confucian school at the present time, it is not surprising that the Chinese should be represented as thoroughly believing in human destiny. To the latter fact has been credited the universal traffic in astrology, fortune-telling, clairvoyance, mesmerism, necromancy, palmistry, phycognomy, the phalene, and the use of nostrums and charms, all with a view to discovering and terting away one's own destiny. For, though the Chinese may sometimes appear to dissemble belief in a predetermined and irrevocable fate, and express contempt for the idea of men being supposed to be possessed or rendered helpless, in realizing that destiny represents the extent to which his nature is in harmony with the ideal. He may attain to the highest honours, if such are indicated to him by the understood will of Heaven, and the only way to
The inevitableness of Fate is tacitly accepted by the Chinese people, and finds constant illustration in their otherwise inexplicable carelesslessness in the control of fire, which sometimes inhumanly consumes their palaces and populous districts; and the neglect of proper precautions against flood, which has been known to inundate whole counties; and similar remissness in connexion with the outbreak of plague, pestilence, and famine, or even personal afflicts such as abnormal growths or deformities. The whole tendency of Taoism, which, though sadly degraded by its modern representatives, is, nevertheless, a powerful influence amongst the thinkers, may be well described as fatalistic, inculcating, as it does, that absolute compliance with the Tao, or 'Course of Nature,' which precludes the stirrings of ambition, and deprecates all restless striving in the direction of self-advancement, whether by virtue of one's individual merits, or by sedulous attention to the desires of the higher or even the highest powers, including the gods themselves.

In conclusion, it may be said that, on this subject, as in the case of many others, the Chinese appear to be able to harmonize what might seem to Westerners to be conflicting and contradictory opinions. They regard the 'by-the-way' as the predestined destiny, and yet speak of the possibility of evading that destiny, of a fate which is unaffected by outside agencies, whilst at the same time they seek by every means to anticipate the decree by recourse to horoscopes, fortune-tellers, etc. The explanation is supplied by the theory that the debased may surrender the good fortune in store for them, for Heaven has the right to annul a decree for the welfare of its intended recipient. The ignorant may be unaware of the destiny which Heaven intends for them, and thus neglect to qualify for their predestined lot. Only complete sincerity can attain to the foreknowledge of Heaven's appointment: only he who fashion his life in accordance with 'the Way' can hope to gain the highest places which benefit Heaven has to bestow. Death is unalterably fixed in the case of all men, and this belief gives rise to that extraordinary resignation with which the Chinese accept the death penalty; but one's lot in life is, to a large extent, in one's own hands; happiness may be secured, and calamity averted, by living in accordance with Tao, as set forth in the Confucian classics; for, as the proverb says, 'If Heaven should weary my body, I must set it off by putting my heart at ease.'


**W. Gilbert Walshe.**

**FATE (Egyptian).**—The Egyptians had a very definite notion of Fate or Destiny, which was personified as the deity Shai. The word for 'destiny,' sa, later Sat (shait), is derived from the verb sa, 'decide,' 'define,' the German bestimmnen; but, therefore, = was bestimmt ist, as in the verse, 'Es ist bestimmt in Gottes Raths, Dass man von Bosten was man hat, Muis schicden, ja scheiden'; Sat = what must be, unavoidable Fate. We find it in this sense always: even the heresy of Akhenaten did not erase it. Man proposes, Heaven disposes. 'Heaven decrees happy unions, etc., i.e. Marriage is Made in Heaven.' Everything depends on Heaven and Fate, and not on man. 'All the planning and schemes are unequal to the one fixed determination of Heaven.'

7. Popular literature.—The doctrine of Fate is very fully illustrated in such selections from Chinese literature as Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio (see Lit. below); and the 'Book of Fate' is frequently referred to as being consulted in order to discover the terms of one's lease of life.
Naturally, unavoidable fate was regarded as evil fate, and ἡδις can mean this without qualification. In the 'Israel-Stella' of Merenptah (1250 B.C.), which records the ravaging of Palestine by the Egyptians and the destruction of 'all Israel, the word is 'determined' by the ideograph of a devouring dog; an evil animal was destiny!

Death was the destiny of all, whether the rich man who built himself a pyramid, or the poor man who died of heat and labour on the canal-dyke or gisr, with none but the fish to see him die. It was an evil destiny, death, and, when one thought upon it, was a matter of tears, and the eyes of death, was pain and grief; never would one come back from the tomb to see the sun. So said his soul to 'Tired-of-Life' in the curious dialogue translated by Erman; but the man himself, seeking rest from the weariness of the world, saw in death no evil fate, but rather a glorious one, since, when dead, he would become a 'living God,' who would accompany RA, his sun-ship through the sky, as a guiding companion in his punishment after death, or πάνω ἁγγαρέους. So 'Tired-of-Life' rebuked his soul, and so the common fate of man appeared to the religious, then as now, rather a good than an evil destiny, and 'That-which-becomes (ἡδις) was desired.' He ceased to be the Devourer, and became, instead, the Benefactor. Shai now appears, in late times, as a popular deity in the form of a serpent, the animal which had become the emblem or image of any and every deity otherwise unprovided with an animal-form.

For religious reasons connected with the idea of death, as mentioned above, and for enonymous reasons too, no doubt, the idea of 'Tired-of-Life' naturally connected itself with the god Petnis, or Petpur, the 'Αγαθοδάμων (not the Μοῖρα) of Dendur. It is in its capacity of protecting demon that we find the serpent Shai, wearing the diadem of Hermes, Philephthon during the celebration of Hermes and the thysion of Dionysos (a true type of the Misch- kunst of the time), represented on either side of the inner doorway of the great family catacomb at Koun and Alexandria, which dates from the 2nd cent. A.D. In the 3rd cent. magical papyri we find Shai as the agathodaimon, the spirit of good rather than of bad luck: in a love-charm he is invoked as 'the great Shai who makes magic for the great (goddess) Triphis, the lady of Koun.' Triphis ('T—rific'), 'the princess,' was a form of Hathor, the goddess of love, who also from the earliest times had been connected with national apellation: thus we find Sapphia (the seven Hothors) foretell the destiny of a child at its birth as early as the 5th dynasty. The name of Shai was now very popular in compound personal apellation: thus we find Sappho ("Daughter of Shai"). Tapetis ('She who belongs to Shai'), Peterepis ('He whom Shai hath given'), and so forth. As the Good Spirit, he was now regarded as watching over the safety of the crops, and appears as a male counterpart of the corn-goddess Ermute (Thermuthis). Such is the history of an Egyptian godling. By this time the word ἡδις had probably lost entirely its original signification of 'what happens or comes to one, but is not destiny unavoidable.' It does not occur in this sense in Coptic, in which ἡδις (ἡδις) means 'good,' 'pleasant,' 'proper,' thus preserving rather the altered and later agatho-
demoniac signification of the word.

LITERATURE.—On the derivation of the word ἡδις, see H. Brugsch, Lith. 3, 12 (1863); H. Schubart, Leipzig, 1. l. c. 12 (1868); on the divinity, Book of the Dead, ch. cxv.; Book of Traveling 113-115 (Sai) (Sat.) 1190; G. Steindorff, ZA, 1890, p. 21; and H. R. Hall, PSBA xviii. (1908) §7-80, where references to inscriptions quoted are given, except that Amasis (Daresys, RT. Xvin. 19. 1, 2) Hall from Daresys's Egyptian text in Oldtest Civilization of Greece, 186, appendix. See also, H. R. Breasted, Social and Religious History of Ancient Egypt, 1907, ii. 906-907, and the 'Dialogue of the Man Tired of Life with his Soul, for which see A. Erman, 'Gespräch eines Lebensmüden mit seiner Seele,' ABA, 1909, 51 ff. For Shai in the magical papyri, see F. L. Griffith, Stories of the High Priests of Abydos, Oxford, 1898, p. 64; Griffith and Thompson, Magical Papyri of London, London, 1909, p. 188. On the Hothors, see A. Erman, Die Marchen der Papyri Westen, Berlin, 1901.

FATE (Greek and Roman).—Fate is the counterpart of Fortune (q.v.). They are two ways of looking at life; both are essentially connected with man. From the point of view of Fortune all is indeterminate; from the point of view of Fate all is determined. And Fate, like Fortune, attains to deity before our eyes during the course of Greek literature. From the first the idea of a predetermined order of destiny in the affairs of man was present to the mind of Hecale, and was fostered by the belief in oracles. That-manhood, "says Anger line (de Cur. ii. 110; A's. v. 9). Fate is by derivation 'that which has been spoken,' with the implication that it shall be fulfilled. The nearest verbal equivalent to this in Greek is τὸ κρόνος, since that is connected with the appropriate word for the answer of an oracle; cf. Eur. Hipp. 1256:

οῖδε τὸν κρόνος τοῦ χρόνος δ' ἀνάλλος.

But there is a great variety of ways in which the idea of Fate may be expressed in Greek, e.g., ἡμέρα, ἡμέρας ἔμπροσθεν, μόρφον, μόρφωμας, τοῦ μόρφου, μόρφωμα ἡμάς, αἰών μορφού, μορφών ἐκλάμα, εἴρισμα, ἐκλάμασις, ἐκλαμομένη, ἐκλαμομένου, τρέπομεν, τρέπομενον, τρεπόμενη, τρεπόμενα, τρεπόμενα, τρεπόμενον, τρεπόμενα.

1. Homer.—The idea of Fortune (τύχη), as Macrobius (Sat. v. 16) has pointed out, is unknown to Homer, but not so the idea of Fate. The latter is everywhere present both in the Iliad and in the Odyssey, though the three Fates as mythological persons are not yet to be found. Μοῖρα in Homer is always singular, except in II. xiv. 49:

τοῦ μοῖρον τοῦ χιόνιον ἵππος χρήσειν.

Μοῖρα is the abstract noun from µετερος, so that the idea underlying it is that of some Power which bestows fortune to man. We may conjecture that the same idea meaning attaches also to Λοχή, which is used convertible with Μοῖρα:

II. vi. 487. σ. ἐν τοίς μιᾷ ὀπόλιν ἀνήρ Πηροδρόμος.

But there are instances of the use of the word in the sense of ‘the lot’ or ‘the share’ of a person.

II. v. 113-115. ἕν γὰρ τοῖς ἀνάλλοις ἄλλοις τοις ἀνησυχίας ἑλέοι, ἐκ' ὑπέρ ἑκάστης ἄλλου τοῦ ἄλλου ἀλώνιος ἀλώνιος τοῦ ἄλλου ἅμοιρας ἅμοιρας ἅμοιρας.

Atymos occurs in II. xxi. 291:

ὅτε αὐτῷ τεντόνης γε ἑμφανίας αὐτοῦ τοῦτο,

and αὔερον ἤμαρ in II. viii. 72, xxi. 100.

Môros stands to Môpos in the relation of effect to cause, and is therefore less a word of primary signification:

II. xvi. 225. ἔν οἷς ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίκητος, ὡς μὲν ἄφθονον ἀδέλταις.

An example of µοῖρον in II. 674 ff.:

ὁ πρὸς Ὀλύμπιος μεταφρασθὲν µοῖρον δὲν ἔφευγεν ἀνάλλοις ἀλώνιοι τοῖς διαδόμεσι, ἡμέρας ἀλώνιοι τοῖς διαδόμεσι.

and of µοῖρον ἢμαρ, II. xv. 613; Od. x. 175. νέον ἔι λιπες ἃνευρέσθαι µεγάλης τινός ἄλωνις occurs in II. xxi. 281 and in Od. xii. 312.

Πέρατα and its cognates come from the root ρατ-, which is a form of ρατ-, and so convey the same idea as µοῖρον of something predetermined.

II. xviii. 229. ἀνθρώπος γὰρ πέρατος, δήμος γὰρ πέρατος.

II. iii. 305 ff. ἵνα τινὰ κρίνη τοιαύτα, τινὰ κρίνη τοιαύτης.

1 Cf. Herc. Prog. 311; Elect. 1303; Iph. Taur. 1400; Oec. 616.

2 Cf. oracle of Bacchus, in Herod. iv. 48.
In *II*. xvi. 441 f. (= xxii. 179 f.) πεπομενοι is used of the victim of fate, meaning ‘foredoomed’—

όλης θυρείς ένεται, σαλίς πεπομένων αλέγ

it is a personification of Fate. *Kρής* and *Κηρή* represent Fate on its sinister side, and are generally associated with death.

In *Od*. i. 322, III. 22—a sense in which it is personified in *II*. xvi. 533:

εις' έρημον, εν τω δέ Κοιμεαμών ομίλλειν, εις' ήλιον Κήρι

Δάφνων has affinities with both Fortune and Fate. common sense responds, *There are mountains still behind.* To derive it from δαίμων in the sense of ‘divide,’ ‘distribute,’ brings it into line with the conceptions already treated of.

In the *Iliad* there are a number of expressions, such as ὑπὲρ μήταρς (xx. 336), ὑπὲρ μήτας (xx. 30, xxi. 517), ὑπέρουρα (i. 155), ὑπέρ αἰσθ (vi. 487, xvii. 790), and ὑπὲρ δίως αἰσθανόμενον (xvi. 363); and ὑπὲρ τεθέν (xvii. 327), which seem to imply that man could occasionally pass over Fate. But except in xvi. 790;

καὶ τέλη δε ἔρημων ἴλαυν δέφερον δῶρον—

we are never told that he does overpass it. The rest of the passages are conditional, and some god always steps in in time to save the credit of Fate. The one passage, that which runs contrary to the rest, may either be set down as hyperbolical or referred to the same range of thought as displays itself in the *Odyssey* (i. 32-35), where a sort of compromise is effected between Fate and free will. Some evils, we are led to suppose, come from the gods, whereas there are others which men bring upon themselves by their own infatuation—for instance, the death of Agamemnon. This is a sound judgment, to which we are not accustomed. *There are mountains still behind* which no wisdom or virtue can guard, while there are others which are clearly traceable to one’s own fault. But even in the *Iliad* the fatalism of the poet is not rigid, but admits of alternatives. Had Patroclus heeded the warning of Achilles, he would have escaped the evil fate (ἐφίλη) of black death (xvi. 685 ff.); and Achilles himself has an alternative destiny—death and immortal glory at Troy or an inglorious old age at home (ix. 410-416).

As men in the *Iliad* are often on the verge of transgressing Fate, so Zeus now and again entertains thoughts of setting it aside, but never actually does so. He sheds tears of blood over his own son Sarpedon (xvi. 431-461), but leaves him to his fate; he pitied Hector, but does not save him (xxii. 168-185). The public opinion of the skies is against such an example. Fate is after all Δάφνων, and Zeus is true to himself. Even when he has been entrapped into an oath by Hera, he keeps it, though to his own cost (xix. 93-135). The general attitude of Zeus is shown by the impartial way in which he holds the scales of battle (viii. 65-74, xxi. 209-215), leaving the fates (αἰσθάνομαι ἡμάρ) of the combatants to decide the matter by their own weight, the heavier to go down to Hades. Vergil has caught the Homeric spirit when he says *(Aen. x. 1124 f.)*:

‘τεταυροκατήκοιν οἰδαμ. Fata vixam inventum.’

It was the metaphor of spinning the web of destiny to men at their birth which brought into being the mythological scene called the Moirai. But the gods in Homer do the work of Fate themselves. Zeus does the spinning in *Od*. iv. 257 f.:

δέν καθότι θηραίνοι γυναικεῖστα τε καθά τε θιτί

1 The line occurs also in *Itn. xvi*. 156 with φέροντων για τούτοις.
Moiragete's and Apollo Moiragete's. Again, in Plutarch (Mor. 474 B, Trans. Am. 15), where ἀντί τωτε... (Moiras) and ἔλθεν τέω... (Eileithia) are spoken of, the context shows that the reference is not to the Fates proper, but to the Greek and Evil Demon. The same author says (Mor. 385 C, de et amrh Delph. 2) that the two Fates at Delphi were intended to awake inquiry, since three were ever ready to represent (προσεχείσθεν). That the Fates should figure among birth-goddesses is only what might be expected. Pindar (Ol. vi. 71) couples the Μοῖρας and Εἰλεθία (Eileithia) at the birth of famous, and addresses the Μοῖρας as 'ανεμοίραες (Nem. vii. 1), while Euripides bestows upon the Μοῖρας the epithet of Χάος (Iph. Taur. 266), and Plato in his poetical way speaks of Μοῖρα and Εἰλεθία in the same breath (Symm. 200 D); an early poet of Delos, too, gave to Εἰλεθία the epithet of εὔφορος, indicating thereby her identity with Φατή (ῥήσατε τῷ Πειραμικῷ τῷ ἀργῷ), and declared that she was older than Kronos (Plat. viii. 21. § 2).

Pindar has Moira in the singular (Nem. vii. 84) and in the plural (Ol. xi. 65, Pyth. iv. 259, Isth. v. 25); also ἔτεος Μοῖρα (Ol. ii. 37); he has two mentions of Clotho (Ol. i. 40, Isth. v. 23), one of Lachesis (Ol. ii. 118), but none of Atropos, though he speaks of Κλωνθα and her sister Μοῖρα (Ist. v. 27.); he also enriches the vocabulary of Fate with some new expressions, such as τὸν ρησόμενον (Ol. ii. 29), πορρήσια ζωή (Pyth. iv. 454), χάομεν καὶ ὁ Ατρόπος (Ol. i. 70, of (Edipus), and lays down broadly το γε μοίρα τον οὐρανόν (Pyth. xii. 52).

3. The Greek tragedies, etc.—This gnome might be taken as the key-note of Greek Tragedy. Quite apart from the case of inherited sin, as in the house of Οἰλέως, man is represented in the Tragedies as the victim of some awful, unseen power, which forsook him to disaster. It has been said that there is less of this in Euripides than in Ἑσύλων or Sophocles. But it is from the Orestes of Euripides (976-981) that we take the following lines:

Ye tear-drown'd, toiling tribes,
Whose life is but a span,
Behold how Fate, or soon or late,
Upsets the hopes of man;
In sorrow still your changing state
Which fate, or can it be

'Pray not at all,' says the chorus in Sophocles' Antigone (1337 f.) to Creon, 'since there is no release for mortals from destined calamity.' Greek Tragedy is filled by many of the events in the Edipus Tyrannus, and there, too, the idea of Fate attains its zenith. Edipus is like a fly in a spider's web; the more he struggles to escape, the faster does Fate entangle him. 'Awful,' says Sophocles (Ant. 921), 'is the mysterious power of Fate.' It is perhaps a sense of this awfulness that makes the Tragedians, though they speak sometimes of 'Fates' in the plural, refrain from using the proper names of the goddesses. The thing with them is too serious for mythology. They were studying life as they found it, in the same spirit as that in which we study the laws of Nature.

In the Iphigeneia Vetus it is darkly hinted that Zeus himself is subject to Destiny, and that Prometheus knows a secret of Fate which will eventually affect his deliverance (511-523).

In Ἑσύλων the connexion between the Fates and the Furies comes out strongly. 'Who then,' asks the chorus, 'turns the rudder of Necessity?' to which the answer is (ib. 516):

And again in the Eumenides (922) the Μοῖρας are addressed as μητρακοσκυλία of the Furies—doubtless with reference to the account in Herodotus of both triplets being the unmothered offspring of Night. This sort of naming, which is rare in the Tragedians, occurs in Eumen. 335 in connexion with Μοῖρα.

The belief in oracles is assailed by Euripides, though in such a way as to 'save the face' of Lookias. EL. 399.1:

When the twain, the twain, the twain, will have the twain?

The logical tendency of this is to upset the belief in Fate, which is so intimately connected with prediction. But, as a matter of fact, Euripides, like other tragedians, is permitted through and through with a belief in Fate. Take, for instance:

In a place of punishment (Prom. Vinc. 936) and in the Iphigeneia, which the present writer believes to be the work of Euripides, a new power, bearing a close resemblance to Fate, makes its appearance upon the scene. This power is Αρδαστία. She is at first identified with Nemesis, in agreement with which it is the custom to propitiate her before dangerous utterances (Plato, Rep. 451 A; Eur. Eth. 492, 498), while others regard Ardasia as another name for Atropos (Schol. ad Plato, Rep. 451 A), and the philosophers frankly identify her with Fate in general (Plato, Theod. 248 C; Ar. Mund. viii. 5; Stob. Ed. i. 188). According to Callisthenes (Sud. xii. 588), the name is due to the accident that the first statue of Nemesis was set up by Ardasia; but the mere usual derivation is perhaps the true one, which takes the name to indicate the impossibility of escape from the goddess (ἀπεράταν τ' & τι αἰτητήν ἀπατήσατε, Schol. on Rep. 451 A).

Nemesis, herself a goddess of distribution (ῥεύμα), is akin to Μοῖρα (μερής), and has at the same time affinities with Fortune, who has managed to appropriate her wheel (see PTOLEMY [Gr.]). Herodotus, with his notion of 'a jealous god' (iii. 40), is full of the idea of some power which brings disaster upon men, not because they are wicked, but simply because they are not fortunate, like Polycrets, or because, like Creusus, they think themselves so (i. 34). In Herodotus (i. 91) we find a strong assertion of the omnipotence of Fate, where the Phthia declares to Creusus that it is 'impossible for a god to escape destiny' (τον πειραμικόν μοίραν αἰτητήν ἀπατήσατε καὶ κρατήριον). Yet, even so, there is a certain amount of elasticity allowed to Fate, for Lookias claims that he had induced the Μοῖρας to postpone the fall of Sardis for three years. How different is this theologian's acquaintance with the hand of God in history from the calm positivism of Thucydides! And how strongly does he recite his ready belief in oracles (vili. 70) strongly contrasted with the sceptical remarks of the later historian (Thuc. ii. 54) as to the way in which predictions get accommodated to current events!

The phrase used by Demostenes in a famous passage of the de Corona (p. 296, § 305)—τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὸν αὐτοκρατορὸν δίκαιον—indicates the same mental attitude as that of the author of the Odyssey, in distinguishing between things which are due to destiny and those which come from the free action of man's free agency: 'He who regards himself as born only for his parents,' says the orator, 'awaits his appointed and natural end, whereas he who thinks that he is born also for his country will die rather than see her enslave. Cicero, in an equally famous utterance (Phil. ii. 10), has an echo of this, or of the ἐνδορ τῶν τῆς Ὀδυσσείας

1 On this title of Zeus, see Paus. v. 15. § 4, vii. 27. § 1. At Megara, the same Πίνδοι, with the Μοῖρας and Εἰλεθία, was worshipped by the Μοῖρας above the head of Zeus, on which Pannainias (i. 48. § 35) remarks: ἔνθα δὲ ἔχει τὸν πειραμικόν μοίραν καὶ προφητήριον,

2 For this remark the writer is indebted to Professor E. A. Sommerrich.
the prominence of Fate in Tragedy—*etd de ipso filio
calvi, filio de ipso tragico, ipso eiunperrejn.* In Gorg.
(512 E) his language leads us to think that sub-
mision to Fate was a sentiment peculiarly preva-
lent among women—συφέλεσαν τας γυναικος, σηθ θεο
εισπράξσ ϑαν ειν εξηγησ. In the bold myth
of the Politicus he identifies *eiunperrejn with the
connatural desire* of the universe, when left by
God to its own devices. This is a new light upon
the subject altogether.

It is with the Stoics that the interest in Fate
really begins. Heraclitus was before his time, and
we do not know exactly what he said. Zeno
identified Fate (eiunperrejn) with Providence (φρωσις)
and Nature (φυσις). 1 Chrysippus said that the
essence of Fate is a spiritual power (δοσιμα πνευμα-
terpe) arranging the whole in order. 2 He declared
also that Fate is the reason of the universe. 2

The unwary reader must not be deceived by Chrysippus
speaking of Fate as a 'spiritual' power. We mean by spirit
something that is not matter; the Stoics meant by it some-
thing that is matter. Augustine uses *spiritus* in its sense
'spirit' in our sense—that something, itself isolate, which
creates all things.

Posidonius made Fate third from Zeus, Nature
being intermediate between them (Stob. Eel. i.
178). Antipater said simply that Fate was God.

With regard to what we have just said, it is not
accurate to say that the word 'Fate' because of the connexion
that had been established by his time between
Fortune and astrology, says Chrysippus, is the same as
Fate the will or power of God, 'sententiam tenet, lingam
corrigat' (De Civ. Del, v. 1).

Pope's 'Universal Prayer' is instinct with the
spirit of Stoicism:

Yet gave me in this dark estate
To see the good from ill,
And binding Nature fast in Fate,
Left free the human will.

That is the position on which Epicetus is always
insisting. God's will is certain to come about,
whether we wish it or not. What is in our power
is to make ourselves happy by a cheerful assent to
it, or miserable by a futile resistance. There
is no doubt that the Stoics held this position.
How they made it good by argument it is not very
easy to see. But Chrysippus, who was the brain
of Stoicism, seems to have reasoned in this way.
Everything has its antecedent causes; but we
must distinguish between two kinds of causes:
(1) those which are complete and primary, or, in
one word, efficient; and (2) those which are adja-
cent and proximate. If all causes are of the
first kind, there would be no room anywhere for
freedom; but, as some are of the second, there is
Sense cannot be stirred except by an object striking
it; but the causes here are of the latter kind, and
and do not affect freedom. A cause is an object
of itself. If a man gives a kick to a cylindrical
stone, he sets it rolling; but it goes on rolling
because of its own nature. Bad minds, according
to Chrysippus, rush into errors voluntarily; and
it is part of the order of Fate that they should
do so, as being a natural consequence of their bad-
ness (Cic. de Fato, §§ 41–43; Aul. Gell. v. 2).

This does not sound very satisfactory as a vindica-
tion of the freedom of the will. Cicero, who had
the works of Chrysippus before him, and who was
a good judge, did not think that he had made
out his case. Neither did he think Epicurus suc-
cessful, who, in order to leave room in the universe
for free will, had recourse to the hypothesis of a
slight deviation from the perpendicular on the part
of single atoms.

Cicero himself, in his fragmentary de Fato, fol-
 lows Carneades and the New Academy in denying
Fate altogether. If there were no such thing as
Fate, things would still happen as they do. Nature
and Chance are enough to account for them. The

1 Stob. Eel. i. 178.
2 *eiunperrejn tain τον εξηγησαν λογον* (Stob. Eel. i. 150).
3 de Civ. Del, v. 1, 7αι Ναμ κα το φτι να σας, διετρ
spiritus: sed quoniam coram esse, non est miriis vitae.
stone which fell in a cavern on the leg of a brigand.

Feudus (Hindu).—The Sîá language has various equivalents for what we call fate, such as, e.g., kâla, lit. 'time,' as leading to events the causes of which are imperative to the mind of man; vidi, 'ordinance,' 'rule;' dâsa, 'servitude,' 'chance;' dharma, 'divine power of evil,' 'destiny,' 'fate,' 'chance; adhyaya, 'what is not seen,' i.e. that which is beyond the reach of observation or consciousness, the acts done by each soul in former bodies, which acts extant then that soul an irresistible power called adhyaya, because felt and not seen; karma (karma), work done in a former existence and leading to inevitable results, fate. Kâla, 'time,' is perhaps the earliest of these, occurring, as it does, in hymns of the Athrâveda (xii. 53) on the power and Divine nature of Time, which is akin to Destiny or Divine Ordinance. It is 'he who drew forth the worlds and encompassed them. Being their author, he became their master. There is no other power superior to him.' In a subsequent period, Kâla was sometimes identified with Yama, the judge of the dead, or represented, together with Mârtyn, 'Death,' as a follower of Yama, or invoke of the great epic of India, contains various tales tending to illustrate the relative importance of the various agencies of which Fate may be said to be composed, none perhaps finer than the apologue of the snake (xiii. 1), relating how a boy was killed by a snake, and the snake, after having been caught by a hunter, was released by the boy's mother on the ground of her loss being due to Fate alone.

First, the snake declares its innocence of the boy's death, Mârtyn, the god of death, having used the snake as an instrument. Thereupon Mârtyn himself makes his appearance and exonerates himself, asserting that Kâla, 'Time,' has in reality killed the boy. 'Guided by Kâla, O serpent, sent thee on this errand. All creatures, mobile or immobile, in heaven or earth, are pervaded by this same inspiration of Kâla. The whole universe is with the same influence of Kâla.' But Kâla in his turn explains that neither Mârtyn, nor the serpent, nor he himself, though he has killed the death of any creature. 'The child was met with death as the result of its karma in the past. We are all subject to the influence of our respective karmas. As men move from a form of day to another, from one to another, men attain to various results determined by karma. As lifetimes are related to each other, so are men related to karma through their own actions. Therefore, neither art thou, nor am I, nor is Mârtyn, nor the serpent, nor this old Brahman lad, the cause of the child's death. He himself is the cause here.' On Kâla expounding the matter in this way, the child's mother became convinced, and asked the fowler to release the snake.

The conception of karma is closely connected with the celebrated Indian theory of transmigration or metempsychosis, which pervades all post-Vedic religious and philosophical systems of India, and has exercised down to the present day a powerful sway over the popular mind. As observed by Barn (in General Report of the Census of India, Calcutta, 1865, p. 364), it is a mistake to suppose that the ordinary Hindus have no belief in the doctrine of transmigration. 'The doctrine of karma is one of the freest beliefs of all classes of Hindus, and the fear that a man shall reap as he has sown is an appreciable element in the average character.' It is in S. India, according to Stuart (ib. p. 364), that the influence of Animism is prevalent, the villagers' real worship being 'paid to Mârinman, the dread goddess of smallpox and cholera, and to the special protected by himself during a previous existence and regarded as the work of evil spirits or devils who must be propitiated. In the same way, a native observer, G. Sarkar, in his well-known work, Hindu Law, an attempt to show that the power of the mysterious but irresistible power of the acts done in previous lives, is universally held by the Hindus as a fundamental article of faith. 'The theory of karma is a supplement of all good and bad deeds, of all meritorious and demeritorious acts and emolument, done by a person in all past lives and also in the present life. This is the adhyaya which determines the condition of every soul, i.e., in the cause of his happiness or misery; the state of a living being depends on his past conduct' (G. Sarkar, Hindu Laws, Calcutta, 1805, p. 230). And so it is stated by Dussehn in his History of Philosophy that the doctrine of metempsychosis has governed the Indian mind from the epoch of the Upanishads down to the present time, and is still of eminent practical importance, as affording a popular explanation of the cause of human suffering and operating as a spur to moral conduct. He quotes a blind Indian Pandit, whom he met in his travels through India, as replying to a question put to him concerning the cause of his deficiency in vision, that it must be due to some fault committed by himself during a previous existence (Dussehn, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. i. pt. ii. p. 282).

Historically speaking, the belief in metempsychosis and the beliefs of karma, or action, as determining the fate of man, makes its first appearance in one of the Brahmanas, and, in a more developed form, in the Upanishads. These philosophical treatises preach a strict determinism, except in so far as a man, by recognizing his identity with the eternally free Atman, may be released from the bondage of karma. The germ of this theory, as supposed by Oldenberg, may be much older; and it has been shown by Schmidt, in his suggestive little book, Die Indogermanen (Leipzig, 1911, p. 148), that the earliest Indo-European conception of Fate is that of a share inherited from the mother at the time of birth; the Roman Parce (from pario), equally with the Greek Eileôeia and the Slav, Rosadanîe, being Fate Mothers (Schicksalsmütter) assisting at every birth. From Brahmanism the theory of karma passed into Buddhism, and became one of Buddhism's leading tenets.

"When a man dies, the khandhas (elements) of which he is constituted pass off, and there results a new set of khandhas instantly starts into existence, and a new being appears in another world, who, though possessing different khandhas in a different form, is in reality the same man just passed away, because his Karma is the same. Karma, then, is the link that preserves the identity of a being through all the countless changes which it undergoes in its progress through Samsâra." (Children, Dict. of the Full Land, London, 1972, p. 181).
in this respect with the latter. There existed in ancient times a large number of philosophical systems, belonging to two principal classes—one asso
ciated with the doctrine of free will, immortality, and transmigration; and the other negating the same. Both Jina and Buddha belonged to the former class. They believed in transmigra-
tion: the determination of the final end in which they had in view (Pischel). According to the Jaina doctrine, the deeds performed in the
trees by the souls are karma, merit, and sin. This drives them, when one body has passed away, into another form of existence, foretelling the future lot or the karma. Virtue leads to the heavens of the gods, or to birth among men in pure and noble
acts. Sin consigns the souls to the lower regions, sends them into the bodies of animals or plants, or even into masses of lifeless matter. The addition of new karma can be prevented by right faith, strict control of the senses, and austerities on which
the Jainas lay special stress (Bühler).

Of modern Hindustan, the Sikhs may perhaps be said to be the most fatalistic of all. They agree with the adherents of other systems in explaining the glaring difference between riches and poverty,
human disease and their divine counterpart in a former life determining the present condition and circum-
stances of a person. But they go very far in deny-
ing the liberty of human action, everything being subject to the decree of Fate, be it the future lot of a person written on his forehead. These ideas have struck root very generally among the Sikhs, who, therefore, are far more rigid fatalists than even the Mohammedans. The karma theory occupies a place in the Sikh religion in India, and the highest goal of the Sikh is not
paradise, but the cessation of re-birth and existence (Trumpp, Macauliffe).

To return to Brāhmans, it should be observed that the rigid determination of its view of karma is frequently mitigated by admitting the modifying and controlling influence exercised on Fate by human exertion. Thus the Anukāsa Parvan of the
Mahābhārata contains the fine discourse on human effort (purvākāra), in which the relative importance of fate (dāiva) and human acts is discussed.

As, unseeded with seed, the soil, though tilled, becomes fruitful, without individual exertion, Destiny is of no avail. One's own acts are like the soil, and Destiny (or the sum of one's acts) is, as it were, the seed. From the union of the soil and the seed doth the harvest grow. It is observed every day in the world that the deer resapes the fruit of life, and the wolf and the raven obtain their food, and are free from good decrees, and benefit from bad ones. Acts, when done, always fructify, but, if not done, neither good nor evil is produced.

By devotion, detachment (or by au-
terity) one acquires beauty, fortune, and riches of various kinds. Everything is secured by exertion, and nothing can be gained through Destiny (dāiva) alone, by a man wanting in personal exertion (Mahābhārata, xii. vi. 7-12).

And so it is stated in the Vana Parvan that
those persons in the world who believe in Destiny, and those
again who believe in Chance, are both the worst among men. Those only that believe in the efficacy of acts are lauded. He that lies at ease, believing in Destiny alone, is soon destroyed like an unburnt earthen pot in water. So also he that believeth in Chance, i.e. stultify inactive though capable of activity, lives not long, for his life is one of weakness and helplessness" (ib. xii. 13-19).

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enuchs worship Fate (dāiva). In other places, the paramount power of Destiny is upheld, and it is clear that the comparative weight of free will and fate must have furnished a fruitful theme for discus-
sion to these Brāhman theorists.

The part played by Fate in the ordinary relations of human life, according to Hindu notions, may best be gathered perhaps from the view which the Indian jurists take of Fate or Chance (dāiva).

Thus, it is a well-known rule in Indian law that a
depositary is not responsible for such damage as may have occurred to a chattel deposited with him by the act of Fate (dāiva) or of the king, Fate being
explained to include ravages caused by fire or water, the falling down of a wall, decay through the lapse of time, an attack by robbers or by imini-
ral forces, and the natural response of fire, water, and
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depositary is not responsible for such damage as may have occurred to a chattel deposited with him by the act of Fate (dāiva) or of the king, Fate being
FATE

success in every enterprise depends on Destiny and human acts; the acts of Destiny are fixed from the beginning. The direction and the quality of man's life are therefore through action. And this, too, is thus said by them, that God cannot be responsible for a man in the world does not happen; and that which is destined, be it something good or evil, predestined through sinfulness or slothfulness, is injured by it. That which will come to pass through exertion is such as he who goes to a meeting of happiness, or the elevation of man, who, owing to sickness, dies early; and he who through sinfulness or slothfulness is not sapped, is not wed no wife, and is certain that no child of his is born, or such as he who gives his body unto slaughter, and life is injured by his living.

Some colour is lent by XXVIII. 17 to the view which the present writer, like Cumont (Mysteries of Mithra, tr. A. E. Cowley, Chicago, 1905, p. 124.), is inclined to favour, that Zoroastrian fatalism is borrowed, in the main, from Babylonic astrology, when it declares that 'every good and the reverse which happens to mankind, and also the other creatures, happen through the seven planets and the twelve constellations.' It is useless to strive against fate, for, according to XXIII. 5-9,

'though a man puts on new clothes in this world, he is not saved, what soever he was, even the self of man puts on new bodies, which are in accordance with his acts in a former life' (Fargam, xx, 50, tr. Jolly).


J. JOLLY.

FATE (Iranian)

The Gathas attribute foreknowledge to Ahura Mazda (Yasna xxix. 4, xlv. 2, 6, 9-11, 13-19, xxviii. 2), which is also implied in the whole Iranian scheme of the Ages of the World (g. a.). Foreordination, however, scarcely developed in Zoroastrian thought, except in a minor infrazalasian sense, until a comparatively late period. Practically the only Avestan passage which is directly cited is its teaching in the Zend, v. 9-10, which states that a man apparently drowned is really carried away by demons, and that 'there, then, Fate is fulfilled, there it is completed' (atha adhita fragasati bozda adhita nashatas).

In genuine Zoroastrian fatalism there is no place, for the entire spirit generated by the long struggle which each man must help Ahura Mazda to wage against Ahriman and every other power of evil militates against a concept which—whatever its alleged justification—has, as a matter of history, sapped the energy of every people that has held it. And yet fatalism came to be an important doctrine of the Zoroastrians, the source of which is a new factor—philosophical speculation, the malign influence of Babylonian astrology, the crushing of the national spirit by the foreign dominion under which the Zoroastrians passed, or a combination of these factors; yet there is at least a curious and suggestive analogy between the rise of fatalism in Iran and that of karman (q.v.) in India, which seems to have been evolved from a combination of philosophical speculation with the religious beliefs of the aborigines of India.

The Dinkart (iii. 77, tr. Sanjana, Bombay, 1874 ff., p. 85) teaches a qualified free will when it says:

'It is through the power and the assistance of the Iads (angels) who knows the Holy Self-existent (Ahura Mazda), fights with the Darjis (demons) and delivers his body and soul from the Darjis and overcomes the power of the Ganges' (the other creation of this world. Under the design of the Creator, man is born, and has the power to direct himself, under the supervision of the Iads. The aholo (in man) of the evil qualities of the evil passions is for the purpose of obstructing him, but not for the purpose of convincing to plunge man into sin.'

Within the sphere of orthdox Zoroastianism, fatalism comes to the front chiefly in two Pahlavi works—the 9th cent., Dāštīsān-ī Dači (DD), and the Dīnī-ī Mavarān-i Xrīt (MX) of uncertain date, but probably of the 10th cent. or later, and possibly in the reign of Chosroes i. (531-570) (MX, ed. Sanjana, Bombay, 1895, p. viii f.). According to DD xxxi. 3, 5,

'there are some things through destiny, and there are some through action; and it is thus fulfilled by them (the high priest) that life, wife, and authority and wealth are through destiny, and the righteousness and wickedness of priesthood, warfare, and toil are through action. And this, too, is thus said by them, that God cannot be responsible for a man in the world does not happen; and that which is destined, be it something good or evil, predestined through sinfulness or slothfulness, is injured by it. That which will come to pass through exertion is such as he who goes to a meeting of happiness, or the elevation of man, who, owing to sickness, dies early; and he who through sinfulness or slothfulness is not sapped, is not wed no wife, and is certain that no child of his is born, or such as he who gives his body unto slaughter, and life is injured by his living.'

In the Dinkart, fatalism is also apparent in the numerous prophecies of future events (e.g., for example, Yatskiki-i Xwarab, tr. Modi, Bombay, 1899, pp. 211, 291., in which Jami prophesies to King Vissapasa the outcome of battle and in the Dīnī-ī Mavarān-i Xrīt, tr. Kerkohi, Erzurum, 1889, pp. 107, 148, and also his Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism, Eng. tr., Chicago, 1901, p. 101, where the cooperation of Babylon. influence is again emphasized.
entire system of Persian divination (q.v.). In the Persian epic of the Šāh-Nāmeh (tr. Moh., Paris, 1876-1878) the power of Fate is also emphasized. Thus the Emperor of China declares (iii. 121): ‘Every event of destiny, all the actions of men (geraditi i-ānān), even though he were able to overthrow an elephant, and the poet makes a similar reflection on the violent death of Yazagird I. (v. 410); but here, as de Harlez observes (Avesta ... trad., Paris, 1881, p. lxxxviii), we no longer move in a Zoroastrian sphere.

LITERATURE.—F. Spiegel, Erw. Alterthumskunde, Leipzig, 1860, p. 388; [see also the philosophy based on predestination by R. Gessner, Do. 1862-1863, ii. 219; L. C. Casartelli, Pitt. of the Mahāyānaist-Buddhists under the Sung. in A.S. 1890, 9, 311-337; E. West, Pokhiri Texts, iii. (SBE xviii. 1883, xxiv. (1885).

LOUIS H. GRAY.

FATE (Jewish).—Based on the OT, which on the whole acknowledges freedom of choice, Judaism does not, and consistently cannot, hold the pagan doctrine of Fate. The subject never entered Jewish consciousness, and therefore there is not even a Heb. word in the OT corresponding to πτωμα or fatum. πτωμα is an engraved statute and hence a law of Nature, but not applied to human affairs. What little attention Jewish countrymen, and more especially their Pharisees, gave to the question of fate, was due to the fact that there is no place in the OT for a theory of predestination. And this state of things is explained by the fact that the Jews had no idea that God desired or intended that his name should be known in the world, and that the whole purpose of his revelation was to prove that his name is great, and that he is the only living God (Isa. 45:5; 1 Sam. 15:3). Thus, when Josephus (BJ i. 2, 4, v. 8) uses the word πτωμα as if he were a real fatalist, the repeated emphasis laid on divine foreknowledge is a step in the direction of the Christian theory of predestination. When Josephus (BJ ii. viii. 14) adduces the Muaph prayers for the New Year, God is spoken of as ‘looking’ (πτωμα) and beholding to the end of all generations.’ A dictum of R. Akiba’s was (Ab. iii. 19): ‘Everything is foreseen (πτωμα), equivalent to Josephus’ ἀφορίστης προφύλακτος (BJ ii. viii. 14), although it is added: ‘free will is given.’ Man in his nature and environment is a product of a predetermined will. ‘He is fashioned, born, lives, dies, and is brought to judgment against his will’ (Ab. iv. 29). In his antecedent state his sex, constitution, size, shape, appearance, social position, livelihood, and all that may befal him, are pre-ordained (Tanh. on Ex 38). Marriages are final in heaven. Forty days before the birth of a child its future spouse is proclaimed by a herald (50:2), and no prayers can alter it (Moed K. 188; Sanh. 22a). Throughout his life he (or she) must be let alone, and his fate is sealed from the first day of his life. No one can touch anything that is destined for another. No kingdom can extend a hairbreadth against another (Yoma, 38c).

History is shaped in accordance with a preordained plan. Suffering, death, the Deluge, Israel’s servitude in Egypt and persecution by Haman, were preordained before creation (Tanh. on Ex 3). God revealed to Adam before he was completely formed his righteous descendants (ib.). To Moses He showed a list of their names—Israel, its kings, guides, and prophets from the creation until the final resurrection of the dead (Midr. on Ex 31). The leaders were to appear on the stage of time as they were wanted: una omnino non deficit alter. Thus, ‘before Moses’ sun set, Joshua’s rose.’ Similar was the case with Eli and Samuel. On the day R. Akiba was slain, ‘the whole creation trembled’ (Jer. 13:31). The day of the great death day Rab Ada bar Alahia was born, etc. (Midr. on Ge 23). Israel’s election was decreed from all eternity, and is irrevocable. Their final redemption must be preceded by repentance.
Should they fail to repent at the appointed time, God will force it by raising up for them another tyrant like Haman (Sanch. 97b, 98a). The interference of miracles with the course of Nature, such as the dividing of the Red Sea at the Exodus, the destruction of the Idolaters, the drought and the deluge, etc., was in accordance with a Divine ‘stipulation’ before creation (Midr. R. on Gn 14).

How far foreordination was compatible with the doctrine of rewards and punishments, was a frequent subject of discussion in the Talmudic period. But the Rabbis advanced no solution of the problem beyond the categorical statement that, notwithstanding, man possessed freedom of will. At most it was added that compliance with the law merited greater reward for the righteous and severer punishment for transgressors (Shab. 32a). The problem wrecked the faith of Elisha ben Abuyah.

It was left to the Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages to reconcile the doctrine of Divine foreknowledge with freedom of will. It being beyond the scope of this article to reproduce their arguments, we conclude that all, with perhaps the exception of the 19th-century Rabbis, have rejected fatalism, pointing out that foreknowledge was not identical with causation.


FATE (Muslim).—1. General. — Islam has often been charged with being a fatalistic religion, but this reproach is not quite merited. For a proper analysis of fatalism in Islam, it is important, in the first place, to distinguish between the popular point of view and the philosophical or theological. Eastern peoples have a psychological tendency to fatalism; but this species of popular fatalism, numerous traces of which are found in their folklore, is a sentiment rather than a doctrine. It is, moreover, limited to the outstanding accidents of human life, and especially to death, which it represents as happening of necessity at such and such a time and in such and such circumstances, no matter what one may do to avoid it; it is, we may say, a physical fatalism. The fatalism of the schoolmen is of a moral fatalism; it does not apply specially to death, but refers to all human actions, holding these to be decreed by God. It is true that there have been scholars who taught fatalism in Islam, and that the books of Muhammad’s successors contain vague and plausible propositions apparently inculcating fatalism. At the same time, it must be remembered that the doctrine of fatalism has always been expressly repudiated by orthodox Islam, which believes in the free will of man, although it encounters serious difficulty in reconciling this with the all-powerful will of God. We now proceed to indicate briefly how the questions of predestination and free will are treated in the Qur’an, among various philosophical sects, and among the people.

2. In the Qur’an.—Muhammad speaks of books, kept in heaven, in which the deeds of men are written; and which will be the basis of the Last Judgment. One of these books is called ‘Il’iyyun : ‘The book of the righteous is in ‘Il’iyyun’ (Qur’an, Ixxxii. 18 [SBE ix. 324]; and ‘Na’sha : ‘The book of the wicked is in Sijjin’ (xxxii. 7 [SBE loc. cit.]). The Qur’an has it that these books are eternal, though this is not indicated in the text of the Qur’an; probably Muhammad thought the lists were written day by day as the deeds took place. There are also books relating to each individual:

‘As for him who is given his book in his right hand (at the Last Judgment), he shall be reckoned with by an easy reckoning; . . . But as for him who is given his book behind his back, he shall call out for destruction, and he shall brol in a blaze!’ (xxviii. 7–13).

Muhammad’s idea seems to be that human actions are noted down as the books at the time they are performed. There is still another book, called the ‘perspicuous Book,’ relating to the whole world: ‘Nor shall the balance be of little weight to them, of a heavy, or of little weight, that, or greater, save in the perspicuous Book’ (xxviii. 150). According to this tradition, this book is eternal; but the Qur’an does not say so. In short, the relevant passages do not justify the popular expression ‘It was written’ (with ‘all eternity’ understood).

While there is no text in the Qur’an affirming that man’s actions are decreed in advance by God, we find passages, on the other hand, which seem to signify that God forces certain men to do evil, that He predestines a certain number to hell; e.g. the following verses:

‘Had we pleased we would have given to everything its guidance; but the sentence was due from me; I will surely fill hell with the jinn and with men all together’ (xxiv. 133). ‘We have created for hell many of the jinn and of mankind: they have hands, and feet, and eyes and they see not therewith; they have ears and they hear not therewith; they are like cattle, nay, they go more astray! These it is they who go not in the right way’ (xvi. 6, 7). ‘All whom He pleases, and guides whom He pleases’ (xxv. 9, etc.).

These passages are probably not to be taken quite literally; but it is clear that the Qur’an does not speak with the precision of a teacher, but rather expresses himself as an orator, almost as a poet. His very emphatic terms were occasioned by the persistent stubbornness of his audiences, and may mean only that God finally hardens the hearts of the wicked who have first scorned His favours. This is more clearly stated in ii. 17 (SBE vi. 3): ‘Deafness, dumbness, partiality, and they shall not be guided.’ It will be noticed that the above passages are reminiscent of the Bible; Muhammad applies to the wicked what the Bible says of idols (Ps. 115:7-10).

3. With the theologians. — It was not until philosophical studies began to flourish that the question of fatalism was thoroughly investigated in Islam. The attributes of God are enumerated; amongst them is specified knowledge, will, power. These Divine attributes must be absolute; what room is left then for the will and power of man? The philosophers-knew God as universal agent and personal creator of all. ‘If God decreed of everything, how could man be the ‘agent’ also (and, so to speak, over and above) of his own actions? In God also they saw the supreme ‘cause, the cause of causes; how then could they admit that man was capable of performing deeds of which God was not the ‘first cause’? Such were the philosophical forms in which the question was clothed.

God’s will and knowledge, according to Muslim theologians, produce from all eternity a sort of decree which is realized by His power. This decree is called the qada; its continual realization is the qadar (cf. Jurjani, in the book of the Ta’rif). Now, man, who is this Divine creator enough liberty to give his life a moral significance; at the same time, the morally bad actions of wicked men must not be attributed to God. This was the problem which Muslim theology tried to solve, but we cannot say that it has given a clear solution.

There is a short treatise by an interesting though late author, Ab dar-Razzaz (q.v.), the Shufi († A.D. 1350 at Kásán), which well represents the point of view of Muhammad’s Muslim Tradition in regard to this question. The work is called Tract on Predestination and Free Will (Risalat fi’t-Qada wa’t-Qadar). Amidst many subtleties, we see how the author conceives the role and function of the will in human action, and the part he means to leave to it in
relation to God's will. Knowledge, says'Abd ar-Razzāq, is the impression of the form of a known object on the mind of man; perception is the feeling of the object given by the external senses, such as light by the eye; it is the mind's power of intelligence or imagination. Power is that faculty of the soul which makes it able to accomplish or leave unaccomplished any action; will is the decisive power. Non-agreeableness, according to Jurjani, is the accomplishment of the 'power' and the 'will' of man. When we perceive a thing, we know it; when we know it, we judge whether it is agreeable or repugnant to us; and it produces in us a certain inclination which makes us pursue or reject it: this inclination is will; and it is will that acts upon the power which moves the members according to the choice of the will. In cases where we are not compelled to admit the absolute agreeableness or non-agreeableness of the object, our intelligence is supplied by the faculties of reflexion and imagination to find out to which side the balance leans; and the will of the intelligence gives free scope to its opinions in this investigation. It may happen that a thing is agreeable under certain aspects and distasteful under others; e.g., it may please some of our senses and not the others; it may be good for certain members and harmful for others; it may please the senses and repel the mind, or, inversely; or, again, it may be advantageous for the present but not for the future, or inversely.

Every agreeable motive produces an attraction, every other a repulsion; if the attractions prevail, the result is a free decision in favour of the action. To this decision should be attributed praise or blame, according as the action is good or bad; but in this decision is deserts either reward or punishment. Nevertheless, 'Abd ar-Razzāq continues, there is no doubt that perception, knowledge, power, will, reflexion, imagination, and the other faculties exist by the agency of God and not by ours. He concludes that we must refer all actions to God as the agent who makes them exist, without, however, entirely withdrawing them from their human authors.

Ghazālī has a fairly thorough investigation of the question in his Epistle to Jerusalem, a section of his great discourse on the Qiyās. The principle is that everything produced in the world is the act and creation of God—'God has created you, and what ye make' (Qurān, xxxvii. 94). No single member of the perfect body of God can make a single movement of his without the consent of all the other members. All the members lie none the less with man to a certain extent. Every free act is, in a way, decided twice—once by God and once by man; it depends upon God for its production, and upon man for the merit or demerit resulting from it; or even, outside of the moral sphere, for the advantages or disadvantages following upon it, since for God there is no advantage or disadvantage. This quality in actions of being advantageous or disadvantageous, which does not exist except from the human point of view, is called kabh, 'gain' (cf. Jurjānī, Tahrīfāt). The choice, therefore, lies with man, the accomplishing of the action with God; the movement is man's, but created by God. God is the creator of the action decided by the human will.

Even before Ghazālī, this doctrine had been very clearly formulated in the work of the theologian Ash'arī. Human power, according to this Ash'arī, can have no influence upon the production of actions, for everything that is produced by a unique decree which is superior to the distinction between the human and the divine, it is not possible that a decision could influence this creative decree; it could also influence the production of natural objects, and almost create the heavens and the earth. We must, therefore, believe that God has arranged man's actions beforehand in such a way that things will happen at their proper time in conformity with the decisions of the human will. Man produces an action in appearance only; it is really created by God; but, from the moral point of view, the action is 'attributed' to man because he decided it. Here we have a veritable system of pre-established harmony, of an accomplished design.

4. With the School of Philosophers.—The question of providence and evil was thoroughly discussed in the philosophic school. Avicenna (q.v.) in particular has some very fine passages on it in his Nūṣṭāt (p. 78, section on Providence, and how evil enters into the Divine judgment), and in a treatise specially devoted to the subject—the Risālat al-Qadr (Treatise on Destiny, tr. by Mehrèn). In these we meet with ideas, expressed in very eloquent terms, that might be compared with those of Leibniz.

Providence, for Avicenna, is the 'knowledge of God enveloping everything.... The knowledge God has of the kind of beneficence applicable to the universal order of things is the source whence good flows over everything.'

How is evil possible in this world which is enveloped by the thought of the absolutely good Being? Avicenna answers the question by a theory of optimism. He regards three kinds of evil—metaphysical, moral, and physical. To moral evil he pays little attention: metaphysical evil does not exist except in potential beings, not yet completely realized, i.e. in the corruptible world, which is inferior to the sphere of the Moon; it depends on matter; but in the sphere of the Intelligibles there is no metaphysical evil, since everything there exists in a state of complete perfection. For physical evil is not so widely spread than physical good; it is frequent, indeed, but not so frequent as good; not ill, but health, is the normal state. Further, every evil is a good in some sense; the weaker animal torn by the wild beast, and the sparrow carried off by the bird of prey, suffer; but their suffering is for the advantage of the stronger animal. Physical good and evil cannot be the same in the eyes of God as they are to us; His point of view and the motives of His judgment are hidden in a mystery which ought to forbid our condemning His work.

5. With certain theological sects.—The doctrine of 'Abd ar-Razzāq is that of the Qadarīs of Islam; it strikes a happy mean; on one side there is a sect famous in the history of Islam: the Qadrātīs, who credit man with full power in the production of his actions, and the Jabārīs, who credit him with none.

The Qadrātīs (from qudrāh, 'human power,' not from qadar, 'the Divine decree') hold that man has the power to create his own actions, and do not allow that his evil actions are produced by God. Ash'arī and 'Abd ar-Razzāq reproach them with positing two principles, one for good deeds—God—and one for bad—Satan. The prophet, writes 'Abd ar-Razzāq, said:

'The Qadrātīs are the Magi of this generation, since they acknowledge two powerful, independent principles, just as the Magi, who looked upon the action and the will as independent principles, the one of good, the other of evil.'

The Mu'tazilites, who were not exactly, as they have been called, free-thinkers, but theologians with a rationalistic tendency, in the 3rd and 4th centuries of Christianity, were inclined to the question of human freedom; they treated the subject, with a very few differences, in the Qudrātī sense.

The Jabārīs are the opposite of the Qadrātīs. They utterly reject the necessity view, and do not believe that an action really comes from man, but attribute everything entirely to God. Man, they hold, does not even have the power of choice.
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God creates the choice and the action along with the sanctions of fate, 'constraint,' because in this system man is constrained in his every action by the decree of God; good and evil are necessary in him just as are their consequences.

The juristic teacher is Jahm, son of Satsrān. He began to teach at Timnāz and was put to death by Sulamīn, son of Ayvān al-Malzī, at Misor at the end of the reign of the Umāmidīs, but, according to Shirāzmīdī, text, p. 209.

This teacher held that God creates actions in man as he creates the air that sustains man and, metaphorically, as they are to things, it is said, e.g., that the tree produces fruits, the water runs, etc. Rewards and punishments are nothing more than the actions themselves.

The name Jabarite with the qualification 'moderate' (or 'mitigated') has, according to Shahristānī, sometimes been given to those who accord a certain role in the production of an action to the power of man, while not allowing him freedom of choice. Jurjānī's definition in the Ta'rifātī, that the moderate Jabarites are those who accord man a certain merit or demerit in the action, like the Ash'arīs, is not exact; for this last position is confused with the orthodox view.

It should be observed that those ancient Muslim teachers who deny human freedom always deny it on the ground of the omnipotence of God, and not on a purely natural determinism; they still cling to religion even in the very act of annihilating freedom, the condition of moral life.

'Abd ar-Rassāq criticized both sects—Qadarites and Jabarites—of those times.

"Both are blind in one eye; the Qadarites in the right eye, the stronger, the eye that perceives essential realities; the Jabarites in the left eye, the weaker, the eye that perceives exterior objects. But the man whose sight is sound enjoys two eyes and sees both. The essence of the right eye and refutes human actions to it, both good and bad; he acquires things with his left eye, and holds that man influences his own actions, not his own actions are compulsory, but the actions themselves, respecting the truth of the word [attributed to the Prophet]—not absolute constraint or absolute independence, but something between the two.

6. In popular belief.—The popular conception of fatalism as we have said, applies only to the outstanding accidents of life and to death. Man is in the power of certain superior, obscure forces, and, however, he may struggle against them, he cannot alter the destiny in store for him. This is exactly the ancient Greek idea of destiny: human freedom is not free. But it is represented as vain in practice, in face of the all-powerful forces that preside over our lives. For example, if it is decided by the power above a man shall die under certain circumstances, nothing can ever prevent the execution of this decree.

It was prophecied to Khalīf Mā'mūn, the famous promoter of philosophic studies in Islam, that he would die at Basra; he accordingly always avoided the well-known town of that name; but one day, when returning from an expedition, he encamped in a little place, where he was seized with a violent fever; he asked the name of the village, and was told that it was Basra; then he understood that this was the place, unknown to him, to which destiny had brought him, and he had no doubt that his death would follow soon— as it did, in fact, within a few hours.

This willingness to believe that death cannot come except at a fixed time and place is a source of great courage in battle; for where is the danger of recklessness? If it is not written that one is to die, he will suffer no harm; and, if it is written, then nothing can save him. Orthodox theology, however, does not altogether approve of this sentiment. Khalīf Ommar attested a saying on this subject, which well represents the point of view of sound theology: 'He who is in the fire should resign himself to the will of God; and he who is in the water should not need to abandon himself into it.' 'Resignation' or, rather, 'abandonment' to God is the form of fatalism admitted by the teaching of Islam. It is the idea of Christian mysticism— the believer should abandon himself to the will of God. But the very name of Islam expresses this sentiment: 'Islam' means 'the action of giving up oneself, of surrendering' (i.e., to God).

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[Arab. fatḥ, 'victory', Hindi 'jyosa', Persian and Shahī 'baytul hikma', i.e., 'House of Wisdom', of the site]—A famous deserted city situated in the Agra District of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh; lat. 27° 5′ N.; long. 77° 40′ E.; 23 miles W.S.W. of the city of Agra. Akbar selected the rocky ridge which passes through the old Hindu village of Sikrī as the site of his new capital.

The native historian, Nigel-d-din Ahmad, in his Ta'biḥat-4 Akbari (h. M. Ellis, Hist. of India, 1873, v. 393.), records that 'the Emperor had several sons born to him, but none of them had lived. Salīm Salīm Chishti, who resided in the town of Sikrī, 32 km from Agra, had gladdened him with the promise of a son. The Emperor went to visit the Shaikhs; several times, and remained there for a week or twenty days each occasion. He commenced a fine building there on the top of a hill, near the Shaikh Salīm. The Shaikh made two mausoleums—a mausoleum and a fine mosque, which at the present day has no equal in the world, near the royal mansion.' This noted saint of niksī, a descendant of another descendant of Fakhr ad-Din Shakarganj, was born at Delhi in A.D. 1453, and spent the greater part of his life at Sikrī, where he died in 1572. The son promised to Akbar was born in the house of the saint, was named Salīm Salīm after him, and became Emperor under the title of Jahangīr (born 1569, ascended the throne, 1605; d. 1628, age 54; Est., 1902, 1027).

The new palace was founded by Akbar in 1569, after his return from a victorious campaign at Ranthambhōr, and the name 'city of victory' commemorates this success and the conquest of Gujrat which immediately followed. His design in selecting this site for his capital and palace was to secure for himself, his family, and people the benefits of the intercession of the holy man referred to above. It continued to be the principal residence of Akbar until 1584, and was occupied by his son and successor, Jalāngī; but it was abandoned by Shāh Jahan in favour of Delhi, partly because the position of the latter was superior, and partly because the site of Fathpur-Sikrī was found to be unhealthy and the supply of water unsatisfactory. Many of the buildings are now in ruins, but careful restoration has been effected by the Indian Government, and a complete survey of the site was carried out by E. F. Smith. Here is the principal residence of the two of the most important religious buildings—the tomb of the saint Salīm Chishti, and the Great Mosque, both situated within the same enclosure, the state entrance to which is by a splendid gateway, the Buland or Bālagān Darwāzā, 'great gate.'

Ferguson describes this gate as 'stately beyond any portal attached to any mosque in India, perhaps in the world, and points out the skill of its architect. The inscription, cut in bold Arabic characters, records its erection in A.D. 1562 to commemorate the conquest of Khānchāt. Coming from a great builder, it has a pathos of its own: 'Said Jesus, on whom be peace! : The world is a bridge; pass over it, but build no house there. He who heareth for an hour, may hope for an eternity. The world is but an hour; spend it in devotion; the rest is unseen. If you standeth up in the sun not in his duty, exaliboth not himself, remaining far from God. The best possession is that which thou hast given in. The best traffic is selling this world for the next.' (E. W. Smith, The Mogul Architecture of Fathpur-Sikrī, pt. iv., p. 17.)

The Great Mosque attains a size which only the 'glory' of the place, and is hardly surpassed by any in India. Bishop Heber (Journal, ch. xxi.) characteristically contrasts it with the Oxford and Cambridge quadrangles. The site of the site—mountain arch records its erection in A.D. 1571. The tomb of the saint, with its lovely carved arcade enclosing the cenotaph, the body being interred in a vault below, is one of the most beautiful buildings in India. It has been fully illustrated.
and described by E. W. Smith. The tomb is largely frequented by pilgrims from all parts of N. India, the great fair commencing on the 20th day of the month Ramadán, when the chief guardian, known as Imám, or Sajjjdanishin, 'he who believes and is true to the Mosso, the descendant of the saint,' is enthroned. Women, as well as men, come to pray; and, though the former are not allowed within the cenotaph chamber, they wander timidly and silently round the temple, which is particularly attractive to children and childless women, who have been placed by people who trusted that the saint would intercede for the recovery of their sick animals.

For aspects of fear not discussed in the present art., see Religion.

FATHER.—See CHILDREN, FAMILY.

FATHERHOOD OF GOD.—See GOD.

FEAR.—1. Definition. Fear in its most general sense means the anticipation or expectation of evil or pain, as hope is the anticipation of good. In its incidence and kind it may be momentary, transitory, and occasional, or a permanent, persistent, all-pervading influence poisoning the whole mind and behavior; it may be a natural, healthy resistance to a particular danger, or a mad, uncontrollable slavement, a paralysis of will and effort in the anticipation of some remote and improbable contingency. Surprise may be regarded as a mild form of fear—the query as to whether an evil is present or not; astonishment is a slightly stronger form of the same emotion; embarrassment and shyness are social forms; anxiety, a more diffuse, indefinite kind; terror is usually employed for more extreme and sudden onsets of fear, fright for a momentary case, and horror for the deepest degree to which the emotion attains (C. Darwin, Expression of the Emotions, ed. London, 1892, ch. 12).

2. Physical concomitants. In its more pronounced form, fear has correlated with it a distinctive group of physical changes in the organism, which, together with their outward effects, form its "expression." These are: (1) changes in the circulation: the blood-vessels contract, with resulting pallor; the heart beats more rapidly, and more violently, as if against a greater resistance. (2) Changes in the respiration: the breathing becomes labored, heavy, and more rapid, with occasional deep inspirations, while in extreme cases the mouth is opened wide as if for easier breath. (3) In the glands also action takes place: the skin perspires freely (a 'cold sweat'); the mouth is dry because of the failure of the salivary glands; the voice is hoarse and the vocal cords descendent; the digestive processes are checked; extreme fear may produce nausea and sickness.

The muscles are variously affected: the skin trembles all over the body ('shaking', with fear) in an extremely tremulous as well as hoarse, and may fail to act ('the tongue cleaving to the roof of the mouth'); the eyes are opened widely ('staring'), the eyebrows arched, the forehead wrinkled, the lower jaw dropped; the arms are swung upwards, as if warding off an approaching enemy; the body, at first motionless and rigid, may become flaccid, the individual shrinking, crouching, perhaps falling upon the ground. In children, and in most primitive races, these phenomena are exaggerated; in civilization, they are modified by training and other causes, but some never fail to present themselves wherever fear is. Similar expressions are found in animals, and in man in the rhesus monkey, where they have been placed by people who trusted that the saint would intercede for the recovery of their sick animals.

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Timidity, again, is the general character or temperament from which fear is likely to spring.

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HERBERT SPENCER suggested that the nervous current follows the line of least resistance; these muscles which are most frequently used, and also those which are nearest the centre, and which are small and unattached to any resisting weight, will present the most permeable paths. Hence the facility with which the muscles of the face are played upon by fear, as by every other emotion (Essays, 2nd ser., 1863, pp. 105, 111). Mosso (p. 112) explains the influence of fear upon the capillary blood-vessels, their contraction and the resulting paleness of the skin, on similar principles. It is known that the centres of all such emotional expressions, including the paleness of the skin, the trembles of the heart, the trembling of the skin-muscles, etc., lie in the brain below the fore-brain (in the mesencephalum and myelencephalum). Jeffrey (Proc. Roy. Soc. 1873, 40) says: For frescoes and other works of art, see V. A. Smith, A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon, 1911, pp. 225, 406 ff., 415, 430, 435, 437, 441, 519 ff., 596.

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keep the centres supplied with fresh materials. The withdrawing of any of the blood vessels may be the direct cause of the erection of the hair, and, even when the latter does not occur, and when the terror is prolonged, the trophy is given, and even the case with grey or fall out afterwards. The circulation of the blood is dependent in its turn on a sufficient supply of oxygen. The breathing of air with oxygen, one may be a great fear is similar in its nature and its origin to the pasting after an exertion, or during and after death. There is a great emotional energy, and all the vital processes are set in action to counteract or make it good. The trembling of the body or the shrinking of the muscles may be, as it were, by-products of this general reflex tendency; they are not adaptive, and serve no end for the advantage of either species or individual.

So obviously is the expression of fear in ordinary cases un-adapted, an organism that Darwin after suggesting the explanation by ' relics' of useful habits,—no longer useful in present circumstances,—admits the inadequacy of his explanation. It has even been thought that the fear-reactions were determined by natural selection, not for the good of the terrified species the victim—but for that of the terrifying species—the beast of prey. This would, indeed, be a bizarre product of evolution. Mosso showed that they have simply no reference to evolution: the trembling of the body, for example, in fear, is similar to the trembling which occurs when lifting a heavy weight, or when exhausted by illness: the nervous excitement prevents us from co-ordinating the movements of the many muscles involved in every—even the simplest—action, as standing, walking, speaking, etc. A man who is afraid does not see better, however widely he opens his eyes; he does not hear better, for his ears shrivel his terror and therefore, presumably, his danger. Actions which are so injurious to the organism should have been discarded in the course of evolution. But the mind, once it is adapted, more hurtful to the individual, the greater the actual danger. The more we go back into the past, the more numerous are the cases, as well as the products of evolution, but symptoms of disease, pathological forms taken by normal conditions of life.

The principle of adaptation can be applied only when we are dealing with very mild forms of fear—little more than expectation. It has no place in the expression of severe attention reflexes—the wide-open eyes, the raised eyebrows, and the frown, which Darwin interpreted as a nascent crying, but Mosso showed to be part of the act of adapting the sight to a near object. Any mental effort tends to set in play the attention reflexes, so that at all higher mental processes tend to have as their expression: the same reactions as occur in the corresponding sensory processes.

3. In its closest form, fear is a perceptual emotion, felt on awareness of an object or recognition of a situation of some definite kind. In other words, the object in the fear-consciousness is collapsed stand-in, constitutive element, which are added to the immediate effect of the stimulus, either from memories of past experience or in some other way. Small and defenceless birds show fear of the hawk and other birds of prey, and of snakes and serpents; horses show fear of the wolf, its appearance, its howl, and even its odour; kittens show fear of dogs; dogs of tigers and lions; cattle of strange dogs, etc. The great cats are so brave that they live on the dragon-fly; the cockroach, according to Bell, of the larger spiders; the child has fear in insecure positions (fear of falling), fear of the dark, of wild animals, etc. It seems, then, as if there were definite classes of objects, corresponding to the most dangerous features in the natural life of every animal, with the perception of which fear is associated. Healthy dogs are said to avoid 'instinctively' a dog which has rabs; they will not attack it, nor do they retaliate when themselves bitten by it. The question arises as to how this is possible. A natural explanation refers the formation of the percept, and its association with the fear of the object. The child in such the individual is, either in memory of actual experience, as a dog 'learns' to reject food seasoned with mustard, or in some sort of inference from past experience, as a child learns to avoid eating something from a table which may feel insecure at any high level afterwards. But, as this explanation is obviously inadequate to account for fear in infants and in young animals, whether it is due to actual experience or to some other circumstance, it is necessary to bring in the experience of the injurious influence of the object. The explanation has been extended to include the ancestors of the individual. It is their experience and not his that conditions his special behaviour towards the object of fear. In the former case, simple and comparatively familiar forms of association account for the result; in the latter case, disturbances of the nature of the case are grey or fall out afterwards. The circulation of the blood is dependent in its turn on a sufficient supply of oxygen. The breathing of air with oxygen, one may be a great fear is similar in its nature and its origin to the pasting after an exertion, or during and after death. There is a great emotional energy, and all the vital processes are set in action to counteract or make it good. The trembling of the body or the shrinking of the muscles may be, as it were, by-products of this general reflex tendency; they are not adaptive, and serve no end for the advantage of either species or individual.

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3. In its closest form, fear is a perceptual emotion, felt on awareness of an object or recognition of a situation of some definite kind. In other words, the object in the fear-consciousness is collapsed stand-in, constitutive element, which are added to the immediate effect of the stimulus, either from memories of past experience or in some other way. Small and defenceless birds show fear of the hawk and other birds of prey, and of snakes and serpents; horses show fear of the wolf, its appearance, its howl, and even its odour; kittens show fear of dogs; dogs of tigers and lions; cattle of strange dogs, etc. The great cats are so brave that they live on the dragon-fly; the cockroach, according to Bell, of the larger spiders; the child has fear in insecure positions (fear of falling), fear of the dark, of wild animals, etc. It seems, then, as if there were definite classes of objects, corresponding to the most dangerous features in the natural life of every animal, with the perception of which fear is associated. Healthy dogs are said to avoid 'instinctively' a dog which has rabs; they will not attack it, nor do they retaliate when themselves bitten by it. The question arises as to how this is possible. A natural explanation refers the formation of the percept, and its association with the fear of the object. The child in such the individual is, either in memory of actual experience, as a dog 'learns' to reject food seasoned with mustard, or in some sort of inference from past experience, as a child learns to avoid eating something from a table which may feel insecure at any high level afterwards. But, as this explanation is obviously inadequate to account for fear in infants and in young animals, whether it is due to actual experience or to some other circumstance, it is necessary to bring in the experience of the injurious influence of the object. The explanation has been extended to include the ancestors of the individual. It is their experience and not his that conditions his special behaviour towards the object of fear. In the former case, simple and comparatively familiar forms of association account for the result; in the latter case, disturbances of the nature of the case are grey or fall out afterwards. The circulation of the blood is dependent in its turn on a sufficient supply of oxygen. The breathing of air with oxygen, one may be a great fear is similar in its nature and its origin to the pasting after an exertion, or during and after death. There is a great emotional energy, and all the vital processes are set in action to counteract or make it good. The trembling of the body or the shrinking of the muscles may be, as it were, by-products of this general reflex tendency; they are not adaptive, and serve no end for the advantage of either species or individual.

So obviously is the expression of fear in ordinary cases un-adapted, an organism that Darwin after suggesting the explanation by ' relics' of useful habits,—no longer useful in present circumstances,—admits the inadequacy of his explanation. It has even been thought that the fear-reactions were determined by natural selection, not for the good of the terrified species the victim—but for that of the terrifying species—the beast of prey. This would, indeed, be a bizarre product of evolution. Mosso showed that they have simply no reference to evolution: the trembling of the body, for example, in fear, is similar to the trembling which occurs when lifting a heavy weight, or when exhausted by illness: the nervous excitement prevents us from co-ordinating the movements of the many muscles involved in every—even the simplest—action, as standing, walking, speaking, etc. A man who is afraid does not see better, however widely he opens his eyes; he does not hear better, for his ears shrivel his terror and therefore, presumably, his danger. Actions which are so injurious to the organism should have been discarded in the course of evolution. But the mind, once it is adapted, more hurtful to the individual, the greater the actual danger. The more we go back into the past, the more numerous are the cases, as well as the products of evolution, but symptoms of disease, pathological forms taken by normal conditions of life.

The principle of adaptation can be applied only when we are dealing with very mild forms of fear—little more than expectation. It has no place in the expression of severe attention reflexes—the wide-open eyes, the raised eyebrows, and the frown, which Darwin interpreted as a nascent crying, but Mosso showed to be part of the act of adapting the sight to a near object. Any mental effort tends to set in play the attention reflexes, so that at all higher mental processes tend to have as their expression: the same reactions as occur in the corresponding sensory processes.
spinosus wasp which preyed upon them. But experiments show, whatever be the views with in-
sects, and higher and higher animals have no such
innate dread of particular objects. Thus there is
no congenital fear of man (Hudson, *Naturalist in 
La Plata*, London, 1892, p. 88 if.); birds crouch with
fear not merely at a hawk, but at any large
object flying over them; in Aberdeenshire, when
grouse are very wild, and are being shot over
dogs, a practice of keepers to fly a paper kite; this
has the effect of making the birds evince till the dog
is upon them. The cry of a hawk frightens, but so
does any harsh, shrill, or grating cry; blind
kittens show fear, hiss, and bristle at the smell of
them, but they do the same at any strong odour,
— such as ammonia (Lloyd Morgan, *Animal Be-

E. L. Thorndike describes experiments on the fears of chicks, corroborating Morgan's decision that "no well-defined specific
fears are present; that the fears of young chicks are of strange
moving objects in general, shock in general, strange sounds in
general." So specific reaction occurred, e.g., to the presence of
man or to the presence of a cat, unless the cat sprung upon
them, when they showed the same sort of terror as when a
basket or fountain was thrown among them. The general fear
of a novel object in motion is not present from the beginning,
but appears during the first month; this is true of the fear
of man. Among the interesting observations made is that of the
great individual differences in the degree of fear, both in the
eigenrassen, and in the process of acquiring definitions of
perception. The meek of a cat, for example, caused a great
shocking of ears or withdrawal in all others (Thorndike, *Animal Intelligence*, N.Y., 1911, p. 169). Thus,

fear, as Lloyd Morgan expresses it, "can be said to have the
same kind of consciousness to deal with, in accord-
ance with the results which are its data" (op. cit. p. 51).

However simple or however complex the fear-
consciousness may be, the reactions and, therefore,
probably the feelings themselves, are essentially
the same as those of the sensory experience—for
effort, the feeling and reaction on being clawed,
bitten, mothered, or otherwise injured (Schneider,
*Der menschliche Wille*, ch. 12). The differences
between actual pain and its reaction on the one
side, and the mental anticipation of pain in fear and its
reaction on the other, are differences only in the
extent of the muscles and organs affected, the
number of movements made, etc. In no case is

*will* concerned with the origin of the fear-reactions;
they are neither distinctly intentional, nor the
"traces," "relics," or "rudiments of ancestral" in a
well-defined sense. Experience may modify them, lead to a selection of their
objects, and to the control or even the exaggera-
tion of these movements, but it has no part in their
formation (cf. also Lloyd Morgan, 110).

In the child the first real expression of fear is
towards sudden, sharp, and unfamiliar sounds, also
to loud, voluminous sounds, and, in some cases,
even to musical sounds when first heard (J. Sully,
*Studies of Childhood*, London, 1866, p. 194). Occa-
sionally such fears do not show themselves in the
early months, until the child is a year old or more;
according to Sully, they are not to be explained
entirely by the disturbance to the nerves sensi-
tibility, but by a sort of " vague alarm at the unex-
ected and unknown": when the sounds have been
"traces," "relics," or "rudiments of ancestral" in a

way repeated, the fear disappears. The fear of
crashing, shown by all children of a few months
old, when being awkwardly carried, or later, when
first trying to walk, may be referred to the same
general cause, that situations are unfamiliar, there-
fore feel extremely uncertain. No doubt also the ex-
perience of actual falls is a contributory influence.
In the case of visual impressions, again, it is mainly
the new and strange—a new room, a strange person,
a child's first play with a familiar person, any new or
distorted form of a familiar object, a grinning,
a什么方向，the play of shadows. Feathers and fur, animals of all kinds when first seen, more
especially by animals that are dark, especially
being alone in the dark, are familiar occasions of

fear in nearly all children, although these feelings
are not developed until the child is several months
old. Many children are afraid of being alone even
by day. But in this, and in respect of every other
fear, children differ so enormously from each
other, so much depends on experience, and on the
suggestions of adults, that the idea of an hereditary
or atavistic element in child fear seems unnecessary
and even absurd. As in the case of animals, fear of
the novel, strange, startling, or disconcerting,
along with fear of what actually causes pain to the
child, gives a sufficient basis for experience to work
upon. Fears of the imagination, probably because of
the very vagueness of the imagery underlying
them, can bring up the nurse excites by her tales of "black man," "booby," ghost and
goat, ogre and dwarf, robbers and murderers in
the dark places, etc.—are of the most intense
descriptions. Children being hereditarily trans-
mitted, the above simple conditions seem sufficient
to account for the facts. The varieties observed in
children may be explained by an inherited ability in
some, which depends on experience, on the ac-
ceptation—"the same cause which makes women
more easily terrified than men, and the victim of
alcoholic or other form of nervous disease more
easily terrified than his fellow in a tense shock of
childhood, and especially in early youth, may permanen-
tly weaken the system, so that a slighter cause may produce fear or terror
than with the normal individual.

4. Theory of fear.—As is well known, these
views have led C. Lange 1 and William James 2 to
regard the feeling of fear as succeeding, not pre-
ceeding, the reactions; it is the conscious-
ness of these changes and movements as they are occur-
ing and after they have occurred—a consciousness
conditioned by sensory nerves leading from the
various muscles and joints of the body, from the
skin, and from the various internal organs to the
brain. In this "back-stroke" hypothesis, expression
precedes feeling or emotion; the reaction (the
"expression") is connected directly with the per-
cception of the object, or with the sensory elements
integrated" in the perception; further, feeling itself
cases to be a different kind of mental ele-
ment from sensation; in the last resort fear can be
analyzed, it is claimed, into the awareness of the
coldness and stiffness of the perspiration, the trem-
ing muscles, the ineffectual efforts, the dryness of
the mouth, the sinking of the stomach, the inability to see clearly, to attend

1 Uber Gesamtheitsempfindung, G. Engelmann, 1867.
or to think steadily, etc.; each of these phenomena has its reflex in consciousness, and these in their sum up the emotion of fear or fear. Thus, according to Lange (p. 40), fear has its characteristic colour from these three processes—the weakening of voluntary innervation (this by itself characterizes fear), dilatation of the blood-vessels (these two combined represent sorrow), and the spasm of the organic visceral muscles. Its diametrical opposite, from this point of view, is considered the common form of the voluntary innervation, dilatation of blood-vessels, but with inco-ordination of action added. In these various manifestations the primary are the vasomotor changes; the muscular weakness, etc., comes from the fact that the nervous system, like the skin and other organs, receives too little blood (p. 41), owing to the narrowing of the fine arteries. Fear, then, is simply the perception (or other consciousness) of certain changes in the person’s body (p. 51).

"Take away the bodily symptoms, let the pulse beat quietly, the eye be steadfast, the colour healthy, the movements rapid and certain, the speech strong, the thoughts clear—what is there left of fear?" (p. 52)

The chief evidence appealed to by both Lange and James is: (i.) the cases of fear and similar emotions existing without any adequate or conscious cause; these, however, the ordinary theory is quite competent to account for, as it is the case of (ii.) The admitted effect of such drugs as alcohol: fear can be removed by alcohol, and by its abuse fear in the most extreme form (as in dili
tium tremens, or in neurasthenic anxieties, etc.) may be produced without, in either case, the external situation offering any cause. This is because alcohol, at first and in moderate doses, excites the vasomotor apparatus, increases the frequency and strength of the heart-beat, dilates the capillary vessels, heightens the voluntary innervation, etc., while alcohol-poisoning has precisely the opposite effects. In the former case, speech and movement are easy, the subject feels warm and active, the thoughts flow freely; in the latter, speech, action, sensation, thought are all alike paralyzed: the resulting state in the one case is courage, in the other fear, and the emotions suggest objects, imaginary if no real ones can be fixed upon. The process is therefore (a) physical state, (b) emotion (its conscious reflex), (c) object, in that order of time, whereas, on the ordinary theory, the procession is from object (perception) to emotion, and from emotion to physical state (expression).

It does not belong to this article to discuss the general theory; there can be no question, however, (1) that in our own case, and in that of animals, the fear-reaction is instinctive, and attaches directly to the perception of its object; (2) that the emotion itself, of fear, is in us largely constituted by sensory and perceptual elements arising from our changed organic and muscular state; (3) there are also many associative ideas present, memories and imaginations of evil, from our own direct experience, from tradition, from analogy, etc.; but these factors alone do not account for the emotion; in itself it is (4) a mental attitude, depending in each case partly on the sensations and their feelings (pain), partly on the bodily disposition as a whole, health, fatigue, etc., partly on the make up the emotion of fear. From both these causes the lower liability to physical fear in ourselves as compared with more primitive peoples, or with our own ancestors of a very remote generation or of the Lower animals, teaches us what the modern fear has lost in intensity and in materiality it has gained in extensity, in persistence, in re- inforcement of torture. Worry is the most extreme, the common form of the two fundamental characters of intellectual and spiritual fear: one the side, the attention is held only by those sensations or percepts, those passing memo- ries, images, and thoughts which harmonize with or corroborate the emotion; the latter forms a morbid apperceptive system by which the whole outlook upon life, the colour and trend of the thoughts, is modified; on the other side, action is paralyzed, dangers, difficulties, evil consequences, uncertainties are constantly before the mind, so that the individual either does not act at all, or acts on any blind impulse that happens at a given moment to have some strength.

In diseases of the brain or of the general nervous system, whether organic or functional, the deficient energy with which the various nervous processes are carried out, the ineffective muscular action, the impaired digestion, other symptoms, the fear and anxiety, are the result of the weakened emotional vitality, of the lack of the of the emotional state, so that it is raised to the intensity and associative force of a dominant idea; in other cases such a real experience has occurred, perhaps in early childhood, but has been forgotten; yet it may be subconsciously revived by the emotion, and so draw to itself the control of thought and of action, without rising into distinct conscious- ness, except after the analysis of the dream. Superstitious fears are largely of this subcon scious type; the intensity of the fear is quite dispropor tionate to the ideas actually in consciousness. To see the baneful influence of such fears in full force, one must go to the African or Australian native. Thus, R. H. Nassau (Feticism in West Africa, London, 1894) represents fetishism as a monstrous outgrowth from natural beliefs; it is crushing the natives out of existence even more effectively than the white man’s competition, destroying independence of mind and freedom of thought among individuals; trust, even in one’s nearest relatives, has ceased to exist—there is universal fear and inse- curity; as every act has to be carefully deliberated, and all possible measures taken against evil influ ences, the result is an appalling waste of human effort, wasted time, and energy, with no hope of progress or even of escape. On the other hand, fear, especially fear of the inexplicable, of the unknown, has formed an almost universal stimulant to religious custom and belief. In the individual, especially in the race, the coming of religion—conversion—is, in a very large number of cases, as Starbuck’s analysis shows, the sequel of a longer or shorter period of intense anxiety and fear (Psy- story of Religion, London, 1894, ch. 4).
FEARlessness—FEAsting

LITERATURE.—The works of Darwin, Spencer, Moses, Sully, William James, and C. Lange, as referred to in the text; also W. McDougall, Social Psychology, London, 1911.

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FEARlessness.—In the highest forms of courage (q.v.), fear (q.v.) still persists as an element; there is at least the consciousness and, therefore, the anticipation of danger. Many of the bravest soldiers have gone with trembling limbs and palpitating heart through their earlier engagements, and many a moral or religious act of devotedness or self-sacrifice has been carried out in ‘fear and trembling,’ yet is all the more highly valued on that account. Fearlessness, on the other hand, is insensibility to danger, where the natural or normal individual would be keenly conscious of it, as in a situation involving almost certain death, or loss of fortune or social reputation. It may arise from inexperience or ignorance, as in the case of an infant’s attitude to fire, or that of the Antarctic penguins to man when first approached by him; or, again, from the absorption of a strong, instinctive impulse, as when a mother-animal turns to defend her wounded young, regardless of her own danger, or as that of the sheep-dogs of S. America, described by Darwin in common, showed of extreme timidity when away from their flock, but turned with the utmost ferocity and fearlessness when back among the sheep with which they had been brought up, and which they probably regarded as their ‘pack.’ In such cases, the consciousness of numbers, as in the ‘crow,’ gives a suggestion of strength to the individual, and inhibits in his mind the thought of difficulty or danger, of possible evil consequences; a naturally timid man may under such conditions become absolutely fearless.

In such cases, fearlessness springs from a temporary absorption or concentration of the attention on one group of facts, with correlative anæsthesia for others, especially those inconsistent with the former. The intensity of absorption in its turn is explained by some primary instinct, social or individual, which is stimulated. Such a state may also be natural and permanent, as in those fortunate beings who, with a capacity for finding happiness in almost any conditions, never experience evil in their own lives, and fail to appreciate the extent of its presence in those of others: W. James gives Walt Whitman as an instance (op. cit. infra, p. 84). So in all great enthusiasts—moral, religious, and political—there are temporary reversals, drawbacks, consequences, do not enter the mind at all; or, rather, they are thought of only as one notes and avoids obstacles in walking across a room, as conditions requiring some adjustment of our action, but not in the slightest degree affecting its successful issue. Such an attitude tends of itself to compel success: confidence is increased; energy, both physical and mental, is economized; the highest possible coordination between thought and action is obtained, without any of the irresolution, uncertainty, weakness, which fear connotes. Civilization has not removed the bodily weakness and mental incapacity of animal fear, with which man has enormously extended the number of fear-objects, just as it has widened the conception of the self, to include the family, the nation, and the race. In its modern form of ‘worry,’ as in older animal forms, fear is destructive to the individual, paralyzes activity, and debases the quality of thought.

A religion which gives the sense of an Infinite Power behind the finite individual, and of infinite goodness and benevolence to all fear, to produce fearlessness, so far as the religion is really believed. Christian Science (q.v.) and other ‘mind-care’ philosophies make this their conscious aim—

to produce in the individual, whether by persuasion or by suggestion, a sense of perfect security and trust. All strain, all effort, deaths by exposure, worry, mental or to some extent, even physical fatigue, fall away, when the thought of self has been banished. The result that is claimed is a great increase not only in the happiness, but also in the efficiency, freedom, and confidence of the individual (see the chapters on ‘The Religion of Healthy-Mindedness,’ in W. James, Varieties of Religious Experience, London, 1902, p. 78 ff.; the characteristics of Saintliness, ib. p. 372 ff.; and the striking instance of George Müller, ib. p. 465 ff.).

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FEASTing.—Introductory.—The custom of feasting together is a direct development of the meal partaken in common. The allaying of the pangs of hunger by food taken at more or less regular intervals has had for man very important and unexpected results. Perhaps as a result of food being prepared by the earliest mother-animal for the use of central spirits or, ultimately, of gods—the gods came to be recognized at the common meal by being presented with some of the food. Eating thus assumed a religious aspect. But, by the very fact that the meal was partaken of in common itself a bond of union between the eaters; and, since it was shared with gods, it thus obtained a sacramental character. Hence there was no more usual way of admitting a spirit to kinship than by permitting him to share the common meal. Again, since the partaking of food gave rise to pleasurable sensations, man’s social instincts suggested the sharing of these sensations, and only the abundance of food or some luxurious form of food was available. In all these ways the common meal easily passes over into the feast, in which there is a religious, a social, and a sensuous aspect, as far as savage and barbaric life is concerned, and frequently at higher levels also. In savage and barbaric life, feasting occupies a considerable place and is indulged in upon every possible occasion. The mere fact that food is abundant frequently leads to a feast in which large quantities are consumed or wasted, with the usual savage lack of forethought. The mere desire for good fellowship and for jollification may lead to a feast at which there are guests from far and near.

Such gatherings are found in the Nicobar Islands, when invitations having been duly sent out, the guests arrive bringing contributions, in the feast of ports, wine, champagne, toddy, etc. (Solomon, JAI xxvii. [1902] 201 ff.). Among the Eskimos there are festal occasions in the tribal or in the family house, when the performers and all present indulge freely in fish and berries (Bancroft, VI. 67). Among the Tasmanians there are frequent drinking feasts lasting for many days, whenever liquor is plentiful (ib. 1. 725).

In civilized society the same social instinct leads to frequent gatherings, private or public, at which the guests eat and drink and enjoy each other’s company. While the motive for these on the part of the giver of the feast may be mere display, none the less the love of fellowship is there, and the pleasurable sensations aroused also stimulate that fellowship. In this article we shall consider feasting as it occurs at different periods: birth and naming, wedding, initiation, marriage, funerals; in connexion with sacrifice; and at various seasonal festivals, including harvest.

1 Nature’s Voyage, ch. 5 (ed. 1904, p. 149).

2 Vol. V. p. 51.
1. Feasts in connexion with birth.—Children being generally regarded as a valuable asset among savages and barbaric peoples, rejoicings usually take place either before or soon after birth, often in connexion with the ceremony of naming.

Thus among the Southern Massim a feast is given when it is certain that the wife is pregnant (Seligm. Ml, ed. New Guinea, Cambridge, 1910, p. 704). Among both Hindus and housed of the Fuegians the feast takes place during the 8th and 9th, or the 7th month of pregnancy (Rose, JAI xxxiv. [1905] 277, 279). In E. Africa, when a young wife is pregnant for the first time, a great feast is held in which only women who have borne children take part (Macdonald, Afri- cana, 1882, i. 128 f.). Among the Southern Massim the untitle! cord of a first-born child is placed in the shroud of one of the leaves growing near the base of a banana. When he bears fruit, the first of a series of feasts termed sypyn is given to the child's maternal uncles, and the produce of the tree forms a part of the feast. Four or five feasts are given at an interval of a month and a half (Seligm., ed. New Guinea, 1847). At Uvea a feast is held soon after the birth of a child, in connexion with a ceremonial iustration (Ploss, Der Kind!, Leipzig, 1884, i. 258). Among the Baganda, at the name-giving ceremony, a portion of the feast is made over to the relatives of the name-giver (Roscoe, The Buganda, 1911, p. 62). The birth of twins was celebrated with much feasting, as this was regarded as a very lucky event, dancing and promiscuous intercourse being part of the proceed- ings (ib. pp. 68-72). At the baptism of the child among the Muhammadan Swahili the ceremony is ended with a feast (ZE xxxi. [1899] 67). Among the Mayas a birth was celebrated with special rejoicings, and feasts were held when the umbilical cord was cut (Bancroft, NR ii. 679). Similarly the Nahuas held a feast a few days after birth, while during the baptism of the child the festivities lasted 20 days, and open house was kept by the parents (ib. 270, 276). American Indian tribes usually celebrate name-giving with festivities. Thus the Pottawatomies make a great feast, inviting numerous guests by sending a leaf of tobacco or a small ring (de Smet, Voyages, Brussels, 1573, p. 395). On the occasion of the birth of a child among the Puna Musalmans, friends are invited to feast on the goat offered as a sacrifice, the parents, however, always invite their own relatives (Campbell, Notes on the Spiritual Basis of Belief and Custom, Bombay, 1885, p. 410). Among the Chinese, when the ceremonial of shaving the child's hair takes place at the end of the 1st month, a feast is held to which neighbours and relatives are invited (see ERE ii. 649). At the amphidromia celebrated by the Greeks on the 5th day after birth, banquets were held for the assembled friends and relatives (Pliny, in Ath. 370 D), and on the tenth day, at the name-giving ceremony, festival banquets were also held (Aristoph. Birds, 494, 922 f.; Eurip. Elect. 1192, fr. 2). In Burma, a fortnight after birth, a feast was given by the relatives of the child and a feast is prepared for all the friends and relatives (Monier-Williams, Buddh. Journ., London, 1889, p. 353). Among the Tibetan Buddhists the name-giving ceremony con- cludes with a feast (Köppen, Rel. des Buddh., Berlin, 1857-59, i. 320). Muhammadans celebrate a birth with great feastings and rejoicings, the father entertaining his friends, usually on the seventh day or on several successive days after a birth (Lane, Arabic Society, 1893, p. 187, Modern Egyptians, 1846, iii. 142 f.). In modern times and in Christian countries the festival gathering of relatives and family friends at a baptism is an asset, and contnues these feasts of ethical races.

2. Initiation feasts.—Initiation being an import-
part of the elaborate ceremonial of marriage consists in the bridegroom's kin bringing many pigs to the bride's folk, who supply a large quantity of fish and fowl upon which the feast is made. With the Southern Massim the kin of the bride and bridegroom exchange presents of food, upon which they feast, the young couple, however, not partaking. This constitutes the bringing married (Seligmann, 271, 504). In Fiji the feast, provided by the bridegroom, was an indispensable part of the ceremony, and was followed by the bridegroom taking a bath (Bancroft, 202). In New Britain, three days after the bride was taken to the man's house, a feast called Wauvonin, 'giving to drink,' was held, the friends of the pair exchanging pigs and comfits. Three days later a more elaborate feast was held.

It consisted mainly of a large dish of tare and coco-nut milk, and of baskets of puddings, almond nuts, chestnuts, bananas, etc. These were arranged in a line, with bundles of food brought by separate individuals. The guests marched round these, and the chief broke a coco-nut over the heads of the pair. Food was then interchanged, the large dish of tare being kept for the second day (Brown, 115 ff.).

In Florida (Melanesia), after the bride has remarried to her first husband, in the house of her father-in-law, her parents bring presents of pigs and other food there, and a feast is made upon this. Neither bride nor bridegroom partakes, but after the feast is over, for now he is married (Dlodrinton, 238). Among the Yornbas, a marriage feast is held at the house of the bridegroom's parents, the bride's parents taking no part in it. There is much merrymaking, and the feast is preceded by dancing (Field, Peoples, 1894, p. 154). Among the Baganda, after the consummation of marriage, the bride visited her own people, who gave her presents of food. Next day she cooked a feast for her husband, who called together his friends to share in it, the first meal prepared for him by his wife (Roscose, 91). With various S. African tribes, marriage is the occasion of a great feast and dance for the friends, neighbours, and retainers. One head of cattle must be killed, or the marriage would be disputed. Beer and milk also form part of the feast (Macdonald, 2JAI xix. (1896) p. 271). Among the Stomatans (Lillooet) of British Columbia, when the bridegroom is conducted by the elders of the bride's family to sit by her, a feast follows at the house of her people. A few days later, the parents of the bridegroom visit to the house of the bridegroom, when another feast takes place (Tont, 2JAI xxxv. (1905) 131 ff.). With other American tribes, feasts and dances had a prominent place at marriages (Lancort, N.E. I. 350, 515, and passim). The Araunanos held a feast three days after the bride was taken home, to which relations of both the young people came (Lachalm, 2JAI xxxix. 359). In higher civilizations the marriage feast still plays an important part. With the Aztecs a banquet shared by all the relatives and friends, but in which the wedded pair took no part, concluded the ceremonies; and among the Mayas a great feast, with lavish quantities of food and wine, was an essential part of the proceedings (Lancort, ii. 238, 608). In ancient Babylon, the marriage day ended with a feast in which the families of bride and bridegroom and numerous guests participated (Maspero, Dawn of Civilization, 1901, p. 735). Feasting and merriment on a most extensive scale are a necessary part of all Hindu marriage ceremonies. Among the aboriginal tribes, e.g. the Gonds, the wedding feast is equally important, and is characterized by much drunkenness and licence (Monker-Williams, Rel. Thought and Life in India, 1883, p. 398 ff.; Hopkins, Rel. of Four Great Religions, 117 ff.). In modern Buddhism, the principal ceremony of marriage is a feast which is given by the bridegroom or the parents. To this all relatives, priests, and neighbours are invited.

There is no more obvious ceremony than the feast. Among Muhammadans in Egypt, the bridegroom's feast his friends, once or oftener, before the wedding. Feasts also take place on the night before the nuptials and on the wedding night; and, according to the character of the feast, it may be incumbent duty, the second day's a sunnah ordinance, and the third day's for ostentation and notoriety. Feasting also takes place on the seventh and fortieth days after marriage (Lane, Modern Egyptians, i. 208 ff., iii. 141 ff., Arab. Soc. 232 f.). Among Indian Muhammadans also the festivities precede and follow marriage (Hughes, DFJ, 315). Among the Greeks the wedding feast (thyiaos) took place after the procession to the bridegroom's house, and it formed one of the most important parts of the proceedings, as there was no civil or religious ceremony. Women as well as men took part in it, though the women sat at a separate table. The bride was then conducted to the nuptial chamber. Among the Romans, after the bride arrived at the bridegroom's house, he gave a feast to the guests, which sometimes, was the second or even a third, a most elaborate and prolonged character, affording an opportunity for display and for gadding. It is also customary to renew them at intervals after a death, or on the anniversary, or there may be a yearly feast, the tossoi (Greek Peop., II. xxii. 52 ff.). Among the Egyptians, also, it was a custom to renew them at times of special rejoicing (see ÈRE iv. 434 ff.; Seligmann, passim; Brown, 201; Roscoe, 120 ff.; Seligmann, The Vedas, Cambridge, 1911, p. 130).

Wenef (Ethics, I. 141) has shown that the reason sometimes alleged as the origin of these feasts—viz. the custom of giving food to all who attended the funeral as a compensation for their trouble in coming, this passing over into a duty and often becoming a means of ostentations display—does not really explain their origin. There is no doubt that the feasts originated out of a desire at once of profiting and of holding communion with the dead by means of the food which they were now supposed to share with the living. Hartland has argued that the feasts in which the mourner's dead is with the dead kinsman are a natural transformation of the communal meal upon the dead (LP. ii. 278). Although this is not unlikely, yet, where food was offered to the dead and shared by the living, the practice would originate and exist independently of the cannibal meal.

Among higher races the funeral repast is also found. In Egypt, during the long interval which often elapsed between the death of the king and the funeral, feasts were held in honour of the dead (Wilkinson, Manners and Customs, ed. 1878, iii. 432). In Babylon the monthly offerings to the dead formed also the material of a meal by which the living had communion with them (see ÈRE iv. 445). Among the Greeks a funeral repast (repediavros) took place in connexion with the rites of burial, those who took part in it regarding themselves as guests of the dead (Lucian, de lootis, 524; Artemidor. Enecn, v. 82; II. xxii, 52 ff.). The anniversary of a death was celebrated by a repast or feast (seyxeta, seyseveta) as well as in other ways. The Romans ate a funeral repast at the tomb, the allimentum, and a banquet in honour of the deceased was held at the house, the cena funeris. Memorial feasts were also celebrated during the Parentalia, the family festival of the cura cognati and cura series. The fourth day, the dies natalis, was considered an anniversary of a death, and at other times. In China the food placed before the dead man is eaten by the family, and after the funeral the food which has been placed by the mother of the dead or by the family is again cooked and eaten. The feast is known under the name of the funeral repast. Subsequently, funeral feasts are also held (de Groot, Rel. System of China, Leyden, 1892 ff., i. 118, and passim). The ancient Teutons celebrated great funeral banquets (exod, or 'heir beer') in which the noble and the chief were especially invited to participate, and at which the hero entered.
FEASTING

on his inheritance (de la Saussaye, Rel. of the Tentons, Boston, 1902, p. 301). Among the Burmese, great feasting goes on in the house for the benefit of the corn spirits and other divinities (cf. Waddell, Buddh. of Tibet, 369). In Tibet the relatives and friends are entertained during the funeral rites with much food, beer, and ten—a species of ‘wake’ at which the dead man’s relatives joined in a feast. A year after the original feast is held (Waddell, Bud-
dhism of Tibet, 1895, pp. 491–98). In modern Europe, memorial feasts for the dead occur sporadically among the folk (Yorks, P. 35 ii. 37), and a meal is often partaken of by the relatives after a funeral, but, this, however, having now little ritual significance. See also Ancestor-worship, Communion with the Dead, Death and Disposal of the Dead.

5. Sacrificial feasts.—Whatever be the origin of sacrifice, the custom of the worshippers feasting upon part of the offering is wide-spread. The feast has a religious aspect, whether we regard it as an actual eating of slain divine victims, or as eating, through the medium of the priest, a part of the offering which has acquired a sacramental character. The Vedas of Ceylon make offerings of food to the spirits of the recently dead, and then eat the offerings as an act of communion with the dead. (cf. Bigsby, 1891, i. Florida) As a public sacrifice some of the food was presented to the tindalo, and the remainder was eaten by the sacrificer and the assistants (Cordrington, 131). In Fiji the gods were supposed to eat the ‘soul’ of the offering, the wor-
shippers consuming the substance of it (Williams, Fij., 1858, i. 231). In Samoa, men partook of the offerings to Tanaalga, god of the heavens, women and children being excluded. Other sacrificial feasts in the cult of Taismalie, for which all kinds of food were prepared, only the family of the priest partook (Turner, Samoas, 1884, pp. 53, 57). Among the Tais, after a human sacrifice to the river-gods, a bullock was killed and divided among the inhab-
habitants of the village (Ellis, Tese-speaking Peoples, 1887, p. 66). Among the Baganda the owner of a fetish often sacrificed a fowl to it, dropping the blood upon it. The bird was then cooked and eaten by him and his friends in presence of the fetish (Roscoe, 329). The Zulus feasted on the black cattle sacrificed to the sky-god when war was required. (Callaway, Rel. System of Amazons, 1884, p. 29). The Patans sacrifice a goat, fowl, and cakes to the Earth-goddess, the males and unmarried girls eating the flesh (Crooke, P.B., 1890, i. 32). The ancient Peruvians at the great festival of the solstice feasted on boiled grains which were then offered sacrifi-
cially. Much wine was also consumed, and the feast was closed with music and dancing (Prescott, Hist. of Conquest of Peru, 1890, p. 51). Herodotus describes a sacrifice of a pig to the moon in Egypt. Part of it was consumed by fire and the remainder eaten by the worshippers (ii. 45). At the festival of Ihsis an ox was sacrificed, and the parts which were not burned were eaten by all present (Wilkin-
on, iii. 376). Among the Zulus the sacrificial feast was well known. Indeed, every meal had a sacrificial aspect, and there, as elsewhere, feast and sacrifice were almost synonymous terms (cf. Athen. vi. 19). Part of the victim was burned on the altar, the remainder was cooked and formed part of the sacrificial feast, the ἔδεικνυα δᾶσ. These feasts were often occasions of great indulgence (Diog. Laert, vi. 7: Life of Dio.

1 Cf. the excellent remarks of Ames, Psych. of Rel. Experi-
tence, Boston, 1910, p. 122 f.

Among the Romans, when the extra of the victims had been burned on the altar, the remainder was eaten in a feast with bread and wine by the wor-
shippers, or by the priests and senarii (Wissowa, Rel. and Cultus der Römer, Munich, 1902, p. 335 f.). In the cult of Mithra the sacrificial repast had also a prominent place (Cumont, Myst. of Mithra, Chicago, 1913, p. 160).

The ancient Tentons in sacrificing animals offered only the exuvice to the gods, and a great feast on the flesh followed. On great occasions much cattle was slaughtered, and many people assembled to take part in the ceremony, bringing food with them, and feasting and drinking together, feasting the gods and each other. Here, also, the gods were conceived as sharing in the feast with the worshippers (Vigfusson-Powell, Corpus Poet. Boreale, Oxford, 1883, i. 404; Grimm, Tent. Myth. 1822–88, p. 46 f.; de la Saussaye, Rel. of the Tentons, 368 f.). In India in Vedic times, while the gods were supposed to eat the flesh of the slain cattle, many people were allowed to eat the offering, but, as in the cult of Sita ál, the gods having partaken of the essence of the food and so consecrated it (Waddell, 343). Sacrifices of animals are made on mountain passes, and those present dine off the flesh with much singing and dancing (Lander, In the Forbidden Land, 1898, ii. 38). In many of these instances the feast upon sacred food is pre-
pared for by propitiatory and other ritual customs, e.g. by fasting (q.v.).

6. Seasonal feasting.—Among the lower races, with whom, as with higher races, the regulation of the food supply is of the highest importance, the periods connected with sowing, ingathering, the opening of the hunting season, etc. are times of rejoicing, in which after hard work it is natural for them to partake in feasting cele-
brated with divine influences, feasting has a promi-
tant place. Man feasts with his gods. But, besides these, other seasonal occasions are also celebrated with feasting, e.g. the appearance of the new moon, the recurring festivals of diversities, etc. The Abipones celebrated the reappearance of the Pleiades with great rejoicings, ceremonial dancing, and feasting (Dobzhansky, The Abipones, 1922, lii. 224). The people of the southern Shantands group (Kiska Islands) held a festival called Vlote when the Pleiades appeared at the nutting season (Brown, 210). Among the ancient Mexicans, at the end of each cycle of the Pleiades (i.e. the four points across the zenith—the sign of the endurance of the world for another period of 52 years)—was the occa-
sion of great rejoicing, eating, and drinking (Bancker, NZ li. 394 f.). Among the Southern Massas in a great feast was held during the south-
east monsoon. For this enormous quantities of food were prepared and distributed among all present (Seligm. 534). In Mysore the appear-
ance of the new moon was the signal for a great feast in honour of deceased parents (TES, new ser. viii. 1895) 96). The Yorubas also feast when the new moon appears (Ellis, 82). The Baganda
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celebrate a feast lasting 7 days, at each new moon, in honour of the python god, the people feasting and day by day and night (Roscoe, 322). Similarly many American Indian tribes held a feast with sacrifices at the beginning of the hunting season, at which all the victims must be eaten (Tanner, Narrative of Captivity, New York, 1830, pp. 195, 257; Scholoof, Indian Tribes, Philadelphia, 1833-6, iii. 61). But most general is the feast that at such firstfruits are either offered to spirits or divinities, or solemnly eaten by priest, chief, or people. Until this is done no one may eat of them, but then follows much feasting and merriment. A few examples of this will suffice. The tribes of the Niger celebrate the yam harvest by a feast to which every one contributes a fowl (Parkinson, JAI xxxvi. (1906) 319). The Yoruba at the yam harvest celebrate a festival in honour of the god of agriculture. All partake of the new yams, and quantities of vegetable foods are cooked and set out for general use (Ellis, 78). In Fiji great feasts take place at the time of the presentation of the firstfruits of the yams to the ancestral spirits (Fison, JAI xiv. (1884-85) 27). Among the Jakan of the Malay Peninsula there is an annual feast at harvest when, besides dancing and singing, much eating and drinking take place (Petrie, 1898, p. 160). The Dayakys hold a festival when the pudding is ripe. They place the firstfruits on an altar, dance and feast for two days, and then get in their crops (St. John, Forests of the Far East, 1863, i. 191, and S. B. Scott, 'Harvest Festivals of the Land Dayakys', JAOS xxix. (1908) 236-290). In Celebes at the time of the new rice, fowls and pigs are killed, and some of the flesh and rice and palm-wine is given to the gods. Then the people eat and drink together (Graafland, Die Minahassa, Rotterdam, 1889, i. 165). Turning to American Indian tribes, we find that the Seminoles at the 'Green Corn Dance,' having prepared themselves by fasting, ate sacramentally of the new corn, and then enjoyed a great feast (MacCauley, & BBEW (1887) 522 f.). The Natchez at their harvest festival, which was solemnly observed with fasting and offering of the first sheaves of the maize, concluded their rites with a great feast (Chateaubriand, Voyage en Amérique, Paris, 1860, p. 136). In India the Hos held a Saturnalia when the granaries are full, sacrificial oxen were slain, the dead were commemorated, and feasting and drinking follow (Dalton, Deos, Ethnol., Calcutta, 1872, p. 196 f.). The hill tribes near Rajmahal held a thanksgiving festival, which was solemnly observed by eaten and sacrifice made. The ceremony concludes with drinking and festivity for several days (Shaw, Asiatic Res. iv. (1765) 56 f.). Similarly, the Japanese held a festival of firstfruits of the rice, followed by feasting in holiday dress, songs, and dances (Aston, Skinto, 1905, p. 277).

Among the lower races, festivals of the gods are sporadically found, of which one great incident in feasting. The Elema tribes of the Papuan Gulf held tribal feasts for eating, drinking, and merrymaking, associating with these one or more tribal gods (Holmes, JIAI xxxix. 427). In Samoa, annual feasts were held in honour of the gods (Brown, 229). The Yoruba held such annual festivals, e.g. one in honour of Oro lasting for 3 months, at which the men feasted on dogs and fowls (Ellis, 111). At one held in honour of the snake, and another in honour of the sun, both of a locustian and banchuanian character (Hopkins, 227 f.). Many such annual festivals were held in Mexico, all of them being occasions for great feasting, and drink were consumed, and much licence occurred (Bancroft, li. 341, 347, 390, and passim).

In the higher religions the many recurrent festivals of divinities are usually the occasion of feasting. Men honour the gods; and, feeling themselves on good terms with them, they rejoice before them—the rejoicing being both testified to and stimulated by a large amount of food and drink. See artt. on FESTIVALS AND FASTS.

Thus in most religions, from the lowest upwards, festival occasions are signalized by the consumption of food and drink, and the feasting at firstfruits are either offered to spirits or divinities, or solemnly eaten by priest, chief, or people. Until this is done no one may eat of them, but then follows much feasting and merriment. A few examples of this will suffice. The tribes of the Niger celebrate the yam harvest by a feast to which every one contributes a fowl (Parkinson, JAI xxxvi. (1906) 319). The Yoruba at the yam harvest celebrate a festival in honour of the god of agriculture. All partake of the new yams, and quantities of vegetable foods are cooked and set out for general use (Ellis, 78). In Fiji great feasts take place at the time of the presentation of the firstfruits of the yams to the ancestral spirits (Fison, JAI xiv. (1884-85) 27). Among the Jakan of the Malay Peninsula there is an annual feast at harvest when, besides dancing and singing, much eating and drinking take place (Petrie, 1898, p. 160). The Dayakys hold a festival when the pudding is ripe. They place the firstfruits on an altar, dance and feast for two days, and then get in their crops (St. John, Forests of the Far East, 1863, i. 191, and S. B. Scott, 'Harvest Festivals of the Land Dayakys', JAOS xxix. (1908) 236-290). In Celebes at the time of the new rice, fowls and pigs are killed, and some of the flesh and rice and palm-wine is given to the gods. Then the people eat and drink together (Graafland, Die Minahassa, Rotterdam, 1889, i. 165). Turning to American Indian tribes, we find that the Seminoles at the 'Green Corn Dance,' having prepared themselves by fasting, ate sacramentally of the new corn, and then enjoyed a great feast (MacCauley, & BBEW (1887) 522 f.). The Natchez at their harvest festival, which was solemnly observed with fasting and offering of the first sheaves of the maize, concluded their rites with a great feast (Chateaubriand, Voyage en Amérique, Paris, 1860, p. 136). In India the Hos held a Saturnalia when the granaries are full, sacrificial oxen were slain, the dead were commemorated, and feasting and drinking follow (Dalton, Deos, Ethnol., Calcutta, 1872, p. 196 f.). The hill tribes near Rajmahal held a thanksgiving festival, which was solemnly observed by eaten and sacrifice made. The ceremony concludes with drinking and festivity for several days (Shaw, Asiatic Res. iv. (1765) 56 f.). Similarly, the Japanese held a festival of firstfruits of the rice, followed by feasting in holiday dress, songs, and dances (Aston, Skinto, 1905, p. 277).

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1. The great prominence given in the OT to the idea of religious joy is attested, not only by the stress frequently laid on it in the sacred texts, but also by the series of Hebrew words (םז, שז, מז, מז, מז, מז, מז, מז, מז) employed to express the various gradations of rejoicing. For it is clear that, where there is a full appreciation of the different degrees of any given sensation, the terms be

2. The few exceptions to this wholesome restraint, e.g. the habit of copious drinking at the Feast of Purim (see, e.g., Abraham, Jason and the Greeks in the Middle Ages, 1898, pp. 305, 320), do not, as a rule, involve more than venial shortcomings.

The Reformed Church in North America—Theological & Historical Library—William J. B. Kelso—FEASTING (Hebrew and Jewish).—Religious joy characteristic of Judaism.—The underlying higher motive for feasting among the ancient Hebrews and pious Jews of the Diaspora down to the present day is religious joy of one degree or another. The occasions of rejoicing may range from celebrations of universal import, such as the ingathering of the harvest, to more or less private family reunions, as at a wedding or the weaning of a child; but the motive of religious joy is to the pious Jew the golden thread that runs through all his seasons of cheer and gladness. It is possible for this high motive to rest on a lower motive, as for instance, the case at the making of the golden calf, when 'the people sat down to eat and drink, and rose up to play,' or perhaps 'to make merry' (Ex 32). But even so a religious element would remain, however eaten and sacrifice made. The ceremony concludes with drinking and festivity for several days (Shaw, Asiatic Res. iv. (1765) 56 f.). Similarly, the Japanese held a festival of firstfruits of the rice, followed by feasting in holiday dress, songs, and dances (Aston, Skinto, 1905, p. 277).

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a strong and fully realized sense of its presence. A mere glance at the rows of passages given in the HEBREW BIBLE shows how the words of the words named will be sufficient to impress the mind with the prevalence of the idea of religious joy in the Hebrew Canon, but it will be useful to refer here especially to such typical passages as the following:

"Ye shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days" (Lv 23:9; Feast of Tabernacles): 'Serve the Lord with rejoicing, come into his courts with dances (Ps 100:1): 'To keep the dedication with gladness, both with thanksgiving, and with singing, with cymbals, psaltery, and with harpe' (Neh 8:10).

In later times, it will be remembered, set itself to discourage all gloomy brooding on a shadowy hereafter in Sheol, and all the unmeaning and disquieting practices that were connected with such brooding, and placed before the people instead the ideal of a life of brightness, plenty, and holy rejoicing. Some special illustrations of the continuance of the same cherished idea among the Jews of later times will be found in § 2, and the reader will do well to consult the article 'Preced, in the HEBREW BIBLE (when a number of Talmudical references bearing on this topic will be found), besides the various articles in the JE to be referred to later. The marked development of the idea of the hereafter among the Jews of post-Biblical times, which had, indeed, a tendency to grow and to acquire a strong ascetic tendency in some members of the race, but the bulk of the nation and the majority of its leaders remained faithful to the old idea of a life of joy; and, as the later Jewish doctrine of the future life was—towards of a cheerful disposition, at any rate—centred in the thought of torment or of a shadowy Hades, but rather in a life of bliss for the good under the wing of Jehovah, they found no contradiction between the newly developed idea of the life to come (נין לארשי) and the ancient Divine command to rejoice in the present (גא יב). They, indeed, gave themselves earnestly to fasting and mourning on the days specially set aside for that purpose, but the dominant tendency of their mind remained one of hope, and of the readiness to rejoice which accompanies hope. It is even correct to say that one effect of the many sufferings and persecutions which the Jews had to undergo was to heighten the relish of religious joy on every possible occasion. The Ghetto is generally thought of only as a place of depression and gloom, a kind of mediaval Jewish purgatory, but it had its bright side as well. In their secluded homes, their synagogues, their convivial gatherings, their Sabbaths (when capacity for enjoyment increased by the bestowal of a חס כה, i.e., additional soul), and more particularly their festival rejoicings, they found a welcome refuge from the many ills that beset them in the world around. The inwardness of the people, the great love that they had for their nation, as well as their love of ease and good cheer, had a tendency to grow with the dangers, the continual, and the suspicions that fastened on them so readily from without.

2. Occasions of feasting.—A brief survey of the chief occasions of feasting, additional to those of festivals proper, may be fitly grouped under (a) special celebrations that were in vogue during the second Temple period and partly carried over into the pre-Exilic times; and (b) seasons of rejoicing: largly observed down to the present day, partly celebrated in continuation of customs prevalent in OT times, and partly dating from later times. The feastings that

1 As one of the best illustrations of the prominence given by the Jews to the idea of life's joy, even in seasons of highest seriousness, may be given the custom of wishing the minds of Jewish young men to thoughts of matrimony (see Bah. Ta'amith, 599; Bab. Bathra, 1119).

was customary at the reunion or parting of friends (e.g. Gn 29:6), at a time of sheep-shearing (I S 3:20, 3:15; 2 Chr 29:3), or at a festival following the bringing of the Ark (2 S 6:6, 1 Ch 15:29), when David 'danced before the Lord with all his might,' need not be included in the list chosen for special treatment.

(a) First to be noted under this head are the processions from the provinces connected with the conveyance and presentation of the firstfruits to the Temple priests at Jerusalem, in accordance with the ordinance contained in Dt 26:1-11 (v. 2). They shall rejoice in all the good,' etc.). This semi-festive religious observance no doubt goes back to very early times, and has its parallels in the customs of other nations (see HDB, art. 'Firstfruits').

The time during which the presentations could be made extended from the Feast of Weeks or Pentecost to the Hasmonean Feast of Dedication (in the month Kislev [December]) see Bikkurim, and cf. Philo, de Festo Copitani, and Jos. Ant. v. viii. 22).

A much greater degree of rejoicing characterized what is commonly known as the Water-feast, which was celebrated during the nights of the Feast of Tabernacles. According to St. John (v. 10) account of these additional festivities will be found), a person who has not been present at these celebrations 'has never seen joy.' The real character of the festivities is still a matter of dispute. Geiger (Lehrbuch dein. Talmud, Breslau, 1872, viii.) translates it by 'Fackel,' (torch') and others consider the torchlight procession to have been its principal feature. Herford and Venetianer (see Lit. at the end of the article) have respectively advocated a connection with celebrations in honour of Dionysus and with the Eleusinian Mysteries. The extraordinary effort of a chief like Simeon b. Gamaliel I. to amuse the people on these occasions by personally engaging in a grotesque dance with eight lighted torches in his hands (Bab. Sukkot, 53a) would seem to favour the idea that he had a particular reason for diverting the attention of the populace from the undesirable associations of such festivities. The purpose of giving a higher sanction to an originally pagan celebration may also be discerned in Midrash Rabba on Gn 29:9 (ch. Ixx. § 0), where the institution of this rite is made to signify the bestowal of the Holy Spirit (cf. Eph 5:18), and where also the well-known suggestion of a connexion with the 'rivers of living water' of Jn 7:39 is referred to.

Special mention must also be made of the thirty-five days ennumrated in Megillath Ta'amith (original text begun in the 1st cent. A.D. and completed in the 2nd), on none of which public fasting was allowed, whilst on the most important of them public mourning was also prohibited. The first of these days was the 5th of Nisan, on which certain Pharisaic statutes were carried in opposition to the Sadducees; and the last date was the 28th of Adar, when news of the close of the persecutions instituted by Hadrian arrived. There is a distinct religious flavour about these half-festive occasions and the entire tone of Megillath Ta'amith.

(b) The second part of this survey appropriately begin with the question of birthday celebrations among the Jews. There is no clear reference to such celebrations among the ancient Hebrews in the OT. The mention of the 'day of our king' in Hos 7:5 may quite naturally be taken to refer to the anniversary of the king's accession to the throne, and the other passages quoted in JE iii. 221 are still less decisive. The only clear reference to a birthday festivity in the OT is found in Gn 40:18. 

1 The occasion of the feasting referred to in Job 14:16 is not clear. As the seven days appear to have been consecutive, they could hardly have been birthdays.

2 On Job 14:2 see the preceding note.
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The birthday celebrations in the Herodian family (see Jos. Ant. xix. 7; Mt 14) were, no doubt, an imitation of Great Pyramids. One can say of Jewish feeling that it in mediaval times is that the birthday celebration of a private person among pagans lay under a minor kind of ban, its connexion with idolatrous worship not being considered pronounced enough to warrant the cessation of all business connexion with the pagan concerned for three days preceding the festivity, so that the ban lay only on the day itself (see Maimonides, Mishneh Torah (Cov. rep. 27, m. ch. ix.), in modern times, however, Jews very largely adopt the custom of birthday celebrations from their neighbours.

The circumcision feast, which was celebrated by banquetting in Talmudic times (see JE ii. 496), had, of course, a profoundly religious significance; but the attempt of the Rabbis to refer the institution of such feasting to Abraham (see JE, loc. cit.) rests on a basis such as it is no question of banqueting on the occasion of a circumcision in the OT.

The weaning of an infant, on the other hand, which apparently took place at the end of the 2nd or 3rd year of the child's life (see Gn 21, 6), is said to be a time of sacrifice in early times (see Gn 21, 6, weaning of Isaac; 1 S 2, 20, weaning of Samuel). The reason for the celebration was, no doubt, the entrance of the child on a more independent and more vigorous existence, but under the influence of Yahweh all such thoughts were permutated by a strain of genuine religious joy.

An occasion of festivity, the mere title of which suggests its religious character is that of bar-mitzvah ('son of commandment'), a term denoting a youth who has completed his thirteenth year, and thus enters on a life of religious responsibility. On the first Sabbath in his fourteenth year the youth is for the first time in his life called up to read a portion of the Torah, and sometimes also the prophetic section entitled the Hafstarah. A family feast, to which the teachers of the youth as well as friends are invited, and at which religious addresses are delivered by the bar-mitzvah himself and others, is the natural accompaniment of this institution. The oldest Rabbinical reference to the idea underlying the institution is found in Pirke Aboth, where it is declared liable to observe the commandment at the age of thirteen (מן שבעה), although the name bar-mitzvah itself appears to be of much later origin (see JE ii. 50). Any young man, according with the doctors of the Law, when only twelve years of age (Lk 2:40-41), has been brought into relation with the same idea. In Morocco a boy becomes, in fact, bar-mitzvah when he has passed the age of twelve years (JE, loc. cit.).

On the subject of festivities connected with betrothal (in the old Jewish sense of a ceremony of so binding a character that only divorce could dissolve it) and marriage (i.e. the home-taking of the bride), only one remark need here be made. Although the Jewish contract of marriage is a purely civil one, in the sense that the presence of a Rabbi and its ratification in a synagogue are unessential, yet the occasion is one of profoundly religious import. Marriage being a Divine ordinance, and the procreation of children a sacred duty, wedding festivities may in the nature of things also bear a deeply religious character.

A minor occasion of sacred holiday-making in old-fashioned Jewish circles, and more particularly among young students of the Talmud (hence called 'Scholars' Festival'), is Lag b'Omer, i.e. the thirty-third day of the Passover, when a slice of the firstfruits was brought as a 'heave-offering' (Lv 23:41). The exact reason for the festivity is lost in obscurity (for some Rabbinical guesses, see JE ix. 400); but some kind of union with the progress of agricultural operations appears to follow from its dating after the heave-offering at Passover time; for, as has already been intimated, religious joy has in the Jewish mode of thought generally been associated with such occasions from early times.

Worthy of mention are also the various local Purim feasts, celebrated in imitation of the Biblical Purim, or Feast of Esther, on anniversaries of delivery from great calamities (see JE, loc. cit.). The best-known of these is the Purim of Cairo, annually held in that city on the 28th of Adar, in commemoration of their escape from the dangers that threatened the Calernre Jews in 1524 at the hands of Ahmad Shaitan Pasha (see JQR viii. [1890-96] 274-288, 511 f.). The reading of a Megillah, written in close imitation of the Book of Esther, forms the central part of the religious observance. For a list of similar celebrations (including that of Frankfurt) in occasion as that of the Purim of Padua, which is held in commemoration of the extinguishing of a great fire in 1750, see JE, art. 'Purims.'

See also artt. FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hebrew) and (Jewish).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the original texts and the various works already named, the reader should consult J. Hochman, Jerusalem Tempel (London, 1880), P. L. Oppenheim, 'Purim and the Firstfruits'; II. 'The Water-Feast.', L. Herzfeld, Gesch. des Volkes Israel im Exil (Berlin, 1871. ii. 136; 'Die einlaufen. Mysterien im jers. Tempel,' in Brüll's Populärwissenschaftliche Bibliothek, 1887, pp. 121-125, 128-129, for theories on the Water-Feast. Among the editions of Megillah in Hebrew is that of Neubauer in Medieval Jewish Chronicles, i. (Amsterdam Grseco-Roman, Semitic Series, vol. 1, p. iv.), and a full account of the work is given in Hamburger, Reisenep. des Juedenraums i, Leipzig, 1866, Supplementband, p. 104-125. On other topics, see JE, cit. on 'Buonacori,' 'Hetzer,' et al.

G. MARGOLOUTH.

FEBRONIANISM.—The system of Church government defended by Honthem, auxiliary Bishop of Trier in the 18th cent. under the pseudonym 'Justinus Ferbonius.' It is the German form of Gallicanism with an Erastian colouring; it had a general currency at the time of the religious decay during the early 19th cent., and was not finally expelled from the Roman Catholic Church till the Vatican Council in 1870.

1. Life of Honthem.—Nicholas von Honthem was born of a distinguished family at Trier on 27th Jan. 1701. His father and most of his relatives were officials in the service of the Bishop-Electors. He began his studies at the Jesuit college at Trier, and continued them at the universities of Trier, Louvain, and Leyden. When he was 12 years old, he was tonsured and received a canon's stall at the collegiate church of St. Simeon in his native city. At Louvain he came under the influence of Van Exem. He took his degree in law in 1724, travelled in Belgium, Holland, Germany, and Italy, and was three years at the German College at Rome, was ordained priest at Trier in 1728, and taught Canon Law in the university from 1728 to 1738. From 1728 to 1747 he was 'Official' (agent) of the Elector at Coblenz, and Director of the Seminary there. In 1747, after having ever been absent from literary work, he retired to his monastery at Trier. As the Elector (Pfalzgraf zu) in 1747 appointed him auxiliary Bishop in place of the one who had just died. He was ordained at Mainz on 13th May 1749, with the title Bishop of Myrhopphus (hitherto an auxiliary bishopric) and exarch, and he became Inspector General and Vicar General in spiritualibus under the Electors Johann Philipp (von Valberg) and Clemens Wenzeslaus (von Schenken). The end of his life. The Electors lived at their castle on the Rhine, and were more princes than bishops, so that Honthem was practically left in peace, free to develop that talent and proficiency in learning and piety. On several occasions he succeeded in composing sermons, and in every instance was proved to be a zealous and pietistic bishop. No one disputes the correctness of his moral, thepolicy of the greater harm (see 'Abida tara, 1, 3, and Examenum, p. 19, 19, in W. A. L. Eisn's edition of the treatate (FS, vol. viii, no. 2), who, however, always defended the position of the Hebraists by instead of taking ויהי used to signify the day of the Census' apostolic conclusion.

The birthday celebration of a king, on the other hand, was only made a religious festival by way of distinction from the greater ban (see 'Aboda zara, 1, 3, and Examenum, p. 19, 19, in W. A. L. Eisn's edition of the treatate (FS, vol. viii, no. 2), who, however, always defended the position of the Hebraists by instead of taking ויהי used to signify the day of the Census' apostolic conclusion.
which arose from his book. He had a Schloss at Montquentin on the Rhine. He died there on 2nd Sept. 1739, and was buried in the crypt of the Church at Trier. In 1802, his body was removed to St. Geraudus in the Neustädte, where it now lies. He left a number of other original chirographies.

2. Writings and system.—Honthem was the author of a number of works. He is said to have written the lessons of the clergy of the Friar religious order (Opp. cit. i. xii.) and he doubts this, as they do not at all represent his ideas (Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, xiii. 83). He deserves well of German historians for his Historia Praevisionum et actionum Romanorum Pontificum libri quinque (Bibliotheeupublica, 1763) and Prodigiorum Historia Trevisana (2 vols., do. 1755). But the work to which he owes his fame is the Febronianus, published in 1763. It is said that the interference of the Papal Legate in 1742-1745 first gave him the idea of writing a work which should distinguish the political from the ecclesiastical power of the Pope. He chose the pseudonym 'Justinus Febronius' from the name of his niece, a nun at Juvin-gy, in religion Justina Febronias. The MS was taken by his friend von Knauf to a bookseller, Esslinger, at Frankfurt am Main, who promised the strictest secrecy as to the identity of the author, and even paid any fee for it. In order to keep the secret, an imaginary publisher and place were printed on the title-page. The work appeared as: Justini Febronii Modi (i.e. in- confidentially) de Ecclesia et personis pontificiis Romani Pontificis liberi singularis ad omnium dissidentes in religione Christiana compositionis; Bullioni apud Guliliemum Evaridi, 1763. The main idea of the work is that the whole power of the Pope should be reduced and that of the bishops increased; the Christian princes should see to this. There is nothing new in it. The ideas are those of du Pin, Richer, Van Espen, and the Gallican school. It puts these clearly, forcibly, and in a moderate compass. The author declares that, so far from opposing the Papacy, he wishes only to strengthen it by fixing its just limits. Thus he hopes to reconcile Protestants and bring them back to union with the Pope. He dedicates his work to the Pope Clement XIII. (1758-1760), 'surnom Pontifici, primo in terris Christi viceari, Christianis principes, et principiis, et doctrinae.' The Pope is the guardian of the Canons for the whole Church. He can make laws 'in the name of the universal Church,' and has a principalis, not of jurisdiction but of order and consociatio. It is entitled 'De incrementis iurium Primiatus Romanorum, et incrementis novitatis et insaniae, tum sunt.' Many Papal rights have been acquired by devotion; there are no part of the regimina ordinaria. The False Decrees totally modified and exterminated the government of the Church. The Roman Curia must be distinguished from the see. Ch. iv. ('De canonicis officiis ministri ecclesiae vocatori') shows how these canons should be reconciled to the Pope. Questions of faith are not reserved; any bishop may condemn heresies. Local synods may reverse the decisions of the Sacred Congregation of the Roman Curia. The confirmation and deposition of bishops, erection of new sees, and so on, are reserved to the Pope. Cardinal Power has been reunited against the monarchical claims of the Church. Ch. v. discusses the right of making laws for the universal Church and the question of appeals to the Council deobliged. The C. X. 2257 does not apply to the successor of Peter. Papal laws are not binding till they are promul- gated; papal bullae and various circulares in 1802 are to be treated as the royal law. Ch. vi. ('De Concordiis generalibus') declares that no Divine or ecclesiastical law re- serves any right to the Pope; 1833, the first right was convened by the Emperor. A General Council is above the Pope. He may not re-examine its decrees, but many Councils have re-examined decrees of the Pope. It is lawful and often expedient to appeal from the Pope's decision to a future General Council. A General Council shall be summoned only, not for the whole Church, but for the provinces or dioceses of England, Germany, and France. th. 2251. The immunities of regulars from episcopal jurisdiction are a grave abuse, a 'hard and undeserved wound' to the rights of the bishops. Ch. vii. ('De sacris restaurandis et caussa') is about the False Decrees. These destroyed the freedom of the provincial Churches, and are the source of all other dangers. The immediate impediment to the reunion of Christendom. Ch. ix. declares that Roman Catholics must carefully watch every step of the Roman Curia which may be hurtful to right law. The best remedy would be to summon without delay a Council of Cardinals and princes and a common constitution by which they would be the best way of securing this. Nor need any one fear the censure of the Pope; there is no danger of a schism. The princes should arouse popular feeling against the False Decrees. The end of the Ecclesiae is to teach the Church the whole purpose of the pope. "It is the interest of the Church certainly to maintain the primacy, but to keep it within proper bounds." An obvious criticism of this famous work is that, like many reformers, its author is carried by his principles too far to have any chance of being heard by authority, perhaps further than he himself foresaw. Certainly it was not difficult for his opponents to quote his book, which is reprinted in almost every country in Europe.

3. The controversy.—The book at once excited enormous interest throughout Europe. The first edition was called for in 1755 and translations appeared immediately in German, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese. The effect of Honthem's principles was soon seen. In 1768, Venice declared that the bishops have jurisdiction over all regulars throughout its territory; the Neapolitan Government abolished the rules of the Roman Cencellaria in that kingdom; Maria Teresa allowed similar laws for the Duchy of Milan. The Bishop of Cambrai, who had forbidden the book in his diocese, was forced by Government to withdraw his order. Especially throughout Germany was the effect of the Febronius long felt, in spite of its repeated condemnation by the Pope and German bishops. The complaints against the Curia made by the legates of the three episcopal Electors at Coblenz on 13th Dec. 1709, the 'Emser Punktat' in 1786, and meeh of Joseph II. and Pius v. 1773, were elaborated. The liberal movement in France was considered by H. It in Italy the Synod of Pistoia (1756), and Leopold of Tuscany (1755-1790) follow the same principles: so that most of the later so-called Gallican movement throughout Europe found the Febronius a guide, or an expression of its principles.

Meanwhile the book was condemned at Rome and attacked by a great number of opponents. As soon as it appeared, it was denounced by the Nunno (Cardinal Borromeo) at Vienna; on 27th Feb. 1764 it was put on the Index by Clement XIII., who on 21st May wrote an encyclical to the German bishops telling them to suppress the book in their dioceses (these are reprinted in 'Lettres de vauchy'. Romanus Pontifex, iii. 234-240. Nine obeyed, including Clemens Wenzenslaus of Trier; sixteen took no step either way (letters of German bishops condemning the book are reprinted in 'Lettres de vauchy'. Febronius a guide, or an expression of its principles. The book was being read with approval by the princes at court; he ordered it to be destroyed wherever found (ib. 238). Clemens Wenzenslaus still did not know, or affected not to know, that the bishop of Vienna had heard that the book was condemned under the unknown name of Justins Febronius' (ib. 241). Among the many writers who entered the lists against Febronius, the most noticeable are F. A. Zaccaria, S.J. (Anti-Febronius . . . una apologetica febroniana fuerint, Rome 1758, Papae, 1770, and Anti-Feronius in crinitudis, do. 1774).
FEELING

B. P. Larrillo (de Potratio ecclésiasticum Summorum Pontificum, Verona, 1769), and the archaeologist T. M. Mannelli (Eutis- tomerium, 3 vols., Rome, 1776-1778). Hontheim answered his critics in four more volumes under the title "Scrip-turae et Constitutiones," which appeared in 1778, 1779, 1780, 1781; in 1777 he published "Febronius abbreviatus."

At first the secret of the authorship was well kept. But in 1764 it began to leak out, apparently through Hontheim's friend Giampi. Pius VI (1775-1799) insisted on a retractation, and Clemens Wenzeslaus in 1778 began to urge Hontheim to withdraw. Apparently he threatened, in case of a refusal, to dismiss not only Hontheim himself, but all his friends as well, from his service. On 14th June 1778, Hontheim sent an incomplete retracta-
tion to the Elector, although he still defended 16 propositions which the Elector's theologians had declared heretical. Neither the Elector nor the Pope was satisfied with this, and a formula of entire retractation was presented for Hontheim's signature. After much discussion he signed it, with one modification, the erasing of the sentence: "Wherefore rightly the government of the Church is called monarchical by Catholic doctors." The Nuncio accepted this. On 2nd Jan. 1779, Pius VI. published a Brief an-nouncing the retractation. Hontheim having received the public an-nouncement (though it always follows, and he had received no guarantee to the contrary), and in letters to his friends began to complain of the way he had been treated. So the idea spread that he had not really meant to retract at all. On 7th April 1780, he published in the Coblenzer Intelli-genzblatt a statement that he had retracted freely and was about to publish a defence of his retracta-
tion. This appeared at Frankfurt in 1781 under the title: 
Justini Febroni-Jeti Commentarius in svnam ret rac tationem Pio VII. Pont. Max. Kol. nov. an. 1778 submissam. In this work he so explained his action that it was plain that he still held the ideas condemned. So the Roman Curia declared itself not satisfied, and the dispute began again. From now to the end of his life Hontheim showed a curious vacillation. In 1781 he wrote to the Hamburger Zeitung:

"The world has read, tested, and approved the statements of my book. My retractation will no more persuade thoughtful men to reject the statements than will so many refutations written by pseudo-theologians, monks, and flatterers of the Pope."

On the other hand, in 1780 he wrote against the "Emser Punktat," which only echoed the ideas of the Febronius. Towards the end of his life he seems inconsistent and perhaps wilfully ambiguous. He was not then the liberal, zealous, and sincere person in union with the Church. The effect of the Fe-
bronius lasted intermittently in Germany into the 19th century. J. V. Eybel took up his ideas to fortify the policy of Joseph II. in 'De ist der Kurfürsten Hof? Vienna, 1782.' The final blow to Febronianism was given by the Vatican Council in 1870.

LITERATURE.—Krafft, "Hist. de la vie de J. J. de Hontheim;" in Otto Mejer, Febronius, Freiberg, 1868; F. X. Kraus, "Hon-

FEELING.—1. Definition and scope.—The equivalent term 'feeling' is now the accepted designation of states of consciousness viewed as agreeable or disagreeable. We have sensations, and they are pleasant or unpleasant; we have ideas, and their presence in the mind creates pleasure or pain; we carry on activities, and along with them goes a glow of delight or a mental disturbance or aversion. The experiences through which we pass create melody or discord, and we are aware of it. A feeling is an expression of its subjective aspect from its emotional, volitional, or volitional companion, as we do whatever it pre-its praise or blame, and the same is true of feeling. The characteristic marks, then, of the feelungs are these two: pleasure and pain (in a somewhat broader and more technical sense than popular use attaches to the words), and pure subjective, as being simply states of the self, and wanting the objective reference implied in knowing and in willing. Among the feelings, we generally mark off the emotions (affections, passions, sentiments) as of the most extensive and the most important class.

It was long customary to regard the distinction of intellect and will—the contemplative and the active powers—as exhaustive. Feeling being regarded as merged in impulse, desire, and volition, and the emotions as complex products in which cognition and appetite blend; and to this view some still adhere. But, whether we consider the dual or the triad, the subject of feeling is more exact, it must be admitted that feeling is so unique a fact, and that the feelings are so impressive, bulk so large in consciousness, and are so important to them, that it is imperative to give the exposition of feeling a place of co-ordinate rank with that of knowing and of willing. In days past, when the struggle of life was more arduous than it is now, and when men had to gather all their energies for a swift and vigorous reaction on circumstances, feeling was readily lost in impulse and volition, and men had little inclination to view it in abstraction from activity, or to give it an independent value. It is otherwise now, as, among other symptoms, the modern novel proclaims; although even now, in circles where life is hard and stern, feeling is apt to be viewed as an intruder.

The importance of feeling may be realized by a moment's consideration of the consequences of its withdrawal from consciousness. Were we incapable of pleasure and pain, of joy and sorrow, of nothing good in our eyes and nothing evil, we should be as stones, nothing could have any value for us, no event any interest, and life would be bereft of all significance. We familiarly speak of an apathetic man as dead. It is only because we are capable of feeling that we are interested in ourselves, or interested in each other, or have any questions to put about life and the universe, or have any reason for desiring any one event to come or dis-
feelings that for base—sensuous, or dissonant-feelings, e.g. the pleasureable feelings arising from the taste of food, from the colour of flowers, from the light of day or the blue sky, or from the sight or hearing of the organism; or (2) painful feelings arising from gloom or weariness, or jarring sounds. (2) There are feelings that have ideas for their base—such as may arise from presentation of an object to sensation (e.g. seeing a man) when it is not accompanied by such ideas as may arise in the activity of memory, and the constructive imagination. Examples are hope, fear, melancholy, jealousy, moral approbation, the sublime. This class of feelings is commonly distinguished about many emotional states, which makes them as difficult to grasp as name; the sensations of the viscera. It is curious that in certain languages emotions have received names that are untranslatable into other tongues; for example, we have no equivalent for the German Gemuthlichkeit; and it is said that no other language has an equivalent for the Scotch word 'earnest.' Further, each one of the more familiar emotions runs through a gamut of modifications or shades, e.g. we have the course of the emotions, we have the pretty, the graceful, the elegant, the lovely, the picturesque; in the emotions of the ludicrous, we have the witty, the humorous, the funny, the grotesque. Thus, fear becomes alarm, terror, despair; anger becomes resentment, indignation, rage, fury; joy becomes brightness, gladness, cheerfulness, delight, rapture, ecstasy. Probably every modification of consciousness has its own

We have a new model for feeling as the thermo-electric pile in relation to the degree of temperature. (b) But what next observe the manner in which the emotions ramify in the mental life. As an example, we may take the emotions of fear. We can trace its presence in the religious feelings of reverence, awe, and adoration. It enters into the composition of the emotion of the sublime. According to Kant at least, it belongs to the sense of duty. In timidity, anxiety, diffidence, suspiciousness, caution, prudence, bashfulness, it requires but little insight to detect its colouring. It acts as a check on conceit and arrogance. Superstitious, bigotry, intolerance would more readily slumber their hold, but for fear. The emotion of fear, like all other simple feelings, is in itself neither good nor bad; but it may enter as an element into the worst and very best qualifications and activities. Similarly we might trace the ramifications of hope, pride, or anger.

It is more than doubtful whether there is any fact in mind that can be properly expressed as 'psychical chemistry'; but the nearest approaches to it seem to be found in the emotional life. The emotions compound themselves; and there emerge new products of the common stock in the form of simplicity, until, turning an analytic gaze upon them, we force them to disclose their elements. One of the simplest examples is found in melancholy, in which the patient regrets the pleasure of recollection of possession, or the pain of self-commiseration, which is attached to the process of self-congratulation, or to the self-conscious enjoyment of the emotions. A somewhat more complex example is found in jealousy, in which the joy and pride of possession, the fear of loss, anger, indignation, rivalry, all blend to create the remark, the form of tragic potency. A more notable example is found in the passion of love. The analysis of its components, as given by Spencer (Psychology, 1870-72, vol. i., pp. 250-251), will be found a marvel of acumen and exactitude. They sometimes even conflict. They influence each other in the most various ways. The question as to the result where two or more emotions press upon consciousness is an open question. (a) Like emotions combine easily and enhance each other. Thus, there is apt to be an easy fusion of disappointment, vexation, anger, envy, and malice; or of success, generosity, kindness, courage, and pride. One would expect a generous donation from an angry and disappointed
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man; but one may readily obtain it when he is elated with the joy of success. Homogeneous emotions not only fuse easily, but in doing so enhance and inflame each other—although this may not happen in the case of the ethical emotions, or even the pathetic. When a man is already down, a slight addition of sorrow may readily prove the last straw; and in the presence of some new trial, in itself not insurmountable, he will cry out, 'I am done for; the losses I have gone over me.' Some emotions are contradictory, and related like salt and sweet, which never blend. Love and hate, arrogance and humility, laughter and devotion, ludicrous contempt and reverence, exclude each other, and do so in proportion to their intensity. Yet they will sometimes press simultaneously on consciousness. King Arthur loves the fallen wife at his feet, while, at the same time, he is inspired with anger and indignation. A friend will sometimes provoke at once our admiration and our contempt. A merchant will be in grief over business losses and in joy over the birth of an heir. An ass has been known to pray at the church door while the congregation was engaged in prayer. What happens? If we could suppose the conflicting emotions to be of equal strength in the case, there would simply neutralize each other. It commonly happens that the one supplants the other, as when a ludicrous idea makes devotion impossible; or, if it cannot quite supplant the other, there takes place a trial of strength and a rapid and distracting alternation of moods. We try to end the turmoil by going in search of reinforcements of the emotion we desire to prevail. (c) There is a third case, however, long ago observed by philosophers, but not clearly defined, although not contradictory, related like bitter and sweet: for example, joy and the ludicrous, humility and hope. In this case, the result is various and uncertain. If the one feeling is weaker than the other, the predominant emotion absorbs the other, and converts it into itself, while yet receiving from it some modifications. Thus, the self-confident courage with which a speaker advances to an audience is sometimes met by the different feeling of alarm when facing it; and the ordinary result is that his courage is toned down, and the speaking improved. A man does not speak the better for over the management of the bosom. On this interesting section of the emotional life, the reader may consult with advantage Hume on the Passions, pt. iii. § ix., also his Dissertation on the Passions, especially in §§ ii. and vi.; Hofling, Psychology of the Emotions; and various sections in Bain, Emotions and the Will.

The method of the spread of the emotions seems next to demand attention. The main instruments are the laws of contingency and similarity. Let M stand for an emotion, and C for its cognitive base. But C is connected by contingency with D, E, F, fuses therewith, and forms the unit CDE. M now spreads over that larger complex unit. Thus, if a man loves a woman, he is apt also to love everything connected with her, even her very raiment, and the ground on which she stands. A similar expansion takes place by similarity. We are here in presence of a weighty factor in human life, and one of extensive application. Thus, Palestine became the Holy Land by virtue of our reverence for Him who lived and died there, extending itself to the very soil with which He was contiguous. Thus, such an emotion as patriotism is created; the colonist, after long years, still turns with longing heart to the hills and rivers associated with parents, friends, and ancestral traditions. In the case of the man who has a bad conscience hates himself; and, as he never be part from the self he hates, the odious thing becomes contiguous with all things he sees or handles, with all places he visits, with all associates and all occupations; a dark shadow falls everywhere, and he hates the very earth on which he comes to hate existence and curse the universe. Another tragic example may be found in the irrational hostility of renegades and apostates to the creed they have cast away; for the hostility is not proportioned to the logical grounds of rejection, but to the misery associated with a former belief. Thus do our own emotions, by their tendency to diffuse themselves, colour the universe, making it, perchance, a temple of God or a pit of blackness.

If turning our eyes in a somewhat different direction, let us next note the conspicuous fact that the emotions of the soul are almost correlative with concomitances of the body, although in smaller degree in the case of the higher or more intellectual emotions. There is no doubt a correlation between every form of mental life and the physical organism; but it does not obtrude itself as it does under the quickened or impeded pulsation and breathing, the stir in the abdominal viscera, that attend anger and fear, joy and sorrow. This 'somatic resonance' of the emotions occupies a popular location in the heart, and was more reflected in Oriental speech, which located them in the liver, bowels, and kidneys. A paradoxical doctrine has even found some acceptance in recent years, to the effect that the bodily commotions reported in consciousness constitutes the emotion: that we do not tremble because we are afraid, but are afraid because we tremble, and similarly that we are sad because we weep. However, this has been adduced at all likely to upset the judgment of common sense that the bodily movement follows as the effect of the mental disturbance. Some bearings of the physical reverberations of the emotional life are important. The unwholesome manner in which the explosive and impulsive will is converted into the rational and deliberate will of the moralized man. Let us note, further, that the 'somatic resonance' of the emotions explains their bearing on health and life. There are authentic records of sudden death through the ahrunt irritation of glad or evil tidings. There are also those that are pining away into early graves through the starving of the emotions, and to whom love and hope would come as the very breath of life, restoring health and youth. Faith-healings and kindred phenomena show what wonders can be wrought when the emotional thrill discharges itself into all parts of the body through the nervous mechanism.

We have next to note the fact that the various emotions are correlated with definite bodily movements, and that each has its definite and characteristic expression. The emotion has a face and attitude we can tell that a man is deep in thought or is fixed in purpose; but we cannot tell what is the thought or resolution. In the case of the emotions, however, we can tell at once the fact of the emotion and the definite nature of it. We have familiar examples in the blush of shame, the pallor of fear, the clenched fist and dilated
nose of rage, the drooped eyes and downward curved muscles of sadness. So close is this emotion to the physical attitude or the expression of an emotion, we can in some measure induce the emotion, and by suppression of its expression to some extent, destroy the feeling, as when we half conquer a man's anger by preventing him to being seated.

Since Darwin's time and the publication of his Expression of the Emotions (1872) there has been much interesting discussion on the various emotional expressions. There is force and truth in many explanations adduced, along with a little that is fanciful or personal. (For illustrative examples, see Spencer, Physiology, ii. §§ 694-695.)

(b) The function of the emotions is to serve as the connecting link between the intellect and the will, and to furnish us with springs of action. Aristotle (Ethics, v. 2, § 8) uttered a weighty truth when he said, 'Intelligence moves nothing.' Ideas, simply as such, have no more power to touch the will than our perceptions have. Truths that have no inherent fitness to create feeling never become springs of action. Man never did anything simply in virtue of his knowledge of algebra. Doctrines, however great and important, never have the smallest real influence on life, unless they become identified with a feeling. The heart; the world has seen immoral philosophers, and upright theologians. It is always emotion that mediates and translates thoughts into deeds. Victory will always be on the side of the principles that can commend the strongest and most persistent enthusiasm. Nothing great was ever yet accomplished by a man incapable of intense feeling. The practical bearings of this principle are numerable. We single out these two: (a) do we do violence to our nature, and demoralize ourselves, if we do not use emotions as the impetus to conduct, or if we permit ourselves to cultivate them simply for the luxury of having them; (b) we need not in any case expect too much from mere teaching and preaching. If a man is already under the power of any emotion or passion, we shall not rescue him unless we succeed in creating a yet stronger emotion or passion; and the creation of this 'potential' is the supreme difficulty in all attempts at moral reformation (cf. Chalmers' Sermon on The Exasperative Power of a New Affection).

(c) 'The inertia of feeling' is a fact of far-reaching consequence. The imagination,' says Hume, 'is extremely quick and agile, but the passions (emotions) in comparison, slow and restive' (Dissertation, § 8). We can pass with ease and rapidity from the object of one emotion to another and from one kind of mental activity to another; and, when we cannot do so, some harassing feeling is the cause; but, as everyone knows, we cannot thus rapidly and easily pass from insensibility to gladness, from ill-temper to serenity, from despondency to hopeful courage, from the comic operas to the church. Our emotions detain us; they drag; they move heavily. Hume has happily compared emotions to a strange instrument that continues to vibrate for a while even after the impulse has ceased, while cognition is like a wind instrument. It follows that emotion is in some respects a hindrance and in other respects advantageous to the movement of thought. The emotion that creeps to a thought will not move and yield so readily as the thought, and may, therefore, cause a memory to haunt us, from which we desire to be free, and draws the attention on our long after its logical hold has been booned or destroyed; but we have the compensation that, once a new conviction has been lodged in us, and has been well saturated with emotion, it becomes thereby a lasting impression of which we cannot be deprived. 'Intelligence is apt to be a disintegrating force in human affairs; emotion alone weds strongly, and perpetuates securely.

Emotion is the slow conservative side of human nature, the custodian of old ideas, old customs, and the old institutions. Emotional natures, with strong loves and hates and ardent attachments, are apt to be most conservative; thus, women, as a rule, are more conservative than men. Cold intellectual natures, whose principles are not saturated with feeling, have no such difficulty in adapting themselves to its changes and applications and heartening to the bidding of logic; they therefore change easily, and are apt to wonder that the world is so slow and irrational. Indeed, on the contrary, where the intellect is not a better, were there no such thing as the inertia of emotional attachment. The inertia of feeling may be used to explain the persistence of character compared with the instability of opinion; also the inevitable relapses and reactions following on too many and too violent changes of habit or thought, whether in the case of individuals or in that of communities; and also, the perpetual bribing and corrupting of the intellect by emotional prejudices.

The doctrine just inculcated may seem to be inconsistent with the undoubted fact that emotional natures are also most impulsive and headlong—the very reverse of conservative. But there is no inconsistency. Emotional natures, having the warmest attachments, are, so doubt, on this very account, with greatest difficulty to change. When 'attachment' movement they are apt to go further. We may find a good example in the proverbial fœtus ingenium. Spinoza, who said, 'people are wedded with intense passion to their own traditions, and move from them with deep reluctance; but what people has gone, and in its reasons and actions they can Scotland abide compromiss in Church and State, after the manner of the English people, on whom that habit site so lightly, and who find it useful. The story of the French Revolution might furnish other examples.

(d) The ethical import of the emotions appears when we consider their relation to character. It is patent that the springs of conduct lie among the emotions, in emotional dispositions, and in complex emotional formations. Man act from hope and fear, love and hate; from love of money, power, knowledge, distinction; from kindness, sympathy, or perseverance from malignity and misanthropy. When we describe the character of men, we, for the most part, do so in terms taken from the emotions; we speak of them as timid, gentle, irascible, sanguine, affectionate, cold-hearted, sentimental. No doubt, we also speak of moral character in terms of intelligence, as when we praise a man for prudence, discretion, consideration, but even in such cases we have in view types of intelligence created by a habitual preference for certain forms of emotion. Thus, the prudent and cautious man has had his habit of judgment formed by the emotions, long habit to another regard; and, when we cannot do so, some harassing feeling is the cause; but, as everyone knows, we cannot thus rapidly and easily pass from insensibility to gladness, from ill-temper to serenity, from despondency to hopeful courage, from the comic operas to the church. Our emotions detain us; they drag; they move heavily. Hume has happily compared emotions to a strange instrument that continues to vibrate for a while even after the impulse has ceased, while cognition is like a wind instrument. It follows that emotion is in some respects a hindrance and in other respects advantageous to the movement of thought. The emotion that creeps to a thought will not move and yield so readily as the thought, and may, therefore, cause a memory to haunt us, from which we desire to be free, and draws the attention on our long after its logical hold has been booned or destroyed; but we have the compensation that, once a new conviction has been lodged in us, and has been well saturated with emotion, it becomes thereby a lasting impression of which we cannot be deprived. 'Intelligence is apt to be a disintegrating force in human affairs; emotion alone weds strongly, and perpetuates securely.

(5) The relation in which emotion stands to religion cannot be neglected; and, clearly, it is an intimate one. It is the heart that pants for the
possession of religious life, even when the search takes the ostensible form of a longing to penetrate the mystery girding us, and to comprehend the use and meaning of our existence: for how could any such desire awake in us except for a longing to be rid of the spiritual wretchedness and to be able to rejoice in the conviction that life has value? The possession of religion comes to a man as a new emotional experience; as a deepening, expansion, and purification of his feeling; as a power to realize in his own existence as an inestimable gift of the Creator; as freedom to look abroad over the world with peaceful eyes made glad with love and hope; as a consciousness of inward nobility raising him above the world's vanity; as a new self-consciousness springing from a heart purged from the foulness of a bad conscience; as a revelation of a new capacity for praise and adoration.

The religion portrayed in the Psalms and Epistles is a life glowing with emotion; and nowhere else in literature have we any such record of emotional experience. If we compare such Psalms as the 88th and the 103rd, we see how this emotive light envelops all, intensifies, and passes from deepest sadness to highest rapture. A religion of this sort requires no evidences. It is like salt, or light, or the aroma of an ointment. It finds its life and motion in the impression of itself like a contagious enthusiasm. Of this sort was Christianity meant to be: such it was in the beginning; and such will it be again some future day. But emotion cannot feed itself, nor can it support itself. The sumnum bonum revealed in immediate feeling demands reconciliation with the sumnum verum; and here all our difficulties in dealing with religion begin. The experience of the heart enwraps ideas that we have great difficulty in making clear and stable, and in bringing into harmony with the facts of life and the world. The correlated creed has never yet been able to make itself more than just a reasonable faith, and in its details has never risen above the fogs of controversy. Nevertheless, no one who has truly experienced the religion of emotion can doubt that it is the greatest and best that can ever enter into the life of man, and that its necessary implications must needs be true.

Our attention is arrested by the fact that there is to be found a fervent emotional religion without merit with its extra Açık characteristics. This was so often brought under his notice in connexion with revivals that Jonathan Edwards (q.v.) wrote his memorable book on The Religious Affections in order to set forth the marks by which to discriminate between genuine and spurious religious emotion. But no empirical tests are available; and the outcome of his effort is simply to show that religion must enwrap intelligence and volition as well as emotion—must root itself in enlightened conceptions, and take form in a holy walk and conversation—must grasp consciousness in the unity of reason. It is so; but it deserves, nevertheless, to be made emphatic that religion is centrally an emotional experience. Otherwise it is formalism. We thus reduce Dogma, Ritual, and Church to their rightful position of subordination.

(1) We are naturally conducted to the question whether emotion can ever be accepted as a ground of judgment, a basis of belief, and a test of truth. Emotion is, without doubt, a cause of belief; but a cause of belief is not a ground of reason. There are cases in which all would admit that emotion must be peremptorily excluded, as, for example, in a judicial trial, and generally in all purely intellec
tual work. It would, indeed, be held that there are certain cases in which emotion may sit in judgment on truth and error, especially in moral and religious questions. That 'the heart has a logic of its own' is a sentiment preached in many a discourse. Tennyson tells us, in Well known lines, that, in virtue of having felt, a man may justly rise in wrath against the freezing reason, that is, of the cold and worthless reason, and authority silence it (In Memoriam, cxxiv.). In a similar vein Jacoby says, 'There is light in my heart, but, when I seek to bring it into the understanding, it is extinguished'; and pronounces the verdict on himself: 'a hearten with the understanding, but a Christian with the spirit' (quoted in Uberweg's Hist. of Philosophy, Eng. tr., 1875, ii, 230). The heart, then, has a co-ordinate title with the judgment to say Yes or No, on a question of truth; nay, a superior title. A writer on Browning says of him that in his poems he assumes that 'love, even in its illusions, may be accepted as a messenger of truth' (Orr, Methodology, 1885, p. 357). Right through all the forms of Mysticism there runs a doctrine of this sort. We have before us an example of the fact that, for popular literary purposes, forms of speech may be allowed which are necessary in the case in hand, and passed by the logical understanding. Nevertheless, there is truth and meaning in such words as 'The heart has a logic of its own,' and in Tennyson's lines. It is true that there come trying hours when our heart moves us to affirm what our head urges us to deny, or in which arguments point to a conclusion that is repugnant; and occasionally it may well be the case that the instinct of our emotion is founded in the end with the higher and sublime. It is guided by an implicit logic, vaguely conscious of the pressure of arguments which it is unable to formulate, but which it will readily recognize when expressed by a clearer and more vigorous understanding; and, in such cases, the first appearance is as if emotion alone judged. When emotion seems to judge in moral and religious matters, it is found that the process is one of deductive reasoning assuming as true some such major premises as 'No doctrine can be true which rob existence of worth and meaning,' or 'The Universe is at bottom wise and good and rational'; and every emotion so governed may, if directly guided by an implicit logic, vague conscious of the pressure of arguments which it is unable to formulate, but which it will readily recognize when expressed by a clearer and more vigorous understanding; and, in such cases, the first appearance is as if emotion alone judged. When emotion seems to judge in moral and religious matters, it is found that the process is one of deductive reasoning assuming as true some such major premises as 'No doctrine can be true which rob existence of worth and meaning,' or 'The Universe is at bottom wise and good and rational'; and every emotion so governed may, if directly
only as we have felt. In Schiller's Wallenstein we hear Thekla singing:

1. Ich habe genossen das froehliche Glück,
2. Das gesang von einem niedrigen Bruch,
3. Der gefühls und geistig.

We may generalize the sentiment: we have lived only as we have gloved with emotion; and the hours of intense feeling stand forth in memory as the hours of life. It was then we learned into how goody an inheritance God summoned us when He gave us being. It is to be feared, however, that such hours are few, and that the emotional experiences of many men are meagre, and within a narrow compass. The more simple emotions, such as love and hate, hope and fear, are known by all men; but the higher emotions seem to remain an unrealized possibility.

'One may assert,' says Ribot, 'that these higher forms are unattainable by the great majority of men. Perhaps scarcely one person in a hundred thousand or a million reaches them; the others know them not, or only suspect them approximately and by hearsay. They are a promised land only entered by a few of the elect' ('Psychology of the Emotions,' 17).

There is much to justify this strong impeachment and moral censure of human nature, which seems so severe a disparity. (n) The intellectual (or logical) emotions, such as arise in connexion with cognitive activity and gather round the idea of truth, seem to be unknown to us. Is it not perhaps that the few have been the only few high in intellectual life. They are not gained by inconsistencies and contradictions, are easily tolerant of the absence of order and of logic; nor do they know the joy of the entrance of a new thought, of emancipation from an error, of a new perception of the law, or of grasping unifying principles. All men laugh, and desire to be made to laugh, yet it does not appear that the higher reaches of the emotion of the ludicrous are very common. The sense of humor, with its sublime combination of quick perceptiveness and genial kindness, is not a universal possession; and the want amounts to a fearful impoverishment of reason. Those who want it neither see nor feel. Their souls become like leather. In rudimentary form all men have some sense of the beautiful; and the ornamentation of their bodies, their furniture, and their weapons, on the part of the humblest races, shows us how deep a root in reason the aesthetic emotions spring. It is a superfluous flourish, but deep as the demand for truth and goodness. Yet a true artistic sense is not yet common; how an exception to the rule reveal the beauty except to one who can sense it all with the inner wealth of his own soul. Probably, the emotion of the sublime is among the rarest of all experiences—the inceptive movement towards it seldom going beyond a vague sense of the imposing, unless to give way to the feeling of awe and terror. Being important for life and conduct, and incessantly demanded, the ethical sentiment exists in considerable vigour. No normal human being is lacking in the emotion of moral approbation and disapprobation attendant on the judgment of conscience, or perhaps an integral part of it; and every man is thus constrained to a recognition of a sacred law or truth in human existence, and of a sublime End giving law to conduct. And yet the immorality of the world proclaims the feebleness of the moral emotions. Probably, no man is without the germs of the religious emotion. In a sense, all men are religious; and they are also irreligious. We cannot extinguish the religious sentiment; nor can all agencies make it strong and fruitful excepting in elect souls, who sense and feel the first stirrings of humanity into God. Religion flares up in a man's spirit in hours when he realizes his nothingness in the immeasurable universe, his weakness in face of its immensity, its tendency to nothingness in the infinite, and the drift of all things towards death. The religious emotion is a direct outbreak of the soul in the face of an unrelenting and sinister future; it is the expression of the futility of our existence. Religion rises up in man's spirit in hours when he realizes his nothingness in the immeasurable universe, his weakness in face of its immensity, its tendency to nothingness in the infinite, and the drift of all things towards death. The religious emotion is a direct outbreak of the soul in the face of an unrelenting and sinister future; it is the expression of the futility of our existence.
Mishna, Amsterdam, 1898-1905, v. 294-310; Ugo- linus, Theatrums, Venice, 1744-49, xii. 147-150; Sa- muel, Tobit ii. i. 276, which gives other instances of ceremonial cleanliness). It must be remembered that the priests always walked about the Temple with bare feet. The ground was covered with a fine dust which was often thrown over the inanimate objects of ceremonial cleanliness. It is necessary to show that in the ancient world, as in Egypt, the priests and worshipers washed their feet, and that the practice was widespread and of long standing.

(2) Roman.—Abolition of the feet was enjoined as a preliminary to worship of the gods under the Roman and Greek cultus (Jos. Laurentius, Varia Sacra, Antwerp, 1629, and Gronovius, Thea Gr. Ant., Lyons, 1607-1702, vol. ii. 215). The practice of feet-washing before engaging in any religious service is still maintained by Musulmans, who have carried over to the ceremony from the Mosaic regulations (cf., e.g., W. M. Thomson, The Land and the Book, Lond. 1881-86, p. 122).

4. In Christian.—Churches of the early Christian centuries were provided with a atrium or area or 'court,' surrounded with porticoes or cloisters, in the middle of which stood a fountain called eauturus or phiola. In this it was deemed necessary by the worshippers abate they wash their feet and hands before entering the church.
(4) North Africa.—An unsuccessful attempt has been made to make Augustin responsible for the prevalence of the ceremony in the N. African Church (J. Viccione, de Antiquis baptismi ritibus, 1018, iii. xx. 911, 1904). The belief in the authority, however, of the work in which references to the Pedilavium in the N. African Church occur has now been given up. The treatise in question (de Tempore, 160) is really a sermon by Covarrubias, archbishop of Arles (A.D. 504). Covarrubias quotes the words of a Gallican missal still extant (Martene, i. 64): 'Secundum quod ipsis in baptismo dictum est, Hospitium pedes lavent, etc.' But this, of course, has nothing to do with the Church in N. Africa (see Cassar. Art. Serm. clxviiii. 3, ecvii. 2, in App. to Augustine, t. vi. col. 291 f.). It is undoubtedly true that Augustin twice refers to the practice. In his Ep. ad Januar, cxviiii., he speaks of the catechumens bathing their whole body, but not only their feet before Easter, that they might be free from bodily filth. This, he says, however, was not a ceremonial washing, but in order that the bodies of the catechumens might not be offensive to others. In the other epistle (cixx. 18) he especially refers to the practice of washing the feet of catechumens after baptism 'on the day when the Lord first gave this lesson on humility.' But he adds that they wear their Pedilavium (which is usually held towards the end of Lent) should be regarded as essential to the proper observance of baptism, it never received general recognition (cf. Casullus, de Veter. sacer. Christi, cit., 1881, p. 49).

(5) Spain.—That there were many attempts to introduce the rite into Spain as part of the Gallo-Gothic service is generally admitted. Apparently, however, there was a growing feeling against its celebration, not only in Spain, but in neighbouring territories. Many Churches, indeed, refused to allow it as part of the baptismal service, and relegated its observance to a day further on in the ecclesiastical calendar—either 'the third day of the octave,' or 'the octave after baptism' itself. Others absolutely declined to admit the observance of it at all. Falling thus into general disfavour, the practice was formally abolished by the Spanish Church.

The 48th canon of the Synod of Elvira (Illibera), a.d. 306, forbids the celebration of the rite in these words: 'Neque pedes eorum (qui baptismato lavandis sunt a sacramentis) lavi unt salui vel sancti' (Manet, i. 14). The prohibition passed into the Corpus Juris Canonici (c. 121, cap. 1, q. 1; see also Casullus, Concilia, Concess. Canum, Eccles. Hispan., Madrid, 1888 [re- produced by Bruno, Biblioth. Eccles. ii. 1, 177]; Habichol, Concilia, 1716, p. 34; Heffele, l. c. 157; Smith, D. D. i. 164, art. 'Baptism'; §§ 34, 67, ff. ii. 1160. art. 'Mundy Thursday').

No traces of the practice can be discerned in the East; and, as it was never followed at Rome, it is plain that the feet-washing of baptized persons was a purely local peculiarity, introduced at an early date into some parts of the Catholic Church, but never universal. At the present day no trace of the rite can be found anywhere in connexion with the sacrament of baptism.

6. The monastic, imperial, and royal washing of the feet of the poor.—Though the practice of the Pedilavium (or Lenten washing, as it is sometimes called) was forbidden as regards the reception into the Church of catechumens, the rite was nevertheless encouraged in connexion with the poor. As the practice was widely spread through both Western and Eastern sections of Christendom, and has secured a place in certain divisions of Protestantism, it will be most convenient to treat of its growth with reference to the headings of the countries in which it has been practised, in order that local variations may be observed.

1. THE WESTERN (ROMAN) CHURCH.—(1) Rome.

The earliest reference to the monastic feet-washing of a Roman bishop seems to be in Offorini, Agnus Dei, 5, of the 11th cent. (Mabillon, ii. 101: 'Pontifex vero...')
INGREDIENTIUS BASILICA S. Laurentii, et sine planetae
residens in seco, facit Mandatum duodecin sub
divisum et Manualis primario cantore et magnis
vaporibus, et ministris suis, quanto unius
vaporo evam, ut mos esset."

The office is in the Missale Romanum from the first ed. (1474) onwards, under
ferta quintai in Coena Domini (see ed. Baltha-
saratius M. Mogesi, 1896, p. 178). Throughout
the Middle Ages the practice was commonly observed in nearly every monastery and court;
and the feet of subordinate priests, of the poor, or
of inferiors, were washed by priests, bishops,
and in some monasteries, by the monks. The fre-
quency of the rite varied. In some places it was performed every Lord's Day. But one day
in particular in the ecclesiastical calendar was decreed as the only day, annually suitable, viz. Holy Thursday, the day before Good Friday. The rubric for this
day runs: 'convenient clerici ad faciendum mandat-
um'—'mandatum' being the name given to the
rite—"in the words of the first antiphon
salutem, and perform the service; 'Mandatum novum do vobis ut diligatis invicem' (Jn 13th; hence 'Maundy' [see below under
Eland, p. 818])."

At one point in the rite as it was practised until 1570 by the Popes is given in Picart, Cerem. and Rites, Customs of the World, 1733, II. 21; Tucker-Mallet, Handbook to Christian and Eastern Rites, Revised Edition, 1886, p. 384; M. S. Romeyn, A Pilgrimage to Rome, 1831, p. 242; F. Chambers, Book of Days, 1863, I. 415; Walsh, F. A., Calendar of the Holy Catholic Church, 1865, p. 670."

This ceremony of foot-washing, associated with Holy Thursday, is widely practised still in the churches of Italy. In Florence, for example, the archbishop on this day annually washes the feet of twelve poor old men, who are given each a small and mansion-houses is it considered to be the correct
thing for the nobleman or his private chaplain to see that the mandatum is observed. Holy Thurs-
day was also the day on which there took place the
participation of those penitents who had been expelled since Ash Wednesday, their re-admission and reconciliation being gone through with accord-
ing to the ritual given in the Pontificale, and with the chanting of the prescribed 'Penitential Psalms' (EB
cxviii. 457, art. 'Penance'). A full account of the
conditions of this restoration is given by H. J. Feasey, Anc. Eng. Holy Week Ceremonial, 1897, p. 96."

A further ceremony known as the Lananda was maintained until recently in Rome during Holy Week. The Great Hospital of the Capuchins has a shrine open to the public of pilgrims who stream across the Alps from all parts of Europe. A corps of Roman ladies and gentlemen, wearing a distinctive form of dress, with blue caps and white aprons and arrangements for the reception of these guests. Only those newly arrived were cared for; and, as the pilgrims were mostly very poor, and had travelled for several hundreds of miles without boots and with their feet enswathed in 30 or 300 yards of linen, they were very grateful to have had their blood-stained clothes removed, and their sores attended to. They were guided to basement rooms with a low wooden seat round the wall. Here the corps of ministerate, men serving men, and women attending on women, in separate rooms, with warm water and coarse soap washed away the dust and the blood from the pilgrims' feet, and dined with them strongly. The foul, steamy atmosphere was very trying and disgusting. Relay after relay was then taken to a long refectory, where they had a good second course of bread and sauce, served at deal tables covered with a coarse white tablecloth. They were then guided to St. Peter's, where they participated in the august ceremonies of the Holy Week (Walsh, 800, art. 'Pilgrimage'). Since the Italian Government has remodeled the sacred rooms the Lananda has ceased (Tucker-Mallet, II. 251, 254).

(2) Milan.—The earliest reference to the practice of
foot-washing in the Milanese Church is probably that given by Beroldus in the 12th cen.
(see Magg.

'Interas vero archiepiscopii lavat presbyteri et diaconos et magistrum scholas et primum et primores inum cum magno reverentia singulis singulos pedes, his causentur hanc anti-
pherere, donee suscitaverit Dominus a 'orato post
mandatum: 'Adesto, Domine, offece servitutis nostrar, qui
pedita lavaret dominus et tuta disciplinae sis et sicut unde
explorat securitas suppletur imprescripturae sua omnium nostrorum interiores
inventor peccata,' etc.- His finitus, pro caritate bibit cum elia
archiepiscopi, presbyteri et diaconos et magistrum scholas et
primicerio lectorum doctos deseros tribuit.'

It may be surmised that this practical was the
manner in which the service was carried out in most of the churches of Northern Italy.

(3) Gaul.—The earliest reference to Frankish
monastic foot-washing is the 24th Canon of the
Council of Aachen (Aquignesranec), A.D. 814. It
runs thus: 'Statutum ut in Coena Domini pedes fratum abbas lavet et osculetur, et demum propriis
mias, ut et legem et sacrosstatum [553].

The obligation of kissing the feet already met with is here most explicitly laid down. The rite was in force in every monastery within the
Frankish monarchy, and was observed in substantially the same form, though slight local variations in the ritual are noticeable. The fullest description of these variations is given by Marténe (vol. ii. col. 290, and vol. iv. p. 372). The mandatum
was performed in some convents not by the abbot alone, but by every inmate, and not merely on
twelve poor persons, but on as many paupers as
were monks in the cloister. The practice of foot-washing was already so well established in the
Roman Church, was still further extended and
encouraged by the enthusiasm with which the re-
nowned Bernard of Clairvaux (A.D. 1091-1153)
urged its observance. So high did he regard this
rite that he sought to have it placed alongside of
Baptism and the Lord's Supper as an eighth sacra-
ment. His words are: 'Nam ut de remissione
disquantiorum minime dubitimus, habemus ejus
sacramentum pedum ablutionem.' A liquid
ligatur quod necessitatum erat ad salutem
quando sine eo nate Petrus partem habet in
regno Christi et Dei (Opera, i., Sermon. 'de Coena
Dom,' col. 187). Though the Pope at first refused to agree to Bernard's plea, such was the greatness
of his character and the weight of his example
that the ceremony was fixed more securely than ever in the service of the Church. There are references from time to time in history to the royal Maundy
of the kings of France. Helgardus (Vita Roberti
regis, in Duchesne, Hist. Franca. Scriptor, 1630-
49, vol. iv.) states that King Robert II. (A.D. 871-
1037) daily gathered to his table 300 poor guests
and, after feeding them, was accustomed to lay
aside his royal vestments, and clad in a rough
garment of goats' hair, to wash the feet of 100
of them, and to wash also the feet of the clergy
head to toe. Each then he made a present of two
ounces of silver ('duobus solidis remunerans'). Picart (ii.
21) records that in his time the chief physician of
the king (Louis xv. [1715-1775]) annually made
choice of twelve children whose feet were sifted
on Maundy Thursday, and who were afterwards
served by his Majesty with dishes of food.

(4) Spain.—To Spain belongs the distinction of
being the first country in Europe to give a synodal
imprimatur to the rite of foot-washing. Canon 3
of the 17th Council of Toledo (A.D. 684), while
affirming that the ceremony ought to take place on
the anniversary of the day when Christ first per-
formed it, viz. Thursday, the 14th Nisan, decreed
to decree: 'Si quisquam sacrosacrametum hos nostrar
diutulit ad implere decretum, duorum mensium
spatia sese noverit in sanctae communione percipien
tes frustratam ('Conc. Tolet., Deel. xvi. 2.) (see
Marténe, vol. iii. col. 280). The office is in Liber
Ordinum (ed. Férrotin, col. 192, or Ximenes,
Missale Mista (Librariae Mozarabicae secundum
Regulas beat. A. Fr. I, pars II. 320, &c. in the
420, 'ad lavandos pedes'). It is here stated that
the rubric as to foot-washing did not exist in the
Missale Toledo, but that it had been an ancient
custom, kept up on the following day of Holy Wch, in
certain churches of Spain and Gaul, and allowed

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lapse in others. In consequence of this, the Council of Toledo ordered the bishops throughout the whole of Spain and Gaul on this day to follow the example set by Jesus Christ, and to practise the same, under the penalty of excommunication, for two months for non-performance—whence, it is added, there arose the ceremony of the washing of the feet of poor persons, which everywhere was performed even by Christian princes centuries before Constantine. In the 18th cent., the royal Maundy as observed in Spain was described by Picart (op. cit. ii. 23). At the present time, besides being observed in almost every convent and palace in Spain, the rite is still continued by the King, twelve old men and twelve old women having their feet washed with a sponge and a towel by the monarch, who afterwards waits on them at a feast. House (The Everyday Book, ii. 465) gives a full account of the ceremony as performed in Seville. In Madrid at the present time all vehicular traffic is forbidden on Holy Thursday. A foolhardy cabman in 1870 nearly lost his life while attempting to defy the public opinion on the subject (see Walsh, 677).

(5) Portugal.—Feet-washing as a part of the services of Holy Week was not observed by either the ex-king (Manuel) of Portugal or his father. In fact, the only royal act of a regal character on that day was the crossing of Dom Pedro V. (1851). After the institution of the Republic the ceremony was no longer maintained in the Royal Chapel, but in only a few of the churches of the city. Twelve poor persons had their feet washed amid much pomp and splendour and a great profusion of lights. Those operated upon in the Royal Chapel used each to receive Rs. 900 (worth to-day 26 shillings). This was done every year.

(6) Bavaria.—The ceremony of the feet-washing is still annually observed in Munich on Holy Thursday. It is performed in the 'Hercules-Saal' of the Royal Palace by the King (at present by the Prince Regent) in presence of the members of the Royal Family and the dignitaries of the Church. After the usual religious service, the feet of twelve old men, above 90 years of age, selected from every part of Bavaria, are washed by the sovereign, and afterwards kissed by the senior priest of the Royal Chapel. After the ceremony, the King (or Prince Regent) hangs a little blue and white bag containing a small cross of the ecclesiastical bulls of the twelve apostles. Every 10 years, the rite is also celebrated at Oberammergau, 45 miles S.W. of Munich, in connexion with the famous Passion Play.

(7) Austria.—Every Holy Thursday it has for centuries been the custom for the Emperor of Austria to wash the feet of the 12 oldest poor men in Vienna. In one of the halls of the Hofburg, amid a throng of brilliantly uniformed nobles and aristocrats, the scene takes place. First comes a 'feast' given to the old men, who are all dressed in a quaint old German costume, and seated on a row of chairs at a table. The Emperor stands at the end of the table, making the number 13. From a side room emerge 12 maids, each carrying a tray laden with entails. The Emperor places the plates in turn before each old man. They remain motionless, not touching a morsel. No sooner are the plates on the table than they are quickly lifted up again and carried off by 13 men, who form a bodyguard. Four courses are thus served, and all—dishes and fruit—are later sent to the houses of the poor guests. Relatives, who have been standing behind the chairs, now remove the shoes and hose of the old persons, and spread a roll of linen over their knees. A high church dignitary reads the Gospel for the day, and at the words 'et coepit ludere pedes discipulorum,' the Emperor dips a towel into a basin, and hastily wipes the feet of the old men in turn. The actual washing is very perfunctory, and the whole ceremony is over in a few minutes. Lastly, the Emperor hangs round the neck of each guest a silken bag containing silver pieces, and the old men are taken home in Royal carriages. The late Empress Elizabeth had discontinued the practice of performing a similar rite on old women in Vienna for some years before her assassination. The custom of the Pedilavium is still widely practised by the lower clergy and church of Austro (cf. P. H. Ditlichfield, Old English Customs extend at the present Time, 1896, p. 258).

(8) England.—In England, Holy Thursday has received the name of 'Maundy Thursday.' A. Nares (Glossary, 1822, s.v.), following Spelman and Skinner, derives the word from the Saxon maund, 'a basket' (in which the provisions were given away). Cf. Shakespeare, A Lover's Complaint, 'A thousand favours from a manul she drew.' Maund has also been derived from Fr. maundier = 'to beg' ('mendicant' = 'a beggar'); hence 'Maundy Thursday' = 'the poor people's Thursday.' Gentleman's Magazine, July, 1776, p. 361. To Société (Concise Etymol. Dict., 1901, s.v.) emphatically maintains that the true derivation is through the Mid. Eng. maundee from Old Fr. maund, and that again from Lat. mandatum, 'a command' (13th cent.), and that this had with them cross-, or 'sprung,' is 'as false as it is readily believed.' The day is also known as 'Shere Thursday' (also Sheer, Chare, from Mid. Eng. sher or shere = 'pure,' 'unaloed, 'clear'; st. been in the use of <sheer, to express physical purity). The Liber Festivolis (fol. xxxii. b) of 1511 explains the name because 'in old faders daues the people wolde that day shere thei hedes, and clypp thei berdes... and so make them honester againe Easterday' (see also Brand, Popular Antiquities, 1813, i. 142, and Wordsworth, Eccles. Diog. i. 297). Hope (Every-Day Book, i. 402) says: 'In the miraculous legend of St. Brendan (A.D. 578) it is related that he sailed with his monks to the island of sheep, 'and on thare thursdays, after souer, he wesshe thei feeet and kyssed them lyke as our lorde dyd to his dysceple [Captions: Golden Legend]' (cf. Early South English Legendary [Early Eng. Text Soc., 1887]).

The Anglo-Saxon Church differed from the national Churches of France, Spain, and other countries in this respect, that it had no distinctive rite or type of liturgy for the washing of the feet. The events which occasioned its existence to Augustine of Canterbury, the A.S. Church was Roman all through. The various missals in use in the A.S. Church were practically the Roman missal with variations and other modifications which serve to distinguish them from the Continental missals of the same date. Of these A.S. missals, written before the Norman Conquest in 1066, three have survived. Two of them have references to the ceremony of feet-washing: (a) The Missal of Robert of Junius (ed. H. A. Wilson, Henry Bradshaw Soc. xi. [1896] 275), once the property of Robert, prior of the Benedictine monastery of St. Ouen at Caen, Abbot of Junius' in 1037, bishop of London under Edward the Confessor in 1044, and archb. of Canterbury in 1051. The MS is of the end of the 10th cent. and the beginning of the 11th, and was preserved at Caen. The other manuscript (for which Dibdin is responsible: Bibliog. Tour, ed. 1821, i. 153) was meanwhile been preserved under the heading 'Benedictio (or Oratio ad mandatum ipso die.' It runs thus: 1

1 On the alleged connexion between 'Chare Thursday' and the German 'Getreide' or 'Karmesin,' see Wilkins, [1801] 399; and for the derivation of 'Charefreitag,' cf. Graff, Worterbuch, Berlin, 1834-46, iv. 694, and Wagner's, Wort zu seinem Ladebuch, p. 319.
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Adesto, Domino, officio nostrae servitutiae, quia tu pedes
Ivare dignatus es discipularum; nec displicea opera mantuum
his iuseque extremitate gaudies et, ut, etiam si, orare
sicut hic externa alibiurntur inquinamenta. sic et omnium
nobissimam speciem sanae vitae, quae regali poetae
etc. (cf. the 'Gradus post mandatum,' in the Millesine Church).

(b) The Leofric Missal (ed. F. E. Warren, 1883),
bequeathed to Exeter Cathedral by Leofric, first
bishop of Exeter (d. 1086), is a complex volume
with three main divisions: (a) a Gregorian sacramentary,
written in Lotharingia early in the 10th century;
(b) an A.S. calendar, written in English about
A.D. 970; and (c) a number of masses, etc.,
written in England, from the 10th to the 11th century. (see
CQI xiv. (1882) 278). In it (p. 256) we find
the following rubric for 'Peria Quinta in Coena Domini': 'Ante
missam vero faciant mandatum cum peregriini et hospitibus.'

In addition to these surviving pre-Norman service-books, we have scattered historical references to the observance of the rite in the A.S. Church. Wearmouth, abbot of St. Albans, ordained
a daily celebration in the Archb. of York, washed the feet of 12 poor men
and fed them every day. In other religious houses it was the practice to wash the feet of as many poor religious as there were monks, the custom being
not only on Maundy Thursday, but on the Saturday before Palm Sunday, which therefore received the name of Mandatum pauperum to distinguish it from the Mandatum Dic
(T. Thesleff-Dyer, Brit. Pop. Customs, 1876, p. 159). Aelfric,
archb. of Canterbury (A.D. 996–1006), ordered the
Saxon priests: 'Impa mandata Domini in coena
ipseius,' 'Do on Thursday as our Lord commands you
in the Gospels, wash the feet of the priests and clerics among
them, and with humility wash your feet among yourselves as Christ himself did and commanded
us so to do.' (Rock (Church of our Fathers, iv. 85, 95)
describes in full detail the ceremony as observed
in the A.S. Church. The rubric for the mandatum
is given by St. Dunstan as it was carried out
in every church throughout Anglo-Saxondom (Roll, 1871, 370). Rupert of Deutz (Tuitonis
(f. 1135)) erroneously ascribed the origin of the rite
to the woman who anointed Christ's feet. It was
sometimes performed in monasteries for the purpose
of comforting the souls of friends and families of the late monks regularly buried there.
Some of the A.S. kings (Biblioth. Patr. 951), referred
to in Froshoake, Ecne of Ant., Lond. 1840, art.
'Mandacy,' p. 827). The Clogne monks merely
tumped each other with the words 'to give, give, give.' The monks of those poor
men: the Benedictines and Cistercians scrupulously
washed the feet of the brethren, the abbots not
being named.

Further references to the early English practice will be
found in the Cistercian Constitutions (ed. Guignard, p. 110 (1875));
and in J. H. Feasey, op. cit. p. 95. References to the observance
of the rite in later times are found in several of the masses,
service-books, and 'tunes.' The Westminster Missal (Missale
ad usum Eccles. Westmon, ed. J. Weckham Legg, Henry
Bradshaw Soc., lii (1893) 573) has 'ad mandatum pauperum
in die cese, Anilpius Domino Bene's.' (see also note in vol.
ii. p. 310 as to the identity of this author with that in
Laurence's rite). The York Missal (Missale ad usum insignum
Eccles. Ebor., (Sarcus Soc. L. 101, ed. Henderson, 1874), a MS
of the 12th cent., gives the rubric first for the mandatum
for the poor, and then that for the brethren (see Maskell, Asc.
of the ceremony (see Bradshaw Soc., lii (1893) 597). The Consuetudini Regulares provides the
body of the abbot (Col. 55, line 10) immediately after the
miserum (the 'refreshment'), and makes no mention of a
purpose for the ceremony. General, Laurence's Notitia agree with the Ezechias Book in placing here
the refreshment, but differ in that it in making no
mention of the abbot's Mandacy (Toynbee, Archdioce. Cant.,
Anilpius, 1826, App. 87, 220). The Rites of Durham (1866
(Sarcus Soc. L. 101, ed. Henderson, 1874), a MS of 1290, has a MS
of A.D. 1290, gives a full guide to the abbot as to the performance
of the ceremony (see Bradshaw Soc., lii (1893) 597). The Consuetudini Regulares provides the
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Progresses of Queen Elizabeth, 1583, i. 225; Hone, Every-Day Book, i. 401.

Charles V., its reign (1560-1568).—On Thursday last his Majesty washed poor men's feet in the Basquing House, an act of humility never before known, in all the presence of many poor men who had served him as such. The Queen did the same to several women of St. James's (Brock, London Paper, i. 1566; see Weeks, ed. Walthall, in vol. ii. 257):—April 4th, 1567.—My wife had been...to the Mundy, it being Mundy's custom that the King did not wash the poor people himself, but the Bishop of London did it for him.' It was in this reign that 'Mundy pennies' were first coined, coming fresh from the mint to the recipients of the grace of St. James's I.'s reign.—The last English sovereign to perform the rite of washing the feet of the poor was Queen Victoria (in Caselli, Oeuvres pour les Etrangers, 1863, p. 33, it is said: 'Le Jeudy Saint, le Rey, selon un fort ancienne coutume, lava les pieds a tout autant de chars qu'il avait dans ses propriétés.' But in the 3rd ed. of the same work (p. 43) there is a reference to the fact that the act was no longer performed by royalty in Britain; 'Mais le Roy G. III, (William iii, a laisit l'habitude de cette cérémonie a son grand Ammoner ou un Evéque du Royaume.' (9) An elaborate account of how the archb., York, as Lord High Ammoner (on 13th April 1571), performed the annual ceremony of washing the feet of a certain number of poor in the Royal Chapel, Whitehall, in the presence of the monarch (see Hone, op. cit. i. 401; Grosvenor Street, Friday, 3rd April, 1823; and Old and New London, iii. 368.).

Since 1754 the rite of feet-washing has been wholly abandoned by the Church of England; and in place of the former gifts of provisions and clothing a fixed sum of money is granted. The ceremony in 1814 is described by Hone (op. cit. i. 401). In 1818, owing to the advanced age of George iii, the mandate was not given. In 1830, Queen Victoria's reign it was the custom to present Mundy pennies to twice as many aged men and women as the Queen had lived years. King Edward vii, omitting the rite for a few months days, in 1887, and in 1888, and the practice is kept up similarly by King George v.

The Roman Catholic Church in England still preserves the rite in its entirety, as well as in certain parts of Ireland. In the archdiocese, clothed in episcopal robes, washes, and wipes with a linen cloth, the feet of 13 choir boys arrayed in casseque and cotta, in the Cathedral at Westminster, each boy afterwards receiving a gift-book (Walshe, op. cit. i. 675).

(9) Scotland.—The references to the practice are scanty. St. Kentigern is recorded to have washed the feet of a group on the Saturday before Palm Sunday (J. Craig Macdonald in Myths, 1882, p. 254, notes, who may be reckoned as Scottish (A.D. 676), is recorded by St. Bede (Life of St. Cuthbert, tr. Stevenson, 1887, p. 33) to have found one day at Ripon a young man sitting in the graveyard, and when he came to the custom with the customary forms of kindness. He lathed his feet for him, wiped them with a towel, placed them in his bosom, himself chafing them with his hands. During his residence in Lindisfarne, he would devoutly wash the feet of his brother monks with warm water, and he is told to have taken off his shoes, and to suffer them to wash his feet for so entirely had he put off all care as to the body, and so had given himself up to the care of the soul alone, that when once he had put on his long hose, which were made of hide, he used to wear them for several months together. Yet, with the exception of one at Easter, it may be said that he never took them off again for a year until the return of the Paschal, when he was washed for the ceremony of the washing of the feet by a bishop of a small order, at 10, Thursday morning (Ed. p. 84; cf. Martine, De Ant. Eccl., Dieuse, c. xxii. pp. 277, 346 [ed. 1796], and De Ant. Monach., Rom. ii. 12, 961).

In Turgo's Life of St. Margaret, Queen of Scotland, p. 61 (tr. from the Latin by W. Forbes-Listh, 1884), as also in Johannes de Fordun's Chronica gentis Scotorum, lib. v. 'The Historians of Scotland, 179, 216, it is stated that, 'when the office of matins was finished, she (Margaret), returning to her chamber, along with the king (Malcolm Canmore), washed the feet of six poor persons, and used to give them a piece of bread. He was so poor, that to relieve him from extreme poverty,' Her son, Alexander i, the Fierce, copied the example of his mother (ib. ch. 28, p. 227). After the Reformation the practice was viewed with great abhorrence (Caldewood, Hist. 1678, iii. 703, referring to reign of James vi.).

(10) Ireland.—Traces of the solemn celebration of this rite are recorded in the Missale Vetus Hibernicum (ed. F. E. Warren, 1879, p. 119, in the service for Maundy Thursday); in the legends of St. Bridget (Hall, Early Christianity in Ireland, 1863, p. 144; see a curious account in the Lives of the Saints from the Book of Lismore [ed. W. Stokes, 1890]; Carmichael, Carmen Gadelica, 1900; cf. also what is said about St. Brendan, above, p. 519).

(11) Palestine.—In an observance of the mandatum takes place in Jerusalem in front of the entrance to the Holy Sepulchre, between the Chapel of the Angel and the Greek Church. The rite is described by Mantell, in PEFS, 1889, p. 180.

II. THE EASTERN CHURCHES.—(1) Greek Orthodox Church.—The ceremony of the Lavapiedum was observed with a scrupulousness in the Eastern Church rivaling that of the Western communion. The office—σέλυσις των θεού και ερημών (in the ordinary ETXAOAITON TO META). Older forms are noted in Goar, ETXAOAIION (p. 291). The variants from the Church of Russia are the oldest in vogue, v. c. A.D. 795. (See also Dmitrijevskiy, Euchologias, for further details regarding the ancient office.) The Greek office prescribes a full service of chants and prayers and the foot-washing service takes place at the end of the service, thus:—The priest—ένοικος ἐν οὔτε ἐν διαθήκῃ. The gift-offerer says, εἰς τὸ χορτον της Θεοτόκου, and the deacon is to pipe in the words: 'He poureth water into a basin,' the brother both repeats the sentence and imitates the action. Goar (p. 596) refers to Jerome's practice of washing the feet of the Lord with a white silk robe, which service was in Russia (1810, i. 55; see also Leo Allatius, de dom. et lebb. Graec., 1846, p. 23). The Cantor of Byzantium is the bearer of Russian, and the Greek Orthodox Church, continues to this day at St. Petersburg the practice of the imperial mandatum, which was observed in the Court of the Byzantine Emperors at Constantinople. The fullest account of the ancient Byzantine ritual is given by Codinius, de Officiis Magna Eucharistia (ed. Bekker, Bonn, 1839, p. 70, and notcs, p. 318; see also PG civil; and, for the date of Codinius, to whom the de Officiis is erroneously attributed and Manuel 1809-1900, vol. vii. note). The repetition of the Triaskan; the pouring out of the water into the basin by the Empress, of the mandatum, and the washing of the feet of each poor man, each carrying a burning taper, the washing and kissing of the right foot of each by the Emperor; and the giving to each panurer of three pieces of gold, are all slight variants in practice from the ritual as observed elsewhere.

(22) Turkey.—The monastic mandatum is carried out yearly on Maundy Thursday by the Greek Metropolitan in Constantinople. (23) Palestine.—On Maundy Thursday the Greek Patriarch washes the feet of 12 of his bishops in a court in front of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. The courtyard is a spacious one, about 3 ft. above the pavement, protected by an iron railing, and enclosing a space about 8 ft. by 12.Inside and outside the railing the seats are filled with the back a gold and white arm-chair cushioned with red satin for the Patriarch. A priest carries in pieces of gold, which is distributed to the poor as labor. Then rise while prayer is offered. The Patriarch removes his shoes, elevates, and stands in white silk robe, and white silk glove. He twines a long Turkish bath-towel round his head, and pours water into the basin, while the twelve
bishops get their feet out of their gaiters, and pull off their whole dress. The Patriarch, who sprinkles, dries, and kisses each. The last is "by foot," who objects, violently gesticulates, and rises. But the Patriarch, as he takes the oil of Holy chrism, shakes his hand at Peter, and the un prudent "apostle" protests. At this moment some bells are rung in the Greek church, before Jerusalem breaks into music. The Patriarch descends the steps and, followed by his footsteps in double file, marches away. A priest raises the vase containing the remains of the holy water, dips a large bouquet of roses into it, and therewith sprinkles the upper part of the nave, a pious gesture, who rush forward, wipe up the drops on the floor with their handkerchiefs, and raise the feet of the sick. "Almost, &c.;" a very full account is given by L. Mantelli, P.P.M., 1852, p. 184.

(2) Armenian.—A translation of the office for Maundy Thursday is given by F. C. Conybeare (Baillie Armenianum, p. 212).

For to-day our Lord, the Giver of life, humbled himself for our salvation, to wash the feet of his disciples. And the Master of the Bible, in the fullness of fulness and fulfillment of the tremendous economy, went down on the knees of dust-created beings, and with the nimble whereby he was girt, washed away and cleansed in the nave, where he washed the feet of his apostles, giving them power and authority to trample on asps and vipers and all the hosts of the enemy. And so it was the Accomplished God, Son of God, who to-day stooped to the feet of the disciples, washing away the scandal from them (the text is from A. an uncial codex in San Lorenzo Monast., Venice, dated, but probably of 9th cent., not later than 10th). In the Armenian rite a vessel of water is placed in the chancel and is poured upon it with the benediction. When the bishop has washed the feet of clergy and people, he also anoints them. Then, resuming his cope, which was laid aside for the feet-washing, he is lifted up on high, and dispenses the people from fasting during Easter-tide (Butler, op. cit. ii. 350).

The Armenian services of Holy Week, in the form they have assumed since the middle ages, and retain till today, have been published by Amy Apax of Odzadzota (Melodies of our Offices in the Holy Week according to the Apostolic Synod of Armenia, Leipzig, 1902). In this work the hymns sung by the congregation are printed with modern musical notation (note by Conybeare, p. 213).

(3) Coptic.—The Text of the Office is in Tuki, Ἐκκλησίας τῆς Καισαρείας, pp. 170-226. The present Coptic usage is described by J. A. Butler, p. 350: "a. The Maundy Thursday, called "The Thaurophany," tiscore, sext., and none are duty recited; after which, if there be no consecration of the holy oils to come first, a procession is formed to a small tank, in the nave, where the Bishop blesses the water with ceremonies similar to those ordained for Egyptian baptism, and hymns of the occasion are sung upon the subject of the Lord's washing the feet of the disciples. At the end of the prayers, the Patriarch gives his benison to the assembled priests and people, sprinkling them with water from the tank; then he washes the feet of sacerdotal persons, both clerics and laymen. In this he is joined by them with a kiss. On this day immediately after the washing of feet, the door of the "khalâs" is opened and the僧们 of the congregation of the Holy Communion, after which it is closed again; but in this Mass the kiss of peace is dispensed, as the commemoration of the dead are omitted." In the Byzantine rite the ceremony of the Synod reads the Deacon from the aposom or pulpit, setting forth the duties of the Patriarch, it is expressly mentioned that he is to perform the office of feet-washing on Maundy Thursday (ib. ii. 145). Hence Butler thinks the ἐκκλησίας mentioned in the ancient usage must mean a towel, besides of fine embroidery, gorgeously woven with silver and gold. It was laid on the patriarch's shoulder at his ordination, with special reference to his performance of this ceremony, to which the Coptic Church attached great importance (see Butler, ii. 122, for the special fano used instead of a mitre on this occasion).

The tank used for feet-washing is a conspicuous feature in Egyptian churches. It is usually a shallow rectangular basin about two feet long and one foot wide, sunk in the floor, and edged generally with costly marbles. The ordinary position for it is in the westward part of the nave, but in many desert churches it lies rather more eastward (ib. 350).

7. Feet-washing in Protestant Churches.—(1) Lutheranism.—At the Reformation, Luther denounced the practice of feet-washing with characteristic plainness of speech. To him the ceremony was one "in which the feet which had been the seat of the feet of Christ, who, the ceremony over, will have all the more humble towards him, while Christ had made it an emblem of true humility and abasement, and the Church thereby the position and status of those whose feet he washed. "We have nothing to do," said he, "with feet-washing with water; otherwise it is nothing but the feet of twelve, but those of everybody we should wash. People would be more bound by such a custom to wash their feet as to dangerous work, and the whole body washed. If you wish to wash your neighbour's feet, do it yourself, and help everybody to becoming better." (Sämtliche Schriften, pt. xiii. [Magdeburg, 1743], col. 680).

Similarly the Lutheran J. A. Bengel (1687-1751) followed his custom in condemning the rite: "In our day, popes and princes imitate the feet-washing to the letter: but a greater subject for admiration would be, for instance, a pope so abased, as to wash the feet of the laity or people, than the feet of twelve paupers" (Gnomon (Eng. tr. of 1759, ii. 439); Bengel recommends the study of Iturigs, de Pedilavit, 1703).

In 1718 the Lutheran Upper Consistory of Dresden condemned twelve Lutheran citizens of Weida to public penance for having permitted Duke Moritz Wilhelm to wash their feet (PRE 2 vi. 325, art. 'Fusswaschung').

(2) Moravian.—Amongst the other ancient practices revived by the Moravian Brethren was that of the Pedilavium, though they did not strictly enforce it. It was to be performed not only by leaders towards their followers, but also by the Brethren among themselves, while they sang a hymn in which the significance of the rite (called the 'lesser Brethren') was explained. In 1793 a Synod of the Church held at Herrnhut, the practice was abolished.

(3) Mennonites.—Menno Simons (1492-1559) in his work, The Fundamental Book of the True Christian Faith (1539), laid stress on feet-washing in addition to Baptism and the Lord's Supper, as a necessary ordinance (Mosheim, Eccl. Hist., 1688, iii. 545; Kurtz, Church History, ii. 405 [Eng. tr. 1801]). His followers were styled Pedalontae. The Confession of the United Brethren or Men- nonites (1660) acknowledges the standing obligation of the rite as instituted by Christ. The Mennonite Church in Holland for 164 years split into 'Flemings' and 'Waterlanders,' the former holding the binding necessity of feet-washing, the latter being not so strict. The Waterlanders now call themselves Doopsgezinden. The literal practice of feet-washing led to a split in the American Mennonite Church in 1811 (McClintock-Strong, Cyclop. vi. 95, art. 'Mennonites').

(4) Dunkers or Dunkards.—However divided on other points, the members of this church are agreed on the binding obligation to observe the feet-washing. The ceremony takes place twice a year in each congregation before the celebration of the love-feast. But as to the correct mode of feet-washing, i.e. whether the person whose feet must also wipe them, or whether another person should perform the latter operation, there have been grave disputes. The 'single mode' is insisted on by the oldest churches as being more in line with Christ's example, but the Annual Meeting has prescribed the 'double mode' as the recognized rubric for the general brotherhood (Schaff-Herzog, iv. 24, art. 'Dunkers').

(5) Winebrennerians, or The Church of God.—The 11th article of their creed says: 'This Church believes that the ordinance of Feet-washing, that is, the literal washing of the saints' feet according to the words and example of Christ, is obligatory upon all Christians, and ought to be observed by all the Church of God.' In every congregation Feet-washing, with Baptism and the Lord's Supper, are 'positive ordinances of perpetual standing in the Church' (see H. K. Carroll, The Religious Forces of the United States, i. 102; Schaff-Herzog, lii. 91; PRE 2 iv. 359; McClintock-Strong, vi. 335, art. 'Church of God').

(6) The Ammonia Society, or Community of true Inspiration.—One of their most sacred religious services is the Liebezahl, or love-feast, celebrated now but once in two years. At this Lord's Supper, the ceremony of feet-washing is
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observed by the higher spiritual orders. The participants are arranged into three classes: 'The number of those who were to serve had to be determined in proportion to the great membership. Thus there were appointed for the foot-washing at the first Love-feast 13 brothers and 12 sisters. For the second Love-feast likewise 13 brothers and 14 sisters from the first class (see Amana Society, vol. i. p. 365 f.).

(7) Seventh-Day Adventists.—Among this American denomination the rite of feet-washing 'is observed at the quarterly meetings, the men and women meeting separately for this purpose, previous to the celebration of the Lord's Supper, during which they meet together' (Special Census Report [1906] on Religious Bodies, ii. 23, Washington, 1910).

(8) Baptist sub-sects. — The Freewill Baptists believe in this rite (ib. 124), as do some General (Arminian) Baptists (ib. 129), and it is also performed by the Two-Seed-in-the-Spirit Predestinarian Baptists (ib. 156) and by more than half of the Primitive Baptists (ib. 139). Both the Separate Baptist Churches (in the Church of Christ) hold that there are three ordinances—baptism, the Lord's Supper, and feet-washing (pp. 132, 136); while the Coloured Primitive Baptists observe the rite 'not 'as a Dutch custom. In this matter of faith in, and obedience to the example given by Him'; the sacramental service is not considered complete until this rite is performed (ib. 151).

(9) River Brethren. — Both the Brethren in Christ and the United Zion's Children—two sub-sects of this denomination, which is ultimately derived from the Mennonites—observe this rite, although the Brethren in Christ hold that the rite is not to be distinguished from baptism (ib. 209). One of the reasons for the formation of the New Congregational Methodist Church in 1881 was its wish to grant to those who desired it permission to observe the rite of feet-washing in connexion with the administration of the Lord's Supper (ib. 147). It is also permitted by the United Brethren in Christ, who hold that the practice of feet-washing should be left to the judgment of each individual (ib. 646).—Louis H. Grove, 1. 2.

It remains only to be observed that some of the purest and noblest souls in modern times who have lived for the welfare of their fellow-men have felt so attracted by this rite that they have desired to have it recognized as a sacrament (see A. B. Bruce, Life of William Denny, 1888, p. 250).

8. Feet-washing in connexion with marriage. — In many countries, both in ancient times and at the present day, hands and feet are washed, and, more particularly, washing of the feet, have been reckoned essential features to the proper celebration of marriage. Thus Roman brides had their feet washed by the groom when they approached his household on the wedding day (Festus Pompeius, ii. 6; Macrobius, Sat. iii.; cf. Matt. Brouerius, de Pop. Vot. Re. Recent. Adorationibus, 1713, col. 976). In many parts of rural England and Scotland, relics of this custom still survive. On the evening before the marriage takes place, a few of the bridegroom's friends assemble at his house, when a large tub nearly filled with water is brought forward. The bridegroom is stripped of shoes and stockings, and his feet and legs are plunged into the water. While one friend washes his feet and legs, another, from the other side of the tub, washes those of another, and so on, in an orderly manner. Subsequently, another besmears them with shoe-blacking or soot, while a third practises some other vagary (cf. the practice of the ancient Greeks in daubing their naked bodies with clay and dirt in the Dionysiac Mysteries; see G. L. Combe, Household of Early Village Life, 1883, p. 219; Gregor, Folklore of N. E. Scotland, 1881, p. 89; and de Gubernatis, Storia comparata degli usi nuziali in Italia, Milan, 1889, p. 121). In 1903 a case occurred where the bridegroom was a son of the Provost of Huntly. His feet were thus washed by his friends, and the bride would have been similarly treated had not her health prevented it (W. C. Hazlitt, National Faiths and Popular Customs, 1905, ii. 434). It was sometimes customary for the ring to be dropped into the water during the washing of the feet of the bride; whoever recovered it first was deemed to have the best chance of being the next to be married (John Grant, The Penny Wedding, Edinburgh, 1836).

In the warm Orient, the practice enters largely into the ceremony of the marriage day. In some parts of Java, it is a matter of a matron or an elder who washes the bridegroom's feet. Among the peoples inhabiting the Tenggar Mountains in Java, the bride washes the feet of the bridegroom, while she is still actually bending in lowly reverence before the priest during the marriage service (E. J. Wood, The Wedding Days in all Ages, the East and the West, 1845, p. 157). It is by means of the hands and feet that bhutas (spirit) enters the body, it is held necessary in India for feet-washing to form part of the marriage ceremony (Crooke, Popular Belief and Folklore of N. India, 1896, i. 241). Thus, at a Sattal wedding, women come forth and wash the feet of the guests who arrive with the bridegroom at the village (E. T. Dalton, Deser. Ethnol. of Sattal, Calcutta, 1872, p. 216). So run its the Musul, at certain times in the marriage service, the two fathers wash the feet of the bride and the bridegroom respectively (ib. 243). If this washing was omitted, some foreign and evil spirits enter the body, and the second, the bridegroom, slip into the company, just as (according to the favourite example of the result of neglect of this rule) Aditi's failure to do this allowed Indra to form the Maruts out of her emulsion (Crooke, i. 242). Amongst the Marathas in India, feet-washing is repeatedly observed in connexion with a marriage. When the bridegroom's father sends a relative along with the priest to the girl's father to propose the match, they are welcomed, and water is given to them to wash their hands and feet. On the marriage day a married woman of the bride's house pours a dish full of water mixed with lime and turmeric on the bridegroom's feet, with the bride's husband and wife, the bride's father and mother sit on two low stools in front of the bridegroom face to face, and the father washes the feet of the husband, while the wife washes the boy's mother's feet, and marks her brow with vermilion. On the morning of the marriage the bridegroom dismounts at the door of the bride, and his feet are washed by one of the women servants of the house. Of the marriage-feast day all wash their hands and
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Feet at a place prepared for the purpose. The maid who stands at the door with an earthen pot full of water empties it at the feet of the pair, who enter the house. The bride and her friends and relatives. At a later stage the girl again washes her hands and feet, and takes her seat as before, to the right of her husband. At night the girl washes her husband's feet in warm water, with the aid of her elder sister, and some friend, and on his feet paints vermilion and turmeric shoes (ib. pp. 115, 117, 119).

A feature of the Bengal Brahman wedding ceremony is the Jāmātā-lārōm, or the bridegroom's welcome by the bride's father. The latter offers his prospective son-in-law water for washing his feet (pādyā-arγhyan), which the bridgegroom touches in token of acceptance (ib. p. 190). On the Malaḥ baros, early in the 19th cent. the bridegroom's feet were washed with milk by a young relative who also put a silver ring upon his toe (Wood, op. cit. ii. 141). The Indian theory of the duty of the wife to wash her husband's feet has even been changed into a means of salvation for the woman. Just as it is taught in the Tantras that 'the water of a guru's (religion teachers') feet purifies all sin' (Morrison, New Ideas in India, 1907), so in the Sācita, the woman's feet (iv. 35) is it laid down: 'Let a wife who wishes to perform prescribed obligations wash the feet of her lord, and drink the water; for a husband is to a wife greater than Siva or Vīra.

The husband is her god, her priest, her religion; with whom she must live in her heart, she ought first and chiefly to worship her husband.' Even amongst the ancient Poles, the bride on being led to church was made to walk three times round a fire, then to sit down and wash her husband's feet (Wood, i. 219). In Rabh, literature it is made abundantly plain that feet-washing was a service which a wife was expected to render to her husband (Jers. Kt. v. 30b). According to R. Huna, it was one of the personal attentions to which a Jewish husband was entitled, however many maids the wife may have had.

A similar duty is laid down in the Rabh, Talmud (Kt. 61a), where washing the husband's feet is part of a wife's necessary service to her lord (cf. Maimonides, 'Yad,' Iskut. xxxi. 3; JE v. 357).


For the rite observed in the Eastern Churches, the principal authorities are: (1) for the Greek Orthodox Church, Gear, Exakton, 2nd ed., 1720; (2) for the Armenian service, Dieudonné, in Cod. Officii Magne Ecclesie (ed. Bekker), Bonn, 1802. The Eastern Catholic ceremony is very simply described by Mantell, loc. cit. (3) The Armenian service is described most fully in A. F. Schaff's Hist. of Religious Knowledge (ed. Dunker), and H. K. Carroll, The Religious Forces of the United States, N.Y., 1880, are of importance.

For feet-washing in connection with Indian marriage customs, the most numerous references are probably to be found in the works of Rev. W. R. Carrie and E. Thurston, Castes and Tribes of S. India, Madras, 1869.

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or, as later and less authentic accounts would have us believe, being absent in Rome.

There are no contemporary records, or extant manuscripts of the Feinn, more than those of Abraham, of Moses, or of Homer. The earliest references to Feinn (originally Finn) occur in a passage (ed. of 1703, and in Annals of Plymouth, c. 1087). Both of these allude to the manner and date of the hero's death, as well as to the information from a poem of Cinmidh na Haraignain, who died in a.d. 963. Translated, this poet's remarks run thus: 'By the Finn of Lyons was the glory of his days, viz., his Ath Bres against Boyne (Book of Leinster, fol. 31b). As it was the bard's and professional story-tellers who in the memory of great men and great incidents, it is possible that no tales of the heroes were written, except perhaps in ogham, till the 13th century. The oldest extant MSS in which they have mention of Feinn and the Feinn are the Leabhar na h'Uidhre, compiled from earlier documents towards the close of the 11th cent., and the Book of Leinster, similarly produced about fifty years later. In the former there is a poem ascribed to Feinn; a remark of his wife's containing Gaelic words so old that they required to be glossed in the 11th cent.; an account of the cause of the battle in which his father was killed; and the story of Morgan, an Ulster king of the 7th cent., who was regarded as Feinn come to life again. In the later MS the references are more numerous. Besides poems ascribed to the Feinn chief, to Old, Cius, and others, there are passages from the Leabhar na h'Uidhre, a topographical tract respecting Feinn; an account of a battle in which he fought; his genealogy as well as that of his famous officer Diarmaid O'Dubhair; an account of the Feinn besides Feinn mentioned in the Book of Leinster, but, if the poem is really drawn up during the 12th or beginning of the 13th cent., as Hyde thinks of Dorisbo de Judaville has proved (Literary History of Ireland, p. 382), then it is evident that there were then extant historical stories of the Feinn, telling as early as that period. And in what Whitely Stokes has written of the ancient poet's art in the earliest portion of the Naxogion of Cormac, king of Cashel (A.D. 877-923), there are two further very definite allusions to the wonderful head of the Feinn, who is then mentioned again.

These earliest written hints and impressions represent Feinn as a real historical personage. The story of his life which they unfold is certainly meagre, but it is perfectly intelligible.

The oldest version of the tale, that in the 'Lather na h'Uidhre is probably the most substantial. According to it, Tadg, chief Druid of King Conn, had a beautiful daughter, called Maurne. Cumhail, son of Trenmor, at that time ruler of the Feinn, wished to wed this young lady. On coming to know this, her father stoutly opposed their alliance, because he knew by his Druidical foresight that, if Cumhail married her, he would lose his power at Almanh (present Allen) in Leinster. But the great military champion was not thus to be balked. So he took the beautiful Maurne and married her against her father's wishes. The result was that the old man at this time resigned the red crown for red, and the royal forces were despatched to deal with the arbitrary hero. This army encountered Cumhail and his Feinn at Cunaca, where a deadly struggle took place, during which Cumhail was slain by Aodh MacMora, who, because he lost an eye in this battle, was ever afterwards known as Goll, that is, 'the blind,' MacMora. Hearing of the fate of her husband, Maurne fled to her sister and gave birth to a son, whom she named Finn, but subsequently she called him Fionn. On account, it is said, of his white head (Finn means 'fair'; Fionn, gen. Feinn, 'band' or 'troop'), by Finn, 'troops' or 'soldiers' (Trans- actions of the Gaelic Soc. for 1886 and 1893). When the boy grew up he demanded eric from his grandfather Tadg for the death of his father, and thus came into possession of Almanh, as his greatgrandson had anticipated. He also made war on the lands of Cumhail and his brother, and usually figures in the stories as a kind of Ajax. Like his father Cumhail, Fionn got the command of the Feinn and was greatly regarded as a poet. In fact, in the oldest setting of the so-called Ossianic tales, the poets of the Feinn were Fergus and he, not Ossian. It was only in later and comparatively recent times, as E. Windisch has shown that the latter ousted his father from the pre-eminence in this respect (RCB, p. 170). He learned the art of poetry from Finn Eges or Fionnog, a bard who lived on the banks of the Boyne (for poem attributed to him at this period, see Kuno Meyer's Four Songs of Summer and Winter, London, 1891)."
he held the secret, but he did not. And so to all posterity there is this surviving: the only one recorded—on the character of the truth, wisest, and kindest of the Feinn, one who, if he could help it, would never let any one be in poverty or trouble. He met his death, it is said, at the hands of a fisherman, probably a Finn of Luagné who sought the notoriety to be obtained from slaying so famous a warrior. The event was followed by the fateful battle of Gabhhrn, and from this time the career of the Feinn falls on the career of the Feinn as an organized body, who henceforth enter the region of myth and fable.

5. For one reason or another these heroes presented ideals of existence that appealed most profoundly to the Gaelic-speaking race, and continued to appeal, in spite of all change, down to the period when science began definitely to cast men's thoughts into other molds. After the Feinn débâcle, the story of their exploits passed into oral tradition. The common people, the hands, the professional story-tellers, the annalists, and the churchmen were all more or less familiar with the details, and added exceedingly complicated and amplified them each class in its own way—with the result that in course of time a great variety of versions arose and entirely new elements entered into the history. In fact, all, the Feinn began to be associated with the supernatural and with personages and incidents belonging to the popular Celtic mythology. As "distance lends enchantment to the view," so the old heroes were gradually elevated and idealized in the popular imagination. Qualities that originally belonged to the gods were ascribed to them, and they figured in scenes and incidents similar to those rehearsed in the earlier mythical stories. In fact, the opponents of Fionn and his men were no longer the heroes of Connaught and Ulster, but underworld deities, and the strife between the two seems like a variant of that between the Tuatha Dé Danann and the Fomorians. Sometimes the former are represented as helping Fionn against his powerful foes. That this defying process had been carried far before the 11th cent. is evident from the story of the Mongan who, the annalists averred, was a reincarnation of the famous head of the Feinn, and son of the god Manannan MacLir.

By and by the Norsemen began to appear and settle in Ireland, and then another new element entered into the legends and wood of the Feinn saga. Fionn in this later rôle is neither the tribal Leinster chief fighting against the northern clans, nor is he the demigod in conflict with underworld deities; he is the leader of all the invaders against the overseas invaders from Lochlann. According to some of the sagas, he was born in Lochlann, and, after his voyage to the giant's land, was put ashore in Ireland, which he then trod for the first time. According to others, he walked from Lochlann to Erinna on a road.

The introduction of the Norse element, like that of the supernatural, has rendered the story of the Feinn, and all its complicated and contradictory, so that the authorities find it hard to reconcile the various versions with the known facts of history. Commenting on this point of view, Headlam (C.R., 390) says: *The only reasonable explanation is that Lochlann meant Norse settlements in Ireland. That fits all versions, and makes this story constant.*

Stripped of the mythology, which is partly Scandinavian in character, the framework thus far may be seen to consist of another Fionn, as he appears in the Celtic. The Norwegians and the Irishmen tempt him to Ireland, where he is slain on the Irish king's territory. His son is born in Ireland, and is or is not the hero in question. When he grows up he seeks vengeance, like an Irishman in a saga. The story makes no progress ahead, coming back to the place where his father set up for himself, tells tales to account for his riches, and then follows his father's example, and fights chiefly in Ireland with Norsemen and Irishmen, turn about, till his power is broken and his men are scattered. Then he becomes mythical, and other authors who have dis- appeared from the world.*

But such a view is surely inconsistent with the earliest impressions of Fionn's origin and history given in the I. t. Echidhne an leath. Also J. Rhy's conjecture (Origin and Growth, p. 335) seems to offer a more likely solution when he says that Lochlann, like the Welsh Llychlym, before it came to mean the center of the Norsemen, denoted a mysterious country in the lochs and seas. The Lochlanners might, in that case, be originally the submarine mythical people or underworld deities corresponding to the Fomorians, with whom the Feinn were represented as fighting when they began to be confused with the personages of the mythological cycle.

A third remarkable element in the saga is the religious or ecclesiastic. It is introduced in the following peculiar way. After the overthrow of the Feinn, Osin and Cuilte agreed to separate. The former went, as tradition says, to Tir-nan-og, 'the land of the ever young'; the latter passed over Magh Bnech, southwards, and ultimately joined St. Patrick. When 150 years had passed away, Osin returned on a white steed to seek his old friend and comrade Cuilte. From this horse he was carried, and not to dismount him lest he lose his immortal youth. On the way he found everything changed. Among other things, instead of the old temples of the gods he observed Christian churches and the Feinn, alas! were now but a memory. One day, unfortunately, as he attempted to assist some men in raising a stone, he slipped from his magic steed, and as soon as he touched the earth he became a blind and withered old man. His horse rushed off to Tir-nan-og, after which Osin was brought to St. Patrick and Cuilte, with whom he lived the rest of his days. Both were the saint's constant companions in his missionary journeys through Ireland, and were useful in giving him the history, legends, and topography of all the places they visited, and many besides. These were written down by Brogan, St. Patrick's scribe, for the benefit of posterity. Osin loved to recount the exploits of the Feinn and to debate with the apostle of Ireland regarding the new religion, against which he was prejudiced in favour of the ethics of his younger days. Between the saint and the aged pagan there were various heated and impassioned disagreements, the settlement of which is the subject of Oschin's Prayer' (Scottish Review, viii. [1886] 350 ff.). The conversations are given in the form of dialogue between the two, the one representing paganism, the other Christianity. Doubtless, if less they were the work of monks or ecclesiastical scribes in the 12th cent. or earlier, and they appear in their pristine form in The Colloquy of the Ancients, which is the longest of all the Feinn saga. It is preserved in MS s dating from the 15th cent., but chiefly in the Book of Lismore (tr. in O'Grady's Silen Garddies; Whitley Stokes, Irisce Texte, vol. iv.).

A fourth element that entered largely into the popular tales and ballads of later times was the wizardry of the Middle Ages. In these, giants, dwarfs, enchanted castles, dragons, palaces, witches, and magic figures were introduced. In Ireland it introduced is impossible to say, though James Macpherson fancied they were imposed on the Feinn saga in the 15th century. There is evidence that, even earlier, the Feinn sagas were represented as giants; and Scottish authors such as Hector Bocce, Bishop Leslie, and Gavin Douglas refer to them as such. As the centuries passed, the volume of detail increased, each age contributing its own impressions and its own imaginative setting. In Scotland we have evidence of this extraordinary activity in the Book of the Dean of Lismore in the 15th cent.;
6. Who were the Feinn? It is a question of the deepest interest, in view of the varied opinions that have been expressed. (a) Irish writers have, always regarded them as an actual martial caste or militia maintained during several reigns by the kings of Erin for national defence. Tighernach, Keating, the Marshes of O'Curry, and Dugald, Hyde, are representative of the common native opinion which has prevailed from early times. Keating, writing about A.D. 1630, gives the traditional account as he gleaned it from ancient books now lost. O'Curry, publishing the same view last century, wrote the following as his own conviction in the matter:

"I may take occasion to assure you that it is quite a mistake to suppose Feinn MacCumhail to have been a merely imaginary or mythical character. Much that has been narrated of his exploits is, no doubt, apocryphal enough, but Finn himself is an undoubtedly historical personage; and that he existed about the time at which his appearance is recorded in the Annals is as certain as that Julius Caesar lived and ruled at the time stated on the authority of the Roman historians" (O'Curry, MS. Materials, Letters, 379).

The band of Feinn were divided into three, or more usually seven, regiments, and had officers over every nine, fifty, and a hundred men. Before a soldier could be admitted he was subjected to rigid tests, some of them of the most extraordinary kind. His relatives had to renounce their right of eric in his case. He himself required to promise—(1) never to receive a portion with a wife, but to choose her for her good manners and virtues; (2) never to offer violence to any woman; (3) never to refuse charity to the weak and poor in the matter of anything he might possess; (4) never to flee before nine challenges, and with these obligations went the loyalty to the High-King and sworn fidelity to the commander-in-chief. More difficult accomplishments were the following:—He must have the gift of poetry, and be versed in the twelve books of the Mase according to the rules of the chief bard. With only a hazel stick of a forearm's length and a shield, and standing in a hole up to his belt in the earth, he had to defend himself against a simultaneous attack by nine warriors armed with spears, and separated from him only by a distance of nine field girds. If he were hurt, he was not received as one of the Feinn. Not a man was taken until, with his hair braided and a start of only a tree's breadth, he was pursued by a war-troop through Ireland's woods, and succeeded in eluding them without letting his hair fall. If even the weapon in his hand trembled, or a withered twig broke under the power of his grip, he was not taken to the fortress. The candidate had further to leap over a branch the height of his forehead, and bend under another no higher than his knee; to hold a spear horizontally with steady arm; and, without shaking his pace while running, to cut at the man's foot with his nail (15th cent. Vulcm in British Museum, marked *Egerton, 1782*).

The duties and privileges of the Feinn were equally well defined. In time of peace they acted as the custodians of the public security, maintaining the right of the ruler and guarding the country against strangers. In winter from Samhain to Beltane (1st Nov. to 1st May) they were quartered on the people and under shelter. In summer they lived in the open air, hunting and fishing, and established the royal bounds and Petty and Biggott in the summering. Their bed consisted of branches, moss, and rushes. Even to this day the peasantry of Ireland profess to find the traces of their fires (Suidheachan na bhFinn) in many of the enclosures. Their bed consisted of branches, moss, and rushes. Even to this day the peasantry of Ireland profess to find the traces of their fires (Suidheachan na bhFinn) in many of the enclosures.

(b) W. F. Skene and D. MacLachlan believed that the Feinn were a race distinct from the Gaels and probably allied to, or even identical with, the Picts. The latter writer went further, suggesting the possibility of their being the forerunners of Gaelic tradition. But the theory that the Picts were a non-Celtic race is not now accepted. Duncan Campbell put forward the view that Fionn figures as a Gaelic type, the leader, like Arthur, of a militia modelled upon the Picts, of the Gaelic Society of Inverness, 1887). Zimmer thinks that he was really the Viking robber, Caitill Find, who commanded the Gull Gaediltach or great host of Ireland. The Pictish St会谈 of Cettica and Ctt bu Dui is, in his opinion, the old Norse Asvin and Ageir. Kuno Meyer is equally convinced that all the names of the Feinn are Gaelic, not Norse, and, like Windisch, he holds that in all probability there were real historical characters round whose memory the tales and myths and folk-lore grew.

(c) While in the main Irish and German scholars thus favour the view that the primeval heroes corresponding to Fionn and the Feinn actually existed, some recent British authorities, prominent among whom have been Alfred Nutt, John Rhys, and Alexander MacBain, are disposed to uphold the opposite opinion, and look upon the Feinn as simply the gods of Celtic mythology humanized, or regarded as men. This way of construing the history may be gathered from the words of MacBain:

"Finn is evidently the incarnation of the chief deity of the Gaels—the Jupiter spoken of by Caesar and the Dagda of Irish myth. His qualities are kingly and those of Cuchulain. He is surrounded by a band of heroes that make a terrestrial Olympus, composed of counterparts to the chief deities. The story of Osian, the poet and warrior corresponding to Norsemen Ogmius of the old myth of the man-god; Cioso, the swift rider; and so on. . . . The stories are racial and general, and can be tied down to neither time nor place" (Celtic Mythology, p. 108).

But this theory does not readily square with the facts. In a review of history we find that it is not so much the gods who are degraded as it is the heroes who are exalted. Popular legends, who in their own day were human enough, in course of time were clad with divinity. By a curious working of the human imagination they are credited with attributes and deeds beyond the range of man's experience. If this means that the tales of Fionn and the Feinn became mixed up in popular fancy with the earlier mythical accounts of gods and heroes, the incidents of the latter were transferred to the former, until the history of prehistoric Ireland was deified. Indeed, Windisch, impressed with the likelihood of some such transference, looked on the mythical incidents of the Feinn cycle as derived from the previous Cuchulainn cycle, which in turn drew upon Christian tradition and the old tales of war, of magic, and of the hero.
impression one gets who is familiar with the varied literature of the Feinn, the actual mythology of to-day, and its history in the past.

FEMALE PRINCIPLE

1. Female deities.—Among many primitive peoples, and in the present tide in those of less developed cults, goddesses occupy important places in the pantheon. In early Babylonia there were as many goddesses as gods; for each male deity, we may assume, had his female companion. There was at least one goddess as patron of each of the cities, sharing with her lord the devotion of its worshippers. Instances are Nana, patroness of Uruk; 'good lady' Bato, 'mother' of Lagash; Ninlil of Nippur; 'mistress of the lower world' and 'lady of the great mountain'; and the 'glorious and supreme' Ninni of Gishgalla, 'mistress of the world.' These city-goddesses had a precarious and extremely varied history. Some of them sank out of sight as consorts of the gods whose majesty and power they could not equal. They became mere shadowy reflections of the gods, with but little independent power, and in some cases none at all (Hastrow, "Rel. Sem.," London, 1894, p. 104). This twilight extinction is especially true in early Babylonia, in Syria, and among other nations that entered upon a heroic programme of world-conquest. As to complete the logics of this type of subjection, goddesses fused into male deities. 'In various parts of the Semitic field we find deities originally female changing their sex and becoming gods' (W. H. Smith, "Rel. Sem.," London, 1894, p. 82). This extinction is brought about by other more powerful and more beloved goddesses, as villages were fused into cities and cities into States. A marked instance of this subjection and absorption was found in the war between later Babylonia and Assyria to the position of 'mother of the gods' (and of goddesses as well), who sometimes absorbs the titles and qualities of all. In the event of an eclipse by a male consort or by a greater representative of her own sex, a goddess did not always forfeit her existence, but was deflected into the performance of some special function of lesser importance.

An instance in point is Ishtar, 'princely mistress' of Minid. This solar deity, Minid, 'mighty one of the gods,' remains even to the days of Nefeshendar up, a 'king of heaven and earth,' and in Assyria also is honoured with every conceivable epithet as god of war and the chase; whilst Assur is only occasionally invoked by the Mesopotamian divines in the lowest role of healer of diseases. In like manner, Juno came to be called by the Romans Juno Lucina, the special goddess of childbirth' (C. M. Gailey, "Clastic Myths, London, 1901, p. 204). No less a goddess than the beloved Ishtar (Astarte of Phrygia) often suffers the humiliation, which in other cases was reserved for other deities, of serving as the parasites of sensuality.

Another line of differentiation from the multitude of early municipal goddesses was the borrowing or transportation of favourite deities by other peoples, or the amalgamation of their qualities and names with those of native goddesses of the places into which they came. Nana of Erech was one of the first of the important goddesses of the early Sumerian period of Babylonia. Her name appears in many forms and places during early Semitic times: Nana, Nani, Nanya, Anitis, Anca, Tanath, etc., through a considerable list. In like manner she won a place in the worship of other nations.

'The worship of the Semitic goddess Nana of Erech is traced with probability in Phoenicia, with certainty in Syria, Babylonia, India, Asia Minor, and Greece. She had shrines with a similar name in Assyria-Babylonia, with Anahita in Perse, Armenia, and possibly in Babylonia with Ashur pattu (Astarte) in Rheneia, and went to the making of Artemis or Diana, of Aphrodite or Venus, and of Athena in the Greek world' (W. G. Gilmore, "New Schaff-Herzog," viii. 90).

It is possible, however, that the goddesses of Greece and Rome are instances of the law of fusion rather than of borrowing. It would seem that Greece and Rome worshipped goddesses of love in very early times, and that their importance was enhanced through association with foreign female deities.
2. Personality of female deities. — Goddesses have exchanged the place of their temporal and even everyday occupation as deities, with mental qualities to fit the part. There is, however, a law of differentiation of function as between male and female deities that sets the gods apart to exercise the after-cults as ruler, judge, protector, or conqueror, whilst goddesses symbolize the gentler and more heartful qualities of Nature and mind. Illustrations are the Greek Aurora, goddess of the dawn, analogue of Uṣā in India; Venus, the spirit of love and beauty; and the Scandinavian Freyja, goddess of the atmosphere and clouds, of marriage, and patroness of the tender affectation of married lovers, and of parental devotion. This specialization of function often produces a compassionate goddess whose prevailing presence can breathe solace in times of grief and pain, and inspire hope to the weary and heavy-hearted. Such is the lady often represented in India, with her almighty power as exact counterpart among the Iroquois, Aztecs, and Mayas of America and elsewhere (D. G. Brinton, The Religious Sentiment, New York, 1876, p. 68).

While it is true that Max Müller has pointed out (Contribution to the Science of Mythology, London, 1897, ii, 518), that female deities are purely abstract principles, it is safe to say that they are generally more spiritual than the gods. The name Minerva, goddess of wisdom and contemplation, is from the Latin, Greek, and Sanskrit words for mind. 'Among the Tzontals of Mexico was and is still worshipped the highest of goddesses, Alagon Naum, 'he who brings forth mind.' To her was due the mental and immaterial part of Nature; hence another of her names was Izta lX, the mother of wisdom' (Brinton, Myths of the New World, Philadelphia, 1896, p. 179). This pervasive quality of goddesses causes them to burrow in the deeps of things, whence they fix destinies, like the Fates—Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, daughters of Night. Of the members of the Egyptian triad, Osiris, Horus, and Isis—the last was par excellence the skilled magiЛan. Whilst many goddesses are resplendent with light, others are, since they dwell in the deeps of things, of a sinister character. Others combine both qualities, as is true of Durga, Kali, Kuan Yin, and Chánmunda, goddess, judge, protectress, and whom the worshipper prayers of little children, and at the same time are gloomy and foreboding. Female deities have often, thanks to their spiritual qualities, acted as intermediaries between gods and men. The Hindus are manifestly by their wife 'the Great Goddess,' Mahādevi. She 'with a thousand names and a thousand forms, is able to suffice the day by her eloquent presence (A. Barth, Religions of India, London, 1801, p. 199). It should not be supposed that, because goddesses are the more spiritual and pervasive presences, they lack integrity and stability. On the contrary, it is frequently maintained in the midst of change. The soil in which such a feeling springs is found in a myth rather wide-spread, that the original creative principle is female, and another belief that woman alone is endowed with immortality.

In making generalizations upon the gentler spiritual traits of goddesses, one should not forget the warlike proclivities of the Assyrian Ishtar, and that Minerva was also Pallais. Athena who hurled the thunderbolt (see also Ashtarti, Bengal, §§ 13, 31, Durgā, Earth, etc.).

3. Supreme goddesses. — Female deities have often enjoyed the highest place among the gods. This depends upon the nature of the social organization and the respect in which women are held. Clan-life in which the mother is the head of the group is likely to lift the 'mother-goddess' into a supreme position, provided the nation has risen above the stage of magic. The early Semites, who before their dispersion had a polyandrous social organization, are an illustration. G. A. Barton says of them:

'We only see more clearly [than did even W. Robertson Smith in his Religion of the Semites] that the chief deity of the clan was at this primitive time a goddess, and that, in so far as a male deity,planet,or conqueror part, was he the son and ruler (G. A. Barton, London, 1892, § 82, f.)

During Babylonia history her later equivalent, Ishtar, rose to a position 'independent of association with any male deity' and 'becomes the vehicle for the expression of the highest religious and ethical thought attained by the Babylonians' (Jastrow, 82 f.). Many other illustrations are found among the natives of America (E. J. Payne, History of the New World called America, Oxford, 1892-90, i. 402, ii. 480).

'The goddess Tamanō, Our Dear Mother, was the most highly venerated of the divinities, and it is because her mother fell upon Our Lady Guadalupe that the latter now can boast of the most popular shrine in Mexico' (Brinton, Myths, 179). It seems inevitable that, as the quilter agricultural pursuits, the worship of goddesses have fallen into the background, through the fusion of clans and cities into warring nations in which chivalry and virility are the chief, a premium on a more gentle and less raised, rine, while those of the 'weaker sex' have been degraded to lesser functions, attached as consorts, superseded and forgotten, or, to save themselves, have changed their sex to fit the new demands (cf. Barton, esp. P. 178-189).

India is unique in having the opposite history of higher appreciation of goddesses, along with its later development. It illustrates, however, the same principle in a negative way. The Vedas were written before and during the period when the Aryans were conquering the aborigines of India and were engaged in feuds among their own tribes. Under such conditions there are no goddesses, although the literature is richly polytheistic. Since the nation has settled down into a relatively peaceful life of agricultural pursuits, the worship of female deities has risen to a place of supreme importance; Durga, Kali, Sarasvati, and Kāli, soul of infinity and eternity; Sarasvatī, supreme wisdom; and Sakti, mother of all phenomena. This is not so strange in a land in which from the earliest times 'one of the highest object of tenderness' (Mann, iv. 185) and 'the mother is a thousand times more than the father' (li. 145), and in which there is the present phenomenon, as in the province of Malabar, of women holding a higher social and political position than men (Sister Nivedita, The Web of Indian Life, New York, 1904, p. 76 f.). Hence it is that the Hindu worshipper utters daily the prayer:

'O Mother Devī, Thou art beyond the reach of our praises; Thou pervadest every particle of the universe; all knowledge proceeds from Thee, O Infinite Source of Wisdom! Thou dwellst in every form, and all women are Thy living representatives upon earth' (Swami Abhedananda, India and Her People, New York, 1908, p. 253).

4. Goddesses of love.—The term 'love,' as shown in the sequel, is a fusion of three or four separate meanings. In this connection it is used in the sense of love of many kinds, with passion. There can be no doubt that certain goddesses of various countries have been patrons of courtship, marriage, and fecundity, and even of sensuality. The Aphrodite in Greece. Freyja in Scandinavia, Ishtar in Babylonia, and Tlalocitoatl of the Aztecs witnesses to this fact. The behaviour of many of these consorts of the gods is evidence that their wifely attributes were much in the thought of the wor-
shippers. The gods have often conducted themselves toward their mates in a wanton and sensuous manner. In addition to the worship of the deities of the Bacchanalian, the Phallicism of the Semitic peoples, and the spiritual unions of Christian mystics with Christ have been of a passionate sort.

In the main, according to W. James, the religion of St. Teresa 'seem[ed] to be of that of an endless introductory flirtation—if one may say so without irreverence—between the devotee and the Virgin' (Varieties of Religious Experience, New York, 1902, p. 347). The full extent of feminine attraction in religion cannot well be appreciated, however, without an adequate recognition of the retention of the private symbols of sex even after the goddesses themselves have lapsed into oblivion. The persistence of the symbols betrays how the concept and the accompanying impulse have been fixed, then abstracted, and finally blended into the central stream of religion. Among the commonest of these symbols and the least mistakeable in their meaning are representations of the reproductive organs, which are symbolized and still are used in the under currents of Shintoism in Japan (E. Buckley, Phallicism in Japan, Chicago, 1898; Griffis, The Religions of Japan, New York, 1895, pp. 29, 49, 58, 280-384). The tōgas in India is the symbol under which Siva is universally worshipped (J. Dowson, Dict. of Hindu Mythology, London, 1891, p. 177). The 'sign of the Mother Goddess,' the symbol of the female organ of reproduction, ramified through many of the Semitic cults (Whatham, AJP, July 1911, pp. 252-309).

Many writers regard certain pillars and posts of houses and altars, and signs carved upon these, as representations of the threshold of life of the mother-goddess (H. C. Trumbull, The Threshold Covenant, 1896, pp. 109-164, 228 ff.; Barton, 101 f., 251, 253, etc.). There are wide-spread serpent-stories and serpent-symbolism in religion (H. Ellis, Psychology of Sex Auto-emotion, Philadelphia, 1905, p. 206) which are supposed to typify sex (G. W. Cox, Myth. of Argyan Nations, London, 1887, p. 353). Fruit-bearing trees, their boughs, their fruit, bunches of grapes, and even the gams that exude from the tree, have been regarded as sacred symbols of the reproductive principle of Nature, and perhaps contain a strain of sexual obsession (W. R. Smith, Rel. of the Anc. Egyptians, London, 1897, p. 138). In Egypt and amongst the Survites in India, the lotus is a symbol of the reproductive act (Crenzer, Symbolik und Mythologie, Leipzig, 1836-43, 1 i. 412). The Buddhists of the north countries still repeat, without suspecting the origin of the phrase, 'Om! The jewel in the lotus.' (Brinton, The Religious Sentiment, 214).

In the West, too, these symbols persist, even when, as also among the Buddhists, they contradict the central doctrine of the religion in which they appear. In later Rome, women carried phallic emblems in the processions in their favour. This was prohibited by the Council of Mars in 1247, and again by the Council of Tours in 1396 (Encyc. Am., art. 'Phallus': on the survivals of old cults, Barton, 203-206). See further, PHALICISM.

When one combines the presence of these phallic rites and emblems with the fact that religion has amongst most peoples a greater or less extent become symphallic, it is evident that the lotus, sarasvatī, the serpent, Siva, and other orgastic veils, and often has with seeming purpose ended in the most unbridled passion, it cannot be doubted that there is something in common between 'love' and the religious sentiment (cf. art. CHASTITY). This is so evident that many students have gone to the extent of affirming their complete identity.

The judgment of M. de Vigny: 'We find that all religions have engaged and concerned themselves with the sexual passion; from the times of Phallic worship through Jewish celibacy, Mohammedanism, witchcraft, to Mormonism, the female is drawn to man's reproductive instinct' (Journ. Med. Science, 1874, p. 198). Even a sober student as the 'beginnings of the Semitic religion go back to the sexual relation' (Sem. Or, 167), and 'that the religions and moral development of many has been closely bound up with fatherhood and motherhood' (p. 307).

Since other writers hold the opposite view of this much debated question, namely, that the sexual content of religion or even deny the connexion altogether, the restrictions and limitations of its unqualified acceptance should be pointed out. An enthusiasm, it is claimed, fostered by the pursuit of a new theory, has blinded students to the multitude of facts pointing in the contrary direction. Some of these are as follows. The greater number of female deities have little or no connexion whatever with sex. Such, for example, are Ceres and Minerva of Rome, and Sarasvati and Lakshmi of India. Even those of 'love' have often subserved primarily other functions. The Asshur-tanis of Assyrian legend are one such; and it is a function of her original prototype that, while a chaste love entered into her relationship with her subjects, she was essentially a goddess of war, of battles, of protection, and was oftentimes a violent destroyer (Jastrow, 204 f.). So much does tradition distort her true picture that she has been handed down essentially in her connexion with the tender passion. There is a curious trait in human nature by virtue of which scanda] travels farther and faster than sober fact. It must be reckoned with in judging the character of those deities and their worship.

The lively imagination of the supporters of the phallic theory of the nature of religion, it would seem, has led to a confusion and distortion in seeing sexual significance in symbols where none exists. The serpent has clearly been an emblem of lightening, of graceful curves, of sinister presences, and many other things. Its place in religious symbolism cannot justly be called invariably a sign of sex (cf. W. R. Smith, 158, and esp. Brinton, The Religious Sentiment, 206-209). The lotus is a token of beauty, of spirituality, and, since it springs forth miraculously from its impure surroundings, of resurrection (Wiedemann, Rel. of the Anc. Egyptians, London, 1897, p. 138). Pillars and columns have been loaded down with phallic significance from the remotest period to the present day. Others are much more cautious in their generalization (cf. W. R. Smith, 456 f. et al.; Moore, Ash'toreth and 'Masseleah', in BDI). The way in which doorsposts, columns of many kinds, obelisks, towers, and steeples have been seized upon as phallic signs illustrates more clearly perhaps the law of apperception in mental behaviour than the sexual content of religion.

It should be borne in mind, too, that religion has tried to suppress or regulate or even to eliminate every type of eroticism. It has practised and preached celibacy in India, Egypt, Europe, Mexico; and elsewhere. The conception of the universe, the seasons, and the months have been linked with the sun, the moon, and many other celestial objects, until the distinction between the sacred and the profane has been almost completely lost. It is from this point of view that authors who have written on the subject of the Virgin birth have come to the conclusion that they are concerned with human beings who sprang from the
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brain of Jove. It has created goddesses who have ignored and transcended any connexion with 'love.' Because Vesta, the guardian of the home and companion of the hearth, rejected all suitors, and in the place of honour in his palace; and in the sacred temples of men on earth she was blessed with a position of highest reverence. Vestal virgins (as also in Mexico and Peru), whose chastity was forfeited at the cost of life, attended her sacred altar. Those who would magnify the erotic element in religion have been wont to think that the presence of priestesses and their attendants, in the exaltation of the other sex, has shown that there is much evidence for it, there are equally convincing proofs that religion has succeeded in preserving the chastity of its worshippers (cf. Jastrow, 536). The large rôle that priestesses have filled in ritual and worship is sufficiently explained on the ground of the finer nervous organization of women and their capability of more delicate emotional response, and hence their special fit-
ness to act as oracle-givers, witches, sorceresses, mediumis, and diviners of the will of the god (Jastrow, 492, 485, 530). It is fair to judge religions, like individuals, at their average best rather than at their worst.

If these considerations as the above would indicate that between eroticism and religion there is at most a kinship rather than an identity. Their inter-relation comes about for two reasons: first, the similarities of the psychoses involved, and second, the almost uncontrollable intensity of the reproductive instincts which religion is trying to regulate. On the first point the law is stated correctly by Brinton:

'Emotion is the sentiment and you arouse the passion of love, which will be directed as the temperament and indi-
vidual culture prompt. Develop very profoundly any form of love, and by a native affinity it will seize upon and consecrate to its own use whatever religious aspirations the individual has. This is the general law of their relation' (The Religious Sentiment, 73).

The other aspect of the law is that religion acts as a control or a regulative function of all phases of life. That sensuality breaks out in it is evidence simply that the strength of the sexual life, due to its utility in conserving biological ends, constantly threatens personal well-being and social symmetry, and that religion has had, therefore, an especially difficult task to keep it in check. This regulation it accomplishes in two ways: by repression, as we have seen, and also by refinement. The refining process consists in the suppression on the one hand of the coarser form of the love impulse, and on the other of the desire to conserve it for the higher levels of consciousness, or 'spiritualizing' it, and then blending it completely with all the other instincts and impulses that subserve life's needs. Philicisms at their best have in this way been softened and dignified and also weakened by being relatively lost in the rich fusion with other strains of mental life. Griffs, for example, in describing the phallic observances in Japan, says: 'I have never had reason to look upon the implements or the system as anything else than the endeavour of man to solve the mystery of Being and Power' (Religions of Japan, p. 51). It is the failure to appreciate the cost of life, the lowering and over-intense forms of the love impulse, and at the same time the effort to spiritualize and harmonize it with the rest of the complex, that has led to much making debate and false interpretation of its place in religion.

5. The female element in terms of the meaning of religion as a whole.—The older emphasis of the rôle of love in religion is thus due to the supposition that religion exists to preserve some form of the love impulse, and at the same time to check its excesses. It does not seek to gratify any taste or appetite, but is for the sake of getting on. It seems to be a function of life as a whole, and is in terms of adjustment and fulfillment. It has, like life in all its relations, an 'antidoteic' or 'tele-
thetic' quality to the world of ideal situations. It has also its 'opposite' or 'complementary' aspect, by which it seeks delicately to adjust life to the immediate situations around it. The worshipper consequently responds to the present and future in terms of what life, attended for whatever with whatever is at hand in the accidents of his surroundings. Among the needs are protection and safety. Gods have been especially useful in this relation. Another need is the increase of crops, herds, and children. Goddesses have been the natural and convenient symbols of fertility and increase. Many of them have filled the rôle simply and solely of ensuring the increase of crops and herds except in so far as, by an easy and natural process of association, the life of sex has been caught up as an incident in their worship.

Diana was 'a personification of the teeming life of nature' (GB, vol. I, vol. II, p. 68). Even the 'marrriages' of gods and god-
desses performed in her cult were charms to promote the growth of crops (ib. p. 121). In Palestine, during drought, the maidens and women carried a winning-form of a woman, called it the 'bride of God,' and performed ritual with it to bring rain. There is no evidence that it was connected with the ceremony except that of exalting a magical influence over the weather. In seeking to compel increase and induce proper management has used the ogre custom of the hood of a symbol, but the cow, the bull, the grape, and any-
thing that the imagination could connect with the increase of crops with a positive observation of erotic customs (ib. pp. 104-112). In the rich literature of the Rigveda there were endless piotations of petitions for abundance of crops, herds, and children, and the reaction and success with it was all male, and there is essentially no evidence of anyatory religious sentiments among the gods or men.

Another great problem of religion has been the question of the origin of things. Femininity has again proved a natural and convenient symbol of creation — but so has the egg, which may, for example, split, one part becoming the heavens and the other the earth.

'Half of the Vedic religions are, in fact, characterised by the cult of an androgenous or female divinity. The ākāti, . . . has its roots . . . in a sexual dualism, placed at the beginning of things (in a Brāhmana of the Yajur-Veda, for instance, Frāśpāli is androgynous), or of a common womb in which beings are formed, which is also their common tomb' (Barth, 200).

Femininity is thus clearly one factor only in the larger business of religion as adjustment and fulfill-
ment.

6. Sexless deities.—It is suggestive of the limita-
tion of the place of femininity in religion that, along with growth, religion has progressively not only emphasized virgins, continent priestesses, and worship, but also conceived as well sexless and hermaphrodite deities and angels, and also gods and goddesses who transcend considerations of sex entirely. Centrally, as the religious impulse does, in feeling the larger life or 'the sentiment of con-
tinuance,' it has thus sought to express the unity of Nature and life in the purely human. It has, therefore, been fond of combining both sexes in one personality, or of fusing, in a deity who happens to be by name of a certain sex (due, let us say, to the limitations of language), the qualities of the opposite sex.

'In the Vaishnavas we see masculine strength united with maidenly softness: in the traditional face and figure of Christ a still more striking example of how the most minute of traits of both sexes to express the highest flexibility of the species' (Brinton, The Religious Sentiment, 67).

Were it not for the fact that gods, irrespective of sex, subserve the higher functions of protector, helper, and unifier, how could one explain the fact that Ishtar sometimes appears as female among the Semites and as male among the others.

In the highest general function of life, the highest of all functions, have risen superior to sex. The God of Muhammad, white calling forth a holy prophet from a virgin mother,
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'begettestth no children'; to impute such to Him would be so gross an impiety as to threaten the clearing of the heavens assunder and the destruction of the earth.' It is not meet for God that He should have a son; God forbid! When He decreeth a thing He only saith unto it 'Be' and it is, (Qur'an, xix., 'He begettesth not, neither is He begotten' (exii).)

Such likewise are Brahma and Jahwhe.

In the female godhead the erotic consciousness of the Heavens, the idea of divine fatherhood is entirely dissociated from the physical basis of natural fatherhood. Man was created in this passion, but never so as to make him a thing of nature but a thing of grace' (W. R. Smith, 41).

More barbaric religions, not being able to regard in terms of aesthetic or moral values or general concepts, have been compelled to picture things in more concrete terms. Deities have sometimes been, therefore, progenitors, just as at other times they are potters who shape men from clay.

Particularly among uncultured people it has been a convenience to represent 'Reality,' the higher self, and the present and possible relationship of the individual to the racial and universal life, as in a softened, refined, or almost imperceptible form, or transcended and left behind. Both these things are likely to happen, each in its own way.

7. Summary of psychological theories.—The interpretations of our problem from the standpoint of psychological discussion have been extremely diverse. Although somewhat antagonistic among themselves, they lie in the same sphere, as truth in each and all of them. Characteristic theories are here described, arranged as far as possible in a series from the least to the most satisfactory.

(a) Degeneration.—A popular conception has been that there is little or no connexion between the female sentiment and religion. Whenever they have mingled, it is because the reproductive passion has broken through its proper bounds. This notion of their antithesis has arisen out of the law of contrast, by which the high and the low, the good and the bad, are sharply set off against each other. This inevitable tendency has gradually produced the two incompatible worlds of 'grace' and 'nature,' the 'sacred' and 'secular'—a contrast unknown to the primitive mind—with 'religion' confined to the one sphere, and the biological function of reproduction to the other; and it has ended in making each a rival to control the other. Modern psychological conceptions have undermined such artificial distinctions. The truth of this notion rests upon the vast difference, through development, between the 'lower' and the 'higher' which is the refined, intellectualized, and controlled expression of the tender passion; and upon the fact of the strength and persistence of sex, with its consequent dangers from the crasser forms of its expression. Its failure to remain in the resultant divided and incoherent personality, the sensualizing of the biological function by freeing it from the control of the higher sentiments, and in limiting religion to a relatively narrow field of highly abstracted values.

(b) Identity.—Many students take exactly the opposite view, and regard the religious impulse as primarily, if not solely, the refinement of reproduction. Love in religion is a spiritualized form of love for mates. In the development of individuals the curve of frequency for conversions and other religions awakenings is essentially coincident with that of the reproductive functions (Starbuck, The Psychology of Religion, London, 1899, ch. iii.). The phenomena attending the stress of conviction for sin are similar to the disturbances of sex (ib. 185, 296). There are marked likenesses between 'love' at its highest and mystical states of religion (Hall, Adolescence, New York, 1904, ii. 295-301). A genetic series of 'love-states,' from its physiological sinking to its highest mystical qualities, identical with those of religion, is easily describable (ib. ii. 126-143). The pathology of the two shows remarkable similarities.

(c) Regeneration.—Religion—man's sentiment of continuance and feeling after perfection, or, as theologians prefer to call it, God's revelation to the mind and guidance in the heart—has been trying to reconcile itself to the need of ascendance. It has tried to incorporate the reproductive instinct in order to regulate its intensity and to eliminate promiscuity (Marshall, Instinct and Reason, New York, 1898, pp. 309-316). In earlier times, biologically, in the absence of the care of children, the perpetuity of the species depended upon multiplicity of offspring. Under such circumstances there must have been a utility in an uncontrolled passion for reproduction. The laws of heredity and recapitulation have brought up this old strain into human life. The conditions later changed. With the increased advantage to the species of having the family as the basis of social organization, the condition of advancement was the establishment of monogamous marriages, and the consequent weakening of the sexual impulse. Religion is in part the crystallization of this feeling and of the need of such regulation. It has, therefore, taken over into itself the function of sex and marriage, and has used every conceivable means of exercising control over them. It has hedged them about with reproductive functions which are frequently celibates or eunuchs, with ritual and ceremony too solemn to be disregarded, and with gods and goddesses whose will could not
be withstood. It has made marriage difficult to enter, has tested the fitness of mates by periods of long delay, and has sealed their union by forbidding divorce. It has uttered its admonitions, prohibitions, and punishments, but wherever it has attempted to restrain the passions, and direct the mind into a sense of the dignity and sacredness of this phase of life, when limited to the channels of social and spiritual well-being.

Adaptation. — But religion has at times assumed the positive attitude of stimulating the reproductive impulse under its controlled form. The reason for this is to be found in the social sense of the need of increasing the number of individuals in the tribe or nation, combined with the individual recognition of special fulfillment through progency. Primitive warring tribes have shown much concern over the birth of the greatest possible number of male children. It is natural that this need should be taken up and made part of the business of religion. No warrior could enter Valhalla in early Germanic times who had not begotten a son. Again, the Mormons one condition and position in heaven depends upon the number of offspring brought forth under the regulation of the 'family.' Modern governments have taken seriously the problem of encouraging marriages and the production of living children. Since the discovery and stimulation of such matters has come over, through specialization, into a body of social customs and also under State control, it has inevitably come about that religion has progressively loused itself, to a greater extent relatively, with ideal adjustments irrespective of the relation of mates. So much is this the case that in the empirical study of the religious confessions of normal persons at the present time there has been carried up into religion a rich blending of fear, self-regard, hunger, self-expression, love, curiosity, and many others. Each of these can be traced from its simple, crude forms to its highly refined existence. It has something with every phase of the mental life. It has been a fascinating theme of students to trace out these relations. Fear, for example, betrays itself by the presence in religion of demons, hell, sacrifice, priestcraft, and the like, and also, with a slight blend from other instincts, as the sense of majesty and reverence, which characterizes religion at its best. Self-regard, likewise, develops from the seeking for mere benefits up to the craving for perpetuity through immortality, and at last becomes the esthetic demand for ideal perfection. The temptation of such procedure, since a certain渗透 permeates entirely the higher religious life, is to give way to the fascination of the description, and conclude, therefore, that religion is nothing else than the single instinct in question. It is analogous to the procedure of an amateur chemist who should be entirely satisfied with discovering a single element in a compound, because he is sure that it permeates every part of the solution. There is perhaps not an instinct that does not, and with much, and just to be the all-filling source and content of the religious life. The enthusiasm of the sex psychologists in particular, during recent years, has resulted in a strange confusion. Many of the facts that seem to the popular mind with religion only want more careful scrutiny to betray their insufficiency. Much has been made of the coincidence and concomitance during adolescence of reproductive and religious awakenings. (On the similarity of these curves of frequency, see ch. ii. for value of this kind of reasoning, consult W. James, pp. 385, 460.) There is no evidence, however, of a causal relationship. On the contrary, it is clear that for the most part on the mental side they are contradictory and antithetical. The coincidence seems to be due to the prevalence of initiation ceremonies practised among all primitive peoples. The modern equivalent is a custom of confirmation. These ceremonies celebrate the entrance of young men and women into the social, political, and religious ways of the clan, and mark at the same time the fitness for marriage. A process of long social selection in connexion with these ceremonies, through weeding out the mentally and physically unfit, has called out and accentuated the eventful period of early adolescence, with its marked readjustment in the complex strain of character, and the sudden calling out of reproductive instincts, whereinto, the fitness for both the civic and the marital relationship, it is but a matter of course that the awakenings of sex and religion should be synchronous. Keeping in mind the distinction between the cause and condition of a mental happening, one may safely say simply that frequently in adolescence the explosive quality of the 'love' instinct touches off a large stock of activities, insights, and interests which are not limited, and among these, the religious impulse. But religion is 'touched off' also by a score of other adolescent nascences, such as scientific insight, logical aumen, and the joy of conquest, and many more frequently so than by the sexual impulse. So markedly is this true that it is not safe to conclude that the reproductive instinct furnishes to any considerable degree the raw material out of which religion is constructed.

The reasoning from the pathology of sex and religion is equally at variance with the facts. That the pathologies of eroticism are likely to take on a religious cast none will doubt. This is the correct clue and it is meaningless to dwell on such fanatics. In the case of Swedenborg, for example, the evidences from his journal and from his writings are conclusive that his 'divine love' and 'angelic wisdom' are— not wholly, but in the effluvia from an unstable and over-excitant erotic temperament. Other instances can be found, particularly among the radical mystics. They are the exceptions, however, from which alienists have derived too sweeping generalizations.

Religions and sexual insanities are both extremely complex psychoses. Each draws from many sources. There are on the one hand many religious insanities that have no sexual setting (J. c.), and on the other many kinds of sexual insanity that do not take a religious turn. The small part that either sex or religion occupies in the whole range of insanities is indicated by statistical studies. Out of 60,918 male inmates in the asylums of England and Wales during the years 1875-1887 there were but 2·57% whose disturbances took the form of religious or sexual expression, sex deaths to sexual or reproductive causes (H. Ellis, in Tuke, p. 1154). It is from these two small and relatively incompatible fields that the facts have been found from which wholesome conclusions have been obtained. Not so, however, when we turn to the raw material from many other sources than sex, but religion is
an indefinitely bigger thing than mysticism, which itself only occasionally shows exaggerated eroticism. That there is more in religion than irradiations of sex is suggested by the fact that alienists of the 19th and 20th centuries have been attracted by its humanizing, restraining, steadying, and stimulating influence (cf. Gasquet in Tuke, 1088–91). Nor can this be suspected as an instance of similia similibus curantur. The occurrence, it should be said, of the interplay of erotic mysticism and sexual insanity is due to the law of association which operates amongst the emotions no less than in the cognitive processes. Religion is the whole-hearted response of the devotee to his sense of absolute values. Its psychoses tend to be completely obsessive and voluminous. This is the character, too, of all the instincts, particularly of the sexual emotion. It is to be expected, therefore, that in the exaggerated form mysticism and eroticism should blend, even if, as is true, they draw for the most part from different sources and have a somewhat independent history.

The greatest oversights of the identity theory of the female sentiment and religion is the supposition that love, which is the central fact of religion, has had its sole origin in sex (cf. Mercier, *Sanity and Insanity*, London, 1890, p. 220). But love is a compound. It has at least three somewhat independent sources—sex, gregariousness, and Nature appreciation. The evolution of the first has brought into religion the tender affection for kind, while its exaggeration results in phallicism and erotics of many sorts. The refinements of gregariousness have created the sentiments of fellowship, sympathy, and loyalty to kind, regardless of sex, and which have provided the basis for the social life, on the one hand, and unreflecting missionary zeal on the other. Nature appreciation, the sheer enjoyment of things in and for themselves, has ripened into a sense of presences of objects, and at last into Nature-gods and Nature-religions. Gregariousness, or ‘sociality,’ as M. J. Guyau calls it (*Non-Religion of the Future*, London, 1897, p. 44), can exist independently of sex. In his fine analysis, Ribot (*Psychology of the Emotions*, London, 1897, pp. 276–303) points out that gregariousness is founded upon nutrition, the will to live, and the attraction of like for like, irrespective of sex, while the development of sex and mother-love lead to these. These two, although having an element in common, have remained, in the course of evolution, ‘distinct and mutually independent’ (p. 280). It is clear, therefore, to the present writer, that the gregariousness of life, irrespective of sex, that the true social and moral feelings are developed, whereas the sentiments that arise in connexion with ‘domestic aggregates’ based upon the tender emotion are ‘restricted to a closed group, without expansive force or elasticity’ (p. 281). Societies formed within the same sex, or even among members of different species, or among animals like bees and ants in which reproduction is but a brief incident for perpetuating the species and limited to a few—all such societies, because of their common interests and contacts, show loyalties, fellowships, and loves of the most saving kind. The co-operation is based upon the instinct of conservation, and the attraction is derived from the interplay of personalities which becomes part of the mental and spiritual furnishing of each individual, in the absence of which there is a loss of stimulus and enrichment. If this dualistic theory of the separate origin of the family group and the social group is correct, as seems highly probable, then the human instinctive and general psychology would be that morality and religion, which are primarily in terms of fellowship, have drawn far more from the gregarious instinct than from sex. The empirical evidences, as we have seen, emphatically support this view. In this connexion it is suggestive that sex is but a specialized form of reproduction, the latter having been performed originally through division, and that both reproduction and sex are functions of the will to live. The reproductive system, for example, is a specialization, embryologically, of the nutritive organs. These considerations would seem to fortify the one point of view that religion, besides being in the interest of the adjustment and fulfillment of the developing higher life, and not for the sake of any special sentiment.

The root of the difficulty, then, with the identity theory of sex and religion is, in the first place, the failure to appreciate that love in religion is a compound of the tender emotion, the gregarious instinct, and Nature attachments, the first suffusing the other two with an esthetic quality, and furnishing them with a basis for external reference; secondly, the failure to see that religion is a compound of all the instincts. The female sentiment is, therefore, but one of the ingredients—more important formerly than now—in a rich compound of sentiments called by the single name ‘religion,’ whose function is ideal adjustment.

Cf. also *Phallicism, Religion, Sex. Literature.—This has been indicated in the article.*

EDWIN D. STARBUCK.

**FENG-SHUI.**—Chinese dictionaries give no definition of what is to be understood by Feng-Shui. No native treatises expound it upon scientific lines. Feng is ‘wind,’ shui is ‘water.’ Wind is what cannot be seen, and water what cannot be grasped. ‘Wind and water’ is the term, therefore, for the ocular sensations which are always bearing down upon human life. Professors of Feng-Shui prefer that it should remain a mystery, and those who pay them for their services accept the position, declaring that it is not to be expected that common people should understand the unfathomable. Eitel (*Feng-Shui, or the Rudiments of Natural Science in China*) calls it a conglomeration of rough guesses at Nature. It undoubtedly grew out of naturalistic beliefs, though it has become distorted and degraded into a gross superstition.

Practically there is little religion in China but such as springs out of Feng-Shui. The worship of ancestors, the reverence for the gentry, the desire to have the good fortune of the gentry, the reverence for the gentry, the reverence for the gentry, etc., is indissolubly connected with it. It enters into every important arrangement of daily life. Every proposed change must be brought to the test of its Feng-Shui. All events which are favourable or adverse, are explained by it. It is spoken of with reverence and awe. The common people are its slaves. Confucianist gentry laugh at the Feng-Shui doctor, but are careful to fall in with his theories and commands. Chinese law does not discuss it, but the courts always act on the presumption that its principles are not fictitious. The Government, though not acknowledging it, publishes every year an Imperial almanac giving all the lists, figures, and diagrams which are required by its professors and their victims. When a rebellion breaks out, the first act of the authorities is not to raise troops, but to send envoys to spoil the Feng-Shui of the rebel leaders by despoiling their ancestral tombs. And, when selling land to foreigners, the mandarins are careful to assign them only what is believed to have bad Feng-Shui.

S. Wells Williams (*The Middle Kingdom*, ii, 246) remarks that this geomantic and spiritualistic faith became systematized in the times of Chu Hi, who lived under the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960–1275). Chu Hi’s commentaries on the Chinese Classics are read in every school; and his mode of thinking has been adopted by modern Confucian-
ism. His theory is that the soul has a dual nature, consisting of the animus and anima—sometimes called the breath of Heaven and the breath of Earth. The anima is the material spiritual element; the animus is the male or material element. So long as a man lives, these two principles co-exist in combination, but at death the union is dissolved. The anima returns to heaven, the animus to earth. While man wanders in a vast and light in space. The animus enjoys freedom of movement, but chooses to limit its peregrinations to the vicinity of its former habitat, and to the company of the people with whom it was formerly associated. The anima lies quiet in the tomb, provided that the tomb has good Feng-Shui. The Chinese believe themselves to be compassed about by a great cloud of witnesses in the persons of their ancestors and forbears generally, and they hold that the spirits of these deceased relatives are omnipresent in the elements of Nature.

Here we arrive at the practical point which is of such extreme interest to believers in Feng-Shui. The selection of a grave is the most vitally important matter in a man's life. The quiet repose of the anima in its tomb is essential to the well-being of its mortal relations. The tomb must be in consonance with that of the universe; and in case it will be disposed favourably towards those members of its family who survive. If otherwise, so low is its ethical character in this disembodied state that it will make havoc of their fortunes.

The Feng-Shui Sien-Sang, or doctors of the geomantic art, know how to profit by these delusions. They are ridiculed and satirized, but universally feared. Nothing affecting the welfare of a family can be decided without their help. They are called in for consultation on a great variety of occasions. Guided by a curious compass with cabalistic signs, they solemnly profess to be able to judge whether a grave is in the proper position, whether it is safe to build a house on a particular spot, or whether a business is likely to prosper where the shop or office stands. If the client is rich, it takes a long while, so the Chinese say, for the learned doctor to arrive at a decision. A coffin corpse may have to remain for years on a shelf in a temple, or to lodge under a shed, till all appears secure. Or, disasters may befall the family after the burial of their relative; whereupon the Sien-Sang declares that the bones must be unearthed and stored in a jar until better Feng-Shui is discovered. If the districts where these jars are filled are co-existent, or a lid is awaiting the populace. Any one disturbing them would do so at the risk of his life. A temporary pagoda is sometimes erected as a regulative influence in order to test the quality of the Feng-Shui; but the pestilence breaks out, and some talented youths in the district win honours at the local examinations, the Feng-Shui is proved to be good. A permanent pagoda then takes the place of the temporary one. These pagodas, as regulating the streams of spirit influence in wauling off the evil or attracting the good, are supposed to exercise a remarkable power in producing talent in students. For this reason they are placed with high pointed roofs in imitation of a pencil or writing brush; and they are often spoken of as 'towers of literature,' the topmost storey being furnished with an image and shrines.

As it is necessary sometimes to build a pagoda to attract or to divert streams of lucky influence, so it is sheer madness to build tall chimneys, to place chimney on houses, to erect telegraph poles and semaphore signals, to cast up a railway embankment, or even to dig for coal. There is no knowing what mischief may be done by such rash adventures.

Some German missionaries near Hong Kong built two little watch-towers in their house. One of these houses is a mile away. Its enraged owners threatened to burn down the whole mission premises. The missionaries argued that the spirit of the house would never dare to do it; but if he stood up, but not if he was lying down quietly in his grave. No discussion of any avail until the house was discovered to be dead was compromised by a substantial money payment to the living!

Much of the violence of the people in Canton, Tientsin, and Peking against foreigners and Christianity is due to the erection by Roman Catholics of lofty cathedral buildings, which upset the Feng-Shui of the whole district. The objection to railways, with their cuttings, tunnels, embankments, and signal-posts, is of the same nature. The first railway in China, from Shanghai to the port of Wu-sung, nine miles away, was purchased and destroyed by the Chinese; for the men who work with the speed of the train destroyed the Feng-Shui of tens of thousands of people on both sides of the line.

With a view to warding off evil influences which are presumed to exist, the custom prevails of building brick or stone signal-posts, or semaphore towers, with painted lucky symbols, or words of defiance, or the rampant figures of savage beasts.

When the Feng-Shui is bad, it can be improved. A low hill may be raised, or a rugged hill-top may be lowered. A straight road or watercourse may be made serpentine. A pond may be laid out on the south side of a cemetery, or a tree which obstructs the favourable spirit-breezes may be cut down.

The Chinese believe that the British have mastered the whole science and art of Feng-Shui. To quote Eitel's reference to the evidences of this in Hong Kong:

'Hong Kong, with its 'abundance of rocks and boulders scattered about on the hillsides, abound in malign breath, and the Chinese think our Government very wise in endeavouring to plant trees everywhere on the hill to screen these harbinger of evil. But the most malificent influence under which Hong Kong suffers is caused by that curious rock on the edge of the hill near Wanchai. It is distinctly seen from Queen's Road East, and forebodes generally in Eitel and Abel, China, as not slaying his brother. The Chinese take the rock to represent a female figure, which they call the bad woman; and they firmly believe that all the immorality of Hong Kong, all the recklessness and vice of Taiping-shan, are caused by this wicked rock. So firmly is the belief impressed upon the local people that there is a Ko-go that those who profit by immoral practices actually go and worship that rock. A rope is spread out on the rock, and the rock is sacred. The British Government have taken care that the rock is at its foot. None dare to injure it; and I have been told by some otherwise sensible people that several stone-cutters who attempted to quarry at the base of the rock died a sudden death immediately after the attempt.'

From all this it will be perceived that Feng-Shui is not strictly a religious doctrine. It is held by no sect. It has no temple, no priesthood, no ritual. It founds no college, nor has it an authorized professorship. Yet its occult influences pervade the whole of Chinese society. It might be called the materialistic faith of China. It has nothing to do merely with happiness and misery, but virtue and vice are generated. Its origin is the current of Nature's breath over the surface of the earth, the configuration of the landscape deciding the limits of its powers. It is a mode of thought characteristic of primitive times. It views heaven and earth as one great fest, animated (as Eitel points out) by a blind, unintelligent, but omnipotent vitality. In place of the idea of the divinity of the sun, the Chinese have substituted the idea of the immortality of the earth. Instead of stars it speaks of hills. Rivers and lakes take the place of the Milky Way.

Philosophically, it maintains that the prismatic cause of the existence of illuminated objects is 'the Great Nothing.' When it began to move, the great male principle came into being; and when it rested, the female
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Armenian)

In the ancient Armenian calendar there are two kinds of abstinence—absolute and relative. Absolute abstinence (fasting) is practised on the first 5 days of Aradjarwarkh (three weeks before Carnival Sunday), and for the 6 weeks of Lent, beginning with Ash-Wednesday and continuing till the Saturday before Palm-Sunday (but see below, Relative abstinence prevents every Wednesday and Friday in the year, and also during (a) the week of Pentecost (the abstinence of the prophet Elijah), 5 days; (b) the week preceding the Feast of Gregory the Illuminator (the 3rd week after Pentecost), 5 days; (c) the Transfiguration (the 6th week after Pentecost), 5 days; (d) the week preceding the Sunday of the Assumption of the Holy Virgin, 5 days; (e) the week preceding the Sunday of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross, 5 days; (f) the week preceding the Feast of St. George, or the Feast of the Cross of Varaj; (g) the week preceding the Feasts of Archangels and Angels; (h) the week of Julife; (i) the week preceding the Feast of St. James of Nisibis; (j) the 7 days preceding the Christmas Epiphany Feast.

During Lent there is no fasting on Saturdays and Sundays, and the same holds for all Holy Week, but abstinence is practised. In none of the above-mentioned cases is abstinence practised on Saturdays, except on the eve of the Transfiguration, of the Assumption of the Exaltation of the Cross, of Christmas, and of Easter; on these days

1 See also art. CALENDAR (Armenian) and the Literature there cited; also Ormanian, Church of Armenia, Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 172 ff.


Iranian (L. H. Gray), p. 872.

Jain (M. Stevenson), p. 875.

Japanese—See CALENDAR (Japanese).

Jewish (S. Poznanski), p. 879.

Laotian.—See Laos.

Mexican and Mayan.—See Calendar (Mexican and Mayan).

Muslim (K. Violier), p. 881.

Nepalese (J. H. Bateson), p. 884.

Roman.—See Roman Religion.


FERTILITY.—See HARVEST, MAGIC.

FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Armenian)
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Buddhist) — The Buddhist calendar prescribes the following festivals and fasts.

1. Upasatha. — The Upasatha days owed their existence to the ancient Vedic custom of holding sacred days or periods in honor of the new moon (Durka) and the full moon (Purnamasa). These feast, or sacred, days were called Upavasatha, and offerings of intoxicating soma were made in connection with the worship of the sun. According to Buddhist tradition, the monks of non-Buddhist sects were accustomed to meet together at the middle and at the close of every half-month in order to proclaim their new teaching in public. At such times the people gathered together, and the different sects found their opportunity of increasing their numbers and influence. The Buddhists adopted the custom of these periods for their fasts, but confined themselves to meeting twice in each month. In later times the intermediate quarter-month days were also held sacred, and so the number of Upasathas was increased to four in every month. The words of the Upasatha are: 'I present food to you on the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth day of each month.' In the Dhammika Sutta the wording is: 'Moreover, being of a pious mind, one should observe Upasatha on the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth day of the lunar fortnight.' The fourteenth and fifteenth days must be taken to mean the fourteenth day from the new moon in short months and the fifteenth in long months.

2. Though the idea of four monthly fast-days was borrowed from Brahmanism and other non-Buddhist sources, the manner in which they were kept was entirely original. It was not proper to trade or do any business; hunting and fishing were forbidden; schools and courts of justice were closed. They were also, from ancient times, fasting-days. The laity were to celebrate the days with clean garments and clean minds. Special observance of the moral precepts was inculcated on these days. In the Dhammika Sutta the eight precepts are detailed, and it is added: 'Such, they say, is the eight-fold fast (Upasatha) declared by Buddha, which came to the world through the Four Eleventh.' The eight precepts were: (1) not to destroy life; (2) not to take what is not given; (3) not to tell lies; (4) not to become drunkers of intoxicating liquors; (5) to refrain from unlawful sexual intercourse; (6) not to eat unseasonable fruits at night; (7) not to wear garlands or use perfumes; and (8) not to sleep on a mat spread on the ground. Furthermore, the brethren and sisters were to make use of the gatherings to confess to the assembled the sins and faults which each had committed, and to take upon themselves the penance which the transgression incurred.

At this Upasatha ceremony the Pattimokka, which forms the second Khandhaka of the Maha-vagga, had to be recited. 'This (Pattimokka) will be their Upasatha service.' Explicit directions are given in regard to the ceremony: an Upasatha was to be held in a clearly defined district; at

1 SEE xii. Introd. p. x; Monier-Williams, Buddhism, London, 1888, pp. 84 and 236; Ibys Davids, Buddhism, do, 1899, p. 138 of the New, of the Aramaic, Gregory arranged that the Feast of St. John the Baptist should be celebrated on the same date as the fast. After the fall of the Arsacid dynasty, this arrangement was abandoned, and the Feast of St. John the Baptist passed over into the ranks of the simple Feasts of the Saints.

3 Feast of Diwam Anurah.. — A fortnight after the beginning of the year, on the 13th of Naxard, Gregory commemorated the Feast of the goddess Anahit (on whom see ERE i. 797). Gregory the Illuminator transformed this into the Feast of the Imme of the Holy Virgin. The feast was brought by St. Bar-
Festivals and Fasts (Buddhist)
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Celtic).—1.

FESTIVALS (Celtic).—The division of the Celtic year.—The division of the Celtic year and the position of its festivals were originally determined by agricultural processes. Probably at first the year was divided into two unequal parts, summer and winter. Later came the astronomical cycles—at first lunar (Plin. xvi. 80), then, as a result of the influence of the Roman calendar, solar. Two important facts must be borne in mind: (1) that, in Celtic belief, night preceded day, and that, in early Celtic literature, "night" usually means a night and a day, with the result that every festival began on the previous night (Cesar, de Bell. Gall. vi. 18; Loth, R.Celt. xxv. 116); (2) that the year began with winter—probably about mid-November, though later the winter festival began on November eve. When we first became acquainted with the Celtic calendar from Irish texts, we find a two-fold division—each half being again subdivided. The winter half (Samhain) was succeeded by Samain, i.e. Oct. 31, and was subdivided into two parts, the second beginning on Feb. 1; the summer half (samhaineth) began with May and the Beltane feast, and also had its subdivision, its second portion beginning on the first day of June (divided in Book of Rights, Dublin, 1847, p. lif.). There were thus four quarters, but these do not correspond to those beginning with the solstices and equinoxes. They begin each with a feast, three of which—Samhain, Beltane, and Lughnasad—can easily be traced. The February feast is now replaced by St. Bridget's day (Feb. 1): its pagan predecessor has left scant traces. It is unlikely that this definite subdivision existed in earlier times, as, indeed, the shifting of Samhain from mid- to 1st November suggests—in the Isle of Man it is still held on Nov. 12 (J.P. II. [1891]308)—and the arrangement is doubtless due to the analogy of the Roman calendar. But the influence of the lunar calendar had the further effect of displacing some of the festivals.

Thus, in Gaul, much of the ritual of Samhain was transferred to the calends of January, while there was a tendency to celebrate Midsummer day instead of Beltane as the summer feast, both being found with similar ritual over the Celtic area, and they are evidently twin halves of one festival. The Roman Christian calendar, with its lists of feasts and saints' days, might also have been taken into account, some of the ritual of the earlier pagan festivals now occurring as survivals on holy days within the range of the pagan festival periods. All these festivals being mainly connected with agriculture, magic as well as religion had its place in the ritual, the object of the magical acts being to promote fertility and to aid the power of the divinities or spirits of fertility.

2. Samhain (perhaps from cean, 'summer,' and fein, 'sunset' or 'end') [Windisch-Stokes, Jr. Texte, Leipzig, 1889, ii, p. 757], though Stokes ([Urk. Sprachw., Göttingen, 1894, p. 229] gives to "samhain" the meaning of "assembly"), as a festival of the beginning of winter when blight and death were assuming their reign, naturally took account of that fact, and its ritual was intended to assist the reaper in his work, to help in the conflict with winter's death. But it had other aspects, also, and a complete understanding of the festival can be arrived at only by studying early descriptions of the ritual or actual survivals. With the growth of Celtic religion this festival started setting itself the task of one of the ritual lesser festivals. It is a festival of beginnings, like the New Year festivals of all primitive folk. Its ritual suggests also the festival of earlier pastoral times, when the flocks and herds were regarded as themselves divine animals. It is also a harvest festival, as is that in England in August; and, though harvests did not occur before mid-November, some of the ritual may have been transferred to that date, especially if it had been associated with threshing rather than with the harvest of the field. With the coming of livestock to the central hearth for a time and the adoption of the Roman calendar, the ritual of the festival was once more scattered over the other sacred days in winter.

(1) As a festival of beginnings, some of the ritual had reference to that fact. All fires having been extinguished, new fire was brought from the sacred bonfire (Keating, Hist., Lond. 1866, pp. 125, 300), itself kindled probably by friction. Possibly the blazing Yule-log brought to the hearth at Christmas was originally derived from the Samhain rites, by being dislocated from them as Christmas festivities became more prominent. Merriment and feasting characterize the festival in Ireland (Windisch-Stokes, i. 205; d'Arbois, ii. 5), and this may also be traced in the Scots Hallowe'en customs.

In other words, it was an orgiastic feast; this is clearly seen from the licentious customs of the calends in Ireland. The Yule-log remained in use for a long period. Such licence always characterizes a festival of beginnings, when the evils of the past year are being ritually got rid of by various means. Rightly or wrongly the inquirers during the coming year, were also in evidence. The most common rite was for each person to throw a stone into the bonfire which was kindled at Samhain. Its position next morning indicated the fate of its owner (Brand, Pop. Ant., London, 1899, i. 390; Stat. Acc. xi. 621). Perhaps in earlier times this rite was a casting of lots to obtain a human victim, while the memory of the slaying was long after transformed into a passage of death or misfortune within the year. Other rites of divination, such as those described in Burns' Hallowe'en, had an erotic character (Hazzlitt, Dict. of Faiths and Folklore, London, 1905, pp. 297 f., 340).

(2) The lack of fodder led to the slaughter of cattle at this time, or rather at a date corresponding with Martinmas, which points to the earlier date of the festival in mid-November. This slaughter, like that of the Scandinavian Blot-mannah, was sacrificial in character, and was followed by a feast on some of the animals. Within recent times in Ireland it was customary to choose one of the sacrificial victims, and especially the successor of some pagan animal-divinity in anthropomorphic form, and ill-luck followed the neglect of this rite (Curtin, Tales of the Fairies, Dublin, 1855, p. 72). This semi-religious slaughter dates back to the age when the animals were themselves divine. In this pastoral stage, perhaps associated with totemism, the annual slaying would be limited to one animal in each group; and, the animal being divine, the feast on its flesh was sacramental. If the slaughter had been more general from the first (as it certainly became in later times), it would be accompanied with rites intended to propitiate the divine animals, as "supernatural" as the life of the animals, as the festival would still be sacramental. The sacramental eating, the divinity of the animal, the gradual anthropomorphic tendency to give the animal-god a human form, as in the case of Attis, of this Christian may, be seen in the Irish legend of St. Martin (already associated with the slaying), which tells how he was cut up and eaten in the form of an ox (BCVL vi. [1884] 254). Possibly the representation of the corn-spirit in animal form may have blended with the divinity of the animals slain at Samhain. Again, in Gaul, at the calends, as formerly at
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Samhain, men wore the heads and skins of animals, in the belief that by this means they could effectually contact the animal divinities, as they had already done by eating. This custom was vigorously attacked by Church Councillors and by individual preachers (see chapter of passages in Chambers, *Medieval Stage*, Oxford, 1903, App. N; PL xxxix. 2001). In certain recent survivals in the Hebrides a youth dressed in a cow's hide paraded the village and was blessed to the annoyance where another or person an animal inhale the fumes of a pile of burning hide carried by him (Chambers, *Pop. Rhymes*, Edin. 1847, p. 257). This custom, which may have taken the place of the carrying of the slain animal in procession, resembles the rite of the festival, which was hunting the woe (see *Animals*, in vol. i. p. 5329), which occurred at Christmas. But this, like the animal masquerades, may have been associated with Samhain in earlier times. Masquerading is still common among young people on Samhain in the Highlands, and in some parts of Britain dressing in animal disguise was associated with an autumnal festival (see *Northumberland*, Newcastle, 1784, ii. 46; *Thoms. RH*, xxxvii. [1898] 334).

(3) The agricultural aspect of the feast is seen first of all in the bonfire which was (and is still in Celtic countries) an offer to the divinities. The analogy of the Beltane and Midsummer fires shows that it was intended as a fire-charm to aid the power of the sun by virtue of mimetic magic, while, at the same time, this symbol was virtually the thing symbolized and conveyed its benefits. Hence the fire was lit from the divine fire, blazing flagots were carried through the village, and the flames jumped through the air in order to be purified and strengthened by contact with the divinity. Numerous references show that various evil powers (perhaps blight and death), represented as demonic beings or witches, were especially rampant on Samhain eve (*Rit. x*, [1898] 214, 225, xxiv. [1903] 172; *Joyce, Soc. Hist. of Anc. Ireland*, 1903, ii. 556; O'Grady, *Silva Gadelica*, London, 1892, ii. 374; *Cymromored. vi.* 176), and one of these references shows that they were particularly hostile to the crops and animals. They may have been conceived as combating the powers of light and growth, which were thus assisted by the bonfire. There are also traces of a traditional belief that offerings were offered to the Welsh for the fire was extinguished, to escape from the "black sow" who captured the hindmost—perhaps a reminiscence of sacrifice (Rhys, *Celtic Folklore*, Oxford, 1901, i. 225), and early Irish literature refers to the tax of the year's corn and milk, and of two-thirds of the children born within the year, to the evil Fomorians on Samhain eve. Keating (Hist. 300) also speaks of a sacrifice to the gods, burned in the fire on Samhain eve. But, though the powers of blight may have been propitiated, it is not unlikely that the primitive slaying of a human or a representative of the corn-spirit or of some divinity of growth was later conceived as such a propitiatory sacrifice. The process of thought is difficult to follow, but it may have seemed natural that, since the divine fire acted magically upon the life of the sun, it would act also upon the power of the god or spirit who was consumed in it in human form. By dying, the divine life was renewed and strengthened (see *Préaux*, 1903, p. 109). We must not overlook the fact that the powers of growth may themselves have come to be regarded as evil in Christian times, just as the corn-spirit was given a demoniac aspect. The "black sow" in the Welsh instance may have been an earlier animal embodiment of the corn-spirit, which had come to be looked upon as more or less demoniac. A person who represented the corn-spirit could hardly be kept apart from the victim slain at Samhain, more especially as harvest is late in several Celtic regions; while, to judge by folk-custom, the slaying was frequently connected with the threshing of the grain, rather than with the harvest-field (Mannhardt, *Myth. Forsch.*, Strassburg, 1884, p. 333 ff.). The slaying of the corn-spirit was probably derived from the similar slaying of the tree-spirit at the summer feast. The corn-spirit, like the latter, had also various embodiments—the last sheaf, an animal, or a human being; and all of these had powers both of quickening and of strengthening the fruits of the earth, cattle, and women, while there can be little doubt that part of the flesh was also eaten sacramentally (Mannhardt, 317 f.; Frazer, *GB* ii. 288). Possibly, too, as the representative of the tree-spirit had once been a priest-king, so he who represented the corn-spirit may have been called a king also. This would account for the choosing of a mock-king, e.g. the king of the bean, at winter festivals (Hazlitt, *Chambers, Book of Days*, Edin. 1863, i. 62). This and the presence of effigies of saints, which were carried in procession, their clothes distributed, and then finally burned (Chambers, ii. 492; Hazlitt, 101), form survivals, though somewhat disfigured and disturbed, which are doubtless derived from the ritual of the corn-spirit, or perhaps that of the divine animal associated in earlier times with it. But, since the last sheaf representing the corn-spirit is usually called by some female name, "the Maiden," "the Mother," etc., this shows that the corn-spirit had originally been conceived as female—doubtless as a result of the fact that agricultural customs first in the hands of women; while in survivals ultimately derived from Samhain rites a "queen" or "Yule's wife" is in evidence (Hazlitt, 97; Davies, *Man. Records of York*, London, 1894, p. 276). With this we may also connect the fact that men disguised themselves as women at the calends. The increased power of the fairies—in Ireland the successors of gods of growth and fertility—on Samhain might be easily explicable by the nature of the festivals, though they may have been sometimes confused with the demoniac powers. The vaguer corn-spirits doubtless became greater and more anthropomorphized divinities, and the spirit of sacrifice was later transferred to the slaughter of several victims, while death was also considered beneficial to vegetation. A similar evolution occurred in connexion with the vegetation spirit, while a holocaust of victims took the place of his representative. Doubtless among the rural people themselves the vaguer spirits and the older ritual still prevailed with little change. This substitution of several victims for one would account for the so-called sacrifice to the Fomorians, if they were aboriginal gods of fertility, and for the sacrificial cult of Crom Cruich, connected in one place with Samhain (see Acts, v. 2). The gods of growth, evolved from these vaguer spirits, may well have been conceived as in conflict with powers of blight and death at this time, and this may have been ritually represented by a combat. The story of the battle of Magtured might then be regarded as based on a myth which told of this conflict, and which showed that, in spite of the apparent blight in Nature, the powers of growth could not be finally vanquished; the same, too, may have been true of the Tuatha Dé Danann, at this battle.

(4) A yearly festival of the dead took place on Samhain eve at the battle of winter, when the power of growth was at its weakest, and when possibly a representative of the corn-spirit was slain. Hence this festival, like that of Lagna-
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Sad, may have been associated with the spirits of the dead. Or, a ritual associated with dying powers would easily become a feast of the dead generally, while the dead themselves were connected with the underworld god of fertility. In Scandinavia and the dead left from the spirit world, the festival of *fylgjur*, identified with the *disir*, also females, living in the hollow hills and apparently earth-goddesses. The Celtic analogy is found in the Matres, also earth-goddesses. Christmas Eve was called *Māthair* (Mother) or *Māthair 113f.* to *Gaidoz*, The In God (Bede, Bre). The festival, therefore, was devoted, a festival originating from *Beltane* (Le Braz, *La Légende de la mort*, 2, Paris, 1902, ii. 115). Thus the festival of the dead brings us back to the earth, and it is not unlikely that the Yule-log was originally associated with Samhain, when new fire was kindled on the hearth, and that the libations poured on it were intended for the dead. The place of the two Christian festivals of All Saints and All Souls is ascribed, and 1 and 2 (the time of Samhain) remains to be explained. The first, of earlier origin, was doubtless intended to supplant the pagan festival of the dead. As it failed to do so, a Christian feast of all the dead was then originated to neutralize existing pagan rites (Frazer, *Adonis, 253 f.*). In this it only partially succeeded, but it is perhaps due to Christian influences that the more friendly aspect of the dead has been largely forgotten, and that they are associated in popular belief with demons, witches, etc., whose power is great on Samhain eve, and who are perhaps representatives of the old powers of blight and death.

3. Beltane, Midsummer.—These two festivals being twins halves of one early summer festival, the object of which was to promote fertility in field, fold, and house, the ritual acts of both may be considered together. The word *Beltane* was already a puzzle to early Irish philologists, who explain it as meaning (1) *Belt-eine*, a goody fire, or (2) *Belt-eine*, because the newly-born cattle (dithe) were offered to a god Bel (Cormac, in Stokes, *Three Irish Glossaries*, London, 1862, p. 9, a. v. *Bel, Beltaine*; *Arch. Rev.,* i. (1888) 201; cf. Joyce, *Irish Names of Places*, 191, i. 578; *RCÉ* xxi. (1904) 95). The latter derivation is followed by those who connect a god Beal or Belus with a borrowed Semitic Baal. No such god is known, however, unless Belenos, Belsam, etc., may be connected with Beltane, as some suppose. P.Arbols (ii. 243) proposes a connexion with *Belus, to die*, and makes the festival his day. But no such god is known, and the feast was one of life and growth, not of death. Stokes (ibid.) divides the word into *Belt-eine*, while its root is perhaps the same as that of the Latin *beleus*, and suggests that it is a termination as in *séchmaine*, week." In his *Uralt. Sprachkreis*, 125, 164, he shows how the primitive form was the composite *belleus*, *pe-neus*, *beleos*, and *beleos*, and that the personal name Beleus is probably derived from it. The name of the divinity is *Belenus*, and *beleos*, *fire* (G. *brn*). The name is perhaps identical with that of the moon-god, *Belos*, and *beleos* is *fire*.

As at Samhain, the chief ritual act was the kindling of a bonfire by a spark from flint, or by friction from a rotating wheel (need-fire), frequently the fires of the district had been extinguished. Cattle were driven through the fire or between two fires lit, as Cormac says, by Druids with incanta-

tions. By this means, viz, contact with the divine fire, they were freed from disease. Survivals show that the festival was communal, since all the inhabitants contributed to the fire, while its religious side is seen in the fact that, within recent times, if there was a contest between a soldier and a mayor and priest attended the fire. They represented the earlier local chief and pagan priest. The fire was sometimes lit round a tree, representing the vegetation spirit, or round a pole covered with green material. If a tree was cut and thrown into the fire (Hone, *Every-Day Book*, London, 1838, i. 849, ii. 593; Joyce, i. 216; *RCÉ* iv. (1879) 193). The people, probably clad in leaves in order to assimilate themselves to the vegetation spirit, danced sunwise round the fire to the accompaniment of songs or chants. The dance, imitating the course of the sun, probably was intended to assist it, for the livelier the dance the better would be the harvest. The fire being divine, the people crept through it to avoid disease and ill-luck, to ensure prosperity, or to remove barrenness. They ran through the fields with burning brands, or killed a bull and blazing wheels over them, or sprinkled ashes from the fire upon them, or preserved charred brands till the following year. The tree itself was borne through the fields before being burned. Certain cakes, *Bé恋s* of the half-grown boughs. All these rites had one end, viz., to ensure fertility through contact with the divine fire or the spirit of vegetation. As in the Samhain ceremonies, the fire represented and aided the sun; and such contact with the fire was equivalent to contact with the divine sun. Animals were sacrificed, probably as representatives of the spirit of vegetation or fertility. Among these was the horse, as an Irish survival, in which a horse's skull and bones were placed in the fire (Hone, ii. 595), or a man wearing a horse's head and representing all cattle rushed through the fire (Granger, *Warship of Romains*, London, 1895, p. 119 f.; for a legend of a speaking horse coming out of a mound at Midsummer eve and giving oracles, see Kennedy, *Legendary Fictions of the Irish Celts*, 1866, p. 153). Some of the flesh may have been eaten sacramentally, and some of it placed on the fields to fertilize them. In French Midsummer survivals, animals were burned, sometimes being enclosed in osier baskets (Bertrand, *Ret. des Gaulois*, Paris, 1897, p. 1; *Syrie de Gaulle, genoise*, 2, Paris, 1879, p. 21). Human victims seem also to have been burned in the fire, or otherwise slain. Thus, in a Perthsire survival, he who received a blackened portion of a cake, the pieces of which were drawn by lot, was called 'the Beltane carline' or 'devoted,' and a pretense was made of throwing him into the fire, and he was spoken of as dead (Stat. Acc. xi. 629); while in France he who stumbled in leaping through the fire was considered unlucky and 'devoted to the faeots, or spirits (Bertrand, 119). In earlier times such persons would be sacrificed. In other places gigantic effigies made of osier were carried in procession or burned, Cahunard, *Bouwkultur, Berlin*, 1875, pp. 514, 523.

Can the sacrificial to these survivals bear witness be connected with the periodic Celtic sacrifices for fertility referred to by Cesar, Nircho, and Diodorus, all perhaps borrowings from Poseidonus, as Maunhardt, *Annukultur, Berlin*, (1875, pp. 514, 523).

The connection of these survivals bear witness be connected with the periodic Celtic sacrifices for fertility referred to by Cesar, Nircho, and Diodorus, all perhaps borrowings from Poseidonus, as Maunhardt, *Annukultur, Berlin*, (1875, pp. 514, 523).
representative of the spirit of vegetation. The Celtic holocausts were not to be seen as the original slaying of the tree, as might have been imagined. The custom of slaying annually one man who was an incarnation of the tree was a later development. The tree and the god were not divorced by light and growth, and there had been a priestly king who had all the powers of the vegetation spirit, but in later times a surrogate took his place and was slain, though regarded as divine. Otherwise, the dying tree was looked upon as a sacrifice; hence it would naturally be thought that the benefits of the rite would be greater if the number of victims increased. This would account for those great periodic holocausts, though elsewhere, as modern survivals show, the ceremony continues in modified form. The victim was burned in the fire—a sun-charm—and thus vegetation received beneficial influences from the sun. He himself assimilated the fire which he consumed. At first the vegetation-spirit had been a tree-spirit which had power over growth, fertility, and fecundity; hence he had a conspicuous place in the summer festival, and it had all the virtues of the spirit which it embodied. It was carried in procession, imparting these virtues to fields and houses; branches were placed over houses to obtain them by contact, the tree was burned as a sun-charm, and the tree ceremony was held in the first year, so that its presence might bestow blessing, and was then continued. At the festival of the Beltane (Beltain), the burning of the sacred tree (Flinty [H.V. xvi. 249]) says, it was cut on the sixth day of the month, though he does not specify the time of the year; but other rites, e.g. circumambulating less frequent, or cereals, or Midsummer eve in order to be effective, and it is far from certain that the rites practiced at the Midsummer festival have been in the same manner. It is well that we have been the mistletoe (called in Gaelic an darchadh, a festival) was collected because it was held to be necessary that it be cut by men, and is discernible by the green. Fired to be cut, and it was burned till its life was secured, in accordance with a wide-spread belief that the life of all vegetation was preserved by being placed under a woman's charge and freedom for himself and that he will die if any one secures it (MacCulloch, OP, London, 1665, ch. 3). But, as survivals, in which women and a sacrifice are the tree and a brazen, and a tree is burned, we may also see human representatives of the vegetation-spirit brought into contact with the earth or heaven, and the tree and the life of the person (Manndag, 315 f.). The vegetation-spirit was given, now a theriomorphic form—hence it could be represented by a ram or a bull. In either case the ruler remained, as a constant factor in the ritual. Hence the doubling of the tree-spirit and the human spirit, the gathering of the mistletoe secured nature at once the life of the tree and that of the beast or man who was also slain. Possibly the oenon slain at the mistelote rite may have been theriomorphic embodiments of the vegetation-spirit, though, as a rule, a human embodiment was found; but at the same time human sacrifices had been prohibited in Gaul. Fraser has, therefore, suggested that the myth of Bolder slain by the mistelote was derived from actual ritual in which the mistelote was plucked before the human incarnation of the vegetation-spirit could be slain (GB 111. 315). Thus in the primitive Celtic summer ritual the spirit or god of vegetation, the tree, and the animal or human victim were one; their life was in one. Hence the burning of the mistelote was at the time of the Beltane in the spirit of Man (GB 111. 9). This done, they were burned in the fires which represented the sun, the visible power of life and growth. Hence both fire and earth were purifying powers. For they smoke, burned brand, ashes, and pieces of the victim added whatever they touched; purifying, strengthening, fortifying. Hence people leaped through the fires, or passed through it, or believed that the fire or smoke fertilized their fields, or carried their life to the earth. They were sprinkled with ashes, or hung a part of the victim in them, or preserved the brands in their houses. The death of the victim was a sacrifice, a purifying rite to which Flinty may refer when he speaks of the Celtic belief that to eat human flesh was considered as holiness (H.V. xxii. 1). The spirit of fire and victim was magico-sacramental. Through them, men, animals, and vegetation were brought into touch with the divine spirit. And in like manner fire and slain victim reacted beneficially upon the gods or spirits whom they represented, the fire upon the sun, the dying god upon the god who lived again. From such vegetation-spirits the greater Celtic gods of growth were probably evolved.

The role of this rite was to roll a log or branch through the fields, initiated the progress of the sun, assisting it and also benefiting the crops. Such an initiation of the sun’s motion is found in the Slav rites, e.g. circumambulating less frequent, or cereals. The log was rolled through the fields in the direction of the sun (desielli), with the same intention as the roll of the log in the Celtic practice of walking diessell round some object on any important occasion. Originating in the idea that to imitate the action of the sun is beneficial, it was the custom to do so brought good luck and repelled evil influences. Thus in the Codhulmian ceremony, to roll a log or branch setting out for war, her charioteer makes her chariot describe a right-hand turn (desielli) to repel evil omens (Lenkbar na hEilekhe, 59). In late survivals the desineil took more formal forms. Probably further process of thought, it was believed that the blazing wheel in its course could purify the earth; and the communities in all probability evils were laid on the slain divine representative (Hone, i. 441; Hazlitt, ii. 340), whether animal or human (see CIRCUM- AMBULATION, POWERS, WREZYA).

Thus the two chief rites of the Beltane and Midsummer festivals, as also those of Samhain, were mutually complement- ary. The vegetation-spirit, slain as tree, animal, or man, died with him or in his place. He might be a god of life and death, and man. So, too, the blazing fire assisted the life of the powers of the sun, its growth, and the earth and vegetation. All these rites survived with little change into Christian times and were used as the pagan cerebrations. The pagan Midsummer rites were described by Paulus Diaconus (165-67, v. 219). Again, by associating the pagan Midsummer feast with the idea of the sacred marriage, the people also associated the services and ritual of the Church, an attempt was made to modify their heathen paganism. But in neither case was it effectively stifled.

It was usual to roll ‘Beltane cakes’ down a slope—again in evident imitation of the sun’s action; but in some cases the whole summer of the cake was denominated by its remaining whole or breaking—if it broke he would die within the year. Perhaps we may trace here an earlier selection of a victim by lot, as in the case of the lot by the blackened fragment of cake. In another survival, pieces of such a cake were given to unnamed friendly powers and to animals hostile to the flocks (Pennant, Tour in Scotland, London, 1774, i. 97). If this was done in the primitive pagan rite, there was a propitiatory benediction and hostile powers—an example of the double outlook of all primitive religion. But probably in their earliest use the cakes were sacramental in character, and not purifying. Many Teutonic instances (Grimm, Teut. Myth., 1880-88, ii. 1239) as moisture was necessary for the growth of the crops, magical methods of obtaining rain were tried, and rains were visited, and rain charms performed with their waters. Hence such wells were deemed to be specially efficacious in other ways at these times, and people visited them for healing and other purposes (Hazlitt, i. 38, ii. 340; New Stat. Acc., Wigtown, 1854-44, p. 208). The customs of bathing in May dew and bathing in a river at Midsummer were originally connected with the magical methods of producing moisture. There was also a dramatic representation of the conflict between the powers of growth and those of blight, or between summer and winter, with the victory of the former at this period. Traces of this ritual are found all over Europe, and notably so in the combat of the forces of the Queen of May with those of the Queen of Winter on Lla-Bodlyn (Beltane) in the story of the Battle of Mynydd Maen (GB 111. 95). Here people—probably surrogates of the May-king and May-queen in popular survivals, and the fact that their pagan predecessors were incarnations of male and female spirits of fertility or vegetation, suggest that the ‘sacred marriage’ was also part of the summer rite. In worldwide agricultural rites the symbols or divinities were united temporarily, the object of the union being to promote the fertility of the soil through mimetic magic (GB 111. 306). Probably a considerable amount of general sexual licence for the same magical end occurred at the same time.

4. Female cults of fertility.—At the winter and summer festivals a divine virgin—the king or his surrogate—was slain, in order to aid the processes of growth and fertility. But, as Celtic divinities and spirits were once mainly female, and as the practices of agriculture were once in the hands of women, it is easy to see how elaborate festivals sprang up on one time confined to them. The divine victim would then be a female—the priestess or her surrogate—representing a female divine being.
Certain survivals point in this direction. The slaying of a female representative of the spirit is suggested in some name of a goddess, 'Beltane' or 'old woman,' applied to the devoted person in the Highland survivals (see above, 840).

Though this person was a male, the name shows that in earlier times the victim was a woman. In which festivals the name was used in this direction, it was masqueraded as women (Chambers, *Med. Stage*, ii. App. N); in local observances of St. Catherine’s Day, Nov. 25, a ‘queen’ was chosen by girls; *Vit. Ewln* shows this was a part of the Christmas pageants (Hazzitt, i. 97; Davies, *Mun. Rec. of York*, 270). Again, at the summer festival, the May-queen had frequently in survivals a more prominent place than the May-king. In both cases such ‘queens’ were the incarnations of a female spirit of fertility, an earth-goddess or vegetation-spirit, and were slain by the women who practised the cult. And if, as is probable, the witch orgies are remains of primitive female cults, the special activity of witches on Beltane eve, especially on hills which were formerly the site of worship (Grimm, *i. 1051), may be traced back to this direction. Later, goddesses took the place of goddesses, priestesses of priestesses, and male victims were accordingly slain. But sporadically the female cults probably still held their ground. This may explain some classical notices of female sacrificial victims. Strabo (iv. 4. 6) mentions sacrifices paid to native goddesses, whom he calls ‘Demeter and Kore,’ on an island near Britain. The cult resembled that of the celtic goddess of Samothrace, i.e. it was a cult of fertility in which female divinities were worshipped. These divinities may still be represented in the sheaves of corn called the Old Woman and the Maiden, the corn-spirits of the past and the future year. The seed of the latter was mixed with next year’s seed-corn, that the life of the goddess might pass into the seed sown (Frazier, *G.B. i. 171 ff*). Probably the goddesses were once represented by actual personages, whose blood was used to fertilize the seed-corn. Such a rite may underlie Strabo’s account of the Nannie women who worshipped Dionysus on an island at the mouth of the Loire, which no man might visit (iv. 4. 6). Yearly they unsowed the temple and the same day re-fooled it, each woman bearing a supply of materials; but she who dropped her load (and this always happened) was torn in pieces and load was replaced with wild cereals. Dionysus Periegetes (v. 570) says that the mysteries took place at night in honour of earth-goddesses, with a great clamour, and that the women were crowned with ivy. The whole reference is obscure, but it might be possible to connect it with rites of fertility, if the flesh of the victim was carried to the mainland and there used to fertilize the soil or the seed-corn. This assumes that she was slain as the incarnation of divinity. Perhaps Strabo was mistaken in saying that a god was worshipped; the cult may have been that of a goddess, as Dionysus reports. Another cult is reported by Pliny (xxii. 1) as occurring among the Britons. In it nude women stained with blood took part. This ritual, which may be connected with that of the Lady Godiva procession is a survival (Hartland, *Science of Fairy Tales*, Larousse*’s Popular N.F.,* J. G. Jones, *Highland*). Agricultural magic, in which nudity is essential to fertility. The same purpose is effected by dressing in foligans, thus effectively personating the spirit of the dead. From this may be seen why the Nannie women were crowned with ivy, and also why, as Diodorus reports (xxxi. 13 [ed. Dindorf, *Paris*, 1842, ii. 490]), sacrificial victims were crowned with leaves. The latter custom might be an extension of the more primitive one. Just as sporadically the cults of women held their ground, so ‘the female’ (Brigint) has remained even after the divinities or spirits of fertility and growth, of corn and vegetation, had been conceived as male. The image of a goddess, called by St. Gregory of Tours Bersyavia (probably a female) (Pagi. Mem. 19) by Beccabrun (Cybele under this name), was borne through the fields and vineyards, on her festival and in time of scarcity, while the worshippers sang and danced before it (Zur. *Glor. Conf.* 77; *Sul. Selv. Vita S. Mart. 9*). Such a lustration of the fields with an image in order to fertilize them is found in many regions (cf. the procession of the Germanic Nertlins [*Tac. Germ.* 49]), and we have already seen that the tree representing the vegetation-spirit was similarly borne through the fields, and probably the image has here replaced such a divine tree. The practice continued even among Celtic religious communities, either with the image of a saint or with his relics (Adamnan, *Vita Columb.*, ii. 45). The washing of the image after the lustration—probably as a rain-charm—is mentioned by Strabo. Later, goddesses, as already mentioned, were commonly used elsewhere; hence it may be assumed that it occurred, since on Celtic ground the washing of images of saints for that purpose frequently took place.

5. Lugnasad, or August, or more probably in earlier times some day in mid-August, occurring midway between Beltane and Samhain, was observed as a festival. It began, as the autumn or harvest-season, and was probably itself a harvest festival associated with the offering of firstfruits, though it is doubtful whether, in Britain and Ireland at least, the harvest would be ingathered by August 1. This points to mid-August as the earlier date of the festival, while, as we have seen, part of the ritual of the harvest festival passed to the Samhain feast. One name of the day, *Brian Trigain*, is explained as ‘the earth is alliterated or under fruit,’ *Trogan* being a name for the earth (‘Wooing of Ener,’ *Arch. Rev.* i. 232; O’Donovan, *lii*). The day was dedicated among the Celts, as the corresponding Lanna among the Anglo-Saxons, to a sacrifice of the fruits of the soil (Vallancey, quoted by Hone, *i.* 1063). But the day was associated with the god Lug; hence its Irish name, *Lognasad*, in Scots *Gaelic Lisnasdal*, in Manx *Luo-Lhuanaig*. Cornacre, *ries* (p. 390) explains the name of Lug mac Eithnenn, which was celebrated in him in the beginning of autumn. But the Rennes Dindsenchas (RCD xvi. [1895] 51) says that Lug’s foster-mother Tatituin was buried on that day, and that Lug directed an assembly and games to be convened then as a yearly memorial of her at her grave-mound. This may be a later explanation of the slaying of the corn-spirit in a human representative. In primitive times, when agriculture was in the hands of women, the victim would be a female, later euhemerized as Tatituin, perhaps herself at one time regarded as the corn-goddess evolved from an earlier corn-spirit. In other parts of Ireland, as at Carman in Leinster, the festival was associated with the death of a woman Carman who had evil designs upon the corn of the Tanatha Dé Danann, but a variant made it commemoratory of Lug mac Eithenn (RCD x. [1894] 313 ff). This may suggest different conceptions of the personality of the corn-divinity, now a goddess, now a god, the one having female, the other male representation. It may be seen why the male victim may have been regarded as a king, on the analogy of the representative of the spirit of vegetation. When the festival, as at Tatituin, was further associated with Lug, it would be easy to...
connect the goddess Tailtin with the god, in the relation of foster-mother, as the euhemerized myth sets forth. The association of Lug, probably a sun god, with the festival of Tailtin in celebration of victory of the powers of light and growth over those of blight, as evidenced by a plentiful harvest. The people rejoiced in presence of the victorious god. But Lug, like a sun-god, was also the warrior spirit, and the magical cult of the waters was also in evidence. Cattle were swum through a pool or river so that they might live through the year, and in recent times in the Isle of Skye, through the waters of the island, a sacred well (Vallancey, quoted by Hazlitt, ii. 340; Rhys, Celtic Heathendon, London, 1888, p. 422). Besides this agricultural aspect, the local assemblies at Lussnasad had also their social side. These assemblies were fairs at which horse-races took place—Lug being the introducer of such races (Laebrar Laingnech, 10, 2)—while marriages were also arranged. Many may have been more inclined to enter upon wedlock when their garters promised to be full. But it is also possible that behind this lies an earlier promiscuous love-making as a result of the frenzied festival gladness, or with the object of securing a rich harvest of the season. Possibly, too, the rite of the divine marriage was also a part of the festival proceedings. At all events there are hints that it was connected with Lug. Though we may explain this as his 'wedding the kingship' on the occasion of his being made king after the battle of Magtured (Rhys, 414)—a phrase which may be an allegorical method of stating what was ritually enacted, viz., the wedding of the divine king, the incarnation of Lug, who received the kingdom by virtue of his marriage with a daughter of the royal house, in accordance with the laws of female succession or the matriarchate. In another text this allegorical interpretation is more plainly seen, for here the kingdom or sovereignty of Erin belonged to a male though mysterious queen who is found in a magic palace with Lug (O'Curry, MS Mot., Dublin, 1869, p. 618). For this reason Rhys explains saosad, not as Cormac = 'festival,' but as 'a wedding,' the word perhaps having the same origin as Latin nuptius (op. cit. 415). The proper observance of Lugnasadh, like that of the festival at Carman, held on the same day, though not apparently in connexion with Lug, produced plenty of milk, grain, and fruit, as well as general prosperity and freedom from pestilence. It was mainly followed, with any neglect of it. We cannot doubt that the seed of the last sheaf, representative of the corn-spirit, was preserved to mix with the next year's grain, in order to increase its fertility by contact with the divine cereal, while the cattle were made to eat straw for the same purpose; or that the human incarnation of the corn-spirit was slain, and his blood or flesh mixed with the grain for the same purpose, or eaten by the worshippers. To neglect this rite would cause a less bountiful harvest, and from this thought may have sprung the wider ideas about observance or neglect of the festival itself. Though Tailtin is mentioned as the place where 'all Ireland' met to celebrate the feast, this is certainly an exaggerated way of describing many such central gatherings, since we know of others held, e.g., at Carman and Cruachan. Probably the greater part of the festival was connected with Lugus (Lyonns), may be similarly explained. In this case the gathering on August 1, originally in honour of Lugus and of the same nature as the instaurated Carman festival, was continued in honour of Augustus, and was called, after his name, the Feast of Augustus. This still survives in Welsh Gwyl Aest, the August, or, more probably, the August festival, proving that the romanization of the native feast had spread to Britain. Similarly the christianizing of the pagan offering of first-fruits has issued in the Lannæs customs. But relics of the ancient rites still mark the modern observance of the day.

6. These greater periodic Celtic festivals may be regarded as the final development of village rituals having for fertility at one time or another during the year, which were more or less liable to variation. The festivals concerned the anthropomorphic divinities of growth, and were apparently held as central gatherings. But side by side with them the older village rituals have been conserved. For example, the folk associated the latter with such anthropomorphic divinities is unknown, but they may simply have concerned themselves with the cult of the older spirits of fertility, of vegetation, of the corn. In any case, no strict line can be drawn between the festivals and the village rituals. Their central purpose was the same, though the festivals may have extended their scope; and we know of the ritual of the festivals constantly recalls that of, popular survivals of the village cults. The ruder aspects of such rituals have been held to be pre-Celtic in origin (Gomme, Ethnology in Foklere, London, 1889), but recent discoveries prove that these peoples had such cults cannot be doubted, but nothing goes to show that Celtic institutions had emerged out of a savage past, that much in 1861, Lugus, and Lugus as the ritual of the node, is shown, and that, if they accepted aboriginal cults, it was only because such cults were already familiar to themselves.

See also art. CALENDAR (Celtic), CELTS.
J. A. McCulloch.

FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Chinese).—The Chinese work Ts'ing-Kwei, 'Regulations of the Priesthood,' contains instructions for the observance of all festivals and fasts throughout the year. They are (Jan. 1912) as follows:
1. National.—(1) The Emperor's birthday. The festival commences three days before and continues for three days after. It is called Sheng-t'ien, the sacred festival. (2) The Empress's birthday. (3) The day of the new moon of April. (4) Four monthly feasts—at the new, and full moon, the 8th, and the 23rd days of the month. They are called Kin-ming si-chet, 'the four feasts illustriously decreed.' (5) Anniversaries of Emperors' deaths, of the present dynasty only.
2. Celestial beings.—(1) Day of worshipping Devas. The authority for the observance rests on Kin-Kweng-ming-king, 'the bright sutra of golden light.' (2) Eclipses of sun and moon, the celestial beings being addressed, in the services, as Bodhisattva (q.v.), and the power of Buddha evoked to deliver them. (3) Sacrifice to the moon on the 5th day of the 4th month, being the moon's birthday. (4) Prayer for fine weather, to various Bodhisattvas. (5) Prayer to Wei-to, protector of the Buddhist religion. If supplies at the monasteries fail, Wei-to is appealed to to replenish them. (6) Birthday of Weng-ming-king, 'towards the end of the 5th month, though the 24th day of the 6th month is the date in the national annals. (7) Birthdays of the divine protectors of monasteries: (a) Hwa-kweng, on the 28th day of the 9th month; (b) Lung-weng, 'dragon-king'; (c) Kwan-ti, 'god of earth.' That the 24th day of the 5th month, though the 24th day of the 6th month is the date in the national annals. (8) Birthdays of the kitchen-god, on the 24th day of the 6th month, the 3rd of the 8th, and the 24th of the 12th.
3. Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.—(1) Birthday of Mi-hi Fo (Maitreya Buddha), 1st day of 1st month. (2) Anniversary of Sakyamuni Buddha, 15th day of 2nd month. (3) Birthday of Kwan-shi yin pu-sa, or Avalokitesvara (q.v.), 19th day of 2nd month. (4) Birthday of P'ah-hien pu-sa,' or Samantabhadra (q.v.) Buddha of the northern Buddhism, 21st day of 2nd month. (5) Birthday of the female Buddha, Chum-ti, 6th day of the 3rd month. (6) Birthday of W'en-shen pu-sa,' or Manjusri Bodhisattva, 4th day of the 4th month. (7) Birthday of T'shui-chi pu-sa', 1st day of the 5th month. (8) Birthday of 'Ta-shi-chi pu-sa', 1st day of the 7th month. This Bodhisattva, with Kwan-yin and Amitabha, are the three sages of the West. (9) Birthday of Ts'ang-tsan pu-sa, 30th day of the 7th month. (10) Birthday of Yoh Fo (the Buddha who instructs in healing), or Bhaisajyaguru Buddha, 30th day of the 9th month. (11) Birthday of O-mi-to fo, or Amida, Amitabha Buddha, 17th day of the 11th month. (12) Anniversary of elevation of Sakyamuni to the rank of Buddha, 8th day of 12th month.

4. Characters in Chinese Buddhist history.—(1) Birth of Huai-yen, 16th day of 1st month to the Death of Huai-yen, a founder of the Tsing-tu school, 6th day of 8th month. (3) Death of Tausien, a founder of the discipline school, 3rd day of 10th month. (4) Anniversary of death of Bodhisattva, 3rd day of 10th month. (5) Death of Ilien-shen, founder of the school bearing his name, 14th day of 11th month. (6) Death of Chi-K'ai, founder of the Tien-tu school, 24th day of 11th month.

5. Supplemental anniversaries.—(1) First day of the year, special worship. (2) End of winter, Kia-tung, 15th day of 1st month. (3) Birthday of Sakra, 9th day of 1st month. (4) Birthday of Yowang pu-sa, medical king and Bodhisattva, 15th day of the 4th month. (5) Commencement of summer, 16th day of 4th month. (6) Yul'jan-p'en, ceremony for feeding hungry ghosts, 15th day of 7th month. (7) End of summer, 16th day of 7th month. (8) Birthday of the Bodhisattva Lingshu, or 'Dragon-tree,' 25th day of the 7th month. (9) Birthday of the ancient Buddha Jan-teng,' or 'Light Lamp' (Tagungka Buddha), Chien-dao disciple, in a former element, Sakyamuni, 22nd day of 8th month. (10) Commencement of winter (L-tung), 15th day of 10th month. (11) Birthday of the Bodhisattva Hwa-yen, 29th day of the 12th month. (12) End of winter, 16th day of 12th month. In this popular calendar, the Tsing-Kuei, no mention is made of anything astronomical. The Buddhists have arranged their calendar of festivals and fasts to suit the Chinese months (see Calendar [Chinese]).

FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Christian).—

1. Days of weekly observance.—The week of seven days was taken over by Christians from the Jewish Church with a change in the sacred day—the first, the day hallowed by Christ’s resurrection, occupying the place of the seventh.

(a) The observance of the first day of the week, as the day when Christians met together specially for ‘the breaking of the bread,’ is already noted in the NT (Jn 20 9.23, Ac 20 7, 1 Co 16 16). In the Epistle of Barnabas (end of 1st cent.) the words [1] Eddius, Chinese Buddhist, London, 1855, pp. 206, 212. occurr (ch. 15): ‘We keep the eighth day for rejoicing, in which also Jesus rose from the dead.’ The Didache (ch. 8) refers to this custom and speaks of the Easter vespers (ch. 14): ‘On the Lord’s own day (sabbato after the resurrection) gather yourselves together and break bread and give thanks.’ Ignatius in his Ep. to the Magnesians (ch. 5), and Irenaeus (Adv. haer. 1.3.6), speaks of a day called ‘the Passover’ which had been converted from Judaism as ‘no longer observing Sabbaths, but fashioning their lives after the Lord’s Day, on which our life (he says) also rose through Him. The latter passages do not fit the Easterntide. In the same sense the words ‘the day of the passover’ (Ch. 10) of Deut. 16 are used, (2) By the Pali calendar; to be noted are July 7, Sundays and Fridays, which were observed by Christians as half-fasts—senejigunia (Tert. de Jejun. 15), so called because they were not prolonged beyond the ninth hour, i.e. the middle of the afternoon. They arc mentioned in the Didache (ch. 8); ‘Let not your fasts be with the hypocrites, for they fast on the second and fifth day of the week, but ye shall fast on the fourth day and on the Preparation’ (repeasreev, see Matt. 9 15). The feast of the passover is referred to in Lk 11 7. In the Shepherd of Hermes (1st half of 2nd cent.) (Simil. v. 1) the author speaks of himself as fasting and holding a ‘station’ with this word, which is explained by the Tertullian (de Orat. 19) as a military term implying that persons were then specially on garrison, is his name for the two weekly fasts (de Jejun. 2 and 14). Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. (P.G. ix. 564) also mentions these fasts, but without using the word ‘station.’ The fasts of Wednesday and Friday are still continued in the East; in the West, Friday alone, as a rule, is so observed. These days were also marked by assemblies for worship (synagogues). In Africa at the end of the 2nd cent. the Episcopast was celebrated as on Sundays (Tert. de Orat. 19); and this was the also the case in Jerusalem, except during Lent, in the 4th cent. (Eucharia, Peregrin. iv. 8) but at Alexandria (Socrates, Hev. v. 22) and at Rome (Innocent I, Ep. ad Decent. 4 [PL xx. 556]) at this latter date the service was non-liturgical.

(c) There was a tendency at first, as might be expected, among the Jews in Christian practice, to continue the observance of Saturday (the Sabbath); but this practice came to be regarded as a mark of Judaizing (Col 2 16). It is not observed again of any importance, except in certain places. We think, indeed, that in the East had become a day of worship, generally eucharistic, and bore a festal character, fasting being forbidden on it, except on Easter Even (Conne. Laod. 16 and 49 [Manit. ii. 567, 571]; Apest. Const. v. 14, 20, viii. 23 [ed. Funk]; Basil. Ep. 98 [PG xxxii. 483]). In the West, on the contrary, except at Milan, Saturday became a day of fasting and was non-liturgical (Ang. Ep. xxxvi., PL v. 304, 306). Even the Conne. of Elvira (524), canon 23 and 26 [Manit. ii. 9, 10].

2. Lent and Easter.—Our Lord’s death and resurrection took place about the time of the Passover. It was inevitable, therefore, that the Apostles, who were Hebrews, and their converts, who at the first were of the same race, should attach a new Christian significance to the ancient festival. There seems to an intuition of this in 1 Co. The letter was written after a winter, yet before
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Christian)

Pentecost (16th-9th), therefore about the Passover season; and in it (5th) St. Paul speaks of Christ as our 'Pascha' (hence Paschal victim) which hath happened. It is at all events of the early church dispute about the time of its celebration that we have the first historical notice of the Christian Pascha. Polycrates, Bishop of Ephesus, and Irenæus, Bishop of Lyons, in their letters to Victor of Rome (last decade of 2nd cent.) trace the Quarto-deciman custom of proconsular Asia back to Poly carp (τ 155), who claimed for it the authority of St. John. The custom of Rome is traced by Tertullian to Bishop Xystus (c. 190), further than whom apparently the tradition did not go (Euseb. HE v. 24).

3. Lent.—(a) Easter never stood alone; it came as a day of rejoicing after a fast which commemorated the death and burial of Christ. The word 'Pascha' for the first three centuries signified not Easter, but Good Friday (Tert. adv. Jud. 10; de Bapt. 19); and this meaning was supported by a singular notion that it was the 'Thursday' (Iren. iv. 10 [PG vii. 1000]; Lact. iv. 26 [PL vi. 531]). The fast, to which at first more importance was attached than to the festival which followed, was called the 'lent' or 'lenten' period. In his letter to Victor (mentioned above, 2.), alludes to different usages as prevailing in his time, and long before (πὸ τὸ πρότερον). 'Some think,' he writes, 'they ought to fast one day, others two; others even more; others reckon the period as 40 hours day and night.' The 40 hours may be illustrated by passages from Tertullian (de Jejun. 2, 13 [PL li. 1006, 1029]), in which he speaks of the custom of fasting during the days 'when the bridegroom is taken away' (Mt 9), i.e. the period from Good Friday evening to Easter morning. In Alexandria, in the middle of the 3rd cent., we are informed that some lasted during the whole week before Easter Day, others for shorter periods, and that the fasting varied in degree of rigour (Dion. Alex. Letter to Basiliades, in Feltoe, Dionysius of Alexandria, Cambridge, 1904, p. 101 f.).

(b) The mention of a Lent of forty days (Quadragesima, τετταρακοστη) first occurs in the fifth canon of the Council of Nicea (325) (Mansi, ii. 689); and, the reference being only a note of time (τετταρακοστη), a well-established custom is implied. The period from henceforth is frequently mentioned as a time of preparation of catechumens for baptism, for the discipline of penitents, and generally of spiritual retreat for Christians. Some celebrate it at a different time; but the practice varied in different countries. See, further,FASTING (Christian), II. 2.

4. Holy Week (Major or sancta Hebdomada, ἡ ἑβδομάδα μετὰ τοῦ σαρώματος).—(a) Palm Sunday (Dominica in Palms, ἡ κυριακὴ τῶν βασιλῶν). The procession of palm-bearers in memory of Christ's triumphal entry into Jerusalem six days before His passion, from which the title of this Sunday is derived, took its origin in Jerusalem. Etheria (Peregrinatio) relates how the whole Christian community there went on the evening of this day to the Mount of Olives, where a religious service was held, and there lifted up hymns to Christ. In the branches of palm or olive and singing, 'Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord.' The ceremony was not introduced into the West until much later. Isidore of Seville (early in 7th cent.) is acquainted with the name 'Dies pulmarum,' but "The Peregrinatio Etheriae is a MS discovered by I. F. Giesuanni in 1716; it is a record of a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, addressed by a Spanish nun to her sisters in religion. Her name was at first wrongly supposed to be Etheria (as Etheria, Christian Worship, p. 480). An ed. of the Peregrinatio, with an Eng. tr. by Bishop Bonner, was published, Christian Worship, p. 480."

(b) Easter Monday (Feria v. in cena Domini, ἡ θάνατος καὶ μεταμόρφωσις τοῦ Χριστοῦ).—The anniversary of our Lord's death is the only day in the year when by general custom the Easter is not celebrated—a custom which was formerly extended to Easter Eve (Innocent i., Ep. ad Decent. 4 [PL xx. 550]), as it is still in the Eastern Church. The first part of the service for Good Friday in the Roman Missal—consisting of lessons from Holy Scripture and Collects, followed by a series of intercessory prayers—probably preserves the type of worship originally used in the West on non-liturgical days (Duchesne, Christian Worship, 172, 248). At a later date (7th or 8th century) (PL xxxiii. 764), the 25th March was the day of Christ's death, and the 25th of His resurrection. The festival seems to have been generally observed in Gaul, as we have fragments of sermons preached on the occasion by Gregory the Great (sermon 321), and it is mentioned by Eulogius of Noyon (c. 610-669) (hom. 10 [PL xxxvii. 229]).

See FLEET-WASHING.

(c) Good Friday (Feria vi. in Passacages, ἡ θάνατος καὶ μεταμόρφωσις τοῦ Χριστοῦ or ἡ ἀναστάσις τοῦ σώματος).—The anniversary of our Lord's death is the only day in the year when by general custom the Easter is not celebrated—a custom which was formerly extended to Easter Eve (Innocent i., Ep. ad Decent. 4 [PL xx. 550]), as it is still in the Eastern Church. The first part of the service for Good Friday in the Roman Missal—consisting of lessons from Holy Scripture and Collects, followed by a series of intercessory prayers—probably preserves the type of worship originally used in the West on non-liturgical days (Duchesne, Christian Worship, 172, 248). At a later date (7th or 8th century) (PL xxxiii. 764), the 25th March was the day of Christ's death, and the 25th of His resurrection. The festival seems to have been generally observed in Gaul, as we have fragments of sermons preached on the occasion by Gregory the Great (sermon 321), and it is mentioned by Eulogius of Noyon (c. 610-669) (hom. 10 [PL xxxvii. 229]).
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Christian)

cent.) this service was elaborated by the introduction of the ceremonies of the Adoration of the Cross and the Mass of the Passion celebrating the Lord's passion. These ceremonies are the origins of the Gelasian Sacramentary and in the Ordines Romani dating from the 9th cent. (ed. Mabillon in Monumenta Gregoriana, reprinted PL, LXXVIII.,). It is omitted in the Gregorian Sacramentary, probably because it was never sung. The same day at Rome was prayed by all the faithful as said by the Pope (Duchesne, 248 n.). It came to the West from Jerusalem, where on this day, in the 4th cent., the true cross, discovered, as alleged, by Helena the mother of Constantine, was laid out to be kissed by the faithful (Eutheria, Peregrinatio). The Mass of the Passion is the communion of the priest, and formerly of the people also, with the Eucharist consecrated on the previous day. The rite was borrowed from the East, where, on days on which the Eucharist was not permitted to be celebrated, the Liturgy of the Paschal, ἡ ἑορτὴ ἡ πασχαλικὴ ἡμέρα, was appointed in its place. The rule in relation to Lent is laid down by the Council of Trullan (692), can. 52 (Mansi, ix. 968) (see Nead, Gen. Intr. 704 ff.; Alliatis, 1531 ff.).

The Devotion of the Three Hours, so popular in modern times in the Roman and Anglican Communion, and probably introduced into the thirteenth century by Robert of Jumieges, was adopted in the fourteenth century. This, the chief festival of the Christian Church, was at first distinguished by any special rite from other Sundays. So late as the 6th cent., it was ordained by Pope Vigilius (537-555) that the Mass on Easter was peculiar to the Church of England. Elsewhere in the West the day is popularly known as ‘Holy Friday.’

(a) Easter Even (Sabbatum sanctum, τῆς μνήμης ή τῆς μνήμης του φεστιβαλ).—This is the only Saturday in the year which is kept as a fast in the Eastern Church. For this day no services were appointed in the Latin rite. The office of the Vigil of Easter, held before the dawn of Easter Day, was in the 7th cent. (see Gelasian Sacramentary) transferred to the afternoon of Saturday, and later on to the morning. Thus the English name is in accord with the ritual aspect of the day. The vigil service proper—consisting of a long series of lessons, chants, and prayers—was followed by the blessing of the font, and the baptism and confirmation of the catechumens. This function was concluded by the Mass, which originally was celebrated at the first signs of dawn. Two other ceremonies were pre-

fixed later on to the vigil service—the blessing of the new fire and of the Paschal candle. The new fire probably took rise from a pagan custom to which its religious significance was attached. The first notice we have of it is connected with Ireland in the legendary history of St. Patrick (Stokes, Tripartite Life of St. Patrick, 1587, p. 278). The custom seems to have been carried to the Continent by Irish missionaries. They may have recognized that it was unknown at Rome in the 8th century (Pope Zacharias [741-752], Ep. 13 ad Bonifacium [PL, LXXVIII. 851]). The fire, which, according to the rubric, must be produced from flint and steel, is used to kindle the lights throughout the church. In the East, the holy fire is peculiar to the Holy Sepulcher at Jerusalem, and cannot be traced farther back than the 9th century, though it has been conjectured that it was introduced by the Latin monks stationed there by Charlemagne, 799-811 (Wordsworth, Ministry of Grace, London, 1893, p. 384 ff., and APP, E, p. 426 ff.). The practice, ‘Holy Fire’ (de la Feuery), was adopted by the Church in the custom of the Gallican rite, and perhaps in Africa. It seems to be mentioned by St. Augustine († 430), who quotes verses which he has taken from the Christian Bersit (de in Dei, xx. 22 [PL, LXXVI. 467]). Two forms of blessing are found in the Opuscula (9, 10) of Emmodius of Pavia (521) (PL, LXXVI. 288, 289). Pope Gregory I. († 594) writes of the proces quae super Cererini in

Ravennati cicitate dili solent’ (Ep. x, 33 [PL, LXXVII. 1146]). The 4th Council of Toledo (633) refers (can. 22) to Easter Eve Mass celebrated by the Greek rite as said by the Pope (Duchesne, 248 n.). It is also in the Gelasian, but obviously inserted there (Wilson, xxvii.). Although not adopted at Rome until much later, the Liber Pontificalis (ed. Duchesne, I, 253) states that it was inserted in the churches of the suburbanian churches as early as the time of Pope Zosimus († 418). The service was read from rolls exquisitely written and illuminated, many of which dating from the 10th and the 12th centuries, are still preserved. They are called ‘exultates,’ from the first words, ‘Exultet iam angelica turba cœliorum!’ At the blessing of the font, the Paschal candle is plunged into the water during a prayer for the desecration of the Holy Spirit. It is lighted at every service from Easter to Pentecost.

5. Easter.—(a) Easter Day (Dominica Resurrectionis, Πάσχα; Εορτή Ρασκά).—This, the chief festival of the Christian Church, was not at first distinguished by any special rite from other Sundays. So late as the 6th cent., it was ordained by Pope Vigilius (537-555) that the Mass on Easter was peculiar to the Church of England. Elsewhere in the West the day is only added by the admission of suitable Scripture lessons (Ep. ad Euthar, 5 [Mansi, ix. 32]). At Rome on this day the custom of communion in both kinds was retained until near the end of the 14th century (Ordo Rom. xvi. [of Amelius, c. 1578-1398] ch. 85, ed. Mabillon, Missa It. ii. 505 ff.). A Western medieval rite, which lasted up to the 12th cent., was the blessing of the flesh of a Paschal lamb (Ordo Rom. xi. 1140, Mabillon, p. 142; Bona, Etemon Lit. II. II, 1185 ff.). A form of blessing is given in the Missal of Robert of Jumieges, 11th cent., p. 103 (H. Bradshaw Soc.). Another rite, still finding place in the Latin Service-book, formed a conclusion to the ritual of Good Friday. On that day, after the Adoration of the Cross, the cross itself with the reserved Sacrament was placed in the ‘sepulcher,’ a recess generally situated on the north side of the sanctuary. Before Matins on Easter Day the Host was ceremonially taken from the sepulcher and laid upon the altar, while the antiphon, ‘Christ rising from the dead, Alleluia!’ was sung. This was the source of the special anthems prefixed to the proper Psalms for the day in the Eng. Prayer Book. The English name ‘Easter’ is probably derived from Eastre, an Anglo-Saxon goddess, to whom special sacrifices were offered at the beginning of spring (Beede, de Temp. Jat. xvi., Op. ed. Giles, London, 1843, vi. 179).

(b) The Sunday after Easter, with which the Paschal season ends, was formerly called simply Octava Pascha, or Pascha clausum; but later it received the name Dominica in albis (albi deponenda), because on this day the newly-baptized laid aside their white baptismal robes. In the Greek Church it is styled Κ. τετελεσμένον γενικώς έκ του γενικώς. The latter title referring to the Gospel for the day. In England it is traditionally called ‘Low Sunday,’ for which the unadorned altars are ‘Laudes,’ the first word in the sequence, or ‘Close Sunday’ (Proctor-Frere, New Hist. of the Book of Common Prayer, London, 1893, p. 543 n.).

6. Ascension Day (Dias, de apol. Κ. τετελεσμένον γενικώς έκ του γενικώς).—The day of our Lord’s ascension was commemorated at Jerusalem in the time of Ethereis, 380 (Peregrin.). It is called by her ‘the 40th day after Easter, that is, the fifth feria (Thursday).’
In *Apoc. Const.* v. 20 (c. 375) it is directed to be kept as a festival. We have sermons preached on this day by Gregory of Nyssa († 395) (PG xlvi. 608 ff., 614 ff.), Athanasius (c. 372), and Chrysostom (c. 405) (PG 1. 441-452), who speaks of it as an ancient and universal feast. There is Western testimony of about the same date. Five Ascension sermons of St. Augustine († 430) (PL xxxviii. 1300 ff.) have come down to us. In the second he says: *This day is celebrated throughout the whole world.*

7. The Transfiguration of our Lord. (Transfiguration of our Lord, *Día Μεταμόρφωσις*), Aug. 6. —This invariable feast may most fittingly be mentioned here among other festivals of our Lord. It was first observed in the East, being noted in the Coptic Calendar (ed. Selden, *de Synedrìa*, iii. cap. 15, p. 409) and in the *Menology of Constantine* (8th cent.; i. 102, ed. Morelli). In the West the Transfiguration formed the subject of the Gospel for the Lent Ember Saturday (St. Leo, *Serm.* 81 (PG lv. 293)); but it was not uniformly commemorated. Probably the Greek festival on Aug. 6 was introduced by the Crusaders; but it did not come into general observance until 1457, when it was introduced in the calendar of the Eastern Church (Baillet, ii. 84). It is only a Black-letter day in the Eng. Prayer Book; but in 1892 the Church in the United States assigned to it a Collect, Epistle, and Gospel, and proper lessons.


9. Pentecost. —By early Christian writers the name *Pentecost* (sometimes *Quinquagesima*) in Latin authors) was generally given to the whole space of fifty days after Easter. The period was regarded as a continuous festival during which no fast was permitted, and prayer was said standing (Tert. de Idol. 14, de Bapt. 19, de Cor. 3; Basil, de Spir. Sanc. 27 (PG xxix. 192)). There is a survival of this use of the word in the Greek Liturgy, where the name *Mesopentecost* is given to a festival of eight days which begins on the Wednesday before the 5th Sunday after Easter. But even so early as Origen (c. Cels. viii. 22 (PG xi. 1540)) and Tertullian (de Cor. 3) we find the word applied also in the restricted sense to the day which closed the period. The Council of Elvira (305) insists upon the duty of celebrating the Whit festival (can. 43 (Mansi, ii. 19)), and subsequently this use of the word prevailed. The word *Pentecost* (Peregrina.) gives this name to the festival, and describes the ceremonial observed at Jerusalem (end of 4th cent.). The Eng. term *White Sunday,* according to the most probable derivation, is *White Sunday,* so termed from the white robes worn by those lately baptized (Procter-Frere, p. 546, n. 4, quoting Skeat), the eve of Pentecost being in the West one of the chief seasons for baptism (Bingham, *Origines*, xi. vi. 7).

10. Trinity Sunday. —The Sunday after Whit Sunday at first known simply as the Sunday of the octave of Pentecost (Diaecium Sacram. and appendix to Gregorian). Its observance as the main festival of the Trinity was of late and gradual introduction. As the day was *dominica vacans* without any distinctive office of its own, the custom arose in some places of using on it the Mass of the Trinity drawn up by Stephen, Bishop of Liége (903-920). This practice was discouraged by Pope Alexander ii. († 1073), on the ground that any special festival of the Trinity was superfluous, as every day in the year was consecrated to the honour of the Trinity in Unity (*Micrology*, 59 and 60 (PL cl. 1019)). But the observance of the day grew in popularity in England, Germany, and France, and was sanctioned by several diocesan synods, as, e.g., that of Arles (1260) (Mansi, xxiii. 1006). Finally, the festival was appointed to be observed generally in England, apparently by Pope Gregory xiv in 1570, and by Pius v in 1566. According to the Roman use, the succeeding Sundays until Advent still continued to be reckoned as after Pentecost. The usage of numbering them from Trinity was adopted in England and for a time in Germany. It is now peculiar to the English Church. In the Greek calendar the day is called *'All Saints’ Sunday*, Ἐκκλησίας τῶν ἀγίων Πατρών.

11. Corpus Christi. —This festival, the latest in the year of the movable feasts of the Reformation, is held on the Thursday after Trinity Sunday. The commemoration of the Eucharist on Maundy Thursday, the day of its institution, was necessarily tinged with the sadness of Holy Week. It also became overshadowed by the consecration of the sacred oils and other ceremonies which had subsequently been appointed for the same day. Thus there arose in the Middle Ages a desire for a festival in honour of the Eucharist at another time. The celebration of Corpus Christi was first kept in 1247, in the diocese of Liége, by direction of Bishop Robert de Thorote, who was influenced, it is said, by a vision which he experienced on a visit to the church at Rheims, which was instituted by a bull of Pope Urban iv. in 1244, which was confirmed by Clement v. in 1311, and by John xxii. in 1316 (Baillet, iv. 107 ff.). The observance of Corpus Christi was discontinued in the Church of England at the Reformation.


13. Christmas. —See sep. art. under that title.

14. The festivals after Christmas. —With the festival of the Nativity of Christ were associated, at least from the 4th cent., commemorations of eminent saints of the NT. Gregory of Nyssa, in his oration at the funeral of his brother Basil, states that after Christmas and before 1st Jan., the date of Basil’s death (379), the Church kept the festivals of Stephen, Peter, James, John, and Paul (PG xlv. 789); and in an earlier panegyric on St. Stephen he explains the principle on which these names were selected, namely, that it seemed fitting that the praise of the proto-martyr should be followed by a commemoration of Apostles (ib. xlvii. 729). This statement of Gregory is confirmed by the Syrian Calendar of the same date and country, which contains the following festivals: Dec. 26, St. Stephen; Dec. 27, SS. John and James; Dec. 28, SS. Paul and Peter. The Armenians do not observe Christmas on Dec. 25, but Dec. 26, 27, 28 they honour the same saints, with the difference that in their order the feast of SS. Peter and Paul precedes that of SS. James and John (Niles, i. 373, ii. 829). The Nestorians in their calendar follow the same general principle. Their custom is to commemorate saints on a Friday; and on the Fridays following Christmas they observe the feasts of St. James the Lord’s brother, St. Mary, St. John Baptist, SS. Peter and Paul, the four Evangelists, and St. Stephen (Maclean, *East Syrian Daily Opuscles*, p. 265 f.). A similar series of holy days following Christmas is found in the West, with the substitution of the Holy Innocents (Rome) or Holy Infants (Paris) on Dec. 26 for SS. Peter and Paul, who in these countries were already commemorated on June 29. The festivals are thus recorded in the Calendar of Cartagine (c. 565): *Dec. 26, St. Stephanus primi martyris; Dec. 27, St. Johannis Baptistae et Jacobi Apostoli.*

1 *In Apoc. Const.* (c. 375) viii. 33, among other festivals and times on which slaves are to rest from work, St. Stephen’s day is mentioned, but the date is not given.

2 On Dec. 25 they commemorate SS. David and James as relatives of our Lord—*Davidum ac Hierovolam* respectively.

3 Baptize*tae* occasionally a transliteration of *βαπτιστα* and *βαπτιστής*, as St. John Baptist is commemorated in the same calendar on June 24.
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Christian)

Dec. 28, SS. Infants. The Gallican liturgies agree with the African and Syrian calendars in celebrating both the sons of Zebedee on Dec. 27; but in the Roman liturgy St. John the Baptist was retained, and St. James was subsequently commemorated on July 25. At Constantinople the Roman date, June 29, for SS. Peter and Paul was observed in the 6th cent. (see below, 22 (c)). Holy Innocents' day also, under the title of Holy Infants, (των ἁγίων νεωτέρων), was adopted later on, but on the 29th instead of the 28th December.

15. The Circumcision.—The earliest notices of the Christian observance of Jan. 1 represent it as a fast kept with the object of counteracting a riotous pagan festival held at this time of the year (St. Augustine, Serm. 198 (PL xxxviii. 1025)). The second Council of Tours (567) (Mansi, ix. 796) enjoins (can. 17) that three days at the beginning of January shall be an exception to the rule that all the days between Christmas and Epiphany shall be treated as festivals. In the Gelasian and Gregorian Sacramentaries the 16th of January was called the Octave of Christmas (Octavas Domini), and the service bears the character of that festival, with a special reference in the proper Preface to the Virgin Mother. The name 'Circumcision' as given to the day was first adopted by the Council of Tours mentioned above. It appears also in the Hieron. Martyr. (c. 595) and in the Gallican liturgical books of the 7th and 8th centuries, which treat the day as a festival. Byzantine calendars of the 8th and 9th centuries connect Jan. 1 with the Circumcision (Menology of Constantinople, i. 83, ed. Morelli, and Calendar of Naples [Mai, Novae Collect. Script. vet., Rome, 1821, v. 568]). The Armenian Church, which observes the Circumcision of the Lord with the Greek on Jan. 6 (the Epiphany), naturally observes the Circumcision on Jan. 13 (Nîles, i. 374).

16. Epiphany.—See separate article.

17. Festivals of the Blessed Virgin.—(a) It has been noted above (14) that the Nestorians hold a festival of St. Mary on the second Friday after Christmas. A similar feast is found in the Coptic Calendar on Jan. 16 (Selden, iii. cap. 15, p. 260). (b) In the West the holding of a festival in honour of the Virgin Mother was at first peculiar to countries of the Gallican rite. Gregory of Tours (6th cent.) states that her festival was held in Gaul in the middle of January. In the Liber Annalis or PL lix. 713). In the Hieron. Martyr. (c. 595) the date Jan. 18, the same as that of the Gallican St. Peter's Châl (see 22 (b), below), is assigned to it. In C. of Bonn (1818 n.), to Rituale Romanum, Gallican books the precise date is not given, but it is placed early in the year. In Spain the 10th Council of Toledo (665), ch. 1, fixed Dec. 18 as the day of the festival, with the note "that it could not fittingly be celebrated on the most suitable day, viz., that of the Incarnation, because it sometimes occurred during Lent or the Paschal season, when, according to ancient rule, festivals of saints might not be held on the same day" (341). At Rome the commemoration of the B.V.M. was that which was superadded to the service of Jan. 1 (see above, 15) until the 7th cent., when four festivals in her honour were introduced from Constantinople. All are mentioned at length in C. of Bonn, but the title '1. Feria post Epiphanias, 665-701," and find place in the Gelasian Sacramentary.

(c) The Purification (Purificationis) B.V.M., or Ursula, January 2, Feria II. (Ives) (I. n. Goggin), Feb. 2.—The earliest of these four festivals was the 'Hypapante,' this name, which always continued in the East and was long retained in the West—sometimes in the form 'Ocurrence of the Most Holy Virgin,' (τις Οκουρείσιν της Σοφίας της Ανωτάτης) of Constance J. C.—refers to the meeting between the infant Saviour and Simeon and Anna. Its later name of 'Purificatio' appears first in the Gelasian Sacra-

1 When the feast was introduced into the West and the Roman Calendar, the Nativity being on the 24th, the Epiphany on the 25th, the Holy Infants on the 29th, and the Circumcision on the 1st, the Conception naturally was dated vi. Idus Sept., the Conception naturally was dated vi. Idus Dec.
is known as ἡ Ἐλληνική τῆς ἁγίας καὶ θεοφρονετή τῆς Ἐυβοεἴας— the word 'conception' in its Greek equivalent being understood in the East in an active sense. Such a celebration, of which the name of John of Euboea (middle of 8th cent.) (PG xvi. 1499), and finds place in the Menology of Constantinople (ed. Morelli, p. 80). Through the Greek settlements in lower Italy, its name passed to the Calendar of Naples (96 cent., ed. Mai, v. 65) is 'Conceptio S. Anne Marie vir.'—it passed into the Western Church, where it appears first in English Calendars and Service-books of the end of the 10th and beginning of the 11th century (Gallican Calendar, Breviary, Psalter, Gallican Calendar, Missal, and Breviary until 1477 (by Sixtus IV.). In 1584 it was re-named by Pius ix. the 'Immaculate Conception', due to the Immaculate Oblation in the Church. In the Anglican Calendar all these festivals are found, with the exception of the Assumption, which was omitted in the Reformation; but the Annunciation and Purification are alone ranked as Red-letter days.

18. Festivals in honour of St. John the Baptist.—
(a) Nativity (Nativitas S. Ioannis Baptistae, τοῦ Γενέθλιον τοῦ Προφήτου), June 24.—The date of this festival, suggested by Lk. 1, was placed exactly six months before Christmas; or, according to the Roman Calendar, on viii. Kal. Jul. as corresponding with viii. Kal. Jan., i.e. on the 24th instead of the 25th of January. The Festival is of Roman origin, as the Latin date intimates. It is first mentioned by St. Augustine (Serm. 287, PL xxxviii. 1501), who remarks that the Church celebrates two birthdays only—that of Christ and that of the Baptist. It appears in the ancient Calendar of Carthage (c. 500). The festival was accepted in the East at an early date. Notwithstanding the appropriate-ness of June 24 for this festival, we have evidence that in earlier times St. John's nativity was celebrated in the East and in Gaul shortly after Christmas-tide. The Armenians placed it on the first day lawful for a festival (i.e. not Wednesday or Friday) between the octave of the Epiphany (Nilos, li. 565). The Nestorian festival, which in the Bishops of Persia, probably his nativity, on the 3rd Friday after Christmas, has been noticed above (14), and in the Calendar of Tours (490) the 'Natale' appears between the Epiphany and St. Peter's (Cath. i.e. at the same time of the year. This Calendar has also the festival of June, but strangely calls it the 'Passio' of the saint.

(b) Beheading (Decollatio or Passio S. Ioan Bapt., τῆς Ἀποκτησεως τοῦ Ἴησού τοῦ Φοβόβατος), Aug. 29.—This festival was adopted in Constantinople before it reached Rome (Menology of Constantinople, ed. Morelli, ii. 222). It is found also in the Coptic Calendar, but with the date Aug. 30 (Selden, i. cap. 15, p. 376). In the West it appears first in the Gallican liturgical books, where it is undated, but follows at a longer or shorter distance after the feast of the Baptist. It is absent from the Leontine and Gregorian Sacramentaries, and its presence in the Gelasian is probably due to a Gallican interpolation.

19. The Cross.—(a) Holy Cross Day (Exaltatio crucis, η Ἀναβολή τοῦ σταυροῦ), Sept. 14. is a Palestinian festival of the 4th century. It is the anniversary of the dedication in 335 of the two churches built by Constantine at Jerusalem—the Martyrium on Golgotha, and the Anastasis over the Holy Sepulchre. The day chosen for the dedication was, according to Eutheria (Perigrinis), that of the discovery of the True Cross by the Empress Helena. Thus the festival was regarded as commemorating both events. Eutheria (end of 4th cent.) notes that the festival was continued for eight days and was attended by a large concourse of pilgrims. From Jerusalem the festival passed to Constantinople, and thence to Rome, where it is mentioned first in connexion with Pope Sergius (657—701) (Lib. Pont., ed. Duchesne, i. 374, 378). It appears in the Martyrologies of Walchester and Canterbury. The festival was suppressed after the Norman conquest, but was reintroduced, at first into Benedictine monasteries, early in the 12th century (Gasquet, Bishop, The Bonneworth Psalter), p. 43 ff.) About the same time we read of the festival in Normandy, where it became so popular that in the Middle Ages it was known as 'Festum nationis Normannicae' (Kellner, Heerdt, 533). The feast gradually made its way through Europe, but was not received into the Roman Calendar, Missal, and Breviary until 1477 (by Sixtus IV.). In 1584 it was re-named by Pius ix. the 'Immaculate Conception', due to the Immaculate Oblation in the Church. In the Anglican Calendar all these festivals are found, with the exception of the Assumption, which was omitted in the Reformation; but the Annunciation and Purification are alone ranked as Red-letter days.

20. St. Michael (Dedicatio S. Michaelis Archangeli), Sept. 29.—This, the most ancient Angel-festival, is noted in the Leontine Sacramentary (6th cent.), but on Sept. 30, as the day of the dedication of a church of the archangel in the Vic Salaria, six miles from Rome (Natalie Basilice Angeli in Salaria). A later festival of St. Michael is that of May 8, and is connected with a church on Mount Garganus in Apulia. The feast of St. Michael in the Greek Church is kept on Nov. 8, and is relative to a church in the baths of Arcadius built by Constantine (Socome, MF ii. 3; Martinoz, Ann. Eclt. p. 273). Legends of apparitions of the archangel are connected with all three sites. At the last revision of the Pr. Bk. (1662), 'and all angels' was added to 'St. Michael' in the title of the festival of Sept. 29, which had already in the Calendar prefixed to Bp. Cosin's Private Devotions (1627). The longer description is also now unknown in the Roman Church. In Bailleul, iii. 371, the festival is named 'S. Michael et tons les Anges'; the same title occurs in AS, Sept. viii. 4 ff., Antwerp, 1762. The festival of the 'Guardian Angels' (Angelorum Custodum), March 1, was first observed in Spain in the 16th cent.; and was admitted to the Roman Calendar by Paul v. in 1608. The date was subsequently changed, except in Germany and a part of Switzerland, to Oct. 2, by Clement x., in 1670. For a general account of the Angel-festivals in the West and East, see AS, Sept., and Bailleul (loc. cit.)

21. The Maccabees, Aug. 1.—This, which is the only commemoration of OT worthies in the West, was observed about universally as early as the 5th century. It is found in the early Calendars of Filocalus, Carthage, Pseudus Silvius, and Syria. It is the subject of Sermons by St. Gregory Nazianzen (Res sacr. in East and West, see AS, Sept., and Bailleul (loc. cit.). In the Roman Calendar, it now yields precedence to the feast of St. Peter ad Vincula (see below, 22 c), which is observed on the same day.
22. Festivals of Apostles.—(a) SS. Peter and Paul.—The early Eastern commemoration of these Apostles, which closely followed Christmas, has already been mentioned (see above, 14). The Roman date of the festival has always been June 29. In the Calendar of Eusebius (336), where it first appears, this date is connected with the translation of their relics to a place called 'Catacumbae,' in the consulsip of Tuscus and Bassus (238). The Calendar of Carthage is defective here, but there are clear indications that it originally contained the entry; and sermons by St. Augustine (295, 296) on the Festival show that this must have been the case (PL xxxviii. 1548, 1552). The festival occurs, but without date, in the Calendar of Tours (490) (Greg. of Tours. Hist. Franc. x. 31), and thenceforward in all Western Calendars and Martyrologies. The observance of the Western date in Constantinople is first mentioned by Theodorus Lector (HE B. 16 (PG lxxxvi. 192)). His statement is that through the influence of Festus, a Roman senator who had been sent on a political mission to the Emperor Anastasius in 491, the festival was celebrated for the first time before. It afterwards came into general observance in the East as in the West. In the Gregorian Sacramentary, in addition to the Mass for June 29, a Mass in honour of St. Paul is appended to the 50th; and this augmentation is still marked in the Roman Missal and Calendar. This ancillary festival is accounted for by the difficulty which the bishop found in celebrating Mass at the tombs of both Apostles on the same day, and the consequent postponement of one of them until the morrow (Kellner, Heortologie. 285). At the Reformation the Church of England made June 29 a festival of St. Peter only, thus confining the commemoration of St. Paul to his Conversion (Jan. 25).

(b) St. Peter's Choir (Cathedra S. Petri).—Another festival of St. Peter appears in the Calendar of Eusebius on Feb. 22 with the title 'Natale Petri de Cathedra.' From early times this has been regarded as meaning the beginning of St. Peter's episcopate; in the Calendar of Tours (490) it is styled 'Natale S. Petri Episcopus'; but recently a view has been put forward that it refers to the actual wooden chair used, as was supposed, by St. Peter, which is mentioned in a document of the time of Gregory the Great (de Rossi, Bull. d'Ann. xvi. Rom. 189). Whether ever may have been the origin of the festival, the choice of the day on which it was held was apparently prompted by a desire to offer Christians a counter-attraction to a popular pagan festival, the 'Cara Cognitio' or 'Caristia,' observed on Feb. 22 in memory of deceased relatives. The festival of St. Peter's chair soon reached Gaul. It is found in the Calendar of Polenus Silvius (448), but under the incorrect designation 'Deposito SS. Petri et Pauli.' It also appears, as we have seen, in the Calendar of Tours. The second Council of Tours (567) complains that Christians sometimes relapsed into pagan rites on this day (Mansi, ix. 803). In Gaul, however, later on, probably in order to prevent the festival taking place in Lent—an occurrence forbidden by the Council of Toledo (see 18 (b) above)—it was transferred to an earlier day, which, after various changes, finally became the 18th in the liturgical books, was fixed at Jan. 18. The two dates appear in the Hieron. Martyr., where the Gallican editor noted Jan. 18, the date familiar to him, as the Calendar of Rome, and, finding another 'Cathedra S. Petri' on Feb. 22, he explained the co-existence of the two commemorations by attributing the latter to the episcopate which tradition assigned to the Apostle at Antioch. This diversity of use as to the date of the feast continued until 1558, when, at the instance of Paul Ry., both festivals were appointed to be observed with the Hieronymian distinction (Cherubini, Bullarium Rom., Lyons, 1655, i. 822). The feast of St. Peter's Chair has never been introduced into the East.

(c) St. Peter ad Vincula, Aug. 1.—This festival, which coincides in date with that of the Maccabees (see above, 21), commemorates the dedication of the Church of St. Peter on the Esquiline, after its restoration in the time of Sixtus III. (432-440). The church, in which the Apostle was believed to be preserved, both those mentioned in Ac 12 and those of his Roman imprisonment. The feast appears first in the 8th cent., having place in the Gregorian Sacram., and in the Martyrology of Bede. The Eastern Church has a festival of St. Peter's Chains on Jan. 16 (Nilles, i. 71). In the English Calendar the festival is termed 'Lammas Day,' which, according to the most probable derivation, is 'Loaf-mass,' and refers to an Anglo-Saxon custom of offering on this day bread made from the new corn in thanksgiving for the harvest. Lammas is one of the legal quarter-days in Scotch water-splendor.

(d) Conversion of St. Paul (Conversio S. Pauli), Jan. 25.—This festival in the Hieron. Martyr., where it is first mentioned, is entitled 'Romae, Translatio B. Pauli Apostoli;' the reference is doubtless to the imperial edict of Constantine. In the Missale Gothicum it appears bearing the name with which it has come down to us. It is not mentioned in the ancient Roman Sacramentaries. The need for it was not felt at Rome, because there a special commemoration of St. Paul was connected with Sexagesima Sunday. The station for that day was held in the basilica of St. Paul on the Ostian Way; the Collect in the Mass involves the protection of the Epistle (2 Co 11) narrated his sufferings. The festival is peculiar to the Western Church.

(e) St. John Apostle and Evangelist.—See 14 above.

(f) St. John before the Latin gate (S. Ioannis ante portam Latinam), May 6.—This festival probably marks the anniversary of the dedication of the church at this place in the time of Pope Adrian (772-795) (Lib. Pont. iv. 398). It is first mentioned in the Sacramentary (the Gregorian) which has come down to us through this Pope. See COLLECT, 2 (l). The legend of the Apostle being thrown into a cauldron with hot and cold water (3 7 et) Whence? What? is subsequently to be connected with it. A Greek festival of St. John on May 8 commemorates a miracle said to have been performed on his tomb at Ephesus; another on Sept. 26 celebrates his legendary assumption (xerardun) into heaven after death (Nilles, i. 164 f., 385).

(g) SS. Philip and James, May 1.—These Apostles are commemorated on the anniversary of the dedication of a church at Rome in their honour about 561. The day was selected for the purpose because it was already connected with the memory of St. Philip (Lib. Pont. i. 306, see n. 2). As only two St. James's are in the Calendar of the West, and St. James the son of Zebedee is celebrated on July 25, it follows that the saint here associated with St. Philip is St. James the son of Alpheus, who is identified with our Lord's brother of the same name, in whose name the son of Alpheus is commemorated on Oct. 9, St. James, 'the brother of God,' on Oct. 23, and St. Philip, 'one of the first company of the twelve,' on Nov. 14.

(h) St. Andrew, Nov. 30.—This festival is of exceptional importance as fixing the date of Advent Sunday. It occurs in the Calendar of Carthage (c. 565), in which no other Apostles are mentioned by name except St. James the Great
and (probably) SS. Peter and Paul. It appears also in all the Gallican and Roman liturgical books. In the Liber Usualis (p. 340; 352, 353) it says, 'At the dedication of the Church, it was the day of his martyrdom at Patras. It is thus the only festival of an Apostle which makes a claim to being observed on the actual anniversary of his death. The day is held in high honour among the Russians, who call St. Andrew the Apostle and patron of their Church (Martinov, p. 293).

(i) The dates of the feasts of other Apostles and Evangelists as celebrated in the West and East are as follows: St. Matthias—in West, Feb. 24, in East, Aug. 9; St. Mark, Apr. 25; St. Barnabas, June 11 (in East, St. Barnabas and St. Bartholomew are commemorated together); St. James the son of Zebedee—in West, July 25, in East, Apr. 30; St. Bartholomew—in West, Aug. 25, in East, June 11 (see above); St. Matthew—in West, Sept. 21, in East, Nov. 18; St. Luke, Oct. 18; SS. Simon and Jude—in West, Nov. 30, in East, Nov. 28; Zelotes, May 10; St. Judas (Thaddeus), June 19; St. Thomas—in West, Dec. 21, in East, July 3. We have no evidence for the reason of the assignment of these days to St. James, St. Judas, or St. Thomas. It is very likely that the Church, in the celebration of the anniversaries of the dedication of churches or of the translation of relics.

23. St. Mary Magdalen, July 22.—This festival is first noted in the Martyrology of Bede. As regards Service-books, it appears first in a Missal of Verona of the 10th cent. and then in some 11th cent. Missals. It was not received into the official Roman books until the 12th cent. (Kellner, Heortologia, p. 171). In the West, St. Mary Magdalen is identified by the Gospel for the day (Lk 7:36-50) with the woman who was a sinner. In the Greek Service-books she is described as 'the holy ointment-bearing and equal of the Apostles.' In the English Pr. Bk. of 1549 this festival was retained as a Red-letter day, with Collect, Epistle, and Gospel, the latter being as usual that in the Latin missal. Since 1552 the day has merely been noted in the Calendar.

24. Days of the Martyrs and Confessors.—The earliest martyr festival on record is that of St. Polycaur, Jan. 26. The letter of the Church of Antioch to the Church of Rome of 137 AD (P. O. I., 226) gives an account of his martyrdom (c. 155) stating that it had been thought wise to celebrate the 'birthday' of Polycaur at his grave 'as a memorial of those who had finished their course' (Martyr. Polyc. 18 [PG v. 1044])—words which imply that earlier martyrs had not hitherto been commemorated. In this letter we find for the first time the death of a martyr described as his 'birthday,' i.e. into a better world—the name by which it came generally to be known (βῆμα γερονθιας, natale, or dies natalis, or natalitius) (cf. also COMMEMORATION OF THE DEAD, vol. iii. p. 718 f.). We find no trace of the commemoration of other individual martyrs until the 3rd cent. to which belong the earliest noted in the Calendar of Filocalus. At first martyr festivals were entirely local, each Church honouring its own saints. There is, therefore, more likelihood of the days of martyrs being real anniversaries of their deaths than those of Apostles. By degrees these local festivals, or some of them, were adopted by the central or mother-church of the country. St. Cyprian (+ 258) noted that the days of martyrs should be noted, in order that they may be locally commemorated, but also promises that, where he is (i.e. at Carthage), oblations shall be celebrated in their memory (Ep. 35 [PL. 328]). Before long the practice arose of one Church adopting com-

memorations from the Calendar of another, so that eminent saints came to be honoured not only in their own country but by the official Calendar. The Roman Calendar of Filocalus appear the Carthaginian martyrs Perpetua and Felicitas (March 7) and Cyprian (Sept. 4). Some, like the last named, passed into the common Calendar of the Church. At first martyrs alone were commemorated, but later on saints otherwise eminent were admitted to share their honours. The authority to admit to the roll of saints belonged originally to the Bishop of each city that claimed them (v.g.v.) in its later sense, by a Pope, was that of Udalric, Bishop of Augsburg, by John xv. in 995 (Matillon, Atti. SS. Ben. Siao, v., Paris, 1898-1701, Pref. lxviii; Gibbins, The Dyptich, Dublin, 1864, p. 33).

Among local festivals which in early times came to be observed should be mentioned the anniversaries of the dedication of churches, the burial days (depositiones) of bishops, and their consecration days (natalia), which were kept during their episcopate.

25. All Saints' Day (Festum omnium Sanctorum), Nov. 1.—The origin of the festival is obscure. The Liber Pont. (i. 317) relates that Boniface IV. (908-915), having received the pagan temple known as the Pantheon as a gift from the emperor Phocas, transformed it into a temple of the Virgin Mary and all Martyrs, no date of the dedication being given. In the Martyrologies of Rabanus Maurus and Florus (8th cent.) there appear, on May 15, 'Natae Sanctora Mariae ad martyres' and, on Nov. 1, 'Festivitas omnium Sanctorum.' The origin of the latter festival is assigned in both works to the consecration of the Pantheon by Boniface IV., the passage from the Liber Pont. being read in this connection; it passed through the chronicle of Bede (de Temp. R., cap. 66, ed. Giles, vi. 323). But the festival of May 13 corresponds better in title with the observance of the Pantheon, and it is apparently older than the festival of Nov. 1, as it is found in the Gregorian Sacramentary, a document of some what earlier date, in which the Feast of All Saints does not appear. Adon, who worked upon and supplemented Florus, observed no such festival; and in his Martyrology he attributed the origin of both festivals to the dedication mentioned in the Liber Pontificalis. He also supplemented the notice of Nov. 1, 'Sanctorum omnium,' by 'Sanctorum Pionum' (779-840), at the instance of Gregory IV., ordained that the festival of All Saints should be perpetually observed on that day in the Gallic territories. As this event would have occurred in Adon's time, we may believe that we are here, at any rate, on solid ground of history (Quentin, Les Martyrologies historiques, p. 366 ff.). In the Eastern Church the Festival of All Saints is kept on the 1st Sunday after Pentecost (see 10, above). It was already observed in Antioch in the 4th cent., as sermons preached on that day by Chrysostom have come down to us (PG I. 706-712).

26. All Souls' Day (Commemoratio omnium fidelium Defunctorum), Nov. 2.—The first distinct notice of the observance of this day is its appointment in 998 by Odilo, Abbot of Cluny, for the monasteries of his order (Dictionnaire de l'Église [PL. exii. 1058]). The first diocese to adopt it seems to have been Liége, where it was introduced by Bishop Notker (c. 1008). In the Greek Church the commemoration of the departed is kept on the 1st Saturday before the Sunday called ' Apostolics,' which corresponds to the Western Septuagesima. The Armenians keep it on Easter Monday. The
day ceased to be observed in the Anglican Church at the Reformation.

27. Octaves.—The word ‘octave’ signifies the eighth day, or the period of eight days after a festival, treated as a repetition of the festal observance. The usage may have been suggested by the rule laid down for the prolongation of the chief OT festivals (Lv 23:34–38). The first octave of which we read is that of Easter and during which the newly-baptized continued to wear their white garments. Etheria (Peregrin.) notices the custom at Jerusalem in connexion with Epiphany, Easter, and the Dedication days of the churches called the Martyrium and the Anastasis. She speaks of the eight Paschal days as kept everywhere. At first the octaves were generally attached only to festivals of our Lord, but in the 8th and 9th centuries a few of the greater saints were similarly honoured (Amalarius, de Excl. Off. iv. 36 [PL cv. 1228]). In medieval times, octaves became more numerous, chiefly owing to the liturgical influence of the Franciscans (Kellner, Hertoirel. 15). In the Eastern Church a similar treat as same is known by the name of 'Apodosis,' but the period observed is not always a week; it may be longer or shorter (Neale, Eastern Church, Gen. Introdc. 764; Daniel, Codex Liturg. iv. 278 f.).

28. Vigils and Ember Days.—See Fasting (Christian), III. 6 and 5.

29. The days of the week.—The Latin and Greek names in liturgical use are 'diei dominicae, feria secunda, l. tertia, l. quarta, l. quinta, l. sexta, sabatum'; 'ημερα, θετερα, τεταρτη, πεταρη, παρακατη, σαβατον.' Why 'feria,' which in classical use means a holy day, should be employed for an ordinary week-day is unknown. The most reasonable explanation is that, as the Jews numbered the days of the week from the Sabbath, saying the 'second of the Sabbath,' the 'third of the Sabbath,' etc., so Christians, adopting the same method, substituted, for 'Sabbath,' 'feria' as an equivalent for 'Lord's day,' the holy day from which they counted (Valesius, Annotationes in II. E. Eusebii, Paris, 1678, p. 155 f.). The names for the days of the week which the early Christians found in general use—as, in Latin countries, 'diei solis, lunae, etc.'—were deemed by them inappropria tate, as derived from pagan gods. At the Reformation in England, when the vernacular was again used, the names of the days of the week, the popular names, which had long lost their pagan associations, were naturally admitted into the Prayer Book.

30. Classification of festivals.—(a) Lanfranc (in his Statuta pro ordin. S. Benedicti ed. Giles, i. 126 f.), distributes festivals according to their importance into first, second, and third classes. These came to be known as Doubles, Semi-doubles, and Simples. A double festival probably derived its name from the usage which before the 9th cent. prevailed in Rome and elsewhere on greater feasts, of reciting two offices, one of the feria and the other of the festival. In process of time the classification of festivals became more elaborate, and the system in force at the present day, according to which there are six grades in the Roman Calendar, viz. Doubles of the 1st class, Doubles of the 2nd class, Greater Doubles, Doubl es, Lesser Doubles, Simples.

(b) The festivals of the Latin Church are also known as Festa chori—their obligations on the clergy only, and confined to the celebration of Church offices; and Festa chori orarii—i.e. those which lay people are bound to observe by attendance at Mass and rest from labour. In modern times there has been a large transference from the latter class to the former owing to the pressure of civil authorities. Thus the festivals of general obligation have been considerably reduced in number, but no uniform rule prevails. In England the settlement made by Pope Pius vi. in 1777 has been but slightly modified since. At present, in addition to Sundays, the following holy days are observed—viz. the Ascension, Corpus Christi, SS. Peter and Paul, the Assumption, and All Saints.

31. (a) In the Church of England, all the feasts for which a special Collect, Epistle, and Gospel are provided (i.e., the eight Sundays) are known as Holy Days. The following list is a rude sketch of the ecclesiastical calendar, excluding the Holy Days.

32. See also Calendar (Christian), Fasting (Christian).
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Egyptian).—

I. SOURCES.—Egypt is extremely rich in this regard.

1. We have first of all the tables enumerating the festivals in regular series, or in the form of chronologically arranged annals of a religious sanctuary. The ordinary form of the first-named is that of the temple calendars. One may consult [Eng.], and also [Fr.]. The specimens most worthy of mention, in order of date, are those of Karnak (XVIIIth dynasty), Medinet-Habu (XXth dynasty), Edfu (Ptolemaic), Denderah, and Edfu (Ptolemaic period). The famous 'Stone of Palermo' (Vth dynasty) is a good example of the second type.

Individual mention of a long series of festivals (sometimes augmented by brief descriptions or explanations as to their value or aim) is made from time to time in the corpus of the Egyptian texts. As principal types we may mention: (a) historical mural inscriptions or official stelae of the temples; (b) mortuary inscriptions of a non-historical character; (c) allusions to commemorations of private stelae or inscriptions engraved upon private statues; (d) funerary literature adds very little to our knowledge of the ceremonies performed at the funerals and the funerary processions of ancient Egypt; (e) some of these ceremonies are mentioned in the records of the temple of Bes at Thebes; (f) others come from a combination of the private stela (e.g., in regard to everything connected with the feasts of the battles and death of Osiris at Abydos); the ex-votos of cures or oracles (cf. Divination and Disease and Medicine [Eng.]) add a great number; finally, the papyri of administrative or private correspondence (principally for the last centuries) serve to complete our knowledge down to the minutest detail (e.g., the papyri of the Ptolemaic period for the kābāsur of the Theban Ammon).

To these properly Egyptian documents, the classical Greek writers add important information on the ceremonies of the ancient religions, and we are indebted to Ptolemaic period for the kābāsur of the Theban Ammon.

The total actually known of Egyptian festivals of all kinds—general, local, exceptional, royal, funerary, commemorative, etc.—extends to round numbers, 1900. Of course, this figure must not deceive us as to the real number of festivals taken part in by the national life of Egyptian society (cf. below). It is more certain, however, that a classification is necessary if we are to render more explicit the understanding of this enormous series. The most satisfactory method seems to be a division of the festivals according to their chief characteristics, without taking account of their chronological details or geographical divisions. Such a procedure is artificial, but it places the information most quickly at the command of the reader.

II. CLASSES OF FESTIVALS.—1. Local festivals having reference to the life of local gods. It has been pointed out in a former article (Calendar [Eng.], VI.) that the detailed list of the acts of the legendary life of the gods, celebrated at times which were foreseen and fixed, marked a decisive advance in the religious civilization of the old nations. This advance makes it possible to follow the series of attempts culminating in the point at which the history of Egypt has already arrived. We may summarize the
Festivals and Fasts (Egyptian)

Festivals of the local gods under the following heads:

(a) The annual festival of the birth of the god (specimens: Stone of Palermo, Sarcophags of Babo).—Practically speaking, the date of these festivals seems to have been based upon the astronomical determination of the heliacal rising of a star, or upon the reappearance in the firmament of a constellation supposed to be the habitation, or one of the 'sousis,' of the divinity (an exception is made, naturally, for the god of Nilotic character or whose solar character, for whom the system is much more complicated).

(b) Festivals having the character of 'seasons of the year,' associated with a local god (not including the feasts of the inundation).—These are more especially the festivals of the 'first day of the year,' coinciding with the reappearance of the star Sothis (Sirius), and the beginning of the rising of the Nile (end of June). The festivals of the New Year Denderah, where the statue of the goddess is brought on to the terrace of the temple and there receives the first rays of the rising sun, are a good example.

(c) The legendary episodes of life of the gods constitute probably the most ancient festivals. Most of these commemorations consist principally in sham battles, and seem to be reminiscences of fights of two rival deities by the friendly divinities and the monsters who were enemies of man (cf. Dualism [Egypt]). The myths of Osiris and Seth disguised them, in the historical period, as the anniversaries of the principal dates of the war between Horus and Seth-Typhon. The traces of the pre-historic period may still be found in many typical details (magical dances, disguises, masks, etc.), and suggest instructive connexions between them and the modern 'assemblies of thieves' of other civilized peoples. Some, still more ancient, seem to have been linked, before any attempt at cosmogonic religion had been made, to the magic festivals in connexion with hunting or fishing, such as are still celebrated in the provinces of a horde of primitive civilized cultures.

(d) The local life of Divine idols.—Like the local lords and princes, who were their heritors, the Egyptian gods lived in effigy the life of lords of the manor in their sanctuaries. The walks which they took for pleasure or inspection, their excursion into their 'houses of rest' during the fine season, form the schema of a series of festivals which the calendar spreads over the whole length of the year. It is of these outings kWhn and journeys that the Theban collection, thanks to the exceptional wealth of its contents, gives us an abundant list, illustrated and commented upon by hundreds of texts.

The festivals of Amun, those of Maat his wife, and of their divine son, Khonsu, represent for us the visit paid by Amun to Maat and Khonsu in their sanctuaries; the Mother-goddess of the nome giving a visit to the home of the family in the great temple of Karnak represents the joyful excursion of the members of the theocratic family of the solar king =Luxor. The Hathor of Amun on the west side of the capital, and the festival of the valley, the 'great festivals' of Amun-Hinu, Medinet-Habu and at Thebanus, the beautiful festival of Amun in Thebes, and the small festivals, sanctuaries which are the object of the most singular pious devotion of the whole province of the Thebaid. What we know of Edfu, Denderah, and Memphis shows us a calendar quite as full of amazing events, which would encourage us to still longer list the 'outings' or the 'manifestations' of its god Phah, in great or in small. The only difference in favour of Thebes arises from its position as capital, for the time being, of Egypt, and from the number of monuments which it has left us by reason of this privileged position. Everywhere, in the same way, the dividing up of the divinity into idols having a special epithet and a particular cult has brought about festivals in connexion with other special 'aspects' of the divinity: 'Lord of Joy' (in Thebes, 'Beautiful Rest'), and Khonsu, 'the magnificent union,' had distinct anniversaries for their rejoicing or processes; just as Ptah, the 'modelleer of the world,' and Phah, 'of the districts of the South,' had theirs.

(c) A series of local festivals of a more essentially 'naturist' character is connected with the cycles of rejoicing proper to each region of Ancient Egypt.

The gods naturally linked with the local region in connexion with their rôle or their legend is here less evident. The festival of the 'reception of the river' (Beni-Hassan, Kahun, etc.), and the festivals of the 'arrival of the Nile' (Silsileh, of the 'beginning of the rising' or the 'opening of the canals' =passim), are the most conspicuous. The popular character of these rejoicings, as revealed in our sources and in the classical authors, shows a strong resemblance to what, during last century, was still the character of festivals such as that of the opening of the khaliy at Cairo. Similarities are equally evident in festivals such as those of the dhemet mentioned by the contemporaries of the Alexandrian civilization, as in the popular 'assemblies' where the people went into the country or to the neighbouring necropoleis or into the 'valley' (Thebes, Denderah, etc.), to make presentations of offerings to the gods, or to taste the sweetness of new honey, while repeating the saying: γάλακτος ἡ ἀλέθεια—as Plutarch tells us (de Is. et Osir. 68). The description of rejoicings of this kind gives the impression of something quite analogous to the festival of demeter in modern Greece, or to the shaman an-asam so dear to the hearts of the lower-class people of modern Egypt (see below, p. 884).}

3. Inter-provincial festivals.—The statues of the chief divinities of the nome came out once or twice a year to pay visits of great pomp to their neighbours. Information in the form of accounts of these journeys abounds in the principal temples. Herahabet of Thebes went to see Hathor of the Fayyum, and the latter came to visit him in her turn. Edfu saw Hathor of Denderah arriving with an immense suite of priests and followers; and Horus of Edfu went to visit the gods of the Fayyum, just as the gods of the Fayyum made the same pilgrimage to the other gods of the Delta. In all cases where the gods are not wanting, and show that the whole population took part, augmented by thousands of pilgrims from outside, not to mention, of course, the presence of the princes of the respective provinces of the visiting gods, their officers, and the whole of their clergy. The episodes of sham wars and massacres, of great popular affrays, and certain strange scenes where troops of animals (oxen, goats, etc.) were hunted, whipped, or put to death, connect these ceremonies with the highest antiquity. Over and above the legendary wars of the Osirian myth, we catch glimpses of magical festivals, with propagandist religious significance, with sham or tribal wars, similar to those which are found among modern uncivilized peoples.

3. Festivals of a national character.—The mechanism which set the machinery to re-act. To begin with, part of them took their rise simply in the successive political preponderance of the large towns of Egypt. The festivals of the local gods of Memphis, Thebes, and the Delta became those of the whole of Egypt. When each town in turn was the first city of the valley of the Nile, the nation adopted in each case the local dates of the festivals or anniversaries, and established them as general feast-days. Their
splendour tended to pale with the decline of the town to which the god really belonged; it diminished in favour of new-comers. Thus it comes about that at the time of Herodotus the great festival of the Thebans had given place to those of the divinities of the Delta, because it was in Lower Egypt that the dynasties of the Bubastites, the Tanites, and the Salites had established the political centre of the Enroutu. The greater number of the gods, which drew their sanctuaries from the highest spoken names, were fairly numerous, but the gods of the great towns. The coronation and the jubilee (saud) are the two great ceremonies. The first divides itself naturally into a series of distinct festivals, ranging from the solemn recognition of the king by the chief of the gods, the presentation to the people in the court of the temple, and the adoption of the "sacred name," to the consecration properly so-called. These were begun from the very beginning to be held at Heliopolis; the few remaining Memphite monuments represent it as being attached to that town, and it is seen from historical inscriptions that the rule of the Pharaoh was valid till after these traditional solemnities had been accomplished at the Heliopolitan sanctuaries. Piankhi himself, the conqueror of Egypt, was not considered the legitimate king of Egypt until he claimed descent from the ancient capital, all the long ceremonies fixed by the custom of thousands of years. Without discussing here the difficult question of the exact nature of the saud, it is evident that its jubilee nature makes it a repetition of the festivals of the coronation. Through it we obtain part of the material details which are lacking with regard to certain points of the coronation, for the festivals of saud have everywhere been represented on Egyptian monuments either in a shortened form or at full length.

The texts of the Pyramids show that the episodes represented on the monuments commemorative of the saud (e.g. at Memphis [XIII dynasty]) existed as early as the proto-historical period. They are found almost unaltered down to the time of the Ptolemies. In this latter period Heliopolis lost the privilege which Memphis gained, of seeing the Pharaoh crowned. The most detailed and curious scene representing the magnificent pomp of these festivals and the concourses of all the divinities of Egypt are represented in the bas-reliefs of the "festival hall" of Peosor [II.], found and re-constructed in 1895 by Naville at Bubastis.

4. Anniversaries of a historical or pseudo-historical character.—Although still having a connexion with the divine life, the festivals in question have reference rather to acts done by human chiefs and to their commemoration. The Thinite monuments and the Stone of Paderno represent for us, as regards the most ancient period, the "festival of beating Anu" or that of "constructing the defences of Dewaza," which may be connected with memories of the real genuine wars of Egypt (but reserve as regards the mythological share). More definite anniversaries were instituted by the Pharaohs of the first Theban Empire, and celebrated the coronation by the Pharaoh. The "festival of repelling the troglodytes" and that of "taking captive the Nubians" were still commemorated, after having been instituted by Usiresen III. (XIIth dynasty), under Thothmes III., in the middle of the New Empire.

At the same time, we ought not to be deceived by these anniversaries. At certain times, some Pharaoh might renew them out of devotion to one of his ancestors, or to show that he was repeating his exploits. But in the interval they had fallen into disuse, and everything tends to prove that festivals of this type rarely survived their original occasion.

5. Foundation of sanctuaries.—The great decorative compositions and the connected texts in the temples of Deir el-Bahri or Soleb, as well as the frescoes of Amarna, are, with much wealth of detail, the festivals which took place at the foundation of new temples. The arrival of the royal procession, the ritual of foundation, the laying of the first stone (Edfn), the ceremonies of inauguration, and the rejoicings accompanying all may be followed step by step. As regards Amarna in particular, the biographical pictures left by the principal dignitaries of the time are very valuable information to the official descriptions given by other documents, in that they show in a life-like way the popular gaiety and joyous excitement of the crowd.

6. Coronations and royal jubilees.—The categories of anniversary festivals in relation to the life of sons of Amun and of the gods, are, as a result of connexion with the festival of the divinities of Bubastis, Sais, and Buto. But side by side, with this first-changing group, a certain number of festivals, throughout almost the entire course of Egyptian history, are celebrated all over Egypt at one time. They are all almost connected, as is only logical, with those gods who, with the chief god Ra, were accepted as the universally adored gods, by the side of the local gods (with whom they are frequently confused). These are, then, festivals in connexion with Ptah-Sokar and with Osiris. As well as having in all those special sanctuaries, where the festivals of their particular calendars were celebrated, their great anniversaries always drew to Memphis, Mendes, or, more especially, to the mysteries of the huge crowds which came from all of Egypt.

The famous Osiran festivals of the month of Chosok at Dendereh seem to have acquired a more gradual popularity, and to have become more universal only when the festivals of Amen-Amon declined. As to the Heliopolitan festivals, which are as ancient as the very history of Egypt, they seem to have retained a monarchical character of high accessional initiation, which separates them absolutely from the great pilgrimage festivals of the other sanctuaries. The national festivals are connected more especially with the funerary life of Ptah-Sokar, Deir el-Bahri, and the "Round of Walls," and ought, rationally speaking, to be taken rather in connexion with the festivals of the dead (cf. below).

7. Royal episodic festivals.—Besides the participation of the Pharaoh in the great festivals of the cult or in the enumerations of his own reign, two distinct series of festivals have been left us by the monuments.

(a) Those having reference to expeditions of war and celebrating the victories of the Pharaoh or his triumphal return.—The royal procession with its booty and its captives, the solemn arrival of ambassadors or tributes from foreign lands, sacrifices and offerings presented in thanks to the Divine Lords are the subject of immense decorative compositions on bas-relief and frescoes, either in the temples themselves (Karnak, the tower of Luxor, Ramessuem, etc.) or on the walls of private tombs (neopelopses of Thebes and Amarn.).

(b) Those accompanying the different acts of royal life (birth of princes, marriages, journeys, inauguration of palaces, etc.).—The sources, which are still richer in incomplete records, are filled up by the paintings of Amarna, which constitute in this respect a series of historical pages of the highest interest. We must make special mention of the arrival of the famous queen-mother Tyana at her new palace at Thebes and of the journey which marked her arrival from Thebes (banquets, popular rejoicings, midnight banquets, processions of musicians and of torch-bearers, military parades, official processions of the gods),

8. Festivals of a funerary character.—The enumerations or calendars of the Memphite mus-
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Egyptian)

Festivals (Ivth-Vth dynasties), of Denderah (Vth dynasty), of Syat (Xth dynasty), of Berenice (XIII-XIVth dynasties), of the Theban necropoleis (XVIIIth - XXVth dynasties), give us the complete lists. The character of these festivals has been shown in art. Calendar (Egypt). The same is the same as for the festivals of the gods. The cults of local gods of the dead and the festivals of these funerary gods become, at least in regard to some of the gods, national anniversaries which were little by little fused into the great cycle of the cult of Ptah-Sokar-Osiris. The placing of the god in the coffin and then in the tomb, the planting of sacred trees or mystical insignia (ancient fetishes?), the mourning of the divine family, the apparent death of the god and his subsequent resurrection, form so many episodes giving rise to distinct festivals, with which are connected the festivals of ordinary dead persons. The participation of the living in the principal anniversaries (see the frescoes of the Theban tomb of Nofrihatet) gradually modifies their character. The agape, the so-called 'funeral banquets,' the general mourning on the day of the feast, the procession of holy pilgrims to the necropoleis, the days of magic 'navigation' of the souls towards Abydos (festival of boats), the prow of which is turned towards Abydos in the night when the totating priests and the whole populace are in tears, the festival in which the processions go by the light of torches to seek the statues of the dead in the necropoleis, and the festival in which 'the round of the walls of the Temple is made praying for the venerated deities,' the festival of new fire, are only exempla which may be quoted in passing. Herodotus (ii, 62) has given a picturesque description of the episode of the 'festival of the Lamps.'

The Character and General Character. The description of the pomp of these great Egyptian festivals cannot be made the object of even the briefest description in a summary so condensed as this. The Theban pictures show their gaiety and magnificence (see Lit.): troopers of dancers and singers, companies of soldiers, troopers of negroes, orchestra, officers and priests, processions of bearers of offerings or sacred objects, emblems, banners, perfumed statues of gods, which have, in a word, along with the local modifications of Egyptian civilization, the signs of rejoicing which are present in festivals all over the world. The three characters of these Egyptian festivals are (a) the procession: what is carried on litters, on which are placed the tabernacles of the images of the gods; (b) the carrying of insignia and emblems, in which may sometimes be recognized the survival of very curious archaic fetishes (the 'box' of Min, vases, didu, thrones with the emblem khaibet, etc.); (c) the participation in the festivals of small portable statues of deified kings or of the reigning king. This participation of the royal 'tools' is made clear by numerous inscriptions and by the bas-reliefs of Medinet-Habu, Deir el-Bahri, Karnak, Ramesseum, Karnac, and Luxor.

Certain traditional and especially venerated statues (of those of Ahmes I. and Nofrihatet), which were continually being embellished or re-made in precious materials, seem to have played a part similar to that of the most famous images of certain of our Christian sanctuaries. The participation of high dignitaries and the local nobility in these festivals would require a long article for itself alone. It is to be regretted that the representations of the deities of Denderah, and more especially of King, have never been popularized as they should be by modern reproductions.

The frescoes of Amarna and the notes made by Herodotus of his travels briefly indicate how the part played by the populace in all these ceremonies; the noisy and sometimes licentious gaiety of the crowds which flock to the pilgrimage, the thousands of devotees encamped in the approaches to the sanctuary, give the impression that a festival of modern Egypt, like the famous fair of Tanis, must still present an aspect not unlike that of a great festival of Egypt at the time of the Pharaohs was like.

The religious ceremonies which were thus gone through comprised essentially in the following:

(a) A representation of celestial navigation by small sacred boats on the sacred lake of the temples. This is probably the most ancient source of the theme of itinerant cerebrations with the organization of mimetic magic in its civilization.

(b) Journeys (by land and sea) taken by the statues of gods, visiting their various provincial sanctuaries. As if they were real living guests, they receive gifts on their arrival, and are entertained at solemn feasts; they are washed, anointed, perfumed, and robed. Sometimes they rest for the night 'on a bed of flowers. During their journey they halt at stations of rest,' analogous to the reposits of Roman Catholic state processions. A solemn sacrifice marks the culminating point of the ceremony.

(c) Visits of the gods to the tombs of deceased kings or princes in the necropoleis, on the great days of commemoration (e.g. the opening of the necropoleis). These divine statues at the solemn acts symbolizing the great events of agricultural life (the rising of the Nile, the cutting of the first sheaf at the harvest).

(d) Sacred dramas, sometimes particularly in representations of wars, battles, and brawls interspersed with songs and incantations. The 'mysteries' of the type of Mendes, Abydos, and Denderah are of a more complicated kind; in them was given a representation lasting for some days and taking place at various points of the sacred territory, of the wars of the god, his death, the battles of his supporters, his entombment, and his resurrection. The making of symbolic images of the god, which had been broken in pieces, associating his death and resurrection with the processes of the death and resurrection of the substances of Nature (corn and vine), is the most salient feature of the famous Osirian festivals of the month of Chouak. Ceremonies like those of the great pilgrimages naturally lasted several days, and in certain cases even several weeks. Festivals of even a local character have, in a word, along with the local modifications of Egyptian civilization, the signs of rejoicing which are present in festivals all over the world. The three characters of these Egyptian festivals are (a) the procession: what is carried on litters, on which are placed the tabernacles of the images of the gods; (b) the carrying of insignia and emblems, in which may sometimes be recognized the survival of very curious archaic fetishes (the 'box' of Min, vases, didu, thrones with the emblem khaibet, etc.); (c) the participation in the festivals of small portable statues of deified kings or of the reigning king. This participation of the royal 'tools' is made clear by numerous inscriptions and by the bas-reliefs of Medinet-Habu, Deir el-Bahri, Karnak, Ramesseum, Karnac, and Luxor.

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This page discusses various festivals and religious practices in ancient Greece and Egypt. Key points include:

1. **Festivals and Festivities** - The text describes several festivals held in honor of deities, often with agricultural themes and associated with the natural world. For example, the harvest-month festival is mentioned, which was probably held in June and involved the observation of the phenomena of the natural world.

2. **Religious Practices** - The text mentions offerings to the gods, such as libations and sacrifices, and the importance of the natural elements in religious observances. It notes the significance of the earth-magic performed during festivals, which was believed to ensure fertility and prosperity.

3. **Historical References** - The text references works by ancient authors like Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar, indicating the influence of these literary figures on the religion and mythology of the period.

4. **Societal Roles** - The text highlights the roles of women in religious ceremonies, such as the Thesmophoria, and notes the importance of maintaining the purity and fertility of the land.

The overall theme is the interconnection between the natural world and religious practices in ancient Greece, emphasizing the role of nature in societal and religious life.
vegetation-spirit—was merely pursued and caught, to get his electrifying power for the Spartan vineyards. The pharmonakoi in the Thargelia were, somewhat informally, intended, obviously, to indicate his connexion with a fertilizing vegetation-power;1 was burned and his ashes scattered to the sea and the winds as a purification of the tainted city. Harppocratic adds that this was done at the Thargelia, and not merely, as Tseutes says, 'if disaster, by the wrath of heaven, overtook a city.' The intention is obvious: the pharmonakoi are at one and the same time incarnation of vegetation-idolies and scapegoats. On both counts, of course, they are liable to be put to death—in the one case, to prevent their powers from waning and give them an opportunity to be re-incarnated, and, in the other, to get utterly rid of them and purify the city, which they are Indem. But they were certainly not actually put to death in civilized Athens. On human sacrifice the Greeks of historical times looked with loathing and horror. The omen boys, because they were nearer to—it just as the Amer. Indians, some of whom at least were once ritual cannibals, regard as permanently infamous any of their number whom hunger has driven to such a terrible resource. Yet no enemy of Athens ever accuses her of so awful a practice; Athenians, and notably the author of the Minos, are as emphatic as any one in denouncing it; and our authorities for the practice are late and double. Finally, the Thargelia was a festival of Apollo, and there is good reason to believe that not even the righteous exaction of a condemned criminal was allowed to sully its purity. The killing of the pharmonakoi can have been only a form; but no doubt, in earlier times or among more backward sections of the Greek world, it was real. At any rate, it was part of a great ceremony of purification, preparatory to getting in the harvest, of the same cult-stratum as the fertilizing rites of the Thesmophoria and Arrephoria. Apollo’s connexion with it is not very clear; probably in his character of a god of joy9 he took over an older ceremonial.

It is especially interesting to us particularly from a literary point of view, are those mimetic vegetation-rites connected with the name of Dionysos—the dances and mummmings of the ‘goat-men’ which took up to Thargelia and Lenaia. In these and many other ceremonies it is not primarily Dionysos the wine-god who is worshipped (a wine-deity pure and simple would hardly exclude wine from some of his offerings, as Dionysos did), but rather Dionysos the god of fertility in general, and especially the fertility of the fields. In Thrace there survives to this day a curious ritual in which we get both phallus, reminding us of the phallic dances out of which, says Aristotle, Comedy sprang, and a masque of men dressed in goat-skins, which provides at last the needed link between ἀργαλία and ἀραγγία and helps to sweep away various absurd etymologies.1 For this masque is ‘tragic’ and turns on the death of one of the characters—no doubt in old times

Dionysos himself. It is well known that nothing is more common than the death, followed by the resurrection, of the vegetation-god; Adonis, Osiris, Dionysos, Balder, Mithra, among many others, are good gods who are slain by Winter or the Storm, and generally returns again in the spring. No festival of Dionysos comes in the summer; he is worshipped in spring and autumn, intended, as the course of the year shows, to be in Poseideon=December (Rural Dionysia), Gamelion=January (Lenaia), and Elaphebolion=March (Greater or City Dionysia), and he is also connected with the Feast of All Souls (Ἀναστάςις) in Anthesterion=February. Counting the Rural Dionysia and Lenaia as merely two forms of the same festival, we get the three feasts just about where we should expect them in the case of an agricultural deity: one at the time of the new wine (Anthesteria), one in full spring (Great Dionysia), and one (Lenaia) to arouse the sleeping vegetation-power in winter. He has no Attic festival, however, in Pyanopsion (October), its place being taken by the festival of the hopi-arrhi.

But we must pass to a brief discussion of the nature of the two great Athenian feasts, the Lenaia and the Greater Dionysia. In those little bits is left of the simple and primitive Nature-cult, either on its quasi-magical or on its orgiastic side (to be considered later). The former festival consisted (1) of a procession, managed by the king-archon and certain assistants (εταυχαρεία) chosen from the sacred gentes of the Enompidai and Kerrykes; (2) of a contest of lyric and dramatic poetry, managed by the king-archon alone.2 Only the contest (μάθημα) is important, for it was at this that many of the great dramatic works were produced. In this connexion, it cannot be too carefully kept in mind that the plays were all religious, at least in theory, and that going to see them was quite an act of worship. A devil of a Greek did not go to the theatre to see a play of Sophocles or Aristophanes merely because he found it amusing or moving, any more than a devout Florentine goes to Sanatissimo and Commedia dell’arte merely because the singing is good. Of course, aesthetic enjoyment played its part, as it generally does—the people who built the Parthenon or Cologne Cathedral were moved by a love of beauty as well as religious zeal,—but, in its essence, the State’s action in appointing chorogoi, the chorogoi putting out and training his chorus, the dramatist’s composition of the tragedy or comedy, and the spectator’s pleasure in the theatre were all parts of the public and private religious duty of Athens and her citizens. It is so long since we have had any such union between Church and State that we are apt to forget that there was a time when the miracle-play was almost as much a part of the service, at some times of the year, as the Kyrie or the Te Deum. The tragedies, as has already been indicated, are the glorified form of old peasant miracle-plays, very like our own May-day and Christmas mummmings in general appearance, representing the contest between the two champions and the death of one of them.3 Rather harder to

explain is the Old Comedy, with its railing and satire, its wild fun and buffoonery, and its frequent coarse jests. Although this is rather strenuous and not merely a survival, for the ideas were still alive in Greece—of old notions connected with fertility, magic, and good-luck charms. We have countless examples, many of them Greek, of peasant merry-making, with the thin line between broad fun at the expense of all and sundry, the ancient 'jests from the waggon' and we shall have occasion to see later on, that in the highly-decorous plays of Dinoysos and at the City of Dionysia one cannot lose their deliberate coarseness. The phallos, as has already been mentioned, was used in these primitive rites as a symbol of fertility. It had its verbal equivalent—designedly coarse and foul jests. These were no mere wantonness—we hear of respectable women ceremonially using them—but part of the fertility-charm. As to the continuous railing against individuals, that may be serious enough sometimes in Aristophanes, but in its ultimate origin it was as often as not a mere method of averting the evil eye; just as a street-boy of Artemis 'Best and Raisins'—really to show, or pretend to show, his contempt for it, and so avoid nemesis. We can now understand why Aristophanes dares to rail against Dionysos himself, painting him as fool, coward, effeminate, and so on. It is really (though whether Aristophanes fully realized this is doubtful) a pious mode of address—an averting from the god of any possible φθονος. Dionysos, though he could be very terrible, was a friendly god who came close to his worshippers in their festivities; and extreme reverence for the beings he worshipped was not a characteristic of the Greek. 1 Cf. arrt. Drama and Drama (Greek).

So much for the spirit of the plays. The details of their production are fully discussed in well-known books, such as Haigh's 'Attic Theatre,' Oxford, 1888, and need not be entered into here, any more than the vexed question of stage or no stage. These points have absolutely no bearing on the religious side of the question. It should, however, be noted—what Dörrpfeld has overlooked—that whether his discovery of the sacred drama of Aphaia and of the wine-press be all he claims for it or not, the name ἄφαιας has nothing to do with λαράς, 'a wine-vat,' which would give ἄφαιας, but must come from ἄφας, an old word for 'straight,' and signify 'to sink or settle.' But ἀφαίαν, however, has nothing of the orgiastic character which the name might imply.

The chief occasion for the production of plays was the Great or City Dionysia, in Eleapheldon. This began, on the 8th, with a παραγωγή, including lyrical performances—no doubt, as in the Lenaia, dithyrambs, the form from which Tragedy is said to have been evolved—and offerings to Asklepios. The feast proper began, as we gather from Pausanias (t. xxix. 2 and other passages), with a solemn procession, in which the sacred cult-statue of Dionysos of Eleutherae was carried to the precincts of the great theatre and placed near the Academy. In this κανενοροι, or girls carrying baskets containing sacred emblems—probably of a similar nature to those borne by the arrhephonoi—

1 Nor always of medieval Europe; cf. the following lines from the song of the song of the Cretan lau-elect a lauell: 'Fat eure al, lovetone! n'as pas pregouve?'
2 'Font Fiz est mort, et a dem compone ung ivrege!' This is quite a famous passage from the Irish 'Religion of the Druids,' as Maudslay.
3 'Irons, 190, in the songs of the Iliad in the Lenaia. So Bhagavati is elaborately burlsted at her great spring-festival at Cranganore (see G.B. pl. 1, vol. i. p. 192).”
4 Parn. v. 206; Nis. 276, who aptly compare ἄφαγος. Mimosena and Miss Harrison support the contrary view.

—took part, as also did dancing and singing boys. A phallic procession is also mentioned. 2 Next—perhaps on the fifth and following days—came the dramatic contests in the great theatre of Dionysos on the slope of the Akropolis. Here there assembled, not only the Athenians themselves, as at the Lenaia, 3 but also representatives from all over the Empire from foreign States. This was the occasion on which most of the new tragedies were produced; indeed, 'at the new tragedies (καινοὶ ἔργαρια) is sometimes used to mean 'at the City of Dionysia.' We hear, nevertheless, of new tragedies being produced even at the minor Peiraic Dionysia; and Aristophanes' frequent references to the Lenaia show that he often produced a new play then, as was natural, since so much of his humour is topical and local.

The most discussed of all these agricultural and quasi-agricultural festivals are the two held yearly in Attica in honour of Demeter and Kore, the Lesser and Greater Mysteries. A good deal is known of the external ritual of these great ceremonies (τὰ φεστανήματα ἰσώρεια), but exactly what was taught, or whether anything at all was taught, has been much disputed point, or side Lobe. We know, unfortunately, next to nothing about the rites, except that they must have been simple, as there was no temple of Demeter, so far as we know, at Agrai, and consequently no place for elaborate ἰσώρεια to take place. 4 The important thing is that the candidate who had been initiated in these mysteries became a μοῖρος, and was entitled to admission to the Greater Mysteries the next year but one.

The Greater Mysteries were held in Boedromion, 5 the true lasting from the full moon of Metageitnion to Pyanopsis 10. They began, it would seem, on the 13th, with a procession of the Athenian epheboi to Eleutherae to get the certain sacred objects of which we know little, but which probably included ancient and peculiarly holy cult-statues of the two goddesses. They returned the next day. Then on the 15th came the ἀργυρις, or assembling of the candidates, who were addressed by the king-archon, the hierophant, and δαυδικοί, at the Stoa Poikile. All who were guilty of certain ritual inquiries (such as the eating of forbidden foods), all who were unable to understand Greek, all who had been deprived of civic rights, and other disqualified persons, were warned away. What this speech was like one can gather from Aristophanes' parody of it (Rem. 204 ff.).

5 'Let every one stand aside who owns an intellect meddled with sins, or in arts like these entitled:

If the mystic rites of the Musee true he has never seen or sung,
He never the magical music knew of Caelius the Bull-eater's tongue.

5' Behold, I give word; and again give word; and give word for the third, last time:

Make room, all such.'
Next followed the rite which gave the day its name, Ἱλαστήριον, 'To the sea, ye mystai!' The whole body of the initiate went down to Phalereon, washed themselves in the sea, and also washed their plait. For in this, as in all other parts of a chthonian sacrifice, the pig was a recognized means of purification, generally by means of its blood. Exactly how the animals were used on this occasion we do not know; however, he suggests that they formed the material substance of some kind of sacrificial feast. Then followed certain rites of which little is known. On the 17th we hear of a sacrifice of a sucking-pig to Demeter and Kore. On the 18th (?) there was a procession in honor of Asklepios, probably identical with the Epiphania which Philostratus mentions (Vit. Apoll. Tyan. iv. 18). On the 19th, late in the day, so as to last well into the night, and therefore, by Greek reckoning, into the 20th, came the great Iakchos-procession to Eleusis, visiting various holy places en route, and stopping at a certain bridge over the Sophas for the rough journey which we have already seen, is associated with agricultural rites. Here it is, in fact, that the presence of Iakchos-Dionysos in this festival of Demeter and her daughter. Our earliest document, the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (7th cent.), knows nothing of him. Probably the Iakchos-route was imported from Thrace, with the Delphic oracle acting as its vigorous missionary and supporter, Dionysos was simply added to the Eleusinian deities, whom he resembled in many ways. Arrived at Eleusis, no doubt after a rest—for the journey of some 15 miles, made fasting, with incidental dancing and singing, must have been extraordinarily fatiguing—the mystai proceeded to the rites of initiation, perhaps on the nights of that very day. Concerning these we know, briefly, the following facts. Firstly, they were connected with the legend of the rape of Persephone, the grief-stricken search of Demeter, her arrival at Eleusis, the gift of corn, and the recovery of her daughter. Secondly, we gather that some part at least of all this was enacted in a sort of mystery-play at the telesterion, or Hall of Initiation. There was also a λεπός γάμος, or mystic marriage ceremony; that at a certain point in the rites the hierophant cried aloud, 'Our Lady Brimo hath borne a holy child Brimos;' that there was some sort of representation of the terrors of the underworld; the elements of later Jewish and Christian authors; and, though quite possibly true for some ritual or other, have not necessarily anything at all to do, really, with Eleusis. One fact, however, we do know, that at the climax of the rites certain holy things were shown. Here again we are in ignorance of what they were.

We know a little about what was said—a less important matter than what was done. We hear of a sacred formula, ὄνομα, Ἰάτριον (Ο Έκκυ), conceiving (O Earth), used by the hierophant—a rain-charm, apparently, belonging to the oldest stratum of the rites; of the mystic formula (passwords?) employed by the initiates; but exactly what it all meant is unknown. The secret was well kept.

Perhaps the fact is that there was no secret—at least no secret doctrine. The glow of ecstatic which with many writers, especially Neo-Platonists, was derived from the Eleusinian mysteries, and which has been furnished by the great pentaeteric festival at Athens, the Panathlon. This occurred towards the end of Hekatombolion, in the height of summer, the chief day being the 28th of the month—πάναθηναίον, ο' εἴτε θερίας, held from 27th to 30th, originally held near the sea and calculated as to allow the rising sun to shine full in through the door on this day, in the year of the temple's completion, 456 B.C. This feast was the celebration of the might of Athens, her power over lesser States—for all the allies were expected to send contributions to it—and of the might of her patron-goddess. It consisted of a series of contests such as a goddes of the artistic and war might be expected to delight in. First came an ἄργος πολεμικός, or contest of singing, instrumental music, and, at least in the days of Peisistratos, recitations from Homer. Next came a gymnastic contest (lasting three days), originally held near the Panathenaeum, but later (4th cent.) in the present Stadium. The prizes for this consisted of jars of oil, originally at least the product of the μοῖραι, or sacred olives of the goddess. There were four prizes for each contest, the second being ¼ of the first; e.g. the winner in the boys' pentathlon received 40 jars of oil, the 'runner-up' 8. The contests were of the usual nature—foot-racing, boxing, wrestling, etc. Next came the chariot race—horse-racing of various kinds; then certain minor contests—a pyrrhic dance, an εὐανδρία, or parade of crack troops, and a torch-light procession—all competitive, each

1. Parn. ii. 171 B.
2. The modern Kohalythou, approximately; about half an hour from Eleusis.
3. The procession probably started from the Agora (Bros. 320, reading δ' Ἰάτριον for Διανοσίνα). For Jesting (γεγονότα), cf. Rln. 420 B.
4. The small extent of this hall, whose foundations are now completely excavated, and which has been, therefore, the object of very elaborate speculative performance, and indeed makes it hard to understand how the numerous μύσαι can have got in at all.
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Greek)

tribe entering. There was also an all-night festival (pannychis), mentioned by Ennius (Herc. 117–1785) and Plutarch (Mor. 757 B), in which the starting day of the feast, an elaborate procession, bringing the city’s tribute to the goddess—the richly embroidered robe (εἵλος) on which was represented her descent to Hades—was held. Moreover, in the midst of this civilized ritual, we get a touch of primitive feeling; the statue of the goddess needs clothing, just as at another period of the year it needed to be taken down to the sea and washed, while the temple was undergoing a revivifying process (Plynteria and Kallynteria). The festival ended with a regatta in the harbor.1

(b) The great games at Olympia and elsewhere were not very different from the gymnastic part of the Panathenaea, which they no doubt suggested. Existing nominally to do honor to Zeus, Poseidon, etc., it is at least possible that they originated from the funeral games of honored heroes. However this may be, and whatever be the origin of the games (Olympian chronology is very uncertain, the list of victors compiled by Hippias of Elis being criticized as early as Pindar’s time), in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. they became hardly by exaggerated. They were pan-Hellenic; a truce similar to that proclaimed by Athens before the Mysteries protected all visitors; and all Greece was in a state of high tension to violate it. Any one who could satisfy the board of judges that he was of pure Greek blood, and not of a city under a curse, that he was free from crime and impurity, and that he had trained for the past 10 months was entitled to enter. This meant that all Greece proper, Ionia, Sicily, Magna Graecia, and the colonies scattered over the Mediterranean sent representatives to Olympia at least, if not to the other religious games. The programme—originally 1 day only—lasted 3 days in later times, and consisted of long and short distance foot-races, races in armour, boxing, wrestling, the pankration, and an ‘all-round’ contest, the pentathlon—jumping, running, discus-throwing, javelin-throwing, wrestling—besides the great chariot- and horseback-races. It was to celebrate victories of athletes that the greatest lyric poets wrote, and the victor received almost divine honors from his city. Moreover, no place was so good as one of these great athletic meetings to hear all the latest news, see every one worth seeing, and listen to the latest poets, authors, or philosophers.2 Where no actual ‘meeting’ contests existed, the games fostered art and literature, as well as the Pan-Hellenic spirit, indirectly at least.3

(c) The best example, perhaps, of this is the great Apolline festival of the Sceptera. This was held at Delphi every ninth year (i.e. once in each oktateria), and was supposed to commemorate Apollo’s slaying of Python, his flight and exile, and his purification and return.4 A boy of good family—obviously representing the god—was escorted, along with certain other boys, by torch-bearing women (oleiati) to a wooden hut built to represent a palace (the ‘abode of Python’). This was set fire to, and the table in it was overturned. Then the boy pretended to go into exile; finally all went— not in mimerly but in actual fact— to Tempe, were purified with laurel, crowned themselves with it, and entered the sanctuary.5 Pythian oracles are given both in the temple and on the way. On the next day the Pythian festival was held at Delphi in triumph. Here we have a good example of a rite giving rise to an etiological myth. For, assuming the Apollo-Python story as a basis, why should a palace—which depicts sentiments do not usually inhabit—and why is it elaborately destroyed, furniture and all? Whereas, starting from the 1 ceremony, it is all plain enough. The boys, headed by the incarnate god, get rid of any mismas they may have in, in the pythiades by the fire of the ceremony, by burning. They go, successfully bear the sins of the people with them, and, instead of their purification, they come back after purifying themselves. In the midst of this civilised ritual, we get a touch of primitive feeling; the statue of the goddess needs clothing, just as at another period of the year it needed to be taken down to the sea and washed, while the temple was undergoing a revivifying process (Plynteria and Kallynteria). The festival ended with a regatta in the harbor.1

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2 In Homer, ch. 1.3

3 Ench., Ophel, 1–3.

1 See Mom. for full particulars as to dates, etc.
2 For details, see Gardner, p. 31 f.
3 Parn. iv. 239 ff.
4 Iliad. 103 ff.
5 It should be remembered that the primitive mind looks upon moral evil of all kinds as much as we regard it as illness of a disease, or something contagious, and to be got rid of by the action of fire and certain medicinal substances, and that this idea persists into quite late times, in a more unconscious form.
identified? Though powers to be feared, their functions are kindly enough; they give fertility and general good fortune. (See EMENIDES.) Did Demeter and Kore develop out of some such figures? Or is the present festival of a simple sacrificial nature? These are questions easy to ask and hard to answer. We think, however, that the close resemblance between the worship of heroes and the worship of fish is enough to seek for a mythical theory a likely one. But this is not the place to discuss so wide a subject, and we shall merely notice a few typical pieces of ritual in which these powers receive honour.

1. Actual offerings to the dead, or to some particular dead persons.—We find a good example of this at Platea, where, under the title of θανάτοι, those who fell in the great battle received offerings—a black sheep, wine, milk, oil, unguents—every year on the 6th of Alkalonemion—Maimakterion.

2. Worship of heroes in conjunction with Olympus.—Here a good example is afforded by the ritual of the Hyakinthia at Amyklaion. This festival, held in the month corresponding to Hekatebion, divides sharply into two parts—the mournful, involving abstaining from cereal food, banqueters ungarlanded, etc. and the other joyous. It is not merely the ritual, but the name, that as one associates with Apollo, whose feast it is. The reason is clear. Apollo's ritual has been superimposed upon that of an old chthonian power Hyakinthos, who, being dead permanently, as a hero, or temporarily, as a popular hero, would in any case become identified with Apollo. His absence as the number of years, he has something to do with harvest, contains the not uncommon tabu on cereals before the harvest begins.

3. Heroes and other chthonians with the name of Olympians.—This does not include genuine Olympians such as Hermes; but it does, on the one hand, include the purely heroic Zeus-Agamemnon, where 'Zeus' is almost an adjective, and, on the other, the Zeus worshipped at the Dian—Zeus Meilichios. Here the ritual is chthonian; the object of worship is often represented as a snake—a regular chthonian form—yet he is called 'Zeus the Easy-to-be-eat.' To the present writer this proves, with some approach to conclusiveness, that the powerful Olympian has been superimposed upon a local chthonian god—or ghost, it makes little difference—to such an extent as to blot out the original. The new form was, and less, merely the gloomy, chthonian nature of certain of the rites: just as a little later in the same month (Antheateron) Dionysos' vigorous personality all but effaces the ancient All-Souls' festival of Xerxes, which still betrays itself, however, in certain points of the ritual.

4. Finally, we must not omit an important class of chthoniacs, namely, the Eleusinians. Every Greek city had its Commination Service, and the powers who fulfilled the cure would naturally be chthonian— the Erinyes, for example. One of the best known of these solemn curses is the so-called 'Dirae of Toss,' with its liturgical refrain: 'May he perish, both himself and his kin' (ἐκίνημαι ἄμαλλοιν καὶ γίγος τὸ εκίνημα), while we know, from the parody in Aristoph. Thesm. 333 ff., the nature of the ritual. The story, told by every Athenian as an archon by the herald at the beginning of each ecleis.

4. Orgiastic ceremonies.—These, though foreign and never germane to Greece, deserve a word of mention, because they are associated with the

Great name of Dionysos. This is not the place for a detailed account of them; but it may be said that they rest on a basis quite different from the calm ritual of ordinary Greek worship. Instead of a simple sacrificial rite, or even a quasi-magic rite, such as we have seen surviving in the Thesmophoria, orgiastic religions seem to be the worship of the object of his worship—either by means of a kind of religious mania or self-hypnotism, induced by wild dancing and the like, or by a sacramental devouring of some animal believed to be the incarnation of the god. This, in the case of Dionysos, was generally a bull or a calf. He himself is hailed as a 'noble bull' in the Eleusinian songs preserved in Pindar, Qucest. 259, B, and often represented as horned or taurocephalous. But this was really a Thracian-Phrygian worship, and in Greece proper Dionysos was usually the recipient of a more sober and ordinary cult. Of his share in the Mysteries we have already written.

In connection with orgiastic and enthusiastic worship in general, the frenzy of prophets, and especially of the Pythia at Delphi, may be noticed. Here we have a curious bit of savagery, for it is simply the 'hymn to the horse' as he saw the god, surviving in the most orderly and most thoroughly Hellenic of all cults. The explanation perhaps lies in the fact that Delphi had been a mantic shrine before the coming of Apollo; and that certain traces of an older and cruder worship were not to be eradicated. At any rate, the actual givers of oracles were the official 'interpreters' of the priestess' inspired ravings, and not herself, as she was in all probability totally unintelligible.

Summary.—The variety of cults mentioned in this art. may perhaps give a wrong impression of the general nature of Greek worship. We close, therefore, by insisting on the fact that the average Greek ceremony, the sort performed by the ordinary worshipper nine times out of ten, was neither orgiastic, chthonian, nor magical, but consisted simply in a sacrifice, partly sublimated by burning, so as to reach the celestial abode of the gods, partly eaten by the sacrificer and his fellow-worshippers. This, from Homer times onward, was the normal expression of Greek piety. In the following ecclesiastical calendar, so to call it, of Athens, the preponderance of such feasts may be seen at a glance.—O. "indicating a festival of any sort in honour of an Olympian, 'Ch.' a chthonian, 'O-Ch.' a hero-feast, 'O-Ch.' one combining both elements.

The Eclesiastical Year at Athens (the dates of the festivals are from Mommsen, to whom the reader is referred).

Hekatombia

15 Kronia (O.).
16 Synoikia (in commemoration of the evagenetai under Theseus) (O. Ch.).
20-23 Musical agia.
24-25 Gymnosophia.
26 Equestrian agia.
27 Tyrrhe and Eraindia.
29 Torchlight procession, wovves, procession, sacrifice, and feast.
29 Bagulia.

Panathenaia.

Herakleia in Kynosarges (O.).
Pantheleia (O.).

(Dates uncertain.)

Borrowed

1 Anniversary of Plataea (1 O.).
2 Geneva (= Remescha) (Ch.).
3 Marathonia (O.).
4 Christmas, for the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants (O.).
5 Echistisa (gymnastic agia).
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hebrew). — I. PERIODICAL FESTIVALS. — I. WEEKLY. — The Sabbath. — From probably an early period every 7th day was observed as the holy day of rest. Since the Sabbath is described in the cuneiform inscriptions as 'a day of rest for the soul,' 1 Sayce (Higher Crit. and Mon. 2, London, 1894, p. 74) argues for a Babylonian origin, and compares it with the observance of the 7th, 14th, 18th days, as days on which it was unlawful to do certain kinds of work. But the Jewish observance of the Sabbath was of a very different kind from that of the ancient Babylonians. The earliest historical reference to the Sabbath in the Bible is in Deut. 4:13, but the language used suggests that its observance was a long-established custom. The fact that at different times and different places its meaning was not the same is shown by the discussion in the Talmud (see HBD iv. 319).

13 Procession of ephebe to Eleusis.
14 Agrypnos.
15 Eleusis.
16 Aion.
17 Sacrifice (to Asklepios). 18 Ephebe (1905), 19 Procession to Eleusis.
20-22 Initiation.

PYTHAIAMBOS, or Pyraisiau.
1 Pyreia.
7 Kaloa of oikophori, Romo, etc., offerings to the dead.
8 Procession, sacrifice, and feast, liberation to Thanatos.
9-11 Aipon, etc.
12 Torchlight procession.
13 Race of ephebes; ceremonial in Kerameis: funeral oration for soldiers killed in battle during the year.
14 Andos.
15 Nestia. — Thesmophoria (Ch.).
16 Kalligeneia. — Thesmophoria (Ch.).
18-21 Apotheosis, or ceremony of receiving children into their fathers' clana (O.); 1 Promethia, Hephaestia, Chalkia, Athena (O.); (dates uncertain).

POIKION.
1 Promethia (O.); 2 Eleusis (O.); 3 Halos (Ch.).
4 Prochoriai (C. Ch.).
5 Dionysia (or Eleusis) (Ch.).
6 Apaturia (O.).

GAMES.
1 Lesia; lyric and dramatic contests.
2 Theaomoria (marriage of Zeus and Hera O.);
3 Apaturia (O.).
4 Apaturia (C. Ch.).
5 Chytroi.
6 Nesteia.
7 Lakchos-procession (O.).
8 Apaturia (O.).
9 Olympeia (O.).

KALYPERIA.
1 Prodoi: offerings to Asklepios.
2 Procession.
3 and following days. Theatrical contests.
4 Galaxia. To Kybele (O.).
5 Myresios.
6 Philaestria, or suppliant procession to shrine of Apollo Daphnis (O.).
7 Mnouthia and Amanthos (O.); to Artemis.
8 Aiantheia. Commemorating Salamin (Ch.).
9 Sacred embassy to Selos (O.).
10 Olympia (O.); to Zeus.

TRIATHLON.
1 Thargelion (O.); 2 Ch.
3 Besidleia (O.).
4 Kalliteria (O.).
5 Pyxistera (O.).

SKIERPHORIA.
12 Skierphoria (O.).
13 Dipollia or Bohonphora (O.).


J. H. ROSE.

FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Greek). — I. PERIODICAL FESTIVALS. — I. WEEKLY. — The New Moon. — This is frequently mentioned with the Sabbath and other festivals of ordinary occurrence (2 K 4:9-11). In the Bara' tradition a special offering was made of two young bullocks, one ram, seven lambs, and a goat for a sin-offering (Nu 28:13). Just as the Sabbath was probably the dedication of each phase, so the New Moon was the unification of the observation of the whole moon or month (see Calendar [Hebrew], § 1).

ii. MONTHLY. — The Hebrew calendar is based on the lunar year, and the monthly festivals are calculated in order to fall on the 1st day of the Hebrew month. The most important of these is the New Moon, which is marked by a sacrificial feast, at which all the household were expected to be present, unless prevented by some ceremonial uncleanness or other religious cause (1 S 25:1). In the Tosaphot the feast of the New Moon is said to be observed as a fast (see Calendar [Hebrew], § 1).

(a) Pre-exilic. — It is not improbable, when every important town had its separate sanctuary, that customs with regard to the festivals, their number and their character, may have varied in different localities. But there is evidence to show that at some sanctuaries, such as Shiloh, probably the most important temple of the early days of Samuel
—there was a great annual festival which, if not the only one, was so important as to be regarded as the great yearly sacrifice (1 S 1:5-21), and which all within the district attended, unless hindered for a sufficient reason (1 S 2:5). The early evidence of the state of things in Samuel's time, may at least be regarded as evidence of what was customary at a typical local sanctuary in the time of the early monarchy. With this we may compare the customs of the annual family feast, of which we have evidence in 1 S 20:26-28, at which the scattered members of the family assembled.

The annual sacrificial feast at Shiloh has been frequently identified with the Feast of Booths at the end of the year. It would probably be more correct to say that the latter was a later development of the annual festival. Ex 23:24 (post-exilic hot evidently based on earlier documents) certainly supports the view that this annual feast was originally a vintage celebration.

In the earliest legal codes, we find three annual festivals: (1) Unleavened Bread (Pesah), including perhaps Passover (Pesah; (2) Weeks (Shelah'; and (3) Ingathering (A'saph) (Ex 23:4, 34:21-23 (J)). That these were agricultural in origin is evident from the last two, and probably in that of the first.

1. Passover.—The meaning of this festival is not given in the early documents (its association with the Exodus being probably an afterthought); see below. Whether the Passover was celebrated once a year or more times is undecided (cf. 1 S 20:26-28). It appears to have been originally distinct: (1) the Paschal meal, or Passover proper, (2) the seven days' Festival of Unleavened Bread, (3) the wave-offering of the first sheaf ('omer).

(1) The essential feature of the Passover proper was the sacrificial feast of the Paschal lamb. There was a very ancient religious tradition that the firstlings and firstfruits belonged to Jahweh (Ex 13:11-13 20:24-26 23:19 34:21-23 (JE)). This tradition that in the last plague the firstborn of Egypt had been involuntarily sacrificed to Jahweh (Ex 13:19), and that the tribe of Levi was consecrated to Him as a tribe to whom the rights of the firstborn had been transferred (Nu 3:13-19), as well as the offering of all firstfruits and firstlings, including the redemption of men and unclean animals by the substitution of a lamb (Ex 13:12-13 etc.), belongs to the same cycle of ideas. What was more natural that the first lambs of the season should be offered to Jahweh? But, as it came to be a matter of importance, with the consolidation of the tribes, that the offering should be observed at all at the same time, the lambs would in due course have ceased to be necessarily the first-born, and the original intention of the feast has been lost sight of, or overshadowed by its connexion with the Exodus. This view of the origin of the Passover is borne out by the analogy of the Feast of Booths which, originally an agricultural feast, came to have an exclusively historical meaning (see below).

(2) The origin of the Festival of Passover is more uncertain. It appears to have originated from an old religious custom that all bread offered to Jahweh was to be without leaven (Ex 23:18; cf. 34:26 (J)], where the same prohibition appears to be confined to the Passover. In later times the law was not rigorously observed. At any rate a distinction seems to be made between unleavened cakes actually offered on the altar (Lv 22:18) and those which were merely prepared for the wave-offering of the firstlings at Weeks (see below), and the thank-offering (Lv 22:18). Whether the sheaf bread was made of leavened or unleavened bread is not clear. It is probable that in early times a distinction was made between the wave-offerings and the essential part of the feast, as usually the animal sacrifice, and what was merely eaten with it, as the bread. In the case of Maspoh, the unleavened bread was the essential part of the sacrifice, and later times, the unleavened cakes were the first prepared out of the barley harvest, analogous to the first two loaves of the wheat harvest at Weeks (Lv 23:20). There is no reason to suppose that the festival in early times lasted more than a day, or was even more than a single day. The chapters, though sometimes been explained, as by Wellhausen, as arising from the unwillingness to mix the firstfruits of the new season with what belonged to the old, the leaven being a piece of old fermented dough. Even in the earliest family feast, of which we have evidence in 1 S 20:26-28, at which the scattered members of the family assembled.

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Josiah. It does not, however, appear in D to be necessarily connected with the festival of Ἱεροσόλυμα; and, if the view taken of the latter be correct, it would naturally have preceded it by a few days. According to the former view, the times have taken place on the morrow after the Sabbath in that festival (Lv 23:10). This has generally been explained as the day following the first day of the feast, i.e. the 16th of Abib (see Jos. Ant. iii. x. 5), but the Sabbath being obvious and necessary in the immediate context in vv. 13, 14, and probably should be so understood here (see Driver, PB, 'Leviticus,' p. 94). The reason for fixing this day was probably that the cutting of the corn was unlawful on the Sabbath itself. At a later time, when the Sabbath was understood to mean the first day of the Feast, it became a burning question whether the cutting of the sheaf was lawful if the day after happened to fall on an ordinary weekly Sabbath (Edersheim, Temple: Its Ministry and Services, p. 222 f.). The waving of the sheaf was followed by an offering of a lamb with a meal-offering. The Feast of Ingathering, therefore, may be thought of as the new corn, whether parched or in leaves, be eaten (Lv 23:4).

2. The Feast of Weeks.—The second festival in the book of Joel is the Feast of Weeks, or Harvest, the firstfruits of their labours, in 343 as the 'feast of weeks, the firstfruits of wheat harvest.' The name 'feast of weeks' is explained by the fact, stated in Dt 16:9, that it took place 7 weeks after the beginning of the harvest (i.e. the barley harvest); hence the Gr. πανάγνησις, the 50th day. But the name and the relative date which gave rise to it are both very artificial, and are hardly likely to be original. If they had originated with D, they probably illustrate a custom in vogue at the Temple of Jerusalem, and exemplify the natural tendency, especially in a city, to substitute, for the sake of general convenience, fixed dates for the chances of the natural seasons. It seems likely that the festival was originally known either as the 'day of the harvest' or as 'the day of the firstfruits'—a name which survived even in D (Nz 22:14; but the phrase, 'the firstfruits of the harvest,' raises a further question, whether originally the rite may not have consisted in the offering of a sheaf of wheat analogous to the sheaf-offering of barley at the commencement of the barley harvest (see above). If this were so, the festival must originally have been only a few weeks after the Passover. At a later time, at any rate, the firstfruits consisted of the first two ears made out of the new wheat (Lv 23:17 [H]), analogous perhaps to the original intention of the Feast of Unleavened Bread. In the Priestly Code the sacrifices were the same as on the 7 days of Ἱεροσόλυμα.

Just as the Passover became the Easter of the Christian Church, so did Weeks (Pentecost) become the Whitsun Feast, commemorating the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on that day (Ac 217 [E] 212 [J]) is described in these ancient codes as taking place at the end of the year, i.e. about the antannel equinox, but otherwise does not appear to have been definitely fixed. It is implied in D (Dt 16:9-12) that it was a thanksgiving for the produce of the threshing-floor and the wine-press. It is to be kept with joy for 7 days. No explanation of the basis of the D date is evidently spoken of as a well-known and recognized custom. In H (Lv 23:16, 19, 20, 41-45) it is ordered that it should begin on the 15th day, and that it should last 7 days (v. 40), which speak of an almost definitely fixed. It is implied in D of the shaving of the threshing-floor and the wine-press. It is to be kept with joy for 7 days. No explanation of the basis of the D date is evidently spoken of as a well-known and recognized custom. In H (Lv 23:16, 19, 20, 41-45) it is ordered that it should begin on the 15th day, and that it should last 7 days (v. 40), which speak of an almost definitely fixed.
able resemblance in the name and ritual between this and the feast which is called in later times the 'Day of Lights' (see Bingham, Ant. xx. iv. 6, 7).

4. Purim (called also 'Mordecai's Day.') In 2 Mac 11. 35 it is mentioned as the 13th and 12th of the 12th month (Adar), with an allusion to the custom of Mordecai and Esther to celebrate this festival. But it may be supposed that the Book of Esther was written at a date when the custom of the Jews to celebrate this day was more in the ascendency than at a later period, since it has been shown that the name Mordecai was chosen to express its primitive character (see above). The feast of Purim may have been originally a Persian or a Babylonian institution adopted as a secular feast by the Jews, and afterwards invested with a religious character. Even in later times the only religious ritual for many centuries appears to have been the solemn reading of the Roll (megillah) of Esther. See, further, art., 'Purim,' in BD, vol. ii. 153 ff.; and cf. Frazer, Gen. iii. 155 ff.; also below, p. 914, sec. 4.

5. Feast of Nicanor.—This was appointed to be kept on the 13th of the 12th month (Adar), in the time of Judas Maccabaeus, to commemorate his victory over Nicanor (1 Mac 7: 2, 2 Mac 12). But it never appears to have been observed as the basis of a great festival. Josephus says of it: 'The Jews thereon (i.e. the 13th of Adar) celebrate this victory every year, and esteem it as a festival day' (Ant., xii. 5). Another reason for the absence of this festival is that it was overshadowed by the Feast of Purim, and came to be kept as a fast in commemoration of the fasting of the Jews connected with the object of that feast (1 Es. 4).

6. Sacred years. —I. The Sabbatical year.—An ancient law provided that the term of service for a Hebrew slave should be 6 years, and that in the 7th year he should at least have the option of going free (Ex. 21: 2-6). But this was never enforced, and the law was practically ignored. Another law provided that the land should not be sown, or any work done in the vineyard or oliveyard every 7th year, but the self-grown crops were to be reserved for the poor and the beasts of the land (Ex. 23: 11). In Deuteronomy there is no provision for the land lying fallow in the 7th year, but, in addition to the law of slave-release every 7th year, there is another requiring the release from all debts in each 7th year, which in this case was called the 'Jubile' (Deut. 15: 1). But the first it was overshadowed by the Feast of Purim, and came to be kept as a fast in commemoration of the fasting of the Jews connected with the object of that festival (1 Es. 4).

II. Sacrifices.—The laws regulating this year are given in Lev. 23: 17, 20, 22, 24, 27-31. As, however, the first and principal passage breaks the context (vv. 17 and 18 dealing with the Sabbatical year), it is probable that it is a later interpolation derived from an original passage as belonging to the Priestly Code (Driver, on the other hand, in his 'Leviticus,' PP., regards vv. 18-20, requiring the restoration of the land, as a genuine part of I.). According to the text as it stands at present, every 50th year (or probably every 49th year; see below) — (1) all land is to be restored to its original owners (vv. 10, 23-16, 25); (2) all slaves, whether Hebrew or foreign, receive their liberty, and no choice of bondage is contemplated (v. 16, etc.); (3) the land is to lie fallow, as in the Sabbatical year (v. 17); (4) the year itself is to be proclaimed by the sounding of a loud horn on the 10th day of the 12th month. (1) The first of these regulations made all possession of real property practically a sort of lease, and calculations were made as to the length of tenure in buying and selling land. Originally it was not a continuous, but a seasonal, release of real property, which descended from father to son (see 1 K. 21). But the custom had long fallen into abeyance (cf. Is. 58), and the regulation of P was probably the result of a fusion of both. (2) The second was the first instance of a modification of the old custom. (3) The same tendency is shown with reference to slave release. The law in this respect was probably an attempt to enforce, on every jubilee, what should have been observed in every 7th year, but in fact had not been. (4) Perhaps the same was intended with reference to the fallow law; but in this case the 7th year's rest was in fact revived and enforced. (5) It has been suggested that the year originally began on what was afterwards not the 1st but the 10th day of the 7th month. This would account for the Attonement being afterwards connected with it. The atonement of the sacred things on probably the 1st day of the 7th month, proposed by Ezekiel, may be a continuation of a pre-exilic practice (Ezk 45: 1-7; see below, III. 2). The absence of any reference to debts is singular if it was intended as part of the jubilee's release: cf. the corresponding release of the Sabbatical year, but it is partly explained by the law which forbade usury altogether to a Hebrew (Lev. 25: 35-38).

It has been argued that the law of jubilee was merely tentative and was never really enforced, on the grounds that: (1) it was impracticable to have a second year of jubilee immediately following the last, viz. the 49th year; (2) there is no certain reference to it in history, and in fact the only Sabbatical years of which the date is actually known, viz. 104-105, 163-164, etc., and A.D. 68-69, do not give room for an intercalated year. But these objections depend largely on the assumption that the year of jubilee was intercalated after the 40th, and that the next jubileal year was reckoned not from the last, but from the year of jubilee. This is nowhere stated. On the contrary, it is quite possible that the jubilee was intercalated before the 40th year. "Then shalt thou send abroad the loud trumpet" (Lev. 25) might as well refer to the 40th as to the 50th year of the cycle. The 10th day of the 7th month is equally difficult to explain in either case, but the difficulty disappears if it was a custom to keep a feast on this day. No mention is made, in connection with the Sabbatical year of Lev. 23, of the release either from debts or from slavery, but the first is clearly implied in Neh. 10: 31, where it is evidently referred to as an ancient custom. We find several references to the Sabbatical year in later times. In it all warlike operations ceased (Jos. Ant., xiii. viii. 1, 17; Jdt. ii. 4). In it they held it as unlawful, or perhaps only as impracticable, to partake of it at any rate, and again the laws regulating it might be interpreted thus (Ant. xi. viii. 5). Tacitus complains that the 7th year was given by the Jews to idleness (Hist. v. 4).

II. Occasional festivals. —Festivals not followed up by a yearly commemoration were appointed to celebrate some important religious or secular event, such as the bringing of the Ark from Kiriath-jearim (2 S. 6: 19-23), the coronation of
the king (1 K 1:4), the dedication of Solomon's Temple (1 K 8:46), the victory of Jehoshaphat over the Ammonites and Moabites (2 Ch 18:24), the laying of the foundation of Zerubbabel's Temple (Ezr 3:10), the dedication of the city walls by Nehemiah (Neh 12:27). If the date of the "7th" of the Chronicler cannot always be trusted in his descriptions of such events, there is abundant evidence of the custom itself. Some of the Psalms, especially Ps 120, embody the contents that they were written for such occasions.

**III. Periodical Fasts.**

1. The earliest appointed fasts were those instituted during the Exile to commemorate events connected with the siege and capture of Jerusalem (Zec 7:1-13). The fast of the 4th month (17th of Tammarz which commemorated the capture of Jerusalem (Jer 39:10), 2 K 25:4) gave the 9th as the day that the breach was made by which the king, etc., escaped, but do not make it clear that the city was at once captured. The fast of the 5th month (9th of Ab) commemorated the destruction of the Temple (according to Jer 52.18 2 K 25:6-7) in 2 K 25:7 (the 7th). The fast of the 7th month (2nd of Tisri) was said to commemorate the murder of Gedaliah and his companions at Mizpah (Jer 41:1-2 2 K 25:23). The fast of the 10th month was in the 10th of Tisri (Jer 33:14; Zec 8:19). After the Return, the question arose whether these fasts should be still observed. Zechariah answered it by saying that the observance of them had been strictly speaking, after all, a purely selfish thing; that what Jehovah really cared for was justice and mercy (8:19-22; cf. the similar teaching of Is 58:10-12); and that the time was coming when these fasts would be "joy and gladness, and cheerful feasts." They, still, however, continued, and new traditions arose to account for their origin. Thus the first was said to be the anniversary of Moses' breaking the tables of the Law; the second was held to commemorate also the destruction of the Second Temple by Titus, etc.

2. The Day of Atonement (yom hokkip'arim, "Day of Coverings," which came to be known as, par excellence, the "Day") was observed as a complete day of rest and fasting, from the evening of the 9th to the evening of the 10th of the 7th month (Tisri). It was evidently unknown in the time of Zacharias (see above); and perhaps in the time of Nehemiah (ch. 9) it was not made use of for the special purpose of a national humiliation, but a day for the purpose was appointed just a few months later, when the feast of Trumpets was duly celebrated on the 1st, and that of Booths on the 15th-22nd days of the same month. It was probably a very late institution, belonging to the period of a late recension of the Priestly Code, the laws regarding it in Lv 23:23-32 being a later insertion in the Law of Holiness. Curiously enough, in Ezekiel's Temple (Ezk 45:15) the atonement for the Temple takes place on the 1st day of the 1st month and on the 1st day of the 7th month (so probably correctly, LXX); but there is no mention of any atonement for sins. This raises the question whether the atonement was not originally intended as a sort of annual consecration or purification of the Holy Places, the 10th day of the 7th month having been originally, so it has been suggested, the beginning of the year (see above). This pushing of the Holy Place affair back to be a very prominent feature of the ceremonies of the Day. Of these, as the rite existed in later times (Lv 16), the most important were the offering of a young bullock by the high priest, as a sin-offering for the iniquity of the sanctuary, and of the goats by lot—one for Jehovah, which was sacrificed; the other for Azazel, which was sent into the wilderness after the high priest had confessed over it the sins of the people. It is probable that Azazel (q.v.) was originally some popular deity, perhaps connected with the goat-gods, 32'thon (Ltv 17, 2 Ch 11:14, Is 15:19), which were believed to inhabit desolate places (cf. Mt 12:24). It came afterwards to be regarded as an evil spirit, just as the Ekronite god Baalzebub (2 K 1) came to be taken as the name of the prince of devils (Mt 12:24). The meaning of the name then became. that the sins were consigned to destruction. According to the Mishnic tract Yoma, the goat was led out and thrown over a rock. The high priest entered at least thrice into the Most Holy Place, purifying it by sprinkling the blood of the bullock and the goat about the mercy-seat, or the stone which afterwards represented it, and cleansing them with incense. The Holy Place was afterwards purified in the same way. This was the only day on which even the high priest, and then he only, was permitted to enter the Most Holy Place. For a symbolic explanation given by an unknown Christian writer, see He 9:24.

3. Weekly fasts on Mondays and Thursdays were practised by the stricter Jews between the Feasts of Passover and Weeks, and between those of Booths and Dedication (cf. Ltv 14)—the latter a week-day being strictly observed, the sabbath on which Moses went up Mount Sinai to receive the two tables of the Law, the former that on which he descended (see Lightfoot, Hor. Heb. on Mt 23).

**IV. Occasional Fasts.** In pre-exilic times there were no regularly recurring fasts, but fasts were proclaimed as acts of humiliation and penitence on the occasion of national calamities, etc. Thus we read of the fast at Mizpah in consequence of the oppression of the Philistines, followed by their overthrow (1 S 7:5; cf. 2 Ch 20); that appointed by Jezebel when she got Naboth accused of blasphemy (1 K 21); that appointed in the reign of Jehoashim, probably with a view to warding off the threatened attack of the Chaldeans (Jer 36:4). We find the practice of special fasts continuing in post-exilic times, and such a fast was appointed by Nehemiah on the 24th day of the 7th month as a national act of penitence (Neh 9; cf. also Jon 3:1, Jl 1:14 2:3).


**Festivals and Fast Days (Hindi).** As described in ancient literature, all Hindù festivals were religious; and this is not due solely to the fact that the literature itself is religious. Either inherently, as in connexion with sacrifice to a god, or artificially, as when a coronation was accompanied by rites which made the whole ceremony a religious festival, all celebrated in pre-Buddhist times consisted partly in feasting and partly in religious exercises.

**I. ANCIENT FESTIVALS.** Among the seasonal festivals the moon-feast always held a high rank, and is important not only on account of its authority, but also on account of its prevalence, since even the Buddhists preserved a memory of it in the
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hindu)

Upa\-n\-a\-tha festival, though reduced in that sober organization to a Saddle-day observance. In the sacrifice at the new moon, and the full moon, the Hindus themselves recognize the prototype of all sacrifices of similar character, and they are probably right in doing so. The moon-festival lasts two days at the new moon and one day at the full moon, but neither the latter has so well preserved the festival character as has the ‘four month’ celebration (see § 2).

2. The seasonal ‘four-month’ celebration, as the name suggests, occurs at the beginning of the seasons of four months each, so that there are three in every year. At the close of winter or the beginning of spring the celebration is ostensibly in honour of the All-gods; at the beginning of the rainy season, in June, it is in honour of the water-god, Varuṇa; and in autumn it becomes the sacrifice of firstfruits. Especially in these seasonal festivals is the old popular participation in the religious rites predominant. The goat and ram which are sacrificed are decorated with phallic-figures, and the wife of the sacrificer has to confess in public how many lovers she has had and wish them all ill. She and the sacrificer take a bath of purification annointed with a holy oil, and the beaten sacrifice go to the fire on the occasions, in which the man and woman wash each other’s backs.

3. There is also a special ceremony of firstfruits, in the time of eating of the firstfruits is regulated religiously.

4. In the soma-sacrifice the dramatic element enters in the purchase of the intoxicant. The Vājapeya, an autumnal soma-festival and sacrifice, has a number of such popular elements. The chief participants were garlanded with ‘golden garlands’, and at a fixed time there was a horse-race over a measured course (seventeen bow-shots), in which three horses were harnessed to one car, and sixteen other four-horse cars took part in the race. This festival was marked by the drinking of sūvā (brandy) as well as soma. The crowning of the sacrificial post and the special prominence of agricultural elements point to the fact that it was at first a farmers’ festival, though it has become a weak priestly affair, from which the popular character has disappeared. See, further, art. Am. Saka, vol. i. p. 24.

5. Either in autumn or in spring occurred the consecration-ceremony, which, as occasion demanded, was celebrated as a sacrifice; but it also contains much of popular usage, such as magical rites, war-games, and a special ceremony to cure the drunkenness due to debauch. The king is soundly beaten, and the reminiscence of human sacrifice still lingers in the formal ritual of the great occasion. The inhabitants of the realm may not cut their hair for a year after this ceremony—a tabu met with in other parts of the world.

6. Like a public festival is the horse-sacrifice, later associated with the assumption of the dignity of emperor, but originally not peculiar to this function. It is one of the oldest of Hindu sacrifices, and must have been originally a carouse of the gods, and a special ceremony to cure the drunkenness due to debauch. The king is soundly beaten, and the reminiscence of human sacrifice still lingers in the formal ritual of the great occasion. The inhabitants of the realm may not cut their hair for a year after this ceremony—a tabu met with in other parts of the world.

7. Apart from these celebrations, the beginning of the great modern festivals which terminate annual pilgrimages may be seen in the early mention of pilgrimages and sacrifice in certain particularly holy spots, such as those to the Sarasvati and Drāpadviti rivers. The tīrtha, or ghāt, where a stream is fordable, became, in the case of a holy river, the meeting-place of pilgrims. Such pilgrimages are recognized but not approved by the early writers, who admit only the efficacy of sacrifice at a holy place; but such orthodox objections were set aside after the visits at Buddha’s shrines and similar popular, and, in the first centuries before our era, hundreds of holy places were known and visited by the devotees of various Brahmanical gods.

8. Modern Festivals.—These stand to those of ancient days somewhat in the same relation as private and public festivals stand to each other. They cannot be entirely separated from the old, yet they are so new in their character as to be virtually distinct. The old occasion is preserved, or rather it forces itself upon the notice of the public; but that public is so different, and the ceremony of celebration is so diverse in details, that it is new in effect, though old in general character. The chief local festivities to-day are associated with places and deities unknown to the ancient world of India; but the seasons remain the same, and the celebration of the advent of spring characterizes the fact that the old spring-festival. To whom the honour is paid is of less importance than that the festivity should be celebrated. The rites in honour of one god may be passed over, or modified without materially altering the celebration, and sometimes even to-day the same celebration is held in honour of different gods. Thus the very pleasing ‘lamp-festival’, in which, in autumn, lamps are lighted in every direction, while the horse and the sacred river, etc., is celebrated by some as a festival in honour of Vīṣṇu’s wife, and by others in honour of Durgā (g.v.), the wife of Śiva. One thing is to be remarked in regard to the modern festivals, as

- The adoration of the steed, and the music and obscenity of the rites are shown in the ritual; but the main object of the popular character of the festival is more truly conveyed by the description of the horse-sacrifice in popular literature (see, further, art. Aṣvamedha, vol. ii. p. 106).

9. Among the most popular and the oldest was the celebration of the solstice-feast. Many popular traits connect the old ritual with the modern New Year’s festival—music, lute-playing, the dramatic ceremonial and the turn of the sun dramatized by discus-play and by mounting the swing. Each of the two solstice-festivities had its proper divinity and melody, and the melody of the summer solstice was accompanied by drums, to imitate thunder, while that of the shortest day was accompanied by the rattle of war-cars, representing an attack on the evil spirits of winter. The dancing of girls round fire, with full water-jugs, and their singing (‘a joyous song’) were additional popular elements.

- A twelve nights’ celebration occurred after the winter solstice, though little remains in this of festival character, except the recognition of a period of extraordinary sacrifice and the sanctity of the days. In the present day it is considered sacred, when the Ribhus, the three personified seasonal deities who divided up the year, slept. The weather of this season was taken as a prognostic of the year to come, and the reasons to-day for celebrating the similar feast in South India. The eighth day after the full moon of the new year was the exact ‘type of the year’, which determined whether the year was to be lucky or not.

10. Apart from these celebrations, the beginning of the great modern festivals which terminate annual pilgrimages may be seen in the early mention of pilgrimages and sacrifice in certain particularly holy spots, such as those to the Sarasvati and Drāpadviti rivers. The tīrtha, or ghāt, where a stream is fordable, became, in the case of a holy river, the meeting-place of pilgrims. Such pilgrimages are recognized but not approved by the early writers, who admit only the efficacy of sacrifice at a holy place; but such orthodox objections were set aside after the visits at Buddha’s shrines and similar popular, and, in the first centuries before our era, hundreds of holy places were known and visited by the devotees of various Brahmanical gods.

11. Modern Festivals.—These stand to those of ancient days somewhat in the same relation as private and public festivals stand to each other. They cannot be entirely separated from the old, yet they are so new in their character as to be virtually distinct. The old occasion is preserved, or rather it forces itself upon the notice of the public; but that public is so different, and the ceremony of celebration is so diverse in details, that it is new in effect, though old in general character. The chief local festivities to-day are associated with places and deities unknown to the ancient world of India; but the seasons remain the same, and the celebration of the advent of spring characterizes the fact that the old spring-festival. To whom the honour is paid is of less importance than that the festivity should be celebrated. The rites in honour of one god may be passed over, or modified without materially altering the celebration, and sometimes even to-day the same celebration is held in honour of different gods. Thus the very pleasing ‘lamp-festival’, in which, in autumn, lamps are lighted in every direction, while the horse and the sacred river, etc., is celebrated by some as a festival in honour of Vīṣṇu’s wife, and by others in honour of Durgā (g.v.), the wife of Śiva. One thing is to be remarked in regard to the modern festivals, as
compared with the old, namely, that whereas the old seasonal festivals, such as those of the New Year, spring, and autumn, were degraded into rituals, in the modern, in most cases it is hard to recognize the original intent, the modern festivals have thrown off Brāhmanism as far as possible, and are more clearly celebrations of seasonal types, the spring-festival is more-sufficient. In other words, in the modern festival we have a reversion to the real meaning of the feast, which, even in the oldest literature, was already so buried in ritual as to be virtually lost. Most of the modern festivals either consist, or are held in connexion with pilgrimages to some holy place, the shrine, or the river tirtha.

In Northern India the most famous of these types are respectively the spring-festival, the pilgrimage and celebration at the shrine of Jagannath (originally Buddha, now Viṣṇu), and the pilgrimage and fair at the junction of the Ganges and Jamuna rivers (Alāhābād [q.v.]). The seasonal festival is celebrated by all; that at Puri, in Orissa, in honour of Jagannath is supposed to be celebrated by worshippers of Viṣṇu, but is actually celebrated by worshippers of Śiva and Durgā as well; while many religions have their own pilgrimage. It is a case to Alāhābād, to wash away his sins and enjoy himself at the fair. In South India the spring-festival is celebrated much as in the North, and the Tirū prāthi, known in the North, though with rather more pronounced sectarian feeling. There is, however, a great difference in the character of the different modern festivals. The clearest is the tirūka celebration. This is really a moral as well as a religious performance; and, though men and women bathe together almost naked, there is no wantonness, and no advantage is taken of the situation by evil-minded men. It is a festivity by accident, due to the immense concourse of people and the resultant fair. It is kept, as it is intended to be, as a purificatory. On the other hand, the temple and shrine pilgrimages in honour of an erotic deity are naturally more or less erotic in character, and at the spring-festival indecency is part of the recognised programme.

Finally, before passing to a closer consideration of the modern festival, it should be said that between the old and the new there must have been a large number of special festivities now lost sight of, or only faintly reflected in the intermediate literature—not to speak of the many special festivities that are described in the medieval Purānic and Tantric literature. Some of these appear to have been popular as well as sectarian; but we know very little about those not described in religious books, and the latter, as described, consist in childish rituals.

Some of the modern festivals are both sectarian and seasonal. Thus the spring-festival in the South is often a Kṛṣṇa festival and love-feast, and the autumn-festival in the North (Bengal) is indifferently a seasonal or Durgā feast, as it is now called. As in the devil-frightening festival already referred to as the ‘Jamp-festival,’ the original intent of the celebration is merged in the worship of some modern deity. The same sort of a celebration as that in honour of Durgā is held in other parts of India in honour of Śītā, the wife of Rāma. Rāma’s birthday—Rāmakṛiti—is observed in South India, and it survives to-day in practically the same form whether as a feast to Durgā or to Śītā. A characteristic feature of all these festivities is mimetic exhibition, which on the stage assumes serious proportions, but on the street is simply licensed vulgarity.

The Holi (spring-festival) is, as in other countries, the occasion when this sort of thing is most pronounced. The orgies of obscenity which welcome the return of spring are scarcely veiled. The very cars of the gods are decorated with huge garlands of flowers, and the mimes now kept from view, but which in India form the delight of men and women. The law practically permits of any excess, the god encourages it, and the nature of the people, which makes the law and its changes, or any change held in connexion with pilgrimages to some holy place, the shrine, or the river tirtha.

The chief seasonal festivities are the Makaravatīrthās, which vary in the North, and the prāthi, as in the South. Thus we have a New Year’s Day, which is the time for the great pilgrimage to Alāhābād and the annual bath of purification in the sacred rivers of the North, while in the South it is the season for the festival called Pongal, at which the boiling of the new rice is watched and regarded as an augury for the New Year, and cattle are led about decorated with garlands and treated with veneration. Presents are given to friends at this time, and general rejoicing takes place. The festival lasts for three days, and is officially a celebration of the Vedic gods Indra and Agni, with the addition of the (later) god Gaṅeśa. The cooking of the rice is in the South the main event of the Pongal, which has given the name to the festival. Anxious bands await the verdict of the official cooks, and, when the rice boils, a glad cry resounds, ‘It boils, it boils,’ and with intense excitement, they repeat the acclamation. In Bengal the New Year is inaugurated in spring, and here the main features are the worship of the Ganges and the cult of the chhenti, or hawking-bean. While at the date of the southern Pongal, the bathing-festival, which brings together 100,000 people, absorbs popular interest.

Between the New Year’s and the Holi festival a special day is devoted to the worship of the goddess of eloquence and arts, Sarasvatī, at which time books are worshipped and fasting is enjoined; but the occasion is also a festival, more especially for children; and boys play games to celebrate the day. Another day is devoted in early spring to Śiva, whose phallic image is worshipped, with fasting and prayer, by pilgrims. The birthdays of the two popular gods, Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, are also observed by adherents of these sects, one of them coming on the ninth of Chaitra (March-April) and the other in July-August, just before which there is a celebration in honour of the fabulous Naga, although the birthday of Kṛṣṇa is sometimes celebrated as an autumn-festival, in August-September (the eighth and ninth of the month Bhadra). On the fourth of Bhadra, Gaṅeśa, the ‘son of Śiva,’ in many places, is represented by his image is thrown into the water. The Durgā festival of Bengal occurs in the month Āśvin, on the tenth day of the light half of the moon, about the time of the autumnal equinox. After this
there is the 'lamp-festival' in October (see above), and at the full moon of October-November (in the native month Karttika) a celebration especially devoted to Siva. The great goddesses, wives of the god and mothers of the nation, have their festivals; and since these there is a great festival in honour of women and children, or the goddess supposed to be theirs, namely, the 'mother of sons,' who is revered under the name of the Mother-goddess. This festival (in Bengal) consists chiefly in processions and music in honour of the mother-goddess. The procession goes to the banyan tree, and the participants worship and pray to her there. On this occasion fathers-in-law are expected to give presents to their sons-in-law, and the time is said to be 'one of the happiest days of the year.' The festival of fasts, to which reference has already been made, is not one in honour of a special god. It is held at the season when new grain is ripe; and offerings are made to gods, names, cattle, cows, and jackals. The rites to the names are celebrated with great solemnity in February at Gayā (e.g., the old seat of Buddhistic worship—some say because the Buddhists were regarded as most opposed to this cult. It is at present a stronghold of Vaishnavism.

The chief day during the period of the celebrations, which is often considerable, is easily met at places where there is a huge concourse of visitors, as at Puri or at Pāndharpur, in the Bombay Presidency, where as many as 50,000 pilgrims gather in a day; but many small communities the cost is met by public contributions, and several villages will often combine to have a festival in common—building a pavilion, honouring the god, and providing the feast. The idol that is made use of on such occasions is a temporary effigy, made of clay and sticks, and is 'animated' by the priest, who, at the end of the festival, flings the image into the water. At the small village celebrations the prayers and processions are, of course, in honour of the local deity thus represented, but the entertainment is more popular, and often consists in an evening recitation by professional story-tellers (or miracle-plays by professional actors) in honour of any god. Such entertainments sometimes include a nautch dance, theatrical representation of some mythological story, etc., and are not infrequently levied. In India on the two occasions of the Ratha-yātra, or char-journey, of the god, to which thousands assist, and in the confusion and tumult the worshippers sometimes lose their lives. The cars are lofty structures, unwieldy wooden buildings on wheels, embellished with obscene sculptures, and dragged through the streets by a frantic mob of devotees. Such a yātra at Puri in honour of Viṣṇu, or at Bhuvanesvar, in honour of Śiva, forms the chief public gratification of the god. Like many other traits of modern Hinduism, it was probably borrowed from Buddhism. At Puri there are three yātra; the first being followed by the car, and being the beginning of the celebration. It is called Jāma-yātra, and celebrates the bathing of Viṣṇu's image.

That there were many festivals not included under the screen of religious rites in ancient times may be inferred from a grant, if not exactly modern, at least not mediaeval; that is, it reverses at most to an age subsequent to that of the Vedas. There are such eras in common use—two political, two sectarian, and one personal. The first political era is that of Viṣṇu, in India regarded as equivalent to the year 57 B.C. This is designated at times simply by the word Samvat, 'year,' which leads to confusion, since the second political era is regularly designated; a non-intercourse era is the 'era of the Scythians' (Sāka), popularly identified with A.D. 78. The two religious eras are those of the Buddhists, in Burma and Ceylon, and of the Jains, in North India. Buddha was born (probably) 500 years before the Viṣṇu era, so that his death (at the age of eighty) would have
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hindu)

The Vedic literature is based on the entire lunar month, which is divided into four stages, each with a length shorter than the preceding.

For dates within a year the popular method has always been to give the day by the asterism (moon-station) in which an important event occurred, which designated the month, and by the fortnight; also, to be more exact, by the muhārta, or hour of the day, sometimes by the night-watch (each night having three watches). Thus: 'on such a muhārta of the tenth of the month called Dasamangala Manvantara,' which is the name of the day and month, is evidence that the five-year cycle of later periods was already recognized. According to this cycle, the solar year and the shorter lunar year were adjusted to each other by the insertion of an extra month on the second and fifth year of the cycle.

The sacrifices and festivals depended upon the moon far more than upon the sun in India, and this is also recognized in the Rigveda, which speaks of the moon as 'determining the seasons'—whether the sacrifice or the year is not stated; but, from the context, the latter is less probable, and in fact the moon had nothing to do with the annual seasons, of which only three were recognized: Heat, Rains, and Cold (later five and six seasons were known, but these also were named without reference to the moon). Moreover, the names of the months refer only to lunar months. The path of the moon through the heavens was laid out according to the stars or constellations through which it passed in the course of its round. These were 27, later 28, stations of the moon, and formed altogether a sort of lunar zodiac, like that of the Chinese and Arabs.

The fact that the moon-stations called naktām were already utilized to make the calendar of the month, which is important, bearing upon the

A sectarian distinction. This is not the place to discuss the probability of any of these dates being correct historically. At any rate, in this era of the calendar, a month is equal to a lunar month (an extra year in 1802).

2 For details, see art. AGENS OF THE WORLD (Indians), in Vol. I. 250. After the Hindus came in contact with the foreign teachers, from whom they were ever prone to learn, they acquired the knowledge of the progression and then developed the monstrous system of zōna, kalpas, and manvantaras, to which we came in Persia, according to which even one age includes 4,293,000 years.

3 The relations between the Hindus 'moon-stations' and the Greek Signs of the Zodiac show that the latter borrowed many of their signs from the former, who, however, could not have known them (the signs are all from the Babylonian solar zodiac). Strictly speaking, only a few of the constellations represent zōna. The first, corresponding to stars in Aries, is called 'Horse (head)'; the third is (Teridōs) 'six nymphs';

question of the date of Vedic literature. Besides the lunar month to the Ilma, the Hindu month is divided into four stages, each with five subdivisions each, but do not seem to have subdivided further, though the week, a 'seven-days,' is a period frequently alluded to in later literature. The lunar fortnight division attracted the attention of the Romans and the Qumrants before the Christians, and the period of Alexander (viii. 9), speaks of it as a noteworthy fact.

As the five-year cycle was divided into years, each having the same name and divinity—Sama, Sāra, Parivāra, Iđava, Sutva, Uda, and the divinities being respectively Fire, Sun, Moon, Creator, Indra—so the greater cycles afterwards employed by the astronomers were divided in the same way.

Apart from these cycles, two popular methods of reckoning are known, one of which is the Kalī-cycle, already alluded to. Another, confused with it, is called the cycle of the Seven Seers (i.e. the stars of the Great Bear), which are supposed to change their position once in a century, according to the asters that the Seers are situated. Thus, as their cycle of notation is 2700 years. Medieval historians have alluded to this cycle, which was a popular one, with their more learned reckoning. So Kalhana says that the 24th year of the 'people's era' is identical with the Kali-month called Dēpak. The popular belief was that the Seven Seers had been for seventy-five years in the asterism Magha when the Kali-age began. The cycle of the Seven Seers is carried back to a date corresponding with the year 4077 B.C.

The astronomical cycles known as 'eras of Jupiter' (the planet Bṛhaspati) are two, one of one revolution of the planet, that is, of twelve years, in which each day is called after the asterism in which Jupiter heliacally rises, and one of five revolutions, that is, of sixty years, in which the first year corresponds with the initial year of the Kali-cycle. In the South this era is regarded as identical with the solar year. There are locally known cycles of less importance, such as the 1000-year cycle of Pārašāma, recognized in the South, but known in the North, even to astronomers, only by name. The only one of these cycles can claim a respectable antiquity is the sixty-year Jupiter cycle, which perhaps reverses to a time antecedent to the beginning of the Christian era.

Cf. also 'Indo-Chinese' and 'Siamese' sections of art. CALENDAR.


E. WASHBURN HOPKINS.

The fourth (al-Delbar) is called 'Rohini's wall'; the fifth (three stars in the head of Orion) is the 'anteceps' head, etc. directed to the difficulty previously mentioned, there are two stations in India, see Burgess, Syrpa-Suddharta, 1901; Colebrooke, Essays on Hinduism, 1828, and 1872, II. 221; and Müller, India, What can it teach us, 1883.

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FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Iranian).—The extant Avesta contains no specific information regarding festivals or fasts, and what literature does exist is almost equally silent. Nevertheless, the Dinkart states (viii. vii. 1, 3, 8, xxix. 8, 10, xiv. 4, tr. West, SHE xxxvii. [1892] 15E, 95, 167) that the last day of Fes-ti-val, Hûparán, and Hadîxôti Naskids discussed, among other matters, 'what is about a season-festival; where the appointed place is, when is the celebration held, and when it has fully elapsed; the assembly of the season-festival, and the duration for the feast; what and where when the celebration is possible, in what proportion the days are to be computed to the festival of the sær (the feast); and divided; where its advantage is, and what benefit there is from it to the good creations both spiritually and materially.' The sinfulness of a failure to celebrate the season-festival is also considered in the Dinkart, and there are a number of minor allusions to the festival in Pahlavi, such as Zâd-i Mainog-i Xrast, iv. 5, vili. 13, Sâstga-i Sâstga, xii. 10, xiii. 29, xvii. 84, xiv. 4.

Besides the season-festivals, we find allusions to the days of the guardian spirits in Bahmen Yâst, ii. 43, Sâstga-i Sâstga, x. 2, xii. 31, Sad Dor, vi. 2. The 'season-festivals' here mentioned are the gahânbâr (the 'yearly'—gâyra—divinities of Yasna i. 9, ii. 9, Vêsp. f. 2, ii. 2), which have been considered in art. CALENDAR (Persian); and the 'days of the guardian spirits' constitute the festival of the Fravashis (cf. p. 645, iii. 717f., also art. FRAYASHIS).1 There is also some reason to believe that there were four lunar festivals in each month. In Yasna i. 8 (so also ii. 8, Yâst vii. 4) occur the words, nisîxhâyâni 'hârsnârâ-yêni mokhtâlî, vêdast, 917, ... perèvî-hârî vêdastkhârî, 'I dedicate, I perform (the sacrifice) for the month (the gods), the day-divisions of Aša, for the between-moon [i.e. the new month] to the full moon, and for the intervening seventh(s)';—in other words, for the first, eighth, fifteenth, and twenty-third days, which, as has been seen in CALENDAR (Persian), were all dedicated to Ahura Mazda (cf. also Bartholomae, 1729).

Our chief knowledge of the Zoroastrian feasts is derived, not from Avesta or Pahlavi texts, but from Paro- Arâbic authors, the most important of whom, in the present connexion, is al-Biruni (Chronology of Ancient Nations, tr. Sachau, London, 1879).

In each month an especially sacred day was the one now called āshû (Av. yasna, 'praise'), on which the corresponding day-name was at the day Fravashi of the month Fravashi.

The āšû are, accordingly, the 14th day of the 1st month, the 21st day of the 2nd, the 10th and 22nd day of the 3rd, the 7th and 21st day of the 4th, the 16th and 29th day of the 5th, the 6th and 26th day of the 6th, the 9th and 25th day of the 7th, the 14th and 29th day of the 8th, the 5th and 15th day of the 9th, the 21st and 34th day of the 10th, the 14th and 17th day of the 11th, and the 12th and 24th day of the 12th (cf. the lunar feasts noted above), the 2nd of the 11th, and the 4th of the 12th.2 Various legends and popular usages are connected with a number of the āšûs, among which al-Birûnî includes the following: Tirgân, 13th day of the 4th month (209 f.); Mihrâjan, 16th day of the 7th month (207-209); Alûk, 10th day of the 8th month (210); Ādâr-čâš, 9th day of the 9th month (211); according to Zadâwâli, as quoted by al-Birûnî, 207, this name was also applied to Saharhû-esteem, as the 4th day of the 6th month (see preceding paragraph), this statement, if correct, probably being due to the retrogression of the calendar; Xûrram-rûz, 1st day of the 10th month (212), 21st day of the 11th month (213), 12th day of the 12th month (216 f.). This list may be supplemented by a Parsi-Persian text made accessible by Unvala.1

1 The view of Lâzgâr (Pârsûn, Göttlingen, 1887) that Fravashis formed the foundation of Parsiism has been discarded; and equally ambiguous is the theory of Schellevicolta (Alcriche in AT., Berlin, 1901-03, 40f., li. 44-45) that the is borrowed from O. Pers. 'fras-avesta freyd, 'frash'; particularly as considered Avesta word probably means 'thriving, growth, prosperity' (Bartholomae, Altdprs. Worterb., Strassburg, 1904, col. 99).
month, Mehekan (Hübchmann, i. 95), and it was evidently known to the Persian kings, as is clear from the statement of Strabo (203) that the arrival of Atranja sent the Persian monarch 20,000 colts annually at the Mehekara. Mihrajan and Nauruz were the two times at which the earlier Sassanian kings gave public audiences (Christensen, I. 183). In his inscription (707, pp. 226, 78 f., 98); and it should also be noted that, according to Ctesias and Duris of Samos (apud Athenaeus, x, 45), the Mihrajan was the one occasion on which it was customary for the Persian king to become intoxicated and to dance the national Persian dance.

The remarkable parallelism between Nauruz and Mihrajan finds its very simple explanation in the fact that both were New Year festivals. Similar double beginnings of the year existed among the Babylonians (E.R.E. iii. 74°, 76°) and the Hebrews (Ex 23°, 34°, 129°), and Marquart has argued (ii. 206-212) with good reason that the Avesta year originally began about the time of the autumnal equinox, and that during the closing years of the reign of Darius I. (522-486) it was changed to conform with the regular Bab. year, thus coming about the vernal equinox.

The date of the Avesta year may be discussed more briefly. On 17th Frawarzin the festival of Zanamahali ('muttering'), on which Sraosa was held to have revealed the murmuring regarding the 17th of the month as well as improving in speech, in easy words became absolutely necessary, during eating (al-Biruni, 204; Hyde, 241). The 6th Tir was the Cahn-i Nitfar ('feast of the water'), and al-Biruni (295) to be of recent date (Hyde, 245, puts it on 17th Ameroda). The 8th (more probably the 18th; cf. Unvola, 208) Satavro was Haszan ('autumn'), an autumn feast (Hyde, 244), which also gave its name to the eighth month of the short-lived calendar of Yazdagird II. (ib. 197). The 1st Mitro was Haszan-i digar ('second autumn'), a feast for the common people, because on that day the work of sowing seeds and cultivation was completed (Unvola, 208; al-Biruni, 207).

A feast of special interest as being, in all probability, a survival of an ancient Bab. custom was celebrated on the 1st Ajar, the Rockh al-Kausi, or Koski haran (the 'ride of the thin-bearded'), which was apparently observed also as a popular feast of rejoicing at the departure of winter and the coming of spring, so that al-Biruni (211) calls it a festival of the vernal equinox.

This festival is described, with trilling variations, as follows (Hyde, 249-251; Unvola, 208; al-Biruni, 211; Marzof, iii. 413; Amerd, 345). The purposes of the festival, which is held in honor of iron, or to-be-beardless (or toothless) man rode (taked, in some accounts) on a horse or ass, holding a fan in his hand and complaining of the heat. Escortied by the attendants of the king (it was usual to make a tour through the city, the target for snow and ice, but the recipient of hot foods. In his other hand he held a crown or, according to other accounts, he carried a pot full of water) with which, as also with mud and fat, he bespatterd those who refused him the drink which was his own property. If he was delayed an instant in receiving his tribute, he had the right to seize everything in the shop. The dirhams which he received in payment of his tribute and the first prayers (7 a.m.) must give to the king or governor; those which he received during the festival (11 a.m.) were his own property; after the second prayers he might be beaten with impunity.

Here the fact, that the chief figure in the 'ride of the thin-bearded' was escorted by the servants of the king or of the governor; that (b) between the first and second prayers he could exact tribute from every shopkeeper, and, if refused, could seize all in the shops of the recusants and could inflict punishment upon them; and that (c) his authority was shortened, since he could be roundly haggled after his brief tenure of power, all point to his original identity with the crowned criminal who enjoyed a brief reign during the Bab. Saca. Anquetil du Perron (ii. 581) had already suggested that the 'ride of the thin-bearded' had perhaps taken the place of the Saca, and the two celebrations have also been compared with the Day Lagari (31 ft.), and especially by Frazer (GP iii. 181-184). It seems, on the whole, most probable to hold, with Meissner (ZDMG i. 1896, 296 ft.), that Winckler (231) calendar that of Mihrajan (208), with variations, and that the festival was similar, or perhaps an imitation of the Zoroastrian Avesta feast of the third month (al-Biruni, 345), Brockelmann (ZA xvi. 1902, 391), and Frazer (Dying God, London, 1911, pp. 115-117), that the Saca was connected with the Bab. New Year, Azgank; and it is of particular interest to note that at Zela, in Pontus, where the Saca was still celebrated in Strabo's time (p. 512), the ruler had formerly been a priest-king (p. 539, xai υδ' ἵππος αἱδέρον).

This interpretation of the Saca seems to the present writer to be preferable to the theory of Geiger (ZA xii. 1875, 144 ft.), Justi (GVP ii. 417), Fräsee (Gesch. der Meder und Perser, Gotla, 1906-10, ii. 215), Zimmern (KAT 384, note 4, 427, 515), and Jeremiah (PREZ xi. 644), that the feast (on which see Jerome, apud Athenaeus, xiv. 44; Dio Chryseotom, Grat. fr. ed. Dindorf, 76, and the enumpheredized account of Strabo, p. 212) was an Azar Anaitis festival. This hypothesis leaves the most characteristic features of the Saca unexplained, although in its favour may be urged the fact that the great festival of latar was celebrated in the spring, which is usually regarded as corresponding to the month of Losa, and the statements of Strabo, which also connect the feast with Anaitis. On the other hand, calendrical retrogression may explain some of the chronological difficulties connected with the date of the celebration of the Saca (we know, for example, that in 232, Ah, but in Tamizz (Robertson Smith, apud Frazer, GBP ii. 514, note 11); and King believes that Losa is the name of the month in which the festival was held). As far as we are told that both the Sogdian and the Chorasmian years began in July (al-Biruni, 220, 223), as did the Armenian (ERE iii. 790). It seems, on the whole, safe to conclude that the Persian 'ride of the thin-bearded' is the vernal counterpart of the (originally) autumnal Babylonian Saca, and that it represents a direct descendant of the Bab. festival of the Zangak.

The 11th Din is regarded as the anniversary of the death of Zaratushtra (Karnika, i. 149). The 14th Din (according to Hyde, 224, the 24th) was Sir-sava ('garlic feast'), when garlic was eaten as an apotropaic (al-Biruni, 212). The 5th Yohuman was Barpadagh ('above or new Sadaq'), five days before Sah sadagh (Canon Masudiana, quoted by Saucho, Chron. Arab., xiv. 213).

The latter feast (‘night of the bonfire’) was falsely understood to be the ‘hundredth night’ (Pers. sadah, from which the Arab. sadagh is borrowed, being taken as an equivalent of the ‘hundreded’). Sab sadagh was originally the feast of fire par excellence (Sād-nāmah., tr. Mohl, Paris, 1876-78, i. 26 f.), and its great importance at one period is shown by its frequent mention side by side with the feast of Nizām (Nizāma); for example, in 551, vi. 109, 506, vii. 27, 327, 374; for other legends, etc., see al-Biruni, 213 f.; Hyde, 224-227 (where it is wrongly identified with the winter solstice); Unvola, 207 f.; Colius, 37-39. On this night blazing
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fires were lighted, and cattle and birds were driven into the flames, fettered with dry herbs and the like, so that they might speedily escape. The festival falls five days before the Mildāz-winter, and the fires may have been kindled to hasten, by sympathetic magic, the slowly increasing length of the sun's warm activity, as well as to purify the creatures that passed through them.

The 22nd Hūrūrūn was the Bahar-i 'āmr ("wind day"), and was probably connected with the Sogdian Badh-bāghān, which was celebrated on the 24th of the corresponding month (al-Bīrūnī, 222). The feast was probably the "windy" day, because of a tradition that on this day a wind blew, after seven years of windlessness, with sufficient force to move the wool on a lamb (Unvāla, 210).

The 30th Vohūnān was celebrated at Isfahān as the Ahrījārān ("outpouring of water"), a rain-festival which, according to some authorities, coincided with Tīrān (Hyde, 243; Unvāla, 206), or, according to others, fell on 20th or 30th Horvadāt (Hyde, 242); probably, as Hyde remarks, the day of celebration varied in different localities.

The 5th Spendarmān was the Jašīn Barzgārān ("feast of cultivators"), on which charms are prepared for the extermination of hurtful creatures (for specimen, see the Jastrow, Pesq. Or. 1866-1903, i., 253), and in which many snakes and other noxious creatures as possible were killed and brought to the priests (vašīr-maṣūr) as a proof of hatred of Ahrīman. The day following is a celebration called Mīrāk-i 'āmr ("fresh wind") of the Pers. al-Kausā, Sactea (Hyde, 217). On the 19th Spendarmān fell Naurūz an a miyā yārī ("new year of rivers and running waters"), when rose-water, perfumes, etc., were cast into the streams (al-Bīrūnī, 217; Hyde, 260); and on the 25th-30th (according to others, only on the 30th) came the Mard-girān ("man-seizure"), when the women could lord it over the men and take from them what they would (Hyde, 259).

This festival bears considerable resemblance to the later form of the celebration of the Saceā, when, according to Herodotus, masters were ruled for five days by their servants, one of whom wore a quizzical robe (vānān rī fināfī) called goyaf, (a word held by Melsner, 29, note 2, to represent Assyry. bēdū, Heb. yēj, "pretect, ruler," and was in control of the land in the 1st month of the year, vānān rī 1ānā). Since, however, the celebration of Mard-girān was separated from that of Rūkūb al-Kausā, which we have been able to be a New Year festival coming within the 1st month instead of by six months, any association of the "man-seizure" with the Saceā seems improbable. If, therefore, the al-Kausā-Lebān, which in the Saceā must have been a celebration of the summer solstice. The month of celebration is curiously identical with the Jewish Purim on 14th Adar, but the identity of month is doubtless merely fortuitous, and no connexion can safely be alleged between the two festivals.

The Gemara to Miṣna III. of the Talmud treats of Aboda zara, i. (11th of Bābī, 99 of Yeruṣālim) mentions four festivals of the Persians which are of interest as showing what ones were at that period regarded as of most importance. The list given in the Gemara is, in more accurate words, to, oil, tey, pe, pērūn, and yōs (for the variants, see Jastrow, Dict. of the Targumim, etc., London, 1886-1903, pp. 741, 534, 739). The first and the third name clearly stand for Naurūz and Miḥrajān; the second doubtless represents Tīrān (on the probable early importance of this feast as that of the summer solstice, see above, p. 572); and the fourth may be conjectured to stand for Xurram. These three would then represent the four seasonal festivals as celebrated at the time of composition of the Aboda zara.

Our information concerning specifically Persian festivals is scanty, but it is certain that each Persian celebrated his own birthday with a feast (Herod. i. 133), and that the king also gave on his birthday a banquet calledǰowzd (connected with Av. tāxwaman, "seed"; O. Pers. tāvar, "family"; Skr. tuṣ, tū, "posterity"; Jackson, J.A.O.S xx. (1899) 57), on which he was bound to grant every request (Herod. ix. 110), while other festivals celebrated the king's marriage (Est 25; Josephus, Ant. xvi. vi. 2) and the birth of his first son (Plato, Aethclides i. 121 C).

A Persian festival of much importance was the Magophonia. According to the usual view (Herod. iii. 78; Ctesias, apud Photius, Biblioth. xxviii.), Agathias, in his 79th book, speaks of the "festival of the Magophonia," and the first of the Magophonia is explained by Darius (cf. Behist. ii. 35-71), and then "no Magian may appear in the light, but the Magians keep themselves in their houses that day." This view, maintained by Spiegele, (Erud. 1878, xxv. kundes, ii. 310, ill. 586-708), Christensen (151), and Meyer (Elie2.) xx. 283, is attacked by Marquart (i. 64, ii. 132, 135; so also Práscik, ii. 140), who holds that there was a corruption of O. pers. βαγγάκινα, and that it is identical with the feast of Miḥrajān, considered above, especially as the upros (βαγγάκινα) lasted five days (Herod. iii. 80) after the death of Gānātā, which was killed on 10th Bagāzān (Beitol-Wuhr), which corresponds to the Zoroastrian month Mitrō (nord. 135). Despite the cleverness of this suggestion, it seems open to objection. Marquart is certainly right in identifying the Magophonia with the old New Year festival of Miḥrajān, and it is almost certain that the O. Pers. year originally began with Bāgayādi ("month of the honouring of the god (Mithra)"), just as the Avesta year at first commenced with the corresponding month Mitrō; though later the O. Pers. New Year was changed to a month of unknown name" corresponding to the Avesta Fararāž and the Bab. Nisan. It seems most plausible to hold, therefore, that it was under the cover of an old festival of uproarious character that they were enabled to kill the usurper, their fury both leading them and inciting the other Persians to slay every Magian they could find (Herod. iii. 79); so that the later celebration to commemorate the slaying of the pseudo-Smerdis came to obscure the real origin of the festival in the popular consciousness.

Why the Magi, so universally honoured in Iran, were obliged to keep within doors during the Magophonia has been a hard problem on the basis of the current explanation: but if, as Marquart holds, it was originally a New Year celebration, to be connected with the Miḥrajān (Beitol-Wuhr), which was probably connected further with the Saceā, which, from the statement of Dio Chrysostom and Berosus, was almost certainly a New Year festival, the prominent feature of which was the killing of a criminal who had for five days been permitted to wear royal robes, to sit on the royal throne, and empowered not only to issue whatsoever mandates he would, but even to consort with the royal concubines, and after his brief tenure of office was escorted and hanged, so that the Saceā probably represents in attenuated form, the wide-spread practice (found also in Babylonia) of killing the priest-king (cf. Frazer, Dyn. and Trad. 113-117; see Lang, Magic and Religion, London, 1901, p. 118 ff). It would follow then that the origin of the festival of the Magophonia was the actual killing of a Magnus
who was at the same time both king and priest. This explains why the Magians were both revered and also liable to be killed, although long before the period of actual killing had been abandoned, and the festival survived merely in a season of merriment, during which the Magi were perhaps the butt of practical jokes and rudely remained indoors. The success of the attack of the Christian forces on Ctesiphon Smardus was very likely due in great part to the fact that Gannáta was himself a Magian; and later, as already noted, the Magophonia was rationalized to commemorate this event, just as in Szurabî's day the Sacaean itself had come to be reinterpreted as commemorating a victory over the Scythians (Zaxâ) which may, indeed, have been won at the time of the celebration of the ancient festival of the Sacaean, after it had long since lost its primal significance.

The meaning of the word Mayapâdana, is, therefore, probably 'Magus-slaying,' representing an O. Pers. *Magumânâya*; and the festival was originally a New Year celebration during which the priest-king was slain.

The four seasonal festivals may, accordingly, be summarized as follows:

- **Autumnal equinox** (Sacaean), Magophonia, Mihrâjan.
- **Winter solstice** (Suraun). 
- **Vernal equinox** (Zagamuk, Rukbû al-Kausâ), Naushâriya.
- **Summer solstice** (Szurabî), Mayapâdana.

The festivals of the Sogdianas and Chorørians are listed by al-Birûnî (221–229), the principal festivals—so far as either their names or their celebrations are known—being the following: 1st day of the 12th month, local Sogdian feast of the Buhkâr Magians at the village of Râmûl; 1st day of the 13th month, Chorørian beginning of the rainy season; 2nd day of the 6th month, Chorasman feast of the Sogdian at Balkâzid; 11th day of the 4th month, Sogdian eating of leavened bread after a fast (read *instead of אֶת הָעַמִּים* [11]; among the Chorørians this day was Ağährân ['firewood and flame'], since in former times it had marked the approach of autumn; 15th day of the 6th month, Sogdian Bâba (or Bîmî) Xûrâ, marked by drinking good, pure wine; 1st day of the 6th month, Choræanian Paghûshnîb, when the king went into winter quarters; 3rd and 15th days of the 6th month, Sogdian feasts, the latter lasting seven days; 1st day of the 7th month, Sogdian Nâyésar ('half of the year'); and Chorasman Azâd Kand Xûrâ, or 'eating of bread prepared with fat' (as a protection against the cold); 2nd day of the 7th month, Sogdian feast of eating cakes of millet-flour, butter, and sugar; 13th day of the 7th month, Chorasman Gârîrî ('day of the wind') celebrated by the Chorasmanas just as was Mihrâjan by the Persians; 21st day of the 7th month, Chorasman Yasat Xûrâ, a Chorasman beginning of the rainy season; 4th and 15th days of the 10th month, a local Sogdian feast of which neither name nor particulars are given; 11th day of the 10th month, Chorasman Nimjâh, which, if it may be read Nimâdân instead of [Nimāmân] (منامان)، is a festival of the very prosperous sort in the month of Elul (or to al-Birûnî, 223, 224), the beginning of their summer was the 1st of Nûsâkerî); 24th day of the 11th month, Sogdian Bâhâghizh (see above, p. 876); 15th day of the 12th month, Chorasman Wâzângânî, in honour of 'the angel [Wis]âzâ' who has to watch over the water, and especially over the river Oxu'; 35th day of the 12th month, the beginning of the Sogdian and Chorasman feast for the dead.

Some special festivals introduced in the Muhammadian period (al-Birûnî, 217), as well as the mythological festivals recorded for the 'Sipâstân' by the Dâbistân (tr. Sheeh and Troyer, Paris, 1845, i. 63), may be disregarded here.

The whole purpose of fasting, fasting, is absolutely forbidden by Zoroastrianism. According to Sad Dar, lxxixii, 'it is requisite to abstain from the keeping of fasts' (rizâl-dâštân), for 'in our religion it is proper that they should not eat every day or anything, because it would be a sin not to do so. With the keeping of fast is this, that we keep fast from committing sin with our eyes and tongue and ears and feet, but not that other things besides.' That which, in other religions, is fasting owing to not eating is, in our religion, fasting owing to not committing sin.

To this al-Birûnî add that fasting commits a sin, and must, by way of expiation, give food to a number of poor people. The reason for the prohibition of fasting lies, not merely in the entire Zoroastrian outlook upon the universe, but in the idea that it is as wrong to torture oneself as any other being of the good creation (cf., further, Modi, *Catechism of the Zoroast. Religion*, Bombay, 1911, p. 35 ff.). The Mandaeans understand fasting in a very similar sense, and, polemize against Christian fasts (Brandt, *Mandäische Religion*, Leipzig, 1889, pp. 93, 143 ff.; K. Kessler, *PRE XII. 173 ff.); so also the Yezidis (Brockelmann, *ZDMG* iv. [1901] 334 ff.) who, on the contrary, long-continued part of the Sogdian religion (al-Birûnî, 221; cf. also above, pp. 760, 765).


LOUIS H. GRAY.

**FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Jain).—** There is, perhaps, no shorter road to the understanding of a religion than to study its festivals and fasts, the occasions on which it rejoices, and the things over which it mourns. This is certainly the case with Jainism—a religion which lays special stress on outward observance.

1. **Pājudnaka.**—Amongst all their holy seasons none is regarded by the Jains as more sacred than the closing days of their religious year, when the ascetics and faithful of all three sects observe the solemn fast of Pājudnaka. At this time they fast a month and a day, and renounce the meat of any living being whatever, against ahinsâ (non-killing), one of the main tenets of the Jain creed. Mahâvîra, their great religious leader, decreed that Pājudnaka should begin 'when the rainy season had elapsed,'1 his reason apparently being that the lay people would by that time have prepared their houses to brave the elements; and business, too, being less brisk, they would be at liberty to attend to their religious duties. It is a convenient season for the ascetics also, who, during the rains give up for a time their peregrinations, lest they injure any of the abundant life, animal or vegetable, then springing into being.

The fast nowadays includes the last four days of the month of Šrâvâna as well as the first four of Bhâdrapada, i.e. it falls usually in August. The Jains say that formerl, instead of eight days, it lasted for one day only, the fifth of Bhâdrapada. The Digama Bâins (the sky-clad or naked sect) usually observe seven additional days for worship at the close of these eight fast-days.

The Jains (sûtras), while fasts varied in strictness: one fast for the whole eight days from all food and water, others only every other day, eating specially dainty food on the alternate days, while others, again, fast in question of the mode in which they happened to fall at the time of their incorporation. *Hydr, St. 254*, had already noted the possibility of such inception of fasts, although in his actual instance, the festival of Sab sadhân (on which see p. 873 ff.) is incorrect.

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1 *Kalpa Sûtra* (SB 2, 9, 90).
During Pājjuśana special services are held in the upāsārā (monasteries) of the various sects. In those of the Śvetāmbara Jains (the white-clad sect) a well-known monk usually reads from the Kājāśāni, the sacred Jain book of famous sacred books); and in those of the Śīrṣākavāśa (the non-idolatrous sect) readings are given from various books which they consider specially sacred, such as the Antegeta or some other. Only the śaivāda (ascetics) are given raised seats; but, on agreeing to sit on the floor and to remove leather shoes, the present writer was courteously admitted to the services.

The exposition of the sacred books was of a colloquial character, questions being freely asked and answered, and the preaching śārūha generally intoning each paragraph before he expounded it. Noticeable amongst the audience were some laymen wearing only the loin-cloth and scarf which form the saucy dress of the Jain ascetic, their nashven heads marking them off from the monks present. They were doing pūsha, i.e. they had become monks for the time being, and during the twenty-four hours they could not leave the upāsārā; but would spend their time in meditation and fasting. Posaha may be observed every fortnight; indeed, the Utarādhyogāna lays down that the faithful householders and laymen should observe the four fasts in both fortinights, not even for a single night; but there is a special obligation to observe it during the season of Pājjuśana. Pōsahe was, according to the Śrīdrakrttigī, specially instituted for those who said that we cannot, submitting to the terrors, renounce the life of a householder and enter the monastic state, but we strictly observe the pūsha on the fourteenth and the eight days of each fortnight (on the new moon, and full-moon days, and) who further undertook to keep the five monastic vows of non-killing, truth-speaking, honesty, chastity, and noncovetousness, so far as the exigencies of lay life permitted. Posaha well illustrates the special genius the Jain religion has for making the laity feel themselves intimately connected with the monastic order, which largely accounts for its survival in India to-day.

Some Jains, however, find even during the sacred season of Pājjuśana that the twenty-four hours' fast from all food and water entailed by posaha too much. For these the hotel-like eating fast, that is, the ākāśic or sahajāvara affords a welcome alternative. Those who observe this fast sit in the upāsārā and listen and meditate for any period they like to choose, from ten to twenty-four hours, but they may take water, and the new moon for half the number of times permitted, and the water not specially prepared for them.

Suhāvatari, the last day of Pājjuśana and the last day of the Jain religious year, is the most solemn day of all. Every adult Jain must fast throughout the day, abstaining even from water; the upāsārā are more than filled, and gatherings of devout Jains are also arranged in secular buildings, such as the verandahs of shops or the dining-halls of various castes. On the afternoon of this day no ascetics are present at the lay gatherings, but they may be seen in the smaller rooms attached to the temple, and making the vow confession privately; one notices that the hair has been newly plucked from their heads, for this austerity (peculiar to Jain ascetics) has to be performed before Pājjuśana ends.

It is most interesting to visit the various upāsārās on this day. Those of the Śvetāmbara sect adjoint their temples, the men and women having different buildings. The women, bedecked

1 Utarādhyogāna (SBE XIV. 1922) 23.
2 Śrīdrakrttigī, 17 (SBE XIV. 429).
3 Cf. Hume, Annual Address As. Soc. Bengal, 1895, p. 46.
4 On boiled water, see M. Stevanino, Data on the Jainism, p. 27.

with jewels and arrayed in their brightest clothes, are seated in silence on the floor, with the exception of one woman who may have paid for the privilege of reciting the prescribed mantras anything from one ruppee upwards. In front of her a wooden tripod is set with food. A little to the left is an altar with lamps and eight heads, the number of the qualities of the Pālākāparasamajī (the Five Great Ones). On the opposite side is the courtyard adjoining the temple is the airlikhā, in which the laymen are seated, clothed only in their loin-cloths, listening to one of the number reciting mantras. The Śīrṣākavāśa women's upāsārā there was no tripod, but first one woman and then another used to sit on the floor and recite mantras which in this community went by singularity. The Śīrṣākavāśa men, having been crossed, went out of their upāsārās, and to the women's of the town school when the present writer saw the ceremony. One of their number was preaching, not merely, as in the other gatherings, reciting mantras: he was giving an instruction on the twelve vows of a layman, which corresponded very much to an instruction that might be given on the ethical aspect of the Ten Commandments. In preaching, for instance, on the vow against dishonesty, he showed how this vow would be broken by a shopkeeper over-praising his goods. At the close of the instruction on each vow, the whole audience rose, and in a set form of Māgadhī words confessed their breach of it and asked forgiveness. Although the meetings went on till eight or nine o'clock, no light was permitted. At the close all asked each other's forgiveness for any slight or injurious committed during the day in the following words: 'Twelve months, twenty-four half months, forty-eight and four weeks—if during this time I may have said or done anything annoying to you, pardon me!'

No private quarrel may be carried beyond Śuhabāsā, and letters must be written to friends or even at a distance, even if written by hand: the postal authorities can testify how faithfully this is carried out, for the mail of the Jain community increases extraordinarily at this season of the year.

Kalpa Sūtra procession. In the morning of the third day of Pājjuśana, the Śvetāmbara community organizes a procession in honour of the Kalpa Sūtra, a Scripture which they hold in peculiar reverence. Some wealthy Jain, who has outlived the others, presents the new clothing to the temple copy of that Sūtra (which is preferably written, not printed, and should be illustrated) to his house in the evening. It is placed on a little table and covered with a rich cloth, and, with the long inanimate of the house and their friends continue what an English-speaking Jain called 'Harmony-Barmony,' singing songs in its honour and playing on as many instruments as they can.

Next morning the procession is formed to return the book to the temple in state. The details would, of course, vary in different places, but when the writer saw it, it was arranged as follows:

The procession was carried by the hotel-like eating fast, lent for the occasion by the Jātā, followed by other drummers on foot, who preceded the inrulīkṛṣṇa, a painted wooden trolley surmounted by the wooden elephant the king of the universe, mounted on a tier of red and blue flake ornamented with gold brocade. A pujari (official), who generally followed, bearing a light, was preceded by four boys walking behind him carrying smaller silver sticks, their parents having paid heavily for this privilege and the spiritual advantages accruing from it. A portion of the crowd wedged themselves in at this point before the main figure of the procession, the carrier of the Kalpa Sūtra, appeared. The proud distinction of being the carrier is accorded to some child connected with the house in which the Kalpa Sūtra has been kept. The child, in this case a little girl of seven or eight, arrayed in her gayest silk garments, was seated on a horse; in her hand she held the Kalpa Sūtra wrapped in silk, and the book lay a cocoanut marked in red with the auspicious Sankītā sign. She was followed by more of the crowd playing on musical instruments, and by other boys who had paid for the honour of carrying the draft lamps which they held in their hands. The last place in the procession was held by groups of women singing songs in honour of the Kalpa Sūtra.

Mahāvīra's birthday. —The birthday of Mahāvīra, the founder of Jainism, has been conventionally fixed for the 11th day of Pājjuśana (the month of Bhrānapada), though the Śvetāmbaras believe Mahāvīra to have been born on the bright thirteenth of Chaitra. The Śīrṣākavāśa Jains would like to keep this festival, but their gurus disapprove it, fearing that it might lead to idolatry. It is observed with great pomp and rejoicing by the other Jains, and the temples dedicated to Mahāvīra are
Festivals and Fasts (Jain)

The Śvetāmbara arranges a cradle procession in honour of the day. This procession very much resembles that of the Kalpa Sūtra. The drum, the bell, the silver staves and air lamps, the singing crowds, and the small elephant-trolley are again in evidence; but, instead of the book, the child on horseback carries in the centre of the procession a little wooden cradle containing his or her godchild.

The conventional birthdays of several other Tīrthaṅkaras are celebrated on various days, when the temples specially dedicated to them are decorated with flags, and the imprints of hands dipped in a red mixture are made on the walls. (The hand, the Jains say, is the special symbol of favour, since it is always used when blessing.) Not only the birthdays but also the days when the various Tīrthaṅkaras attained kaivalya and nīkāya are celebrated, the pomp, of course, being all the greater at the actual place where the event is supposed to have happened.

The Jain festival to Pojsuṣṭa the greatest of all the Jain sacred seasons is Diwālī. If the former owes its importance to the emphasis which Jains lay on the sin of killing, Diwālī derives its position from the importance of wealth. A mercantile community like the Jains has a special reason for their participation in what is really a Hindu festival in honour of Lākṣaṇī, the goddess of wealth. They say it originated when Mahāvīra passed to nīkāya and the eighteen confederate kings and others who were present at his passing instituted an illumination, saying: ‘Since the light of intelligence is gone, let us make an illumination of material matter.’ The festival continues for four days—the last days of Āśvin which close the Hindu year and the first of Kārttika—falling usually within the months of October or November. Amongst the Śvetāmbara Jains, the first day (Dhanartera) of the festival is devoted to polishing jewellery and ornaments in honour of Lākṣaṇī; on the second day (Kālichehanda) the women try to propitiate evil spirits by giving them some of the sweetmeats they prepare and cook on this day. These they place in a circle at cross-roads (q.v.), in order to protect their children from evil influences during the year. The third (Âmāsa) is the great day of the feast. It was on this day that Mahāvīra went to nīkāya, and Gantama Īndrabhūtī attained to kaivītya. This is the day on which Jains worship their account-books and decorate and illuminate their houses. In the morning, Jains of all three sects go to their temples and convene and do reverence to the chief monk or nun present, who preaches to them on the life of Mahāvīra and sings appropriate songs. The more devout laypeople stay and do pūjā, but the generality go home and make up their accounts for the year. In the evening they summon a Brāhmaṇ to direct the Sūradā pūjā, or worship of the account-books, for Brāhmaṇs are still the domestic chaplains of the Jains. After the Brāhmaṇ having arranged his account-book on a stool, the Brāhmaṇ enters and paints a chāndalo (auspicious mark) on the Jain's forehead, his pen, and one page of the account-book. He then writes the word Śri (i.e. Lākṣaṇī) on the account-book, either five, seven, or nine times, in such a way as to form a pyramid. A rupee (the eldest possible) is now placed on the book; this rupee for the time being is considered to be Lākṣaṇī herself, and the placing of it is called Lākṣaṇī pūjā. All the year the owner will carefully guard this particular coin, as it is considered luck-bringing, and will use it again next Diwālī, so that in some Jain homes the rupee can hardly be considered a commonalty. Besides the coin, the leaf of a creeper is also placed on the account-book, and the Jain waves a little lamp filled with burning camphor before the book, on which he has placed rice, ānī, betel-nut, turmeric, and various kinds of fruit. The ceremonial of procuring the red powder, after which the Brāhmaṇ and the Jain feast on sweetmeats. The account-book is kept open for several hours, and before closing it they say: Lokā labhakkā Lokā labhā, i.e. ‘a hundred thousand profits!’

The various Jain conferences are trying to introduce a new Sūradā pūjā of their own in which the Brāhmaṇ will play a less important part, and the Jain himself will perform the pūjā to the rupee; but most Jains are content with the old rite. Some of the stricter Śvetāmbara refuse to have anything to do with either the old or the new rite, regarding both as idolatrous. The Śvetāmbara light their temple at Diwālī with little earthenware oil lamps, saying their selves contain the Tīrthaṅkara, the chief objects of Jain reverence. Between the figures are written the names of the three jewels of the Jain faith: Īdāra, Right Knowledge; Dravīdā, Right Faith; and Chaitya, Right Conduct; and also the word tapa, ‘austerity,’ on which the Jains lay such overwhelming emphasis in their system. This plate, which thus bears on its surface a complete summary of Jainism, is regarded as of such importance that no Śvetāmbara temple is ever without it. Twice in the year, once in Āśvin (September or October) and once in Chaitra (April or May), it is worshipped for eight days by office bearers and conventuals, and during each of these eight days the saint-wheel is taken outside the town to some spot, probably near a tank or lake, where, before doing the eightfold pūjā, they bathe it with water, and this is called Jaijalātrī, ‘water pilgrimage.’ This little pilgrimage is accompanied with much rejoicing, and the pilgrims usually celebrate their return home by a feast.

Full-Moon Fasts. — The phases of the moon are watched with the keenest interest by the Jains (as they are, indeed, by all the inhabitants of an agrarian country like India); and four of the full-moon days are observed as special fasts. On two of these, Kārttika Purnama (October or November) and Chaitrī Purnama (April or May), they go, if possible, on pilgrimage. The favourite places of Jain pilgrimage are the hills of Satrājīya (in the State of Pālītāna, Sametākshara (Bengal), Gīmār (Junāgarh), and Mount Abu (Rajputānā); but at these full-moon āṣṭās the place is most eager to visit is Satrājīya. It was on Satrājīya, they say, that at Kārttika Purnama the two sons of Kṛṣṇa—Drāvdā and Vālīdllī—
obtained sodas along with about a hundred million monks, and at Chaitri Puja that Puṣṭārīka Gaṇḍhāra, the chief disciple of the Bhāṣavas, obtained sodas with Sūrya Deva. This is not merely Śrāvaṇa but any of the other days, Jains still manage to acquire some special pilgrimage merit by taking a map or photograph of Śrāvaṇa into the field, or in their tent, in the direction of that mountain and worshipping it there.

On the two other full-moon fasts, Phālaṃgana Puṇeṇa (in February or March) and Āśādhī Puṇaṇa (in June or July), Jains of either the Śvetāmbaras or the Digambara fast seat, decorate their temples with lamps, and are specially diligent in attendance at the temple-worship, whilst Śrāvakāśī Jains go to their spākṣārā to hear sermons. Āśādhi is especially important to the ascetics, for in whatever town monks or nuns may be for that fast, there they must remain till the moonson is over and Kārttika Puṇaṇa comes round.

5. Śvetāmbara and Śrāvakāśī Jains observe the 5th day of the bright half of Kārttika, which they call Āśādhiṣṭhāpana, since special knowledge is gained by those who worship their sacred books on this day. The institution of these books is specially useful in proving to Saddhā and DigambaraJains, for not only are the books worshipped and sandal-wood sprinkled over them, but all the volumes in Jain treasure-houses are supposed to be dusted, freed from insects, and rearranged on this day.

6. Maunagāyārasa.—Once a year the very strict ascetics commemorate by a solemn fast the five stages through which a mortal must pass before he can become a Sadhā. Śrāvakāśī laymen do not generally keep this day, though some of the Śvetāmbara laity do. During the whole day absolute silence is observed, together with abstention from both food and water. The Jain, as he tells his beads, meditates on each of the five stages (śādhu, or ascetic; upākṣāṭaṃ, or preceptor; ācchārsaya, or ruler of monks; śrāvakāśī, or lay-finder; śādhu, or perfected one) which lie before him. This fast, as its name shows, must be kept on the eleventh day of a month. If possible, it should be observed on the eleventh day of the bright half of Mārgāśīra (November and December); but, if this particular date is inconvenient, the eleventh of any other month may be substituted. On the day following, Śvetāmbaras celebrate the breaking of this eleven-day fast in a curious way. They choose five or six of the things connected with the pursuit of knowledge, and put eleven of each kind, such as eleven pens, eleven books, eleven pieces of paper, eleven ink-pots, etc., in front of them, and worship these 112 articles.

7. All or Amba.—Eight days before Chaitri Puṇaṇa great fairs are held at the chief places of pilgrimage, which are attended by Jains from all over India. At this time men and women take special fasts called, Amba, promising, for instance, to eat only one kind of grain throughout the day and to drink only boiled water. Oli or Amba is the fast par excellence of women, for this season a royal princess, Mayaṇā Śnātikā, by purchasing the mint-wheel, won health and restoration to his kingdom for her husband, Śrīpāla, who had been a leper. Ever since the days of this princess, women who want a happy married life have kept this fast. Keeping this fast, giving up all the things they particularly like, such as melted butter or molasses, and eating only one sort of dish.

8. Days of abstinence.—In addition to special fasts like the above, many careful Jain observers observe as

9. The bathing of Gomateśvara.—Three or four times during every century the Digambara Jains hold a great festival at Śrāvaṇa Belgolā (Hassan District, Mysore State) to lave the gigantic statue of Gomateśvara. This statue, which is one of the wonders of India, was cut some 900 years ago from a solid block of stone sixty feet high.

The last festival was held in March 1910, when Jain devotees gave grants to the materials and labour to erect the immense scaffolding which encircled the image on its three sides. On the day of the bathing Indraḥitā was closed to all but Jains, but it was possible to get a view of the figure from the ground by the stairs which were erected for the worship of the image. The actual bathing took place in the afternoon, and the gradual darkening of the image, as the mingled streams of water and milk and milk-powder flowed over it, was noticeable even from afar. The privilege of paying the figure had been previously put up to auction, Jains bidding what price they would pay for every separate cup of mixture they poured over it. During the festival the question was raised of erecting a glass shelter over the sixty-foot figure, but it was decided that to hold this would be to appear wiser than their ancestors, and, furthermore, the placing of the image was considered to have proved a valuable means of protecting it from the elements. It was suggested that the festival should be held more frequently, and the image bathed every three or every seven years.

10. The consecration of an idol.—Perhaps amongst festivals should be included Aśādiṣṭhāpana, the consecration of a new idol, for it is celebrated with the greatest pomp and magnificence. Mantras are recited, and in the case of Śvetāmbara Jains the metal eyes are inserted in the head of the idol, while also the metal eyes are inserted in the head of the idol, which is then anointed with saffron; until this takes place, the idol is not regarded as sacred. The ceremony is rare nowadays, owing to the enormous expense it entails on the donor of the idol, who has to pay for great processions and feasts in addition to the cost of the image.

11. Hindu festivals and fasts observed by Jains.—In addition to their own fasts and festivals, Jain laymen observe most of the great festivals of the Hindus: for example, Holi, the festival of spring which, however, is kept by the ascetics or by laymen who have taken the twelve vows; Sītalāśātama, the festival of the goddess of smallpox, when most of the Jain women and children (despite the efforts of their religious leaders and the conferences) go to her temple and offer drawings of eyes to the goddess and money to the temple Brāhmaṇas to obtain immunity from small-pox for the year. On this day, as the women refuse to cook on the ordinary hearths (believing the goddess of smallpox to be sleeping there for the day), the household has usually to eat stale food, or to cook on some other hearth. Jains also observe Vīrapaṇa, which falls on some Sunday in the month of Śrāvaṇa (August), when brothers give presents to their sisters, and sisters bless their brothers; and the corresponding feast of Bhāī bāja, when sisters invite their brothers to their houses. Diśā, in a sense a monopoly kept by Jains only to the extent of eating specially dainty food on that day. Another Hindi festival the Jains observe is Mahārāṣṭrākānti, which falls...
in January. On this day they fulfil one of their Four Fundamental Duties—that of charity—by giving away food and clothing to the poor and fodder to cattle.

Many Jain women, even of the non-idolatrous sect, observe the Hindu fast of Bakotha, by abstaining from food till evening, when they worship the goddess Gaari, wife of Siva, and then cows and calves, which they mark with red on their foreheads. Jain girls very frequently keep the Hindu fast of Muktaka, abstaining for a whole day from all food containing salt, in order to obtain a kind husband. Many of the Jains so far observe the Sraddhaka, or death-cremations of the Hindus, as to eat specially good food on that day. (The ceremony of throwing food to the crows at this time has, however, in most cases been discontinued by them.

In fine, so many festivals do the Jains observe, and such rich food do they eat in celebration of them, that a proverb has sprung up—'To turn Srikvaks for Siro—which accuses folks of turning Jain for the sake of a luxurious and dirty feast.

LITERATURE.—The information contained in the above article has been derived directly from Jain informants. The reader may consult also Tr. L. (1903), p. 115, and the present writer's Notes on Modern Jainism, London, 1910.

FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Jewish).

1. Modifications of the ancient feasts.—Although the post-Biblical period of Judaism witnessed the institution of several semi-festivals and other memorial days, it was marked by the rise of new festivals invested with the solemnities of the ancient feasts. As an offset to this, however, the feasts prescribed in the OT underwent manifold changes, and the character of not a few was fundamentally modified. More particularly after the destruction of the Temple, and the consequent cessation of sacrificial worship, the Jews sought to find a substitute for the latter, partly in the development and institution of an ordered liturgy—the terms of which, it is true, go back to the time when the Temple was still standing—and partly in the establishment of new observances for family devotion, as, e.g., the Kiddush (lit. 'hallowing'), i.e., the ceremony of hailing the dawning Sabbath or feast-day by speaking a benediction over a cup of wine, the Seder (see below) designed for the evening of the Passover, and the like. Other modifications were wrought by the altered conditions of life; thus, e.g., the pilgrim festivals almost entirely lost their agricultural character, and became purely historical celebrations.

One particular modification which affected all the Biblical festivals except the Day of Atonement was the introduction of a second feast-day for the Diaspora, i.e., for countries outside Palestine. Among the Jews in the time of the Second Temple, and for centuries afterwards, the beginning of the month was determined, not by calculation, but by observation of the new moon, as it was described by the authorities that the month should begin with the first sight thereof (see art. CALENDAR [Jewish], vol. iii. p. 117 ff.). At first the authorities caused the event to be announced to the various communities by beacon fires on the hills (cf. Wunsche, in Becker's Islam, i. [1910] 101), and afterwards by express messengers (Mishna, Rosh Hashanah, i. 3-4, ii. 2-4), telling the people to keep the same day, whether the preceding month was 'defective', i.e. one of 29 days, so that the new month began on the thirtieth, or 'full', i.e. one of 30 days, the new month thus commenced on the thirty-first. But, as the Diaspora became more widely spread, it was found impossible for messengers to reach the communities in due time, and accordingly, in order to avoid all possibility of error, these outlying communities observed not only the computed feast-day, but also the day following, which, if the closing month had been a 'full' one of 30 days, would, of course, be the proper date. Thus, e.g., the Diaspora kept the Feast of the Passover from the 15th to the 22nd (instead of to the 21st) of Nisan, and held a solemn celebration on the 15th and 16th and on the 21st and 22nd (instead of the 15th and 16th only), etc. An exception was made in the case of the Day of Atonement alone, as being a fast, for it was considered dangerous to fast for two days in succession (Jerus. Halta, i. fol. 57c, i. 14; Bab. Rosh Hashanah, 21a). The New Year festival, again, which fell on the 1st of Tishri—on the first day of a month—was often celebrated on two days, even in Palestine, on the ground that it was never possible to determine whether the previous month, Elul, would be 'defective' or 'full'. Once the fixed calendar was introduced, all uncertainty in the matter was at an end; nevertheless, a second New Year, known as Rosh Hanisan, was observed in Palestine as elsewhere from the 12th cent. A.D. (cf. 'Responses of the Geonom,' ed. Lyck, 1864, no. 1; Zerubia Gerundiu's Ma'or on tr. Beqa, at the beginning). In the Diaspora likewise, the observation of the second day of the Jewish year by them was called by the introduction of the fixed calendar, but it was allowed to continue for tradition's sake (cf. Bab. Beqa, 4b). The first to reject it were the Karaites, who reinstated the observation of the moon, and many modern Jewish communities follow their example.

The several festivals were modified as follows:

(1) Pesah (The Passover).—Of the three characteristic symbols of this feast—the sacrificial lamb, the unleavened bread, and the bitter herbs—the first was discarded, while the others survived in family devotion under the name Seder. In Palestine the Seder is observed on the first, and in the Diaspora on the first and the second, evening of the festival, and the ritual for its observance is contained in a book called Hagadda ('story, narrative'). A faint vestige of the originally agricultural character of this festival appears in the prayer for dew (tal), which is recited on the first day (see below).

(2) Shavuoth (The Feast of Weeks).—According to Scripture, this feast was to be celebrated seven full weeks after the Passover. The seven weeks were reckoned from the new moon, minhorath hash-shabbath (Lv 23:15), and the interpretation of these words was subject of controversy between the Pharisees and the Boethusans. The Pharisees, as also the LXX, Philo, and Josephus, understood them as meaning 'on the next day after the feast,' and counted from the 16th of Nisan; so that the Feast of Weeks fell (when Nisan and Iyyar were both 'full') on the 5th of Sivan, or (when Nisan was 'full' and Iyyar 'defective,' or conversely) on the 6th, or again (if both were 'defective') on the 7th (Jer. Rosh Hashanah, i. fol. 57b, i. 18 from foot). Hence, after the introduction of the fixed calendar, according to which Nisan was always full and Iyyar always defective, the festival fell on the 6th, or (in the Diaspora) on the 6th and 7th of Sivan. The Boethusans, on the other hand, interpreting the Biblical phrase as 'on the next day after the Sabbath,' began the commemoration with the first Sunday of the Passover festival, and celebrated the Feast of Weeks always on a Sunday. The Boethusans were followed in this by all the schismatic communities, down to the Samaritans and Karaites of the present day (cf. Poznanski, in Konfunnun, 1884, p. 491; and Breder, ib. note 4). But there were others who took the words to mean 'on the next day after the last
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Jewish)

feast-day' (so e.g., the Syrian Peschîta), and therefore counted from the 22nd of Nisan, celebrating the Feast of Weeks on the 12th of Sivan (as e.g., the Babylonian Talmud). The reckoning was by months of four weeks or twenty-eight days—on the 15th (so e.g., the apocryphal Book of Jubilees; cf. Epstein, Eldad ha-Dani, Vienna, 1891, p. 154). Weeks likewise lost their liturgical character, and became the festival of the Sinaitic legislation, which was delivered in the third month, i.e. Sivan (Ex 19; cf. Bab. Shabbath, 80b). The festival bears this character also among the Samaritans (cf. Cowley, The Samaritan Liturgy, Oxford, 1909, i. 335 ff.) and the Karaites.

(3) Rosh Hashanah (New Year Festival).—In the Pentateuch (Nu 29) and Lv 23* this feast, which falls on the 1st of Tishri, is referred to as Yom Teru'a ('a day of blowing the trumpet'), but not as the beginning of the year (the year began with Nisan [Ex 12]), though the Feast of Tabernacles (Lv 23) was celebrated on Tisri, is spoken of as taking place 'at the turn of the year' (Ex 24). Ezekiel (40) speaks of the 10th of the month—probably Tishri is meant (cf. Lv 25)—as the day when the people of the land were to read the Book of the Law before the assembled people of the 1st of Tishri, and calls the day 'holy to the Lord' (Neh 8:1-12), but not New Year's Day. The latter designation was first given to the festival in the Talmud (Rosh Hashanah, l. 1), where it ranks also as a day of Divine judgment. We may perhaps discern here traces of Bab. influence (cf. Zimmern-Winkel, KAT, p. 515). The days from the 1st to the 10th of Tishri came simply to be days of penitence and heart-searching ('Aserath Yeinê Tshabib; cf. Rosh Hashanah, 18a).

(4) Yom Kippur (The Day of Atonement).—Here, too, a substitute for the abandoned sacrifice was found in a solemn festival in the synagogues, and this day is regarded as the most important of the Jewish festivals.

(5) Sukkoth (The Feast of Tabernacles).—This festival likewise entirely lost its originally agricultural character as a vintage festival. According to a Talmudic ordinance (Ta'anith, l. 1), God is to be praised as the sender of rain in a prayer beginning on the 8th day of the Feast of Tabernacles and ending with the 1st day of the Feast of Tabernacles, that is, by praising therewith, a special prayer for rain (geshem) was offered on the former day—as also one for dew (tal; see above) on the latter—and various hymns were sung for the geshem from the 7th or 8th centuries. The 9th and last day of the Feast of Tabernacles—in the Diaspora only, of course—was called Simhat Torah, 'delight in the Law,' because, according to a very ancient custom, the reading of the Pentateuch in public worship was completed, and a fresh beginning made, on that day; this designation, however, is first met with in the 11th or 12th cent. (cf. Luzz, Ritus, Berlin, 1859, p. 80f). The 21st of Tishri, the last of the semi-festival days, is styled Hoshâna Rabbe'th, 'the great Hosanna,' or Yem 'Arâbâ, 'the day of willows' (Sukkah, 45a). At this festival it was customary to set up willows about the altar, and march round it once; but on the 21st of Tishri the altar was compassed about seven times, and in commemoration thereof it is still the practice to hold a sheaf of willows during the prayer on that day. Physically Middle Ages, Napoleon gained a powerful hold upon the day, and converted it into a statutory judging day supplementary to the preceding New Year's day and the Day of Atonement (see above, Regeln, Rundbemerkungen zum hebr. Gebetknichte, ii. [1912] 25 ff.).

2. Minor festivals of later origin.—Of semi-
festivals, besides the Biblical Feast of Purim and the Feast of the Maccabees (Hanukka)—not found in the Bible—both of which have been referred to in the 'Hebrew' section, the following, together with other minor festivals, some of which have been given up and some fallen into decay, may be noted:

(1) If, owing to Levitical uncleanness, or from any other cause, a man was unable to present his Paschal offering on the 14th of Nisan, he could, provided he observed certain regulations, make good his omission on the 14th of Iyar (cf. Nu 9:11-12). Traces of this practice still survive, and the day is known as Pesah Sheni ('Second Passover'),

(2) The 15th of Ab was the day on which wood was supplied for the altar of burnt-offering, and was, as such, a day of rejoicing (references in Schürer, GJV ii. 516). The recollection of this fact was subsequently lost, and the Ta'anith (de. Ta'anith, 69e; Bab. 39b) seeks in various ways to explain the significance attached to the day.

(3) Nicano's Day was the 13th of Adar, and commemorated the time when Tobi, the general of the Syrian general Nicano at Adasa in 161 B.C. (1 Mac 7:19-25, 2 Mac 15:1-28; Jos. Ant. XII, x. 5), P. Hapht ('Purim,' Beitr. zur Assyri. v. 2, 3 ff.) sees a day of rejoicing from Purim from Nicano's Day, but, as it would seem, without a very good reason. Nowadays, as we shall see presently, the 13th of Adar is observed as a fast.

(4) and (5) The Alexandrian Jews celebrated several other festivals of a special character. One of these was designed to commemorate the translation of the Torah into Greek (Phil, Vita Mosis, ii. 7), another was a memorial of their marvellous deliverance at the time when Ptolemy IV. (1 Mac 6) or Ptolemy VII. (Josephus, c. Apion, II. 2) attempted to destroy them by means of elephants. The dates of these festivals, however, are quite unknown.

(6) A little book bearing the title Megillath Ta'anith ('Roll of Fasts'), and redacted in Aramaic in the 1st or 2nd cent. A.D., contains a list of days on which, as commemorative of some joyful event, it was not permissible to fast (Lit. in Schürer, i. 157, and JE, c. v.). Of such days there are no fewer than sixty-two, including, besides the Hanukka, those mentioned in 1-3 above.

(7) The 15th of Shevat is spoken of in the Misna (Rosh Hashanah, 10) as the New Year for trees—that is to say, the Biblical ordinances relating to trees and their fruits (as, e.g., in Lv 19:23) come into operation for the year on that day. This date still marks the agricultural associations, and is regarded as a day of rejoicing.

(8) The forty-nine days between the Passover and the Feast of Weeks are called the 'omer days,' because the beginning of their enumeration was signalized by presenting a sheaf ('omer') of barley as an offering. These days were also accounted a time of mourning, as it was said that 12,000 pupils of Akiba had perished during the period (Tebanoth, 62b); and perhaps we have here the Jewish reminiscence of Bar Cochba's revolt under Hadrian, in which Akiba took a very active part. Further, it is regarded as improper to marry during this season; but the earliest mention of this restriction is found in post-Talmudic sources (cf. the 11th of Omer, p. 22, in Geiger's Jüd. Ztschr. viii. [1886] 83), and many scholars find in it simply an echo of the Roman practice of having no marriages in May, as the spirits of the gods were then in a decaying state. On very special ceremonies, and the so-called Lustrans celebrated, in that month. An exception was made of the thirty-third 'omer day (Lag bc'omer; lag = 37 = 33), which coincides with the 15th of Iyar, and is regarded as a great semi-festival. The practice of designating this particular day is far from clear. A felicitous conjecture has been made by Derenbourg
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Muslim).

The festival of Sacrifices connected with the feast of Ghufrān, for reason of al-Aladha; yaum an-nahr; al-'id; al-kabir or al-akbar; Turk, qurban bairâmi), which is celebrated from the 10th to the 13th of Dhu-l-Hijja by pilgrims in the Valley of Mina (now Minâ), east of Mecca, and by non-pilgrims at home. Although the festival

still later origin; and in France, even as far down as the 11th cent., the fast was regarded not as an enactment of the law, but as a custom of the church. 

The Karaites keep strictly to the Biblical dates, fasting on the 7th of Tamuz, the 7th and 10th of Ab, and the 10th of Tebeth. On the authority of Neh 9, they hold the fast of the 7th month on the 24th of Tishri, and they too connect it with the as-}


customary for fasting, probably because it was on these days that the people of the surrounding districts came into the cities for the purpose of hearing the lesson from the Torah, or of attending the law-courts (cf. Joel Müller, Misschet Seforim, Leipzig, 1878, p. 226 ff.). But we find that fasting was practised on other days as well, though never on Sabbath, or on feast-days, or their preparatory days (cf. Jth 9).

There are also local fast-days, designed to commemorate particular local calamities, and thus obligatory only upon the Jews living in the countries concerned, viz., Zadok, Ritus, 127 ff. Of such fasts the best known is the 20th of Sivan, observed as a memorial of the slaughter of Polish Jews by Cossacks in 1648-49.

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated in the course of the article, see N. EL POZNAŃSKI.

FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Muslim).—Properly speaking, Muslims know only two festivals ('id, more rarely mawlid), which, however, are not mentioned in the Qur'ân, though they are based on it. Further, they have introduced, in the course of time, a multitude of commemoration days for holy men and sacred events; and, finally, in countries which were arabized later, they have appropriated the pre-Islamic holidays to a certain extent. Thus we can distinguish festivals and holidays, properly speaking, from observances purely Islamic and half Islamic, universal and local.

1. The greatest festival is the festival of sacrifices connected with the feast of Ghufrān, for reason of al-Aladha; yaum an-nahr; al-'id; al-kabir or al-akbar; Turk, qurban bairâmi), which is celebrated from the 10th to the 13th of Dhu-l-Hijja by pilgrims in the Valley of Mina (now Minâ), east of Mecca, and by non-pilgrims at home. Although the festival

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FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Muslim)

rests on a heathen basis (cf. art. CALENDAR (Muslim), vol. iii. p. 1209). Islamic legend assumed that the sacrifice of Ismail was performed by Abraham at the hand of Abraham. In the Sūra al-Hijāz (xxii.) of the Qur'an there is, besides the explicit recognition of the Ka'ba cult, also a mention of animal sacrifices in 'a day of the festival' (Qur. ii. 264; cf. vi. 16). The prophet's successors, semi-officially, interpreted it to mean the sacrifice of animals on the 10th of Muharram.

'So proad to thy Lord and slaughter (victims)!' (Qur. eviii. 2) of the festival of sacrifices. According to the oldest tradition (hadith, quoted according to the Sahih of al-Bukhārī, Bulaq, 1256 [vocalized], in 8 parts), the introduction of the festival order, partly in common with the other festival (see below), which this festival has. First (Bukhārī, ii. 3, 8, 3, 18, 4, 2, 15, 6, 10, 7, 20, 8, 4; vi. 223, 226, 6, 7) contains the general prayer (salāt) accompanied by an edifying address (khutbah) by the leader in prayer (imām). Only thereafter can the sacri9dng of the animals take place. Some wished to make the address precede the prayer, because after it the crowd could not be held in restrain. But this practice is criticized. It is lawful to eat dates before the prayer, but not to slaughter or taste flesh (ii. 3, 15 ff., 5, 18, 6, 11, 10, 5, 9). If any one does not respect the prayer as a sacrifice, he had to repeat the slaughter after the address. When the imām addressed women, they used, in the times of the Caliph, to put the ornaments, as rings (saddqah) into the garment of the mu'dadāhin, Bilāl, hold out to them. During the prayer (ii. 5, 4, 7, 20, 8, 12) an antique weapon (anaz), short spear, or hābā, dart, javelin, used to be planted in the earth before the imām (ii. 7, 10 ff.). (This explains also the name dābha for Friday, because it was forbidden by the Prophet to carry armes on festival days (ii. 51 ff.). It is told that the Prophet commensuated the sacrifice in the following fashion (vi. 224 f.). He took two rams (kibā, cf. Gn 22:8), placed them in the direction of the Ka'ba, and then 'brought the other to the Ka'ba, and slaughtered the animals. The following predicates are applied to the victims: (1) amal, 'of mixed colours'; black and white (Tweddie, Arabuhn Horse, 1894, p. 283, translates this rare expression 'silver grey'); (2) i'xaq, 'with grown horns'; (iii.) in some texts but not all, manfah, 'mash实际行动, i.e. 'with testicles crushed' between two stones in the boards, because a sacrificial animal must have no sensuality. The last regulation seems to be pogan; for we may infer from Ly 224 (mep) and Dt 23 (527292) that this practice was also present in the Canaanite cult, and was suppressed only by the Jahveh-reformation. The 'protection of the rams' (qilday) is mentioned even in Islam (vi. 227, 71.). The victim is called dāba, ahiya, dābha (cf. 221), and in the texts it is called 'ayada. The flesh was eaten by the owner of the sacrifice, and also often distributed among the poor (vi. 233, 8; Ilaifawiti, i. 623, 6 f.). The second and the third days, on which the inferior parts were consumed, were called on this a day of the heads; yaum al-qār, 'day of the remnants'; yaum al-adār, 'day of the legs'. Besides sheep, oxen and camels were allowed as victims. At the slaughtering the following words are pronounced (a) Dismilah! 'in the name of God!' (cf. Qur. xii. 37); (b) Allahā akbar! 'God is very great!' (cf. Qur. xxii. 41); (c) Allāhumma kāddā minka wa-slika (lahkā) 'O God! this from Thee and unto Thee,' which probably means, 'From Thee, and unto Thee, we take the gracious Gift!' (cf. I. Goldziber, 'Über eine rituelle Formel der Muhammedaner,' ZDMG xlvii. (1894) 95 ff.). The ethical side of sacrifice is emphasized in Qur. xxii. 38 as well as in tradition (ii. 7, 10). It is a matter of fends of securing moral advantages, the blessing, and of coming near to God (acc. to the interpretation of gurba, 'sacrifice'). The puri9tive Abu Bakr wished therefore to hold in restraint as far as possible the joyful disposition that such a festival naturally brought with it, and to exclude female singers. But the more tolerant Prophet allowed them (ii. 2 f.). Also in the matter of luxury in clothing, there existed side by side a stricter and a laxer practice. Whether or not neglected the celebration of the sacrifice, or could not be present, had to substitute for it a prayer consisting of two bows (raka') (ii. 10, 15 ff.). In course of time both festivals have become connected with other regulations, during which the faithful make calls and give presents, put on new clothes, and seek annuements; yet they also visit graves, and hold devotional exercises.

2. The custom of fasting and the festival that follows it are closely connected. (a) The fast (sawm, i'jām) (opp. ifṭār).—According to the Arabian tradition, Muhammad commanded first that the faithful should fast on the Day of 'Ashār, the 10th of Muharram, after the fashion of the Jews, who fast on the 10th of Tishri, the Day of Atonement (ii. 208, 8, 225, 8, 231, 6, 14; iv. 290 f.). Later this regulation was abrogated, and, instead, the whole month of Muharram was declared fasting month (calend.). The regulation for this is in Qur. ii. 179 ff.

O ye who believe! There is prescribed for ye the fast as it was prescribed for those before ye; haply ye may fear. (19) A certain number of days, but he amongst you who is ill or on a journey, then let him fast the number of days which he has not; and if ye can do it not, then feed the poor (of God's possessing)." This is best for you; and if ye do it not, then feed the poor, until ye feel the weight of the burden of your fast. (20) That ye may think of the countenance of your Lord, and for manifestations of guidance, and for a discrimination. And he amongst you who beholds this month let him fast it; but he who is sick or on a journey, let him fast an equivalent time. And those are of the guidance of your Lord, straight; and God is well-pleased with them. (21) And if ye do not feed the poor then feed the poor of your own. (22) The words 'may redeem it by feeding a poor man' were soon abrogated (mamāsh), because they were nuisanced by the wealthy (Qur. ii. 180; Bukhārī, ii. 219). The custom of determining the daybreak by the test of the heathen on the earth was recognized, not as a reward for piety, but as a black is of Jewish origin. The ethical nature of the fast was strongly emphasized in the earliest tradition (ii. 208, 18, 210, 19, 211, 4 f.), just as it was in the case of the Day of 'Ashār, 'atonement' (kabārā), on the other 'a protection against sensuality.' It is of no benefit whatever as a mere opus operatum, but it must take place (1) in faith (mīmān), (2) intentionally (nīma), (3) on the part of the one who is called to it (ibtiṣab) from God (ii. 210, 4, 222, 7, 233, 17). Whoever does not give up untruth and deceit will not profit by fasting (ii. 210, 18). Boisterous merrymaking is not allowed (ii. 210, 19). The faithful
are exhorted not to insult each other during the fast. Whoever is insulted or attacked while fasting must not rise to his feet, but he is not fasting' (ii. 298. 15, 210. 220. 2). Tradition says of one who keeps the fast in this manner: The perfume of the mouth of the faster is more pleasant before God (cf. ii. 208. 210. 20). The month may not be shortened, but there must not be any overdoing either (ii. 233 f.). The Qur'an itself excludes all rigorous practice (ii. 181). Similarly, tradition says that the fasting month is one of mercy, and one of tolerance, for equality of each individual (Ba'jawi, i. 102. 6). Some overzealous people wished to continue (wisal, muaqala, aard) the fast after sunset through the whole night until the next morning; this met with disapproval, and was even threatened with punishment (ii. 223 f.). To meet different conditions and circumstances of everyday life there are special regulations which partly border on casuistry. The Qur'an itself makes an exception in favour of the sick and of travellers (i. 180). Likewise a Bedawi proverb says, Al-mu'aqil fi kifir, 'The traveller is (like) an infaid, i.e. he is not bound by ritual precepts. Sexually or the dressing of a woman is allowed (although restricted by the ethical conception of the fast, ii. 215), just as the swallowing of one's saliva (ii. 215. 20) and the use of the mouthpiece (i. 185). Furthermore, it was allowed to snuff up medicine (as al- 'at) and to dye the eyes with eye-paint (kuhul) (ii. 216. 7). In view of the question whether vomiting or bleeding breaks the fast, the following principle has been established (ii. 218): the fast concerns that which goes into the body and not that which comes out (contrast the position in Mk 7:31 ff.). Others condemn even the drawing of blood. The pious do not permit smoking, wine or other pleasures. One who is dying in Ramadan must appoint a substitute (wadi) to fast the rest of the month in his place (ii. 221. 11). In time of menstruation, a woman may neither fast nor pray (i. 221. 4).

Some people fast voluntarily at certain times outside of the month of Ramadan, e.g. on the Day of 'Ashura (i. 231) (see above); in Sha'ban (i. 225); on the 13th-15th of each month; during the days of pilgrimage at Mount 'A'adib (in the valley of Min'ah, Min'ah (i. 229)); or three days in each month (i. 101. 18 f.). If a person alternately fasts one day and not the next, that is called 'the fast of the Prophet' (i. 224. 1). More than once fasting is given in the Qur'an as a penalty, e.g. iv. 94, where two months' fast is commanded for a case of murder; lviii. 5, two months' fast for one who wishes to have intercourse with his wife after having once pronounced the formula of divorce; v. 91, three days' fast for breach of faith; all this when the culprit is not able to pay the prescribed material penalty.

The oldest Islamic legend explains the choice of Ramadan, which had no special significance in pre-Islamic Arabia, as far as we know, by the tradition that it was the month of revelations. The 'Leaves of Abraham' (Qur. lxxxvii. 10, cf. lii. 37), the Torah, the Gospel, and the Qur'an (ii. 181) are said to have been successively 'sent down' in Ramadan (Ba'jawi, i. 102. 19 f.). Owing to the fast and the Laylat al-qadr (see below), the month of Ramadan is surrounded by a greater halo than any other Islamic month. The mere sighting of the new moon (hilal, cf. Calendar [Muslim]) which inaugurates Ramadan causes a joyful excitement. Ramadan is surrounded by a greater halo than any other Islamic month. The mere sighting of the new moon (hilal, cf. Calendar [Muslim]) which inaugurates Ramadan causes a joyful excitement. Ramadan is surrounded by a greater halo than any other Islamic month. The mere sighting of the new moon (hilal, cf. Calendar [Muslim]) which inaugurates Ramadan causes a joyful excitement. Ramadan is surrounded by a greater halo than any other Islamic month. The mere sighting of the new moon (hilal, cf. Calendar [Muslim]) which inaugurates Ramadan causes a joyful excitement. Ramadan is surrounded by a greater halo than any other Islamic month. The mere sighting of the new moon (hilal, cf. Calendar [Muslim]) which inaugurates Ramadan causes a joyful excitement. Ramadan is surrounded by a greater halo than any other Islamic month. The mere sighting of the new moon (hilal, cf. Calendar [Muslim]) which inaugurates Ramadan causes a joyful excitement. Ramadan is surrounded by a greater halo than any other Islamic month. The mere sighting of the new moon (hilal, cf. Calendar [Muslim]) which inaugu...
verse the order, and commemorate his death on the 15th anniversary of the day of the Prophet's birth (mawlid, milad) of the Hijra, i.e. of the Hijra and Hijriya together, falls in Rabi' ii. Many other great and small saints also have their mawlid. In Jumada I come the commemorations of the birth of Ali, his birth on the 8th, and his death on the 15th. On the 20th of Jumada I, the Ottomans celebrate the capture of Constantinople in A.H. 857 (27th May A.D. 1453). Rajab has been regarded as a specially holy month ever since the times of the Prophet. On the 17th of this month is the Lailat ar-ragha'ib, 'the night of the fulfilled desires,' because the Prophet is said to have been conceived in that night. The night of the 26th of Rajab is the Lailat al-miraj, 'the night of the ascension' of the Prophet. This observance is based on the narrative, found in Qur. xvii. 1, of the 'journey by night' (isra', mi'raj) which the Prophet made on a marvellous animal (burdah) from Meecca to Jerusalem and back. This event has been treated both in prose and in poetry in the literatures of all Muslim peoples. The 3rd of Sha'ban is considered by some as the birthday of 'Umar bin al-Khattab. The 12th of Sha'ban is very important as 'night of privilege' (Lailat al-barat); in it the heavenly tree, Sidrat al-muntaha (Qur. lii. 14), is shaken to decide who shall die in the following year. Something similar to this is told also of the Lailat al-nilad; (see above), so that one can apply to both nights what Meisner says about the latter, that it must be regarded as a reminiscence of the Babylonian festival of the New Year (ZUAPAKU; ARzF. (1902) 227; KA7, p. 515). On the 21st of Ramadan the Muslims of India commemorate the death of 'Ali. In the month of Shavan, soon after the 'little festival,' the Egyptian, Syrian, and the Ottoman countries. Consequently the celebration of the departure and of the return of the pilgrim caravans is now more and more confined to the sending of the kiswa to Mecca. But the pilgrims, who used to start on foot or riding about this time, have now come to use extensively European steamers from the Maghrib, Egypt, Syria, and the Ottoman countries. The observance of the observance of the holiday, the festival of the Lake of Hamun, where the Prophet is said to have nominated 'Ali as his successor, is purely Shi'ite, and kept on the 18th Dhu-l-hijja.

4. Just as in the worship of Saints, so also in the observance of certain festivals, a syncretism exists which is otherwise unknown in Islam. It is true that the Arabs, though numerically far inferior in the great countries which they had conquered, thanks to some other factors spread their language there more or less successfully. But, on the other hand, they naturally adopted some customs, among which was the observance of certain days, closely bound up with the nature or the history of the subjected peoples. Thus in Egypt the following days are celebrated as general festivals: the second day of the Capricorn Raster (Shaminan-nasim, 'smelling the mild west wind'); the Lailat es-nasqis, 'night of the dropping,' i.e. the wonderful light of the 15th, which is the most important as 'night of privilege' (Lailat al-barat); in it the heavenly tree, Sidrat al-muntaha (Qur. lii. 14), is shaken to decide who shall die in the following year. Something similar to this is told also of the Lailat almiraj; (see above), so that one can apply to both nights what Meisner says about the latter, that it must be regarded as a reminiscence of the Babylonian festival of the New Year (ZUAPAKU; ARzF. (1902) 227; KA7, p. 515). On the 21st of Ramadan the Muslims of India commemorate the death of 'Ali. In the month of Shavan, soon after the 'little festival,' the Egyptian, Syrian, and the Ottoman countries. Consequently the celebration of the departure and of the return of the pilgrim caravans is now more and more confined to the sending of the kiswa to Mecca. But the pilgrims, who used to start on foot or riding about this time, have now come to use extensively European steamers from the Maghrib, Egypt, Syria, and the Ottoman countries. The observance of the observance of the holiday, the festival of the Lake of Hamun, where the Prophet is said to have nominated 'Ali as his successor, is purely Shi'ite, and kept on the 18th Dhu-l-hijja.

5. Besides the above yearly festivals, the Muslims have also other, regular, festive days, Friday, Jumma, Jumma'a (cf. Calendar [Muslim] and Bukhari, i. 1941). Work is not forbidden on Friday; but every good believer is expected, even if he thinks that he has an excuse for other days, to take part on that day in the common prayer in the mosque (jami', musjid), and to hear the address (khutbah) of the imam or hukb, which follows the prayer. The observance of the rest of the day is private, or taken up with the dhikhr exercises of the dervishes.


R. VollerS.

FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Nepalese).—Buddhism and Hinduism are so closely connected that the festivals of Nepal are of mixed character as are the religions. With the mass of the people the religious character of the festivals is scarcely recognized. They are occasions of festivity and mirth rather than of religious worship. All the national, or Nirvar, festivals have lost a great deal of their importance under Garkha rule. The share which individual Nirvars take in the different festivals is not optional, but depends upon a curious custom. Under the Nirvar kings, from the earliest known times, the acting, or festival occasions, was the duty or privilege of certain families or castes; so also were the dancing, the construction of the cars, the making of masks, and the necessary painting. In each instance the privilege was hereditary, and passed from father to son. The custom continues to the present day. The important Nirvar festivals are given in the following table. The date according to which they are celebrated, commencing with the month of Baisakh, the first month of the Nirvar year.

1. 'Bhairabjatra' or 'Biskati', in the month Baisakh.—Bhairava is an incarnation of Siva, the most popular deity of Nepal, and regarded as the guardian angel of the country. The deity is essentially Hindu, but has been admitted into the Buddhist pantheon. Dancing and the sacrifice of buffaloes characterize the festival, which is always celebrated at night, except every twelfth year, when it takes place in the daytime.

2. 'Lashai'—This festival is in honour of the cow. It commences on the first day after the full moon of Sawan. The Hindu festival, where the cow is worshiped, is confined to one day. The Buddhist part of the festival lasts a month. The Buddhist vilakas and temples are visited, little wax trees (probably commemorative of the sacred Bo-tree at Gaya) are carried, and offerings are made to various Buddhas. Images and pictures are exposed to view in the vilakas for fifteen days—from the fifth day before till the tenth day after full moon (Dassami), when the festival closes, and the pictures are taken down and carefully put away in the vilakas.
3. "Banhratra," in the month Sawan.—The name alludes to feasts which are given from time to time to the Brahmans, Sarvastivada and Mahayana sects of Buddhism. The feasts are held alternatingly (quarterly, in the months Baisakh, Sawan, Kartik, and Margh. They are celebrated by the giving of alms to the banhras on the part of any patron or any one in whose honor they are given, and on the part of the people generally. On this occasion the coronet of Amitabha Buddha is taken from his image in his temple and exposed to public view.

4. "Machendrajatra," in the month Bhadu.—This festival, held in Kathmandu, is peculiar to Nepal. It is held in the beginning of September. It commences four days before the full moon of the month Bhadu, and lasts until the fourth day after.

5. "Swayambhumahal," in the month Assin.—This is the birth day of Swayambhu. It is a great Buddhist holiday, on the day of the full moon, and there is general Buddhist worship throughout the country.

6. "Sheorati," in the month Phagan. —It is held on the first day of the month, and is a fast, not a feast. It is a purely Hindu festival, but most Nepals (Siamese) observe it, of course on the first day of the new month. It consists of three distinct portions: (1) the bathing of the image of Machendra; (2) the dragging of the image in a triumphal car; (3) unrobing the image and exhibiting his shirt to the people.


8. "Neta Devi Rajatra," in the same month.

9. Great "Machendrajatra."—This is the most important festival in Nepal. It is held in the fifth month, and consists of the death or birth of Buddha (Buddhist) or of his image (Shiva). The festival consists of the death or birth of Buddha (Buddhist) or of his image (Shiva). The festival consists of the death or birth of Buddha (Buddhist) or of his image (Shiva). The festival consists of the death or birth of Buddha (Buddhist) or of his image (Shiva).

10. Festival of "Narayan"—Narayan is a form of Vishnu, and Buddhists to some extent into the worship of the day. 

FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Siamese).—Introductory.—Siamese festivals, fasts, and observances are a rule, traceable to either Brahmanism or Buddhism. These two creeds, introduced into the country at a very early date into the country, have ever since existed side by side as rivals for the supremacy, but without any violent struggle, in so far at least as extant records go. The former (in its varied developments, especially Saivism) was, with few exceptions, patronized by the Court till about 150 years ago, while Buddhism found most support among the masses, not naturally led the rulers of Siam, even when deeply attached to Saivism, to assume the rôle of defenders of Buddhism as a matter of policy. Thus in every Siamese capital of the past (as even in the present one, Bangkok), and in the chief provincial towns, especially in the south (Malay Peninsula), Brahmanic temples with a body of officiating Brahmins, who acted at the same time as State and Court priests, were to be found along with numerous Buddhist shrines and monasteries erected, some by pious rulers, but mostly by the people. Of these temples there were at least three in each town, facing the east, and dedicated respectively to Siva (that on the south), Ganesa (the middle one), and Vishnu (that on the north side). The result of all this was, if not an actual blending of the two religions, the gradual introduction into most of the national festivities and ceremonies of both Brahmanic and Buddhist rites. This process was further intensified during the reign of siamese Buddhist sovereigns like Song-tham (1618-28) and Mongkut (1851-68), who succeeded in infusing into Buddhism there having spent a considerable part of their life in a cloister. It was especially through the endeavours of the latter ruler that the introduction of Buddhist rites into State and Court ceremonies, which had long re-

maintained strictly Saivism, reached its climax. It thus comes to pass that nowadays in well-nigh all festivals and ceremonies occurring in the same period, whether of Brahmanic or Buddhist origin, we find Buddhist rites associated with Brahmanic practices. Nor is this all, for the prestige of Brahmanism, especially during the present dynasty (which ascended in 1851), having even more considerably dwindled, it may be said that in a good many festivals and domestic ceremonies the presence of the so-called Brahmanis (now a somewhat degenerate body) is solicited chiefly out of homage to a time-honoured tradition which renders them indispensable. Their task consists mainly in calculating auspicious dates, making offerings to the gods and goblins, performing lustrations, blowing banhras shells, or striking the gong of victory, and waving their Savile hour-glass-shaped drum (damara).

The private observances and ceremonies of the Siamese will be discussed in art. VI (Buddhism). In this art. only festivals of a public nature are treated.

For the sake of easier comparison and identification of Siamese festivals introduced from Brahmanic or Buddhist India, and of those of their land of origin, the Siamese solemnities are here mentioned in the serial order of the months in which they occur, beginning with Chaitra, the Siamese New Year. It is with this that the Siamese new year now commences, whereas at an uncertain remote period it began with Magha (as in North India till about the end of the 10th cent., according to al-Biruni), the present Siamese first month. Along with public festivals, some solemnities now held only at Court, or abolished of late, which were formerly more or less public, will also be mentioned. It seems fit, moreover, that the principal state ceremonies periodically repeated at the appointed seasons should not be passed unnoticed, owing to their intimate connexion with most public festivals, of which they often constitute the predominant feature. The national periodically recurring holiday is the Moon-feast, or Buddhist Uposatha festival, which till recently was regularly observed on the 8th and 15th days of the waxing and on the 8th and 15th days of the waning, but is now telescoped to a large extent (since the adoption of the solar calendar in 1889) for civil purposes by Sundays.

I. CHAITRA (6th month).—The greater part of this month is occupied with New Year's festivals, which are actually three, intended to solemnize respectively the commencement of the lunar-solar, civil (modern solar), and astrological (old solar) years. Leaving out civil New Year's Day—fixed, since the introduction of the modern calendar in 1889, to fall invariably on the first of April, and which is an empty observance—it remains to consider the other two, owing to their being essentially religious, connected with the old calendar adopted from India on the basis of the Saka era reckoning, and celebrated with as much pomp as ever, despite the introduction of the new calendar.

1. 'Trut', or popular New Year.—The festivities last three days: the 15th waning of Phalguna (4th month); the 1st wakening of Chaitra (5th month), or New Year's Day; and the day following. These holidays are an occasion for the people to perform meritorious work and enjoy themselves, after having duly freed the premises from ghosts through exorcistic recitations by Buddhist monks, who are presented with food and requisites. The task is accomplished on a much larger scale in the town of Bangkok, where recitations of the *Atanatiya sutta* (an uncanonical compilation) are held all round the royal palaces and the city walls, and guns are fired off from them at regular intervals during the night to frighten the goblins. The people carry protective...
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Siamese)

rings of unspun cotton cord on the head, and threads of the same material, ground on the shoulders for the same purpose, so as to be freed from evil influence on New Year's Day. On this date (1st of Chitātra), oblations to the gods are made and ancestral worship is performed. At court, after this and a koma sacrificial offering on the sacred fire by the Brāhmaṇa, the 'name' of the year is changed. This ceremony, termed Saimachabhara-chinch, consists in changing the name of the animal denoting the place of the Brāhmaṇa's residence (or convent) in the chandrayoni cycle (of the twelve animals; see CALENDAR [Siamese]) after which the year is designated, but not the 'figure' or serial number of the year in the era, the altering of which is to be effected later, on Maha-saṅkhranti, i.e., at the completion of the astrological (solar) year. The people are allowed free gambling—an extraordinary ordinance of which full advantage is taken. In connexion with this popular New Year festival the following other important ceremonies are performed.

1. 'Saṅhāra,' or 'Gajendrāsa-saṅhāra' ('sprinkling of the lordly elephants and horses,' a later reduced form of it).—This has been but recently imported into the kingdom. It was originally a general purification of the army, like the Hindú Nirajāṇa, which was restricted later to a formal sprinkling of the elephants and horses from the royal chariot, offered from stands with blessed water as they filed past in a stately procession. On the same occasion the Vṛddhi-pāda Brahmans (i.e., those in charge of auspicious rites in connexion with elephants) uncoiled, in the royal elephant warfare houses, the ropes and nooses stored therein for elephant-catching, and performed a hook and noose dance in honour of Viṣṇu, simulating the capture of elephants. This took place on the third day of the fasting. Next morning the ropes and nooses were coiled up again and stored away. Both these ceremonies were repeated on the 4th new-moon day of the 11th month (Aśvayuja) in connexion with the half-year festival. The purpose was a general review of the army, so that all its equipment might be kept in proper order and efficiency.

2. 'Thī-Nam,' or drinking of the water of allegiance.—This is a ceremony performed with the utmost splendour in the royal Buddhist temple of the capital (and in the chief temple of every provincial town) with the concourse of all officials. It takes place on the third day of the fasting, and is a sort of re-litigation with the sawal year festival on the 13th day of the waning of the 10th month (Bhṛdrapada). Water is locally drunk, in which royal weapons (symbols of the sovereign power) are dipped, adjurations being pronounced the while, so as to make it fatal to traitors. In essence this is tantamount to a water-ordeal, of the kind that formerly obtained in the Hindu Courts (cf. Brah-पति, in SEB xxxii. 1889:218).

3. Songkrān, or astrological (solar) New Year. This falls nowadays on either the 12th or the 13th of April, the date of the assumed entrance of the sun into Ari, according to the traditional local (Hindu-zodiak) reckoning. The day is tenanted by Maha Songkrān day (Maha-saṅkhranti being substantially the same as Maha-saṅkhranti), and with it commences a three days' festival, the year's serial number in the era being changed with much ceremony on the third day, which is actually regarded as New Year's Day (solar). On this occasion the king performs with much splendour a kind of shower-bath with hustral water, termed mardāhābhikṣaṇa, and afterwards he sprinkles the sacred images. The people, amid much rejoicing and free gambling, as on the popular New Year's Day, perform a good deal of meritorious work by washing the Buddha images in the temples, sprinkling the monks and their relatives as an act of respect, and building sand-hilllocks in the temple-grounds. They partake of rice gruel, and offer pūṣadas of food, and lighted incense-sticks and tapers, to the statues of the Buddha.

ii. Vaisākhā (6th month).—5. Ploughing festival.—The king, that state ceremony, traceable to the remotest antiquity in India, is performed up to the present day in Siam in order to usher in auspiciously the tilling of paddy fields. The people also make the sacrifice of the bull, (which is done by the Brāhmaṇa). This festival has been held, in which prognostics are also drawn concerning the prospects of the crop. It takes place on a lucky day designated by the astrologers in the waxing part of Vaisākhā (usually the early days of May). A high official, formerly holding the title of baladeva, and representing the king (now the task falls ex officio to the Minister of Agriculture), performs the ploughing in a Crown field, attended by the Brāhmaṇas, a large retinue, and crowds of people who naturally take a keen interest in the ceremony. After having cut three concentric furrows with a gilt plough drawn by richly caparisoned bulls (which were hitherto employed), he severs over them seeds which have previously been hallowed by mantra (Brāhmaṇic, and now also Buddhist, recitations). The bulls are next fed with seven different sorts of food, and as those they most relish will be plentiful during the year. In ancient times the king presided in person, but later he delegated authority to the Minister of Agriculture, who holds, according to the ancient statutes, the title of baladeva in allusion to Baladeva or Balarāma, Krishna's brother who accomplished so many wonders with his ploughshare. This dignitary was on such an occasion, till a century ago, regarded both from his appearance in princely attire, surrounded by a retinue carrying princely insignia, but also from his being entitled, during the three days that the festival lasted, to collect all toils and ship-dues in the capital and its suburbs, while the real king kept retired in his palace without transacting any state business. The present king of Siam, however, did away with this absurd custom by resigning on 24th April 1913 the ploughing festival, to which he drove in his motor car, his presence being greatly appreciated by all as a token of the sovereign's interest in promoting the welfare of the nation's agriculture.

6. Vaisākhā pūjā. This is a strictly Buddhist festival, occurring at the full moon of Vaisākhā, which is held to be the anniversary of the birth, enlightenment, and death of the Buddha. For three days the people, and especially those in their dwellings festively, suspending flower wreaths, garlands, and lanterns which they light at night. They assemble at the temples to worship the sacred images with flowers, scents, and lamps, and to bear religious addresses. They adorn the holy spires with flags and streamers, present offerings of food, etc., to the monks, distribute alms to the poor, and purchase living animals (especially birds and fishes), which are released. The Buddhist precept of showing kindness to all creatures. It goes without saying that the royal temples on the evening of such days are gorgeously illuminated, with the addition of the manmade festival-lights; till this the festival is not so intensely popular as the New Year and Mid-Year ones.

iii. Jjyēṣṭha (7th month).—7. Top-spinning.—This state ceremony, which was disapproved of as superstitious, was discontinued by the king. It was performed with the sacred images. The people, amid much rejoicing and free gambling, as on the popular New Year's Day, perform a good deal of meritorious work by washing the Buddha images in the temples, sprinkling the

monks and their relatives as an act of respect, and building sand-hilllocks in the temple-grounds. They partake of rice gruel, and offer pūṣadas of food, and lighted incense-sticks and tapers, to the statues of the Buddha.
the three gods, were carried out in procession by the Brahmins from the temple of Siva and set in motion on a board by means of a silken string of five colours. From the duration of their spin and the number of revolutions, they were drawn, iv. Asādi (5th month).—8. Vīśṇu's sleep.—It is well known that Vīśṇu is supposed to commence his four-months' sleep on the Milk Sea on the 11th waxing of Asādi, a date which is to this day solemnized in the form of a festival. This was certainly the case formerly also in Siam, as is evidenced by the state ceremony recorded to have regularly taken place, in the past, at such a season. It consisted in a lustration (mūrdhābhiseka) administered to the king by the household Brahmins on a dais rising in the centre of a pond (representing the one the sea and the other the serpent Viṣṇu, Vīśṇu's mythical couch). Besides the above Yalovana festival (or in connexion with it), the Asādi, or Midsomer festival (7th to 14th day of waxing) was likewise celebrated in Siam in bygone days, and at the end of it the Brahmins began their retreat and fasts. But the festival gained very little in importance: the Brahmins were entirely absorbed in the following Buddhist one.

9. Beginning of 'Vassa,' or Buddhist retreat.—This is solemnized by a festival lasting three days (the 8th, 9th, and 10th of waxing; during the first of which elaborate vasta tapers are carried in procession to the temples, where they are to be lighted and kept burning for the whole year. Offerings of robes and requisites for the incipient retreat-season are liberally made to the monks; and the days preceding it are widely taken advantage of by the youths who seek to gain admission to the holy Order whether as novices or as monks. There is a similar lustration at this period in and about the temples. On the 15th the magnificent vasta tapers (a sort of Paschal candles) are formally lighted by means of 'celestial fire' (which is obtained from the sunbeams through a burning-glass, or, in default, produced with a flint and steel). Those in the royal temples are lighted from candles sent by the king, which have been kindled from the 'celestial fire.' Rehearsals of the Vessantara Jātaka are held in the Upovasa hall of royal and other temples by lay devotees engaged for the purpose; Buddha images in the shrines are sprinkled with scented water, and their attire is changed, a scarf being put on their shoulders as befits them in the rainy season. Among the presents made to the monks are large quantities of bees' wax formed into tapers, artificial flowers, trees with gilt or silvered branches, and tiny figures of birds perched on them, sometimes even entire landscapes to recreate the recluses; or modelled into pineapple-like cakes gorgeously ornamented with ribbons and flowers—all in order to provide light to the monks during their retreat, as they are not allowed to use oil lamps.

v. Śrāvana (9th month).—10. 'Tulābhara.'—This state ceremony (well known in India as Tulāpuraṇa or Tula), consisting of the being weighed against gold, silver, etc., and distributing this in charity, was in the past invariably practised by Siamese kings, and at times also by the queen, at this season; but after the middle of the 18th cent. it fell into disuse.

11. 'Varuna-sattram,' or 'Mahā-megha Puja.'—This propitiation of Varuna and of the clouds was essentially a rain-making ceremony, performed of old in India. It consisted in marking against gold, silver, etc., and distributing this in charity, was in the past invariably practised by Siamese kings, and at times also by the queen, at this season; but after the middle of the 18th cent. it fell into disuse.

12. Semi-annual renewal of the oath of allegiance.—The adjured water is drunk a second time by all officials on the 13th waxing, as at New Year (see no. 2 above).

13. 'Sāt' (Śrāda).—This is the Half-Year or Autumnal Festival, termed Sāt (Śrāda) from the autumn season which now begins. The celebration lasts three days (i.e. the last one of Bhādrapada and the first two of Āśvin). Originally it was mainly a Saiva solemnity, connected with the descent of the sun (Siva) to the realm of the departed (the south), which suggested worship to the Brahmins in the Saivism, and profited by the festival has long assumed a Buddhist character. It is an occasion for merit-making; oblations are made to the gods and goblins, offerings to the elephants, and the king and the monks together joined the Order two months before, and presents of sweetmeats to relatives and friends. Every one partakes of rice cooked with coco-nut milk and sweetened with either honey or sugar.

vi. Bhādrapada (10th month).—A festival by the name of 'Bhadravata' took place at this season, not explained in the old records, which possibly corresponded either to the Sakra utṣava (Indra's festival, 12th of the waxing) or to the Ananta chaturdāśi (festival of the serpent-god Ananta, 14th). Now the only solemnity in the following months is the following:

12. Semi-annual renewal of the oath of allegiance.—The adjured water is drunk a second time by all officials on the 13th waxing, as at New Year (see no. 2 above).

13. 'Sāt' (Śrāda).—This is the Half-Year or Autumnal Festival, termed Sāt (Śrāda) from the autumn season which now begins. The celebration lasts three days (i.e. the last one of Bhādrapada and the first two of Āśvin). Originally it was mainly a Saiva solemnity, connected with the descent of the sun (Siva) to the realm of the departed (the south), which suggested worship to the Brahmins in the Saivism, and profited by the festival has long assumed a Buddhist character. It is an occasion for merit-making; oblations are made to the gods and goblins, offerings to the elephants, and the king and the monks together joined the Order two months before, and presents of sweetmeats to relatives and friends. Every one partakes of rice cooked with coco-nut milk and sweetened with either honey or sugar.

14. Lustration of arms.—It being now the half-year season, the sprinkling of elephants and horses, as well as the uncoiling, tendusting, and re-coiling of the elephant neck, are performed, with similar ceremonies as at New Year (see no. 2 above).

15. Royal regatta.—Until the downfall of the former capital, Ayuttihīyā, in 1767, a regatta used to take place at this time of the year between the king and the queen in their respective state barges, in which a number of officials also joined, racing between them. Prognostics were drawn; if the king's large lost, it betokened prosperity to the realm; but, if it won, it was a sign of impending calamities and famine. This state ceremony was discontinued, but a possible survival of it: in a modified form is the boat race held annually on the 8th waxing, in honour of the Phak-nam Pagoda (a spire rising in the middle of the river Mō-nam near its mouth), though this is strictly a Buddhist festival.

16 and 17. Termination of the 'Vassa,' or Buddhist retreat; floating of lamps at night.—These are two festivals occurring contemporaneously on the 14th and 15th of the waxing and on the Ist of the waning. Although now believed to be both connected with Buddhism, there can be little doubt that the second one is merely the traditional continuation of the Hindu Dvīda or Koṭāgara festival, held at full moon in honour of Insira and Lakom, when lamps are also lighted. In Siam little rafts with lamps are floated on the streams these three nights, with the object of thus worshiping the footprint which the Buddha is said to have left on the sandy bank of the Nareulā, at the instance of the Nāgas. Round fish-pies, some of large size, are made and partaken of. The Buddhist festival ending the Vassa is celebrated on these three days by illuminating the sacred images, offering flowers to the monks wherewith to adorn the wposatha hall in which Paviraraṇā is to be held, and the halls reserved for recitations of the Mahā Jāti.

18. 'Kaṭhin' processions.—From the termination of the Buddhist Vassa on till the end of the month, and even for some days later, presents of
robes and requisites for the monks to use during the coning dry season of outdoor errands are con-
dveyed to the temples in solemn processions, either by water or by land. Such processions are termed 
Kathin processions, for they consist of the presentation of the robes and requisites on such occasions to the monks, which, ac-
cording to old custom, should be made from raw cotton, spun, woven, ent, and stretched together in the form of a single day and night, such a feast being considered highly meritorious. The Royal 
processions taking place for the same purpose at this season are famed for their magnificence, which makes them well worth seeing. Before A.D. 1630 or so they were held only by water, but since then 
King Prasat Thong instituted also the land Kathin or Kathin Bok, of which Tachard in 1685, Kaempfer in 1690, and nearly every other traveller in Siam, have spoken in glowing terms.

19. The ‘Phi-pit’ serenades.—Robes and re-
quisites are also presented to the monks in a some-
what stealthy manner which enhances the fun of 
the donation. This is accomplished at night by a 
surfing, past a state ceremony, regent and ducal 
silent procession to the precincts of the monastery 
singled out for the purpose, and lays the robes and 
other gifts in and about the bush (whence the name 
‘Phi-pit,’ composed of the two words ‘Pha-pa’ 
— i.e. robes and trees). When everything is ready, 
displayed, the party suddenly bursts into a lively 
serenade, with musical instruments and singing, 
thus awakening the monks, who, as soon as day-
light sets in, come out to gather the presents.

viii. K ARTIKA (12th month).—20. Feast of 
Lamps.—This embraces two distinct festivals: (1) 
the hoisting of lamps on poles on new-moon day 
and the lighting of them at night, till the second 
day of the waning, when they are lowered; (2) 
the floating of lamps in the streams at night on the 14th, 
15th, and 16th days of the moon, with the eventual 
addition of fireworks. This second form of illumi-
nation seems, however, to be connected more especi-
ally with the festival hereafter explained (no. 21).
On the other hand, the aerial lanterns hoisted on 
poles, as aforesaid, are kept burning to scare away 
goblins in time of epidemics (cf. the raft-pit—
predipas), and, it is believed, also to retain the 
water from draining off the paddy fields, for the 
ears of rice would not attain maturity if the yearly 
rainy season were to abate so early. Hence the 
festival is a very popular one, likewise counter-
part of the Divali or Dipawali, in India. They closely 
correspond, although the aksha-predipas (lamps 
raised on poles in the air) are in India lighted in 
highly-illuminated streets. We have here to do essen-
tially with a festival in honour of Vienm and his 
consort, for it is known that on the 11th day of the new moon of Kariikta the god awakes from 
his four-month sleep, and that his victory over 
king Bali (Vimaça avatara) took place at this season.

21. ‘Kartikeya’ festival.—The main feature 
of this in Siam, besides the popular one of lamp-
floating, past a state ceremony, regent and ducal 
visit the monks by the four temples of each stand, facing 
the four points of the compass, hillocks were 
erected, formed of earth mixed with cow-dung. 
Three earthen pots containing paddy, beans, and 
and mixed with oil were placed on the top of each stand; and, the wicks having been lighted, 
fire was kept burning in the pots for three days. 
Prognostics were then drawn by means of twelve 
staves, having rags dipped in oil tied at one end. 
After the setting of fire to these the staves were 
burned, and the staves of Kathin are lined with 
hillocks rising round each stand. From the side 
on which they fell it was argued that prosperity 
would arise either the king, the clergy, the officials, 
the people, or the gods; and further, if the tops 
of parched rice to the earthen pots, and addresses 
to the three gods. Similarly in Southern India, 
and new-moon day, rice-meal pans are made, with 
a cavity in the centre filled in with gph and 
vided with a wick which is lit; and bonfires are 
kindled on the mountain-tops in honour of Kär-
tikeya. This is practically a Saiitve festival held as 
a counterpart to the Valanvite one mentioned 
above, which in India is by some celebrated in 
organisation of Durga, the wife of Siva. So are eventu-
ally the lamps set out afloat on the streams. In 
Siam this lamp-floating is accomplished more gener-
ally and with far more splendour than in the month of 
Karttika. During the 17th, because the rains 
are now at an end and fine weather has set in. 
Many of the lamps are quite elaborate creations, 
carved out of squill stalks, some being in the form 
of rafts of rafts, or floating groups of figures in them, or neatly arrayed with lanterns, 
tapers, and fireworks, which are lit when they are set adrift.

x. MA RAGIRSa (1st month).—22. Feast of 
speeding the outflow.—This ceremony, literally 
‘driving away the water,’ of high importance in 
connexion with agriculture, was not performed 
regularly every year, but only in years of great 
storms. The last three times that this took place was on the 
occasion of the memorable flood of 1831. It has 
since fallen into disuse. The purpose was to drive 
away the flood-monstr, or, in plain language, to 
cause the water in the river to abate rapidly, so that 
the paddy fields might be drained and the harvest 
accelerated. To this end the king proceeded down 
the river in his state barge, escorted by a pompous 
water-procession, and repeatedly waved the royal 
flabellum in the direction of down-stream, as a 
magic intimation to the water to flow off rapidly. 
Kaempfer and other contemporary writers mistook 
the royal flabellum for a sword, and thus put on 
record the king that the water with a knife in 
or, as it were, like counterintended, the Divali à la 
aver (see Kaempfer, History of Japan, Glasgow, 
1906, l. 73, where he confounds this ceremony with 
that of Kathin-am, ‘Water Kathin,’ for which see no. 19). 

23. Kite-flying festival.—This was a state 
ceremony as well as a public festivity. Large paper 
kites were flown with the object of calling up the 
seasonal wind by the fluttering noise they made. 
The festival was obviously connected with hus-
bardy, as the wind prevailing at this season is the 
main-east monsoon, which, when beginning to blow, 
sweps the rain-clouds away, so that fine weather 
sets in and the yearly rain quickly abates, the 
fields drying up rapidly. This festival was des-
continued after the downfall of the former capital, 
Ayuddhá. La Loubere, who was in Siam during 
the last quarter of 1857, mentions that the king 
of the king of Siam is in the air every night for 
the two winter months, and some mandarins are 
ominated to ease another in holding the 
string’ (Historical Relation of the Kingdom of 
Siam, London, 1699, p. 49). From this it follows 
that the kite-flying was continued far many days 
in succession, till the desired result (the setting 
in of the north-east monsoon) had been attained.

x. PAUSA (2nd month).—24. PuSAIRESKA.
This state ceremony, past a state ceremony, regent 
and ducal visit the monks by the four temples of 
fall of the former capital, Ayuddhá, consisted in
25. Worship of the sacred bull.—This festival, which has dropped out of use for several centuries, consisted in leading the sacred bull (Nandi, the bull-god) with a handbell of Siva's and a cymbal, to five houses, which the Brahmans who attended upon him performed a sort of angel dance. The rite corresponds to the Hindu Puṣṭabaṅgaka Śāna, or ceremonial bathing of a king when the moon stands in the asterism Puṣṭabha in Cancer.

26. Swing festival.—This very popular festivity is held with much pomp for the reception of Siva, and is followed by a quieter one to welcome Vīṣṇu. It has been celebrated from the remotest period in all old Siamese capitals and chief cities, and in some of the latter (e.g., Ligor) swing-pillars exist to this day and a semblance of the ceremony is still performed. But it is in Bangkok, the present capital, that it survives in its splendor. As it falls about the vernal solstice, its original purpose was undoubtedly that of a solstitial festival, in which the swinging and the circular dances that follow it typify the seasonal movement of the sun. But its origin is different, and it is not the orbit of the sun, but the circle of the year that it is symbolically represented. As it stands, the festival is an admirable illustration of the usefulness of local customs. It is, in the first place, an excellent form of amusement for the people of the city. It serves to give the people an opportunity of taking part in a public festival, of enjoying their day, and of being taken care of by the temple, which is always wealthy in offerings and gifts. It is therefore a great social event, and brings together all the people of the city. It is also a religious festival, for it is a time of great devotion, and the people of the city go to the temple to pay their respects to the gods. In addition, it is a time of great prosperity, for it is believed that the gods will grant the people whatever they ask for during this festival. In short, it is a festival of rejoicing, of thanksgiving, and of proper worship of the gods. It is a festival that brings together all the people of the city, and it is therefore a very popular festival.

27. The reception of Vīṣṇu.—The Vaiṣṇavite festival immediately following the Sāvite one just described is performed quietly in the temple of Vīṣṇu. It begins on the first day of the waning, and ends on the sixth, the date of the god's departure from the world of men. The statues of Vīṣṇu, Lakuṣṇī, and Mahēśvarī are carried about the town in procession before moonrise, as befits the god of darkness (the night). In former times the king of Siam, mounted on an elephant, used to escort the gods Siva and Vīṣṇu in procession in and out of the temple.

XII. MĀṆGA (3rd month).—28. 'Dhānya-dāha' (or 'Dāhanam'). Festival of burning of the ears of paddy.—This was another popular agricultural ceremony, associated with the harvest, as a form of thanksgiving for the same; it has since been abolished. It must somehow have originated from the old Brahmānic rite of partaking of the firstfruits of the harvest (Agrāvyāna sacrifice, for which cf. the Gṛhyasūtras). A canopied dais was set up in the Crown paddy fields, to which the usual mock-king proceeded in state as on the occasion of the Ploughing Festival (see no. 5 above). Before the dais a large rāhutta (state conical umbrella) was erected, having three storeys, made respectively of a different variety of paddy, and held together. To this structure the mock-king set fire; then his followers, divided into four parties differently attired and representing the gods of the four quarters and their retinue, rushed in to contend for the umbrella. Prognostics were drawn according to which of the parties succeeded in obtaining possession of the spoils.

Conveying the paddy home.—The ceremony just described was followed by the conveyance home of the harvest. When thethreshing of the new paddy had been completed on the Crown fields, the king proceeded thither in state, loaded some of the grain on his paddy sled, and had this
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At the same time, the palace caused a large conical umbrella to be made with this rope, while from the fresh trees gathered over the juice expressed. This was the usual coagulated milk and sugar, and sent as an offering to the king of the royal monasteries. It goes without saying that such ceremonies were followed by the celebration of the religious festival of the keenest interest, while in the country the harvest operations were, and are still, celebrated by the peasants with oblations to the gods and rites similar to those already described, though on a less pompous scale, but amid lively pastimes and intense rejoicing, of which harvest songs (especially threshing and reaping ditties), joined in alternately by men and women, form the chief and most pleasant feature.

29. 'Siwa-ráti. Festival of Siwa's night. — This is, as the name implies, strictly Savite, and has been celebrated from the remotest period in Siam on full-moon day of Magha, it being derived from the similar Hindu festival more correctly termed Magha festival, which falls on the 14th day of the waxing. An earthen pot full of water, but with a hole in the bottom, is suspended by means of strings to four poles, and beneath the pot is a vessel placed, which rests upon a basement of the usual symbolical form, provided with a spout. At night the vessel is let down upon the tiinga, and collected from under the spout into vessels. Shortly before dawn, rice is cooked in the temple of the god, with the addition of honey, palm sugar, and other condiments, and when ready it is distributed all round in small portions to the bystanders, to be partaken of. At daybreak all go down to bathe in the river or creeks, and wash their heads with some of the water collected from underneath the tiinga. It is believed that all impurities and sinful stains are thereby removed and carried away by theallowed water.

30. 'Mágha-púja.' — This is a purely Buddhist ceremony, revived only some sixty years ago by King Mongkut. It is held on full-moon day, to commemorate the exposition of the Pátimokkha made on that date by the Buddha to his 1250 disciples of the four congregations. The celebration takes place in the royal temple, where, after feasting the chief monks in the forenoon, a recitation of the Pátimokkha and of the Buddha's discourse thereto is held in the evening, after which 1250 tapers are lit round the temple in honour of the saintly company referred to above. The full-moon period of this month is also largely taken advantage of by the people for making religious pilgrimages to various sacred spots and shrines in the country, such as, e.g., the models of Buddha's footprint (Páthá-bít) and shadow (Páthá Cháit), two stone benches on which the Blessed One is reputed to have rested, etc.

LITERATURE.—There is no reliable account of Siamese festivals and fasts, in works that have hitherto appeared on Siam. For the literature of Siamese Buddhism generally see Siam (Buddhism in).

G. E. GERIN.

FESTIVALS (Slavic). — Beginning with the winter solstice, the festivals of the pagan Slavs, attested in historic texts, folklore, and popular vocabulary, seem to have been of twisted greatly altered or even nonexistent. Kraun or koroën was the festival of the shortest day. The popular word for the solstice itself is koleda, which is simply a transcription of the classical calendae, kalēdā. The people, as a rule, personified Koleda and made a mythical character called Krst (cf. Ital. piantana — epifania; Eng. 'Father Christmas,' etc.).

At the coming of spring among the Czechs, the Serbs of Lukeia, and the Poles, a figure called Marena, Marzana, was thrown into the water; this probably the act of cleaning out the water, is a festival of an ancient Greek, that is to say, the washing of the earth by the cold of winter.

In the month of May there was a festival of roses (Rusalia). — At the summer solstice the festival of kypalo (festival of the bath) among the ancient Russians, coinciding later with the Christian festival of St. John (June 24). This name seems to have been derived from the verb kypati, 'to bathe,' perhaps because river-bathing begins in the month of June, perhaps—and this designation would be produced under a Christian influence—because John was baptized by immersion.

The chronicle of Thietmar (b.c. 61) supplies a very detailed description of the annual festival celebrated at Arcona in the island of Rügen in honour of the god Sçmotovita. The description is too minute to be reproduced here. The festival was held in the month of July, on the third day, in memory of a battle which the Teutonic tribes, in their consternation, committed to a common enemy that a common duty to violate every rule of temperance. According to Helmold (i. 52), the sacrifices of the Baltic Slavs were accompanied by feasts and orgies. The people assembled around the banks of the river, pronouncing over it meanwhile formule not of consecration but of exorcism. Helmold was evidently thinking of the consecration of the Teutonic Slavic.

According to the Czech chronicler Cosmas, prince Bretislav in 1092 suppressed the festivals celebrated by the Czechs about the season of Easter—festival during which offerings were carried to the springs, and victims were sacrificed to the demon.

One of the biographers of Otto of Bamberg (Ebbe, ii, 12, 13) speaks of annual festivals of a very rustic and warlike character, which were held at Pyritz and Volyn by the Baltic Slavs. For festivals in honour of the dead, see artt. Aryan Religion, in vol. ii. p. 25 ff., and Death and Disposal of the Dead (Slavic), vol. iv. p. 509.

LITERATURE.—Louis Leger, La Mythologie slav, Paris, 1901, passim.

L. LÉGER.

FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Tentonic). — Among the Germanic races, religious festivals seem to have been in the main occasions for intertribal intercourse. Tacitus relates of the Germans that 'at a certain period all the tribes of the same race assemble by their representatives in a grove consecrated by the auguries of their forefathers and by immemorial associations of terror' (Germania, 39). Some seven centuries later a religious festival at Skiringslas, in Southern Norway, seems to have united persons who certainly had no political organization in common; and this was probably the case with the great religious festivals held every nine years at Upsala; for the 11th century. Adam of Bremen states that it was the custom in all Swedish lands that a religious festival should be held at Upsala (Mon. Germ. vii. 380). We have Thietmar of Mersburg's authority for a similar nine-yearly festival at Lejre in Denmark (ib. iii. 750), but all the other public festivals of which we have any knowledge appear to have been annual. Of these the most important all over Germanic territory were three in number: one in the autumn, one at midwinter (Yule), and one at midsummer. But, though the Germanic peoples were thus more or less agreed as to times and seasons, the religious significance attributed to these festivals varied in different countries. Thus, among the Scandinavians we are repeatedly
told that the autumn festival (at the 'winter nights') was 'for plenty,' and it was a favourite time for weddings, whereas among the Saxons the festival season was legally ordained for festivities connected with the cult of the dead; and that this was the more usual significance of the autumn festival seems clear from the fact that the Church found it advisable to institute the festival a few days after the date of the Feast of All Saints from spring to autumn. In England, we know that the autumn festivities gave the name to the month known as Blotmånath (cf. Swedish dialectic Blötmanad), because, as Bede intimated, in May during that month the people sacrificed to their gods the cattle slaughtered during the autumn. The importance of this festival doubtless originated in the necessity of killing off a large number of cattle on the approach of winter. The old heathen midwinter festival lasted from about Christmas Day till Twelfth Night, and the high esteem in which it was held by the Teutons is recorded by writers of all nationalities, from Constantius to Morphygenitus, who describes the Yule-tide observances of the Varangian guard at Constantinople, to Bede. The latter tells of the wearing of animal masks at the Anglo-Saxon festival on the Colnigh; she says of the night of the mothers—which he declares, fell on the same date as Christmas Eve. Procopius tells of a festival celebrated by the people of 'Thule' (Norway (7)) to greet the sun on its reappearance—presumably early in January. It was, moreover, at this season—about the date of the Epiphany, says Thietmar—that the great nine-yearly festival at Lejre was held.

The Scandinavians, and possibly also the Anglo-Saxons, seem to have had a festival in spring. According to later writers, this was 'for victory'—no doubt with a view to the Viking expeditions of the summer; but an agricultural festival in spring seems to have been common all over Teutonic Europe.

The midsummer festival may be said to survive to this day in rustic observance, especially in the Scandinavian countries, where bonfires are still lighted on St. John's Eve (June 23). But this festival is rarely mentioned in early times; and the conclusion seems inevitable that it had already sunk into a popular observance, of magical rather than religious significance. The originally agricultural importance of some of these heathen festivals is seldom indicated by the earlier sources, and popular customs in later times often serve as evidence for the close connexion of heathen festivals with agricultural operations. Of these rustic observances certain rites, such as ploughing round the fields at Yule-tide, and leaping the fire at Midsummer, are so common in all Teutonic countries as to make it almost certain that they formed part of the original heathen festivals. The older sources, however, lay chief stress on the actual feasting and ale-drinking, which was no doubt characteristic of all festivals.

Icelandic sources show that the blood of the sacrificial victims was offered to the gods, while the flesh was cooked and eaten. Horses were much valued as sacrifices, so that horseflesh was identified by Christian converts with heathendom, but excavations of Icelandic temples show that other domestic animals were more common victims. The other integral part of the festival was the ale, which seems to have been brewed in vats so large that Saxo Grammaticus declares that a Danish prince, Hunding, was accidentally drowned in an ale-bowl at a festival in Central Europe. We do not know how he came across a party of men sitting round an enormous vat of ale, and that they described themselves as worshipping Woden. Early Norwegian laws enjoin the brewing of ale before all Christian festivals, and its consumption in the company of neighbours, under penalty of a fine. The Swedish laws of the 13th cent. also speak of a 'legal custom,' called Festival in late Latin, following St. Martin's Day (Nov. 11). In heathen times, toasts were drunk to the gods and to the memory of departed ancestors. Drunkenness seems to have been a feature of the feast, according to Tacitus tells us (Anna. i. 50) that the Romans surprised the Germans at a festival, and were able to massacre an intoxicated foe. It is Saxo, centuries later, who relates that, while Athilod was honouring the funeral rites of Wolf with muchгу austerity, he drank too greedily, and paid for his filthy intemperance by his sudden end (iii. 75).

Most of the private festivals in the North were actually described as Jól, 'ale.' For instance, the eax-jó, or funeral feast, which was very important in Scandinavia and in Northern England, survived in the latter country as årded till twenty years ago.

After the Reformation, 'lyke-wake drinking' formed the subject of many restrictive ordinances for Denmark and Norway. Already in 1570 the 'great excess of meat and drink at funerals' was prohibited, and Christian IV, in 1624, finally suppressed all Pressed. Before that date it was usual in the regulations of Danish guilds that on the death of one of their members the heirs of the deceased shall give the guild-brothers a drink and some food. On the Continent, memorial (anniversary) feasts were popular, and Christian priests were strictly forbidden to 'drink wine for love of the dead,' or to join in the festivities connected with such observances.

Drinking seems also to have been characteristic of wedding-feasts. In the North the 'ale of departure' and the 'greeting-ale' were additional occasions for festivities. A feature of all these feasts was the vows taken by the chiefs, pledging themselves to some deed of valour, such as a Viking expedition, vengeance on a powerful neighbour, and the like. This custom persisted into Christian times, and the attempt of the Jomsvikings to conquer Norway in the latter half of the 10th cent. is attributed to such a vow, made at a funeral feast.

From the hints our sources afford us, it seems as if the actual feasting took place at night, Tacitus and the Icelandic sagas concurring in the mention of games during the day. That the festivals actually took place in the temples is also indicated by the fanatical persecutions in Iceland and Scandinavian custom. A post-Reformation bishop complains of 'the carousing and drinking and dancing with life and drum' which took place within the church-doors on the Monday and Tuesday of a wedding-week, and elsewhere he finds it necessary to assure his flock that eating, drinking, and dancing in church are only fit for the children of the devil (Danske Magazin, iii. [Copenhagen, 1847] 60).

If we may judge from the silence of our sources on the subject, fasting for religious purposes seems to have been unknown among the Teutonic races until the introduction of Christianity. It was certainly unknown in Scandinavia, for the Icelandic Laxdala Saga expressly mentions the extreme interest aroused in a neighbourhood by a Christian convert's Lenten fast.

**Literature.—** Information regarding the religious festivals will be found in all manuals of Germanic religion, but the following deal more especially with the subject: A. Tiele, Julefe (Wolf and Christmas), Leiden, 1859; G. Griffler, Christmas, Jülfest, Stuttgart, 1891; K. Weinhold, Uber die deutsche Jahrfeite, Leipzig, 1892; D. Conrath, Altertumsansichten, Strassburg, 1901, s. v. 'Jahrfeite'; W. Mannhardt, Wilde und Politik, Berlin, 1878; H. Thomsen, Legefund. Hau- nenschild, Hanover, 1878; J. G. Frazer, GB, 1911, 'Midsummer Observances,' pp. 58-69.

B. S. PHILLIPTON.
FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Tibetan).—The popular festivals of Tibet are essentially religious in character, and almost all of them are assimilated to the Buddhist type. Those which manifestly belong to the pre-Buddhist religion, the indigenous Bon, are taken part in by the Buddhist laity as priests.

The festival in Tibetan means feast-time ('dus-ston), which aptly denotes the popular conception of the event, with its cessation from routine work and the preponderance of enjoyment over the religious acts of worship and ceremonial. The term 'feast-time' is derived from the same root as 'harvest-season' and 'autumn,' implying plenteous store of food and fruit for feasting upon. It also suggests that originally the great festival was probably in the autumn, after the crops were garnered. The great festivals are called by both laity and lama 'Great Feast-time ('dus-ston ch'en-po), or shortly, 'Great Time' ('dus-ch'en).

Another term which is less commonly used, and more specifically applicable to the Bonist festivals, is amgur, or 'banquets,' which in its religious sense denotes a propitiatory feast to the four great classes of beings, namely (1) the Holy Gods, interpreted by Buddhists as the Triratna (Buddha, the Law, and the Monarch), the founder of the spiritual bar and his personal retinue; (2) the 'Lords of the east,' deities of veneration, (3) the six classes of beings (the five underworlds and the sun), and (4) the deities of the wild beasts and the home gods (cf. 134); (5) the aboriginal deities called glon and byongs.

1. General characteristics.—The Tibetan festivals may be broadly classed as (1) indigenous, or Bonist, and (2) Buddhist.

(1) The indigenous festivals appear to be for the most part Nature-feasts, in the revolutions of the seasons of the year. They are obviously related to the solstices and equinoxes, and display what seems manifestly to be worship of the powers of Nature, conceived mythologically as benign spirits and malignant demons of darkness, drought, and ill-luck, to be appeased or expelled from the land. In addition to this Nature-cult there is an element of ancestral worship to be seen in the festivals given to the dead and malignant ghosts. The survival of the cult of ancestors (in itself opposed to the principles of Buddhism, which teaches that ancestors do not remain in the tomb, but return to life in new forms) is seen in the elaborate ceremonial to secure repose of the spirits of the dead and the lighting up of the funeral monuments (chortens) at the cremation of the cremated remains of the more wealthy classes and the actual bodies of the higher lamas—amongst whom the Dahi lama claim to have as their dead ancestors the kings of the country, whose tombs and those of their noblest subjects the country in the pre-Buddhist period (cf. ERE iv. 509).

(2) The Buddhist festivals commemorate semi-historical and legendary events in the life of Buddha (his birth, attainment of Buddhahood, death, etc.), and in the life of the two great canonized monks of Tibet, namely, the Indian teacher Padmasambhava (c. A.D. 855-1100), the founder of Lamain, and the Tibetan reformer Tsong-kha-pa (A.D. 1356-1417), the founder of the modern dominant sect of lamas, the yellow-cap sect ('dus-ston), and other Grand Lama hierarchies belonging. Some of these Buddhist festivals appear to have been grafted on to pre-Buddhist feast-days, as is evidenced by the aboriginal rites which they embody and the discrepancy between some sects of lamas and those current in other Buddhist countries.

2. Ritual.—During the festivals, some of which extend over several days, the laity generally cease from their ordinary work in the fields, whilst spending their time mainly in festivities, also devote more time than usual to pious deeds to avoid the five great sins, muttering their mystic spells, plying their prayer-wheels, circumambulating the sacred buildings, and visiting the temple to bow before the chief images. For the clergy these events include many parts of the liturgy: the solemn celebrations, reading of the sacred texts, and austere vigils and fastings. The ritual exhibits generally both indigenous and Buddhististic elements—the latter being most conspicuous in the festivals of the yellow-cap sect. The indigenous rites of both private and public worship generally include expiatory and sacrificial ceremonies, though the latter do not usually involve the taking of life, and there are satirical revels and orgies.

3. Occasions.—The general feasts, annual and monthly, are held mainly at fixed periodical times. One, the Water-Festival, is movable according to the appearance of a particular star, and occasionally there are special festivals, at irregular times, for passing events, such as the installation or death of a Grand Lama, or war, or pestilence.

The dates for the general Buddhist festivals are at stated times definitely fixed in the lunar calendar of Tibet (cf. ERE iii. 63). But, owing to the disparity between the lunar and the solar year (ib.), and the regular adjustment of our solar calendar to the lunar—calendaring a month every few years, the relationship between the dates and the natural seasons has become seriously displaced. Further confusion also has been introduced by the date of the ancient Tibetan New Year, which obviously coincided with the winter solstice, having been transferred by the yellow-cap sect to a lunar date corresponding to January-February. This was manifestly done with the object of making it coincide with the Chinese New Year, which, however, it does not exactly. Hence the seasonal incidence of the festivals seldom coincides precisely with the actual equinoxes and solstices, rainy season, or harvest, as the case may be. As a result we get, among other anomalies, 'flower-festivals' in icy January-February.

The monthly festivals are the usual ones as prescribed for meditation and fasting in all Buddhist countries, following the Brahmanical rule, namely, the auspicious days of the new and full moon (cf. ERE iii. 78). To these were added later the other two lunar quarter days, so that this holy day, recurring four times a month, might be called 'the Buddhist Sabbath.' In Tibet it is the 8th and 15th day of each month which are mostly observed, and these are holy days rather than 'festivals,' being days of fasting, and of less, partaking of nothing except farinaceous food and tea; and many of the laity do likewise, and on no account take animal life. The lamas spend these days in reading the scriptures, make formal confession of sins (pratimoksa), and perform the rite of 'washing away sin' (tsi-sol).

The annual festivals, which include all the festivals properly so-called, are not enumerated or described in any known Tibetan work. In compiling the following list from his own observations and those of others, the present writer has arranged the events in the order of the Tibetan calendar, and has shown within these brackets the corresponding approximate month in the European calendar.

1st month, 1st-3rd day (= February), Carnival of New Year (Logar) in new style.—The festival of the New Year is held on this date in Lhasa and the other centres where the yellow-cap sect of lamas is dominant. Elsewhere it is observed on the old date in the 11th month, about the winter solstice. The popular festivities are generally similar to those of Christmas in Europe. It is a season for cessation from work and for general rejoicing, singing, dancing, feasting, and visiting of friends. Even the younger monks have their restrictions.
relaxed, and are permitted to participate for two or three days in the mirth-making. For the event the roads are swept, the houses whitewashed, and the doorways decorated. There is also a pudding, resembling the Christmas pudding of the West, to the eating of which the head of the family invites to his house all the other members and relatives. The pudding is made with raisins, dried apricots, etc., and is brought into the room often with a red flag, at which time a certain incantation is chanted; when this is finished, a hole is made in its centre, into which melted butter is poured—which, as the fuel of lamps, is said to symbolize light and life. Thus it may be supposed the advent of the New Year's light dispelling the demons of darkness. The flag is admitted a demon-driving device in Lamasism.

The head of the house first partakes of the pudding, next his wife, and then his guests and the rest of the family. During the festivities the people indulge in much food delicacies than usual; and charitable gifts are freely dispensed. A custom of 'first-footing' also prevails.

There is in the course of the day, when the noise of the festivities commences, we had a good mind to get up to witness the happiness of the inhabitants of Lhasa, but the cold was so severe that all quiet and entertainment was under outer wooden coverings. Unfortunately for our comfort, violent knocks on our doors and windows warn us that there is something we must resource to our project. We therefore donned our clothes, and, the door being opened, some friendly Tibetans running into the room, invited us to the New Year's banquet. 'Next year will have plenty. Rejoice, Take, Earn.' (G3.36.)

Amongst the festivities at Lhasa is the spectacle of 'Flying Spirits,' by performers who glide down a rope stretched from the summit of Potala palace to its base. 1st month, 4th-15th day (=February), Supplication (Mon-lom).—This appears to be prayers and expiatory sacrifice for new growth and prosperity during the new year. It is conducted chiefly at Lhasa and Tashilhunpo, and is the greatest ceremony of the year in the Lamaist church, when yellow-cap monks to the number of 30,000 congregate in Lhasa alone, as described in the present writer's "Buddhism of Tibet." At this festival largesse is distributed to the assembled monks (amounting to about ten shillings per ordinary monk, and several hundreds to the higher lamas) from the treasury of the Dalai Lama's Government, as well as from the emporium of China, which is for a special purpose specially represented by the Amban on the occasion. The prayers continue till the 15th day of the month, which is the anniversary of Buddha's conception, and on this date the great temple of Buddha (Thub-thob, Jokhang) is illuminated with lanterns. Thereafter the demons are propitiated, and on the 30th day the ceremony of 'Deliverance' (grol-ston), a festival of relaxation, concludes the feast. A notable feature of this festival is that the civil government lapses or changes hands during the currency of the New Year's ceremonies, which continue throughout the month. The temporal government of Lhasa is removed from its usual custodians, and for the month is placed in the hands of the chief proctor of Dre-jung monastery (to which the Dalai Lama is affiliated), and that monk becomes for the time a rex Sacroesus, as with the Romans. It probably represents a period during which the administration of justice was suspended to allow of unrestrained carnival or mirth-making, in accordance with the ancient Greeks and the dies nectus of the Romans. In Tibet, however, it is made the occasion of excessive extortions of taxes, to escape which many of the residents leave Lhasa during this period. The procession concludes to have spread over Tibet. In Ladak, at the present day, during the New Year festivities the Tibetan ex-ruler is permitted by the Kashmir State to assume royal dignities and to occupy the old palace.

1st month, 18th day (=February), Anniversary of Buddha's Conception.

1st month, 29th day, Procession of the Holy Dugger (Phurba or Vajra).—This is obviously a Bonist celebration for expelling evil influences from the country. About a thousand Buddhist priests, half of whom are dressed in Chinese costumes, and the other half are in their native guise, with drums, etc., and, accompanied by about a thousand mounted Tibetan soldiers, and the high priest of the State Oracle of Nechung, whose attendants carry in state a famous miraculous thunderbolt-dagger (phurba) from Sera monastery, file past a throne in the open on which is seated the Dalai Lama. After dancing movements to the beat of the drums, there is raised a series of bowls 'like the roar of a tiger,' which may possibly be intended to rouse the sleeping god from his winter slumber, and would be appropriate in connexion with the old-style festival which occurred at the winter solstice. Later in the day follows the foremost Lama of Tibet, the successor and representative of Tsong-kha-pa, the 'Ti-Rinpoche,' who is usually ex officio regent of Tibet (and was so during the British mission of 1904), and the Buddha Trik-ul, the chief of the orthodox Manichaeans. His duty is to recite the prayer against the evil spirit, who is called 'The King of the Serpents and Lord-rieds' (Lung-gon rgyal-ba). This concludes the ceremony amidst great rejoicing.

2nd month, 26th day (=March), Chase and Expulsion of the 'Scapegoat' Demon of Ill-luck. — This ceremony as practised in Central Tibet is described in the present writer's 'Buddhism of Tibet' (p. 512 f.). In Ladak it is termed Naghron. Two Lamas called hlokar are stripped and their bodies painted black, on which ground a devil's face is painted in red on the chest and back. Other lamas surround the two figures and recite prayers and incantations, whilst others beat drums and blow trumpets. After an interval the hloktars appear to become possessed with devils, and begin to shout and leap about and rush over the roofs of the houses, chased by the people. Whilst in this excited state they are consulted as oracles, and eventually they fall down exhausted in a swoon.

3rd month, 15th day, 26th day (=April), Anniversary of 'Revelation' of the Demons Trik-ul-cult (Kila-chakro), with sacred masked plays.

4th month, 6th day, 8th day (=April-May), Anniversary of Buddha's Renunciation of the World.

4th month, 15th day, Anniversary of Buddha's Attainment of Buddhahood, and of his Death (parinirvana), Feast of the Dead, or All Souls' Day.—This corresponds to the first lunar month of the Indian calendar, the month Vaisakha, when the moon is full near the Southern scale, and is deemed by the Brahmanas a most auspicious time, to which Indian tradition ascribes the above great events in Buddha's life.

6th month, 5th day (=May-June), 'Buddha as the Physician,' or 'The Medical Buddha,' and the beginning of the Buddhist Lent (or Rainy Season).

6th month, 10th day, Anniversary of Birth of Padmasambhava.—This is a festival chiefly of the old sects, and is accompanied by masked plays and devil-dances. That at Hemis, in Ladak, is a celebrated fair.

6th month, 4th day (=July), Anniversary of Buddha's Birth and First Preaching of the Law.—This is the occasion for the display of great pictures of Buddha, or of Maitreya, the Buddhist Messiah.

7th month, 10th day (=August), Birth of Padmasambhava (according to Sikkim style).
FETISHISM


FETISHISM. — 1. Definition. — Few words have been used with so bewildering a variety of applications as ‘fetish’ and ‘fetishism.’ ‘Fetish’ is derived, through the French, from the Portuguese festico, which, in its turn, comes from the Lat. factitus. A Portuguese-French Dictionary defines it as ‘sortilege, maléfice, enchantement, charme.’ As an adjective, it means ‘made by art,’ ‘skilfully contrived.’ Miss Kingley observes (West African Studies, p. 44) that

‘the Portuguese navigators who re-discovered West Africa, noticing the reverence paid by Africans to certain objects, trees, fish, idols, and so on—very fairly compared these objects with the amulets, talismans, charms, and little images of saints they themselves used.’

The above etymology suggests that fetishism was at first regarded as a branch of magic, which, as J. G. Frazier has pointed out, may be either religious or non-religious. The fetish may be a god, or the abode of a god or spirit, helpful to its possessor or devotee; or it may be only a sort of clever device or instrument for attaining ends not otherwise to be accomplished.

The first to draw attention to fetishism as a branch of the study of religion was the French writer, de Brosses, whose interesting and, for the time, remarkable book, Du Culte des dieux fétiches, was brought out in 1738. He understands by fetishism ‘le culte de certains objets terrestres de matières,’ but includes the religious practices of certain tribes with whom those objects are not so much gods as things endowed with a Divine virtue, such as tracés, amulets, and preservative talismans. He excludes the worship of the Sun.

Augusto Comte, on the other hand, gave prominence to the Sun, Moon, and Earth as ‘grands fétiches.’ In his Positivist calendar he devoted a whole month to fetishism, instituting festivals to Animals, Fire, the Sun, and the Moon. To him and to his followers fetishism is practically Nature-worship. They apply the term to the first stage in the development of religion, in which the natural object or phenomenon is a direct object of worship, not a more or less anthropomorphic deity who has

abstention from food or from drink or from both, from sunrise to sunset, and total abstention from animal food or spirituous liquor. So intimately is fasting associated with the conception of holiness in the popular mind that the word for ‘virtue’ (dge-ba) is used as a synonym for ‘fasting.’ Many of the laity also observe a more or less partial fast during these holy days and feasts, as above noted.

Fasting is practised with exceptional strictness by the more ascetic Lamas, who are selected to perform not merely exorcistic sacrifices to the gods, but also the exorcising of evil spirits. In this latter regard it is noteworthy that even the low unorthodox priests of a shamanist type, who practise for purposes of sorcery and exorcism the animistic rites of the Bonist cult, also require, as an indispensable condition, to undergo ceremonial purification and be spiritualized by preparatory periods of fasting.


FETICIDE. — See FETICIDE.


Herbert Spencer’s view of fetishism is radically different from that of Comte. In his Sociology (t. 313) he says:

‘The unworldly object which makes an object a fetish, is supposed to imply an indwelling ghost—an agent without which deviation from the ordinary would be inexplicable. . . . Only when there were spirits of the place, appearances, or metempsychosing into a thing, does there arise this idea of a possessing spirit. The Chumbas worshipped lakes, rivulets, rocks, hills, and other places of striking or unusual aspect. Indirect evidences from all sides converge to the conclusion that the fetish-worship is the worship of a special soul supposed to have taken up its abode in the fetish, which soul, in common with supernatural agents at large, is originally the double of a dead man. It will be seen that the fetishism of Comte and that of Herbert Spencer are mutually exclusive. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that, while the former makes it the primary stage of all religion, the latter regards it as a more recent development. Herbert Spencer’s attempt to bring Nature-worship within the scope of his ghost-theory of the origin of religion is a veritable tour de force of sophistical rationalisation. Goblet d’Alviella, who calls Nature-worship ‘primary fetishism,’ is nearer the truth when he says, in his Hibbert Lectures (p. 82),

‘Man, having been led by different routes to personify the souls of the dead on the one hand, and natural objects and phenomena on the other, subsequently attributed to both alike the character of a fetish. For let us add that this must have taken place everywhere, for there is not a people on earth which we do not come upon these two forms of belief side by side and intermingled.’

1 Lipps’s definition of fetishism as ‘a belief in the souls of the departed coming to dwell in any thing that is tangible or visible in heaven or earth’ (Die Religionen der europäischen Culturvolker, 1888, 22), seems little more than an echo of Herbert Spencer’s.
No writer has done more to elucidate this subject than Taylor, who, in his *Primitives Culture* (ii. 144), defines fetishes as

the doctrine of spirits embodied in, or attached to, or conveying influence through, certain material objects—vessels or vehicles for the conveyance of spirit beings.

The term "fetish" is therefore applied to an object as a fetish, he adds (p. 146), "demands explicit statement that a spirit is considered as embodied in it or acting through it or communicating by it, or at least that the people it belongs to do habitually think of such objects; or it must be shown that the object is regarded as having personal consciousness and power, is talked with, worshipped, prayed to, sacrificed to, personified, with reference to its past or present behaviour to its votaries."

This is very clear and convenient. It covers a very large proportion of what is usually understood by "fetish," and applies with special force to the ideas prevalent in West Africa. It deserves general acceptance, if we are not to consign the word to the terminological scrapheap as so blurred and disfigured by indiscriminate usage that it is unserviceable and misleading. There is much temptation to do so.

Goblet d'Alviella's definition of fetishism is closely akin to that of Taylor. He calls it "the belief that the application of a bit of matter—the services of the spirit lodged within it." He distinguishes between the talisman or the amulet, in which the spirits act on inanimate things from without, using them as implements, and the fetish, which is a thing inanimate, in which the spirit or spirit-being is recognisable by the greater number of savage races. Max Bauer, on the other hand, thinks that fetishism belongs more to the realm of art than of religion, and that, instead of 'fetish' or 'idol,' we should say 'amulet' or 'medicine.' Others call a fetish a magical appliance, or "an object conceived of anthropomorphically." Schultze, in his *Fetishism* (p. 241) says that "a fetish is an object of religious veneration, wherein the material thing and the spirit within it are regarded as one, the two being inseparable." Travellers have added their quota to the confusion. Miss Kingsley, for example, means by fetishism the whole system of West African religion, of which, as she points out, the worship of spirits embodied in material objects forms only a part. Other travellers have applied the term to the material symbols of the great Nature-deities. Lexicographers naturally reflect the views of anthropologists and travellers. Perhaps Webster's definition represents as accurately as anything is possible, viz. "a material thing, living or dead, which is made the object of brutish or superstitious worship, as among certain African tribes." Littre says: "Fétiche—objet naturel, animal divinisé, boîte, pierre, idole grossière, qu'adorent les nègres des côtes occidentales de l'Afrique et même de l'intérieur des terres jusqu'en Nubie." No wonder that Max Müller exclaimed—"fetishism, whatever that may mean!"

2. Classification.—The variety of definition and opinion indicated above is not due to mere wanton caprice. It is the reflexion of a very great and real complexity in the subject matter. The evidence of which anthropologists have baséd their views is enormous in amount, and of a very heterogeneous kind. It comes to us from all parts of the world, though its chief source is West Africa. There are at least five distinct classes of objects to which it relates, all of which fall under the general description of material objects worshipped, honoured, or esteemed because of their qualities other than their physical properties or commercial value.

(i) CLASS I.—Natural objects and phenomena.—The Sun, the Sky, and the Earth (as a source of food) almost universally hold a leading position among the so-called things of this class. Aeschylus's Prometheus extends the list in his magnificent appeal to the Nature-deities to witness the injustice done him by the later generation of anthropomorphic gods:

O lofty divinities, O Winos of phoebe swift,
O fountainheads of Rivers, and O thou
Illuminating laughter of the Sea,
O Earth, the Mighty Mother, and thou Sun,
Whose辐Շ成都 with all

(Prometheus Vinctus, 88, 89, Morhead's tr.)

When once the personification, followed by the worship, of a few of the most striking and most powerful objects (distinguished as 'grand fetishes') has been accomplished, others follow easily, as the moon, trees, rivers, wells, mountains, rocks, and thunder. Nor does the process stop here. Having personified the most splendid, benignant, and awful objects of Nature, the active, though by no means powerful, imagination of the savage runs riot and defies indiscriminately all manner of objects of no intrinsic importance or significance, as curious pebbles, leaves, etc. Japanese myth speaks of a time when trees, rocks, leaves, and foam had the power of speech, and evil deities buzzed like flies in the 5th month. It is of the lower and more trivial levels of Nature-worship that 'teratism,' or the love of the curious and extraordinary, to which Herbert Spencer (*Sociology*, i. 313) attached an exaggerated importance, finds its chief sphere of operation.

As a distinction which, he says, is already recognised by the Sun is not worshipped because he is remarkable, abnormal, or extraordinary, but in gratitude for his daily light and warmth; the Sun and Rivers, because they supply fish for food, or will drown one if he is not careful; the Earth, as the great provider of human wants.

It is not always recognized by anthropologists that Nature-worship in its primary stage is not the worship of a deity or spirit immanent in the material object, or of an anthropomorphic being separate from it but controlling its activities. This would involve a dichotomy of soul and body, mind and matter, which is foreign to the ideas of the primitive man or savage. It is not found in the lowest races, though no doubt, as readers of Taylor's *Primitives Culture* are aware, it plays an important part in the philosophy of tribes of no great enlightenment or cultivation. The earliest cult of all is of the material object itself (Comte's fetishism) considered as alive. The Sun, the Sea, the Mountain, as the author of all things, is held to be in this early stage the god. There is no suggestion of an indwelling spirit in Aeschylus's invocation quoted above. The *fons et origo* of the Greek dramatists is simply the Sun. Herace's *Fons Bandusiae* (*Carm. iii. xiii.*), to which he promises the offering of a kid, is not a nymph of the well, but the water itself, as the epithet 'splendidior vitru' shows. Of course, nymphs, dryads, and fauns are plentiful enough in pagan myth. But this is a secondary development with which fetishism is not concerned. The two stages of belief, however, merge into one another.

The worship of Nature-deities is sometimes referred to the principle that primitive man, like the savage and the child, conceives of everything as animated by human feelings. This view requires some qualification. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a primitive man. Man, at any given period, has ancestors and a long history behind him. But, allowing the term as marking a stage of progress short of that of man's own, it will be plain, on reflexion, that the ordinary primitive man, like the lower classes everywhere, troubles himself little about the sentient aspect of the universe. To him, as to the lower animals, the animate is animate, and the inanimate inanimate. It is at all times only a few
of the more imaginative individuals of a race to whom their fellows are indebted for religious personification and myth. Religious progress is everywhere the work of the genius, not of the vulgar. Clans are sometimes divided to treat animates as alive. But this is exceptional, and usually stops short at make-believe. The child does not attempt to eat his own mud-pies. The boy knows well that his father's walking-stick is not a real horse, and, in spite of de Brosses, Schultz, and others, the girl does not really believe that her doll is a living being. A mother of the writer's acquaintance, having renominated with her little daughter for her pugn treatment of "poor dolly," received the reply: 'Poor dolly! It is only a bag of sawdust." Nor does even the primitive or savage genius discern life in all creation. He does so only in a desultory, fragmentary fashion, singling out such objects or phenomena as stir in him the feelings of gratitude, fear, or wonder. The worship of deified living men and of animals for their beneficial (as the cow) or formulative (as the tiger) function, is credited all 161), Hy Let rock-cave be deified. A Nature-deity representing phenomena whom the grandson of Heaven, 'genuine (2) mirror, ottered where the transition of a snake or serpent in many countries as the representative of a kind of god-body of Japan had its origin. Sun-goddess is represented in the temple of is by a mirror offered to her, according to the myth, in order to induce her to leave the rock-ave of Heaven, in which she had hidden her self at rude behaviour of her younger brother, the Rainstorm. When the Sun-goddess sent down her grandson to rule the world, she gave him this mirror, saying: 'My child, when thou lookest upon this mirror, let it be as it thou went looking on me. Let it be with thee on thy couch and in thy hall, and let it be to thee a sacred mirror.' Another myth says: 'This is the Great God of Is.' We see here the transition from the offering to the symbol, and from the symbol to the actual deity. Of course, the last development is the work of the most ignorant and dull-minded worshipper. But it is not without parallel. The in of the Ainus of Yezo (see art. ANUS, vol. i. p. 245 ff.), which consist of willow wands whittled into a mass of admirals, at one time made offerings, but occasionally receive direct worship as 'genuine fetishes,' to use the expression of John Batchelor, a missionary who lived amongst them for years. In Greece, as Lucian (Iam. 14) tells us, the visitors to the temple of Olympia believed that Phidias's statue was Jupiter in person. Plutarch and Seneque relumed similar superstitious ideas about the gods. In West Africa, the dead ancestor is represented by his skull, or by a mass of chalk saturated with dippings from the putflying head which is hung up over it. ‘The conception,' says Tyler (Prim. Cult. ii. 151), 'of such human relics becoming fetishes, inhabited or at least acted through by the souls which formerly belong to them, will give a rational explanation of much reli-worship otherwise obscure.'

With the Danarans of South Africa, the ancestors are represented by stakes cut from trees or bushes consecrated to them, to which stakes the meat is first offered.

From fetishes of this second class the transition is easy to the idol. In Ancient Greece the primitive memorial erected to a god did not even pretend to be an image, but was often nothing more than a pillar, a boulder, a shapeless stone, or an styx. At the present day in Korea we see these pillar-gods, consisting of upright logs of wood, which have so far approached becoming idols as to have their tops very rudey fashioned into human form. In the Indian Museum at Calcutta is a liiga with a face carved on one side of the top—an incipient idol.

The totem, regarded as the animal, vegetable, or mineral which represents the personified national or tribal unity, belongs to this class of fetish (see TETEMISM). In other cases, however, the animal may be worshipped as representing a Nature-deity, or as a personification of a particular phenomenon. It is sometimes difficult to say to which of these categories the animal gods of ancient Egypt belonged.

(3) Class III.—In this class the fetish is a material object which is supposed to be the permanent or temporary abode of a spirit, and is regarded and honoured accordingly. This is the most general use of the word, and is especially appropriate to the type of fetishism prevalent in West Africa, the chief home of this institution. It is the fetishism of Tyler and of Goblet d'Alviella, though the latter somewhat narrows its application by introducing the proviso that the spirit's services belong to the person who appreciates the fetish, as in the case of Aladdin and his lamp. Some of the sacred objects referred to material objects may be Nature-spirits, while others are the souls of dead men. In Japan, the spirit of a Nature-deity will descend into the sacred wand with paper scallops attached, which is called gohei, and answer questions by the mouth of the hypnotized medium who holds it in his hand. The soul of a dead Carib might be thought to abide in one of his bones, taken from the grave and carefully wrapped in cotton, in which state it could answer questions and even bewitch an enemy. But most fetishes of this class are tenanted by spirits of an indeterminate kind, no doubt originally suggested by the former two classes, but without specific character. The objects selected by the West African negro to serve as the abode of his guardian spirit are, such things as animals, snakes, shells, tiger's teeth, antelope hoofs, monkey's paws, horns, snake-skins, bits of metal or ivory, teeth, bones, beads, stones, rags, etc. A much valued fetish, which was the subject of a lawsuit, consisted of a brass pan containing a lump of clay adorned with parrot's feathers. Another was a mixture of clay and various roots in an earthen pot. Many are compounds of a number of strange and disgusting things which remind us of the contents of the witches' cauldron in Macbeth. Some of these objects have originally belonged to the second class of fetishes, and have been at first symbols rather than receptacles. A spirit may be lodged in the object selected as fetish by simple exposure in the open air, or by invitation. Frequently the intervention of a fetish-priest is necessary, with his ceremonial and hocus-pocus formula of consecration. Again, some chance circumstance may cause an otherwise indifferent object to be made a fetish.
A fetish is more fully trusted when experience has proved its value by its success in trade, war, hunting, or fishing, or as a protection against disease and danger. The owner talks to it, asks its advice, lays his complaints before it, and calls upon it on every urgent occasion. It is rubbed with ashes, bound with a cat's tail, and a toad, deer skin, or oil, is poured over it, and it is sprinkled with blood of animals or even of man. To swear by the fetish is the most binding of oaths. On the other hand, if it fails, after warnings and reproaches, to perform what is expected of it, it may be punished, thrown away into the sea, or buried, given away, or sold. Every fetish has its special province of efficiency. One prevents sickness, another heals it, others grant long life, children, wisdom, courage, safety in travelling or in war, protection against thunder, success in trade, fair winds, rain, etc. In short, they are supposed to procure every imaginable blessing and avert every conceivable misfortune. They are to be found everywhere—at the entrance to towns, in the huts and over the doors, by every road, at the foot of rocks and trees, on poles set up by men’s necks. Some fetishes are private, belonging to individuals or families; others are public and protect villages or tribes from misfortune by war or pestilence. The latter sometimes have priests and temples dedicated to them. The chief house is the home of numerous fetishes which may be credited with supernatural power, such as that of making rain. The priests of the fetish deity are naturally assimilated to him, and are credited with the possession of similar powers. In the case of the ordinary fetish, as well as of the idol, there are two currents of opinion. Many fetish-worshippers declare positively that, for example, ‘the tree is not the fetish. The fetish is the invisible spirit which has taken up its abode in the tree. It cannot consume the offerings of food which are made to it, but it enjoys the spiritual part of them, and leaves the visible bodily element.’

On the other hand, there is undoubtedly a lower conception by which the material fetish itself is the object of worship, the spirit which inhabits it being forgotten or neglected. Tyler says that the negro usually combines the two as forming a whole, and this whole is (as the Europeans call it) the fetishistic spirit of his worship of his spirits. Turner, in his Nineteen Years in Polynesia, 1861 (p. 527), says—

‘On the isle of Nukunono Fakaofo worship used to be paid to the Tai Tokosal, or Lord of Tokosal, who lived in a field of sand, covered with rocks, among which was a stone, wrapped up in matting, and held so sacred that only the chief could bring it on the beach. It was only once a year that this sacred stone was removed, and then only by seven persons who must have been chosen by the chief. When it was brought on the beach, it was placed on the sand and occupyed a key position in the ceremony, which lasted from morning till evening. After the stone was placed on the beach it was never touched by any one but its custodians. When the stone was returned to the field it was given back to its former owner. In former times this stone was regarded as a god, and was the object of constant worship. It was a two-headed stone, and the two heads were regarded as the heads of the two gods who were worshipped. The stone was divided into pieces when it was to be removed to another place, and each piece was given to some one who was regarded as being able to place it in the right position. When the stone was placed on the beach it was surrounded by a ring of men who were to protect it from harm. They were arranged in a circle around it, and each man was to have some part of the stone which was placed in front of him. The stone was then surrounded by a circle of fires, and the fires were kept burning all night. The stone was then taken back to the field, and placed in its former position. It was regarded as a sacred stone, and was regarded as a god. The stone was never allowed to be touched by any person who was not a priest, and it was always surrounded by a circle of men who were to protect it from harm.

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As in the case of Class II., the transition of fetishes of Class III. to the idol is easy. A few days of paint or scratches with a knife are sufficient to convert a shapeless stone or post into an anthropomorphic figure. Idols are rare amongst most of the coast tribes of West Africa, but are common amongst all the interior tribes.

(4) Class IV.—The term ‘fetish’ is frequently used, though more in general literature than by scientific writers, of non-religious magical appliances, charms, amulets, etc., independent of any gods or spirits. Such are the piece of the rope with which a man has been hanged carried by the superstitious gambler, and the drinking of the springs of the well. To this class belong such fetishes as the kite’s foot hung round the neck of the Basuto child, so that he may escape misfortune with the swiftness of the kite. Another is the ill-will worn as the claw of a lion, in order that his life may be as firmly secured against all danger as that of a lion.

This class of so-called fetishes is dealt with more fully in art. Magic.

(3) Class V.—Material things are sometimes the objects of a make-believe worship. The Devonshire farmer, who at Christmas salutes his apple-trees with much ceremony, offering them a bowl of cider and raising the same with them, and then drinking out of a tree-god. When a Japanese housewife gives her needle one day’s rest in the year, and sets before it a tiny offering of cake, it is not necessary to suppose that the needle is taken for a sentient thing, or is believed to have a soul away, or is not called it kami, or ‘god.’ Both of these practices are due to the pleasure which men take in dramatic make-believe. The writer is not aware how far this applies to the annual honours paid in India by the artisan to his tools, which Herbert Spencer would include under the term ‘fetishism.’ Underlying all such cases there is, no doubt, a vague sense of gratitude, whether to the inventor or to Nature, which may eventually result in real worship. The kitchen-furnace in Japan is a recognized kami, or ‘god,’ and tree-worship had probably its origin in some such practices as that described above, which are known all over the world as well as in Devonshire.

The above classes of fetish often merge into one another in the most perplexing way. An object considered as a fetish (Class I. and II.) may be credited with both divinatory and curative qualities (Class I.), or be regarded as a divinity (Class III.).

Tylor (ii. 205) points out that ‘the negro can say ‘In this river, or tree, or amulet there is a wongo (fetish-deity)’ But be more usually says, ‘This river, or tree, or amulet is a wongo.’ Again, the same writer says (ii. 176): ‘So close is the connexion conceived between spirit and image, that the idol is itself called ‘wongo.’ The medicine or magical appliance which in one case is purely non-religious may in others be fortified by a prayer or incantation. The practice of prefixing the sign of Jupiter to medical prescriptions is perhaps not wholly obsolete with ourselves. On the other hand, an ostensibly religious fetish may be found to owe its efficacy to some physical property of the material object in question.

3. Religious value of fetishism.—Fetishism is, of course, an undeveloped or a degraded form of religion; yet it rests on a principle which the higher religions are unable to dispense with altogether. In the name of the god there is represented by the physical. Christianity has its Cross, its Eucharist, its Baptismal water. Unfortunately, the evidence relating to fetish-worship, though plentiful enough, seldom enables us satisfactorily to trace the history of the ideas which underlie it. Missionaries are hampered by their religious prejudices; travellers seldom have the necessary previous training for that thorough knowledge of savage languages without which precision is impossible. Supposing that a Tim-

buctoo savant, visiting this country, saw an educated English gentleman prostrate himself before a wafer of bread, how wholly false and inadequate an impression would he receive of an institution whose history is traceable back for thousands of years through many varying forms of ritual and belief! Not that the traveller is much to blame. But, under the most favourable circumstances, it would be difficult to learn from the fetish-worshipper, or even from the priest, the reasons for practices which they pursue in those faint impressions. They themselves, in fact, seldom know much about them. Yet all fetishes must have a history of some sort. It is not enough to say with de Brosses (op. cit. p. 182):

‘On n’est pas obligé de rendre raison d’une chose où il n’y en a point; et ce serait, je pense, assez inutilement qu’on en cher-
chercit d'entre que la cranite et la folie dont l'esprit humain est susceptible, et que la facilite qu'a de telles dispositions de se tromper. Le Fetichisme est un genre de ces choses si abordes qu'on peut dire qu'elle ne rapporte rien. Les gens croient qu'ils ont des ames et des consciences invisibles. Fear and folly do, no doubt, play a great part, but Herbert Spencer is nearer the truth when he says (Study of Sociology, 1866, p. 305): 'The wrong belief is sometimes always true, and there is a right belief hidden by them.' There would be no spurious coins if there were not a genuine gold or silver currency. We are sometimes able to catch a glimpse of this returning after, or a lapse from, something higher, associated with what might at first sight appear a gross form of fetishistic superstition.

In 644 a prophet arose in Eastern Japan who persuaded his neighbours to worship a grass-green caterpillar with black spots, promising them that, if they did so, they would enjoy long life and riches. The movement spread so far and so rapidly that the authorities intervened; the prophet's conceit of his religion was suppressed. This might seem pure fetishism of a low type. Yet, when we are told that the god was called the God of the Eternal World and the God of Gods, it seems probable that the caterpillar was merely a symbol, and that the movement, recorded by no friendly observer, was, in reality, a protest against the prevailing polytheism of the time. The circumstance that the devotees of the new god threw their property into the highways indicates a degree of religious exaltation hardly to be produced by the mere worship of a caterpillar, though the taboos indicate that in his time the Greeks worshipped the sword of Agamemnon. Surely it was not a moral or a religious object which they paid their devotions to. Its association with the heroic virtues of the men of the Homeric age must have counted for much in the motives for their reverence. The material object worshipped at the shrine of Ine in Japan is a metal mirror enclosed in a box, and never seen by anyone. This is quite different from the British objects take this form (Class B) for the actual deity; others know that, historically, it represents the Sun or, rather, the Sun-goddess; but the majority regard it as the higher, though less correct, conception of the god as a great Divine ancestor, who from heaven enviarthe tribal or national blessings. The sun-goddess of Japan. The sun-goddess worship of the Ancient Egyptians was something more than the mere adoration of bulls and cats.

Fetishism filling the word in its most comprehensive signification—rests on two principles. The first is what, in modern phrase, we call the immanence of Deity; the second is the necessity which there is for the spiritual to be expressed in terms of the physical. But the savage's conceptions of them are crude and inadequate, and his unintelligent application of them has resulted in a profuse outgrowth of gross superstition.

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W. G. ASTON.

FETISHISM (American).—Among the native tribes of the two Americas, fetishism is rife. They regard the fetish as intrinsically possessing that magic power known to some of the N. Amer. Indians. In fetishism, the person who has the power in his possession, the personal essence which enables the object to achieve supernatural results. But the ability to perform these, and the sphere of action of the fetish, depend greatly upon the nature of the object containing the magic power. The possession of a fetish presumes possession of its magical properties.

It must be borne in mind that to the untutored Indian intelligence all things—animals, water, the seasons, the elements, the appearance of the night and day, and such properties as light and darkness—are regarded as possessing animation and the power of volition. It is, however, the general Indian belief that many of these are under the power of some spell or potent enchantment. The rocks and trees are the living tombs of imps imported from the spirit world. If they are impounded, it is probable it would appear as the place of demonization of some powerful intelligence imprisoned therein, for revenge or some similar motive, by the spell of some mighty enchanter.

Nearly all the belongings of a shaman or medicine-man are classed as fetishes by the N. Amer. Indians. These usually consist of the skins of beasts, birds, and serpents; roots, bark, powders, and numberless other objects. But the fetish must be altogether divorced from the idea of religion proper, with which it has little or no connexion, being found side by side with religious phases of many types.

The fetish is often the bone, a feather, an arrowhead, a stick carved or painted, a fossil, a tuft of hair, a necklace of fingers, a stuffed skin, the hand of an enemy, or anything which might be suggested useful to the original maker; usually, the idea is an imagination. It is sometimes fastened to the scalp-lock, the dress, the bridle, concealed between the layers of a shield, or specially deposited in a shrine in the wigwam. The idea in the mind of the original maker is usually symbolic, and is revealed only to one formally chosen as heir to the magical possession and pledged in his turn to a similar secrecy.

Notwithstanding that it has been stated that the cult of fetishism is not, strictly speaking, a department of religious activity, a point exists at which the fetish begins to evolve into the god. This happens when fetishes survive the test of experience, and achieve a more than personal or tribal popularity, as among the Zuhi Indians, examples of which will be adduced in the course of the article. Nevertheless, the fetish partakes more of the nature of those spirits which are subservient to man (as, for example, the Arabian jinn) than of gods proper; and, if they are prayed and sacrificed to on occasion, the 'prayers' are more of the nature of a magical invocation, and the 'sacrifices' no more than would be accorded to any other assisting agent. Thus sharply must we differentiate between a fetish, or captive spirit, and a god. But it must further be borne in mind that a fetish is a spirit, an individual, and not a piece of property. It may belong collectively to an entire community, and, as will be remarked later, it is not necessarily a small article, but may possess all the appearance of a full-blown idol. An idol, however, is the abode of a god—the image into which a deity may materialize. A fetish, on the other hand, is the place of imprisonment of a subservient spirit which cannot escape, and which, if it would gain the rank of godhead, must do so by a long series of luck-bringing, or, at least, by the performance of a number of marvels of a protective or fortune-making nature.

It is the personal essence of a belief exists in the Indian mind that there are many wandering spirits who, in return for food and other comforts, are willing to materialize in the shape that the savage provokes for them, and to assist him in the chase and other sides of life.

1. The Eskimos.—Among the Eskimos, fetishism presents itself in an almost perfect form, and with them is found one of the few instances of making a fetish of the human body itself. Nelson (In R.B.H. of 1899, pt. 1, p. 429) states that along the coast of Norton Sound and the Lower Yukon a new-born child is sometimes put to death for the purpose
of having the services of its shade to secure success in hunting. The child must be killed secretly, and its body stolen, so that no one may know of the occurrence. The body is then dried, placed in a bag, and worn on the person or carried in a box, with the head. By invoking the name of the hunter believes that he compels its shade, which is clairvoyant, to assist in finding game, and so to direct the flight of his spear that the animals he hunts cannot escape. The Eskimos also employ masks to assist them in hunting. These are carved to represent supernatural beings, the tun-ghat, or wandering genii, and are believed to possess the qualities of the animals they depict, the spiritual essence of which enters into the wearers. They are supposed to watch for game, and, by some clairvoyant power, to see it at a great distance; and the hunter is then guided by the influence of the masks to find it. They are also supposed to guide the spears in flight. Among the people of the Kaviak Peninsula and Kotzebue Sound, the possession of the dried body of a weasel, worn in a pouch or belt, is supposed to endow the owner with extraordinary skill in whaling. In all cases it follows that the owner of any mumified animal carries with it power over its shade, which becomes the servant of the possessor.

The Eskimo clairvoyant is of great importance to those fetishes which they believe bring them success in whale-hunting. To this end they employ images of fabulous and other animals. These are of practical significance as the mask fetishes allowed to above. A whale-hunter, for example, possesses a number of fetishes, such as a wolf's skull, a dried raven, the axis vertebra of a seal, feathers, the skin of a golden eagle, or the tip of a red fox's tail. At the end of the month after these are worn, a seal, they cut off and swallow the tip of its tongue in order to retain the essential essence or spirit of the animal. In several of their folk-tales it is mentioned that certain persons took small pieces of such skins, and that afterwards these became full-sized skins, to the benefit of the owner, thus indicating the meaning of this custom. They place implicit faith in such fetishes, which they believe to have been in contact with supernatural beings and objects which by their general appearance recall the effect expected from the fetish—a well-known phase of sympathetic magic.

Other fetishistic objects enumerated by Murdock ('Point Barrow Expedition, 9 RB EW, 1892, pp. 436-441) are bunches of the claws of the bear or wolverine, the metacarpal bones of the wolf, the head or beak of the gull or raven, and small dried seal, the young unbranched antler of a reindeer, the last three joints of a reindeer's foot, the sub-fossil incisor tooth of some ruminant, the task of a young walrus, and the stuffed skin of a black-bellied raven. A charm of great value to the mother who has a young babe is the canine tooth of a polar bear, as she is under the impression that, while she wears it, her milk supply cannot fail.

An instance of tribal fetishism is noticeable in the Ai-y̱a-gehák, or 'Asking festival,' when a wand known by the same name is made, having three hollow globe-like attachments hanging to it. It is used by a man, chosen for the purpose, to obtain the wishes of all the various members of the tribe, who in turn ask for something which he obtains for them from the other members. This wand is much respected, and it is considered wrong to refuse any request made with it. In some parts of the Lower Yukon, instead of stating their wishes, they make small images and hang them on to the wand held by the man, who conveys it from one to another.

2. Athapascan family.—The Apaches, both male and female, wear fetishes which they call tsi-daltos, manufactured from lightning-given wood, generally pine or cedar or fir from the mountains (Bourke, 9 RB EW, p. 587). These are highly valued, and are never sold. They are shaved very thin, rudely carved in the semblance of the human form, and decorated with red lines, representing the lightning. They are small in size, and few of them are painted.
Bourke describes one which an Apache chief carried about with him. It was a piece of wolf's neck skin, about the size of a silver dollar, having drawn upon it a figure in yellow with a black narrow band, and three snake-heads with white eyes. It was further decorated with pieces of examination to a sweet-smelling grease upon it, and fumigated the bones with the smoke. There are certain trees and stones which are regarded as fetishes; beside them the Siouan make offerings of red cloth, red paint, and other offerings. But all balls or fetishes, and in all hunting and warlike excursions the 'medicine,' or fetish, is carried. It usually consists of a head, claws, stuffed skin, or other representative of the fetish animal. Even their horses are provided with fetishes in the shape of a deer's horn, to ensure their swiftness. The rodent teeth of the beaver are regarded as potent charms, and are worn by little girls on their necks to make them shoot accurately. Bourke (op. cit.) mentions a class of fetish which he terms 'phylacteries.' These are pieces of buckskin, or other material, upon which are inserted or drawn certain characters or symbols of a religious or 'medicine' nature, and they are worn attached to the person seeking to be benefited. They differ from the ordinary fetishism in that they are concealed from the public gaze.

3. Iroquoian family. — Most things that seem at all unnatural are accepted by the Hurons as ok), or supernatural, and therefore it is accounted lucky to find them. In hunting, if they find a stone or other object in the entrails of an animal, they at once make a fetish of it. Any object of a peculiar shape they treasure, for the same reason. They give high honor to that depicted of the wand, the image of the bird, the claw, the serpent, the fish, and the hawk; these are the totem animals of the Huron, and are represented by many N. Amer. tribes. The medicinal virtue of some fetishes is regarded as very great, one old woman of the Lower Canada Hurons preserving the mumified embryo of a fish, which she said the swan had given her during a severe illness of which it had cured her.

4. Algonquian family. — Hoffman states 'The Medicine Lodges' (4 RBEW, 1886, pt. 1, p. 14) that at the medicine lodges of the Iroquois there are preserved fetishes or 'amulets, worn upon the elbows, which consist of strands of beaded work, metal bands or skunk skins, while bracelets of shells, buckskin, or stone are also worn.' At a great tribal festival of the Cheyenne was their medicine arrow, which was taken from them by the Pawnees in battle. The head of this arrow projects from the bag which contains it, and is covered with delicate waved or spiral lines which denote its sacred character. It was, indeed, the palladium of the tribe. A peculiar type of fetish consisted of a mantle made from the skin of a deer, and covered with feathers mixed with beading. It was made and worn by them in a mantle of invisibility, or chameleoning, to enable spies to traverse an enemy's country with impunity. In this instance the fetishistic power depended upon the devices by which it was conveyed.

5. Siouan family. — The principal fetishes among the Hidatsa tribe of the Sion are the skins of foxes and wolves, the favourite war-fetish being the strip-off the back of a wolf's skin, with the tail hanging down the shoulders. It is made of a large piece of flesh, and is worn by them in the skin, through which the warrior puts his hand, so that the skin of the wolf's head hangs down upon his breast. These, of course, are totemic fetishes. The Siouan tribal fetishes with the Siouan tribes are (or were) buffalo heads, the neck-bones of which they preserve with a view to preventing the buffalo herds from removing to too great a distance from them. At certain periods they perform a ceremony with these bones, which consists in taking a potsherd with live coals, throwing the sweet-smelling grease upon it, and fumigating the bones with the smoke. There are certain trees and stones which are regarded as fetishes; beside them the Siouan make offerings of red cloth, red paint, and other articles. But all balls or fetishes, and in all hunting and warlike excursions the 'medicine,' or fetish, is carried. It usually consists of a head, claws, stuffed skin, or other representative of the fetish animal. Even their horses are provided with fetishes in the shape of a deer's horn, to ensure their swiftness. The rodent teeth of the beaver are regarded as potent charms, and are worn by little girls on their necks to make them shoot accurately. Bourke (op. cit.) mentions a class of fetish which he terms 'phylacteries.' These are pieces of buckskin, or other material, upon which are inserted or drawn certain characters or symbols of a religious or 'medicine' nature, and they are worn attached to the person seeking to be benefited. They differ from the ordinary fetishism in that they are concealed from the public gaze. The serpent phylactery, therefore, may be employed to enwrap other 'medicine' and thus augment its own potentiality (op. cit. 59). It describes several of these objects. One worn by an Indian named Ta-lu-tu-je was 'tightly rolled in at least half a mile of . . . sodder's silk,' and when brought to light was found to consist of a small piece of buckskin, two inches square, upon which were drawn red and yellow crooked lines which represented the red and yellow snake. Inside were a piece of malachite, a small cross of light-brown, and two very small perforated shells. The cross they designated 'the black wind.' Another 'phyllactery' consisted of a tiny bag of hoodedt (on which see RBEW 4059), holding a small piece of buckskin. Inside it was stated that the phylactery, it was explained, contained not merely the 'medicine' of the crystal and the eagle, but also that of the black wind, the white bear, the yellow snake, and the skunk.

6. Shoshonean stock. — At Sikatski in Arizona, a territorial nucleus of the Hopi, Fewkes (17 RBEW, p. 5, p. 729.) had opportunities of inspecting many interesting objects. Among the noteworthy articles are веревки, covered in native graves were pebbles of botryoidal shape, with a polished surface, or with a fancied resemblance to some animal or other form. These, in good order, were objects of trade, and the most prized photographic is that at the Antelope rock at Walpi, 'around which the Snake dancers biennially carry reptiles in their mouths.' There is, in the cave, on one side a number of pebbles of such material (hematite), to which prayers are addressed on certain ceremonial occasions, and upon which sacred meals and prayer emblems are placed. There are a great number of the personal fetishes of this people consist of cephalopod fossils, some of which are wrapped up in the sacred bundles which are highly revered, the latter, of course, being tribal fetishes.

In one grave was found a single large totem of a mountain lion, made of sandstone, in which legs, ears, tail, and eyes are represented, the mouth still retaining the red pigment with which it was covered. It is almost identical with those used by the Hopi at the present day.

7. Zuñi family. — Cushing (2 RBEW, 1883) seems to think that fetishism among the Zuñis arose from the supposition they entertained that they were kin with animals, or, in other words, that their fetishes were totemistic. It is in this stage that totemism and fetishism meet, and the two are by no means incompatible, though they very often covered in native graves were pebbles of botryoidal shape, with a polished surface, or with a fancied resemblance to some animal or other form. Fetishes of this description are, indeed, the natural concomitant of a totemistic system. Zuñi fetish objects are usually natural concretions, or alluvial, but the resemblance to animals has been heightened by artificial means. Ancient fetishes are much valued by the Zuñis, and are often found by them in the vicinity of pueblos inhabited by their ancestors, and as tribal possessions are handed down from one generation to another. The shamans believe them to be the actual petrifications of the animals they represent. The Zuñi philosophy of the fetish is given in the Tale of the Two Sun Children, instanced by Cushing (op. cit. 14.)

"Now that the surface of the earth was hardened, even the animals of prey, powerful and like the fathers (god) themselves, would have devoured the children of men; and the Two Thought it not well that they should all be permitted to live, "for," said they, "silks will the children of men and the children of the animals of prey multiply themselves. The animals of prey are provided with talons and teeth; men have not poor, the finished beings of earth, therefore the weaker."

Whenever they came across the pathway of one of these animals, were great mountain lion or but a mere mole, they struck them with the fire of lightning which they carried in their magic shield. This fire was instantly he was shrivelled and burnt into stone.

Then said they to the animals that they had thus changed to stone. "Then if they make a slit in their great good unto them, have we changed you into rock everlasting. By the breath of prey, it endure forever within you, shall ye be made to serve instead of to devour mankind." Thus was the surface of earth hardened and scarred and many of all kinds of beings changed to stone. Thus, too, it happened that we find, here and there, certain totem forms, sometimes large like the beings themselves, sometimes shrivelled and distorted. And we often see among the
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rocks the forms of many beings that live no longer, which shows us that all was, when the thing had happened. Let us now see the head of the beast, and observe the eyes, ears, nose, and mouth. Of these pietractions, which are, of course, mere concoctions or thoughts, in the form of the Zoulih says, "Whomever of us may be met with in the sun shining or in the moonlight, we will not see (discover, find) them and should treasure them for the sake of the sacred (magic) power which was given them in the days of the new." This tradition furnishes additional evidence relative to the preceding statements, and shows the motive which lies behind the power of these fetishes. It is supposed that the hearts of the great animals of prey are infused with a spirit or "medicine" of magic influence over the hearts of the animals that eat them. The animals therefore eat them with their breath, piercing their hearts and quite numbing them. Moreover, their roar is fatal to the senses of the lower beasts. The mountain lion absorbs the blood of the game animals; therefore he possesses their acute senses. Again, those powers, as derived from his heart, are preserved in his fetish, since his heart still lives, even although his body be changed to stone. It happens, therefore, that the use of these fetishes is chiefly connected with the chase. But there are exceptions. The great animals of the chase, although fetishistic, are also regarded as supernatural beings, whose mythological position is absolutely defined.

In the City of the Mista lives Po-shah-ahn-ka, father of the Medicine Beasts, a strange corruption of their name, which is guarded by six beings known as the 'prey-gods,' and it is their counterfeiting presentations that are made as fetishes. To the north of the City lives the Mountain Pest-prey-god; to the west, the Bear; to the south, the Badger; to the east, the Wolf; and in between them, below, the Mote. These beings possess not only the guardianship of the six regions, but also the mastership, not merely geographic, but of the medicine powers which emanate from them. They are the mediators between Po-shah-ahn-ka and man. The prey-gods, as 'Makers of the Path,' are chosen from among the divinities in high rank among their gods, but, notwithstanding this, their fetishes are 'held in captivity' by the priests of the various medicine orders, and greatly venerates by them as mediators between themselves and the animals they represent. In this character they are exalted with elaborate prayers, rituals, and ceremonies, and sometimes placed with sacrifices. Of the prey-gods of the hunt (see-med-e-ht) the special priests are the members of the Great Coyote People, the chosen members of the Eagle and Coyote, and, of the Prey Brother priesthood. These prey-gods appear to be almost unique, and may be indicated as an instance where fetichism has become allied with religious belief. They depict, with two exceptions, the same species of prey-animals as those supposed to guard the six regions of the world above the Wild Cuts. Each of the six species of prey-animals is subdivided into six varieties. They are, strictly speaking, the properties of the priests, and members and priests of the sacred societies are required to deposit their fetishes, when not in use, with the keepers of the Medicine of the Father. These 'medicines,' or memberships, alone can perfect the shape of the fetish and bestow its powers.

The 'Day of the Council of the Fetishes' takes place a little before or after the winter solstice or national New Year. The fetishes are taken from their place of deposit, and arranged according to species and colour, in front of a symbolic flat altar, quadrupeds being placed upright, and birds suspended from the rafters. The fetishes are prayed to, and prayer-meal is scattered over them. Chants are intoned, and a dance performed in which the cries of the fetish beasts are imitated. A prayer with responses follows. Finally, all assemble round the altar, and repeat the great invocation.

The life of the fetish among the Zoulih is extremely curious and involved.

The hunter goes to the house of the Deer Medicine, where the vessel of the fetish is brought before him. He sprinkles sacred meal over the vessel in the direction he intends to hunt, chooses a fetish from it, and presses it to his body. He then places the fetish in a backskin bag over his heart. Proceeding to the hunt, he deposes the fetish from his body. If the hunter has rested it, he imitates its cry, and is thus supposed to confine it within a narrow circle. He then breathes deeply from the nostrils of the fetish, and, with the help of the god of the deer, and puffes the breath long and loudly in the direction which he, being at the moment quite off the breath, he has borrowed from the prey-prey god will stiffen the limbs of the animal he hunts. When the beast is caught and killed, he infuses its spirit. Then he again breathes into the nostrils of the fetish. He then dips the fetish in the heart's blood of the slain animal, anoints it, and devours a part of the liver. The fetish is placed in the sun for a time, then replaced to the backskin pouch with a blessing, afterwards being duly returned to the Deer Medicine. The Zoulih priesthood of the Bow has three fetishes—the Mountain Lion, the White Bear, and the Knife-feathered Monster. The last is probably a tutelar deity, and was perhaps the Zoulih god of war—an instance of the reversion of a full-fledged deity to the status of a fetish, probably occasioned by the popularity and wide-spread nature of fetishism among this people. They have also an equine fetish borrowed from the Navahos, and known as 'The Pony'; and from the same people they have adopted a sheep fetish, the purpose of which is to ensure fecundity.

8. Mexico and Central America.—Although traces of fetishistic belief undoubtedly make their appearance in the religious systems of both Mexico and the ancient civilizations of Central America, the concrete examples of them are few, and it is owing to the fact that these religions had reached a stage far beyond the fetishistic radius. Nevertheless we cannot point to any particular reaction against fetishism, as we can in the case of Peru in the reign of Manco Capac, unless it be the alleged withdrawal of the Inca's city, Coyotyl towards the elimination of the swarming deities of the Mexican provinces, many of which probably were merely overgrown fetishes. But the heresies of the Tlatonoh of Teczenco are possibly fabulous.

The only Mexican idol now in existence was most probably of fetishistic origin. This is the uncouth beast known as the po-xotel Tezynomiquia—in reality Centoed—the 'Corn-mother.' The image shows signs of having been evolved, in its design, from the bundles of maize carried on the backs of women at her festival, and provided with a face back and front. This figure appears to reproduce the primitive fetish which it superseded, and we seem to have forgotten here the process noted among the Zoulih Indians. The first missionary of Achiollan, Fray Benito, cited by Burgoa (Hist. de la Prov. de Predicatoros de Guazaca, Mexico, 1674, ch. xxxviii.), destroyed at Miatlan, or Yoaquin, an 'idol' cut from an emerald of great value, of the size of a thick capsicum pod, on which was skillfully engraved a bird and a serpent coiled ready to strike. This the present writer suspected to be a fetish, and he was glad to see that Eduard Seeler confirmed his suspicions in his "Deities and Religious Conceptions of the Mexicans," and further identified it, from the hieroglyphs on its surface, with the Mexican god Quetzalcoatl, or 'Feathered Serpent.' But the latter circumstance would seem to make it an amulet bearing the god's name, and not a fetish. 2 There are, however, instances where amulets, especially jewels of great value, have been worshipped owing to their connexion with some great deity, as among the Hindus, and this may be a case in point.

The tepitoton, or small household idols of Mexico, were perhaps of fetishistic origin. We know very little about them save that they were broken by the people at the end of every seven of fifty-two years, when it was considered that the world might possibly come to an end. The ceremony then held was for the purpose of renewing the sacred fire throughout Mexico, and, if these small figures

2 Dorsey ('Boswell Coler,' II, B.B.W., 1904) calls the amulet a 'Amulet,' and the present writer to be 80. An amulet is considered to be directly associated with power, faith, or idea; a fetish is rarely symbolic, but is merely an acceptable or suitable substitution of a deity. Prey, and puffs the breath long and loudly in the direction where he is, being at the moment quite off the breath, he has borrowed from the prey-prey god will stiffen the limbs of the animal he hunts. When the beast is caught and killed, he infuses its spirit. Then he again breathes into the nostrils of the fetish. He then dips the fetish in the heart's blood of the slain animal, anoints it, and devours a part of the liver. The fetish is placed in the sun for a time, then replaced to the backskin pouch with a blessing, afterwards being duly returned to the Deer Medicine. The Zoulih priesthood of the Bow has three fetishes—the Mountain Lion, the White Bear, and the Knife-feathered Monster. The last is probably a tutelar deity, and was perhaps the Zoulih god of war—an instance of the reversion of a full-fledged deity to the status of a fetish, probably occasioned by the popularity and wide-spread nature of fetishism among this people. They have also an equine fetish borrowed from the Navahos, and known as 'The Pony'; and from the same people they have adopted a sheep fetish, the purpose of which is to ensure fecundity.
Each dwelling, had its own god, each different from those of all others, such as herbs, plants, flowers, stones, pebbles, pieces of jade and jasper. That many of these fetishes cannot be doubted. He also mentions that many of these lesser deities were animals, which were revered to imply a totemic system. But animals are used as fetishes as well as totems, as in Dahomey; and on the Slave Coast. In these areas the population was divided into tribes, or oyilas, supposed to be connected with one another by a system of spiritual relations, or ríos, and not to have as an object of worship often a single one— which was generally a group of rocks rendered conspicuous by their shape and isolation. These were often treated as totemic, and were regarded, and, in some instances, as the abodes of spirits imprisoned by the gods, or else as folk who had been turned into stone by the same agency. Such stones or monuments were to be seen at Tiahuanaco, Pucara, Xauxa, Pachacamac, and Casmares.

But, most important perhaps of all fetisist examples to be found on the American continent were the huacas. The word now signifies 'treasure-houses,' or 'ruins of the gods.' In Incan times it implied that the object was one to which worship should be given, and it denoted objects of worship of all descriptions. We have mentioned to do for huacas, and although some immovable ones were fetishes, such as those mentioned at Tiahuanaco and elsewhere. These portable huacas included the conojar, which were in reality household gods, and as such are of no more interest here than are the huacanaps, or amulets proper. Many of the movable huacas were stones or pebbles of unusual shape or colour, unshaped by hand; but often they were carved to resemble the image of a god, and in battle to obtain those of the enemy, which they treasure as fetishes. Their hereditary enemies, the Papago, reciprocated these customs, a case occurring where an aged warrior long wore an Apache arrow-point as a protective against Apache arrows. A Papago shaman also wore a Seri arrowhead for a similar purpose. The Seri are never without imitations of what they believe to be the fetishes of enemy camps.

McGee (op. cit. p. 250) says that 'the day before the 1895 expedition entered their stronghold, a band of warriors and women were furnished from a freshly slaughtered cow by party of cazadores so suddenly that their arms were left behind—a heavy Springfield rifle 'temple'ed' and loaded with 'a hundred and forty-two shot,' being fired from the muzzle by one of the priests, while the other carried with him a shortsword.' These weapons were, of course, regarded as symbols of mystical potency, as were several puma-like objects made from rattle-pitted cacao wood in and out of the form perhaps iron scales.

The chief use of the weapons of the whites by the Seri is shamanistic and symbolic. As regards their own efficacy, the appearance and rarity of their stone arrow-heads would seem to point to their being originally manufactured in fetisistic mimetics of alien deities, and it is notable that they are still made only by the shamans of the tribe. Most of the Seri shields or bucklers are fetishes, as is proved by the circumstances that they are usually made from pelican or some other bird so thin to turn aside a blow, their magical properties being considered sufficient to deflect an enemy's attacks.
FETISHISM (Indian).—1. Universal prevalence and nature.—Fetishism is a born strength of the Animism universally inherent in the religious practices of the population of India. It is a very common superstition of the educated, and part of the actual religion of the uneducated masses, and, of course, of the savages in their daily life. It is thus ubiquitous under the surface of all the formal religious beliefs prevalent in the country, and is present everywhere in the domestic and similar customs and in the folklore of the people. The main cause of its universality is to be sought in the eclecticism of that amalgamation of heterogeneous beliefs, aboriginal and imported, which goes by the generic name of ‘Hinduism,’ and is the prevailing recognized religion of the people, largely colouring every other form, and in the capacity of that religion for absorbing and assimilating parts of all the ancient faiths that happen to survive among its extremely varied and indefinitely diverse elements. Any but important cause lies in the fact that the popular Muhammadanism of India is, in reality, a graft of that faith on the indigenous Hinduism, retaining practically all the superstitions handed down by Hindu ancestors to converts, who, for the most part, do not count many generations.

But, while fetishism is thus in evidence all over India, it exists there fundamentally in the same sense as it is to be found concurrently with the various forms of religion which obtain in the Western world: credited by the philosopher and man of education, and unrecognized by the occupants of the official creeds, occupying largely the position of magic and witchcraft and their survivals among Christians. The natives of India, in fact, in adopting the ideas giving rise to the practice of fetishism, have much in common with the inhabitants of nearly every other religion of the civilized world.

2. Definition.—In India the root-idea of the fetish is spirit-possession. The object is conceived of as containing an in-dwelling spirit, and thus proper for worship as being capable of influencing the lives of those connected with it. And in pursuance of this idea it may safely be said that the Indian villages adopt as a fetish any conceivable kind of object, especially if it presents an unusual appearance.

(a) Spirit-possession.—Under the influence of the idea of spirit-possession, the most trivial objects are continually being created. Anything which can be imagined to possess a spirit is sufficient for this purpose: a hollow tree, a heap of stones, rags left on a bush, a ruin by the wayside or in the jungle, an isolated grave or hummock that can be conceived to be a possible grave, even a milestone of the British Government. Any kind of caim, grave, tomb, or monument will serve as a fetish, those of English men and women being not uncommonly brought into requisition. Once a story of sanctity is started by an honest or casual devotee, or by a wary would-be priest in search of a living, its mere currency is sufficient for all the neighbourhood to believe, for the tale to be embroidered with accretions, and, for the place to be provided with a holy legend, a special ritual, and a list of miracles. In a Hindu neighbourhood all the village bazaars are attributed to a godling, hero, or demon; in a Muhammadan neighbourhood, to a saint; among savages, to the spirits. But the sense is every-

1 Descubrimiento del gran Rio de las Amazonas, 1839, ch. xiv.

fetishes, according to the Mercurio Peruano for 1794, 'were adored as deities.' They are found in all the mountain passes, and doubtless originated in Inca times, when those who were laden with baggage, when they had to face a dangerous track, laid down their load, and as a sign of gratitude offered the first thing they could find or lay hands on to the local spirit, saying 'Apechecha,' which means 'to make whole.'

11. Brazil.—'Ibols,' says Prince Maximilian in his Travels in the Brasile (London, 1820, p. 67), 'are nowhere seen among the Tapuyas, and it is only on the River Amazon that certain images have been found which seem to have a connection with the religious creed of the inhabitants.' This would seem to be borne out by the evidence of Christoval de Acuña, who says that the Amazon River tribes had gods who rendered them active assistance in hunting, fishing, and war. On an expedition of war one of the war-gods was placed in the prow of the boat; on a fishing expedition this place was occupied by a god 'holding a fish. When not in use these fetishes were kept in baskets, and, should the expedition prove unsuccessful, the images were thrown aside, and replaced by others. Thus we learn how the savage carefully preserved the sacred spirit before he raises it to the level of a god.

The Uapes River tribes possess 'divine stones' of quartz, Jasper, or jade, to the piercing of which they devote several years of labour. On the Upper Jamunda is to be found a lake formerly consecrated to the 'Mother Moon,' into which the fabled Amazons threw their muirkatim, or sacred stones, representing animals, fishes, and other symbolic objects. The Ipirunas make fetishes of the bones of their ancestors, as do other S. Amer. tribes, and the ancient Caribs were punctilious in preserving the bones of their forefathers, which, after they had been cleaned, bleached, and painted, they kept in a wicker basket full of spices suspended from the doors of their dwellings.

12. Colombia.—The ancient semi-civilized Muysca-Chibcha race, who inhabited a portion of this Republic, manufactured many fetish-like articles of gold, both in the shape of human beings and of animals and plants. The gold figures were placed in the tombs of their dead, and in their dwellings. The Gojiuna, who inhabit the Colombian peninsula of the same name, keep a number of large golden 'ibols,' called guaras, which, when not in use, are suspended from the door of their houses, giving off a glistening colouring when the sun's rays strike them. Three figures have often served as the supreme arbiters of peace and war among the tribes. Any chief who possessed one and sent it to an enemy at once brought about a cessation of hostilities. The guara is carefully enclosed in a case wrapped in wadding, from which it is drawn only once a year to be bathed. The day is marked by festivities and the sacrifice of oxen. The origin of the guara is unknown to the Gojiuna, who say that they have possessed them from time immemorial, and inherit them from father to son. There are two which are widely celebrated: one at Samenta, and that of the Cacique Juipara, at Ichuuma. Several villages are possessed by numerous Indians, and partake of the general nature of personal fetishes.

FETISHISM (Indian)

where the same: it is held to be wisdom to worship the fetish, because of the power of the spirit within for diseases and other defects. These fetishes are occasionally carried very far indeed, as in the case of the Nukalsaini or Nikarsinghi 'faisqis' (Nicholson's 'devotees'), who worshipped the well-known General John Nicholson in Old Delhi, and Delhi famine during his lifetime, despite repeated severe punishments at the hands of their fetish for so doing. This worship is nowadays transferred to his monument in the Margallah Pass.

The sacred fire. — Attribution of a mystical power to a common object in this way has largely brought about the vogue of the sacred fire fetish in India among all sorts and classes of the population, alike at the shrines of the Hindu and Muhammadans and at the holy places of the Dravidian and other non-Aryan savages. Such fire must be ceremonially produced and tended, and it and the ashes it causes will then become worshipful as containing a guardian spirit and curer of disease. But the volcanic fires, meteoric lights, and ignes fatai observed in various parts of the country appear to be venerated as manifestations of the power in this hand and many of them are improper, though the border line here is not always easy to define.

3. Family and tribal fetishes. — Families, especially when of considerable social position, are peculiarly exposed to fetish worship, and instances are not unusual throughout India of some objects being possessed by the guardian spirit of the family being held in veneration thereby. Any handy domestic object serves for the abode of such spirit: a stone in the courtyard, an old pestle and mortar, a doorpost, a flower-bar, a specially planted tree or shrub, and so on. On the same principle the Santals keep sets of prophylactic symbols beside their houses, which represent the abodes of the powers of Nature: pieces of wood, white stones, arrow-heads, and iron tridents. Among the more civilized tribes, but still low down in the social scale, such symbols become rough wooden images set up together in groups, or rude clay models grouped on platforms, which are regularly worshipped as the tribal protectors.

4. Trade and industrial fetishes. — Closely connected with the notion of the family and tribal fetishes are those revered by trades and occupations. The followers of practically every calling among Hindus worship their tools or means of livelihood, actually or symbolically. The object everywhere is the protection of their interests and, incidentally, cures in general. Instances are as numerous as the occupations. Thus, in various parts of the country, and usually at fixed periods and feasts, sailors will worship their boats; soldiers their swords and other weapons, and, in some Native States, their colours; merchants and bankers their books; clerks their books, pens, and inkstands; grain-merchants their weights daily; farmers their oxen and ploughs; shepherds their sheep; market-gardeners their scales; artisans their tools daily; working-jewellers their pincers and blowpipes; carpenters their yard-measures and also their tools, chisels, and saws; shoemakers their lasts; tailors their scissors; potters and many other 'low castes' the potter's wheel and moulding-clay for luck; tanners their scrapers; curriers their axes; navvies their mattocks; oilmakers their presses; barbers their razors, scissors, and mirrors; religious mendicants their begging-bowls and bags; dancing girls their musical instruments.

(a) The Thags. — The most striking instance of a fetish of this description in the pickaxe of the Thags, a criminal brotherhood now suppressed, who gained their livelihood by professional murder by strangling. The pickaxe was the tool used for burying the victims; it was forged with great ceremony, and was especially venerated as the fetish of the association.

(b) The house-broom, plough, and rice-pounder. — In India, as elsewhere in the world, the corn-sieve, the house-broom, and the plough are common fetishes connected with marriages and births, as symbols of life and symbols of prosperity. To these in India must be added the rice-pounder.

5. Fetish stones. — The commonest kind of fetish in India to come under general observation consists of a stone or stones regarded as representing the village spirits or guardian. These are to be found practically in every village in the country, and are looked upon, according to the degree of civilization of the inhabitants, either as the natural abodes of the guardians themselves or as their symbols, or as representatives of the godlings, who, in their turn, are symbolical of the various powers of Nature. In any case it is considered right and wise to worship them and to treat them with ceremonial reverence. Curious or eccentric forms, such as is exhibited by stalactites in caves, is the usual visible sign of spirit-possessed stones, and for this reason many of them are the remains or fragments of ancient religious monuments, and even altars, temples, or pre-historic implements. So also any stone that lends itself by form to phallic worship is sure to be used as a village fetish. In this way, too, meteoric stones, and, in mountain regions, striking rocks, are sometimes regarded as sacred. There is no way remarkable by peculiar cleavage or otherwise, become abodes of the gods which attract special worship.

(a) Footprints: visująḍā. — Miracle-working and worshipful footprints are very common in India, with both ancient and modern attribution of sanctity — among Muhammadans to saints and to Muhammad himself, and among Hindus to all sorts of heroes and godlings. Elaborately carved visująḍā, or footprints of Visnú, which are true fetishes, are to be found in several places, and are probably copies of similar footprints of Buddha, common still in all Buddhist countries.

(b) Phallic stones (līṅga): perforated stones, śālagraṁa, grindstones: 'rain' stones. — The assumption of spirit-possession leads in the ordinary course to that of magical powers available for securing the desire of devotees, and hence of fetishes in general. Hence phallic stones (līṅga) in particular are venerated as disease-curers. But the form of stone which is specially associated with the care of man, and which is often held to be the most sacred is that which is naturally or artificially perforated. In addition to the perforated, split, fissured, and tunnelled stones and rocks at shrines and places of pilgrimage, both the śālagraṁa, a species of amonite with reputed prophylactic and curative qualities, which is ubiquitous in a religions sense, and the family grindstone must be placed in this category. The same line of reasoning has produced rain-getting stones in parts of the country.

6. Fetish trees and plants. — Fetish trees are almost as common as fetish stones, and the forms that most usually strike the observer are the lotus and the tulsi (sacred basil) plant, to be found in or near almost all Hindu dwelling places. The latter is frequently also grown in conjunction with the nimb tree (Morgania). The piṭpal or sacred fig, the bel or wood apple, the ām (mango), the sīt, and the bel (Terminalia) palm in S. India are examples of other trees treated as the natural haunts of spirits and therefore worshipped. So, of course, are hollow and unusually large trees, or those that grow in large and erection groves. Especially dark or 'ghostly' groves are further considered to be the abodes of spirits, and are feared and propitiated accordingly.

7. Fetish myths. — Myths, stories, and legends
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FETISHISM
about fetislies are, of course, legion, and it is hardly
an exaggeration to say that they are as numerous in
India as the villages themselves. They are chiefly
strictly local folk-tales of a religious cast, usually
made up of the traditional incidents peculiar to
their class, but occasionally throwing a valuable
light on the notions of the people in tins connexion.
For instance, the great mass of religious legend
which attaches to the soil of the Govardhan HUl
near Mathura has led to the belief that all its

stones are endowed with life.
Sometimes such
stories acquire a certain general importance, as in
the case of the legend of Lorik, a tribal fetish
among the widely spread and numerous Ahir (q.v.),
brought into vogue to account for the tribe's worship of a particular rock at Benares and of a fissured
boulder and an elephant stone near the Markundl
Pass. Of the same nature and social importance
are the very numerous and popular stories to account for the beneficial miracles to be secured at
real or reputed shrines and tombs of the more
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widely known Muhanimadan saints. Indigenous
and imported, such as Saklii Sarwar, Badru'd-din
Anlia, Khwaja Khizar, Salar GhazI (Zinda Shah
Madar), Ghau.su' 1- Azam ( Abdu'l - Qadir), Sallm
Chishti, Shaikh Farid, Shah Daula, etc. ; or of
Hindu godlings, heroes, or holy men, whether of
classical antiquity or of comparatively modern or
even recent date, such as Bhairon, Bhimsen, Vetal,
Gam Gorakhnath, Guru Gugga, Lai Beg, Jnmadi,

modem religious
; or of eclectic media>val and
reformers, like Kabir and Ramanand. Such shrines,
tombs, monuments, or abodes contain and con-

etc.

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wonder-working fetishes for the whole
population, Hindu and Mnhammadan alike.
8. Human sacrifices in connexion with fetishism. There is one point in regard to the ritual
connected with fetishism in India that cannot be
It is
overlooked in a discus.sion on the subject.
the universal practice to smear any and every kind
of fetish that can be conveniently so treated with
stitute real

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ruddle, or red ochre, or red paint. The bright red
stain thus produced represents the blood of sacrifices made to the fetish, which, it is not difficult to
The sacrifice of
show, were originally human.
human beings has been prevalent in India, sub rosa
at any rate, throughout all historical times to the
present day, and there is hardly an important
building or architectural structure in the country
that has not a story of snch a sacrifice connected
with its foundation, for the purpose of providing
Under the influence
it with a ghostly guardian.
of civilization and the pressure of governing authorkinds
culminating
in the fear of
various
ities of
British law, actual human sacrifice has taken on
modified forms of many sorts until the artificial
reddening of the fetish to procure for it the desired
power of guardian and curer is all that remains
of the original sacrificial ceremony.
Miymiai.
Human sacrifice has given rise to
a special fetish known a« momidi, still actively
believed in and used under the necessary prosaic
modifications demanded by British law. But the
veritable momidi should consist of the ceremonially
distilled fat or essence of a murdered boy, and is
believed to be of inestimable value as a cure and
prophylactic. At the present day this unfortunate
superstition gives rise to an unreasoning political
fear in many jiarts of the country, as its successful
concoction is attributed to Europeans. Surgeons
with a taste for anatomy, freemasons (always
regarded by the ignorant masses as a kind of

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collectors for museums
are especially ex|>osed to suspicion in this connexion.
LiTlRATUltK. There in no book devoterl to the subject, but
sorcerers),

and anatomical

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there are very many that may be usefully consulted, among
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1870 onwards) and Census Reports (for 1881, 1891, 1901, 1911)
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Journey through Oude, 2 vols., do. 1858, Rambles and Recollections, ed. V. A. Smith, do. 1893 V. Ball, Junqle Life in India,
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Panjab Ethnography, Calcutta, 1883 G. A. Grierson, Bihar
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Macpherson, Report upon the Khonds, Calcutta, 1842 F.
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FICHTE.—The philosophical work of Fichte falls into two well-defined divisions, corresponding closely with his periods of residence in Jena and Berlin respectively. The work of the first period is that which has had the greatest influence on subsequent philosophical speculation, for it gave direction to the advance which was made on Kant's position by post-Kantian idealists, while his teaching during the second period was more popular in form and closely bound up with current political events. In the first period we have the *Wissenschaftslehre* (quite inadequately translated as *Theory of Knowledge*), the practical philosophy of the *Theory of Natural Right* (*Naturrecht*) and of the *Ethics* (*Sittenlehre*), and the religious philosophy of the essay *On the Ground of our Belief in the Divine* (*Unter den Grundlagen des Glaubens an den Gott*) (in which the vocation of each individual is grounded).

*From this point onwards the inquiry centres in that divine idea, which Kant has called *the thing in itself*, whereupon the self-designing principle in the popular works, and which at first sight appears to have no immediate connection with the *Wissenschaftslehre* in its earlier form, in certain minor doctrines, the new expositions differ from the Wissenschaftslehre... but on the whole we find nothing to them to be extended or superposed the Wissenschaftslehre... They contain a wider, more concrete view, to which Wissenschaftslehre may be regarded as an introduction* (Adam-Phil. Fichte, p. 36).

Before describing the salient features of Fichte's contribution to speculation, we must briefly sketch his life and indicate his chief writings.

1. Life.---Friedrich Wilhelm Gottlieb Fichte (1762) was the eldest son of a humble handicraftsman at Rammnau in Upper Lusatia, who had married the daughter of a well-to-do manufacturer. The boy was meditative and earnest, endowed with a remarkable memory, and very fond of reading. These characteristics, along with a certain obstinacy, were to have far-reaching effects upon his life. An accident brought his talents to the notice of a nobleman, who sent him first to a tutor, and then to a monastery-like and antiquated foundation-school at Schulpforta, near Nurnberg.

At eighteen years of age he entered the theological faculty at Jena, being transferred, however, to Leipzig in the following year. Theological difficulties, especially those arising out of the relation of Providence to the voluntary action of man, led him to give up theology, and in philosophy, and he frankly adopted the determinist position, in which the reading of Spinoza's *Ethics* only served to confirm him. He was thrown on his own resources even before his University course was completed, and after three years at Leipzig he spent some years as a tutor in various families, first in Saxony, then in Zürich; it was in Zürich that he met his future wife, a niece of Kleistock. In 1790 he had a hard struggle against poverty in Leipzig, he spent some years as a tutor in various families, first in Saxony, and then in Zürich; it was in Zürich that he met his future wife, a niece of Kleistock. In 1790 he had a hard struggle against poverty in Leipzig, but the autumn of that year brought him more pupils, among them one who desired to study the philosophy of Kant. This was a turning-point in his life. *A circumstance,* he writes to his betrothed, 'which seemed the result of mere chance, led me to give myself up entirely to the study of philosophy. I determined to be as comprehensive as possible which restrains the imagination, always too powerful in me, which gives understanding away, and which raises the whole spirit to an infinity. It was the idea which at first struck me, and which I afterwards developed with more confidence; it is not a mere speculative dress, without direct bearing upon human life, but their consequences are the utmost importance for an age whose morality is at present in great need of spiritual illumination. I shall work on this subject more closely, and to set these consequences before the world in a clear light would, I believe, be doing my fatherland a service. I am thoroughly convinced that the human will is free, and that to be happy is not the purpose of our being,—but to deserve happiness.'

In 1791, Fichte paid a visit to Kant at Königsberg, and laid before him an essay entitled *Kritik aller Offenbarung,* and by some accident this was published anonymously. The professor seemed, already expecting a work on religion by Kant, assumed that the Königslberg philosopher was the author, with the result that Fichte, once again a private tutor, found his book immediately famous. A tour in Switzerland, after his marriage in 1793, brought him into contact with Pestalozzi and other men of wide reputation. The writing of political pamphlets, and deep reflexion upon the difficulties of the Jewish question, led him to Jena. In 1794, he was interrupted in the spring of 1794, he accepted the post of Extraordinary Professor of Philosophy at Jena, where he became the centre of progressive philosophical and literary movements in Germany. His work at Jena, where his influence among the students was remarkable, was cut short by an unfortunate attack upon him on the ground of his supposed atheism—an attack which he met with much tact. The result was, that he resigned the charge and before long he was compelled to make his way quietly to Berlin. There he at first moved in the circle of Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and others of the Romantic party, but it was not long before he found a more congenial and intimate circle of friends. Obtaining permission to lecture in Berlin, he gathered round him an audience containing most distinguished scholars and statesmen. At Erlangen in 1803 he delivered a number of lectures, including the famous course on *The Nature of the Scholar.*

In 1807, on the conclusion of the war with France, which had interrupted his residence in Berlin, Fichte was chosen to frame the proposed University of Berlin a constitution which should ensure its efficiency and success—a task peculiarly congenial to him. Unfortunately, a change in the scheme led to the rejection of his remarkable and far-sighted proposals.

With patriotic disregard of the risks he was running, he delivered his *Addresses to the German People* during the winter of 1807-8, while Berlin was occupied by the French, and his services to the restoration of Prussia were recognized by his election as first Rector of the University of Berlin in 1810. While in the strenuous service of his Fatherland, he was stricken down by a fever contracted from his wife, who had laboured in the overcrowded hospitals for five months, and he died on 27th January 1814.

2. Writings.---The *Kritik aller Offenbarung* appeared in 1792; it was an attempt to carry the principles of Kant's critical philosophy into full investigation of the possibility of revealed religion. Its interest lies in the emphasis which Fichte thus early laid upon the practical reason as the clue to speculative problems. In 1794 it was followed by *Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre,* a tract containing a purely formal sketch of his first Jena lectures, which has unfortunately been frequently used as the most adequate source for a knowledge of Fichte's system. While at Jena, Fichte developed his speculative principle (described below) in a series of works dealing with its theoretical and practical grounds and implications, including *Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre* (1794), *Grundlage des Naturrechts* (1796), *Erste und zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre* (1797), *Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre* (1797) which expounds the philosophical system as a whole, and *System der gesammten, in *Grundlagen der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre* (1794), *Grundlage des Naturrechts* (1796), *Erste und zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre* (1797), *Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre* (1797) which expounds the philosophical system as a whole, and *System der gesammten,
of current culture and thought of Grundriss des gegenwartigen Zeitalters (1806), and for the bold reconciliation of life and thought in religion which is found in the Anweisung zum seligen Leben (1806). When Prussia was invaded in 1805 by Napoleon, Fichte was by no means the man who had wished to make the unsuccessful appeal to be allowed to accompany the Prussian troops as a preacher of ‘fire and sword,’ found expression in the Reden an die Deutschen—addresses on the characteristics of the German people out of which the new State may be built up, and expound the steps to be taken in order to utilize the freedom and vitality of the nation.

(1) The Jena Period. — (a) Wissenschaftslehre. — Fichte’s problem was set for him by the unresolved difficulties of Kant’s system. By an analysis of knowledge and an investigation of the result, for knowledge, of the existence of the unity of self-consciousness, Kant attempted to explain experience. But the result of his method seemed to be that two elements, each of which has meaning only as related to the other, are equally necessary for experience, though the relation is a purely negative one.

What Kant, however, does not perceive, is that these two elements are not merely relative to each other, so that either taken apart from the other, becomes an empty abstraction. He has, indeed, proved that existence unrelated to a conscious life is an empty category, and therefore self in its universality—as opposed to all the other matters of the desires—cannot equally abstract itself and the self, and only the self, is nothing at all. Self-consciousness always implies consciousness of something else than self, and could not exist without it. Self-determination, therefore, though it may be relatively opposed to determination by the not-self, cannot be absolutely opposed to it, and the not-self the self would disappear (E. Caird, Hegel, Edinburgh, 1869, p. 134f).

Fichte refused to start with any abstract notion. Certainty to him rested on intuition, though he meant by intuition neither the Kantian mode of knowing things-in-themselves nor the consciousness of the Absolute of (Schelling), but what he called in his later writings the free activity of the Ego.

The best-known expression of this starting-point is found in the Grundlage der Wissenschaftslehre, where it is reached by a highly artificial method, which cannot be reproduced in brief. The procedure is to assume that any one who considers what happens when he calls himself ‘I’ will find that he is at the same time both object and subject. But this primitive activity of consciousness (its self-affirmation) is known to the Ego only through the thought, by limitation. In other words, ‘The Ego determines’ and ‘The Ego is determined’ are the two sides of one contradiction. The whole solution of this contradiction is found in the proposition ‘The Ego becomes itself and is partly real.’ From this position the theoretical Wissenschaftslehre analyzes the successive steps of consciousness which are involved in the opposition between non-Ego and Ego. Fichte was quite aware, and held, that this has only formal worth. The practical Wissenschaftslehre (Stiftenslehre) makes an advance. If the Ego is to unite the pure activity of self-affirmation and the limited, determined activity, ‘it must be an activity which is at the same time, though not in the same sense, finite; it must be an infinitely striving. Striving implies opposition. . . . Thus the practical activity of the Ego is the ground of the Antithetical Opposition, which renders intelligence possible’ (Adamson, 177).

(b) Practical philosophy. — The Theory of Natural Right and the Moral Phil. are deductions from the first principles of the Wissenschaftslehre, and lay down a series of stages marking the realization of the practical Ego. The Ego, on the principles of the earlier investigation, must affirm itself, be aware of its own activity. It can be so aware only in so far as it is practical, willing. ‘The practical Ego is the Ego of original self-consciousness conceived in its fullness, yet limitedly only in willing; and, were it not practical, would receive neither itself nor the world—would not be an intelligence at all. Will is in a special sense the free activity of the Ego, (between us and Adamson, 181). This striving is a feature of consciousness only to the extent that consciousness is limited, and the Ego is really a system of impulses, or strivings partially but absolutely opposed.

Fichte examines the implications of the principle that the Ego, to be self-consciousness, must affirm itself as acting freely; and his results are similar to that of right. For it is found that action involves the existence of a sphere of action, a world against which the activity is to be directed. Fichte further deduces the existence of a plurality of individuals, and the external world is the means of communication between such free intelligences. What is further, the complete knowledge of persons is possible only if they stand in a relation of right and wrong (Rechts) to each other. The theory of right establishes (1) primitive right (the right to be not to be violated by the cause involing personal freedom and property). To assure this right, there must be a (2) right of conscience as the agreement in a communon by mutual contract that violations of the former shall be annulled by the contrary. Hence (3) the political rights of free contract, of legislative and of executive authority.

Socialist principles regarding State-control of trade, labour, and money are deduced immediately given.

(c) Philosophy of religion. — In his first Essay in the critical style, the Critique of all Revelation, Fichte attempted to apply the critical principles to the question of the possibility, the form, and the content of any revelation, the religious ideas in the Kantian system. The importance of this Essay lies in the stress which he already lays upon the practical side of that system. Within the earlier system of Fichte there was no place for the conception of God as creative, or as personal. Kant had shown the possibility of the existence of Natural Religion, as involved in the necessity of the practical postulates of God and immortality; Revealed Religion, Fichte tried to show, rests upon the morally imperfect condition of those to whom the revelation is made, and any revelation must be in harmony with the natural law. It is of the Divine moral law, not of God, that Fichte speaks, which led to Fichte’s removal from Jena. Belief in the moral order of the universe is belief in God, and there is no other; only by reason of the necessities of intelligence do we regard this order as substance or person.

(2) The Berlin Period. — (a) The Nature of Man. — The harmony which Fichte had tried to establish between cognition and will, by means of the conception of the moral order, received during the Berlin period more elaborate treatment; the Wissenschaftslehre, so often taken as Fichte’s last word, is merely introductory to the whole of what is contained in the Popular Works. The clearest exposition of the later synthesis is found in Die Bestimmung des Menschen of 1800 (Jena, 1831. The three sections of this work—Doubt, Knowledge, and Faith—state the positions of Naturalism, Theoretical Idealism, and Practical (or Ethical) Idealism. Naturalism leaves us with the conflict of natural necessity and freedom, Knowledge is self-imposed, but the belief in the third book the end of existence is declared to be not knowledge, but action.

In the section entitled ‘Faith,’ Fichte shows that the attempt to analyze the freedom of the absolute leaves the sceptical doubts described in the section entitled ‘Doubt.’ We must simply accept the impulses to independence, and realise that ‘thought is not the same thing, but founded on the same impulses.’ ‘The true dignity of my understanding fills me with
reverence. It is no longer the deceptive mirror which reflects a series of empty pictures, proceeding from nothing and tending to nothing; it is bestowed upon me for a great purpose. Its cultivation for this purpose is entrusted to me; it is placed in my hands, and at my command it will be required. ‘We do not act because we know, but we know because we are called upon to act. The practical reason is the root of all reason.

The moral results which follow from this position are clear. ‘Not merely to know, but according to thy knowledge to do, is thy vocation,’ Fichte would, however, have us remember that others also are busy doing. ‘Assume it as already known that they can give a purpose to their own being wholly by themselves, and independently of thee; never interrupt the accomplishment of this purpose, but rather further it to the utmost of thy power.’ The vocation of the race is to form itself into one single body, each part of which shall be in intimate contact with every other. All has tended to this end, and much of the way is already passed over. Man has attained to a more comprehensive, more energetic freedom. ‘When once every useful discovery made at one end of the earth is at once communicated to all other parts, then, without further interruption, with united strength and equal step, humanity shall move onward to a higher culture, of which we can at present form no conception.’ But an even greater Order appears; the Eternal World, in which we are and live even now, the world in which Will is the first link in a chain of consequences that stretches through the whole invisible realms of spirit, rises before us. God, the Divine Will, is the bond of union between finite wills within that world, and our true life is a life of active endeavour to co-operate with other willing persons, fulfilling our respective vocations while respecting their freedom, guided by conscience, which is the felt harmony between the natural tendency and the tendency to freedom.

Creative life reveals itself in a different shape in each corner of the universe as the power by which we ourselves were formed. Here it streams as self-creating and self-forming matter through human veins and muscles, and pours out its abundance into the tree, the plant, and the grass. There it leaps and dances as spontaneous activity in the animal, and appears in ever-new forms. ‘Everything that lives and moves follows this universal impulse.’ Through that which to others seemed a mere dead mass, Fichte saw this life rising in ever-increasing growth, no longer the ever-recurring circle, or the eternally repeated play. ‘It is not Death that kills, but the more living Life which, cou-

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