TO: Deputy Assistant Director, OSI
FROM: Chief, NED
SUBJECT: (Unclassified) German Scientists

DATE: 5 May 1950

1. Expressions of concern at this time over sporadic reports of activities of German scientists directed toward the formation of groups to carry on research and development work in other countries, and proposals to prevent such activity, are not considered to be useful effort.

2. Shortly after the termination of the war with Germany, attempts were made, on a high-priority basis, to deny to the U.S.S.R. and other nations, outstanding German and Austrian scientists and technicians. Unfortunately, even at this early date, the U.S.S.R. had, by one means or another, taken a number of outstanding German scientific personnel, who would be of use in atomic energy and other programs, to various installations within the U.S.S.R. or satellites. To mention a few, von Ardenne, Bode, Born, Geib, Hertz, Ortmann, Patzschke, Pose, Riehl, Schintelmeister, Schuetz, Volmer and Zimmer, were and are within the U.S.S.R. and most likely engaged in research activities connected with the atomic energy program.

3. The so-called denial program was thus soon seen to be almost a complete failure. While lists of scientists and technicians were prepared and attempts were made to keep the personnel on such lists from working for the U.S.S.R. by offers of employment in the U.S., reopening of laboratories in Germany, extra rations and the like, the failure to state a firm policy on the various phases of the problem and difficulties connected with immigration regulations, essentially vitiated any such attempts.

4. As a result of the breakdown of our efforts along these lines, General McNarney on 17 July 1946, recommended to JCS that:

   a. Overall plan of denial of scientists and technicians within U.S. zones of Germany and Austria be abandoned.

   b. Those scientists and technicians of military or security importance to U.S. be moved with their families to the U.S. or the U.K.

   c. That volunteer scientists be shipped to U.S. immediately.
5. This led to an expression of policy on the part of the U. S. that b. and c. were desirable and immigration controls were relaxed. However, as can be seen from the lists of German and Austrian scientists and technicians believed to be within the U.S.S.R. and working on the atomic energy program alone, even such measures were of little real avail, although many recruits to the U. S. were obtained. In this connection the case of Schintlmeister is significant. Shortly after the policy decision, referred to above, was affected, Schintlmeister appeared in the U. S. zone on a recruiting trip. No firm offer of employment in the U. S. appeared to be possible and failing this even kidnapping was considered as well as plans to compromise him in the eyes of the U.S.S.R. All of this apparently failed and he returned to Russia for further work.

6. From the above it seems clear that closing of zonal boundaries to scientists or technicians who desire to leave, is doomed to failure unless firm offers of the proper inducements can be made by the U. S. Such offers, for one reason or another have not been seductive enough in the past, whether they would be in the future is highly problematical. Certainly, the imposition of deportive controls alone cannot effect denial to any great extent. The scientists and technicians now in Germany or Austria must have a real scientific and economic inducement to remain or to go to countries of our choosing. This goes to the very heart of the entire German problem, and it is not believed that anything short of the solution to the whole problem will be of material avail.